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OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

FINAL REPORT




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AUGUST 2000



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS



Source: EIU Country Profile on Mozambique, 1999-2000, Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

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MOZAMBICAN GENERAL ELECTIONS DELEGATION AND STAFF

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LIST OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMODE	<i>Associação Moçambicana Para o Desenvolvimento da Democracia</i> (Mozambique Association for the Development of Democracy)
CNE	<i>Comissão Nacional de Eleições</i> (National Elections Commission) Responsible for overseeing the local activities of the administrative STAE and composed of members from both Frelimo and Renamo
CPE	<i>Comissão Provincial de Eleições</i> (Provincial Elections Commission)
DFID	Department for International Development, based in the United Kingdom
Editais	Tally sheets handwritten at the end of the voting process at each voting table
EU	European Union
FECIV	<i>Forum de Educação Cívica</i> (Voter Education Forum)
FORCISO	<i>Forum de Educação Cívica de Sofala</i> (Civic Education Forum of Sofala)
FRELIMO	<i>Frente da Libertação de Moçambique</i> (Liberation Front of Mozambique) The incumbent party and winner of the 1999 elections
Mesa	A voting table consisting of five poll workers administering the vote
PT	Partido Trabalhista (Labour Party)
PVT	Parallel Vote Tabulation
RENAMO-UE	<i>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana-União Eleitoral</i> (Mozambique National Resistance-Electoral Union) The main opposition party in Mozambique
STAE	<i>Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral</i> (Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration) The administrative arm of the electoral body responsible for all electoral preparations, polling official training, and civic education
UD	<i>União Democrática</i> (Democratic Union)
UMO	<i>União Moçambicana de Oposição</i> (Mozambican Opposition Union)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



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FOREWORD

After critical first elections supporting both war to peace transitions and a move to democracy, a country's second election often presents even greater challenges. In Africa in particular, second elections have been marked by lower voter turnout, frequent opposition boycotts, and the entrenchment of incumbents by increasingly large margins.

Since the end of the civil war and the first multiparty elections in 1994, Mozambique has made significant progress in its transition from war to peace and has moved toward an open and democratic society. Wide-ranging economic reforms have been implemented and contributed to high rates of growth and foreign investment. Nevertheless, the country still faces enormous challenges in terms of economic development, political reconciliation, and the consolidation of its political institutions.

In this context and in light of Africa's poor experience in second elections, The Carter Center viewed the 1999 elections in Mozambique as important to reinforcing peace and democratic stability in the country and across the region. The Carter Center organized a comprehensive observation program of the electoral process, including an assessment of registration and the deployment of 10 medium-term observers to monitor the campaign. For the Dec. 3-5 elections, the Center mounted a 50-person delegation, and 12 observers remained for extended monitoring of the vote tabulation process.

Taken as a whole, the 1999 electoral process demonstrated a number of positive signs, including bipartisan consensus on a new electoral law, a successful registration exercise supported by both parties, and a generally satisfactory campaign period, except for government and Frelimo

abuse of their almost exclusive access to the media. In addition, the voting process was peaceful and orderly, with high turnout and a tightly contested race between two strong candidates.

Unfortunately, technical problems and a lack of transparency in the final tabulation of results undermined the credibility of the process, fueling political suspicions and doubts about the final results, which showed incumbent President Joaquim Chissano the winner with more than 52 percent of the vote. The opposition party, Renamo, rejected the results and filed a complaint with the Supreme Court, which eventually ruled against Renamo and validated the results. Although Carter Center observers made

repeated requests, they were not provided sufficient access to verify the final tabulation nor analyze thoroughly the subsequent review.

Taken as a whole, the 1999 electoral process demonstrated a number of positive signs.

These problems prevented the Center from concluding with an entirely positive assessment of the election process. There are clear indications that all sides recognize that the 1999 elections were flawed in some important respects, and that electoral reforms are necessary to increase trust and confidence in future elections. The Carter Center is hopeful, therefore, that Mozambicans will work together constructively to strengthen democratic practices and institutions.

The Carter Center is indebted to all the delegates who participated in our various assessment and observation missions, and to the other observer groups, both Mozambican and international, for their enthusiasm and dedication during the entire electoral process.

I want to extend special thanks to Sir Ketumile Masire, former president of Botswana, for co-leading the December 1999 delegation. His experience and wisdom added immeasurably to our efforts. The Carter Center is





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GRANT LEE NEUBURG



Members of the Carter Center delegation gather in Maputo the day after observing the elections.

especially grateful to the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), whose generous funding made this initiative possible. We also appreciate the support provided by the Swiss Embassy and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and

by private donors.

Finally, I commend the Mozambican people for their perseverance and optimism. Their dedication to building and sustaining a peaceful and democratic nation is a symbol of hope for all countries emerging from conflict. ☐

Jimmy Carter



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 Shortly after Mozambique gained independence in 1975, civil war erupted and continued to rage for the next 16 years. In 1992 a peace agreement was negotiated, and in 1994 the country's first multiparty elections were held under U. N. auspices. President Joaquim Chissano and the ruling Frelimo party won the presidency and a majority in Parliament. Renamo, the former guerilla movement headed by Afonso Dhlakama, received nearly 34 percent of the presidential ballots and won 112 of the 250 seats in Parliament.

2 Although the 1994 elections were hailed as marking a successful transition from war to peace and toward multiparty democracy, Mozambique's long-term transition requires strengthening political institutions and overcoming political, regional, and ethnic divisions. As a result, The Carter Center and others viewed the December 1999 elections in Mozambique as an important test for the country's transition.

3 The Carter Center's involvement in Mozambique's electoral process began in May 1999 when a staff team concluded that Mozambican political parties and electoral authorities welcomed a Carter Center role. In August, after the Center was invited by the *Comissão Nacional de Eleições* (National Elections Commission, or CNE), a 13-person Carter Center team observed the registration exercise and concluded that the process was proceeding in a positive fashion.

4 In October 1999, the Center opened a field office in Maputo and recruited 10 medium-term observers to monitor the campaign and electoral preparations. The observers traveled to all 11 provinces to assess the campaign and meet with electoral authorities, political parties, and others. The Center found several problems during the campaign, including delays in the disbursement of cam-

paign funds, serious incidents of violence, and biased media coverage. Also, Carter Center observers noted credible reports of intimidation of Renamo representatives in three districts in Tete province. In spite of these problems, the Center concluded that the electoral process was progressing satisfactorily.

5 Carter Center staff planned to assess the feasibility of a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) to enhance confidence in the official results. Unfortunately, the issue was politicized before the Center could meet with political parties and electoral authorities to explain the technique. In October, the CNE told a Carter Center team that since Mozambican law did not provide for a PVT, one could not be allowed.

6 For the Dec. 3-4 elections, the Center organized a 50-person delegation co-led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Mrs. Rosalynn Carter, and former President Ketumile Masire of Botswana. Because of logistical problems in Zambezia province, the CNE announced that voting would be extended to a third day. Overall, between Dec. 3-5, Carter Center observers visited 747 polling stations in all of Mozambique's 11 provinces. In addition, delegates observed poll closing and ballot counting at polling stations on Dec. 5.

7 In general, Carter Center observers reported that: voting was orderly, tranquil, and efficient; party agents were present at most polling stations; and security was adequate. However, Carter Center observers noted that intimidation of Renamo representatives in three districts in Tete province before the elections had prevented Renamo agents from being present in those districts. Other problems included a lack of understanding of the voting process, improper campaigning, and insufficient lighting during counting.



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8 On Dec. 6, President Carter and President Masire delivered a positive preliminary statement on behalf of the delegation, noting that the Center would continue to observe the counting and tabulation processes. While most delegates departed, 12 Carter Center observers remained in the country.

9 The tabulation of provincial results occurred between Dec. 7 and 15. After some initial difficulty, Carter Center observers were allowed limited access to the databases in most provinces, except Zambezia. However, the computer software restricted observers' access to short periods between data entry shifts. Carter Center observers had only limited access to tally sheets, but did not detect discrepancies between those and the results in the computer databases.

10 While the provincial tabulation was in process, copies of the tally sheets were sent to the CNE-Maputo, along with the null, blank, and contested ballots for CNE to "reclassify." The official national results were to be computed by combining the provincial databases and adjusting those based on the reclassified ballots, and also on some 938 unprocessed "problem" tally sheets that were excluded from the provincial tabulations due to problems and sent to CNE-Maputo for resolution. However, as a check of the provincial data, the CNE built an internal database using copies of original tally sheets sent to Maputo.

11 Carter Center observers were allowed limited access to all review processes in Maputo, but the level of access varied and no aggregate information was available. The unprocessed tally sheets from the provinces were reviewed by two CNE members, one from each party. Although Carter Center observers could view this process, they were not allowed close access and could not assess questions about how unprocessed tally sheets were resolved.

12 Carter Center observers voiced concerns to the CNE about the lack of transparency of the CNE's work, and repeatedly requested greater access. While limited access was available to computer terminals for the internal CNE database, no access was provided to tally sheets or the databases with provincial results.

13 Over time, distrust between the CNE members from the two parties increased. Eventually, Renamo viewed the internal CNE database as the only data they could trust. On Dec. 20, the CNE president ordered that work on the internal database be abandoned, later explaining that the decision was due to pressures to complete official results, and the need to concentrate on reviewing null, blank, and contested ballots still arriving from distant districts. Renamo CNE members protested the decision.

14 On Dec. 21, The Carter Center issued a statement urging that party monitors and observers be allowed access to check results. The same day, the CNE held a meeting to finalize the official results. Renamo CNE members walked out, refusing to sign and validate the results. On Dec. 22, the CNE president announced that President Chissano won the elections with more than 52 percent of the vote. Renamo rejected the results and filed a complaint with the Supreme Court.

15 In a Dec. 23 statement, The Carter Center reported that while it was not aware of serious irregularities that would affect the outcome, its observers did not have adequate access to verify the accuracy of the tabulation, despite repeated requests to the CNE. The statement also called for maximum transparency during the period for filing and resolving complaints.

16 On Jan. 4, the Supreme Court issued a decision dismissing Renamo's complaint and validating the official results and the election of President Chissano. Regarding the unprocessed tally



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sheets, the court determined that after the CNE reviewed the problem tally sheets, 550 tally sheets were still deemed unprocessable due to major errors, and thus excluded from the official results. The court estimated that this represented about 377,773 potential valid votes, but did not address the fact that this figure was larger than President Chissano's margin of victory.

17 From April to May 2000, a Carter Center assessment team visited Maputo to analyze the overall electoral process and formulate recommendations for future elections. The team found a lack of comprehensive information about the election results, but reported that election officials and political parties seemed genuinely disposed to work on electoral reforms.

18 The CNE and the Supreme Court indicated that unprocessed tally sheets were reviewed by a CNE subcommittee, including representatives from both parties. Renamo, however, claimed its representative did not review the tally sheets definitively at that time. Members of the court indicated that technical experts were consulted to determine whether the unprocessed tally sheets were likely to have changed the final result.

19 Overall, compared to some other recent experiences of post-transition second elections in Africa, Mozambique's 1999 general elections showed signs of a maturing political system. The parties forged a consensus electoral law and campaigned widely, and election day processes were well-administered with high voter turnout. Nevertheless, the credibility of the process was undermined by technical problems and a lack of transparency during vote tabulation.

20 In the spirit of support for Mozambique's democratization, this report offers several recommendations for possible steps to improve future elections. The recommendations include: (1) reforming the electoral law to eliminate gaps and contradictions; (2a) restructuring the CNE on the basis of a comprehensive review involving civil society, political parties, and election technicians; (2b) increasing the role of civil society leaders in the CNE, selected in consultation with the political parties; (2c) clarifying CNE rules and operating procedures; (3) restructuring STAE as an independent body with permanent technical staff; (4) adjusting a series of election day procedures; (5a) publishing complete polling station results for the 1999 elections and for future elections; (5b) establishing a faster reporting system and allowing party agents and observers to monitor the data; (5c) permitting a greater role for civil society, media, and national observers to gather information about election results, including conducting parallel vote tabulations (PVT); (6a) adopting regulations to provide automatically for a review of results, or a whole/partial recount, if certain margins or thresholds are crossed; and (6b) reforming the institutions and processes for electoral dispute resolution. □





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BACKGROUND

In October 1994, Mozambique held its first multi-party elections, capping a two-year peace process that brought an end to 16 years of civil war. Shortly after gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, fighting broke out between the government army and a small guerrilla force organized with help from the Rhodesian security forces, who were then fighting their own war against nationalist liberation forces. In the early 1980s, what was to become Renamo was picked up by a new patron, South African military intelligence, which sought to use the group to destabilize neighboring Mozambique. While Renamo received substantial outside support, it soon began to capitalize on existing grievances within Mozambique.

Foremost among these were a sense of ethnic and regional domination (by southern groups against the center and center-north) and heavy-handed at-

tempts by the new Frelimo government to displace existing social and economic relations in the countryside without prompt and effective replacements. In 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord, designed to halt hostilities between the two countries (and end support for one another's armed opposition movements), but the war within Mozambique raged on.

By the end of the 1980s, with the transformation of the Soviet Union and the South African apartheid regime both looming on the horizon, external support for both sides began to dry up. A series of meetings in Kenya between Renamo leaders and Mozambican clergy in 1989 was eventually followed by formal peace talks in Rome. Frelimo changed the constitution in 1990, legalizing rival political parties and disavowing its Marxist-Leninist model. In October 1992, the Frelimo government and Renamo signed

the General Peace Accord in Rome. The accord called for: the dismantling of Renamo's armed forces and the integration of some of its troops into a unified national army; the reform or disbanding of various government security forces; the reintegration of Renamo-controlled territory into a unified state administration; and the holding of the country's first multiparty elections. The completion of these tasks was initially envisioned within a one-year time period. Two years passed, however, before conditions were in place for a satisfactory electoral process. The peace process was supervised by a 6,800-strong U.N. observation mission, ONUMOZ.

The 1994 elections, overseen by a U.N. observation mission/peacekeeping force and generously funded by the international community, were widely seen to be free, fair, and successful, despite an abortive last-minute boycott attempt

In the five years since the 1994 transitional elections, new democratic institutions have functioned relatively well and have suffered none of the reversals of some of Mozambique's neighbors, such as Zambia.

by the former guerrilla movement, Renamo. Frelimo, the party that had ruled Mozambique since independence, won the majority of seats in Parliament, and their incumbent president, Joaquim Chissano, was elected with 53.3 percent of the vote. Despite its international reputation as a brutal pawn of the South African apartheid regime, Renamo won 112 of the 250 seats in Parliament. Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo's leader and presidential candidate, polled 33.7 percent of the vote in a field of twelve candidates. A coalition of three small and largely unknown parties won the remaining nine seats in parliament.

The vote revealed sharply drawn regional and political cleavages, with the five central and most heavily populated provinces voting in favor of Renamo, while the south and extreme north went overwhelmingly for Frelimo.

In the five years since the 1994 transitional elections,



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new democratic institutions have functioned relatively well and have suffered none of the reversals of some of Mozambique's neighbors, such as Zambia.

In Mozambique's essentially presidential political system, the president forms the cabinet, which includes a prime minister, and appoints provincial governors. In this system, the only formal openings for opposition in government are in the National Assembly (Parliament) and municipal governments. Parliament has functioned relatively well, though the opposition boycotted it on several occasions. Frelimo's 51 percent share in the first multiparty legislature has given the opposition little leverage on major issues, since voting almost always follows strict party lines.

Until June 1998, when municipal elections were held in 33 selected cities and districts, all subnational administrators were appointed. In the newly created municipalities, mayors and municipal assemblies are elected. However, the new municipal governments have almost no representation from opposition parties, since Renamo and most of the other opposition parties boycotted the 1998 municipal elections in protest over election administration issues and alleged fraud. Renamo initially claimed there were problems with the electoral law, and later that there was fraud in the voter registration process and other aspects of the election administration. None of the opposition parties managed to register their candidates in time or fulfill all the requirements necessary to field candidates in all races. Only the *União Democrática* (Democratic Union, or UD) and the *Partido Trabalhista* (Labour Party, or PT) managed to run candidates. The PT contested just one municipal race, and the UD fielded candidates in three races.

As a result, Frelimo ran unopposed in 81 percent of the municipal assembly races and 58 percent of the mayoral contests. However, several independent citizens' groups, running as apolitical organizations interested in the nuts and bolts of local governance, mounted successful challenges and won a significant share of seats in several cities, including the capital, Maputo, and Beira, the second largest city.

The 1998 municipal elections foreshadowed the 1999 general elections in several respects. First, they suggested that levels of political party development (in terms of technical and substantive capacity) had progressed little since 1994. Second, they demonstrated the degree to which technical and political problems can become entangled. High levels of mistrust tended to transform technical problems into political ones, and the notion of neutral technicians within the machinery of election administration is regarded with suspicion by the opposition. In the 1998 municipal elections, this problem was compounded by a lackluster elections commission unwilling or unable to take a leadership position on key issues. Third, voter turnout averaged less than 15 percent, and fell below six percent in some areas. The low turnout appeared to result from a combination of several factors, including the Renamo boycott, voter apathy, unfamiliarity with the new municipal governments, and dissatisfaction with government performance. Finally, conduct of the elections was marred by strong accusations of irregularities, including ballot box-stuffing, and the election administration in general was roundly criticized from all quarters. □





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MAY 1999: EXPLORATORY ASSESSMENT

The Carter Center has maintained an active interest and involvement in Mozambique for several years. In light of this interest, and because of the challenges of consolidating Mozambique's broader transition, the Center viewed the 1999 general elections as a potentially critical event.

In May 1999, The Carter Center sent a small staff mission to Mozambique to assess the current context of

Mozambique's transition and the extent to which the Center could play a useful role in the elections, which were expected in either late 1999 or the first quarter of 2000.¹ The team met with representatives of the two main political parties, several smaller parties, government officials, electoral authorities, civil society groups, and key members of the international community.

