

**U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Humanitarian Response
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)**



OTI-funded poster, "Freedom for a New Millennium," Serbia 2000

**RESULTS REVIEW
FY 2003
June 22, 2001**



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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: Frank Alejandro, BHR/PPM

SUBJECT: FY 2003 Results Review of the Office of Transition Initiatives

PURPOSE: To record the discussion that took place regarding the Office of Transition Initiatives FY 2003 Results Report

Background: The Results Review for the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was held on Wednesday, June 13, 2001 in conference room 4.08 E/F with representatives from each of the agency's regional and central bureaus in attendance.

Summary of Discussion: The review was opened with a cordial welcome and brief introductory, logistical and procedural comments by Lowell E. Lynch, Director, BHR/PPM. Lowell emphasized the excellent work OTI has done over the last reporting period, focusing his remarks on activities in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone. Jim Lehman and Diana Ohlbaum, OTI Director and Deputy followed Lowell's comments, respectively. Jim introduced each of OTI's regional team leaders and referenced some of the challenges staff has confronted over the past reporting period. Angela Martin, Chris O'Donnell and Eileen Wickstrom Smith, Robert Jenkins and Kirk Day, and Russell Porter provided highlights for programs in Africa, Asia, E&E, LAC. OTI also discussed its organizational management and program development efforts with presentations by Roger Conrad and Mary Stewart.

Generally, OTI has focused much attention on integrating its activities within mission strategic frameworks, and staff have made extra efforts to collaborate more closely with partners within the agency, with PVOs and NGO, and, most importantly, with its local partners. Considerable emphasis has been placed on institutionalizing OTI's activities with the rest of the Agency.

Jim Lehman pointed out OTI's new mission statement and its new legislation and funding from Congress. Diana Ohlbaum identified the challenges OTI faced in the past reporting period, particularly OTI's own transition in response to a changing administration, and the issue of managing resources judiciously.

Key points raised and discussed at the review included, but were not limited to the following:

- Strategic Plan - OTI's strategic plan expires in January 2002. The office has been actively exploring options on the most appropriate way to address this given the change in administration and a proposed new agency reorganization. It was recommended that OTI be clear about when the new strategy will be completed and decide if there should be a request for deferment while it waits for more guidance on the new administration's plans for the agency and bureau.

- Performance Monitoring Plan – OTI was commended on improvements in performance monitoring in the R4 document. It was suggested that, in addition to its current set of process indicators, OTI should also think about measuring its collaboration, hand-off, and cross-fertilization. OTI should maintain its new focus on documenting impact.
- Collaboration/coordination - A comment was introduced stating that OTI's work was duplicative in nature and that much of the office's effort was already performed by others within and/or outside of the agency. OTI responded by stating that it endeavors to work closely not only with colleagues in USAID, but also with its partners in the NGO community and the US government. Constant interaction with colleagues helps to reduce and diminish the problem of duplication. Good examples were cited from Croatia and Zimbabwe. In other cases, the problem of egos and turf gets in the way, but these too are quickly addressed. In fact, over the past reporting period OTI made an effort to invite mission and/or regional bureau staff on initial assessment teams that recommend whether or not to engage in a country and draft the approach to be followed in that particular country.
- Hand-Off – OTI discussed its efforts to improve hand-off strategies. It was agreed that not all program elements need to be handed off and that hand-off partners can extend beyond USAID. It was argued that in some places, i.e. Croatia, OTI left too soon. The same may be true in Nigeria, where OTI is scheduled to exit in September 2001.
- Technology – It was noted that \$15 million is available for projects in the area of information technology.
- Personnel – It was asked whether OTI has checks and balances for decisions made by field staff. OTI's programs are field-based but it was noted that several mechanisms act as "checks" against individual decisions, including close contact with Washington, transparency through the OTI database, local and worldwide staff retreats.
- Sharing Lessons Learned – OTI was advised to share more of its lessons learned with the Democracy and Governance Center. For example, schedule more Tuesday Group presentations.
- Maintaining Independence – Although coordination and collaboration were stressed frequently throughout the meeting, it was also noted that OTI needs to maintain its independence in order to remain strategic. There is a tension between independence and collaboration.
- Education – It was asked what OTI's role is in the area of education in post-conflict countries. Several examples were given from East Timor, Sierra Leone and Kosovo.

- Corruption – It was asked whether OTI should be focused on corruption. Although OTI does work in this area if there is an overwhelming need, or if it are jumpstarting Mission activities, it is traditionally the purview of long-term development actors.

Summary: OTI has been working closely with its USAID colleagues and other U.S. Government agencies on some of the most important foreign policy challenges this country faces. OTI looks forward to continued collaboration and sharing, and hopes that this constructive dialogue will enhance mutual efforts to fulfill OTI's role more productively. OTI faces many challenges in the years ahead in order to move closer to integrating its activities with the rest of the agency, while at the same time striving to achieve maximum impact in the short time span of its activities.

There were no action items, other than the need for clarification on completion of OTI's strategic plan.

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USAID – OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES
RESULTS REVIEW FY 2000
May 7, 2001

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PART 1: OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

I. INTRODUCTION

Around the world, OTI's work in post-conflict and conflict-prone countries is helping to put USAID at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy and is making a critical difference in the lives of citizens. Of the approximately 20 priority countries mentioned by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his Senate confirmation hearing, OTI was active in half during FY 2000. Many more are on OTI's watch list, which tracks potential transitions worldwide.

A broader definition of appropriate settings for OTI's special interventions now includes complex emergencies, post-conflict scenarios, and the prevention of violent conflict. In order to break the vicious cycle of poverty, repression and recurring disasters, OTI helps to transform the underlying political dynamics. This is accomplished through support for people and organizations that actively promote peace, democracy, good governance, interethnic cooperation, transparency, accountability, freedom of information, and the protection of human rights.

OTI's mission of supporting local partners has proven sound. Throughout this document are examples of how OTI's investment in the efforts of nascent non-governmental organizations, citizens groups, and media outlets has resulted in positive change – conflicts prevented, managed and transformed; corrupt officials removed from offices; laws changed, and new, democratic leaders elected.

The international and U.S. media have highlighted the work of OTI programs and grantees in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Indonesia, Colombia, Kosovo, and Serbia-Montenegro. Otpor, the student opposition group credited with helping to unseat Milosevic in Serbia, has gained international acclaim. Otpor called OTI "the single largest donor and...the fastest and most flexible in providing support to Otpor's activities."

Other highlights of FY 2000 include:

- **Critical input to the design of programs that reduce the scope of illicit diamond exports from Sierra Leone;**
- **Successful interventions to manage or mitigate violent conflict in East Timor, Indonesia, and Nigeria;**
- **Supporting civil society's efforts to reform the constitution and open up political dialogue in Zimbabwe; and**
- **Supporting Kosovars in the process of rebuilding their communities while preparing them for the challenges of self-governance.**

A. Country Presence

In FY 2000, OTI initiated a new country program in Zimbabwe and continued activities in fourteen other countries (Albania, Bosnia, Colombia, Croatia, DROC, East Timor, Honduras, Indonesia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, and Sierra Leone). Over the course of the year, OTI closed programs in three of these (Bosnia, Croatia, and

Honduras). OTI attempts to limit its involvement in each country to two or three years, after which it hands off activities to the USAID Mission or other partners. Figure 1 shows OTI's country presence from FY 1995 to FY 2002. The shaded column shows active country programs in FY 2000.

Figure 1. OTI Country Presence

COUNTRY	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02
Angola ¹					◆			
Haiti	◆			◆				
Rwanda	◆							
Liberia		◆			◆			
Bosnia-Herzegovina		◆				◆		
Sierra Leone			◆	suspended				◆
Sri Lanka			◆		◆			
Guatemala			◆		◆			
Croatia			◆			◆		
Kosovo			◆		---			◆
Serbia ² / Montenegro			◆		---	◆		◆
Philippines			◆				◆	
DROC				◆	---	---	◆	
Indonesia				◆				◆
Nigeria					◆			◆
Colombia					◆			◆
Honduras					◆	◆		
Albania					◆		◆	
Lebanon					◆		◆	
Zimbabwe						◆		◆
East Timor					◆			◆
Peru							◆	→

LEGEND	
—◆	Program started before period displayed in table
◆—◆	Program started and exited (may be estimated)
◆—→	Program expected to continue beyond period displayed in table
---	Reduced program activity
suspended	Program was suspended ³

¹ OTI's first program, Angola, began in FY 1994.

² Dates of reduced program activity refer to Serbia only.

³ "Suspended" means that program activities end early (staff are evacuated but funding is still committed to the country), due to changing and unfavorable conditions, but with expectations to resume activities.


B. Resource Flexibility and the Transition Initiative Line Item

After growing rapidly in the first few years of its existence, OTI’s core funding (previously in the form of International Disaster Assistance, now in a separate account entitled Transition Initiatives) has held constant at the level of approximately \$50 million for FY 1999 and FY 2000. As a measure of OTI’s success, in FY 2000 other offices and agencies contributed an additional \$12 million (25% of OTI’s core budget) for OTI activities in Kosovo (\$781,339 SEED), East Timor (\$10,950,000 ESF) and Sierra Leone (\$250,000 DFA). By April 2001, OTI had already received an additional fifty percent of its FY 2001 budget from outside funding.

At its current staff and management capacity, OTI can engage in only a limited number of countries, although not all countries have the same level of activity. As OTI exits countries, it enters others, thus keeping program levels fairly constant. A strict adherence to its policy of staying in countries a maximum of 2-3 years helps to ensure that OTI is available for places most in need of transition assistance. In the future, OTI may choose to focus on fewer, high-priority countries. Any increase in country presence beyond current levels must correspond to expanded resources for the Office to manage additional programs.

In FY 2000, OTI’s resources continued to be channeled to countries of high-priority national interest. Figure 2 demonstrates that five priority countries – Indonesia, Nigeria, Kosovo, Serbia-Montenegro, and East Timor – make up 72% of OTI’s budget.

Figure 2. OTI FY 2000 Budget (000)



C. Partnerships

OTI recognizes that, with a budget of \$50 million and staff of just 50 worldwide, strong partnerships are the key factor for achieving maximum impact. OTI’s closest relationships exist

within USAID—with the Missions, Bureaus and Offices, such as the Center for Democracy and Governance and the Office of Procurement. Without these relationships, the work that OTI undertakes in a country's political development would not be initiated, sustained, or built upon once OTI leaves the country. In FY 2000, OTI reinforced these partnerships by including USAID colleagues in new country assessments and strategic planning retreats, staff meetings and task forces, and program evaluations. At OTI's pilot orientation for new staff in September, representatives from various USAID and USG offices were invited to present sessions on their work and comment on how OTI could build stronger relationships with them. Because of its flexible funding and expertise in conflict, OTI was asked to sit on the selection panel for a new conflict specialist in the Africa Bureau. OTI also participated in several conflict-related groups within the Agency, including the Conflict Core Group and the Emergency Response Council.

One new mechanism for building relationships is the development of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between departments or offices. In FY 2000, OTI/Kosovo signed an MOU with USAID/Kosovo that outlined administrative areas of coordination. This MOU was later replicated with USAID Missions in Serbia and Peru. OTI also signed an MOU with the U.S. Department of Defense, promoting cooperation in support of civilian-military relations.

OTI's on-going challenge in FY 2001 will be to reinforce existing relationships, and to proactively seek out new relationships that will enhance OTI's programs. New activities may include a jointly-funded RFA with the Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation.

OTI works through implementing partners in all of its programs. In FY 2000, OTI's

USAID Missions reported on their close collaboration with OTI in their R4s. Both USAID/Zimbabwe and USAID/Indonesia reported on OTI activities as success stories.

"The agile resources of OTI are having an important complement to our development assistance program. Support for the independent media, especially in the wake of the bombing of the only independent daily newspapers, legal assistance, support for constitutional reform and other dialogue efforts are allowing the mission to respond in a unique way to the crisis and political transition." USAID/Zimbabwe Results Review FY 2000: 4.

In addition, USAID/Indonesia included OTI under its key results in the area of conflicts and crisis. In fact, with the exception to humanitarian assistance to IDPs and victims of natural disasters, all of their accomplishments in this area were supported by OTI.

"The Office of Transition Initiatives is an essential part of the Mission, working closely with our democracy and conflict teams. OTI brings rapid response and flexibility in achieving the mission's objectives." USAID/Indonesia Results Review FY 2000: 3.

USAID/Kosovo noted the hand-off of OTI programs into its portfolios:

"As of the Office of Transition Initiatives in Kosovo draws to a close, USAID plans to absorb five of its seven field offices into USAID field operations in an effort to promote civic participation and support citizen interaction with the new municipal governments. The programs comprising SO 3.1 as well as those in the democracy portfolio will use these field offices to facilitate citizen participation in project identification and decision making as well as provide feedback on the grassroots impact of the Mission's activities." USAID/Kosovo and Montenegro Performance Report for FY 2000: 23.

implementing partners included: Albania – International Organization of Migration and Development Alternatives Incorporated; Bosnia – RONCO; Colombia – International Committee of the Red Cross, the Salesian Missions, and the International Organization of Migration; Croatia – Ronco; DROC – Development Alternatives Incorporated; East Timor – Development Alternatives Incorporated; Honduras – International Organization of Migration; Indonesia – Development Alternatives Incorporated; Kosovo – Ronco and the International Organization of Migration; Lebanon – Information International, the International Center for Journalists, and the State University of New York/Albany; Nigeria – Louis Berger International; Philippines – Development Alternatives Incorporated; Serbia-Montenegro – Ronco; Sierra Leone – Management Systems International, World Vision, Search for Common Ground; Zimbabwe – PACT.

In addition, OTI also funded the following U.S. PVOs and NGOs: Internews, the Institute for World Affairs, International Foundation for Election Systems, the Carter Center, and the International Center for Non-Profit Law.

For a more in-depth look at how OTI partners with others in the field, see Annex 3.

II. NEW APPROACHES

OTI constantly seeks to fill critical gaps in assistance and to address root causes of conflict. In FY 2000, OTI continued to innovate. In addition to its groundbreaking work on conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone and community stabilization in East Timor (described elsewhere in this report), OTI designed new programming to address police reform in Nigeria and used computerization of revenue systems to address municipal-level corruption in Lebanon.

- **Police Reform in Nigeria.** After the 1999 Nigerian elections ushered in civilian-led democratic rule, the police were charged with the internal security of the country. Recognizing that limited police capability posed a real threat to peace and democracy, OTI jumpstarted efforts to lay the foundation for a broad-based police reform program. OTI was the catalyst for the formation of the Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), a consortia of Nigerian non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations that focus on police reform, human rights and related issues.

OTI designed its police program to be part of a larger USG approach to help the Government of Nigeria achieve a sustainable transformation of law enforcement. OTI agreed to fully fund the strategic planning and design of yearly action plans to modernize and strengthen the police, and the design of a USG program of assistance to implement selected activities. OTI fielded a team in July 2000 with participation from the British Department of International Development (DFID) to work with the Nigerian Police Force, Ministry of Police Affairs (MPA) and civil society groups.

In FY 2001, OTI deployed a second team to complete the action plans in coordination with the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement office at the Department of State, and secured \$4.2 million in ESF funding for implementation of the program. In part due to OTI's program, USAID has established a new Working Group on the issue of police reform.

- **Computerizing Administrative Processes within Municipal Governments.** In Lebanon, OTI funding gave the USAID Mission the opportunity to expand its ongoing municipality assistance program into Beirut and Jounieh municipalities. The program, implemented by SUNY/Albany, created a 'one-stop shop' for reducing the number of interactions between

citizens and municipal officials in an effort to reduce corruption. The program has provided very tangible results. Citizens now have a system of clear and streamlined procedures where the costs and processing times for each transaction are publicly noted. The process makes it more difficult for municipal employees to accept bribes.

In the process of implementing the computerized document tracking system, Jounieh municipality uncovered a conspiracy between three municipal employees. The officials allegedly collected taxes from citizens, gave them falsified receipts, and recorded false numbers in the municipal documents. It is estimated that they stole approximately \$250,000 from the municipality. The former employees are currently in jail awaiting trial. That the fraud was uncovered can be directly attributed to the work of the SUNY program.

With the SUNY program, "signatures are cut by one half. In the old system, an individual needed to gather an average of 76 signatures that took an average of two years. Now, citizens can obtain the required signatures in two weeks, or so."
--Beirut municipal council member

Jounieh has also been able to increase its tax revenues. The computerized system generates the taxpayer list and specifies how much each citizen owes and whether or not the citizen has paid the taxes. These changes resulted in an increase of tax revenue in Jounieh municipality from \$25,000 in 2000 to \$150,000 expected in 2001.

According to municipal workers, the program will be sustainable once SUNY's involvement in the program ends. After seeing the new system in Jounieh, the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Municipalities have expressed interest in expanding the SUNY program to all municipalities in Lebanon.

- **Developing Information Technology Lessons Learned**


OTI is experimenting with several pilot projects that involve the internet. These have ranged from establishing internet connectivity to radio stations in Indonesia, to setting up a multiethnic internet center in a minority village of Kosovo. Many of these have proven successful. However, OTI has learned that use of the internet is not always applicable to transition settings. A recent initiative in Nigeria to connect seven journalism centers to the internet failed in five of the seven centers. An assessment of the project revealed problems ranging from connectivity difficulties to inappropriate use of equipment and lack of sufficient training on internet use. Most notably, the assessment recognized that there was an incompatibility in program objectives. On the one hand, the project was intended to provide a public service by providing information. On the other, the centers were expected to become financially sustainable. OTI/Nigeria is now revising the project by moving the internet terminals into conflict management resource centers that are able to provide public access at little or no cost.

PART 2: RESULTS REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION

OTI reports on three intermediate results: enhanced citizen security, contribution to democratic processes, and improved targeting of its efforts. Figure 3 illustrates OTI's results framework.

Figure 3. OTI Strategic Results Framework



II. IR 1: ENHANCED CITIZEN SECURITY

OTI's activities under IR 1 for FY 2000 focused on ex-combatant reintegration and community stabilization, which involved the provision of short-term economic assistance to communities devastated by violence. Through the opening of employment opportunities, potential spoilers were re-directed into actively rebuilding their community's economic and physical infrastructure.

With time, OTI has learned that activities that focus solely on citizen security, such as mine action, may be better suited to other donors with a specialization in the field. OTI's greatest strength is concentrated more heavily in IR 2: Democratic Political Processes. OTI's next Five-Year Strategic Plan will reflect this reality, but will retain IR 1 in order to describe accurately OTI's on-going efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants and promote security sector reform.

A. Technical Assistance

OTI's results under this IR were not limited to its own country programs. The following examples were provided with technical assistance only. Technical assistance does not necessarily constitute the use of OTI funds to establish an OTI program.

- **Applying OTI Methodology to Angola Reconstruction Plan.** In May 2000, OTI provided technical assistance to the Government of Angola (GOA). At the GOA's request, OTI designed a strategy to help other donors support Angola's reconstruction and rehabilitation. The GOA agreed to the principles outlined in the strategy, which would be implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Development Program. Potential activities included reintegration of ex-combatants, a community-based reconstruction program, and a special fund to invest in parts of the country affected by conflict.
- **Responding to USG Requests.** In addition, OTI responded to requests for enhanced programming in the security sector in two existing country programs. These included an assessment at the request of the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia to help structure a U.S. Government response to a worsening situation in Aceh and a request by the USAID Mission in Colombia for OTI to assess, design and administer a program to reintegrate child soldiers in Colombia. In Aceh, OTI increased its level of support to the Henry Dunant Center, which is facilitating a "Humanitarian Pause" between the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). In Colombia, in FY 2001, OTI signed a \$2.5 million cooperative agreement with the International Organization of Migration (IOM) to implement the child soldier reintegration program.

B. Ex-Combatant Re-integration

- **Strengthening the Peace Agreement between the Philippine Government and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Ex-combatants.** OTI successfully brought the Government of the Philippines back into neglected, Muslim areas of Mindanao. OTI effectively addressed the root causes of the conflict—the lack of government services delivered to Muslim areas—by effectively involving local and national Philippine Government agencies at the community level. Of the \$2.8 million total project funds, the Government of the Philippines contributed almost fifty percent; local communities contributed over fifteen percent; and OTI contributed the remaining thirty-five percent. These counterpart contributions greatly increased the pool of available resources and strengthened alliances critical to the peace effort. The program helped to provide the communities with a new sense of hope for a longer-term solution to the problems of poverty and isolation. The ex-MNLF groups interviewed said that they now feel connected, have a vested interest in preserving their relationship with the Government of the Philippines, and have no desire to go back to war.

“Without exception, ex-combatants affirmed a positive correlation between OTI project support and a better life.”
--Final program evaluation

- **Reintegrating 40,000 War-Affected Youth in Sierra Leone:** OTI's Reintegration Training and Education for Peace initiative in Sierra Leone is a two-year, nationwide, non-formal education initiative that will serve approximately 40,000 ex-combatant and non-combatant young adults. The program focuses simultaneously on reintegrating war-torn communities and providing remedial education for youth that have been by-passed by schooling during ten years of war. The program combines reintegration orientation and counseling with life-skills

training, vocational counseling, agriculture skills development, civic education, health, and functional literacy training through five modules of facilitated learning. Workshops are organized in locations with a high number of ex-combatants.

By the end of FY 2000, 30 master trainers and 1,340 learning facilitators had been trained; over 60 Community Management Councils were organized to sponsor the training groups; and 670 groups of 13,400 participants were enrolled in the courses. Although the impact of the reintegration training on the 2,654 ex-combatants is difficult to assess at this early stage, participants' testimonials have indicated that the training has contributed to their re-socialization. For example, an ex-combatant participant in OTI's Education for Peace Program was quoted by implementing partner World Vision as saying: "This training is more important than the monthly stipends because the training will stay with us forever, but the stipends are just relief therapies that are short lived. This is the first training for youth with a very big difference, because it focuses our attention on self-discoveries, in terms of our attitudes and behaviors in our respective communities. It has also helped us to reflect on what we used to be before the training."

C. **Civilian/Military Relations**

- **Expanding civilian-military reform efforts in Indonesia.** Recognizing the importance to the U.S. Government of promoting civilian oversight of the Indonesian military (TNI), OTI/Indonesia expanded its efforts in the civilian/military arena in FY 2000. OTI helped enhance civilian capacity for military oversight by undertaking 24 activities that supported legislative oversight of the military, raised awareness on the issues of military-owned businesses, corruption, territorial affairs, control of natural resources, and addressed the military's involvement in inter-ethnic conflict.

For the first time, in March 2000, OTI/Indonesia teamed with another U.S. Government office, the Office of the Military Attaché for Defense Programs (OMADP), for the purpose of supporting a civilian/military program that studies the controversial territorial command structure of the TNI. The data collected were presented at the national level to help inform decision-makers about alternative command structures.

In June 2000, the Institute for Research and Empowerment, an OTI grantee based in Central Java, conducted discussions among local citizen leaders and members of the police and military on the traditional role of the military in local politics. As a result of these discussions, military personnel were prohibited from becoming village leaders or holding official village posts.

D. **Security Sector Reform**

- **Strengthening Peace Negotiations in Aceh.** In Aceh, Indonesia, OTI supported the efforts of the Henry Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, which brokered a "Humanitarian Pause" between the armed separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GOI). Under the terms of the Pause Agreement, the two sides agreed to provide space and security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout the province, as well as develop a framework for future rehabilitation and development. OTI opened a field office with two Achenese staff in Banda Aceh the same month that the Pause was signed, supported a local NGO to publicize the Pause Agreement via a mass media campaign, and provided office infrastructure and transportation to the Security and Humanitarian Action

Committees created by the Agreement. The OTI commitments were the first from the international community and permitted the Committees to become immediately operational.

- **Helping Sierra Leone Reign in Illegal Diamond Trade.** OTI pioneered the response to "conflict" diamonds in Sierra Leone with technical assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL). In March 2000, OTI and the U.S. Embassy in Sierra Leone hosted a groundbreaking workshop in Freetown. The workshop brought together government cabinet members, parliamentarians, representatives of civil society and human rights NGOs, traditional leaders, the rebel RUF leader, diplomatic representatives from Canada and the United Kingdom, and international diamond experts. This led to OTI's May 2000 Working Paper, which synthesized the results of the March workshop. The report was published by the GOSL as its policy framework and has been subsequently implemented. UN sanctions against Sierra Leone diamonds were adopted on July 7, 2000, and OTI worked as part of a trilateral technical team, along with Belgium and the UK, to assist the GOSL in complying with UN Resolution 1306.

The GOSL, with assistance from OTI and the Diamond High Council of Belgium, developed and operationalized a new Certification of Origin regime in October 2000. The "Sierra Leone model," particularly the aspects related to the electronic tracking of diamond exports and imports, is now being used as a basis for developing a global diamond certification system.

E. Community Stabilization

- **Providing Short-term Economic Opportunities after the Post-Referendum Violence in East Timor.** At a time when there was little visible impact of donor efforts in East Timor, OTI's Temporary Employment Program (TEP) injected critical financial resources into devastated communities, provided young people with a constructive use of their time, and provided tangible results to the East Timorese. Under TEP, OTI created over 65,000 temporary jobs in East Timor and contributed to 597 infrastructure projects—repairing roads, re-building irrigation systems, re-roofing schools, and rehabilitating market places. By providing cash, equipment, materials, and employment opportunities, OTI's program helped reduce community tensions and the likelihood of violence.

"The community has responded to TEP with enthusiasm, which is reflected in their devotion to performance. Different international NGOs involved in TEP implementation in Ainaro have also responded positively, as accessibility to resources to assist the people of East Timor has been an enduring problem. The Catholic Church, political groups and other local players have all welcomed the program, not only because of the direct and quantifiable benefits but also because through TEP, young people are kept busy in useful pursuits and away from anti-social activities and politically destabilizing behavior."
-- June 2000 UNTAET Ainaro District Administration Monthly Report

III. IR 2: DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES INITIATED, RE-ESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED

OTI's second, and proportionately larger intermediate result in terms of activities, is the enhancement of democratic processes. OTI's activities in this IR include support to civil society, media and elections-related programs, promotion of transparency and good governance, conflict management activities, community impact projects, and support for human rights.

A. Civil Society

- **Changing Public Perceptions about NGOs in Croatia.** In a country with little history of volunteerism and general suspicion of NGOs, OTI grantee GONG recruited, trained, and accredited 5,000 domestic election volunteers for three elections. GONG was so successful that it was requested by the Government of Croatia to become a permanent member of the electoral commission and changed the national perception of NGOs. An independent study identified GONG as the "most important organization to the pre-election campaign for parliament."

