

Office of Transition Initiatives

Results Review FY 1999

May 2000

**Bureau for Humanitarian Response
Office of Transition Initiatives
U.S. Agency for International Development**

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Part 1: Overview & Factors Affecting Program Performance

I. Introduction


In FY 1999, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives continued to adhere closely to U.S. foreign policy interests and work in concert with other USG entities in all its country programs¹. OTI country programs in FY 1999 were critical countries for the U.S. in terms of national interests, including national security, democracy and human rights, and humanitarian response. These national security interests are directly linked to the Department of State's FY 1999 Performance Report's strategic goal to ensure that local and regional instabilities do not threaten the security and wellbeing of the U.S. or its allies. This report highlights progress in reducing regional tensions in countries where OTI had active transition programs, including Serbia, East Timor, DROC, and Sierra Leone, as well as OTI FY 1999 priority countries – Indonesia, Nigeria and Kosovo. Together, these three programs comprised 60% of OTI's FY 1999 budget – 74% including the rest of the Balkans.

OTI programs also support the U.S. national interest in "Democracy and Human Rights." This national interest is linked to the U.S. strategic goal to increase foreign government adherence to democratic practices and respect for human rights. In the FY 1999 DOS Performance Report, positive democratic developments in such OTI countries as Indonesia, Nigeria, and Rwanda (the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) was noted. Also, OTI programs in Honduras, Kosovo, and DROC support the U.S. national interest in humanitarian response, and its related strategic goal to prevent or minimize the human costs of conflict and natural disasters.

Figure 1 shows how OTI resources were allocated in FY 1999. OTI responded to opportunities in Nigeria (13% compared to .1% in FY 1998), and increased activities in Sierra Leone (2% compared to .3% in FY 1998). Colombia joined the portfolio with 2% of the budget, while countries like DROC saw a reduced expenditure (6% in FY 1999, down from 20% in FY 1998).

¹ The term "country program" may refer to programs in places that are not always recognized as countries per se, such as Kosovo.

Figure 1. FY 1999 Resources by Country Program²



OTI promotes U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives by advancing democracy in transition settings and building foundations for security. OTI’s fast, flexible, and responsive culture also helps the U.S. make a positive contribution to the strengthening of fragile democracies worldwide. In a recent address to the Center for Strategic International Studies, Under Secretary of State Alan Larson noted, “each country’s challenge is unique. There is no single recipe to guide them on the path to stronger democracy and development. What is clear, however, is that each must seek democracy and development together, not as antagonistic goals but as two sides of the same coin.”

Over the years, the international donor community has increased its attention to the areas of post-conflict reconstruction and democratic governance. As more and more donors see the value of transitional programming, they are seeking the advice and expertise of, and cooperation with, OTI. This trend leads to stronger partnerships on the ground and greater opportunities to leverage funds.

A. Country Presence


In FY 1999, OTI was active in eighteen countries. It initiated programs in six countries (Albania, Colombia, East Timor, Honduras, Lebanon, and Nigeria) and closed out programs in three (Angola, Guatemala³, and Liberia). If activities proceed as planned for FY 2000, OTI will exit Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Honduras, and Rwanda and start a program in Zimbabwe. FY 1999 was the largest portfolio of countries the Office has had to date. OTI has begun making concerted efforts to limit its involvement to two years in a country, after which it will hand off activities as appropriate. Figure 2 demonstrates where OTI was active in FY 1999, and shows that it is shortening its time in transition countries.

Although it is currently a major OTI country program, East Timor will be treated as part of the Indonesia portfolio for FY 1999. OTI funded activities in East Timor as part of its Indonesia program until the referendum. It will be reported as a separate country in next year’s R4.

² These figures include funds transferred to OTI from other parts of the U.S. Government.

³ Guatemala programming was adequately covered in last year’s R4 and is thus not reported in this document; all FY 1999 activities in Guatemala focused on close-out activities.

Figure 2. OTI Country Presence



⁴ “Start-up” means either the first fund obligated, OTI field presence established, and/or first grant approved.

⁵ “Exit” means when the last funded activity ended or the field office closed, whichever is last.

⁶ OTI’s first program, Angola, began in FY 1994.

⁷ Dates of reduced program activity refer to Serbia only.

⁸ Although East Timor programming began in FY 1999, this chart refers to Indonesia dates only; in FY 2000, OTI will begin reporting East Timor as a separate country.

⁹ “Suspended” means that program activities end early (staff are evacuated but funding is still committed to the country), due to changing and unfavorable conditions, but with expectations to resume activities.

B. Technical Assistance

In addition to supporting country programs and activities, OTI provides technical assistance to USAID Missions or other U.S. Government agencies in a limited number of countries each year. Typically, the objectives are to determine whether or not to start a country program, and/or to analyze conditions and develop program tools that may be adopted by the host government or incorporated into USAID Mission portfolios. Technical assistance does not necessarily constitute the use of OTI funds. To date, OTI has provided technical assistance to:

- Recommend potential peace- and confidence-building activities
- Provide information, program options, and lessons learned to U.S. negotiation teams
- Provide advice on developing potential transition strategies.

Assessments – An assessment is used to determine whether or not OTI will implement a country program – otherwise known as a “go” or “no go” decision. In FY 1999, OTI conducted five assessments.

Figure 3. OTI Assessment Decisions

GO DECISIONS	NO GO DECISIONS
<p>Lebanon (March 1999) – An assessment of corruption concluded that the Mission should proceed with an anti-corruption program incorporating municipal development, small grants to local organizations, and the media. The Mission requested OTI to develop the program.</p> <p>Honduras (Dec 1998) – A post-hurricane Mitch assessment concluded that OTI could fill a gap between short-term relief and long-term reconstruction. A focus on government accountability for donor funds was also included.</p> <p>Zimbabwe (June 1999; Sept 1999) – The Mission requested a two-phase assessment of the need to increase information and dialogue between citizens, policy makers and civil society leaders. A five-point conflict mitigation program was developed as a result.</p>	<p>Cambodia (June 1999) – The assessment concluded that, despite the great needs of Cambodia, a transition toward democracy was not taking place.</p> <p>Sudan (Aug 1999) – The field visit concluded that the situation in southern Sudan, characterized by on-going conflict, a military stalemate, and feeble negotiation efforts, did not constitute a transition for the purposes of OTI.</p>

Program Analysis and Development – Three field visits examined the potential for USAID to engage in a country on a particular transition-related issue.


- **Burundi** (Spring 1999) – OTI worked with the Africa Bureau and G/DG to assess the potential of starting a Great Lake Justice Initiative (GLJI) program in Burundi. OTI also evaluated whether there was an opening for political transition activities. The result was to implement the former but not the latter. Most GLJI activities were channeled through existing NGOs, such as Search for Common Ground.

- **Republic of Georgia** (Oct 1998) – USAID/Tbilisi asked OTI to look at the potential for conflict in the Samtskhe-Javakheti and assess conditions for the return of refugees into Abkhazia. In the former, OTI found potential for conflict, which could be addressed by providing resources on the community level as a tangible demonstration of concern by the government in the region. In the latter, OTI found the security issues for returning IDPs to be overstated and made recommendations to the Mission for implementation of confidence-building measures, and supporting a transition from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development.
- **Peru/Ecuador** (Feb 1999) – OTI helped the Peru and Ecuador Missions design a short-term program and longer-term strategy to address community needs on both sides of the border. Although the two countries signed a peace agreement, tensions and recurrent wars along the border remained, impeding development. OTI recommended that USAID channel funds through CARE to implement a small grants program that would meet the basic needs of rural communities in border districts.

C. OTI Resource Flexibility

After growing rapidly in the first few years of its existence, OTI funding has held constant at the level of approximately \$50 million for FY 1999 and FY 2000. This amount does not include transfers from other accounts, which brought total OTI funding to approximately \$69 million in FY 1999. At its current staff and management capacity, OTI is limited to the number of countries it can engage in, although not all countries have the same level of activity. As OTI exits countries, it enters others, thus keeping levels current. A stricter adherence to a two to three year timeframe will ensure that OTI is available for places most in need of transition assistance. In the future, OTI may choose to focus on fewer, high-priority countries. Any increase in country presence beyond current levels must correspond to an expanded capacity within the Office to manage additional programs.


Figure 4. OTI Country Presence and Total (IDA) Budget¹⁰



In FY 2000, as in FY 1999, OTI's resources will be channeled to countries of the highest priority to U.S. national interests, including humanitarian objectives of its foreign policy. OTI will continue to devote the bulk of its resources to places like Kosovo, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Although Indonesia remains a priority, OTI has also created a separate program for the newly independent East Timor to meet that country's immediate post-conflict needs. It is estimated that, with a transfer from the U.S. Department of State's Economic Support Funds, OTI's East Timor budget will be the largest in FY 2000. Overall funding for the Balkans will decrease slightly as OTI closes out its programs in Bosnia and Croatia. Nigeria's budget shows a slight increase, as does Sierra Leone's.

¹⁰ Budget figures for 2000 represent estimated projections only.

Figure 5. Projections for FY2000 Resource Use¹¹



D. Partnerships

OTI actively coordinates with other USAID offices (regional bureaus, Missions, G/DG, PVC, FFP, and OFDA); U.S. PVOs; multilateral organizations, including the United Nations and World Bank; other governments; and over one thousand local NGOs all over the world. Such partnerships increase OTI's impact by leveraging complementary funds and designing coordinated strategies. OTI continues to search for the right balance between independent action and coordinated approaches, and maintains an ongoing dialogue with other organizations.

USAID Missions reported on their close collaboration with OTI in the following R4s:

“An essential programming partnership with OTI has been forged by the USAID/Nigeria Mission.”
 ---- USAID/Nigeria Results Review FY 1999:7

“[USAID/Angola looks] forward to our continued close collaboration with our key partners in other bureaus in USAID, without which we will not be able to implement this strategy, most notably BHR OFDA, FFP and OTI as well as G/PHN.”
 --- USAID/Angola Results Review FY 1999:4

“A close positive partnership with OTI assured rapid, targeted disbursement of SEED monies ... and in reaching communities during the NATO-Kosovo conflict ... [which] contributed to two of the Mission’s strategic objectives”
 --- USAID/Croatia Results Review FY 1999:8-9

“Many of the Mission’s most impressive accomplishments over the last year go beyond the approved strategic plan as resources were reprogrammed from planned Mission activities, available child survival resources, OFDA, OTI, food aid programs, and local currency accounts to meet immediate recovery and rehabilitation needs after Hurricane Mitch.”
 --- USAID/Honduras Results Review FY 1999:6

¹¹ These figures include funds transferred to OTI from other parts of the U.S. Government.

II. Lessons Learned and Next Steps

Throughout OTI's first six years, its priority has been maintaining speed, flexibility, relevance, and innovation. This focus has allowed OTI to lead the Agency in developing emergency transition responses to conflict-prone countries; to successfully adapt relevant development activities to humanitarian contexts; to improve humanitarian assistance by expanding and empowering communities at the grassroots level; and to help USAID fill the gap between relief and development.

During FY 1999, OTI continued to pilot and implement new activities and approaches to emergency transitions. However, OTI also recognized the need to balance the flexibility and innovation of its approach with the development of systems that better support and improve its response capability. In FY 1999, OTI made progress in its plans to reform operating systems to improve its responses to transitions. As a result, OTI learned several lessons about both creative approaches and operational management.

A. Innovative Approaches

OTI aims to stay on the cutting edge of developing and implementing innovative approaches to transitions. To do this, OTI compares similar programs across OTI country experiences, evaluates pilot transition efforts to gather lessons and test hypotheses, collaborates with development professionals both within and outside the USG, and looks for opportunities to replicate successful transition efforts.

1. *Conflict Mitigation and Early*

Action/Response – One of the newer transition approaches that OTI is exploring is conflict mitigation and early action within a humanitarian mandate. In immediate post-conflict settings, USAID has learned that transition assistance must respond to complex, rapidly changing, politicized and polarized societies with extremely volatile conditions. OTI has demonstrated that emergency transition assistance can have a positive impact in post-conflict settings and help break the vicious cycle of violence that inhibits development in conflict-prone countries. OTI is exploring whether its experiences in immediate post-conflict transition activities, which target the root causes of conflict and primary roadblocks to peace and development, could be applicable where there is a threat that conflict will develop into a full-scale humanitarian emergency.

OTI Toolkit - In April 2000, OTI developed a "toolkit" of transition activity experiences that synthesizes its field activities and organizes them according to the major program area – civilian security, democratic political processes, and combinations of the two. The toolkit is intended to serve as a guide for developing a detailed strategy and program. While it represents the sum of OTI's experience, the toolkit does not limit OTI's ability to develop new, innovative transition programs or adapt those that already exist.

Next Steps: Continue efforts to mitigate violent conflict in Zimbabwe. Evaluate the program to determine whether emergency transition activities are having a positive impact. Develop lessons learned for other OTI mitigation early action country programs.

2. Anti-Corruption/Transparency – Throughout FY 1999, OTI explored opportunities to support anti-corruption efforts. OTI has incorporated anti-corruption activities in the Honduras, Nigeria, Lebanon, Indonesia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia programs. OTI also worked with the USAID Democracy and Governance Center and international community to develop coordinated donor responses.

OTI fights corruption by supporting national media campaigns, investigative journalism training, and civic advocacy organizations. Although USAID Missions have undertaken their own anti-corruption efforts, OTI has a comparative advantage in transition countries because corruption can be a key domestic issue around which activists can mobilize popular support for democratic processes.

OTI has also learned that these programs must have the Mission's full support. Because corruption is such a political issue, and anti-corruption efforts often seek to change the behavior of government officials or other elites, OTI must work with the Mission and the Embassy in order to present a united USG front. An integrated strategy is also essential since anti-corruption assistance often requires a hand-off to longer-term development approaches to achieve a sustained impact. In Lebanon, OTI and the Mission successfully worked together to develop a coordinated anti-corruption program; but in Honduras, an anti-corruption program that OTI developed had to be downsized to reflect political realities on the ground.

Next Steps: Co-implement the anti-corruption program in Lebanon with the USAID Mission, monitor the results, share lessons learned with other USAID offices, and explore opportunities to further develop anti-corruption programs for emergency transition countries.

3. Civilian-Military Relations – In FY 1999, OTI focused on strengthening civilian control over the military in Indonesia and Nigeria, and supported USAID/W efforts to develop technical expertise within the Agency. In Indonesia, OTI encouraged dialogue between the public and political elite to discuss how to reduce the military role in political and civilian affairs. In Nigeria, a carefully structured series of interventions to strengthen civilian oversight of the military began in mid July 1999. Although these programs are relatively new, OTI has learned that focusing on improving civilian-military relations during transitions is a critical role for USAID because:

- The possibility of renewed military domination of the country's political life is a key threat to success of the civilian, democratic government.
- These programs are often considered to be too politically sensitive by USAID Missions, which have relatively little experience in this area.
- USAID is statutorily prohibited from working directly with militaries. OTI works closely on an interagency basis to ensure that its efforts to build the capacity of civilian organizations and civil society are completed by State Department and DOD programs to reprofessionalize the military, and encourage military reforms.

Next Steps: Continue to implement civilian-military relations programs in Nigeria and Indonesia. Continue to work with G/DG, PPC, GC, the Missions and Regional Bureaus and other actors within the USG to identify and implement civilian-military relations programs within emergency transition programs, and to develop further USAID's experience with such programs and strategies. Establish a memorandum of understanding with Democracy and Governance Center and Department of Defense regarding complementarity in the civilian-military sector and improved operational coordination.

4. Community/Grassroots Focus – One of OTI's hallmarks is its focus on community impact. Typically, OTI activities create or support participatory mechanisms to address the community's transition needs in conflict-prone areas. In this way, the foundations for democratic decision-making are strengthened at the neighborhood level around the immediate priorities for rehabilitation, recovery, and reintegration. Likewise, such activities can begin to build trust among donors, local officials, and community members, some of whom may be former adversaries. During FY 1999, OTI included community impact activities in 9 out of 16 country programs. In Rwanda in FY 1999, and previously in Haiti, evaluations of community impact activities revealed the following key lessons learned:

- Community impact activities have helped to reduce tensions in communities. Hunger, lack of housing and poverty are often the primary causes of social tension. OTI's community-level participatory approach can assist vulnerable populations to build homes, feed themselves, and begin

to restart their lives economically. By bringing together community members to decide their priorities, a place for communication, interaction, and cooperation is created – which can also help build a sense of unity and social trust among former enemies or victims.

- OTI’s community-level focus contributes to the participation of citizens in new political structures. OTI-funded projects provide opportunities for community members to participate in local decision making processes. This experience is intended to help strengthen leadership capacity among OTI-funded beneficiaries and enable them to compete for elective office.

Lessons from the Philippine and Colombian programs reveal:

- By working closely with host governments, OTI can help orient them towards previously neglected communities. Fostering closer relationships between governments and communities improves mutual understanding and long term prospects for peace; more concretely, it also means improvements in municipal services for communities.

Next Steps: Share lessons learned with other USAID offices and other donors, including hosting a joint seminar/workshop on community empowerment programs with UNDP. Continue to evaluate impact within and across OTI country programs. Determine the relative merits of a focus on democratic process over speed of implementation.

B. Operational Management

From its inception, OTI recognized that the fluid, dynamic, and chaotic nature of transitions required it to make timely, effective and flexible response its first priority. As OTI gained experience and learned the lessons of operating in transition countries, the Office began looking at ways to improve response by standardizing operational systems. One such mechanism is the Support Which Implements Fast Transitions (SWIFT) contract to provide rapid administrative and procurement support. OTI also developed a regional approach for management of some country programs, and pilot tested new avenues for recruitment. OTI also has recognized the need to implement the results of an Office-wide performance assessment review, and to improve contingency planning, the SWIFT contracting mechanism, and exits from country programs, as described below.

1. Results of the Performance Review – In FY 1999, OTI initiated an “innovation assessment” to review its mandate and operations in terms of timeliness, agility, innovation, and administration of its programs, and to recommend ways to improve future performance. The assessment targeted six operational areas for improvement. OTI is working to address them during FY 2000:

- Review and revise the OTI strategic framework
- Update the OTI organization chart
- Redesign administrative procedures
- Create a project management training module
- Refine the OTI tool box
- Improve program orientation for new staff.

2. Contingency Planning – Dynamic transition environments require OTI to be flexible and change course rapidly in order to remain relevant and to maximize its impact in conflict-prone countries. Despite OTI’s best efforts, the operating environments do not always remain stable enough for continued programming. During FY 1999, the chaotic nature of transition environments required OTI to reduce

activity in Serbia and DROC, and evacuate staff out of several countries. Lessons learned from these events suggest that OTI needs to improve contingency planning in ways such as:

- Develop systems to continuously monitor country program impacts and retarget accordingly. These could include regularly scheduled field meetings, grant databases that track impact, evaluations, assessments, and other program reviews. While many of these procedures and activities currently exist, they should be refined to ensure that OTI programs more directly reflect the most urgent and significant transition needs.
- Develop national, regional, and local contingency plans which identify serious potential hot spot/security risks and suggest alternative programming options (budget, staff, partners, mechanisms), evacuation plans, and reengagement criteria. Develop them in concert with the Mission, Embassy, and other partners and donors. Plans have been developed for some programs such as Sierra Leone, where each contract or agreement included a contingency clause which clearly spelled out an operation plan for its partners in case OTI had to reduce or end active engagement.
- Conduct country strategy reviews when events significantly change the current transition context, particularly when staff and implementing partners have been evacuated. The reviews, which must incorporate the views of country backstops and field staff as well as outside observers, need to take place quickly. The final decision rests with OTI's senior staff.

Next Steps: Discuss and review suggestions, in order to institutionalize contingency mechanism for all transition country programs.

3. SWIFT Contract – The SWIFT contract was not written to handle OTI's subsequent growth. During FY 1998-1999, the Office launched large programs in Nigeria, Indonesia, and the Balkans. As a result, OTI is revising the SWIFT contract in order to define operational requirements better (e.g., set-up of field programs, an integrated grants/financial database for all programs, standard formatting of budgets and reporting), contractor roles, and guidelines for sub-grant processes.

Next Steps: Competitively bid the follow-on SWIFT II contract in FY 2000.

4. Exit (Hand-Off) Strategies – OTI has learned that exits from transition programs can be messy, especially when programs and activities initiated by OTI need to be continued beyond the period of its involvement. OTI has tried different kinds of hand-offs including handing off funding but not management, management but not funding, and both funding and management. The Office has also explored a range of hand-off partners, including local communities, host government, corporations, other donors, foundations, other U.S. Government agencies, IFIs, and other USAID operating units.

