



THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE

(GHA)
STRATEGIC PLAN

FY 1998 - FY 2002

FINAL VERSION

November 1997

**THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE (GHAI)
STRATEGIC PLAN
FY 1998 - FY 2002**

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**THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE
STRATEGIC PLAN
Fiscal Year 1998 - Fiscal Year 2002**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) was launched in 1994, following a visit to the GHA region by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator J. Brian Atwood and a determination by President Clinton that the USG should develop a new framework for and approach to addressing post-Cold War realities in that troubled part of the world. "Breaking the Cycle of Despair," a concept paper (Annex B) setting forth the goals of the Initiative -- crisis prevention and food security -- was drafted later that year, and emphasized the importance of USAID's "doing business differently" in order to meet the challenges posed by events in the 10-country region stretching from Eritrea in the north to Tanzania in the south.¹

This Strategic Plan, the preparation of which was coordinated by USAID's Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA), is USAID's contribution to a broader inter-agency exercise to move the GHAI beyond concept and into implementation. The GHAI USG Interagency Framework (Annex A) lays out the vision and expected outcomes for the Initiative. These will be supported by individual Agency strategies or action plans. The USAID Strategic Plan sets forth the Agency's goals and objectives for the Initiative over the next five years. It provides a vehicle for establishing the overarching operational framework through application of the GHAI's five core Principles and also identifies specific objectives aimed at addressing key constraints to food security and conflict prevention in the region. The Strategic Plan covers a five-year timeframe from FY 1998 to FY 2002.

The Development Context

Since the conception of the GHAI in 1994 and the original consultations conducted in the region and with donor colleagues, it has been clear that USAID and its partners in the GHAI share a general consensus regarding the nature of the complex development context in which the Initiative is being implemented. Much of this context is described in the original GHAI Concept Paper; events unfolding since that document was drafted only reinforce the analysis set forth there.

¹The GHAI countries include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Rwanda and Burundi.

Several changes, many inspired by the end of the Cold War, have triggered the transformation of the development context into one in which the underlying theme is, in fact, change itself. Change necessarily entails opportunities and risks; these, in turn, demand thoughtful and innovative responses.

Like the change which defines it, the development context in the Greater Horn is neither fully negative nor fully positive. The Greater Horn includes Somalia, a country which gave rise to the concept of the "failed state," and Uganda, a country which not long ago was the world's leading symbol of horror but is today regarded as an economic and political leader. There is considerable tension between the Government of Sudan and many of its neighbors in the Greater Horn, but there is also a regionally-led Sudan Peace Process. There are continued food shortages across the region, but there are also new measures and policies aimed at fostering less dependence on food aid.

The challenge to USAID is to take advantage of the change unfolding in the region and in the international community by rendering itself able to respond to windows of opportunity as they arise. The challenge is easier in some cases than in others. For example, the increased flow of food aid to the region and, with it, an increased dependency on "free hand outs," has been expressed as a concern by a wide range of governments in the region; the region's Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its international partners are responding with a regional Food Aid Charter to be used as a guide for both regional and international actors. USAID is participating in the development of the Charter, and should thus be well-positioned to invoke it in its own operations. In the case of Kenya, however, the "window of opportunity" for USAID may not yet have been fully opened; as events unfold and local and/or regional partners identify creative means of preventing what appears to be a looming crisis, USAID's challenge will be to respond quickly and to embrace the innovations that may be proposed.

The GHAI Approach

The "lessons learned" through GHAI consultations and its implementation thus far have given rise to the formulation of five GHAI Principles which will serve as the Operational Framework for the GHAI Strategic Plan. These are:

- African Ownership**
- Strategic Coordination**
- Linking Relief and Development**
- Regional Perspective**
- Promoting Stability**

One of the challenges inherent in efforts to "institutionalize" the GHAI has been the question of whether the GHAI entails "doing business differently" with all resources flowing into the region or simply with dedicated GHAI resources. Another challenge has been clarifying the relationship between existing USAID programs in the region and those undertaken to date and/or proposed by the GHAI. This Plan's strategic objectives rely on overall USAID program synergy and convergence for their achievement. Convergence is the process by which USAID's bilateral and regional programs in the Greater Horn, including programs centrally-funded by the Global Bureau (G), the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR), and the Office of Sustainable Development in the Africa Bureau (AFR/SD), will accommodate and more directly support the goal and strategic objectives of the GHAI.

The GHAI Results Framework

The goal of the GHAI Strategic Plan is "a food secure, just and peaceful region." Parallel to USAID's development of the GHAI concept, IGAD and the East Africa Community were defining their own revitalization processes. Other international aid institutions, ranging from multi-lateral agencies to private voluntary organizations (PVOs), were exploring the ways and means of adapting their approaches to a new era. Indigenous organizations and governments began an assertive effort to confront both crisis and food security in the region. The GHAI goal of a food secure, just and peaceful region, therefore, reflects the region's priorities as well as the aspirations of USAID's international partners.

The Strategic Plan includes two Strategic Objectives and a third Special Objective. In the spirit of the primary GHAI Principle of "African ownership," the Plan's Strategic Objectives are cast in terms of enhancing the capacity of the GHAI's regional partners. Each will thus be pursued in cooperation and close consultation with regional partners, including regional institutions such as IGAD, governments, technical networks and indigenous organizations, as well as with international partners.

SO1 is "strengthened African capacity to enhance regional food security." To achieve food security, attention must be paid not only to bilateral issues but also to regional issues. Long term projections of food availability show that even with a continuation of current favorable agricultural production trends in some countries, the number of food insecure people in the region will nearly double by the year 2010. A major reason for this is the level of poverty and low levels of productivity in the region. Increasing food security requires not only increases in agricultural production but also in the income with which people can access food and improved health and nutritional status.

SO2 is "strengthened African capacity to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict." Coupled with that taking place in the international community, the change unfolding in the region necessarily entails risk, but with that risk comes the opportunity to develop genuine partnerships aimed at ensuring that declining resources are invested towards the promotion of stability, peace and prosperity and that the region's dependency on the international community is reduced. This opportunity, however, represents a new area of engagement for USAID; as such, the SO allows for maximum flexibility, responsiveness and experimentation. This SO is designed to reflect the fact that practical experience will be gained and priorities best determined through a learning process. Through experimentation, testing and replication of best practices, USAID, in partnership with regional institutions and other partners, will maximize their respective comparative advantages in pursuit of this strategic objective.

SpO3 is "increased access to regional analytical information." One of the most glaring impediments to the formulation of regional policy approaches in the GHA is the shortage of data and analyses which assess the region as a whole. The quality of existing resource material, meanwhile, is mixed. As a consequence, regional factors are given insufficient weight, and regional approaches are too often defined on the basis of an amalgamation of national analyses as opposed to deliberate regional assessments. There is also a need to make existing information resources more widely available and accessible to stakeholders in the region. This aspect of the "information gap" affects both GHAI partners in the region as well as USAID and its international counterparts. SpO3 will seek to ensure that frequent and accurate reporting on the activities generated by SOs 1 and 2 is provided to the broadest possible range of GHAI stakeholders and also serve as the vehicle for identifying and addressing gaps and linkages between them.

GHAI Resources

GHAI-specific funds will provide flexible, catalytic support for program convergence as well as for application of the overarching operational framework. As achievement of the strategic objectives relies on improved linkages between existing and potential regional and bilateral programs, including those programs which are centrally-funded, GHAI resources alone will not, in most cases, lead to significant progress toward the proposed intermediate results. Rather, GHAI funds should be used to leverage other resources, both within USAID and with our partners, to achieve results.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AA	Assistant Administrator
AF	African Affairs (Department of State)
AFR/SD	Africa Bureau Office of Sustainable Development (USAID)
ASARECA	Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa
BHR	Bureau for Humanitarian Response (USAID)
CPMR	Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response
DA	Development Assistance
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
EAC	East African Cooperation
EATI	East Africa Transport Initiative
ESABO	East and Southern African Business Organization
FFP	Office of Food for Peace (USAID)
FY	Fiscal Year
G	Global Bureau (USAID)
GHAI	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IR	Intermediate Result
IRM	Information Resources Management Division (USAID)
ISP	Integrated Strategic Plan
LPA	Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs (USAID)
M	Bureau for Management (USAID)
NGO	Non-governmental Organization

NRM	Natural Resources Management
NSC	National Security Council
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)
OYB	Operating Year Budget (USAID)
PARC	Pan African Rinderpest Campaign
PPC	Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (USAID)
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (Department of State)
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
REDSO/ESA	Regional Economic Services Office for East and Southern Africa (USAID)
R4	Results Reporting and Resource Request (USAID)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SO	Strategic Objective
SPO	Special Objective
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency

THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE

STRATEGIC PLAN

FY 1998 - FY 2002

I INTRODUCTION

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) was launched in 1994, following a visit to the GHA region by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator J. Brian Atwood and a determination by President Clinton that the USG should develop a new framework for and approach to addressing post-Cold War realities in that troubled part of the world. "Breaking the Cycle of Despair," a concept paper (Annex B) setting forth the goals of the Initiative -- crisis prevention and food security -- was drafted later that year, and emphasized the importance of USAID's "doing business differently" in order to meet the challenges posed by events in the 10-country region stretching from Eritrea in the north to Tanzania in the south.²

This Strategic Plan is USAID's contribution to a broader inter-agency exercise to move the GHAI beyond concept and into implementation. The GHAI USG Interagency Framework (Annex A) lays out the vision and expected outcomes for the Initiative. These will be supported by individual Agency strategies or action plans. The USAID Strategic Plan sets forth the Agency's goals and objectives for the Initiative over the next five years. It provides a vehicle for establishing the overarching operational framework through application of the GHAI's five core Principles and also identifies specific objectives aimed at addressing key constraints to food security and conflict prevention in the region.

USAID's Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA) was mandated to coordinate the development of USAID's GHAI Strategic Plan. In doing so, REDSO/ESA drew upon several resources, including: the original and subsequent GHAI consultations with a wide range of partners and stakeholders; the experience gained by USAID thus far in implementing the GHAI and, in particular, the individual experiences of USAID Missions; the findings of the GHAI Transitions Team; and USAID's support to the revitalization of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the formation of the Joint IGAD-Partners Forum.

²The countries of the Greater Horn include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.

The task of the drafting teams was to take exciting concepts, a wealth of ideas, some significant accomplishments, a wide range of priorities, and the multiple goals of USAID operating units, and condense these into a manageable strategy for implementation. As such, the Plan is not "all things to all people," and reflects decisions based on an analysis of comparative advantage and the experience of the GHAI to date. Because of its unique nature, and with a view to identifying lessons learned and fine-tuning the Initiative during strategy implementation, a Special Objective for impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation has been established.

Evolution of the Strategic Plan

At a January 1996 meeting of USAID Mission Directors and U.S. Ambassadors to the region hosted by REDSO/ESA, it was agreed that USAID would take the lead in developing a GHAI strategic plan setting forth the aims, objectives and actions required to pursue the goals of the GHAI.

In late February, 1997, the GHAI Steering Committee determined that the structure of the GHAI Strategic Plan should be revised to accommodate the very different planning processes undertaken by the individual USG agencies participating in the GHAI. It was decided that each participating USG agency would attach its own plan for implementing the Initiative to an agreed-upon consensus document constituting the USG framework for the Initiative.

USAID's Strategic Plan also reflects the results of an interim review of the strategy conducted in June and July of 1997 by the GHAI Steering Committee. As a result of this review, more specific parameters were provided, including guidance for program "convergence" between bilateral and regional programs.

II THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Since the conception of the GHAI in 1994 and the original consultations conducted in the region and with donor colleagues, it has been clear that USAID and its partners in the GHAI share a general consensus regarding the nature of the complex development context in which the Initiative is being implemented. Much of this context is described in the original GHAI Concept Paper (Annex B) and events unfolding since that document was drafted only reinforce the analysis set forth there.

Ten or even five years ago, the development context in the Greater Horn was one characterized by a sharp distinction between relief and development approaches, by a bilateral or national orientation, by a marked degree of aid dependency coupled with little effort to address causes, and by the isolation of relief and development efforts within the wider political arena.

Several changes, many inspired by the end of the Cold War, have triggered the transformation of the development context into one in which the underlying theme is, in fact, change itself. Change necessarily entails opportunities and risks; these, in turn, demand thoughtful and innovative responses. An overarching qualification must be made here, however. The magnitude of the region's problems is significant: millions of people remain food insecure; the region is home to some ten million refugees, displaced persons and recent returnees; and all of the region's countries are either engaged in or directly affected by armed conflict(s). As such, no outside agent, including USAID, can turn the situation around. What USAID and others can do, however, is take advantage of the openings that exist, support the region's efforts to consolidate positive gains, and foster the analytical and operational changes which will allow the Agency to effectively invest limited resources against growing challenges.

A. Nature of Change

The factors triggering crisis -- and change -- in the Greater Horn are multiple, and commonly prioritized in accordance with the perspective of the person or organization doing the prioritizing. In fact all of a wide range of factors -- population growth, land tenure, centralized governmental and political systems, inappropriate policies, environmental conditions, the availability of arms, uneven terms of trade -- contribute to the emergence and spread of crisis and conflict in the region. It is the fact that each of these factors is at play, and that none can be de-linked from the others, which renders the development context so complex.

Change in the region is taking many forms and unfolding on all levels. In the humanitarian arena, there has been a shift from what were once fewer "disasters" to what are now more frequent "complex political emergencies." With this has come an alarming imbalance between the amount of assistance spent on emergency needs versus that invested in development, with USAID's humanitarian assistance normally far exceeding its development aid to the region.

The region has also seen a shift in the scope and nature of conflict, with, for example, the failure of the state in Somalia leading to seemingly interminable instability and the genocide in Rwanda spawning a region-wide military convulsion. This change has fostered new thinking in the international community. The majority of aid providers have found the traditional tools of relief and development woefully inadequate, as has been made abundantly clear in the Great Lakes region.

Other changes appear to be potentially more positive. On the economic front, the region is witnessing the liberalization of a majority of national economies and,

with this, the expansion of efforts to foster regional and sub-regional trade and investment. Though the political environment is one which is far from perfect, the majority of the GHA countries can be said to be making considerable progress -- considering their starting points -- in the areas of democratization and good governance.

As a consequence of the dire negative effects of conflict, as well as a growing awareness of the need for expanded economic cooperation, there is also a new commitment to regionalism. IGAD has been substantively and organizationally revitalized in recent years, with the regional leadership investing far more time and effort in building regional cooperation than was the case in the past. The East Africa Cooperation (EAC) has been similarly re-established, with an invitation for membership recently extended to Rwanda.

Perhaps most significant of the positive trends emerging out of the region's tumult has been the emergence of new actors -- at the governmental and non-governmental levels -- determined to fashion solutions to their own problems and to take responsibility for their own mistakes. This growing determination to seize what the Initiative refers to as "African ownership" stems in part from a parallel desire to reduce the region's dependency on the international community for either its economic survival or its political growth. It also derives from what is a markedly more open atmosphere, within which the region's problems and possible solutions are subjected to increasingly public debate. Through this process, long-standing local and regional knowledge and perspectives are beginning to rise to the surface.

While growing food insecurity remains a constant in the region, the development context affecting food security has also changed significantly. Several of the region's governments are placing a new emphasis on the role of small farmers; coupled with the emergence of indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community associations, this means that the definition of "food security" is being expanded to include not only national production, but also access. At the same time, and in part due to improved regional transport and communications, the region is seeing increased cooperation between and among regional networks organized to conduct research and analysis and to link these efforts across national borders.

That food security is taking on a new regional dimension is also evidenced by the priority given to policy harmonization and trade promotion by the revitalized IGAD. IGAD's project profiles, meanwhile, include several activities aimed at improving regional infrastructure and information exchange. Parallel to this effort, regional governments, and some donors, are attempting to expand the use of regional grain surpluses to balance deficits elsewhere in the region, thus indirectly promoting trade. Finally, both governments and NGOs in the region, as

well as some of the region's major food aid providers, have begun to explore the ways and means of using food aid as a development tool, thus decreasing its negative impact as a disincentive to production.

Like the change which defines it, the development context in the Greater Horn of Africa region is neither fully negative nor fully positive. The region includes Somalia, a country which gave rise to the concept of the "failed state," and Uganda, a country which not long ago was the world's leading symbol of horror but is today regarded as an economic and political leader. There is considerable tension between the Government of Sudan and many of its neighbors in the Greater Horn, but there is also a regionally-led Sudan Peace Process. There are continued food shortages across the region, but there are also new measures and policies aimed at fostering less dependence on food aid.

B. Nature of Opportunities

The opportunities for USAID in this environment are multiple. First, USAID can build upon the shared goals of its African partners and the many international aid institutions who, parallel to the evolution of the GHAI, have come to similar conclusions and identified similar goals as the impetus for change.

Second, the scope and breadth of change in the Greater Horn have meant that all of USAID's partners are engaged in debate and deliberation about the means of response. The World Bank recently adopted a Framework for Post-Conflict Situations; the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is re-thinking its traditional support for governments in the context of "good governance" and regionalization; IGAD has included a Department of Political and Humanitarian Affairs in its new organizational structure; international NGOs are evaluating their roles in complex political emergencies; and, indigenous NGOs are examining their partnerships with international NGOs and governments. That each and every actor in the Greater Horn faces the same challenges posed to USAID means that there exists an enabling environment for change, as well as considerable room for pursuing the GHAI principle of "strategic coordination."