The team reported that there was strong interest in

Carter Center involvement in the elections, including from the major parties, Frelimo and Renamo, the Mozambican government, the *Comissão Nacional de Eleições* (National Elections Commission, or CNE), and several other political parties. All sides encouraged the Center to become involved as early as possible and observe the entire electoral process, beginning with registration during the summer.

The political climate in the country was surprisingly

calm. In the wake of the dismal 1998 municipal elections which were marred by low turnout and Renamo's boycott, the major parties worked together to forge a new consensus election law, which was approved in

DAVID CARROLL



In August, Mozambicans wait to register for the election amidst a high turnout rate.

December 1998. Given the controversies surrounding the voters list from the 1998 elections, a new registration was mandated, and all sides stressed the importance of having credible observers present during the registration exercise. ☐

¹ The team included Carter Center staff Dr. David Carroll and Jason Calder, and Dr. Carrie Manning, the Center's senior political advisor on Mozambique.



AUGUST 1999: REGISTRATION PROCESS ASSESSMENT

In early August, Mozambique's CNE sent a letter inviting The Carter Center to observe the registration process (see Appendix A). In response, the Center organized a 13-member international delegation, led by Dr. David Carroll, which visited Mozambique Aug. 10-20, 1999, to observe and assess the registration process.¹ The observers traveled to 10 of the 11 provinces in Mozambique, visiting nearly 100 registration posts in nine of the provinces, and meeting with election officials from the CNE and the Technical Secretariat of Electoral Administration (*Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral*, or STAE), party officials, local observers, and civil society leaders. Before departing, the delegation issued a report summarizing its findings (see Appendix B).

Overall, The Carter Center delegation's report was very positive. The delegation found that: there was a high voter turnout, especially among women; party agents were present and satisfied with the process at almost every post observed; and there was evidence that citizens were receiving accurate information about where and how to register. The report also noted that the STAE's registration brigades were well-organized and dedicated, and domestic observers, in particular from AMODE (*Associação Moçambicana Para o Desenvolvimento da Democracia*), FECIV (*Forum de Educação Cívica*), and FORCISO (*Forum de Educação Cívica de Sofala*), were established in some provinces and

beginning to work in others.

However, the team noted several potentially serious logistical problems related to the long distances and scarce transportation resources that hindered the distribution of supplies and the communication of election data. Registrants also cited long distances between registration posts as a hardship in many areas.

The delegation raised another concern: the status of Renamo's integration and active participation in STAE. According to the electoral law, political parties holding seats in parliament are to be represented in both the CNE and the STAE. The Carter Center delegation noted the absence of some Renamo assistant directors, particularly at the district level in some areas, and recommended that Renamo be integrated fully into the technical staff of STAE before of the electoral period, as provided for in the electoral law.

The Center's observers also reported party agents' unclear roles at some registration posts, as well as an inconsistent police presence at the posts. Finally, the team noted concerns about the work conditions of brigade members, many of whom reported that they routinely worked entire days without food or rest.

Despite these concerns, The Carter Center team's general conclusion was that Mozambican society took an active role in the process, and that voter registration was proceeding in an extremely positive way. □

¹ The delegation also included: Dr. Carrie Manning, senior political advisor on Mozambique; Carter Center staff Ozong Agborsangaya, Jason Calder, and Patrick Berg; Therese Laanela of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA, Sweden); Denis Kadima, David Pottie, and Julie Ballington of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA, South Africa); Antonio Pita de Oliveira of the North-South Center (Portugal); Mario Paiva (Angola); Ana Conceição Pedro Garcia of the Central Geral de Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Angola; and Claudia Werman (U.S.).



OCTOBER 1999: FIELD OFFICE AND MEDIUM-TERM OBSERVER TRAINING


Where feasible and appropriate, The Carter Center often deploys long- or medium-term observers (LTOs or MTOs) as a critical component of its election observation methodology. The field presence of such observers allows the Center to conduct a thorough assessment of the pre-election environment, which is increasingly recognized as critical to an accurate, overall assessment of the entire electoral process.

In late October and early November 1999, a Carter Center team traveled to Mozambique to open a field office in Maputo and organize a team of nine volunteer MTOs to

assess the campaign and electoral preparations around the country during the weeks preceding the elections.¹ Andrea Wolfe, the Carter Center field office director, and Ana Barradas, a senior electoral consultant, managed the Center's Maputo office, trained the MTOs, and coordinated their subsequent reporting. The MTOs received three days of training on Mozambique's electoral law, focus-

¹ The team was led by Dr. David Carroll and the Center's senior political advisor on Mozambique, Dr. Carrie Manning. The other team members were: Carter Center staff Ozong Agborsangaya and Curtis Kohlhaas; consultants Andrea Wolfe, the new field office director in Maputo, and Ana Barradas, an electoral consultant; and Dr. David Pottie from the Electoral Institute of South Africa.

DAVID CARROLL



(l-r from center) Carter Center delegates Therese Laanela of IDEA and Julie Ballington of EISA talk with potential voters during registration.



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ing on the campaign period, the electoral bodies' role, and their role and responsibilities as international observers. Their reporting is covered in more detail in subsequent sections.

The October-November visit coincided with the receipt of a letter from CNE inviting President Carter and The Carter Center to observe the December elections (see Appendix C). The visit also coincided with the first major campaign swings by the two principal presidential candidates, President Joaquim Chissano of Frelimo and Afonso Dhlakama of a Renamo-led coalition. Both candidates initiated their campaigns in their opponent's territorial stronghold. Early reports of violent skirmishes between supporters suggested that the race would be heated and closely contested.

PARALLEL VOTE TABULATION (PVT)

A secondary purpose of the October mission was to assess the feasibility of conducting a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) for the 1999 elections.

PVTs are frequently used tools in election observation, the methodology of which involves the monitoring and recording of results from a random statistical sample of polling stations by election observers, and the comparison of these results to official results.² When credibly implemented, PVTs provide an extremely reliable projection of the re-

sults. PVTs' main purpose is to verify the accuracy of the official results and thereby enhance confidence in the process and the likelihood that the results will be accepted as legitimate by all sides.

Given Mozambique's history of political polarization and the incidents of violence that were occurring at the outset of the campaign, the Center believed that it would be useful to explore the feasibility of a PVT.

The Carter Center team planned to hold meetings with major Mozambican observer groups, the CNE, major political parties, and others to explain the operations and purposes of PVTs, and assess the extent to which there was interest and capacity in Mozambique to implement a PVT. Unfortunately, however, the issue was politicized shortly after the team arrived but before a full round of meetings could be held, when a pro-government newspaper ran several articles which seemed designed to obfuscate the issue and discredit any plans for a PVT.

When The Carter Center team finally met with the CNE to discuss the PVT issue, the CNE president told the Center team that "Mozambican law does not provide for a PVT, and therefore it would be against the law for the CNE to permit it." In the face of what the Center viewed as the CNE's overly strict interpretation of the law, and cognizant of severe logistical challenges, it became clear that a PVT would not be possible. □

² PVTs that use a random sample to obtain a rapid projection of the results are also referred to as "quick counts." Alternatively or in addition to quick count efforts, observers sometimes conduct more comprehensive PVTs, which collect results from most or all of the polling sites. For a thorough review of PVTs, see Larry Garber and Glenn Cowan's "The Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations," in the *Journal of Democracy*, April 1993.





OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1999: MTO ASSESSMENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN AND ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS

In the five weeks preceding the elections, The Carter Center's MTOs traveled more than 50,000 kilometers and conducted more than 100 interviews with provincial governors, provincial electoral bodies (STAE and CPE), leaders of political parties, civil society groups, and others. Their observations covered electoral preparations, campaign-funding issues, campaign activities and violence, and media coverage. These efforts were coordinated by Andrea Wolfe and Ana Barradas in the Center's Maputo office, and culminated in a Nov. 23, 1999, Carter Center report. The report's conclusion was that the campaign and electoral process were progressing satisfactorily, given the context of Mozambique's recent history (see Appendix D). Although several problems were identified, as detailed below, the Center's general assessment was that the process was on track.

ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS

Carter Center MTOs visited provincial level offices of STAE and the provincial elections commission (CPEs) in all 11 provinces. The Maputo office likewise maintained contact with the national level electoral bodies. The Center's MTOs reported that both the Frelimo and Renamo were generally well-represented in the electoral organs, including STAE, with only a few exceptions.

As the administrative arm of the electoral management structure, STAE is responsible for all electoral preparations, including the training of polling officials and civic education. Most of the STAEs that Carter Center observers visited were well-organized and efficient, particularly in their training activities. The Center's MTOs reported that STAE trained thousands of civic education agents and polling officials and that the training was critical to the

exemplary organization of the election day processes. In addition, the Center noted that several other international organizations such as NDI (the National Democratic Institute) and AWEPA (European Parliamentarians for Africa) trained more than 1,400 party agents on their role in the elections.

The provincial and district commissions for elections (CPEs and CDEs) oversaw the local activities of the corresponding STAE administrative office and consisted of Frelimo and Renamo members. Whereas the national CNE was plagued with political arguments which often hindered its ability to handle technical problems, CPEs and STAEs at the provincial and district level were sometimes able to play crucial roles in fostering calm, peaceful campaigning. Finally, in most provinces, the delivery of electoral "kits" appeared to be progressing well, even in the more remote and logistically difficult areas, designated by STAE as "areas of difficult access."

CAMPAIGN FUNDING: A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD?

During the 1999 general elections, opposition parties once again remained dependent upon external sources of funding as in 1994. This included both promised funds from the government and supplemental funding from international donors.

Most of the parties contesting the 1999 general elections also had run in 1994. In mid-1999, Renamo formed a coalition, *Renamo-União Eleitoral* (Renamo-Electoral Union), with 10 smaller parties, most of which had contested elections in 1994. These parties agreed to back Renamo's Dhlakama for president in exchange for winnable seats on the parliamentary lists. Another coalition, UMO (*União Moçambicana de Oposição*), was formed under the leadership of Wehia Rupia, the third-place 1994 presi-



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dential candidate. Although several member parties of the UMO coalition defected to Renamo-UE, the remnants of UMO contested the election (see Appendix E for a list of candidates and parties).

The provision of campaign funds by both the government and donors suffered considerable delays. The delays contributed to the slow start-up of opposition parties' campaigns, as these parties had practically no alternative sources of support. Funding for the smaller parties also was delayed by problems in their candidate lists and the additional time required of the CNE to verify these lists. These were finally overcome, and after some delays, campaign funds from the state budget were delivered as provided for in the electoral law and CNE regulations. Donor contributions for the campaign fund, however, were delayed longer. Initially, it was due to negotiations between the government and donors. Later, it was because donors had difficulties in disbursing the funds to the government. With about two weeks remaining in the campaign, the CNE distributed funds to the parties. Since the delays were not widely explained, they fostered accusations against the CNE and its status as a nonpartisan institution.

The opposition parties argued that these delays tended to work to the benefit of the ruling Frelimo party, which obtained an unfair advantage. Frelimo countered that their party had mobilized support and campaign contributions

and that opposition parties could have done the same. Although there were complaints and widespread evidence of

Frelimo using government resources and personnel in their campaign, no formal complaints were submitted by the parties or other appropriate authorities. The opposition parties mostly were disorganized and relied heavily on donor-provided campaign support.

While it is easy to be dismissive of opposition parties lacking the ability to raise sufficient funds on their own to conduct an election, it is important to remember that the governing party was, until recently, synonymous with the state, and enjoyed a formidable advantage via assets and the usual perks of incumbents (combining government business with campaign opportunities and using state resources).

TYNISHA GREEN



Women with their registration cards outside Maputo City. The elections saw a high turnout of women voters.

UNEVEN CAMPAIGNING AND LIMITED VIOLENCE

In spite of the late disbursement of campaign funds, most parties campaigned quite actively and peacefully. Unfortunately, however, campaign rhetoric between the two major parties was quite negative. Frelimo party members and the newspapers *Notícias* and *Domingo* were especially negative, referring frequently to the possibility of war, and blaming violent clashes on Renamo's alleged threats to return to war if it did not win. Renamo, for its



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part, accused Frelimo of corruption and neglect of the poor. Campaigns were carried out mostly in provincial and district capitals, reducing rural voters' exposure to the parties' campaign messages.

The campaign was marred by a few disturbing incidents of violence, most of which occurred when campaign rallies overlapped. The atmosphere worsened with bellicose rhetoric in the media. Each party routinely accused the other of instigating these problems. While several persons suffered serious injuries, the campaign generally ran peacefully.

Incidents in Changara district, Tete province, however, seriously affected the campaign and the elections in that district. In Changara, a Renamo district representative and his family fled the district after their home was burned. In total, six houses were burned. The climate of intimidation surrounding these incidents was very disturbing. Alleging that they were unable to campaign in Changara district, Renamo made a formal protest to the CNE, requesting that the elections in the district be postponed. The CNE declined to act on the complaint, since according to a strict interpretation of the electoral law, the police handles "electoral crimes" (*ilicitos eleitorias*).

In other instances, however, electoral structures worked with civil society actors to call for calm and self-control. Carter Center MTOs found especially noteworthy that some STAEs and CPEs organized meetings of political parties, security forces, and civil society to foster agreements on encouraging cordial and effective relations.

MEDIA BIAS

Much of the media coverage of the campaign was marked by partisan and incomplete reporting. Both major parties contributed to the problem by inappropriately using the media. However, the high de-

gree of state-owned or -controlled media meant that most of the abuses were attributable to the government and Frelimo. Consequently, the media failed to respect the spirit of the electoral law and/or the norms of rigor and impartiality in their coverage. According to the electoral law, printed publications that are "property of the state or under its control," shall be governed in their coverage of the electoral process by criteria of "absolute impartiality and rigor, avoiding discrimination between different contestants" (Article 30).

Coverage of the incidents of campaign-related violence in most of the media was usually inconsistent with what Carter Center observers witnessed. Much of the media coverage of confrontations between Renamo and Frelimo supporters was one-sided and suggested that Frelimo was the victim of a war-mongering Renamo party.

Notable exceptions were *Mediafax*, *Metical*, and *Radio Moçambique*. The first two are fax newsletters with a relatively small circulation. The latter, which is the only means of communication that reaches a majority of Mozambicans, even developed a code of ethics for its journalists during the elections.

Especially culpable were the state-owned television, TVM, and the newspapers, *Notícias* and *Domingo*. The former is the only daily in Maputo, while the latter is the only Sunday newspaper. These two newspapers were formerly government-owned, but since 1993 have been owned by a private company, Notícias SRL, with two parastatals, the Bank of Mozambique and the National Insurance Company, as the major shareholders. Given even this limited role of the state, and the fact that the editors and directors have not changed significantly following the "semi-privatization," it would seem that these papers should be subject to the media provisions of the electoral law.¹ ■

¹ See the final report by Article 19 on media monitoring for the 1999 elections.



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NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1999: CARTER CENTER OBSERVER MISSION

DELEGATE BRIEFINGS

For the December elections, the Center organized a 50-person delegation of international observers from 16 countries. The delegation was co-led by former

U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Rosalynn Carter, and former President Ketumile Masire of Botswana. The delegation also included eight observers from an autonomous delegation from the Southern Africa Development Community – Electoral Commissions Forum, or

GRANT LEE NELLENBURG



Voters patiently waited in long lines in the heat, particularly on the first day of the elections.

SADC-ECF), led by Justice Lewis Makame, chairman of the National Electoral Commission of Tanzania.¹ The delegates arrived in Maputo on Nov. 29, three days before the elections. On Nov. 30, the delegation received a series of briefings on the elections and political developments and was trained on the Center’s election observation methodology and the roles and responsibilities of international observers.

After receiving a detailed orientation on the political and historical context of Mozambique, the STAE director and CNE president briefed the delegation on the electoral law and the current state of preparations for the elections.

Both major parties sent representatives (the secretary general of Frelimo and the national campaign manager of Renamo) to meet with the delegation and share their opinions and concerns. The delegation also heard presentations by Mozambican observer groups on their observation ef-

forts and plans.

In addition, The Carter Center’s medium-term observers provided a province-by-province briefing, summarizing their assessment of the campaign period and their observation experiences in the field.

OBSERVATION METHODOLOGY AND DEPLOYMENT

A final briefing session covered the Center’s observation methodology, logistics, and security issues. Observers also were provided with observation forms, or “checklists,” which detailed the procedures and/or irregularities that delegates should observe

¹ The observers from the SADC-ECF worked closely with the Carter Center delegation, including participating in joint briefings and deployment, but retained a separate institutional identity for official statements and reporting.



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and record. Since voting was planned for two days, delegates received specific instructions for each phase of each day. (See Appendix F for samples of The Carter Center's checklists.)

Delegates were instructed to arrive at their polling station on the first day, Dec. 3, to watch the opening procedures at 7 a.m., and ensure that ballot boxes were empty and properly sealed. Throughout the day, observers were to visit various polling stations to observe the voting process

and complete a checklist at each station visited. Observers were to record information about the operation of the polling station, including the presence of polling officials, party agents, and observers, and note whether there were any problems or irregularities.

At the end of the day, observers were to watch a poll closing, especially noting how ballot boxes were sealed, and whether police guarded the boxes overnight, as the electoral law specified. They were then instructed to telephone the Carter Center office in Maputo to report on developments during the day. For the second day of voting, observers were to complete special checklists on poll openings and closings, including items related to ballot box security. After observing the vote counting process at one or more polling stations, observers were to record information about the results of those stations.

The Center's deployment strategy was developed in light of Mozambique's vast size and scarce, unreliable com-

munication and transport beyond the provincial capitals. Following the briefings in Maputo, Carter Center observers were deployed Dec. 1 to provincial or district capitals, generally in teams of two. In total, 22 teams were deployed. Once in the deployment zone, observers traveled to more remote polling stations during the two days of voting (see Appendix G for the Center's deployment plan).