OTI recognizes that negotiating a hand-off strategy that incorporates its partners' different mandates and objectives might significantly change the activity in the process. However, these differences in philosophy or implementation strategy can not be allowed to artificially extend OTI's presence in a country. Since hand-off strategies are dependent on the context of each country, the approach for each may be fundamentally different. Figure 6 identifies the current status of OTI hand-off dates, plans, and agreements.

Figure 6. OTI Hand-off Strategies

COUNTRY	Date Set	Plan in Place	Agreements Signed	HAND-OFF PARTNERS							
				Mission	Regional Bureau	Embassy	Host Government ¹²	Donors	LNGOs ¹³	INGOs ¹⁴	Foundation / Corporation
Albania	✓	✓		✓				✓			
Angola	✓	✓	✓	✓							
Bosnia-Herzegovina	✓	✓		✓					✓		
Colombia	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓			
Croatia	✓	✓	✓	✓						✓	✓
DROC	✓	✓		✓							
Honduras	✓	✓		✓							
Indonesia	✓	✓		✓				✓			✓
Kosovo	✓	✓						✓			
Lebanon	✓	✓		✓					✓		
Liberia	✓	✓	✓	✓							
Nigeria	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓		
Philippines	✓	✓					✓		✓		
Rwanda	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓			
Serbia/Montenegro	✓	✓									
Sierra Leone	✓	✓			✓		✓				

Next Steps: Develop exit strategies early in the program and when significant modifications and re-targeting occur. Involve the Missions and Bureaus from the start by encouraging participation and partnership throughout the life of the program, starting with the assessment stage. Where feasible, the Mission should consider joint programming and integrated strategic planning, monitoring, and evaluation activities.

¹² Host Government partner can be at either the national, regional, or municipal levels.

¹³ LNGO = Local Non-Government Organization


¹⁴ INGO = International Non-Government Organization

Part 2: Results Review

I. Introduction

OTI developed its first strategic plan in FY 1996. The strategic plan outlines OTI's strategic framework, consisting of one Strategic Objective and three Intermediate Results. Figure 7 illustrates the OTI results framework. In FY 2000, OTI plans to review and revise its strategic framework.

Figure 7. OTI Strategic Results Framework



To organize and analyze the results of FY 1999 activities, OTI assigned each country a primary Intermediate Result (IR). To conduct the analysis, OTI reviewed all country reports and country profiles filed during FY 1999 and conducted impact assessments of the three key programs – Indonesia, Kosovo, and Nigeria. The assessments are summarized in Annex A. OTI also collected and analyzed the Mission R4s for the countries where OTI had country programs. Key activities, with examples from key country programs, are highlighted for each IR.

Figure 8 identifies all FY 1999 countries, their primary IR, and the activities in which they were engaged. In actuality, many programs address both citizen security and democratic change objectives through their implementing activities. Annex A provides a list that defines each activity.

Figure 8. FY 1999 Activities by Country

COUNTRY	Primary IR	IR 1: Citizen Security		IR 2: Democratic Political Processes				Both IR 1 & IR 2			
		Ex-combatant Reintegration	Mine Action	Transparency / Good Governance	Civil Society Org. Support	Election Processes	Civilian / Military Relations	Community Impact Activities	Media	Justice / Human Rights	Conflict Management
Albania	2			✓				✓			
Angola	1		✓		✓			✓			
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2				✓				✓		
Colombia	2							✓			✓
Croatia	2			✓	✓	✓			✓		
DROC	2				✓			✓		✓	✓
Honduras	1			✓				✓			
Indonesia/E. Timor	2			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓
Kosovo	1			✓	✓			✓	✓		
Lebanon	2			✓					✓		
Liberia	2									✓	
Nigeria	2			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		
Philippines	1	✓						✓			
Rwanda	2			✓				✓		✓	
Serbia/Montenegro	2				✓				✓		
Sierra Leone	1	✓		✓	✓						✓

NOTE: These categories and activities reflect FY 1999 only.

In next year's R4, OTI will begin using its grant database to report on these activities. OTI will also begin reporting the percentage of program funds directed at each activity and each IR by country.

II. IR 1: Enhanced Citizen Security

A. Assessing Impact at the Country Level

USAID Mission R4s from countries where OTI is engaged capture at least some of OTI's work in their descriptions of impact at the SO and IR levels. For most countries, OTI reviewed available R4s and identified related Mission Strategic Objectives based on direct mention of OTI or its activities that supported the Missions' country strategies. Only three relevant Mission R4s do not mention OTI or its activities in the Results Review section of their documents. For those countries, OTI conducted its own assessment of where OTI activities best supported Mission SOs. This suggests that OTI has been increasingly integrated into Mission strategic frameworks – that USAID is following ADS guidance on strategic planning. It also ensures that OTI activities are tied both to longer-term development planning and to the Mission Program Plans coordinated by the Embassy. However, it is also clear that OTI needs to continue to work on integrating its activities into Mission plans, particularly at early stages of a transition program.

Figures 9 and 10 summarize Mission rankings for Strategic Objectives and/or Intermediate Results supported by OTI activities. Where reported, the figures then identify the Mission's assessment of whether they have met, exceeded, or not met their expectations. OTI's goals are then listed, followed by OTI's assessment of whether it has met, exceeded, or not met expectations in those countries – based on interviews with USAID/W country team leaders. In only four countries were OTI's and the Mission's assessments somewhat different (the Philippines, Indonesia, Liberia, and Rwanda), suggesting that in some cases OTI's activities might have achieved results not seen in a larger and more long-term country context.

Figure 9 summarizes the mission rankings for OTI-supported Strategic Objectives related to enhanced citizen security. In FY 2000, OTI will move away from these more subjective assessments and tie assessments to each country's database of measurement indicators. Key activities in IR 1 include peace process support/conflict management, ex-combatant reintegration, and media.

Figure 9. Mission Rankings for Strategic Objectives Supported by OTI (Specific to IR 1)

Country	Related Mission SO(s)	Mission Assessment	OTI Goal Statement	OTI Expectations Assessment
Angola	SO 1: Increased resettlement, rehabilitation and food-crop self-reliance of war-affected Angolans	On Track	Build rural foundations for democratic participation through participatory rehabilitation activities.	Met
Honduras	SpO: Critical hurricane reconstruction needs met	Varies by Component	Support relief and reconstruction efforts. Implement an innovative emergency housing project. Repair rural infrastructure in strategic, at-risk areas. Initiate anti-corruption effort between donors and government.	Met
Kosovo	IR 2.1.3: Independent media and civil society free to operate Proposed IR 3.1.1: Improved sustainability of social services and community infrastructure Proposed IR 3.1.2: Strengthened civil institutions	Not Rated	Promote local democratic leadership. Organize community improvement councils, meet their priority needs. Promote an independent media and strong civil society.	Exceeded
Philippines	SO 1: Accelerate the economic transformation of Mindanao	Targets related to the transition programs for former MNLF combatants were fully attained (exceeded)	Strengthen the peace in Mindanao. Integrate MNLF ex-combatants and their families into local communities. Encourage government to invest in neglected, Muslim areas.	Met
Sierra Leone	No USAID Mission	N/A	Support implementation of the Lome Accords. Encourage troop demobilization, reintegration of war-torn communities, respect for human rights.	Exceeded

B. Peace Process Support/Conflict Management

OTI fills the gap between disaster assistance and sustainable development by supporting nascent peace processes in post-conflict countries. These efforts engage the former warring factions in dispute resolution dialogues. In FY 1999, OTI played a critical role in both Colombia and Sierra Leone where new peace processes hinged on including all the stakeholders at the early stages of negotiations. In both cases OTI facilitated the inclusion of actors previously excluded from the table. Without OTI's quick response, crucial momentum would have been lost.

During a visit by OTI field staff to a Muslim village in Mindanao, Philippines, it was revealed that the community had held a meeting to decide whether they would provide the in-kind contribution they had pledged for their OTI-funded agricultural project. Because they had no other cash resources, they decided to sell their guns in order to buy their contribution. Although guns are the most important possession of these ex-combatants, they chose to fulfill their pledge because they saw the direct benefits of rejecting their former way of life.

- **Bringing leaders together in Colombia.** At the request of the Inter-Agency committee on Colombia, OTI sponsored a workshop that brought together for the first time national political leaders with local municipal and civil society leaders. Discussions focussed on the role of local municipal administrators in the peace process and investments needed to respond to the needs of communities in the conflict areas. Subsequently, OTI funded a community impact program designed to build momentum for peace. Similarly, OTI funded a workshop for the Government of Colombia, international organizations and civil society to draft a national strategy that addresses the needs of children affected by violence, and child soldiers. *In FY 2000, OTI will assist the High Commission for Peace and the Minister of Interior to work with civil society to develop positions on issues ranging from changes in agrarian structures to changes in social and economic models, in order to bring the parties to the negotiating table and make negotiations more productive.*
- **Assisting peace negotiations in Sierra Leone.** OTI contributed substantially to the April 1999 Lome peace negotiations. An OTI technical team provided draft concepts and text for much of the political and governance section of the agreement. Following negotiations, OTI assisted the Government of Sierra Leone, and worked in partnership with the US Embassy and the Department of State on developing an overall U.S. Government policy. *In FY 2000, with OTI's technical assistance, the Government of Sierra Leone will attempt to gain legitimate control over diamond production and trading, and give the rebel movement, the RUF, an acceptable mainstream post-conflict role.*
- **Supporting historic peace efforts in East Timor.** In East Timor, the results of an August 1999 referendum on independence led to widespread fighting between pro-independence groups and factions favoring integration with Indonesia. In spring 1999, both sides were willing to conduct peace talks, but needed a neutral group to mediate. OTI quickly issued grants to the newly established Justice and Peace Commission of the Diocese of Dili, which wanted to arbitrate between the two parties but lacked facilities and resources. Funding for the Commission's office was approved within seven days and procurement, delivery, and computer installation was completed in one week. Using these resources, the Commission launched the East Timor Peace and Reconciliation Initiative to end violence in the province prior to the August 1999 referendum. Unfortunately, this effort came too late and was unable to avert the crisis that followed in August and September 1999. Without OTI's quick and flexible funding of the Peace Commission, historic opportunities might have been missed. This initiative also helped lay the groundwork for reconciliation after the conflict.

C. Ex-Combatant Re-integration

OTI continues to address the issues of potential "spoilers," such as ex-combatants, to help ensure that hard-won peace is not jeopardized. It has been shown that soldiers who have gone through a demobilization process can, if given a chance, become productive members of their communities. Through re-integration programs, OTI has helped ex-combatants to experience the benefits of civilian life and to become committed local advocates of peace.

- **Supporting the Arms to Farms program in the Philippines.** In FY 1999, OTI continued its successful reintegration of rebels from the Moro National Liberation Front, a Muslim group that signed a peace accord with the Philippine government in 1996. Phase II of the OTI program (the Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program) (ELAP) began in April 1999. Phase II provides MNLF villages and families with village-based micro-infrastructure projects, post-harvest machinery, and capacity building activities to help the villages become more productive.

During a visit to a Moro National Liberation Front village, Governor Candao stated that he was embarrassed that the staff of a foreign donor (USAID/OTI) had to be the one to introduce him for the first time to a village within his constituency. He sees this as a challenge to all local government officials to provide better leadership.

By the end of FY 1999, OTI had approved 51 village projects assisting 2,759 families and 2,053 ex-combatants. More importantly, the Government of the Philippines and MNLF village groups were picking up close to 50% of the costs. OTI has successfully used the village projects to facilitate positive interaction between communities and local, provincial and national government officials. The Muslim groups are now more strongly convinced that the GRP is sincere in its overtures for peace. *By March 2000, the impact has grown to 183 projects benefiting 11,319 families and 7,526 ex-combatants. Matching funds from the Philippines government now exceed OTI's contribution, and the program will be handed off to them at the end of the year.*

The OTI program in the Philippines supports Mission SO 1, Accelerate the Economic Transformation of Mindanao, and the new IR 3, Increased Economic Progress of Mindanao's Religious/Cultural Minorities. IR 3 activities focus on assisting former Muslim separatist combatants to make the transition from guerilla fighters to productive farmers.

According to the Mission's FY 1999 Results Review, the number of marginal farm and fishing families initiating commercial-level production of more lucrative products as a result of USAID-supported activities exceeded target by a substantial margin. While 10,600 families were targeted, more than 13,000 initiated production activities – including 2,200 former MNLF combatants through the OTI-funded program.

D. Media

OTI continues to develop its media expertise. Thirteen country programs have had a media component, recognizing that expansion of independent and objective sources of news and information both magnifies the impact of other transition activities and is a powerful peace and democracy tool in and of itself. In FY 1999, OTI put its expertise to use in a particularly challenging environment – Serbia and Montenegro.

- **Ensuring the survival of free media in Serbia-Montenegro.**

OTI's previous experience supporting objective news and information programs in Bosnia provided critical input into formulating U.S. responses when state-run media in Serbia and Montenegro tightened its stronghold. OTI helped free media continue to provide alternative information sources to the public and play an active role in demanding government accountability. By working closely with other OTI offices in the Balkans to share strategy and ideas, and coordinating with E&E programs and the rest of the U.S. government, OTI provided assistance to media in Serbia and Montenegro throughout the year, even while diplomatic relations were severed.

OTI has developed a video that highlights its use of the media as a tool for democratic change. Footage from the Balkans includes human rights and justice public service announcements in Serbia, and documentaries produced in Bosnia on the conflict in Kosovo. OTI plans to use the video to share its media approach with other partners and donors.

As the only U.S. government presence in Montenegro during the NATO bombing, OTI ensured the survival of core “free” media organizations by covering essential printing, labor and distribution costs. Similar support proved crucial to Serbian media during the fall of 1999. OTI grantees in both republics, because of their demonstrated ability to deliver unbiased, factual information, are continually threatened by the Yugoslav government.

OTI continues to be a key player in the USG Inter-Agency “Ring Around Serbia” (RAS) initiative, designed to provide Serbians access to credible Western news agencies as an alternative to state-run propaganda. With sizable staff on the ground, OTI set up and maintained much of the technical media equipment. The initiative is clearly working; the Yugoslav government continues to try to block RAS signals.

However, the Ring Around Serbia initiative and other technical media projects were difficult to implement. Poor elucidation of RAS foreign policy priority to the field resulted in delays in implementation. In addition, OTI lacked the expertise to complete the work single-handedly. Procuring and transporting equipment across borders, hiring engineers, and dealing with issues of weather and security were time consuming, taking the focus away from other priority areas. OTI has learned that technical media projects require clear guidelines, significant outside assistance, attention to detail and feasible timelines.

- **Diffusing tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.** OTI's support to media in Bosnia played a significant role in moderating hard-line sentiments and helping to create a calmer political environment. Brcko, a small but strategic district in Bosnia, had been a sticking point in the Dayton Accords; a decision on it had been postponed for several years. A decision by international arbiters to create a multi-ethnic district in Brcko was met with confusion and hostility. OTI's rapid response to the Brcko decision informed the population on the correct interpretation of the ruling and succeeded in thwarting attempts by nationalistic groups to spread misinformation. OTI not only funded radio and print public service announcements on the subject, but actually printed and mass distributed the text of the decision.
- **Supporting a Mission outreach campaign in Croatia.** The OTI program in Croatia supports Mission SO 2.1, Increased, better informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making, and SO 3.1, Return and reintegration of war-affected populations. SO 2.1's activities focus on developing and supporting civil society organizations that might otherwise have withered in the face of harsh government harassment.

According to the Mission's FY 1999 Results Review, OTI played a key role in funding a massive outreach campaign that included direct support for TV and radio shows, commercials, provocative posters, brochures, and face-to-face citizen outreach as part of a USAID "get-out-the-vote" elections campaign. This coordinated effort resulted in voters turning out at the polls in record high numbers, exceeding the turn-out for the 1990 referendum on independence from Yugoslavia. The Mission's R4 also documents the important role OTI's rapid disbursement mechanisms can play in supporting the Mission's strategy. The Mission channeled SEED monies to OTI, which was then able to support a wide range of independent electronic media outlets in airing programs that addressed key political, social, and economic issues. "Without these outlets, opposition parties would have lacked a crucial vehicle for communicating with the public."

III. IR 2: Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Re-established, or Expanded

Figure 10 summarizes mission rankings for OTI-supported strategic objectives related to democratic political processes initiated, re-established, or expanded and OTI's assessment of whether it met, exceeded or did not meet its own expectations. Key activities include civilian-military relations, transparency and good governance, and community impact.

The chart shows the relationship between OTI programming and related USAID mission strategic frameworks in each country categorized under IR 2. It describes how missions assess OTI performance for each mission SO to which OTI activities contributed.

Figure 10. Mission Rankings for Strategic Objectives Supported by OTI (Specific to IR 2)

Country	Related Mission SO(s)	Mission Assessment	OTI Goal Statement	OTI Expectations Assessment
Albania	SO 2.1: Increased, better informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making	On track	Strengthen local governments. Help them meet community needs for infrastructure and basic services.	Met
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Assistance Areas: Media Development; Political Pluralism; Civil Society	On track	Promote reform efforts. Support independent media and local NGOs.	Met
Colombia	N/A as of 5/5/00	N/A as of 5/5/00	Advance peace process. Provide resources to neglected communities in conflict areas. Facilitate negotiations between the government and FARC.	Exceeded
Croatia	SO 2.1: Increased, better-informed citizen participation in political processes SO 3.1: Return and reintegration of war-affected populations	SO 2.1: Exceeded expectations SO 3.1: On track	Help people participate in elections and decision-making. Increase access to more objective news and information. Help government become more transparent and accountable.	Exceeded
DROC (Congo)	IR 2: Promote good governance and rule of law with emphasis on multi-stakeholder problem solving	Not rated	Advance the peace process. Support national reconciliation dialogues; help implement Lusaka Accords.	Did not meet
Indonesia	SpO 1: Democratic transition strengthened	Exceeded expectations	Support transition to democracy through voter education and registration. Help local NGOs mobilize political participation. Teach media how to cover political issues. Help civilians regain oversight of the military.	Met
Lebanon	SpO 2: Increased effectiveness of selected institutions which support democracy	Exceeded expectations (OTI partnership new, so not rated specifically)	Combat corruption. Increase public awareness; change attitudes; strengthen investigative journalism. Help local governments become more transparent and accountable.	New Program
Liberia	SO 1: Successful democratic transition, including free and fair elections	Did not meet	Enhance security and nascent democratic processes.	Met
Nigeria	SpO 2: Strengthened civil society contribution to sustainable democracy and good governance New SO: Transition to democratic civilian governance sustained	SpO 2: Exceeded expectations	Support transition to democratic government. Train newly elected officials. Promote civilian oversight of the military. Support conflict resolution and mediation efforts. Jumpstart economic reform. Strengthen the media.	Exceeded
Rwanda	SO 1: Increased rule of law and transparency in governance SO 3: Increased ability of rural families in targeted communities to improve household food security	On track	Advance local participation in rebuilding society.	Exceeded
Serbia / Montenegro	Montenegro: Democracy Reform Program	Not Rated (new)	Support democratic elements in society, e.g., opposition municipalities, independent media, and NGOs (Serbia). Promote tolerance and democracy. Support local governments, NGOs and independent media. Promote legal reform (Montenegro).	Did not meet

A. Civilian-Military Relations

A threat to democratic consolidation in many countries emerging from violent conflict is military intervention in politics. This is especially true whenever military leaders have suffered real losses in the political transition – of power, wealth and access to resources. OTI recognizes that it cannot meet its mandate without paying attention to the critical relationship between discarded military regimes and the civilian-run democracies in which they now operate.

Improving civilian-military relationships means changing the balance of power between the civil government and the military while increasing the spirit of cooperation and mutual respect. In FY 1999, OTI began a concerted effort to address this sector in key programs such as Indonesia and Nigeria. To bolster these efforts, OTI also funded a civilian-military specialist housed in USAID's Global Bureau, Center for Democracy and Governance.

- **Strengthening civilian control of the military in Nigeria.** OTI's early 1999 assessment pinpointed the military as the biggest threat to the democratic transition and stability of democratic rule. Thus, OTI made civilian-military relations a top priority. After close consultation with USG and Nigerian Government partners, OTI paired a specialized U.S. based consulting firm with a Nigerian team to quickly develop a comprehensive reform action plan. Simultaneously, OTI conducted seminars for top-ranking civilian and military leaders on "Civil-Military Professionalism in a Democracy."

Because of early buy-in by both governments, the action plan was strongly supported and eventually adopted for implementation. The Nigerian Government and the U.S. Departments of Defense and State will co-fund implementation with OTI's initial support. An independent, OTI-funded assessment of the FY 1999 activities showed that measures put into practice as part of the action plan have already contributed to advancing civilian oversight of the Nigerian military.

