



**OFFICE OF TRANSITION  
INITIATIVES**

**1999-2000 Report**

Office of Transition Initiatives  
Bureau for Humanitarian Response  
U.S. Agency for International Development

U.S. Agency for International Development

**Cover photo:** The community of Gjakova, Kosovo turned out to celebrate Gjakova 2000, a ceremony that kicked off the rebuilding of Gjakova's historic Old Town. The 450-year-old marketplace once boasted 700 privately owned shops but was completely burned down during the war. OTI convened the Gjakova Old Town Community Improvement Council, which developed a multiphased approach to clean up the area, refurbish a local brickmaking factory, and secure funding for reconstruction.


**Photo credit:** Edmond Hoxha

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USAID

# Introduction to OTI



# ■ Introduction

## Global Situation

An increase in violent intrastate conflicts has resulted in complex humanitarian disasters across the globe. Whether the eruptions of violence are religious, ethnic, economic, territorial, and/or political in origin, the failure of state institutions to manage internal struggles over political power and economic resources has cost thousands of lives and millions of dollars in destroyed infrastructure and property. In such an environment, the line between “pre” and “post” conflict has become increasingly blurred as countries find themselves trapped in cycles of violence where the root causes are never fully addressed. These conflicts result in high levels of citizen insecurity, stalled democratic development, displacement of people, interruption of economic and agricultural cycles, and in many cases, heightened regional tensions. Because they are designed to respect state sovereignty, neither traditional diplomacy nor sheer military power has proven effective in deterring intrastate conflict.

The needs of societies emerging from internal wars or complex emergencies are central to the discussion of international development. As the number of crises continues to mount, USAID and other donor organizations must be able to move quickly and effectively to meet the transition challenges they face. There is an increased demand to help countries in crisis promote national reconciliation, build open democratic and participatory processes, and broaden access to and efficient use of economic, political, and natural resources. Without these structural changes, the cycle of poverty, violence, and repression is likely to continue indefinitely.

## OTI—Pioneering Transition Assistance

In 1994, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) created a new tool for responding to these challenges: the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). OTI’s

“The OTI program is a critical element in the U.S. Office/Pristina’s efforts to combat intolerance, centralization, and extremism in an environment where small amounts of resources can make a big difference.... In many ways, the OTI offices are force multipliers for the U.S. Office/Pristina itself.”

—Larry Rossin, former chief U.S. diplomat in Kosovo.

## Defining “Transitions”

The term “transition” has a different meaning for different people working in the post-Cold War period. Originally, “transitions” referred to situations where the nature of governance shifted from authoritarian rule to more open societies. In recent years “transition” has become a more porous concept, one that has come to incorporate moving from war to peace, or making the turn from division to national reconciliation. OTI uses the term to refer to what is also called “post-conflict reconstruction”—the period after the fighting stops or an election is held where international and local actors work jointly to rebuild society, jumpstart economic life, and advance political development. OTI also considers opportunities for transition work in countries where political strife has not yet erupted into violence, and where the possibility exists to prevent or mitigate conflict and broaden

democratic participation.

The timing of transition assistance is critical. Because there is a short window of opportunity in which to make positive political gains, transition assistance depends on a quick response to fill the gap between emergency relief and long-term development. Traditional development programs can often take years to design and implement.

Transition assistance can pay large dividends by reducing the need for costly military operations, peacekeeping efforts, and emergency humanitarian relief. It can help countries develop strategies for sustainable development that will enable them to become stronger trading partners and allies, thereby enhancing global security by enlarging the community of peaceful, democratic nations.

“The U.S. Agency for International Development is doing an impressive job in East Timor through the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). Its in-kind support for scores of excellent East Timorese NGOs and its jobs program...have offered some of the speediest, most effective assistance available.”

—Dr. Jose Ramos Horta, Nobel Laureate and vice-president of the National Commission of East Timorese Resistance


mission is to help local partners advance peaceful, democratic change in conflict-prone countries. Seizing critical windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key transition needs. Its ability to assist local partners in addressing the root causes of conflict is key to bridging the gap between emergency relief and long-term sustainable development.

OTI’s programs and resource allocations reflect U.S. foreign policy priorities in assisting transition countries during the critical two-year period when they are most vulnerable to renewed conflict or instability. Because OTI possesses special programming flexibility, it can put staff on the ground swiftly to identify and act on what are often fleeting opportunities for systemic change. Working closely with local, national, international, and nongovernmental partners, OTI carries out short-term, high-impact projects that increase momentum for peace, reconciliation, and reconstruction. There are no set responses; rather, strategies are tailored to meet the unique needs of each transition country. Typically, they are tested on a small scale and applied more broadly when it is clear that high impact is being achieved. Changing conditions are quickly reflected in new or modified strategies.

OTI’s transition assistance has included:

- ◆ Supporting community development programs that encourage political participation at the local level;
- ◆ Funding reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities as productive citizens;
- ◆ Backing alternative media and public information campaigns to encourage peace, reconciliation, and informed participation in elections;
- ◆ Assisting local efforts to fight corruption and promote transparent, accountable governing systems;
- ◆ Helping governments develop action plans for key reforms;
- ◆ Encouraging measures to bring the military under civilian democratic control;
- ◆ Building the capacity of civil society organizations to effectively engage government officials in dialogue and debate;
- ◆ Promoting human rights by funding human rights education and monitors;
- ◆ Assisting national governments to manage their strategic natural resources; and
- ◆ Supporting local efforts to mitigate/manage ethnic and religious conflict.

## OTI Programs and International Disaster Assistance Funding FY 1994–2000



\*By the close of FY 2000 OTI had 13 active programs.

## OTI at Six Years

After growing rapidly in the first few years of its existence, funding for OTI has held constant at the level of approximately \$50 million of International Disaster Assistance for FY 1999 and FY 2000. This amount does not include transfers from other accounts, which brought total OTI funding to more than \$69 million in FY 1999. In FY 1999, OTI had 18 active programs, its largest portfolio to date.

In FY 2000, OTI has initiated a new program in Zimbabwe; completed operations in five programs—Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Honduras, and Rwanda; and continued operations in 12 programs—Albania, Colombia, Congo (DROC), East Timor, Indonesia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Montenegro, Nigeria, Philippines, Serbia, and Sierra Leone. OTI also provided technical assistance to help USAID Missions develop transition strategies in countries

## OTI Presence: FY 1995–FY 2001

PROGRAM	OTI Start-Up <sup>1</sup> and Exit <sup>2</sup> Dates						
	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01
Angola <sup>3</sup>					◆		
Haiti	◆			◆			
Rwanda	◆					◆	
Liberia		◆			◆		
Bosnia-Herzegovina		◆				◆	
Sierra Leone <sup>4</sup>			◆	— suspended —			◆
Sri Lanka			◆		◆		
Guatemala			◆		◆		
Croatia			◆			◆	
Kosovo			◆		-----		◆
Serbia <sup>5</sup> / Montenegro			◆		-----	◆	◆
Philippines			◆				◆
DROC				◆	-----		◆
Indonesia				◆			▶
Nigeria					◆		◆
Colombia					◆		◆
Honduras					◆	◆	
Albania					◆		◆
Lebanon					◆		▶
East Timor					◆		▶
Zimbabwe						◆	▶

**LEGEND**

◆ Program started before period displayed in table     
 ----- Reduced program activity  
 ◆◆ Program started and exited (may be estimated for FY 01)  
 ◆▶ Program expected to continue beyond period displayed in table

<sup>1</sup> “Start-up” means either the first funds obligated, OTI field presence established, and/or first grant approved.

<sup>2</sup> “Exit” means when the last funded activity ended or the field office closed, whichever is last.

<sup>3</sup> OTI’s first program, Angola, began in FY 1994.

<sup>4</sup> “Suspended” means that programs stop and staff are evacuated due to unfavorable conditions, but with expectations to resume activities.

<sup>5</sup> Dates of reduced program activity refer to Serbia only.

where OTI does not have a presence.

In FY 2000, OTI managed programs totaling more than \$64 million, including \$12 million in transfers from other U.S government accounts. As OTI’s expertise has grown and the need for rapid response mechanisms has become more widely understood, requests from the Department of State and USAID Missions for OTI interventions have increased.

### Recent OTI Accomplishments

Over the past year and a half, OTI’s achievements have included:

- ◆ Quick responses to pivotal elections in Indonesia, Nigeria, Croatia and Zimbabwe. With as little as five weeks’ lead time in some places, OTI’s support to independent media



*OTI's Transitional Employment Program (TEP) in East Timor, implemented jointly with the UN, provided immediate relief to thousands of East Timorese and addressed basic infrastructure needs. In this TEP project, laborers construct a fishpond.*

■  
 Congressional visits over the past year to OTI programs in Indonesia, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe have generated bi-partisan support for practical, timely, politically sensitive initiatives.

■

and leading civil society organizations promoted public debate on key issues, created a more informed electorate, enhanced voter participation, and supported efforts to monitor elections and reduce election-related violence and human rights abuses. OTI's grantees contributed to a smooth transfer of power to democratically elected governments in

Indonesia and Nigeria, record high voter turnout and the rejection of a hard-line regime in Croatia, and a near-majority for Zimbabwe's leading opposition party in the national parliament.

- ◆ OTI's creation of more than 200 broad-based citizens' councils in post-war Kosovo helped channel international donor response and provided a new model for participatory democracy. OTI's councils identified and implemented over 250 community reconstruction projects through a process of local decision-making, representative leadership and civic action. The program, which leveraged \$4.3 million from other donors and \$2.3 million from local contributions, has been recognized as an effective transition tool by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, the U.S. State Department, visiting Members of Congress, and leading international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
- ◆ OTI addressed a root cause of conflict in West Africa by assisting the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) to harness its illicit diamond trade. Based on the work of OTI and its partners, the United Nations Security Council voted to impose a worldwide ban on purchases of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone unless they are identified by an authenticated Certificate of Origin. OTI is also working with diamond giant De Beers and the Diamond High Council of Antwerp to obtain private sector cooperation in reducing diamond smuggling. During the World Diamond Congress in

July 2000, the diamond industry pledged to act to reduce diamond smuggling and remove "conflict" diamonds from mainstream marketing channels.

- ◆ OTI filled a critical gap in East Timor by jumpstarting a United Nations employment initiative designed to provide immediate relief to thousands of unemployed East Timorese and address basic infrastructure needs. The Transitional Employment Program (TEP) employed approximately 50,000 local men and women in community reconstruction projects in all 13 districts of the country. OTI was the only donor office with the ability to fund a large employment program early in East Timor's post-conflict transition.

## The Importance of Partnerships

The needs of countries in transition far outweigh OTI's modest resources. Because OTI is a small part of U.S. foreign policy and the international donor community, it is committed to coordinating its efforts to achieve the greatest impact in transition countries. OTI's partners include other U.S. government and USAID offices, as well as local, national, and international organizations, businesses, and governments. These partnerships are essential for creating targeted strategies that maximize both the resources and expertise of the donor community. By leveraging additional funds to support transition activities, OTI ensures that each dollar of its core funding has maximum impact.

### U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

OTI country teams cooperate closely with USAID's regional bureaus and missions to conduct field assessments for new OTI country programs, develop country strategies, and ensure that elements of its programs can be handed off smoothly.

- ◆ Within USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR), OTI works closely with the **Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)** to facilitate the shift from relief to transition assistance.

## Partnering on Policy

In part, OTI measures its success by the degree to which it is able to have an impact on U.S. and host governments' discussions. Because of its ability to bring local voices to the policy table, OTI is an important player in policy decisions. Examples include:

- ◆ OTI's strategy for promoting professional and balanced local media in Bosnia and Kosovo has influenced the media policy and approaches of the United States and other donors.
- ◆ OTI played a critical role as facilitator of discussions among actors at the beginning of peace talks in Colombia. OTI was able to foster dialogue among groups with competing agendas.
- ◆ OTI functions in countries where there is no USAID Mission, such as Sierra Leone, and therefore is the main connection between the U.S. Embassy and civil society/local communities.
- ◆ At the request of the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, OTI developed a strategy for addressing the crisis in Aceh. OTI's strategy was well-received and set the basis for future policy.

- ◆ OTI collaborates with the **Global Bureau's Center for Democracy and Governance** (D/G Center) on assessment tools and program design.
- ◆ OTI is establishing a cooperative relationship with the **Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation** to identify ways in which the two offices can strengthen the organizational capacity of local NGOs.
- ◆ Twenty-six of the Indonesian NGOs funded initially by OTI have been selected by the **USAID Indonesia Mission** for possible long-term institutional capacity-building support. The continuation of funding ensures that these groups can carry on their democracy-building activities after OTI closes out of the country.
- ◆ OTI's program in Sierra Leone is an example of intense coordination of humanitarian and transition assistance in the field, in Washington, and among donors. With no USAID Mission in Sierra Leone, three of the offices within USAID/BHR—**Food for Peace, OFDA, and OTI**—and the Department of State's **Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration** are working together closely to represent the United States as it addresses the causes and consequences of the civil conflict.
- ◆ In Kosovo, OTI collaborated with the **USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team** on its Shelter Program, and with the **USAID Europe and Eurasia Mission** on Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Projects to further OTI's efforts to rebuild schools and other critical buildings.

### U.S. Government

OTI coordinates closely with U.S. government (USG) offices to develop a coherent USG strategy. Partners include the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the National Security Council, among others.

- ◆ In **Angola**, OTI's \$8.1 million investment in land mine removal and a related mine-awareness public information campaign was matched by an additional \$6.6 million from other U.S. government departments. OTI's



USAID/OTI's partnership with the UN in East Timor has proven to be a model in post-conflict cooperation, building on the strengths of each organization.



"I can assure you that OTI's efficiency, speed and flexibility have been (and still are) an extremely significant factor in making the agreement work. Indeed I find it hard to think of another organization which could have done what you have."

—Martin Griffiths, director, Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, on the Humanitarian Pause Agreement in Aceh, Indonesia

Angola program also made possible the delivery of food and other humanitarian assistance totaling more than \$200 million from the U.S. government and other donors.

- ◆ OTI funded the first phase of a civilian–military program in Nigeria, which involved fielding technical experts to work with Nigerian counterparts to develop an action plan for reform. The second phase of the program was successfully handed off to the **Department of Defense** and the **Department of State** and is currently being funded equally by the USG and the Government of Nigeria.

#### International Organizations

The U.S. government is not alone in its understanding that complex humanitarian emergencies threaten regional security, wipe out years of economic investment, and greatly diminish the speed at which democratic institutions are likely to develop. Increasingly, international organizations, such as the World Bank, United Nations, and their affiliates, are channeling their resources into post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. Part of OTI's strategy is to work closely with them to coordinate efforts and maximize their resources.

- ◆ OTI's work in post-Hurricane Mitch Honduras focused on maximizing the participation of beneficiaries, local organizations, international NGOs, municipalities, the Government of Honduras, and other donors. OTI funding covered approximately 10 percent of the actual cost of housing solutions provided, and its \$3 million leveraged approximately \$27 million from other sources.
- ◆ OTI jumpstarted a temporary employment program in East Timor for the **United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor**. OTI's funds filled the gap until UN funds became available.
- ◆ The **United Nations Development Program (UNDP)** contributed \$450,000 for projects that were identified by OTI's Community Improvement Councils in the Peje region of Kosovo. In addition, UNDP/Emergency Response Division and USAID/OTI

co-hosted a round-table discussion in October 2000 on best practices for community-based approaches to reconstruction and rehabilitation.