The Carter Center consulted with other international observer groups, including the European Union (EU) and

the Commonwealth, to coordinate deployment within and across provinces. This allowed the various missions to maximize their collective coverage of polling stations and ensure that relevant information was shared among groups. The UNDP played a positive role in serving as an ef-

fective clearinghouse of information for the various international observer missions.

Two days before the election, Dec. 1-2, Carter Center observers met with provincial level candidates, local party officials, STAE and CPE officials, Mozambican observers groups, and other civil society representatives. These meetings provided information about the political context, the campaign period, the preparedness of parties and party agents, road conditions, and communications in the deployment areas. In addition, the meetings alerted parties and officials and civil society to the presence of international observers, which facilitated observers' work and helped deter any possible wrongdoing.

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(l-r) Former President of Botswana and delegation co-leader Ketumile Masire, Mozambique President Chissano, and President Carter meet before the elections.



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GRANT LEE NEUBURG



President Carter and Afonso Dhlakama, presidential candidate for the main opposition, Renamo-EU.

LEADERSHIP MEETINGS ON DEC. 2

On Dec. 2, President and Mrs. Carter and President Masire met with the CNE and STAE members and the two main candidates: President Joaquim Chissano of Frelimo and Afonso Dhlakama, the presidential candidate of Renamo-UE. They also met with representatives of a Mozambican human rights organization, *Liga Moçambicana de Direitos Humanos* (Mozambican Human Rights League), private sector leaders, leaders of the EU observation mission, and several of the Mozambican observer groups, including FECIV and AMODE.

In their meeting with the CNE, President Carter and President Masire voiced concerns about the long delay between the end of voting and official announcement of results. They asked what would prevent news organizations, political parties, and other groups from publishing their own tabulations or projections of the results. CNE President Jaimisse Taimo replied that there was nothing in the law to prevent them from doing so. This discussion raised

the question of the value of a PVT, or “quick count” by The Carter Center or other credible and impartial organizations. After the meeting, several members of the CNE privately expressed their opinion that a PVT by The Carter Center would be extremely useful and not in violation of the law, even though the CNE had told the Carter Center delegation that visited in October that the CNE could not legally allow a PVT.

In other meetings, STAE officials explained the tabulation process and said that observation would be governed by recently issued regulations. STAE officials, including the two deputy directors representing the two major parties, did not report any concerns about tabulation procedure nor the software to be used.

Renamo party leaders expressed several concerns about the electoral process, particularly the unresponsiveness of the CNE to Renamo’s formal complaints, and the late disbursement of campaign funds. Civil society groups stressed that Mozambique’s institutional structure still trailed behind the dramatic economic and political transformations of the last five years, citing problems in the credit and banking systems — and the judicial system, particularly the police and lower courts.

ELECTION OBSERVATION ON DEC. 3-5

On election days, Carter Center observers moved from poll to poll throughout the day to monitor the voting process in their deployment area. At every polling station visited, Center observers recorded information on their checklists.

On the evening of Dec. 3, observer teams called into the Carter Center office in Maputo and reported that most of the voting had been orderly, efficient, and peaceful. Most estimated a voter turnout for the first day of about 48



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percent to 50 percent, and all reported a calm atmosphere. The only problems noted were late poll openings, with a few teams reporting that some stations had started as much as two hours late. Two teams in Zambezia reported that voting had not started because the voting kits never arrived in several districts not accessible by road.

On the second day, Dec. 4, the CNE announced at a 2 p.m. press conference that logistical problems in delivering materials had led to late openings at some 77 polling stations in Zambezia (less than 1 percent of the national total). As a result, voting was extended to a third day in all stations throughout the country. The CNE decision, in part, reflected concern about the electoral law (which states that polling should occur simultaneously across the country) and fears that a partial extension might lead to a legal challenge in the Supreme Court. The CNE also announced that the posting of polling station results (*"editais"*) at the stations could only be done countrywide at 6 p.m., Dec. 5, regardless of whether polling stations had completed voting by all registered persons by Dec. 4.


Carter Center observers calling in from the field reported that the Dec. 4 voting process continued to function smoothly. Since there was relatively high turnout on Dec. 3, turnout on Dec. 4 was lower. In most localities, observers reported between 70 percent to 80 percent of registered voters had voted by the end of the second day. President and Mrs. Carter traveled with Dr. Carrie Manning on Dec. 4 to Beira in Sofala province, where they observed the voting process

in eight polling stations in the city of Beira and outlying neighborhoods. No major problems or irregularities were observed, and voting appeared to be going smoothly at all posts visited.

The extension to a third day of voting forced extensive revisions in the schedule. The Center decided to bring back one member of each team on Dec. 5 as scheduled to participate in debriefings and contribute to the delegation's preliminary statement that President Carter was scheduled to release on the morning of Dec. 6. The other delegates remained in the field to observe the Dec. 5 voting and counting processes.

In most places, voting on Dec. 5, was extremely slow. Even with the additional day, 11 polling sites never opened because of logistical problems. After the close of polling on Dec. 5, most observers watched the counting of presidential ballots at selected stations and recorded this information on a separate form. Teams were assigned sites from which to compile presidential election results. If a station was inaccessible, teams were instructed to collect data from

GRANT LEE NFEUNBURG



Polling officials explain voting procedures.



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another station that was as geographically close and ethnically similar to the original station as possible. Twenty-two observer teams were deployed throughout Mozambique, covering all 11 provinces.

Where possible, observers also recorded election results from some polling stations where they were not able to observe the count directly, but where results had been publicly posted after ballots were counted, as provided for by the electoral law.

Despite serious logistical difficulties, Carter Center observers reported election results from 39 polling stations, including 14 where counting was observed directly, and 25 that were collected from posted results.

DEBRIEFINGS AND PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

In the Dec. 5 delegation debriefings, observers reported overwhelmingly that the voting process at the polls visited was orderly, tranquil, and efficient with few problems. The initial assessment of the other observer missions was similarly positive.

The Center's observers were particularly impressed with STAE's electoral preparations and voter participation. Almost every team commended the polling officials, describing them as well trained and diligent responding to voters' needs. Most teams also reported a high level of women's political participation, both as polling officials and voters. Party agents from both parties were found to be

present at more than 80 percent of the polling stations visited, and worked side by side in a cooperative manner in most stations. Security was well-administered, with police

generally maintaining an appropriate distance from the polls, as required by the electoral law.

Carter Center observers also reported that Mozambican observers, including AMODE, FECIV, and several others, were encountered in more than 45 percent of the stations visited. The Mozambican observers appeared well trained and diligent in their efforts.

Carter Center delegates, however, did cite several problems. Every team reported encountering one or more voters unable to vote due to errors in the voters' register or on voter cards. In addition, as noted above, incidents of intimidation of Renamo party representatives during the campaign seriously affected elections in three districts in

Tete province, as Renamo agents fled the area and could not get credentials. Renamo requested that the elections in the affected polls be postponed, but the elections were held. Carter Center observers were posted in one of those districts (Changara) and reported that Renamo party agents were not present.

Several teams witnessed incidents of improper campaigning at polling stations, and many noted that polling booths were arranged with the open side facing the polling officials (perhaps to deter placement of campaign propa-

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President Carter inspects presidential and parliamentary ballots, which featured pictures as well as words for illiterate and non-Portuguese speaking voters.



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GRANT LEE NEUBURG



Mrs. Carter converses with voters as she completes her polling station checklist.

ganda). However, the booths were usually placed far enough away from the officials' tables so that secrecy of the vote did not seem to be compromised.

Most teams noted that many older people, and those who did not speak Portuguese, did not seem to understand how to vote. This necessitated lengthy explanations, and a slow queue for voting. Lastly, many observers reported that polling stations had not been provided with enough candles to last through the vote count. When counting began Dec. 5, officials often had to work late into night, sometimes long after their candles had burned out.

Overall, the Center's observers visited 747 polling stations in approximately 50 districts across all of Mozambique's 11 provinces, representing about 650,000

voters. The delegation's consensus was that the voting process functioned normally in the stations visited, with only a few problems. (See Appendix H for a summary report of the observer checklists.)

On the basis of the debriefings, a breakfast meeting of the leaders of the main observer groups, and phone calls from the Center's observers still in the field, a Carter Center staff team started drafting the preliminary assessment and report. On Dec. 6, President Carter and President Masire delivered the preliminary statement on behalf of the full delegation, noting that while voting had ended, the Center would continue to observe the counting and tabulation processes before making a final assessment (see Appendix I). □



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GRANT LEF NEUBURG



A woman votes in one of the voting booths that was constructed to ensure a secret ballot.



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
DECEMBER 1999: VOTE COUNTING AND TABULATION PROCESSES

Although the majority of Carter Center delegates left Mozambique by Dec. 7, a team of 12 Carter Center staff and MTOs remained on the ground to monitor the tabulation of the results in the provincial capitals and at the national headquarters of CNE and STAE in Maputo. The MTOs were coordinated initially by the Center's field office director in Maputo, Andrea Wolfe, with some assistance from Dr. Shelley McConnell of The Carter Center, and later by Patrick Berg of the Center's Democracy Program. This work was coordinated with a small team of EU observers until the latter departed the country.

After counting at the polls, tally sheets from individual polling stations were sent to the provincial STAE and CPE for tabulation, along with blank, null, and contested ballots.¹ The material was transported in kits to provincial STAE offices under police escort and accompanied by party observers if they wished. Upon arrival at the provincial STAE, the kits were opened. The inviolable bags with blank and null ballots were removed and sent to the CNE in Maputo for review, along with a carbon copy of the tally sheet and any ballots that had been contested during counting.

¹ The other original ballot papers were stored at the district level.

GRANT LEE NEULBURG



(l-r) Dr. John Hardman, President Masire, President Carter, Mrs. Carter, Dr. Carrie Manning, and Dr. David Carroll listen during delegation debriefings.



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Vote counting and tabulation occurred in three major stages:

1. At each of 8,322 polling stations on Dec. 5-6 with the results recorded on individual tally sheets (“*editais*”).
2. In the provinces, where the STAE and CPE tabulated 11 separate provisional results via a consolidation and computerization of individual polling stations results.
3. At the national level, where the CNE-Maputo computed overall results by combining the computerized results from the 11 provinces and adjusting them based on CNE rulings on null, blank, and contested ballots and on “problem” tally sheets not included in the provincial results because of various problems. This process was followed for both the presidential and legislative races.

database for tabulation. To detect errors, every tally sheet was double-entered, using two separate groups of technicians. When errors were encountered, the CPE reviewed the tally sheets in question before approving them for re-entry.

In each province, one computer terminal was set up for national and international observers to check the data gathered at the polls against the information entered into the official database. If doubtful, observers could ask to see the original tally sheets for comparison and to resolve any discrepancies. When completed, the partial results from each province were stored on CD-ROM and sent in duplicate to the CNE in Maputo for the calculation of the final national results.

TIMELINE OF POST-ELECTION MONITORING

- Dec. 9-15:** Carter Center observers monitor provincial counting and tabulation
- Dec. 15:** Carter Center and EU representatives request that CNE provide more access to the CNE’s internal database and tally sheets
- Dec. 17:** Carter Center sends letter to CNE requesting more access to the internal database
- Dec. 19:** Carter Center sends letter to CNE requesting more access to tally sheets and original databases from the provinces
Observation at STAE/CNE headquarters in Maputo: Arrival of materials, reclassification of null and blank ballots, resolution of problematic tally sheets, computer room data entry
- Dec. 21:** Carter Center issues press release urging patience and suggests that the CNE ensure that observers have adequate access to check results
- Dec. 22:** Final results published (two days late)
- Dec. 23:** Renamo files complaint with Supreme Court
- Jan. 4:** Supreme Court announces decision: rejects Renamo complaint and validates final results

PROVINCIAL TABULATION


The tabulation of the partial provincial results occurred in most provinces between Dec. 7 and 15 using the tally sheets sent from individual polling stations. At the provincial office, polling station tally sheets were sent to the computer room and entered into a

Apart from some logistical problems resulting in delays, Carter Center observers reported no problems with the transport of materials in most provinces. In Tete, however, the material from two districts arrived unguarded and were sent back to their districts to return with the proper escort. Later, a Carter Center observer reported that most of the tally sheets he saw from these districts showed modi-



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SATU YLISAARI



Women wait in line to vote in Cabo Delgado. In more remote areas, women and men formed separate lines.

fications or suspiciously high voter turnout rates of 90 percent to 100 percent, with either no or very few blank votes.

Carter Center observers initially had some difficulty accessing the database because provincial CPE and STAE personnel had not been adequately informed about the rights of election observers. These problems were resolved after a high-level STAE team visited the provincial capitals on an inspection tour. Thereafter, the system proved quite effective in most provinces, except Zambezia, where computer access was never provided. Even in the provinces where access was allowed, the software did not allow observers to have access when entry was ongoing. Therefore, that access was restricted to short periods of 15 to 30 minutes between shifts.² The Center's observers reported that data entry started off slowly because the software was new and the personnel had not received sufficient training, but that the pace improved over time.

Access to the original tally sheets varied from province

to province. In Cabo Delgado and Zambezia, the tally sheets were not available to observers at all. In the other provinces, the Center's observers reported they had limited access to tally sheets. Where access was provided and where it was possible to compare poll results in the computer database with either original tally sheets and/or results observed at the polls by the Center's observers, no discrepancies were detected.


A large number of tally sheets had errors and required review by the CPEs before deciding whether they could be processed. Most of the errors turned out to be minor arithmetical mistakes or discrepancies, probably the result of polling officials' fatigue. More problematic, however, was the fact that hundreds of tally sheets contained more seri-

² In addition, the number of polling stations in each province was pre-programmed by STAE-Maputo. Therefore, final modifications in the number of polling stations made at the provincial levels could not easily be entered in the database. This caused a discrepancy between the actual number of polling stations and the number of stations in the database.



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GRANT LEE NEUENBURG



A Mozambican recognizes President Masire (center, facing forward) as The Carter Center's Dr. John Hardman (right) and President Masire's assistant, Gilbert Motsemme, look on. Many Mozambicans greeted President Masire with admiration.

ous errors and were excluded by the CPEs, either because they felt the results were not usable (i.e., lacked poll identification numbers, listed more votes cast than registered voters, or appeared as if numbers had been changed), or because the CPE members could not agree among themselves. These unprocessed "problem" tally sheets were forwarded to CNE-Maputo for resolution and were not reflected in the provincial declarations of results issued by the CPEs (see "Unprocessed Tally Sheets" on Page 36).

Carter Center observers met with party representatives in the provincial capitals on various occasions. In general, Frelimo representatives had few complaints and were usually satisfied with the process. One important exception was in the provincial count in Nampula, where Renamo technicians who had been excluded from the process until very late were detected attempting to enter data fraudulently. The problem was corrected and the data were rechecked to ensure accuracy. Frelimo also complained about discrepancies in the data from seven poll-

ing tables in the Nacala Porto district of Nampula and requested a recount. A recount was done in the presence of observers from both parties and found only very minor discrepancies, basically confirming the original results.

Renamo's representatives, on the other hand, made a series of complaints about the campaign and the elections. The most serious problem was in Zambezia, where Renamo technicians were never allowed access to computers. Renamo militants created a disturbance in protest, and police arrested three Renamo members, including two Renamo-UE candidates for Parliament.

NATIONAL VERIFICATION AND TABULATION

While the provincial tabulation was ongoing between Dec. 7 and 15, carbon copies of the tally sheets were arriving at the CNE-

GRANT LEE NEUENBURG




President and Mrs. Carter head out to a polling site with Carrie Manning (third from left) and Lisa Wiley of The Carter Center.



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GRANT LEE NEUBURG



President Carter and Dr. David Carroll of The Carter Center discuss election matters in Maputo the day after elections.

Maputo, along with the null, blank, and contested ballots that CNE had to “reclassify.” These reclassified ballots and other adjustments resulting from problem tally sheets were to be combined with the partial provincial results, when finished, to compute the final national results. The provincial results were behind schedule, and most did not arrive in Maputo until around Dec. 15-16.

On Dec. 15, a delegation of Carter Center and EU observers met with CNE representatives to discuss the observers’ reports from the provinces. Because of the problems of limited access to the computers at the provincial CPE/STAE offices, the observers requested that a computer separate from the network be set up for the observers working at the CNE in Maputo. Access then would be allowed to all files at all times without disturbing data entry work. This was followed by a letter from the Center which formally requested such access. Although a formal response was not received, the CNE indicated to Carter Center ob-

servers that too few technicians were available to comply with this request.

The work in Maputo proceeded in three separate areas:

Receipt of materials: Incoming materials were registered in one room by a subcommittee of at least two CNE members, including both Frelimo and Renamo representatives. The materials included null, blank, and contested ballots and carbon copies of all tally sheets. Later, the unprocessed “problem” tally sheets arrived (see section “Unprocessed Tally Sheets” on Page 36).

Reclassification: Null, blank, and contested ballots were sent to STAE technicians for re-evaluation/reclassification. The decisions were confirmed by two CNE members, one from each party, and then signed by CNE President Taimo.

Computer data entry: Photocopies of the tally sheets were made and sent to the computer room for data entry into a new, internal CNE database. The original carbon



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Medium-term observers and local office staff pose with President Masire and President Carter: (l-r) Ana Barradas, Eduarda Cipriano, Andrea Wolfe, President Masire, Daude Suleman, President Carter, and Stella Santos.

copy was filed. The CNE decided to build this second database to conduct an internal, unofficial check against the partial provincial results arriving on the CD-ROMs to uncover any discrepancies.

Carter Center observers were allowed in all three rooms, but the level of access varied, and no aggregated information was ever available about the overall status of the process.