The OTI program in Nigeria supports old Mission SO 1, Democracy and governance, and new SO4, Strengthened civil society contribution to sustainable democracy and good governance. During FY 1999, the Nigeria Democracy and Governance program was transformed from a small, grassroots-based Special Objective to a fast-paced elections-oriented transition program, and then to a full-fledged Strategic Objective covering a wide range of program areas. According to the Mission's FY 1999 Results Review, OTI has been catalytic in the area of civil-military relations and is now working with other U.S. Government agencies to develop a strategy for reforming the civilian police force.

- **Funding civilians to transform the military in Indonesia.** At the request of the USAID Mission in Jakarta, OTI stepped in to provide support in addressing civilian-military issues. A thorough one-month assessment concluded that small steps towards reform led by interested civilians were vital to the broader national effort to transform the military. OTI decided to fund small projects that would empower local groups to engage their communities in promoting military reform.

The grants targeted concerned groups ranging from student and labor activists to established academicians, particularly outside of Jakarta where mechanisms for civilian oversight of the military are few. Activities included tracking the military's human rights records in local areas, assessing the role of the military in political and social organizations, and evaluating military practices in village society. OTI also provided an in-country specialist to strengthen the groups' strategies and organizational capacity.

The impact of OTI's work in this sector is difficult to measure, but the positive steps that the government and society have taken to contain the military point towards success. *OTI plans to take advantages of new opportunities in this area in FY2000.*

B. Transparency/Good Governance

Corruption plagues many countries in transition, robbing them of their potential and jeopardizing their resources and those of outside donors. As OTI explores anti-corruption mechanisms, it is finding the issue to be both challenging and complex. The case of Honduras illustrates an initial, albeit unsuccessful effort.

- **Planning anti-corruption efforts in Honduras.** From its first visit to post-Hurricane Mitch Honduras, OTI believed that it was important to ensure that donor reconstruction resources would be used in an efficient, effective and transparent manner. In what was considered a promising sign, Honduran President Flores requested the U.S. government to develop a plan to battle corruption. To this end, OTI committed \$500,000 and began to amass the wide-reaching support needed to make real reform.

OTI worked with the USAID Mission in Honduras and with the Inter-American Development Bank to create an anti-corruption plan, the primary thrust of which was contracting an independent oversight entity for all relief and reconstruction efforts. OTI invested considerable time in the plan and established buy-in with other donors, and USAID/Honduras assumed the project when the Hurricane Mitch supplemental funding was approved. OTI continued to assist the Mission with assessments concerning the use of civil society to control corruption at the local level and the majority of the OTI anti-corruption funding was re-programmed for housing. The final plan -- as approved and implemented by USAID/Honduras, other donors, and the Government of Honduras (GOH) -- was an outgrowth of the original OTI plan and included independent oversight for government ministries involved in implementing relief and reconstruction efforts. That this plan fell somewhat short of the single entity originally proposed reflected a loss of resolve on the part of the GOH and differences of vision among donors.

Although OTI was able to make an impact in other areas in Honduras, specifically in housing, it did not realize its vision of a single, wide-ranging transparency plan. The OTI experience in Honduras confirmed lessons learned from other programs: that without the requisite political will to eliminate or reduce corruption, dramatic deep-reaching reform is impossible. This holds true no matter how much cooperation there is within the USG and no matter how good the plan looks on paper. OTI will exit Honduras in FY 2000.

- **Combating corruption in Nigeria.** Nigeria is known as one of the most corrupt countries in the world and is listed in Transparency International's worst offender category. OTI recognized that if it wanted to help sustain the democratic transition, it could not avoid a focus on transparency and accountability. Thus, OTI funded several activities designed to combat corruption, such as:
 - A "Code of Ethics for Parliamentarians": The Code for the House of Representatives was drafted by an OTI-sponsored NGO in conjunction with the Legislators. After adoption by the House, the Senate approached the NGO and requested help creating a similar code.
 - Adoption of a public-private sector integrity pact to ensure transparency in public contracting, long a feeding trough for greedy officials and contractors.
 - Anti-corruption youth clubs in universities across the country, in recognition of the fact that corrupt practices start early.
- **Supporting anti-corruption efforts in Lebanon.** The OTI program in Lebanon supports Mission SpO 2, Increased effectiveness of selected institutions which support democracy. According to the Mission's FY 1999 Results Review, the new Lebanese government has taken a strong stance against corruption, which prompted the Mission and OTI to assess possible anti-corruption activities as part

of a transition strategy in March 1999. This resulted in other programs and significant OTI commitments to the Mission's local government program. The OTI-led anti-corruption activity began in July, and presently includes municipal development, a mass media campaign, investigative journalism training, and a planned small grants program.

In FY 2000, USAID will follow up on OTI's anti-corruption initiative with support to additional municipalities and greater focus on the Municipality of Beirut.

In FY 2000, OTI will have a better sense of its impact in the area of transparency/good governance.

C. Community Impact

Community impact projects and participatory development are not new to practitioners of long-term sustainable development. OTI, however, has been a pioneer in the use of participatory community approaches during emergency transitions. OTI believes citizens of post-conflict, or post-natural disaster countries must be involved from the start in building the physical and democratic infrastructures of their country.

- **Organizing Community Improvement Councils in Kosovo.** OTI's community engagement programs help local citizens organize informal groups, called Community Improvement Councils (CICs) to facilitate post-war reconstruction. CICs allow citizens to participate in the identification and implementation of community improvement projects, funded by OTI or other donors. CICs bring together a mix of local authorities, community groups, NGO members, local technical experts and interested citizens. OTI community organizers work with the Councils to solicit input from the community through public forums and town meetings. With this input the OTI community organizers select and fund projects to restore or improve public services, refurbish or repair homes, rehabilitate schools and community centers, reconstruct health clinics, etc. This process not only empowers local citizens to prioritize their needs, but also helps direct donor resources.

The project has directly engaged more than 2,500 local leaders across Kosovo in on-going public discussions and meetings, and indirectly reached nearly 940,000 Kosovar citizens. The CICs have stimulated civic action, encouraged broad-based community action plans, and encouraged participation from groups who do not traditionally participate in local decision-making. *In FY 2000, OTI plans to transition the CICs to activities that more directly advance democratic change and promote national reconciliation, especially in view of upcoming elections. OTI will also expand its efforts to make the CICs more inclusive of women and other underrepresented groups.*

IV. IR 3: Improved Targeting of OTI Interventions

The cornerstone of OTI's mission is to act quickly and flexibly in new areas of political transition, and to re-target on-going programs to meet the needs of changing political environments. To manage its competitive advantage in responding to political openings and opportunities, OTI measures its performance in terms of speed, resource leveraging, policy leveraging, and re-targeting/flexibility.

Figure 11 summarizes IR 3 results based on country profiles (found in Annex B). Although specific baselines and goals for these indicators were not established in previous years, the chart provides a useful tool for performance measurement. *In FY 2000, OTI will standardize these measurements.*

Figure 11. Process Indicator Results by Country (based on reporting in OTI Country Profiles)

Country	Speed ¹⁵				Resource Leveraging					Policy Leveraging			Re-targeting/ Flexibility	
	# of days to [re]open office	# of days to hire or [re]deploy staff	# of days to make first grant	# of days to make a grant	Multi-laterals	USAID / Other USG Agencies	PVOs	Local Community	Private Sector	U.S. Government	National Government	Bi-laterals	Country program was re-focused/re-targeted ¹⁶	On-going monitoring systems used to re-target ¹⁷
Start-up Country Program(s) in FY 1999														
Albania	30	30	40	30				✓					✓	✓
Colombia	30			14-21			✓			✓	✓			
Honduras	30	45	45			✓		✓		✓				
Lebanon	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A					✓	✓				
Nigeria	45	45	90	21		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		
Reduced Program Activity Country Program(s) in FY 1999*														
DROC	N/A	N/A	N/A	1-30	✓	✓								
Kosovo	30	45	30	14-30		✓	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓
Serbia/Montenegro	N/A	N/A	N/A	2-28		✓				✓				
Sierra Leone	N/A	N/A	N/A	7-90	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
On-going Country Program(s) in FY 1999														
Bosnia-Herzegovina	N/A	N/A	N/A	2-35			✓			✓			✓	✓
Croatia	N/A	N/A	N/A	2-45	✓	✓	✓						✓	✓
Indonesia/E. Timor	N/A	N/A	N/A	5-28	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Philippines	N/A	N/A	N/A	7-21	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Rwanda	N/A	N/A	N/A	14-28		✓				✓			✓	✓
Exit Country Program(s) in FY 1999														
Angola	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		✓				✓				
Liberia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓		

*These country programs reduced, but did not suspend, their activities due to political events in the countries

¹⁵ From the time the decision was made to [re]engage in countries started-up or re-opened in FY 1999

A. Process Indicator 1: Speed

Speed is the essence of OTI's ability to respond to political openings. It is measured as the time it takes for OTI to open a country office, hire and deploy staff, and make grants. In FY 1999, in the best case scenario, OTI opened an office within 30 days of engaging in Kosovo and Albania, re-deployed staff in 15 days, and made the first grant 15 days after setting up an office. Highlights include:

- **Starting up the office in Kosovo.** Following the failed October 1998 peace agreements, OTI conducted an assessment and designed an expanded program by December 1998. Staff and infrastructure were in place by January 1999 and five regional offices were established by February 1999. Programming was suspended in mid-March 1999 due to the NATO action. When the conflict ended, OTI was able to re-establish operations days after NATO entered.
- OTI's start-up in Nigeria was not as fast as it should have been. Although staff were deployed quickly to implement critical activities, OTI had to play catch-up later when implementing logistics and management systems. During that period, OTI missed opportunities to have a greater impact in several program areas.*
- **Fielding assessment teams in Colombia.** OTI designed and obligated funds within one month of receiving Inter-Agency support to assess potential opportunities to encourage the peace process.
 - **Accelerating grant-making speed in East Timor.** After the September 1999 referendum, many East Timorese fled to the mountains or neighboring countries. On September 20, Australian Peacekeepers arrived and by November 5, UNHCR and the IOM had repatriated 30,000 refugees. OTI staff returned in October to begin funding organizations that had ongoing relationships with OTI, and to assess the new situation. OTI disbursed its first grant in independent East Timor a month later.

B. Process Indicator 2: Resource Leveraging

OTI coordinates with donors, international NGOs, the private sector, and local communities to multiply the impact of OTI programs with other sources of funding. When OTI builds collaborative relationships, OTI can provide policy input into country strategies and leverage resources for ongoing activities. All new programs are designed with a strategy that identifies and works in tandem with other donors who may provide support to complement, or follow-on, OTI financial assistance. In over half of the countries where OTI was active in FY 1999, resources were leveraged from either the USAID mission or another U.S. Government agency. Just under half of the countries leveraged funds from PVOs and local communities. Highlights include:

- **Leveraging local communities in Indonesia.** Every local organization supported by OTI provides a "grantee contribution," such as staff, office space, or matching funds, to the proposed activities.
- **Leveraging multiple donors in Kosovo.** OTI's CICs are becoming the focal point for other international agencies and donors. As de facto representatives of diverse community interests, CICs provide insights to local needs and priorities, as defined by Kosovars themselves. Other USAID offices, bilateral donors, UN agencies, the World Bank, KFOR, and NGOs, have worked through CICs to implement programs. As of January 2000, OTI has leveraged about \$3.1 million from other international donors and \$1.1 million in in-kind labor, equipment and expertise from local communities. Approximately every dollar spent by OTI was matched 50% from other international donors and 20% by local communities.

¹⁶ Based on critical changes within the country and new programming opportunities

¹⁷ Database, assessments, evaluations, strategic planning sessions, retreats, etc.

- **Leveraging government and rebel resources in the Philippines.** OTI provided \$500,000 as leverage capital to draw in the resources of the Government of the Philippines and the Muslim rebel group to implement projects in priority villages. Of the 130 village projects approved in 1999, OTI provided \$357,278 (50%), the Government of the Philippines provided \$215,151 (30%), and the rebel groups provided \$143,435 (20%).
- **Leveraging multiple sources in Honduras.** OTI's shelter project in Honduras drew extensively on resources provided by the NGO community, flood victims themselves, and other donors. OTI funding covered approximately ten percent of the actual cost of the housing solutions provided. It is estimated, however, that OTI's \$3 million leveraged an additional \$27 million from other sources. In the rural roads project, OTI funding covered management costs and leveraged funding for the construction work which cost more than twenty times the OTI contribution.

C. Process Indicator 3: Policy Leveraging

OTI has provided policy input and has coordinated strategies within the US Government and the international community in FY 1999. The majority of OTI's sixteen countries reported that they had provided policy input to the U.S. Government, while under half reported that they had provided the same input into the policy of other governments. OTI's Washington-based outreach and policy coordination includes a comprehensive web site with program details and monthly country reports, as well as OTI participation on inter-Agency task forces and working groups.

A by-product of OTI's focus on community empowerment activities is its enhanced ability to bring local voices to the policy table. OTI is able to advocate for policy changes based on information gathered at the local level, and is often the only player able to groundtruth proposed policy decisions. Highlights include:

- **Fostering dialogue in Colombia.** OTI recognized that peace talks and subsequent negotiations would be a long and difficult process, far outlasting OTI's involvement. OTI determined it could play a critical role as 'facilitator' of discussions among the actors at the beginning of the talks. OTI, with Embassy and USAID Mission coordination, provided the first tangible U.S. Government support to Colombia's peace. OTI's influence depended less on funding, than on the ability to foster dialogue and communication among groups with competing agendas.
- **Contributing expertise to the Lome peace negotiations in Sierra Leone .** The OTI technical team drafted concepts and text for much of the political and governance section of the agreement. Since the negotiations, OTI has provided technical assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone, and worked in partnership with the U.S. Embassy and State Department on USG policy.

D. Process Indicator 4: Re-targeting/Flexibility

OTI works in complex political environments that require on-going monitoring to gauge new opportunities or re-focus activities. OTI undertakes on-going monitoring, evaluation, and assessments to determine if, and how, a program strategy may change. Using databases, impact assessments, mid-term and final evaluations, and on-going monitoring, OTI ensures that activities continue to be relevant during times of transitions. In FY 1999, half of OTI's sixteen country programs re-targeted their strategies to reflect the changing environment. Highlights include:

- **Shifting focus in Albania.** OTI's program started by working in those Albanian communities that hosted a large number of Kosovar refugees. Since the crisis abated and the refugees were repatriated, the focus has shifted to reflect more political objectives by targeting communities that represent pockets of reform.

- **Re-targeting in Kosovo.** In FY 1999, OTI's Kosovo program went through three phases that reflected the changing situation in the region.
 - Phase 1: Crisis-Aversion Programming (October-March, 1999). OTI funded anti-war efforts in Serbia, attempting to soften hard-line attitudes towards ethnic Albanians. In addition, OTI funded over 40 grants in Kosovo for media activities and youth.
 - Phase 2: Programming-in-Exile in Macedonia (May-June 1999). OTI re-located to Macedonia and supported leadership and empowerment in refugee camps, strengthened linkages between camps and the local community, and enhanced the ability of Kosovar leaders to contribute to planning for future governing structures in Kosovo.
 - Phase 3: Kosovo Transition Initiative (July to September 1999). OTI returned to Kosovo and made grants in the areas of community improvement, media, and NGO support.
- **Shifting areas of operation in Rwanda.** The Mission and OTI worked together to turn their attention to the northwest areas of Rwanda, where emergency needs were great and donor assistance was limited. Linking relief and development, these targeted interventions built local capacities for peace. Through the OTI/WIT project, new communes and women's associations in Gikongoro, Kibuye, and Gisenyi received agricultural and livestock raising assistance. OTI funding provided critical assistance to 86 women farmer associations (3,198 members) in five Gisenyi communes.

E. Management Systems that Support Process Indicators

In the FY 1998 Results Review, OTI identified several areas that needed to be addressed in FY 1999. Results were achieved in each of these areas and are described both below and in Section V.

- **Training.** OTI/Washington conducted an assessment workshop in December 1999 on assessment approaches, lessons learned, and a framework for determining program options, stakeholders, and impact. In addition to OTI staff, representatives from USAID regional bureaus and the Democracy and Governance Center, as well as outside donors, attended the workshop. OTI also conducted strategic planning sessions in Indonesia and Nigeria. *In FY 2000 OTI will conduct a survey to determine other training needs. In FY 2000, OTI will sign a contract with an outside firm to design and conduct orientation training sessions for newly recruited OTI staff.*
- **Contracting Mechanism.** In FY 1999, OTI identified quick contracting as a crucial need to ensure timely implementation and the rapid deployment of staff to the field. *In FY 2000, OTI is filling this gap by hiring a contract specialist who will work exclusively on OTI contracting and procurement needs.*
- **Innovation Assessment.** External consultants conducted a preliminary survey of OTI programs, management, and staff in FY 1999/2000. The survey looked at OTI's current programs and operations to assess performance, evaluate the timeliness, agility, innovation, and administration of OTI's programs, and develop recommendations for improvement. *Recommendations are reported in the Lessons Learned section and OTI is addressing the major findings in FY 2000.*
- **Staff Recruitment.** As noted in the FY 1998 Results Review, efficient staff recruitment is essential for responding to opportunities in new countries. In FY 1999, OTI used external recruiting firms to identify candidates for field and Washington-based positions. *In FY 2000, OTI will hire a part-time staff member to work exclusively on hiring staff for positions as they arise. It will also modify and expand a personnel database.*

V. OTI FY 1999 Impact Assessments: Case Studies

Monitoring OTI Results

In FY 1999, OTI increased its monitoring and evaluating capacity to include a worldwide data base to capture the impact of political transition grants, evaluations for both mid-term and close-out countries, and impact assessments for a number of high priority countries. Together, these tools enable OTI to design effective programs, re-adjust country programs mid-course, and manage for results.

- **Database.** In FY 1998, OTI developed a grants database for Indonesia. In FY 1999 OTI customized it to include Croatia, Colombia, East Timor, Nigeria, Kosovo, and the Philippines. Database training was conducted for staff from Croatia, Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Kosovo and the Philippines in early FY 2000. The database in FY 2000 will include Kosovo, Lebanon, Zimbabwe, and an archival database for Bosnia and Herzegovina's close-out program. Database information includes grants, processing time, strategic objectives, and indicators. On-going training will take place in FY 2000. In addition, the SWIFT II contract will require future implementing partners to maintain a standardized OTI grants database.
- **Evaluations.** In FY 1999, OTI developed an overall evaluation agenda, and completed evaluations of the Bosnia and Herzegovina media program, the Guatemala reintegration program, and the Rwanda women in transition program. OTI is developing evaluation guidance on mid-term and close-out evaluations to highlight lessons learned, impact, management issues, and successes/failures. Planned evaluations for FY 2000 include the Philippines, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and possibly Honduras, Angola, and Liberia.
- **Impact Assessments.** In the FY 1998 R4, OTI identified Indonesia, Nigeria and Kosovo as countries with a predominant focus of the FY 1999 OTI portfolio. OTI committed to conducting impact assessments of these countries, and undertook the assessments in March 2000. Both Nigeria and Indonesia were assessed by external evaluators, while Kosovo was evaluated internally by the OTI/Kosovo field staff. Highlights of the three impact assessments follow.

A. Kosovo Impact Assessment

“The OTI program is one of the best international community activities in Kosovo since the end of the war last June. It started fast and has not flagged. It has drawn to the fullest on the talents and insights of Kosovar as well as American staff. USOP continues to rely on its resources and advice of its people. Few development programs have accomplished so much with so little in such a short period of time. Clearly, the management of the OTI team and the expertise of the staff are critical elements in such success. But it is the wholesale adoption and determined application of a locally-centered, grassroots organizing philosophy that has been just as important in expanding OTI’s influence. I commend the Kosovo OTI team and its accomplishments to date and I recommend the replication of the OTI assistance program in similar post-conflict, post-dictatorship situations.”

--- Quote from a February 2000 cable from Larry Rossin, Departing head of the US Office in Pristina

OTI’s assistance to Kosovo began in July 1997, and was significantly re-targeted due to political changes in 1998 and 1999. Since re-starting programs in Kosovo after the NATO airstrikes ended in June 1999, the goal of OTI’s Kosovo Transition Initiative (KTI) has been to maximize the number of Kosovars participating in decision-making and the future development of Kosovo. The program’s objectives are:

- To empower citizens to maximize their broad-based political influence in their communities
- To encourage and support the conditions necessary for the development of local leadership
- To assist Kosovars to mobilize and direct resources to meet community-identified priorities.