#### Local Partners and Host Governments

Local ownership of OTI projects is essential to ensure the sustainability of efforts to advance peaceful democratic change. OTI places a special emphasis on partnerships with local community groups, including NGOs, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and businesses. Since its inception in 1994, OTI has assisted thousands of local NGOs engaged in peace-building and transition-related activities. OTI has also worked closely with host governments to ensure that programs started by OTI can be continued once OTI leaves.

- ◆ The **Kosovo** Transition Initiative assisted in the creation of Community Improvement Councils of citizens who identified and prioritized community needs. Of the \$8 million in total funding, local communities' contributions—mostly in the form of in-kind labor, equipment, and expertise—totaled \$1.1 million.
- ◆ OTI formed a partnership with local NGO coalitions in Croatia to put together a comprehensive "get out the vote" campaign that contributed to the highest voter turnout since the 1990 vote for independence.
- ◆ Through its Community Revitalization Projects, which rehabilitated Angolan schools, roads, and bridges, funded markets, and opened irrigation canals, OTI obtained more than 60 percent of the materials and 100 percent of the labor from other sources. Each dollar invested by OTI was matched by an average of two to three dollars of community investment.
- ◆ OTI's program to reintegrate Muslim ex-combatants in Mindanao has been implemented in partnership with the **Government of the Philippines**, which contributes up to 50 percent of the costs. The program will be handed off to the Government of the Philippines and the local communities at the conclusion of OTI's program.

## Private Sector

OTI recently has begun to explore the creation of private-public partnerships that would provide funding, materials, and other needed support to communities in transition. Recognizing the important role international trade and investment play in the economic and political development of a country, OTI is seeking to leverage its own resources in areas where interests overlap.

- ◆ OTI has formed a partnership with a leading international shoe company to provide 1,000 pairs of athletic shoes through Catholic Relief Services to a youth soccer team program in East Timor.
- ◆ Through an agreement with the Lebanese affiliate of **Saatchi and Saatchi**, OTI leveraged over \$500,000 in free airtime in the local media for anticorruption public service announcements.

## Other Governments

Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, and other countries are actively involved in responding to complex emergencies. Many of these governments have created units similar to OTI or

have strengthened existing units within their humanitarian assistance agencies or foreign ministries. OTI coordinates with these units to explore joint action in implementing transition activities.

- ◆ To help the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) comply with the United Nations Resolution that imposed sanctions on “conflict diamonds” of Sierra Leone origin, OTI is working with a coalition comprised of the GOSL, the United States, the **United Kingdom**, and **Belgium**.
- ◆ OTI organized a USG interagency team to assess the possibility of USG assistance to reform the Nigerian Police Force. The **UK’s Department for International Development (DFID)** participated as an observer during the assessment mission, in order to closely coordinate and collaborate on any police activities. In the first half of Phase I (development of a reform plan), DFID sent three part-time police specialists to work with the U.S. team and has expressed desire for a joint UK/U.S. team to work on the plan’s implementation.

## OTI Funds for Activities Implemented by U.S. PVOs

Country	Organization	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000 (Est)
Colombia	Salesian Mission		250,756	52,200
DROC	American Red Cross	132,830		
Indonesia	PACT	618,666	581,335	
Indonesia	The Asia Foundation	993,743	981,997	
Indonesia	Internews	187,851	2,750,787	628,051
Liberia	Search for Common Ground	100,415		
Liberia	International Foundation for Election Systems	313,000		
Nigeria	International Foundation for Election Systems		84,569	
Nigeria	Institute of World Affairs			275,000
Philippines	World Education, Inc.	99,678		
Rwanda	Internews		187,519	
Rwanda	International Rescue Committee		378,005	
Sierra Leone	World Vision		560,196	967,126
Sierra Leone	Search for Common Ground			250,000
Zimbabwe	PACT			1,640,000
	<b>Total funding for U.S. PVO activities</b>	<b>\$2,446,183</b>	<b>\$5,775,164</b>	<b>\$3,812,377</b>



*OTI's community projects in Kosovo leveraged contributions from other international organizations as well as from the community itself. In this project, OTI and the Nekofc Community Council rehabilitated a heavily damaged primary school, with help from UNICEF and the British Red Cross.*

### U.S. Nongovernmental Organizations and U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations

NGOs and PVOs are major actors in the international relief and development field. Hundreds of NGOs and PVOs are present in the most difficult and dangerous places in the world, and OTI works closely with this community.

- ◆ OTI's **Kosovo Transition Initiative** has leveraged \$4.2 million from NGOs and other international donors for needed community improvement projects.
- ◆ Similar collaboration occurred in Albania. For example, **Mercy Corps International** contributed furniture, playground equipment, television sets, computers, and other educational toys to an Albania Transition Initiative project to rehabilitate a children's mental health center in Shkodra.
- ◆ OTI builds partnerships with U.S. NGOs and PVOs to help implement critical parts of its programs. For example, OTI has drawn on the media expertise of Internews to equip and train independent radio stations across Indonesia and East Timor.

### OTI's Hand-Off Strategies

Because OTI uses International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds, which are intended for emergency response programs, OTI attempts to limit its programs to two years


or less. Given this timeframe, it is essential to formulate a hand-off strategy early in the design phase of each program. The hand-off strategy requires that OTI determine which activities will end or continue once it leaves, and forge partnerships with other donors for those activities which will continue. This not only leverages funding and magnifies program impact, but also maintains the momentum for change by laying the groundwork for the continuation of OTI-initiated activities by other investors—both local and international. A fully successful OTI program thus requires engaging relevant partners and ensuring they have a stake in OTI's programs and are willing and able to build upon OTI's work.

Since hand-off strategies are formulated with a country's unique circumstances in mind, one approach may differ fundamentally from another. OTI's hand-off strategies are reviewed and refined at least every six months and shared with USAID and U.S. Embassy staff. OTI has found that high levels of coordination and information sharing with its partners can considerably ease hand-off and lessen disruption after OTI's departure. Of OTI's FY 1999 programs, hand-off partners include: USAID Missions (11 programs), other donors and international NGOs (seven programs), host governments (four programs), local NGOs (four programs), USAID regional bureaus (two programs), foundations/corporations (two programs), and other U.S. government agencies (one program). Most programs have identified more than one hand-off partner.

USAID

# OTI Program Activities





OTI World Map

## USAID/OTI Program Activities

PROGRAM	DATES	PROGRAM GOALS AND ACTIVITIES/ACHIEVEMENTS	FY 1999 Funds obligated (\$000) <sup>1</sup>	FY 2000 Funds estimated (\$000) <sup>2</sup>
<b>AMERICAS</b>				
<b>Colombia</b>	<b>Start:</b> 1/1999 <b>Exit:</b> 9/2001	<b>Advance peace process through local action</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Restoring confidence in the government by providing municipal level resources to neglected communities in conflict areas</li> <li>· Helping local governments and communities identify and implement projects that respond to citizens' needs</li> <li>· Facilitating negotiations between government and rebel forces</li> <li>· Designing and implementing a reintegration program for child ex-combatants</li> </ul>	\$1,095	\$980
<b>Guatemala</b>	<b>Start:</b> 11/96 <b>Exit:</b> 12/1998	<b>EXITED</b>		
<b>Haiti</b>	<b>Start:</b> 9/1994 <b>Exit:</b> 10/1997	<b>EXITED</b>		
<b>Honduras</b>	<b>Start:</b> 5/1999 <b>Exit:</b> 2/2000	<b>EXITED</b>		
<b>ASIA</b>				
<b>East Timor</b>	<b>Start:</b> 6/1999 <b>Exit:</b> 12/2001	<b>Promote emergence of democracy</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Supporting community-led reconstruction projects</li> <li>· Jumpstarting United Nations /World Bank vocational training and job efforts</li> <li>· Enabling civil society to play a role in relief, reconstruction and nation-building</li> <li>· Providing start-up funding for independent media outlets</li> </ul>	N/A	\$12,438

<sup>1</sup>) As of 9/30/99

<sup>2</sup>) As of 10/25/00 (includes transfers)

PROGRAM	DATES	PROGRAM GOALS AND ACTIVITIES/ACHIEVEMENTS	FY 1999 Funds obligated (\$000) <sup>1</sup>	FY 2000 Funds estimated (\$000) <sup>2</sup>
Indonesia	Start: 8/1998 Exit: 12/2001	<b>Facilitate the political transition process</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Mitigating outbreaks of violent conflict</li> <li>· Encouraging accountable, transparent government</li> <li>· Supporting civil society organizations to mobilize peaceful political participation and address ethnic/religious conflicts through dialogue and mediation</li> <li>· Increasing capacity of media to cover political processes</li> <li>· Improving civilian capacity for military oversight and control</li> </ul>	\$16,749	\$8,810
Lebanon	Start: 9/1999 Exit: 11/2001	<b>Mobilize citizens' anti-corruption efforts</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Increasing public awareness of costs of corruption through national media campaign</li> <li>· Strengthening investigative journalism</li> <li>· Fostering transparency and accountability at the municipal government level</li> <li>· Supporting anti-corruption efforts by indigenous groups</li> </ul>	\$1,089	\$ 731
Philippines	Start: 9/1997 Exit: 3/2001	<b>Institutionalize the peace in Mindanao</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Assisting the reintegration of MNLF ex-combatants and their families through economic and social development projects</li> <li>· Providing training on ways to enhance community participation</li> <li>· Encouraging Philippine government's investment in neglected, Muslim areas</li> <li>· Supporting civil society organizations to address ethnic tensions</li> </ul>	\$2,033	\$1,533
Sri Lanka	Start: 10/1996 Exit: 9/1998	<b>EXITED</b>		
<b>BALKANS</b>				
Albania	Start: 6/1999 Exit: 12/2000	<b>Strengthen local governments to promote regional stability</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Rehabilitating local community facilities, services, and infrastructure</li> <li>· Increasing local participation in democratic governance</li> </ul>	\$3,000	\$ 934
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Start: 2/1996 Exit: 5/2000	<b>EXITED</b>		

<sup>1</sup>) As of 9/30/99

<sup>2</sup>) As of 10/25/00 (includes transfers)

PROGRAM	DATES	PROGRAM GOALS AND ACTIVITIES/ACHIEVEMENTS	FY 1999 Funds obligated (\$000) <sup>1</sup>	FY 2000 Funds estimated (\$000) <sup>2</sup>
Croatia	Start: 7/1997 Exit: 3/2000	EXITED		
Kosovo	Start: 10/1998 Exit: 9/2001	<p><b>Promote local democratic leadership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Engaging Kosovars in community councils designed to increase citizen participation, encourage political diversity and increase citizens' influence in political and community affairs</li> <li>· Responding to critical community-identified needs, including school reconstruction, water, electricity and local infrastructure</li> <li>· Promoting development of independent media and strong civil society</li> </ul>	\$12,466	\$8,570
Montenegro	Start: 7/1997 Exit: 9/2001	<p><b>Support democratic elements in society</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Awarding direct grants of assistance to municipalities which demonstrate open policies and democratic principles</li> <li>· Promoting legal reform</li> <li>· Supporting independent media outlets</li> <li>· Ensuring action-oriented NGOs can creatively and publicly represent the views and needs of their constituencies</li> </ul>	\$1,211	\$1,000
Serbia	Start: 7/1997 Exit: 9/2001	<p><b>Support democratic elements in society</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Awarding direct grants of assistance to municipalities which demonstrate open policies and democratic principles</li> <li>· Delivering needed humanitarian commodities to support and build capacity for civil society groups who distribute them</li> <li>· Supporting independent media outlets</li> <li>· Ensuring action-oriented NGOs can creatively and publicly represent the views and needs of their constituencies</li> </ul>	\$ 946	\$ 3,404
<b>CENTRAL/SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>				
Angola	Start: 4/1994 Exit: 6/1999	EXITED		

<sup>1</sup>) As of 9/30/99

<sup>2</sup>) As of 10/25/00 (includes transfers)

PROGRAM	DATES	PROGRAM GOALS AND ACTIVITIES/ACHIEVEMENTS	FY 1999 Funds obligated (\$000) <sup>1</sup>	FY 2000 Funds estimated (\$000) <sup>2</sup>
DROC (Congo)	Start: 11/1997 Exit: 1/2001	<p><b>Advance the peace process</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Supporting dialogues on national reconciliation and targeting initiatives that advance implementation of Lusaka Accords</li> <li>· Promoting social justice and rule of law as part of the Great Lakes Justice Initiative</li> <li>· Assisting participatory decision-making processes at the local level using community improvement projects as a catalyst</li> </ul>	\$3,908	\$2,750
Rwanda	Start: 11/1994 Exit: 12/1999	<b>EXITED</b>		
Zimbabwe	Start: 1/2000 Exit: 3/2002	<p><b>Advance prospects for a peaceful transition</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Supporting citizen-led efforts for constitutional reform</li> <li>· Improving quality and distribution of independent press</li> <li>· Mitigating election-related violence and promoting national reconciliation</li> </ul>	N/A	\$2,423
<b>WEST AFRICA</b>				
Liberia	Start: 11/1995 Exit: 3/1999	<b>EXITED</b>		
Nigeria	Start: 5/1999 Exit: 9/2001	<p><b>Sustain the current transition toward national reconciliation and a democratic government</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Training in democracy and governance for newly elected political representatives</li> <li>· Engaging civil society and the government on civil-military and police reform issues</li> <li>· Educating trainers in conflict resolution and mediation nationwide</li> <li>· Strengthening the media and facilitating public awareness on key transition issues</li> </ul>	\$8,487	\$8,904
Sierra Leone	Start: 1/1997 Exit: 9/2001	<p><b>Support the peace process</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Assisting civil society and government to build consensus on key issues and enact crucial reforms</li> <li>· Assisting GOSL to design policy on diamond trading</li> <li>· Reintegration of rebel forces, including literacy and vocational training, counseling and civic education</li> </ul>	\$1,032	\$3,284

<sup>1</sup>) As of 9/30/99

<sup>2</sup>) As of 10/25/00 (includes transfers)

## Criteria for Country Selection

Before engaging in a country or region, OTI considers whether it can play a pivotal role in the transition. OTI's resources are relatively modest, so programs must be carefully targeted for high impact.

OTI poses four main questions in determining whether to engage:

◆ *Is the country significant to U.S. national interests?* OTI programs are aligned with foreign policy objectives and priorities set by the U.S. Secretary of State. Though many transitions could benefit from OTI's assistance, funding constraints require that it focus on countries of particular importance to the United States. Humanitarian as well as strategic concerns factor into engagement decisions.

◆ *Is there a window of opportunity?* This question considers whether a country is in a period of transition. Typically, an event occurs—an election, a peace accord, or some other settlement—that signals movement away from conflict or instability and toward more stable, democratic governance. In addition, there must be sufficient political will in the country and an availability of reliable partners, both indigenous and international.