Finally, the increasing weight being given two of the GHAI's operational Principles -- African ownership and regionalism -- provide USAID with the opportunity not only to institutionalize these principles, but also to do so in a manner which can reinforce our partners' ability to institutionalize them, as well.

C. Nature of Risks

Operating in such a fluid environment is not without risk. The application of "African ownership" entails a different kind of dialogue than that employed in the past, and one which -- in an era and region of uneven political maturity -- risks

USAID's entering into a politically-charged environment. Similarly, the expansion of USAID's involvement in the fields of relief and development to include conflict prevention, mitigation and response represents the Agency's venturing into uncharted territory. Additional risks emerge from the fact that time is of the essence (given, for example, the increasing possibility of major change and/or instability in Sudan and Kenya) but USAID has limited resources and expertise with which to "experiment."

D. Thoughtful Innovation

Responding in the Greater Horn -- and implementing the GHAI -- thus entails marrying risk to opportunity. Ensuring that USAID achieves maximum impact requires that the implementation of the GHAI be characterized by the following approaches, each of which reflects the fluidity of this period of change in the region:

- * While pursuing real and demonstrable results, the GHAI will aim to promote process before project, or to ensure that each activity undertaken adequately reflects the risks and opportunities posed by changes in the region;

- *So as to ensure the achievement of genuine partnerships while taking advantage of the open debate unfolding within the region, within the international community, and between these, implementation will include regular and consistent consultation with partners;

- *Implementation will also seek to achieve balance between building our partners' capacity to seek GHAI goals and USAID's own internal efforts to change the way we do business; and

- *Deliberate efforts will be made to evaluate progress and so ensure that the GHAI adequately reflects the realities and opportunities arising from change in the region.

The challenge to USAID is to take advantage of the change unfolding in the region and in the international community by rendering itself able to respond to windows of opportunity as they arise. The challenge is easier in some cases than in others. For example, the increased flow of food aid to the region and, with it, an increased dependency on "free hand outs," has been expressed as a concern by a wide range of governments in the region; IGAD and its international partners are responding with a regional Food Aid Charter to be used as a guide by both regional and international actors. USAID is participating in the development of the Charter, and should thus be well-positioned to invoke it in its own operations. In the case of Kenya, however, the "window of opportunity" for

USAID may not yet have been fully opened; as events unfold and local or regional partners identify creative means of preventing what appears to be a looming crisis, USAID's challenge will be to respond quickly and to embrace the innovations that may be proposed.

III THE GHAI APPROACH

A. Evolution of GHAI's Operating Principles

USAID's internal and external dialogue about the nature of the challenges in the Greater Horn, its development experience evolving from the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) and its experience in responding to crises in the region, has made clear that specific "ways of doing business" can render the GHAI more effective:

- * Given that approaches rooted in local knowledge and defined on the basis of regional priorities have the greatest chance of success, the GHAI must be implemented on the basis of regular and consistent consultation and coordination with our partners in the region;
- * Capacity-strengthening should be undertaken with a view toward not only developing human resource capacity in the region, but also toward enhancing USAID's understanding of these potential and existing capacities. Taken together, these approaches can increase USAID's ability to identify and support appropriate interventions with sustainable outcomes while, at the same time, enhancing the region's capacity to manage its own affairs at the public and private levels;
- * Information-sharing, in and of itself, does not constitute coordination, thus the international community must -- internally and in cooperation with its regional counterparts -- work toward a deliberate division of labor based on comparative advantage and interest in the region;
- * International aid institutions must re-think the traditional structural division between departments managing relief and those supporting development;
- * Analysis of the region's myriad political and economic puzzles can and should be enhanced by taking a regional, in addition to bilateral, perspective; and by explicitly recognizing the limitations imposed by relying on bilateral relationships absent the institutional capacity to incorporate regional analyses and approaches; and

* Addressing "transitions" in the region requires an understanding that these are complex and long-term in duration and, as such, require creative and sustained attention.

These "lessons learned" have given rise to the formulation of five GHAI Operating Principles. These are:

African Ownership: This Principle aims to ensure that GHAI efforts continue to build upon and respond to the growing evidence of African leadership in the GHA. Where there is an absence of political will on the part of a government or other actor potentially involved in an activity, efforts should be made to ensure that the resultant U.S. leadership is rooted in local priorities and realities, and that activities are designed on the basis of widespread consultation. Further, it suggests that opportunities to respond to local, national and regional efforts be taken advantage of wherever possible, with an increased focus on capacity strengthening.

Strategic Coordination: This Principle entails not only the more effective coordination of all USAID assets and actions, but also coordination between USAID and other USG agencies and U.S., international and local partners. It aims to ensure that activities are undertaken within the context of a precise framework or set of agreed-upon parameters, that comparative advantage is maximized, that duplication of effort and contradictory actions are minimized, and that gaps are identified and addressed.

Linking Relief and Development: This Principle entails providing humanitarian assistance which reinforces longer-term development goals, and deploying development assistance in such a manner as to prevent or reduce potential crises and the attendant need for humanitarian assistance. It also aims to ensure that transitions are better understood and more effectively supported.

Regional Perspective: This Principle involves analyzing and responding to events within the context of a regional perspective, and ensuring that GHAI activities achieve optimal regional impact where possible. Further, it aims to promote joint activities (e.g. between GHA countries) where possible.

Promoting Stability: This Principle aims to ensure that all programming reflects an awareness of the fact that each of the GHA countries is vulnerable to significant economic and/or political change. As such, one of its purposes is to promote advance-planning and preparedness as well as

flexible programming to respond should these changes occur. Further, this Principle aims to ensure that programs take advantage of opportunities to promote positive change in the midst of crisis.

B. The Overarching Operational Framework

The GHAI Principles described above will serve as the "overarching operational framework" within which the GHAI is implemented. The application of the Principles will lead to USAID's ability to "do business differently," and, importantly, better. Through practical tools and measurements described in Section IVB, application of these Principles to all USAID programming in the GHA region will be key to the success of the Initiative.

C. Convergence

One of the challenges inherent in efforts to "institutionalize" the GHAI has been the question of whether the GHAI entails "doing business differently" with all resources flowing into the region or simply with dedicated GHAI resources. Another challenge has been clarifying the relationship between existing USAID programs in the region and those undertaken to date and/or proposed by the GHAI.

As suggested by the GHAI Steering Committee, this Plan's strategic objectives rely on overall USAID program synergy and convergence for their achievement. Convergence is the process by which USAID's bilateral and regional programs in the Greater Horn, including programs centrally-funded by the Global Bureau (G), the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) and the Office of Sustainable Development in the Africa Bureau (AFR/SD), will accommodate and more directly support the goal and strategic objectives of the GHAI.

The GHAI's strategic framework is the starting point for convergence - the initial "wedge" with which to begin the process. The achievement of the proposed intermediate results relies not only upon existing synergies between bilateral, regional and central programs, but also on collective efforts to identify those areas where greater convergence may be needed and adaptations can be made accordingly.

GHAI-specific funds will be used as a flexible resource to provide catalytic support for program convergence, including support for application of the GHAI Principles to USAID programming. For details on GHAI-resource funding criteria, see Section VI.


In a collaborative process to be formalized by and monitored through the GHAI Field Steering Committee, the GHAI Strategic Objective Teams will monitor progress toward these intermediate results, determining those areas where greater program synergy may be required, as well as any adjustments to the results themselves which may be necessary. This effort will be directly supported by the proposed Special Objective Three (SpO3) described in Section IV.

D. Strategic Plan Timeframe


The Strategic Plan covers a five-year timeframe from FY 1998 to FY 2002. At the end of the five-year period, it is assumed that USAID's involvement in the region will reflect the GHAI Principles, derive from genuine partnership and consultation, and achieve more effective results in addressing the profound changes unfolding in the region. Internally, it is assumed that USAID will have developed the mechanisms and procedures required to sustain that greater effectiveness. Within the five year lifetime of the strategy, a degree of program convergence should be reached whereby the contribution of both GHAI and other USAID resources flowing into the region can be clearly measured for results against the GHAI strategic objectives. While complete harmonization of programs is unlikely during a five-year period, progress toward achieving such a harmonization should be evident.

OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK


African Ownership, Strategic Coordination, Linking Relief and Development
Regional Approaches, Promote Stability



GHAI Strategic Objective 1




GHAI Strategic Objective 2



GHAI

Special Objective 3



IV THE GHAI STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

A. GOAL: A Food Secure, Just and Peaceful Region

The GHAI evolved concurrent to a parallel process in the region. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of some of the region's more autocratic governments, the GHA was, by the beginning of this decade, seeing the emergence of a regional vision and increased debate, by and among constituents, in and about the decision-making that affects them. The most visible manifestation of new regional thinking was captured in the revitalization of IGAD and its adoption of a new and far-reaching mandate which includes both food security and conflict resolution goals. Less visible but equally important have been efforts, particularly among indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to take on the new issues of regional economic cooperation, democratization and conflict resolution and forge regional partnerships in pursuit of these and other development objectives.

Since the inception of the GHAI, USAID has undertaken extensive consultations and worked jointly with a range of governmental and non-governmental partners in the region, each of whom is dedicated to laying the groundwork for positive change. Similarly, the international community has begun to focus less on the short-term gains borne of regional Cold War alliances and more on the long-term investments, and partnerships, that can yield durable solutions to the region's myriad problems.

As such, the GHAI has come at a good time. Parallel to USAID's development of the concept, IGAD and the East Africa Community were defining their own revitalization processes. Other international aid institutions, ranging from multi-lateral agencies to private voluntary organizations (PVOs), were exploring the ways and means of adapting their approaches to a new era. Indigenous organizations and governments began an assertive effort to confront both crisis and food security in the region. The GHAI goal of a food secure, just and peaceful region, therefore, reflects the region's priorities as well as the aspirations of USAID's international partners.

The indicators of progress toward this goal are key, as it is at the goal level where people-level impact will be measured. Improved nutritional status at the household level and decreased flows of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) serve as the goal level indicators.

B. THE GHAI OVERARCHING OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The GHAI Principles of African ownership, strategic coordination, linking relief and development, applying regional perspectives and promoting stability, will serve as the overarching "operational framework" for the GHAI, reinforcing reengineering concepts and exemplifying new and better ways of doing business within USAID. Over the lifetime of this five-year strategy, various tools will be utilized to assist USAID in its efforts to apply these Principles to virtually all aspects of its programming in the GHA region. The Principles should become "enshrined" within USAID and serve as the norm for programs in the region.

Although USAID has on occasion demonstrated its capacity for applying these Principles, they are yet to be incorporated into all aspects of USAID programming in the region. USAID staff are not sufficiently trained to be able to apply the Principles to their day-to-day work and USAID's internal policies and procedures are not always inherently geared toward their application. Thus, this strategy seeks to assist USAID in establishing the overarching operational framework through analytical work, technical assistance and policy and procedural adjustments in support of the GHAI Principles.

The GHAI suggests several kinds of actions or "tools" to assist in the practical application of the Principles to USAID programming. In most instances, the "tools" do not require program resources, but rather a willingness on the part of USAID operating units to commit human resources to the effort.

Examples of suggested tools are as follows:

- * analyzing each operating Principle, identifying constraints to and providing recommendations for their successful application (e.g. the GHAI Transitions Team analysis of USAID constraints to linking relief and development yielded over thirty recommendations, all of which have been approved by the USAID Administrator);
- * developing guidelines to assure transfer of capacity from international to local NGOs in partnering arrangements;
- * providing technical assistance to specific USAID operating units or multi-office teams to assist them in applying the Principles in their work context;
- * preparing guidelines and assistance in integrated strategic planning (ISP);
- * developing a donor coordination strategy;

- * incorporating assessments of linking relief and development (LRD) into standard relief and development program evaluations;
- * providing LRD training to USAID staff and partners; and
- * establishing crisis prevention as a USAID subsector.

Measuring Progress

Since the overarching operational framework is about "doing business differently" within USAID and with USAID partners in the region, progress will be measured in large part through changes in USAID processes. The GHAI's Special Objective Three (SpO3), described later in this Section, will monitor and evaluate not only progress toward the strategy's strategic objectives, but also toward establishing the operational framework. Examples of measuring progress are:

- * the number of Transitions Team recommendations implemented;
- * the number of similar analyses undertaken of constraints to and recommendations for applying other GHAI Principles;
- * steps taken to establish crisis prevention subsector within USAID; and
- * completion of guidelines for integrated strategic planning (ISP).

C. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE ONE (SO1): Strengthened African Capacity to Enhance Regional Food Security

This Strategic Objective focuses on enhanced regional food security and incorporates three dimensions:

Availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Access by households and individuals to adequate resources to acquire appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

Utilization of food through adequate diet, water, sanitation and health care.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

The Nature of Food Insecurity in the Greater Horn

The Greater Horn of Africa region has suffered more than its share of sub-Saharan Africa's food insecurity. In the early 1990s close to 50% of the population was estimated to be chronically food insecure, with a significant proportion of the population dependent on food aid. Over the past decade, the region has suffered from devastating droughts exacerbated by civil strife and conflicts.

Over 80 percent of the population in the region depends on agriculture for its survival. The region's agricultural sector is characterized by widespread dependence on subsistence production of food crops and livestock, which suffer regularly from the vagaries of the region's climate. Currently, small farmers (both male and female entrepreneurs) produce the bulk of the region's food within an agricultural system beset by a variety of problems. As a result, the transition from basic agrarian societies to modern diversified economies is unfolding slowly and unevenly across the region.

Even though the countries of the region have tremendous variations in natural endowments, weather and degree of political stability, the Greater Horn of Africa region as a whole has the natural and human resource capacity to feed itself. However, the region, and most of its individual countries, have failed to achieve this capacity, and increased levels of food aid and commercial imports have resulted. The high volume of food aid provided for relief purposes contributes to short-term improvements in food security, although it potentially limits the region's ability to achieve long-term self-sufficiency. Costly commercial imports and the region's extremely high transport costs place a heavy burden on governments and consumers.

Infant and child mortality rates in the Greater Horn of Africa region are among the highest in the world. It is estimated that over 50% of this mortality is directly linked to undernutrition. Improving the nutritional well-being of the Greater Horn's population will reduce mortality, significantly improve learning capacity, increase labor productivity, and reduce health care expenditures. Improving nutrition has been linked to reduced pressure on marginal lands, which in turn reduces a society's risk of civil strife.

Root Causes of Food Insecurity

A variety of adverse trends, shocks, and policies are at the root of food insecurity at the regional, national and household levels in the Greater Horn of Africa. These include: poor economic policy environment (both macro and agricultural);

droughts and environmental degradation; inadequate physical infrastructure; high population growth rates; civil strife within countries and across borders; and inappropriate international response.

Economic Policy Environment

Although there was a moderate trend in the 1980s and 1990s away from state-owned monopolies to more market-oriented policies, government controls continue to impede the attainment of food security. Inappropriate tariffs, trade barriers and price controls still exist in most GHA countries.

Drought and Environmental Degradation

The regular occurrence of drought and other natural disasters, combined with a lack of mitigation activities and delayed or inappropriate responses, has reduced the coping ability of traditionally resilient populations. Drought, poor agricultural practices and the prevalence of armed conflict, in turn, have and will continue to exacerbate environmental degradation.

Physical Infrastructure

The transport, communication and marketing infrastructure in most of the Greater Horn region has been neglected due to war, inappropriate economic policies, and ineffective maintenance. This has a negative impact on food security in the region because it impedes the distribution of agricultural inputs, both within countries and across the region, reduces the flow of food from surplus to deficit areas, constrains marketing, and discourages agricultural investment.

Population Growth

Prior to 1950, population growth rates in the region were relatively low. Population tripled between 1954 and 1994, from about 61 million to approximately 186 million, and today the current average annual population growth rate in the Greater Horn region is 2.9%. This rate of growth approaches and in some cases exceeds the carrying capacity of fragile environments in the region. As a result, the region has suffered a reduction in the duration of fallow periods, the increased cultivation of marginal lands, increased pressure on grazing land for livestock and, in some cases, conflict between pastoralists and sedentary populations.

Civil Strife

Civil strife has greatly impeded the attainment of food security in the Greater Horn region. Agricultural production has been disrupted by conflict and war-induced mass migrations, and the prioritization of defense over agricultural and social

sector expenditure has caused production to lag. The region is dotted with refugee camps which are home to enormous and unsustainable food-insecure populations. The region's civil instability has also prevented an efficient marketing system from developing, resulting in increased poverty and widened income inequalities.

International Response

The response of the international community to the crises in this region has frequently exacerbated problems on the ground. Even in a post-Cold War world, the international community has emphasized rapid emergency response over and above responding to the root causes of food security.

The USG's Programs to Date

There is a growing recognition that the vast quantity of USG humanitarian assistance expended over the last ten years, while contributing to saving lives, has not adequately addressed the root causes of food insecurity. Many USG development programs have been well-designed and well-implemented, but the gains have all too frequently been lost within weeks, months, or years, either because of conflict or drought or because other sectors of the economy were not coordinated to reinforce these gains.

