

PD-ABS-613  
106773



**FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY, INC**

**Final Report**

(9 June 1997 – 31 July 2000)

**Kivu Agricultural Rehabilitation Project  
OCTOBER 30, 2000**

**SUBMITTED TO:**

**Cognizant Technical Officer  
Timothy McRae  
USAID/BHR/OFDA, Room 8.06  
1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW (RRB)  
Washington, D.C. 20523-6001**

**Submitted by:**

**Keith Wright  
Food for the Hungry, Inc.  
Washington Office  
P.O. Box 75166  
Washington, DC 20013-5166**

**KIVU AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION PROJECT  
FINAL REPORT**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Organization: <u>Food for the Hungry, Inc.</u>	Date: <u>30 October, 2000</u>
Mailing Address: <u>7729 E. Greenway Road</u>	Contact: <u>Shaun Walsh</u>
<u>Scottsdale, AZ 85260</u>	Tel/Fax: <u>(44)(777)644-5258</u>
<u>U.S.A.</u>	E-mail: <u>swalsh@fhi.net</u>

Program Title: Kivu Agricultural Rehabilitation Project
Cooperative Agreement/Grant No.: AOT-00-97-000287-00
Country/Region: Kivu Region, Democratic Republic of the Congo
Disaster/Hazard: Civil War, Population Displacement
Time Period Covered by This Report: 9 June 1997 – 31 July 2000

The goal of this program was to ensure sustainable food security and a return to self-sufficiency for the vulnerable population of Kivu Region. An extension to this grant expanded this goal to areas of northern Katanga Province.

**Objective #1:** To provide 1 hoe and 12-15kg of seeds to 144,000 families

**Indicator and Current Measure:**

FHI was successful to distribute an average of 12.2kg of staple seeds per family, plus vegetable seeds and tools to 179,691 families over seven agricultural seasons, throughout North and South Kivu and certain targeted areas of northern Katanga. In addition, 218 special groups, (nutrition centers, orphanages, widows groups, etc.), received seeds and tools to create communal gardens, assisting the groups in becoming auto-financed, and reaching an estimated additional 65,400 beneficiaries.

1,656MT of staple seed to 144,000 beneficiary families proposed, but actually distributed 1,825MT of staple seed, 2MT of vegetable seed and 39MT of potato seed to 179,691 families in direct distributions. Estimated harvests from the general distribution total approximately 22,750 MT.

**Objective #2:** To train and equip 43 partners to enable them to begin/restart multiplication of improved seeds.

**Indicator and Current Measure:**

FHI has been successful to conduct 77 seed multiplication projects through local agencies and organizations, resulting in more than 13,000 MT of improved seed, and almost 1.1M meters of improved cassava and sweet potato cuttings injected into the local seed pools. All partners except INERA, the national seed research agency, received training and technical support in addition to the necessary materials.

**Objective#3:** Assist 31 communities to rehabilitate infrastructure supporting agriculture and agricultural production.

Certain projects, such as canal systems and road rehabilitation often included several communities into a single, large project. FHI has been successful to assist 60 communities to conduct 27 infrastructure rehabilitation projects including 5 irrigation canals, one marsh drainage system, one hydraulic mill, one boat dock, 5 bridges and 283 kms of market roads.

## **Program Overview**

**Goal/Purpose:** to ensure sustainable food security and a return to self-sufficiency for the vulnerable farming populations of South Kivu, North Kivu and northern Katanga Provinces

**Objective #1:** To provide 1 hoe and 12-15kg of seeds to 144,000 families

**Objective #2:** To train and equip 43 partners to enable them to begin or restart multiplication of improved seeds.

**Objective#3:** Assist 31 communities to rehabilitate infrastructure supporting agriculture and agricultural production.