◆ *Is OTI best qualified to meet the particular transition needs of the country?* Before engaging, OTI must determine whether assistance from the USG is desired by local partners and will improve the chances for a successful transition. In addition, OTI considers whether it has a comparative advantage over other USG offices and programs. OTI will initiate a program only if

## Fiscal Year 1999 and 2000 Decisions

GO DECISIONS	NO GO DECISIONS
<p><b>Lebanon</b> (March 1999)—An assessment of corruption concluded that the USAID Mission should proceed with an anticorruption program incorporating municipal development, small grants to local organizations, and the media. The USAID Mission requested that OTI develop the program.</p> <p><b>Honduras</b> (December 1998)—A post-Hurricane Mitch assessment concluded that OTI could fill a gap between short-term relief and long-term development. A focus on government accountability for donor funds was also included.</p> <p><b>Zimbabwe</b> (June 1999; September 1999)—The USAID Mission requested a two-phase assessment of the need to increase information exchange and dialogue among citizens, policymakers, and civil society leaders. A five-point conflict mitigation program was developed by OTI as a result.</p> <p><b>Aceh</b> (March 2000)—OTI's Indonesia program initiated a special assessment trip to Aceh to determine the needs and prospects for conflict mitigation. OTI is now developing a program of assistance for Aceh in accordance with the findings of that assessment.</p>	<p><b>Cambodia</b> (June 1999)—The assessment team concluded that, despite the great needs of Cambodia, a transition toward democracy was not taking place.</p> <p><b>Sudan</b> (August 1999)—The field visit concluded that the situation in southern Sudan, characterized by ongoing conflict, a military stalemate, and feeble negotiation efforts, did not constitute a transition for the purposes of OTI beyond what was being carried out through USAID's STAR program.</p>

there are no other offices able to address critical transition needs, and if OTI has the requisite skills, expertise, and financial resources to make a difference.

- ◆ ***Is the operating environment sufficiently stable?*** The environment must be secure enough to ensure the safety of OTI personnel and the proper monitoring of OTI funds.

In answering these questions, OTI elicits information from a wide range of sources. It draws on the knowledge of country experts, USAID, U.S. government offices, NGOs, and other donors. It also conducts an extensive review of academic journals, books, reports, and studies.

As part of the decision-making process, OTI conducts an in-depth field assessment, which serves as a basis for potential program strategy and design. Part of this assessment involves taking an inventory of all available in-country resources and proposed donor activities. The assessment is used to determine whether or not OTI will implement a country program—otherwise known as a “go” or “no go” decision. The results of assessments in FY 1999 and FY 2000 are listed on page 17.

## Technical Assistance

In addition to supporting country programs and activities, OTI provides technical assistance to USAID Missions or other U.S. government agencies in a limited number of countries each year. Typically, the objectives are to analyze conditions and develop program tools that may be adopted by the host government or incorporated into USAID mission portfolios. Technical assistance does not necessarily constitute the use of OTI funds. To date, OTI has provided technical assistance to:

- ◆ Recommend peace- and confidence-building activities;

- ◆ Provide information, program options, and lessons learned to U.S. negotiation teams; and

- ◆ Provide advice on developing potential transition strategies.

Three recent field visits examined the potential for USAID to engage in a country on a particular transition-related issue.

- ◆ **Burundi** (Spring 1999)—OTI worked with USAID’s Africa Bureau and the Democracy and Governance Center to assess the potential for a Great Lakes Justice Initiative program in Burundi. OTI also evaluated whether or not there was an opening for political transition activities. The decision was made to implement the former but not the latter. Most activities were channeled through existing NGOs, such as Search for Common Ground. OTI continues to monitor Burundi in light of the Arusha Peace Accords.

- ◆ **Peru/Ecuador** (February 1999)—OTI assisted the USAID Missions in Peru and Ecuador in designing a short-term program and longer-term strategy to address the causes of instability on both sides of the border. Although the two countries had signed a peace agreement, tensions and recurrent battles along the border continued, impeding development. OTI recommended that USAID channel funds through CARE to implement a small grants program that would meet the basic needs of rural communities in border districts.

- ◆ **Angola** (May 2000)—At the request of the Government of Angola, OTI designed a strategy to help donors support Angola’s reconstruction and rehabilitation. The government agreed to the principles outlined in the strategy, which will be implemented by the United Nations Development Program in cooperation with the Angolan government.

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
6/99	12/00	\$3,000,000	\$934,431

# Albania

The Kosovo refugee crisis was one in a series of human and political catastrophes to affect Albania over the past decade. From a succession of weak governments, to the 1997 collapse of pyramid schemes, to the subsequent rise in crime and instability, Albania continues to be one of the most vulnerable and volatile countries in southeast Europe.

In May 1999, OTI launched a program in Albania with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The Albania Transition Initiative (ATI) was designed to alleviate the impact of the Kosovo refugee crisis on Albanian host communities. Following the return of the refugees, OTI shifted its focus from simple community improvement projects to a more process-oriented program of community engagement and empowerment.

The program strengthens local governments by helping them meet community needs for infrastructure and basic services. As of July 2000, the ATI had completed 44 infrastructure projects in 22 cities and towns, including school, bridge, and community center rehabilitation.

The ATI has targeted two types of towns for assistance—reform-oriented towns and those that have received little or no attention from the international community. Once the ATI had established itself in these towns and built a solid reputation, the projects began drawing support from other donors, including the

Soros Foundation, the British Department for International Development (DFID), and the Canadian government. Due to the success of the program, USAID's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (E&E) is planning to provide IOM with \$10 million to be used for additional municipal infrastructure improvements.

OTI's program does more than work with Albanians to prioritize community needs and provide tangible neighborhood improvements. It helps instill in democratically elected local officials the principle of accountability to their constituencies, particularly as they approach local elections. Successful infrastructure projects are covered in the media so that Albanians across the country are exposed to examples of local communities engaged in civic action. Perhaps the most important result is that the projects provide concrete examples of hope to communities on the brink of despair.

OTI's operating partners in Albania include Development Alternatives Incorporated, the Urban Institute, and the International Office of Migration. OTI's funding partners include DFID, the Soros Foundation, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Norwegian government.



*The Albania Transition Initiative helped local citizens rebuild the Kuchova Community Health Care Center.*



# ■ Angola

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
4/94	6/99	\$399,711	0

**E**ven among the world's long-standing civil conflicts, the statistics on Angola are sobering. For more than two decades, beginning in 1975, competing armed forces ravaged the country, leaving infrastructure devastated, more than a million people internally displaced, and hundreds of thousands of refugees in neighboring states. The Lusaka Peace Protocol, signed in November 1994, collapsed in late 1998, forcing the international community to reassess its assistance to the country.



Despite volatile circumstances, OTI managed to make a difference in the lives of Angolan citizens. Working in concert with the USAID Mission and the U.S. Ambassador, OTI helped reduce the threat from mines to facilitate the delivery of emergency relief. More than 250,000 Angolans received mine awareness training and more than 600 kilometers of roads were opened to vehicle traffic. OTI's Community Revitalization Projects benefited approximately 650,000 people and helped Angolans rehabilitate or open 74 schools, five grinding mills, five major markets, 168 latrines, 415 kilometers of roads, 81 bridges, and 490 kilometers of irrigation canals. OTI-funded Voice of America (VOA) news broadcasts provided the only easily accessible source of objective information on events in Angola, reaching almost 66

percent of the population.

In June 1999, OTI phased out its activities, handing off mine action to the U.S. Department of State and news and information activities to the USAID Mission. OTI's Community Revitalization Projects were closed at the end of the FY 1999.

In May 2000, at the request of the USAID Mission, OTI designed a strategy of assistance that would help donors support Angola's reconstruction and rehabilitation in the short to medium term. OTI argued convincingly that, despite no foreseeable end to the conflict, it was time to create opportunities for rehabilitation and reconciliation, especially at the community level. The government of Angola (GRA) agreed to the principles outlined in the strategy and OTI and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) agreed to help develop it. Potential GRA-donor activities include reintegration of ex-combatants, a community-based reconstruction program, and a special fund to invest in parts of the country affected by conflict.

OTI's operating partners in Angola have included: Creative Associates Inc., Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, Search for Common Ground, Africare, CARE, Save the Children, Mine Advisory Group, Norwegian People's Fund, the United Nations Assistance Coordination Group, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the USAID Mission, and VOA. OTI's funding partners have included the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, UNDP, and the USAID Mission.

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
2/96	5/00	\$2,990,890	\$1,059,000

# ■ Bosnia

The Balkans conflict created a humanitarian disaster of major proportions and wreaked havoc with economies and infrastructures across the former Yugoslavia. The United States played a lead role in brokering the Dayton Peace Accords and is contributing greatly to post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction.

OTI first engaged in Bosnia in February, 1996, immediately after the signing of the peace accords. Recognizing that donor assistance was concentrated in the capital, Sarajevo, OTI chose to focus its activities in regions of Bosnia experiencing the greatest tension and lacking a donor presence.

OTI also determined that its impact in Bosnia could be heightened by focusing on media development.

To that end, OTI supported media messages designed to reshape hard-line, nationalist attitudes, promote respect for human rights and basic freedoms, and deliver objective information. Working closely with a range of print and electronic media outlets, OTI gained a reputation for its ability to help Bosnians quickly and effectively develop a targeted media response to rapidly changing conditions.

For example, when a decision was reached to make Brcko a special self-governing district within Bosnia-Herzegovina to be shared by both entities, a political crisis ensued. Violence and mass demonstrations prompted OTI's local partners to create an information campaign to counter misinformation and rumors about the decision. The campaign included television and radio public service announcements, roundtable discussions, and the distribution of thousands of copies of the text of the decision on Brcko and of

interviews with political leaders.

During the Kosovo refugee crisis, OTI's grantee produced a series of three information call-in shows, which explored the historic developments behind the crisis.

OTI's assistance in Bosnia was also designed to foster alternative media in critical, underserved areas of the country. More than 75 percent of journalists interviewed for OTI's media evaluation stated that OTI was their only source of funding for equipment and operating expenses, suggesting that OTI was able to break new ground by reaching out to regions and media outlets that no other international organization was able to assist.

OTI closed its Bosnia program in May 2000, handing off its media activities to the USAID Mission. OTI/Bosnia's partners within the U.S. government included the USAID Mission, U.S. Information Service, and the U.S. Embassy. Other partners included the Independent Media Commission, the U.N. Office of the High Representative, Ronco and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

"Without OTI support, freedom of information and increased political discussion could not occur in many regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the Republika Srpska."

—Dr. Maureen Taylor, *an evaluation of media grants in Bosnia, April 1999.*



# Colombia

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
1/99	9/01	\$1,095,000	\$980,367



*Over 180 children, like those pictured above, have received scholarships through an OTI-funded program. The scholarships keep them in school and reduce their chances of recruitment into armed factions. In addition to putting them out of harm's way, the schools provide educational and vocational alternatives to fighting.*

*"They [OTI] are critical for this country."*

*—Colombian President Andres Pastrana, asked to comment on OTI's activities by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs.*

In August 1998, following 50 years of conflict, the Colombian government initiated a peace process with armed insurgent groups. President Pastrana, who was elected on a platform of bringing peace to Colombia, represented a major contrast to the corrupt tenure of the previous president, who

had open ties to the drug barons. Pastrana's election was seen as a window of opportunity for peace. Although the process has proven long and arduous, President Pastrana is committed to formal negotiations with both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).

OTI's program in Colombia began in January 1999. Recognizing that civil society has a particularly important role to play in the promotion of peace, OTI designed its program to open lines of communication and foster dialogue among the government, civil society, and neglected communities. OTI is working with U.S. and Colombian universities to help the government of Colombia (GOC) establish a framework for permanent and peaceful resolution of the conflict. In its role as facilitator, OTI, with U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission support, has provided the first tangible U.S. government support to Colombia's peace process.

Another focus of OTI's involvement in Colombia has been to strengthen democracy through community-based programs. The projects bring together local elected officials and other influential individuals with members of the local community to assess the priority infrastructure needs, such as schools, health centers, roads or clean water. With OTI's assistance, the community works together to design and implement the project, filling basic needs while building participatory, democratic processes.

OTI, through the Salesian Missions, also supports a revolving loan fund that provides \$200 to \$300 loans to rural craftsmen, farmers, and entrepreneurs. These small loans have resulted in new job opportunities and more stable income for some of Colombia's most vulnerable populations.

The Salesian program has added a scholarship component designed to rescue children from forced and voluntary recruitment into insurgent forces. The scholarships benefit students in grades 8-11, whose families lack resources to keep them in school. These families, who live in rebel-controlled areas, can bring children to the Salesian-run schools to escape their conscription.

This year, OTI increased its support to NGOs involved in the peace process at both the local and national level. A "Peace Fund" grant-making mechanism was developed with the International Office of Migration (IOM) that provides seed money to local Colombian organizations attempting to facilitate dialogue and bring an end to violent conflict.

In addition to the agencies listed above, OTI's partners in Colombia include the U.S. Embassy, the USAID Mission, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Pan-American Development Foundation, the GOC's High Commissioner for Peace, other GOC agencies, the Colombian Episcopal Conference, the World Bank, and all major UN agencies operating in Colombia.



start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
7/97	3/00	\$3,686,036	\$5,940,720

# Croatia

OTI's program in Croatia began in 1997 with the understanding that progressive change in Bosnia and Herzegovina was partly contingent on the intentions of its powerful neighbors. OTI's efforts in Croatia are viewed as elements of a regional peace-building and democratization program.

During 1999 and 2000, most of OTI's support centered around Croatia's parliamentary elections, a pivotal event in that country's history.

To prepare for the elections, OTI worked closely with GONG, an NGO founded in 1996 specifically to monitor elections and educate voters. GONG's early success attracting volunteers and raising public awareness in the Dubrovnik municipal elections convinced OTI of its value as a partner. Over the course of 1999, GONG planned an election monitoring campaign that fielded over 5,000 trained monitors for each of three elections. The total number of volunteers was unprecedented in Croatia. GONG's success led the government to request that it become a permanent part of the electoral process in Croatia.

OTI's program in Croatia also worked closely with a nonpartisan NGO coalition, GLAS '99 (Vote '99), to put together a "get-out-the-vote" campaign. GLAS '99 was formed when four major NGO coalitions, representing women, youth, ethnic minorities, and the environment, agreed to develop the campaign using democratic processes. OTI supported their approach and agreed to provide funds and technical assistance. Collectively, GLAS '99 represented the talents of 140 member organizations.

Beginning in September 1999, the GLAS coalition coordinated a sophisticated and comprehensive campaign urging Croats to vote. OTI worked with other donors by encouraging them to contribute to the project, ultimately leveraging over \$2 million. As a principal donor, OTI helped GLAS define and clarify its non-



partisan message by bringing it together with a professional media team and serving as a source of expertise and information.

The campaign was bolstered by other OTI-funded activities, including "Week Report," a weekly radio show, and a weekly TV show entitled "5 to 12." Both established close ties with the GONG and GLAS '99 campaigns. In addition, OTI supported the creation of "Info-clubs" in war-affected regions. These clubs, which provided access to news and spurred community-building, also became rallying points for campaign volunteer activities. The clubs proved instrumental in generating high voter turnout in areas of Eastern Slavonia where there had been significant intimidation in the wake of the NATO action in 1999.

Elections were held on January 3, 2000, and produced a major defeat for the hard-line ruling party. The "get-out-the-vote" campaign resulted in the highest turnout since the 1990 vote for independence, with estimates ranging from 73 percent to 78 percent of the eligible voters participating. In addition to ushering in an opposition government for the first time in 10 years, the election brought new prominence to the role of civil society in a democratic system.

OTI closed its Croatia program in March 2000, handing off its support for civil society to the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the British Know-How Fund, and the USAID Mission.

OTI's partners in Croatia included the USAID Mission, the U.S. Embassy, other embassies, the Open Society Institute, Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, Ronco, the Information Research and Exchange Board, the EU, the OSCE, the Westminster Foundation, the Mott Foundation, and the British-Know-How Fund.



