



ACTIVITIES DESIGN:

**CIVIL SOCIETY MORE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN ISSUES OF GOVERNANCE (IR 1), AND INCREASED
KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS OF CITIZENS (IR 2)**

UNDER

SO 5: IMPROVED CITIZEN SECURITY

USAID/JAMAICA

FINAL DESIGN

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	<u>Introduction</u>	3
II.	<u>Strategic Objective and Intermediate Result #1 and #2</u>	4
III.	<u>Institutional Analysis of Key Citizen-Security-Related Civil Society Organizations: Agendas, Capabilities, and Institutional Strengthening Needs</u>	6
	<u>Agendas</u>	8
	<u>Capabilities</u>	9
	<u>Institutional Strengthening Needs</u>	10
	<u>Application of Institutional Development Framework</u>	11
IV.	<u>Role of Other Institutions, Stakeholders and Donors in Achieving Intermediate Results</u>	13
V.	<u>Assessment of Key Actors, Challenges, and Opportunities: Civic Education</u>	16
VI.	<u>Results and Activities Framework: Activities/Outputs/Inputs Necessary to Achieve Intermediate Results</u>	19
	<u>Activity Resources, Instruments, and Methodologies</u>	21
VII.	<u>Implementation Planning</u>	24
	<u>“The First Year”</u>	26
	<u>“A Tiered Approach”: Human and Institutional Capacity Development</u>	29
	<u>Taking Advantage of Cross-Sectoral Synergies in Mission-Wide Programming</u>	29
	<u>Women and Women's Organizations</u>	31
VIII.	<u>Opportunities for Networking, Alliances, and Partnerships</u>	32
	<u>Information-Sharing: Establishing a Clearinghouse</u>	33
IX.	<u>Performance Monitoring Plan</u>	35
X.	<u>Initial Cost Estimates and Multi-Year Financial Plan</u>	40
XI.	<u>Acquisition and Procurement Plan</u>	41
XII.	<u>Obligation Requirements</u>	42
XIII.	<u>SO/IR Team Management Structure</u>	45
XIV.	<u>Donor Coordination</u>	46
XV.	<u>Potential of Global Development Alliance (GDA) and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)</u>	47
	<u>Global Development Alliance</u>	47
	<u>Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)</u>	48

TABLES

Table 1. Suggested Partner Organizations	6
Table 2. Suggested Stakeholders	8
Table 3. IDF Component Description	12
Table 4. Civil Society Related Activities of Other International Donors/Partners	15
Table 5. Activities by Output and Input Components	22
Table 6. Activities Implementation Planning Schedule	24
Table 7. Estimated Budget Breakdown by Activity Category and Line Item – High Option	40
Table 8. Estimated Budget Breakdown by Activity Category and Line Item – Low Option	41
Table 9. Matrix: USAID Budget Options versus Activities	43
Table 10. Phased Funding Alternative: Low Budget Option	44

FIGURES

Figure 1. Results Framework SO#5 (IRs 1 and 2)	5
Figure 2. International Donor Contributions by Strategic Results	16
Figure 3. IR Results and Activities/Outputs Framework	20
Figure 4. Phases of Activities Implementation	27
Figure 5. Management Structures	45

ANNEXES

Annex I Report: USAID Civil Society Stakeholders’ Workshop	49
Annex A Workshop Participant List	53
Annex B Workshop Agenda	56
Annex C An Overview of Democracy and Governance in Jamaica: An Assessment – Presentation	57
Annex D Group Discussion Notes	62
Annex II Documents Consulted	67
Annex III Individuals Consulted	69
Annex IV Institutional Development Framework	72

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Activities Design Paper (ADP) is twofold: 1) to postulate an interrelated set of activities that will significantly impact two key Intermediate Results (IR) in a broader strategic framework, namely, **Civil Society More Actively Engaged in Issues of Governance** and **Increased Knowledge and Awareness of Citizens**; and, 2) to propose a phased implementation plan to carry out the sets of activities with partner civil society organizations and in coordination with other international donor partners. The paper is organized into three major sections: strategic context, analysis of the institutional and environmental conditions and implementation.

The strategic context for the ADP's two principal IRs derives from a higher Strategic Objective of **Improved Citizen Security** (see Results Framework illustration in section II). In a Democracy and Governance (DG) Assessment completed in May 2001, a fundamental conclusion was reached that citizen security and participation in democratic processes are inexorably linked in the minds of Jamaicans.¹ The pervasive effects of rampant and burgeoning crime and violence serve to deter broader participation in virtually all political processes. Brutal attacks on the populace, unsolved criminal cases, and perceived infringement of basic human and constitutional rights by police have led to a demonstrable loss of trust in the criminal justice system, particularly the police and courts. Correspondingly, good and transparent governance practices continue to elude the central Government of Jamaica and its' constituent political units throughout the country. Similarly, the long, intermittent history of electoral violence and political party confrontation compounds the trepidation that many Jamaicans experience when contemplating the exercise of their democratic prerogatives.

The crime and violence, of course, emanate from many interrelated and complicated sources that can be usefully categorized as political, economic and social/cultural in origin. The above-mentioned DG Assessment and numerous studies provide vivid descriptions, statistical data and analyses of crime and violence in Jamaica, and disaggregate the information by types, categories, and manifestations.² The studies commonly prescribe a range of plausible corrective interventions, model strategies, policy approaches, and potential intermediaries.

It is from this base of information that USAID extrapolated a strategic approach that defines four key, mutually reinforcing intermediate results³. The proposed interventions in this ADP focus on, a) institutional strengthening partnerships with indigenous CSOs, b) developing effective CSO advocacy practices, and c) ensuring sustainability and improvement of citizen knowledge and attitudes through civic education and enhanced networks, coalitions and vertical linkages. Similarly, counterpart official institutions, e.g. Social Development Commission (SDC), the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), other donors, and, possibly, off-shore expatriate institutional partners will be engaged as partners and/or stakeholders to create a broad support system.

¹ By USAID and MSI. See annex II for full citation.

² See attached bibliography.

³ See Strategic Results Framework in section II.

An important avenue of solution in other, successful democracies is a strong **civil society** that can effectively aggregate and articulate the interests of citizens and special interest groups, that can mobilize public opinion to advocate freely, without fear of intimidation, opposing views, alternative reforms and modification of public sector policies. The civil society of Jamaica is, in many ways, quite progressive and firmly established. Yet, the contribution of the civil society sector as a whole has not been fully realized. The DG Assessment found Jamaican democracy formally operative across the variables of consensus, inclusion, competition, and rule of law, but at the same time noted that major shortcomings were evident in all variables. The linking issues, though, all seemed related in a direct manner to issues of good governance. Consequently the DG Assessment concluded that the primary area of democratic weakness lay in the areas of **good governance and the rule of law**. It is in these areas of democracy that the intermediate results (#1 and #2), and the related activities proposed in this ADP are focused. **The paper extrapolates sets of activities based on the hypothesis that a strengthened, operationally efficient, and sustainable civil society, empowered by increased capacities of outreach, partnership, and advocacy can and will influence public policy formulation, institutional reform, and decision-making, which will result in higher levels of citizen security.**

II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE AND INTERMEDIATE RESULT #1 AND #2


The strategic focus for the civil society activities design (IRs 1 and 2), **citizen security**, represents a somewhat inscrutable “black box”. It is a dynamic labyrinth of social, cultural, economic, political, and historical determinants that slowly evolved as the Jamaican polity and economic philosophy moved forward in fits and starts in the 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's, with major internal and, frequently, with externally-imposed shocks. Citizen security, in an introspective sense, traversed numerous historical, psychological and societal challenges, during this period, that defy simple explanation or modeling. Levels and proximity of crime and violence also ebbed and flowed with several other diverse factors, such as, intolerably slow economic growth, low productivity, and small scales of economy. These were made more problematic by a narrow and vulnerable primary resource base. The economy often suffers from uneven levels of domestic and foreign direct investment and attendant unemployment and poverty. Compounding its economic woes, Jamaica endures social and community upheaval linked to a history of political tribalism and winner-take-all attitudes; drug addiction and trafficking; deteriorating institutional influences on the family/community/schools/church; emigration of ambitious and skilled workers; and inefficient, unresponsive rule of law and governance.

The result is a systemic loss of personal and community security—lost trust in the government's capacity to reform, particularly, the criminal justice processes; human and civil rights abuses; and, denial of proper governmental services. The solution is equally complex and long term. USAID's SO 5 strategic framework suggests an array of intermediate results that reflects the need for an omnibus response that includes donor partners, GOJ, and civil society organizations. Reforms in the judiciary and the criminal justice system, police/citizen relations and community policing, citizen knowledge and awareness, and possible future involvement in constitutional reform, decentralization and local government and electoral reform undergird USAID's approach.

The full engagement and advocacy of civil society will be integral to mobilizing public opinion, to forging a role for civil society in public decision-making, and to establishing a “watch dog” function to monitor changes in policy, in laws, and in government resource allocation. And perhaps most significantly, a viable civil society is necessary to restore the badly depleted stock of Jamaican social capital.

The Results Framework below illustrates the hypothetical relationship of USAID/ Jamaica’s Strategic Objective (SO) #5 and Intermediate Results 1 and 2, which are the focus of this Activities Design. USAID believes it can materially affect the SO through a plan of concerted interaction of activities associated with the four key IRs and in partnership with other donors, governmental entities, private sector institutions and capacity-enhanced civil society organizations (CSOs).

Figure 1. Results Framework SO#5 (IRs 1 and 2)



III. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF KEY CITIZEN-SECURITY-RELATED CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS: AGENDAS, CAPABILITIES, AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING NEEDS

During the activities design team’s mission, team members met either formally or informally with more than 60 Jamaican civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs)⁴, community based organizations (CBOs), private sector organizations (PSOs), international donors, community leaders and activists, political party and GOJ representatives, all of whom have some level of involvement in issues related to SO 5 Improved Citizen Security. This consultative process has provided a rich data source on which the following institutional analysis is based. Using structured interview techniques and an Institutional Development Framework questionnaire (see annex IV), the team formulated the following generalizations regarding this sector:

- For the purposes of activity design and implementation the sector can be productively disaggregated to include:
 - **Partner Organizations:**
 - National Level CSOs, NGOs and local CBOs who have as a primary/central mission citizen-security and justice related issues⁵ (see Table 1 below for suggested partner organizations)
 - **Stakeholders:**
 - CSOs, NGOs, and CBOs for whom citizen-security and justice related issues play an important if not primary/central role
 - Government agencies, political party organs, or other state-sponsored entities with a mandate to deal with issues related to citizen-security and justice
 - International NGOs and donors who engage in or fund projects/activities with direct or proximal linkages to citizen-security and justice related issues

Table 1. Suggested Partner Organizations

Organization Name	Organization Type (activities)	Location
Christians United for Love Justice and Peace	CSO (advocacy, civic education, outreach)	Kingston

⁴ To define, NGOs are primarily service-provisioning entities while CSOs are typically more oriented towards advocacy. Though empirically there is not always a clear distinction, is it analytically useful to disaggregate these two functions/identifying factors when examining organizations.

⁵ This is operationalized by explicit mention of “citizen security, justice, human rights, women’s rights, minority rights, corruption/anticorruption, rule-of-law, governmental integrity” or related phrases in the group’s mission statement (either written for those groups who have a written mission statement, or articulated orally for those who do not). Further the group should be able to demonstrate some ongoing commitment and or engagement in these issues. For nascent organizations, the mission statement of the group could be taken as evidence of such commitment or engagement.

Organization Name	Organization Type (activities)	Location
Citizen's Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE)	CSO (advocacy, civic education)	Kingston and Island-wide during elections
Coalition of Concerned Jamaica Citizens (CCJC)	CSO Umbrella	Kingston
Committee for the Upliftment of the Mentally Ill (CUMI)	NGO (service provision, outreach, advocacy)	Montego Bay
Dispute Resolution Foundation (DRF)	NGO (outreach, service provider)	Kingston and six parishes
Duhaney Park Police Area Consultative Committee (and other Community/Police Committees)	CBO (police/citizen relations, advocacy)	Kingston
Families Against State Terrorism (FAST)	CSO (advocacy, outreach)	Kingston
Farquharson Institute	Think-tank (policy research, civic education)	Kingston
FLANCODAC – Flankers Community Development and Action Committee	CBO (community development and advocacy)	Montego Bay
Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights	CSO (advocacy, civic education, outreach)	Kingston
Jamaicans for Justice (JfJ)	CSO (advocacy, policy, outreach)	Kingston, Montego Bay, Spanish Town
PALS	NGO (outreach, service provider, civic education)	Kingston
Police Social Action Committee (POLSAC)	CSO (advocacy, outreach)	Kingston
Press Association of Jamaica	Media	Island-wide
Research Committee of Jamaica	Think-tank (policy research)	Kingston
Sistren Theatre Collective	NGO (outreach, civic education)	Kingston
Transparency International – Jamaica	CSO (advocacy, civic education)	Kingston
Various local community development organizations and committees	CBO	
Woman Working for Transformation	CSO (civic education, outreach)	Kingston
Woman's Inc.	NGO (advocacy, policy, outreach)	Kingston

Table 2. Suggested Stakeholders

Organization Name	Organization Type	Location
American Chamber of Commerce	PSO	Island-wide
Amnesty International	International NGO	NY
Faithjustic Servants	CSO (outreach, community development)	Kingston
Flock Jamaica Limited	CSO (outreach, community development)	Kingston
Jamaica Bar Association	CSO	Island-wide
Jamaica Council of Churches	CSO	Island-wide
Jamaica Progressive League (U.S. Chapters)	CSO	(U.S.-based)
Jamaican Chamber of Commerce	PSO	Island-wide
Jamaican Confederation of Trade Unions	Union	Island-wide
Kingston Restoration Company Limited	NGO (community development, advocacy, service provider)	Kingston
Mennonites	Religious NGO	Island-wide
Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ)	PSO	Kingston and Island wide.
Social Development Commission (SDC)	Government	Island-wide
St. Patrick Foundation	Religious NGO	Kingston
Stella Maris Foundation	Religious NGO	Kingston
Union of Jamaican Alumni Associations (U.S. and Canada)	NGO (U.S.-based)	U.S.-based
Woman Center Foundation of Jamaica	CSO (outreach, advocacy, service provision)	Kingston
Other CBOs, local NGOs, and community development groups	Various	Island-wide

AGENDAS

Most potential CSO partners in the Improved Citizen Security SO share many key concerns. A focus on governmental—and in particular justice sector—integrity is chief among them. Most mission statements express a high level of value placed on the rule of law and the desire to make it more applicable to those Jamaicans who are effectively excluded from its protection. A focus on the need to respect human rights is also common and a desire to support “the good cops” in the criminal justice system is shared by virtually all CSOs interviewed. Under the broad umbrella of human rights, a number of CSOs focus on women's issues, providing services, promoting public awareness of the issues, and undertaking advocacy work directed at policy reform. Many of those that do not address women's issues as a focus of their mandate still do consider gender issues in their programming and the content of their materials. In general, some CSOs have a more activist and sometimes adversarial relationship with the government while others work

behind the scenes either in concert with the authorities or more as service provisioning NGOs. The ability and willingness of the state to engage with particular CSOs seems to be a major factor in determining how publicly critical a particular CSO may be. There also seems to be a recognition on the part of the most vocal groups that new tactics and an evolving relationship with state power may promise more productive advocacy in the future. At the same time some groups point out that some level of discomfort between CSOs in this sector and the government is inevitable. After all, one can hardly imagine that the government likes to hear when it makes a foul-up, and yet in order to hold the government accountable, citizens must be vigilant and sometimes vocal in demanding accountability.

Virtually all groups involved in the sector claim strict non-partisanship while the perception of many outside the sector is that the most vocal groups are “pro-opposition”. Nonetheless, the groups guard their autonomy quite jealously and partisan labels are vigorously avoided.