For the January 2000 election, over 120 NGOs joined together in various coalitions to encourage public participation. These coalitions, supported by OTI, were non-partisan and communicated to the public basic voter information and the responsibilities of citizens and political parties. A national survey on the acceptance of civil society and the role of NGOs showed that 53% agreed that NGOs helped in getting important information out to the public during the elections.

In a network analysis of 17 NGOs and alternative media in Zagreb, OTI emerged as the most frequently talked to organization and more importantly, the organization that NGOs had the richest (face to face, meetings, personal contact) communication. The data suggested that OTI staff had enormous impact on the NGOs that they worked with, and by extension, on the 2000 election process.

Once NGOs were accepted, they began to exert their influence with positive results. An OTI-sponsored legal advice organization, SAN, exposed a law that was on the books limiting public gatherings of more than 20 people. Through a cooperative effort with media and other NGOs, SAN helped to repeal this law in the Daruvar municipality.

- **Enabling NGOs to Contribute to Reconstruction.** In East Timor, OTI's timely support to approximately 35 civil society organizations enabled them to replace looted or destroyed equipment and to more effectively contribute emergency assistance to their communities. Local organizations were better able to implement projects and coordinate their activities with the international NGO community, as well as to develop longer-term programs and forging relationships with other donors. With OTI funding, a consortium of local NGOs has emerged and is playing an increasingly active leadership role, extending information and training services out to district-based organizations and community groups.

B. Elections

- **Promoting Fairer Elections in Zimbabwe.** OTI's support in Zimbabwe helped to encourage fairness in the June 2000 elections, which were plagued by violence and intimidation. In

addition, OTI assisted in the training and fielding of 7,200 national election monitors and conducted extensive voter education activities. Out of the 120 seats in parliament up for election, the opposition won a total of 58. This is the first time since independence that an opposition party has occupied more than three seats in the 150-member parliament.

- **Funding Parallel Vote Tabulations.** In both Serbia-Montenegro and Croatia, OTI supported parallel vote tabulations for national elections. In Croatia, the results forced the government to announce the election results without delay. In Serbia-Montenegro, the parallel tabulation helped inform the public that Milosevic had lost the election and was attempting to manipulate the results. The election ended with the fall of Milosevic and the emergence of a moderate leader, Vojislav Kostunica.
- **Supporting Election-Related Campaigns.** In FY 2000, OTI continued its strategy of supporting local partners' efforts to inform the voting populace about upcoming elections and election-related issues. OTI's support of the Serbian student opposition group Otpor's campaigns "Resistance" and "He's Finished" helped build momentum that culminated in the end of the Milosevic regime. OTI's support of a massive get-out-the-vote campaign in Croatia helped propel the voter turnout to 76%, the highest since independence. In Kosovo, OTI's support for the first-ever municipal elections in October 2000 included the production of campaign materials directed to women and youth, and support for numerous NGOs that were trying to focus the election on issues of local importance. The election had a high voter turnout and minimal violence.

*"From the marketing perspective, the most effective was the GLAS 99 campaign ... it was an exceptionally implemented campaign in the field, and the engagement of independent prominent personalities has largely contributed towards allowing those who have never voted to finally have their say."
--Fedja Vukic, a prominent Croatian marketing expert, speaking about the OTI-funded election campaign in Jutarnji list, one of the two leading newspapers in Croatia.*

C. Good Governance

- **Creating Responsible Citizens in Kosovo.** In Kosovo, 130 members of OTI-supported Community Improvement Councils (CICs) ran for local leadership positions in the province's first-ever-municipal elections. Through the CICs, community members developed skills to organize and address priority actions, and eventually participate in more formalized systems of representative and accountable government. Twenty-five former CIC members won municipal seats and two former CIC members were selected as Chief Executive Officers in Decan and Gjakova municipalities.
- **Helping Government and Peace-Building in Sierra Leone.** An OTI grantee in Sierra Leone, the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), conducted consultative forums in all areas under government control and played a key role in peace-building efforts after the May 2000 setback. These forums allowed communities to maintain and renew their commitment to reconciliation and the peace process, despite slowdowns in disarmament and demobilization. Members of civil society groups, supported under the CGG grant, undertook numerous confidence-building initiatives and initiated dialogue with rebels in the Northern Province. They actively engaged in debates on the political dimensions of the peace process and are undertaking planning efforts for the 2001 elections. In total, the Campaign for Good Governance carried out reconciliation activities in seven out of 12 districts over the course of FY 2000.

- **Training Government Officials in Indonesia.** OTI/Indonesia's good governance activities in FY 2000 included parliamentary training and village leader training at the district level, civic fora, enabling transparency in local elections, and raising public awareness about decentralization, particularly its potential to cause and/or exacerbate local conflicts. By the end of FY 2000, OTI had funded the training of approximately 5,836 members of parliament in 200 of Indonesia's 310 kabupatens (regencies), representing a coverage rate of 64%. OTI also supported democracy training for about 1,500 village leaders in Sumatra.

OTI's legislative strengthening programs were aimed at reducing the likelihood of conflict related to the increased responsibility that comes with regional autonomy. As a counterweight to legislative strengthening, OTI also funded grantees to develop citizens' forums in major urban areas, thus providing an arena for citizens to voice their opinions rather than resorting to violence. In addition, OTI funded training for village leaders in the basic skills necessary for implementation of regional autonomy and debates surrounding key district head of government races.

Much of OTI's parliament strengthening programs focused on the application of new decentralization laws and regulations at the local level, the drafting of legislation and budgets, transparent revenue enhancement schemes and inclusive processes to review and modify existing laws. In July 2000, following an OTI-supported parliament training in Lampung Province of Sumatra, the head of a Regency Level Parliament reported to OTI that they were so pleased with the training program that they decided to plan for similar technical training in 2001, and fund it out of their own budget.

D. Human Rights

- **Supporting Court Cases in Zimbabwe.** OTI's support for court cases in Zimbabwe contesting 39 election results for parliamentary seats is helping to present a major challenge to the country's authoritarian rule. These cases document acts of violence and intimidation that hindered free and fair voting in the June 2000 elections. Their ruling presents a test of the independence of Zimbabwe's judiciary.
- **Providing Assistance for East Timorese Victims.** OTI/East Timor provided \$20,302 in start-up assistance to the East Timor Human Rights Commission (CDHTL). In addition to investigating human rights abuses during the violence, CDHTL is setting up an international human rights tribunal to address injustices and to advocate human rights issues. OTI's grant included funds to develop monitoring of human rights violations, particularly for women victims. Paving the way for victims of human rights abuses to seek justice is a necessary and important step in the democratic nation building of East Timor.

E. Media

- **Fostering Alternative Media in Croatia.** OTI fostered the development of alternative media in Croatia. In an evaluation of the program, evaluators found that the continued existence and positive influence of several independent media outlets in Croatia could be attributed to OTI support. In a comparison of attitudes about state-controlled media and alternative media in Zagreb, evaluation data showed that OTI-supported radio stations rated more favorably than state-controlled, nationalistic radio.

“The impact of key information at key times is clear: in many volatile locations, OTI media grantees have offered the only balanced and objective information to the public. This information no doubt minimized violence and helped key communities continue on the path to reconciliation.”

-- Maureen Taylor - Evaluation of Bosnia OTI - 2000

- **Creating a Role for East Timorese Media.** OTI’s program in East Timor is building and strengthening professional print and electronic media outlets that are helping to make the process of nation-building as transparent and inclusive as possible. OTI funds enabled a print shop consortium to print four newspapers on a regular schedule. The consortium is now earning revenue from new clients, including NGOs, UN agencies, religious organizations, and businesses.
- **Bringing Journalists Together in Kosovo.** OTI/Kosovo sponsored a media conference that helped 19 local radio stations establish a Kosovo Association of Independent Electronic Media. The Association protects the interests of independent electronic media, including lobbying for frequency allocations, seeking funds from international donors, developing training programs, and conducting program exchanges with radio stations outside the province.
- **Investigative Reporting in Sierra Leone.** Open less than a year, Search for Common round’s Talking Drum radio studio in Sierra Leone (funded by OTI) is already making a difference. For example, there was a certain local official who was abusing human rights in the southern part of the country. After interviewing local villagers, the studio aired several programs about this man and also took the matter directly to the Minister of the Interior. The government soon removed the offending official. As local staff reported, "We do not take full credit for this, but we sincerely believe that through our persistent reporting and follow-ups with government officials and agencies, government action was carried out."
- **Contributions to Peace in Hard-line Areas in Bosnia.** OTI’s program helped develop free and open media outlets in the Republika Srpska and Herzegovina that are playing an important role in building peace and moderating nationalistic voices. In many volatile locations, OTI media grantees offered the only balanced information to the public, according to a final program evaluation. OTI successfully supported two key media outlets in Herzegovina that were identified by the Office of the High Representative as the most significant contributors to peace in the region.
- **Supporting Independent Voices in Zimbabwe.** Since OTI’s support for Zimbabwe’s leading independent daily newspaper began, it has more than doubled in circulation enabling it to compete with the monopolistic and one-sided state-run papers. Less than a year ago, the newspaper’s circulation was 35,000. Today it is 90,000, having reached a peak of 145,000 during the period immediately prior to and following the elections. During the same time period, the circulation of the government-sponsored newspaper declined from 140,000 to 60,000. In addition, 9,000 copies of a weekly independent newspaper are being distributed to opinion leaders in the rural villages, who otherwise would have little access to independent media.

F. Conflict Management

- **The Indonesia Experience.** OTI/Indonesia re-targeted its program in FY 2000 to be more pro-active in the “hot spots” or conflict-prone areas of the country. With the spread of conflicts in the outer islands of Indonesia, OTI shifted its priority program areas in FY 2000 to Aceh, Maluku, Papua, Sulawesi, and East Nusa Tenggara/West Timor. To reduce tensions and the outbreak of conflict OTI supports media campaigns, radio dialogues, community discussions, reconstruction and rehabilitation of mixed communities in former conflict zones, and joint government/civil society task forces.

In early 2000 and again in August 2000, there were separate incidences of bomb explosions near houses of worship in Medan, North Sumatra. These bombings threatened to cause antagonisms between religious groups. In both cases, OTI's office in Medan immediately contacted its local partners and religious groups and provided space for the two to meet. After the first incidence, religious leaders urged their constituents to not react violently. After the second incident, a group of informal leaders from major religious and ethnic groups in North Sumatra attended a conflict analysis and management workshop. The workshop participants outlined the actual and potential conflicts in Medan, and discussed coordinated actions that the groups could undertake either individually or jointly to reduce the possibility that further provocations might result in a general explosion of violence.

Following fighting in the Malukus, thousands of displaced persons fled to Manado, North Sulawesi province. While there had been no conflicts in North Sulawesi, the huge influx of IDPs threatened to destabilize the province. In response, OTI funded several local civil society and media groups in North Sulawesi to carry out conflict prevention programs in order to reduce social tensions caused by the influx of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in local communities of North Sulawesi, and encourage community dialogue about conflict prevention. OTI also provided space for the development of a local crisis response group comprised of local leaders, government, police, civil society groups, and IDP representatives. To date, there has been no fighting between religious groups or IDPs and the local community in Manado.

- **The Nigeria Experience.** OTI's program in Nigeria supports non-governmental organizations to intervene in conflicts that had become, or are likely to become, violent and destabilizing. For example, conflict between the *Ife* and *Modakeke* in Osun State had been going on for over 150 years and past attempts to resolve the conflict had had little, if any, success. In February 2000, OTI made a major commitment to assist these two communities to manage their differences without the use of violence. As a result of OTI's initiatives, Ife/Modakeke citizens came together and identified the fundamental issues involved in the conflicts between them and jointly offered solutions, one of which was to form an inter-community peace advocacy committee. Since then the fighting has stopped and former adversaries are working together as members of the Inter-Community Peace Advocacy Committee.

In response to the conflict in Oke-Ogun between the *Hausa* and *Yoruba*, OTI provided support to help the two groups stop the violence that had almost resulted in the total displacement of the Hausa/Fulani communities. OTI's intervention resulted in the creation of an Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee of community members along with representation of the Nigerian National Police, the State Security Service, and traditional institutions. The Committee meets every month and has dealt with a variety of conflicts in the community. As a testament to the importance of the Committee, the local governments voted money to fund

its continued existence. Since the inauguration of the Committee, no inter-ethnic conflict has arisen in the area. Even during the Hausa-Yoruba conflicts in October, no violence between the two groups occurred in Oke-Ogun. This intervention at this stage of the conflict was critical and has succeeded in stabilizing the situation.

In the Niger Delta, OTI provided support for a joint meeting of representative of the *Elemes*, *Okrikas*, and *Ogu/Bolos* communities to jointly solve their problems. The original group of 24 citizens, which included youth leaders, respected elders and chiefs, and a local government chairman, were joined by three high level officials designated by the Secretary to the State Government and a representative of the Rivers State Government. As a result, an agreement was made to engage in a peace process and find acceptable solutions to the difficult issues. An action plan was developed that included the creation of a Joint Peace Committee, which worked closely with the local government authorities to prevent violent conflicts among the communities. Concurrently, the State government set up a judicial commission inquiry to investigate the immediate and remote causes of the conflicts. As part of the State government's strategy for implementation of the commission's recommendation, they proposed the establishment of a peace committee. At this critical juncture, the OTI-supported Joint Peace Committee approached the state government to be included as part of the government's peace committee. The government agreed. Although no financial assistance has been allotted, the request is still under consideration. Most important, since the OTI intervention and peace process that ensued, there has been limited but significant travel among the three communities and no violent conflicts.

When OTI began focusing attention on developing responses to potentially destabilizing conflicts, there were several well-trained facilitators interested in collaboration. However, it soon became apparent that this core group was too small to respond to the many serious conflicts around the country. Thus an early priority for OTI was to increase the number and skill level of facilitators committed to peaceful conflict resolution. To realize this goal, OTI began by providing a "training of trainers" workshop in mediation skills and the methods needed to teach these skills to others. During the training, participants embraced the idea of creating a conflict management network. The end result was 30 trained master trainers who, with OTI, organized a conference of key representatives of civil society organizations, drawn from all over of Nigeria to review and adapt training materials, strengthen their facilitative skills, and deepen their commitment to conflict management. This network is known as the Conflict Resolution Stakeholders Network (CRESNET).

Following the conference, six regional workshops were conducted. Each regional workshop involved approximately 200 community-based and non-governmental organization representatives. Subsequently, these NGOs and CBOs across Nigeria carried out workshops and other conflict management initiatives to teach awareness and skills to those at the grassroots level. The impact of this effort is that the trainers and members of CRESNET have played a major role in a responding to number of important conflict situations including Ife-Modakeke and the aftermath of the religious crisis in Kaduna. Meanwhile, CRESNET itself has developed. Strategic planning meetings resulted in the creation of six zonal CRESNET chapters capped by a 15-member national board. At present the zonal and national bodies are in the process of finalizing their constitutions and obtaining certification by the Nigerian government.

CRESNET stands out as the only nationwide organization working actively to manage interethnic strife in Nigeria. That it emerged from workshop participants themselves is a

practical and symbolic sign that Nigerians are prepared to take responsibility for managing conflict in their country.

G. Community Impact

- **Kosovo's Community Improvement Councils.** A major component of OTI's Kosovo Transition Initiative (KTI) involved assistance to communities in forming and organizing Community Improvement Councils (CICs). These Councils supported Kosovars in rebuilding their communities while preparing them to participate in community decision-making and the development of democracy. As a result of OTI's support, the CIC process brought together political factions within all ethnic communities to cooperate in identifying and addressing community needs. Completed KTI community projects included 74 schools repaired or rebuilt, improved electrical supply to 41 communities, 27 water systems repaired and six health clinics or hospitals rehabilitated or supplied. Approximately 30,000 Kosovars actively participated in the implementation of KTI-funded projects. Kosovo-wide local groups involved in KTI projects contributed \$2.7 million of in-kind labor and direct financial community contributions. In one example, a CIC in Lloshkobare worked with KTI to upgrade the town's electrical system. Once the project was completed, the community began collecting contributions for additional projects. Local residents cited the work of the CIC as the reason that the community was able to organize to address other needs.
- **Engaging Communities in Albania.** OTI's program in Albania borrowed some elements from its neighbor in Kosovo. OTI and its implementing partner, IOM, held a series of open community meetings to encourage citizen participation in the identification of their community's priority emergency rehabilitation needs. At these meetings, OTI tracked the top community priorities and worked with the community to achieve consensus. Once the priority projects were agreed upon, OTI and the community developed collaborative action plans and the rehabilitation work, with community buy-in, began. Over the course of the project, OTI, with labor, materials, or funding contributed by local communities, repaired or rebuilt a total of 75 schools, community centers, and libraries.

"The CICs have prompted among its members a theretofore unknown process of democratic participation and debate over public issues of importance to them and their future."
-- *CDIE Transition Assistance Study*

The impact of the community meetings was leveraged by OTI's use of local TV or radio stations, which advertised the meetings and reported on progress once the reconstruction commenced. Albanian local media proved eager to broadcast "positive" stories about community participation. By covering community meetings and following up with coverage of the reconstruction work, local media outlets provided tangible results of civic participation in community infrastructure repair. Given the near-total absence of community participation in Albanian media before 1992, OTI's program significantly contributed to increased media-community interaction and civic participation.

Members of the program staff were frequently thanked by community members for being asked to contribute their ideas for community improvement projects. Citizens also noted that OTI/IOM was the first international organization to hold an open meeting and to solicit citizen input into the reconstruction the needs of their communities.

- **Helping Local Communities in**

Colombia. OTI's Quick Impact Projects with the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) created community-building activities in contested areas and helped war-affected communities recover and rebuild. As a result, the 50 communities have been able to absorb additional displaced families without straining already-limited local resources, rebuild a functioning social life following guerrilla attacks, and remain in their places of origin, avoiding the devastating consequences of becoming displaced within Colombia.

“The community now knows that problems can be solved by community action. Community development, and community action, is above all a matter of consciousness-raising. Once the community learns that it can help itself, and can solve many problems without government help, it will continue to do so as long as the community exists.”
--Flemming Hegaard, independent final evaluation of OTI/Albania.

- **Sharing the OTI Approach.** Recognizing that it was making significant contributions to participatory methodology in post-conflict settings, OTI teamed up with UNDP's Emergency Response Division to host a roundtable on the subject in October 2000. Entitled “Community-Based Reintegration and Rehabilitation in Post-Conflict Settings,” the roundtable drew 75 field-based participants from USAID, UNDP, and leading NGOs. The two-day session included small group discussions on community engagement, designing a program strategy, linking local involvement to the national level, and disengagement. A report on the roundtable has been made available to all OTI staff and partners; its findings are now influencing program design in Serbia and East Timor. Next steps include a training manual for field staff and stepped-up field coordination with UNDP/ERD.

IV. IR 3: IMPROVED TARGETING OF OTI INTERVENTIONS

OTI measures itself not only on what change it effects in political transitions, but also on how it does so. OTI's ability to act quickly and flexibly, to leverage resources and to contribute to U.S. and host country policy decisions, make up its *process indicators*.

The following demonstrate some of the best examples of OTI's process.

A. Speed

Speed is the essence of OTI's ability to respond to political openings, and it is that which helps make the Office a valuable tool within USAID and the U.S. foreign policy arena. Speed can be measured in the time it takes to mobilize an assessment, design a program, open an office, make grants, and respond to new opportunities as a program develops.

- **Taking the Lead in East Timor.** In the fall of 1999, OTI's quick disbursement of funds to indigenous non-governmental organizations enabled the East Timorese to join the international community on decisions affecting their future. These organizations' leaders now hold positions of authority in East Timor's Transitional Administration. In addition, OTI was able to support community rehabilitation in all 13 districts of East Timor when no other donors were operational outside the capital in any capacity other than humanitarian assistance. Between March and August 2000, OTI's Temporary Employment Program (TEP)

provided short-term employment to 65,000 East Timorese, and funded the program until UN and World Bank funds were operational.

- **Responding to Critical Elections in the Balkans.** OTI/Croatia's GOTV campaign for the parliamentary election of January 2000 was implemented with only one month's notice. Grant-making time was as little as 48 hours. In Serbia and Montenegro, OTI has long been considered a fast and effective donor mechanism. This was especially critical in the summer of 2000 when the first significant signs of democratic transition appeared. OTI quickly responded by re-targeting 76% of its available funds to support for politically active civic groups, independent media, and political parties during the run-up to the pivotal September 24 elections.

B. Re-Targeting/Flexibility

OTI works in complex political environments that require on-going monitoring to gauge new opportunities or re-focus activities. OTI encourages programs to re-evaluate their strategy every six months and has instituted a mandatory internal mid-term impact assessment. Using these and other tools, including evaluations and site visits, OTI ensures that activities continue to be relevant during times of transition. Highlights of re-targeting in FY 2000 include:

- **Selecting Strategic Grantees in Serbia.** Following the cessation of NATO bombing in June 1999, the Milosevic regime increased its repression of groups and individuals working toward democratic change. Arrests, media denunciations and police violence were used to intimidate the regime's more vocal opponents. As a result, many of OTI's partners were cautious about being outspoken. However, a few partners not only continued their activities but also intensified their efforts to enact democratic change in Serbia. OTI's support was re-targeted toward these partners, who eventually succeeded in voting Milosevic out of office.
- **Targeting the Hot Spots in Indonesia.** During FY 2000, it became apparent that Indonesia's transition to democracy, and its simultaneous efforts at decentralization, were resulting in increased fractionalization among political elites, tensions between ethnic and religious groups, and localized calls for independence. To respond to this situation, OTI targeted its programs upon "hot-spot" areas, as well as national level issues that threatened to further destabilize the country. OTI also adjusted its programs to address the critical issues of how the local and national government might better handle the growing problem of internally displaced persons (IDPs) that often result from local conflicts.
- **From TEP to TEPS II in East Timor.** OTI's Transitional Employment Program (TEP) jumpstarted key rehabilitation activities over a four-month period in post-conflict East Timor. When complementary employment programs of the World Bank and the UN became operational, OTI re-targeted its program to focus on other priorities not being covered, including the rehabilitation of roads, water systems, and income generating programs. This program was known as TEPS II (Transitional Engagement for Population Support). After the initial phase of TEP II was completed, OTI re-targeted once again to incorporate a more participatory approach, where communities could decide which development activities were its priorities. This shift reflected lessons learned by other OTI programs with similar community-based initiatives.

C. Resource Leveraging

In order to multiply the impact of its programs, OTI coordinates and co-funds projects with other donors, international NGOs, the private sector, and local communities. When OTI builds collaborative relationships it can provide policy input into country strategies and leverage resources for ongoing activities. All new programs are designed with a strategy that identifies and works in tandem with other donors who may provide support to complement, or follow-on, OTI financial assistance.

- **Leveraging international donor funds.** OTI's Community Improvement Councils in Kosovo served as de facto representatives of the diverse interests in their communities. They provided other donors with knowledge of real local needs and priorities, as defined by Kosovars themselves. As a result, the Kosovo Transition Initiative leveraged \$5.9 million in grants for CIC projects with \$4.2 million in grants from other international organizations such as KFOR, UNMIK, the European Commission, and other bilateral donors.

In Croatia, OTI took the lead in coordinating international donor support for the GOTV campaign and domestic election monitoring. OTI's total support of approximately \$1 million for all pre-election activity was matched by another \$1 million from other donors. In addition, the number of all donors jointly supporting OTI grantees was significant and included the Open Society Institute, Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the Information Research and Exchange Board, the EU, the OSCE, the Westminster Foundation, the Mott Foundation, and the British-Know-How-Fund.

- **Leveraging grantee contributions.** OTI's grassroots programs strongly encourage support and buy-in from the local communities with which they work. In Kosovo, the Community Improvement Council strategy required grantee contributions to projects; these can consist of equipment, labor or cash. Grantee contributions added up to \$2.7 million in FY 2000, leveraging an OTI contribution of \$5.9 million. In Colombia, OTI's \$750,000 grant to the ICRC for community-led development in particularly vulnerable parts of the country generated \$280,000 in in-kind assistance from communities and local governments. In this case, counterpart funding was not required, but communities voluntarily contributed to expand the projects, often in the form of labor or other resources. When OTI's grant to the ICRC ended in September 2000, the activity was continued with internal ICRC funding.
- **Leveraging USAID Mission and USG funds.** OTI's management of USAID/Colombia's program for IDPs influenced the Mission's plans in this area and resulted in the dedication of \$25 million in USAID Plan Colombia funds to programs that empower communities to help themselves and their most vulnerable citizens. It also leveraged \$6 million in outside assistance from the Government of Colombia and private-sector sources. In addition, OTI has been asked by USAID to manage a \$2.5 million program of assistance to former child combatants beginning in FY 2001.

In another example, the success of the \$1.6 million Albania Transition Initiative program encouraged USAID's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia to approve a \$10 million grant to IOM for additional community-driven municipal infrastructure improvements after OTI departed in December 2000. USAID/Albania also built on OTI's program by launching a new Municipal Infrastructure Support Project (MISP). IOM, who was the implementing partner

for OTI's program, will partner with USAID's new implementing partner, the Urban Institute, on the MISP activity.

D. Policy Leveraging

OTI continues to provide policy input within the U.S. Government, host governments and the international community. OTI's Washington-based outreach efforts include a comprehensive web site with program details and monthly country reports, as well as OTI participation on inter-Agency task forces and working groups. Together, this enables OTI to bring its field-based perspective into Washington policymaking.

- **Leveraging international and host government policy.** The Government of Sierra Leone adopted and published OTI's Working Paper of May 2000, which synthesized the findings of the March 2000 workshop on conflict diamonds that was held in Freetown. OTI led a Trilateral Technical Team, with representatives of the Diamond High Council of Belgium, the Belgian Government, and the UK, to provide assistance to Sierra Leone for their new Certification of Origin regime. OTI has also been part of the multi-donor assistance for demobilization and reintegration, participating in numerous meetings in Freetown, London, and Washington.
- **Leveraging U.S. Policy:** OTI's program in Zimbabwe, including several activities associated with rule of law issues, has had a significant effect on policy decisions within the U.S. Government, other donor governments and the UN. On the one hand all of these activities have served to keep people informed of key issues and points of view on a regular basis. On the other hand the activities themselves have highlighted certain issues pertaining to freedom of the press, government monopoly of the electronic media, politically motivated violence, freedom to campaign, etc. In part because of these exposes, various elements of the U.S. government and other bilateral donors and international agencies have come out and publicly recognized or acknowledged that there is a real crisis in Zimbabwe, which if not addressed will not only have even more horrendous consequences for the people of Zimbabwe but an extremely negative impact on the stability of the region. OTI/Zimbabwe has joined the USAID Mission in its efforts to keep key policymakers in touch with what is going on in the country and the desperate situation being faced daily by the majority of Zimbabweans.
- OTI, as the only USAID office in East Timor, has been acknowledged as a leader in donor coordination and working groups, and is frequently called upon to provide input to U.S. Government policy on East Timor. OTI works closely with the Agency's Asia Near East Bureau and the State Department to determine the most appropriate use of U.S. funding for East Timor.