### **Target Population:**

All three objectives combine to address the problems of food security for the farming families of North and South Kivu and northern Katanga Provinces. For objective one specifically, during the first season of distributions in each area (1998A for the Kivus, 2000A for northern Katanga), the farming community as a whole was targeted due to a general lack of inputs available at those times and places. Subsequent distributions targeted needier communities and individuals within those communities as the need became access to inputs rather than availability of inputs.

For objective two, seed multiplication projects were placed in areas that could be easily supervised with the exception of certain communities where the quality of seed was exceptionally low due to isolation caused by poor transportation infrastructure and insecurity. The farming community in general was targeted through local partners.

Rehabilitation projects, objective three, targeted specific farming communities with specific infrastructure problems that were adversely affecting the food security of that community. See Annex 3 for a listing of specific communities.

### **Geographic Locations of Major Activities:**

General distributions were conducted throughout North and South Kivu, covering all territories of North Kivu, and all territories of South Kivu except Mwenga and Shabunda territories. In northern Kantanga, distributions included the accessible areas immediately surrounding the cities of Kalemie and Moba.

Seed multiplication projects were conducted in the Ruzizi Plain of South Kivu, in Katana Territory of South Kivu and in the territories immediately surrounding Goma in North Kivu.

Rehabilitation projects were scattered throughout North and South Kivu. The specific community where each project is located, is shown in Annex 3.

## **Program Performance**

Each program objective has been met and exceeded.

### **Objective 1:**

The distribution of 1,656MT of staple seed to 144,000 beneficiary families was proposed, while FHI was able to increase that to 1,825MT of staple seed, 2MT of vegetable seed and 39MT of potato seed to 179,691 families in direct distributions.

Annex 1, Table 1 shows the numbers of families as well as the amounts of seed and tool distributed by season. The associated graph (Annex 1, page 3) demonstrates how FHI consistently exceeded the amount of inputs proposed.

Temporary shortfalls were seen in the 1998B and 1999A distributions due to the onset of the war, making large areas inaccessible due to poor security. The shortages for these two seasons were compensated for in the 1999B distribution when these areas opened up to humanitarian access and the unused resources from the previous two seasons could be used.


Annex 1, Table 2 shows the harvest of food from the seed distributed to be estimated at 22,750MT. Due to the tremendous land area covered, the very large number of beneficiaries, and continuous difficulty in accessing the fields cultivated due to poor security, these figures are estimates based on interviews with approximately 5% of the beneficiary population. We feel these figures are conservative in that they do not take into account the amount of food that was eaten green, before the crop was ripe for harvest. This estimate also does not include the considerable harvest from vegetable seed due to the difficulty in measuring the many varieties of vegetables.

Certain harvests were poorer than normal, largely due to drought and insecurity. In the first few months of the war, beginning in August 1998, many families had to abandon their fields at a critical moment in the agricultural cycle. Other harvests, such as the 1999B harvest were negatively impacted by drought.

Regardless of the amount of seed distributed, FHI has observed that the distribution of hoes is usually more important than the seeds. While families might have been able to scavenge and borrow a certain amount of seed to plant, amassing enough cash to buy a hoe was very nearly always beyond them, especially in isolated areas like Walikale and Katanga where the relative price of a hoe is even higher than normal. The distributed hoes not only allowed the distributed seed to be cultivated, but were often loaned to other families, allowing them to cultivate as well. When families were displaced, we observed that they often carried the hoes with them. This allowed them to hire themselves out on plantations and have a source of income in their places of asylum. For this reason, in certain isolated areas of North Kivu where seed was plentiful, but hoes rare and expensive, FHI distributed only vegetable seeds with the hoes.