CAPABILITIES

The activity design team conducted one-on-one interviews with representatives of 33 organizations in the initial two weeks of the design phase, in addition to conducting a Stakeholders’ Workshop (see annex I) that brought together these organizations with an additional dozen groups. Further, the team used a rapid institutional assessment tool developed by MSI called the Institutional Development Framework with a subset of seven groups with which we met. These interviews and assessments lead us to conclude that CSOs in this sector have the following demonstrated capabilities:

- Great enthusiasm and commitment to the issues of citizen security and justice.
- A willingness to engage in both outreach and advocacy:
 - CUMI does daily service delivery to mentally ill, as well as mobilizing to improve the justice system for these vulnerable members of society;
 - JfJ accompanies witnesses into court and provides comfort and support for families of victims;
 - In addition to public pronouncements, FAST also works closely with victim families providing support;
 - ICJHR engages in civic education, advocacy, and has begun to assist in reducing a backlog of cases of individuals imprisoned without charge (in two recent cases for more than 20 years).
- In many instances, CSOs have demonstrated high levels of capacity to mobilize and bring pressure on a handful of issues and questions (Michael Gail case, Montego Bay "street people" round-up) and to force governmental enquiries when they had been initially rejected.
 - This has included sustained media campaigns
 - Newspaper
 - Talk shows

- Success in making a presentation in Parliament regarding the issue of the Privy Council. This is one of the few times in recent memory that a group from this sector has made such a formal presentation.
- Highly educated and bright leadership, leading figures that serve as CSO issue champions.
- Some groups have deep connections to neighborhoods and parish levels, but as a whole most CSOs recognize that this area needs strengthening.

A compelling example of CSO sector capability is found in the evolution and ongoing relationship between the Committee for the Upliftment of the Mentally Ill (CUMI) and Jamaicans for Justice – Montego Bay Chapter. CUMI operated for years an outreach-oriented NGO focused on meeting the needs of the homeless mentally ill of Montego Bay. They provided food, clothing, shelter, psychiatric care and social rehabilitation aimed at restoring the mentally ill to their families, a supported environment, or independent living.

Going about this noble but unglamorous cause since 1991, CUMI and its board served a function that the single psychiatric hospital on the island has been largely unable to tackle. Yet one day in 2000, the nurse/administrator was surprised when a large number of daily clients did not show up for day-shelter activities. Soon word trickled back that there had been a roundup of street people the night before. Some 32 homeless people had been forced into a Parish Council truck by police and others and taken more than 80 kilometers to a remote parish and left on the shore of a mud lake. The staff quickly found transportation and brought back as many of the homeless as they could find while still others trickled back into town. In the days and weeks that followed, CUMI and its Board members began to demand accountability on the part of those who had perpetuated this cruel act.

A Board member then contacted the newly formed Jamaicans for Justice organization and an **alliance** was born. Over the course of the past year, CUMI has moved from a simple service provisioning NGO to embrace an additional role as an advocacy group for the rights of the mentally ill.

At the same time Jamaicans for Justice was able to provide support and information to aid CUMI in their demands for state accountability on this issue. A new chapter of Jamaicans for Justice in Montego Bay was founded with the street people issue as the first unifying event for JfJ. This is in many ways a case that illustrates best practices within the CSO sector with advocacy and service provision playing vital complimentary roles and two groups with different missions able to work together for common interests. By taking advantage of matching strengths, these groups have leveraged synergies and brought public focus on an important human rights and public policy issue.

INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING NEEDS

The institutional strengthening needs of the partner CSOs are many and varied. The basic needs surround issues including:

- Sectoral sustainability is chiefly threatened by lack of financial autonomy, but this is generally a function of institutional weaknesses more broadly. Many organizations lack multi-year strategic plans to guide their daily operations. A small number of professional NGOs with staffs are able to keep their doors open, but they too have significant weaknesses that could threaten their sustainability when project funds dry up.
- The strong personal leadership of a committed core group of activists is laudable and vital. However unless the core activists can rapidly expand the number of associates and the level of commitment and activity of a new cohort of leaders, burn-out could easily result. There are many other reasons why a leader or core of leaders could leave the CSO scene, and unless appropriate skills and knowledge development is institutionalized, the capacity to function and engage on these issues can leave with the driving personality.
- The sector as a whole includes groups with a wide variety of institutional capacities. Strengths and weaknesses are such that there is potential for productive partnerships that could link groups weak in some area (Group A) with those who have corresponding strengths (Group B) such that both groups could benefit from service provision targeted at Group A and provided by Group B.
- Sectoral sustainability is also impeded by competition between and among CSOs that pursue a limited donor support pool (international and local sources). Common goals, shared agendas, and open communication can serve to ameliorate some of this unhealthy competition.
- Many CSOs believe that international donors need to better coordinate their approach to the support of this sector, close interaction between USAID, CIDA, DFID, UNDP, and IADB in this regard would provide greater confidence. To this end, the establishment of a civil society donor working group is vital.
- A high-handed attitude on the part of some policy makers vis-à-vis the CSO sector is also seen as a challenge to successful CSO advocacy. Many policy makers believe that they—and not CSOs—are the proper and appropriate representatives of “the people” and that the CSOs are “special interests”. Deeper and more consistent linkages with a broader constituency base could aid CSOs in being able to articulate the needs of that constituency lending more credibility to CSO claims of legitimacy. This said, it should never be argued that CSOs have a legitimate place at the policy table only if they can demonstrate a constituency. CSOs with small memberships or no membership can and should play an important role in informing the process.

APPLICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

Graph 1 below presents the aggregated results of the pilot Institutional Development Framework (IDF)⁶ based on a self-assessment provided to the design team by seven of the CSOs/NGOs that

⁶ The IDF or an instrument like it is recommended as a tool to structure the institutional development component of this IR. The entire IDF as well as an article explaining its use is provided as an annex to this document.

we interviewed. It should be noted that the seven groups chosen for the pilot assessment include what are likely to be the groups with the most institutional capacity (professional NGOs, high profile CSOs and those that have been in existence for a long period of time). This was a deliberate choice on the part of the team because the IDF assumes a certain level of institutional ability to begin with. Representatives of the lowest ranking CSOs would likely have a difficult time even answering many of the questions, so there was a matter of efficiency given the short amount of time that the team had in field. The selection also allows us to assert with confidence that the pilot results are the best case and thus other groups in the sector will also have significant needs and serious shortfalls in many of the areas identified.

The five components covered are largely intuitive and described in Table 3 below:

Table 3. IDF Component Description


Component Name	Mean Score of Jamaican CSOs/NGOs	Institutional Focus of Component
Oversight/Vision	2.86/4	Board, Mission, Autonomy
Management	2.46/4	Leadership style, Participatory management, Planning, M&E
Human Resources	2.05/4	Staff skills, Staff development, Organizational diversity
Financial	2.60/4	Management, Vulnerability, Solvency
External	2.68/4	Public relations, Organization and Community, Ability to work with government, Ability to work with other CSOs, NGOs, CBOs

The 1 – 4 scale of the IDF can be thought of as a loose continuum with the following equivalencies:

1	Just starting out
2	Getting organized
3	Strong
4	Sustainable – Here to stay

In brief, and not surprisingly given the results of qualitative interviews with potential target groups to date, Graph 1 demonstrates a sector with significant shortcomings in most areas. The mean score for all groups is presented for each of the five broad components in the IDF represented by the lighter bars. The darker bars indicate the highest scores possible. The average scores of the seven groups included in this pilot exercise remains solidly in the “Getting Organized” range between 2 and 3. In the area of human resources the CSOs are barely above the “Just Starting Out” range while in terms of oversight and vision the CSOs as a group can almost begin to be described as “Strong”.

In no area however are the strongest CSOs/NGOs in the sector approaching sustainability. This should serve as both a caution and a point of optimism. While many groups have many positive attributes and are making progress toward sustainability, it should also be noted that while the institutional strengthening component will see early activity, enduring results would take time. This is precisely because if sustainability were simply a matter of a little money funneled their way, most of these groups would already be there because most have had donations from a number of sources in the past. The challenge is to tackle the sustainability issue in a systematic, iterative, and creative manner that builds capacity for both weaker and stronger groups in the same activities. We present the outlines of how such a program might look in section VII.



IV. ROLE OF OTHER INSTITUTIONS, STAKEHOLDERS AND DONORS IN ACHIEVING INTERMEDIATE RESULTS

The stakeholders presented in Table 2 above as well as international donors, will also play a vital facilitating role in the success of the proposed activities. The design team suggests that the line between stakeholder and beneficiaries may sometimes be a bit blurry precisely because at some moments, groups that are targeted for assistance under these activities will in fact be engaged in service provision. The same is likely to be true of some of the local NGO stakeholders. For example, while groups like the Stella Maris Foundation have a primarily ecumenical function, their concern for and demonstrated engagement in citizen security and justice issues makes them an ideal stakeholder. Because they are well positioned as a neutral party to most political disputes and because of their community outreach programs, they may be able to serve as a neutral broker for project related activities. Currently the Stella Maris Church functions as a space for community meetings of all types including peace negotiations and community

reconciliation. Further, CSOs like Jamaicans for Justice use the space for their weekly meetings. The Stella Maris Foundation offices also provide subsidized office space for groups like CAFFE, JfJ, and the St. Patricks Foundation. Resources could be targeted at and through such organizations to lessen the burden on groups like Stella Maris and allow them to pay more attention to their primary ecumenical functions. Alternatively, support could be provided to allow a Stella Maris to function in the coordination role that it has often shouldered by default but to strengthen its capacity to do so in a professional and sustainable manner.

A similar case can be found in the program of Reverend Miller and the Wholelife Ministries. This organization too provides meeting space for numerous community groups, photocopying and secretarial services to activist organizations like Christians United for Peace Love and Justice, and the Coalition of Concerned Jamaican Citizens. By formalizing these relationships of service provision and logistical support, and working with the NGOs, church groups, and others that do so on an ad-hoc basis, it is believed that the institutional capacity of both the service provider and the target groups can be enhanced. Often the costs of these services are not accounted for by either the provider or the recipient and are thus hidden costs that can have a substantial impact on the sustainability of both organizations. On the part of the provider, these costs can distract from the central mission of the organization and on behalf of the recipient, and they create the perception of meeting operating expenses on less than they would actually have to spend if the subsidy were removed. This is not to argue against such arrangements, on the contrary, they are a healthy part of networking and alliance building and they allow weak groups to get stronger. However, these relationships should be recognized, accounted for in strategic planning, and when possible, formalized to enhance sustainability of the organizations involved.

Other stakeholder CSOs and NGOs can assist in the advocacy process itself. By the cordial relations common between Private Sector Organizations (PSOs) and state agencies, some PSOs can pave the way for more productive CSO interactions with policy makers. The American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) provides an excellent example of a PSO who was able to both provide significant funds for research on a policy initiative (the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Report) and was also able to carefully pursue the appropriate ministerial level officials and win public and near unanimous support for the implementation of the report. AmCham remains committed to the implementation and continues to lobby both in the U.S. and in Jamaica. AmCham seems likely to be a positive contributor and stakeholder in other areas closely related to this project activity and should be considered an important partner.

To date, the DG assessment team—and now the Activity Design team—has had modest success in engaging with groups like the PSOJ, Jamaican Chamber of Commerce, and Bar Association. These organizations should be the target of early meetings with any activities implementation team—with the focus being common goals, and possible synergies between partner organizations and these stakeholders. Expatriate Jamaican organizations such as those in attendance at the Stakeholders Workshop can also provide important support to the partner organizations in the form of fund-raising, recruitment of volunteers for service trips, lobbying aimed at both U.S. policy makers on behalf of Jamaica and lobbying aimed at Jamaican politicians themselves. Activity implementers should put into place a mechanism (such as a semi-monthly list-serve message, or project Web site) that would allow the connections between the partner CSOs and expatriate stakeholders to be maximized. Including Jamaican returned U.S. Peace Corps

Volunteers in this effort could open another avenue of support and could engage yet another largely untapped stakeholder.


Finally, on the role of other international donors, Table 4 presents the relevant activities of other donors in the DG sector. Figure 2 indicates the likely contributions to USAID’s SO 5 in terms of both IRs 1 and 2, and also indicates at least two possible additional IRs that other donors could be encouraged to engage in either separately or jointly with USAID as more funding becomes available or as priorities change in the out years.

Table 4. Civil Society Related Activities of Other International Donors/Partners

CIDA	IDB	DFID	UNDP
Enhancing Civil Society Project	National Crime and Violence Prevention Strategy	-Community Service Enhancement Project	(Currently in Planning Stage; Completing Preliminary Report; Focus on Public Sector Justice Institutions; Work in Dispute Resolution; Increase Access of Under-represented CBOs)
Supporting Local Government Reform Project	Community Action	-Jamaica Urban Poverty Project	
Social Conflict and Legal Reform Project	Social Marketing and Public Education Campaign	-Urban Trust Fund -Jamaica All-Age School’s Project -Capacity building for the Social Development Commission	

One important caveat is the issue of duplication of resources and targeting of CSOs that are working with other donors. At least three of the CSOs on the partner organizations list are also recipients of significant resources from other international donors (PALS, DRF, and the Sistren Theatre Collective). In most cases these CSOs are service providers, and while their provision of service provides some support to the CSO as a whole, most of the operational and overhead expenses have very modest support in the projects they service. Further, there is very little assistance in the area of institutional strengthening for the CSOs. One exception is the new IDB loan, which will provide some level of funds to strengthen the institutional capacity of its six partner CSOs. It is vital that USAID and any project implementer speak very frankly with partner CSOs who are working with other donors and get an accurate picture of the nature of their contracts and support. It would not be wise to exclude a CSO simply because it is getting support from another donor. That said, the support must be taken into account in the design of a strategic plan for that CSO. To the degree that institutional strengthening is provided by other projects, CSOs that benefit from it can serve as a resource to other CSOs and NGOs in the USAID Civil Society portfolio but should not receive duplicative training or assistance.

Figure 2. International Donor Contributions by Strategic Results



V. ASSESSMENT OF KEY ACTORS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES: CIVIC EDUCATION

Civic education has been used as a component of DG SOs around the world with varying degrees of success. First we must briefly consider the intent of civic education in the Jamaican context before we turn to the actual attributes of successful civic education programs. Most scholars see civic education as a “jump-start” that allows societies which are not endowed with a rich democratic tradition to imbue citizens with:

- 1) Democratic competencies (political knowledge, sense of political efficacy);
- 2) Democratic values (tolerance, trust, support for democratic institutions);
- 3) Democratic behavior (participation in local and national politics).⁷

⁷ From “Jump-Starting Democracy: Adult Civic Education and Democratic Participation in Three Countries” (Harry Blair). See annex II for full citation.

These citizen qualities are important insofar as they support the ability of democratic institutions to function in a credible, legitimate, and ultimately efficient manner. The direct objective of most civic education programs is to influence the third of these three areas, democratic behavior. It is important to assess the basic assumptions of the civic education model in the Jamaican context prior to the adoption of any particular approach, however, because the goal will have an important impact on the programmatic design. First, it is not entirely clear that Jamaica represents a situation in which a “jump-start” is needed. At least among upper and middle class Jamaicans, there seems to be ample evidence that democratic competencies flourish. However, and impressionistically speaking, the level of democratic values may not be as high as one would expect from a country that has been governed by democratic institutions for the past forty years. And there is concern among many that democratic behavior as measured by decreased levels of voting and a general sense of political mistrust, malaise,⁸ and alienation means that if not a “jump-start”, then at very least Jamaican citizens at large could stand in need of a democratic “tune-up” as far as their competencies, values, and behavior are concerned.