“While several international donors and the UN have a place in East Timor's democratic transition, the United States assistance program, through USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), has already established itself as perhaps the most credible actor. It has provided timely and essential support following the havoc wreaked in the aftermath of the August 1999 Referendum. The East Timorese generally view the United Nations and some members of the donor community as less efficient, slower to deliver, and sometimes partisan. In contrast, U.S. credibility and projected levels of USAID assistance through 2003 will enable the United States to play a central role in the task of nation building.”
-- *East Timor Democracy and Governance Draft Assessment/Strategy, March 2001.*

- **Leveraging USAID Policy.** In Kosovo, OTI's emphasis on community participation has influenced USAID's Community Infrastructure Service Program (CISP) philosophy in that CISP now requires community consultation throughout the identification, implementation and maintenance stages of its infrastructure rehabilitation projects. In addition, after OTI collaborated with the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and shared more information about its community council model, IRC decided to use the approach to conduct community development activities in Kamenica Municipality, Kosovo. Other organizations have also adopted this approach such as when the UNMIK civilian police unit in Mitrovica used CICs and town hall meetings to discuss new policing laws. OTI's successful work in minority areas has also encouraged the U.S. Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration to develop their own minority programming initiatives.

V. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In FY 2000, largely as a result of a worldwide OTI retreat in January, OTI moved forward on a number of new management and program-related approaches that have enhanced its results and improved its indicators of success.

- **Develop hand-off strategies at the beginning of every country program.** With each country that OTI completes, OTI re-learns the lesson that hand-off strategies must be developed, however preliminarily, at the beginning of every program. These strategies must also be developed in concert with OTI's partners—the USAID Mission, host governments and others. Plus, hand-off strategies must be re-tuned regularly to ensure that discrete activities are ended appropriately, and that on-going programs move as seamlessly as possible from OTI to the hand-off partners.

OTI has explored several hand-off models over the past year, from a transfer of staff and expertise to the USAID Mission, as in Croatia, to merging programmatic objectives and frameworks, as in the Philippines, to leaving implementing partners and programs in place and ensuring follow-on funding by the Mission, as in Albania.

Next Steps: In FY 2001, OTI will develop a preliminary guide for exit strategies listing best practices and lessons learned.

- **Cross-fertilize programs.** With over six years of experience behind it, OTI has developed considerable expertise in designing programs that address transition needs. In a number of instances, activities that have worked successfully in one country can be replicated or adapted in others. In the past, similar programs arose, largely by default, rather than by design, for there was no systematic mechanism for sharing ideas and experience among country programs. In FY 2000, OTI's program development team organized various crosscutting issues sessions for all interested OTI/W staff. The purpose of these seminars is to increase awareness of best practices and lessons learned across geographic boundaries. This will not only enrich OTI staff and programs with practical knowledge, but also avoid the inefficiency of repeating mistakes. OTI will also be publishing its guide to program options in transition settings, a compendium of transition activities that includes activities, specific examples, lessons learned, and other relevant information.

Next Steps: In FY 2001, OTI will place greater emphasis on more systematically facilitating these linkages and exchanges among its field staff. By providing opportunities for regional

exchanges OTI programs will be enriched with lessons learned and best practices from other geographic areas.

- **Increase Performance Monitoring.** To improve monitoring systems, OTI instituted a policy in FY 2000 that required all countries to budget and plan for mid-term assessments and final evaluations. As a result, final evaluations were conducted in Bosnia, Croatia, Albania and the Philippines.

Next Steps: In FY 2001, OTI will conduct final evaluations in DROC, Nigeria and Kosovo. Mid-term impact assessments will be conducted in Lebanon, Zimbabwe, and Sierra Leone. In addition, in order to be better equipped to measure results, OTI will request that all new country programs conduct baseline studies as soon as it is feasible during the start-up phase. With an accurate baseline, OTI staff will be able to track changes associated with local attitudes, behavior, and perception, as they relate to OTI-supported programming.

- **Increase regional programming.** To date, the majority of OTI's programs have focused exclusively on the political development needs and the forces of democratic change in one country or province. While this approach has proven successful, OTI believes that increased regional programming can yield faster and more far-reaching results. OTI will build on its experience in the Balkans, where support for independent media in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo influenced the media environment in Serbia and Montenegro.

Next Steps: OTI will explore the possibility of working with selected partners, such as human rights groups and media outlets, in neighboring countries to enhance regional efforts to resolve the current crisis in Zimbabwe.

- **Enhance contracting mechanisms.** OTI's principal contracting tool, known as SWIFT, originally had a ceiling of \$25 million per contractor. Based on earmarks OTI received for Indonesia and East Timor, as well as the need to fund large programs such as Nigeria, OTI requested and received an increase in the ceiling to \$50 million per contractor. To expand the group of contractors and seek an even higher ceiling, OTI is designing a follow-up contract. SWIFT II will incorporate the best practices and lessons learned from the first contract. SWIFT II, as with the first SWIFT, will be available for Agency use.

Next Steps: Given OTI's expanding portfolio and anticipated buy-ins from Missions, OTI intends to competitively bid and award SWIFT II for four contracts with a funding ceiling of \$100 million each.

- **Finalize the five-year strategic plan.** In accordance with USAID policies, OTI is revising its Five-Year Strategic Plan to reflect upcoming programmatic priorities. In FY 2000, OTI began discussing its strategy and sponsored a review of OTI's criteria for engagement and adherence to core values. It is anticipated that OTI's strategic plan will be completed in FY 2001, and will be reviewed and implemented in FY 2002.
- **Pilot Orientation.** In September 2000, OTI initiated an orientation program for fifteen of its U.S. and field-based staff. The five-day "Basic Training Course" was designed to inform participants of OTI policies, program operations, and project design and implementation methods, and to highlight critical organizational relationships within USAID and with other U.S. Government offices. The orientation provided staff with a solid understanding of policies and procedures and a deeper understanding of OTI's core values.

Next Steps: Based on the success of this pilot orientation, OTI will host orientations for all new staff on a regular basis.

- **Expansion of the Bullpen.** In order to respond quickly and flexibly to opportunities for assessments, new country start-ups, or to provide extra staff resources during periods of heavy programming, OTI has a roster of senior field and administrative advisors, also known as the “bullpen”. OTI currently has five bullpen staff available to work for a maximum of 160 days each throughout of the year. In FY 2000, this added surge capacity greatly enhanced OTI’s ability to lend management support to country programs. For example, in Bosnia and Croatia, OTI used bullpen members to develop a comprehensive close-out plan with the Mission. In Kosovo, OTI was able to address issues related to records management and filing through the procurement of services from the bullpen. In East Timor, a member of the bullpen provided critical support for the design of the Transitional Employment Program.

Next Steps: In FY 2001, OTI is planning to expand the number of positions in the bullpen to further increase the office’s ability to respond to the management and program needs of field offices.

- **Provisional Re-Organization.** In FY 2000, OTI took a closer look at its own internal management structure. Recognizing that the number of OTI staff had grown considerably since 1994 while the management structure had remained the same, OTI developed a new organizational framework. The re-organization created two new positions that respond directly to the Director and Deputy Director: the Field Operations Coordinator, to whom country teams report, and the Management and Program Coordinator, to whom the administrative and program development teams report. This provisional re-organization of OTI staff in Washington has enabled OTI to streamline its management and communications.

Next Steps: In FY 2001, OTI will seek to formalize this re-organization through Agency channels.

- **Employment Benefits for PSCs.** OTI relies heavily on personal services contractors, or PSCs, to carry out its work. OTI is participating in an Agency effort to enhance benefits for PSCs. For example, OTI has pledged to hire a consultant under a purchase order to facilitate the creation of a 401(K) plan, which has been authorized by the Internal Revenue Service. OTI has further committed resources to identify options and implementation strategies for a group health care plan.

Next Steps: OTI will work with the new USAID Administration to address the PSC issue. OTI will also continue to move forward on the 401(K) and health care plan initiatives.

- **Standardization of Reporting and Outreach.** In FY 2000, OTI’s database was in operation in ten of its 15 countries. Updated and sent to Washington on a regular basis, the worldwide database enables country managers to track the number of approved, rejected and pending grants, and provides a breakdown of grants by sector. OTI now requires that all new country programs institute the database. OTI also revisited its monthly reporting format and revised it to track changes in the political situation, development of the program, and performance monitoring. OTI’s website, a major outreach tool, was also significantly updated in FY 2000. Not only does the site include links to other partners conducting similar activities, but also

archives all monthly reports, evaluations, conference materials, and other documents produced by OTI. The site is averaging more than 16,000 hits per month (FY 2001 data).

Next Steps: In FY 2001, OTI is planning to make the database mandatory for all new OTI programs.

- **Stronger Partnerships with the Office of Procurement.** USAID's Office of Procurement (OP) is critical to the success or failure of OTI's programs. Unfortunately, staff shortages and competing priorities often hamper OP's ability to work effectively. In FY 2000, OTI helped build the capacity within OP by funding a full-time contract specialist PSC dedicated to OTI. In addition, OTI and OP instituted weekly meetings and a contracting queue that assists OP prioritize OTI actions. These changes had a positive affect on the OTI-OP relationship and set in motion a series of reforms that continued into FY 2001.

Next Steps: In FY 2001, OTI and OP held a half-day retreat to further improve communication between the two offices. OTI committed to, among other things, inviting OP to make frequent field visits to OTI programs.

ALBANIA	START DATE: JUNE 1999 Exit Date: December 2000
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$934,431 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: The Kosovo refugee crisis in the spring of 1999 was one in a series of humanitarian and political catastrophes that hit Albania in the past decade. Rising crime and economic instability, stemming from the collapse of the pyramid schemes in 1997, have hampered Albania’s transition to democracy. Among its neighbors of southeast Europe, Albania remains one of the more vulnerable and volatile. Promoting stability in the region continues to be a key U.S. Government foreign policy objective.

Program Description: In May 1999, OTI, with the International Organization of Migration (IOM) as its implementing partner, launched the Albanian Transition Initiative (ATI). This program was designed to alleviate the impact of the Kosovo refugee crisis on Albanian host communities in the wake of the NATO airstrikes in Serbia. Shortly after the program began, however, the airstrikes ended and the Kosovar refugees returned to Kosovo. In response, OTI shifted its focus from community improvement and host-community incentives to community engagement, improvement, and empowerment.

OTI/Albania Strategic Plan

Goal: To enhance citizen participation and strengthen local governance.

Objectives: To support OTI’s goal, the program aimed to:

- demonstrate to the public the power of citizen involvement and civic action through the identification and implementation of community projects;
- use the local media to publicize models of effective citizen participation projects.

Activities and Impacts

Citizen Involvement in Infrastructure Repair: ATI held a series of open community meetings to encourage citizen participation in the identification of their community’s priority emergency rehabilitation needs. At these meetings, ATI tracked the top community priorities and worked with the community to achieve consensus. Once the priority projects were agreed upon, ATI and the community developed collaborative action plans, and the rehabilitation work, with community buy-in, began. Over the course of the project, ATI, with labor, materials, or funding contributed by local communities, repaired or rebuilt a total of 75 schools, community centers, and libraries.

Impact: These community meetings proved to be a highly successful means of identifying community needs and priorities. Both citizens and local authorities attended and had the opportunity to express their concerns. The impact of the meetings was enhanced by ATI’s use of local TV and radio stations, which advertised the meetings and reported on progress once the reconstruction commenced. Staff of ATI were frequently thanked by community members for being asked to contribute their ideas for community improvement projects. Citizens also noted

that ATI was the first international organization to hold an open meeting and to solicit citizen input into the reconstruction needs of their communities.

According to an independent final evaluation of the program, “The community now knows that problems can be solved by community action. Community development and community action is above all a matter of consciousness-raising. Once the community learns that it can help itself and can solve many problems without government help, it will continue to do so as long as the community exists.”

Local media development: ATI focused ten percent of its program on developing local media initiatives. This support was primarily designed to showcase examples of citizen involvement in the infrastructure repair component of ATI, and was largely undertaken towards the end of the program. To publicize community participation, ATI developed a network of local journalists interested in community and local government issues, and developed press releases to encourage wide-spread coverage of local events. ATI also solicited ideas from local media to develop civic action feature stories, short documentaries, and public service announcements. One such TV story, "Heroes of Albania," was comprised of 30 TV episodes that featured the voluntary community contributions of ordinary Albanians. Each show was aired twice a week on national television. Another ATI grantee produced documentaries that tracked ATI infrastructure projects from start to finish.

Towards the end of the program, ATI focused on providing balanced information and encouraging discussions and voter turn-out in the October 2000 local elections. In total, OTI sponsored nine debates in selected communities. Prior to OTI's support, there had been few, if any, pre-election debates in Albanian politics.

Impact: Albanian local media proved eager to broadcast positive stories about community participation. By covering ATI community meetings and following up with coverage of the reconstruction work, local media outlets aired evidence of tangible results of civic participation in community infrastructure repair. Given the near-total absence of community participation in Albanian media before 1992, ATI's program significantly contributed to increased interaction between the media and local communities.

One TV station aired a broadcast of a program about a local NGO that was helping communities organize themselves for local action. The series, “Heroes of Albania,” received positive feedback from viewers.

When asked whether the ATI-funded newspaper, *Dita Jug*, would print anything critical of the city administration, both the Mayor and the editor claimed that the paper often printed articles critical of the policies of the City Council. The Mayor felt that this was useful and was eager to hear the opinions of members of his community.

A local newspaper in Gjirokaster, which had received OTI support, became an important source of local information. The newspaper is now almost entirely supported by advertising revenues. Merchants report that sales have improved due to their newspaper advertisements, suggesting that the paper may be able to become totally self-supporting in the near future.

Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Targeting: In February 2000, staff from OTI/Kosovo and OTI/Washington visited Albania and suggested refinements to the ATI program. These changes highlighted the need for enhancing

community action plans and adding a program-wide media campaign. The program also narrowed its geographic focus to target reform-oriented communities, as well as areas that had received little international assistance.

Resource Leveraging: The success of the ATI program encouraged USAID's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia to approve a \$10 million grant to IOM for additional community-driven municipal infrastructure improvements. USAID/Albania also launched a new Municipal Infrastructure Support Project (MISP) and awarded the Urban Institute (UI) the Local Government Assistance and Decentralization Project grant. IOM will partner with UI on the new MISP activity. ATI's community projects also attracted the interest and funding commitments of other donors, including DFID, the OSCE, the Soros Foundation, and the Canadian and Norwegian governments.

Policy Leveraging: From the start, the U.S. Embassy and the USAID Mission took an active interest in the ATI program. The support of the Ambassador and the Mission Director helped attract national and local media attention to the local community self-help and cooperative projects and this high-level exposure added legitimacy which generated similar efforts in other communities.

FY 2000 Summary Grant Chart:

Sector	NUMBER OF GRANTS	Total Value of Grants
Community Improvement	42	\$1,544,846
Media	2	\$59,329
Total:	44	\$1,604,176

Lessons Learned in FY 2000:

- OTI's experience in Albania highlighted the importance of involving the media in promoting community organizing. Learning about successful grass-roots level community projects in news stories, documentaries, and PSAs can inspire other communities to organize to identify and implement their own community improvement projects.
- Indicators of success, drafted early in a program, enable better program evaluation.

Exit Strategy: The USAID Mission approved an IOM grant to continue programming past OTI's December 2000 exit from Albania.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	START DATE: FEBRUARY 1996 Exit Date: May 2000
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$1,059,000 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: The Balkans conflict created a humanitarian disaster of major proportions and wreaked havoc on the social and economic fabric of the former Yugoslavia. The United States played a leading role in brokering the Dayton Peace Accords and is contributing financial assistance and military support for the peacekeeping operation in order to aid Bosnia’s post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction.

Program Description: OTI’s program sought to address the issues that contributed to the violence of the 1990s. OTI concentrated its activities outside the capital in areas where political tensions ran high and where there was little other donor presence. In FY 2000, OTI focused on media activities and in particular, on message development. At the request of its U.S. Government colleagues, OTI extended its activities until April 2000 to provide needed support to local partners for the municipal elections.

OTI/Bosnia and Herzegovina Strategic Plan

Goal: To promote reform efforts by supporting independent media and local NGOs.

Objectives: To achieve this goal, OTI aimed to:

- foster the creation and maintenance of an independent media that expands public access to balanced and objective information;
- promote democratic political change in neighboring Croatia and Serbia;
- encourage voter turn-out and participation in the April 2000 municipal elections.

Activities and Impact

Independent Media Support: OTI worked with grantees, such as ATV in Banja Luka and OBN in Sarajevo, to produce documentaries on politically important topics such as the return of refugees to Kosovo (aired primarily for ethnic Serbs), the Croatian Parliamentary elections, and corruption within the Party for Democratic Action. These documentaries were shown throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina by OTI’s network of media grantees.

In hard-line ethnic Serb areas in Eastern Herzegovina, local radio stations had been afraid to broadcast politically charged information for fear of retaliation from hard-line factions. OTI worked with Reporter Magazine and radio stations to develop a political call-in show that would help protect the station owners. After articles from Reporter Magazine were read on the air and attributed to the author, the public was invited to call-in and comment.

OTI facilitated cross-entity contacts with a grant for joint radio programs between stations in Tuzla and Zvornik, three ethnic stations in Brcko, and stations in Tuzla, Livno, and Prijedor. With OTI support for newspapers and magazines, such as Nezavisne Novine and Reporter Magazine, media outlets were able to increase circulation in areas with different ethnic compositions.

Impact: Through its use of alternative media, OTI was able to increase different ethnic groups' understanding of the social and economic problems experienced in other communities and was able to break the nationalist parties' monopoly on information. Over time, OTI-supported media outlets were capable of countering nationalist propaganda and averting violence and were thus able to contribute to the peaceful resolution of ethnic and political differences.

Influence Political Developments in Croatia and Serbia: OTI established the first transmitters for the "Ring Around Serbia Initiative," which provided information from Radio Free Europe, Radio France International, Deutsche Welle, the BBC, and Voice of America to stations in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Because of Yugoslavia's repressive media law, local publications often censored themselves. To provide an alternative source of information that was beyond the reach of the Yugoslav court system, OTI supported the production, transportation, and distribution of the Banja Luka-based Reporter Magazine in Yugoslavia.

OTI, in partnership with the Forum for Democratic Alternatives and an NGO based in Novi Sad, supported the first conference between Yugoslav and Bosnian political and economic experts. The conference was hosted in Banja Luka by the former Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska, and was attended by government officials from Serbia, Montenegro and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by members of the Serbian opposition. The event was covered widely in Montenegro and both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was seen as a major step towards reconciling the two countries.

Impact: The cross border projects initiated by OTI in Serbia and Croatia encouraged the two countries to cooperate and helped counter the negative influence of Serbia over the Republika Srpska, and of Herzegovina over Croatia. By working with moderate partners in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OTI was able to constructively influence the environment in countries neighboring Bosnia.

Support to the April 2000 Municipal Elections: Together with local NGOs and media throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, OTI organized an extensive "Get Out the Vote" campaign entitled Mreza X (Network X). The Network organized billboards, Public Service Announcements (PSAs), and stickers to encourage voter turnout. In response to a public that was tired of the typically dry campaigns, OTI supported PSAs using rap music, bright colors, and young faces. The Network X campaign was also significant because the organizers came from different ethnic groups, and while both Cyrillic and Latin alphabets were used, the message was the same for all groups.

Impact: At a time of apathy and growing election-fatigue, OTI was able to invigorate the electoral process. The campaign not only excited the population, but also underscored the importance of participating in the elections. The campaign, an indigenous initiative, succeeded in crossing ethnic lines and promoting one message, regardless of ethnicity.

Results and Impacts by Process Indicators

Speed: OTI had a quick grant-making turn around time in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In most cases, a grant could be drafted and approved two days after the submission of the project proposal. Often the OTI team would identify potential conflict areas and work on projects that would seek to prevent a political crisis. This proactive approach allowed OTI to maximize its speed in crisis situations.

Targeting: In response to the opening presented by the Croatian Parliamentary elections, OTI decided to present more moderate political views to the Croat population in hard-line Herzegovina. As such, OTI worked with local media partners to organize radio call-in shows that gave space to these moderate voices. During and after the NATO airstrikes in Serbia, when the OTI team in Serbia and Montenegro had withdrawn for security reasons, OTI/Bosnia was the only means of programming in Serbia. OTI recognized the importance of remaining engaged in Serbia during this difficult period and worked with Bosnian grantees to influence the situation in Serbia.

Resource Leveraging: OTI leveraged \$40,000 from the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Democratic Rights and Labor for the Mreza X “Get-Out-the-Vote” campaign.

FY 2000 Summary Grant Chart:

Sector	NUMBER OF GRANTS	Total Value of Grants
Media	188	N/A
Civil Society	10	N/A
Total:	198	\$ 1,191,233

Lessons Learned in FY 2000:

- OTI can have a positive impact on reform efforts in one country through activities in neighboring countries. OTI should not draw geographic borders that would limit its overall goal of advancing democratic peaceful change.
- OTI should not be afraid to change the direction of its program. What may have been a relevant strategy at the beginning of a program may quickly become irrelevant in the dynamic political situations in which OTI operates. Program strategies should be viewed as guidelines, rather than as strict rules, and OTI should continuously re-examine the country’s needs and readjust accordingly.

Exit Strategy: OTI closed its program in Bosnia in May 2000. OTI worked with the Mission to identify media partners that OTI had supported and felt deserved further assistance. As a result, many of the major OTI grantees are now working with the Mission’s Promedia Program.

Quotes on OTI’s work:

“The impact of key information at key times is clear: in many volatile locations, OTI media grantees have offered the only balanced and objective information to the public. This information no doubt minimized violence and helped key communities continue on the path to reconciliation.”
 --Maureen Taylor, July 2000 Evaluation of OTI/Bosnia

COLOMBIA	START DATE: JANUARY 1999
	Exit Date: September 2001
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>CITIZEN SECURITY ENHANCED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$980,367 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: In August 1998, following 50 years of conflict, the Colombian government initiated a peace process with the armed insurgent groups. Although the process has proven long and arduous, President Pastrana is committed to formal negotiations with both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). In FY 2000, Colombia was one of the four countries of top foreign policy interest to the United States. In addition to helping finance “Plan Colombia,” the Colombian response to narcotics production and the illegal drug trade, U.S. assistance is also providing essential support for development, the administration of justice, and internally displaced persons.

Program Description: OTI’s program in Colombia facilitates the peace process at the national level and builds stability and cooperation at the community level. By opening lines of communication and fostering dialogue among the government, civil society, and neglected communities, OTI is working to establish a framework for permanent and peaceful resolution to the conflict. OTI’s program is also strengthening democracy by bringing together locally elected officials and other key stakeholders with members of the local community to assess the priority infrastructure needs. The community then comes together to design and implement the project, filling basic needs while at the same time building participatory, democratic processes.

OTI/Colombia’s Strategic Plan

Goal: To build momentum for the peace process.

Objectives: To support this goal, OTI aims to:

- empower communities and civil society affected by conflict to participate in democratic processes;
- assist the GOC and civil society to negotiate peace;
- manage programs to assist internally displaced people and stabilize communities where they have settled.

Activities and Impact

Community Development: OTI, through the Salesian Missions, created innovative models of community-led development in parts of the country where government institutions are weak or non-existent.

Impact: This activity supported a revolving loan fund that provided \$200 to \$300 loans to rural craftsmen, farmers, and entrepreneurs. During FY 2000, approximately 159 micro-credit loans were awarded in support of small community projects for vulnerable and disadvantaged populations. These projects resulted in new job opportunities and more stable incomes. By providing economic support for communities, OTI was able to help people living near the FARC-controlled *despeje* zone regain control of their lives despite the on-going conflict.

In addition, the grant to the Salesian Missions funded 11 small (under \$2,500) community projects. These projects included the construction and supply of equipment to several community centers for displaced families (which were built by the families), several schoolrooms, a playground for 500 displaced children, four school cafeterias for students, displaced families and the elderly, a community crop storage facility, and a library.

The Salesian program also included a scholarship component designed to keep children from forced and voluntary recruitment into insurgent forces. The 98 scholarships awarded benefited students in grades 8-11, whose families lacked the resources needed to keep them in school. These families, many of whom live in rebel-controlled areas and other areas where illegal armed actors operate with impunity, brought their children to the Salesian-run schools to escape the conflict. As a result, these children were able to lead normal lives, receive an education, and avoid conscription.

Good Governance: OTI helped local governments and communities identify and implement activities that were responsive to their immediate needs by implementing Quick Impact Projects with the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). OTI's grant to the ICRC resulted in 50 communities identifying and implementing, in a participatory manner, the construction of local infrastructure such as health posts, community centers, libraries, schools and classrooms, recreation centers, granaries, and silos. The subgrants also supported small productive ventures for displaced families and other activities designed to help struggling communities overcome the damages of the civil conflict. Fifty small infrastructure grants were approved, leveraging an estimated \$280,454 in contributions from counterpart organizations, and benefiting approximately 112,597 people directly and another 12,322 indirectly.

Impact: As a result of these quick impact projects, communities have been able to absorb additional displaced families without straining already-limited local resources, rebuild a functioning social life following armed attacks, and remain in their places of origin, avoiding the devastating consequences of becoming displaced within Colombia. This project ended in September 2000. ICRC, for which this was a new model of donor partnership, has decided to continue the project with its own funding. The OTI-initiated venture continues to have an important impact in scattered rural communities, whose inhabitants are at risk of displacement.

Conflict Management: OTI/Colombia worked to strengthen the peace process through civil society initiatives at the community level. At the end of FY 2000, OTI created a "Small Peace Grants" mechanism that was developed with the International Office of Migration (IOM). This fund provided seed money to local Colombian organizations attempting to facilitate dialogue and bring an end to violent conflict.