Except in Katanga where there was a noticeable lack of local organizations, once an area was picked for a distribution FHI searched for partners already working on agriculture in that area to

use as the distribution agents. These partners were responsible for working with the village committees to select the beneficiaries, provide a distribution site, organize the distribution, and follow-up with the beneficiaries through that agricultural season. In the first few distributions FHI required the beneficiaries to return a given number of kilograms of their harvest to the partner that distributed the seeds. The partner was allowed to retain a certain percentage of the return for autofinancing and as payment for the work performed in the distribution. The rest of the returned seed was to be further distributed. This process worked in a very limited number of cases, depending largely on the amount of follow-up the partner did, as well as the general attitude of the local population. In most cases though, the partner did not have the management capacity to plan out and implement a follow-up scheme, much less organize a seed collection and distribution. Eventually this aspect of the program was dropped as ineffective. For this type of interaction to be effective, the partners would need much more training and supervision than is normally available.



Above is a graph showing the cumulative numbers of beneficiary families proposed and actually served in the general distributions. It is clear that FHI continuously exceeded the proposed objectives.

In each season's procurement, FHI would add a small percentage (2-5%) to cover losses to spoilage and pilfering. Through closely controlling commodities during storage, transportation and distribution, at the end of each distribution, we generally have an amount of seed left in the warehouse. Also, by finding the lowest price possible for quality seeds and transportation, there

is normally a certain amount left in the budget. We have found that by using these resources to target special vulnerable groups that wouldn't be appropriate to target in the general distribution. This had good success in helping many organizations such as orphanages and nutrition centers to become more self-sufficient. Annex 1, page 2 shows the numbers of groups and beneficiaries targeted each season. Because the seeds and tools for these distributions were funded by savings from the normal distributions, the numbers served per season vary widely. In seasons where the general distribution were funded by savings from previous seasons, there were no resources to target special groups.

## **Objective 2:**

FHI has been successful to conduct 77 seed multiplication projects (192ha) through local agencies and organizations, resulting in more than 13,000 MT of improved seed, and almost 1.1 million meters of improved cassava and sweet potato cuttings injected into the local seed pools. This compares to the 43 partners (138ha) proposed. All partners except INERA, the national seed research agency, received training and technical support in addition to the necessary materials. In North Kivu, this training was given on an individual basis by the FHI agronomist. In South Kivu, this training was given in the form of a seminar, tailored to the level of the majority of the suppliers. After the seminar, SENASEM certified these suppliers as approved seed multipliers.

In certain cases the labor for the initial ground preparation and planting was paid for by FHI. In other cases, the labor was provided for by the organization. At harvest, depending on the type of seed and the success of the harvest, the partner organization was required to distribute a percentage of the harvest to beneficiaries or remit them back to FHI for further distribution. The rest of the harvest remained with the partner to provide seed for the following season, to pay for the costs of labor for the next season, and to provide auto-financing for the partner.

Annex 2 gives the data relating numbers of proposed versus actual projects and acreage, as well as amounts of seed sowed and the corresponding harvests.

Several partners in Rutshuru, North Kivu had portions of their harvests and tools looted in raids by the Interhamwe both before and after harvesting. In certain cases we granted these partners a second project with new inputs in the following seasons.

Due to the start of the second war and worsening security conditions in general, we were unable to provide as much direct supervision as planned. This coupled with the low management capacity of local organizations resulted in approximately half of the partners failing to continue to multiply seeds after the first season. It is suggested that future seed multiplication projects in this region include general administrative, programmatic and financial training along with the technical agricultural training.

As much as the general lack of management skills prevented continued multiplication by a partner, security was an even bigger barrier, especially in the Rutshuru area. At times the whole harvest would be looted out of the fields or out of the partner's warehouse as it was waiting for

distribution. Several times the tools and equipment were looted, both by militant groups and by the villagers living nearby. Other times, periods of insecurity prevented workers from getting to the fields to tend the crops for weeks at a time, reducing the overall harvest.

### **Objective 3:**

FHI has been successful to assist an estimated 60 communities to conduct infrastructure rehabilitation projects as compared with 31 proposed communities. These projects include five irrigation canal systems (with two associated dams), one marsh drainage canal system, one boat dock, one hydraulic mill with its associated canal and dam, five bridges, and 239 km of secondary roads.