The OTI Kosovo portfolio is a mix of community development initiatives, coupled with media and NGO support. As of the end of February 2000, OTI had funded 261 grants for a total of \$6.3 million in program funds in Kosovo.

Program Category	Relationship to this Report	Number of Grants
Community Improvement	Evaluated	208
Media Activities	Evaluated	31
NGO Support Grants	Not Evaluated	22
<i>Total</i>	---	<i>261</i>

Community Empowerment Program

In Kosovo, OTI has initiated Community Improvement Councils (CICs) to help identify and implement OTI-funded community improvement projects. The CICs bring together a mix of local authorities, community groups, NGO members, local technical experts and interested citizens. OTI community organizers work with the Councils, who solicit input from the community at large through public forums and town meetings to assist residents in identifying and prioritizing community projects. Together with the Councils, OTI community organizers select and fund projects that restore or improve public services, refurbish or repair homes, rehabilitate schools and community centers, reconstruct health clinics and other community projects. Since July 1999, KTI staff has helped create over 220 Community Improvement Councils (CICs) around Kosovo.

- **Program Expected Impact:** A higher number of citizens are able to participate in decision-making about developments in their communities, an ethic of participation and accountability is encouraged, and moderate voices and leadership are strengthened. Citizens who effectively engage in open public processes and demonstrate leadership skills in representing their communities will eventually advance to higher levels of leadership within those communities.
- **Program Impact (Exceeded Expectations):** OTI's community engagement programs have enabled citizens to participate in decision-making about developments in their communities, encouraged participation and accountability, and strengthened moderate voices and leadership capacity. OTI demonstrated to the international community the importance of soliciting local input in designing programs and planning for the future. "CICs" have become a commonly-used term and many other donors are replicating the tool across the region. Further, OTI has leveraged contributions from local communities, international donors and other NGOs to fund priority community projects.
- **Suggested Improvements:** The OTI program should begin to shift away from major infrastructure projects while transitioning towards activities that will more directly advance democratic change and promote national reconciliation.

OTI should develop better information on the "leadership cultivation" objectives of the program. This can be obtained immediately through an assessment of how many CIC members have joined the UN-created Joint Interim Administrative Structures at the local level. In the future, it will be important to obtain this information via elections as well. Better tracking of "leadership" information will allow program managers to adjust program activities to ensure that the leadership objectives are met.

Media Program

OTI's media strategy is designed to create and nurture a vibrant independent media in Kosovo and ensure that fair and objective information is available to all Kosovars. Immediately following the war, OTI focussed on repairing or replacing Kosovo's damaged media infrastructure. Grants included start-up equipment to enable radio stations to begin re-broadcasting, support to several municipal radio stations, and the establishment of the first independent television stations. To facilitate TV and radio broadcasting across Kosovo, OTI has supported the funding and construction of three transmission towers across the region for use by both public and commercial media.

- **Program Expected Impact:** To provide Kosovars with an accurate source of information, and to promote reconciliation through media-related activities.
- **Program Impact (Met Expectations):** With OTI assistance, the first independent Albanian-language radio station in Kosovo now broadcasts 24 hours a day with regular news briefs and reaches the majority of Kosovars. There is now a forum through which to distribute information of vital importance to the community, such as schedules of distribution for humanitarian commodities, as well as messages from civic leaders, NGOs, UNMIK and other organizations. Along with regular entertainment programming, the stations also cover issues of community concern, and give information about the complex governmental transitions now taking place. Despite widespread ethnic tension and historical grievances, media representatives of the three primary ethnic groups expressed the desire to co-locate their future operations into a single space and make collective use of resources. This Free Media Center also acts as a forum for journalists and media professionals to share information and resources for the common benefit of the multi-ethnic community of Prizren. The Center is also serving as a forum for professional media training courses and is beginning to offer local journalist training to young journalists and students.

- ***Suggested Improvements:*** The media portfolio is shifting its emphasis to focus on improved programming and coverage of examples of successful civic action. OTI should build stronger linkages between different elements of the program. In particular, the links between the community engagement activities and the media portfolio should be strengthened. For the independent media, working with communities provides invaluable sources of news and information. For the communities, media coverage will broadcast their issues and agenda more broadly. Such coverage will also expand the benefits of the program to populations not directly reached via the CIC methodology.

Overall Critique of the OTI/Kosovo Program

A regional approach to budgeting suggests that budget changes are driving OTI Kosovo's strategy, rather than strategy driving the budget. For example, OTI staff in Kosovo have noted that abrupt changes in strategy due to sudden budget cuts have been detrimental to the transition process. A member of the KTI team notes, "If OTI allows the remaining CICs to fall apart without delivering on the CIC expectations for infrastructure assistance that OTI has generated through public meetings and priority-setting processes, their experience with 'democratic process' is unlikely to be positive."

Coordination

Although this assessment looked at OTI's contribution to the transition, the Kosovo program partners heavily with other US and international actors in Kosovo, including USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and USAID Mission, the regional bureau, particularly in media, the Department of State, KFOR, OSCE and UNMIK. A typical OTI Kosovo grant has several partners. Specific information on coordination can be found in OTI Kosovo's bi-weekly reports.

Assessment Methodology

OTI Kosovo field staff conducted this impact assessment during two weeks in March 2000. The team used reports produced by OTI Kosovo staff and other donors, and conducted extensive interviews with OTI field staff.

B. Nigeria Impact Assessment

Following more than fifteen years of uninterrupted military dictatorship, Nigeria recently embarked on a new experiment in democracy. As a pivotal part of a larger U.S. presence, OTI positioned itself to mitigate factors that threaten the stability of Nigeria's fragile civilian government. The program's focus in the spring, summer and fall of 1999 emphasized civilian-military relations and strengthening the newly elected government leaders. OTI's overarching goal is to sustain the transition to democratic civilian government.

At the end of FY 1999, OTI Nigeria had funded 44 grants and one contract, for a total of \$2,719,311. Of this amount, \$830,162 was spent on civilian/military relations and \$1,586,518 was spent on good governance activities. Other activities included media, dialogue & advocacy, and capacity building for civil society groups.

Good Governance Program

OTI, in partnership with the Democracy and Governance Center and other USAID offices, conducted the Training for Good Governance program during a six-week period in the spring of 1999. It covered 10,300 elected officials at the national and state levels, including all Governors and National Assembly members, and more than half of all locally elected officials. The training, implemented by Nigerians who completed a training-of-trainers course, was held prior to swearing-in of officials and focused on organizational structures of government, leadership, management of resources, conflict management, and the challenges of transparency and accountability.

- **Program Expected Impact:** Elected representatives and officials would be more responsive to public expectations, exercise leadership and improve their abilities to legislate, build coalitions, and resolve conflicts.
- **Program Impact:** The good governance training stimulated an enabling environment of democratic governance for officials and their constituents. Prior to the training, many officials were unsure of their roles and responsibilities. The OTI program helped to give them the focus and direction they needed.

"Before now, I thought that once you got elected, you wait for people to come to you with their problems or views. After the training, I realized that it is important to go to the people, visit them in their homes, and reach out to them with information on latest issues being addressed. Hearing their problems equips you for action."

--- Good Governance Training Participant

The assessment found that the program was effective, well articulated, timely, and appropriate. It contributed to an open leadership approach, a participatory mode, efforts towards being transparent, accountable and responsive to the needs of the electorate, and the successful resolution of conflicts.

The following are some noteworthy results:

- The conflict resolution module was especially appropriate in preparing leaders at all levels for conflict mediation and resolution. Officials spoke of the importance of conflict resolution in issues of sharia law and the Kaduna riots, discussions on the role of the military, and violence in the Niger Delta. Many of the officials have set up conflict resolution committees to help resolve issues of civil strife in their constituencies.
- State legislators attribute the peaceful co-existence and cooperation in the houses of assembly to the good governance training.

- The training exposed federal officials to ways of working closely with their constituents in advocating the principles of justice, security and education.
- Federal and local officials felt they gained significantly from training in coalition building. Some indicated that they had even begun to make strong links across party lines during the training, which they have continued into the present.
- Federal officials have good relationships with their constituents because they are aware of their expectations and respond to them accordingly.
- State officials felt they had gained a new sense of doing business in a democratic setting and have adopted the principles of transparency and accountability.
- **Suggested Improvements:** OTI should include women in similar training programs to prevent further marginalization from the political process. Also, OTI should provide additional training to all elected officials in conflict resolution to deal with continuing violence. Training in conflict resolution appears to pay high dividends.

Civilian-Military Relations Program

A focal point of the OTI program, civilian-military relations consists of a series of interventions designed to assert civilian control of the military and to re-professionalize the Nigerian armed forces. This assessment looks primarily at the executive leader seminars offered in the north and south of Nigeria, including the senior leader seminar, “Civil-Military Professionalism in a Democracy.”

“There was probably no source in Nigeria that was likely to come up with the concept for the seminar.”

--- Senior official of the Nigerian Ministry of Defense, commenting on the civilian-military leadership seminar

- **Program Expected Impact:** Encourage the perception that a transition from military to civilian rule can result in a stable society. Structures put in place to facilitate better civilian-military relations so that the relationship can improve.
- **Program Impact:** OTI’s civilian-military relations program was the right application at the right time and helped stimulate a process to aid the transfer of governance from military to civilian rule.

The senior leader seminar and interactions of civilian and military leaders with MPRI, a U.S. based consulting firm hired by OTI, have contributed to the redressing the civilian side of the civil-military equation. Civilian-military relations that had deteriorated are now a topic of open, public dialogue. As a result of OTI/DOD assistance, several recommendations of the joint Nigerian-MPRI action plan will be implemented by the Nigerian and U.S. governments.

The following steps in the right direction, direct results of OTI’s programs, are particularly noteworthy:

- Placement of military personnel in civilian-led Ministry of Defense departments, where they advise civilians on the basis of their specific, technical knowledge. This has helped to improve civilian and military interaction.
- The establishment of a formal liaison between the Ministry of Defense and the National Assembly.

- The understanding of the need for legislative oversight of the military budget.

Although the seminars were seen as productive, many participants commented on their “top-down”, “Western” structure. They felt that the presentation did not reflect the Nigerian side of the equation, and was based on the perception of an absence of direct Nigerian input to the preparation and presentation of the seminar.

Although program imprints are present, it is not clear if the program will have adequate funding from the Nigerian Ministry of Defense beyond the first year of implementation. The transition is still incomplete and somewhat tentative and it is imperative for the Government of Nigeria and the Ministry of Defense to pay particular attention to moving the transition along.

Most interviewees suggested that the transition was on track, that appropriate actions were being taken and that in the end Nigeria would succeed. They noted that the public in general would simply not tolerate a return of the military to any role in the governance of Nigerian society. However, some expressed a guarded optimism, given the culture of military autocracy that has prevailed for several decades.

Overall, civilian-military relationships have improved within the short life of democratic governance. The key constraint is the persistence of ethno-religious and regional divisions.

- ***Suggested Improvements:*** The assessment recommends that OTI should develop a case study of its experience in supporting enhanced civilian-military relations. It should ensure that its training employs a participatory orientation in which participants are considered and used as an important resource. Finally, OTI should include in its initial strategy for a civilian-military relations program an estimate of funding by which government can maintain and continue improvement of projected achievements.

Overall Critique of the OTI/Nigeria Program

The two program activities have progressed significantly towards the expected results. These results contribute to OTI’s goal in Nigeria. The availability of the country program’s strategic plan is very useful; however, it needs a performance monitoring plan with clear statements of expected results and targets incorporated in it.

Coordination

Although the impact assessment focused on OTI’s contribution to the transition, both programs evaluated were undertaken in partnership with other USG offices. The Training for Good Governance partners include the Democracy and Governance Center and the USAID Mission. The civilian-military program was closely coordinated with, among others, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the USAID Mission.

Assessment Methodology

A three-person team, led by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and accompanied by two Nigerian social scientists, spent three weeks in-country on this assessment in March 2000. Sites visited included Lagos, Abuja, and Port Harcourt and surrounding areas. The team employed rapid appraisal methods, including key informant interviews, focus group interviews, direct observation and documentation review.

C. Indonesia Impact Assessment

OTI's assistance to Indonesia was triggered by a series of events: the devastating economic crisis that began in late 1997; the riots, violence and political demonstrations that climaxed in May 1998; the sudden transition of political leadership when President Soeharto stepped down and transferred the presidency to Habibie in May 1998; and the scheduling of general elections in June 1999.

OTI's assistance to Indonesia began at the end of FY1998 with support to a handfull of NGOs. The current goals of the OTI program in Indonesia are to strengthen the capacity of newly elected and newly empowered local parliaments, and to support efforts that contribute to the resolution of conflict in increasingly restive provinces and other conflict zones. To achieve these goals, OTI's program objectives are:

- To empower citizens to participate in the debate on reform through civic and political education
- To encourage local organizations and communities to effectively manage conflict
- To assist Indonesian media outlets to provide independent and objective news and information
- To engage civilian organizations in the debate on civil-military and security issues
- To jump-start activities focused on building good governance practices.

By FY 1999, program activities had grown to 285 grants and could be categorized into five program areas, for a total of over \$11 million.

Program Category	Relationship to this Report	Number of Grants
Civil Society Groups	Evaluated	105
Elections	Evaluated	83
Media	Evaluated	71
Governance	Not Evaluated	17
Civilian/Military Relations	Not Evaluated	9
<i>Total</i>		285

Election Program

The OTI election programs began in early FY 1999 in preparation for Indonesia's general elections in June 1999. OTI/Indonesia supported large-scale civic education efforts, through public service announcements on national television, political party debates in the local media, training for journalists on how to cover an election, and grassroots voter education activities. The election programs were visible and successful. Common themes were conducting peaceful elections, how to participate in elections, and democratic change.

- **Program Expected Impact:** Broader sections of public (particularly women) are represented in politics at both the local and national level thorough direct citizen involvement (i. e. town hall meetings) and the activities of NGOs. OTI identified three specific types of activities to achieve this

result: train journalists to cover the elections; educate voters through workshops and training sessions; and educate voters through a public information campaign.

- **Program Impact (Met Expectations):** Greater citizen involvement, increased awareness of election issues, and increased interest in politics.
- **Suggested Improvements:** The primary barrier to greater success of all three election activities was timing. Grantees consistently said that OTI's programs were rushed – although some grantees faulted the length of time it took to negotiate and approve a grant, because too little time would remain to implement the program.

Media Program

The FY 1999 media programs overlapped heavily with the election programs, with the goal of increasing the capacity of local media to cover the election and political events. One example is the training for Journalists on how to cover election issues and voting fraud; this kind of activity was categorized as a primarily election-related activity. In addition to the election related media programs, the primary media activity was technical training.

- **Program Expected Impact:** Journalists increase their professionalism and objectivity.
- **Program Impact (Met Expectations):** Professional skills were developed as a result of the media training, and valuable networks developed.
- **Suggested Improvements:** Both implementing partners and grantees suggested that more emphasis should have been placed on developing training manuals that could have been shared with other journalists and media staff.

Civil Society Program

OTI/Indonesia's Civil Society programs sought to increase the participation of grassroots organizations in the voter education process and to mobilize target populations for peaceful political participation. Civil Society programs also overlapped heavily with Election programs in the months leading to the June 1999 General Election. Civic education activities were sponsored in a variety of media, such as training programs and posters, but also through arts performances and interactive radio broadcasts.

- **Program Expected Impact:** OTI-supported NGOs, media, and civil society organizations are able to articulate their messages to their constituents, the public, and to policy-makers.
- **Program Impact (Met Expectations):** Civic education messages circulated and understood by public. According to civil society groups, the primary benefit of working with OTI is that OTI assistance helped “jumpstart” or accelerate specific activities. However, there is less evidence for overall program impact in the area of civil society as a whole not because individual grants were not successful but because there were few commonalities among the civil society activities funded by OTI.
- **Suggested Improvements:** The primary concern among civil society groups (and other organizations involved with voter and civic education) was how to maintain the benefits of the voter campaign and then further develop their programs.

Overall Critique of the OTI/Indonesia Program

Many grantees were concerned that OTI didn't pay enough attention to planning long-term programs. Because OTI/Indonesia intentionally focuses on short-term programs with potential for high impact, this decreases the likelihood that a single grant will cover a longer time period. Furthermore, several OTI/Indonesia staff said that they had explained OTI's mandate many times with individual grantees. Although most grantees appreciated that OTI provided support for transition programming, their complaints about not getting support for long-term programming suggest that they still do not understand how the OTI mandate differentiates OTI from other sources of funding. Educating grantees on the differences between OTI funding and other funding would alleviate confusion and also set expectations more realistically.

Coordination

Although the assessment focused on OTI's contribution to the transition, the Indonesia program partners closely with the USAID Mission in Jakarta, the regional bureau, and the Department of State, to name a few.

Assessment Methodology

A consultant PricewaterhouseCoopers spent two weeks in Indonesia on this assessment in March 2000. Interviews, focus group discussions and site visits were held in Jakarta and Surabaya. Although OTI also had significant activity in Medan during FY 1999, the site was not visited due to time and resource constraints. The approach was primarily qualitative as resources did not allow for quantitative analysis of the entire portfolio.

Annex A: Definition of OTI Activities

Definition of OTI Activities

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT –

Description: Civil society development strengthens the capacity of independent non-governmental organizations to promote democratic and peace agendas for their organization, membership, constituency, and/or board of directors.

Objectives: To support democratic pluralistic society and peaceful participation in the transition to democracy. Building civil society increases opportunities for individuals and groups to interact politically with the government (at all levels) to achieve major political change such as electoral reform or executive power sharing, and contribute to democratic transition processes.

CIVILIAN / MILITARY RELATIONS –

Description: The relationship between civilian authorities and organizations and the military can be critical during the transition to democratic governance. Often, the military has little real interest in accepting real civilian control and/or no experience with democratic processes, and civilian organizations need to have input into the military reform process.

Objectives: Enable elected civilian leaders to set and monitor military budgets and establish national security policy; expand public debate and information on foreign and military policy; eliminate inappropriate military involvement in country's political life.

COMMUNITY IMPACT ACTIVITIES –

Description: Create or support communal mechanisms to address the community's transition needs in violence-prone areas – with special focus on inter-communal activities (e.g., on the front lines of the conflict).

Objectives: Support existing or build the foundations for participatory decision-making at the community level on the immediate priorities for rehabilitation, recovery, and/or survival needs; build trust among participants (including trust between community and donors).

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT –

Description: Support local/regional/national organizations, political leaders at all levels of society, and the private sector in peace-making efforts through conflict resolution conferences, training seminars, workshops or other conflict mitigation initiatives.

Objectives: To prevent, mitigate, manage and/or resolve violent conflict, increase government accountability, build national consensus, and expand public participation in policy decisions.

ELECTION PROCESSES –

Description: Electoral assistance to prepare, conduct, and/or monitor an election, and/or observing to ensure that it is free and fair; with emphasis on developing local capacity to prepare, conduct, monitor, and observe the election.

Objectives: Providing fast assistance to electoral processes and reform efforts in order to fill critical donor assistance gaps; and increase citizen participation and non-nationalist agendas in the election process. Increase capacity for conducting free and fair elections; and increase public confidence in electoral process.

EX-COMBATANT REINTEGRATION –

Description: Typically, after combatants have been disarmed and collected into formal camps (“demobilized”), reintegration programs help ex-combatants adjust to civilian life through training, education, and other assistance.

Objectives: To reduce the former combatants' ability and desire to renew combat, engage in criminal violence and/or otherwise derail the peace and recovery processes. The highest priority is generally to occupy former combatants, to buy time for the early phase of the transition to peace and sustainable development, and to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life to support long-term stability.

JUSTICE / HUMAN RIGHTS –

International Level:

Description: Assist war crimes tribunals to document, investigate and prosecute war crimes and genocide where massive human rights abuses have been perpetrated.

Objectives: To document the truth of what happened during the conflict, publicize such information locally and regionally, support the public acknowledgement of crimes committed, and support legal reforms to prevent future abuses. Likewise, efforts can focus on preventing further abuses by monitoring current activities and by disseminating information on the prosecution of past abuses throughout the region.

Domestic Level:

Description: Legal system reform and development can strengthen a country's judicial system and develop a more impartial, effective, and well-organized judicial/legal system; additionally, in a conflict environment, emphasis on dealing with the past (human rights abuses, war crimes, and/or impunity) is often a necessary first step in the transition/recovery/reconciliation process.

Objectives: Strengthen weak or non-existent civilian legal institutions to provide fair access regardless of social status, ethnic or religious group, or wealth; and establish a national system to deal with past human rights abuses, war crimes, and/or impunity.