Impact: This grant fills an important gap in the USAID program by providing an outlet for civil society voices in the peace process and by encouraging local initiatives that have the potential to have an impact on the country as a whole. An initial pilot effort of \$200,000 was signed in the final days of FY 2000. Implementation began but no results were available by the end of FY 2000.

Assistance to Displaced Persons: OTI manages USAID/Colombia \$27.5 million portfolio to assist displaced people. The five grants under this Mission strategic objective provide economic and social opportunities for vulnerable groups, especially internally displaced persons. This non-emergency support to assist IDPs and others focuses mainly on education, health, reproductive health, income generation, and political participation. It is designed to reduce friction between

established communities and the newly-arrived IDPs, who often strain already-limited social resources. Local capacity to absorb IDPs is being strengthened and participatory dialogue on IDPs and poverty-related issues is being enhanced. Programs are community-based, benefiting IDPs as a part of the larger community of vulnerable populations.

Impact: OTI's management of the USAID Plan Colombia funds resulted in five grants with five organizations signed the day after funds became available. The design of this program benefited greatly from OTI's previous experience with the ICRC and the Salesian Missions. At the end of FY 2000, the five grants were signed and implementation began, but no results were available.

Support for the Peace Process: Through a grant to U.S. and Colombian universities, OTI worked with the GOC to develop negotiating points for peace talks with the FARC. This project had intended to bring GOC peace negotiators together with the private sector and NGOs, making the GOC approach to the peace negotiations more participatory.

Impact: This effort did not meet OTI's expectations. During FY 2000, the peace negotiations with the FARC did not advance as anticipated. The GOC counterpart for the project – the Minister of the Interior – was removed from his post, and his responsibilities for the negotiations distributed among different ministries. In addition, the GOC project director was made Minister of Development, and was not replaced. The project was able to host only two of the ten meetings planned. In response to these problems, OTI and the grantee redesigned the project to work closely with the Minister of Development, who has received a special Presidential mandate to advance all peace processes, not only those with the FARC. OTI is supporting this government initiative, in the form of funding meetings, and is working to make the process more inclusive by involving different sectors of civil society and other private peace initiatives in the overall government strategy for peace.

Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Speed: With OTI's extensive input into the design and initiation of the assistance program to aid internally displaced persons, the Mission was able to sign grants for \$27.5 million one day after the funds were received. IOM made its first sub-grant to PROCOMUN, a Colombian NGO, which promotes decentralization and improved participatory local governance, less than a week after OTI's Small Peace Grants Initiative was established.

OTI also provided the first U.S. Government assistance to at risk communities and vulnerable populations in Colombia. At the time, very few other donors were working at the community level in ways that promote participation and inclusiveness. OTI pilot programs were initiated 18 months ahead of other U.S. Government and international donors in this area.

Targeting: Given Colombia's dynamic political situation, OTI programming remained flexible throughout FY 2000. Recognizing the difficulty of implementing small community projects under the initial project design, OTI restructured its grant to the Salesian Missions and shifted funds accordingly. Funds were moved from the small social projects line-item into income-generating loans, which were felt to have a greater impact on the communities.

Resource Leveraging: OTI's grant of \$750,000 to ICRC, which initiated community development programs in parts of the country where government institutions are weak or non-existent, resulted in an additional \$280,000 of in-kind assistance from communities and local governments. Although counterpart funding was not a requirement under the agreement, communities decided to make their own contributions, often in labor and other resources, in order

to expand the projects. When OTI's funding ended in September 2000, ICRC continued the program with its own funding.

The OTI program of community assistance (the \$750,000 grant to the ICRC and the \$300,000 grant the Salesian Missions), was in effect replaced by the \$27.5 million USAID strategic objective to provide social and political opportunities to vulnerable peoples, especially the internally displaced. OTI's groundwork and experience ensured the successful implementation of this much larger USAID program.

Policy Leveraging: OTI designed and implemented USAID's plan to assist internally displaced persons, and was also a key proponent of the U.S. Government's plan to reintegrate former child combatants. OTI's direction in these two areas has also led to a sweeping change in the GOC approach to the internally displaced: the GOC interventions are being decentralized, made smaller and more appropriate to local needs, and also made more inclusive and participatory. The change was largely as a result of OTI negotiations with the central government and in response to the USAID program designed by OTI and its grantees.

FY 2000 Summary Grant Chart:

Sector	Number of Grants	Total Value of Grants
ICRC Community Infrastructure	36	\$436,813
Salesians Community Project	11	\$129,079
Javeriana University Peace Negotiations	2	\$49,000
Total:	49	\$614,892

Partnerships: OTI has developed close relationships with the USAID Mission and the U.S. Embassy, which helped OTI to identify many peace grantees. Close relationships were also formed with local NGOs and international NGOs, and were strengthened with GOC agencies, as well as ICRC, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNHCHR.

Lessons Learned in FY 2000:

- Flexibility is particularly critical in a conflict situation where OTI assistance may be needed to help push a faltering process forward.
- Although OTI's management of the USAID Mission's IDP portfolio resulted in many successes that were widely documented in the Mission's R4, this work had an impact on the amount of time staff had to devote to the OTI program. When working closely with the Mission is it important to analyze carefully staff roles and responsibilities and if need be, make allowances for multiple demands on staff time.

Exit Strategy: OTI intends to hand over its program to the USAID Mission in September 2001.

CROATIA	START DATE: JULY 1997 Exit Date: March 2000
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$1,656,000 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: The death of Croatia’s nationalist leader, President Franjo Tudjman, in December 1999 paved the way for the country’s transition to democracy. The parliamentary election held on January 3, 2000, was a milestone in the country’s history. The seventy-six percent voter turnout was the highest since the 1990 vote for independence. The parliamentary election, which was run in an orderly and professional manner, resulted in the defeat of the ruling HDZ party. The HDZ’s collapse had a carryover effect on the presidential election where the early HDZ favorite, Mate Granic, lost to Stipe Mesic, a relative unknown whose election ushered in a new era in Croatia’s political development.

As one of the more powerful former Yugoslav republics, Croatia is vitally important to durable peace in the Balkans. The U.S. has a strong interest in eliciting Croatia’s cooperation in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and in supporting democratic reforms for long-term stability.

Program Description: During FY 2000, OTI’s support focused on Croatia’s parliamentary elections, a pivotal event in the country’s history. OTI closed its program in Croatia in May 2000.

OTI/Croatia’s Strategic Plan

Goal: To identify and support democratic elements of society.

Objectives: To support this goal, the OTI program aimed to:

- promote an informed and engaged citizenry through increased public access to complete, objective and accurate information;
- encourage greater popular participation in elections and public life;
- improve transparency and accountability of the government and government institutions.

Activities and Impact

Media: OTI supported the production of documentaries, talk shows, and investigative reports that emphasized citizen participation and the need for democratic processes. OTI also facilitated relationships between NGOs and the media to increase the reach of political activism.

Impact: OTI fostered the development of alternative media in Croatia. In an assessment of the program, evaluators found that the continued existence and positive influence of several independent media outlets in Croatia could be attributed to OTI support. In a comparison of attitudes about state-controlled media and alternative media in Zagreb, assessment data revealed that OTI-supported radio stations rated more favorably than state controlled radio. After the January 2000 elections, the new government began to reform state media in an effort to encourage more objective and accurate news programs, and included programs developed by many OTI media grantees.

Election Support: One hundred-twenty NGOs joined together in various coalitions to encourage public participation in the elections. OTI supported these coalitions, which were non-partisan and communicated to the public basic voter information and the responsibilities of citizens and political parties. To encourage transparency during the election, OTI supported domestic voter monitoring and get-out-the-vote efforts. OTI further developed "info-clubs" in war-affected regions that provided access to news and became centers for volunteer activities.

Impact: International partners, NGOs, and media in Croatia agreed that without support from organizations such as OTI many voters in Croatia would not have had sufficient balanced information to participate in the elections. In a country with little history of volunteerism and general suspicion about NGOs, GONG, a major OTI grantee, recruited, trained and accredited 5,000 domestic election volunteers for three elections. GONG was so successful that it was requested by the Government of Croatia to become a permanent member of the electoral commission. OTI's work in Croatia helped change the national perception of NGOs.

Good governance and accountability: OTI-supported NGOs lobbied the government to allow citizen monitoring of the vote on election day and brought politicians together to explain their views in public forums, which were then broadcast on media.

Impact: Because of OTI's efforts to encourage civil society and alternative media, Croatian citizens now have more information about the government than they ever had before.

An OTI-sponsored legal advice organization, SAN, exposed a law that limited public gatherings of more than twenty people. Through a cooperative effort with media and other NGOs, SAN helped to repeal this law in the Daruvar municipality.

OTI's support for GONG enabled its members to participate in the drafting of the electoral laws to ensure that domestic monitoring was permitted. By producing their own election results through a parallel vote tabulation process, GONG forced the government to release election results immediately rather than delay the announcement.

Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Speed: Grant-making speed ranged from two days to six weeks. The entire pre-election campaign was implemented with only one month's notice.

Targeting: OTI focused its resources on the parliamentary elections, a strategy that paid off with the highest voter turn-out since the referendum on independence that was held in 1990. Because Croatia had ample media outlets, OTI focused its media resources on improving the coverage of the news and developing program content.

Resource Leveraging: OTI took the lead in coordinating donor support for the get-out-the-vote efforts and domestic election monitoring. OTI's total support of approximately \$1 million for the pre-election activity was matched one-to-one with funds from other donors.

Policy Leveraging: OTI was an integral part of the U.S. Government's strategy in Croatia, and played a highly supportive role in the international community's efforts to implement the Dayton Peace Agreements. OTI was also recognized for its leadership in the Croatian transition.

FY 2000 Summary Grant Chart

Sector	Number of Grants	Total Value of Grants
Civil Society	11	\$1,069,917
Media	17	\$628,296
Total:	28	\$1,698,213

Partnerships: OTI's partnerships ranged from complementary programming to co-financing of an individual project. Key partnerships were with OSI, NDI, Freedom House, IREX, Mott Foundation, the EU, and the British-Know-How Fund.

Lessons Learned in FY 2000

- By helping to connect NGO grantees with media grantees, program impacts can be amplified significantly. For example, the OTI-supported TV newsmagazine had a special feature on the pre-election activities of an NGO.
- Many Croatians are still unclear about the differences between NGOs and government services. It is important to assist NGOs in learning how to explain their role in civil society to both the public and government and work more effectively with government agencies and officials.

Exit Strategy: OTI handed off its program in May 2000. Approximately \$800,000 in SEED funds were left by design in the OTI funding mechanism for the USAID Mission to program after OTI's departure.

Quotes on OTI's work:

On the OTI-sponsored election campaign:

"From the marketing perspective, the most effective was the GLAS 99 Campaign with its witty ironies of omnipresent prize winning games...it was an exceptionally implemented campaign in the field, and engagement of independent prominent personalities has largely contributed towards allowing those who have never voted to finally have their say."

Fedja Vukic, a prominent Croatian marketing expert, quoted in Jutarnji list, one of the two leading newspapers in Croatia.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DROC)	START DATE: NOVEMBER 1997 Exit Date: January 2001
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$2,750,000

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: The May 1997 rebellion that swept across Zaire resulted in the overthrow of the dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. With the backing of neighboring Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, Laurent-Desire Kabila assumed the presidency and restored the country’s former name, Democratic Republic of the Congo. The new government found a country devastated by years of corrupt and divisive rule and a population eager for a change to responsive government.

However, the respite from conflict was brief. In August 1998, a falling-out between Kabila and his backers in Uganda and Rwanda resulted in an invasion of eastern Congo by these countries, and eventually inspired an insurgency in the north of the country. A year later, in July 1999, a cease-fire agreement was signed by the war combatants, which included five foreign states, the government, and the rebels. Titled the Lusaka Accord, progress toward implementation of the agreement was slow and uneven at best. In spite of the support for the peace agreement by a number of important UN Security Council resolutions, the country remained divided in half, with the South-western half at war with the foreign-occupied North-eastern half, which was controlled by different competing rebel administrations backed by different external sponsors.

DRC’s wealth of natural resources and its strategic location in the center of the continent bordered by nine other countries make it the lynchpin to regional political stability and economic growth. The conflict has destabilized much of central Africa and led to considerable displacements of people and human suffering. For these reasons, the U.S. Government has a strong interest in ending the conflict, helping to restore the country’s territorial integrity and assisting the establishment of a more open transparent and democratic government in DRC.

Program Description: Following the overthrow of Mobutu in May 1997, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) conducted a comprehensive assessment of the prospects for democratic transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC). Finding strong enthusiasm for democratic reform and economic restructuring at the local level, OTI decided to focus its efforts on five politically important provinces where a new generation of leaders was attempting to introduce meaningful change. OTI’s immediate objective was to address the soaring expectations of the population by engaging in community improvement projects that demonstrated positive change and brought civil society together with local government in a democratic and transparent process. The hope was that momentum at the local level would rise and expand to the national level, facilitating a transition "from the outside in".

In August 1998, a falling out between President Kabila and his backers in Uganda and Rwanda led to an invasion that subsequently fractured into several competing "fronts" that exercise local control over large areas of eastern and northern Congo. OTI was forced to suspend its operations until January 1999, after the Lusaka Peace Accords had been signed and the situation was stable enough to allow OTI staff to re-enter and resume their work. Upon its return to the country, OTI expanded its focus – with the help of funding from the Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI) -- to support implementation of the peace agreements through support for civil society

groups working toward community reconciliation, improved respect for human rights and the rule of law, and administrative accountability and transparency. The offices in Lubumbashi and Kananga continued to fund "critical bottleneck" projects that brought communities together and built hope for the future, but the Bukavu office remained closed for political and security reasons.

In June of 2000, OTI decided to hand off the program to the USAID Mission. In the meantime, OTI focused its efforts narrowly on the Inter-Congolese dialogue (ICD). OTI also continued its support for peace-building activities by civil society organizations and limited human rights/rule of law initiatives utilizing GLJI funds.

II. OTI/DROC Strategic Plan

Goal: To strengthen the peace process.

Objectives: To achieve this goal, OTI aimed to:

- back the office of the ICD Facilitator;
- support Congolese civil society's efforts to lobby for peace in the region and adherence by all signatories to the Lusaka Peace Accords as well as its effective participation in the Inter-Congolese dialogue;
- assist civil society organizations and local government in overcoming critical obstacles to improved social conditions via transparent, participatory, multi-actor public-work initiatives;
- prepare for the hand-off of OTI's program to the Mission.

Activities and Impact

Conflict Management: A critical component of the Lusaka Peace Accords was a national dialogue to chart a peaceful transition to a democratically elected government. The former President of Botswana was named in late 1999 as the Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD). Using funding designated through the Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI), OTI supported the dialogue along with related activities to engage civil society in their country's transformation.

Support for Civil Society: Activities included funding pre-dialog civil society coordination meetings, publication of relevant documents, and preparation of social and economic studies that could significantly facilitate its participation in the ICD and enhance its contribution once the ICD began. In a highly symbolic event, OTI brought together civil society groups from across the country in October 1999 to meet with an umbrella organization, the Civil Society Campaign for a Lasting Peace, and the All-Africa Council of Churches. This marked the first time that large numbers of Congolese from the east were able to travel freely to Kinshasa, and a rare opportunity for the government and civil society to engage in a frank discussion of political issues.

Impact: By helping average citizens join the debate on the DROC's future government, OTI tried to help lay the foundations for political reform. Actions by then-President Kabila, including temporarily closing the facilitator's office and calling for his replacement, diminished any chance that civil society could have a significant input into a dialogue to decide the future of the country.

RESULTS AND IMPACT BY PROCESS INDICATORS

The OTI program was essentially in a "holding pattern" for much of the year with limited activity that ceased by the mid-point of FY 01 for all regional offices. The Kinshasa office was the only active office after March 2000. As such indicators are not relevant to identify results and impact.

Speed: N/A

Targeting: N/A

Resource Leveraging:

The substantial amount of OTI resources, including material assets and trained local staff, were transferred to USAID/Congo Implementing Partners. This facilitated the implementation of a significant increase in relief and public health programming by the mission.

Policy Leveraging: NA

FY2000 Summary Grant Chart

Sector	NUMBER OF GRANTS	Total Value of Grants
Critical Bottlenecks	13	\$248,200
Inter-Congolese Dialogue	25	\$341,500
Total:	38	\$589,700

Partnerships: OTI's partners in DROC include Development Alternatives International, the U.S. Embassy, the USAID Mission and the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the International Foundation for Election Systems, the Human Rights Law Group, and numerous local governments and civil society organizations.

Exit Strategy: OTI handed-off its program to the Mission in during the second quarter of FY 2001. This more gradual hand-off allowed the Mission and OTI to support some key initiatives in response to the changing conditions as the result of the change in leadership in the DROC.

EAST TIMOR	START DATE: SEPTEMBER 1999 Exit Date: June 2002
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 Budget: \$11,037,000 (ESF) \$1,500,000 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: In August 1999, the people of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia in a national referendum that was held under the auspices of the United Nations. The reaction from pro-Indonesian militias was swift and vengeful. Armed forces rampaged the territory, wreaking unprecedented violence, death, and destruction. An estimated 450,000 people were displaced (250,000 fled across the border into West Timor) and over seventy percent of all infrastructure was destroyed or damaged. In October 1999, the government of Indonesia officially handed East Timor over to the UN's International Force for East Timor, and the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) was established to administer the territory and exercise legislative and executive authority during the transitional period. East Timor's emergence as a democratic nation will further the overall goals of the U.S. of promoting democracy internationally and in Southeast Asia.

Program Description: Drawing on its Indonesia program resources and experience, OTI was able to move quickly in the fall of 1999 to jumpstart reconstruction efforts and to help lay the foundation for a political transition in East Timor. OTI had conducted a few activities in East Timor prior to the referendum, but the new situation called for a larger and more rapid response. In December 1999 OTI established a field presence in Dili, East Timor. OTI quickly worked to help local NGOs and other civil society organizations rebuild themselves and join the international community's emergency response to the humanitarian crisis. In so doing, OTI enabled the organizations' participation in the decision-making process on East Timor's future.

OTI/East Timor's Strategic Plan

Goal: To help encourage and secure a political, social, and economic environment conducive to the democratic nation building process during East Timor's transition to independence.

Objectives: To support this goal, OTI aims to:

- stabilize communities by addressing gaps in local social services and economic infrastructure;
- promote the production and dissemination of accurate and balanced information;
- broaden participation in the political transition process;
- enhance good governance and engage the Timorese in decision-making processes; and,
- facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants and displaced Timorese.

Activities and Impact

Media: To make the process of nation-building as transparent and inclusive as possible, OTI's media program builds and strengthens professional, independent print and electronic media outlets and expands media coverage.

Impact: OTI's media programs have supported UN and East Timorese efforts to develop the legal framework for the media and to promote the dissemination of accurate information. As a result of the post referendum violence, East Timor was left without printing facilities for newspapers, textbooks, or any other publications. OTI identified a former Indonesian government printshop and provided funds in order to purchase and rehabilitate equipment, fill critical gaps in technical skills, and provide materials to re-start operations. Since August 2000, the print consortium has regularly printed four newspapers and has earned revenue from commercial clients, including NGOs, UN agencies, the Catholic Church, and local businesses. OTI's funding of a radio station near the border with West Timor has enabled the broadcast of local and national news into West Timor, which gives refugees there access to balanced information about the situation in East Timor and has promoted voluntary repatriation.

Civil Society: OTI's grants to civil society organizations are targeted towards increasing participation in the political transition and the development of a peaceful and democratic society. OTI supports organizations engaged in civic education, reconciliation, human rights, women's empowerment and leadership training, good governance, issue advocacy, and voter education. OTI funded a training-of-trainers workshop for civic education workers and supported an initiative to coordinate the development and production of civic education training materials to avoid a duplication of effort in this area.

Impact: Timely OTI assistance to approximately 35 civil society organizations enabled these organizations to replace looted or destroyed equipment and to contribute more effectively to emergency relief efforts. Local organizations were better able to implement projects and coordinate their activities with the international NGO community, as well as to develop longer-term programs and forge relationships with other donors. OTI grants helped the NGO Forum, an umbrella organization of local organizations, extend their information and training services out to district-based organizations and community groups.

Governance: OTI's governance assistance focuses primarily on the district level by providing training, capacity building, and technical assistance for East Timorese who are being phased into the district governing and administrative entities.

Impact: OTI's governance program encouraged participatory processes and democratic principles by encouraging Timorese to replace UN staff at the district level, and providing space for new grassroots political leaders to emerge.

Community Stabilization: OTI targets small-scale interventions that support community normalization by focusing on gaps in local social services and economic infrastructure. The program emphasizes community prioritization and decision-making, citizen participation in project implementation, women's access and participation, and the use of local implementing partners.

Impact: Under an initiative called the Temporary Employment Program (TEP), more than 65,000 people over a six-month period were employed on 597 projects to rehabilitate physical and social infrastructure. At a time when there was little visible impact of donor efforts in East Timor, TEP injected purchasing power into devastated communities, provided young people with constructive use of their time, and showed the East Timorese people some tangible results of their struggle. Such activities have enabled individuals to rebuild their livelihoods and reduced the need for humanitarian assistance.

Reintegration: OTI has provided support to internally displaced persons and returning refugees in order to speed resettlement and reintegration into their communities.

Impact: OTI's support helped facilitate the reintegration of approximately 250,000 refugees and displaced persons back into their original communities. The training and agricultural supplies helped to stabilize families and villages and restored a sense of normalcy in their communities.

Although a small number of ex-combatants were included in this program, larger-scale implementation was delayed until after the UNTAET and the National Council had finalized plans for the size and scope of the new defense force. Results for this program will be reported for FY 2001.

Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Speed: OTI's greatest strength in East Timor has been the speed and flexibility with which it has made small grants to local organizations. In FY 2000, OTI provided over \$7 million for 135 separate grants to indigenous organizations for civil society initiatives and for the Temporary Employment Program (TEP). OTI was the only donor that was able to provide local NGOs with funding to rebuild themselves in order to participate in decisions affecting East Timor's future. OTI was also able to support community rehabilitation activities in all 13 districts at a time when no other official assistance programs, bilateral or multilateral, were operational in the districts. Between October 1999 and January 2000, OTI funded 30 grants to local civil society organizations engaged in human rights protection, civic education, jobs training, trauma counseling, labor advocacy, primary health care, community development, and small enterprise development.

From March to August 2000, OTI moved quickly to implement the Temporary Employment Program (TEP), which provided short-term employment to 65,000 East Timorese through 597 small projects in all of East Timor's thirteen districts. OTI has established relationships of trust with many key Timorese players, and has gained a reputation for timely performance and reliability exceeding that of any other donor.

Targeting: OTI's programs directly supported indigenous organizations at a time when other donors were channeling assistance through the UN and international NGOs. This meant that more of the funds went directly to those who needed them, and that the recipients were able to participate in program design and implementation. As soon as the World Bank's and the UN's employment programs became operational, OTI re-targeted its programs to focus on other community priorities, such as the rehabilitation of roads, water systems, and income generating programs.

Resource Leveraging: UN and World Bank resources have continued a number of program activities that OTI initiated, and other donors, such as CIDA and UNESCO, have contributed their funding to the print consortium. OTI's community development activities now require labor and in-kind contributions from the communities.

Policy Leveraging: OTI has been at the forefront of U.S. policy in East Timor and has actively participated in donor coordination and sector working groups. OTI is frequently called upon to provide input to U.S. Government policy on East Timor and works closely with the USAID Asia and Near East Bureau and the State Department in determining the most appropriate use of U.S. Government resources in East Timor.

FY 2000 Summary Grant Chart

Sector	III. Number of Grants	Total Value of Grants
Community Stabilization	77	\$4,583,055
Civil Society/Governance	42	\$1,241,138
Media	16	\$1,198,534
Total:	135	\$7,022,827

Partnerships: OTI works closely with UNTAET, the World Bank and other donors to ensure coordination and to prevent duplication of effort. OTI has been instrumental in funding programs that help UNTAET achieve its goals.

Lessons Learned in FY 2000:

- The need to respond quickly should not overshadow the need to build local capacity. The East Timorese must have ownership over the reconstruction of their country and participate fully in the development of a democratic governance structure.

Exit Strategy: Over the next year, OTI will hand-off governance, civil society, and media activities to USAID/Jakarta's recently selected democracy and governance partners. Recognizing that the transition to full independence will be neither quick nor smooth, OTI expects to remain active in East Timor for at least several months after the inauguration of a new government. OTI and USAID/Jakarta are jointly preparing a transitional development strategy for East Timor that will transfer management of OTI activities to USAID/Jakarta by June 2002.

Quotes on OTI's work:

"TEP has been an overwhelming success in Oecusse District. This is true whether you measure success by the number of people employed, the number of indirect beneficiaries, the quality and sustainability of the work implemented, the development of project management and implementation systems, the level of coordination and linkages with other programs, the level of local awareness and capacity building that resulted or the long awaited public confidence built-up for the international community."

-- July 2000 UNTAET Oecusse District Administration Report

"The USAID Transitional Employment Program (TEP) has been a great success in Covalima. TEP and the projects it brought filled a critical need for something to happen fast in the district. In Covalima, TEP earned the acclaim of the United Nations international, military and local staff, and NGOs."

--July 2000 UNTAET Covalima District Administration Report

"The timely arrival of TEP, its simple procedures and direct implementation with the UN District Administrations, allowed us to get US \$95,000 into the community in less than ten weeks. As the TEP/Covalima program matured, it has come ever closer to both achieving both broad program participation linked with high impact projects. This was strongly aided by the assistance of the USAID monitoring teams who visited regularly and encouraged with constructive analysis of our efforts"

--July 2000 UNTAET Covalima District Administration Report

“Originally it was thought that this workshop would provide a small amount of income for the cooperative in the beginning as they began to build the business. However, as the cooperative has signed the 15,000 USD contract with the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA), it is expected that at least 6,000 USD will be obtained for further workshop capitalization, salaries and community investment. As this will occur before July 2001, the impact of the USAID donation is far greater than initially expected.”

--February 2000 Actione Contra La Faim final report on a TEPS II grant to a carpentry workshop in Manatuto District

HONDURAS	Start Date: January 1999
	Exit Date: January 2000
OTI Principal IR: <i>Citizen Security Enhanced</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$126,769 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: In October 1998, Hurricane Mitch wrought great destruction across Central America, leaving more than ten thousand dead and over one million homeless. In Honduras alone, the damage to infrastructure and productive capacity was estimated at \$3 billion. A top U.S. Government priority is to assist in the post-Hurricane Mitch recovery and reconstruction process.