With countries in the region currently in different phases of development, USG bilateral efforts to address the root causes of food security necessarily differ. Within USAID, for example, the Tanzania strategy emphasizes investments in rural infrastructure and the role of the private sector. The strategy for Kenya emphasizes commercialization of smallholder agriculture and enhancing the role of the private sector. In Uganda, the emphasis is on increasing rural household income; a similar approach is being taken by Eritrea, which is focusing on rural enterprises as a way of increasing household income in targeted areas. USAID programs have also supported the development of nationally "owned" strategies rather than developing competing strategies. For example, USAID/Uganda supported decentralized public fora to vet the government's food security strategy, while the strategy for Eritrea is a reflection of dialogue with the Eritrean government and an expression of their national food security objectives.

RATIONALE FOR SO1

To achieve food security, attention must be paid not only to national but also to regional issues. Long term projections of food availability show that even with a continuation of current favorable agricultural production trends in some countries, the number of food insecure people in the region will nearly double by the year 2010. A major reason for this is the level of poverty and low levels of productivity in the region. Increasing food security requires not only increases in agricultural

production but also in the income with which people can access food and improved health and nutritional status.

While the GHAI cannot address all of the root causes of food security in the region, it can support the institutions and activities which promote regional collaboration and specialization, policy harmonization, information exchange and the development and transfer of regionally-appropriate technologies. While there is considerable individual capacity to address food security in the region, the institutionalization of this capacity has been weak, especially at the regional level. The revitalization of organizations like IGAD and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the emergence of groups like the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa (ASARECA), suggest that support to these institutions is necessary and that the potential exists for them to have a major impact on food security in the region. In addition, support should be provided to assist the various regional organizations to rationalize their sometimes conflicting roles and responsibilities.

Achievements cannot be gained, however, without adequate conservation of the region's natural and human resource base. A focus on improved nutrition at the household level will help determine if food security is being achieved and if the welfare of the people of the region is improving.

Within the five year lifetime of this strategy, regional capacity should be sufficiently strengthened to more effectively analyze regional comparative advantage, exchange information, and develop and transfer regionally-appropriate technologies on a sustainable basis.

Within the USG, in addition to the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, two additional complementary initiatives have been launched: the African Food Security Initiative (AFSI) and the African Trade and Investment Initiative (ATRIP).³ The GHAI focus on strengthening African capacity is complementary to these two other initiatives, reinforcing efforts which will collectively contribute significantly to improve food security in Africa.

³AFSI builds on USAID's extensive experience in agricultural development to help countries reverse the decline of funding to agriculture. ATRIP seeks to expand the number of African countries attractive to foreign investors as well as accelerate private sector response to reform efforts.

DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS

The development hypothesis guiding this Strategic Objective is that while national-level technical advances and policy reforms can contribute to enhanced national or sub-national food security, the strengthening of regional ties and consequent results are key to the GHAI goal of a food secure, just and peaceful region.

CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

This Strategic Objective rests on the assumptions that African individuals, governments and institutions will increasingly act on the need to identify regional solutions to food insecurity, and that the USG will continue to expand its outlook beyond national-level programming.

RESULTS FRAMEWORK

Strengthening African capacity (both governmental and nongovernmental) occurs throughout all of the activities supporting the following intermediate results (IRs) and is also supported through a number of activities which are cross-cutting in support of SO1. For example, strengthening the capacity of IGAD is a priority area which cuts across many of the IRs as does support for indigenous non-governmental organizations, including the private sector. An aggregation of these IRs, combined with the cross-cutting emphasis on capacity-strengthening, yields the following SO level illustrative indicators.

Illustrative Indicators at the SO Level:

- protocols or agreements on roles and responsibilities signed between regional and sectoral institutions dealing with food security;
- number of sectoral and sub-sectoral networks working on food security established or strengthened;
- number of innovative techniques/approaches/protocols developed, transferred, replicated and/or utilized in the area of food security.

IR1.1 ENHANCED AFRICAN CAPACITY TO INCREASE SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Increasing agricultural productivity in the Greater Horn region has been a long-standing objective of government, donor and NGO programs. Support to regional activities that strengthen African capacity to create and share agricultural technology through a variety of partnerships is necessary. A regional approach to cross-border transfer of technologies, commercialization of technology development and regional policies to support the flow of technologies and inputs across borders would complement bilateral efforts and help achieve food security at the regional level. A concurrent improvement in transferring technologies to farmers, as well as in ensuring that research and technology development are demand-driven, is also needed.

An important approach to achieving this result will be through the creation of nontraditional partnerships between private sector/NGO groups and private sector/regional agricultural research networks. These nontraditional partnerships will be incorporated under activities in support of this IR.

Illustrative Activities:

- a) support sustainable, regional agricultural research and technology transfer and policy networks;
- b) support private sector efforts at transfer of inputs and technology across borders;
- c) promote sustainable production of drought tolerant high yielding crop varieties (IGAD Project 6.1); and
- d) support transboundary livestock disease control and vaccine production (IGAD Project 6.2).

Illustrative Indicators:

- increase in production of selected staples in targeted areas;
- number of non-traditional partnerships established;
- progress toward establishment of regional livestock disease early warning information system.

IR 1.2 REDUCTION IN BARRIERS TO REGIONAL TRADE

Food security in the Greater Horn region has traditionally been sought through efforts to achieve increased national production and to promote income-enhancing activities. Thus far, trade has not been vigorously pursued as a policy option for achieving national or regional food security, although increasingly governments are referring to strategies of "self-reliance" rather than "self-sufficiency." Self-reliance strategies rely more on a country's gains from economic specialization, derived from natural resource conditions and trade, than on meeting total national food needs through production.

Governments such as Eritrea recognize the impossibility of relying on internal production, and seek a diversified economic base, built on trade, to complement increases in agricultural productivity. Uganda and Kenya both promote the production of non-traditional food and export crops, and the former's agricultural base should enable it to become a major food exporter in the region.

The hesitancy of some governments to move toward specialization and reliance on trade stems from fears that food needs may not be met reliably by the private sector. These fears, along with the desire to gather revenues from taxation, led many governments to set up parastatals and adopt other inward-looking policies which appear contrary to conventional economic and international trade wisdom. Kenya, for example, follows a self-sufficiency policy for maize despite neighboring Uganda's apparent comparative advantage in the supply of this commodity.

Despite many barriers, informal cross-border trade has been shown to be very important to meeting food security needs during times of peace and conflict in the region. Recent analyses have shown that the magnitude of private informal trade is much greater than formal trade, with the informal sector capable of moving large quantities across borders despite serious bureaucratic constraints which tend to escalate the transaction costs.⁴

Regional policy harmonization in the trade and transport areas, focusing on the reduction of trade barriers, is critical to increasing agricultural trade and food security in the GHA region. Reducing transport costs will not only enhance exports, but will also reduce the costs of food (both commercial and aid) imports. Based on existing analyses conducted under GHAI, transportation costs could be significantly reduced through the implementation of "non-infrastructure" related reforms.

⁴For example, in 1994 total trade between Kenya and Uganda was estimated at US\$325 million, out of which not less than 40% was handled through informal channels.

Illustrative Activities:

- a) support for regional policy harmonization on regional trade and movement toward a common market area; and
- b) support for implementing transportation sector reforms which will lead to a significant reduction in transportation costs.

Illustrative Indicators:

- reduction in the costs of transportation;
- reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers.

IR 1.3. FOOD NEEDS OF TARGETED POPULATIONS MET THROUGH ENHANCED REGIONAL CAPACITIES

An important trend in response to crises in the region has been increased quantities of externally provided food aid, for both emergency and development purposes. Although food aid imported into the region provides a major economic resource, it is not a benign resource. Its increased use over the past ten years has provoked an emerging debate over the real long term benefits – and costs -- of traditional food aid programs. Recent statements by governments of the region have acknowledged that new approaches to food aid should be taken, i.e., those that encourage local production and marketing capabilities, including those related to livestock. Drought mitigation efforts which focus on strengthening the capacity of communities to cope with stress have been emphasized by both African governments and many NGOs. Some of these approaches are already being implemented as part of USAID bilateral programs in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan.

At the regional level there is a need to design and test new food aid approaches such as regional monetization -- which could lead to effective utilization of increased local production and to a stronger private sector role in meeting food needs for targeted populations. Related to the longer term perspective of the region, efforts have already been initiated with the U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to develop methodologies for long term estimates of food imports into the region based on differential income distribution within countries. This should provide more realistic estimates, taking into account regional trade and the impact of market liberalization efforts currently underway in the region. Efforts to target food aid more effectively and assess vulnerability to food insecurity in a regionally comparable manner are also necessary. For example, as a follow-up to the Rome

World Food Summit, a Food Aid Charter is being developed by the region which will detail responsibilities of both donor and recipient countries.

Illustrative Activities:

- a) support activities focusing on the role of livestock and crops in the region's food security;
- b) design and implement a regional food aid monetization activity;
- c) analyze short and long term food import needs;
- d) conduct participatory vulnerability assessments;
- e) support IGAD in development of a Regional Food Aid Charter;
- f) reexamine the role of food aid in the GHA; and
- g) facilitate the reestablishment of traditional trading routes.

Illustrative Indicators:

- increased percentage of food aid sourced in the GHA region;
- percentage of US food aid provided through monetization schemes that enhance local production and marketing capacities; and
- number of participatory vulnerability assessments conducted;
- improved estimates of food import needs into the region.

IR 1.4 INCREASED PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN ENHANCING REGIONAL FOOD SECURITY

Recent analyses have underscored the vital role that the African private sector, including large- and small-scale investors and the region's small producers, can play in achieving food security for the region. Governments' economic policy formulation processes often ignore the views of the private sector. Despite the mistrust existing between private and public sectors, however, there is a growing realization of the need for partnership with the private sector by both donors and governments. Consultations with many businesses and business associations throughout the region indicate that the private sector seeks commercial opportunities in the food sector, especially in "down-stream" activities which will

stimulate production. The enabling environment for establishment of formal private/public sector fora on policy reforms that affect food security must be improved. Without private sector representation, even well intentioned reforms rarely lead to increased levels of production, trade and investment. Regional fora to complement those already established at the national level (such as the Uganda National Forum) would improve the quality of the policy debate on market reforms needed to stimulate national and cross-border food production and trade. Improved information on trade and investment opportunities would facilitate private sector participation in food security in the region.

Useful experience has been gained from USAID bilateral programs on the effectiveness of microenterprise programs in enhancing income growth and food security (e.g. Kenya). Encouragement of microenterprise development, especially in transferring lessons from one country to another, could be a major contributor to achieving food security in the region.

Illustrative Activities:

- a) collect and publish information on private sector investment opportunities in food security;
- b) support dissemination of improved regional commodity market information;
- c) conduct lessons learned and pilot activities in microenterprise development; and
- d) establish a regional commercial food policy forum.

Illustrative Indicators:

- increased number of meetings and/or fora that invite private sector dialogue to discuss regional food insecurity;
- number of microenterprise pilot activities developed which draw on lessons learned in other countries; and
- information networks established on private sector opportunities in food security.

IR 1.5 ENHANCED AFRICAN CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL NUTRITION AND OTHER CHILD SURVIVAL INTERVENTIONS

Over the last 20 years, the prevalence of childhood undernutrition has declined in all regions of the world, except for sub-Saharan Africa. Most African countries have experienced either no change in the prevalence of childhood undernutrition or, in the case of the Greater Horn region, an overall increase in its prevalence has occurred.

Nutrition is the critical link between the various food security components, regardless of sector (agriculture, humanitarian assistance, health). An emphasis on the quality and safety of diets through improved processing and storage techniques, food fortification and micronutrient supplementation means more nutritious and better utilized foods.

Several important trends in African countries need to be considered and built upon by GHAI activities. Increasingly, nutrition, health and other strategies must be consistent with trends in Africa toward integration and decentralization of services. Capacity development and logistics systems are particularly affected by both integration and decentralization. The trend in Africa toward adoption of minimum health packages including key services and interventions can provide an opportunity for nutrition -- regional approaches can provide important lessons for countries in the formulation of these interventions. Partnerships with communities and NGOs, another trend seen in African countries, are essential for sustainable nutrition improvement.

Improved nutritional status is crucial to the attainment of the GHAI goal and it is therefore essential to include an emphasis on improved nutrition at the household level. Improved availability and access to food in themselves do not necessarily translate to improved childhood and maternal nutrition. To improve nutrition at the household level in the Greater Horn, it will be necessary to develop and improve institutional and individual capacity in the region to a) improve the implementation of nutrition and other child survival interventions and b) to improve policy and program coordination in those sectors relating to food security in the GHAI.

Programs in the area of nutrition can contribute significantly to the GHAI goal, both through directly contributing to increased food security as well as providing the means to monitor and verify positive changes. The GHAI can play an important advocacy role for nutrition in regional institutions, and promote coordination between international, regional and national organizations. Specific activities which contribute value-added to USAID's bilateral programs will be developed jointly with African and other partners.

Illustrative Activities:

- a) regional assessment of iodized salt markets outside of Eritrea and Ethiopia;
- b) microenterprise trials of the development and marketing of fortified foods;
- c) inventory of nutrition programs in the region, both governmental and nongovernmental; and
- d) pilot activities adding child survival interventions to food distribution schemes.

Illustrative Indicators:

- increase in the use of "better practices" and related lessons learned in child survival and reproductive health; and
- decreased micronutrient malnutrition through increased availability of fortified foods.

IR 1.6 IMPROVED COLLABORATION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL NATURAL RESOURCES

Food production is largely dependent on the conditions of the resource base. To achieve sustainable increases in agricultural and livestock productivity, improved management of the natural resource base as well as sustainable agricultural and grazing practices are necessary. Variable rainfall, steep lands and other biophysical characteristics, compounded by population pressures, have led to land degradation, soil erosion, fuelwood scarcity, expansion of cultivation into unsuitable marginal lands, loss of biodiversity, and in particular, deterioration of the very resources upon which food security depends. War and civil strife, coupled with refugee displacement (and recently refugee repatriation) have exacerbated demands on the resource base, especially along borders.

The region's resources have more potential for suitable and sustainable use when taken as a whole rather than taken individually. Hence, it is critical to link management of the transnational natural resource base with food security. Use of transboundary resources in a region where pastoralism remains important and where most rivers cross several countries aggravates conflict and contributes to food insecurity.

The management of transboundary resources requires the cooperation of all countries in which it occurs. Lake Victoria cannot be managed by any of the three

countries in which it occurs without the cooperation of the other two. The management of natural resources must also be based on an adequate understanding of the natural resources at hand. Adequate ecological knowledge must form the basis upon which multinational protocols for the management of transborder resources are negotiated.

The sustainable management of the region's natural resources hinges on the ability of African policy makers and technicians to analyze the behavior of the resources and the consequences of their manipulation. Only then will countries be able to enter into well-informed and objective dialogue over the management of transboundary resources, and collaborate in the management of common resources.

Illustrative Activities:

- a) support for capacity building in integrated water resources management (IGAD Project 8.1);
- b) promotion of community based land husbandry (IGAD Project 8.2); and
- c) follow-up to GHAI Natural Resources Management (NRM) stakeholders meetings.

Illustrative Indicators:

- completion of comprehensive needs assessment for capacity building in the water sector; and
- successful creation of a network for implementing Pilot Land Care Groups in the Greater Horn of Africa region.

COMMITMENT AND CAPACITY OF PARTNERS

Central to determining how this SO is implemented is defining our partners and means of coordination. During the extensive consultation process in the region which has preceded and continued through development of the strategy, key partners have been identified. Through the implementation of the strategy new partners and partnerships will also be identified and developed. It is clear that there is considerable momentum in the region and acceptance of the approach that GHAI is following through application of the GHAI principles.

The GHAI will continue to build upon its growing partnership with IGAD as well as other regional entities including the East Africa Transport Initiative (EATI). There are also a number of private sector-oriented networks including trade organizations, dairy and seed producers as well as networks related to disaster preparedness and management (e.g., Eastern and Southern African Business Organization [ESABO], the Organization of African Unity-Pan African Rinderpest Campaign [PARC] Livestock Network).

The nature of governments in the region, as well as USG relations with them, is quite diverse. At one end, the more forward-looking approaches of the Governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia and, to a lesser extent, Uganda and Rwanda, have been key to the development of the Initiative. The Government of Tanzania might also be considered in this grouping, although given its parallel role in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) its involvement in the Initiative has been relatively limited this far. The Governments of Burundi and Sudan, given the ongoing crises in those countries, pose unique but not unsurmountable challenges, while the Governments of Kenya and Djibouti have been much more active in recent regional developments such as the revitalization of IGAD. Finally, the fact that there is still no government in Somalia and that the USG has no official relations with the as-yet unrecognized "Somaliland Republic" mean that the involvement of Somalia is having to be sought in new and creative ways.

USAID's primary partners are IGAD and its members, the East Africa Cooperation Secretariat (EAC) and regional technical networks. Emphasis will also be given to a growing number of indigenous organizations engaged in fields relevant to the implementation of this SO.

SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS

This Strategic Objective aims to build African capacity to enhance regional food security, not to enhance food security through donor-driven, nationally-based activities. Its sustainability demands a real and continuing commitment on the part of the USG, and other development partners, to the often difficult process of building local capacities. If that commitment is forthcoming, the newly-strengthened African capacity will make a sustained contribution to the achievement of the GHAI goal.

D. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TWO (SO2): Strengthened African Capacity to Prevent, Mitigate and Respond to Conflict

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

Complex economic, social and political realities in the GHA region pose significant challenges to efforts to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict. Continued instability in the region is simultaneously characterized by cross-cutting thematic issues including: failed states and states in transition; variable approaches to democratization; efforts to both manipulate and address ethnic and religious divisions; and increased pressure on resources. At the same time, each of the GHA countries suffers from its own specific internal constraints. At both the national and regional levels, efforts are underway to address conflict and the wide range of causes giving rise to them. Whether it be at the national or regional level, however, institutional capacity to deal with these challenges is as yet insufficient to meet the needs.

Two obstacles impede the ability of the region and its international partners to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict in the GHA region. First, while regional actors have taken considerable initiative to transform local knowledge into concrete measures to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict, there is as yet insufficient institutional capacity to ensure that the region's people and governments do, in fact, "own" and guide the process of change in the region.

Second, the sheer magnitude of the region's problems is such that regional and international efforts -- however well-inspired -- may prove insufficient to the task. As such, and because it is evident that a stable and prosperous region will be some time in coming, this SO aims not to prevent, mitigate or resolve each conflict that may unfold in the region, but instead to increase the capacity of both the region and its international partners to respond to them and, where possible, wrest positive change out of those conflicts.

RATIONALE FOR SO2

Coupled with that taking place in the international community, the change unfolding in the region necessarily entails risk, but with that risk comes the opportunity to develop genuine partnerships aimed at ensuring that declining resources are invested toward the promotion of stability, peace and prosperity and that the region's dependency on the international community is reduced. This opportunity, however, represents a new area of engagement for USAID, and has thus led to considerable internal analysis and discussion.

The term "crisis," for example, has been used in reference to both natural disasters as well as manmade problems and in recognition of the linkages

between the two. In addition, the "prevention," "mitigation" and "response" terms together imply a host of interventions, ranging from technical interventions to promote seed multiplication activities and thus mitigate the effects of drought, to diplomatic initiatives to bring warring parties together. The identification of the most appropriate starting point is the subject of heated debate as well.

In light of the wide range of opinion on both the issue of crisis prevention, mitigation and response and how USAID should address it, this strategic objective focuses on "conflict" as opposed to "crisis" because: a) the choice of conflict reduces potential redundancies between this GHAI framework and other frameworks (e.g., the BHR/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistant [OFDA] framework) which seek to capture results related to more traditional crisis prevention, mitigation and preparedness activities; and b) although complex interrelationships exist between conflict and other forms of crisis, e.g., food-based crises, making the distinction between the two is seen necessary so as to more clearly focus the SO.

Given these complex interrelationships, there are clear linkages between this Strategic Objective and SO1 and SpO3 that should be noted. For example, efforts to improve African research and the use of appropriate technologies under SO1 could be considered a conflict prevention approach in some circumstances. Another example is development and dissemination of drought resistant seeds in the region, which could help assure food access in times of drought and avert a resource-based conflict.

This SO is designed to reflect the fact that practical experience will be gained and priorities best determined through a learning process. Through experimentation, testing and replication of best practices, USAID, in partnership with regional institutions and other partners will maximize their respective comparative advantages in pursuit of this strategic objective.

The intermediate results outlined below are based on input from GHAI field missions and other operating units, as well as consultations with IGAD and other regional governmental and non-governmental partners. The first two intermediate results, for example, directly support IGAD's priorities.

DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS

The development hypothesis is that innovative and locally-owned approaches to conflict prevention, mitigation and response, when applied as an integral part of relief and development programming, will help to prevent conflicts and thus lead to a more food secure, just and peaceful region.

CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

This Strategic Objective rests on the assumptions that the prevailing trend towards greater African responsibility for managing regional problems and identifying solutions will continue, and that USAID will remain committed to using its resources to help meet broader U.S. foreign policy goals related to conflict management.

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS

IR 2.1 INDIGENOUS ORGANIZATIONS RESPONDING TO CONFLICT STRENGTHENED

There is considerable individual capacity in the region to analyze conflict [and food security] issues, but institutionalization of this capacity is weak, including at the regional level. As with other indigenous organizations, those addressing conflict need to: acquire better management and advocacy skills; increase their capacity to produce analysis and share information; and, enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of governments and external actors in the region. Activities that focus on strengthening these skills could complement capacity-strengthening activities at the bilateral level. Activities which seek to improve dialogue and cooperation between governments and indigenous organizations in GHA countries can also be complemented at the bilateral level. Organizations can be supported to share lessons learned in addressing conflict which should result in faster dissemination of successful techniques.

This IR will strengthen African capacity for several reasons: first, it aims to build the capacity of a regional organization, as opposed to providing external expertise; second, it supports the institutionalization of indigenous knowledge and research, and hopefully, its wider utilization by both the regional and the international community; and third, IGAD's work in this area marks the first time that what were heretofore considered the internal affairs of states are now considered to be issues of regional concern.

Illustrative Activities:

- a) strengthen the institutional capacity of IGAD secretariat in the area of conflict prevention, mitigation and response (CPMR);
- b) policy harmonization support for IGAD (ex. applied research and analysis, case studies, information dissemination and policy summits);
- c) support for regional capacity building in the areas of conflict prevention, resolution and management (IGAD Project 9.1);

- d) grant-making and institutional strengthening program for regional African non-governmental organizations; and
- e) support strengthened capacity in regional disaster management (IGAD Project 10.1).

Illustrative Indicators:

- improved management and advocacy skills;
- increased capacity to produce analysis and share information;
- proven legitimacy with governments and external actors in the region; and
- regional agreements reached on conflict prevention, mitigation and response.

IR 2.2 EFFECTIVE REGIONAL MECHANISMS FOR RESPONDING TO CONFLICT SUPPORTED

There are an estimated 10 million refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and recent returnees either in, or originating from, the GHAI countries. These populations are both the result of and a cause of conflict in the region. The existence of these populations costs the donor community millions of dollars per year, creates internal and cross-border tensions within and among GHA countries, disrupts economies, destroys local and national infrastructure and causes serious environmental damage.

Response to these conflicts in the region has been characterized by the fact that in most cases, more resources are made available to deal with emergency needs than in addressing the long-term consequences of humanitarian crisis, including the creation of refugees and internally displaced persons IDPs. In most of the region, refugee populations languish long past the point when international attention to a given crisis fades. The international community has yet to effectively link conflict response to refugee solutions, but is partially impeded by the fact that there exists no locally-defined framework for doing so. While there are many political and security issues to be sorted through, there is a core of African leadership, including some of the member states of IGAD, committed to finding durable solutions for the region's refugee and displaced populations.

There exist at least two specific tools for addressing these issues in the region, including a joint IGAD-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) project, the elaboration of which included GHAI involvement, to undertake pilot projects in which refugee needs and conflict prevention, mitigation and response

(CPMR) goals are linked. Second, many of IGAD's members were signatories to a Declaration at the 1992 Summit on Regional Humanitarian Issues which includes a call for a new regionally-based framework for addressing refugee issues. Both IGAD and many of its partners have indicated an interest in resurrecting this Declaration as the impetus for moving forward on this issue.

Given that crises can emerge out of either man-made or natural causes, and are usually the consequence of both, there will necessarily be some overlap between the activities undertaken here and under SO1.

Illustrative Activities:

- a. support development of regional mechanisms for the sustainable reintegration of refugees (IGAD Project 10.1);
- b. support reintegration programs for population groups outside IGAD sub-region; and
- c. support regional mechanisms which develop creative and lasting solutions to political problems (IGAD Project 9.1).

Illustrative Indicators:

- creation of a regional plan of action for the repatriation and reintegration of refugees/IDPs;
- establishment of a network of key stakeholders in the region to share information; and
- establishment of and/or coordination between and among effective conflict early warning systems.

IR 2.3 PILOT ACTIVITIES TESTED TO ESTABLISH BEST PRACTICES

There are many new organizations and many as yet untested methodologies being proposed to address conflict. Innovative ideas are emerging from these organizations in response to conflict situations. Therefore, USAID can be most responsive in this new field by establishing a mechanism for prompt support to promising pilot activities. Timely evaluations of these activities, as well as those undertaken earlier by the GHAI and others, will accelerate the learning curve on what works in the region. As "best practices" are established (and unworkable mechanisms identified and discarded) over the next two years, the priority activities in the SO will be refined.

Perhaps one of the most exciting yet difficult challenges to the GHAI will be response to the situation in Sudan, where a major transition is possible and where USAID has been authorized to implement an inter-agency decision to support local-level governance and democratization through capacity-building. USAID will be utilizing the GHAI to both test the degree to which USAID can prepare for and facilitate a smooth transition in Sudan – should circumstances so dictate – and to examine whether and how USAID can support local-level capacity building, and with it democracy and good governance, during a conflict, as opposed to only when armed conflict has ended.

Decisions regarding the final allocation of the USD three million dollars in Development Assistance (DA) allocated for Sudan are pending. For the purposes of the strategy, a portion of the Sudan allocation is intended to support pilot activities through those actions which can be defined as innovative, facilitative and instructive to the Agency's efforts to institutionalize new approaches toward conflict prevention and transitions in the region. The remainder of the Sudan allocation will be used as follow on to these initial efforts. Though GHAI resources are not normally meant to replace a Mission's operating year budget (OYB), the uniqueness of the Sudan situation, combined with the opportunity to apply all of the GHAI Principles to this new DA funding, have led to the decision to place the entire Sudan DA commitment within the GHAI.

Illustrative Activities:

- a. Establishment of a quick response conflict-management fund, managed by REDSO/ESA, and available to a wide range of entities, including bilateral missions, with sufficient funding for evaluation and write-up of results;

- this fund is not meant to replace nor serve as humanitarian assistance. Rather, it will be utilized to fund African participation in one-time or limited activities, such as summits or peace conferences, which seek to prevent, mediate or resolve conflicts. Over time, the fund might be expanded to provide other types of conflict-related support;
- b. continued support for Karamoja peace process, initiated to devise ways and means of preventing inter-ethnic clashes (USAID/Uganda);
- c. support to PVOS/NGOs for conflict resolution activities, including training (USAID/Somalia);
- d. support for locally based NGOs involved in CPMR on a regional level, assisting in capacity strengthening and participation in regional workshops and conferences (USAID/Tanzania);

- e. design and implement Sudan contingency and D/G plans in collaboration with USG and regional partners; and
- f. support for peace dialogue among tribes within and across the northern Kenya borders, including Ethiopia and Sudan (USAID/Kenya).

Illustrative Indicators:

Given that this IR is intended to support pilot activities in a new field, it is inappropriate to define indicators which might prescribe certain activities as opposed to allowing the GHAI to respond flexibly to creative initiatives that may be proposed. The proposed Special Objective Three, with a focus on impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation, will be key to establishing appropriate indicators for this result. Possible indicators might include increased initiative by bilateral Missions to promote these kinds of activities, and the sharing of lessons learned, both within USAID and between USAID and GHAI partners.

COMMITMENT AND CAPACITY OF PARTNERS

The commitment of USAID's partners to achieve this Strategic Objective is significant. It can be argued, in fact, that this Strategic Objective derives in large measure from USAID's desire to respond to the region's own effort, initiated parallel to but not as a result of the GHAI, to increase its capacity to address and manage its own problems.

At the level of the international community, recent joint studies, including the Multi-Donor Assessment of Rwanda and the United Nations' War-Torn Societies Project, have made clear the willingness of the international community to evaluate its practices. As illustrated by international involvement in the Joint IGAD-Partners Forum, the international community is demonstrating a new understanding of the need to tackle both regional conflicts and partnership in a new way.

Challenges posed by the complex political emergencies in the GHA region have similarly caused some members of the international PVO community to reflect on their roles and approaches in the field of conflict prevention. At the regional and national levels, both official and private institutions are giving increased attention to researching and addressing the root causes of conflict and linking their findings to more traditional development models, exploring the nature of their own partnership and cooperation with international counterparts striving to tackle conflict-related issues in the region. During the last three years alone, the region has spawned government-led efforts to address conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi. The GHA countries which are members of IGAD have signed a new IGAD Charter which specifically includes conflict prevention and response as a central component.

The capacity of the GHAI's regional partners, including IGAD, is mixed. There is considerable knowledge about the ways and means of assessing, preventing and resolving conflict within the region, but lesser institutional capacity to transform this local knowledge and perspective into concrete initiatives. There is also little capacity in the region to network and share experiences and approaches within and across borders, nor to utilize local knowledge to inform the national, regional and international decision-making that shapes conflict prevention efforts. The capacity of the GHAI's international partners is mixed, as well. Among both donor governments and PVOs, new and often ground-breaking analysis is not being consistently translated into new and effective approaches.

SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS

The sustainability of results of this Strategic Objective is heavily dependent on the inter-relationship between and among various aspects of crisis, namely, food security, political, social and economic dimensions of conflicts. The comprehensive approach promoted under the GHAI, including integrated strategic planning and convergence of both substantive issues as well as resources, will contribute to the sustainability of results.

When considering the sustainability of results, it is important to understand that the GHAI aims to help increase the capacity of its African partners to prevent, mitigate and respond to their own conflicts while at the same time enhancing the ability of USAID, as a primary member of the international community, to adapt its own operations to better address conflict-related issues in the region. As such, real results should be seen less in terms of the cessation of conflict in the region, and more in terms of the increased capacity of both the GHAI's African partners and USAID to prevent or respond to them more effectively.

Sustainability will derive from the degree to which both African and USG participants in the GHAI institutionalize this new capacity. Based on GHAI efforts to support IGAD, as well as some of the pilot activities undertaken, there is already evidence that the existence of institutions, mechanisms and communication facilities can and do enhance the effectiveness of both those living in the region and those aiming to support them.

E. SPECIAL OBJECTIVE THREE (SPO3): Improved Access to Regional Analytical Information

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

One of the most glaring impediments to the formulation of regional policy approaches in the GHA is the shortage of data and analyses which assess the region as a whole. The quality of existing resource material, meanwhile, is mixed. As a consequence, regional factors are given insufficient weight, and regional approaches are too often defined on the basis of an amalgamation of national analyses as opposed to deliberate regional assessments. There is also a need to make existing information resources more widely available and accessible to stakeholders in the region. This aspect of the "information gap" affects both GHAI partners in the region as well as USAID and its international counterparts.

Equally significant, at both the national and regional levels, is the parallel problem that, despite increased efforts to analyze food security and crisis prevention issues, these tend to be viewed sectorally rather than holistically.

Food security and conflict prevention are seen to relate to at least three distinct processes: economic development; social/political development; and ecological sustainability. Addressing any one sector in isolation from the others risks (and may in fact guarantee) failure to achieve goals in the selected sector. The "information gap," in this case, has more to do with the failure to make the linkages between food security and conflict prevention -- by looking at them in isolation from one another -- than with the unavailability of information.

The third aspect of the information gap has to do with the GHAI itself. The Initiative's innovative nature is such that USAID will need to make mid-course modifications; impact assessments, monitoring and evaluation are necessary to both measure results and adjust implementation.

RATIONALE FOR SPO3

The GHAI Strategy therefore proposes a Special Objective very similar to one presented by USAID's Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA). This SpO, "Improved Access to Regional Analytical Information," is intended to develop, both within the GHAI and in the region as a whole, a coherent and wide-ranging basis for accurately assessing "regional" interests and impacts at the regional level.

This SpO will ensure that frequent and accurate reporting on the activities generated by Strategic Objectives One and Two, including regional analyses,

studies, activities, etc. is provided to the broadest possible range of GHAI stakeholders. Similarly, results of monitoring and evaluation, undertaken in collaboration with African partners, will also be shared widely.

Through additional analyses and other relevant activities, this SpO will also augment the analytical work, information-sharing and capacity-strengthening activities suggested by the other Strategic Objectives. This SpO will serve as the vehicle for identifying and addressing gaps and linkages between the SOs, thereby contributing to the holistic, regional perspective needed to achieve the GHAI goal.

This Special Objective will also serve as the overall mechanism by which USAID will monitor its progress toward achievement of both the Strategic Objectives and establishment of the Overarching Operational Framework.

Through the approaches described above, SpO3 should contribute significantly to filling the information gaps described above.

This Special Objective is highly experimental, in part because it entails rendering public much of the program analysis usually considered to be internal. Success is by no means certain: the difficulty of communication and of obtaining information, the unfamiliarity of the approach, the lack of institutional capacity and the great differences in the needs and resources of the countries of the region are but a few of the many obstacles that the GHAI and its partners must overcome to achieve this Special Objective.

DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS

Many decision-makers in and working with the region, whether in government, business or civil society, have recognized the value and necessity of closer regional cooperation and are therefore already taking "regional" factors into account in their decision-making. Moreover, regional bodies such as IGAD are institutionally oriented toward a region-wide perspective. However, there is little regionally-based information and analysis from which to fashion new approaches.

CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

A critical assumption is that African private and public sector policy-makers would take well-founded and unbiased information and analyses on regional trends into account in their decisions if this information were more widely available to them. A second assumption is that such work would also provide an authoritative common reference point for discussions among donors, were it available to them. Finally, it is assumed that both regional and international approaches toward food security and conflict prevention in the region would be

enhanced, and rendered more sustainable, were they to be based on regional as opposed to national-level information and analysis.

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS

IR 3.1 BROADER INFORMATION DISSEMINATION ON GHAI

The GHAI recognizes the importance of information-sharing among stakeholders. Consistent with the dynamic nature of the region and the development process, the GHAI will also help facilitate improved accessibility to regional information resources by various groups in the region, including: governments, the private sector, civil society at large, private citizens' groups, non-governmental organization, as well as by USAID and other donors.

One of the Initiative's top priorities during the first year of strategy implementation will be to make information more readily available to its partners. To ensure that systematic and frequent reporting on the GHAI and related activities and analysis is established, GHAI is undertaking the Greater Horn Information and Outreach Service (GHIOS) activity. In its first year, the GHIOS will focus primarily on improving coordination and dissemination of information relative to the USG's GHAI-related programs in the Greater Horn of Africa.

Beginning in Year Two, GHIOS will expand its information base to include activities which are not necessarily supported directly by the GHAI, but which are related to its goal and objectives. This expansion will entail significant networking with external partners. In addition to hard copy information, the GHAI website will be revived and maintained.

IGAD has also placed a high priority on developing and maintaining integrated information systems. With greater access to the internet and communications technologies in the region, information flows can be enhanced and decision making improved. Creating and sustaining regionally compatible information systems will also ensure that there is accurate and relevant information upon which to base technical and policy decisions affecting regional food security and conflict management.

An important aspect of this result will be the complementarity between GHIOS and IGAD's proposed Regional Integrated Information System.

Illustrative Activities:

- a) establishment of GHIOS; and,
- b) support implementation of Regional Integrated Information System (IGAD Project 5.1).

Illustrative Indicators:

- frequent and accurate information on GHAI disseminated to all interested parties;
- GHAI website operational and updated at agreed upon intervals;
- completion of comprehensive design of Regional Integrated Information System; and,
- number of IGAD member states linked to Regional Integrated Information System.

IR 3.2 IMPROVED LINKAGES BETWEEN FOOD SECURITY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION THROUGH ANALYSES AND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

The activities pursued under this IR will augment similar activities undertaken through SO1 and SO2, with a view to addressing research and analytical needs required to link the two. Through broad dissemination of the analyses, research and other activities supporting these linkages, this IR will contribute directly to creating a regional capacity to view food security and crisis prevention more holistically.

Illustrative activities and indicators under this intermediate result will be a function of the gaps and linkages identified between SO1, SO2 and the operational framework.

IR 3.3 EFFECTIVE MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

African participation will be sought in the monitoring and evaluation of the GHAI. This will in part strengthen the capacity of individual Africans and regional African institutions to provide the sort of rigorous analysis required in the region and by its partners. It will also ensure that USAID's efforts are evaluated on the basis of a regional as well as external perspective. It is recognized that this process will take time, but the GHAI is committed to the process of strengthening African capacity, both through this Special Objective, and through activities in the other SOs.

Illustrative Activities:

- a) continuous monitoring of SO1 and SO2 and Operational Framework from Year Two of the strategy; and
- b) overall GHAI evaluation at the end of Year Three (late FY 2000).

Illustrative Indicators:

- assessment of extent to which the GHAI is meeting its objectives and establishing the Operational Framework, including its impact on regional food security and conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution;
- assessment of GHIOS effectiveness;
- assessment of degree to which gaps and linkages between SO1 and SO2 are being identified and addressed; and
- adjustments made to Strategic Framework as necessary;

V LINKAGES TO AGENCY GOALS

The GHAI is by definition a cross-cutting Initiative which supports all five Agency goals. The GHAI also reinforces Agency reengineering efforts by seeking to change the way USAID and its partners work by using the Operational Framework to assimilate the five GHAI Principles: African ownership, regional approaches, strategic coordination, linking relief and development and promoting stability. Combined with the GHAI approach of overall USAID program convergence in the region, the Initiative's Operational Framework thus lends support to all USAID goals.

Strategic Objective One, "Strengthened African Capacity to Enhance Food Security," contributes directly to the following Agency Goals: broad-based economic growth; protecting the environment; stabilizing world population; saving lives; reducing suffering; and reinforcing development potential. The GHAI Principle of Linking Relief and Development also contributes directly to the latter goal. Strategic Objective Two "Strengthened African Capacity to Prevent, Mitigate and Respond to Conflict," directly supports the Agency's Goal of building sustainable democracies.

VI GHAI Resources

All of the GHAI-specific resources will provide flexible, catalytic support for program convergence as well as for application of the overarching operational framework, i.e., the GHAI Principles. As achievement of the strategic objectives relies on improved linkages between existing and potential regional and bilateral programs, including those programs which are centrally-funded, GHAI resources alone will not, in most cases, lead to significant progress toward the proposed intermediate results. Rather, GHAI funds should be used to leverage other resources, both within USAID and with our partners, to achieve results.

A. Criteria for GHAI Funding

With the exception of management, monitoring and evaluation and operational framework costs, the following are the proposed criteria for GHAI funding, defined on the basis of consultation with GHAI operating units. A proposed activity must:

- a. demonstrate its relationship to one or more of the GHAI Strategic or Special Objectives;
- b. promote/demonstrate use of GHAI Principles; African ownership; regional perspectives; strategic coordination; link relief and development; and promote stability;

*respond to African priorities, be managed and implemented by African institutions or strengthen the capacities of African institutions;
*comply with one of the following definitions of regionalism:

- an activity that is implemented for a public or private regional organization, based on mutually agreed upon objectives, either for its own strengthening, or for the benefit of two or more of its members;
- an activity that is implemented by one country or an

organization in one country, with clear, direct, equitable benefits for at least 3 countries in the region; an entity within one country acts as the "agent" for the activity; and/or

- a number of similar activities implemented in more than one country in the region at the same time, to achieve structured comparative experiences for the region - often to test alternative efficiencies, cost savings, or impacts in different national contexts;

*demonstrate strategic coordination (i.e. improve collaboration and partnership between institutions; prevent duplication of effort and contradictory approaches; complementary; not redundant to other USG, IGAD, donor, multilateral, host government, university or PVO/NGO activities);

c. represent innovative approaches:

*support non-traditional methods and unforeseen targets of opportunity; lead to the adoption of new tools and practices; focus on root causes as opposed to symptoms of problems; manage existing resources differently and more effectively; promote structural change within traditional development institutions, including the public sector; engage and support historically under-represented development agents and stakeholders; ensure development efforts are rooted in indigenous initiative and respectful of African realities and priorities;

d. catalytic, facilitative, and value-added:

*focus on capacity-building and the sharing of lessons learned; lead to development of common strategies and frameworks for approaching complex issues; support indigenous leadership; expand the knowledge base around priority issues; leverage additional resources; has the potential for broader replication; lead to improved and harmonized policies; foster the formation of networks of individuals, organizations and governments with common interests; support multi-sector approaches.

e. limited in duration: not to exceed 24 months; and

f. does not exceed \$500,000.

B. FY-98 Priorities

Successful implementation of the GHAI requires the reallocation of existing staff and/or the recruitment of new staff and the establishment of new management mechanisms. The estimated "start up" time for these efforts is 10 months from the time of strategy approval. With the shift of GHAI implementation from Washington to the field, the top priority for FY98 will be ensuring that staff and management mechanisms in the field are in place to launch this strategic plan.

VII ANNEXES

- A. GHAI USG Interagency Framework
- B. GHAI Concept Paper

ANNEX A

GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE

USG INTERAGENCY FRAMEWORK

I. Introduction

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) was launched in 1994 following a visit to the region by USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood and a determination by President Clinton that the USG must develop a new framework for addressing post-Cold War realities in that troubled part of the world.

A GHAI Concept Paper setting forth the twin goals of crisis prevention, mitigation and resolution and the pursuit of food security was shared with over 800 representatives of GHA governments, regional institutions, donor governments, international and indigenous NGOs and the U.S. Congress. Since that time, USG agencies have been involved in supporting the re-organization of the regionally-based Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and in adapting or developing the internal mechanisms required to meet GHAI goals.

As a Presidential Initiative, GHAI operates under the direct authority and policy guidance of the President and the Secretary of State. The USAID Administrator is the designated head of the Initiative. In January 1996 it was agreed by U.S. Ambassadors and USAID Mission Directors in the GHA region that the development of a strategy for GHAI implementation would be coordinated by USAID's/Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA), outlining the involvement of USAID, the Department of State, the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce and Defense, U.S. Government intelligence agencies. The following draft strategy, which will be shared with a wide range of GHAI partners, applies to the over-arching strategic framework for the implementation of the GHAI, which is endorsed by all participating USG agencies, and individual agency Action Plans.

The Nature of the Problem in the Greater Horn of Africa

Comprising Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, the Greater Horn of Africa region has for the last decade been viewed as an "arc of crisis" characterized by war and famine. At the root of continued crisis lie widespread poverty and instability.

The causes of crisis in the Greater Horn are multiple and their relative importance is widely debated. There is growing consensus, however, on a number of causal factors. Governance in the region too often has been characterized by over-centralization, the exclusion of large segments of the civil society in the decision-making that affects them, and ill-conceived economic policies. Population growth has continued to outpace national economic growth. Regional trade and cooperation, as well as national development, have been constrained by limited infrastructural development and maintenance. During the Cold War, the region was beset by external interference and flooded with weapons.

These factors result in a Greater Horn beset by crises. There are today more countries at war than at peace, many of the conflicts in the GHA are regional in scope and impact, and the level of violence has increased. Development problems, natural disasters and complex political emergencies have given rise to chronic food insecurity; of the region's 200 million people, roughly half are undernourished. Overall conditions are further exacerbated by massive population movements triggered by the loss of physical or food security and by increased competition for access to resources. Over 10 million people in the region are either refugees, internally displaced, or recent returnees. Ongoing crisis has meant that governments have been unable, or unwilling, to direct limited resources towards social and economic development, and in many countries the limited infrastructure that exists has deteriorated. Over the period, AIDS -- a crisis in itself -- has spread while the provision of health and other social services has declined in many GHA countries.

The response of the international community, while frequently bountiful, has in most cases failed to address the root causes of crisis and food insecurity and in some cases exacerbated conditions on the ground. In the process of developing and adapting the tools required to respond to the new post-Cold War environment in the region, the international community remains better-equipped to react than to be proactive. With the flow of private capital to the Greater Horn remaining extremely low, foreign assistance remains critical. But the crises in the region mean that assistance provided by the U.S. Government and other donor nations is skewed towards relief needs as opposed to development goals. The U.S. spent significantly more on humanitarian assistance than it did on developmental investments each year since 1991, and in particularly bad years, as much as three times as much.

II. The Current Situation in the Region

The end of the Cold War has triggered tremendous change in the Greater Horn. With political priorities now less frequently determined by external alliances or dependencies, new struggles over the nature and organization of the state have emerged. At one end of the spectrum, war continues to be viewed as a legitimate means of social and political change. A majority of governments in the region have

come to power either by winning wars or by staging military coups, some continue to deploy force in order to remain in power, and opposition forces frequently opt for violence over and above more peaceful means of channeling dissent -- often because legal means to change or influence the political process are closed to them. At the other end of the spectrum, however, is a burgeoning and relatively peaceful struggle for democracy and wider social, economic and political participation.

At present, all of the countries of the region are in transition either from crisis or face ongoing or potential instability:

* Eritrea, which emerged from 30 years of war in 1991, has entered into independence with potential for self-reliance and political stability but faces an enormous challenge as it attempts to conquer chronic poverty, introduce democratic institutions, and reintegrate refugees from abroad.

* Ethiopia is more peaceful than at any time during the last 35 years. However, its minority government faces economic and political challenges as well as localized instability in some regions of the country. Ethiopia also faces chronic food shortages.

* Having brought about a tentative end to a long-running internal war, Djibouti faces the twin challenges of an upcoming struggle over succession as well as the obstacles imposed by a tradition of large-scale corruption.

* Kenya remains the economic engine of the region. However, it is beset by chronic corruption and is moving towards potentially divisive elections.

* Sudan, whose government is considered "terrorist" by much of the international community, has spent more years at war than at peace since its independence in 1956. Its instability is seen as a direct threat to regional peace and prosperity. What was once considered the "breadbasket of the Middle East" is now dependent on international food aid.

* Somalia, some six years after the collapse of the central government, has yet to establish a central authority in the face of an ongoing cycle of factional violence. Political anarchy continues to be a major constraint to regional economic integration.

* Uganda, a country whose triumph over brutality has inspired many throughout the region, continues to make marked economic progress. However, at the same time it is witnessing conflict in the north and on its border with Congo. Corruption, meanwhile, is an emerging problem, and the reluctance of the government to permit greater political pluralism has provoked considerable discontent.

* It is widely hoped that Tanzania's newly-elected government can and will make progress in tackling corruption, but even that relatively peaceful and democratic country faces enormous hurdles posed by limited economic growth; the spillover effects of the crises in Burundi, Rwanda and Congo; and potential political instability emanating from Zanzibar.

* Post-genocide Rwanda has made considerable strides towards recovering from civil war and genocide of some one million people. However, it must jump-start the economy and take on the delicate issue of justice, deteriorating internal security, and the absorption of more than three million old- and new-caseload returnees.

* Burundi, where efforts to tackle crippling internal contradictions appear to be stalemated, continues to slide further into the depths of violence and economic decline.

At the same time, drought has returned to the region, following a predictable cycle, with Somalia set to face another food shortage and Kenya, often a surplus producer, declaring an emergency and appealing for increased international food aid. The ongoing civil strife in Uganda's economically-deprived north, meanwhile, has caused that government to officially declare an emergency.

On a brighter note, the post-Cold War era has brought some good news to the region. National or local elections, though receiving mixed results from the international community and some internal constituents, have been held in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. The Government of Rwanda has publicly debated the judicial response to the genocide in a new parliament and has initiated trials. Several governments in the region are attempting to build democratic institutions; support for the development of the judiciary, for example, has become a central area of focus for international donors for the first time.

Ethiopia has shown that with good rains it can produce a food surplus, though there is still need for strengthening in famine early warning for cyclical drought years. Ethiopia is undertaking a complete overhaul of its civil service and, along with Uganda and others, registered significant economic growth. With varying degrees of success and with some risk, the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda are attempting to devolve power from the capitals to the rural areas. While international capital flows to the region remain depressed when compared to other regions of the world, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia and even Rwanda have attracted new sources of private capital.

Several governments in the region have demonstrated a commitment to taking responsibility for their own difficulties and their own mistakes. While far from "perfect," the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda have

demonstrated considerable progress towards a more equitable and stable future. While progress has been uneven, democracy has -- for the first time -- become the subject of increasingly public political debate.

At the regional level, six governments of the Greater Horn have worked together -- against considerable odds -- to revitalize the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), providing it with a new mandate to address food security, conflict prevention and resolution, and infrastructural development. This development, along with the creation in 1993 of the OAU's Conflict Resolution Mechanism, marks the first time that conflict -- heretofore considered the sole purview of individual states -- might be subjected to a regional or continental forum. IGAD, though still in the process of consolidating its reorganization, has mounted new efforts to address the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia.

Kenya and Uganda overcame their differences to re-establish, along with Tanzania, the East African Cooperation (EAC) group; the role of COMESA is under review; and the Kagera Basin Organization is similarly poised to play a new role in the Great Lakes region. Under new leadership, the UN's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) may prove a relevant force in the region's development future. The OAU, as well, has grown both more active and more relevant in recent years, in part through the increased utilization of its Conflict Resolution Mechanism.

In summary, the region is characterized by competing trends. On the one hand, there is a sharp increase in the incidence and scope of crisis, whether economic or political in nature. In recent years this region has witnessed more conflict than at any other time in the recent past, and dependency is growing, not decreasing. On the other hand, there are growing signs that the region is recognizing and acting on the need for both regional economic cooperation and regional solutions to regional problems. Finally, and most important, there are increasing signs that the pursuit of democracy is gaining currency, both at the governmental and non-governmental levels. While far from consolidated, this trend provides hope for a troubled region.

III. The GHAI -- What's New?

The GHAI does not represent a panacea for the problems of the region. More appropriately, it represents a "laboratory" in which the USG, in tandem with its partners, can adopt new tools and adapt existing ones for the tasks at hand. Specifically, the GHAI is unique in that it is geographically subscribed; it aims to promote non-traditional methods; it focuses on partnership and capacity-building in and with the region; and it is less dependent on providing new resources than on managing existing resources differently.

Since its inception, the GHAI has registered some significant results. The USG now has a growing working partnership with IGAD, to which it is providing significant technical assistance during the revitalization process. USAID programs in Sudan, Eritrea, Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda have been re-examined to give greater attention to crisis prevention, ensure more effective utilization of humanitarian assistance, and develop partnerships with both government and non-governmental actors. Donors are improving coordination in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Rwanda as well as on a regional basis to achieve greater efficiency and reduce duplication of effort.