*The get-out-the-vote campaign indicated a prize-winning game. The message was that everyone who casts a vote is a winner.*

"International partners, NGOs and media in Croatia all agree that without support from organizations such as OTI, many voters in Croatia would not have had enough objective information to participate in the elections."

*—Dr. Maureen Taylor, final evaluation of OTI's Croatia program, September 2000.*

# Democratic Republic of Congo

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
11/97	1/01	\$3,908,000	\$2,750,000

Following the overthrow of President Mobutu in May 1997, OTI initiated activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) to address the soaring expectations of the population and to aid in the transition. OTI's method was to support the development of community improvement projects that demonstrated positive change and brought civil society together with local government in a democratic and transparent process. In August 1998, a falling out between President Kabila and his backers in Uganda and Rwanda led to an invasion that subsequently fractured the soldiers controlling large areas of eastern and northern Congo into several competing forces.

In July 1999, the various parties signed the Lusaka Peace Accords in an attempt to bring an end to the conflict. A critical component of this agreement was a national dialogue to chart a peaceful transition to a democratically elected government. The former President of Botswana was named in late 1999 as the facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD). Using funding designated through the Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI), OTI is supporting the dialogue along with related activities to engage civil society in their country's transformation. By helping average citizens join the debate on the DROC's future government, OTI is helping to lay the foundations for political reform. Recent actions by President Kabila, including temporarily closing the facilitator's office and calling for his replacement, have put the future of the ICD in jeopardy.

In a highly symbolic event, OTI brought together civil society groups from across the country in October 1999 to meet with an umbrella organization, the Civil Society Campaign for a Lasting Peace, and the All-Africa

Council of Churches. This marked the first time that large numbers of Congolese from the east were able to travel freely to Kinshasa, and a rare opportunity for the government and civil society to engage in a frank discussion of political issues.

In order to advance the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Accords and promote broad-based peace and reconciliation, OTI has targeted quick-impact activities at the local level. These initiatives have brought relief to large numbers of people facing acute hardships. Projects approved and implemented in 1999 included the rehabilitation of central markets in Lubumbashi and Kolwezi City and the replacement of a bridge on a major Lubumbashi food supply line.

In Kananga, OTI provided computers and accessories to the provincial government to improve efficiency, transparency and accountability to the public. Its provincial administration building now has electric lights for the first time in 20 years.

OTI's local initiatives not only provide tangible benefits but also enhance democratic processes. Communities come together to design and implement projects in a collaborative, participatory manner—a stark contrast to the traditional way the country was run under Mobutu's 30-year dictatorship.

In mid-2000, OTI decided to close down its regional hubs and target its limited resources to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. It plans to hand off activities to the USAID Mission in January 2001.

OTI's partners in DROC include Development Alternatives International, the U.S. Embassy, the USAID Mission and the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the International Foundation for Election Systems, the Human Rights Law Group, and numerous local governments and civil society organizations.

"USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is a critical element to our support for the Congolese National Dialogue and to the overall goal of implementing the Lusaka ceasefire agreement...OTI is supporting the people who should have a say in the future of their country, and doing it in an innovative and effective way."

—U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard C. Holbrooke



start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
6/99	12/01	N/A	\$12,438,949

# East Timor

In August 1999, the people of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia in a national referendum. The reaction from pro-Indonesian militias was swift and vengeful; armed forces rampaged the island, wreaking unprecedented violence, death, and destruction. Thousands of people fled and over 80 percent of all infrastructure was destroyed or damaged.

Drawing on its Indonesia program resources and experience, OTI was able to move quickly to jumpstart reconstruction efforts and help lay the foundation for a political transition in East Timor. Although OTI had conducted activities in East Timor prior to independence, the new situation called for a rapid response. In November 1999, OTI initiated funding for 29 separate activities totaling over \$1 million. These included funds to help local NGOs rebuild themselves so they could participate as equal partners with the international community on decisions affecting East Timor's future. With assistance from OTI, the National Commission of East Timorese Resistance began to play a major role in representing East Timorese to the UN leadership.

From March-August 2000, OTI joined with the UN in an initiative designed to provide immediate relief to thousands of unemployed East Timorese and address basic infrastructure needs through the Transitional Employment Program (TEP). TEP was expanded to cover all 13 districts in East Timor, employing approximately 50,000 men and women. In a typical TEP program, OTI provided the capital, tools, and labor costs while UN administrators implemented and managed the projects.



For example, in the Covalima District, workers constructed a building to house a community training center for peace and reconciliation activities. TEP paid the salaries of 60 women to harvest local building materials as well as 30 carpenters for construction. In Viqueque District, TEP helped reopen a road damaged by landslides. The damage, which cut off more than 11,000 villagers from the district capital, would have been left untouched for up to six months without a TEP contract to repair it. In Dili, TEP workers organized to clear the streets of charred buildings and piles of rubble. The project combined the resources of OTI, UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), UNDP, UN Peacekeeping Forces, and local East Timorese leadership.



*East Timorese laborers, funded through the Transitional Employment Project, construct a traditional meeting house in Liqueca District.*

By providing initial funding for TEP, OTI helped diminish the threat of violence and unrest in East Timor. Its support filled a key gap; OTI was the only organization with the ability to fund a large employment program prior to the summer of 2000, when programs of the UN and the World Bank began to be implemented. The USAID/UN partnership has proven to be a model in post-conflict cooperation, building on the strengths of each organization.

In addition to TEP, OTI assistance has proven vital to the survival of local media and civil society groups in East Timor. OTI is spearheading cooperative efforts among donors to establish media projects that provide equipment to radio and print outlets and professional training to journalists in technical and management areas. OTI grants have allowed newspapers to start up, publish, and distribute news in an information-poor environment.

Grants from OTI are enabling civil society organizations to participate in East Timor's burgeoning democratic society. OTI is supporting groups throughout East

"The U.S. Agency for International Development is doing an impressive job in East Timor through the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). Its in-kind support for scores of excellent East Timorese NGOs and its jobs program...have offered some of the speediest, most effective assistance available."

*—Dr. Jose Ramos Horta, Nobel Laureate and vice-president of the National Commission of East Timorese Resistance*

“The timely arrival of TEP, its simple procedures and direct implementation through the UN District Administrations, allowed us to get US \$95,000 into the community in less than 10 weeks. As the TEP/Covalima program has matured, it has come ever closer to achieving broad program participation linked with high impact projects.”

—From a UNTAET Covalima District report

Timor (with a focus on those outside Dili) engaged in civic education, human rights, women’s rights and leadership, and peace and reconciliation.

Future plans for OTI’s East Timor program include an emphasis on small-scale community rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants. OTI also plans to monitor the development of the transitional Timorese government and look for areas to support a smooth transfer of responsibilities from UNTAET to local self-rule.

OTI/East Timor’s partners include United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and other UN agencies, Development Alternatives Inc., Australian Aid, the World Bank, Canada’s



Local journalists take a turn at the microphone at an OTI-funded “Reporting for Peace” training.

CIDA, Japan’s JICA, the U.K.’s DFID, the International Organization for Migration, and local and international NGOs.

## OTI Helps East Timorese NGOs Bridge the Digital Divide



Local NGOs in East Timor have been recipients of critical computer equipment that was destroyed during the violence after the referendum. With the new equipment, the NGOs were able to quickly return to work at developing civil society in their new nation.

OTI/East Timor has begun a project aimed at addressing both the training and computer repair needs of local non-governmental organizations, while also providing local NGOs access to the Internet.

Addressing one of the most fundamental gaps in East Timor – technical skills and services – the grant will provide the NGO Forum, an umbrella organization of 120 local organizations, with the equipment and funds necessary to set up and run a computer training and repair center, as well as an Internet Center. Currently there are no local commer-

cial outlets for computer repair available to Timorese organizations, and sending repair jobs to Australia at high cost is not a viable option.

The Forum will also offer computer repair services and courses in basic computer skills to local groups. In addition to a Timorese technician, the project has already attracted two international volunteer computer technicians.

Given that Internet service is currently prohibitively expensive for most East Timorese organizations, the Forum’s Internet Center will provide a critical service for local organizations.

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
5/99	2/00	\$4,735,461	\$126,769

# Honduras

Six months after Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras, more than 1,000 families were still in temporary shelters in the capital city, Tegucigalpa. The long, barrack-like shelters, built by USAID in the hurricane's aftermath, were designed as a temporary solution, but permanent homes were not being rebuilt fast enough.

In response to this need, OTI designed a \$3-million Macro-Shelter Housing Solutions Program with the International Organization for Migration that found permanent housing for 2,000 families displaced by the storm. The innovative program provided the displaced families with vouchers to apply toward the down payment on a new home. This motivated non-governmental organizations with housing programs to make shelter for voucher recipients a priority. The NGOs cashed in the vouchers and used the funding to improve their projects and infrastructure.

OTI provided 15 to 20 NGOs with technical and financial support to help them devise permanent solutions for the hurricane victims. With OTI assistance, a coordinating body was set up for information sharing and to help match up suppliers and voucher holders. This approach not only benefited NGOs but also gave local people significant negotiating power. Equally important, it resulted in more efficient and lower-cost solutions. Other donors, including the Inter-American Development Bank, quickly saw the value of this approach and created similar, complementary models. Over the course of the year, OTI was asked to manage the com-

plete housing package for the USAID Mission.

OTI also provided \$2.8 million in start-up capital to support the design of the first infrastructure repair activities in the country. Hurricane Mitch had destroyed crucial farm-to-market rural access roads. OTI's bridges and roads program repaired critical roads that the government could not, enabling farmers to get their crops to market, replant with new seeds and equipment, and attract investment, which would not have happened without assurances that farmers could sell what they produced.

OTI's partners in Honduras included the USAID Mission and USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the International Organization of Migration, the Municipality of Tegucigalpa, Mercy Corps, Habitat for Humanity, the Honduran Red Cross, the Cooperative Housing Foundation, CARITAS, Adventist Development Relief Agency, the Institute for Education by Radio, Ven a Servir, Nuestros Pequeños Hermanos, the City of Madrid, Spanish International Cooperation, ECOVIDE, Cristo del Picacho, and others.

OTI left Honduras in February 2000 and handed off the management of its activities to the USAID Mission.

## The Santa Rosa Housing Site

In January 2000, USAID Administrator J. Brady Anderson visited the Santa Rosa housing site outside Tegucigalpa. The site was a prime example of OTI's work in Honduras. The beneficiaries worked together to purchase the land, the Red Cross constructed water and sanitation facilities, and the Honduran government paid for electrical connections to the site. OTI worked with USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to build an access road to the site. OTI also paid for the design, worked with the beneficiaries to evaluate contractor bids, helped with the contracting process, and handled legal problems. When a controversy arose about land ownership, OTI helped bring about a negotiated solution. The Santa Rosa community has repeatedly acknowledged that their housing project would never have taken place without OTI's assistance.



# Indonesia

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
8/98	12/01	\$16,749,000	\$8,810,634



*OTI's support in Indonesia includes local initiatives to help restore civilian control over the military.*

On OTI-funded media training: "Media is also important because of its role in covering conflicts...and fueling conflicts.... For example, I am Muslim. If I...always covered stories and took the side of the Muslim people in the story, I wouldn't be objective. That's the importance of the new knowledge reporters [received in the OTI-sponsored training] so that their writing provides fresh stories for the people."

—OTI/Indonesia media grantee participating in an independent assessment of OTI's program.

Indonesia held its first free and fair parliamentary elections in June 1999, ushering in a new set of leaders with popular legitimacy. In October 1999, the parliament named Abdurrahman Wahid as president and Megawati Sukarno-Putri as vice president, thus laying the foundation for a sustained democratic transition. While democracy is being consolidated, Indonesia's government faces many challenges: heated ethnic-religious conflicts in several parts of the country, numerous separatist movements, a weak economy, pervasive corruption, and a legacy of military involvement in politics and government.

OTI initiated its program in August 1998 and soon had established two regional offices outside of Jakarta. To begin its work, OTI identified five sectors where near-term assistance could have the greatest impact on Indonesia's transition. They included supporting the June 1999 general elections, enhancing the capacity of civil society organizations to advocate reform, helping the media stimulate discussion of political issues, encouraging accountable, transparent governance, and improving civilian-military relations.

OTI directed many of its early efforts toward a national campaign for religious and ethnic tolerance and support for the national parliamentary elections. It supported mass media campaigns that stressed the importance of voting, examined key election issues, and promoted messages of peace and tolerance. The campaigns incorporated a series of grassroots voter

education activities, including town hall meetings, political party debates, and radio talk shows.

The media campaigns featured a series of televised public service announcements, produced by one of Indonesia's leading filmmakers, which reached more than 130 million viewers. Polls indicated that as much as 80 percent of target audiences recalled and correctly understood the messages. Nearly 50 percent said the messages influenced their thinking and behavior concerning the 1999 elections. The campaign drew widespread praise from local and international media, with one international newspaper crediting it as a major force behind the high voter turnout and enthusiastic participation in the elections.

Throughout its time in Indonesia, OTI has been working to increase the newly independent media's role. OTI supports 50 radio stations with training to help journalists understand and cover political issues, better equipment to expand their field reporting, and legal assistance to secure freedom of the press. OTI is also helping civil society groups use media to stimulate public discourse and provide information necessary for informed decision-making. OTI funded Indonesia's first televised political party debates on economic issues and helped jumpstart the country's first radio talk show dedicated to gender issues.

OTI is also helping civil society organizations advocate greater governmental transparency and accountability. Good governance activities include assistance to emerging government watchdog organizations and training of regional parliaments. In FY 1999, OTI trained over 3,000 newly elected government offi-



cials in ten of Indonesia's 26 provinces.

In addition, OTI is helping Indonesia assess the appropriate role of a modern military in a democratic society. It supports efforts to promote reconciliation, trust, and respect between the military and civilians in an effort to overcome the legacy of decades of human rights abuses.

OTI recently retargeted its efforts to focus on reconciliation activities in conflict areas. Tensions in the northern region of Aceh prompted OTI to undertake a rapid assessment in March 2000. After identifying key local partners, OTI disbursed several grants in Aceh, including support for the facilitation of a ceasefire agreement, the Humanitarian Pause.

OTI plans to exit Indonesia in December 2001 and is working to ensure hand-off of its media and civilian-military activities to the USAID Mission. OTI anticipates that its civil society portfolio will also be incorporated into the Mission's strategy.

OTI's partners in Indonesia include the USAID Mission, the U.S. Embassy, the Government of Indonesia, Development Alternatives Inc., Internews, the National Democratic Institute, the Asia Foundation, PACT, and local Indonesian NGOs.



*OTI's programs in Indonesia encourage women's political participation.*

## Responding to Conflict

When ethnic and religious conflict threatened to undermine the progress Indonesia has made over the past year, OTI quickly shifted its resources to respond. Conflict areas were given priority, and special assessment teams were sent out to identify local partners.