Program Description: The OTI program began in January 1999 to promote maximum participation and coordination of the Honduran people, local organizations, and other donors in a variety of post-Hurricane Mitch efforts. The primary activity was in Tegucigalpa, where OTI managed an emergency housing project for area flood victims. A longer-term activity was to repair key transportation links in the worst hit areas of the country, thereby helping to spark economic reactivation in those areas.

OTI/Honduras Strategic Plan

Goal: To aid Honduras' recovery from the devastating effects of Hurricane Mitch.

Objectives: To achieve this goal, OTI aimed to:

- maximize the participation and coordination of the Honduran people, local organizations, and other donors in rehabilitation efforts;
- stimulate economic recovery in the hardest-hit areas.

Activities and Impact

Emergency Housing: OTI funded an emergency housing project for Tegucigalpa victims of the flood, managed by the International Organization of Migration (IOM). OTI's use of vouchers allowed eligible families, which had lost their homes, to negotiate with pre-approved participating NGOs and to choose their replacement home based on factors such as community, location, cost, and size. OTI also provided legal services to the flood victims, developed urbanization and water/sanitation plans for the housing sites, helped obtain environmental clearances, and expedited water and sanitation connections.

Impact: OTI provided technical and programmatic support to NGOs to construct 1,800 housing units for the OTI beneficiaries. Seventeen NGOs received financial and technical support from OTI and 1,800 families were empowered to select the project in which they wished to participate. The OTI program ensured that the families were informed and could participate fully in the process. The beneficiaries remained supportive, even though the process of building the new homes took longer than planned.

Roads and Bridges: OTI supported the design of the USAID/Honduras roads and bridges project.

Impact: OTI's support for the design of the project to repair critical roads enabled farmers to get their crops to market, replant with new seeds and equipment, and attract investment. OTI's support also provided critical start-up cash, which allowed grantees to begin implementation six months before Hurricane Mitch relief funds arrived.

Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Speed: The OTI assessment commenced in mid-January 1999. By mid-February the housing project had been approved and funded. Initial staff was hired in late February and the first grant was made on March 1. The entire process took less than six weeks. The roads and bridges assessment began within two months of the hurricane.

Targeting: The target group for the housing project was 2,000 homeless flood victim families residing in temporary shelters in the Tegucigalpa area. The rural roads project targeted the economically active population who needed access to markets in the rural areas that were hardest hit by the hurricane.

Resource Leveraging: OTI leveraged over \$25 million for its program. In the case of rural roads, OTI funding covered management costs but not actual construction work, which amounted to over 20 times the OTI contribution.

Partnerships: The housing project complemented the USAID Mission's housing strategy. OTI was asked to manage the complete housing package of the Mission and participated heavily in the design of that strategy. OTI management of Mission funds produced many synergies between OTI, the Mission, and OFDA, and provided for more effective use of resources. Outside the U.S. Government, OTI worked closely with the International Organization for Migration, the Municipality of Tegucigalpa, the Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), and other NGOs.

Lessons Learned in FY 2000:

- OTI learned from its experience in Honduras that it had withdrawn its country representative too early. The program was not yet halfway completed and the Mission did not have adequate resources to fully manage the program when it was turned over. If OTI leaves a country again before the projects are fully completed, OTI should ensure that adequate resources exist to assist the Mission and provide more direct involvement.
- Honduras did not fit OTI's traditional mission. OTI's assistance can be more beneficial during a complex political emergency than in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

Exit Strategy: The OTI/Honduras program has been handed over the Mission.

INDONESIA	START DATE: AUGUST 1998 Exit Date: June 2002
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$9,000,000 IDA

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation, home to the world's largest Muslim population, and the third largest democracy in the world. The U.S. has important economic, commercial, and security interests in Indonesia. It is a linchpin of regional security due to its strategic location astride a number of key international maritime straits, and both the United States and Indonesia share the common goal of maintaining peace, security, and stability in the region. A Balkanization of Indonesia would cause long-term instability in the region, and a likely humanitarian catastrophe.

Indonesia held its first free and fair parliamentary elections in June 1999, ushering in new leaders with popular legitimacy. In October 1999, the parliament named Abdurrahman Wahid president and Megawati Sukarno-Putri vice president. While democracy is being consolidated, Indonesia's government faces many challenges: heated ethnic-religious conflicts in several parts of the country; numerous separatist movements; a weak economy; pervasive corruption; and a legacy of military involvement in politics and government.

In the beginning of FY 2000, Indonesia was still euphoric about its first successful, peaceful democratic election of June 1999. The most pressing issue at the time was the selection of the president. While Megawati's popular PDI-P party had clearly led in the polls, there was sufficient resistance in parliament to deny her appointment to the presidency. Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, was named president, and he named Megawati vice president. The elections in Indonesia resulted in a sudden transfer of power from the Golkar Party, previously headed by Suharto and then Habibi, to several new parties. This resulted in a large influx of new representatives with few parliamentary skills. Many had no understanding of what it meant to be a parliamentarian and were not used to making decisions. Compounding this was the fact that most Indonesian citizens had no tradition of engaging their representatives to address local concerns.

In the wake of Wahid's erratic leadership style, pervasive corruption within the government and military, and growing discord among Indonesia's outer provinces, the earlier euphoria began to fade. East Timor's 1999 independence from Indonesia through a popular referendum gave momentum to independence movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya. In the provinces of Aceh, Papua, Maluku, North Maluku, West Timor and Central Sulawesi, abuses by the military, economic hardship, unequal access to resources, and political uncertainties contributed to growing tensions and violence. By early 2000, burgeoning religious and ethnic violence in the provinces began threatening Indonesia's stability. As the year wore on, President Wahid faced increasing scrutiny from Parliament on both policy and personal matters.

Program Description: OTI initiated its program in August 1998 and established regional offices in Medan and Surabaya. OTI identified five sectors where near-term assistance could have the greatest impact on Indonesia's transition. These sectors included: supporting the June 1999 general elections; enhancing the capacity of civil society organizations to advocate reform; helping a newly-open media environment become more professional; encouraging transparent governance; and improving civilian-military relations. Working through DAI under a SWIFT

(Support Which Implements Fast Transitions) contract, OTI/Indonesia has implemented a small grants program addressing each of these areas.

Goal: To support Indonesia's peaceful transition to democracy and strengthen local capacity to prevent or mitigate conflict.

Objectives: To achieve this goal, OTI's program aims to:

- foster transparency and good governance and encourage citizens' political participation;
- enhance civilian capacity for military oversight;
- promote conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation activities.

Activities and Impact

Good Governance: OTI provided support for parliamentary training and village leader training at the district level, the development of civic forums, and public awareness about new regional autonomy laws. OTI conducted legislative strengthening programs to reduce the likelihood of conflict related to the increased responsibility that came with regional autonomy. As a counterweight to legislative strengthening, OTI also funded grantees to develop citizens' forums in urban areas – providing an arena for citizens to voice their opinions, rather than resorting to violence. In addition, OTI funded training for village leaders in the basic skills necessary for implementation of regional autonomy and debates surrounding key district head of government races.

Impact: By the end of FY 2000, OTI had trained approximately 5,836 Members of Parliament (MPs) in almost 200 of Indonesia's 310 kabupatens (regencies), representing a coverage rate of 64%. OTI also supported democracy training for about 1,500 village leaders in Sumatra province.

To reduce the likelihood of conflict related to the gubernatorial selection issues, OTI worked with a consortium of Papuan NGOs to raise public awareness of the process. The activity came to a climax with the live broadcast of the selection proceedings from inside the provincial parliament by the grantee's media partners – including a large screen outside the parliament building. However, there was a portion of the session that took place behind closed doors and was off limits to the press. In the post-election period, the consortium worked to lessen the tensions that emerged from the selection of the governor and vice governor through a series of interactive dialogues and a public service announcement campaign. The focus of these activities was on remaining calm and examining how the selection process might be improved in the future.

Much of OTI's parliament strengthening programs focused on the application of new decentralization laws and regulations at the local level, the drafting of legislation and budgets, transparent revenue enhancement schemes and inclusive processes to review and modify existing laws. In July 2000, following an OTI-supported parliament training in Lampung Province of Sumatra, the head of a Regency Level Parliament reported to OTI that they were so pleased with the training program that they decided to plan for similar technical training in 2001, and fund it out of their own budget.

Media: In FY 2000, OTI's media program used media as a communication tool for civil society groups in conflict areas. OTI provided training and funded program development and media equipment. One OTI grantee, the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA), conducted a media training in Ambon, titled "Indonesian Journalists Facing the Autonomy Era," to provide 70 Christian and Muslim NGO activists from 25 diverse communities in the Maluku islands the opportunity to meet, learn, and share their experiences. Christians and Muslims also joined together for a two-day seminar and interactive workshop to learn and develop basic fact-finding

skills, public relations strategies, outreach techniques, innovative writing styles, and grass root campaign strategies for invigorating public dialogue in this contentious region. In other programs, OTI supported numerous efforts to dissuade corruption in mayoral races in North Sumatra. OTI also funded local partners to conduct public polling, radio dialogues, and other media outreach involving parliamentarians, political party leaders, journalists, NGO activists, academics, students, and other members of the public.

Impact: An OTI grantee's media campaign in Medan helped to oust a corrupt politician and set an example for others. The grantee ran a series of radio public service announcements throughout Sumatra. Two of these PSAs stressed the importance of monitoring the political selection process. In the process, one politician in particular was exposed for paying legislators for their votes. He ultimately resigned from his post following public pressure.

Civil Society: OTI continued to work to strengthen civil society's ability to engage in public advocacy at local and national levels. OTI supported 73 grants related to the development of civic forums, parliament watch groups, or encouraging or improving civic participation in the political process. OTI also supported government and civil society efforts to address the issue of human rights. Programs included training in investigative and forensic techniques, strengthening the ability of groups to shepherd cases through the judicial system, and increasing public awareness, and national focus, on human rights issues.

Impact: In June 2000, OTI grantees in Surabaya facilitated the establishment of new citizens' forums in dozens of districts within Central and East Java. These forums began meeting on a regular basis to identify and sharpen the most prominent issues facing their districts with regard to public participation in implementing Indonesia's new regional autonomy laws. The issues were later presented to district legislatures through public hearings and interactive radio dialogues. Many of the forums proved to be self-sustaining, and continued to meet and self-fund their activities, representing a viable channel for the public to air their aspirations to their elected representatives. In the case of at least two citizen's forums, public policy was changed to reflect the public's demands on a particular issue.

In August 2000, an OTI grantee successfully lobbied parliament to insert a special chapter on human and children rights in the Constitution. The chapter includes language on non-discrimination and affirmative action for women and children. The amendment is in line with the principles contained in the UN Convention on Women and Children, which was ratified in 1999 by the Indonesian Minister of Women's Empowerment. To raise awareness and encourage discussion among the public and parliament about human rights and women's issues in Indonesia, the grantee held public dialogues and workshops, developed a position paper on major issues raised, produced public service announcements on national television, and worked with the parliament to establish a women's caucus. All of the activities involved the stakeholders and interest groups, and included academicians, NGOs, professionals, and the working team of the Indonesian Parliament.

Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Reconciliation: With the spread of conflicts in the outer islands of Indonesia, OTI shifted its priority program areas in FY 2000 to Aceh, Maluku, Papua, Sulawesi, and East Nusa Tenggara/West Timor. To reduce tensions and the outbreak of conflict, OTI supported media campaigns, radio dialogues, community discussions, reconstruction and rehabilitation of mixed communities in former conflict zones, and joint government-civil society task forces.

Impact: Calls for independence steadily increased in the restive province of Papua. This culminated in the convening of the Papua Peoples' Presidium Congress in June 2000, during which the Presidium stopped short of declaring unilateral independence from Indonesia. In response to this situation, OTI funded conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution activities. Local NGOs received funding to undertake workshops, interactive radio and television dialogues and public service announcements on the role and function of the media in conflict prevention and civic education in Papua. To focus on human rights issues, OTI coordinated with The Asia Foundation (TAF) to add value to investigative techniques training for community-based advocacy organizations around the province. The information obtained from the investigations was then passed along to ELS-HAM, a regional human rights advocacy organization funded by TAF, for processing and follow-up with the authorities. Also during FY2000, Indonesia's new regional autonomy laws gave the provincial legislature an unprecedented role in selecting the head of government for the province and, after extensive delays, the new governor and vice governor were ultimately selected in October.

In early 2000 and again in August 2000, there were separate incidents of bomb explosions near houses of worship in Medan, North Sumatra. These bombings threatened to cause antagonisms between religious groups. In both cases, OTI's office in Medan immediately contacted its local partners and religious groups and provided space for them to meet. After the first incident, religious leaders urged their constituents to not react violently. After the second incident, a group of informal leaders from major religious and ethnic groups in North Sumatra attended an OTI-funded conflict analysis and management workshop. The workshop participants outlined the actual and potential conflicts in Medan, and discussed coordinated actions that the groups could undertake either individually or jointly to reduce the possibility that further provocations might result in a general explosion of violence.

Following fighting in the Malukus, thousands of displaced persons fled to Manado, North Sulawesi province. While there had been no conflicts in North Sulawesi, the huge influx of IDPs threatened to destabilize the province. In response, OTI funded several local civil society and media groups in North Sulawesi to carry out conflict prevention programs in order to reduce social tensions caused by the influx of the IDPs in local communities of North Sulawesi, and encourage community dialogue about conflict prevention. OTI also provided space for the development of a local crisis response group comprised of local leaders, government, police, civil society groups, and IDP representatives. To date, there has been no fighting between religious groups or IDPs and the local community in Manado.

Civilian-Military Relations: OTI recognized the importance of promoting civilian oversight of the Indonesian military (TNI) and expanded its efforts in the civilian/military arena. OTI helped by undertaking 24 activities that supported legislative oversight of the military, raised awareness on the issues of military-owned businesses, corruption, territorial affairs, control of natural resources, and addressed the military's involvement in inter-ethnic conflict. For the first time, in March 2000, OTI teamed with the U.S. Embassy's Office of the Military Attaché for Defense Programs (OMADP) to support a civilian-military program to study the controversial territorial command structure. The data were presented at the national level to provide decision-makers with information for developing alternative command structures.

Impact: In June 2000, the Institute for Research and Empowerment, an OTI grantee based in Central Java, conducted discussions among local citizen leaders and members of the police and military on the traditional role of the military in local politics. As a result of these discussions,

military personnel were prohibited from becoming village leaders or holding official village posts.

Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Speed: In FY 2000, OTI responded proactively to Indonesia's rapidly changing socio-political environment. In non-crisis situations, OTI maintained an approximate two week turnaround time for grants. Following a local crisis, as soon as the situation was deemed safe enough for U.S. staff, OTI quickly mobilized assessment teams, often in partnership with other USAID offices, to determine the most appropriate package of assistance. New grants were made within days. In Aceh, OTI quickly leveraged the efforts of the Henri Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, which brokered a "Humanitarian Pause," between the armed separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia in May 2000. Under the terms of the Pause Agreement, the two sides agreed to provide space and security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout the province. Anticipating an urgent need for assistance, OTI established a field office in May 2000, supported a local NGO in carrying out a mass media campaign to publicize the agreement and provided office infrastructure to the Security and Humanitarian Action Committees established under the Agreement. OTI's donations were the first commitments from the international community, and enabled the Committees to rapidly become operational.

Targeting: During FY 2000, it became apparent that Indonesia's transition to democracy, and its simultaneous efforts at decentralization, were resulting in increased fractionalization among political elites, tensions between ethnic and religious groups, and localized calls for independence. In response, OTI readjusted its strategy to focus on "hot-spot" areas, as well as national-level issues that threatened to destabilize the country. OTI also adjusted its programs to address the critical issues of how the local and national government might better handle the growing problem of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) that often result from local conflicts.

Resource Leveraging: Every local organization that OTI supported made a grantee contribution to their proposed activities. These contributions included staff, office space, or matching funds. For example, in January 2000, OTI's grant for legislative training in Central Java received such a positive response from legislators that members of the executive branch secured additional funding from the local government to include their members in future training sessions. As a result, where OTI originally had committed to funding the activity in full, it only needed to provide funding for the training venues – while local governments picked up other expenses (such as the cost of the trainers and distribution of training materials). Over 1,300 legislators and 440 executive branch members were trained in legislative skills.

Policy Leveraging: In FY 2000, OTI's efforts influenced U.S. Government policy, the Indonesian government, and other bi-lateral institutions. OTI's work in the area of governance helped inform citizens and local politicians about the impact of decentralization at the community level, particularly in the areas of policy development and local budgeting. This work leveraged the efforts of the Government of Indonesia as well as other donors. OTI has also been at the forefront of the U.S. Government's response to the crisis in Aceh.

FY 2000 Summary Grant Chart

Sector	NUMBER OF GRANTS	Total Value of Grants
Civil Society	98	\$2,347,291
Civilian/Military	24	\$970,182
Governance	46	\$1,593,571
Media	28	\$709,366
Total:	196	\$5,620,409

Partnerships: OTI's success in Indonesia stems from its close relationship with the USAID Mission and the U.S. Embassy. The Mission and OTI have shared lessons learned and leveraged program resources. In collaboration with the U.S. Embassy, OTI has responded to policy changes and recommended policy options to the Government of Indonesia. OTI also cooperates with DAI (Development Alternatives, Incorporated), Internews, HDC (Henri Dunant Center), the United Nations, and hundreds of local organizations.

Lessons Learned in FY 2000:

- **Link Activities in the Regions with the Center:** Many of OTI's programs in the regions have greater impact if they are linked to similar efforts in Jakarta. These linkages minimize the risk of outlying area programs working at cross-purposes with Jakarta policy. Efforts to develop these linkages have been done either directly, or by including a "Jakarta-connection" component in the grant itself, or by encouraging national media coverage of the event.

Hand-off Strategy: Over 30 of OTI's best local partner organizations have been recommended to USAID's Democracy Office for longer-term funding and capacity building. Of this group, several have already been accepted. OTI is also discussing other funding options with the USAID Mission to institutionalize the SWIFT mechanism as a potential means for other USAID offices to access rapid or bridge funding for their own programming.

KOSOVO	START DATE: JULY 1997 Exit Date: September 2001
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$7,779,000 (IDA PLUS \$781,339 SEED FUNDING)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: The majority ethnic-Albanian province of Kosovo enjoyed autonomous status within the Yugoslav Federation prior to 1989. At that time, Slobodan Milosevic revoked that status and Serbs took control of the province’s administration, police, and judiciary. Ethnic Albanians lost public sector jobs and experienced general harassment from Serb police and military forces at an increasing rate.

During late summer 1998, Yugoslav aggression toward Kosovar Albanians reached new heights, prompting the first in a series of threats of NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia. Negotiations between Yugoslav government officials and the international community led to the deployment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observations Mission and, with Milosevic’s eventual acquiescence, to the expanded OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission. Continuation of violent tactics in the winter of 1999 and the failure of peace negotiations at Rambouillet led to the evacuation of the international community and the consequent NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999. The airstrikes ended in mid-June 1999 when Serb authorities signed UN Resolution 1244, which provided for a NATO and UN presence to protect and administer Kosovo. In late June, overwhelming numbers of Kosovar refugees, accompanied by NATO forces and international organizations, flooded back to the province to begin rebuilding their communities.

The Balkan region remains a top foreign policy priority for the United States. The U.S. Government has committed significant resources, including some 5,000 U.S. ground troops, to build a lasting peace in Kosovo and promote regional stability.

Program Description: OTI supported activities in Kosovo as part of its Yugoslavia program, which began in July 1997. In October 1998, a separate Kosovo program was initiated and an office was opened in Pristina. During the airstrikes, OTI temporarily closed its Kosovo office and moved to Macedonia to work with refugee communities. Building on contacts developed before the bombing and during the program-in-exile, OTI quickly established seven field offices in Kosovo following the return of Kosovar Albanians in July 1999. The Kosovo Transition Initiative (KTI) encourages political diversity, increased citizen participation in community and political affairs, and professionalism and transparency in media and public service institutions. The bulk of OTI’s portfolio has consisted of assistance to communities in forming and organizing Community Improvement Councils (CICs). These Councils have supported Kosovars in the process of rebuilding their communities while preparing them for the challenges of democratic self-governance. OTI also works with media outlets in Kosovo, helping to ensure that professional, moderate, and high quality media is available to as many Kosovars as possible.

OTI/Kosovo Strategic Plan

Program Goal: To maximize the number of Kosovars involved in, and recognizing the value of participating in decision making and the future development of democracy in Kosovo.

Objectives: To support this goal, OTI aims to:

- help citizens exercise political influence in their communities;

- encourage and support the conditions necessary for the development of moderate, local leadership;
- assist Kosovars to mobilize and direct resources to meet community-identified priorities;
- improve access to professional and balanced sources of news and information.

Activities and Impact

Community Development/Infrastructure Repair: OTI has helped communities organize themselves, engage in important political activities, and conduct infrastructure repair projects. OTI has worked with local communities to form CICs that reflect each community's demographics. Once formed, CICs collect information about community needs, set priorities, and execute those projects as agreed upon by the entire group. Decisions made and group processes used are broadly participatory and democratic.

Impact: In FY 2000, an estimated 3,000 Kosovars participated directly in the CIC process and approximately 30,000 Kosovars actively participated in the implementation of KTI-funded projects. In total, 243 community improvement grants, all identified and developed by Kosovar CIC members, were approved. Completed KTI community infrastructure projects include: 74 schools repaired or rebuilt, improved electrical supply to 41 communities, 27 water systems repaired and six health clinics or hospitals rehabilitated. Overall, approximately one million Kosovars were positively affected by CIC activities. Throughout Kosovo, the OTI community development process brought together political factions within all ethnic communities to cooperate in identifying, prioritizing, and addressing community needs, a practice that was previously unfamiliar.

Community Development/Political Empowerment: OTI supported town hall meetings, public hearings, ad hoc issue groups, and local NGOs to take part in social and civic awareness activities, and encouraged media to serve as an independent source of news and information. OTI further supported municipal pre-election activities, such as local debates, get-out-the-vote efforts, and call-in shows.

Impact: OTI-sponsored youth forums and roundtable discussions on election issues, voting responsibilities, and tolerance were the only activities of this nature in Kosovo. Regional debates were covered widely by local media outlets and gave Kosovars the unprecedented opportunity to engage municipal candidates on issues of concern in their respective communities. A network of civic-minded individuals, local NGO associations, and media outlets was established to contribute to the pre-election awareness campaign throughout Kosovo. These activities contributed to high voter turnout and minimal violence in the October 2000 municipal elections. In addition, OTI assistance enabled Kosovar leadership to access independent media, and encouraged the development of an enabling environment for the free and open exchange of opinions. OTI-sponsored community-affairs programs heightened Kosovar awareness of local events and governance issues and demonstrated methods for holding public officials accountable to their constituencies.

Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Speed: Once the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) set the date for municipal elections, OTI quickly developed a broad program of pre-election activities. These activities included public service announcements (PSAs) for radio and television, local debates, and call-in shows to complement the efforts of other partners, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). A series of live,

post-election debates with calls taken from the viewing audience was planned to provide Kosovars with opportunities to openly question municipal assembly candidates about their plans for municipal development.

Targeting: In FY 2000, OTI carefully focused its assistance at the community level through the CIC mechanism. OTI insisted that CICs reflect the community's demographics in terms of gender, age, education, employment, and political affiliation. In FY 2001, OTI anticipates altering its program to form partnerships between newly elected municipal representatives and the communities they represent.

Resource Leveraging: OTI successfully leveraged outside resources and funding for its programs. As de facto representatives of the diverse interests in their communities, OTI's CICs provided other donors with knowledge of real local needs and priorities. In FY 2000, OTI leveraged \$4.2 million from other international donors such as the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), the United National Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the European Commission, and national governments. OTI's program strategy required grantee contribution to projects, including equipment, labor, material, and/or cash. In FY 2000, OTI grantees contributed \$2.7 million of in-kind labor and direct financial contributions to community projects.

Policy Leveraging: OTI's emphasis on community participation significantly influenced USAID's Community Infrastructure Service Project (CISP) program philosophy. CISP now requires community consultations throughout the identification, implementation, and maintenance stages of its infrastructure rehabilitation projects. OTI staff discussed its CIC model with the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which had expressed interest in using this approach to include greater Kosovar participation in decision-making. IRC was awarded a USAID sub-grant to conduct community development activities in Kamenica Municipality, drawing directly from its earlier collaboration with KTI. UNMIK civilian police in Mitrovica used CICs and town hall meetings to discuss new policing laws. The civilian police reported that in areas where such interaction took place, criminal activities were being reported more quickly to the police. OTI's successful work in minority areas encouraged other donors, such as the U.S. Department of State's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), to develop their own minority programming initiatives.

FY 2000 Summary Grant Chart:

Sector	NUMBER OF GRANTS	Total Value of Grants
Community Improvement	243	\$5,207,255.77
Media	42	\$609,299.50
NGO	18	\$170,870.00
Total:	303	\$5,987,425.27

Partnerships: In FY 2000, OTI actively collaborated with the OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team for the provision of emergency shelter kits. OTI also worked closely with USAID's CISP program to identify infrastructure projects across Kosovo. OTI submitted four project proposals totaling \$255,000 to CISP in FY 2000. OTI also collaborated with USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance on election programming.

OTI partnered with UNMIK on city clean-up projects and heating system repairs. OTI worked closely with KFOR to identify and leverage funding for community projects such as school

rehabilitation and infrastructure repair. OTI collaborated with non-governmental organizations, such as Mercy Corps, Balkan Sunflowers, OXFAM and Caritas on various projects. In the Peja area, OTI coordinated with UNDP's Emergency Response Division to identify community projects. With the International Research and Education Exchange (IREX), OTI co-hosted training for 13 local radio stations to better prepare them to improve their coverage of Kosovo's first municipal elections. OSCE worked with OTI's CICs to help develop its report "Voters' Voices: Community Concerns" project, which provided an overview of community priorities to candidates, allowing them to tailor their party's respective platforms to the expressed concerns of the communities they hoped to represent.