Annex 3 provides a listing of these projects as well as their locations and purpose or impact. It is extremely difficult to estimate the number of participating communities and beneficiaries for pieces of infrastructure that are used and supported by the public in general. In these instances, we have given estimates of the number of communities affected based on proximity to the project.

In all but the bridge rehabilitation projects, the main source of unskilled labor used was the beneficiary community. Not only did this reduce the cost of the project, but it gave ownership of the infrastructure to the population, hopefully increasing the likelihood of its being properly maintained and managed in the long run, and decreasing the likelihood of its abuse or destruction by elements in the communities.

FHI has found, even in the tumultuous atmosphere during this grant period, these strategically placed, high impact, low cost projects were extremely successful in improving the food security of large populations, both during the crisis and long afterwards. In the Ruzizi plain for two separate seasons during the program period, only those families with irrigated land were able to produce a reasonable harvest. These same families were also able to add an extra harvest even to normal years, further reducing their vulnerability to loss of a crop due to insecurity. Road and bridge projects often gave the humanitarian community as well as market trucks access to previously isolated communities. The boat dock restored access to public boat transportation to an island that was becoming evermore isolated, due simply to a lack of a place for large boats to dock, allowing farmers access to the large, profitable markets in Bukavu. All of these projects were small, low cost, fairly simple projects. Their strategic placement though assisted large numbers of the population to improve their food security under very adverse conditions. The projects often reduced the families' vulnerability to food shortages by maximizing the resources available to them as well as increasing the profit margin when they sold their produce.

### **Success Stories**

A recent visit to the Ruzizi plain showed that the irrigation systems rehabilitated in the plain were still running and were still being maintained by the beneficiary community even after three years without additional support from FHI. Unirrigated fields in the Ruzizi plain often have difficulty producing a second harvest during normal years, and have difficulty with even a single harvest in drought years. This means that in certain areas, due to the FHI irrigation projects, the

beneficiary families have already been able to cultivate an additional 3 to 6 harvests as well as being able to cultivate normally during a drought in which harvests in non-irrigated fields were reduced or even lost completely.

Upon FHI's arrival in Moba, Katanga Province, the majority of the population was living in the bush or their fields, dying at an estimated 10 times the normal rate due to disease, malnutrition, increased exposure to malaria and the elements, and lack of access to services like medical care and clean water. Markets were nearly non-existent. Selling prices of local produce were severely deflated, and a very large portion of the children were either malnourished, or vulnerable to malnutrition. Schools and churches were not functioning. Few families had access to a hoe more than two days per week, severely limiting the amount of terrain they could cultivate, even if they could find sufficient seed to plant.

Within one month of the FHI distribution, families were gaining the courage to return to their villages, restarting the schools, churches and pharmacies, and rebuilding their homes. The harvest in April and May was the largest seen since the start of the war, sufficient enough to allow exportation to Kalemie, Uvira and Kigoma. Markets reopened and prices normalized. The population in Kalemie normally depends on the Nyunzu-Niamba area west of Kalemie for a large part of the food. Destabilization in that region shortly after the 2000A planting season eliminated this source of food for Kalemie. Now Kalemie depends almost completely on Moba for its food imports. Without the increased Moba production stimulated by FHI's distribution, Kalemie, as well as Moba would currently be facing famine conditions.

### **Impact of Insecurity**

Although FHI was able to exceed each of its objectives, program implementation was continually hampered by insecurity in the program areas. In August 1998, a civil war started that would continue to limit access to program areas throughout the rest of the grant period. During this grant period, the Uvira office and residence was completely pillaged right down to the bathtub by the Rwandan Army. One vehicle was attacked by the Interhamwe, the vehicle badly damaged and the contents pillaged in a convoy where 18 people were killed and about 20 were wounded. Our office in Goma sustained minor damage when a bomb dropped by government forces landed barely 100 meters from it in an air raid where more than 100 people were killed. The FHI national staff have been beaten, robbed, threatened and harassed throughout the grant period by myriad militant groups.