To have an impact on democratic behavior, civic education programs need to have the following attributes:

- **Good instructional qualities** seem paramount in studies of impact
 - Use of participatory teaching and training
 - Frequent classes/exposure opportunities
 - Covering a wide variety of topics
 - Perception that the instructor is of “high quality”
- **Use of high quality training-of-trainers** methods including ongoing in-service training to assure instructional quality.
- **Programs should be tailored and adapted** to the context in which they are employed; in civic education, one size does not fill all.
- **Civic education** in formal school settings has a much **greater impact in higher grades** than in elementary and middle-school grades.
- **Gender matters.** That is, males tend to demonstrate higher levels of attainment in civic education, consequently, gender issues should be considered in both the determination of content and in pedagogy design.
- **Pairing civic education with other interventions** produces better results as it allows citizens to practice and apply principles of democratic participation (in CSOs, NGOs, and CBOs for example), and this experience reinforces the civic education messages.
- **Media campaigns alone usually have low impact** because the methods are not participatory, the number of exposures is limited (unless significant resources are devoted), and because the messages often are received outside of a broader citizenship practice context. That said, being paired with other methods of civic education, media (and ICT more broadly) can be a useful tool to increase civic education impact.

⁸ An *Observer* newspaper poll commissioned in March 1999 indicates that 60% of Jamaicans want a fundamental change in the political system which seems to indicate a significant level of alienation (*Citizens and Governance: Civil Society in the New Millennium*. A report prepared by Association of Development Agencies in collaboration with the Commonwealth Foundation, July 1999, 13).

- **Fade out effects are evident but can be dealt with** by quality instruction and integration of civic education into civil society capacity building for example.
- **Monitoring and Evaluation that uses pre-test/post-test and control methods are able to demonstrate program impact most convincingly** because it escapes the vexing question of causality. Namely, if a treatment group scores higher after exposure than another treatment group, there could be something systematically different that allowed them to get into the classroom to begin with (higher interest for example). A pre-test and then use of control groups followed by a post-test allows an evaluator to give a definitive answer to the question of program impact on changes in knowledge, behavior, and attitudes.

The design team believes strongly that a civic education component that takes these points into account would be able to influence the level and quality of democratic participation in the Jamaican polity for the better.

Consistent with the broad project goals of institutional capacity building, an implementing partner should look first at the NGOs and CSOs that are already engaged in or capable of producing civic education materials (these include but are not limited to PALS, the Farquharson Institute, Women's Inc., and ICJHR). The delivery of civic education training and the follow-on to the training may also be productively funneled through some of the partner or stakeholder groups to increase their institutional capacity in service delivery and to have a positive impact on their bottom line.

StreetLaw (www.streetlaw.org) is a group with a great deal of global experience in civic education material development and because of the warm reception granted by CSOs to initial visits by StreetLaw personnel, this U.S.-based NGO may represent an excellent sub-contractor, cooperative agreement holder, or grantee. Most StreetLaw programs do not have a permanent field presence and like many NGOs (PERF included) they may not have the rapid turn-around and deployment capacity of an institutional contractor. For this reason, the Mission may want to consider pairing NGO and institutional contractors for purposes of this IR and closely linking it to the civil society capacity building activities.

Civic education related activities do not need to be limited to human rights, citizen responsibilities, or civics type material. In fact, early in the life of the activity, it would be wise to prepare partner CSOs by using civic education as one of the first steps in institutional development. This would be done through communication skills and transfer of knowledge. So, as part of initial strategic planning for institutional strengthening, partner CSOs can be encouraged to better articulate their mission by teaching others about whatever it is they do best. For example, the Sistren Theatre Collective would teach others to use the participatory methods that they employ to engage their audiences, FAST would teach people about helping others and being supportive at crucial crisis moments, Jamaicans for Justice would teach people about the judicial system and how to access it, and CUMI could teach about linkages between service provisioning NGOs and policy activism. The partner CSOs would be able to do this because one of the first training activities would focus on how to get your message across to a variety of audiences and inspire them into action.

VI. RESULTS AND ACTIVITIES FRAMEWORK: ACTIVITIES/OUTPUTS/INPUTS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE INTERMEDIATE RESULTS


This section illustrates the “management” hypothesis between activity outputs and the intermediate results (IR 1 and 2) and sub-IRs. The activity outputs are those outcomes that we can confidently predict will be accomplished with a given level of resource inputs and within a given timeframe. There is ample precedent for undertaking and successfully completing activities at this level of hypothesis. Our working or development hypothesis then follows: if these activity outputs are accomplished they will lead to significant impact on intermediate results. Nevertheless, it is prudent to anticipate adjusting the mix, magnitude and frequency of activities as experience unfolds in the early years of implementation.

The reader will note that the outputs are, for operational purposes, grouped into sets. The interaction and synergy of the three proposed sets provide the developmental change necessary, according to the design’s hypotheses, to accomplish the sub and intermediate results. Accordingly, the activities, then, fall into the following sets:

- 1) Improved CSO operational efficiency,
- 2) CSO sustainability, and,
- 3) CSO advocacy strengthened.

Thus, the strengthened CSOs—both individually and networked in partnerships, alliances, and coalitions—become empowered to aggregate and articulate public interests and concerns, and, consequently, mobilize successful interventions in official policy making, in law-making and/or amendment, and in decision-making associated with policy promulgation and public sector resource allocation.

Figure 3. IR Results and Activities/Outputs Framework



ACTIVITY RESOURCES, INSTRUMENTS, AND METHODOLOGIES

In transforming input resources to activity outputs several categories of instruments have been identified that can be employed by **the implementing agent** according to the type of activity and most effective methodology. The following list of methodologies, modalities, and resource tools guided the design team's recommendations outlined in Tables 5 and 6.

- Methodologies:**
- Full time technical advisors/trainers
 - Full time coordinator with short-term advisors/trainers
 - Workshops, Seminars, Symposia
 - Research projects and case studies
 - Institutional exchanges
 - Pilot Projects
 - Observation trips: In-country, U.S., third country
 - Small Grants Fund
 - Exchange Visits: U.S./Jamaican NGOs/CSOs
- Modalities:**
- U.S. Contract
 - U.S. Cooperative Agreement
 - Contract/Cooperative Agreement Partnership
 - Contract/Host Country Cooperative Agreement Partnership
- Tools:**
- Technical Advisors**
 - Short term
 - Long term
 - Training**
 - Long Term
 - Degree
 - Non-degree
 - Short Term
 - In-country
 - U.S.
 - Third Country
 - Observation Visits
 - Conferences
 - Research**
 - Commodities** (primarily ICT)

Table 5. Activities by Output and Input Components

Outputs (By Sets)	Kind of Input	Magnitude of Input
Improve CSO Operational Efficiency		
CSOs survey and assessment; Strategic Planning; Sustainability Training	Short term (ST) TA and COP	4 weeks ST Expat - TA 4 weeks ST Local - TA
Internal Communications Strategies and Democratic Practices in Use	Communications strategy planning and training	1 week ST Expat - TA 1 week ST Local - TA 1 week COP
Personnel, Administration, Information Technology Systems in Place	Assessment, systems planning and training	1 week ST Expat -TA 1 week COP
Goal Statement, By-Laws, Rules of Order Published	NGO Board Training Course and follow- up (NGO BTC)	2 weeks ST Expat -TA 2 weeks ST Local – TA
HR/Staff Development System in Place	System planning, training	1 week ST Local - TA 1 week COP
Strategic/Annual Operating/ Budget Plans in Use	Strategic planning, budget planning, models, training (repeated)	2x2 week Financial Planning and Sustainability Course (FP&SC)
Transparent and Efficient Financial Management/ Audit Functions in Use	Strategic planning, budget planning, models, training (repeated)	FP&SC
On-going M&E System Functions to Inform Decision- Makers	M&E training, 4 week course by contractor (to be repeated)	4 weeks ST Expat - TA 4 weeks ST Local – TA (in 2 different trips with 3-4 weeks intervening)
Leadership and Staff Cap- abilities Enhanced	Leadership seminars	NGO BTC
CSO Sustainability		
Effective Leadership Skills in Use: Board and CEO	Leadership seminars	NGO BTC
Diverse Fundraising strategies in Use	Training, methods, models, practicum	FP&SC
Analytic Study Successful/ Failed Approaches	Research, case studies with CSOs and COP, ST-TA	2 weeks ST Expat – TA and partner CSO sub-grant
Board Provides Policy Direction	Board training and follow up	NGO BTC
Networking and Partnerships Formed	Support development of clearinghouse and partner- ship, seminars,	2 conferences in Year 1 on Networking and Partnerships (NP)

Outputs (By Sets)	Kind of Input	Magnitude of Input
	Ongoing COP informal networking	2 weeks ST Expat -TA 2 weeks ST Local – TA Ongoing COP
Membership Expanded	Training, CSOs campaign	1 week ST Expat – TA and partner CSO sub-grant
Clearinghouse/Coalition Mechanism Established	Support development of clearinghouse, seminars	NP
CSO Advocacy Strengthening		
Press and Media Used Effectively	Media strategy planning and training Study tour (USIS)	1 week ST Expat – TA 1 week ST Local – TA 1 study tour (year 1)
Catalogue Jamaican Laws Relating to Free Expression of Ideas	Research/case studies with CSOs and Publication	2 weeks COP Partner CSO sub-grant
Small Grants Program	Grant funds, legal aid, etc	Support for grants committee meetings (2 per year)
Engaged with Policy-Makers	Technique seminars, pilots, advisory groups established	1 week ST Expat – TA Ongoing COP
CSOs Conduct Civic Education Program	Seminars, materials, pilots	U.S. NGO sub-contract, exchange/observation trip (for local community-level leaders)
CSOs Prepare Model Civics Curriculum for Sec. Schools	Institutional exchange civic ed. specialists, secondary school teachers, grassroots CBO; liaison with MOE	Same as above
Conflict Resolution/Negotiation Strategies Practiced	Conflict Resolution Training, target pilot neighborhoods, e.g., Grants Pen, Trenchtown, etc.	Partner CSO sub-grant 2 weeks COP

It should be noted that the proposed activities plan is front-loaded with ample local and offshore TA in years 1 and 2, designed to jump-start partner CSOs and provide substance for long-term strategic planning. Virtually all off-shore short term (ST) TA is designed to be coupled with local short term TA in order to take advantage of considerable local capacity, and to engage in skills and knowledge transfer. It is also noted that whenever possible, activity implementation should include local CSO partners as either primary or secondary service providers to take advantage of their skills, and to provide institutional support mechanisms, including a means of fund raising. Using local partners even to do logistics for activities can assist them in meeting their own overhead expenses and provide USAID and the project implementer with an economical means of carrying out project inputs.

VII. IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING

Figure 3, above (section VI), shows by way of an expanded results framework the relationship of activities to IRs 1 and 2. As previously stated, activity outputs are grouped into three operational sets reflecting the characteristics of a mature, effective CSO (see Table 3). Table 5 (section IV) provides an approximation of the "Kinds of Inputs" and "Magnitudes of Inputs" that are required to accomplish the activity outputs. **This transformation of inputs to outputs constitutes the essence of activities.** Our management hypothesis states that accomplishing these activities leads to intermediate results.

The implementing contractor and/or grantee, during the first 60 days of its contract/grant, should be required to prepare a more precise and **detailed annual work plan** that spells out which activities and in what quantities will be undertaken during that period. This would be followed periodically with additional annual plans over the life of the activity design.

In Table 6 below, the design team prepared an illustrative planning schedule that disaggregates both pre/general implementation steps and discrete activities. The implementing agent will determine the final mix of inputs and timing of delivery. Consistent with applicable ADS, the implementing agent with USAID/Jamaica concurrence should have the latitude and flexibility to adjust the kinds, magnitudes, timing and sequencing of inputs/outputs, as necessary, based on quarterly progress reports and appropriate monitoring and evaluation. It is likely that some inputs levels can be decreased or increased and, possibly repeated, as activities unfold and partner CSOs move toward greater effectiveness in advocacy, efficiency, and sustainability.

Table 6. Activities Implementation Planning Schedule

	FY 2001 1 2 3 4	FY 2002 1 2 3 4	FY 2003 1 2 3 4	FY 2004 1 2 3 4	FY 2005 1 2 3 4	FY 2006 1 2 3 4
Pre-Implementation						
a. USAID/W Approves SO 5	4					
b. SOAG Signed	4					
c. Establish SO/IR core and extended teams		1				
d. IQC Task Order or Contract RFP or RFA Issued		1				
e. Implementation Contract/ Grant Signed		1				
f. Contractor/Grantee Mobilizes		1				
Implementation--General						
a. Implementing Contractor/ Grantee Arrives in Jamaica		2				
b. Establish Office/Hire Staff		2				
c. Complete Initial Procurement		2				
d. Initiate Collaboration CSOs, Stakeholders, Donors		2				
e. Gather IR Baseline Data for Activity Planning and R-4		2	3	3	3	3
f. Initiate CSO inventory and assessments		2				

	FY 2001 1 2 3 4	FY 2002 1 2 3 4	FY 2003 1 2 3 4	FY 2004 1 2 3 4	FY 2005 1 2 3 4	FY 2006 1 2 3 4
g. Mid-term Evaluation				3		
h. Final Evaluation						4
Implementation -- Activities						
Activities: Improve CSO Operational Efficiency						
Strategic Planning; Sustainability Training Completed		0000000000	0000000000			
Internal Communications Strategies and democratic Practices in Use		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000		
Personnel, Admin, Info. Tech. Systems in Place		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000		
Goal Statement, By-Laws, Rules of Order Published		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000		
HR/Staff Development System in Place		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000		
Strategic/Annual Operational/ Budget Plans in Use		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000		
Transparent and Efficient Financial Management/ Audit Functions in Use		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000		
On-going M&E System Functions to Inform Decision Makers		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000		
Leadership and Staff Capabilities Enhanced		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000		
Activities: CSO Sustainability						
Effective Leadership Skills in Use: Board and CEO		0000000000	0000000000			
Diverse Fundraising Strategies in Use		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000		
Analytic Study Successful/ Failed Approaches		0000000000				
Board Provides Policy Direction		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000		
Networking and Partnerships Formed		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000	0000000000	
Membership Expanded		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000	0000000000	
Clearinghouse/Coalition Mechanism Established		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000	0000000000	
Activities: CSO Advocacy Strengthening						
Press and Media Used Effectively			0000000000	0000000000		
Catalogue Jamaican Laws Relating to Free Expression of Ideas			0000000000	0000000000		
Small Grants Program		0000000000	0000000000	0000000000	0000000000	0000000000
Engaged w/Policy-Makers			0000000000	0000000000	0000000000	0000000000
CSOs Prepare Model Civics Curricula for Secondary Schools			0000000000	0000000000		
Conflict Resolution/ Negotiation Strategies Practiced				0000000000	0000000000	0000000000

“THE FIRST YEAR”

The vision of the initial year of this project is built on a handful of assumptions.


- 1) USAID will target no more than 20 (possibly fewer under low budget option) CSOs, NGOs, and related CBOs as primary partners for institutional strengthening in Year 1.
- 2) USAID will support a Citizen Security and Justice umbrella organization to link CSOs, NGOs, and CBOs both horizontally and vertically.
- 3) All stakeholders recognize the importance of and need for long-term engagement in the sector and realize that while immediate results and the impact of small grants and increased knowledge of—and direct engagement in—the sector will be evident in year one, a sustainable and policy-engaged CSO sector in support of citizen security and justice will not occur overnight.
- 4) Project start-up can be rapid in light of a fully engaged CSO sector many of which have already shown signs of “ownership” by participation in the original DG assessment and the activity design phase. This noted, significant time and resources should also be invested in a sectoral capacity inventory to serve as a tool for uncovering logical groupings of CSOs and CBOs around common agendas, regional or parish-level groupings that may be possible, and productive vertical linkages.