Resulting conflict management activities include:

- ◆ Providing support to the Muslim Institute and the Conference of Churches in North Sumatra to promote an antiviolence campaign and interfaith dialogue prior to the June elections—one of the largest such initiatives in the history of the region. The elections passed with almost no incidents of violence, and the two groups now meet regularly to exchange ideas on interfaith initiatives.
- ◆ Helping to fill information voids in Aceh, OTI is funding a biweekly news broadcast that includes critical information on the status of the Humanitarian Pause between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement. OTI is also supporting activities of the Henry Dunant Center, the group that facilitated the signing of the Pause Agreement.
  - ◆ Providing support to independent radio stations in the Poso-Palu Region of Central Sulawesi, an information-poor area composed primarily of displaced Christians.
  - ◆ Developing a media campaign targeted at warring Muslim and Christian communities in the Moluccas. Grantees are planning city reconstruction activities in Ambon that will bring both communities together.
  - ◆ Supporting a conflict prevention program in West Timor designed to reduce tensions between East Timorese refugees and West Timorese communities.

# Kosovo

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
7/97	9/01	\$12,466,000	\$8,570,484



*Members of a Lushta Community Improvement Council meet to identify their reconstruction priorities. OTI insisted that CICs reflect the diversity of the local population, including women. These women repeatedly remarked, "No one has ever asked our opinion before."*

"The OTI program is one of the best international community activities in Kosovo since the end of the war last June. It started fast and has not flagged.... [The U.S. Office in Pristina] continues to rely on its resources and advice of its people.... Few development programs have accomplished so much with so little in such a short period of time."

—Larry Rossin, former chief U.S. diplomat in Kosovo.

During late summer 1998, Yugoslav aggression toward Kosovars reached new heights, prompting the first in a series of threats of NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia. Continuation of violent tactics in the winter and spring of 1999 and the failure

of peace negotiations at Rambouillet led to the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999. The airstrikes lasted through mid-June 1999, when Serb authorities signed Resolution 1244, allowing a NATO and UN presence to protect and govern Kosovo. In late June, overwhelming numbers of Kosovar refugees, accompanied by NATO forces and other international organizations, flooded back to the province to begin rebuilding their communities and establishing a peaceful and democratic Kosovo.

OTI was engaged in Kosovo as these events were unfolding, initially as part of its Yugoslavia program, which began in July 1997. As part of this program, OTI opened an office in Pristina in November 1998 to help relieve tensions between Kosovar citizens and the Yugoslav police and army. During the war, OTI conducted the Kosovo program-in-exile in Macedonia and actively supported Kosovar refugees and Macedonian host communities from May to June 1999.


An OTI team, along with its colleagues in the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, was in the first group of non-NATO officials to enter Kosovo in late June 1999. Building on contacts developed before the bombing and during the program-in-exile, OTI quickly established seven field offices throughout Kosovo. It began a new program, the Kosovo Transition Initiative (KTI) that focused on rehabilitation and democracy-building.

The KTI is designed to maximize the number of Kosovars participating in setting priorities and making decisions about the future development of the province. The initiative helps

citizens understand and responsibly exercise their political rights, encourages and supports the development of moderate and democratic local leadership, and enables local communities to get the resources they need to rebuild according to their priorities.

To accomplish these objectives, the KTI staff helps Kosovars form Community Improvement Councils (CICs). By organizing town hall-style meetings, OTI encourages the development of representative CICs, composed of 12 to 15 people each who reflect the political, social, and intellectual diversity of the local population. After a CIC identifies the community's priority reconstruction needs, such as repairing a school or a road, and secures a local contribution—usually in the form of labor—OTI provides the material resources. The experience of working together in a participatory, democratic, and constructive manner is as important a benefit as the humanitarian impact of the project itself.

This approach was well received; by April 2000 the KTI had established 200 CICs across the province. In fact, the CICs have emerged as de facto representatives of the diverse interests in their communities, providing other donors and international agencies with information on real local needs and priorities as defined by



Kosovars themselves. By August 2000, KTI had leveraged \$4.2 million from other donors and \$2.28 million in local community contributions with its \$6.43 million in assistance.

To date, KTI has funded over 250 small-scale community improvement projects. A sampling of projects demonstrates the breadth of needs of Kosovar communities:

- ◆ In Pones, a predominantly Serb village in the Gjilan municipality, OTI helped repair the village's only primary school, which both Serb and Albanian children attend but take classes in separate schoolrooms.
- ◆ OTI arranged a shipment of 30 buses to transport children to schools in Mitrovica, Prizren, Ferizaj, Peja, Gjilan, and Gjakova.
- ◆ In the village of Shalza, Mitrovica, OTI helped villagers improve poor conditions on a well-traveled mountain road.
- ◆ In Peja, OTI provided supplies and tractor spare parts to a CIC to help with fall planting. Mercy Corps International supported the planning, implementation, and evaluation.

In addition to developing CICs, the KTI also supports the creation of an independent media and a strong civil society. Media projects include rebuilding infrastructure for radio and television broadcasts and supporting the first independent Albanian-language radio station in Kosovo, as well as community radio and newspaper outlets across Kosovo. Civil society groups, which have mobilized around issues related to human rights, women, and youth activism, have received crucial start-up assistance from OTI.

OTI's partners in Kosovo include USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance/Disaster Assistance Response Team (OFDA/DART), the U.S. Office in Pristina, KFOR, UNDP, UNICEF, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, IOM, Ronco, IBB, GTZ (German donor agency), the Swiss government, and many U.S.-based PVOs and international NGOs, such as the Adventist Development Relief Agency, CARE, International Medical Corps, Doctors without Borders, OXFAM, Red Cross International, International Rescue Committee, Samaritan's Purse,



*Local students and shop owners join in a community clean up in Gjakova Old Town. The Gjakova Old Town Community Improvement Council was formed to deal with the very difficult issues facing Gjakova's Old Town Bazaar. This historic 450-year-old marketplace once boasted 700 privately-owned shops but was completely burned down by retreating Yugoslavs during the first days of the NATO airstrikes. Participants on the council include private architects and builders, leaders of cultural and historical organizations, the shop-owners association, and members of the interim municipal government. Together, this group has developed a multiphased, comprehensive approach to reconstruction of the Old Town, which they call the Gjakova 2000 Project. To date, Gjakova 2000 successfully planned a communitywide clean-up project, refurbished a local brick-making factory to aid in rebuilding, and secured funding for the reconstruction of 38 shops.*

Internews, International Research, and Education Exchange.

OTI's partnership with U.S. forces in Kosovo (U.S. KFOR) has been particularly productive. Work in the U.S. sector is often difficult for the U.S. military because of ethnic tensions in the area and U.S. commanders are often concerned about the security of their troops in the region. OTI has been able to leverage U.S. KFOR's participation on Serb and Albanian identified projects, providing opportunities for KFOR to directly assist citizens, both Serb and Albanian. In turn, KFOR's resources have helped stretch OTI's own program assets ensuring citizens' highest priority projects were completed while facilitating contacts between community leaders and U.S. soldiers. This has stabilized relationships in the area and provided greater security to both Kosovars and U.S. forces. Daily interaction between OTI staff in the U.S. sector and U.S. civil affairs and other military representatives is an ongoing feature of this program.

# Lebanon

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
9/99	11/01	\$1,089,000	\$731,376



*In this print ad, Kullana Massoul, the Lebanese anticorruption NGO that organized the media campaign, tells Lebanese citizens that, "corruption is favorable to some, but detrimental to all...."*

**C**orruption in Lebanon is endemic, draining the country of millions of dollars a year and burdening its citizens. Lebanon's economy continues to stagnate as high public debt constrains growth, and the price of doing business discourages foreign investors.

Following his election in November 1998, Lebanese President Lahoud launched an anticorruption initiative, promising to make rule of law and clean government focal points of his administration. This commitment, and strong public support for his efforts, signaled an opportunity for OTI to enter Lebanon.

In close cooperation with the USAID Mission, OTI has developed a four-part program to empower local government, media, civil society, and average citizens in their efforts to fight corruption. The first part of the program is a nationwide media campaign, which was organized by a Lebanese anticorruption NGO, designed by a leading local advertising firm, and built on research and polling data gathered by a local consulting firm. The campaign, using the slogan "We are all responsible," focuses on the cost of corruption to the average citizen and identifies specific actions that can be taken to fight it. In its first phase, the campaign produced 400 billboards, 24 newspaper ads, 138 spots on four main TV stations, and 1,088 airings of a radio ad. President Lahoud personally received campaign organizers to praise them for their efforts. After polling data indicated that Lebanese ages 18 to 30 would be the most receptive to anticorruption efforts, OTI decided to target this audience in its second phase. The polling done for this campaign has been shared with Transparency International and will allow Lebanon to appear for the first time in its annual corruption survey.

The second part of the program included in-

vestigative journalism training, which the International Center for Journalists organized in cooperation with two Lebanese universities. Due to the success of the first course, the 10-week program for journalists will be repeated in FY 2001. In addition, consultants have worked with the two universities to help them incorporate the training materials into their regular journalism curricula. The consultants are also helping to establish an annual award for investigative journalism.

With the State University of New York at Albany's Center for Legislative Development, OTI is helping local municipalities make their accounting and budgeting systems more transparent and expedite routine municipal transactions. Once implemented this assistance will generate additional resources that are currently lost to corruption and inefficiency.

The fourth part of OTI's program provides small grants to local groups that endeavor to increase transparency and accountability in government. Of particular interest are activities that encourage greater interaction between government and citizens.

OTI is working with the USAID Mission to design a hand-off strategy building on OTI's initial anticorruption efforts.

OTI's partners include the USAID Mission, the UN, the International Center for Journalists, Saatchi and Saatchi, Information International, the State University of New York/Albany, and local NGOs.



start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
11/95	3/99	\$250,000	0

**A**lthough Liberia is at peace, President Taylor's government has not succeeded in establishing an enabling environment for reconstruction. Many challenges are still blocking progress.

OTI did not implement a full-fledged country program in Liberia but responded to requests from U.S. government agencies to perform specific, targeted activities. These included jumpstarting independent media projects, fielding a human rights expert to monitor treason trials and assess Liberia's rule of law, and funding an independent external audit of the Liberian Central Bank.

OTI initiated funding for Talking Drum Studio and Star Radio, two media outlets that became respected sources of information in Liberia. Star Radio frequently tests the limits of freedom of the press, winning numerous battles with the government to stay on the air. Talking Drum Studio produces civic education and reconciliation programs as well as community drama shows that air on eight Liberian radio stations.

OTI's partners in Liberia included the USAID Mission, the Africa Bureau, the USAID Democracy and Governance Center, the U.S. Department of State, the National Security Council, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Dutch government, UNDP, Search for Common Ground, Foundation Hirondelle, and the International Foundation for Election Systems.



*Talking Drum Studio has become a model for media that seeks to build peace and conflict mediation. OTI is funding a similar effort in Sierra Leone.*



## The Calculated Risk of Transition Work

OTI has gained critical experience in transition countries and achieved some notable successes. But it works in some of the most unstable environments in the world, and there have also been a few failures. In some cases, OTI's efforts to advance peace were negated by macro-level conditions beyond its control, most notably a lack of political will for change. In other cases, such as Liberia, programs were initiated before a momentum for peace gathered sufficient critical mass.

Lessons learned from both its successes and failures have helped OTI build better responses and expand its capabilities. Some of those lessons are:

- ◆ A timely "good" response achieves more than a too-late "perfect" response.
- ◆ Small amounts of strategic assistance in the early days of a transition can have tremendous impact.
- ◆ Politically-oriented interventions are necessary because political weakness often underlies the unraveling of societies.
- ◆ Building local capacity is essential to sustaining momentum for change.
- ◆ New actors who can help the populace engage in new democratic behaviors must be brought to the fore. People invested in the status quo are unlikely to foment change.
- ◆ An urban bias undermines the impact of transition activities; programs must also reach out to rural areas.
- ◆ Program interventions must respond to the specific realities, needs and opportunities of a country in transition. Generic responses are largely unsuccessful.

# Nigeria

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
4/99	9/01	\$8,487,000	\$8,904,869



*OTI's program in Nigeria tries to build a more objective, balanced media.*

After 15 years of uninterrupted military dictatorship, Nigeria held free elections in February 1999. President Obasanjo was sworn in on May 29, 1999, and has been hailed as a leader who could advance democracy

and national reconciliation. However, regional and ethnic tensions, economic instability, a military coup, and corruption are threatening the new government.

As part of a larger U.S. presence, OTI quickly positioned itself to mitigate these threats. OTI launched its program in April 1999 with an initial focus of helping civilians assert control over the military and training newly elected leaders in good governance.

After close consultation with U.S. government and Nigerian partners on the fragile civilian–military relationship, OTI paired a specialized U.S.–based consulting firm with a Nigerian team to develop a comprehensive action plan for improvement in this area. An early buy-in from both governments provided support for the action plan's implementation. A 1999 independent assessment indicated that measures put into practice as a result of the plan have contributed to easing the transition from military to civilian rule.

In partnership with USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance and Management Systems International, OTI conducted training for all 10,300 newly elected officials in Nigeria, including all governors and National Assembly members and more than half of all locally elected officials. The training was held throughout Nigeria during a six-week period in the spring of 1999 and focused on the basic building blocks of democracy—how government is organized, how to manage resources, what it means to be transparent and accountable, and how to dampen conflict. An assessment of the training program found that it helped give officials the focus and direction they needed, contributed to a more open

leadership approach, and stimulated an enabling environment of democratic governance both for the new leaders and for the people they represent.

When Nigerian officials told OTI that aspects of their training helped them address strife among each other as well as in their own communities, OTI added a new program component in conflict mitigation. Drawing on international and local experts, OTI sponsored the creation of a nationwide conflict management training program, with special emphasis on conflict-prone areas. OTI trained 1,200 trainers nationwide to teach techniques for avoiding, mitigating, and resolving disputes in their local communities.

OTI is also supporting local civil society groups that are working on issues of reform, including anticorruption. OTI grantees supported the formulation of a public–private sector integrity pact that was adopted by the government to promote transparency in public contracting, and helped draft a “Code of Ethics for Parliamentarians” that was adopted by the House of Representatives and is under consideration in the Senate.

OTI continues to respond to new threats to Nigeria's transition to democracy as they emerge. Recently, when Nigeria was faced with chronic blackouts and energy shortages, OTI funded a diagnostic evaluation of the country's National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). NEPA's leadership welcomed the results and recommendations, which have laid the foundation for activities that USAID's



## Training for Good Governance

What Nigerian elected officials said about OTI's Training for Good Governance:

- ◆ "There are certain cardinal prerequisites that need to be known. Newcomers didn't know what to expect, i.e. the processes, the steps of how to process a bill, the steps to dealing with a bill in all detail...the training was very important to our understanding of these concepts."
- ◆ "Before now, I thought that once you got elected, you wait for people to come to you with their problems or views. After the training, I realized it is important to go to the people, visit them in their homes, and reach out to them with information on the latest issues being addressed. Hearing their problems equips you for action."
- ◆ "Our leadership is so open to people, we speak with them freely, we go to them, and they come to us. In the past, people had no choice of who ran government."

Global Bureau will pursue in energy-sector reform.

OTI is also exploring ways to assist the Government of Nigeria (GON) with a reform plan for the Nigerian Police Force, which is underpaid, ill-equipped and poorly trained. OTI is working with the GON to develop a plan designed to improve the professionalism and effectiveness of the force and ensure it respects human rights and the rule of law. The plan will facilitate partnerships among the government, public, civil society groups, and the international donor community to help build a responsible and accountable police force, an important step to enhancing security for Nigerian citizens.