This climate of insecurity very often limited our access to projects, causing certain scheduled distributions to various areas to be cancelled, two bridge rehabilitation projects to be cancelled and the completion of numerous other rehabilitation projects to be delayed. Active fighting in program areas reduced the amount of supervision FHI was able to provide to all three objectives. Attacks by various armies and militant groups caused beneficiaries to flee, missing the planting season or leaving their crops to rot in their fields. Numerous partners had their crops and equipment pillaged. Foraging armies and militant groups stole harvests out of the fields and out of beneficiary homes. All resulting in a reduced overall impact of the program to the region, but increasing the need for such programs.

FHI firmly believes that the continued inputs from FHI's program, along with other similar simultaneous programs in the region, were instrumental in preventing a general famine in the Kivus and Katanga both immediately after the war that overthrew Mobutu as well as during this second round of war.

Food for the Hungry/Congo

Grant: AOT-G-00-97-000287-00

KARP expenditure report, Annexed to Final narrative report

DESCRIPTION	Total Grant	Actual	Variance	Comments on line item variance
	Budget	Expenses		
	Jun 97 - Jul 00	Jun 97 - Jul 00		
Salaries - Expat and national staff	\$578,912	\$588,331	(\$9,419)	Personnel line items were exceeded as a result of the NCE that covered personnel costs
Benefits - Taxable/non-taxable	\$152,147	\$160,270	(\$8,123)	
Temporary Labor: seeds & tools	\$48,468	\$52,822	(\$4,354)	
International airfares	\$72,105	\$73,583	(\$1,478)	OK
Regional airfares	\$40,440	\$39,304	\$1,136	OK
Visas/work permits: expats	\$11,851	\$15,866	(\$4,015)	Same explanation as in personnel line
Four-wheel drive vehicle rental	\$157,601	\$160,028	(\$2,427)	OK
Large truck rental	\$150,508	\$149,555	\$953	OK
Fuel, repair & maint. 4-wh vehicles	\$56,695	\$54,359	\$2,336	OK
Fuel, repair & maint: large trucks	\$25,788	\$19,714	\$6,074	OK
Office (Goma)	\$16,928	\$16,691	\$237	OK
House (Goma)	\$21,715	\$20,720	\$995	OK
Office/House (Uvira / Bujumbura )	\$34,520	\$34,520	\$0	OK
Warehouse	\$11,468	\$11,118	\$350	OK
Office supplies	\$40,674	\$42,534	(\$1,860)	OK
Warehouse supplies/repairs	\$13,616	\$13,748	(\$132)	OK
Fuel for generator	\$3,356	\$4,554	(\$1,198)	OK
House Furnishings	\$4,027	\$2,527	\$1,500	OK
Communication (tel/fax/email/post)	\$57,849	\$61,063	(\$3,214)	OK
Regional office support costs	\$10,325	\$10,178	\$147	OK
Bank fees and related costs	\$74,500	\$74,855	(\$355)	OK
Lap top computers/printers	\$26,785	\$26,785	\$0	OK
Office safe/ copiers	\$7,844	\$7,844	\$0	OK
Generator	\$2,260	\$2,260	\$0	OK
HF Radios	\$62,368	\$57,431	\$4,937	OK
Toyota 4x4 trucks and related	\$73,519	\$73,519	\$0	Ok
Motorcycles	\$18,746	\$18,246	\$500	OK