The sector is made up of a variety of CSOs with variable goals and institutional capacities, yet most if not all of these organizations express a willingness and desire to partner with other organizations. However, concrete knowledge of the CSO sector in general is not abundantly evident and this is particularly true of the relationships and access points between national level and local level groups. Thus the first year of the proposed activities design would include the conduct of a sectoral inventory and capacity survey.

Next, the project would focus on 20 groups and engage them in in-depth individual institutional assessments and strategic planning. Though the CSO umbrella concept would be discussed and integrated into each organization’s goals as appropriate, the entity itself may not take shape until the organizations undergo a basic level of capacity building that enabled them to partner effectively. This said, the project should recognize and engage with the existing and nascent Coalition of Concerned Jamaican Citizens (CCJC) as one of the partner groups for assessment and strategic planning. In all activities, the project would follow a model of multiple, mutual, interwoven institutional training and strengthening activities that combine the strengths and weaknesses of the partner groups and stakeholders to improve the institutional capacity of the sector as a whole.

Figure 4 outlines a five-phase vision of activities implementation, which can serve to guide annual work plans. The phases should not be viewed as strictly linear as some of the later phases include goals that can be worked towards in parts of earlier phases. Instead it may best be viewed in a cyclical, iterative manner. The five phases should include feedback loops such that activities in later phases inform and allow activities managers to modify and adjust strategic plans and annual work plans to account for changing environments and new developments in the sector.

Figure 4. Phases of Activities Implementation



A sectoral inventory and survey is needed in order to provide information necessary to be more strategic and systematic about the choice of groups with which to work and the precise mixture of activities necessary to aid them effectively. This detailed sectoral assessment can be conducted by contractor/grantee staff with ex-pat and local short-term TA and oriented towards identifying, 1) the basic parameters of the CBO sector broadly including number and capacity of community groups island wide (survey/inventory instrument), 2) possible productive grassroots and community group linkages (case study and focus groups), and 3) strengthening horizontal linkages within the sector (focus group and participant observation with partner groups). Such an assessment is most efficiently conducted by an ex-pat Team Leader with knowledge of CSOs in Jamaica who focus on citizen security and justice issues and with a strong background in assessments and survey methodology.

The team should include a Jamaican social scientist who is also familiar with the terrain, perhaps one associated with the Jamaican Social Development Commission (SDC) and or who has knowledge of local-level grassroots community organizations as well as the general political milieu in which they function. Contractor/grantee staff could also be used to conduct interviews and provide logistical support. Alternatively, it may be necessary to engage a Jamaican research firm to conduct surveys, and enter and clean data as well depending on the scope of the activity. This activity would likely take about four weeks with three weeks of field time and one week to

write-up results. This could take place during the first weeks of the activities start-up and in the spirit of multiple institutional strengthening could use one of the stronger local NGOs to provide logistical support on a fee-for-service basis (in order to enhance sustainability of the NGO). In fact this model should be pursued whenever possible during the life of this project and NGOs, CSOs, and CBOs should be provided sufficient overhead when engaged in activities-specific delivery to allow them to cover some operating expenses.

The next important step that should begin shortly after project start-up is an in-depth institutional assessment for the partner groups themselves which would include:

- Phase 1) consultations and interviews with the executive director, board members, staff, volunteers, clients, funders/donors, members, constituents, and other relevant stakeholders. A tool similar to MSI's Institutional Development Framework would prove to be a useful device to guide this process;
- Phase 2), a write-up of the assessment, and an opportunity for partner organizations to reflect on it and inform the assessment; and finally,
- Phase 3) a strategic plan would be drafted with the group to meet the needs and fill the gaps identified in the assessment.

It is estimated that the contractor/grantee staff consisting of two technicians, an office manager, and a driver could accomplish phases 1-3 in 1.5 – 2 weeks or a total of 30 – 40 weeks elapsed time for all partner groups. Thus assuming office set up and project start-up phase of 6 weeks (including the completion of the sectoral assessment/inventory/survey described above), this component could take the up to 36-46 weeks. A larger staff or a hired technical assistance team could accomplish these tasks with more than one group at a time, thus, shortening the elapsed time for the total number of assessments to 18 – 23 weeks (assuming 2 groups are assessed at a time). However, the length of any particular group assessment cannot be shortened. Thus all things considered, a six-month planning and assessment period seems reasonable.

Ultimately these assessment and strategic planning activities will allow contractor/grantee staff to conduct a complex weaving of group skills between providers and provisioners. Each component of service provision will be matched and provided via a group in the partner population whenever possible thus the training or inputs will have double impact in that they both reach the intended partner group but also strengthen the provisioner.

Activities in addition to sectoral assessment/inventory/survey and the institutional strengthening studies/strategic planning exercises in the initial year could include civic education material developed and delivered on human rights, police community relations, and justice. A StreetLaw approach could be employed and could engage many CSO partner organizations. Currently, StreetLaw is partnering with some of the CSOs on the project list in pursuit of a grant from the U.S. State Department. If successful in obtaining funds, a linkage between that modest program and the civil society capacity building activity would be a natural alliance in the early months of the project. Additional project funding could then leverage and build on the hoped-for early success of StreetLaw.

“A TIERED APPROACH”: HUMAN AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

This approach to technical assistance builds upon and strengthens existing Jamaican capacity. An initial survey showed that there exist organizations where providing others with technical assistance or training would be within their range of capabilities, and would fall within their mission. In addition, these kinds of activities would generate revenue for the organization.

The process of strengthening partner CSOs begins with an assessment process, and a commitment by those organizations to engage in improving their organizations individually and collectively. Each organization will have specific strengths and weaknesses, and will therefore embark on its own process. However, organizations can learn from one another, and in some cases, working together can take advantage of economies of scale by combining resources for certain functions (e.g., accounting services, staff development). In addition, by working closely with one another, organizations can explore the value of leveraging their programs according to perceived synergies. For example, one organization that provides community awareness about domestic violence would point their clients to another organization that provide longer term support services for people in need, resulting in a more comprehensive package for the target community. In addition, both organizations benefit from each other’s interventions.

Both expatriate and Jamaican technical assistance can play an important role in orchestrating the capacity building activities, and would be chosen based on their ability not only to transfer skills but to enable others in turn to transfer knowledge and skills. An underlying commitment to the philosophy of training potential trainers—and thereby enabling the direct recipients to pass on their knowledge is an important step in creating the ability of organizations to help others.

An important aspect of the transfer of skills and the provision of technical assistance is a training component for those delivering those services. Because Jamaican organizational knowledge will be maximized, those organizations providing assistance will be given extensive training on delivery techniques. The successful transfer of knowledge so that it can be used by the recipient depends on the delivery and facilitation of the information. This requires not only an understanding of the recipient organization’s needs, but requires tailoring of the information, contextualizing, planning for next steps, and follow-up assistance as the recipient institutes the changes. This approach need not be limited to skills, but may include awareness-building activities around such issues as gender or new communications technologies. The ability to deliver information in a way that another organization can digest and utilize it is useful for almost any subject matter.

TAKING ADVANTAGE OF CROSS-SECTORAL SYNERGIES IN MISSION-WIDE PROGRAMMING

SO 5 and particularly the activities proposed under IRs 1 and 2 will offer USAID a unique opportunity for building and promoting cross-sectoral synergies across many, if not most, of the other mission SOs. Promoting linkages between democracy and governance programs and activities in other sectors inevitably creates two-way synergies. Skills and processes are introduced to organizations designed to increase their capacity and build their programs,

enhancing their ability to operate democratically and to engage in their democracy. This can directly build the efficiency and effectiveness of their work.

Social capital (a set of basic attributes of trust, reciprocity and efficacy that are associated with populations in well-functioning democracies) is generated both around the programs and the process. This occurs as people become more familiar with what daily democratic practice means and entails their own social and organizational lives. This allows them to productively engage Jamaica's democratic institutions. Consequently, the inputs from both sectors stimulate one another in achieving desired development goals. In the proposed activity design, the kind of institutional training and technical assistance to be provided to partner organizations will provide them with a better understanding of the potential resources they can tap into, and their role in creating and catalyzing change. Getting a more solid sense of the bigger picture and how they can work with others to affect people's lives in the immediate term and to affect policy that affects people's lives on the longer term, will enable these organizations to become engaged in the governance process. The more organizations committed to using their on-the-ground experience to inform policy-makers' decisions, the more credibility and legitimacy they will carry. This in turn makes it more likely that they will affect the policy process, as well as the policies they target.

This activity design will increase the capacity of individual CSOs to be more effective in their work and to create and use networks and partnerships to leverage resources. These methods of promoting democratic practice, as well as the CSOs themselves, can be used to complement the work that USAID/Jamaica is doing in other development sectors. For example, health sector organizations can exchange techniques and information about teen counseling around issues of pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, and sexually transmitted infections, to improve their services, get ideas for new approaches, and strengthen their own sustainability and advocacy capacity. Or, those organizations that have undergone training on how to strengthen their boards or how to evaluate their programs could share those techniques and program-specific ideas with local partners under other SOs that might find those resources relevant. NGOs working with at-risk youth to ensure a minimum level of literacy and numeracy can explore linkages with other Jamaican organizations that might complement their activities—like organizations that provide other kinds of needed support as the youth move into full-time employment—so that the NGO itself need not be a one-stop shop.

This model promotes the efficiencies that can often be gained from specialization. Other possibilities include informal networks of teachers—working within the formal system of education—designed to share information and experiences, and to encouraging dialogue that is most productive when kept “off-the-record”. All of these examples demonstrate what organizations can do when they have the capacity to recognize and share their strengths, and when they have the time and commitment to look beyond their own programs to work with others. Ultimately, this kind of collaboration could easily and organically lead to the formation of constituencies able to address and engage the government on issues they are concerned about.

WOMEN AND WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

Women and women's organizations are important participants in civil society, and the legal status and treatment of women is testimony to the strength of a country's democracy. In Jamaica, women typically play a lead role in social institutions as well as in political society. Jamaican women are traditionally strong, outspoken, and capable advocates thereby strengthening civil society, and ensuring the sustainability and growth of Jamaica's democracy in years to come. The activity design team recognizes the importance of attention to women's role and women's issues in the activities outlined under this IR, and has addressed them in three ways:

- A large number of women were involved in giving feedback in the results framework design process
- Select women's groups are explicitly included as partner organizations
- Women are involved and engaged in virtually all of the other CSOs as partner organizations or stakeholders in the outlined activities.

Of the organizations proposed as partners, four specifically address women's issues as their mission: Women's Centre of Jamaican Foundation, Women's Inc., the Sistren Theatre Collective, and Women Working for Transformation. These organizations provide services and support for women and the problems they face including teen pregnancy, incest, domestic abuse, rape, and sexual harassment. The services they provide are intended for crisis situations, and also include long-term skills training and education to help women continue their education and be able to meet their own financial needs. These organizations also embark on activities that promote public awareness and put civic education programs in place. Women's Inc., for example, engages in policy advocacy directly as well as providing training of new police recruits in issues of spousal abuse, rape, and sexual harassment. Many of these organizations have worked in collaboration and leverage each other's programs. In addition, there is much untapped potential for them to come together to advocate for policy or legislative reform on issues they have in common.

Other partner organizations take seriously the need to consider gender issues in their programming and in the content of their activities. For example, the Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (IJCHR) includes in its literature brochures on women's rights and children's rights, specifically. Other stakeholder organizations, such as the Association of Women's Organizations in Jamaica (AWOJA), focus on women's issues and will likely be included as resources in the IR activities, as specified in section IV.

Testimony to the presence of women in civil society activities is the turn-out at the Stakeholders' Workshop on October 1st. Of the 60 participants, 34 were women (57 percent). Of the organizations represented, many were led by women-including PALS, the Dispute Resolution Foundation, CUMI, FAST, Jamaicans for Justice, the Sistren Theatre Collective, Woman Working for Transformation, Woman's Inc, Women's Centre of Jamaican Foundation, the American Chamber of Commerce, and Transparency International.

VIII. OPPORTUNITIES FOR NETWORKING, ALLIANCES, AND PARTNERSHIPS

Another early activity will include the focus on strengthening a CSO clearinghouse/umbrella organization in the sector of citizen security and justice. One idea in this realm is to use an extant organization and provide it with assistance to take on further responsibilities and functions. There may be opportunities for using UWI in this role. Another possibility is the Coalition for Concerned Jamaican Citizens. Because of the diversity of groups involved and the particularly good match between intermediate results and the new coalition's mission, it may hold considerable promise as a target for activities in this area.

One function of such an umbrella group could be to involve it in the administration of a modest grants fund to strengthen key partners and the sector itself on the basis of early strategic planning results. Illustrative activities that may result from small grants could include:

- Establish a “legal aid fund” that could be administered by a collection of partner CSOs with the contractor/grantee implementer serving as the fiscal/administrative controller. These functions could gradually be taken over by the partner grouping as they gain the requisite strength to accommodate USG accounting regulations.
- Sponsor generic CSO strategic action planning workshops to augment and buttress the work of the contractor/grantee staff with individual groups, and to bring groups together to build on more formal networks. These could be done using a training-of-trainers (TOT) approach to further leverage the money invested in the workshops.
- Encourage and facilitate the creation of and/or support currently established Citizen/Police Consultative Committees such as the currently functioning organization in Duhaney Park. Currently its function is largely as a sponsor for the Cub Scouts and the Youth Club but the Consultative Committee has also demanded meetings with the local police station commander and requested the reassignment of certain police officers that they feel are too brutal. Thus they not only support the good officers but also serve as a bulwark against excesses.
- Support for a policy study on the regulatory environment in which CSOs function could be pursued. The Farquharson Institute along with any of a number of partner CSOs could examine the unique impediments to more efficient CSO operation related to legal non-profit status and other issues. Advocacy could be improved by a greater understanding of the legal avenues and formal structures already in place in various ministries for consultation of citizens.

Many Jamaican organizations were consulted to compile a list of the basic attributes of a successful CSO coordination body, committee, or clearinghouse that would be able to successfully overcome “tribal politics”. These attributes include:

- Involve groups that focus on a common set of issue areas;
- Develop group buy-in, members must see mutual benefit;
- Establish robust information sharing function;
- Assure independence from the government;

- Arrange institutional support for clearinghouse as well as for constituent groups (strong groups network and communicate by virtue of their strength);
- Establish a culture where members respect and value all views, and where the clearinghouse is viewed as a “neutral zone” that does not favor one group or another and is perceived as an honest broker;
- Craft the network so it reflects a balance of partisan, class, race affiliations;
- Actively recognize the need for “champions” (but overcome egos) through:
 - Careful cultivation of personal trust between group leaders;
 - Attentiveness to detail, protocol;
 - Strategies that allow actors to “save face” instead of making them admit they are wrong;
 - Use of existing or “home-grown” Jamaica-driven solution.

Possible groups that meet some of these criteria are listed below including short descriptors of assets (+) and liabilities (-):

- **UWI**
 - +/- Neutrality?
 - +/- Capacity
 - +/- Consistency with UWI mission
 - - Perceived class bias, “distance” issue
- **United Way**
 - + Already serves coordination function
 - - Not engaged with this sector
 - - May have too broad a mandate
- **Association of Development Agencies**
 - + Already serves coordination function
 - - Not engaged with this sector
 - - May have too broad a mandate
- **CJCC**
 - +/- New and untested
 - + Engaged explicitly with sector, many partner groups already represented
 - - May be perceived as biased or favoring a sub-set of groups
 - + Has solid grassroots participation and connections
- **Homegrown / Project advisory group**
 - - Risk that it would be seen as an extension of USAID
 - + Could be explicitly designed to fulfill functions

INFORMATION-SHARING; ESTABLISHING A CLEARINGHOUSE

To begin, groups need to recognize that there are different ways and reasons come together. This coming together can be as informal as a group for information sharing and moral support, to more structured partnerships where groups are coordinating resources and activities—or any

variation or combination thereof. To determine the kind of association, groups first meet and each put forward their mission and goals, then come to consensus on the areas where they can all come together. Using the examples from the Stakeholders' Workshop, some topics of common interest are:

- civic education for adults
- civic education for youth, in schools
- civic education in communities
- advocacy techniques to affect decision-makers
- physical security
- community-police relations
- CSO-media relations
- efficacy of the judicial system
- women in civil society
- work in specific communities (Trenchtown, Mountain View, Kingston West, etc.)