MEDIA –

Description: The use of electronic and print journalism as well as traditional (dramas, etc.) to promote peace, encourage debate and discussion of important transition issues, disseminate objective information and/or alternative viewpoints.

Objectives: Help the public make more informed decisions; expand public support for peaceful reconciliation and democratic values; counter extremist propaganda. Encourage public debates and discussions on critical issues.

MINE ACTION –

Description: Mine action includes efforts to survey, mark, and remove landmines in areas critical to providing humanitarian and transition support, training in mine removal techniques, supporting landmine accident victims, and disseminating information about the whereabouts and effects of land mines.

Objectives: Educate civilians about the existence of landmines, and what to do when they are found, in order to reduce accidents; fund de-mining and the training of de-miners in order to open up key areas of the countryside.

TRANSPARENCY / GOOD GOVERNANCE –

Description: Build capacity of new government structures (at local, regional, or national levels) by enhancing official skills, improving communications between political officials and constituents, increasing positive links between local officials and national government authority, and increasing accountability for government decisions and processes.

Objectives: Government becomes more accountable for its actions; government processes become more democratic in nature.

Annex B: OTI Country Profiles

ALBANIA	Start Date: 6/1999 Exit Date: 12/2000
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$3,000,000 [IDA funds]

Context: In March, April and May 1999, over 450,000 Kosovars fled into Albania in a desperate attempt to escape the brutal tactics of the Yugoslav forces. In the face of this overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe and despite their acute poverty, the people of Albania opened their homes and communities to welcome the refugees. The Government of Albania instituted progressive and open policies of refugee support, in marked contrast to neighboring Macedonia.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: The Kosovo refugee crisis was one in a series of human and political catastrophes that have hit Albania over the past decade. From a series of ineffective governments, to the 1997 collapse of the pyramid schemes and subsequent anarchy, to the overwhelming rise in crime, Albania continues to be one of the most vulnerable and volatile countries in southeast Europe. Since stability in southeast Europe is one of the U.S. Government's highest foreign policy objectives, stability in Albania is a critically important component of that policy.

OTI Role: In May 1999, OTI launched a program in Albania designed to alleviate the impact of the Kosovo refugee crisis on Albanian host communities. Given severe security restrictions facing U.S. Government staff and contractors, OTI funded a grant to the International Organization for Migration to implement OTI's Albania Transition Initiative (ATI). Following the return of Kosovar refugees, ATI has gradually shifted its focus from simple community improvement projects to a more process-oriented program of community engagement and empowerment.

Focus/Program Design: Following the quick return of Kosovar refugees at the end of the NATO airstrikes in Yugoslavia, OTI shifted the goal of the ATI project from refugee support to re-instilling within Albanian communities a sense of hope for the future as a first step in re-building a vibrant civil society. Towards that end, the goals of the ATI program have been:

- To demonstrate to citizens the power and possibility of civic action in Albania through concrete community projects.
- To instill principles of accountability of democratically elected local governments to their constituencies, particularly as they approach local elections.
- To publicize models of effective civic action throughout Albania using the local media so that the broadest population is exposed to the powerful experiences of local communities engaged in civic action.

The ATI is scheduled to close out in December 2000 and will be considered successful if the following results occur:

- Targeted communities build on ATI-funded projects to develop other important civic actions.
- Local governments who are responsive and accountable are rewarded by re-election.
- Albanian media increasingly covers stories of civic action, with or without ATI program encouragement.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: The USAID Mission strategy is undergoing significant revision. OTI will actively participate in the democracy strategy development in April 2000.

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: Once OTI decided to engage in Albania in May 1999, an IOM team was deployed immediately both to conduct an assessment and design an intervention. This enabled the project to start in June 1999.

Targeting: The ATI program started by working in those communities that hosted a large number of Kosovar refugees. Since the crisis abated, the focus has shifted to reflect more democracy-related objectives, targeting communities that represent pockets of reform.

Resource Leveraging: The ATI program is increasingly attracting additional donor funding as the project demonstrates that it can efficiently deliver community improvement projects. Examples of leveraging other donor resources include:

- An Italian NGO matching ATI funds for the Infirmary Faculty in Vlora.
- The Soros Foundation provided bookshelves for the library renovated with OTI funds in Gjirokaster.
- IREX contributing computers to the OTI-renovated Faculty of Journalism.

Policy Leveraging: Given the newness of the ATI project in FY 1999, OTI did not expect to affect major policy change.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: The ATI project was active for four months of FY 1999. During this time ATI staffed-up and set-up the Tirana-based headquarters, established transparent project management systems, and began projects in targeted communities. In fiscal year 1999, ATI funded 8 projects in 6 communities for a total of \$214,000. By the end of December 1999, 28 projects had been funded for a total of \$1.2 million.

In the communities where ATI has funded projects, there has been a demonstrated increase in community pride and activity. Examples of increased community involvement include:

- Following ATI's renovation of the Goze-Kavaje schools, the community planted trees, dug drainage systems, collected trash and is providing on-going security for the school grounds.
- In the renovated Lushnja Cultural Center, the community has scheduled a 3-month program of weekly concerts and artistic performances featuring artists from across Albania.
- In Vlora, the local community removed illegal kiosks that surrounded the renovated museum. In their place, they planted a community garden.

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: Albania remains a state on the brink of anarchy. Even small steps that demonstrate that communities or local governments can provide tangible benefits for average citizens are extremely important to moving Albanians beyond this state of despair. ATI provides concrete examples of hope.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999: The ATI program was developed as a Kosovar refugee program. When the refugees returned suddenly to Kosovo one month after project initiation, the entire premise of the project came into question. It took several months and several false starts to re-direct the project and develop new objectives to make it relevant for on-going OTI funding. In the future, if a country experiences dramatic change that puts an entire program into

question, a new assessment should be conducted to determine what role OTI should play in the radically changed political circumstance.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: The most important partners to the ATI program are the USAID-funded implementers that are strengthening local government, Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), and the Urban Institute. Both organizations are working to enhance the transparency and accountability of local governments, and have developed models for citizen participation in local decision-making.

Other Partnerships: OTI in Kosovo has worked with the British Government's Department for International Development and the Soros Foundation. Increasingly, donors are working in tandem with ATI to complement work at the local level.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: OTI began refocusing the program following the return of Kosovar refugees in the summer of FY 1999. In FY 2000, OTI will continue readjusting the program to help develop a democratic and participatory process for reconstruction. ATI will continue to implement community projects that will instill a sense of pride and hope within the community, work with locally elected officials on issues of accountability, and publicize effective civic action throughout Albania using local media.

Exit Strategy: OTI's Albania Transition Initiative is tentatively scheduled to close-out in December, 2000. OTI's engagement will continue through the local elections scheduled for September/October 2000, with the hope that in targeted regions citizens will feel a closer connection with their community and leaders. OTI has held preliminary discussions with the USAID Mission to pick up ATI's local governance and small grants process and integrate OTI's initiatives into their democracy and governance portfolio. OTI would also agree to pay for office rents and up to two FSN salaries for one year.

HIGHLIGHTS

The ATI program began as a Kosovar refugee mitigation program, but succeeded in effectively shifting its focus, as the environment changed and the refugees returned, to a community improvement program. Since the shift in FY 1999, OTI's Albania program has responded quickly to community priorities and to lay the ground-work for increased citizen involvement in their communities. OTI-funded projects are receiving wide-spread interest from Albanians, as well as attention and complementary funding from other donors.

ANGOLA	Start Date: 5/1994 Exit Date: 6/1999
OTI Principal IR: <i>Citizen Security Enhanced</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$399,711 [IDA funds]

Context: After twenty years of civil war, in November 1994, the government of Angola and representatives of the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) signed the historic Lusaka Protocol peace agreement. Years of conflict had devastated the country's infrastructure, internally displaced more than a million people, led to the exodus of hundreds of thousands, and left the country littered with mines. In late 1998, open warfare returned to Angola as cities in the interior come under attack from UNITA troops. On December 23 1998, the UN Security Council again laid principal responsibility for the escalation of violence on UNITA. Because of the rapidly diminishing security and political space, the international community had to reassess its assistance to the country.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: The U.S. Government has an interest in helping Angola build a strong, diversified economy. Oil reserves, large armed forces, and its potential to destabilize the region contribute to Angola's commercial and strategic importance.

OTI Role: OTI provided technical assistance to the United Nations during the drafting of the Lusaka Protocol, and has provided critical input in the formulation of U.S. policy towards Angola. OTI also worked to enhance democratic processes at the local level, and provided first-hand information to policy makers on events and developments in rural areas of the country.

Focus/Program Design: OTI worked to advance the peace process by: 1) increasing freedom of movement through mine action; 2) promoting self-help activities identified by Angolan communities; and 3) enabling the flow of accurate news and information. In FY 1999 OTI continued to phase out its activities, in part because its role during the emergency phase of the transition was determined to be over, and because the collapse of the Lusaka Protocol and the continued lack of commitment to peace by key actors limited its impact at the local level.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: OTI supported the Mission's SO1: Increased resettlement, rehabilitation, and food crop self-reliance of war-affected Angolans. During 1997, OTI initiated its close-out strategy. OTI handed off its news and information activity to the USAID Mission, and handed off the funding of its mine action activity to the Department of State. Throughout the program, OTI has enjoyed close collaboration with the Mission and Embassy.

PROCESS INDICATORS

Resource Leveraging: OTI's \$8.1 million investment in mine action and related information dissemination leveraged an additional \$6.6 million from other U.S. Government departments for OTI's mine action program. It also made possible the delivery of food and other humanitarian assistance totaling well more than \$200 million in U.S. Government and other donors. Through its Community Revitalization Projects (CRP), OTI leveraged more than sixty percent of the inputs and one hundred percent of the labor for community-based rehabilitation activities. In the grants administered by Creative Associates, Inc. (CREA), each dollar invested by OTI was matched by an average of two to three dollars of community investment. CREA initiated projects in areas where no other NGOs had been active, and its presence often encouraged other NGOs to work in these under-served communities.

Policy Leveraging: After FY 1999, OTI provided critical input into the U.S. Government's mine action policy for Angola. Originally, the Department of State had determined that the U.S. Government would provide no funding for all mine action activities because both UNITA and the Government of Angola (GOA) had renewed their strategies of planting land mines. Through four months of intensive discussions and working in concert with the USAID Mission, and later the U.S. Ambassador, OTI helped lift the ban on mine action in order to facilitate the delivery of emergency relief, and to make safe land provided by the GOA to IDPs for agricultural purposes.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change:

- **Mine Action:** In FY 1999, 60 Angolan de-miners and dog handlers were trained (for a program total of 960); more than 250,000 Angolans have received mine awareness training/education (for a total of 2.5 million); and more than 600 km of roads were opened to vehicle traffic (for a total of 1,600 km).
- **Self-help activities:** In FY 1999, an additional 16 communities received assistance from OTI's Community Revitalization Projects (for a total of 326), directly benefiting a total of approximately 650,000 people. The communities have rehabilitated or opened 74 schools, 5 grinding mills, 4 major markets, 168 latrines, 415 km of roads, rehabilitated or constructed 81 bridges, opened 490 km of irrigation canals and sources of potable water.
- **The CRP model successfully established durable patterns of participatory decision-making and created sustainable self-help interventions by:** 1) unifying fractured social, political, and traditional structures; 2) providing start-up capital for communities to begin investing in the future; 3) revitalizing municipalities' farm-to-market patterns; 4) fostering commerce and freedom of movement; and 5) facilitating the formation and training of representative community organizations and associations.
- **Information:** OTI continued to manage "off-shore" daily half-hour newscasts into Angola, providing the most objective and complete news reporting available in the country. OTI initiated and funded this activity for the first two years of its operation; the Mission funded the newscasts in 1998 with continued OTI oversight.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999: OTI learned that even the most participatory and comprehensive programs can be in vain if the overall conditions in the country are not appropriate for a full-scale transition. However, these efforts can still build a foundation for future democratic development. By developing a contingency plan for each of its five regional offices, and a trigger list for each contingency, OTI was better able to respond to the deteriorating situation in Angola. Thus, as triggers were reached, OTI and its partners moved capital equipment in anticipation of security concerns, developed an information network with partners to keep abreast of military actions, and began phasing out staff in order to reduce their vulnerability to attack. OTI also learned that in response to daily changes in the field, it needed almost daily contact with its partners in order to manage its country program. OTI learned that it should initiate its hand-off and exit strategy during the design phase of its country programs, and at the time of significant strategy modifications. It takes a long and intensive process to manage a successful hand-off strategy; and it requires a keen understanding of the different mandates and objectives of possible hand-off partners.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Exit Strategy: During 1997, OTI initiated its close-out strategy in conjunction with partners and possible partners.

The USAID Mission picked up the news and information component of OTI's program in October 1998; the Department of State picked up the funding of OTI's mine action activities in September 1998; and the self-help activities were scheduled to be picked up by the World Bank, the Government of Angola, and foreign oil companies

by June 1999. However, after the war re-started in late summer of 1998, OTI shifted its close out strategy to fund the self-help activities through FY 1999 in order to assist in terminating this activity rather than handing it off. By March 1998, OTI's only funding commitment for its Angola program was the self-help activity, although it continued to manage and monitor the mine action program at the request of the Department of State.

Evaluations: January 1998, "Listenership survey of the OTI-funded Voice of America (VOA) special daily news broadcasts. November 1998," "Angola Community Revitalization Projects: A Review of Accomplishments & Study of Impact," final report by Creative Associates International, Inc.

HIGHLIGHTS

During FY 1999, the VOA special daily news broadcasts increased its reporting on military actions throughout Angola. As a result of the public's increased attention on the activities of both UNITA and the GOA, it became more difficult for them to commit similar human rights abuses in the future.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA	Start Date: 2/1996 Exit Date: 5/2000
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$2,990,890 [IDA funds plus \$1,500,000 SEED funds]

Context: The Balkans conflict created a humanitarian disaster of major proportions and wreaked havoc with economies and infrastructures across the former Yugoslavia. The United States played a lead role in brokering the Dayton Peace Accords, and OTI first engaged in Bosnia immediately after signing of the Accords as part of a larger U.S. Government effort to assist in the post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is critical to the stability and security of the Balkans and Europe.

OTI Role: OTI's goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina are to 1) re-shape hard-line, nationalist attitudes; 2) promote respect for democratic processes, human rights, and basic freedoms; 3) disseminate more objective information; and 4) effect positive political change. This was achieved through support for civil society and the development of alternative electronic and print media.

Focus/Program Design: OTI concentrates activities in the regions of Bosnia where there is greatest political tension and limited donor presence. In FY 1999, projects focused on message development and programming (e.g., documentaries, public service announcements, and investigative reporting emphasizing tolerance and the need for democratic processes). Activities in FY 1999 also promoted the regional objective of building peace and democracy in the Balkans. For example, the Bosnia program supported media activities in Serbia and Montenegro through augmented broadcasts of free media into Yugoslavia, increased accurate and objective reporting in the Republika Srpska of events surrounding the NATO airstrikes in Yugoslavia, and served as a basis for programming in Croatia.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: **There is a high degree of information sharing and policy coordination related to media sector and civil society activities among the USAID Democracy Office and OTI. OTI and USAID have worked particularly closely on pre-election campaign strategies for both municipal and general elections. The synergy between OTI and the Mission over the past three years has maximized both programs' impact in Bosnia and Herzegovina.**

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: OTI activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina began in February 1996 before the USAID Mission presence was established, enabling transition assistance to begin two months following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. Using rapid, flexible funding mechanisms, OTI has developed a reputation for its ability to develop a targeted media response to dynamic situations.

Targeting: OTI targets Bosnians through electronic and print media, and works to a lesser extent with civil society organizations in politically and geographically important areas. A dominant initial focus on civil society organizations shifted to media-related activities following an evaluation of the OTI program completed in April 1999. The evaluator commented, "OTI support is crucial to keeping objective,

alternative information flowing throughout the region. Without OTI support, freedom of information and increased political discussion could not occur in many regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Republika Srpska.”

Resource Leveraging: OTI has succeeded in leveraging funds from the Soros Foundation and from OTI grantees through their requirement to make either in-kind or financial contributions to their OTI-funded project.

Policy Leveraging: OTI has exerted significant influence over other donors and has helped shape the media landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina. OTI has also used its media skills in the development of regional Balkans policy as a key player in the development of the U.S. Government-led ‘Ring Around Serbia.’

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: In FY 1999, OTI made a total of 377 media grants valued at \$1,970,165 and 66 civil society grants valued at \$241,325. OTI actively supported media outlets not under control of hard-line nationalists in the Republika Srpska. The subsequent emergence of independent media has helped encourage more moderate attitudes and created a more stable political environment. OTI media grantees from the Republika Srpska spent time in Macedonia during the Kosovo refugee crisis. They produced a series of documentaries, articles, and radio programs during the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia which helped alleviate tensions among the population of the Republika Srpska.

Impact: Through OTI’s funding of alternative media outlets, more moderate voices are now heard, and a greater number of citizens have access to more objective information.

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: OTI-funded radio programs, TV documentaries, PSAs, are often produced around controversial political actions or events. In FY 1999, a number of OTI’s implementing partners played critical roles ensuring free flows of information that helped counter propaganda and ease community tensions during the NATO airstrikes and the Brcko decision.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999: OTI assistance has enabled many local media groups to become operational, but it was not until FY 1999 that more attention was paid to message development and media strategy. Future country programs should address both of these issues from the beginning. Media outlets should be encouraged to address local issues more directly and should be made aware of the important role media can play in developing civil society. As noted in the aftermath of the NATO airstrikes in Yugoslavia, feed-back offered to grantees only during crisis situations can be interpreted as censorship, not as constructive advice. OTI’s media activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were extensive. However, quantity must be balanced with quality and close relationships should be maintained with all grantees. OTI should recognize that the quality of a grantee’s programming will be a critical element for securing outside funding and developing long-term sustainability.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI’s primary partners are the USAID Mission, USIS, and the U.S. Embassy. OTI has a close and productive relationship with the Mission’s Democracy Office which has often chosen local implementing partners in part based on OTI recommendations.

Other Partnerships: OTI’s partners include the Independent Media Commission (IMC), the Office of the High Representative (OHR), and OSCE’s democratization offices. The IMC has provided assistance

on many occasions, particularly on the Ring Around Serbia Initiative, and has helped expedite necessary licenses for OTI grantees.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Exit Strategy: OTI plans to exit Bosnia by May 2000. OTI has developed closer relationships with a smaller group of grantees to enhance their sustainability, and is focusing on politically significant regions of the country, and on the municipal elections scheduled for early April. OTI's program in Bosnia has spent the past 1 ½ years familiarizing the Mission with the work of OTI's civil society and media partners. The hand-off in Bosnia has been gradual, as the Mission has begun to support many of OTI's local partners in their efforts to promote democratic, moderate leadership and information throughout Bosnia. One FSN staff member will be retained in the Republic of Srpska to continue OTI activities in support of the Serbia Montenegro program.

Success Stories: OTI's rapid response to the Brcko decision, which created a multi-ethnic district, through the airing of documentaries and other programming informed the population on the correct interpretation of the ruling and succeeded in diffusing attempts by nationalistic groups to spread misinformation.

Evaluations: An independent evaluation of the Bosnia program will be conducted in May/June 2000.

COLOMBIA	Start Date: 1/1999 Exit Date: 2001
OTI Principal IR: <i>Citizen Security Enhanced</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$1,095,352 [IDA funds]

Context: In August 1998, following 50 years of conflict and over 300,000 deaths and millions of internally displaced persons, the Colombian government, with the support of civil society, initiated a peace process with the armed insurgent groups. Given the intensity of armed conflict, the endemic nature of violence and the strength of the insurgent groups, the process will be long and arduous. President Pastrana is deeply committed to the peace process, and formal negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest guerrilla group, were initiated in October 1999. A similar process is now underway with the National Liberation Army (ELN).

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: As Colombia has become the leading producer of illicit drugs consumed in the U.S., and the ties between insurgent groups and narcotics production become more apparent, Colombia has surged to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. The Administration has requested \$1.3 billion in supplemental resources to help finance “Plan Colombia” to assist the Government of Colombia (GOC) reduce the production of cocaine and heroin. Funding will also be provided for alternative development, administration of justice, and programs to address the needs of the internally displaced.

OTI Role: OTI has fostered dialogue among government and civil society groups to support the implementation of the peace negotiations. Through the creation of community development models, OTI is also demonstrating that government and civil society institutions can be immediately responsive to the needs of marginalized communities in conflict-torn areas. OTI is assisting the GOC in establishing positions to bring to the negotiating table, and is providing scholarships for children at risk of recruitment into the insurgent forces.