RECLASSIFICATION

Carter Center observers noted that the atmosphere in the reclassification room seemed cooperative, with no signs of distrust among the CNE members. The process was efficient as ballots were reclassified by polling station and the results summarized by province. When completed, the provincial summary sheet was given to the computer room to be added to the partial provincial results.

COMPUTER DATA ENTRY

The area for observers in the computer room was fenced off from the rest of the room, which could be seen but not entered. Twenty computers in two groups were used to enter data. Observers were allowed to access the second database on a network computer, but each province was accessible only for short intervals. Carter Center observers did not have access to the carbon copies of the original tally sheets and therefore could only compare the database with results recorded from observers' monitoring in the

field. Of those that could be checked, no discrepancies were found.

As the process continued, distrust between the CNE members from the two parties increased and began to hinder the CNE's ability to work. Eventually, due in part to the delays in receiving the partial results from provinces and concerns about tampering with unprocessed tally sheets, the Renamo CNE members announced that they did not trust the data arriving on CD-ROMs from the provinces.

Although they initially opposed its creation, Renamo argued that the internal database was the only data that could be trusted and verified as accurate. To verify the data, they insisted that all tally sheets entered into the database be printed out so that these could be compared with the copies of the original tally sheets. Although this threatened to paralyze its work, the CNE agreed to print all the tally sheets entered up until that point, a process which



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took several hours and interrupted all other work in the computer room. The printed tally sheets then were compared one by one with the tally sheets by two CNE members, one from each party. After this, the process of entering the tally sheets was resumed and continued until it was halted on Dec. 20 (as described in "Final CNE Results" on Page 37.)

Speculation about the provincial results from the provinces was fueled by the CNE's delays in making the results public. When the provincial data finally were released, the numbers showed that results from roughly 10 percent of the polling stations were not included. But, since no clear public explanation was offered, suspicions about the results continued.³

In response to Renamo complaints of tampering by

Frelimo, Carter Center observers visited the room where the main server and backup system were installed to store the entered data. A technician explained that a computer auditlog kept track of every user on the system and that user's actions.⁴ The Renamo delegates refused to request a print out of the computer auditlog, but insisted that it should have been provided to them without their asking.

- ³ The official provincial results notices (*actas*) indicated that 934 tally sheets had not been processed, and hence not reflected in the provincial results. The number of unprocessed tally sheets were distributed across provinces as follows: Niassa 33, Cabo Delgado 101, Nampula 350, Zambezia 157, Tete 95, Manica 6, Sofala 120, Inhambane 11, Gaza 13, Maputo Province 48, and Maputo City 0.
- ⁴ The auditlog helped uncover the attempt to enter fraudulent data in Nampula, discussed in the section on provincial tabulation.

SATU YLISAARI



Boys gather for the camera in Cabo Delgado.



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UNPROCESSED TALLY SHEETS

Along with the provincial results, unprocessed tally sheets from the provinces were sent to the CNE in Maputo for review by two CNE members, one from each party, in the room where arriving material was processed. Carter Center observers were able to observe the review of the incoming tally sheets, but were not allowed close access to this process and could not directly inspect any of the unprocessed tally sheets. As a result, it is not clear whether and how unprocessed tally sheets were resolved.

However, Carter Center observers reported that there did not appear to be conflicts between the CNE members reviewing the unprocessed tally sheets.

In a meeting with the CNE president, Carter Center observers voiced concern about the perceived lack of transparency of the CNE's work. They requested greater access to the computer databases and tally sheets, suggesting that international observers might be able to help calm the atmosphere. A follow-up letter repeated this request. Unfortunately, in spite of some initial, positive indications from the CNE, access was never provided to the original tally sheets, nor to the databases containing the official provincial results.

RENAMO'S CHARGES

As the process dragged on, Renamo began holding press conferences every other day, announcing that the data gathered by its party observers indicated a Renamo victory and any other result published by the CNE would necessarily be fraudulent. They also

claimed that most of the unprocessed tally sheets were from Renamo's provincial strongholds, in particular Zambezia, Sofala, and Nampula, and charged that the CNE was conspiring with Frelimo to rig the results. Frelimo officials remained mostly silent at this

time, but urged calm and suggested that Renamo's press conferences were complicating the already tense political situation.

Tensions between the Renamo and Frelimo members of the CNE increased as the final results drew closer to completion. In addition to the regular Renamo party press conferences, Renamo CNE members started holding press conferences, charging that Renamo's representatives were being marginalized from the CNE and STAE.

Carter Center observers could not verify active marginalization. Although they did note that there were usually more Frelimo STAE personnel than Renamo STAE present in the computer room, no pattern of consistent restriction was apparent. On the contrary, Renamo technicians were usually present in the computer room.

GRANT LFE NEUENBERG



A woman casts her vote and a man dips his finger into the indelible ink while polling officials observe.



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THE FINAL CNE RESULTS

On Dec. 20, the CNE president ordered that the work on the second database be abandoned. Although it was not explained at the time, the CNE later said the decision was due to time pressures, since the legally required date for publishing final results (Dec. 20) had arrived, and additional election material from the more distant districts was still arriving, which required the CNE to concentrate on reclassification of null, blank, and contested ballots.

Renamo CNE members immediately protested the decision in an open letter published in *MediaFax*, arguing that this step compromised the transparency of the whole process. The following day, Dec. 21, The Carter Center released a short statement encouraging all sides to maintain calm while the CNE completed the results, and urging that party monitors and other observers be allowed adequate access to check results (see Appendix J). The same day, President Carter tried to phone both candidates to relay the same message and demonstrate the Center's support. He spoke briefly with President Chissano, but was unable to reach Dhlakama despite repeated efforts.

The CNE planned to meet Dec. 21 to combine the partial results from the provinces with the results of the reclassification of the null, blank, and contested ballots, as well as with results from the unprocessed tally sheets that had been reviewed. The meeting was postponed several times and finally started at 1:30 a.m. on Dec. 22. Renamo members of the CNE walked out of the meeting about 90 minutes later, refusing to sign and validate the election results.

Later that morning, Dec. 22, the CNE president announced the final results, declaring that Frelimo and its presidential candidate Joaquim Chissano had won with 52.29 percent, defeating Afonso Dhlakama with 47.71 percent.

Renamo representatives declared separately that they did not accept the results and that Afonso Dhlakama was the actual winner. On Dec. 23, Renamo filed a 23-point complaint with the Supreme Court, demanding that the elections be declared null and void and asking for a recount. Dhlakama also made repeated public declarations that he had won the elections and would not accept any other outcome.

In the wake of these developments, The Carter Center issued a preliminary report on Dec. 23 which commended Mozambique for completing the process, but expressed concern about the transparency of the final vote tabulation. The report noted that the Center was not aware of serious irregularities that would affect the outcome, but said that its observers did not have adequate access to verify the accuracy of the tabulation processes, despite repeated requests to the CNE.

Citing these concerns, the report also called for maximum transparency during the period for filing and resolving complaints. President Carter added, "We hope the Supreme Court will take steps to resolve doubts about possible discrepancies in the election results and will invite the involvement of political parties and observers so that all sides can confidently accept the final result. Every opportunity should be pursued to check vote tabulations from alternate sources." (See Appendix K for the Dec. 23 preliminary report.) ■



JANUARY 2000: THE SUPREME COURT RULING

The complaint filed by Renamo included 23 separate allegations of fraud or irregularities, the most important of which concerned 938 tally sheets which Renamo claimed were not included in the results.

Renamo's complaint demanded that the elections be declared null and void and that the court mandate a recount.

By law, the Supreme Court was required to announce its decision within 15 days. To assist them in their investigation, the court requested the assistance of technical experts, including a math professor at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo and an expert from the government statistics office. Carter Center observers met with members of the Supreme Court and offered to observe the process or assist in any way, but were not permitted to monitor the court's deliberations nor access any evidence that was considered.

The court conducted its investigation behind closed

CANDIDATE	VOTES	%
Afonso Dhlakama	2,134,255	47.70
Joaquim Chissano	2,339,848	52.29
TOTAL VALID VOTES	4,474,103	90.63
TOTAL NULL VOTES	141,690	2.87
TOTAL BLANK BALLOTS	320,955	6.50

doors without any public hearings and relied primarily on testimony and interviews with STAE personnel. Members of the CNE were not interviewed directly, but instead were sent a list of questions, to which the CNE responded.

On Jan. 4, the Supreme Court announced its ruling, rejecting Renamo's complaint and validating the official results and the election of President Chissano (see tables "Presidential Election Results" and "Parliamentary Election Results"). The court issued a long, written decision that reviewed Renamo's charges point by point, dismissing

most as either incorrect, outside the court's jurisdiction, or lacking sufficient evidence.

As for the charge regarding the unprocessed tally sheets, the court determined that the tally sheets were excluded because of major errors or omissions which rendered them unusable. According to the Supreme Court's decision, of the total of 8,322 polling stations, 847 stations returned tally sheets that were not processed at the provincial level due to various problems. Of these, the CNE-Maputo processed 297 and added these data to the final official results.

NO.	POLITICAL PARTY/COALITION	VOTES	%
1	Labour Party (PT)	111,280	2.69
2	Social-Liberal Party (SOL)	83,515	2.02
3	RENAMO-Electoral Union	1,604,470	38.79
4	Democratic Union (UD)	61,276	1.48
5	Mozambican Opposition Union (UMO)	64,182	1.55
6	FRELIMO	2,008,165	48.55
7	National Party of Workers and Peasants (PANAOC)	24,165	0.60
8	Independent Party (PIMO)	29,456	0.71
9	Democratic Liberal Party (PADELIMO)	33,247	0.80
10	Progressive Liberal Party (PPLM)	11,684	0.28
11	Social Broadening Party (PASOMO)	2,153	0.05
12	Liberal and Democratic Party (PALMO)	102,115	2.47
	TOTAL VALID VOTES	4,136,158	85.79
	TOTAL NULL VOTES	222,330	4.61
	TOTAL BLANK BALLOTS	463,011	9.60



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PROVINCE	FRELIMO	RENAMO-UE	TOTAL
Niassa	6	7	13
Cabo Delgado	16	6	22
Nampula	24	26	50
Zambezia	15	34	49
Tete	8	10	18
Manica	5	10	15
Sofala	4	17	21
Inhambane	13	4	17
Gaza	16	-	16
Maputo	12	1	13
City of Maputo	14	2	16
TOTAL	133	117	250

Results from 550 polling stations, however, were deemed unprocessable and excluded from the official results. The court declared that the irregularities on the tally sheets in question were so evident that neither candidates nor political parties had complained previously about the rejection of the tally sheets. In addition, the court noted that the discarded tally sheets came from polling stations in almost all provinces, suggesting that this indicated that there was no inherent bias against Renamo.

In its decision, the court estimated that the 550 excluded tally sheets represented about 377,773 potential valid votes. However, the court's decision did not address the fact that this figure was significantly larger than Chissano's final margin of victory (205,593 votes), nor did it provide any information about the provincial distribution of the excluded tally sheets or their probable impact on the final outcome. As a result, questions about the potential impact of these tally sheets went unanswered, leaving Carter Center observers and others wondering about the court's reason for not addressing the issue, and further fueling Renamo's suspicions of fraud.


Although the Supreme Court's decision was final, Renamo continued to call for a recount and announced that its deputies would boycott the Parliament. However, on further consideration and after consulting with its coalition partners in the Electoral Union, Renamo declared that it would claim its seats after all, but for the sole pur-

pose of demanding a recount. Shortly after taking their seats in Parliament, Renamo deputies introduced a proposal to create an ad hoc commission that would conduct an inquiry into the issue of a recount. The proposal was briefly debated, but defeated by a majority vote led by Frelimo.

After the Supreme Court ruling, The Carter Center issued a statement Jan. 12 calling on both parties to work together constructively and maintain a productive dialogue. The statement also reiterated that while the Center had not seen evidence of serious irregularities that would affect the election's outcome, the

Center's observers did not have adequate access to verify the accuracy of the final tabulation and verification processes, despite repeated requests to the CNE for such access (see Appendix L for the Center's Jan. 12 statement). □

GRANT LIT NEUBURG



A woman casts her vote as Carter Center delegates Dr. David Carroll and Natasha Singh (second from right) chat with a Mozambican observer.



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

APRIL-MAY 2000: POST-ELECTION ASSESSMENT

As the final phase in the Mozambique election project, a small Carter Center assessment team visited Maputo in late April and early May.¹ The team met with many of the key actors connected to the electoral process, including the director of STAE, the president of the CNE, members of the Supreme Court, and representatives of both major parties and of government. The goal was to analyze the overall electoral process, with particular attention on the counting and tabulation processes and the Supreme Court's ruling, to better understand what transpired and formulate recommendations for improving future elections.

The team reported that while there was willingness on all sides to concede that the elections were flawed in some ways, there was also a nagging lack of comprehensive transparent information about the election results. However, the team also noted that both the election officials and the major parties recognized the need to improve future elections and seemed genuinely disposed to work expeditiously to develop and implement recommendations for electoral reforms.

As background for the development of recommendations for future elections, the team reviewed some of the key problem areas in the 1999 elections. The major issues concerned the handling of unprocessed tally sheets and how the Supreme Court dealt with that issue in its decision.

UNPROCESSED TALLY SHEETS

The team met with various people to better understand the process through which decisions were made to exclude some unprocessed tally sheets. Both the CNE and the Supreme Court indicated that these decisions were, in effect, consensus decisions. They cited the fact that there was a three-person CNE subcommittee

(including representatives of both Renamo and Frelimo) which received and signed the unprocessed tally sheets arriving from the provinces. This fact had been verified by Carter Center observers who had witnessed Renamo representatives participating in much of this work. Renamo, however, claims its representative did not review the tally sheets at that time, at least not definitively. Renamo claims that a full CNE session should have been held to deliberate the issue, and says that is one of the reasons the party walked out of the final CNE meeting preceding the official announcement of results on Dec. 22.

SUPREME COURT DECISION

The team also met with members of the Supreme Court to discuss the Jan. 4 decision. Members of the court indicated that although they concluded Renamo's complaint was lacking evidence, the issues at stake were nonetheless of sufficient public importance to warrant thorough investigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court brought in technical experts to assist with calculations to determine whether the unprocessed tally sheets were likely to have changed the final result. Unfortunately, as noted earlier, the court did not provide any information about these analyses in its decision, nor through any other releases or statements to the public or media.²

As described to the Center, the court's analyses were based on projections of Dhlakama's possible share of the

¹ The team included Dr. David Carroll and Amanda Bronson from The Carter Center, Senior Political Advisor Dr. Carrie Manning, and Dr. David Pottie of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. The assessment visit was originally scheduled to take place in early March, but extensive flooding in Mozambique and across the region forced a postponement.

² This lack of clarity is confounded by apparent inconsistencies in the information published by the Supreme Court in its Jan. 4 ruling. For example, the ruling appears to have given an incorrect number for the average number of registered voters per polling station (634).



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excluded tally sheets. For example, assuming that Dhlakama would have obtained at most no more than 70 percent of the potential votes on the excluded tally sheets, Chissano would still win by a margin of roughly 70,000 votes. While 70 percent is more than 20 percent over Dhlakama's percentage of the national vote, Dhlakama actually surpassed 70 percent of the vote in two provinces, Zambezia and Sofala. Unfortunately, neither the CNE results nor the Supreme Court provided detailed information about the distribution of unprocessed tally sheets by province. To complete a thorough analysis of the issue and resolve lingering questions about the potential impact of the unprocessed tally sheets, it would be necessary to have a complete listing of results by polling station, including how many polling stations from each province were excluded.³ □

³ Analysis of the final results validated by the Supreme Court, including the increase in votes in each province resulting from the reclassification and review of unprocessed tally sheets, provides a rough basis on which to estimate the number of tally sheets excluded in each province. Analyses along these lines suggest that the largest number of unprocessed tally sheets were in Nampula and Zambezia, and that these two provinces probably accounted for between one-half and two-thirds of the unprocessed tally sheets.



Many Mozambicans hope for the promise of a better future.



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CONCLUSIONS¹

A key challenge of democratization in Mozambique, as in other post-conflict societies, is to balance the ongoing need for political reconciliation and accommodation with the divisive tendencies of electoral competition. The 1999 elections therefore were an important test of Mozambique's democratization, and more generally, of its transition from war to peace and national reconciliation.

Compared to recent experiences of post-transition second elections in Africa, most of which have been marked by low voter turnout, opposition boycotts, and the entrenchment of incumbents winning by increasingly large margins, Mozambique's 1999 general elections showed positive signs of a maturing political system. The major political parties were able to forge a consensus electoral law which provided for a new voter registration and included political party representation in both the CNE and STAE. Technical preparations for the elections, including the registration process and poll worker training, were well-managed and implemented. Although there were problems during the campaign period, including some serious inci-

dents of violence and extended delays in the disbursement of campaign funds, the political parties campaigned widely. Finally, the election itself was peaceful and orderly with high voter turnout and results that revealed a tightly contested race between two strong parties and candidates.

Nevertheless, the credibility of the process was undermined by a series of technical problems that emerged during the tabulation of votes, which fueled political suspicions and split the CNE. The problem was compounded by a lack of transparency during the final stages of tabulation preceding the announcement of the official results, and by the limited technical monitoring capacity of the parties' agents and representatives.

Although Renamo rejected the results, the fact that it contested the final results through established legal channels, and that due procedure was followed in addressing Renamo's complaint, are positive signs of a nascent democracy.

Given Mozambique's recent history and the experience of the 1999 elections, it is important for future elections that steps be taken to build trust, confidence, and credibility in the country's electoral institutions. ■

¹ Parts of this section draw from a forthcoming article by Dr. Carrie Manning to be published in *Democratization*, Summer 2001.