*Mr. A. Gudugi, an OTI program manager in Abuja, greets Senator Florence Ita Giwa and Mrs. Onikepo Oshodi during OTI's good governance training.*

Finally, OTI supports activities that enhance media coverage of transition issues by promoting an ethical, balanced, and responsive media and providing training and technical assistance. Media grants include support for enhanced Voice of America (VOA) programming (the only broadcaster capable of nationwide coverage), Internet training, and equipment for local journalists.

OTI is scheduled to exit Nigeria in fall 2001, handing off activities to other U.S. government agencies, the Government of Nigeria, or other donors as necessary.

OTI's partners in Nigeria include USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, the USAID Mission, the U.S. Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense, the British Council, the European Union, UNIFEM, UNESCO, the World Bank, Louis Berger Inc., Management Systems International, MPRI, the Voice of America, the Institute for World Affairs, and many local NGOs.

# Philippines

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
9/97	3/01	\$2,033,000	\$1,533,151



*An ex-Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) commander-turned-State chairman standing with a rice thresher that OTI donated to the community. Both the Government of the Philippines and the local community must contribute donations in order to complete an OTI transition assistance grant. Through these joint efforts, OTI builds communication and trust between the government and former MNLF fighters.*

In the fall of 1996, after years of negotiations, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the largest Muslim rebel group at the time, signed a peace agreement ending hostilities. The peace agree-

ment emphasized economic development for the Muslims of Mindanao.

OTI's program in Mindanao began in 1997 to encourage the Philippine government's investment in neglected, Muslim areas and to reintegrate ex-combatants from the MNLF back into local communities. The initial phase, which ran through March 1999, provided 4,000 ex-combatants and their families with agricultural livelihood assistance and literacy training.

Phase two of OTI's program, which will run through March 2001, is helping ex-combatant villages become more productive and self-sufficient. Assistance in this phase comes in the form of post-harvest machinery, such as rice threshers and equipment for village-based infrastructure projects. As of June 2000, more than 9,000 ex-combatants and 14,393 families have benefited from this program.

OTI developed the program jointly with the GRP's Department of Agriculture and the MNLF villages and the cooperatives they have formed. After OTI provided \$500,000 as leverage capital to draw in other resources, both partners recognized its potential value and contributed as well. The GRP contribution now accounts for between 30 percent and 50 percent of program funding, with village groups contributing another 20 percent. In November 1999, OTI finalized negotiations to establish a special Village Partnership Fund whereby the government agreed to provide \$575,000 to Mindanao farmers for agricultural machinery.

In the spring of 2000, OTI was forced to

respond to changing circumstances in Mindanao when fighting was renewed between the GRP and a second Muslim rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which had never finalized peace negotiations with the government. The violence was exacerbated by the kidnapping of foreign tourists by a fringe Islamic terrorist group and a series of bombings within civilian centers across Mindanao and Manila. These events contributed to a breakdown in trust, and an increase in tension, between Christian and Muslim populations in Mindanao.

In June, OTI began providing special reconciliation grants to civil society groups that promote tolerance, understanding, and the use of negotiations to resolve conflict. Special public service announcements, directed toward both civilians and government decision-makers, are being created with similar aims.

Despite the difficult security environment in Mindanao, evidence indicates that the majority of MNLF ex-combatants are not only hold-

**S** Indicates OTI project site



ing firm in their commitment to the 1996 peace agreement, but they are also serving as a peace buffer between MILF and GRP forces. Several villages have been spared fighting due to arrangements brokered by former MNLF commanders; one village successfully deterred the entry of MILF forces by posting a sign identifying the community's USAID-GRP project. MNLF ex-commanders in North Cotabato have joined government efforts to track MILF movements, and the government has chosen others to serve as mediators.

OTI plans to phase out its program in Mindanao in early 2001. Until then, OTI is working to ensure that MNLF community relationships forged with local, provincial, and national governments will be sustained.

OTI partners in Mindanao include the USAID Mission, the Government of the Philippines' Department of Agriculture, UNDP, FAO, Development Alternatives International, the World Bank Social Fund, Catholic Relief Services, the Canadian government, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

## Warriors Turned Peace Leaders

Mayor Elvino Balicao of Wao and MNLF State Chairman Abdul Jabbar Narrah used to command opposing forces. Now they are signatories to an OTI grant to construct a 6 kilometer farm-to-market road linking 120 former MNLF combatant families to the growing agricultural market in Wao Municipality.

The road symbolizes more than transport—it is a foundation for lasting peace. At the signing ceremony, Narrah stated, "Today we have built a bond of peace, one built on the principle of peaceful co-existence among Filipinos, regardless of religion or creed." To make this project happen, OTI leveraged a \$3,500 fuel investment for the local government's heavy road equipment into a \$23,000 all-weather road project. The mayor's office and the community will work together and provide matching funds.

# Rwanda

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
11/94	12/99	\$702,596	0



Rwandan participants in the Women in Transition Program.

"By this letter, we want to thank WIT for the sincere love that you have shown to our women. Mamas of Rwerere were close to death when you first arrived. Now women, widows, and their orphans sing a song to praise WIT. This letter is a small nothing, but it means a lot because it comes from the depths of our hearts."

—From a letter handed to the OTI team by a woman at the end of the team's visit to Gisenyi, Rwerere, commune.

"... the Women in Transition Program has played a key part in Rwanda's reconciliation process."

—U.S. Ambassador Robert E. Gribbin's farewell address in December 1998

Continued insecurity in the northwest of Rwanda increased throughout 1998 as Hutu rebel groups trying to overthrow the Rwandan government launched cross-border attacks from bases within neighboring countries. Rebel attacks and harassment within Rwanda drove almost 680,000 people from their homes and sources of food.

With a program that began in 1995, OTI played a critical role in Rwanda by facilitating peace and reconciliation and by advancing the post-genocidal recovery process. OTI addressed the social justice concerns of surviving Rwandans, promoted self-help activities identified by rural women's associations, and increased citizen participation in local government decision-making.

In three years, under the Women in Transition Program (WIT), OTI made a total of 1,800 grants to women's associations in 11 out of 12 provinces to support self-help activities in areas such as agriculture, livestock, income generation, and shelter. These grants directly assisted 40,922 women association members, including those in isolated and insecure areas. In northwest Rwanda's Gisenyi Prefect, where OTI staff had to be accompanied by military escort on field visits, OTI helped women's groups restart potato production, one of their staple crops.

According to an evaluation of the program, WIT proved effective at strengthening the organizational capacities of different communities, responding to local power dynamics, identifying effective community leaders and workers, and increasing a community's willingness to invest in the peace process. OTI found that many women, especially heads of households that have benefited from WIT's assistance, are now able to make their own financial

decisions and are no longer dependent on external aid.

During 1999, the WIT Program worked closely with the Ministry of Gender and Women's Development to support the creation of Women's Communal Funds (WCF). These funds are managed by elected representatives from each commune and are designed to support political decentralization efforts.

OTI also managed an activity that disseminated information on the International War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). OTI's grantee was the only news organization that covered the Rwanda Tribunal in English, the language spoken by many Tutsis, on a daily basis. All of the original ICTR-related articles and analysis pieces were carried by Africa News Service and Africa News Online, which distributed them to more than 50 newspapers around Africa.

In December 1999, OTI exited its Rwanda program and handed off activities to the USAID Mission.

OTI's partners in Rwanda included the USAID Mission, United States Information Agency, the Government of Rwanda, the National Security Council, Internews, the International Rescue Committee, the U.S. Department of State, and Interagency Taskforces on the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, and Preventing Genocide.



# ■ Serbia–Montenegro

In 1999, President Milosevic's policy of stirring ethnic hatreds finally brought the wrath of the international community directly home to Serbia. On March 24, 1999, NATO forces began air strikes against Yugoslavia that lasted through mid-June, when Serb authorities signed Resolution 1244, authorizing a NATO and UN presence to govern and protect Kosovo.

Throughout the airstrikes, the democratically elected government in Montenegro maintained a courageously neutral position. They welcomed Kosovar refugees to their republic and refused to join Yugoslav Army forces.

OTI began a four-office operation in Serbia and Montenegro in July 1997 with the initial objectives of curbing hard-line attitudes and perceptions, maximizing the availability of objective information, and promoting peaceful, democratic change throughout the country. During the NATO intervention, OTI evacuated its Belgrade and NIS offices, while Podgorica remained open. Since then, OTI has been operating in exile to provide direct, high impact support to politically active civic groups, independent media, and democratically oriented municipalities and political parties. With the dramatic events following Serbian elections on September 24, 2000, OTI now plans to fully re-engage its program in Serbia and Montenegro.

The goal of OTI's program in Serbia and Montenegro is to trigger democratic reform through free, fair and open elections, broadened citizen participation, improved capacity for good governance, and local and national media campaigns.

OTI's funding for independent media is critical, giving the public alternatives to state-run media in the form of objective news and information. OTI media activities include support for publishing and distributing independent newspapers, newsletters, and other written material; support for the creation of public service an-

nouncements that promote democracy; and the provision of urgently needed equipment, operations support, and legal advice.

OTI is also helping civil society groups cultivate initiatives that expand civil participation, open the political system, and increase democratic practices. OTI also supports reform-minded local governments through the provision of valued resources, such as computers with Internet connections.

In conjunction with the U.S. Department of State, OTI began a new program that both provides humanitarian aid to the Serbian population and builds capacity for Serbian civil society groups. Alt Net, or the Alternative Network program, has delivered two shipments of goods valued in excess of \$221,000 to metropolitan areas and to opposition-controlled towns in Serbia. NGOs distribute the goods to metropolitan areas, and municipal services distribute within the towns. No organizations controlled by the Milosevic regime have been involved. More shipments are planned to an expanded list of cities.

Depending on the opportunities for expanded operations inside Serbia, OTI is currently preparing to open new offices and develop additional programming. OTI anticipates handing off its programs in September 2001 but will reevaluate as the situation develops.

OTI's partners in Serbia and Montenegro include its implementing partner Ronco, USAID Europe and Eurasia Bureau, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of and Defense, the International Republican Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the National Democratic Institute.

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
7/97	9/01	\$2,157,000	\$4,404,000



# Sierra Leone

start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
1/97	9/01	\$1,032,000	\$3,284,938



*Participants in OTI's Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program in Lungi.*

Throughout FY 1999, OTI funded 232 small grants to civil society groups supporting peace, human rights, and youth activism for community development.

Recognizing that Sierra Leone's development hinged on

ending the smuggling of diamonds and other mineral resources across its borders, OTI has sought opportunities to help the government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) establish a legitimate diamond trade policy. Consultations between OTI, the U.S. Department of State, the U.K. British and Commonwealth Office, the Belgian government, and diamond industry representatives resulted in a shared approach to international sanctions on illicitly-traded diamonds of Sierra Leonean origin. In July 2000, the UN Security Council voted to impose a worldwide ban on purchases of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone unless they are identified by a properly issued Certificate of Origin. A trilateral U.S./U.K./Belgian team is working with the GOSL in Freetown on a new certification regime, which the Sierra Leone government presented to the UN Sanctions Committee.

OTI laid the groundwork for joint meetings of U.S., U.K., and Belgian representatives with diamond giant De Beers and the Diamond High Council of Antwerp to advance private sector cooperation in reducing diamond smuggling.

OTI has also tackled the destabilizing problem of ex-combatant youth whose educational opportunities had literally passed them by during years of war and displacement. OTI developed a remedial education program, focusing on basics such as reading, writing, and simple math. The Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program is a commu-

nity-based, nonformal education effort targeted at 60,000 youth, both ex-combatants and noncombatant youth activists.

Following setbacks in the peace process in May, OTI added a new component to the Education for Peace Program to address the frustration of civil society and traditional and religious leaders who have been repeatedly disappointed by failed peace prospects. OTI and its partners, Management Systems International (MSI) and World Vision, are developing educational workshops that will promote positive action and nation building.

OTI is also working with Search for Common Ground (SFCG) on a multidonor effort to launch a radio production studio in Freetown. The studio will produce messages to aid the peace process and lay the groundwork for reconciliation and reintegration of former soldiers.

OTI plans to exit Sierra Leone at the end of FY 2001, with current programs handed off to the GOSL.

OTI's partners in Sierra Leone include the GOSL, the UK and Belgian governments, the World Bank, the Diamond High Council of Antwerp, ECHO, UN organizations, World Vision, MSI, SFCG, and bilateral donors such as the Dutch, the Swiss, and the Canadians.



start	exit	FY 1999	FY 2000
1/00	3/02	0	\$2,423,444

# Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is facing major economic deterioration, growing corruption within the government, worsening social services, and political ferment. In the past two years, the government's legitimacy and popularity have eroded significantly. Due in large measure to its policies, the country is experiencing rising prices, massive unemployment, fuel and commodity shortages, human rights abuses, physical and political intimidation, and a land reform crisis.

The emergence in Zimbabwe of a vibrant constitutional and electoral debate and an increasingly vocal civil society is providing an important opportunity to support expanded participation in the political process and channel rising frustrations into constructive avenues for positive change. OTI is responding to the opportunity to encourage a peaceful transition in Zimbabwe by supporting democratic alternatives to violent conflict. Timely and carefully targeted assistance is being aimed at facilitating the development of an institutional environment that is more democratic, transparent, accountable, and responsive to the social and economic needs of the population.

OTI's program addresses the most pressing aspects of the current crisis in governance by promoting dialogue and advocating a return to the rule of law. OTI is supporting the civil society movement for constitutional reform. In a national referendum on the constitution held in February, voters rejected the government's draft constitution. The "No" vote represented not only a rejection of concentrating power in the executive branch, but also a high level of dissatisfaction with the ruling party.

OTI worked to promote fairness in Zimbabwe's historic June 2000 elections, in which groups from a broad spectrum of

society came close to winning a parliamentary majority despite government-instigated violence and intimidation. With only five weeks to prepare, OTI was able to design and implement effective elections-related projects. OTI assisted in the training and fielding of 7,200 national election monitors and conducted extensive voter education activities. OTI also supported a local NGO, which provided logistical support to the Electoral Supervisory Commission. Through the Zimbabwe Enterprise Network, OTI co-sponsored the only event in the pre-election period which saw representatives of the ruling party and the opposition share the same stage in public to discuss their positions. Commenting on Zimbabwe's election results, *the New York Times* credited the strength of the showing of the opposition to these and other civil society groups that monitored the balloting.

OTI also supported voter education through the printing and distribution of related newspaper supplements and sections produced by the local press. For many Zimbabweans, this was their first exposure to printed news that was not controlled by the government. Through a variety of activities, OTI is supporting efforts to strengthen the right to freedom of speech and promoting rule of law and human rights. OTI is also supporting broader coverage and greater distribution of independent print media to maintain and strengthen an alternative to the state-controlled press.

OTI's partners in Zimbabwe include a broad range of indigenous and international NGOs.



USAID

# OTI Cross-Cutting Issues



OTI works in diverse countries around the world with very different national histories, economic structures, religious and ethnic influences and cultural norms. Often the only apparent similarities are their rapidly shifting political environments and their vulnerability to outbreak of violent conflict. Two issues must be addressed once basic humanitarian needs are met and before long-term, sustainable development can resume: the establishment of reasonable citizen security and the development of democratic political processes.

## Citizen Security

### Reintegration of Ex-Combatants

Finding peacetime roles for former combatants is critical for a country undergoing a transition from armed conflict. Members of armed forces—government or rebel fighters—may revert to violence, turn to banditry, or deliberately disrupt the peace process if they feel they are not benefiting from post-war efforts or that their own security is at risk. A focus on ex-combatants can ensure greater security by giving potential “spoilers” an opportunity to live as productive citizens.