Focus/Program Design: The goals of OTI’s program in Colombia are to build momentum for the peace process by empowering communities affected by conflict to participate in democratic processes, and to assist the GOC and civil society in negotiating a lasting peace. To achieve these goals, OTI is:

- Creating effective models of community-led development in parts of the country where government institutions are weak or non-existent.
- Helping local governments and communities identify and implement social and productive activities that are responsive to their immediate needs.
- Assisting the GOC to establish negotiating points.

OTI will consider its program in Colombia fully successful if:

- Lines of communication are opened among the GOC, civil society, and communities long ignored by the development process.
- Through the Plan Colombia, the GOC and other donors build upon the models OTI established to support communities in the high intensity conflict areas of the country.

- The ability of local governments and indigenous NGOs to provide basic social services is strengthened in conflict-torn communities.
- A coherent strategy is developed for both short and longer term assistance to the large number of internally displaced in Colombia.
- A national strategy is developed to address the needs of children affected by violence.
- The GOC has fully developed positions on each of the 12 points on the negotiating agenda.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: OTI actively participated in the design of the country strategy, in coordination with the US Embassy and USAID Mission, to further the peace process. OTI's programs have created models for the USAID Mission and other donors to use for community level activities in high conflict areas and programs that address the needs of the displaced.

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: OTI was able to design and obligate funds within one month of receiving Inter-Agency support for an assessment of potential opportunities to encourage the peace process. Sub-grants are approved within 2-3 weeks of receipt of the community proposal.

Targeting: While OTI's initial assessment identified three targets of support, the GOC, civil society and local communities, the program focused its response on the immediate needs of communities in conflict zones, using ICRC, the Catholic Church and indigenous NGOs to assist in the implementation of activities. OTI has broadened its approach to include policy support to the GOC, assistance to the displaced, and scholarships to children at high risk of forced or voluntary recruitment into insurgent forces.

Resource Leveraging: The USAID Mission has agreed to use supplemental funds to expand existing OTI activities and to help establish new OTI projects. The GOC has provided complementary funding for activities for the displaced, and for community development projects in conflict zones.

Policy Leveraging: OTI recognized that peace talks and subsequent negotiations would be a long and difficult process, far outlasting OTI's involvement. However, it was determined that OTI could play a critical role as "facilitator" of discussions among the many actors at a time when the talks were beginning. OTI, with Embassy and USAID Mission support, provided the first tangible U.S. Government support to Colombia's peace process, and expanded the U.S. Government focus which had been exclusively focused on counter narcotics.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: Activities that stimulate community involvement, address the needs of children affected by violence, or provide critical services to IDPs, are difficult to implement in a post-conflict environment where there is reasonably secure access to target groups. In mid- to high-intensity conflict, however, the same activities are not possible. For this reason, new approaches and models had to be developed to the Colombian context of on-going violence and insecure access to target communities. OTI has been able to demonstrate that it is possible to work effectively in an environment of intense conflict. Communities will respond to initiatives that build on their own capabilities and permit them to make informed decisions on immediate social investments. Children can be rescued from near-certain recruitment if there are alternative choices available. Very small amounts of in-kind credit can be used effectively to provide new sources of employment and income to families displaced by violence.

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: In August, 1998, the Inter-Agency Committee on Colombia asked OTI to consider how the US Government could enhance its policy to encourage the

peace process following Andres Pastrana's election and his new peace initiative to end the country's 50 year conflict. OTI's assessments required a dialogue with the parties in conflict, which was quickly established. In November 1998, OTI sponsored a workshop that brought together for the first time such national figures as the High Commissioner for Peace, the Director of the Peace Fund, the head of National Planning, and the Director of the National Reconciliation Commission with local municipal and civil society leaders. Discussions focused on the role of local municipal administrators in the peace process and investments needed to respond to the needs of communities in the conflict areas. Similarly, OTI funded a workshop for the GOC, international organizations and civil society to draft a national strategy that addresses the needs of children affected by violence, and child soldiers.

Perhaps most importantly, OTI, working with such institutions as the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Colombian Church (the Salesian Mission), has created effective models for working with communities affected by violence and neglect and fostering dialogue among the parties. At the GOC's request, OTI is assisting the High Commission for Peace and the Minister of Interior to work with civil society to develop positions on issues ranging from changes in agrarian structures to changes in social and economic models.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999: In Colombia's complex situation with few models from other conflict situations that can be easily adopted, knowledge of the country's political culture and history was key in designing an effective program. With the security situation precluding travel to conflict zones, OTI identified local and international institutions that had both the commitment and ability to manage field activities. Flexible grant-making was crucial for adapting to changing circumstances and for testing new approaches. The Peace Fund project with ICRC, for example, did not originally address the needs of IDPs in peri-urban areas, but the critical nature of the problem and overwhelming demand permitted OTI to test models in Bogota and Cartagena. The Salesian project did not initially include a scholarship program, but it became necessary to rescue children from forced and voluntary recruitment into insurgent forces.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI has closely coordinated with the U.S. Embassy and the USAID Mission.

Other Partnerships: OTI has close ties with the GOC's High Commissioner for Peace, other GOC agencies, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Salesian Mission, the Colombian Episcopal Conference, IOM, and all major UN agencies operating in Colombia, including UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP and UNHCHR.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: As activities expanded, OTI established a Country Resident Coordinator position located in Bogota. Supplemental U.S. funding for Plan Colombia will permit the USAID Mission to continue and expand OTI's activities.

Exit Strategy: OTI has coordinated with the USAID Mission, international organizations, and NGOs to ensure that the programs OTI initiated would be sustained once IDA funding ends in FY 2001. Bilateral donors as the Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway have agreed to provide additional funding to complement OTI's activities. Other donors have also agreed to augment funding for some OTI activities.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

Success Stories: OTI has helped to open lines of communications among the GOC, civil society, and communities long ignored by the development process, one of the root causes of the conflict. OTI's partnership with the Salesian Mission and the "Peace Fund" created with ICRC have produced models of

community-led development in parts of the Colombian territory where government institutions are fragile or non-existent. OTI has helped create strategies to address the needs of the displaced and children affected by violence, and have provided alternatives for children whose lives were at risk with the insurgent forces. The highest levels of the Colombian government and civil society have expressed their strong support of OTI's activities to encourage the peace process. When asked by the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs to comment on OTI's activities, Colombian President Andres Pastrana's simple reply was: "They [OTI] are critical for this country."

CROATIA	Start Date: 7/1997 Exit Date: 3/2000
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$3,686,036 [IDA funds plus \$500,000 SEED funds]

Context: In 1990, Croatia declared its intent to secede from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, igniting fear among Croatian Serbs that they would become minorities in a hostile break-away republic. Serbia responded by attempting to militarily annex Serb regions of Croatia – the opening salvo of a Balkans conflict characterized by horrific campaigns of ethnic cleansing. The complex ethnic linkages among the republics of the Former Yugoslavia – especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) — requires a regional approach to peace-building.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: As one of the more powerful former Yugoslav republics, Croatia is vitally important to durable peace in the Balkans. The U.S. has a strong interest in eliciting Croatia’s cooperation in implementing the Dayton Agreement, and in supporting democratic reforms for long-term regional stability.

OTI Role: OTI began its Croatia program in July 1997, recognizing that progressive change in Bosnia and Herzegovina was partly contingent on the intentions of its powerful neighbors. OTI efforts to influence attitudes, perceptions, and expectations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and Croatia were viewed as elements of a regional peace-building and democratization program.

Focus/Program Design: The Croatia program shifted to allocate the majority of time and resources to the parliamentary elections which were seen as a pivotal event in promoting stability and democratic change in Croatia. At the same time, support continued for independent media, promotion of reintegration and national reconciliation. In addition, the program adjusted to fund activities in response to the negative economic impact on Croatia of the NATO airstrikes in Yugoslavia.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: **OTI/Croatia has a very strong relationship with the USAID Mission. OTI activities support two Mission Strategic Objectives: SO1 Return/reintegration of war-affected populations, and SO2 Democratization (Independent media and civil society development). OTI was also deeply involved in the U.S. Government election strategy, and was seen as the main mechanism for U.S. Government support to citizen participation in the parliamentary elections through a “get out the vote” campaign and election monitoring by a domestic NGO.**

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: Estimated time between identification of a project and signing of a grant varies from 24 hours to 45 days. OTI’s rapid response was instrumental in the Mission’s decision to use OTI to program over \$1.8 million in SEED funds. Its rapid support to the pre-election activities made OTI one of the few donors able to work effectively in a situation where the date of the election was declared only one month in advance.

Targeting: OTI targets its support on civil society groups, independent media, inter-ethnic communities. The target groups have not changed, but the specific types of actions have changed to reflect the focus on the election. For example, within the media sector, OTI has increased its use of paid advertising as well as informative programming.

Resource Leveraging: OTI's pre-election actions would not have been so successful without significant support from other donors. While OTI was the largest single donor for both the domestic monitoring (\$260,000) and the GOTV campaign (\$750,000), over \$2 million was leveraged from other donors. Most of those funds were allocated based upon information provided by, or a direct appeal from, OTI.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: As of September 31, 1999, OTI had made a total of 172 grants valued at \$2,227,160. Of this total, 64 grants worth \$1,062,767 were made in support of media development, while 108 grants with a value of \$1,164,393 were in support of civic organizations.

Impact: OTI's programs in Croatia had the following impact:

- An OTI-supported "get out the vote" campaign resulted in the highest voter turnout since the 1990 vote for independence. Estimates of voter turnout range from 73 - 78%, reversing a trend of declining voter participation and contradicting pre-election predictions of a 60 - 65% turnout.
- GONG, the OTI-supported non-governmental organization for election monitoring, fielded over 5000 trained election monitors for each of three elections. The total number of volunteers recruited, over 9000, was unprecedented in Croatia. GONG's professionalism and success has led the government to request that GONG become a permanent part of the electoral process in Croatia.
- The OTI-supported media campaign to increase voter participation and encourage election monitoring was cited as the most professional and effective of all the pre-election campaigns. Members of several political parties requested the continuation of the campaign for the presidential election due to its impact. (OTI declined due to the prohibition on partisan activities and a lack of funds).

Lessons Learned: The success of OTI in Croatia was based on the full integration of OTI into U.S. Government strategy, clear channels of communication, a well-designed and targeted program, and a loosening of the government's grip on media and civil society organizations towards the end of the program.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI Croatia is very closely linked to the Mission, with much programming complementing Mission activities. OTI assisted the Mission in programming \$1,000,000 of frontline state money allocated to Croatia to mitigate the economic impact on neighboring countries of the NATO campaign.

Other Partnerships: OTI local staff have effective relationships with local authorities, independent media, and members of civil society. All funds leveraged from donors were based upon OTI staff's knowledge of the grant recipients and OTI's ability to oversee the funded actions.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: The program is closing in March 2000, but the FY 2000 balance of SEED funds will be programmed by the Mission using OTI staff and the RONCO mechanism.

Exit Strategy: OTI will phase-out in March 2000, allowing for closure of activities and post election analysis. It is anticipated that three OTI staff will be employed by the Mission. The Mott Foundation and the British Know-How Fund may provide long-term support to civil society.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

The local Croatian NGO, GONG, commented, “OTI was the first donor to have belief in GONG and their ability to undertake a nationwide election monitoring campaign including the mobilization and training of thousands of volunteers. OTI demonstrated this as the first major donor and most consistent donor, making sure that GONG had sufficient resources through direct financial support from OTI or through solicitation of funds from other donors.”

Evaluations: An independent evaluation of the Croatia program will be conducted during Summer 2000.

DROC (CONGO)	Start Date: 11/1997 Exit Date: 2001
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$3,907,914 [IDA funds plus \$2,500,000 AF transfer]

Context: The May 1997 rebellion that swept across Zaire resulted in the overthrow of the dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. With the backing of neighboring Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, Laurent-Désiré Kabila assumed the presidency and restored the country's former name, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC). The new government found a country devastated by years of corrupt and divisive rule and a population eager for a change to responsive government. The respite was brief. In August 1998, there was a fall-out between Kabila and his backers in Uganda and Rwanda which led to an invasion by an insurgency that has since fractured into several competing "fronts" that exercise local control over large areas of eastern and northern Congo. The ensuing conflict has drawn in other African states and has become the largest regional conflict in recent African history. Efforts to restore peace to the country are underway. The African-led Lusaka peace process has now received strong backing from the United Nations. UN Security Council resolution 1291, approved in February 2000, provides for a joint peace-monitoring process in which the belligerents, operating through a joint military commission, work alongside a UN observer mission of over 5,000 troops.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: DROC's wealth of natural and human resources and its strategic location make it the lynchpin to regional political stability and economic growth. The conflict has destabilized most of central and southern Africa, and has led to massive displacement and human suffering. The U.S. Government has a strong interest in ending the foreign military intervention and the internal and cross-border ethnic conflict, and seeks to prevent further collapse within the DROC.

OTI Role: OTI participated in the initial USAID assessment in 1997 and immediately began a strategy to engage local government leadership at the provincial level and lower. OTI has forged relationships with a broad range of local officials committed to democratic change and members of civil society, giving the US an extensive presence and outreach unique among donors. OTI is engaging local government leadership, coalitions of civil society, the private sector and community-level leadership in addressing shared community needs. While the renewed conflict has required OTI to close its office in Bukavu, its offices in Lubumbashi and Kananga have remained open. As the Lusaka peace process has evolved, OTI has been working closely with the U.S. Embassy to provide resources to energize support for its implementation, particularly with respect to the "Inter-Congolese Dialogue."

Focus/Program Design: OTI seeks to strengthen the peace process and support democratic change by: 1) providing opportunities for civil society organizations and local government to overcome critical obstacles in a transparent, participatory and effective manner; 2) focusing on rule of law and justice issues such as community reconciliation, human rights, and administrative transparency; and 3) supporting effective participation in the Inter-Congolese dialogue by the country's civil society. OTI has become the lead international donor agency providing resources for Lusaka peace accord-related activities. By supporting the expanded participation of Congolese civil society in democratic governance, OTI is helping to lay the foundation for genuine political reform.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: OTI has established collaborative relationships within USAID and the Department of State, and has worked closely with the Africa Bureau and the Global Bureau Center for Democracy and Governance to develop the Agency's DROC strategy

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: Within months of Mobutu's overthrow, OTI made its first grants and opened its regional offices. Political Transition Grants (PTGs) have been funded in a matter of days. During the evacuation of American personnel in 1998, Congolese OTI staff continued operations and upon the return of the American staff, operations quickly returned to normal

Targeting: OTI's grant-making activities are targeted at the provincial level and lower, and include parts of the country presently under insurgent control. For example, OTI has supported civil-society gatherings, and is expanding conflict prevention and mitigation activities. In eastern Congo, for instance, OTI has instituted a small portfolio of "critical-bottleneck" Political Transition Grant (PTG) - funded initiatives in the greater Kinshasa area to help to alleviate some of the acute hardships faced by the citizens of one of the most populous areas.

Resource Leveraging: The PTG program requires in-kind contribution from the grantees, and thus continues to leverage the participation and contributions of civil society, local government, and the private sector. OTI's capacity to implement activities beyond Kinshasa was instrumental in the decision to transfer \$2.5 million in Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI) funding to the OTI initiative in the DROC.

Policy Leveraging: OTI presence at the provincial level and its broad network of contacts have made it a respected partner in building international support for major issues, particularly the Inter-Congolese dialogue. OTI supports indigenous Congolese efforts to build the peace process and influences donor coordination to support the process.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: During an extremely volatile period in Congolese history, OTI operations in the Congo helped maintain stability in areas under extreme economic and political duress. The Congo has long been known for high levels of corruption and petty larceny. In FY 1999, OTI made a total of 49 grants valued at \$984,290. These grants supported effective, transparent, self-help efforts that demonstrated local government's and civil society's ability to work together at the grassroots to collectively build a foundation for future democratic processes.

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: USAID is one of the only bilateral donor agencies with a significant presence throughout the country. The momentum for positive, democratic change that had been present in 1997 - 1998 has slowed due to the outbreak of war in August 1998. Nonetheless, OTI's presence and steady, modest support has been an important element in sustaining the processes of post-war rehabilitation and political reconstruction. Through its direct involvement in support to the Lusaka/UN peace process and the Inter-Congolese dialogue, OTI is helping to strengthen the forces for a peaceful transition. By demonstrating donor, particularly U.S. Government, support for participation in this process, OTI has helped to galvanize and channel energies that might otherwise be directed into expanded armed conflict.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999:

- OTI's continued presence has been an important factor in maintaining U.S. Government credibility. OTI is helping to reinforce the message that the U.S. Government supports the Congolese people and their efforts to bring about positive change.
- OTI's decentralized approach and community level initiatives have allowed OTI to continue operations despite popular distrust of U.S. intentions. The decentralized approach has also brought financial buy-in from other parts of USAID.
- OTI's history of transparent operations and emphasis on local buy in has allowed OTI to support civil society activities on both sides of the current conflict.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI works closely with the U.S. Embassy in pursuit of national dialogue and peace building, using its resources and presence to reinforce U.S. support of the Lusaka process. As the only U.S. Government office in the interior of the country, OTI has developed a network of interlocutors and contacts which regularly serves to enhance interactions at all levels. While the Bukavu office is officially closed, its staff, logistics resources and contacts have been made available to OFDA in support of humanitarian activities in the east.

Other Partnerships: Both the International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES) and the Human Rights Law Group are involved in the peace building and national-dialogue process. Coordination with OTI is close, informal, and highly complementary. OTI has developed collaborative working relationships with Congolese non-governmental organizations and key government counterparts and works in close collaboration with its implementing partner, Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI).

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: DROC's future, and indeed the future of Central Africa, hinges on the successful implementation of the Lusaka peace process. OTI's role in DROC will be adjusted to reflect the needs, priorities, and challenges that arise during implementation of the ICD and peace accords.

Exit Strategy: OTI's strategy is based on a number of scenarios. If the Lusaka Accords and the UN process is stalled or collapses, OTI will withdraw by July 2000. If the Lusaka Accords and the UN move forward slowly and unevenly, but with main benchmarks met (MONUC/JMC deployment, Inter-Congolese dialogue), OTI will support the process and hand-off to the USAID Mission by January 2001. If the Lusaka Accords and the UN are highly successful and a transition government is established in 2000, OTI will take part in reconstruction activities, particularly in the east, alongside USAID, the UN and the World Bank to jump-start to process. Full hand-off to the USAID Mission, in this scenario, would take place in 2002.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

Success Stories: OTI's major success has been the extent to which local partners have focused on bringing positive change to their communities despite warfare and political obstacles. In addition, many Congolese have assumed considerable personal risk for their willingness to speak out openly and passionately, in a setting of wartime restrictions on freedom of speech, for the changes they wish to see.

HONDURAS	Start Date: 5/1999 Exit Date: 2/2000
OTI Principal IR: <i>Citizen Security Enhanced</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$4,735,461 [IDA funds]

Context: Hurricane Mitch wrought great destruction in Central America at the end of October 1998. The initial estimates of the human toll were immense--more than ten thousand lives lost and more than one million people homeless. In Honduras alone, the damage to infrastructure and productive capacity was estimated at \$3 billion.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: To the extent that Honduras is able to offer a better quality of life to its citizens, the pressures that result in illegal immigration will be reduced. U.S.-Honduran ties are further strengthened by numerous private sector contacts, with an average of 110,000 U.S. citizens visiting Honduras annually, and approximately 10,500 Americans residing there. In recent years, more than 100 American companies have been operating in Honduras. The extent of the humanitarian suffering in Honduras also required a coordinated and multi-level U.S. Government response.

OTI Role: USAID requested OTI to consider options for short term assistance to address high priority needs in housing and economic reactivation that fell between emergency relief and the commencement of major donor resource flows for reconstruction. In the absence of alternative resources, small timely initiatives made a critical difference in key recovery areas. OTI provided technical assistance and initial funding to jump-start the country's overall infrastructure repair activities through the design and initial implementation of the rural Roads and Bridges Project.

Focus/Program Design: OTI's focus in Honduras was to maximize the participation of beneficiaries, local organizations and other donors (the flood victims themselves, NGOs, municipalities, the Government of Honduras, and the Inter-American Development Bank) in a variety of team efforts, including: 1) an emergency housing project for Tegucigalpa flood victims housed in temporary shelters in the city; and 2) a longer-term activity to repair key transportation links in the worst hit areas of the country, thereby helping to spark economic reactivation in those areas.

OTI's program in Honduras:

- Provided technical and programmatic support to NGOs to construct 2,000 housing units for beneficiaries.
- Engaged local beneficiaries in the design and implementation of reconstruction programs.
- Conducted a technical assessment for USAID/Honduras to design the Roads & Bridges activity.