The USAID Integrated Strategic Planning (ISP) process adopted under the GHAI, which fosters the integration of USG resources within a common framework and based on a range of possible "scenarios," has been undertaken in Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan. Coordinated by the State Department, the GHAI has also developed a portfolio of options for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, and supported conflict prevention training exercises in the field.

IV. Tools for the Initiative

Effective implementation of the GHAI will derive from the USG's ability to utilize a wide range of tools and to engage a significant number of actors.

Each participating agency in the USG will develop its own Action Plan and mechanism(s) for managing its involvement in the Initiative; each supporting agency will ensure through coordination with participating agencies that their approaches towards and programs in the GHA region reflect the goals and principles of the Initiative. Action Plans will be shared across agencies. Coordination, at the level of implementation, will be ensured at the Washington and Country Team levels through traditional clearance process as appropriate.

Partners include international colleagues such as the International Financial Institutions, the UN agencies, including the ECA, the EU, bilateral colleagues and NGOs. Within the region, partners include: GHA host governments; regional and sub-regional governmental organizations including IGAD, the OAU, EAC, the Kagera Basin Organization, and others; regional NGOs, technical and professional associations, and networks; and national NGOs and local community groups.

The GHAI principles are perhaps one of its most effective tools. These include the following:

- a) **African ownership.** This principle aims to ensure that GHAI efforts have a constituency in the region and build upon and respond to the growing evidence of African leadership in the GHA. GHAI efforts should be rooted in

local priorities and realities, and its activities should be designed on the basis of widespread consultation. Further, the principle suggests that opportunities to build local, national and regional capacity be taken advantage of wherever possible.

b) **Strategic coordination.** This principle entails not only the more effective coordination of USG assets and actions, but also between the U.S. and other international and local partners. It aims to ensure that GHAI activities are undertaken within the context of a framework or set of agreed-upon parameters, that comparative advantage is applied, and that duplication of effort and contradictory actions are minimized.

c) **Linking relief to development.** This principle entails both investing humanitarian assistance with an aim to reinforcing longer-term development goals, and deploying development assistance in such a manner as to prevent or reduce potential crises and the attendant need for humanitarian assistance. It also aims to ensure that transitions are better understood and more effectively supported.

d) **Regional perspective.** This principle involves analyzing and responding to events within the context of a regional perspective, and ensuring that GHAI activities achieve optimal regional impact where possible. Further, it aims to promote joint activities -- in two or more GHA countries -- where possible.

e) **Prepare for instability.** This principle aims to ensure that all GHAI activities reflect an awareness of the fact that all of the GHA countries may be in transition and thus vulnerable to significant economic or political change. As such, one of its purposes is to promote advance planning and preparedness where possible. Further, this principle aims to ensure that, where possible, GHAI activities take advantage of opportunities to promote positive change in advance of, or in the midst of, crisis.

V. The Future of the GHAI: A Strategic Framework

The goals of the GHAI are to increase food security and more effectively promote crisis prevention, mitigation and resolution through application of the GHAI programming principles.

For the purposes of the strategy, food security exists "when all people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life." There are three distinct variables which are central to the attainment of food security, namely food availability, access and utilization: **availability** of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied

through domestic production or imports; **access** by households and individuals to adequate resources to acquire appropriate foods for a nutritious diet; and **utilization** of food through adequate diet, sanitation and health care.

Crisis prevention is meant to represent short- as well as long-term interventions or actions designed to alleviate economic, environmental, or political conditions that might, over time, give rise to conflict or food emergencies. Mitigation involves responding to existing crises in such a manner as to prevent their expansion and, where possible, support the positive management of their outcomes. Resolution refers to "real-time" measures aimed at directly confronting outright economic or political emergencies with a view to bringing them to an end.

The objectives of the GHAI are:

- a) to support the capacity at regional, governmental and non-governmental levels to lead efforts to prevent, mitigate and resolve crises in the GHA and seek the assistance of other international partners to these ends;
- b) to support the capacity at regional, governmental, and non-governmental levels to lead efforts to establish and implement appropriate food security policies and programs; and,
- c) to incorporate the GHAI programming principles into USG approaches towards the region and all GHAI activities.

The combined inter-agency GHAI strategy aims to achieve broad results through its implementation. The strategy covers a multi-year period, during which time progress will be assessed. Progress will be shown by:

- a) an increased involvement of, capacity for and leadership by the region, at both governmental and non-governmental levels, in the management of the GHA's political and economic development, particularly as this involves the GHAI goals of food security and crisis prevention, mitigation and resolution; and
- b) the application of GHAI programming principles in relevant USG policies and programs affecting the GHA region.

VI Implementation of the GHAI

Given the enormous scope of the GHAI's goals, it is critical that its implementation recognize that it cannot be all things to all countries and that, given that the abilities and resources of the USG are limited, effort will be focused in a few key areas and, assuming progress, expanded over time. For this reason, it is important to use existing assets -- whether they be internal mechanisms for analysis and decision-making or human and financial resources -- more effectively. This entails, for example, employing the USG Integrated Strategic Planning process and Mission Program Plans to further GHAI goals. GHAI activities will focus initially on Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.

Although the GHAI is not considered to be "additive," meaning that significant additional resources are not attached to it, there are some resources specifically allocated for its implementation. These include resources provided by the USAID Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP) to IGAD, as well as USAID and other USG resources, including those of the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, that might be deployed towards IGAD's project portfolio. In addition, the GHAI includes limited "facilitative" funds made available by USAID which will be targeted to foster regional cooperation at all levels and will be managed by USAID in a process designed to ensure that GHAI goals and principles are reflected, clear priorities are set, and inter-agency consultation is fostered.

As a Presidential Initiative, the GHAI can be most effective when all interested Agencies coordinate their efforts in the region, towards the mutual joint goals of food and physical security. We look forward to a time when the convergence and synergies fostered by the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative become the normal means for the USG to accomplish its business in the region.

ANNEX B

**Breaking the Cycle of Despair:
President Clinton's Initiative on the Horn of Africa**

**Building a Foundation
for Food Security and Crisis Prevention
in the Greater Horn of Africa**

A Concept Paper for Discussion

November 1994

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Executive Summary

"Tribute is due to the great thinkers of our continent who have been, and are, trying to move all of us to understand the intimate inter-connection between the great issues of our day of peace, stability, democracy, human rights, cooperation and development. Even as we speak, Rwanda stands out as a stern and severe rebuke to all of us for having failed to address these interrelated matters."

Nelson Mandela
at the Organization for African Unity meeting in Tunis
June 1994

The Greater Horn of Africa -- a region comprising Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania -- remains a region in the throes of crisis. Famine, conflict and poverty have become all too common elements in these countries' differing levels of development.

In response to the existing and impending crises in the Greater Horn of Africa, President Clinton has called for a renewed commitment to these countries. It is in the interest of the international community to prevent further human suffering and political deterioration, and to work together to create an environment where future investments will result in sustainable development. This initiative represents a collaborative effort among African states, non-governmental organizations, concerned citizens, Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) and the international donor community to address the root causes of food insecurity in the Horn. This paper is forwarded not as a final product, but as a spark for a much needed dialogue among the mutual "owners" of this initiative. Only with the collective insight, creativity, and vision of these concerned parties can we respond effectively to these grave challenges.

To achieve the goal of food security requires changes in thought and action both in Africa and beyond. The way in which countries in the region relate to each other must change. The way donors approach country programs and assistance must be improved. The abilities of Africans to guide sustainable development efforts must be strengthened. Voices of peace and moderation, which all too often in the past have been cruelly ignored, must be heard. We must begin to look at the problem as a whole and not just the sum of its parts.

The Magnitude and Underlying Causes of Food Insecurity

A portrait of food insecurity in the region reveals acute and chronic food security concerns more severe than those of any other region in sub-Saharan Africa. Food insecurity

in the region is growing because of a complex and interrelated set of political, social and economic factors.

In 1989, an estimated 46 percent of the region's population, some 71 million people, were chronically food insecure. This percentage is greater than that of the overall figure for sub-Saharan Africa. This year an estimated 22 million people in the region required external food aid assistance. Nearly 11 million of these were refugees and internally displaced people, with another 11 million in danger of being severely drought-affected. Per capita food production declined in the region by more than 16 percent during 1980 to 1993 period. As a result, domestic food production per capita has declined and food import bills have placed increasing strains on trade balances. Donor food aid assistance has also increased. Regional per capita calorie availability (1,950 Kcal per capita per day) is less than the international minimum standard for survival of 2,100 calories, and much less than the standard for an adequate diet of 2,400 calories a day.

Solutions to these daunting problems must be grounded in an understanding of their root causes. It can be argued that the unstable social and political environments that have stunted economic growth in the region lie at the heart of inadequate food production and the low capacity to import foodstuffs. A number of factors have converged to create this instability: Poor economic policies have limited possibilities for intensification of agriculture and economic growth; growing population pressures and a lack of development of human resources have further stressed the natural resource base; civil strife and the absence of good governance structures have hindered equitable economic and social development; and the natural resource base of the region, although highly uneven, is limited in high production potential endowments. While these are some of the most immediately apparent factors that have eroded food security in the region, we hope that subsequent discussions will further our understanding of the region's problems.

An initial analysis of food insecurity in the region suggests the following framework as one way to address this humanitarian crisis. Again, this framework is a work in progress, one that will ultimately be strengthened by the critiques and insights of all those who help shape and implement it.

A Proposed Framework

In Preliminary discussions, members of the international community have voiced a recommitment to this region. For reasons of stable development, political interests and budgets, this renewed effort is needed. There is agreement that we need to collectively stimulate consensus on the goals and approaches to this task and institutionalize a new partnership in the region. This framework, when complete, will be entirely a product of the capabilities and input of national and regional African leaders and organizations, donors and all in the development community. Hope for the future lies in its creation and implementation.

The central goal of this framework is for the people of the Greater Horn region to achieve lasting food security. To achieve this goal there needs to be an institutionalized process of joint problem-solving to attack root causes of food insecurity.

The following suggested objectives outline a program of action for where this effort might begin:

- strengthen support for effective regional and national food security strategies;
- increase the capacity in the region for crisis prevention, response and conflict resolution;
- improve regional collaboration in promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing population growth rates; and,
- implement regional and national strategies to ensure the transition from crises to broad-based sustainable growth.

The Next Steps

The process suggested in this paper can be implemented if donors, country leaders, and non-governmental organizations approach the problems in a more integrated fashion. From mid-November to mid-December, we suggest that bilateral discussions for re-commitment to the Greater Horn of Africa take place in donor headquarters and African field offices. Simultaneous with donor discussions, joint donor meetings with African governments will be conducted.

We propose six steps to initiate a discussion on a recommitment to the Greater Horn region: First, regional institutions could be strengthened to perform stronger coordination roles for regional food security. We propose IGADD as an important regional institution. Second, options for a donors forum could be explored. Third, regional and national early warning systems could be expanded to cover the region, and to include political, security and social factors. Fourth, an international team might be asked to detail the principles that could guide the "relief-to-development continuum" approach. Fifth, joint analysis by donors and Africans could be undertaken to analyze strategies and priorities for agricultural and economic growth. And, sixth, joint donor/recipient portfolio reviews could be conducted to ensure that efforts contribute to a food security objective and that gaps in assistance are identified.

Open discussion, comments and alternatives, and ultimately decisions on the proposed concepts and framework are seriously solicited. The magnitude of human suffering and the hope for a better future demand urgent attention by the international community.

I. Introduction

International donor responses to the Greater Horn of Africa region, in many respects, reflect the region's turmoil. Throughout the world, as in the Greater Horn, the donor community is spending more on emergency relief and peacekeeping operations than on conflict prevention. The international community is spending more each year to dress the wounds of disaster and civil conflict while spending less on the development programs that might prevent them. This fact is nowhere more evident than in Somalia, where the U.S. contribution to the relief effort from the onset of Operation Restore Hope forward cost five times more than did its total development expenditures in Somalia for the 30 previous years.

The question is whether or not the aid dollars provided by the international community are being well-invested. Food aid alone cost donors more than \$4 billion between 1985 and 1992. Many believe that too much foreign assistance is being provided to address the symptoms of crisis in the region, while too little is being allocated to address the problems that cause them. The time has come for the international donor community to address the broader causes of disaster by placing a strategic focus on sustainable development while responding to the existing and impending crises in the region.


The rationale behind this recommitment is clear: The international community -- of which the governments and people of the Greater Horn are members -- can no longer afford to commit massive resources to the region that have little development payoff.

The proposed goal of this renewed effort is to achieve food security in the Horn. Food insecurity is both a cause and effect of crisis in the region and is, therefore, inextricably bound to crisis prevention. Drought and civil strife, two important sources of food insecurity, appear to be increasing in this region (Figure 1 (p.2)). Crisis prevention -- averting the horrors of another Somalia or Rwanda -- is an important objective. Collaboration on achieving food security is the wedge that breaks the "cycle of despair." Everyone living in the Greater Horn of Africa region, and everyone who is committed to its development, has a stake in achieving sustainable food security in the region. New ways of thinking, new ways of acting and new institutions should be adopted and supported by all partners in the region.

Humanitarian, political and development interests converge on this problem. Food insecurity reduces peoples' quality of life and fosters the social, political, environmental and economic instability associated with recurring crises.

Figure 1

Drought and Civil Strife in the Greater Horn



Source: U.S. State Department, 1994; World Bank, 1994.

II. Donors in the Greater Horn: The Historical Context and New Realities

During the Cold War period, outside powers were extensively involved in the internal affairs of African states. Both the United States and the USSR commonly exercised disproportionate influence over African domestic political and economic policy as well as foreign relations. One of the many negative consequences of this external involvement was that it fostered the notion among African leaders that solutions to political and economic problems were to be found externally and not locally. By and large, national governments followed either socialist or capitalist models of development, thus reinforcing the belief that there existed a development model or formula that could be imported from outside.

One of the most influential trends of the Cold War was the superpower support for centralized and authoritarian regimes that were highly militarized and whose activities fueled the burgeoning arms trade on the continent. Military expenditures outpaced social spending in many of the countries of the Greater Horn. Production was not geared to meet basic needs, but to sustain governments and to pursue wars. Inevitably, as conflict escalated in much of the region, food security decreased.

Another consequence of this period of misplaced priorities was a relentless economic decline. The confluence of armed conflict, failed policies, poor leadership and the increasing disenfranchisement of the citizenry undermined economic and social conditions in most of the region. This led to the collapse of market systems; the deterioration of tax and other revenue-collection systems; corruption and patronage; substantial military and other debt; increased food aid and Official Development Assistance (ODA) dependency; population growth in excess of economic growth; massive population displacement and, thus, shifting trade and labor patterns; an increase in black market trade both internally and across borders; a severe reduction in the village-level and household asset base; an increase in the number of female-headed households; a decline in the delivery of social services; growing risk-aversion on the part of subsistence producers; the continuation of inequitable land tenure systems; and, significantly, a sharp rise in the percentage of national populations considered vulnerable to external shocks.

As strategic interests in the Greater Horn region have declined, donor resolve to assist countries of the Greater Horn is being tested by the immense costs of recurrent crises, especially complex ones of a man made nature (Figures 2 and 3, p.5). U.S. expenditures in Somalia alone from the start of Operation Restore Hope in December 1992 to the present have been about \$1.6 billion. This is equivalent to two years of U.S. development assistance to all of sub-Saharan Africa. The European Union increased by five times its external humanitarian expenditure between 1990 and 1993, and many other foreign assistance agencies are experiencing similar trends.

The post-Cold War period has seen a shift in the basis of relationships between donors and recipient countries and a leveling-off of development assistance flows. Official Development Assistance to the Greater Horn in current dollars net of food aid and

emergency assistance rose from \$25 per capita in 1985 to \$36 per capita in 1990 and then dropped to \$27 per capita in 1992. While donors remain committed to provide relief for major humanitarian and development needs, demonstrable progress toward sustainable development should be paramount in consideration of future flows.

For many of the reasons described above, government development policies have not been implemented, and investments have not resulted in significantly increased capacity of national governments in the region to address the social and economic needs of their populations. Similarly, relief assistance, while undoubtedly saving lives, has fostered a dependency mentality among many recipients and has not contributed to addressing causes of recurring crises. In contrast to the Cold War era, donors increasingly recognize the limits on their ability to effect change without constructive leadership in recipient countries. Experience in Somalia over the last two years has further driven home lessons about the limits of successful donor intervention.


Though in its early stages, both donors and leaders in the region have embarked on a new and different approach, marked by greater power and authority being vested in Africans. Donors and regional leaders are structuring better partnerships. Development is characterized by efforts to ensure popular participation and the involvement of indigenous organizations. Host governments are expected to take the lead in development and economic reform programs in a new effort to achieve sustainability.

In recent years, the emphasis has begun to shift to the identification and implementation of local solutions and to more practical mechanisms for regional cooperation. In 1992, the leaders of five states in the region met in Addis Ababa to draft a regional framework on humanitarian principles. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1993 became the umbrella for a regionally supported peace process in Sudan.