Groups would then think about their needs in the area that they are most committed to and would select commit to one topic initially. While they may become involved in more than one network, networks and partnerships take a lot of time and energy to create and maintain. There needs to be a minimum of five organizations to make networking activities worthwhile to begin. Topic groups would then come together and begin discussion the needs around the topic. What are some possible short and long term goals of the group? What kind of association are members comfortable with? Is there existing information that is not shared? What is the easiest, most efficient way to share information among members? What kind of information can each group contribute? Who might be the coordinating body? Are there others that should be invited to join the group?

Some guidelines:

- Members need to be very clear about the purpose of the network/partnership.
- Members need to be clear about their expectations of the network and of other members.
- Members need to agree to leave other (perhaps controversial) topics at the door.
- The network must allow groups to maintain autonomy.
- Members must have respect for each other/each other's role, functions, and programs.
- To assure group buy-in, members must be able to see mutual benefit.
- Members need to ensure that the target groups have a voice in the network's activities/programs.

Outputs:

- Existing networks, at least weekly exchange
- Information production by members
- Strategy for collecting and disseminating information used/useful (perhaps through a survey to members)
- Leveraging of program resources
- New, innovative programs and cross-sectoral work
- New stakeholders/participants involved

Inputs:

- Internet connection: technology or time/money to go to a cybercafe
- Meeting time, and meeting space (if applicable)
- Time for participation
- Information production
- Coordinating body: time and resources
- Web site, monthly hosting fee, maintenance and updating

IX. PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLAN

Strategic Objective 5: Intermediate Results 1 and 2

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE & REPORTING	
				SCHEDULE/ FREQUENCY	RESPONSIBLE PERSON(S) AND TEAM	SCHEDULE BY MANAGEMENT EVENT	RESPONSIBLE PERSON(S) AND TEAM
Intermediate Result 1: Civil Society More Actively Engaged in Issues of Governance							
Strategic Objective 5: Improved Citizen Security							
1. CSO initiatives acted upon by branch(es) of GOJ	Definition: Policies, Laws or Constitutional Revisions initiated by a Civil Society Organizations reviewed, debated and/or acted upon in some form by government Unit: Numbers and categories of initiatives	CSOs, public records	Survey Questionnaire, records exam or interviews with CSO	annually, in time for R4 preparation.	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee	In time for incorporation into R 4 presentation, final evaluation	SO 5 Core Team
2. Score CSO Advocacy Index	Definition: CSOs that advance on the CSO Index Unit of Measure: Number on Index	Index survey	Application the the Index methodology by contractor	Biennially, R-4 Process	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee	Every other R-4	SO 5 Core Team
IR 1.1: More Effective Advocacy by CSOs							
1. Effective advocacy campaigns conducted by targeted CSOs	Definition: CSO clearly identifies a key issue of importance and develops a strategy for advocating around that issue; campaign defined as the use of a coordinated, multi-pronged approach to advocate issue(s); CSO coordinates and networks with other CSOs on the issue; CSO interacts with and attempts to coalesce the public around the issue. Unit of Measure: Number of Campaigns	CSO records, newspaper survey, opinion survey	Review of records, surveys	Annually	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee		SO 5 Core Team
2. CSO.s able to raise public awareness on key issues	Definition: Targeted CSOs able to research, formulate, and engage other partners in public education campaign Unit: Number of successful outreach efforts—break out by individual CSOs and partnership efforts	CSO records, contractor survey, newspaper analysis	Appropriate survey methods	Annually	Contractor, and/or Cooperative Grantee		SO 5 Core Team

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE & REPORTING	
				SCHEDULE/ FREQUENCY	RESPONSIBLE PERSON(S) AND TEAM	SCHEDULE BY MANAGEMENT EVENT	RESPONSIBLE PERSON(S) AND TEAM
IR 1.2: Improved Institutional Capacity of CSOs							
1. Increased membership of CSOs	<p>Definition: Memberships must be on a formal, signature basis, with or without fees paid to the CSO as a membership requirement</p> <p>Units of Measurement : members are individuals, so that if an organization has spousal memberships, each is counted separately</p>	CSO membership roles	Annual CSO Survey Questionnaire, CSO records verified	Annually	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee		SO 5 Core Team
2. Increased fundraising with audited records by CSOs	<p>Definition: Funds are the amount of money taken in by the CSO from all sources, i.e., membership dues, grants, loans, donations, in cash or kind, and available to advance the CSO agenda, except for funds expended by USAID.</p> <p>Unit of Measurement: J\$ raised and % increases</p>	CSO reports,	<p>Annual CSO Survey Questionnaire</p> <p>Baseline data is gathered before activities commence</p>	Annually	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee;		SO 5 Core Team
3. Forums held by CSOs to discuss public issues	<p>Definition: Discreet meetings to which other CSOs and/or the public in general is invited to a public discussion sponsored by one CSO or group of two or more CSOs.</p> <p>Unit of Measurement: number of meetings, not the number of issues discussed. Meetings with multiple sponsors count as one meeting, regardless of the number of sponsors.</p>	CSOs, media reports	Records reviews and news analysis	Quarterly	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee		SO 5 Core Team
4. CSOs become more sustainable	<p>Definition: Long range strategic plan for org. sustainability created and followed</p> <p>Unit: Yes or no</p>	CSO and contractor files, IDB records	CSO/contractor meetings	Annually	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee		SO 5 Core Team

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE & REPORTING	
				SCHEDULE/ FREQUENCY	RESPONSIBLE PERSON(S) AND TEAM	SCHEDULE BY MANAGEMENT EVENT	RESPONSIBLE PERSON(S) AND TEAM
5. Policy analyses papers prepared and circulated	Definition: Policy analyzes are researched, reasoned written positions for or against a public policy, no matter its origin. Length is not a factor, but the paper must demonstrate that the basis of the policy proposal is more than an opinion of the author. The policy proposals may be circulated internally to the CSO's membership, to members of the government, or to other NGOs. Unit: Number of policy papers	CSOs, contractor files	Interviews or CSO records of policy analyzes papers prepared and circulated	Annually	CSOs		SO 5 Core Team
IR 1.3 Mechanism for Information Sharing & Coordination Established							
1. Partnerships, scheduled fora, or advisory councils between CSO-related advocacy groups and ministries, cabinet or parliament established	Definition: Formal and informal fora and bipartisan committees in which representatives of CSOs meet and influence executive policy, legislation decision-making and/or the allocation of resources Unit: Number of Effective Partnerships	Study to determine existence and impact of partnership, fora, advisory councils	Interviews, records analysis, and focus groups	Annually	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee	Final evaluation	SO 5 Core Team
2. CSOs acting in concert thru partnerships, coalitions	Definition: CSO partnerships, coalitions formed or active (threshold for active)Unit: Number formed	CSO records, press survey	Record review and surveys	Annually	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee	Final evaluation	SO 5 Core Team
IR 2: Increased Knowledge & Awareness of Citizens							
1. Citizens reached by a public education program	Definition: Citizens reached by CSO launched education or information campaigns through media, public meetings, or formal training programs	Sample survey, focus groups, newspaper survey, and interviews	Random sampling, quick appraisal and media surveys	Annually	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee	Final Evaluation	SO 5 Core Team
2. Civic Ed. Recipients can articulate & act upon basic citizen rights & responsibilities	Definition: pre & post treatment knowledge and attitude measure Unit: % of those involved in C.E. program	Sample survey, focus groups, interviews	Random sampling, quick appraisal and selective interview	Biennially	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee	Final Evaluation	SO 5 Core Team
IR 2.1: Improved Civic Education							

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION AND UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	DATA SOURCE	METHOD/ APPROACH OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE & REPORTING	
				SCHEDULE/ FREQUENCY	RESPONSIBLE PERSON(S) AND TEAM	SCHEDULE BY MANAGEMENT EVENT	RESPONSIBLE PERSON(S) AND TEAM
1. Best available materials in use	Definition: Either program created or borrowed materials from other successful programs in use for communities or secondary schools Unit: Expert Opinion	Expert evaluation, survey of materials in use	Expert evaluation, and random survey technique	Annually	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee	Final Evaluation	SO Core Team
2. Curriculum of secondary schools reflects integrated civic education component	Definition: Schools exposed to new Civ. Ed. Integrated curriculum and at least pilot applications completed and examined Unit: Number of schools	Ministry and school records	School visits, interview with curriculum specialists in ministry and schools	Annually	Contractor and/or Cooperative Grantee	Final Evaluation	SO Core Team

X. INITIAL COST ESTIMATES AND MULTI-YEAR FINANCIAL PLAN

Table 7. Estimated Budget Breakdown by Activity Category and Line Item – High Option

High Option US\$3,725 (000s)							
<u>Output Components:</u>	<u>Fiscal</u>	<u>Year 1</u>	<u>Year 2</u>	<u>Year 3</u>	<u>Year 4</u>	<u>Year 5</u>	<u>Totals</u>
		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	
1. Improved CSO Operational Efficiency							
		50	50	50	50	50	250
2. CSO Sustainability		25	25	25	25	25	125
3. CSO Advocacy Strengthening		25	25	25	25	25	125
	<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>500</u>
4. U.S. Contractor/Grantee							
a. Int'l Advisor--COP(loaded)		250	250	300	300	300	1400
b. FSN Professional TA		35	36	38	39	41	190
c. FSN Admin. Asst./Acct.		17	18	18	19	20	92
d. FSN Expediter/Driver		8	8	9	9	9	43
e. Home Office Backstop		17	18	18	19	20	92
f. Office Rental, Util/Maint		17	17	17	17	17	83
g. Supplies/Furn/Com/Computer		25	5	5	5	5	45
h. 1 Project Vehicle, CIF, M&F		56	6	6	6	6	80
i. Relocation/shipping/equip		20	5	5	5	20	55
j. Housing Allow.		26	26	26	26	26	128
k. Int'l Travel/Per Diem		30	20	20	20	30	120
l. In-country Travel/Per Diem		8	10	10	10	10	48
m. Short-term Contractors		24	20	10	10	5	69
	<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>532</u>	<u>438</u>	<u>481</u>	<u>485</u>	<u>508</u>	<u>2444</u>
5. Sub-contractors/Grantees							
a. Int'l Advisor--Short Term		20	20	20	20	20	100
b. Int'l Travel		10	10	10	10	10	50
c. In-country Travel		4	4	4	4	4	20
d. Short-term Contractors		16	16	16	16	16	80
	<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>250</u>
6. Other Direct Costs							
a. Baseline surveys, Assessments, Audits, M&E		25	5	5	5	5	45
	<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>45</u>
7. Indirect Cost:							0
a. Contractor/Grantee Overhead/Fees		106	89	95	96	99	486
	<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>486</u>
	<u>Grand-Total</u>	<u>814</u>	<u>682</u>	<u>732</u>	<u>736</u>	<u>763</u>	<u>3,725</u>

Table 8. Estimated Budget Breakdown by Activity Category and Line Item – Low Option

Low Option US\$2,344 (000s)							
<u>Output Components:</u>	Fiscal	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	<u>Totals</u>
		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	
1. Improved CSO Operational Efficiency		15	15	15	15	15	75
2. CSO Sustainability		10	10	10	10	10	50
3. CSO Advocacy Strengthening		10	10	10	10	10	50
	<u>Sub-total</u>	35	35	35	35	35	175
4. U.S. Contractor/Grantee							
a. Int'l Advisor--COP(loaded)-(possibly part-time)		200	200	200	200	200	1000
c. FSN Admin. Asst./Acct.		17	18	18	19	20	92
e. Home Office Backstop		15	16	16	17	18	81
f. Office Rental, Util/Maint		12	12	12	12	12	60
g. Supplies/Furn/Com/Computer		25	5	5	5	5	45
h. 1 Project Vehicle, CIF, M&F		56	6	6	6	6	80
i. Relocation/shipping/equip		20	5	5	5	20	55
j. Housing Allow.		26	26	26	26	26	128
k. Int'l Travel/Per Diem		20	10	10	10	20	70
l. In-country Travel/Per Diem		8	10	10	10	10	48
m. Short-term Contractors		15	15	10	10	5	55
	<u>Sub-total</u>	414	322	318	319	341	1714
5. Sub-contractors/Grantees		25	25	25	25	25	125
	<u>Sub-total</u>	25	25	25	25	25	25
6. Other Direct Costs							
a. Baseline surveys, Assessments, Audits, M&E		15	5	5	5	5	35
	<u>Sub-total</u>	15	5	5	5	5	35
7. Indirect Cost:							0
a. Contractor/Grantee Overhead/Fees		70	55	55	55	60	295
	<u>Sub-total</u>	70	55	55	55	60	295
	<u>Grand-Total</u>	559	442	438	439	466	2,344

XI. ACQUISITION AND PROCUREMENT PLAN

The activities design team recommends that USAID/Jamaica examine two possible implementation approaches. One of the approaches has a low-cost permutation that is presented as well.

OPTION 1: Contractor-Lead Implementation: A core contractor is engaged to provide overall work plans, organization of input resources, implementation and implementation monitoring, performance monitoring, and financial accountability. The contractor assigns a technically qualified chief-of-party (COP) to oversee all aspects of the activities design implementation. The contractor draws on his home office for additional technical and specialized expertise, as required, by the field COP. In addition, the contractor either sub-contracts or sub-grants to a minimum of two U.S. based non-governmental organizations (NGO).

Given the predominant role of NGOs in the civil society activities, both in Jamaica and the U.S., NGOs have ready access to specialists in various facets of civil society program and, generally, have partnering experience in developing countries. It would be a mutually reinforcing compact. The management and accountability functions carried out by a private sector firm that works in a highly competitive environment and NGOs with hands-on, grassroots, and people-to-people sensitivities to interact directly with Jamaican CSOs.

How to proceed: USAID/Jamaica solicits a proposal from qualified contractors utilizing either the IQC/Task Order system (subject to the funding level, term, and open competition parameters) or Request for Proposals (RFP). In either case, a contract firm is employed to plan, organize, and implement the entire activities design for IR 1 and IR 2. The contractor would be required to propose at minimum two subordinate cooperative grantees that would work in tandem with the contractor. Under this option the final contractor would be required to prepare a comprehensive work plan for submission to USAID within 90 days of signing the contract.

Permutation: USAID might wish to examine the feasibility of employing a part-time COP, as a lower-cost option. Under certain conditions, a part-time or shared expert could perform most of the functions of a COP, but be resident in Jamaica only part of the time, say 6-8 months, on an intermittent basis over the course of a work year. With this arrangement the SO core team would provide interim oversight and coordination with the contractor's home office.

OPTION 2: Cooperative Grantee Implementation: A second implementation management mode would be to retain a Cooperative Agreement Grantee through Request for Applications (RFA). While this in all probability would be a lower-cost option, USAID would have to abide by less stringent controls and oversight inherent in and required under a Cooperative Agreement. Based on the design team's experience, we estimate that at least a half dozen U.S. NGOs would have the necessary qualifications and experience to undertake the activities design. The relationship with USAID clearly would be of a different order, but the partnership and grassroots strengths and economies associated with NGO's might appeal to USAID managers.

How to proceed: USAID/Jamaica issues an RFA, and following a technical review by the SO team and Jamaican counterparts (including CSOs), negotiates a mutually satisfactory cooperative agreement with a U.S. NGO that reflects both parties' requirements and outcomes. USAID could suggest a management structure and general approach. However, under the ground rules of cooperative agreements, the NGO could propose its own approach and means of management and implementation.