OTI will consider its program in Honduras successful if:

- The 2,000 beneficiaries receive permanent housing in functioning communities, which promote the economic and social development of their inhabitants.
- The beneficiaries work to improve their new houses and their communities.

- The large public shelters where the 2,000 OTI beneficiaries currently reside close on, or near, schedule.

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: The OTI assessment commenced in mid-January 1999. By mid-February the housing project was approved and funded. Initial staff were hired in late February and the first grant was made on March 1. The entire process took less than six weeks.

Targeting: The housing project targeted 2,000 homeless flood victim families residing in temporary shelters in the Tegucigalpa area.

Resource Leveraging: The housing project drew extensively on resources provided by the NGO community, flood victims themselves, and other donors. OTI funding covered approximately 10% of the actual cost of housing solutions provided (current estimates are that OTI's \$3 million is leveraging \$27 million from other sources). In the case of rural roads, OTI funding covered management costs but not actual construction work, which amounted to over 20 times the OTI contribution.

Policy Leveraging: That OTI addressed the key impediments to a successful transition from emergency assistance to longer term development in housing is shown by the attention the program received from the GOH and from other donors, few of whom originally thought that the OTI approach was correct. OTI provided legal services and urbanization and water/sanitation plans for the sites, helped obtain environmental clearances, and helped USAID/Honduras prioritize OTI-affiliated housing projects for water and sanitation connections.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: 2,000 families and 15 to 20 NGOs received technical and financial support for the development of permanent housing solutions for the hurricane's victims. OTI provided a coordinating body which assured adequate information sharing and linkage arrangements among beneficiaries and participating organizations, and provided an on-going technical and financial audit of OTI assistance. The housing project developed a model approach which significantly strengthened beneficiary participation and negotiating power, thus facilitating greater efficiency, lower cost, and market-based matching between suppliers and receivers (actual buyers) of services. Three other donors have already undertaken studies in Honduras to make their own programs more similar to the OTI model. All NGO projects with whom OTI worked improved their housing product and community planning as a result, both materially and technically.

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: The housing project ensured that positive steps were taken to find permanent housing for flood victims residing in the public shelters, thereby ensuring that the shelters would not become permanent. OTI also worked closely with USAID/Honduras and the implementing partner to tear down and recycle the public shelters so that new families could not move in. OTI's intervention in the Roads and Bridges Project helped jump-start the first infrastructure repair activities in the country.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999: NGOs were not included in the original design and implementation phase of the shelter project. However, OTI learned that NGOs did indeed have an important role to play in the project because of their closer relationships to the families, and their ability to provide the hurricane victims with solutions for permanent settlement. Future shelter projects should include NGOs as partners from the beginning.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: The housing project complemented the USAID Mission's housing strategy. Over the course of 1999, OTI was asked to manage the complete housing package of the Mission, and participated heavily in the design of that strategy. The OTI model was not appropriate for the rest of the country, but the Mission continues to work with many of OTI's local partners. OTI management of Mission funds produced many synergies between OTI, the Mission, and OFDA and provided for more effective use of resources.

Other Partnerships: OTI worked closely with the Municipality of Tegucigalpa, the International Organization of Migration, and both international and local NGOs in Honduras.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: OTI-funded activities end in August 2000, however, the USAID Mission has taken over management of these activities.

Exit Strategy: OTI withdrew staff from Honduras in February 2000. The USAID Mission has taken over management of OTI's activities, but OTI will continue to provide technical assistance to the project from Washington on a reduced scale.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

In January 2000, USAID Administrator J. Brady Anderson visited the Santa Rosa housing site outside Tegucigalpa. The Administrator held a press conference and met OTI beneficiaries and implementing partners.

The site was a prime example of OTI's work in Honduras. The beneficiaries worked together to purchase the land, the Red Cross constructed water and sanitation facilities, the national government paid for electrical connections to the site (although OTI did the actual contracting and purchasing) and the savings were used to provide connections for other OTI-supported housing sites. OTI worked with OFDA to build an access road to the site. OTI paid for the design work, worked with the beneficiaries to evaluate contractor bids, helped with the contracting process, and handled legal problems. Early in the project, members of a neighboring community refused to allow the Santa Rosa community to move onto their land. Working with the owner, OTI found another site owned by the same person and negotiated a trade. Community opposition stopped and the project went ahead as planned. The Santa Rosa community has repeatedly acknowledged that their housing project would never have taken place without OTI's assistance.

INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR	Start Date: 8/1998 Exit Date: 6/2001
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$16,748,106 [Includes IDA funds plus DA funds \$14,955,211 and ESF funds \$175,000]

Context: After President Soeharto's thirty-two years of autocratic rule, soaring inflation, massive capital flight, and endemic corruption began to destabilize his regime. Widespread civil unrest, rioting, and public pressure led President Soeharto to resign in May 1998, handing over power to his vice president, B.J. Habibie. The nation's first largely free and fair parliamentary elections followed on June 7, 1999, bringing in many new political actors were viewed as legitimate leaders by Indonesians. The parliament named Abdurrahman Wahid as President and Megawati as Vice President in October 1999 and laid the foundations for a sustained democratic transition. An August 1999 referendum and subsequent violence in East Timor resulted in the former province gaining independence from Indonesia, but left behind massive destruction and the formidable task of state building. While democracy is being consolidated in Indonesia, the present government faces many challenges: pervasive corruption, human rights violations, restive provinces, a tradition of military involvement in politics and government, and simmering inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict. Major schisms remain between the new democrats and the old regime, and between the government and the military.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation, is home to the world's largest Muslim population, and is now the third largest democracy in the world. The U.S. has important economic, commercial, and security interests in Indonesia. It is the focal point of regional security due to its strategic location astride a number of key international maritime straits, and both the United States and Indonesia share the common goal of maintaining peace, security, and stability in the region.

OTI Role: USAID focused on building the capacity of civil society groups to advocate for political and economic reform. During the relatively short period of Habibie's rule, while the government continued to demonstrate a lack of engagement with NGOs, there was greater room for advocacy -- leading to OTI's broad-based support of the civil society sector. In anticipation of the June 1999 parliamentary elections, OTI undertook a comprehensive civic and political education campaign, featuring Public Service Announcements (PSAs) in the local media as well as grass-roots political and voter education across the country. Since his election by Parliament, President Wahid has voiced support for strengthening Indonesia's democracy, is promoting decentralization, and supports the engagement of NGOs in policy dialogue. This shift in government policy has necessitated a shift in OTI's role to work directly with the government by strengthening the capacity of newly-elected local, as well as national, parliamentarians, and to program activities in restive provinces and other conflict zones that could destabilize this new democratic state.

Focus/Program Design: The current goals of the OTI program in Indonesia are to strengthen the capacity of newly elected and newly empowered local parliaments, and to support efforts that contribute to the resolution of conflict in increasingly restive provinces and other conflict zones. To achieve these goals, OTI will focus on civic and political education on rights and responsibilities in a democratic society; conflict prevention, mitigation and prevention focused on inter-ethnic cooperation and decentralization of power; development and expansion of independent and objective media; improved civilian capacity for democratic control and oversight of the military; and, good governance through

parliamentary training, decentralization, anti-corruption, and legal reform. OTI will consider its program in Indonesia successful if:

- Regional Parliaments gain capacity to manage local area resources under Indonesia's newly decentralized system and undertake training and other initiatives on their own.
- Broader sections of the public (particularly women) are represented in politics at both the local and national level through direct citizen involvement (i.e. town hall meetings) and the activities of NGOs.
- OTI-supported NGOs and the media are able to articulate their messages in policy settings.
- Journalists increase their professionalism and objectivity.
- The Military decreases its involvement in civil and political affairs.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: OTI coordinates with the Embassy political section and several Mission offices, including Democracy & Governance, Urban & Environment Programs, and Economic Growth. OTI has provided a list of 30 exceptional grantees to be incorporated into the DG strategy, and is working together to develop a new training program for regency-level parliamentarians.

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: In anticipation of the June 1999 parliamentary elections, OTI quickly mobilized its efforts to conduct a massive civic and political education effort, featuring public service announcements, politically oriented debates in the local media, and comprehensive grass-roots education. Following the elections, OTI shifted programming from large scale civic -education efforts to targeted projects that supported the new government, such as immediate training for newly elected parliamentary officials in 10 of Indonesia's 26 total provinces. OTI's average grant turn-around time is approximately two weeks.

Targeting: OTI's programs target the following populations:

- Newly elected government officials: over 3,000 trained in 10 of Indonesia's 26 provinces.
- Local radio stations and news organizations: over 100 radio stations have received assistance from Internews, and a number of local newspapers or magazines were supported during the election period.
- General Public: Over 130 million viewers were reached by PSAs; thousands of women across Indonesia were provided with grassroots political education.

Resource Leveraging: Every local organization that OTI supports provides a "grantee contribution" to the proposed activities. These contributions may include staff, office space, or matching funds. OTI also has leveraged funds from other USAID offices, as well as from other donors including the British Council, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Australian Embassy, and the German Embassy.

Policy Leveraging: OTI has significantly leveraged its impact on the policy front with both U.S. Government and other donors. OTI-funded efforts supported the development of a new media law and contributed to the drafting on the new laws on decentralization. OTI's close relationship with the US Ambassador enables it to provide immediate assistance to meet U.S. Government foreign policy objectives and impact the highest levels of Indonesian politics.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: For FY 1999, totals for Political Transition Grants (PTGs) in Indonesia are as follows:

Sector	# of Grants	Total Value
Civil Society	105	\$2,652,000
Civil/Military	9	\$209,000
Elections	83	\$2,404,000
Governance	17	\$258,000
Media	71	\$5,913,000
	285	\$11,436,000

Impact: OTI has had the following impact:

- Broader sections of public (particularly women) are represented in politics at both the local and national level through direct citizen involvement (i. e. town hall meetings) and the activities of NGOs. OTI identified three specific types of activities to achieve this result: train journalists to cover the elections; educate voters through workshops and training sessions; and educate voters through a public information campaign. As a result, there was greater citizen involvement, increased awareness of election issues, and increased interest in politics.
- The FY 1999 media programs overlapped heavily with the election programs, with the goal of increasing the capacity of local media to cover the election and political events. As a result of OTI media activities, journalists developed professional skills and valuable networks.
- Civil Society programs sought to increase the participation of grassroots organizations in the voter education process and to mobilize target populations for peaceful political participation. Civil Society programs also overlapped heavily with election programs in the months leading to the June 1999 General Election. Civic education activities were sponsored in a variety of media, such as training programs and posters, but also through arts performances and interactive radio broadcasts. Through OTI's support, civic education messages circulated and were understood by the public. According to civil society groups, the primary benefit of working with OTI was that OTI assistance helped "jumpstart" or accelerate specific activities. However, there is less evidence for overall program impact in the area of civil society as a whole not because individual grants were not successful but because there were few commonalties among the civil society activities funded by OTI.
- Civilian Military & Security Issues: Current legislation restricts OTI from working directly with the Indonesian military. Nonetheless, OTI has supported efforts to create dialogue among the public and the political elite to discuss how to reduce the military in political and civilian affairs.

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: OTI is strengthening regional parliaments, fostering dialogue among parties in conflict, contributing to dialogue among conflicting parties in restive provinces, and working with NGOs to more effectively communicate their message.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999:

- Incipient NGOs are often quicker to implement new and creative programs.
- Program impact is maximized when civil society organizations are connected with the decision-makers.

- OTI should move to outlying conflict zones to begin encouraging dialogue.
- On-going evaluation enables OTI to monitor impact, quickly identify successes and failures, and adjust programs accordingly.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI's success in Indonesia stems largely from its strong collaborative relationship with the USAID Mission and the US Embassy. In collaboration with the Mission, OTI has shared lessons learned worked in tandem on joint issues. In collaboration with the US Embassy, OTI has responded to policy changes and recommended policy options to the Government of Indonesia. In February 1999, OTI worked with the Embassy to develop an assessment of civilian-military programming options in Indonesia.

Other Partnerships: OTI partners with Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), Internews, the National Democratic Institute, the Asia Foundation, Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT), and the local Indonesian NGOs.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: OTI has shifted its activities from broad-based support to civil society organizations to more direct engagement with the government. In FY 2000, OTI opened a separate office in East Timor.

OTI engaged in **East Timor** in an effort to enable the East Timorese to participate in the re-building of their country. OTI's greatest strength in East Timor has been its speed and agility. In the autumn of 1999, OTI was the only organization positioned to help NGOs rebuild themselves to the level where they could participate as an equal partner with the international community on decisions affecting East Timor's future. OTI is currently the only organization in East Timor that has the ability to fund a community-led reconstruction and employment program in coordination with UNTAET and East Timorese communities. The UN and the World Bank will continue this program once their funds come on-line. OTI will remain active in East Timor until the larger donors are actively delivering their programs, thereby making OTI's assistance unnecessary. OTI hopes to see the East Timorese actively participating in the physical, economic, civic, and governmental reconstruction of their country. In East Timor, the program focuses on community-led development, reconstruction and employment projects, and support to the East Timor political leadership. OTI will report on East Timor as an independent program in FY 2000.

Exit Strategy: As OTI withdraws from broad support to the civil society sector, the Mission's democracy and governance focus has moved to building the long-term capacity of NGOs. OTI anticipates that the most capable NGOs that have received OTI funding in the past will be incorporated into the Mission's FY 2001 Democracy and Governance strategy. OTI is working to ensure that its other activities, in the areas of independent media and civilian-military relations, will be funded by other donors.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

Success Stories:

Indonesia Media Watch: In the months following Soeharto's 1998 resignation, rapid deregulation of media laws allowed Indonesia's journalists to operate with unprecedented freedom, yet many media professionals lacked the skills and networks to utilize these new freedoms effectively. To address this

problem, a group of journalists in East Java created the Indonesia Media Watch (IMW) to provide training and networking opportunities for media professionals. OTI provided support and technical assistance for a four-day investigative journalism training workshop for print, electronic, and broadcast media professionals to better cover the election. The IMW workshop provided a rare opportunity for journalists and opinion-makers from throughout East Java to meet and compare ideas on political issues. It is estimated that some 110 journalists have gained training and networking opportunities through activities inspired by the original IMW-Surabaya event.

Interfaith Workshops and Anti-violence Campaign in North Sumatra: The hardship of the economic crisis in Indonesia led to widespread outbreaks of violence in 1998 and 1999 between religious and ethnic groups. Ethnic Chinese Indonesians, the majority of whom practice Christianity or Buddhism, were particularly targeted, as this group was widely believed to have enjoyed longstanding economic privileges at the expense of Indonesia’s Muslim majority. With its large ethnic Chinese population, and comparatively high proportion of Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, the province of North Sumatra has been particularly prone to religious and ethnic violence. With the onset of the crisis, violence in the region threatened to spiral out of control. Responding to this danger, the Muslim Institute (MI) and the Conference of Churches (PGI), religious organizations with a history of promoting religious and ethnic harmony, developed programs to prevent religious and ethnic clashes and promote reconciliation among North Sumatra. Through OTI’s support and technical assistance, these groups were able to conduct aggressive anti-violence campaign and promote interfaith dialogue. In the weeks before the June general election, MI conducted a massive media campaign, disseminating leaflets, posters, banner, T-shirts, and stickers that carried anti-violence messages. The campaign was one of the largest anti-violence initiatives in Medan’s history. The election period in North Sumatra passed with almost no incidences of violence. PGI and MI continue to hold regular meetings to exchange ideas on future interfaith activities and initiatives.

KOSOVO	Start Date: 7/1997
	Exit Date: 2001
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$12,465,665 [IDA funds]

Context: During late summer 1998, violence against Kosovars by Yugoslav forces reached new peaks, prompting the first in a series of threats of airstrikes by NATO against Yugoslavia. A temporary settlement was brokered by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in October 1998, which allowed for the establishment of the OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). Continued aggressive Yugoslav tactics in winter and spring 1999 and failed negotiations to reach a new peace at Rambouillet led to the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999. The airstrikes lasted through mid-June 1999, when Serb authorities signed Resolution 1244, allowing a NATO and UN presence to protect and govern Kosovo. In late June, overwhelming numbers of Kosovar refugees, accompanied by NATO forces and other international organizations, flooded back to the province to begin re-building peaceful and democratic Kosovo.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: The U.S. Government has committed significant resources to building a lasting peace in Kosovo.

OTI Role: While OTI has been engaged in Kosovo since the Yugoslavia program began in July 1997, the program in Kosovo started in November 1998 when OTI opened an office in Pristina. At that time, the focus was to help relieve tensions between Kosovar citizens and Yugoslav police and army. By January 1999, OTI expanded its presence in Kosovo to open five field offices. The NATO action in March 1999 temporarily suspended the program in Kosovo. During the war, OTI established the Kosovo program-in-exile in Macedonia, and actively supported Kosovar refugees and Macedonian host communities from May to June 1999. Building on contacts developed before the bombing and during the program-in-exile, OTI quickly established 7 field offices throughout Kosovo. For its expanded program, the Kosovo Transition Initiative (KTI), OTI crafted a rehabilitation and democracy-building strategy to develop councils at the community level comprised of local authorities, community groups, interested citizens and technical experts that would identify and initiate essential community-based projects.

Focus/Program Design: OTI's Kosovo Transition Initiative (KTI) is designed to maximize the number of Kosovars participating in decision-making and the future development of Kosovo. KTI's objectives are to empower citizens to maximize their political influence in their communities; to encourage and support the conditions necessary for the development of a moderate and democratic local leadership; and, to assist Kosovars to mobilize and direct resources to meet community-identified priorities. OTI will consider its program successful if:

- **Citizens of communities in which OTI engaged more actively participate in political processes, including open town hall meetings, advocacy campaigns, public debates, elections, etc.**
- Moderate, democratic leaders who work with OTI's community improvement process are elected locally.
- Media coverage of local-level issues increases over time.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: OTI-sponsored Community Improvement Councils (CICs) have helped USAID project design teams to better target their development programs.

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: Within two months of the October 1998 peace agreement, OTI conducted an assessment and designed an expanded program by December 1998. Staff and infrastructure were in place to implement the Kosovo Transition Initiative (KTI) by January 1999 and 5 regional offices were established by February 1999. Programming was suspended in mid-March 1999 due to the NATO action. However, during that time, OTI quickly adjust its program to service the needs of Kosovar refugees in Macedonia and Albania. By early May, OTI established an office in Macedonia and began refugee-support programming. Within the first two weeks of OTI's establishment of the Skopje office, 8 grants were made to support Macedonian and Kosovar initiatives dealing with the crisis. While in exile, OTI maintained the capacity to move back into Kosovo as soon as the emergency ended. An OTI team was in the first group of non-NATO officials to enter Kosovo in late June. By early July, OTI had opened seven regional offices, with grant funding smoothly transferred from Macedonia to Kosovo. The first community improvement grant was signed on July 15; within the 30 days of operation, 18 grants were signed.

Targeting: OTI carefully targets its assistance at the community level through the CIC mechanism. The CICs are groups of 15 democratically selected citizens from defined geographic areas. A Council generally reflects the community's demographics in terms of gender, age, education, employment, and political affiliation. Engaging in an open process of identifying and prioritizing the most important needs within its community, the CIC reports back to the community on a regular basis to ensure accountability and transparency in the representational process.

Resource Leveraging: OTI's CICs are rapidly emerging as focal points for other international agencies and donors. As de facto representatives of the diverse interests in their communities, CICs are able to provide other donors and international agencies with knowledge of real local needs and priorities, as defined by Kosovars themselves. It is estimated that by January 2000, KTI leveraged \$3.1 million from other international donors and \$1.1 million provided by local communities, mostly in in-kind labor, equipment and expertise.

Policy Leveraging: According to the former Director of the U.S. Office in Pristina, "The OTI program has greatly furthered US policy objectives in Kosovo." For example, in Djakovica/Gjakova, OTI's local CICs have pushed forward the agenda of missing persons to all levels of the U.S. Government and other international officials. In Gjilane, US KFOR has changed deployment plans to address security concerns identified by OTI's community groups.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: The following is a summary of the numbers of grants by sector OTI funded in Kosovo during FY 1999.

Sector	# of Grants	Total Value
Community Improvement	74	\$1,995,913.04
Media	22	\$687,176.56
NGO Support	15	\$119,845.00
TOTAL:	111	\$2,802,934.60

Over the course of the year, OTI's Kosovo programming went through three major phases:

Phase 1 -- Crisis-Aversion Programming (October – March, 1999): Up until the temporary closing of the Pristina office in March 1999, OTI funded over 40 grants in Kosovo for a total of \$480,000. These grants included better coverage of Kosovo issues in Yugoslavia through sponsoring correspondents from Serbia and Montenegro to cover Kosovo directly; and direct support that established Radio-Kontakt, Kosovo's only multi-ethnic, multi-lingual free broadcaster.