Seeds for multiplication/distribution	\$1,507,529	\$1,495,908	\$11,621	OK
Tools for distribution/multiplication	\$460,476	\$462,825	(\$2,349)	OK
Agricultural rehabilitation inputs	\$155,571	\$145,796	\$9,775	OK
<b>SUBTOTAL - DIRECT COSTS</b>	<b>\$3,898,590</b>	<b>\$3,896,955</b>	<b>\$1,636</b>	
NICRA	\$350,093	\$349,937	\$156	Funds not spent is mainly the NICRA as the actual rate turned out to be les
Grant funds not spent	\$97,422	-	\$ 97,422	
<b>TOTAL COSTS</b>	<b>\$4,346,106</b>	<b>\$4,246,892</b>	<b>\$99,214</b>	used in the original grant and succee

The actual NICRA was computed as follows:

<u>Year of Expenditure</u>	<u>Direct Costs</u>	<u>Indirect Costs</u>
1997	1,097,120.00	89,634.70
1998	1,154,863.00	112,137.20
1999	1,260,636.00	113,520.27
2000	384,730.00	34,644.94
		<u><u>\$349,937</u></u>

B

## General Distribution Summary

Season	# families proposed	# families actual	# ben *	individual tools	Staple Seed (MT)	Vegetable Seed (kg)	Potato Seed (MT)
1998A	30,000	34,290	171,450	34,390	474.60	212.61	0
1998B**	30,000	27,892	139,460	27,892	237.74	279.96	0
1999A**	20,000	18,255	91,275	17,755	241.17	378.73	0
1999B	23,000	29,420	147,100	25440	322.03	500.04	33.15
1999C	0	17980	89,900	1091	0	265.43	0
2000A-Kivu	29,000	34250	171,250	34250	360.16	260.00	6.00
2000A-Katanga	12,000	12,624	63,120	18,124	189.36	90.62	0
2000B/C	0	4980	24,900	300	0	63.9	0
<b>Total Direct Distribution</b>	<b>144,000</b>	<b>179,691</b>	<b>898,455</b>	<b>159,242</b>	<b>1,825</b>	<b>2,051</b>	<b>39</b>

Note: All 12,624 families in the 2000A Katanga distribution also received food in the form of a seed protection package for a total of approximately 500 MT

\* Beneficiaries were registered by family. We have calculated the number of beneficiaries using an average of 5 people per family

\*\* Low number of beneficiaries was due to an inability to reach the beneficiaries because of insecurity. These missing beneficiaries were served in the 1999B season when security permitted access.

## General Distribution Harvest Estimates

Season	Beans (MT)		Maize/Sorghum/Rice (MT)		Soy/Peanuts (MT)		Potato (MT)		Vegetables (kg)
	sowed	harvested	sowed	harvested	sowed	harvested	sowed	harvested	sowed
1998A	270	1600	145	4375	65	325			148.74
1998B	212	1275	88	2630	150	800			278.92
1999A	163	980			75	400			378.73
1999B	130	800	5	151	63	315	30	132	283.53
1999C									41.00
2000A	205	1225	105	3160	75	390	5.5	22	138.00
2000B	63	380	125	3790					90.62
2000C									63.90
<b>total harvest</b>	<b>1043</b>	<b>6260</b>	<b>468</b>	<b>14106</b>	<b>428</b>	<b>2230</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>1423.44</b>

These numbers are estimates based on interviews with approximately 5% of beneficiaries in seasons where the population was accessible. When the population was not accessible, estimates were made on general knowledge of the success of the harvest compare to other seasons

Total Harvest 22750 MT  
not counting vegetables

## Special Group Distribution Summary

Season	# Special Groups	# ben *	individual tools	Staple Seed (MT)	Vegetable Seed (kg)	Potato Seed (MT)	Manioc Stems (M)
1998A	21	6,300	180	3.28	2	0	0
1998B	17	5,100	1,037	3.40	4.5	5	6605
1999A	16	4,800	220	2.13	4.7	0	0
1999B	89	26,700	1,072	21.4	29	1.3	0
1999C **	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
2000A	73	21,900	1,643	15.32	25.20	0	0
2000B/C **	2	600	0	0	1.2	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>218</b>	<b>65,400</b>	<b>4,152</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6,605</b>

\* Every special group is different and exact numbers of beneficiaries are often impossible to count exactly. We have calculated the number of beneficiaries using an average of 60 families per special group, a very conservative estimate since a nutrition center may easily serve 100 children, therefore assisting the whole family.