RECOMMENDATIONS

The Center's involvement in the 1999 elections was motivated by a desire to demonstrate international interest and support for Mozambique's democratization. In the same spirit, and on the basis of our work in Mozambique over the last 10 months, we suggest a number of recommendations that might be considered for future elections. These recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive nor definitive, but are offered simply as a means of contributing to the discussions that are already taking place in Mozambique. More important than any particular step is the need to move forward forthrightly and ensure that there is broad participation in the process, including both civil society and political parties.

1. Reforms to electoral law. The electoral law needs to be reformed well in advance of the next elections. Waiting too long could lead to problems similar to those that occurred in 1999, when delays in completing the legislative and regulatory framework made it difficult to keep the electoral calendar on schedule, and forced steps that increased the election costs. Discussions on a new electoral law should begin as soon as possible, preferably within the next six to 12 months. In this regard, careful consideration should be given to the lessons learned from recent elections to design electoral processes that are efficient, cost effective, and sustainable for the long term.

The new law should be more precise and eliminate gaps and contradictions that led to problems in 1999. The lack of precision in the 1999 electoral law resulted in ambiguities that forced the CNE to make too many policy decisions on issues that should have been technical. In addition, the law's imprecision fostered confusion and contributed to problems in many instances where Mozambican authorities interpreted the law very narrowly. Some suggested changes in the electoral law include:

(a) Correct the contradictions in the electoral laws which provide that persons 18 years or older can vote, while voter registration is only for persons who are 18 at the time of registration, disenfranchising those who turn 18 after registration but before the elections. Likewise, consider changes which would prevent the disenfranchisement of poll workers and observers, as occurred in the 1999 elections.

(b) Review the system of campaign financing. While a donor-supported campaign fund may or may not make sense, it is important to ensure that public campaign funds are disbursed on a timely basis before the start of the campaign period.

(c) Clarify the roles of both national and international observers, and provide explicitly for their full access to all phases of the election and their

ability to participate in monitoring and verification exercises, including PVTs. This should be done well in advance of elections.

(d) Limit voting to a single day (or ending earlier on the second day to expedite counting).

(e) Eliminate the provision which only allows for elections to take place simultaneously across the whole country (which resulted in 1999 in a third day being required, when only a small number of stations genuinely needed the additional day due to logistical problems).

(f) Expedite the counting and tabulation processes, and shorten the period between election day and the announcement of official results.

(g) Establish realistic time periods for completing technical preparations for elections, but provide for sufficient flexibility to accommodate the need for additional time, if necessary (rather than press ahead under time pressures that could lead to serious technical problems).

2. Restructure the CNE. As part of the reform of the

More important than any particular step is the need to move forward forthrightly and ensure that there is broad participation ...

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electoral law, the CNE needs to be restructured. While there is an array of possible options for the structure of a new CNE, it is critically important that the restructuring be the result of a comprehensive review of the issue, involving civil society as well as political parties and election technicians, and that it reflect a reasonable consensus. In general, the CNE and other institutions designed to manage elections and resolve electoral conflicts should put a premium on transparency and dialogue. An initial list of some possible changes to consider include the following:

(a) Reduce the size of the CNE from its current 17 to a more workable number, perhaps five to nine members.

(b) Create mechanisms to ensure that CNE membership, especially the president, is seen as credible and impartial. This might be accomplished by reducing political party representation in the CNE and increasing the role of independent members of civil society. While there are clear benefits to including political party representatives on the CNE, most importantly in terms of balancing political influence on the CNE, consideration should be given to reducing their role. Independent civil society leaders, selected through a process with adequate involvement and consultation of the political parties, should play leading roles if possible. Perhaps the Assembly could play a larger role in nominating CNE members. Also, it could be required that the CNE president be a consensus choice, perhaps by allowing the opposition to nominate a short list of candidates, all of whom should be acceptable to the governing party, which would then select the president.

(c) Establish clear CNE rules and operating procedures before the CNE is named, including decision-making procedures and the specific responsibilities and rights of CNE members. These procedures should be sufficiently clear and detailed as to allow anyone to monitor whether decisions within the CNE are being taken according to procedures, and whether all members are able to participate fully in CNE's activities. At the same time, the CNE should establish higher standards of public relations and information. In addition, some key interested parties (i.e., political party representatives) not represented on the CNE should be

allowed to observe deliberations.

(d) Consider steps to streamline the functions of the various levels of CNE (and STAE) offices, possibly enabling final decisions on null and blank ballots to be made at the polling station or district level, and concentrate tabulation and verification exercises at the national level, but ensuring adequate participation by political parties and access for national and international observers (see also #6).

3. STAE as independent technical body. Consider making STAE an independent body, with permanent technical staff that would work both during and between electoral periods, and over which the CNE would provide general policy guidance. A permanent STAE could be responsible for periodic updating and verification of the registration lists. If it is decided to include political parties in STAE, as occurred in this election, this must happen much earlier in the process so they are fully integrated in a meaningful way. Regardless, the lines of authority between the CNE and STAE need to be clarified.

4. Election day procedures. Based on the findings of the Center's election delegation and from other reports, a number of changes might be considered regarding election day procedures. These include: standardizing rules for producing, distributing and using party agent credentials; standardizing polling station configuration, including the orientation of voting booths; numbering ballot papers to facilitate closing and counting processes; and ending the final day of voting at an earlier hour to provide more daylight during polling station closing and counting. Some of these may need to be included in revisions of the electoral law; others through future CNE regulations.

5. Verification and publication of polling station results. As part of its official counting and tabulation, the CNE should announce and publish complete polling station-by-polling station results for future elections and the 1999 elections. Timely publication of the complete 1999 results, even if they reveal some errors, will help resolve lingering doubts about the election and allow Mozambique to focus on future elections.

For future elections, the election results reporting sys-



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tem should have the capacity to produce polling station information much earlier during the tabulation and verification period — before the final official results are to be announced — and allow for party representatives and observers to monitor the data while the process is ongoing. This will require a different computer system and thorough and timely training of personnel, which were lacking in 1999. An improved system for reporting and monitoring results should make it easier to reduce the time between voting day and the announcement of results.

The systems for reporting and verifying results should be flexible enough, however, to allow for reasonable changes in procedure or established deadlines, if doing so would demonstrably increase the confidence of one or more of the parties in the process. The bias should be toward ensuring acceptance of results, not in following previously established rules to the letter.

In addition, as noted previously, consider encouraging a greater role for civil society groups, national observers, and independent news media in collecting and disseminating information about election results. Also, consider permitting such groups to engage in independent parallel vote tabulations (PVT) as a means of verifying and enhancing confidence in official election results.

These and other confidence-building mechanisms will likely require more lead time in terms of training and developing human resource capacity among political parties and civil society groups to ensure that they can effectively use such mechanisms. In addition to training poll watchers, capacity building should be extended to persons involved at all phases of the process, including technical training relating to computerization and monitoring of computerized databases. Forums, workshops, study missions, and other forms of information exchange would be useful, perhaps including some joint activities involving parliamentarians, civil society groups, and parties.

Based on the Center's experience observing the 1999 electoral process, including discussions during the post-election assessment in May, it seems that many Mozambicans are interested in learning more about PVTs

and other techniques and considering their use in future elections. Discussions on these issues, including workshops and other such activities, should begin well in advance of the next elections so that all sides understand the purpose and use of various election observation techniques and other confidence-building mechanisms.

6. Provisions for required checks and electoral dispute resolution. To avoid the doubts created by the unprocessed tally sheets in 1999, Mozambique should consider adopting electoral regulations which would provide automatically for a thorough review or recount of tally sheets or a whole/partial recount of ballots, if certain margins or thresholds are crossed, and for ensuring that observers have complete access to such reviews.¹ For example, a review could be mandated if the number of potential votes on tally sheets/ballots with problems or questions is greater than the margin between the leading candidates and/or greater than a certain percentage of the total national vote.

In addition, consider reforming the institutions and processes for electoral dispute resolution. Currently, the Supreme Court (whose members are appointed by the president) serves as the electoral tribunal in lieu of the Constitutional Council, which is mandated in the Constitution but has never been established. It is important to note that while the court is therefore the ultimate authority and arbiter of election-related conflict, it is the only body involved in election administration in Mozambique whose members were appointed by political leaders of a single party.

For future elections, the Constitutional Council should be in position to fill its constitutional role. Alternatively, Mozambique might consider creating a special Electoral Tribunal that would have jurisdiction over a range of electoral disputes and complaints. This could be coupled with a clear specification of procedures and processes for filing and resolving disputes. In any case, the responsible institutions should strive to be as transparent as possible and take reasonable steps to support the credibility of elections. ■

¹ If such regulations were mandated, it might also be necessary to consider storing ballots at provincial headquarters to facilitate any recounting of ballots.



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Carter Center is grateful for the support provided by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) which enabled the Center to implement the Mozambique elections observation project. The Carter Center worked closely with DFID and USAID officials throughout the process and would like to extend special thanks to Anna Bewes of DFID and Thomas Johnson of USAID for their assistance. The Center also thanks the Swiss Embassy and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in Maputo for providing space and equipment for our field office.

We are also grateful to the CNE and CNE President Jamisse Taimo for inviting The Carter Center to observe the registration period and the elections, including the pre- and post-election processes. In spite of the electoral disputes that marred the outcome, the Mozambican electoral authorities, and STAE in particular, are to be commended for their dedicated efforts to organize elections and educate voters. Likewise, we acknowledge the important work of the Mozambican national observer groups, FECIV, AMODE, and FORCISO, and others which together deployed thousands of observers to promote free and fair elections.

Sincere thanks also go to the Carter Center delegates who volunteered their time, expertise, and insights. The delegates accepted a range of responsibilities without complaint and demonstrated a strong commitment to supporting the process of democratization in Mozambique. In particular, the Center wishes to thank former President Ketumile Masire of Botswana, who co-led the election observation delegation, and Justice Lewis Makame and the other members of the delegation from the Southern Africa Development Community-Electoral Commissions Forum (SADC-ECF). Likewise, the Center wishes to extend our appreciation to Denis Kadima, Dr. David Pottie, and Julie Ballington of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa

(EISA) for their participation on the election delegation and various pre- and post-election assessments. We also want to acknowledge the important contributions of the following individuals who participated on assessment missions and/or the election observation mission: Therese Laanela of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, Sweden); Antonio Pita de Oliveira of the North-South Center (Portugal); Mario Paiva (Angola); Richard Klein of the National Democratic Institute (NDI, Washington, D.C.); Adrian Muunga (NDI, Malawi); and Laurie Cooper of the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES, Washington, D.C.).

We would like to extend special thanks to several other delegates, including Mell and Alicia Traylor, who provided financial support to the project, Dr. John Hardman, the executive director of The Carter Center, and Amb. Gordon Streeb, the Center's associate executive director.

We are especially grateful for the contributions of Dr. Carrie Manning of Georgia State University, who served as senior political advisor to the project and whose expertise on Mozambican politics proved invaluable. Much appreciation also goes to Democracy Program research assistant Patrick Berg, whose efforts throughout the life of the project were absolutely critical to its success, especially regarding observer deployment and post-election monitoring of counting and tabulation.

The Carter Center field staff in Maputo did an outstanding job during the campaign period and provided important insights on Mozambican culture. Field Office Director Andrea Wolfe and Elections Consultant Ana Barradas were instrumental in overseeing the field office activities and coordinating deployment and reporting of the medium-term observers. We extend our gratitude to the medium-term observers Robin Andrews, Nicolas Fernandez-Bravo, Leonardo Galicio, Jean-Paul Murekezi, Achille Nisengwe, Pedro Novoa, Lauren Rinehart, Ruth



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Schaad, and Claudia Werman.

The Maputo office assistants, Stela Santos and Eduarda Cipriano, provided useful information about logistical concerns and helped keep the office running smoothly. Daude Suleman, who worked as a special assistant during the pre-election assessments and in the Maputo office, was especially helpful to the project. Special thanks also to Dr. Shelley McConnell, associate director of the Center's Latin American and Caribbean Program, for her stellar efforts in helping to manage the Maputo office and assist in the post-election monitoring of provincial counting, and to Dr. Richard Wike, for managing data analysis during the election observation mission. We also want to acknowledge the support provided by Dr. Wayne Haag and Alzira Muchanga of the Carter Center's Sasakawa-Global 2000 office in Maputo.

The Carter Center's Democracy Program in Atlanta had overall responsibility for the project, beginning with the initial assessment in May 1999 and lasting through the post-election trip and final report in April and May 2000. The project was managed and directed by Democracy Program Associate Director Dr. David Carroll, with critical assistance from Ozong Agborsangaya and Tynesha Green. Charles Costello, director of the Democracy Program, pro-

vided important advice and guidance throughout the project. Lisa Wiley and Curtis Kohlhaas of the Center's Events office organized logistics in Atlanta and in Mozambique. Chris Brown of the Center's Finance department was responsible for the financial aspect of the election observation both in Atlanta and in the field. Tom Eberhart, Matthew Cirillo, and Olivia Owens-Fernandez of the Center's Finance department managed the project's budgets and financial reporting, along with Tynesha Green. Becky Castle of the Center's Development office provided important assistance in securing financial support for the project. Natasha Singh and Deanna Congileo managed press relations in Mozambique during the elections as well as for Carter Center press releases before and after the elections. Democracy Program interns Amanda Bronson, Satu Ylisaari, and Mike Bindell contributed greatly to the project both in Atlanta and the Maputo office.

This report was drafted by Dr. David Carroll, Dr. Carrie Manning, Andrea Wolfe, and Patrick Berg. David Carroll and Amanda Bronson managed the final editing. Amanda Bronson organized and compiled the appendices and other supporting documentation. Pam Smith of the Center's Publication Information office compiled the report into its final version. ■



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APPENDIX A

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Republic of Mozambique
National Elections Commission

Maputo, 2 August, 1999

Your Excellency,

As you know, at the end of this year Mozambique will be holding the second multiparty general elections in its history. For the second time, Mozambicans will conduct a universal, free, and secret vote to elect the President of the Republic and the deputies of the Assembly of the Republic for the next five years.

Motivated by a strong desire to see that these elections constitute an opportunity to consolidate democracy, peace and national unity, as well as the economic and social development of our country, the National Elections Commission is committed to holding free, fair, and transparent elections.

In this context, and in order to guarantee greater credibility in the electoral process, the National Elections Commission invites you to send observers to follow the registration process that will occur from July 20 through September 17, as well as the legislative and presidential elections that will take place at the end of 1999, on dates still to be announced.

Your presence during the electoral process would be a great honor for us, as I am convinced that your observation will contribute to strengthening the dignity of the Mozambican people.

Logistical requirements, including accommodation, meals, and transport will be at the observers' own expense.

Certain of your positive reply to our invitation, I take this opportunity to again extend to you our highest regards.

For transparent, free, and fair elections

Jamisse Uilson Taimo
President

President Jimmy Carter
Chairman, The Carter Center



REPÚBLICA DE MOÇAMBIQUE

COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ELEIÇÕES

Maputo, 2 de Agosto de 1999

Excelência,

Como é do vosso conhecimento, em finais deste ano, realizam-se as segundas eleições gerais e multipartidárias da história da República de Moçambique. Pela segunda vez, os moçambicanos vão eleger por sufrágio universal, livre e secreto, o Presidente da República e os deputados da Assembleia da República para os próximos cinco anos.

Movido pelo profundo desejo de ver estas eleições constituírem mmais uma oportunidade para a consolidação da democracia, paz, unidade nacional e o desenvolvimento económico e social do nosso país, a Comissão Nacional de Eleições está comprometida com a realização de eleições transparentes, livres e justas.

Neste contexro, e para garantir maior credibilidade ao processo eleitoral, a Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE) convida V.Excia a enviar observadores, para acompanhar o processo de recenseamento, que decorrerá de 20 de Julho à 17 de Setembro, assim como para as eleições legislativas e presidenciais, que terão lugar em finais de 1999, em datas a anunciar oportunamente.

A vossa presença no processo eleitoral constituirá motivo de grande honra para nós, pois estou convicto que o vosso testemunho elevará o prestígio da dignidade do povo moçambicano.

As condições logísticas com alojamento, alimentação e transporte, constituem encargo dos próprios observadores.



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

Certos de que V.Excia. responderá positivamente ao nosso convite, aproveito a ocasião para reiterar os protestos da minha elevada estima e consideração.