XII. OBLIGATION REQUIREMENTS

In section X, **Initial Cost Estimates and Multi-Year Financial Plan**, the team constructed high and low option budgets with breakouts for each of the five fiscal years currently foreseen for the activities design. The high option design is estimated to cost \$3.725 and the low option \$2.344 million. **However, the low cost option brings into question impact efficacy of the activities design if some structural changes in outputs/inputs are not considered. Similarly, it would be prudent to reexamine the IR level expected results to ascertain whether there are**

sufficient resources to reach performance targets and desired level of impact. In the following illustrative table, adjustment or deletion of certain activities is suggested for the low-budget option. The reader should remember, however, that there are not many discretionary resources available once the basic contract or grant operating expenses are covered. It is only after a base investment that one can expect the "exponential returns" to kick in. Following the budget options table the reader will find a low-budget, substantially reduced and phased implementation plan that can serve as a focal point for discussion if USAID wishes to proceed with the activities design but with major reductions in OYB funding.

Table 9. Matrix: USAID Budget Options versus Activities⁹

Activities	High Budget ¹⁰	Low Budget ¹¹
Improve CSO Operational Efficiency		
CSOs survey and assessment; Strategic Planning; Sustain-Ability Training	yes	Reduce number of partner CSOs
Internal Communications Strategies and Democratic Practices in Use	yes	yes
Personnel, Administration, Information Technology Systems in Place	yes	yes
Goal Statement, By-Laws, Rules of Order Published	yes	CSO resources only
HR/Staff Development System in Place	yes	yes
Strategic/Annual Operating/ Budget Plans in Use	yes	yes
Transparent and Efficient Financial Management/ Audit Functions in Use	yes	yes
On-going M&E System Functions to Inform Decision-Makers	yes	yes
Leadership and Staff Capabilities Enhanced	yes	yes
CSO Sustainability		
Effective Leadership Skills in Use: Board and CEO	yes	yes
Diverse Fundraising strategies in Use	yes	no ¹²
Analytic Study Successful/ Failed Approaches	yes	no
Board Provides Policy Direction	yes	yes
Networking and Partnerships Formed	yes	yes
Membership Expanded	yes	no

⁹ Table shows comparative, high-budget/low-budget, use of USAID SO financial resources for various activities. Note that bulk of resources allocated to implementing contractor or grantee direct costs. Smaller sums allocated to activities represent marginal, additional costs to conduct training, workshops, seminars, coalition or alliance meetings, studies, research, fieldwork and observations.

¹⁰ Shows activities to which USAID funding allocated if high budget amounts available.

¹¹ Shows activities to which USAID funding allocated if low budget amounts available, but does not foreclose USAID involvement with activities if CSO resources available.

¹² Yes = retain activity; No = no USAID \$ resources directly allocated, although base-cost contractor/grantee TA could be utilized, as well as CSO generated resources.

Activities	High Budget¹⁰	Low Budget¹¹
Clearinghouse/Coalition Mechanism Established	yes	yes
CSO Advocacy Strengthening		
Press and Media Used Effectively	yes	reduced
Catalogue Jamaican Laws Relating to Free Expression of Ideas	yes	no
Small Grants Program	yes	reduced
Engaged w/Policy-Makers	yes	yes
CSOs Conduct Civic Education Program	yes	CSO resources only
CSOs Prepare Model Civics Curriculum for Sec. Schools	yes	CSO resources only
Conflict Resolution/Negotiation Strategies Practiced	yes	yes

Table 10. Phased Funding Alternative: Low Budget Option

FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006
Start-Up Inventory/Survey /Assessment	CSO Strengthening, Civic Education	Advocacy, Partnership and Linkage	Advocacy, Sustainability	Sustainability; Early USAID Termination
Contractor/grantee coordinator on-board 1 part-time TA <i>or</i> 1 full time TA	Continue training and begin individual consultancies with partner CSOs (KMA)	Conflict Resolution/ Negotiation, press and media workshops (coordinated with IR 3 and 4 activities)	Engage policy makers in CSO fora	CSOs reach out to MPs, policy-makers, and influence resource allocation
Modest office established, minimal staff hired	Begin umbrella group, partnership, clearinghouse activities (KMA)	Actively promote umbrella group activities in urban and rural areas	CSOs work to expand memberships and fund raising	CSOs self-generating, able to form effective coalitions, operate through nation-wide networks
Select modest number partner CSOs	Sub-grantee ¹³ prepares civic education programs with and for partner CSOs (KMA)	CSOs disseminate civic education program	Evaluation activities implementation	Civic education programs routinely organized and conducted by partner CSOs
Partner CSOs Assessment KMA ¹⁴ (delay broader inventory/survey)	Sub-grantee prepares model civics curriculum for sec. Schools (CSOs extend)	Pilot program with model curriculum in test schools in cooperation with CSOs	Civic education programs and curriculum pilots expanded to entire country by CSOs	Improved civics courses taught by numerous secondary schools
Training workshops for partner CSOs only in strategic planning, communications, IT, admin. Systems, staff	Limited small grants to support umbrella group formation and common funds, e.g., legal fund	Country wide CSO survey/inventory; 2 nd round of strengthening workshops sponsored	Partnership and clearinghouse links with rural, grassroots CSOs and CBOs	Contractor/grantee departs

¹³ StreetLaw represents a good grantee prototype

¹⁴ KMA: Kingston Metropolitan Area


FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006
Start-Up Inventory/Survey /Assessment	CSO Strengthening, Civic Education	Advocacy, Partnership and Linkage	Advocacy, Sustainability	Sustainability; Early USAID Termination
development leadership, finance management		by contractor/grantee		

XIII. SO/IR TEAM MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

To provide the proper oversight and clear lines of accountability USAID should establish four overlapping management structures. Furthermore, in the event that currently contemplated IR components of SO 5 come on-line, the design team recommends that another USDH/PSC or FSN/PSC DG position be established. The current SO team leader serves in both a regional and bilateral capacity and clearly would find it difficult to provide the responsible oversight, accountability and management leadership without an augmented staff, especially during periods of regional travel.

The first two management structures involve the agency’s proscribed **SO core team and extended teams**. The **SO core team** would consist of the SO team leader, the program officer, the controller, SO team leaders from other mission SOs that interact with SO 5, and the implementing contractor’s chief-of-party. (On those few occasions when internal, proprietary Agency policy or budgetary matters must be discussed, the contractors chief-of-party may be excused.)

Figure 5. Management Structures



Notwithstanding the requirement for some USAID confidentiality, it is important that the contractor’s chief-of-party be a fully participating partner of the core team. That individual will serve as the operational and field “eyes and ears” of the core team, and can provide invaluable performance monitoring feedback, institutional information, and early warning on environmental

factors that affect clients, partners and activities implementation. Conversely, to be fully responsive to the Agency's need for timely feedback, data and information (i.e. R-4 replacement process, evaluations, external oversight visits, etc.), the chief-of-party should have his hand on the pulse of USAID's operations, timetables and deliberations. The SO team, itself, would determine the frequency of the meetings, the agenda, and venue, but, at a minimum, monthly meetings would appear appropriate.

The membership of the **extended team** would include the entire SO team, key donor/partners, representatives from the partner CSOs, and a representative from the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ). Normally, it would be invaluable to have other recipient partners and grassroots beneficiaries involved with the extended team, but in this case the sheer numbers of CSO's, clients and beneficiaries would be prohibitive.

Accordingly, it is recommended that the SO team consider establishing a "**CSO Advisory Committee**" that could meet on a quarterly or semi-annual basis to improve channels of communications with the SO team and USAID, to confer on issues affecting the CSO community, to provide guidance on group priorities, and provide the sub-structure of an eventual clearinghouse. The concept of the advisory team emanated from the design team interview with the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), which employs such an advisory model and reportedly finds it a valuable outreach mechanism for the Bank's entire range of civil society activities.

Finally, the SO team should avail itself of the UNDP-sponsored working group system. Periodic interaction with the DG working group will provide another vital dimension of information, feedback, communication, and coordination among those engaged in civil society activities. The group will want to work beyond mere information-sharing and consider proactive action-planning, careful coordination and prioritization of interventions, and, possibly, joint performance monitoring and evaluation. It is the design teams understanding that DFID has been asked to chair the DG working group of the UNDP.

XIV. DONOR COORDINATION

As noted in section IV, a number of donors have programs that impact and influence IRs 1 and 2 of SO 5. While the variable contributions of donors are discussed above, here we simply note the ongoing need for donor coordination and close collaboration as the activities are implemented. A monthly coordination meeting of civil society-oriented projects should be planned and initiated by the USAID implementer (assuming USAID would like to assert leadership in this area), unless such a meeting is already taking place.

It is suggested that the most productive level of coordination would be at the level of activity implementation managers (COP or equivalent) to assure a level of technical knowledge of the sector and a level of familiarity with the details of the programs to make coordination meetings productive and efficient. For example, it would only be at that level that the institutional capacities of various NGOs and the programmatic responses to variable capacities could be productively discussed. Questions about duplicative funding or program overlap will also be

most evident between managers with day-to-day knowledge of CS activities. A GOJ representative (perhaps from PIOJ) and a rotating set of CSO partners should also participate.

It is important to note that these coordination meetings, while occurring between donors, should also put in place mechanisms to allow for report-outs to CSO participants. It would be counterproductive to engage in too much “behind-the-scenes” deal making about the levels of support offered to various CSOs. These will be difficult decisions but will likely be much more palatable to the NGOs and CSOs involved if the criteria for decisions are spelled out and transparent and if donors offer well articulated justifications for decisions that are taken.

The CIDA Civil Society and Local Government programs and the IDB Citizen Security projects are both highly relevant to the proposed activities and every effort should be made to engage these project managers at the earliest possible opportunity. The activity design team has made initial contacts and courtesy visits to the IDB and the IDB Project Execution Unit, and has also been to see CIDA’s Development Counselor and First Secretary. Additionally the design team invited both IDB project managers and CIDA managers to the workshop. This is a reasonable start, but ongoing communication, notification of status, etc. between USAID and these players will facilitate project start-up when a project implementation partner is chosen and begins project activity.

XV. POTENTIAL OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCE (GDA) AND OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES (OTI)

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCE

USAID announced earlier this year a “new business model” for leveraging additional resources from the corporate and not-for-project segments in the United States, in the host countries, and with other multilateral and international donors. The Global Development Alliance program consists of a mission statement, conceptual framework, preliminary GDA guidelines for USAID, and proposed “incentive fund.” The new initiative foresees Washington and field operating units engaging and enlisting resource support from private and public sector groups that can be mutually beneficial and can usefully contribute to the accomplishment of strategic results in USAID’s targeted development “pillars.” The list of potential alliance partners is extensive. The program foresees innovative and creative parallel and integrated associations and working alliances with increased magnitudes of success or with increased effectiveness of the development impact.

The activities design team found at least two possible models for alliances. The first involves the American Chamber of Commerce engaging its members and its own resources to undertake an assessment of criminal violence in Jamaica. Though this is usually a public sector function, private sector companies in both U.S. and Jamaica have suffered inestimable financial damage and loss of sales due the extreme and pervasive nature of crime and violence in the country. The AmCham moved from the assessment stage to direct dialogue with the government, and has now

proposed to finance technical assistance to undertake police reform. As this is an important target sector for international donors and the government itself, this assistance complements and augments other resources directed at the same objectives.

The second example flows from intersectoral cooperation following the “street people” incident in Montego Bay. The story is already related in section VIII: Opportunities for Networking, Alliances, and Partnerships. In a few words, a health sector NGO transformed itself into the partner of a human rights/justice NGO. The health NGO became an activist for the civil and human rights of mentally handicapped, indigent and addicted citizens, who otherwise would have been left under served by an inadequate national health program. The NGO now lobbies the parish and national level authorities and advocates widespread health reform.

Finally, throughout the design references and illustrations have been offered for linkages to other USAID/Jamaica strategic objectives in which civil society organizations participating in the strengthening program can form alliances, partnerships and coalitions. The civil society sector has a long way to go to broaden its horizontal and vertical linkages, especially to grassroots and community level NGOs. Some of these relationships could be formalized, joint action plans prepared, and, possibly, applications made for “incentive funds” from USAID’s central fund.

OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES (OTI)

The activity design team contacted the Office of Transition Initiatives to carry out the requested coordination immediately after the signing of the TO contract for the design work. In conversations with Mr. Russell Porter, the team learned that OTI had backed off its earlier commitment to send an assessment team to Jamaica to explore programming options. Due to the events of September 11th and because of legal impediments associated with the Mission’s proposed police reform IR, OTI seems to have taken a wait-and-see attitude for the time being. Consequently, there is little further to report on USAID/OTI coordination of possible assistance at this time. The team will, however, forward the draft version of the activity design to Mr. Porter for his comments, and thus allow OTI to pursue any appropriate next steps in a fully informed manner.

ANNEX I

Report: USAID Civil Society Stakeholders' Workshop

Prepared by Zoey L. Breslar, MSI; October 2001

The workshop took place on October 1, 2001 in the Belisario Suite at the *Le Meridien Jamaica Pegasus Hotel* in Kingston. As all activities took place at the hotel, the participants were able to stay focused and move together to facilitate their informal networking.

Workshop Intent and Design

The Civil Society Stakeholders' Workshop was designed to inform the design process of the results framework for USAID/Jamaica's new Democracy and Governance (DG) Strategic Objective. The focus of this conference was the involvement of Jamaican civil society organizations (CSOs) in issues of security and justice. More than fifty-five representatives from a wide range of CSOs alongside other stakeholders—including private sector organizations, USAID, Government of Jamaica, other bilateral and multi-lateral donors, and political parties—attended. In addition to those participants from Kingston, representatives from organizations in Montego Bay, New York, and Washington, D.C. joined the workshop (see annex A for participant list). In this way, a variety of perspectives and experiences were drawn upon not only to obtain input for gauging the feasibility of possible future USAID activities, but to explore the range of solutions to the problems that CSOs and others working with issues of citizen security and justice are wrestling with. This forum also provided an opportunity for networking among the stakeholders, which was complemented by a discussion of the value of partnerships at the end of the day.

The workshop began at 9:00 a.m. and closed, as scheduled, at 4:30 p.m. (see annex B for agenda). The day's events were designed to allow time at the outset for the participants get comfortable with the forum and the range of opinions present, and to enable them to be conscious and selective about how and what they shared with the group. To begin, the overview of the USAID-funded assessment catalyzed discussion around the state of democracy in Jamaica. The brainstorming and framing that followed focused the remainder of the workshop more specifically on issues of citizen security and justice, and took place in plenary as well. After lunch, participants self-selected into issue-specific groups for in-depth stock-taking and solution identification that was then shared with the whole group. Finally, group findings were affirmed with a discussion on networks and partnerships. The tone of the day was one foremost of respect, as well as of transparency and frankness. Morning and afternoon coffee breaks, and a one-hour lunch break were planned to allow participants enough time to network and discuss issues informally.

Workshop Highlights

To open the workshop, Horace Donalds led the participants in prayer. Dennis Darby, representing USAID, then greeted the participants and gave some history on the Democracy and Governance program under formation. Introductions included representative names and a few

sentences on the nature of their organization's activities. Attending from USAID were Dennis Darby, Robin Brinkley, and Charles Clayton. The MSI team included Jim Holtaway, Dr. Zeric Smith, Zoey Breslar, and Carol Taylor.

Workshop objectives were introduced to get the workshop underway, and were noted on the agenda. They were as follows:

Objective 1: Review *Democracy and Governance in Jamaica: An Assessment* (prepared by MSI and USAID/Jamaica, May 2001).

Objective 2: Obtain Feedback from Participants as to the Role of Civil Society Organizations Working in Citizen Security and Justice to Inform Design of New USAID Program.

Objective 3: Lay the Groundwork for Possible Future Stakeholder Collaboration Around Citizen Security and Justice Activities.