Lessons Learned in FY 2000:

- OTI and its CIC model gained the greatest degree of legitimacy and credibility in Kosovar communities when the time was minimized between public consensus on specific needs and the implementation of a solution. Moreover, the success of a CIC depended in large part on the ability of OTI to articulate the ultimate goal of community organizing, rather than simply focusing on short-term infrastructure repair. This approach fostered a greater sense of the importance of self-organization in CICs.
- The most effective tool to ensure that CICs represent citizen interests was to create councils in open, well-attended town-hall meetings or public hearings. Most attempts to build successful regional or large municipal CICs failed as the relationship between the community improvement project and public input proved to be tenuous and diluted.
- Encouraging female engagement in community councils remained a challenge in FY 2000. Energetic facilitation on the part of OTI field staff was needed in order to encourage the participation of women.
- New program policies that encouraged local procurement also helped to amplify the impact of community projects by investing in local communities.
- During FY 2000, OTI consolidated management of its seven field offices under one grantee, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and ended its relationship with the contractor that had been responsible for five offices. General coordination and oversight of OTI improved greatly once this consolidation took place.

Exit Strategy: The OTI Kosovo program is scheduled to end in September 2001. The value of KTI's participatory work has been widely recognized and emulated; several organizations have expressed interest in building upon OTI's work after its September exit. OTI and the USAID Mission are discussing strategies to integrate OTI programs into the Mission portfolio. Part of the existing KTI organizational structure, including staff, could remain to assist the USAID Mission identify projects for CISP and to facilitate coordination with local communities in CISP project implementation. OTI is also in discussions with other organizations such as NDI, International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Save the Children, and others about strategies for possible coordination/hand-off of programming and staff in September 2001.

Quotes on OTI's work in Kosovo:

"The CICs have prompted among their members a theretofore unknown process of democratic participation and debate over public issues of importance to them and their future."

-- CDIE Transition Assistance Study

"The work of the Office of Transition Initiatives in community building continues to provide critical support to USAID's civil society building efforts. The Community Improvement Councils are key mechanisms for project selection in the Community Infrastructure Services Program."

--USAID Strategy for Kosovo 2001-2003

“OTI has made a substantial contribution to the reestablishment of media institutions destroyed by the war and in restoring geographic coverage to the province.”

-- USAID Strategy for Kosovo 2001-2003

LEBANON	START DATE: MARCH 1999 Exit Date: March 2001
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$700,000 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: Following his election in November 1998, President Emile Lahoud launched an anti-corruption initiative, promising to make rule of law and clean government keystones of his administration. At the time, the President's commitment and the strong public support for these efforts represented a critical opportunity to jump-start anti-corruption reform in Lebanon. Unfortunately, in the two and a half years since his inauguration, President Lahoud has taken only minor steps towards curbing corruption in Lebanon. Nevertheless, an opening exists for increasing public awareness and discussion of the cost of corruption to Lebanese society.

The U.S. Government seeks greater stability in the Middle East by encouraging peace and discouraging terrorism. One critical component for bringing stability to Lebanon is to crack down on corruption as a prerequisite for encouraging foreign investment. Corruption also interferes with the Government's ability to administer basic social services, creating a gap more radical groups have filled to win the loyalty of citizens.

Program Description: To take advantage of the opening for anti-corruption activities, OTI and the USAID Mission in Lebanon implemented a program to encourage key Lebanese stakeholders—local government, media, and civil society—to initiate anti-corruption activities. OTI did not open an office in Lebanon or field a staff person, but managed the program from Washington with the support of the Mission and frequent use of TDYs and a consultant.

Goal: To create space for Lebanese citizens to take action against corruption.

Objectives: In achieve this goal, OTI aims to:

- heighten public awareness of the extent of corruption and its social, political, and economic consequences;
- reduce opportunities for corruption in municipal administration;
- persuade citizens that corruption can be reduced through their efforts.

Activities and Impact

Anti-Corruption Media Campaign: OTI gathered a group of prominent Lebanese citizens who named themselves Kulluna Massoul (We Are All Responsible). With research conducted by the Lebanese firm Information International, Kulluna Massoul identified the campaign's target audience and message, and chose the Lebanese branch of Saatchi & Saatchi to create and conduct a nationwide multimedia campaign against corruption.

Impact: The media campaign, which encouraged citizens to talk openly about corruption, was the first major corruption awareness campaign in Lebanon. One member of the original Kulluna Massoul group noted that before the media campaign began, the issue of corruption was a "ball that politicians threw to one another and was a stick used by the President, Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the House for mud-slinging." The campaign was credited with taking the issue out of realm of politicians and bringing it to ordinary citizens.

Investigative Journalism Training: OTI funded the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) to conduct two investigative journalism training courses for newspaper journalists in Lebanon. ICFJ conducted the first course for 70 journalists from January to March 2000. In November 2000 ICFJ brought 12 of journalists to the United States for 45 days of in-country training.

Impact: ICFJ reported that the program succeeded in increasing the pressure on editors to publish anti-corruption articles. ICFJ noted that following the first training a number of newspapers started running long investigative stories. Two journalists who participated in the U.S. training reported that their editors had refused to publish the investigative pieces they proposed to write. To remedy this, the journalists who attended the U.S.-based training plan to design their own website where they can publish their anti-corruption articles.

“It gave me courage. If you want to do something, you need courage. Alone you can’t do anything.”
- U.S. training alumna

Municipal Government Assistance: To complement the USAID Mission’s program and to provide assistance to Beirut and Jounieh, two key Lebanese municipalities, OTI contributed its resources to the Mission’s Municipal Government Assistance project. The goal of the project was to reduce the opportunities for municipal workers to exact bribes from local citizens and to update antiquated administrative procedures, by providing computer equipment and specialized computer training to municipal employees.

Impact: The municipal government assistance component has had tangible impact. Citizens reported that they were relieved to change from a system of arbitrary procedures and lengthy transaction times, to a transparent system of streamlined procedures. Using these new technologies, it has been much more difficult for municipal employees to solicit bribes. For example, in the process of implementing the computerized document tracking system, Jounieh municipality uncovered a conspiracy between three municipal employees. The officials allegedly collected taxes from citizens, gave them falsified receipts, and recorded false numbers in the municipal documents. It is estimated that they stole approximately \$250,000 from the municipality. The former employees were arrested and are currently awaiting trial. That the fraud was uncovered can be directly attributed to the work of the program.

“I can now do in seconds what used to take me days!”
- Jounieh municipality citizen waiting in line

Jounieh has also been able to increase its tax revenues. The computerized system has generated a taxpayer list which specifies how much each citizen owes and whether or not the citizen has paid the taxes. These changes resulted in an increase of tax revenue in Jounieh municipality from \$25,000 in 2000 to \$150,000 expected in 2001.

Transparency and Accountability Grants: OTI, in conjunction with USAID/Lebanon, has created a small grants mechanism to support efforts by local groups aimed at increasing transparency and accountability in government, both local and national. The program will be initiated in FY 2001, and will serve as an action-oriented follow-up to the media campaign.

Impact: Results of this component will be reported on in FY 2001. It is expected that these grants will encourage the development of creative and effective citizen responses to the challenge of reducing corruption.

Results and Impacts by Process Indicators

Speed: The Lebanon program was not a strong example of OTI's speed. The USAID/Lebanon Mission Director, in December 1998, requested that USAID conduct an assessment of possible anti-corruption activities. The assessment was conducted in March 1999, and OTI fielded a consultant the next month, but the media campaign did not begin until March 2000.

Targeting: Because OTI did not have staff permanently based in Lebanon, OTI was not as up-to-date as possible on Lebanon's political situation. As a result, OTI may not have been able to re-target its program as effectively as it has in other country programs.

Resource and Policy Leveraging: Because of the success of the OTI-funded municipal government assistance program in Jounieh municipality, both the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Municipalities have expressed their interest in enlarging the program to cover all municipalities in Lebanon. The two Ministers plan to seek funding from other bilateral and multilateral donors for the expansion of the program.

Partnerships: There was a high degree of synergy between OTI and the USAID Mission, perhaps higher than with any other OTI program. This synergy is in large part due to the fact that the Mission originally requested OTI to engage in Lebanon, and had exercised considerable oversight once the program came on-line. The high level of Mission ownership of the OTI program has greatly facilitated the hand-off strategy, and has enabled the Mission to treat the OTI program as an incubator for programs it may eventually fund.

Lessons Learned in FY 2000:

- OTI must always keep abreast of a country's political developments. By not having an OTI staff member based permanently in the country to report and analyze the political environment, OTI staff in Washington did not feel they had as full a grasp of Lebanon's dynamic political situation as possible. As a result, they were less able to re-target activities to take advantage of political openings as they arose.

Exit Strategy: OTI has obligated all of its funds for this program and has no offices to close or staff to terminate. USAID/Lebanon plans to continue funding for the municipal assistance program and may fund local organizations that successfully initiate anti-corruption activities.

Quotes on OTI's anti-corruption campaign:

"[OTI] had the guts to start something, which helped us [The UN] continue. External entities [USAID] started this campaign and gave it legitimacy"

--UN official in Lebanon

"The campaign changed our lives and the way we think about corruption."

--Kulluna Massoul executive board member

"The campaign put corruption on the map as a current viable subject to talk about. It is now not so alien to say that we need to work on corruption. That was not the case before. Now it is on the agenda."

-- Jamil Mroue, Editor of the Daily Star

NIGERIA	START DATE: MAY 1999 Exit Date: September 2001
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$8,904,869 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy:

After 15 years of uninterrupted military dictatorship, Nigeria held free elections in February 1999. The resumption of civilian rule in May 1999 brought with it an opening of political space that, in turn, gave room for forcibly repressed disputes to erupt. Unfortunately, even under democratic rule, Nigeria’s weak and largely discredited political institutions have had difficulty serving as forums for airing disputes and responding to them in ways that are generally considered unbiased and legitimate. Nigeria’s leadership role in the region and its economic and trade links make it critical to the stability of West and Central Africa. Its rich oil and gas resources make it a prime investment and development focus for U.S. business. In FY 2000, Nigeria was one of four countries designated by the Department of State whose democratic transition was of the highest priority to the U.S.

Program Description:

As part of a larger U.S. presence, OTI quickly positioned itself to mitigate these threats. OTI launched its program in April 1999 with an initial focus of helping civilians assert control over the military and training newly elected leaders in good governance. During FY 2000 OTI’s program became increasingly focused on supporting the nation’s democratic transition by mitigating destabilizing conflicts. Consistent with this focus, OTI supported non-governmental organizations seeking to intervene in conflicts that have become, or are likely to become, violent and destabilizing. Ensuring that these interventions are effective is highly dependent on well-trained and practiced facilitators. Therefore, OTI’s strategy has also been to expand the number and skills of Nigerian facilitators through various training activities. Also during FY 2000, OTI conducted programs designed to strengthen Nigeria’s capacity to stop corruption, promote civil-military relations, and reform the police.

IV. OTI/Nigeria’s Strategic Plan

Goal: To assist Nigeria in sustaining its transition to democratic civilian governance.

Objectives: To achieve this goal, OTI aims to:

- mitigate potentially destabilizing forces;
- strengthen mechanisms of transparency, accountability and good governance;
- build the capacity of civilian organizations to exercise democratic control over the military.

Conflict Management: OTI’s program in Nigeria supported non-governmental organizations to intervene in conflicts that had become, or were likely to become, violent and destabilizing. For example, conflict between the Ife and Modakeke in Osun State had been going on for over 150 years and past attempts to resolve the conflict had had little, if any, success. In February 2000, OTI made a major commitment to assist these two communities to manage their differences without the use of violence. OTI introduced the idea to the different groups of community-led conflict resolution, supported a venue for inter-ethnic meetings, funded conflict management skills training, and provided follow-up assistance to help sustain the process.

Impact: As a result of OTI's initiatives, Ife/Modakeke citizens came together and identified the fundamental issues involved in the conflicts between them and jointly offered solutions, one of which was to form an inter-community peace advocacy committee. Since then the fighting has stopped and former adversaries are working together as members of the Inter-Community Peace Advocacy Committee.

Conflict Management: In response to the conflict in Oke-Ogun between the Hausa and Yoruba, OTI provided support to two groups to stop the violence that had almost resulted in the total displacement of the Hausa/Fulani communities. This support included one-on-one meetings with key community leaders to introduce the concept of community-led conflict resolution, joint skills training for members of the House/Fulani and Yoruba communities, and continued assistance to sustain the conflict management process.

Impact: OTI's intervention resulted in the creation of an Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee of community members along with representation of the Nigerian National Police, the State Security Service, and the traditional institutions. The Committee meets every month and has dealt with a variety of conflicts in the community. As a testament to the Committee's importance, the local governments have voted funding to continued its existence. Since the inauguration of the Committee, no inter-ethnic conflict has arisen in the area. Even during the Hausa-Yoruba conflicts in October, no violence between the two groups occurred in Oke-Ogun. This intervention at this stage of the conflict was critical and has succeeded in stabilizing the situation.

Conflict Management: To assist the people of the Niger Delta manage their conflicts, OTI provided support for a meeting of representatives of the Elemes, Okrikas, and Ogu/Bolos to jointly solve their problems. The original group of 24 citizens, which included youth leaders, respected elders and chiefs, and a local government chairman, were joined by three high level officials designated by the Secretary to the State Government and a representative of the Rivers State Government.

Impacts: As a result of this meeting, an agreement was made to engage in a peace process and find acceptable solutions to the difficult issues that divided them. An action plan was developed that included the creation of a Joint Peace Committee, which has worked closely with the local government authorities to prevent violent conflicts among the communities. Concurrently, the State government set up a judicial commission inquiry to investigate the immediate and remote causes of the conflicts. As part of the State government's strategy for implementation of the commission's recommendation, they proposed the establishment of a peace committee. At this critical juncture, the OTI-supported Joint Peace Committee approached the state government to be included as part of the government's peace committee. The government agreed. Although, no financial assistance has been allotted, the request is still under consideration. Most important, since the OTI intervention and peace process that ensued, there has been limited but significant travel among the three communities and no violent conflicts.

Conflict Management: When OTI began focusing attention on developing responses to potentially destabilizing conflicts, there were several well-trained facilitators interested in collaboration. However, it soon became apparent that this core group was too small to respond to the many serious conflicts around the country. Thus an early priority for OTI was to increase the number and skill level of facilitators committed to peaceful conflict resolution. To realize this goal, OTI began by providing a "training of trainers" workshop in mediation skills and the methods needed to teach these skills to others. During the training, participants embraced the idea of creating a conflict management network. The end result was 30 master trainers who with OTI assistance, organized a conference of key representatives of civil society organizations. These

representatives were drawn from all over Nigeria to review and adapt training materials, strengthen their facilitative skills, and deepen their commitment to conflict management. This network is known as the Conflict Resolution Stakeholders Network (CRESNET).

Impact: Following the conference, six regional workshops were conducted. Each regional workshop involved approximately 200 community-based and non-governmental organization representatives. Subsequently, these NGOs and CBOs across Nigeria carried out workshops and other conflict management initiatives to teach awareness and skills to those at the grassroots level. The impact of this effort has been that the trainers and members of CRESNET have played a major role in responding to a number of important conflict situations including Ife-Modakeke and the aftermath of the religious crisis in Kaduna. Meanwhile, CRESNET itself has developed. Strategic planning meetings resulted in the creation of six zonal CRESNET chapters capped by a 15-member national board. At present the zonal and national bodies are in the process of finalizing their constitutions and obtaining certification by the Nigerian Government.

Following the violent ethnic clashes that claimed many lives and properties in Kaduna in February 2000, members of the North-West CRESNET responded with a media -campaign, direct mediation, and training on conflict mediation and reconciliation. The activities were instrumental to peace building and accounted for non-retaliation of the Lagos ethnic conflict later in the year, when the militant Odua Peoples Congress (OPC) reportedly killed several Northerners.

Civilian-Military Relations: Strengthening the civilian-military relationship was an early focus of OTI's program. Consistent with OTI's mandate of quick response, the aim was to initiate a process of reforming the Nigerian military and improving civilian oversight and then to transfer the effort as seamlessly as possible to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).

Impact: Negotiations with the Nigerian Ministry of Defense and the Nigerian Armed Forces resulted in their agreement to participate, along with representatives of civil society, in a strategic planning exercise that would lead to the preparation of an action plan for military reform and increased civilian oversight. OTI funded the strategic planning process through a contract with Military Professional Resources International (MPRI), a U.S.-based consulting firm specializing in military issues. The strategic planning process began in August 1999. The action plan was completed in January 2000 and ratified the next month by both the U.S. and Nigerian Governments as the basis for continued military cooperation. Formal hand-over of U.S. support from OTI to the DOD occurred on April 1, 2000 when U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Nigeria to sign an agreement pledging financial and technical assistance for the implementation of the action plan.

Anti Corruption: The extent of corruption in Nigeria, its negative developmental consequences, and its crucial role as a hurdle to sustaining the transition all suggested that OTI should make anti-corruption programming a priority. OTI provided assistance to the federal House of Representatives and to regional chambers of commerce to help them develop codes of ethics, improve systems of transparency and accountability, and build local capacity. OTI also provided assistance to non-governmental organizations organizing and university and secondary school clubs to conduct training and produce educational materials.

Impact: For the most part, the results from these initial efforts showed little impact. As these disappointing results were emerging, a USAID-sponsored team was concluding its work on an anti-corruption assessment. That assessment underscored the pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria and the need to adopt a systematic approach to confronting it. In light of experience and the assessment results, OTI took the difficult strategic decision of turning down further grants in

the anti-corruption area. The decision was based on the realization that continuing to fund anti-corruption grants in a scattershot fashion would not produce measurable impact on such an endemic problem. At the same time OTI also recognized that it lacked the financial and managerial resources to accelerate its work on anti-corruption in the ways the assessment determined would be the most effective. Under the circumstances, and in light of the growing programmatic priority on conflict management activities, OTI decided to terminate its anti-corruption programming. As a result, OTI has limited results to report in the area of anti-corruption.

Police Program: After the elections in 1999, the military troops returned to the barracks and the police were charged with the internal security of the country. During the year, several conflicts spiraled out of control, which the police could not contain. The limited capability and lack of professionalism among the police posed a real threat to peace, democracy, and the rule of law. OTI used this opportunity to jumpstart a program that would lay the foundation for a broad-based police reform program. Like its program for civilian-military relations, OTI funded a team to help Nigerians devise a strategy and action plan for police reform. OTI's strategy included support and participation by other U.S. Government agencies, such as Department of Justice's ICITAP and Department of State's INL, as well as by the British DFID.

Impact: OTI was the catalyst for the formation of the Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), which is a consortium of Nigerian non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations that focuses on police reform, human rights, and related issues. Whereas other U.S. efforts have focused solely on police institutions, OTI ensured that the Nigerian reform process included substantial participation by civil society. Working closely with the Minister of Police Affairs and the Nigerian Police Force, OTI helped move the process from one focused largely on increased numbers of police seeking training and equipment, to one concerned with quality, community relations, and public service.

Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Speed: After conducting an initial assessment of the energy sector in 1999, OTI was well positioned to respond to the rapid changes in Nigeria's government. In March 2000 President Obasanjo fired the entire management of Nigeria's Electric Power Association (NEPA) for incompetence, as the supply of electricity became less reliable and conflicts resulted. While the World Bank was shouldering the majority of the donor support for restructuring and privatization of energy, they could not access funds quickly enough to respond to the management crisis. OTI quickly designed a six-month program of technical assistance to address this critical area while coordinating with the World Bank and USAID/Nigeria to ensure a smooth hand-over of activities six months later.

Targeting: Sectarian rioting in Kaduna and heavy-handed military suppression of resource-related conflict in the Niger Delta in early 2000 provided graphic evidence of the danger that unmanaged conflicts posed to Nigeria's continued democratic transition. OTI responded by reorienting its programmatic priorities to focus on developing an indigenous capacity to manage conflicts through facilitated interventions.

Resource Leveraging: OTI's early support to the energy sector provided the foundation for the support of other donors. Building on the six-month technical assistance OTI provided to NEPA, the USAID Mission developed a USG-GON Framework for Cooperation on Energy and an assistance package of \$2-3 million. OTI activities demonstrated donor interest in the sector at a critical time while the World Bank considered long-term projects. Currently, the Bank Board has

approved \$100 million for energy transmission development and \$100 million for privatization activities, \$22 million of which has been dedicated to the power sector.

Initially the British Department for International Development (DFID) was hesitant to provide assistance in the area of police. However, OTI invited DFID to participate in the initial assessment in April 2000. DFID supported OTI's approach and funded experts to be part of the Phase I technical team. Throughout the last six months of FY 2000, OTI and DFID held joint meetings with the Government of Nigeria, co-sponsored activities, and coordinated all projects associated with the police and accessible justice programs.

The civilian-military program started by OTI was successfully handed over to DOD for long-term support. OTI's initial investment of approximately \$1 million was followed by a joint commitment of \$7 million, half from the DOD and half from the Nigerian government.

FY 2000 Summary Grant Chart:

V. Sector	Number of Grants	Total Value of Grants
Conflict Management	52	\$1,803,812
Anti-Corruption	15	\$425,915
Civilian-Military Relations	3	\$39,611
NGO Capacity Building	11	\$107,788
Others	66	\$1,450,652
Total:	147	\$3,827,778

Partnerships: OTI worked with USAID to design an energy program that could be smoothly handed over to the USAID Mission in six months' time. Project design was done with the technical expertise and guidance of the USAID Office of Energy in Washington. OTI and USAID coordinated all activities with the World Bank and the U.S. Department of Energy, which in cooperation with the Global Bureau is currently implementing much of USAID's program.

OTI participated fully in donor coordination activities convened by UNDP. OTI contributed a section on conflict management to the Programme Framework Document for the joint UNDP-Nigerian National Planning Council National Programme on Governance for Sustainable Development. It was only due to OTI's strong advocacy for the close connection between conflict and democracy that the section was included. Now that the connection has been made, other donors, including DFID and the EU, are considering providing funding to this area.

Lessons Learned:

- It is difficult to directly address corruption and have meaningful impact in a two-year time period when it is as pervasive and systemic as in Nigeria. It seems that the best way to address corruption is indirectly through transparency and accountability in institutions and by helping to establish checks and balances in the system. In Nigeria, corruption needs to be viewed as a crosscutting issue and addressed in manageable ways throughout all programs and projects.
- When dealing with security issues like civilian-military relations and police, it is essential to weave civil society participation into the process. Because this approach often runs counter to the ways that both the military and the police operate (in the U.S. and other countries) it is important to have a multi-disciplinary teamwork on any assistance program provided to the host government. Any security program needs to be rooted strongly in the proper development context.

Exit Strategy: OTI will finish awarding grants by the end of June 2001 and will close all four of its offices by the end of FY 2001. Many of the programming areas were successfully handed off to other partner organizations during FY 2000. Conflict mitigation and police transformation are the two areas that will be handed over to the USAID Mission and other U.S. Government agencies and international donors.

Quotes: “In this community, there are so many misunderstandings between the Hausa and the Yoruba. But due to the intervention of our committee, we always settle everything amicably. Between Hausas and Yorubas, we now quickly understand ourselves. As my colleague said, there has been no trouble in this town between Hausas and Yorubas. The conflicts in Lagos will not spread here due to the intervention of our committee and the workshop they gave us, we learned many things.”

--Chief S. A. Yusuf (Yoruba) member Inter-LGA Peace Advocacy Committee in Ogun State.

“People knew about conflict resolution, but for the first time OTI has pushed this project to the point where now every body is aware of it. OTI will eventually see some good results. In fact, some embassies in Lagos are talking to us, but they don’t want this to be known because they have seen the reports and they know what is going on. In fact, I am really proud of OTI because for the first time conflict resolution has been taken to the limelight.”

--Dr. Isaac Olawale Albert, one of the trainers at Oke-Ogun.

“It is only the people of an area that can solve the problems of that area. This is true, but OTI has given youth in the South East the tools so that they can properly do so. We have been taught that violence is not the best option and that we need to face each other and dialogue. We are not God, but we have done our best and violence in the region has been greatly reduced.”

--Emeke Ugwuoke, (Igbo), an organizer at the first South East youth seminar on transforming violent youths into political activists.

“I could have followed suit on the earlier decision of my people (to shoot on sight), but because of this training I tried to see it from a different angle and I think it is having a positive impact”.

--Patrick Asikpo-Okon (Niger Delta), Secretary to Calabar South Local Government, on the training for Local Government officials in Cross River State.

“We thank God that peace is gradually coming in to our territory. We will continue to thank USAID/OTI for what they have done. We are now sitting face to face with ourselves, whereas some months ago we were shooting each other face to face!”

--Chief Gabriel Adetola Agbe (Yoruba), Chairman Ife-Modakeke Peace Committee on Ife-Modakeke intervention.

“During the crisis, the town (Modakeke) was a horrible place with all the suffering, inconveniences, and the sorrows. I don’t have words to describe what OTI has done. It is such a marvelous achievement. OTI has made it possible for to cross-check rumors from either end. It is the USAID effort that contributed 99% to peace in these towns.

--Captain Patrick Adewuyo Bayomi (Rtd.) (Yoruba), former Modakeke war lord on Ife-Modakeke intervention.

PHILIPPINES	START DATE: SEPTEMBER 1997 Exit Date: April 2001
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>CITIZEN SECURITY ENHANCED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$1,533,151 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: After years of negotiations, the Government of the Republic Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the largest Muslim rebel group, signed a peace agreement in September 1996. The goal of the Agreement was to improve government accountability and responsiveness to Muslim citizens, thereby bringing democracy and economic renewal to Mindanao. It was hoped that successful implementation of this accord would lead to similar peace agreements with other Muslim separatist groups. OTI recognized that if the GRP did not fulfill its side of the agreement, the more radical Muslim separatist groups would gain support and violent conflict could easily resume.

With the end of the U.S. military presence, U.S.-Philippines relations have focused on economic and commercial ties and security issues. Improved Philippine domestic political stability has resulted in increased U.S. investment in the country.

Program Description: Phase II of OTI’s program took place from April 1999 to April 2001 and was known as “Arms to Farms.” During the two years, OTI provided 423 grants to MNLF villages, encompassing 17,130 families, 10,180 of which were former combatants and 61,280 were women. OTI supported the peace agreement with village-based micro-infrastructure projects, post-harvest machinery—dryers, shellers, mills—and capacity building activities to assist the target villages in becoming more productive and profitable. In addition, the program facilitated tangible linkages between the GRP and the MNLF ex-combatant groups by forging village project agreements that require counterpart funding from each party. Each village project promoted self-help concepts and enhanced the agricultural, economic, and social well being of the MNLF ex-combatants, their families, and other members of their community.