While constructive leadership in the region is necessary for improving returns on development investments, donors also must meet the challenge of applying foreign assistance resources differently. Political and social factors need to be better incorporated in planning. The "relief-to-development continuum" concept is a good example of this new approach to assistance. Relief should address a wider set of issues to prevent humanitarian crises and reinforce investments aimed at sustainable development. Similarly, development aid should facilitate emergency prevention and response but focus on ameliorating the root causes of food insecurity and instability. All resources should be integrated to achieve the greatest impact with the least duplication.

A recommitment is needed to address the combined problems of the region and the international community. At the regional level, this means tackling the challenge of achieving food security with the ultimate objective of reducing economic and political vulnerability; at the international level, it means developing integrated approaches that are driven from the ground up.


Figure 2



Source: USAID, 19944

Figure 3

Total Donor Food Aid to the Greater Horn (1966 to 1993)



Source: FAO/USDA 1994

III. The Magnitude and Causes of Food Insecurity and Prospects for Change

This section describes the food insecurity problem in the Greater Horn of Africa, examines the most important causes of food insecurity and lays the foundation for developing a framework for action. This preliminary problem identification section will need to be jointly refined by those who commit to this effort.

A. The Magnitude of Food Insecurity

Although there is considerable variation across countries in this region, the regional statistics and trends presented below paint a stark portrait of food insecurity.

- In the late 1980s, an estimated 71 million people, or 46 percent of the region's population, were chronically food insecure. This percentage is higher than that for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and has continued to increase in the past five years (Figure 4, p.13).
- In August 1994, approximately 22 million people in the region were in need of external food aid assistance. Nearly 11 million of these were refugees and internally displaced people, most of whom fled their homes as a consequence of civil strife. Another 11 million are severely drought-affected. Most refugees and internally displaced people do not have the resources for sustained access to food supplies. The 7.3 million internally displaced were concentrated in five countries: Sudan, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Somalia. Every country in the region except Eritrea hosts some of the 3.8 million refugees.
- Per capita food production declined in the region by more than 16 percent over the 1980 to 1993 period (Figure 5, p.13).
- As domestic food production per capita has declined, food import bills have placed increasing strains on trade balances and donor food aid assistance has increased substantially. The value of food imports as a percentage of export earnings has risen from a low of about 27 percent in 1980 to more than 35 percent in the early 1990s. The capacity of most countries in the region to significantly increase commercial imports is limited by low export earnings.
- Regional per capita calorie availability (1,950 Kcal per capita per day) is less than the international minimum standard for survival of 2,100 calories and much less than the standard for an adequate diet of 2,400 calories (Figure 6, p.13). These current levels, stagnant for the last 10 years, are even below those attained in the region in the 1960s.

- The Greater Horn region is one of the poorest in the world. Gross National Product per capita is US\$167, and growth rates, which were negative throughout most of the 1980s, averaged -2 percent in the early 1990s. Poverty analyses done by the World Bank suggest that skewed income distribution in some countries (Kenya, Tanzania) makes food access a struggle for many even when food is nationally available.
- Poor nutritional and health status indicators are another dimension of high food insecurity. The regional infant mortality rate is 107 deaths per 1,000 with malnutrition underlying more than one-third of infant and child deaths. The prevalence of wasting (low weight to height measurement) of children under 2 years was between 30 percent and 45 percent in 1990 for the six countries for which data were available. Malnutrition also may be implicated in up to 80 percent of maternal deaths. Country-specific data are shown in Table 1 (p.14).

The magnitude of food insecurity in the Greater Horn of Africa remains a compelling human crisis.

B. The Root Causes of Food Insecurity

At the root of this alarming description of food insecurity is an unstable social and political environment that has precluded sustainable economic growth. A number of factors have converged to create this instability: Poor economic policies have inhibited the development of agriculture based on comparative advantage and intensification of agriculture, retarding economic growth; growing population pressures have combined with a lack of investment in human resource development, further stressing the natural resource base; civil strife and a scarcity of democratic institutions have undermined sustainable growth strategies; and the natural resource base of the region is highly uneven, and several countries have limited areas of high agricultural production potentials. Linked to weak national institutions are weak regional institutions precluding effective action on these underlying causes. These causes and their relative importance should be jointly analyzed with African organizations to help guide integrated efforts to overcome food insecurity.

1. Natural Resource Constraints

The limitations of the natural environment in the Greater Horn place certain constraints on improving food security. The chances of drought occurring in parts of the Greater Horn have increased from a probability of one in every six years to one in three years for those areas affected. Over the last decade there are two apparent changes in long-term weather patterns. First, there is a mean decrease in annual rainfall in the Sahelian Zone of Sudan; and second, interannual variability of rainfall has been increasing in the crescent from Kenya to Sudan, including parts of Ethiopia and Tanzania.

Repeated occurrences of drought and high variability in precipitation have reduced the ability of many smallholders to maintain their assets or to respond when conditions are good. Other natural disasters such as pest infestations and periodic flooding destroy area-specific production levels. Analysis of these factors argues for an more effective weather and pest early warning system in the region.

Increases in agricultural production in the past in many of the Greater Horn countries resulted from expansion onto new lands; notable exceptions include parts of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, where land scarcity has led to intensified use of existing land. The movement onto new lands, without improvement of management techniques, has caused environmental deterioration. In several countries, there is little additional land to be brought into production -- but there exists potential for agricultural intensification. However, in many areas few incentives exist to intensify. Roads are inadequate, and market distortions are common due to poor policies, including pricing, land rights, and, in some areas, poorly targeted food aid programs. Arable land in Ethiopia exists, but required investments in infrastructure and malaria eradication would be costly. Unexploited water resources exist, but the potential has not been fully explored and can be costly. The current accounting shows that our knowledge of the region's natural resource endowment is less than adequate.

Lack of agricultural intensification and low agricultural productivity mean that many of those in rural areas remain subsistence producers, and, therefore, the large quantity of food at low prices which is essential for economic growth in urban areas is not available. Productivity increases and growth linkages both in rural areas and between urban and rural areas are a prerequisite to increased incomes and sustained access to basic foodstuffs. Other food sources that have been neglected and could provide these linkages include livestock and aquatic resources. Aquaculture could be enhanced, and the rational use of marine resources could be promoted (six of the 10 countries have access to marine resources). Livestock are also extremely important throughout the region, but continued difficulties in policies such as disease control, grazing rights and supply of important inputs inhibit production increases. A component of a successful regional food security strategy needs to focus on regional research and diversification in resource management, and growth linkages throughout these economies.

2. Poor Economic Policy Environment

Agricultural intensification and the development of product markets and processing industries have not occurred partly because of a poor policy framework that has led to inadequate research, a lack of appropriate technologies and weak dissemination of existing technologies. Many policies persist that neglect the critical role of women in agriculture and restrict their full involvement in that and other sectors.

Economic and agricultural policies that distort prices of agricultural inputs and outputs adversely affect investment in agricultural production, marketing and storage, and incomes earned from these activities. While structural adjustment programs have improved

some critical pricing and other administrative control issues, difficult policy problems remain, especially privatization, land tenure, access to critical inputs, and international and domestic trade. Policy reform is a high priority because it is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for growth.

Weak market integration due to both poor infrastructure and domestic and international trade restrictions affect the ability of food surplus countries and regions to export to food deficit countries and regions. Public infrastructure, an important condition for both food availability and access, remains limited in all countries. For example, road systems do not reach the majority of the population in Ethiopia and are a woefully inadequate support to an active and extensive agricultural trade in Tanzania. The eight major railroad systems in the region are in various stages of disrepair. Cross-border trade restrictions as well as restrictions on internal movement of foodstuffs has prohibited the private sector from responding to shortages when and where they exist. Some progress has been made in lifting these restrictions, but additional policy analysis and reforms are needed.

Liberalization of marketing systems has encouraged the growth of small trading firms and entrepreneurs in several countries, but viable commercial enterprises throughout the food system (storage, assembly, processing and marketing) are lacking. The lack of development of efficient services is to some extent linked to the inadequacy of roads and the availability and cost of trucking. In many areas private traders are not able to respond to the liberalized markets because of lack of access to working capital. In addition to policy constraints, firms in this area need technology, financing and management support to increase food availability at low cost.

3. Rapid Population Growth and a Poor Human Resource Base

Population growth rates in the region were very low before 1950. In the four decades from 1954 to 1994, population tripled, growing from about 61 million to approximately 186 million. The current regional population growth rate is 2.9 percent. A partial explanation for food insecurity is that the greatly increased population of the Greater Horn may have approached or exceeded the carrying capacity of the fragile environment in some areas. With reduced fallow, barely arable land being cultivated and increased grazing pressures to feed livestock, increasing soil erosion and deforestation are reducing productivity. High population growth must be dealt with immediately, even though the impact of policies implemented now will only occur over the long-term.

Population growth rates remain high because of poverty and accompanying problems of poor child survival rates. Limited access to or the absence of basic services such as health facilities and education has meant low contraceptive prevalence rates, poor bodily absorption of available food nutrients because of disease and high infant mortality. Illiteracy rates in the region, especially high for women, exceed the average for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and correlate closely with fertility and high infant mortality rates. Another urgent problem that transcends borders is the spread of HIV/AIDS throughout these countries.

These poor levels of health undermine increases in labor productivity and represent a considerable barrier to increases in growth. Improvements in health services and education, especially those targeted to women, will contribute to reducing population growth rates and average family size over time. A healthy and educated population will, in turn, contribute to productivity increases and economic growth.

4. Civil Strife and Absence of Good Governance

For the last 25 years, armed conflict has been endemic to the region; since 1980, the number of Greater Horn countries suffering the consequences of civil strife at any one time has increased from three to five or six per year. Both military confrontation and attendant political instability have undermined food security in the region in direct and indirect ways. Agricultural production has been disrupted by actual conflict, by war-induced mass migrations and by an emphasis on defense over and above agricultural and social sector spending. Each of the greatest food crises of recent years -- Ethiopia in 1984-85, Somalia in 1992, Sudan since 1987 and Rwanda in 1994 -- has been generated by conflict.

Insecurity in the Greater Horn region ranges from full-scale warfare to cross-border clashes. In all cases, the militarization of the region during the Cold War era has contributed to the scale of conflict as well as to the tendency to resolve disputes by force. Governance in the Greater Horn region has for decades been characterized by autocratic rule and by extensive centralization required to maintain state power. This has, in turn, resulted in the growing political and economic disenfranchisement of the majority and in the retardation of the growth of democratic institutions in government or civil society. Armed conflict has evolved as the most readily available course of political interaction.

The structures of governance in the region have not only arrested popular participation in political decision-making and spawned armed conflict; they also have directly affected development. Weak, unstable or highly centralized governance structures have proven inadequate to the task of responding to food crises, even in cases where early warning indicators might have allowed for famine mitigation or prevention. The militarization and centralization of governance also has meant that the social sectors, including, for example, education, have received low priority. Illiteracy rates for the region are among the highest in Africa. Total illiteracy is above 50 percent for all countries but two, and in three countries, illiteracy rates for women exceed 85 percent. A healthy, well-trained labor force is a prerequisite for increased economic production; and at the same time, education is both a means and an end to a responsible citizenry.

There are cases for both optimism and pessimism in the potential for resolution of these crises in the region. In some parts of the Greater Horn the tide has turned. The 30-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been resolved. Uganda has emerged from a past of terror and armed conflict. However, the Greater Horn region has seen -- in Somalia and Rwanda -- the emergence of "failed states".

5. Weak Regional Institutions and Donor Coordination

The absence of stable and legitimate national governance structures and the continuation of cross-border conflict have precluded strong regional organizations to deal with complex regional problems such as refugees, trade, arms flows, natural disasters, etc. Regional analysis and action are needed in these areas, and forums could be supported in which comparative experiences can be shared to increase options. One regional institution, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development, exists but is relatively weak. However, African leaders have indicated their support to strengthen IGADD, and other donors have initiated actions in this direction.

Donor involvement in the region has often been duplicative, conflicting or conducted without local participation. No mechanism comparable to the Club du Sahel exists that could improve collaboration among donors, and integrate actions of donors and African organizations. In-country donor coordination is often limited to the exchange of information after implementation. Not only is a regional coordination forum lacking, but no national structure exists for joint problem identification and joint resolution with donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Societies of the region lack recognition of the benefits that accrue to nations from regional coordination. National organizations need to move beyond their preoccupation with national-level solutions where efficient and effective regional approaches can be formed.

C. Prospects for Growth in Food Production

The Greater Horn region is beset by some of the most intractable problems on the African continent. The difficulty of quickly turning around this bleak picture of food security for the region as a whole can be seen in projections of growth rates of critical parameters (food production and population) over the next 15 years. The World Bank and other research bodies have portrayed the necessary and sufficient conditions for progress toward attaining food security as increases of 4 percent GDP and 4 percent agricultural production growth or more, along with a reduction in population growth rates. Applying these conditions in the Greater Horn, projections from 1995 to 2010 range from a small, but significant increase in the food deficit to a doubling of the current deficit. Using the most optimistic assumptions about food and population growth rates, while keeping consumption constant (1,950 calories per capita), a small surplus in the regional food balance sheet results. Assuming no change in the current population growth rate of 2.9 percent, or the current food production growth rate of 2.1 percent, the regional food deficit will double in 15 years.

This analysis is only illustrative, and the focus on growth in food production does not imply that countries in the Greater Horn region should be food self-sufficient. Economic growth options in other areas that would provide capacity for countries to import also need to be analyzed. Annual food production growth rates of 4 percent in the next decade are, however, difficult to conceive, given past performance. Yet, there is cause for optimism as

such rates are, in fact, possible, according to recent analyses. Until 1990, the region experienced increases in food production of over 4 percent every third or fourth year. Precipitous declines in Somalia because of conflict have contributed to the negative trends; similarly, production levels have dropped in Rwanda and Burundi, but both countries experienced consistently positive national food balances until the late 1980s.

There are two important issues that a regional analysis masks. First, even in countries with national surpluses such as Tanzania and Uganda, nutritional indicators reveal considerable food insecurity for a large proportion of the population. Country-level statistics in Table 1 show unacceptably high infant mortality rates in these countries. Issues of access to food and other important basic needs within countries also must be addressed.


Second, dividing the region into a Northern and Southern tier reveals the production diversity of the region, which also indicates that there may be a partial solution to food problems through an expansion of regional food and livestock trade. Whereas countries in the Northern tier (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia) tend to have structural food deficits, the Southern tier countries (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) were as a group experiencing food surpluses until the end of the 1980s (either through domestic production or through the capacity to import). Although without concessional food neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia would make it through a "normal" year without a food crisis (Ethiopia has an annual structural food deficit usually in excess of 1 million metric tons), Sudan experiences considerable surpluses of sorghum every three years. These surpluses are frequently difficult to export. Absent political conflict, this production potential could be increased to three out of every five years. Several Southern tier countries experienced food surpluses until the end of the 1980s. Kenya was a food surplus country until 1988 but may be facing a continuing structural food deficit requiring significant commercial imports. In fact, Kenya is currently importing cereals from Uganda, as well as from outside the region.

Although the pressure on food availability for the region as a whole is growing, the individual country analyses indicate that there is still considerable scope within the region for increases in productivity and that regional trade can be a contributing factor in stimulating this production. In the short term, the Greater Horn region will require considerable assistance to raise consumption levels, but policies that promote sustained growth in agriculture through intensification and which emphasize comparative advantages can contribute to increasing regional and national food security.

The preliminary description of the food security problems and the analysis of the magnitude and root causes of this insecurity suggest the following as a possible framework for addressing this humanitarian crisis. It is a broad framework that starts with food security as the opening wedge to international and regional cooperation to break the cycle of despair in the Greater Horn of Africa region.

Figure 4

Food Insecure Population
Percent by Region




Source: World Bank Food Security Unit, 1992

Figure 5

Food Production Index
Greater Horn


per caput
1979-81=100



Source: FAO Agrostat, 1994

Figure 6

Food Security Gap
Greater Horn of Africa



Source: FAO Agrostat, 1994

Table 1: Basic Indicators for Countries in the Greater Horn

Country	GNP Per Capita (US \$)	Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) (1992)	Prevalence of Wasting Children Under 2 (1990s)	Fertility Rate (1992)	Adult Illiteracy
Burundi	210	106	43.5	6.8	50
Djibouti	--	115	--	--	--
Ethiopia	110	122	45	7.5	75
Eritrea	--	--	--	--	--
Kenya	310	66	31.6	5.4	31
Rwanda	250	117	38.4	6.2	50
Somalia	--	132	--	6.8	76
Sudan	--	99	--	6.1	73
Tanzania	110	92	36.7	6.3	35
Uganda	170	122	31.8	7.1	52
Greater Horn	167	107	--	--	57
Sub-Saharan Africa	530	99	--	6.1	50

IV. A Proposed Framework

This proposed approach will be discussed and modified with other organizations of the U.S. Government, other donors, national and regional African leaders, and private and other non-governmental organizations before adoption.

In essence, what is proposed is that the international community recommit to (1) provide long-term help to the Greater Horn region and (2) operate in a more effective, integrated way. Institutionalizing integrated operations will reveal gaps in solutions to food security and crisis prevention and provide a credible base to mobilize the resources needed to address the root causes of these problems.