Smith's overview of *Democracy and Governance in Jamaica: An Assessment* (see annex C for the presentation slides) led to Q&A directed at Smith and Darby regarding the assessment and the new USAID program. In addition, participants elaborated on and clarified the picture of Jamaican democracy that was depicted in Smith's presentation (see Participant Comments on Assessment, Democracy and Governance in Jamaica section of annex D for flipchart notes). Participants qualified the picture to include a lot of good work on the part CSOs in recent years; the impact of dons, guns, hatred and the "enemy concept"; and, the interplay of jeopardized security and economic marginalization.

As the discussion became focused on the role of CSOs in citizen security and justice, the group crafted an operational definition of "civil society organization" and clarified what is encompassed in "citizen security and justice" in Jamaica (see Definition of Civil Society Organization and Brainstorming: Citizen Security and Justice sections of annex D for flipchart notes). Participants discussed resulting themes, and Smith listed the potential program areas for the new program (see Themes in Citizen Security and Justice section of annex D for flipchart notes). From these themes came the articulated need for a national vision to guide and coordinate activities, as well as the necessity of donor coordination with the aim to maximize donor assistance and Jamaican inputs into these issues.

Sister M. Amora Binnom led the lunch prayer. A moment of silence was observed for the events of September 11, and for those involved in the current violence in Mountain View.

After lunch, the topics were introduced for the small group work, as noted on the agenda:

- networking/coalition/partnership/information sharing among CSOs
- accessing decision-makers, policy-makers about specific issues
- sustainability
- linking national and grassroots/community-level organizations

Carol Narcisse added a fifth issue, *Working with Donors/Partners: Helping to Construct the Big Picture*. An issue was assigned to each of five tables and participants gathered around the table of the issue they wanted to discuss. In all, they worked for approximately one hour in order to:

- List successes any you can think of
- List barriers to achieving successes
- List enhancers/enablers
- List possible solutions to these barriers

Before groups reported in plenary, Smith addressed the issue of donor coordination and explained the process the team has used in informing itself about other donor activities, and informing the other donors about the USAID process. Breslar, with Holtaway's counsel, then talked briefly about how big picture visioning leads to developing specific objectives, which then leads to coordination of resources and specialization of activities. Fleshing out the issues outlined in the small group work are relevant to CSOs' ability to engage in that kind of process effectively.

The five groups had many common points and overlapping ideas. The issues were thoroughly explored, so much so that there were few additions from other participants (see *Small Group Work* section of annex D for flipchart notes). These ideas affirmed the draft plans of the SO design team (also having had input from USAID/Jamaica) as to the needs and possible strategies for engaging in this sector. These include strengthening organizations' ability to do advocacy, increase the number of civic education programs for all citizens, and providing organizations with training to enhance their ability to better reach their goals. Of particular emphasis was the need for organizations to work together towards common goals. This provided a segway into a brief session on networking and partnerships—and about the kinds of exchanges and collaboration that can be initiated, the benefits of such activities, and the factors that make them work. Participants then asked for a brief description of stakeholder analysis, as there was no time left for the exercise itself.

After thanks from the MSI team, Darby gave the closing remarks, and Reverend Al Miller led the closing prayer and Jamaican national anthem.

Workshop Results

In spite of the potentially difficult dynamic with this wide variety of perspectives in one room, participants were engaged and constructive. Comments were, for the most part, straight forward and people were invested in the process and the outcome—albeit expressly cautious about another donor program. As intended, this event was an important networking event. A number of the participants mentioned to the MSI team that this was the first time that such a wide array of organizations working in the area of citizen security and justice had been brought together.

The MSI team was pleased with the results of the workshop. Not only did the discussions confirm the issues that the team and USAID/Jamaica had identified as potential focus areas, but the participants' creativity and candidness contributed to ideas for concrete, constructive approaches. Having so many of the players in the room together also illustrated the level of

collaboration and coordination possible in future activities. Overall, the workshop was beneficial to all involved.

Annex A

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Annex B

WORKSHOP AGENDA

USAID Civil Society Stakeholders' Workshop Le Meridien Jamaica Pegasus Hotel, Belisario Suite October 1, 2001; Kingston, Jamaica

- 9:00 Opening and Prayer
Welcome from USAID/Jamaica –USAID Director Madame Ambassador Mosina Jordan
- 9:15 Introduction of the MSI Team and Workshop Participants
- 10:00 Workshop Objectives and Ground Rules
- Objective 1: Review *Democracy and Governance in Jamaica: An Assessment* (prepared by MSI and USAID/Jamaica, May 2001).
- Objective 2: Obtain Feedback from Participants as to the Role of Civil Society Organizations Working in Citizen Security and Justice to Inform Design of New USAID Program.
- Objective 3: Lay the Groundwork for Possible Future Stakeholder Collaboration Around Citizen Security and Justice Activities.
- 10:30 *Coffee Break*
- 10:45 *Democracy and Governance in Jamaica: An Assessment*, Overview by Dr. Zeric Kay Smith, MSI
- 11:15 Discussion of Assessment and the Role of Civil Society, Focusing on Citizen Security and Justice
- 12:00 *Lunch, served in Belisario Suite*
- 1:00 Examination, Discussion of Issues Surrounding the Work of Civil Society Organizations in Citizen Security and Justice Issues:
- networking/coalition/partnership/information sharing among CSOs
 - accessing decision-makers, policy-makers about specific issues
 - sustainability
 - linking national and grassroots/community-level organizations
- 2:30 *Coffee Break*
- 2:45 The Importance of Partnerships and Networking
Defining Networks and Partnerships. What Makes Partnerships Work? Creating a Stakeholder Map.
- 4:15 National Anthem and Closing

Annex C

An Overview of *Democracy and Governance in Jamaica: An Assessment*

Jan Stromsem – USAID/Washington
Dennis Darby – USAID/Jamaica
Dr. Ivelaw Griffith – Florida Int. Univ., Management Systems Int.
Richard Loudis – USAID/Jamaica
Dr. Zeric Kay Smith – Management Systems International

Much is Right With Jamaica

- ✓ Long experience with democratic institutions
- ✓ Vibrant free press and media
- ✓ Associational freedoms
- ✓ Resilient spirit
 - Community involvement
 - Active NGOs, CSOs, CBOs
 - People of good will in all sectors

Challenges to Efficient Democratic Governance

- Good Governance –
 - Accountable, transparent, efficient
- Rule of Law –
 - Legal structure, human rights, security, judicial integrity
- Consensus –
 - Fundamental rules of political life
- Competition –
 - Elections, Media, Civil Society, Private Sector, in Govt.
- Inclusion –
 - Formal or informal political, economic, social participation

Governance

- ☞ Institutions formally in place but operate at sub-optimal levels
- ☞ Without sufficient resources they suffer from inefficiency
- ☞ Perceptions of public corruption and lack of access to information reduce state legitimacy
- ☞ Political system of winner-take-all politics and patron client ties typified by “Tribal Politics”

Rule of Law

- ✓ Wide rhetorical legitimacy, yet operational rule of law stands on shaky ground
 - Criminal justice and police
 - Drug trade
 - Judicial efficiency
 - Human Rights

Overarching Issues

- ✓ Political Will for Reform
- ✓ Economic Stagnation
- ✓ Drug Trade
- ✓ Patron/Client System
- ✓ Crime and Violence

DG Program Rationale

The rationale proceeds from evidence that democratic institutions and practices have either eroded or failed to develop. It is the assessment team's belief that needed democratic reforms will require greater inclusiveness in public life by all sectors of society, as indicated by a more vigilant and active civil society that is better able to assess good public policy and effectively advocate for change. At the same time, neither democratic nor economic development will be able to proceed in Jamaica without strengthened respect for rule of law. A paramilitary style police force has alienated inner city citizens and an inefficient judicial system invites corruption, human rights abuses, and vigilantism.

Strategic Recommendations: Process

- ❏ Model democratic practice (i.e., inclusive, consultative, participatory, grassroots)
- ❏ Establishment of a common donor framework
- ❏ Collaboration with US operational agencies with focus on Jamaica's needs
- ❏ Development of consensus building activities on key issue(s)
- ❏ Provision of technical and financial assistance through existing SO programs where possible
- ❏ Flexibility to pursue strategic approach
- ❏ Engagement of Jamaican ex-patriot community in the US
 - Design and implementation
 - Political pressure
 - Source of resources and technical expertise

Strategic Recommendations: Program

- ▣ Financial and technical assistance to building civil society capacity
- ▣ Work with the JCF and community to establish a positive and replicable police/community relations model
- ▣ Facilitation of information transfer in the justice system to reduce opportunities for corruption and reestablish public confidence in the functional rule of law

Annex D

GROUP DISCUSSION NOTES

Definitions and Describing the Environment

Participant Comments on Assessment, Democracy and Governance in Jamaica

Last 6 years – rapid growth of civil society sector
Enemy concept: emotional rather than rational discussions
Use of fear and hatred
Barriers to entry (physical, economic, political, social)
Press: “free to a degree”
Dons
Guns: easy to access, easy to import
Lack of accountability (everyone)
Economic marginalization
Legal system – inconsistent, functionality depends on person/class
Populous dismisses justice system
Lack of respect for human life
Dysfunctional community life

Definition of Civil Society Organization (Smith)

Community groups
Advocacy organizations
Service groups
(non-partisan)

Brainstorming: Citizen Security and Justice (Participants)

Trust
Safety for all
Freedom from violence
Freedom from fear of violence
Security of witnesses and jurors
Integrity of crime scene
Economic security
Due process of law
Everyone treated the same regarding the law
All (legal, administrative, political) processes transparent to the public
Accountability: people in power are punished if they cross the line
Honesty
Trust in system and legal processes
Timely legal processes

Education on rights and responsibilities
Effective protection and effective remedies
Having the right of free speech, involvement, and movement

Themes in Citizen Security and Justice

(Participants)

1. Good governance
2. Human rights
3. Citizen involvement, meaningful participation
4. promotion of good governance/transparency
5. establishment of structures of cooperation in civil society

confidence in the system: all people treated justly
educate all players as to their civic rights and responsibilities

(Smith)

1. civic education
2. advocacy
3. institutional strengthening
4. networking

Small Group Work

Group One: Working with Partners: Helping to Construct the Big Picture

Successes:

Forum for dialogue with decision-makers

Barriers:

Competition for donor money

Lack of information

Mistrust

Abuse of power

Fear of losing control/autonomy

Lack of funding

Solutions:

Respect for each other/each other's role, functions, and programs

Good information flow

Training

Trustworthy coordination, "honest broker"

Patience

Determination, consistency

Assured funding

Group Two: Linking National and Grassroots/Community-Level Organizations

Enhancers/Enablers:

- Independence from government
- Community needs to drive program

Barriers:

- Following donor agenda

Solutions:

- Umbrella organizations bring organizations with same agendas
- Better communication to keep autonomy of groups

Group Three: Networking, Coalition-building, Partnership-Building, Information Sharing Among CSOs

Successes:

- Common issue areas
- Group buy-in, members able to see mutual benefit
- Target group needs to have voice in programs
- Central clearinghouse of information (database)

Barriers:

- Groups with different agendas can't get consensus
- Lack of support (institutional)
- Time for members to be productive in the network
- Lack of transparency among donors can lead to competition among members

Solutions:

- Donors need to facilitate networking
- Access to technical/information technology support
- Coordinated effort to inventory resources
- One agency responsible for coordinating networking

Group Four: Accessing Decision-Makers and Policy-Makers About Specific Issues

Successes:

- Presentations in Parliament to assist in the creation of law/policies
- Media attention

Barriers:

- Delay tactics
- Arrogant/made to feel not welcome in the process
- Groups left out of the process, perceived as troublemakers
- The system is design to give a few people a lot of power

Enhancers/Enablers:

- Public forums (talk shows, etc.) – builds awareness and numbers to lobby
- NGOs bringing pressure from their perspective

Solutions:

- Civil society withholds support to political parties if not given a voice
- Legal civil disobedience

TV, radio used to show what's going on behind closed doors = more professional behavior and speech on the part of the decision-makers

Someone maintains watchdog role
(But access doesn't necessarily affect outcome)

Group Five: Sustainability and Sustainable Results

- Successes:
- Full-time time administrator
 - Commitment of members and volunteers
 - Framework in place for organization (legal or informal)
 - On-going evaluation and assessment
 - Focus on objectives of organizations/projects
 - No political agenda
 - Free exchange of ideas with the public
 - Funding
- Barriers:
- Lack of funding
 - Rigidity, inflexibility within organizations/projects
 - Not handling public image well
 - Duplication of efforts, wasting time and money
 - Government interference/bureaucracy
 - Feelings of fear, apathy, frustration
- Solutions:
- Sufficient funding
 - Public image campaign
 - Business/action plan for organizations
 - Recognition and respect of organizations
 - Keep big picture in mind

Networks and Partnerships

Definitions (provided)

Network: An extended group of people with similar interests or concerns who interact and remain in informal contact for mutual assistance or support.

Partnership: A relationship between individuals or groups that is characterized by mutual cooperation and responsibility for the achievement of a specified goal.

Benefits of Partnerships/Networks (provided)

- Keep you up-to-date
- Provide a ready-made audience for your ideas
- Provide support for your actions
- Provide access to varied and multiple skills and resources
- Pool limited resources for a common goal
- Form nucleus of action and attract others
- Provide motivation and moral support (added by participant)

Networking (from plenary discussion)

Participation needs to be voluntary

Members need to be accountable

Information shared must be of good quality

Need to be realistic about environment in which members are working

Leverage existing resources

Messages and communication needs to be culturally-specific

Annex II

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Annex III
INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED

Individual Name/Position	Organization Name
Carriann Mitchell	
Becky Stockhausen	American Chamber of Commerce
Veronica Salter	AWOJA/UWI
Grace Baston	C.A.F.F.E
Donald Blackwood	C.C.J.C
Dorothy Hibbert	CCJC and Faithjustice Servant
Barry Wade	Christian United for Love Justice and Peace
Al Miller	Christian United for Love Justice and Peace, Whole Life Ministries
Luc Frechette	CIDA, Counsellor
Paulette A.G. Jude	CIDA, Enhancing Civil Society Project
Vivian A. Monteith	CIDA, First Secretary
Sharene McKenzie	CIDA/SCLRP
Joy Crooks	CUMI
Liz Hartley	CUMI, Jamaicans for Justice – Montego Bay Chapter
Maureen Weber	Development Options
Paul Hines	Dispute Resolution Foundation
Vivienne DaCosta	Dispute Resolution Foundation
Donna Parchment, Exec. Director	Dispute Resolution Foundation
Michael Morrissey	Education Consultant
Yvonne McCalla Sobers	Families Against State Terrorism (FAST)
Rosalie Jackson	FAST
Ken Jones	Farquharson Institute of Public Affairs (FIPA)
David Bucklet	FIPA
Alfred Sangster	FIPA
Paulette Dixon	FLANCODAC
Horace Donalds	Flock Jamaica Limited
Ruxanne Baines Kandre Leveridge	G2K
Wilmot Perkins Richard Rainford	Hot 102
Simeon Robinson	IADB – Project Executing Unit
Sharon Miller	IADB, Sectoral Specialist
Dr. Lloyd Barnett	Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (IJCHR)
Nancy Anderson	IJCHR
Anthony Chang	Jamaica Chamber of Commerce