In **Guatemala**, OTI supported the implementation of the 1996 Peace Accords, which established an immediate plan for the reintegration of the rebel Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG). Through OTI-supported programs, 2,940 URNG ex-combatants in eight camps received literacy and vocational training, temporary housing assistance, credit for land, legalization of documents, and other assistance that facilitated their incorporation into civilian life. OTI also funded a project to provide more than 400 ex-combatants with micro-enterprise credit and conducted reconciliation activities in potentially unstable areas.

In **Haiti**, following the restoration of the constitutional government in September 1994, OTI funded a program to reintegrate Haiti’s historically repressive armed forces. OTI supported dozens of existing Haitian vocational training programs that accepted former FADH soldiers, training them in new skills such as auto mechanics, plumbing, and computers.

Following the peace agreement among **Liberia**’s warlords, and while reintegration programs were being designed and put into operation, OTI supported a United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) quick-employment strategy to create temporary jobs for ex-combatants. Of the 20,332 ex-combatants that were disarmed, approximately 10,000 participated in UNOPS employment activities.

In Mindanao, **Philippines**, OTI’s program is providing agricultural equipment and training to ex-combatants of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The program, which has assisted more than 8,000 ex-combatants and their families, also provides MNLF villages with funding for locally based micro-infrastructure projects, post-harvest machinery, and capacity-building activities. The MNLF has held firm to its peace accord with the Government of the Philippines, despite an outbreak of violence between the government and a second Muslim group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

### Mine Action

When countries emerge from war, the presence of land mines and other unexploded ordnance often hinders or prevents refugees and displaced persons from returning home and resuming economic activities. Removing mines improves access to food and shelter and allows communities to reestablish commerce and agricultural production. Increasing community awareness of the dangers, locations and procedures for marking and removal of mines is an important component of mine action programs.

In **Angola**, OTI supported programs for surveying, marking and removing mines, as well as improving community awareness. As a result, a total of 960 Angolan deminers and dog handlers received training, and mine awareness activities reached 2.5 mil-



*Sierra Leone youth take part in the Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program.*

lion Angolans. In addition, more than 1,600 kilometers of roads were reopened to vehicle traffic. This has resulted in a significant reduction in mine accidents, increased freedom of movement, the return of refugees and displaced persons, and the resumption of commerce and agriculture in important areas of the country.

OTI funded the establishment in **Bosnia** of a chapter of the Landmine Survivors' Network to address issues related to the remaining mines and the needs of survivors. This activity provided a forum to bring together members of different ethnic groups who suffered mine injuries. The visibility of the Landmine Survivors' Network was dramatically increased when Princess Diana visited the Balkans, raising global awareness of the horrors of landmines in the period immediately preceding the worldwide vote to ban anti-personnel landmines.

### **Internally Displaced Persons**

In today's complex humanitarian emergencies, the majority of victims are no longer soldiers but civilians. At the hands of combatants seeking to terrorize local populations and demoralize their enemies, civilians have been forced from their homes through violence and intimidation, sometimes as a form of "ethnic cleansing." Often the victims never

leave their country's borders, and as internally displaced persons (IDPs), unlike refugees, they are not covered by international humanitarian law. Threatened in their host communities as well as those to which they are returning, IDPs may need specially targeted programs to ensure their physical security and their successful re-absorption into economic and political life.

In **Colombia**, OTI's program to accommodate IDP families include the construction of additional classrooms, the construction of parks to give poor and displaced children a safe place to play, and the construction of health centers in areas settled heavily by IDPs. OTI's grantee, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), has also supported a number of projects that have assisted in the resettlement

of displaced communities and helped prevent the displacement of others.

In **East Timor**, in conjunction with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (UNHCR), OTI's Temporary Employment Program (TEP) is funding programs to facilitate the return of IDPs. Housing is being rehabilitated for the returnees most at risk of retribution from their communities. OTI has given a grant to a local East Timorese NGO to provide emergency/medical aid to approximately 10,000 displaced East Timorese in five districts. Another grant has been provided to the National Commission of East Timorese Resistance and its Emergency Office to respond to the influx of refugees and to provide food and other assistance.

In **Honduras**, OTI's activities enabled IDPs to return to normal life after Hurricane Mitch by facilitating their movement from temporary shelters into permanent housing. OTI moved the disaster victims in the capital (where they were most heavily concentrated) from temporary shelters into permanent housing through an innovative voucher system that built the capacity of local NGOs.

In **Kosovo**, OTI's Community Improvement Council (CIC) program assists returning refugees and IDPs in rebuilding their communities. OTI also funded a public information and education campaign, which included the translation, publication, and distribution of 50,000 copies of a USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance booklet that detailed the steps necessary to repair houses damaged by fire. Through its campaign, OTI emphasized cooperation between the international and local communities, promoting the message: "Let's pass the winter together; let's help each other."

## **Democratic Political Processes**

### **Transparency/Good Governance**

Corruption plagues many countries in transition, robbing them of their economic potential and jeopardizing the resources available to them. It also stifles democratic reform, promotes continued apathy, and reinforces



*By replacing old bookkeeping records (shown above) with computers, OTI is helping municipal governments in Lebanon become more efficient, effective, and transparent.*

cynicism.

Good governance activities can build popular support for reform and broaden democratic participation. These activities can include enhancing the knowledge and skills of newly elected officials, improving communication and a sense of accountability between legislators and their constituents, and increasing transparency of government decisions and processes.

In **Nigeria**, OTI funded a comprehensive training for more than 10,000 newly elected officials in constituency building, transparency, legislative processes, and conflict management. A “Code of Ethics for Parliamentarians” was drafted by an OTI-sponsored NGO in conjunction with members of the House of Representatives. After its adoption by the House, the Senate requested help in creating a similar code. In recognition of the fact that corrupt practices start early, OTI-funded youth clubs have been formed in universities across the country to combat corrupt practices and institutions.

In addition, OTI worked with the Nigerian National Chamber of Commerce to develop a public/private sector integrity accord that has been the focus of public meetings across the country. At the meetings, public officials, business leaders and civil society representatives are invited and called upon to take a public stand against corruption. Finally, an OTI-sponsored weekly radio show about the effects of corruption has captured the imaginations of a large Nigerian audience, and is planting the idea that action is possible against this pervasive problem.

In **Lebanon**, OTI is working on a four-part program that empowers Lebanese businesses, local government, media, and civil society to fight corruption. The program includes a media campaign, investigative journalism training for media professionals, assistance to municipal governments designed to help increase oversight of local government revenue, and small grants to support local groups who are fighting corruption.

OTI has taken advantage of the trend toward

decentralization of authority in **Indonesia** by working to strengthen the capacity of newly elected local as well as national parliamentarians. More than 3,000 newly elected parliamentary officials in 10 of Indonesia’s provinces have been trained through OTI-sponsored programs on issues of transparency and accountability.



*Nigerians staged a drama exposing the costs of corruption in their society.*

### Civil Society Development

A strong and active civil society is an important hallmark of a democratic society. OTI targets NGOs and other civic organizations that have not yet come to the attention of other international donors and helps them develop into effective and professional voices for those previously excluded from the political process. Through its special funding mechanism, OTI is able to support incipient organizations that represent citizens’ interests, advocate good governance, and provide leadership for transition initiatives.

To mitigate forces that could potentially destabilize civilian rule, OTI’s program in **Nigeria** is working to strengthen the ability of civil society organizations to engage newly elected officials through interactive forums, debates, and civic education workshops.

For **Indonesia**’s first largely free and fair parliamentary elections, OTI provided assistance to NGOs working to ensure that broader segments of the population, especially women, were involved in politics at the local and national levels.

In **East Timor**, OTI is helping local NGOs rebuild themselves so they can participate as equal partners with the international community on decisions affecting East Timor’s future. With assistance from OTI, the National Commission of East Timorese Resistance has begun to play a major role in representing East Timorese to the UN leadership. OTI is also supporting groups throughout East Timor (with a focus on those outside Dili) engaged in civic education, human rights, women’s

empowerment, and peace and reconciliation.

In **Zimbabwe**, OTI, with co-funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), sponsored a local NGO to host the only event leading up to national parliamentary elections in which representatives from the ruling party and the opposition came together in public to discuss their plans for the country.

In a highly symbolic event, OTI brought together civil society groups from across the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**

**(DROC)** in October 1999 to meet with an umbrella organization, the Civil Society Campaign for a Lasting Peace, and the All-Africa Council of Churches. This marked the first time that large numbers of Congolese from the east were able to travel freely to the capital, Kinshasa. At the meeting, government and civil society engaged in a rare, frank discussion of

political issues.

### **Civilian–Military Relations**

A continuing threat to democratic consolidation in many emerging democracies is military intervention in politics and commerce. To counter this threat, there must be a shift in the way that militaries define their role and civilians exercise theirs. These shifts will not occur, however, until civilian leaders are able to claim legitimacy among the people and demonstrate their capacity to rule effectively. OTI's programs enable elected civilian leaders to set and monitor military budgets and establish national security policy, expand public debate on defense and military reform issues, and provide alternatives to inappropriate military involvement in a country's political and economic life. OTI and the USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance work together to design and implement USAID's civilian–military programs.

OTI does not provide any assistance, training or equipment to foreign militaries. It works with civilians to enhance their capacity to exercise democratic control over the military.

An OTI/**Indonesia** initiative provides small grants to groups throughout the archipelago, which are used to conduct programs to empower and engage communities in a discussion of military reform issues. These grants are used for such activities as media monitoring, Internet interactive dialogues, collecting data on military authorities in local government positions, tracking the military's human rights record, evaluating military practices in village society, assessing the role of the military in social and political organizations, and identifying the military's legal parameters. OTI also co-funds civilian–military initiatives with the National Democratic Institute that involve training for journalists and legislators.

OTI has made civilian–military relations a top priority in its **Nigeria** program. After close consultation with U.S. and Nigerian government partners, OTI supported the development of a military reform action plan which the Nigerian government has adopted for implementation. The plan is being co-funded by the Nigerian government and the U.S. Departments of Defense and State. According to an OTI assessment, reform measures put into practice as a result of the action plan have already contributed to advancing civilian oversight of the Nigerian military.

## **Citizen Security and Democratic Political Processes**

### **Human Rights**

Awareness of and respect for human rights are critical parts of the political transition process in conflict-prone countries. Often, institutionalizing new laws and procedures on human rights can help demonstrate a government's break with a past record of abuses, promote national reconciliation, and confer or sustain political legitimacy. During transitions, a focus on human rights activities can contribute both to increased security and improved democratic processes.

OTI supported the International Criminal Tribunal for **Rwanda** as a key element in national healing. By funding broadcasts of the court proceedings, OTI demonstrated the interna-



*Retired Nigerian military from Cross River and Akwa Ibom states are retrained in computer skills and information technology in this OTI-funded project.*

tional community's commitment to prosecute violators of human rights, while informing Rwandans and others of the progress of the trials. In addition, OTI provided start-up assistance and management guidance to the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, including recruitment and training of more than 200 field officers. An OTI-funded conference on genocide, hosted by the President of Rwanda, resulted in draft legislation on the definition of genocide, which was debated in the National Assembly and later became law.

OTI's programs in the **Balkans** have provided support to indigenous nongovernmental human rights organizations, including those working on behalf of persons still missing and unaccounted for. These groups have developed and expanded assistance networks focusing on legal advice and rights, provided training in human rights monitoring, reporting, and conflict management and mediation skills, and distributed human rights publications.

In **Zimbabwe**, OTI is funding an NGO that documents human rights abuses and publishes a weekly summary of acts of violence and intimidation. These reports were especially critical prior to and during the June 2000 parliamentary elections. The findings of the unit are being used by the NGO in legal challenges to argue the absence of conditions for free and fair elections in many constituencies.

### **Natural Resource Policy Reform**

Increasingly, civil conflict is being fueled by competing claims to, and illegal exploitation of, natural resources. Similarly, trafficking in narcotics, weapons and human beings is becoming both a cause for war and a means of fueling it.

OTI is working with the Government of **Sierra Leone** (GOSL) to help it harness its illicit diamond trade, which has fueled the war with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) for decades. Based on the work of OTI and its partners, the United Nations Security Council voted to impose a worldwide ban on purchases of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone unless they are accompanied by an authenticated Certificate of Origin issued by the GOSL. A trilateral

U.S./U.K./Belgian team is working with the government on a new certification regime, which the GOSL presented to the United Nations Sanctions Committee.

OTI is also working with diamond giant De Beers and the Diamond High Council of Antwerp to obtain private sector cooperation in reducing diamond smuggling. During the World Diamond Congress in July, the diamond industry, led by the International Diamond Manufacturers Association, pledged to act to reduce diamond smuggling and remove "conflict" diamonds from mainstream marketing channels.

### **Media**

OTI has found that media activities are particularly suited to transition programs because of their ability to quickly convey messages of peace and democracy to large numbers of people. Thirteen OTI country programs have had a media component, a recognition that independent and balanced sources of news and information magnify the impact of other transition activities and are a powerful peace and democracy tool in and of themselves.

OTI's support to independent media has included the development of infrastructure—where it was destroyed or nonexistent, programming—where messages of peace, tolerance and democratic participation were needed, and capacity—where journalists were unfamiliar with the challenges and responsibilities of objective and professional news reporting.

In **Croatia**, OTI's get-out-the-vote media campaign contributed to the highest voter turnout since the 1990 vote for independence. The campaign was bolstered by other OTI-funded media activities, including "Week Report," a radio show, and "5 to 12," a weekly TV show.

OTI's support to media in **Bosnia** helped create a calmer political environment. OTI was



*The get-out-the-vote campaign in Croatia used local rock stars to reach the youth.*



*KFOR troops airlifted the jointly funded OTI-DFID antenna tower to the roof of the telecommunications building in downtown Pristina. OTI and the USAID Mission have jumpstarted international efforts to establish regular telephone connections as well as terrestrial broadcast coverage for radio and TV Kosovo-wide.*

the first organization to initiate contact and offer support to independent radio stations in eastern Republika Srpska. In many volatile regions of the country, OTI media grantees have offered the only balanced information to the public. When OTI closed its Bosnia program, it left behind a network of print and electronic outlets that are playing an important role in building peace and moderating nationalistic voices.

OTI's previous experience supporting objective news and information programs in Bosnia provided critical insight into formulating the U.S. response to increasingly bellicose state-run media outlets in **Serbia and Montenegro**. As the only U.S. government presence in Montenegro during the NATO bombing, OTI contributed to the survival of alternative media organizations by covering essential printing, labor, and distribution costs. Similar support has proved crucial to independent Serbian media.

Immediately following the NATO action in **Kosovo**, OTI focused on repairing or replacing damaged media infrastructure. This support included a grant of start-up equipment that enabled an Albanian-language station returning from exile to begin rebroadcasting, support to several municipal radio stations and print media outlets, and assistance to establish the first independent television stations.

Eligible voters in **Indonesia** were reached through a number of OTI-funded media activities, including public service announcements (PSAs), politically oriented debates, grassroots education, posters, arts performances, and interactive radio broadcasts. OTI-funded PSAs in Indonesia reached more than 130 million viewers, a strong majority of which remembered and accurately perceived their messages.