Por Eleições Transparentes, Livres e Justas


Jamisse Uilson Taimo
Presidente

President Jimmy Carter
Chairman, The Carter Center
1 Copenhill
Atlanta, Georgia 30307
USA
Fax: (404) 420-5196 or 420-3867



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APPENDIX B

Summary Table of Observers' Assessments at Registration Posts

GENERAL DATA

Delegation members:	13	Districts visited:	40
Number of observation teams:	5	Posts visited:.....	96
Provinces visited:	9	Miles traveled.....	about 10,000

POST ORGANISATION AND OPERATION

1. Brigade members present at the posts

Supervisor	85 of 96	Photographer	85 of 96
Emissors	90 of 96	Electoral Official	78 of 96
Interviewer	86 of 96	STAE civic educator	27 of 96
2. How many brigade members were women (average)?: 2.5 of 6
 How many brigade members spoke the local language (average)?: 5.8 of 6
3. Number of posts with party agents present:

FRELIMO	76 of 96	UMO	1 of 96
RENAMO	87 of 96	Other	9 of 96
4. Number of posts with domestic observers present:

FECIV (not in Sofala).....	15 of 86	FORCISO (only in Sofala).....	7 of 10
AMODE (not in Sofala).....	18 of 86		
5. Number of posts with international observers present:..... 0 of 96
6. Number of posts with police forces present: 59 of 96
7. Number of posts with media present: 7 of 96
8. Number of posts with party propaganda/paraphernalia present: 1 of 96

MATERIALS AND OPERATION

9. Brigade seemed well organized and efficient: YES: 80 NO: 2 N/A: 14
10. Brigade / post members seem well trained: YES: 82 NO: 0 N/A: 14
11. Registration books completed clearly and legibly: YES: 84 NO: 0 N/A: 12
12. Weekly report are well maintained: YES: 72 NO: 1 N/A: 23
13. Process is going smoothly:..... YES: 78 NO: 2 N/A: 16
14. Relations between brigade and citizens are cordial: YES: 82 NO: 0 N/A: 14
15. ...between brigade and party observers are cordial: YES: 82 NO: 0 N/A: 14
16. Average time it takes to register: N/A (between 7 and 20 minutes)



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

17. Registrants seem to understand the process: YES: 82 NO: 0 N/A: 14

QUESTIONS TO BRIGADE

18. Post operated from 7:00 to 17:00:..... 96 of 96

19. Post opened on time on day of observation: 96 of 96

20. Party agents signing completed registration books: YES: 84 NO: 2 N/A: 10

21. Registration post received all necessary materials on opening day: 90 of 96

22. Materials are present in sufficient quantities on day of observation:..... 95 of 96

If not, what is missing: films, plastic covers, registration forms, registration books, ink, pencils

23. (Some) Brigade members recruited locally: 96 of 96

24. Forms of ID most commonly used:..... Old voter cards, ID cards

STATISTICS

25. Number of brigades that began work on July 20: 92 of 96

Voters registered at the visited posts:

Total (at day of observation):.....192,987

Average number registered at posts:.....2,010

Average percentage of women: 60%

How many voters registered daily (average):94

Week 1(average):90 Week 3(average):95

Week 2(average):110 Week 4(average):84

REPORTED PROBLEMS

The following table indicates who reported the problem to the Carter Center delegation and the number of posts where the problem occurred.

30.	Brigade	Party agents	Dom. Observers
Someone attempts to disrupt registration process	1	2	---
Intimidation	---	---	---
Persons prevented from registering*	9*	7*	---
(Eligible) Persons denied registration	3	1	
Difficult access for post	14	11	2



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Difficult access for women	10	7	1
Foreigners / ineligible persons allowed to register	1	1	---
Insufficient materials**	23**	15**	2**
Official complaints filed? How many?	---	---	---
Result / Resolved? (Explain on back)	---	---	---

* These cases represent persons who are ineligible and therefore correctly prevented from registering

** Some posts were running low of materials, but had already ordered new supplies. Only 1 of the 96 posts visited had run out of material and could therefore not operate.

QUESTIONS TO CITIZENS / REGISTRANTS

31. People learned about the registration process mainly from: Radio, Civic Education(STAE),
Traditional leaders

32. Average travel time for registrants to post:.....N/A

OVERALL IMPRESSION OF REGISTRATION POSTS

35. Number of posts that functioned well or had only minor problems: 94 of 96

Number of posts with significant problems: 2 of 96



APPENDIX C



REPÚBLICA DE MOÇAMBIQUE

COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ELEIÇÕES

Maputo, 1 de Novembro de 1999

Excellency,

As you may know, within near future, the second term elections will take part in our country. The mozambican will be once more faced with the great, but responsible exercise of choosing by vote, the President of the Republic as well as the Members of the Parliament for the same new parliament to come.

In recognition of the great support that the institution of your Excellency have paid to many events such as this all over the world, we therefore wish to invite you to be part of the mozambican elections, that take place on **3th and 4th December 1999**, as observers, and also to contribute in whatever that can be useful for our process, with the hope that you will accept us to benefit from your honorable presence.

For further clarification we desire to inform that all expenditures on accommodation, food, and transport will be on your account, due to lack of financial resources from our side.

Best regards.

POR ELEIÇÕES TRANSPARENTES, LIVRES E JUSTAS!


Jamisse Wilson Taimo
President



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

APPENDIX D

**Summary of Information Gathered by
Medium-Term Observers**

GENERAL

Provinces visited by MTOs: 10 + Maputo City
Number of Cities/localities visited: 44
Kilometers traveled by car/bus: 35,000

INFORMATION ON ELECTORAL BODIES

Interviews conducted with electoral bodies: 40
Provincial and District STAEs visited: 20
STAEs visited with active training programs on schedule: 20
STAEs visited with material readily available to public: 17
STAEs considered as excellent to good: 15
STAEs relating difficulty obtaining materials or transport: 1
CPEs and CDEs visited: 18

POLITICAL PARTIES AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES

Interviews conducted with political parties: 68
Parties with very active campaign (by Nov. 17): 2
Parties seen campaigning in sites visited: 8
Number of campaign activities (rallies and marches) observed by CC: 22

MOST FREQUENT CAMPAIGN CONCERNS IN ORDER OF TIMES CITED

Lack of funds for campaign
Violent or aggressive incidents
Partisan or manipulative media reporting
Extensive use of government personnel, funding and apparatus for campaign
Climate of intimidation



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APPENDIX E

Lists of Parties and Candidates

Parties

FRELIMO	<i>Frente da Libertação de Moçambique</i> (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
PADELIMO	<i>Partido Democrático Liberal de Moçambique</i> (Democratic Liberal Party)
PALMO	<i>Partido Liberal e Democrático de Moçambique</i> (Liberal and Democratic Party)
PANAOC	<i>Partido Nacional dos Operários e Camponeses</i> (National Party of Workers and Peasants)
PASOMO	<i>Partido de Ampliação Social de Moçambique</i> (Social Broadening Party)
PIMO	<i>Partido Independente de Moçambique</i> (Independent Party)
PPLM	<i>Partido de Progresso Liberal de Moçambique</i> (Progressive Liberal Party)
PT	<i>Partido Trabalhista</i> (Labour Party)
RENAMO-UE	<i>Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana-União Eleitoral</i> (Mozambican National Resistance-Electoral Union)
SOL	<i>Partido Social-Liberal e Democrático</i> (Social-Liberal Party)
UD	<i>União Democrática</i> (Democratic Union)
UMO	<i>União Moçambicana de Oposição</i> (Mozambican Opposition Union)

Candidates

FRELIMO	Joaquim Chissano
RENAMO-UE	Afonso Dhlakama



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

APPENDIX F

CARTER CENTER ELECTION DAY OBSERVATION CHECKLIST
Mozambique, December 3-4, 1999

Observer team: _____
 Province: _____ District: _____ Posto Administrativo: _____
 Locality: _____ Local da Assembleia/Mesa Name: _____ Caderno/Mesa Number: _____

Number of Voters on Register _____ Women Registered (if they know): _____
 Number who have voted so far today: _____ Number waiting in line to vote: _____

Date _____ Arrival/Depart times: _____ / _____ Repeat Visit? _____
 Present for the poll opening? _____ (attach sheet) Present for the poll closing? _____ (attach sheet)

OUTSIDE THE POLLING STATION	YES	NO
1) Is there party propaganda within 300 meters of the polling station? (Specify whose)		
2) Are police in the area?		
3) If yes, are the police at least 100 meters away from polling station?		

INSIDE THE POLLING STATION		
4) Are the President or Vice-President & two Scrutineers present (i.e. legally formed mesa) ?		
(i) President		
(ii) Vice-President/Secretary		
(iii) Scrutineer 1		
(iv) Scrutineer 2		
(v) Scrutineer 3		
(vi) Does at least one polling official speak the local language?		
(vii) Number of women functioning as polling officials ()		
5) Are Party Agents (delegados) from both FRELIMO and RENAMO present?		
(i) FRELIMO		
(ii) RENAMO/UE		
(iii) UMO		
(iv) Other (specify)		
6) Are domestic observers present?		
(i) FECIV		
(ii) AMODE		
(iii) Other (specify)		
7) Are International observers present? (specify)		

REPORTING PROBLEMS

8) Are there any problems or concerns mentioned by officials, party agents or observers?

Please indicate your source and how serious the source thinks the problem is/was.
m = minor (no effect on vote); *s* = significant (voting continued); *v* = very serious (voting halted or delayed)

		Carter Center	Party agent	National Observers	Officials	Citizens
i	Intimidation of voters					
ii	Registered voters w/ ID prevented from voting					
iii	Foreigners / ineligible persons allowed to vote					
iv	Voters from other voting list allowed to vote					
v	Double voting					
vi	Ballot boxes not sealed or guarded overnight					
vii	Difficult access to polling station, or long distance					
viii	Party agents prevented from observing fully					
ix	Insufficient materials					
x	Voters do not appear to understand how to vote					
xi	Voter secrecy not assured					
xii	Competence and impartiality of polling staff					
xiii	Delayed opening (note time)					
xiv	Campaigning on day or propaganda within 300 meters					
xv	Someone tries to disrupt the voting process					



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

CARTER CENTER ELECTION DAY OBSERVATION CHECKLIST

Mozambique, December 3-4, 1999

	YES	NO
9) Have any citizens or party agents registered complaints with the Presiding Officer?		
10) If so, were the complaints deliberated by the mesa and noted in the acta?		
11) Are Polling Station officials generally responsive to citizen and party concerns?		

IF VISITING DECEMBER 4, ASK THE FOLLOWING :

12) How many citizens had voted by close of polls yesterday? _____

13) Were boxes sealed appropriately the previous night?		
14) Did police guard ballot boxes at night?		
15) Did party monitors (F/R/other) or their representatives stay with the box overnight?		
16) Were the boxes kept in the polling stations?		
17) Did at least two party observers (F/R/other) witness the reopening of the polling station?		

QUALITATIVE INFORMATION FROM VOTERS

- 18) How did voters learn about the elections? (Indicate 2 most common answers)
 Neighbor ___ Trad. leader ___ Party ___ Radio ___ Church ___ STAE / Civic Educ. ___ Other ___
- 19) How long did it take voters to travel to the polling station? (Average of 5 responses)
 Less than 1 hour: ___ 1-3 hours: ___ More than 3 hours: ___
- 20) What was the longest time any citizen reported traveling to reach the poll: _____
- 21) How long has the first person in line been waiting? _____

OVERALL IMPRESSION OF THE POLLING STATION

Discuss with party agents and observers their overall impression of the polling station.
 Check the box that best summarizes their assessment, and then note your own assessment.

	Carter Center Team	Frelimo Agents	Renamo Agents	Other Part Agents	Dom. Observers
Post functioned well, no problems					
Some minor problems that won't affect outcome					
Serious problems, potential for significant impact on result					
Grave violations, results of poll should be invalidated					

COMMENTS: Use the space below to note interesting facts and describe any problems you noted in more detail.



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

CARTER CENTER ELECTION DAY OPENING AND CLOSING REPORT FORM

Mozambique, December 3-4, 1999

Observer team: _____

Province: _____ District: _____ Posto Administrativo: _____
Locality: _____ Local da Assembleia/Mesa Name: _____ Caderno/Mesa Number: _____
Date _____

At the station where you watch the opening on December 3

Were these procedures followed ?		Yes	No
1.	Ballot boxes shown to be empty		
2.	Ballot boxes correctly sealed		
3.	Do delegates/observers record seal numbers		
4.	All materials checked		
8.	Time opening procedure began		
9.	Time first ordinary person voted		

Province: _____ District: _____ Posto Administrativo: _____
Locality: _____ Local da Assembleia/Mesa Name: _____ Caderno/Mesa Number: _____

At the station where you watch the closing on December 3

Were these procedures followed ?		Yes	No
1.	Closing time at 18.00 hrs If not please explain:		
2.	President sealing ballot boxes		
3.	President noting seal numbers		
4.	Police ready to guard ballot boxes overnight		
5.	Party agents present		



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

CARTER CENTER ELECTION DAY OPENING AND CLOSING REPORT FORM

Mozambique, December 3-4, 1999

Observer team: _____

Province: _____ District: _____ Posto Administrativo: _____
 Locality: _____ Local da Assembleia/Mesa Name: _____ Caderno/Mesa Number: _____
 Date _____

At the station where you watch the opening on December 4

	Yes	No
1. Were these procedures followed ?		
1. President checking seals numbers and ensuring that they are intact If no, please explain:		
2. Party agents present		
3. Opening time of polling station		
4. Number of national observers present		

Province: _____ District: _____ Posto Administrativo: _____
 Locality: _____ Local da Assembleia/Mesa Name: _____ Caderno/Mesa Number: _____

At the station where you watch the closing on December 4

1. Number of staff		
2. Number of party agents present		
3. Time station closed		
4. Were these procedures followed ?	Yes	No
4.1. Spoiled and unused ballots checked and packed in respective inviolable bags		
4.2. Number who voted checked from register		
4.3. Ballot boxes opened and number of ballot papers inside counted (both boxes)		
4.4. The secretary notes the number of ballot papers in the "edital"		
4.5. Presidential vote counted first		
4.6. The President shows and reads out loud each ballot.		
4.7. Ballot papers arranged by candidate or party(blank and void are also counted and arranged)		
4.8. The Secretary notes the number of votes cast for party/candidate		
4.9. The President confirms whether the total votes cast concurs with the number in the "edital" The 2nd "escrutinador" confirms these numbers.		
4.10. The President invites the party delegates to examine the stacks of ballots.		
4.11. The President reads the results attributed to each candidate in the order listed on the ballot		
4.12. The "editais" are filled in appropriately, signed and stamped by the polling station members and posted outside the polling station.		
5. Decisions on unclear ballots		
5.1. Were there many ballot papers where a choice was not obvious ?		
5.2. Was there a full discussion in each case ?		
5.3. Did all parties agree with all decisions ?		
5.4. Were there any formal objections ?		
5.5. Did you see any indication of bias or unfairness		



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

APPENDIX G

Carter Center Election Deployment Plan
December 3-5, 1999

Site	Delegates
Beira City Sofala Province	Amanda Bronson Laurie Cooper Shelly McConnell
Chimio Manica Province	Joseph Jude David Pottie
Cuamba Niassa Province	Nicolas Fernandez-Bravo Jim Free
Ile Zambezia Province	George Kondimbule Chimwaza Lauren Rinehart
Ilha de Mocambique Nampula Province	Leonardo Galicio Lloyd Sachikonye
Inhambane City Inhambane Province	Francesca Bettio Gordon Streeb Mell and Alicia Traylor
Lichinga Niassa Province	Fernando de los Rios
Maputo City Maputo Province	John Hardman Ketumile Masire Gilbert Motsemme Andrea Wolfe
Maputo City Maputo Province	Brooks Entwistle Tynasha Green Mario Paiva
Maputo City Maputo Province	Yeda Crusius Nyemba Wales Mbekeani
Matola and Sede Maputo Province	Justice Lewis M. Makame Ruth Schaad
Milange Zambezia Province	Julie Ballington Miriam Solsana
Mocimboa da Praia Cabo Delgado Province	Kevin O'Neill Satu Ylisaari
Montepuez Cabo Delgado Province	Moree J. Khaebana Pedro Novoa
Morrumbala Zambezia Province	Molly Ryan
Namapa Nampula Province	Ozong Agborsangaya Jean-Paul Morekezi
Nametil Nampula Province	Lynn Miller Nandini Patel
Nampula City Nampula Province	Margaret Riney Claudia Werman
Quelimane Zambezia Province	Ana Barradas Hendrick Gappy
Tete City Tete Province	Denis Kadima Achille Nisengwe
Xai-Xai Gaza Province	Khabele Matlosa Rosa Sawyer



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

APPENDIX H

SUMMARY OF THE DAILY CHECKLIST
ONE FORM PER TEAM

OBSERVER TEAM _____	ALL (22 Teams)
PROVINCE _____	11 Provinces
NUMBER OF POLLING STATIONS VISITED	747
NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS AT ALL STATIONS	650808
NUMBER OF REPEAT VISITS	68
1. NUMBER OF STATIONS WITH PROPAGANDA	13
2. NUMBER OF STATIONS WITH POLICE	382
3. NUMBER OF STATIONS WITH POLICE PROPERLY DISTANCED	403
4. NUMBER OF MESAS LEGALLY CONSTITUTED	710
5. NUMBER OF STATIONS WITH BOTH RENAMO AND FRELIMO AGENTS	601
6. NUMBER OF STATIONS WITH DOMESTIC OBSERVERS	343
7. NUMBER OF STATIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS	61
8. SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED: NUMBER OF STATIONS WITH	
I. Intimidation	12
ii. Registered voters with I.d. prevented from voting	10
iii. Foreigners/ineligible persons voted	2
iv. Persons not on registration list voted	10
v. Double voting	1
vi. Ballot boxes not sealed or guarded overnight	0
vii. Difficult access to polling station	13
viii. Party agents prevented from observing fully	3
ix. Insufficient materials	27
x. Voters do not understand how to vote	38
xi. Secrecy not assured	34
xii. Competence and impartiality of officials questionable	1
xiii. Delayed opening	48
xiv. Campaigning/Propaganda	10
xv. Attempt to disrupt voting process	6
9. NUMBER OF STATIONS WHERE COMPLAINTS WERE OFFICIALLY REGISTERED	17
10. NUMBER OF STATIONS WHERE COMPLAINTS WERE DELIBERATED	13
11. NUMBER OF STATIONS WHERE MESA IS RESPONSIVE	653
NUMBER OF MESAS VISITED ON DECEMBER 4 ONLY	287
13. NUMBER OF DEC. 4 MESAS WHERE BOXES WERE PROPERLY SEALED	322
14. NUMBER OF DEC. 4MESAS WHERE POLICE GUARDED OVERNIGHT	319
15. NUMBER OF DEC. 4 MESAS W/ PARTY MONITORS WATCHED OVERNIGHT	284
16. NUMBER OF DEC. 4 MESAS WHERE BOXES STORED AT THE STATION	313
17. NUMBER OF DEC. 4 MESAS W/BOTH PARTIES WATCHED RE-OPENING	308
19. NUMBER OF ALL MESAS WHERE VOTERS WALKED	
LESS THAN 1 HOUR	439
1-3 HOURS	113
MORE THAN 3 HOURS	36
OVERALL EVALUATION IN VIEW OF CARTER CENTER TEAM	
NUMBER OF MESAS WITH NO PROBLEMS	575
NUMBER OF MESAS WITH SOME MINOR PROBLEMS	145
NUMBER OF MESAS WITH SERIOUS PROBLEMS	16
NUMBER OF MESAS WITH GRAVE VIOLATIONS	0





OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

APPENDIX I

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

THE CARTER CENTER
1999 MOZAMBIKAN GENERAL ELECTIONS

December 6, 1999

The Carter Center's election observation delegation would like to commend the Mozambican people for their participation in the general elections of December 3-5, and to present this preliminary statement on the electoral process.