Individual Name/Position	Organization Name
Lloyd Goodleigh	Jamaica Con. Of Trade Union
	Jamaica Council of Churches
Deborah Butler	Jamaica Progressive League – Wash, DC Chapter
Hugh Thomas	Jamaica Progressive League – Wash, DC Chapter
Lincoln Brown	Jamaica Progressive League – Wash, DC Chapter
Angela Gray	Jamaicans For Justice
Khruma Williams	Jamaicans For Justice
Jason Excell	Jamaicans For Justice
Liz Hall	Jamaicans For Justice - Mo. Bay
Vahl Williams	Jamaicans For Justice – Mo. Bay
Morin Seymour	Kingston Restoration Company
Robert Davis	KPMG (DFID)
Sybil Williams	Min. of Finance and Planning
Orville Simmonds	MNSJ
Joan Goodin	MSI / Civil Society Capacity Building Expert
Janilee Abrikian	PALS Jamaica
Elaine Myers	Patriots
Donovan Rodriques	Patriots
Sr. M. Amora Binnom	Peace Justice Servants
Sannia Laing	PIOJ
Denise Irving	PIOJ
Heather Robinson	Police Social Action Committee (Polsac)
Peter Townsend	POLSAC
Donna Ortega	Press Association of Jamaica
Mr. Stultz	Research Committee of Jamaica
Lara Finikin	Sisteren Theatre Collective
Richard Billings	Social Development Commission
Beth Koplovsky	St. Patrick Foundation
Fabian Brown	St. Patrick's Foundation
Father Richard Albert	Stella Marris Foundation
Trudy Ann Forbes	Street Law Inc. – Wash. DC
Hillary Phillips	The Jamaica Bar Association
Anthony Johnson	Transparency International Jamaica
Beth Aub	Transparency International Jamaica
Gloria Davis-Simpson	Trench Town Comp. High School
Barbara Richards	UJAA (USA) Inc. NY, NY
	UNDP – Jamaica
Luke George Cooke	United People's Party
Ruel Brown	United People's Party
Russell Porter	USAID / OTI

Individual Name/Position	Organization Name
Larry Cooley	USAID GDA Project Consultant / MSI
Trevor Munroe	UWI- Govt. Dpt.
Sherill Morris	Woman Center
Hughton McLeggan	Woman Center
Jeanette Hall	Woman Inc.
Joyce Hewett	Woman Inc.
Vivine Nembhard	Woman Working for Transformation
Elaine Wint	Woman Working for Transformation
Pamela Walters	Woman Working for Transformation
Carol Narcisse	Woman Working for Transformation and JfJ

Annex IV

Institutional Development Framework (revised 12-Mar-00)

Resources		CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
		Founding	Developing	Expanding/ Consolidating	Sustaining
OVERSIGHT/VISION					
<i>Aspect</i>	<i>Component</i> Board's Role	Roles of Board members and the relationship of Board members to the Executive Director are unclear.	Board members understand their role and how to relate to Executive Director.	Board members assist organization through access to key people and to other organizations.	Board members provide policy direction for action and overall programming.
	Active Board	Board is formally constituted, but not yet active partner.	Board becoming active partner. Contributes and pursues resources.	Board provides some leadership and committees formed, but only some active members.	Significant funds raised by Board and many members of Board play active role.
	Advancing Organization	Board selected based on initial enthusiasm of founding of organization, not necessarily on its long-term development.	Board members' skills do not match with growing needs of organization.	Board's skills match needs of the developing organization.	Board members are catalyst for long-term development of organization.
Mission		No Mission Statement. Group coalesces around general objectives, such as a commitment to environment, health or development.	Mission Statement exists, but is not focused. Diverse portfolio of projects and proposals is not consistent with Mission Statement.	Mission Statement is clear and is generally consistent with portfolio. However, staff are not uniformly capable of articulating the Mission Statement and people outside organization may not identify it with the organization.	Clear Mission Statement. It can be articulated by Board and staff and is consistent with portfolio. Outsiders identify the same mission with the organization.

Resources	CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
	Founding	Developing	Expanding/ Consolidating	Sustaining
Autonomy	Organization is the implementing agent of one donor.	Organization is able to respond to more than one donor and the organization's Board.	Organization is able to obtain funding to support <u>its</u> program, in consultation with the Board.	In addition to managerial and financial autonomy, organization is able to successfully advocate, on behalf of its constituency(ies), to government, donors, and private sector.

Resources		CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
		Founding	Developing	Expanding/Consolidating	Sustaining
MANAGEMENT RESOURCES					
<i>Aspect</i> Leadership Style		All leadership emanates from core founder(s).	Leadership comes from core founder(s) and one or two Board members.	Vision increasingly comes from Board as Board members improve involvement.	All Board members contribute to leadership and development of the organization.
	Board				
	Staff	Staff provide technical input only. Decisions taken by core founder(s).	One or two staff provide organizational impetus, in addition to Executive Director.	Staff increasingly provide vital drive to organization.	Organization would survive without current Executive Director or Chairperson of the Board.
	Mission/Overview	Planning is predominately ad hoc and incremental.	Annual plans are developed and reviewed during course of year. Often not integrated into longer-term strategic plan.	Planning is expanded and more forward oriented, long term/strategic in nature and structured around Mission.	Based on Mission Statement, strategic plan development and annual plans continue as operative instruments with regular review of long term plans.
	Participation	Planning is top-down in orientation, Executive Director, and Board driven.	The participation of staff in planning is widened with contributions to decision making.	Constituents provide information for planning but beneficiaries excluded from decision making.	Constituents and staff contribute to planning <u>decisions</u> along with Exec. Dir./Board.

Resources		CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
		Founding	Developing	Expanding/Consolidating	Sustaining
	Resource Implications	Objectives set without assessment of resource requirements, nor consideration of important external factors.	Accomplishment of objectives tied to resources, but important external factors still overlooked.	Plans are based on resources, and consideration of important external factors. But, organization does not review plan during implementation.	Annual and strategic plans are comprehensive and specific enough to permit accurate resource allocation, and flexible enough to be modified as warranted.
	Work Plan as Tool	Organization does not produce workplans.	Workplans are drafted, but seldom used by management and operations staff	Workplans are used by management and operations staff, but not viewed as dynamic instruments to be modified, as warranted.	Workplans are viewed by management and operations staff as useful tools and are modified as required.
Participatory Management	Appropriate Delegation	Decisions handed down to organization from Executive Director and Chairperson with little or no feedback.	Most management decisions taken by Executive Director and Board. Some input from one or two staff members.	Management decisions increasingly delegated to project managers.	Management decisions delegated to appropriate level of the organization.
	Transparent Decision-Making	Decisions handed down to organization from Executive Director without clear decision criteria and little or no feedback.	Management decision criteria used by Executive Director generally shared with Board, but other staff not included in process.	Decision-making is increasingly operationalized to become transparent to staff; some staff participation in actual decisions.	Transparent decision-making process; full staff participation in relevant decisions.
	Staff Participation	Staff roles and responsibilities unclear and changeable.	Staff roles better understood, but fragmented.	Staff understand role in organization more clearly and how to participate in management.	Staff increasingly able to shape the way in which they participate in management.
	Communication Flow	Intra-staff communications mostly through informal channels.	Emergence of formal channels for dialogue and decision making (such as staff meetings).	Communications are open and inter-hierarchical. Formal and informal channels established and utilized.	Organization periodically reviews communication flow to ensure free flow of information through both formal and informal channels.
Management Systems	Personnel Systems	No formal personnel systems (job descriptions, recruitment and hiring procedures, etc.) exist.	Some, but not all necessary, personnel systems exist. Informal employment practices persist.	Virtually all necessary personnel systems are institutionalized. Occasionally informal mechanisms are used.	Formal personnel systems are institutionalized, understood by employees and redress can be pursued.
	File Systems	No formal file system exists.	Files are maintained, but are not comprehensive or systematic.	Files are systematic, and accessible, but significant gaps remain.	Files are comprehensive, systematic and accessible.

Resources		CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
		Founding	Developing	Expanding/Consolidating	Sustaining
	Administrative Procedures	Few administrative procedures formalized, or, if formalized, not followed.	Administrative procedures increasingly formalized and followed but no operating manual exists.	Administrative manual in place, although not up to date or considered the arbiter of procedures.	Administrative manual updated, as needed. Considered the arbiter of procedures.
Service Delivery		Service delivery to NGO customers is supply-driven, often responding to the specifications of donors.	Type, quantity and quality of services delivered to NGO customers is at the initiative of the organization. However, little monitoring of service quality is undertaken. Customer input into product design or quality review is <i>ad hoc</i> , if at all.	Organization makes consistent effort to obtain NGO customer input into determining the appropriate type, quantity and quality of services. NGO customers' attitudes and perceptions are accessed, at least on an annual basis, to provide feedback into how to improve services.	Organization is committed to ongoing process of continuous quality improvement of services provided to NGOs. Services are tailored in response to articulated customer preferences and quality is continually monitored through customer feedback. Service delivery improvements are made based on this data.

Resources		CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
		Founding	Developing	Expanding/ Consolidating	Sustaining
MANAGEMENT RESOURCES					
Constituency Participation		Organization involves its constituency (ies) only as recipients of the organization's program.	Organization draws on its constituency (ies) leaders for advice and mobilization of its members.	Organization draws on its constituency(ies) leaders in planning, implementation and evaluation events.	Constituency (ies) participate fully in planning, implementation, and evaluation. Constituency (ies) contributing cash, material, labour, and management to create and maintain project results.
Monitoring and Evaluation	Integration into Decision Making	No formal evaluation mechanisms exist. Word of mouth and "gut" feelings are used.	Occasional evaluations are undertaken, usually at request of donor and implemented by outsiders.	Evaluation are initiated by staff; staff increasingly involved in their execution; some management decisions are taken based on data; M&E still isolated management function	Ongoing M&E system functioning and data analysis are integrated into decision- making.
	Constituency Feedback	No feedback from constituency (ies).	Informal channels for constituency (ies) feedback.	Formal mechanisms exist for constituency (ies) feedback but only via surveys and evaluations. Women and marginalized groups not included.	Continuous feedback and input from constituency (ies) where women and marginalized groups are clearly involved.

Resources	CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
	Founding	Developing	Expanding/ Consolidating	Sustaining
Human Resources				
Skills	Too few people are filling too broad a range of professional skills.	Specialists are brought on (or contracted) for core skills areas, such as accounting and fundraising. Some gaps remain.	All core skills areas are covered with staff and external experts.	All skills areas are covered and staff/external experts are recognized for excellence and provide expertise and assistance to outside organizations.
Strategy	Human resource development is <i>ad hoc</i> and based on emerging opportunities.	General direction provided for staff development, but it is short-term and project based.	Staff development is based on needs assessment and an action plan exists. The plan is consistent with organizational mission.	Professional development is considered part of overall development of organization. It is supported by individual career development plans.
Training	Little, or no, training provided.	Training is significant, but is <i>ad hoc</i> in nature.	Training is generally consistent with plan, but is still not fully systematic or sufficient.	Actual training meets or exceeds specifications of individual career development plans.
Mentoring	Little or no coaching or counselling, provided.	Some coaching and counselling, provided.	Staff receive adequate teaching, counselling, coaching, and mentoring, but mutual staff development still not integrated into organization.	Internal professional support considered important part of each staff person's job.
Motivation	Little or no recognition of employee performance. Staff "burn-out" is common.	Performance recognized informally, but no formal mechanisms exists.	Formal performance appraisal system established.	Employees participate in objective setting and know what is expected of them.

Resources		CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
		Founding	Developing	Expanding/Consolidating	Sustaining
FINANCIAL RESOURCES					
<u>Aspects</u> Financial	Planning	Budgets are set unrealistically. Budgets are developed incrementally on a project-by-project basis, usually only for donor funding.	Budgets are maintained on project-by project basis, but are not used as instrument for organizational decision making. Awareness of overall annual financial condition emerges.	Organization maintains a multi-year “master” organizational budget, but still does not manage finances accordingly.	Financial planning is based on a “master” organizational budget and includes overall financial condition in long-term organizational planning and management.
	Control	Financial resources are mainly controlled by donors. Internal controls are weak.	Financial procedures are established, but still are not fully systematic.	Financial procedures are systematic and established to support operational management. Documented procedures facilitate ongoing controls.	Control is an internal management function. Organization does not perceive controls as being excessive.
	Reporting	Financial reports are incomplete and difficult to understand. Organization often needs to be prodded to produce them.	Financial reports are clearer but still incomplete. Reports are project-specific and usually submitted on timely basis.	Financial reports are clear and complete, even as portfolio becomes more complex. Formal reports are regularly used in operational management.	Reports and data system can quickly provide a sense of overall financial health. Reports are always timely, trusted, and available to the public.
	Audits	Audits are not performed.	External audits are only rarely performed.	External audits are performed frequently, but aperiodically.	External audits are performed with a regular, and appropriate, frequency.
	Separation of Accounts	Funds are not separated for different projects within the	Project funds are separated only when required by donors.	Standard procedure is to avoid cross-project financing . All	All project funds are separated and adequate controls exist to

Resources		CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
		Founding	Developing	Expanding/Consolidating	Sustaining
		organization.		funds are separated, but occasional cross-project financing occurs.	avoid cross-project financing.
<i>Financial Vulnerability</i>	Funding Diversity	Financing comes from only one source.	Financing comes from multiple sources, but 70% or more from one source.	No single source of funding provides more than 60% of funding.	No single source provides more than 40% of funding.
	Local Resource Mobilization	Local resource mobilization (including goods and services) for operational income is untried or unsuccessful.	Local resource mobilization pursued on an <i>ad hoc</i> , basis.	Local resource mobilization strategy is operational	Local resource mobilization strategy is operational. X% of annual expenditures generated from local resources.
<i>Financial Viability</i>		Project funding is scarce and is dependent on local opportunities.	Funding is available to cover project activities, consistent with mission.	Funding is available for short-term costs. Medium-term funding strategies exist.	All projects, consistent with mission, have long-term funding plans and current funds are adequate to meet needs of management plan.

Resources		CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
		Founding	Developing	Expanding/ Consolidating	Sustaining
<i>(a) External Resources</i>					
Public Relations	Public Recognition	Organization little known outside the range of its donors and direct beneficiaries.	Organization is known in its own community, but does little to promote its activities to general public and key decision-makers.	Organization has contact with key decision makers and has developed some lines of communication with public.	Organization and its work is well known to public and policy makers. Able to engage decision-makers in dialogue on policy. It has a supportive constituency, and commands respect outside that constituency.
	Media Strategy	Organization makes little use of media, perhaps preferring to maintain a low profile. Occasionally, press will initiate encounters. No established mechanisms for communication.	Organization begins to seek out media exposure. Usually based on publicizing specific compartmentalized project events.	Organization able to gain access to media through formal and informal mechanisms. Exposure of organization to media frequent, but not yet strategic.	Organization uses its established media relationships for frequent and effective public communication. A media strategy exists and attempts are made, through social marketing and other means, to both make the organization known and to foster a broader public awareness in support of the Mission.
Constituency Orientation		Organization operates in centralized manner with little connection to constituency.	Organization serves constituency based on perceptions/assessment, but without active constituency involvement.	Constituency input sought for key decisions. Organization and its efforts viewed by constituency as service provided to constituency.	Constituency integrated into organization's policies and practices.

Resources	CRITERIA FOR EACH PROGRESSIVE STAGE			
	Founding	Developing	Expanding/ Consolidating	Sustaining
<i>Ability to work with central and local government</i>	Viewed as "we", "they". Little communication. Tension is frequent between government and organization.	Relations are friendly. Collaboration occasionally occurs on specific tasks and projects.	Collaboration is frequent, usually on informal level. Relations are friendly, but still not as equal partners.	Formal and informal mechanisms exist for collaboration and are often used. Relations are as equal partners.
<i>Ability to work with other NGOs.</i>	Organization does not have experience working with other NGOs. Not known or trusted by NGO community.	Organization increasingly known and trusted by NGO community. Experience with collaboration based on project implementation requirements only.	Organization works with international or local NGOs, and participates in NGO networks and coalitions. Networks and coalitions are based on constituency needs.	Organization plays leadership role in promoting NGO coalitions based on constituencies' interests. Capable of helping to resolve NGO-NGO or NGO Govt conflict and of affecting policy on behalf of constituency