In **Liberia**, OTI provided support to a local media production facility, Talking Drum Studio, which produced human rights programming emphasizing reconciliation and basic freedoms in an environment hostile to minorities. The Talking Drum Studio also produced voter information and civic education programs that were aired on eight Liberian radio stations, as well as live community drama

shows. Another grantee, STAR Radio, an independent radio station serving all of Liberia and the border regions, became a respected source of information for Liberians and raised the standards of news reporting. Also, to inform Liberians about the rapidly changing election process, OTI provided a grant to purchase 2,640 wind-up shortwave radios for distribution to election polling sites and community groups.

In **Angola**, OTI funded Voice of America (VOA) radio programming, which provided balanced news reports and featured programming focused on conflict management, local governance issues, and general democracy building. OTI also supported the training of Angolan journalists in an effort to increase the flow of accurate, uncensored news and to increase awareness of the importance of press freedom.

### **Community Impact Activities**

OTI has been a pioneer in the use of community-based, participatory approaches during emergency transitions. OTI believes citizens must be involved from the start in rebuilding their physical and political infrastructures.

In **Haiti**, OTI's Communal Governance Program (CGP) funded a wide range of quick-impact projects identified through highly collaborative community decision-making processes that enjoyed broad citizen participation. The projects included such activities as road reconstruction, school and health facility repairs, water supply, flood control projects, and courthouse rehabilitation. Initially, the CGP worked through pre-existing community groups, empowering them after years of political repression to take the lead in addressing community concerns and priorities. After local elections, the CGP shifted strategies to work more closely with local government officials. The CGP encouraged the newly elected officials to work with community representatives to create processes to strengthen government accountability, transparency, and responsiveness to community needs. The CGP completed 2,363 projects in 122 of Haiti's 134 communes. Additionally, more than 1,500 municipal authorities and local leaders were trained in basic governance skills.

In **Kosovo**, OTI's program is helping local citizens organize informal groups, called Community Improvement Councils (CICs), to facilitate post-war reconstruction. CICs are bringing together local authorities, community groups, NGO members, local technical experts, and interested citizens to identify and implement community improvement projects. OTI community organizers work with the councils to solicit ideas from the community through public forums and town meetings. With these ideas, the OTI community organizers select and fund projects to restore or improve public services, refurbish or repair homes, rehabilitate schools and community centers, and reconstruct health clinics. This process not only empowers local citizens, but also helps direct donor resources most effectively. Thus far, OTI's program has directly engaged more than 2,500 local leaders across Kosovo in ongoing public discussions and meetings with nearly 940,000 Kosovar residents. The CICs are stimulating civic action, encouraging broad-based community action plans, and expanding involvement of groups that have not traditionally participated in local decision-making.

OTI's Transition Employment Program (TEP) is designed to assist the citizens of **East Timor** in the rapid reconstruction of their communities while providing needed employment. TEP has employed more than 50,000 local workers in community reconstruction projects. The next phase of the program will emphasize participatory decision-making processes within local communities, rather than employment.

### Women

Women in conflict-prone settings face both constraints and opportunities for participation in the reconstruction of their societies. Considering that women and children account for at least 70 percent of refugee populations, and that the number of female-headed households rises dramatically in transition countries, it is clear that gender can be a key factor in transition assistance. However, women also face problems of access to humanitarian assistance, which is often distributed through male heads of household. They may be constrained from economic participation by formal and customary law and a lack of access to credit. In

addition, women may be held back from equitable participation in political decision-making as they are pressured to return to traditional roles. OTI has found that an emphasis on the role of women in conflict-prone countries can be instrumental in advancing peace and democracy.

In 1996, OTI initiated a program to support **Rwandan** women in their role as agents of change during the transition from war to peace. OTI recognized that expanding the political and economic participation of women was crucial to rebuilding Rwandan society. By providing support to women's organizations to implement community improvement projects, the OTI-funded Women in Transition (WIT) Program addressed critical community needs that directly benefited approximately 122,916 Rwandans. WIT also empowered women within their own communities and facilitated dialogue with the Ministry of Gender and Family. The program invigorated a nationwide network of local groups, which are now serving as a central organizing mechanism for community-based housing and income-generating activities.

In **Indonesia**, OTI is working to support organizations advocating increased civic participation for women. OTI has funded more than 49 grants for activities related to protection of women's human rights, and women's awareness of political and voter rights. In addition, OTI has funded more than 50 grants totaling over \$1 million for local activities that help ensure women have a voice during Indonesia's transition. Programs have included grassroots voter education training for women, political party debates that focus on women's issues, support for radio programming targeted to women, training that shows men the benefits of including women in the decision-making process, and support to the National Commission on Violence against Women.



*Women in Nigeria attend an OTI-funded roundtable promoting greater participation by women in the new government.*



*Children are targeted in OTI's programs because they are especially vulnerable in conflict-prone settings.*

In **Kosovo**, OTI ensures that all of its Community Improvement Councils (CICs) reflect the gender balance in the community. CICs have addressed women's needs in projects such as supplying sewing machines and other income-generating equipment to isolated women in Junik, rehabilitating local community centers for women and children to use, and providing start-up costs for the Kosovo Women's Forum in Peja. OTI grantees have also worked with women who are survivors of rape and torture.

In **Sierra Leone**, OTI has funded the efforts of the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs to organize conferences, create public awareness, and build consensus on the role of women as peace makers and agents of reform.

#### **Children and Youth**

Youth under 25 often make up half the population or more in countries where OTI has operated. Although they represent the future of the country, and are essential players in the transition to democracy, they are also among the most traumatized by years of war and destruction. OTI has focused many of its programs on children to enable them and their families to recover from the ravages of conflict and develop a positive and nonviolent vision of their own future. In most transition countries, OTI's programs benefit children through community and grassroots approaches to advancing economic stability, reconciliation, education, and democracy.

In **Angola**, OTI's efforts were linked to other USAID programs, including the Displaced Children and Orphans Fund, which helped to reintegrate nearly 300,000 war-affected children into their communities and reunited 2,500 children with their families.

OTI is working with the Salesian Missions in **Colombia** to implement a scholarship program for children from the ages of nine to 18 who are at risk of being conscripted into warring forces. Over 186 scholarships have been awarded thus far. An endowment is being created that will allow the program to continue and provide more scholarships for the most vulnerable youth. In addition, OTI is working to address the psychosocial needs of children

and families affected by violence and displacement. As a result of these efforts, a joint project of the International Office of Migration, International Committee of the Red Cross, and others has been initiated to strengthen local capacities to address the needs of the displaced, including children. OTI is currently designing a special program for reintegration of demobilized child soldiers in Colombia.

In **Sierra Leone**, OTI's Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program is working with 60,000 youth from the ages of 17 to 35. Training is provided in basic literacy, vocational counseling, agricultural skills, civic education, and psychological readjustment needed to support a civilian economy and reinforce the peace process. In addition, OTI has funded a number of local NGOs to implement programs benefiting youth, aimed at peace building and reconciliation.

OTI has worked with a number of youth organizations in **East Timor** and has funded activities centered on emotional needs, vocational training, and education. Through student associations, OTI has provided skills training for up to 1,000 disadvantaged children and helped reestablish a technical school for elementary, junior high, and high school students.

Youth are the target audience in the second phase of an OTI-funded anticorruption media campaign in **Lebanon**, after polls indicated that they suffered disproportionately from the effects of corruption and would most readily engage in anticorruption efforts. The campaign aims to create a groundswell against corruption among university students, who will bear their message on T-shirts, caps and other campaign paraphenalia.

In **Kosovo**, OTI has partnered with UNICEF and other donors to rebuild and reequip primary, secondary, and high schools, as well as community centers. OTI-funded grants have facilitated computer training courses for youth, provided games and toys for disabled children and reproduced textbooks and notes for students and professors.

### Managing Interethnic/Interfaith Conflict and Fostering Reconciliation

Conflict management activities bring people on opposite sides of a dispute into forums that can reduce tensions and open opportunities for meaningful negotiations. Interethnic/interfaith reconciliation is a major cornerstone in building democratic institutions, reintegrating communities, healing physical and psychological wounds, and promoting a sense of hope for a better future.

OTI makes a contribution in these areas by moving quickly to identify and support local conflict management and reconciliation efforts, bringing in experts where appropriate for training and mediation.

In **Kosovo**, OTI is fostering ethnic reconciliation between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians by helping local populations rebuild their communities in ways that promote respect for human rights, tolerance of differences, and support for individual freedoms. OTI works in a range of communities to meet their reconstruction needs, regardless of ethnicity. OTI also funds NGO projects, such as the development of a public education campaign against acts of retribution. OTI also has provided radio production and broadcast equipment to an independent multi-ethnic and multi-lingual station to provide the population of Pristina and the surrounding area with access to balanced and moderate news coverage.

OTI's activities in **Indonesia** over the past year have targeted restive provinces and other conflict zones that could destabilize the entire country. OTI provided funding to the Indonesian Institute for Democracy and Education to train conflict mediators and analysts and to develop a manual on the application of peace-building skills. A one-day dialogue involving 60 grassroots religious and ethnic leaders was held on ways to prevent conflict between religious and ethnic groups. A peace campaign provided four million citizens with conflict prevention training through a series of public broadcasts. Interventions based on OTI-led assessments are being developed in Aceh, Sulawesi, and Moluku.

In **Nigeria**, OTI conducted a nationwide conflict management training program. Over 1,200

trainers took conflict meditation skills back to their communities and are applying them in the prevention, avoidance, mitigation, and resolution of conflict. In one example of this approach, OTI assisted the Ife Development Board and the Modakeke Progressive Union in organizing two three-day conflict management workshops led by experts in alternative dispute resolution techniques. After they analyzed the conflict and identified ways to bring peace to their communities, participants undertook the instruction of 200 more leaders in each community in subsequent workshops. In a related project, OTI is cooperating with the Nigeria Union of Journalists to send peace messages via the media to both communities.

In Mindanao, **Philippines**, due to fear of growing cultural intolerance and distrust between Christian and Muslim communities, OTI is supporting reconciliation projects that help civil society groups promote tolerance, understanding, and the use of negotiations to resolve the ongoing conflict. Support is in the form of materials for peace campaigns, rallies, forums, and public service announcements. Reconciliation grants are also being used to help the disparate civil society groups develop a more unified peace advocacy movement.

In **Colombia**, OTI sponsored a workshop that brought together national political leaders with municipal and civil society leaders for the first time. Discussions focused on the role of local administrators in the peace process and investments needed to respond to communities in the conflict areas. OTI is also helping the government develop constructive proposals to bring to the bargaining table with rebel forces.

In **East Timor**, OTI funded the Justice and Peace Commission of the Diocese of Dili prior to the August 1999 referendum. This initiative helped lay the groundwork for reconciliation after the conflict.



*East Timorese procession commemorating the first anniversary of the referendum for independence and the victims of the violence that followed. OTI/East Timor held an opening ceremony on the day of this photo to open a new Peace and Reconciliation Training Center.*

# Staff List

**Chris Phillips, Director (8/1999 - 1/2001)**

**202/712-5603; CPhillips@usaid.gov**

**Diana Ohlbaum, Deputy Director (11/1999 - 1/2001)**

**202/712-5603; DOhlbaum@usaid.gov**

## Field Operations - Washington

James Lehman, Chief, Field Operations

202/712-0113; JLehman@usaid.gov

Sylvia Fletcher, Senior Policy Advisor

202/712-5755; SFletcher@usaid.gov

### Africa

Angela Martin, Team Leader

202/712-5434; AMartin@usaid.gov

Sheila Roquette, Program Manager

202/712-0701; SROquette@usaid.gov

Marc Scott, Senior Field Director

202/712-0735; MScott@usaid.gov

### Asia

Larry Meserve, Team Leader

202/712-5458; LMeserve@usaid.gov

Nick Cox, Program Manager

202/712-4458; NCox@usaid.gov

Chris O'Donnell, Program Manager

202/712-0174; CODonnell@usaid.gov

Eileen Wickstrom Smith, Program Manager

202/712-0955; EWickstrom@usaid.gov

### Balkans

David Costello, Team Leader

202/712-5231; DCostello@usaid.gov

Robert Jenkins, Program Manager

202/712-0914; RJenkins@usaid.gov

Patrick Wingate, Program Manager

202/712-5062; Pwingate@usaid.gov

### Latin America

Russell Porter, Team Leader

202/712-5455; RPorter@usaid.gov

## Management and Program Coordination - Washington

Roger Conrad, Chief, Mgmt. & Prog. Coordination

202/712-5261; RConrad@usaid.gov

### Management Team

Betty Ryner, Senior Advisor for Management

202/712-5772; BRyner@usaid.gov

Monique Bryant, Contracts Specialist

202/712-1055; MBryant@usaid.gov

Cara Hagood, Administrative Analyst

202/712-5309; CHagood@usaid.gov

Juanita Jones, Program Specialist

202/712-5603; JuJones@usaid.gov

Philomena Thomas, Financial Mgmt. Spec.

202/712-5229; PhThomas@usaid.gov

### Program Development Team

Mary Stewart, Team Leader

202/712-4899; MStewart@usaid.gov

Anne Lee, Program Manager

202/712-1299; AnLee@usaid.gov

Cressida Slote, Program Manager

202/712-5417; CSlote@usaid.gov

Keri Eisenbeis, DG Advisor – Civil Military

202/712-4227; KEisenbeis@usaid.gov

Eve Fuerth, Public Affairs Officer

202/712-4031; EFuerth@usaid.gov

### Office of Transition Initiatives

U.S. Agency for International Development

Bureau for Humanitarian Response

Ronald Reagan Building, Room 2.9B

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20523-8602

Telephone 202/712-5603

Fax 202/216-3406

E-mail [oti@usaid.gov](mailto:oti@usaid.gov)

[http://www.usaid.gov/hum\\_response/oti](http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti)

## Field Operations

### Senior Field Advisors

Jerry Jordan, Senior Management Field Advisor  
Donald Krumm, Senior Field Advisor  
Michael Mahdesian, Senior Field Advisor  
Tom Stukel, Senior Field Advisor  
Wanda Williams, Senior Field Advisor

### Albania

Robert Jenkins, Program Manager

RJenkins@usaid.gov

### Colombia

David Gould, Country Representative

DGould@usaid.gov

### Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC)

Jay Nash, Country Representative (Acting)

Jay\_Nash@dai.com

### East Timor

Justin Sherman, Country Representative

JSherman@dai.com

### Indonesia

Michael Stievater, Country Representative  
Karma Lively, Deputy Country Representative

Mstievater@usaid.gov  
KLively@usaid.gov

### Kosovo

Kirpatrick Day, Country Representative (Acting)  
Jason Aplon, Deputy Country Representative

KDay@usaid.gov  
JAplon@usaid.gov

### Lebanon

Nick Cox, Program Manager

NCox@usaid.gov

### Nigeria

Lisa DeSoto, Country Representative  
Tjip Walker, Deputy Country Representative

LDesoto\_oti@yahoo.com

### Philippines

Paul Randolph, Country Representative

otidavao@mozcom.com

### Serbia & Montenegro (Budapest, Hungary)

Jeanne Bourgault, Country Representative (Acting)

Bourgault4@aol.com

### Sierra Leone

Terry Leary, Country Representative

TLeary1000@aol.com

### Zimbabwe

Marc Scott, Senior Field Director

MScott@usaid.gov

**For additional information about OTI and its activities, please contact OTI's Information Officer at (202) 712-1299, [oti@usaid.gov](mailto:oti@usaid.gov), or [http://www.usaid.gov/hum\\_response/oti](http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti)**