Goal: To provide tangible evidence to the Muslim communities and the estimated 40,000 ex-combatants that the GRP was delivering on the 1996 Peace Agreement.

Objectives: To achieve this goal, OTI aims to:

- enhance the livelihoods of MNLF ex-combatants and their families;
- build the basic human resource capacity of MNLF village groups;
- improve the level of trust and communications between the GRP and ex-MNLF village groups;
- develop a hand-off strategy that sustain OTI efforts and fully integrates the GRP linkages.

Activities and Impact

An impact evaluation of the program was conducted in September 2000. The findings, which are incorporated into this country profile, were based on 80 monitoring and evaluation reports and interviews with project staff and beneficiary groups.

Equipment Support: OTI supported village-based micro-infrastructure projects, which delivered post-harvest machinery such as dryers, shellers, and mills, and provided training to help target villages to become more productive and profitable.

Impact: During FY 2000, 371 village projects assisted 7,870 ex-combatants in 14,140 families. The evaluators noted, “Equipment and facilities are being delivered in a timely fashion and utilized profitably by beneficiary groups for productive and social purposes. OTI has an enviable record of performance for dependable, on time delivery and effective leveraging of counterpart resources.”

Facilitating Linkages: OTI facilitated partnerships between local, provincial, and national government officials and the rural MNLF village groups in an effort to reinforce the peace agreement.

Impact: OTI facilitated 645 linkages for 73 of the 80 community groups reviewed. OTI utilized GRP counterparts to facilitate linkages and was especially effective with local government units. Interactions and linkages that were initiated by the groups themselves following OTI-facilitated introductions to local government units and other stakeholders, were a major success of the program.

Promoting Capacity-building Activities: OTI funded capacity building activities to help the target community groups become more productive and profitable.

Impact: The evaluators noted, “Increases in net group income were modest, but in general grants are resulting in significant reductions in harvesting and processing cost and modest increases in output for members of recipient farmer organizations. Anecdotal evidence indicates substantial improvements to individual farmer net income. Without exception, ex-combatants affirmed a positive correlation between OTI project support and a better life. Early benefits included home improvements, more rest, increased purchases of small appliances and farm animals, and greater linkages with other community members and local government. Fifty-five percent of those contacted for the evaluation reported satisfactory or better improvement.”

Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Speed: Phase II began in April 1999, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the GRP. OTI’s administrative and program systems were established by mid-May 1999 and field staff were deployed to MNLF areas just six weeks later. During FY 2000, 371 village projects assisted 14,140 families and 7,870 ex-combatants. Of the 371 village projects, most were delivered with 30 days of grant approval. Clearly, the Philippines program was a strong example of OTI’s speed and flexibility.

Targeting: One of the root causes of the conflict was the inability of the GRP to deliver basic government services to the Muslim communities in Mindanao. OTI recognized that in order for the Muslim community to recognize that the GRP was implementing its side of the 1996 Peace Agreement, the GRP would have to be more actively involved in delivering assistance to MNLF areas. As a result, OTI designed a program that facilitated positive and meaningful interactions between the rural Muslim communities and local, provincial, and national GRP officials, rather than merely substituting U.S. for GRP assistance.

Resource Leveraging: In FY 2000, OTI provided \$1,039,539 (37%) as leverage capital to draw in GRP resources of \$1,571,134 (45%) for 371 priority village projects. Contributions by MNLF communities accounted for \$449,530 (16%) of the total value, and the remaining one percent came from other donors.

FY 2000 Summary Grant Chart:

Category	Number of Families	Ex-Combatants	Approved Grants	Delivered Grants	Matching Funds (\$)	OTI Contribution
Agriculture Production	3,776	2,564	101	101	\$426,129	\$257,260
Reconciliation	N/A	N/A	38	35	\$47,992	\$54,124
Capacity Building and media	N/A	22	3	3	\$676	\$172,090
Gender and Development	553	131	16	15	\$48,212	\$35,251
Post-harvest Facilities	6,571	4,790	177	174	\$661,645	\$433,569
Village Infrastructure	6,230	2,674	87	84	\$505,590	\$246,253
Media	N/A	N/A	1	1	0	\$17,650
Total:	17,130	10,181	423	413	\$1,690,244	\$1,216,198

Partnerships: OTI's primary partner was the Philippine Government's Department of Agriculture. OTI also developed close working relationships with Provincial Governors and with municipal officials who were crucial for continuing relationships established during the implementation of the OTI program. The sustainability of the program will be determined by the success of the partnerships that OTI established with the MNLF village groups.

Lessons Learned in FY 2000:

- Despite the active involvement of government offices, many MNLF former combatants are not willing to give the government credit for the assistance they provided. Additional work will be needed to educate the communities on the government's support of the program.
- The technical capacity building training (bookkeeping, equipment, and maintenance) that was provided was not sufficient because of the low levels of education in the target communities. Thus, capacity-building activities should be an important component throughout the life of any program. In addition, any follow-on programs should continue to provide capacity-building activities for previously identified groups as well as for those new groups targeted.
- OTI streamlined the grant process by helping villages develop quality proposals. This allowed OTI to quickly design, approve, and deliver grants. The lesson learned was that by engaging communities in the development and design process, the proposals produced are of higher quality and more likely to be funded.

Exit Strategy: OTI closed its program in the Philippines in April 2001. The USAID Mission developed a task order of \$5 million to be competed under the SWIFT Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) for a two-year period. The task order combined the Mission's Emergency Livelihood Program (ELAP) with OTI's SWIFT program and will target new MNLF communities with an agricultural development component (seeds, seaweed, fertilizer and technical assistance). This is the first example of the SWIFT IQC being utilized as a mechanism to provide follow-on assistance by the USAID Mission.

SERBIA-MONTENEGRO	START DATE: JULY 1997 Exit Date: September 2002
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$3,404,882 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: The breakup of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the ensuing violence in the Balkans created a humanitarian disaster of major proportions and wreaked havoc on the economy and infrastructure throughout the region. In addition to humanitarian concerns, the close proximity of the Balkans to many of the United States' NATO allies, the influx of refugees to those countries, and the possibility of spreading violence has made the Balkans region high on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities. During FY 2000 OTI supported democratically-minded groups to ensure free and fair elections. Now that a new democratic government is in place, it continues to be important to the U.S. to promote increasing stability and democratic development of Serbia-Montenegro.

Program Description: In June 1999, following the end of the NATO-led air strikes, OTI re-opened its FRY office in Pristina, Kosovo. In December 1999, OTI divided its FRY program into two separate "country" components, OTI/Serbia-Montenegro and OTI/Kosovo, and re-located its Serbia-Montenegro headquarters to Podgorica, Montenegro. OTI's Serbia-Montenegro program has provided direct, short-term, high-impact support to pro-democracy organizations and groups, alternative media, opposition-controlled municipalities, and democratically-oriented political parties. As the first significant signs of democratic transition appeared in the summer of 2000, OTI intensified its support for these local partners. By the elections in September 2000, dramatic democratic changes in Serbia were underway.

OTI/Serbia and Montenegro Strategic Plan

Goal: To advance peaceful democratic change in Serbia and to support continued democratic reforms in Montenegro.

Objectives: To achieve this goal, OTI aims to:

- strengthen reform-minded civic organizations in Serbia and Montenegro;
- give credence to democratically-oriented leaders and political groups;
- challenge and provide alternatives to state propaganda;
- encourage democratic participation in political processes.

Activities and Impact

Civil Society Grants: OTI's civil society grants supported public meetings, issue-based information campaigns, advocacy, printed materials such as leaflets, posters, T-shirts and buttons, and the provision of office equipment and other materials.

OTI provided eight get-out-the-vote grants, valued at \$304,000, to assist civic organizations in their efforts to encourage voter participation in the September 2000 elections. OTI also provided 16 political action grants, valued at \$407,000, to fund political campaign activities implemented by Otpor (Resistance), the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), and other Serbia-based civic organizations, prior to the September 2000 elections. OTI was the primary supporter of many of Otpor's activities, such as the "He's Finished" sticker campaign, the walk from Novi Sad, and the

first “Congress of People’s Resistance.” Otpor is recognized as the major mobilizing force behind the overthrow of the Milosevic regime.

Impact: OTI provided critical support for the indigenous groups that engineered Milosevic’s defeat in October 2000, and laid the groundwork for the Serbian parliamentary election in December 2000. OTI’s backing for such groups as Otpor, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), various civic groups in both Serbia and Montenegro and numerous municipal media outlets helped them to become major forces for peaceful, democratic change. On several occasions OTI was a primary donor to support projects by Otpor and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia that proved crucial to their efforts and initiated real change.

Otpor’s willingness to undertake creative and often dangerous actions against the Milosevic regime during the first half of 2000 encouraged the opposition parties to unite. Moreover, Otpor’s omnipresent “Gotov Je!” (He’s Finished) campaign served as a catalyst for voter turn-out and helped to undermined electoral support for Slobodan Milosevic and his allies in days leading up to the September elections.

Support for Elections and Reform-Minded Officials: OTI provided grants valued at \$149,477 that assisted the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), and DOS to conduct a parallel vote count.

OTI made 48 Alternative Network (Alt-Net) grants, valued at \$450,000 (SEED funded), to assist participating NGOs and municipal officials in Nis, Kragujevac, Pancevo, Novi Sad, Kraljevo, Uzice, Sombor, and Leskovac in distributing humanitarian food parcels to needy families.

OTI provided ten Community Improvement Project (CIP) grants, valued at \$67,612, to implement politically motivated public service and infrastructure repair projects in Nis, Kragujevac, Sombor, Novi Sad, Kaljevo and Soko Banja.

Impact: OTI’s get-out-the-vote (GOTV) and elections monitoring grants aided DOS and CeSID in their efforts to get Serbs to the polls on election day, and to report accurately on the election process and outcome. The results issued by DOS and CeSID directly contradicted those announced by the authorities and ultimately served as the basis for removing Slobodan Milosevic from office. Without OTI’s grant of \$149,477 to DOS and CeSid, opposition political parties would not have conducted this parallel vote count that proved so vital for the change in Serbian leadership.

Both the Alt-Net and CIP grants gave standing to opposition political parties and municipal officials in the time leading up to Yugoslavia’s September elections, while at the same time provided needy families in Serbia with more than 300 tons of basic food commodities.

Dissemination of Alternative Information: OTI supported the dissemination of alternative information, both electronic and print, that consistently challenged state propaganda and encouraged democratic participation in the political process. OTI/Serbia assisted numerous NGOs in their efforts to expose, via the media, public forums, and other means, the failings and corruption of the Milosevic regime. OTI also supported the broad dissemination of alternative independent information in Serbia through its support of the U.S. Government’s Ring-Around-Serbia (RAS) Initiative and its aid to key indigenous media outlets. OTI’s media support assisted production and distribution of messages through electronic media in the form of public service announcements, politically-oriented talk shows, and investigative documentaries. OTI also helped to expanded the capacity and reach of alternative electronic and print media.

Impact: OTI's backing of the U.S. Government's RAS initiative was instrumental in ensuring that a modest cross section of the Serbian public (10% to 15%) had access to balanced news and information during and after NATO's air intervention, as well as in the lead-up to the September 2000 elections. Much of the information provided via the RAS's foreign broadcast feed (BBC, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle and Radio France International) had been previously unavailable to the Serbian public due to government pressure and control.

OTI-FRY's sponsorship of Serbian language news outlets in Serbia, the Republika Srpska and Montenegro also ensured that the Serbian public had access to alternative news and information.

In Montenegro, OTI was instrumental in supporting alternative media in traditionally hard-line, pro-Milosevic areas at a time when the Milosevic regime was attempting to manipulate and destabilize the pro-Western Montenegrin Government.

Results and Impacts by Process Indicators

Speed: When the FRY elections were announced in July 2000, just two months before balloting was due to begin, OTI was able to move quickly to identify and fund key political groups in Serbia and Montenegro. With less than three months to prepare, OTI moved faster than any other donor. This speed was critical to the election campaign and to building momentum for change. Slobodan Homen of Otpor said, "OTI was the single largest donor and proved to be the fastest and most flexible in providing support to Otpor's activities."

Targeting: Following the end of the NATO airstrikes in June 1999, the Milosevic regime increased its repression of groups and individuals that threatened his regime and were working towards democratic change in Serbia. Many of OTI's previous partners were cautious about being outspoken. A few partners, however, not only continued their activities, but also intensified their efforts to enact democratic change in Serbia. Due to the short-term nature of OTI's funding, support was largely targeted at those partners who had increased their pro-democracy efforts.

Resource Leveraging: OTI leveraged its resources with implementing NGO's and other donors such as the USAID Mission, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the British Embassy, Freedom House, the German Marshall Fund, the Hungarian Government, the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Open Society Institute (OSI-Soros), and the Swedish Helsinki Committee. The high level of cooperation and information sharing was critical to the targeted and timely donor response to Serbia's dynamic political situation.

Policy Leveraging: The open communication and frequent meetings between OTI and State Department representatives allowed OTI and other implementing partners to ensure that OTI's activities were an effective tool of United States foreign policy. OTI was a primary U.S. Government instrument for having an impact on the FRY elections, the outcome of which was critical to U.S. national interests.

FY 2000 Grants:

Between December 1999 and October 2000, OTI/FRY awarded approximately 120 grants of assistance, valued in excess of \$2.2 million (\$639,000 in SEED funding), to numerous Serbian and Montenegrin media and civic organizations. Of these, 88 grants valued at \$1,543,723

supported September 2000 elections related activities and of those, 64 grants valued at \$1,175,660 were awarded following the announcement of the September elections in July 2000.

Partnerships: The partnerships formed with USAID's Europe and Eurasia Bureau, and implementing partners such as IRI, NDI, and Freedom House proved critical. IRI and the British Embassy co-funded the DOS Parallel Vote Count. OTI worked closely within the U.S. Government to implement both the RAS and the Alt-Net initiatives.

Lessons Learned in FY 2000:

- OTI must have the flexibility to move its resources quickly and to target them toward those most likely to bring about democratic change. This means authority to hire staff and transfer funds rapidly.
- When working in a rapidly changing political environment, additional staff support to the field is critical. In Serbia just prior to the elections, OTI/Washington was unable to respond quickly enough in providing expatriate support to the OTI field staff. This inhibited the ability of the program to perform optimally under already difficult circumstances.

Exit Strategy: Following the election victory of the opposition in Serbia on September 24, 2000 and Milosevic's subsequent acknowledgement of defeat, the OTI program re-entered Serbia and Montenegro at the end of FY 2000. OTI has changed its programmatic goals to focus primarily on encouraging public participation and accountability of elected officials through jointly-identified community improvement projects. The program is due to close in September 2002.

SIERRA LEONE	START DATE: JANUARY 1997 (SUSPENDED 1997-98) Exit Date: March 2002
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>CITIZEN SECURITY ENHANCED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$3,802,976

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: Sierra Leone has been embroiled in armed conflict since March 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched its first incursion from Liberia. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed the Lome Peace Agreement on July 7, 1999, but implementation has been erratic. In October 1999 the United Nations authorized the deployment of the largest UN peace-keeping force in the world, known as UNAMSIL, with up to 13,000 troops. The peace process suffered a major setback in May 2000, when over 500 UN peace-keepers were taken hostage. After their release a new Cease-Fire Agreement was signed in Abuja in November 2000. Since the cease-fire, the UN force has been expanded and cooperation between the RUF and the UN has improved. However, there has been little disarmament and demobilization of the RUF.

Over the past ten years of conflict, estimates of war-related deaths range from 20,000 to over 100,000. At its peak, the war forced almost half of Sierra Leone's 4.5 million inhabitants from their homes. Estimates of the current number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sierra Leone range from 500,000 to over one million, and there are approximately 300,000 refugees in neighboring countries. According to Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone's civil conflict is characterized by some of the worst human rights abuses on record. Sierra Leone remains in a humanitarian crisis. The U.S. Government has been the single largest donor of humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone throughout the civil conflict, providing \$297 million in humanitarian assistance between 1991 and 1999.

Sierra Leone is not of high strategic importance to the United States. It has, however, received considerable U.S. Government attention because of the RUF's extreme violence against civilians, and their use of "conflict" diamonds to fuel the armed conflict.

Program Description: In early 1997, OTI initiated a program to help address the root causes of the conflict by involving Sierra Leone's civil society in peace-building initiatives. OTI's engagement was suspended in June 1997 following a military coup of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the exile of the democratically elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. OTI returned to Sierra Leone after the reinstatement of the Constitutional government in 1998. In FY 1999, OTI fielded civil society observers and a technical team to the Lome peace talks of 1999, and provided 232 small grants to civil society organizations.

In FY 2000, OTI expanded its program to include four program components: diamond policy and programs to address "conflict" diamonds; Reintegration Training and Education for Peace for ex-combatants and war-affected communities; support for peace-building initiatives; and media support for reconciliation and reintegration.

Goal: To help bring closure to the war and support the reconciliation and reintegration process.

Objectives: In Sierra Leone OTI's objectives in FY 2000 were to:

- enable effective control and monitoring of "conflict" diamonds, and increase the benefits of diamond mining to the producing communities;
- assist the reintegration of ex-combatants and war-torn communities, including remedial education for youth by-passed by schooling during ten years of war;
- strengthen civil society's peace-building initiatives;
- build public support for demobilization, reconciliation, and reintegration.

Activities and Impact

Diamond Policy and Development Program. OTI pioneered a response to "conflict" diamonds in Sierra Leone with technical assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) for new diamond policies and development activities. In March 2000, OTI and the U.S. Embassy hosted a ground-breaking workshop in Freetown. The workshop brought together government cabinet members, parliamentarians, representatives of civil society and human rights NGOs, traditional leaders, the rebel RUF leader, diplomatic representatives from Canada and the United Kingdom, and international diamond experts. UN sanctions against Sierra Leone diamonds were adopted on July 7, 2000; OTI worked as part of a trilateral technical team, along with Belgium and the UK, to assist the GOSL in complying with UN Resolution 1306 (2000).

Impact: OTI facilitated a critical dialogue among the key players that led to the development of new policies and programs to control "conflict" diamonds. OTI's May 2000 Working Paper on diamonds was published by the GOSL as its policy framework and has subsequently been implemented. The GOSL, with assistance from OTI and the Diamond High Council of Belgium, developed and operationalized a new Certification of Origin regime in October 2000. The "Sierra Leone model," particularly the aspects related to the electronic tracking of diamond exports and imports, is now being used as a basis for developing a global diamond certification system.

The Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program: The Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program is a two-year, nationwide, non-formal education initiative that will serve approximately 40,000 ex-combatant and non-combatant young adults. The program targets youth whose schooling was by-passed by ten years of war, and combines reintegration orientation and counseling with training related to life-skills, vocational counseling, agriculture skills development, civic education, health, and functional literacy. In FY 2000, learning groups were initiated in areas under GOSL control that have large numbers of ex-combatants.

Impact: In FY 2000, the Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program trained 30 Master Trainers, formed over 60 Community Management Councils (CMCs) to sponsor 670 training groups, provided training of trainers to 1,340 learning facilitators to train 670 groups, and enrolled 13,400 participants in the various courses. Although it is difficult to measure the impact of this reintegration training on the participants, testimonials indicate that the training has had a positive impact on ex-combatants' re-socialization. The program has improved participants' literacy and numeracy skills, and has given thousands of people the opportunity to take part in adult learning.

Youth groups and CMCs promoted dialogue and reconciliation and demobilization with the rebels in tense areas such as Mile 91, Kenema, southern Kono, Port Loko, and Daru. In Daru, a former UN enclave that was surrounded by rebels and accessible only by air for many months in 2000, a Peace Council was organized by program participants. This Council was instrumental in creating dialogue and fostering reconciliation and demobilization in approximately 18 specific community incidents.

Support for civil society's role in the peace process: OTI continued its support of peace-building initiatives in FY 2000 through small grants to local NGOs. In FY 2000 OTI's implementing partner, World Vision, selected three of the most successful local NGOs and provided each with a grant fund. The Campaign for Good Governance received funding for its work as an umbrella NGO; FAWE received assistance to work with girls and women victims of rape and war atrocities; and the Network Movement for Justice and Development received assistance for capacity-building activities for the Community Management Councils established under the Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program.

Impact: The Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) conducted consultative forums in all areas under government control and played a key role in peace-building efforts after the May 2000 setbacks to the peace process. These forums allowed communities to maintain and renew their commitment to reconciliation and the peace process, despite the slow pace of disarmament and demobilization. Members of civil society groups supported under the CGG umbrella grant undertook numerous confidence-building activities and initiated dialogue with rebels in the Northern Province. Civil society organizations actively engaged in debates on the political dimensions of the peace process and are undertaking planning efforts for the 2001 elections. In total, the Campaign for Good Governance carried out reconciliation activities in seven out of 12 districts over the course of FY 2000.

Media and mass communications for the peace process: OTI, along with a number of other donors, funded Search for Common Ground's (SCG) Talking Drum Studio to produce programs for local radio stations. Talking Drum Studio aired four weekly programs on seven local radio stations, and produced the first news program by and for children. Talking Drum Studio also produced programs in support of OTI's Education for Peace and Nation-Building Programs as a tool for distance learning.

Impact: Reconciliation messages and news in indigenous languages reached people in all parts of Sierra Leone. OTI also enabled the first programs on reconciliation produced by and for children to be aired on national and local radio stations.

Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Speed: The Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program initiated 150 new learning groups every eight weeks. OTI's diamond assistance program enabled the Government of Sierra Leone to put into operation a Certification of Origin regime in October 2000, and obtain an exemption to UN Resolution 1306 (2000), just three months after sanctions went into effect.

Targeting: OTI's programs have targeted four segments of the population including ex-combatants, women and children victims of war, youth activists, and civil society leaders. OTI believes that targeting these groups will contribute to Sierra Leone's peaceful and democratic development.

Resource Leveraging: The most significant case of resource leveraging was OTI's assistance for "conflict" diamonds. OTI's early provision of technical assistance helped secure contributions by the U.K. and the Diamond High Council to the Certification of Origin regime. As part of the new diamond policies, the Government of Sierra Leone has earmarked approximately one-third of diamond export taxes for Community Development Funds. The new mining and export procedures have resulted in a stream of tax revenue and foreign exchange. Official diamond exports were \$1.24 million in 1999. In 2000 they were \$9.98 million, eight times greater, and the

projection for 2001 is \$50 million. These funds provide fresh tax revenue and foreign exchange earnings and are important for Sierra Leone's post-conflict recovery in diamond-producing areas ravaged by war.

Policy Leveraging: The Government of Sierra Leone adopted and published OTI's Working Paper of May 2000, which synthesized the findings of the March 2000 workshop that was held in Freetown. OTI led a Trilateral Technical Team, with representatives of the Diamond High Council of Belgium, the Belgian Government, and the UK, to provide assistance to Sierra Leone for their new Certification of Origin regime. OTI has been part of the multi-donor assistance for demobilization and reintegration, participating in numerous meetings in Freetown, London, and Washington.

FY 2000 Summary Funding Chart:

Activity	Total Funding
Diamond Policy and Development Program*	0
Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program and Education for Nation-Building	\$ 2,194,921
Civil Society Support for Peace-Building (Small grants)	\$108,055
Media and Communications - Talking Drum Studio	\$250,000
Elections – participation of women, youth, other groups**	\$300,000
Reintegration Employment/Apprenticeships/Skills Training***	\$950,000
Total:	\$3,802,976

* Diamond funding of \$435,664 was obligated in FY 1999, but activities were performed in FY 2000 and FY 2001.

** Funding was obligated in FY 2000, but activities will be carried out in FY 2001.

*** Funding was obligated by USAID/AFR in FY 2000, but the activity will be carried out in FY 2001.

Partnerships: OTI's partners in Sierra Leone include the Government of Sierra Leone and three major local NGOs: Campaign for Good Governance, "FAWE," and Network Movement for Justice and Development. OTI's international implementing partners are World Vision, Management Systems International, Search for Common Ground, and the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Systems (CEPPS). On the "conflict" diamonds work, OTI worked in coordination with the State Department, and with the private sector, particularly the Diamond High Council, De Beers and the World Diamond Council. With NGO advocacy groups, OTI has worked with Global Witness, InterAction, and World Vision, and coordinated its activities very closely with the State Department and with Congressional staff.

Exit Strategy: OTI will exit Sierra Leone in March 2002. USAID/Guinea is responsible for implementing the AFR Sierra Leone Transition Strategy for 2001-2003, and OTI is working collaboratively with USAID/Guinea on the management of DFA funds from FY 2000 and FY 2001.

ZIMBABWE	START DATE: JANUARY 2000 Exit Date: August 2002
OTI PRINCIPAL IR: <i>DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESSES, INITIATED, REESTABLISHED, OR EXPANDED</i>	FY 2000 BUDGET: \$2,423,000 (IDA)

Country Context and Relevance to U.S. Foreign Policy: Zimbabwe is facing major economic deterioration, growing corruption within the government, worsening social services, and political violence. In the past two years, the government’s legitimacy and popularity have eroded significantly. Due in large measure to its policies, the country is experiencing rising prices, massive unemployment, fuel and commodity shortages, human rights abuses, physical and political intimidation, and a land reform crisis. Political, economic, and social instability in Zimbabwe has a significant impact on the region, especially the rising problem of Zimbabwean refugees, deteriorating trade conditions with surrounding countries, and the potential for violence that could further stress southern African development and important relations with the U.S. and its allies.

Program Description: OTI is responding to the opportunity to encourage a peaceful transition in Zimbabwe by supporting democratic alternatives to violent conflict. Timely and carefully targeted assistance is being aimed at facilitating the development of an institutional environment that is more democratic, transparent, accountable, and responsive to the social and economic needs of the population. OTI’s program is helping local partners to strengthen civil society, monitor elections and train election monitors, expand independent media, document human rights violations, bolster the independence of the judiciary, and expand access to alternative media.

Goal: To advance the prospects for peaceful democratic transition.

Objectives: To support OTI’s goal, the program aims to:

- promote dialogue;
- re-establish rule of law;
- support constitutional reform;
- increase availability of and access to independent media;
- provide election support.

Activities and Impact

Promoting Dialogue: OTI’s programs in this area encourage discussion of constitutional reform, boost informed citizen participation in governance, broaden awareness of human rights issues, and generate and sustain public debate on critical issues facing the country. Specific activities have focused on building networks of civil society organizations, supporting independent media, and funding the High Court challenges.