\*\* In these seasons, general distributions were not scheduled, but were made possible through savings made during the scheduled distribution. Therefore, there were little or no remaining quantities with which to serve special groups.

**Seed Multiplication Projects**

Season	# projects		hectares		individual tools
	proposed	actual	proposed	actual	
1998A	12	28	36	81	1179
1998B	12	24	36	46.9	937
1999A	12	2	36	12.7	30
1999B	-	12	-	24.5	285
2000A	10	11	30	27	388
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>2,819</b>

Season	Staple Seed (MT)		Potato Seed (MT)		Cassava/sweet potato (m)	
	sowed	harvested	sowed	harvested	sowed	harvested
1998A	3,976	31,986.00			42000	617000
1998B	2,587	20,164.00	6,500.00	19666	12000	57666
1999A	590	7,246.00	3,400.00	15000	26000	410000
1999B	1,480	7109	8300	14321		
2000A	1,177	12919	5000	10756.00		
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,810</b>	<b>79,424</b>	<b>23,200</b>	<b>59,743</b>	<b>80,000</b>	<b>1,084,666</b>

Total harvest            139,167 MT plus 1.1M meters of casava and sweet potato cuttings

## Rehabilitation Summary

Location			Year	Description	Purpose/Impact	Est # communities**	Est # Beneficiaries**
Province	Territory	Location					
South Kivu	Uvira	Luberizi	1998	Irrigation Canal	Restore and augment flow of water	2	12,500
	Uvira	Runingu	1998	Irrigation Canal	Restore and augment flow of water	1	8,000
	Uvira	Kiliba	1998	Irrigation Canal	Restore and augment flow of water	1	4,000
	Fizi	Itota	1998	9m Bridge	Restore access to western half of territory	6	200,000
	Uvira	Makobola	1999	Irrigation Canal	Restore and augment flow of water	1	4,000
	Kabare	Mumosho	2000	Marsh drainage	Increase the area of arable land	3	41,000
	Idjwi	Kashofu	2000	Public Boat Dock	Increase access to markets, general transportation	2	85,000
	Kalehe	Kalungu	2000	20 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	2	10,000
	Uvira	Kiringyi	2000	Irrigation Canal	Restore and augment flow of water	3	15,000
	Fizi	Makobola	2000	Hydraulic Mill	Decrease cost of transforming produce	1	4,000
North Kivu	Rutshuru	Tshengerero	1997	8m Bridge *	Increase access to markets, general transportation	9	100,000
		Kiniamukubi	1997	4m Bridge *			
		Kiniamukubi	1997	9m Bridge *			
		Kinioni	1997	6m Bridge *			
		Busanza	1998	20 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	1	7,000
		Tongo	1998	36 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	7	35,000
		Ntamugenga	2000	30 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	6	42,000
	Masisi	Mema	1998	18 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	4	19,000
		Bitonga	2000	10 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	2	13,000
		Bunyuka	2000	15 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	1	8,500
		Mtwanga	2000	10 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	1	8,000
		Masoya	2000	14 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	1	6,000
		Maboya	2000	15 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	1	3,200
	Lubero	Kiranga	2000	10 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	1	5,000
	Kasuo	2000	16 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	1	7,500	
	Musasa	2000	12 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	1	2,000	
	Vuyinga	2000	13 km road	Increase access to markets, general transportation	2	7,000	
totals						60	646,700

\* These four bridges were located along a single major axis and served the same population, so that population is only counted once

\*\* The term "community" is a vague term. Numerous groups participated in and benefitted from single projects, to varying degrees; therefore, the numbers of communities are estimates. Numbers of beneficiaries are based on population figures for those areas, provided by government sources.