Our delegation is co-led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former President Ketumile Masire of Botswana, and includes 50 persons representing 16 different countries. The delegation was invited by the National Elections Commission (CNE), and welcomed by the major political parties. Carter Center election observers visited 649 polling stations in approximately 50 districts across all of Mozambique's provinces, representing an estimated 550,000 registered voters.

Prior to the arrival of this delegation, the Center issued two pre-election reports, first on the voter registration process in August, and then on the campaign and electoral preparations. The Center found that registration was very high, that the CNE and STAE were performing well, and that the major parties appeared generally satisfied with registration.

In October, the Center opened a field office and deployed nine medium-term observers to report on the campaign and electoral preparations. These observers found that while there were some incidents of violence during the campaign, the parties campaigned actively and felt they were able to get out their message. However, regrettable delays in the availability of campaign finance funds made it difficult for most parties to begin effective campaigning until well into the campaign period. The delays were due to several factors including the late delivery of contributions from international donors, disagreements over the relative share of funds to be supplied by donors and the government of Mozambique, poor preparation on the part of parties in preparing candidate lists, and the time required for CNE to verify the eligibility of parties to receive funds. The Center also found that media coverage during the campaign was frequently characterized by incomplete and overly partisan reporting.

Although the voting is now over, the Center will continue to observe the counting and tabulation process for provincial election results as well as the tabulation of national results. Once these observations are complete, the Center will issue a final report on the entire electoral process.

On the basis of our visits to polling stations and other information gathered by our delegates, we offer the following observations:

High turnout. Voting was peaceful and orderly throughout the country, and delegation members reported high turnout in all provinces. A preliminary estimate of turnout at the polling stations we visited is approximately 75%, with strong representation of women.

STAE and electoral preparations. Polling station officials were generally well organized, efficient and consistent in the performance of their duties. They showed themselves to be responsive to the concerns of voters and party agents, and demonstrated their commitment to enable voters to exercise their right to vote.



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

The overwhelming majority of the 8350 polling stations opened on time on the first day of voting. However, logistical difficulties in delivering materials contributed to extended delays in opening of polling stations in some parts of the country, especially Zambezia. By the end of the second day of voting 77 polling stations in Zambezia province had not yet opened. Voting was extended by the CNE for a third day to address this problem. After the third day, the CNE and STAE reported that 11 polling stations were never opened. While this is a serious concern, the impact is limited to about 8,000 of the 7.1 million registered voters (about 0.113%). This amounts to approximately 0.57% of the total number of registered voters in Zambezia province.

Presence of party agents and observers. Party agents from both major parties were present at the large majority of polling stations visited, and in almost all cases reported that the process was functioning normally. Similarly, there was strong presence of domestic observers in many of the areas visited. The domestic observers usually remained in a single polling location throughout the voting and worked well with international observers, who with much smaller numbers, moved around throughout the course of the election.

Party agents and domestic observers reported very few problems at the polling stations we visited, and expressed satisfaction with the process. In the overwhelming majority of the polling stations we visited, party agents and domestic observers indicated that there were "no problems," or "a few, minor problems."

Our delegates came to similar conclusions, reporting that the voting process functioned normally in polling stations visited. Serious problems were observed in only a small fraction of the polling stations.

Participation of women. Most of our observers were impressed by the high levels of participation by women as polling officials, observers, party agents and voters. On average, there were roughly two women polling officials per station. Women were also present in large numbers among the domestic observers and party agents.

While our assessment of the electoral process to date is largely positive, we want to note several concerns, as follows:

Processing of electoral complaints. For the most part, institutions established to deal with electoral complaints have not functioned as effectively as they might. Although problems reported by Renamo in Tete do not provide sufficient grounds to challenge the overall results, they are nonetheless instructive in this regard. In Tete, Renamo reported that members were intimidated during the campaign period making it impossible to campaign and to credential its party agents in 3 districts, Changara, Cahora Bassa, and Mague. The CNE and STAE eventually attempted to respond, but the actions were late and Renamo agents were not observed at polling stations in Changara district. The CNE's position is that these problems are electoral crimes that should be addressed by the police, not CNE. While the police have responsibility to deal with electoral crimes, the issues raised in this complaint should be within the competence of an elections commission.

The failure of the CNE to address these issues undermines the potential effectiveness and credibility of electoral institutions. For their part, political parties have too often relied solely on the media to voice complaints rather than use appropriate formal channels. Democratic institutions can only be strengthened when and if the problems that they are designed to address are in fact referred to them.



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

Other issues. Our delegation noted several other minor concerns, including late opening of some polls (discussed above), concerns about positioning of voting booths, and voter education.

Observers reported that some voting booths were positioned in a manner that did not adequately ensure the secrecy of the ballot. In many instances we were told that this was done at STAE's direction in order to prevent propaganda or other inappropriate material being left in the booth.

In spite of much evidence of a good civic education campaign, our observers reported that a number of voters, especially elderly persons, appeared completely unfamiliar with the voting process.

Finally, there have been limited reports about other incidents, including campaigning at the polling stations, and an apparent assault of polling officials by Renamo members. However, these seem unlikely to affect the outcome of the elections.

Conclusion. Overall, the strong sense of our delegation is that the process we have witnessed so far has been very positive. Our observers were very impressed by STAE's preparation and administration of the electoral process, and by the CNE's commitment to seeing the process through to a successful conclusion. We also commend the commitment of poll workers, party agents, and domestic observers.

Mozambicans turned out in large numbers to participate in this important exercise of democratic choice. We know that there are still crucial phases to be completed, including counting and tabulation of both the provincial and national vote results, and we will be following these processes in the weeks ahead.



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

APPENDIX J

NEWS

F R O M
THE 
CARTER
CENTER

ONE COPENHAGEN ATLANA GA 30307

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, December 21, 1999

CONTACT: Deanna Congileo
or Natasha Singh
404-420-5108

CARTER CENTER CALLS ON MOZAMBIicans TO MAINTAIN CALM AND AWAIT OFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS

ATLANTA, GA.... The Carter Center today called on the Mozambican people, political parties, and media to maintain a calm and patient atmosphere as the National Elections Commission (CNE) completes final results for the general election, which took place December 3-5.

Those results were due on December 20, but were delayed as the CNE in Maputo reviews and verifies a larger than expected number of null, blank, and invalid ballots as well as a significant number of polling station results. Although the delay is regrettable, it is important that the CNE take the time necessary to ensure the accuracy and transparency of its results. The Carter Center remains impressed by the responsibility and commitment demonstrated by the CNE and STAE, and by the cooperation of political party representatives working in these offices.

The Carter Center organized a 50-person team to observe the December elections, and has maintained a small number of observers on the ground to monitor the counting and tabulation processes at the provincial and national level. Although the access granted to observers has not been consistent, Center's observers have been able to observe and assess the provincial counting in almost all provinces, and to monitor many of the verification steps undertaken by the CNE in Maputo.

"It is important for all Mozambicans to maintain a calm atmosphere and to wait for the CNE to complete its work and announce the official election results," said Dr. David Carroll, associate director of the Carter Center's Democracy Program. "While completing its work, the CNE should ensure that party monitors and accredited international observers have adequate access to check election results data."

The Carter Center has observed Mozambique's electoral process since August, when the Center organized a team to assess the registration process. In October, the Center opened a field office and deployed 9 medium-term observers to monitor the campaign period.



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

APPENDIX K

PRELIMINARY REPORT

THE CARTER CENTER
1999 MOZAMBIKAN GENERAL ELECTIONS

December 23, 1999

Working at the invitation of the National Elections Commission (CNE) and welcomed by the major political parties, The Carter Center has observed the Mozambican electoral process since August 1999, when the Center sent a team to assess the voter registration process. In October, the Center opened a field office and deployed 9 medium-term observers to monitor the campaign period. For the December 3-5 elections, the Center organized a 50-person observer team led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former President Ketumile Masire. Observers were deployed to all 11 provinces to observe the voting process. On December 6, The Carter Center delegation issued a preliminary statement congratulating the Mozambican people for their orderly participation in the election, and commending election officials for their successful conduct of the process up to that point.

Following the vote, a small team of Carter Center observers has remained in Mozambique to monitor the tabulation process in each of the 11 provinces, as well as the CNE's national tabulation and verification exercises in Maputo, which ended yesterday with the CNE's announcement of official results. This preliminary report summarizes The Carter Center's overall assessment of the process, focusing on the recent tabulation and verification exercises.

After more than two weeks of vote tabulation, the National Elections Commission (CNE) yesterday announced final results which declared victories for President Joaquim Chissano and the ruling FRELIMO party. The Carter Center once again congratulates the Mozambican people for their participation in the process and the election officials for completing the final tabulation. In addition, we commend all Mozambicans for the calm they maintained in the weeks following the voting in spite of the uncertainty of the post-election tabulation process.

While the Center is aware of several specific incidents of irregularities that were brought to the attention of the CNE during the tabulation process and addressed by it, we have not witnessed nor are we currently aware of evidence of serious irregularities that would affect the outcome of the elections. We are pleased to note that representatives of both major political parties were present and participated in most of the tabulation and verification exercises.

Nonetheless, we are concerned about disagreements that surfaced during the final tabulation and verification processes, in particular concerning the accuracy of the provincial vote counts and whether or not to cross-check these data against a parallel computer database and against original tally sheets (editais). Unfortunately, these disagreements have created some doubts about the transparency of the process.

Although Carter Center observers were able to observe many aspects of the provincial counting, and to monitor some of the CNE's verification steps in Maputo, we regret that the access granted was not consistent nor adequate for our observers to verify the accuracy of these processes. The



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

Center made repeated requests to the CNE for fuller access, but unfortunately did not receive a positive reply.

While we have so far seen no evidence suggesting significant problems in the CNE's results, we are aware that RENAMO has announced that it does not accept the results. We believe that it is vitally important for complaints about the electoral process to be referred to the Supreme Court and that established legal processes be followed to file and resolve complaints.


Given concerns about transparency in the tabulation process, we believe that all sides should strive to provide for maximum transparency in the post-election period, particularly during the period for filing and resolving complaints. To ensure such transparency, we hope that the Supreme Court will take steps to resolve doubts about possible discrepancies in the election results, and will invite the involvement of political parties and observers so that all sides can confidently accept the final result. Every opportunity should be pursued to check vote tabulations from alternate sources.

The Center will continue to monitor the process, including any forthcoming deliberations concerning complaints or protests. After the process is concluded, the Center will issue a comprehensive final report covering the observation of the entire electoral process.



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

APPENDIX L



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, Jan. 12, 2000

Contact: Deanna Congileo or
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**CARTER CENTER URGES MOZAMBIANS TO WORK TOGETHER
TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY**

ATLANTA, GA....The Carter Center today called on Mozambican political parties and leaders to work together constructively to strengthen Mozambique's democracy. The call follows the Mozambican Supreme Court's Jan. 4 decision to validate the final election results and dismiss complaints filed by the opposition party Renamo.

Results for the Dec. 3-5 elections were announced by the National Elections Commission (CNE) on Dec. 22. Renamo immediately filed a list of complaints concerning problems in the CNE's counting and verification process. The decision of the Supreme Court, which acted in its role as Constitutional Council, is final and represents the formal end of the electoral process.

"Now that the electoral process is officially complete, we hope that both parties will work together constructively and maintain a productive dialogue, recognizing that all sides have a genuine stake in Mozambique's democracy," said former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who led the Center's 50-person delegation that observed the December elections.

In a statement issued Dec. 23 following the announcement of results, the Center said that while it had not seen evidence of serious irregularities that would affect the outcome of the election, the Center's observers did not have adequate access to verify the accuracy of the final tabulation and verification processes, despite repeated requests to the CNE for fuller access. The Center also called for greater transparency in the process for filing and resolving complaints.

The Carter Center has observed the Mozambican electoral process since August, when a team assessed the registration process. Observers also monitored the campaign period in October and November, and voting and counting in December. For the Dec. 3-5 election, the Center deployed a 50-person team to all 11 provinces to observe voting. Following the vote, several Carter Center observers remained in Mozambique to monitor the tabulation of votes in the provinces and the CNE's national tabulation and verification exercises in Maputo. The Center is currently preparing a comprehensive final report covering the observation of the entire electoral process.

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OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

APPENDIX M

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Mozambique election viewed with optimism

By Keith Graham
STAFF WRITER

The second time around is not always lovelier than the first.

But staff members at the Carter Center hope Mozambique's general elections Dec. 3-4 will run even more smoothly than the African nation's first national multi-party elections five years ago.

The 1994 elections, just two years after the end of a 16-year civil war, were heavily monitored by U.N. observers. This year's election will be observed principally by a 50-member team from the Atlanta-based center and a similar group from the European Union.

Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter will be joined in the Carter Center delegation by two other former presidents, Ketumile Masire of Botswana and Marquel Pinta da


Costa of São Tomé and Príncipe.

The Carter Center was already involved in economic development and farming programs in Mozambique before being invited to monitor the vote. Among the world's poorest nations just five years ago, Mozambique has made strides, achieving one of the highest growth rates by 1997 and 1998.

"It was one of those countries that was at the very bottom of the heap," said Georgia State University's Carrie Manning, a senior consultant to the election monitoring team. But it appears to have made a successful transition from war to peace and has made progress in attracting investment. "Of course, they were starting from zero," she said.

Still, the success of this election could be critically important to the nation's future, said David Carroll, associate director of the Carter Center's democracy program. So far, registration has gone well. And, despite some incidents, "the level of violence may not be as bad as initially thought," he said.

The race pits incumbent President Joaquim Chissano of the Frelimo Party against Afonso Dhlakama of Renamo. Chissano took 53.3 percent of the 1994 vote to Dhlakama's 33.3 percent.



Staff



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

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December 6, 1999, Monday, BC Cycle
18:07 Central European Time

SECTION: International News

LENGTH: 517 words

HEADLINE: Carter criticises Mozambique election body

DATELINE: Maputo

BODY:

Former U.S. president Jimmy **Carter** on Monday criticised Mozambique's National Elections Commission (CNE) for the way it has handled the main opposition Renamo's complaint that it was prevented from campaigning in three districts of Tete province.

A Renamo spokesman Gulamo Jafar on Sunday complained that the CNE failed to respond to Renamo's request to postpone the elections in the Changara, Magoé and Cahora Bassa districts of the Tete province because "Frelimo gangs" prevented his party from campaigning in the three districts.

"In the CNE's view a crime was committed and therefore the police should investigate it. While it is responsibility of the police to deal with electoral crimes, the issues raised in Renamo's complaint should be within the competence of an elections body," **Carter** told a press conference in the capital of Maputo.

Carter, leader of a 50-man observer team from his US-based Carter Centre, said the failure of the CNE to address these issues undermined the potential effectiveness and credibility of electoral institutions.

However, he also criticised Mozambique's political parties for using the media to voice their complaints "rather than using the appropriate formal channels".

Voting in Mozambique's second democratic elections after a 16-year civil war ended at 6 p.m. on Sunday after the CNE decided to extend voting to a third day because helicopters from the South African Air Force with election materials were unable to land at remote polling stations in the Zambezia province due to heavy rains.





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Renamo condemned the decision, saying it was "just one more opportunity for fraud".

Carter said the Centre's observers, including himself and former Botswana president Quet Masire visited about 650 polling stations in the country's 11 provincial constituencies, adding that they did not find any evidence of fraud and considered the elections "overwhelming free and fair".

He regarded the voter registration exercise during July to September and the elections as "highly successful", adding that the Carter Centre estimated voter turnout at over 70 per cent and even 80 per cent at some polling stations.

Ader Afronso Dhlakama's allegation on Sunday that "electoral fraud "is being prepared, Carter said, "I talked to the Renamo president on Monday and he did not repeat that allegation to me."

He said if an opposition party suspected electoral fraud, the correct way to deal with it would be "to file an official complaint together with evidence to substantiate the allegation".

Counting of the votes started at polling stations on Sunday night. Provisional results should be announced by December 12. A week later the CNE must announce the final results.

A spokesman said all votes that were declared invalid at the polling stations as well as those that were contested by a political party's polling station monitors need to be varified.

Carter said that some of the centre's observers would stay on in Mozambique to observe the provincial count and the final tabulation of the election results. dpa dl jp



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

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A Smooth Vote Is Marred By Complaints In Mozambique

By RACHEL L. SWARNS

MAPUTO, Mozambique, Dec. 5 — Helicopters sent to deliver voting materials to several remote districts ran out of fuel this morning before reaching their destinations, leaving about 8,000 people unable to vote by the close of Mozambique's presidential and parliamentary elections today, officials said.


The national election — which began on Friday and was originally scheduled to take two days — had already been extended to allow officials to deliver ballot boxes and voting materials to the central province of Zambézia, where torrential rains had flooded the roads.

But tonight election officials said that the law did not permit them to extend the balloting further and that people in the affected districts in Zambézia would be unable to vote.

The affected voters constitute a tiny fraction of the nation's 7.1 million registered voters, but the opposition party has particularly strong support in Zambézia, and party leaders quickly voiced their outrage.

The opposition party, the Mozambique Resistance Movement, called Renamo, also questioned the fairness of the vote in several other provinces, saying it believed that government officials were planning to tamper with ballot boxes.