Impact: As a result of OTI assistance, civil society leaders who were previously isolated and inexperienced, are starting to work together to organize NGOs/CSOs and develop an action plan. The NGOs are learning to use their power to insist that government officials address issues of democratic participation, rule of law, and equal justice.

Re-establishing the Rule of Law: In some way, all of the OTI-supported activities are designed to contribute to the re-establishment of the rule of law. Activities include support for a coalition

of human rights NGOs devoted to both exposing abuses and legally challenging the government's use of force.

Impact: Reports published by the OTI-supported human rights coalition have been picked up by the independent media and disseminated widely throughout the country. Legal contests over 39 parliamentary seats where substantial intimidation and irregularities were documented are, with OTI support, posing a major challenge to the legality and credibility of ZANU-PF rule.

Supporting Constitutional Reform: OTI's first major effort in Zimbabwe was in support of a coalition of civic organizations that was working to reform the Constitution. With OTI support, the coalition published and disseminated educational materials, organized public meetings and discussions, and stimulated debate over key constitutional issues.

Impact: The impact of OTI-supported activities was enormous. First, the government felt compelled to issue its own constitutional reform proposal in response to public pressure. Second, the Zimbabwean electorate soundly defeated the government's inadequate proposal.

In a national referendum on the constitution held in February 2000, voters rejected the concentration of power in the executive branch and indicated their high level of dissatisfaction with the ruling party. This catalytic event so mobilized the people that the subsequent elections four months later resulted in 58 seats in parliament being taken by the opposition, a party that had formed only a few months before the election. Several grantees have reported that it was this timely support from OTI that made the difference.

Availability of and Access to Independent Media: OTI has supported independent media through the purchase of newsprint, the publication of special supplements about election issues, start-up funding for an independent radio station, and assistance to hire and train stringers. OTI has focused its funding on activities that expand access and coverage to under-served rural areas.

Impact: An indicator of success of this support for an independent radio station is the significant publicity that has been generated. The strategy to create an independent radio station included challenging the government's monopoly of the media by taking the "permission to operate" issue to the Supreme Court. The resulting Court decision said that in the absence of broadcasting regulations, independent radio could not be prohibited from operating. The government monopoly of the media was declared unconstitutional. Within less than five days of its first broadcast, the independent radio station was shut down by the government. The police, who would not leave until they were able to search, surrounded its founder's house. In the interview she said, "...the continuing publicity surrounding its (the radio station) brief tenure, has helped to exacerbate the public debate. While there is no change in the government, it is clear that people want change and want balanced reporting."

In addition, since the February 2000 referendum "no" vote to amend the Constitution, the OTI-supported independent daily newspaper has increased in circulation and advertising revenue. Less than a year ago, the newspaper's circulation was 35,000. Today it is 90,000, having reached a peak of 145,000 during the period immediately prior to and following the elections. During the same period, the circulation of the government-sponsored newspaper has declined from 140,000 to 65,000. In addition, newspapers are being distributed to thousands of opinion leaders in the rural villages who previously had little access to independent media.

Election Support: OTI supported voter education through the printing and distribution of related newspaper supplements and sections produced by the local press. Through the Zimbabwe Enterprise Network, OTI co-sponsored the only event in the pre-election period, which saw representatives of the ruling party and the opposition share the same stage in public to discuss their positions. In terms of the actual elections, OTI assisted in the training and fielding of 7,200 national election monitors and conducted extensive voter education activities. OTI also supported a local NGO, which provided logistical support to the Electoral Supervisory Commission.

Impact: The greatest indicator of OTI's impact in this area is that out of the 120 seats in parliament up for election, the opposition won a total of 58. This is the first time that an opposition party has occupied more than three seats in the 150-member parliament since independence. Commenting on Zimbabwe's election results, the New York Times credited the strength of the showing of the opposition to OTI-supported civil society groups that monitored the balloting.

Gathering news on the election also meant that human rights abuses were documented and reported in the daily press. These reports have helped the human rights community to bring formal charges against the police, military and youth and also to gather evidence and prepare cases for the court challenges of the 39 congressional seats which were acquired in areas that experienced government-sponsored violence.

VI. Results and Impact by Process Indicators

Speed: Average time to make a grant from the time a proposal was received is eight days, including pre-award survey. Grants ranged in size from \$3,400-\$261,000. In several cases the time period was only two to three days from the receipt of the proposal to money actually being in the hands of the grantee. These cases occurred principally during the period prior to the parliamentary elections.

Regarding the ability to respond to new political openings or events, OTI was able to sign a grant, make funds available, procure equipment outside of Zimbabwe, ship it to Zimbabwe, install it and actually begin grantee operations, all within a period of five days from the time that the government announced its intention to effect a new, highly restrictive law.

OTI utilized an existing U.S. NGO in Zimbabwe to be its in-country implementing partner. Full-scale operations began the very day after the contract was signed and at considerably lower cost than would have been the case for an organization new to the country. The partnership from the outset has been a highly efficient and productive one.

Targeting: Due to solid OTI initial pre-program assessment and design as well as close collaboration with the U.S. Government and local partners, there has been broad support for OTI's focus on constitutional reform, independent media, and civil society. When the level of violence leading up to the June 2000 election began to rise, OTI responded immediately with activities to reduce the conflict and to protect pro-democracy forces. Subsequently, OTI added rule of law as a major element of its overall program.

Resource Leveraging: In the area of constitutional reform and elections support, OTI's commitment and funding was used by various NGOs and others to leverage significant resources from a number of international donors and NGOs which had earlier held back on their level of commitment.

Policy Leveraging: OTI's support to the media, constitutional reform (including activities associated with the referendum on the draft constitution), elections, monitoring and reporting on violence, various fora promoting discussion and dialogue, and several activities associated specifically with rule of law issues have had a significant effect on policy decisions within the U.S. Government, other donor governments and the UN. Not only have these activities served to keep people informed of key issues and points of view on a regular basis, but they also have increased pressures to reform. Partially as a result of the heightened attention, the U.S. Government and various other bilateral donors and international agencies have acknowledged the seriousness of the crisis in Zimbabwe which could lead to a humanitarian and political emergency in Zimbabwe and negatively impact on the stability of the entire region.

FY 2000 Summary Grant Chart:

Sector	NUMBER OF GRANTS	Total Value of Grants
Constitutional Reform/Election Support	8	\$721,956
Independent Media	4	\$450,369
Dialogue	1	\$260,621
Rule of Law	1	\$200,000
Total:	14	\$1,632,946

Quotes on OTI's work:

A sentiment expressed by one mid-term assessment interviewee that was echoed by others was, "The success of the OTI program is that it is serving to create some mental space for people to learn the whole picture."

When asked if USAID/OTI's support to the independent media helped to make the elections free and fair, one grantee responded, "No, but the media showed that it (the election) was not free and fair! Independent monitors were able to gather documentation that showed the elections were not free and fair. This is how the legal cases (challenges) are now being built."

OTI PARTNERSHIPS

OTI has come to recognize that it takes more than information sharing and program coordination to constitute effective partnerships. The Office has increasingly moved toward shared assessments, joint programming initiatives, integrated strategies, and smooth hand-off of projects and grantees to its partners. These partnerships, which also result in both funds and in-kind contributions to OTI's local partners, enabled OTI to significantly leverage its impact. How this works was demonstrated in FY 2000 by a newer program, East Timor, an existing program, Kosovo, and a closing program, the Philippines.

East Timor

OTI engaged in East Timor in the fall of 1999 as an outgrowth of its Indonesia program. OTI/East Timor was the only USAID presence with full time staff in East Timor and worked closely with the **USAID Mission** in Indonesia to design USAID's East Timor framework. OTI jumpstarted community rehabilitation activities and provided short-term employment opportunities for 65,000 people in conjunction with the **World Bank** and the **United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)**. UNTAET District Administrators oversaw the rehabilitation projects while OTI provided funds for labor and materials. When complementary funding for the UN and the World Bank became available, OTI restructured its program to address other priorities. OTI also worked with the **World Bank's Community Empowerment Program** to provide basic tool kits to newly-elected community councils in 157 sub-districts.

OTI/East Timor has taken the lead in media support and, with the World Bank, has brought donors together for regular media coordination meetings. OTI initiated funding for an indigenous print consortium that was later funded by **CIDA** and **UNESCO**. In the area of governance, OTI supports the **UN's Serious Crimes Investigation Unit** that is charged with investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of the 1999 violence. On the policy front, OTI's East Timor Representative attends all major donor consultation meetings on East Timor and provides input to **USAID/ANE** and the **U.S. State Department**. Finally, OTI collaborates and co-funds activities with British **DFID**, Japan's **JICA**, **AusAid**, and numerous international NGOs. OTI is planning to exit East Timor in FY 2001, handing off activities to USAID/Indonesia. As their funds become available for media and elections support, OTI is identifying new and complementary initiatives for their implementing partners, including the **Carter Center** and the **Asia Foundation**.

A recent democracy and governance assessment of East Timor noted, "USAID/OTI has already established relationships of trust with many key players and has a reputation for performance and reliability exceeding that of any other donor. USAID will have a natural advantage building on this track record."

KOSOVO

OTI works closely with other USAID programs in Kosovo to promote U.S. Government policy objectives. In FY 2000, OTI actively collaborated with **OFDA/DART** for the provision of emergency shelter kits. OTI also worked with **USAID's Europe and Eurasia Bureau's** Community Infrastructure Service Program (CISP) to identify infrastructure projects across Kosovo. OTI submitted four project proposals, totaling \$255,000 to CISP in FY 2000. OTI also collaborated with USAID's Democracy and Governance partners, especially for election-oriented programming.

OTI partnered with **UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)** on city clean-up projects and heating system repairs. OTI worked closely with **KFOR** in identifying and leveraging funding for community projects such as school rehabilitation and infrastructure repair. OTI collaborated with non-governmental organizations, such as **Mercy Corps, Balkan Sunflowers, OXFAM** and **Caritas** on various projects. In the Peja area, OTI coordinated with **UNDP/ERD** to identify community projects; \$500,000 in projects were funded by **IRC, UNDP/ERD's** implementing partner. With the **International Research and Education Exchange (IREX)**, OTI co-hosted a training for 13 local radio stations to better prepare outlets and support their coverage of Kosovo's first municipal elections. **OSCE** worked with OTI's CICs to help develop its report "Voters' Voices: Community Concerns," which provided an overview of community priorities to candidates allowing them to tailor their party's respective platforms to the expressed concerns of the communities they hoped to represent.

USAID's Strategy for Kosovo 2001-2003, notes, "The work of the Office of Transition Initiatives in community building continues to provide critical support to USAID's civil society building efforts. The Community Improvement Councils are key mechanisms for project selection in the Community Infrastructure Services Program."

For its hand-off in September 2001, OTI/Kosovo is discussing strategies with its implementing partner, **IOM** and **USAID/Kosovo** as well as with organizations such as **NDI, International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES)**, and **Save the Children**. **USAID/Kosovo** plans to absorb five of OTI's seven field offices in an effort to promote civic participation and support citizen interaction with the new municipal governments.

The Philippines

OTI/Philippines demonstrates OTI's focus on partnerships with host governments and local partners, as well as the U.S. government and the international community.

Within the **Government of the Philippines (GRP)**, OTI worked closely with the **Department of Agriculture (DA)**. A joint partnership between OTI, DA, and **local villages** represented only the fourth GRP project that directly targeted ex-combatants of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and involved substantial GRP support. OTI also developed relationships with the **provincial governors** to improve the involvement of their offices in MNLF reintegration activities and promote future support to isolated former MNLF villages. OTI also developed partnerships with critical **municipal officials**. Finally, OTI designed its projects around the needs of villagers themselves. Ultimately, the sustainability of the program will rely on the villages to manage the assets provided under the program.

OTI/Philippines' relationship with **USAID/Philippines** prompted the Mission to seek additional funds for follow-on programs to OTI's activities. The Mission is developing a task order for a two-year program, which is the first time an OTI-designed contracting mechanism has been used to provide follow-on assistance by the Mission. In January 2001, prior to hand-off in March 2001, OTI co-sponsored a consultation conference with the **World Bank, Asian Development Bank**, and **UNDP** to visit project sites and share lessons learned about the program.

PART THREE
RESOURCE REQUEST FY 2003
FOR BHR/OTI

May 2001

PART THREE: RESOURCE REQUEST FY 2003

During FY 2000, OTI obligated a total of \$61,196,578 in grants, contracts, technical assistance, and operations support. This amount included: \$49,173,334 from the International Disaster Account (IDA); \$41,905 from the Development Assistance (DA) account, which was earmarked for Indonesia; \$10,950,000 in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for East Timor; \$250,000 in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for Sierra Leone; and \$781,339 in Support for East European Development (SEED) monies for Kosovo.

Table 3.1: OTI's FY 2000 Actual

Expenditure Category	FY 2000 Actual
General Support and Operations (IDA)	\$49,173,334
Transition Emergency Response (Transfers: DA, DFA, ESF, SEED; Other)	\$12,023,244
Grand Total	\$61,196,578

In FY 2000, OTI responded to a new complex emergency in East Timor, initiated a new program in Zimbabwe, continued programs in 13 countries, and completed programs in five countries. OTI also provided technical assistance to help USAID Missions develop transition strategies in countries where OTI does not have a presence.

OTI implemented programs in FY 2000 in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, DROC, East Timor, Honduras, Indonesia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nigeria, Philippines, Serbia/Montenegro, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. By the end of FY 2000, OTI completed its programs in Bosnia, Croatia, and Honduras. In FY 2001, OTI has continued to provide transition assistance in Colombia, DROC, East Timor, Kosovo, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Serbia/Montenegro, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe; provided one-time support for earthquake relief for El Salvador; started a new country program in Peru; and by the end of FY 2001, will have handed off programs in Colombia, DROC, Kosovo, Lebanon, and Nigeria. In FY 2002, OTI plans to continue operations in East Timor, Indonesia, Peru, Serbia/Montenegro, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe.

The FY 2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act established a separate funding account for OTI. It provided \$50 million under "Transition Initiatives" (TI) "to support transition to democracy and to long-term development of countries in crisis," which "may include assistance to develop, strengthen, or preserve democratic institutions and processes, revitalize basic infrastructure, and foster the peaceful resolution of conflict." Under this legislation, USAID reports to the Committees on Appropriations at least five days prior to beginning a new program of assistance. In addition to the \$49 million in TI funds, OTI in FY 2001 has received to date \$21,650,700 in SEED, DFA and ESF for Serbia & Montenegro, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Indonesia, and Colombia.

In FY 2002, OTI requested \$50 million in TI funds. In FY 2003 OTI requests \$60 million in TI funds.

Table 3.2: OTI's Projected Resource Request (\$ in Millions)

Expenditure Category	FY 2001 Projected	FY 2002 Projected	FY 2003 Projected
General Support and Operations (TI)	\$49,890,000	\$50,000,000	\$60,000,000
Transition Emergency Response (Transfers: DFA, ESF, SEED; Other)	\$21,650,700	\$20,000,000	\$25,000,000
IDA carryover	\$3,700,000		
Grand Total	\$75,240,700	\$70,000,000	\$85,000,000

A number of significant factors have been considered in developing this resource request. They include:

- OTI's increasing role in conflict prevention;
- New opportunities for OTI to provide transition assistance in post-conflict societies;
- Continuing needs for OTI staff in the field and in Washington to be able to respond quickly and flexibly to dynamic and challenging operating environments;
- OTI's growing success in building cooperation, creating partnerships, and leveraging its resources.

OTI's Increasing Role in Conflict Prevention

Over the past decade, violent intra-state conflicts have resulted in complex humanitarian disasters in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe. Whether the eruptions of violence are religious, ethnic, economic, territorial and/or political in origin, the failure of state institutions to manage internal struggles over political power and economic resources has cost millions of lives and millions more in property destroyed. The consequences are major citizen insecurity, years of development progress erased, growing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, setbacks to democratic advances, and in many cases, increasing regional instability. Whereas traditional military power has proven effective in deterring international conflict and turning back cross-border aggression, it has been less able to deal successfully with violent intra-state conflicts and societies marked by growing anarchy.

In such environments, programs to promote national reconciliation, build open democratic and participatory processes and broaden access to and efficient use of economic, political, and natural resources play an increasingly important role. OTI's focus on rapid, catalytic, flexible actions to address issues with a high potential for conflict makes it a key actor in this endeavor. The line between "pre" and "post" conflict has become increasingly blurred as countries find themselves trapped in repeating cycles of violence where the root causes are not addressed fully. OTI's ability to assist local partners in transforming the underlying situation is the key to avoiding future large expenditures for military and humanitarian intervention.

New Opportunities for OTI to Provide Transition Assistance

New post-conflict transition opportunities are emerging as current and potential peace talks mark an end to the violence and repression in many habitually conflicted countries. To take full advantage of these transition opportunities, OTI has developed a “watch list” comprised of those countries where possibilities may soon exist for transition to peace and democracy. Included on OTI’s current “watch list” are Sudan, North Korea, Burundi, Afghanistan, Myanmar/Burma, and Ethiopia/Eritrea. OTI reviews its watch list regularly and is continually assessing countries and their progress in ending repression and violent conflict. In addition, peace talks in such places as Armenia/Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), the Middle East, Cyprus, Senegal, and Sri Lanka may conclude successfully within the next two years, thus contributing to the need for OTI’s assistance. USAID Missions, U.S. Ambassadors, and other U.S. Government officials continue to request transition assistance, as OTI’s field operations demonstrate increasing relevance to U.S. foreign policy interests and as complex emergencies often consume significant U.S. Government resources.

Table 3.3: FY 1995 – FY 2002 OTI Country Programs*

COUNTRY	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02
Angola ¹					◆			
Haiti	◆			◆				
Rwanda	◆					◆		
Liberia		◆			◆			
Bosnia-Herzegovina		◆				◆		
Sierra Leone				◆	suspended			◆
Sri Lanka			◆		◆			
Guatemala			◆		◆			
Croatia			◆			◆		
Kosovo			◆			-----		◆
Serbia ² / Montenegro			◆			-----	◆	◆
Philippines				◆			◆	
DROC				◆		-----	◆	
Indonesia					◆			◆
Nigeria					◆			◆
Colombia					◆			◆
Honduras					◆	◆		
Albania					◆		◆	
Lebanon					◆		◆	
Zimbabwe						◆		◆
East Timor					◆			◆
Peru							◆	◆

LEGEND

—◆ Program started before period displayed in table ----- Reduced program activity
 ◆—◆ Program started and exited (may be estimated) | suspended | Program was suspended³
 ◆—➔ Program expected to continue beyond period displayed in table

*Exit means termination date of contract or transfer of responsibility for contract management.

¹ OTI's first program, Angola, began in FY 1994.

² Dates of reduced program activity refer to Serbia only.

³ "Suspended" means that program activities end early (staff are evacuated but funding is still committed to the country), due to changing and unfavorable conditions, but with expectations to resume activities.

Continuing Need for Quick and Flexible Response to Dynamic Operating Environments

In order to respond quickly and flexibly to changing circumstances and emerging transition opportunities, OTI must have a staff that is highly competent, well versed in OTI's programs, and able to deploy on short notice. Each major declared complex emergency or political transition requires OTI to shift its resources, including regular OTI personnel, "bull-pen" staff, available funding, and equipment. OTI has developed the SWIFT contracting mechanism to enable fast and efficient program start-up in new countries, and is working to establish new procedures and capacities for rapid response.

OTI conducts regular reviews of its strategies in each country and makes frequent adjustments to program design, office structure, and personnel. The need to maintain a surge capacity and a wide variety of "tools" – expertise, logistical support, and contracting relationships – places special demands on OTI's budget and personnel. OTI's monitoring, evaluation and assessment capacities are particularly important to maintain, so that the lessons from its cutting-edge approaches can be learned and applied to ongoing and future programs. Streamlined and efficient contracting procedures will be essential to OTI's future.

OTI's Growing Success in Building Cooperation, Creating Partnerships, and Leveraging Resources.

In order to improve the impact of its emergency transition programs, OTI has placed increased emphasis on coordinating with other USG and USAID offices as well as other donors. Such partnerships contribute significantly to OTI's impact by leveraging complementary funds and designing coordinated strategies. The strategies employed by OTI are proving successful in utilizing resources effectively and efficiently. For example, USAID/Zimbabwe Results Review FY 2000 stated: *"The agile resources of OTI are having an important complement to our development assistance program. Support for the independent media, especially in the wake of the bombing of the only independent daily newspapers, legal assistance, support for constitutional reform and other dialogue efforts are allowing the mission to respond in a unique way to the crisis and political transition."*

Outside the U.S. Government, OTI's implementing partners have included U.S. private organizations (profits and nonprofits), international organizations, universities, cooperatives, host governments, and other bi-lateral donors. By working with a wide variety of partners, and leveraging additional funds for its activities, OTI ensures that each dollar of its core funding brings expanded impact in the field.

**Table 3.4: FY 1999 – FY 2001 OTI/W Collaboration with U.S. Non-Profit
Implementing Partners**

Country	Organization	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001 (Est.)
Colombia	Salesian Mission	250,756	52,000	11,500
East Timor	Internews	0	0	500,000
Indonesia	Private Agencies Collaborating Together, Inc.	581,335	0	0
Indonesia	The Asia Foundation	981,997	0	0
Indonesia	Internews	2,750,787	628,051	0
Nigeria	International Foundation for Election Systems	84,569	0	0
Rwanda	Internews	187,519	0	0
Rwanda	International Rescue Committee	378,005	0	0
Sierra Leone	World Vision	560,196	96,126	1,296,690
Sierra Leone	Search for Common Ground	0	250,000	139,605
Zimbabwe	Private Agencies Collaborating Together, Inc.	0	1,640,000	2,624,232
	Total U.S. PVOs	\$5,775,164	\$2,666,177	\$4,572,027

Table 3.5: FY 1999 – FY 2001 OTI/W Collaboration with International Organizations

Country	Organization	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001 (Est.)
Albania	International Organization for Migration	3,000,000	800,000	0
Colombia	International Committee of the Red Cross	750,000	0	0
Colombia	International Organization for Migration	0	500,000	3,500,000
East Timor	International Organization for Migration	0	0	1,000,123
Guatemala	International Organization for Migration	25,000	0	0
Honduras	International Organization for Migration	2,000,000	0	0
Kosovo	International Organization for Migration	3,000,000	6,167,409	3,000,000
Sierra Leone	Economic Cooperation Organization for West African States	73,800	0	0
Worldwide	UN Development Program/Worn-Torn Societies Project	209,336	304,500	300,000
Worldwide	World Bank	50,000	0	5,000
	Total International NGOs	\$9,108,136	\$7,771,909	\$7,805,123

Table 3.6: FY 1999 - FY 2001 OTI/W Collaboration with U.S. NGOs

Country	Organization	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001 (Est.)
Colombia	Georgetown University	0	195,625	0
Indonesia	National Democratic Institute	500,000	0	0
Worldwide	National Democratic Institute	250,000	22,785	0
Zimbabwe	National Democratic Institute	0	561,000	0
Total US NGOs		\$750,000	\$779,410	0

Table 3.7: FY 2000 Collaboration & Co-Financing with USAID & USG Entities

<u>FUNDS TRANSFERED TO OTI FROM OTHER USAID BUREAU ACCOUNTS</u>		
Kosovo	SEED	781,339
East Timor	ESF	10,950,000
	Total	\$11,731,339
<u>FUNDS RECEIVED DIRECTLY FROM OTHER USG ACCOUNTS</u>		
Sierra Leone	ESF	250,000
Indonesia	DA	41,905
	Total	\$291,905
	TOTAL FUNDS TO OTI	\$12,023,244
<u>FUND TRANSFERS - FROM OTI</u>		
Nigeria	Dept. of Justice	520,000
Nigeria	Voice of America	150,000
Nigeria	Global Bureau	275,000
Sierra Leone	Democracy and Governance Center	300,000
	TOTAL FUNDS FROM OTI	\$1,245,000

During FY 2000, OTI received transfers from other USAID Bureaus of \$11,731,339 from SEED and ESF accounts that were utilized to carry out programs in Kosovo and East Timor. Also in FY 2000, OTI receive \$291,905 in ESF and DA funds directly for programs in Sierra Leone and Indonesia. At the same time, OTI transferred funds totaling \$1,245,000 to other U.S. Government offices and to other USAID Bureaus for joint activities in Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

OTI operates in accordance with one Strategic Objective: Political transitions successful advanced in priority, post-conflict countries. Given that one of OTI's criteria for engagement is that it possesses

sufficient resources to make a positive and significant impact in a given country, OTI would choose to operate in fewer countries rather than eliminate activities under any of its Intermediate Results if funding for FY 2003 is lower than expected. This could mean that OTI would not have the resources to address opportunities for peaceful and democratic transitions that might arise during the year or would be forced to suspend operations in a lower-priority country.

OTI's ability to manage transition assistance and carry out its mandate requires adequate staffing levels. To meet anticipated transition needs in FY 2003, the operating expense budget will need to be increased to enable senior direct-hire staff to effectively manage OTI's activities in priority countries. OTI believes strongly that to be most effective, programs must be implemented in areas outside the capital or other major urban areas. OTI expects to continue and expand its presence in critical population centers throughout transition countries. This practice relies heavily on strong field staff to manage field operations.

Table 3.8: FY 1999-2003 BHR/OTI Workforce Requirements

	Actual	Estimate	Requested	
STAFF LEVELS	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003
USDHs	7	7	7	7
USPSCs-W	18	22	26	27
Part-time technical advisers	7	11	11	11
PSCs/FSNs - Field	52	33	39	39
TOTAL	84	73	83	84

By the end FY 2001, OTI's staff will include seven USDHs, 22 Washington-based full-time PSCs, 11 part-time technical advisers who work both in Washington and in the field, and 33 field-based PSCs and FSNs. For FY 2002 and FY 2003, OTI anticipates that it will need to increase slightly the number of Washington-based PSCs and field-based PSCs/FSNs to adequately staff in-country operations. Having adequate staff on board is essential to OTI's mission to respond quickly to transition needs as they arise while at the same time sustaining country programs that exist currently.

Table 3.9: BHR/OTI Operating Expense Direct Hire Travel Budget, FY 2000-2003

	Actual	Estimate	Requestes	
OPERATING EXPENSES	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003
Travel	\$100,000	\$100,000	\$125,000	\$125,000

In conclusion, it is likely that in FY 2003 the demand will be great for OTI programs in countries of high priority to U.S. foreign policy. OTI will need to increase its capacity to respond to new transition opportunities in priority countries while retaining its ability to support ongoing transitions.