A. The Goal and Purpose

The goal of the initiative is for the people of the Greater Horn region to achieve lasting food security. Ensuring food security is seen as the most important way to reduce the economic and political vulnerability of the people of the Greater Horn. Food security is meant in the broadest sense of the concept:

- adequate food availability at the regional, national and sub-national levels with sufficient quantities of necessary types of food consistently available to individuals and households;
- sustained access (entitlements) to food by those currently vulnerable to food deficiencies, particularly because of conflict, displacement and other crises; and,
- proper utilization including sufficient micro-nutrient intake, adequate health services and clean water to ensure proper absorption, and appropriate knowledge and inputs for good storage, preparation, and use.

The purpose of this framework is an institutionalized process of joint problem-solving to address root causes of food insecurity.

B. New Institutions, New Ways of Thinking and New Ways of Acting

Three new institution-building initiatives could be undertaken to ensure that the purpose will be achieved, and that the framework is further developed with regional and international participation.

- 1) International donors could support the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Disaster (IGADD) enabling it to become a viable regional coordinator for food security strategies, an objective currently within its mandate. There is an organizational vacuum in the region for policy analysis, coordination and monitoring,

and African leaders have indicated that IGADD is an appropriate sub-regional institution to assume this role. Regional technical and private associations also could be strengthened to supplement government analysis and planning.

- 2) A new donor forum could be formed. Lessons from CILSS (Intergovernmental Committee Against Drought in the Sahel) and SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) in the 1980s and 1990s show that a donor forum is important in a process for achieving regional food security and crisis prevention. True donor coordination and integration in the region would add value to all national and international activities.
- 3) National Action Committees at the governmental level could be established or adapted to undertake joint donor/recipient problem-solving. This mechanism also could draw in representation from other organizations such as international and local non-governmental organizations and the private sector.

New ways of thinking about food insecurity in the region are required by the magnitude of the problem described above. All organizations involved in the development process in the region need to be part of this new approach. The following principles are a starting point for discussions:

- Think crisis prevention/early warning. The root causes of food security problems, including political and social factors, need to be addressed. Political and social indicators could be brought into early warning systems, and better methods for linking warning to response in these areas could be developed.
- Assume prolonged or recurring instability. Development practitioners usually assume stability in planning. A high occurrence of shocks and the continuing presence of instability are, however, the norm in this region.
- Adopt common objectives and complementary approaches. If all donors and national governments commit to the objective of regional food security and develop complementary programs, a higher return on investments will be achieved. This process requires a review of current programs to identify overlaps and gaps.
- Plan jointly with a transparent approach. Both donors and national governments would agree to programs of action which provides guarantees of support on both sides in return for a joint commitment to tackle difficult and sometimes risky development problems.
- Integrate political-security factors with relief-development assistance. The proposed institutions can serve as fora for exploring new approaches as and vehicles for facilitating new and creative actions in crisis prevention and conflict resolution. Awareness of the linkages between instability and conflict, and relief and development, should lead to the promotion and elevation of sound humanitarian principles (e.g., the 1992 Regional Summit

on Humanitarian Issues) and acknowledgment of the fundamental civil, human and political rights of people. Deliberate efforts to ensure that development activities foster equitable access to both resources and opportunities and support for the basic principles of democratization at the national and grassroots levels also are suggested. These actions also might include establishing and developing government and civil democratic institutions and supporting efforts to decentralize power and authority.

- Integrate all resources. Internal and external resources for the region need to be better integrated toward the common objective of food security. In addition, stronger coordination within donor country agencies that provide resources to the region, e.g. ministries of development, agriculture, foreign affairs, etc., will bring the highest return on those investments.

New ways of acting also are essential to ensure a successful initiative. We offer the following as a start:

- Consider a wider set of contributing causes. Participants engaged in building a new foundation should be prepared to act on a wider set of contributing causes to the cycle of despair in the Greater Horn. The causes of food insecurity are multiple, complex and often regional in nature. Participants in joint problem identification may not agree on the priority of problems. Central to the achievement of food security, however, is the willingness of all to consider failures and successes of past efforts and to identify and act simultaneously on a wider set of contributing causes. It is increasingly necessary to address political instability. This framework calls for action to address political instability where it significantly increases the vulnerability of people to food insecurity.
- Adopt the "relief-to-development continuum" approach. The framework adopted should consider this approach in which short-term emergency responses and long-term development assistance would be integrated and undertaken simultaneously. Strategies would be developed to ensure the transition from crisis to broad-based sustainable development. Three concepts characterize this continuum:

Integration. These new ways of acting could be characterized by the integration of emergency relief and development programs. Relief resources can be used to address both immediate needs and longer-term objectives. Food aid distribution programs could support market development and agricultural productivity increases. Linking relief aid to longer-term objectives is illustrated through some programs in southern Sudan, which have aimed not just at meeting food needs but, importantly, have supported the rehabilitation of local productive capacity, particularly in agriculture and livestock, and have developed local capacity in health and sanitation. On the development side, programs would be based on sound risk assessments that identify vulnerabilities in social, political and physical infrastructure and provide means for preventing and mitigating disasters. Studies need to be undertaken to determine where investment in low-productivity areas, perhaps at the cost of growth dividends, may have high payoffs in social and economic stability, i.e., crisis prevention.

Methods to incorporate the probability of disasters into development strategies have begun to be developed and applied by major donors and some national governments, which urgently require policy implications from these exercises.

Simultaneous Action. An effective strategy also will require simultaneity in implementation. Practitioners need to deliver immediate life-saving food along with inputs allowing people to meet their own food needs, but, simultaneously, they need to use the good will and leverage of relief and recovery actions to move on short-, medium-, and long-term agendas (such as market reform, land reforms and stabilizing population growth) to solve the root causes of food insecurity.

Transitions and Gaps. While countries receive relief, rehabilitation and recovery activities necessary to fill gaps between crisis and sustainable development are often neglected. Examples of post-crisis transitions indicate that there is often under-investment in activities such as the demobilization of ex-combatants, demining, rehabilitation and reconstruction of critical infrastructure, and resettlement of refugees.

Operating principles on how to apply these new ways of thinking and new ways of acting would need to be jointly developed, and relief and development practitioners would need to be trained to think and act differently. Each donor would need to examine these principles within the constraints and mandates of their institutions. It is increasingly clear, however, that a new approach with real change is needed to address the magnitude of the problem in this region.

The inter-relationships of the major components of the proposed framework are summarized and illustrated in Figure 7 (p.22). Food security is the common goal on which all parties would focus complementary efforts organized through new regional coordination and national decision-making institutions. Although donors may play a large role in the beginning, their role should diminish over time with the impact of effective regional and national strategies. New thinking would be developed on how to integrate political and social factors with development efforts across a continuum from early warning-relief-recovery to development. Simultaneous implementation of interventions is needed to address the root causes of food insecurity. Some programs may not have a measurable impact for 15 years, but these should be implemented at the same time as interventions that have an immediate and short-term impact.

Sustained change in the Greater Horn of Africa will take at least a generation and probably more. All too often, international aid and financial institutions, as well as local government officials, fall into the "quick-fix" trap, advocating and designing programs aimed at resolving a crisis in one or two years.

C. Proposed Objectives for a Program of Action

Achieving food security in the Greater Horn region requires a program of action that addresses the root causes of food insecurity. The preliminary analysis of these root causes revealed critical obstacles to achieving food security in the region. Four objectives are proposed below as a framework in which we can together address these root causes. Projects appropriate for regional and national solutions would be formulated during regional consultations and by National Action Committees.

Objective 1: Strengthened support for effective regional and national food security strategies

Food security has been defined to include three aspects: availability, access and utilization at regional, national and household levels. Some countries experience serious problems of national food availability. Where countries have the potential to increase production, as well as the comparative advantage to do so, they will need to concentrate attention on improvement in policies and availability of technologies. This would imply a major research effort. However, some countries will not have a comparative advantage in food production, and economic growth in other sectors might be the best means to address food access problems. In these countries, and in sub-national regions where food insecurity cannot be alleviated through production, food access must be addressed through economic growth strategies and through systems for the effective identification and targeting of public works programs or other food safety nets. Much more would need to be done to encourage trade in the region between food surplus and food deficit countries.

Significant work has already been done on national and regional food security strategies for several of the countries of the region. For example, in 1990, with European Union funding, and with assistance from several British universities, IGADD prepared a regional food security strategy for six of the 10 countries in the Greater Horn. A ministerial-level conference in Kampala unanimously endorsed the resolution to implement "The Food Security Strategy for the IGADD Region." This analysis and similar work could be considered as a basis for the further development of this framework.

Objective 2: Increased capacity within the region for crisis prevention, response, mitigation and resolution

Crisis prevention involves the ability to foresee, and the means to prevent, prepare for, and mitigate or resolve crisis and conflict. Crises in the Greater Horn region have been and continue to be of a complex nature, in which there are political and economic dimensions that are often exacerbated by natural or external events. Effective prevention requires monitoring and analytical capacity at the regional, national and local levels, as well as the ability and will to respond to warning signs of all kinds (weather, economic, social and political) in a timely and appropriate manner. While there is a growing consensus that

interventions must be made in the region proactively, rather than reactively, the ability to do so will depend upon institutional capacity, good governance and effective coordination at the regional and international levels.

Effective capacity for crisis prevention depends on a balance between the complementary roles of the African state and civil society. There are many advocates of democracy and good governance. Multiple views exist, however, about the timing, sequencing and ownership of the processes through which these are achieved. Solutions to the larger issues of democracy and good governance can often be discovered in the process of working toward more limited objectives. Dimensions of democracy across a wide range of groups in the state and civil society should therefore be encouraged in such vital areas as agriculture and natural resources, education and family planning. In the state sector, local government and judicial bodies might receive special attention. Women's groups and indigenous NGOs are particularly important civil institutions.

Objective 3: Greater regional collaboration in promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing population growth rates

Measures described in the first objective that increase the productivity of food crop farming and which improve the access to and distribution of food supplies will be essential to achieving food security in the Greater Horn. Long-term food security also depends, however, on the sustained, broad-based growth of economies, which results in rising incomes on an equitable basis. Broad-based economic growth will require an appropriate policy environment, as well as support for sectors in addition to the food sector, such as export products, microenterprises and processing industries.

Population growth rates currently outstrip gains in economic growth. Investment in human resources through expanded programs in family planning, health and nutrition services, and education have the benefits of both improving the human resource base, thereby increasing productivity, and lowering population growth rates. A stronger human resource base is a precondition for sustained economic growth. Women deserve particular attention in this regard given the evidence that their educational status, income-earning capacity and nutritional condition are among the most important determinants of child survival rates and reduced demand for more children.

In determining growth strategies, it will be important to link the technical analyses proposed (particularly on agricultural production, natural resource development and social sector reform) with the broader macroeconomic and structural adjustment reform agenda and policy dialogue. This could be accomplished through technical symposia of research networks involving a broad array of public and private sector entities and institutions, or through more formal negotiating sessions under the aegis of IGADD or international donor institutions. Building the capacity of Africans to undertake technical and applied sectoral analysis to support effective policy dialogue would contribute significantly to this process.


Objective 4: Support of strategies to ensure the transition from crisis to broad-based sustainable growth

Nearly all of the countries of the Greater Horn region are in various stages of transition in and out of crisis, and none has escaped the fallout of crisis in neighboring countries. Emergency relief is being delivered to almost all of these countries. The transition from emergency relief to development programs, however, is made difficult by the lingering effects of these crises: large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, high military presence and crumbling infrastructures, among others. Given the great spillover of the effects of crisis on neighboring countries, the difficulties of transition in one country impede transition in the region as a whole.

The management of emergency interventions has generally been successful in saving lives. The means of achieving sustained development is well understood. But strategies for the successful transition from emergencies to development are not widely known, or if known, not often followed. Filling the transition "gap" in assistance strategies will be critical to achieving food security in the Greater Horn. Developing programs to ensure successful transitions may require changes in donor assistance mechanisms, and at the least, will entail considerable cooperation among donor agencies, international governmental organizations, the NGO community and a wide range of African organizations.

Figure 7

The Food Security Wedge



V. The Next Steps

The process outlined in this paper can be implemented if donors, African leaders and private and non-governmental organizations approach food security problems in a more integrated fashion, using new thinking and new actions.

The facilitative actions that follow are suggested as first steps in the implementation of an international recommitment. A tentative timeline follows in Table 2 (p.26). All such actions should be undertaken in a way that builds local capacities and institutionalizes the processes for sustainability.

1. IGADD and professional and private regional associations could be strengthened to perform stronger coordination roles for regional food security. IGADD also could support and facilitate improved policy analysis. IGADD could assist the coordination and monitoring of food insecurity across the region by providing a clearinghouse for information and comparative experiences, developing methods for regional solutions and providing training in these methods. The current United Nations Development Program institutional assessment of IGADD will help donors assess what assistance is required to strengthen the institution.
2. The options for a donors forum could be explored. Integrated approaches through a donors forum would promote complementary work plans, support cross-border solutions and promote transparency as a *modus operandi* for all efforts. A forum could serve to mobilize long-term commitments to address root causes of food insecurity in the Greater Horn of Africa. Options include a new forum, a sub-group under the Club du Sahel or a donors counterpart to IGADD, etc.
3. Regional and national early warning systems could be expanded to cover the region with access to findings by all parties. The system could include political, security and social factors and be connected to national, regional and international decision-making and response mechanisms.
4. An international, interdisciplinary team composed of African and donor members (including crisis prevention, relief, recovery, food security and economic development practitioners) might be asked to detail the principles that could guide the "continuum" approach for integrating prevention and relief-recovery-development. If this research and analysis phase is successful, the donors could support training for African and donor practitioners in regional and national food security organizations so that these principles will guide their operations.

5. Joint analysis by donors and Africans could be undertaken to: (a) analyze strategies for agriculture and economic growth; (b) collect knowledge on and model the necessary conditions to achieve food security; and (c) determine the relative importance of causes and optional interventions to achieve food security.
6. Joint donor/recipient portfolio reviews, based on the above analysis, could be conducted to determine how the present efforts serve to reduce national and regional food insecurity. The reviews also would show the degree to which current operations accord with continuum principles and contribute to a food security objective.

If Africans expand their efforts to address root causes of food insecurity, donors could recommit to not only help meet immediate and short-term food needs (two to four years), but to address medium (five to 10 years) and long-term (10-20 years) root causes as well. Clear specification of mutual commitment would be required. Under the concept of "variable geometry" (where each country moves as fast as it can in the agreed direction), this commitment will vary by country. All donors and host countries could work together to identify gaps in assistance, which would be filled on the basis of comparative advantage.

To facilitate these "process" actions, flexible donor support will be needed to fund research, assessments, analysis, conferences and contract staff. Appropriate "Horn of Africa Support Projects" could be established by donor and recipient programs to facilitate the initial activities.

The six suggested actions described above could be jointly accomplished with modest funding at a Facilitative Level, (\$7 million-\$10 million each). If donors and recipients went no further than these actions, the resulting changes in integrated processes should produce important efficiencies. If all parties decided to move forward, a start-up level of funding (\$25 million-\$75 million each) would be needed to begin priority programming. As soon as new processes have been institutionalized and action integrated, the credibility will exist to allow the international community to seek additional resources necessary (\$100 million per donor per year) to cut in half food insecurity in the region within 15 years.

From mid-November to mid-December, we suggest that bilateral discussions for recommitment to the Greater Horn of Africa take place in donor headquarters and African field offices. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is considering a meeting on the Horn of Africa in mid-December. This will be the first opportunity for donors to discuss together these concepts and possible next steps. It is anticipated that the DAC Informal Meeting will result in the scheduling of a Roundtable on the Greater Horn of Africa in late 1995.

Simultaneously with donor discussions, joint donor meetings with African governments and IGADD's secretariat will be conducted. African leaders could be asked to work with each other and donors in a new, integrated relationship and be willing to commit the staff, time and resources necessary for implementation. IGADD is proposing a first multidonor, multirecipient meeting to coincide with the ministerial meeting in Nairobi to be held January 10-15, 1995. This joint meeting would focus on reaching agreement on the regional and bilateral objectives of an international recommitment to the Greater Horn, with discussion of potential sectoral and geographic participation. Although all participants will have considered the framework, this opportunity to discuss details will be important.

If agreement is reached on sectoral and geographic coverage, joint donor-recipient working groups could be formed around the proposed objectives, or other objectives which are suggested during consultations. These working groups would focus on the analytical work needed to conduct joint portfolio reviews using an integrated regional framework. Working groups would submit Plans of Action to National Action Committees and to plenary sessions of IGADD members. We suggest that donors provide the necessary financial support for these analyses to be undertaken by recipients.

A Greater Horn of Africa recommitment should be given a high-profile official launching. The exact venue should emerge from joint consultations. The launching could be built around IGADD's annual Ministerial Meeting in January. Alternatively, the launching could occur in late January to coincide with the 10th anniversary activities commemorating work on the 1984-86 drought. Or a separate meeting could be organized in February-April 1995. We anticipate that the launching would be led by the African heads of government and donor ministers of development.

Open discussion, comments and alternatives, and ultimately decisions on the proposed concepts and framework are seriously solicited. The magnitude of human suffering and the hope for a better future demand urgent attention by the international community.