Renamo officials, who contend



A woman voted yesterday at a polling center near Maputo, the capital. Logistical problems prevented some people in remote areas from voting.

that their party won the election, said they filed a complaint with the National Electoral Committee.

"If we lose because we just lose, because we don't have the trust of the people, that we will accept, but to lose because of fraud, we can't accept that," Afonso Dhlakama, the presidential challenger and opposition leader, said on Saturday night.

Jamisse Taimo, the president of the electoral commission, said that he had no knowledge of Renamo's allegations but that the commission would investigate any formal complaints.

Until the allegations are investigated, Mr. Dhlakama said, he could not declare the elections fair.

Mr. Dhlakama is challenging

President Joaquim Chissano, who is also the leader of the governing party, the Mozambican Liberation Front.

The allegations of fraud and the problems experienced by the voters in Zambézia have marred an election that has otherwise gone smoothly throughout most of the country, international observers and officials of both the governing and opposition parties said.

"In general, this has been a very carefully conducted election," said former President Jimmy Carter, who is leading a team of 50 international observers. "We didn't have any serious problems reported."

The results will be released on Dec. 19.



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

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Mozambique Says President Is Re-elected; Rivals Protest

By RACHEL L. SWARNS

JOHANNESBURG, Dec. 22 — President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique was declared the victor today, after three days of voting this month, touching off cries of protest from opposition leaders who said the balloting was rigged.

Leaders of the opposition, the Mozambique Resistance Movement, known as Renamo, said their candidates had won the presidency and control of Parliament, though results released by the National Electoral Commission indicated otherwise.

The Renamo officials said that they would petition the Constitutional Court for a recount and that their newly elected legislators would boycott Parliament until their concerns had been addressed.

"We are not accepting these results," a spokesman for Renamo, Jafar Guiamo Jafar, said in a telephone interview. "Our information, our data, shows another picture. A manual recount would give us some guarantees."

The fraud allegations marred an election that many people had hoped would solidify a fledgling democracy. The balloting, on Dec. 3, 4 and 5, was the second free election since a 13-year civil war ended in 1992.

Fearing civil disturbances from angry Renamo supporters, the government put the national police on alert for the third day in a row, and Mr. Chissano and his opponent in the election, Afonso Dhlakama, called for calm.

The electoral commission reported that Mr. Chissano had won 52 percent of the vote and Mr. Dhlakama 48 percent. In Parliament, the governing Mozambique Liberation Front, known as Frelimo, won 133 seats to 117 for Renamo, the commission reported.

International monitors had declared the three days of voting free and fair, although 5,000 citizens never voted because officials could not deliver voting materials to several remote districts made inaccessible by torrential rains.

Western observers said the counting, which lasted more than two weeks, had been hampered by computer glitches, mathematical errors and other technical problems, leading to many many contested votes.

Renamo officials contend that fraud occurred when election officials entered results into a computer and that their officials were denied adequate access to monitor that process. Election officials and Frelimo officials have denied the accusations.

The Carter Center in Atlanta, which has a small team of monitors in Mozambique, did not comment on the elections today. But in a statement on Tuesday, officials said they had observed and assessed the counting in virtually every province, even though the center also said its monitors' access was inconsistent. The officials commended the commitment and cooperation between the two parties in the election.

In a statement tonight, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, who has been mentioned as a possible mediator in the dispute, urged the parties "to accept the elections outcome, which has been declared free and fair by the Mozambican National Electoral Commission and the International Observer Mission."



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

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Mozambique vote

It was less than a ringing endorsement.

The Carter Center's preliminary assessment of Dec. 3-5 election in **Mozambique** commends the country's people for participating in the election process and maintaining calm despite uncertainties about the counting of votes that followed.

But the report from the Atlanta-based center also cites problems. Carter Center observers were "aware of several specific incidents of irregularities" and became concerned about disagreements "concerning the accuracy of the provincial vote count." The election observers also felt their access to monitor the process was not consistent nor, in all cases, adequate.

Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano and his governing FRELMO party won re-election, 52.3 percent to 47.3 percent, and the Carter Center said its observers are not "currently aware of evidence of serious irregularities that would affect the outcome."

But the opposition has challenged the results in court and has threatened to boycott Parliament.

The Carter Center called on Mozambique's Supreme Court to "take steps to resolve doubts about possible discrepancies in the election results." And the Atlanta center, which also is involved in economic development and agricultural projects in Mozambique, said it would "continue to monitor the process, including any forthcoming deliberations concerning complaints or protests."

Until 1992, Mozambique was embroiled in a 15-year-civil war that left 600,000 people dead. Elections in 1994 were the African nation's first national multi-party voting. This month's vote was the second national election.



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

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Election Dispute Mars Mozambique

Democratic Image Hurt by Treatment of Voting Irregularities

By STEVEN MUFSON
Washington Post Staff Writer

Just last month, U.S. diplomats were holding up Mozambique as a model of African democracy and reconciliation.

"Look to your other neighbor, Mozambique, where the U.N. oversaw a cease-fire and transition process that also led to democracy," Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, urged a South African audience in December. "The people of Mozambique are making history as we speak, with their second multiparty elections."

But the Mozambican democratic miracle is suddenly looking tarnished. After the peaceful casting of votes in December, the counting of the ballots was marred by allegations that the election commission, after locking out observers from the Atlanta-based Carter Center, tossed out tens of thousands of opposition ballots in order to inflate the margin of victory for the ruling Frelimo party candidate, incumbent President Joaquim Chissano.

"The lines of people standing under the sun [to vote] were inspiring," said a U.S. official in Mozambique. "Then the lid came down. The vote counting was messy, and ... in a lot of people's minds, a cloud remains."

The State Department has glossed over the irregularities, some Africa analysts say, because the candidate preferred by the United States won. The State Department hailed the peaceful voting, and after the Mozambican Supreme Court unanimously rejected the opposition's protests, the United States seemed eager to put the controversy to rest.

"All Mozambicans can be proud of the continuing strength demonstrated by their multiparty democracy," the State Department said after the court ruling. "The election results were very close. In recognition of this fact, we hope the opposition in the assembly will fulfill its democratic responsibilities and contribute fully and constructively to governing the country and consolidating a strong, sustainable democracy."

It remains unclear whether opposition candidate Afonso Dhlakama, a former guerrilla leader, plans to play the role of parliamentarian or seek a more disruptive form of opposition. Members of his Renamo party took 117 seats in the country's 250-seat parliament, but Dhlakama boycotted the presidential inauguration on Jan. 15 and last week moved some of Renamo's offices out of the capital, Maputo, to his traditional stronghold in Beira.

"Clearly the State Department is aware that electoral fraud took place," said a senior State Department official. "And it's saying to Re-

namo ... 'Take it like a man.'"

Though it is a country of only 19 million, Mozambique has been one of the few bright spots for democracy in Africa, and the State Department has long emphasized the southeast African nation's progress.

In 1994, the United States and other European donors spent \$60 million, or about \$11 per voter, on elections in Mozambique. Last year, they gave about \$40 million, including \$2 million from the United States to support election observers and voter education programs. Mozambique is also one of the largest recipients of U.S. developmental assistance in sub-Saharan Africa.

After a long civil war in which the apartheid government of South Africa backed Renamo, the warring Frelimo and Renamo factions made peace and the country went to the ballot box in 1994. Chissano's Frelimo party won by a comfortable margin; Dhlakama's party was the biggest opposition group. Including his time in office before the civil war ended, Chissano has been president for 13 years.

Voting took place again from Dec. 3 through Dec. 5, 1999. By all accounts, it was peaceful and orderly. International observers were there, including a 50-person delegation led by former president Jimmy Carter and Botswana's former president, Ketumile Masire.

According to David Carroll, a member of Carter's delegation, "It was clear that the race would be very close." But as the results were tabulated over the next two weeks, he said, a large number of ballots—many filled out by uneducated people from rural areas—required interpretation by the national election commission because the preferences intended were unclear.

The Carter Center delegates and election observers from South Africa offered to help the election commission examine the contested ballots, but the commission rejected the offers. The U.S. ambassador to Mozambique, Dean Curran, lobbied unsuccessfully for the commission to allow Carter Center officials to be present.

The election commission invalidated tally sheets from several hundred polling stations—about 7 percent of the total number of voting places—mostly in provinces where Dhlakama's support was strong.

"We regret that the access granted was not consistent nor adequate for our observers to verify the accuracy of these processes," the Carter Center said, noting that disagreements had "created some doubts about the transparency of the process."

Renamo appealed to the Mozambican Supreme Court, whose members have been appointed by Chissano. The court decided unanimously against Renamo. "It is not enough to

claim there is fraud or illegality. It is necessary, as the law says, to present elements of proof," the court said.

While acknowledging some irregularities, the court ruled that they did not change the outcome. It calculated that Dhlakama would have needed 77 percent of the disputed ballots to win, a bigger margin than he carried in any province.

Even if Dhlakama accepts the election results, the tabulation procedures have soured many experts and U.S. officials about Mozambique's ruling party, which already owns most of the country's media. The New York-based organization Human Rights Watch had expressed concern earlier about "heavy-handed policing and the manipulation of the electoral process." Now, even though Renamo won majorities in six of the country's 11 provinces, Chissano is widely expected to install Frelimo governors in every province.

"What does Renamo have to show for this great democratic experiment?" a senior U.S. diplomat asked rhetorically.

The opposition party "feels entitled to some recognition, and I think they are," said Curran, the U.S. ambassador. "I think the [Mozambican] government should take note and be more inclusive."

But Curran still praised the elections' peacefulness and Renamo's willingness to press its case "in the courts and not in the streets." Mozambique, he said, still "deserves to be on the model pedestal—even though it's not perfect."



OBSERVING THE 1999 MOZAMBIQUE ELECTIONS

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Africa News

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February 3, 2000

SECTION: NEWS, DOCUMENTS & COMMENTARY

LENGTH: 1748 words

HEADLINE: Mozambique;
Feature: The Washington Post And The Echo Chamber

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BODY:

Maputo, Mozambique (PANA) - Let us imagine that, two months after the forthcoming US presidential elections, a Mozambican newspaper publishes an article claiming that the results were fraudulent.

The article is written by a journalist who has no particular knowledge or experience of American politics or of the American electoral system, and has never set foot in the US.

Furthermore the article relies exclusively on anonymous sources in the Mozambican foreign ministry for its sensational claims.

Would such an article be picked up in the US? Would its claims be mentioned on US radio and TV networks? Would the US Secretary of State be forced to appear on television to deny the claims? We think not.

Indeed, we think that American diplomats would correctly surmise that such an article was a crude piece of disinformation and would toss it into the nearest waste paper basket.

But when an American paper (Washington Post) publishes such an article two months after the Mozambican elections, under the by-line of a reporter (Steve Mufson) who has, as far as the Mozambican News Agency (AIM), is aware, no prior knowledge of Mozambique, and who relies exclusively for his claims of fraud on anonymous sources in the State Department, then the report is considered to be credible.

Within 24 hours of its publication Monday, much of the Mozambican media were referring to the



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article.

However, Radio Mozambique and Mozambican Television did not take it at face value, and sought a Mozambican government reaction.

Foreign Minister Leonardo Simao had to appear on TV Tuesday night, patiently explaining that the Mozambican government has received no accusations of fraud from its American counterparts.

He said President Bill Clinton has warmly congratulated Joaquim Chissano on his re-election - which he would hardly have done had he believed the election was stolen.

No doubt Mozambican Television believed it was behaving in a responsible and professional manner. But the effect of forcing government ministers to react to anonymous claims that the elections were fraudulent is to keep those claims alive: the cloud of suspicion remains in the air.

This, of course, appears to be the intention of the disinformation artists who planted the story on the Washington Post in the first place.

It is worth looking more closely at how the story leapt from the Washington Post into the Mozambican media.

Mozambican journalists do not subscribe to the Washington Post. Even those who happen to read English fluently do not log on to the Washington Post website every day on the chance that the paper might be carrying something about Mozambique.

The article needed translation and a convenient middleman before it could reach a Mozambican audience.

That middleman took the shape of the habitually compliant, habitually servile Portuguese media.

The Portuguese news agency, LUSA, eagerly retailed the Post story, and so did RDP-Africa, the Portuguese radio service beamed into Lusophone Africa - they were happy to use a third rate American article citing anonymous sources, even though they have their own, competent professionals who live and work in Mozambique, and who followed the elections and the vote counting step by step.

This is a well known tactic in intelligence work, one used by both American and Soviet intelligence agencies during the Cold War.

You plant a story in one news outlet in one country, with the intention of getting it reproduced elsewhere.

The target audience is not in the country where the story was first published, but in the one where it is reproduced. This is an echo-chamber effect. The article is published in just one US paper (even the Post's sister paper, the International Herald Tribune has not carried it), but is then multiplied across the Portuguese media, and then amplified still further in the Mozambican media.

The political effects are felt, not in the US, but in Mozambique, as it adds to the opposition RENAMO campaign to discredit all Mozambican institutions.

For sure Mufson's anonymous sources know perfectly well how the media operate.

They know that the Portuguese media are always willing to grab any hostile article on Mozambique that appears in a supposedly reputable US publication, and they know that within a matter of hours the Portuguese version will be on Mozambican news editors' desks.

Mufson's by-line has never appeared on stories related with Mozambique before. He was not in



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Mozambique during the elections, and, as far as AIM can ascertain, he has never been here.

What sources did Mufson use? Since the article begins with an attack on Richard Holbrooke, the US ambassador to the UN, portrayed as naively accepting fraudulent elections in Mozambique, it is reasonable to assume that the plant comes from those in the State Department opposed to the Clinton administration's Africa policy.

Three anonymous sources are cited - "a US official in Mozambique", "a senior State Department official" and "a senior US diplomat."

A spate of anonymous sources and a journalist with no track record of writing on Mozambique or southern Africa - these should have been warning flags, alerting both Portuguese and Mozambican editors on the spurious nature of this piece.

There are a couple of named sources: at the end of Mufson's article, US ambassador to Maputo Br Curran, defended Mozambique, saying it deserves to be "on the model pedestal, even though it's not perfect."

Curran made no mention of fraud, but since his remarks were thrown into the last paragraph, they were overshadowed by all the misinformation earlier in the article.

As all journalists ruefully acknowledge, many readers never reach the end of lengthy articles.

Curran also made the mild remark that RENAMO "feels entitled to some recognition. I think the (Mozambican) government should take note and be more inclusive."

This unexceptional sentiment has been wildly misinterpreted by the Maputo daily, Noticias as "government interference in Mozambique's internal affairs."

The most startling claim in Mufson's article is that the National Elections Commission locked out foreign observers, and then "tossed out tens of thousands of opposition ballots in order to inflate the margin of victory" for FRELIMO.

Mufson appears to be confusing two issues here. One was the rechecking of 'votos nulos' - which votes declared invalid at the polling stations.

These were patiently checked, one by one, and a large number were salvaged, when the election commission decided that polling station staff had been too strict and that the voters, though they had not filled in their ballot papers perfectly, had indicated a clear preference.

Far from prejudicing RENAMO, this worked in its favour since more of the 'votos nulos' that were eventually accepted were for RENAMO than for FRELIMO.

The room in which the 'votos nulos' were checked was open to accredited observers and reporters who wandered in and out with no difficulty.

The second issue was the problem of 'editais' or polling station reports giving the details of each individual polling station count. A large number of these were kept out of the final tally because they lack certain critical information such as codes of polling stations and number of ballot papers in the boxes, among others.

Anyone unfamiliar with the Mozambican election would assume, from Mufson's article, that the elections commission was an exclusively governmental body. Mufson seems unaware that RENAMO-appointed members were in the electoral bodies at the central, provincial and district levels.

Mufson implies that the US NGO, the Carter Centre, also thinks the vote count was fraudulent.



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In fact, in its preliminary report, issued 27 December, the Carter Centre did complain of lack of adequate access for its observers. But it added immediately that, despite this, it had not seen any sign of significant problems in the results announced by the elections commission.

The centre also said that it had not witnessed or obtained knowledge about any proven cases of serious irregularities that could affect the outcome of the election.

It was satisfied that both FRELIMO and RENAMO were present and participated in most of the vote tabulation and verification.

Mufson's quote from the Carter Centre is thus highly selective. He suppressed anything in the centre report that is not in line with the fraud theory of his State Department sources.

Mufson does mention that RENAMO appealed to the Supreme Court against the results and that its appeal was thrown out. But his summary of the Supreme Court ruling is woefully inadequate, and he hints that the court cannot be relied upon because its members "have been appointed by Chissano."

The practice of the president appointing Supreme Court judges was not invented in Mozambique, but borrowed from that venerable document, the Constitution of the United States.

Had Mufson done a little homework, he would have found that Chissano has not abused his power by making the same blatantly ideological appointments to the Supreme Court that characterised the approach to the judiciary of former US Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush.

Quite gratuitously, Mufson throws in a completely untrue claim about the Mozambican media, alleging that "most" of it is owned by FRELIMO.

It is strange that the Stalinist mindset ("public ownership = ownership/control by the ruling party") should hold sway in the Washington Post.

In reality, FRELIMO does not own Radio Mozambique any more than the British Labour Party owns the BBC.

The State Department was so irritated by the Washington Post article to issue 'Press Guidance' restating its earlier positions and pointing out that the Supreme Court had rejected "some of the counts of the opposition appeal because they were accompanied by no proof, others because they had no legal foundation, and others because of gross errors."

"We note that the opposition has taken its seats in parliament, and call on all parties to work together to better the lives of the Mozambican people," the department said.

Finally, the clear lesson from this affair is that the Mozambican media should not lap up stories about their own country merely because they have been published in a prestigious US paper, and served up in a convenient Portuguese form by LUSA or RDP-Africa.

Our media should, in short, learn how to spot misinformation.



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
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