Phase 2 -- Programming-in-Exile in Macedonia (May-June 1999): During the program in exile in Macedonia from May-July 1999, OTI supported 23 grants to Kosovar refugee and Macedonian groups for a total of \$680,000. These included:

- Establishing a women's health and legal clinic in Tetovo, while at the same time ensuring the re-establishment of the Pristina-based Center for the Protection of Women and Children.
- Strengthening linkages between refugee camps and host communities through support to the local school.

Phase 3 -- The Kosovo Transition Initiative (July – September 1999): During the first three months following return (July – September 1999), the KTI team signed a total of 98 grants in the areas of community improvement and media and NGO support, totaling over \$2.7 million in direct support. The following is a sample of OTI's projects:

- Pec/Peje Region – Fall Planting in Istog: OTI provided supplies and tractor spare parts to the Istog CIC to support fall planting. Mercy Corps International supported the planning and implementation of this project.

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: OTI's program in Kosovo has evolved as the situation in Kosovo has changed. When the majority of Kosovars fled the region during the Yugoslav

Army's aggressive campaign of "ethnic cleansing," OTI moved with the refugees to Macedonia and Albania and adjusted its program to support those Kosovars who wanted to prepare for a peaceful return. When the dramatic return began, OTI quickly assisted Kosovars in building a more stable Kosovo. Finally, when the UN established a governing presence in Kosovo, OTI worked actively to ensure that Kosovars were able to take care of pressing community needs themselves and to communicate effectively with UNMIK administrators.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999: Maintaining a program through three evacuations demonstrated the importance of taking care of local employees during times of crisis. Keeping track of OTI's Kosovar employees at the beginning of the NATO bombing was a difficult experience. OTI's program-in-exile in Macedonia proved to be invaluable to the quick return to Kosovo. While in exile, OTI staff re-established relationships with local Kosovar community leaders, sustained Kosovar media outlets with equipment, and facilitated contacts with Macedonian media markets. By standing with critical Kosovar partners, OTI's credibility and ability to work in Kosovo was greatly enhanced.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI has actively collaborated with the OFDA/DART on a wide array of humanitarian programs. OTI began collaboration with the DART as community partners identified shelter repair as one of their most pressing needs. OTI-DART collaboration extended to a jointly sponsored public information campaign.

Other Partnerships: OTI works closely with KFOR and has collaborated on several community clean-up projects.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: OTI's program is in the process of adjusting to deepen the political context of OTI's organizing. Some of the more advanced CICs may be able to run broad-based local advocacy campaigns in local elections that will be held in the next year.

Exit Strategy: The OTI Kosovo program will begin to close-out between March and June 2001. OTI will be able to hand-off the functions of the CICs to donor-funded municipal development programs and civil society support programs. OTI and the USAID Mission are discussing strategies to integrate OTI programs into the Mission.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

Success Stories: OTI worked in Pones, a predominantly Serb village in the Gjilan municipality. The Pones CIC is made up of 3 women and 7 men, all Serbs. They decided to repair the village's only primary school, which is attended by both Serb and Kosovar children who take classes in separate school rooms. The women from the CIC stated that OTI was the first to ask anyone other than the village leaders about their community's needs.

Quotes about OTI's Work: In a February 2000 cable, Larry Rossin, departing Director of the US Office in Pristina (USOP) wrote, "...USOP continues to rely on its resources and advice of its people. Few development programs have accomplished so much with so little in such a short period of time. Clearly, the management of the OTI team and the expertise of the staff are critical elements in such success. But it is the wholesale adoption and determined application of a locally-centered, grassroots organizing philosophy that has been just as important in expanding OTI's influence. I commend the Kosovo OTI team and its accomplishments to date and I recommend the replication of the OTI assistance program in similar post-conflict, post-dictatorship situations."

Evaluations: OTI conducted an internal impact assessment of the Kosovo program in March 2000.

LEBANON	Start Date: 9/1999 Exit Date: 9/2000
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$1,088,961 [IDA funds]

Context: Following his election in November 1998, President Emile Lahoud launched an anti-corruption initiative, promising to make rule of law and clean government focal points of his administration. The president's commitment, and strong public support for these efforts, represent a critical opportunity to jump-start anti-corruption reform in Lebanon. OTI, in close cooperation with the USAID Mission, is implementing a four-component initiative to empower Lebanese business, local government, media, and civil society, in their anti-corruption efforts. Lebanon is a country still transitioning from 16 years of civil war. It is a fragile democracy that is heavily influenced by Syrian political control and the presence of 30,000 Syrian troops and the Israeli occupation in the south. While two parliamentary and presidential elections have been held since the Ta'if Accords in 1989, the first municipal elections since 1963 were held only in 1998. While most day-to-day decisions are made by the Government of Lebanon (GOL), all major decisions are undertaken in consultation with the leaders of Syria. OTI's mission in Lebanon is confronted by unique challenges. All U.S. personnel live and work on a heavily guarded compound, all travel outside the compound is undertaken with multiple vehicles and armed bodyguards. Some areas of the country remain occupied and/or in open conflict, and the threat level to official personnel remains critical.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: The U.S. Government seeks greater stability in the Middle East by encouraging peace and discouraging terrorism. One critical component for bringing stability to Lebanon is to crack down on corruption as a prerequisite for encouraging foreign investment. Corruption also interferes with the Government's ability to administer basic social services, creating a gap more radical groups have filled to win the loyalty of citizens.

OTI Role: Based on world-wide experience implementing media campaigns, particularly in Indonesia and Bosnia, OTI is well-placed to design similar campaigns in Lebanon. OTI is building the Lebanon portfolio based on a pilot program that identifies and addresses attitudes, processes, and practices that lead to corruption.

Focus/Program Design: OTI's Lebanon program has the following activities:

- **Anti-Corruption Media Campaign:** The advertising firm Saatchi and Saatchi, building on research and polling data by a Lebanese NGO, Information International, will create and implement a nationwide multimedia campaign focusing on the costs of corruption to the average citizen and identifying specific actionable steps that citizens can take to fight it
- **Investigative Journalism Training:** The International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), in cooperation with two Lebanese universities, will conduct a 10-week (60 hour) course for 40 media professionals. As part of the course, participants will complete an investigative story under the supervision of the instructors and will then be monitored for several months after the training to assess their application of the training

- **Municipal Government Assistance:** The State University of New York (SUNY)-Albany's Center for Legislative Development will expand its existing program which provides technical and material assistance to local municipalities to modernize their budgeting and accounting systems.
- **Small Grants in Support of Anti-Corruption Efforts:** OTI, with USAID/Lebanon, is creating a small grants mechanism to support efforts by local groups to foster transparency and accountability.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: OTI complements USAID's objectives in the areas of reconstruction and expanded economic opportunity (Strategic Objective 1), and increased effectiveness of selected institutions which support democracy (Special Objective 2).

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: The initial country assessment was conducted in March 1999. During the summer, the media campaign's advisory group was formed, Saatchi and Saatchi was selected for campaign development, and Information International was selected for the polling and corruption research. The ICFJ and the SUNY contracts were signed in August and September 1999. OTI's inability to field a country director due to security restrictions has affected OTI's ability to move as rapidly as it has in other countries.

Targeting: The nation-wide anti-corruption media campaign will reach approximately 3.5 million people. The investigative journalism training component is targeting 45 print journalists from major print media in Lebanon. The municipal government assistance focuses on two of the largest municipalities in Lebanon, Beirut and Jounich. The small grants mechanism will primarily target civic groups to improve the interactions between ordinary citizens and their government.

Resource Leveraging: OTI received an in-kind contribution of donated air time worth \$600,000, equal to OTI's contribution, to increase the reach and duration of the anti-corruption public service announcements.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: Parliamentary elections will take place in August 2000. It is anticipated that OTI's programs will make anti-corruption an election issue. Examples of future anti-corruption efforts may include the introduction of new legislation or new civil society and citizens' efforts to fight corruption.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: Due to significant security restrictions, there is no OTI Country Director in Lebanon. OTI maintains a close relationship with the USAID Mission, and the Democracy and Governance FSN currently serves as OTI's staff on the ground.

Other Partnerships: OTI is coordinating with the UN and local NGOs engaged in anti-corruption efforts.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Exit Strategy: The USAID Mission will have additional Democracy and Governance funding available in FY01 and will evaluate, with OTI input, how to program these funds based on results from OTI's anti-corruption campaign. OTI's overall strategy is to implement activities that will break citizens' apathy and catalyze local initiatives against corruption. Each exit strategy varies by activity. The nationwide media campaign will be executed as a discrete activity and will have no direct follow-on. It is anticipated that the campaign will begin to change public perceptions and attitudes towards corruption, and that the

working group that helped develop the campaign will continue working together on future activities. Work will be done to integrate training materials into the journalism program at two Lebanese universities to continue this activity. The small grants mechanism, however, will fund activities that foster transparency and accountability. OTI is working with the USAID Mission to potentially transfer the small grants program to them once OTI completes its program in Lebanon. The municipal assistance program will put in place financial systems which will reduce the scope of corruption and provide additional resources for further activities by the municipalities.

LIBERIA	Start Date: 11/1995 Exit Date: 3/1999
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$250,000 [IDA funds]

Context: After 7 years of brutal conflict, 13 failed peace accords, and nearly \$1 billion of US humanitarian assistance, Liberian warlords agreed to a cease-fire in August 1996 and an election that brought former warlord Charles Taylor to power in 1997. Although the peace has held, Taylor's government has not succeeded in establishing an enabling environment for reconstruction. Recurrent violations of human and civil rights, including harassment of the media, inability to attract foreign investment, and low levels of voluntary repatriation of refugees are just some of the challenges impeding progress in Liberia.

US Foreign Policy Interests: Liberia has had close ties to the US since its founding by freed slaves. It has received a large amount of US foreign assistance, and in the 1980s had the highest assistance per capita in Africa. The US seeks to reduce wasteful aid resources by ensuring a sustainable peace in Liberia. Such a peace would also contribute to regional stability in West Africa.

OTI Role: OTI has partnered with the Africa Bureau to help promote a successful transition to democracy.

Focus/Program Design: OTI exited from Liberia in March 1999. OTI never developed a full-fledged program in Liberia, but responded to requests from U.S. Government agencies to perform specific, targeted activities. In FY 1999 OTI fielded a human rights expert to monitor treason trials and assess Liberia's rule of law.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: OTI partners with the USAID Mission creating a synergy in strategy and design of activities.

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: OTI has been able to respond quickly to needs in Liberia. When the Department of State and the National Security Council approached OTI seeking a human rights expert to monitor the treason trials in December 1998, OTI fielded an expert by January 1999.

Policy Leveraging: The report from OTI's human rights expert on treason trials and rule of law has contributed to the formulation of US policy in post-conflict Liberia.

II. BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons Learned in FY 1999: OTI proposed to the Inter-Agency Group on Liberia that a process of developing and monitoring benchmarks be initiated with the Taylor government to prevent patterns of human rights abuses. This was not adopted, however, and conditioning donor engagement to the Government's compliance with international standards for human rights has not been systematic.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI Liberia benefits from successful partnerships with the USAID Mission, the Africa Bureau and G/DG. OTI maintains strong links with the Department of State and the National Security Council.

Other Partnerships: Other partnerships include the World Bank, the IMF, the Dutch Government, UNDP and Search for Common Ground.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

OTI's role in Liberia ended in 1999, with the USAID Mission taking over implementation of its media and communications initiatives (STAR radio and Talking Drum Studio).

NIGERIA	Start Date: 5/1999 Exit Date: 6/2001
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$8,486,686 [IDA plus \$605,186 transfer from AF]

Context: After fifteen years of uninterrupted military dictatorship, Nigeria held free elections in February 1999. President Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn in on May 29, 1999, and has been hailed as a leader who can advance democracy and national reconciliation. However, regional and ethnic tensions, economic instability, and corruption are a legacy of military rule, and continued human rights violations remain serious challenges to the new government.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: Nigeria’s leadership role in the region and its economic and trade links make it critical to the stability of West and Central Africa. Its rich oil and gas resources make it a prime investment and development focus for U.S. business. The Department of State has designated Nigeria one of the four countries whose democratic transition is of the highest priority to the United States, and has allocated a significantly increased budget for transition and development assistance activities in FY 2000.

OTI Role: The U.S. recognizes that stability through democracy and civilian oversight of military forces is central to Nigeria’s long-term development. OTI’s focus, which emphasize good governance practices and better civilian-military relations, is integral to building and strengthening new democratic structures to sustain Nigeria’s transition. In addition, OTI’s ability to quickly direct resources to potential flashpoints makes it an integral component of the U.S. Government’s overall approach.

Focus/Program Design: The goal of the OTI program in Nigeria is to mitigate forces that could potentially destabilize elected civilian rule. Specifically, OTI is assisting Nigerian change agents in the public and private sectors in three areas:

- Conflict mitigation and management;
- Civilian-military relations; and
- Facilitating policy reform in good governance; anti-corruption; and economic reform.

OTI will consider its program successful if:

- Civil society organizations are engaging the population in debate on issues critical to reform;
- Tensions lessen between religious and ethnic groups in targeted areas;
- Media more effectively informs the public and policy makers on key transition issues;
- The Government of Nigeria begins to exert civilian, democratic control over the military by implementing the OTI-sponsored Action Plan; and,

- The Government of Nigeria, with the help of international donors, improves the professionalism and human rights record of the police.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: OTI has helped the Mission meet the objectives set out in its strategic framework and MPP. Specifically, OTI programs are central to the Mission’s SO1, “Transition to democratic civilian governance sustained.”

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: OTI, in partnership with the USAID Africa Bureau and G/DG began activities in Nigeria shortly after the February 1999 elections with a comprehensive training of over 10,000 newly elected governors, state and national assembly members, and local officials. Over the course of FY 1999, OTI emphasized its core area of civilian-military relations with an assessment and action plan developed by MPRI. Using the SWIFT mechanism, OTI quickly set up offices in Lagos, Abuja, Kano, and Port Harcourt to address the country’s regional issues. In June 1999 expatriate staff were hired to spearhead the Kano and Port Harcourt regional offices, and in August 1999, a media specialist was hired for the Lagos office to head OTI’s media efforts. In September 1999, OTI developed a strategic plan, and in November 1999 identified a Country Director to provide in-country leadership.

Targeting: Among OTI’s principal targets are grassroots civil society organizations, civilian bodies for oversight of the military, journalists and other media professionals, interethnic communities and inter-religious groups, and local and national government organs, both executive and legislative.

Resource Leveraging: OTI works closely with the USAID Mission and coordinates with other bilateral and multilateral donors to leverage OTI funds and ensure effective hand-off of OTI initiatives. OTI leverages resources from other organizations to develop interventions that will amplify ongoing efforts and build the capacity of local civil society organizations and community-based groups to carry out their activities independently.

Policy Leveraging: OTI’s civilian-military relations program is a prime example of policy leveraging. In close coordination with the Department of Defense and the Department of State, OTI funded the design of an Action Plan to re-professionalize the military, using technical experts paired with Nigerian counterparts. Implementation will be co-funded by U.S. Government agencies and the Government of Nigeria, in an approximate equal share of costs.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: Pre-inaugural training of elected officials enabled them to communicate more effectively with each other and with their constituencies. The Ethics and Privileges Committee signed the Code of Ethics for Parliamentarians that had been developed through a joint effort funded by OTI with the Nigeria chapter of Transparency International. A Code of Conduct Bureau was also established under the Constitution. A public-private sector integrity pact has been adopted to ensure transparency and contract sanctity in public contracting. To resist and root out corrupt policies, and to better understand their roles and responsibilities in a democratic system, OTI funded anti-corruption youth clubs in universities. OTI’s civilian-military efforts have helped legislators and other government officials begin the process of civilian oversight of the military. Conflict mitigation activities, which include a nationwide training of trainers in all six geo-political zones, have started to strengthen and enhance traditional methods of dispute resolution.

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: OTI has become a key part of the U.S. Government presence in Nigeria. OTI activities are paving the way for longer-term development projects and bilateral activities of other U.S. Government agencies.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI relationships within the U.S. Government are essential to its successful engagement in Nigeria. OTI and the USAID Mission consistently share information and coordinate activities. OTI is also closely cooperating with the Democracy and Governance Center, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense. These relationships are critical for OTI to design and implement a successful program.

Other Partnerships: Additional partners include the British Council, the European Union, UNIFEM, UNESCO, the World Bank, other international and local NGOs, as well as OTI's SWIFT contractor, Louis Berger.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: Adjustments for FY 2000 include the incorporation of police reform into OTI's program, and the expansion of conflict mitigation activities to emphasize all six geo-political regions.

Exit Strategy: OTI will begin phasing out activities by the end of February 2001, and will complete its program by June 2001. All activities that require further support will be handed off to the USAID Mission, other bilateral or multilateral agencies, or local civil society groups. OTI is currently working to prepare for a smooth exit.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

Success stories: The March 2000 impact assessment of the Nigeria program noted the following successes:

- The good governance training stimulated an enabling environment of democratic governance for the 10,000 elected officials trained and their constituents. The conflict resolution module was especially appropriate in preparing leaders at all levels for conflict mediation and resolution.
- The civilian-military program helped stimulate a process to aid the transfer of governance from military to civilian rule. It was the right application at the right time.

Quotes about OTI's Work: **The March 2000 external impact assessment highlighted the following quote regarding OTI's training in good governance for elected officials. A National Assembly member commented, "...there are certain cardinal prerequisites that need to be known. New comers didn't know what to expect, i.e., the processes, the steps of how to process a bill, the steps to dealing with a bill in all detail, e.g. appropriation bills that come from the executive...the training was very important to our understanding of these concepts."**

Another official who attended the workshop noted, "before now, I thought that once you got elected, you wait for people to come to you with their problems or views. After the training, I realized that it is important to go to the people, visit them in their homes, and reach out to them with information on the latest issues being addressed. Hearing their problems equips you for action."

Evaluations: An independent impact assessment of the Nigeria program was conducted in March 2000. An evaluation of OTI/Nigeria's SWIFT contracting mechanism was conducted in April 2000.

PHILIPPINES	Start Date: 9/1997 Exit Date: 12/2000
OTI Principal IR: <i>Citizen Security Enhanced</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$2,033,077 [IDA funds]

Context: After years of negotiations, on September 2, 1996, the Government of the Republic Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the largest Muslim rebel group at the time, signed a peace agreement ending hostilities. The Peace Agreement was seen as a mechanism for creating the stability needed for the Southern Philippines (Mindanao) to begin fulfilling its potential as the new economic engine of the Philippines. It was thought that if the GRP could deliver the promised tangible socio-economic assistance to previous MNLF strongholds, it would galvanize the peace agreement, and other skeptical Muslim separatist groups would join in signing a comprehensive peace agreement. If, however, the GRP did not deliver on its promises, support for other, more radical Muslim separatist groups might be strengthened and lead to an expansion of conflict. Without peace, the economic development of Mindanao, and the Philippines, will continue to be hampered. In October of 1999, the second largest Muslim rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), opened peace negotiations with the GRP following nearly 18 months of on-again, off-again cease fires.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: With the end of the U.S. military presence, U.S.-Philippines relations have focused on economic and commercial ties while maintaining the importance of security. Improved Philippine domestic political stability has resulted in increased U.S. investment in the country.

OTI Role: In June 1997, at the request of the USAID Mission, OTI sent an assessment team to determine the immediate needs of MNLF communities. The USAID Mission was implementing several economic and governance activities in Mindanao, but recognized that it needed a more targeted program to reach the former combatant communities.

Focus/Program Design: The goal of the OTI program in the Philippines is to provide tangible evidence to the Muslim communities and the estimated 40,000 ex-combatants that the GRP is delivering on the 1996 Peace Agreement. The OTI program enhanced the livelihood of MNLF ex-combatants and their families; built the basic human resource capacity of the MNLF village groups; provided tangible evidence that the GRP is delivering needed services to the Muslim community; and, developed a hand-off strategy to the GRP.

Phase I, from August 1997 to March 1999: The Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program (ELAP) assisted 4,000 MNLF ex-combatants, their families and survivors to reintegrate into the civilian economy by providing immediate agricultural livelihood assistance and initiating a pilot “literacy for enterprise development” program for 600 ex-combatants.

Phase II, April 1999 to October 2000: OTI provides 300 MNLF villages and 9,000 families with village-based micro-infrastructure projects, post-harvest machinery, and capacity building activities to assist the target villages in becoming more productive and profitable. OTI works to facilitate tangible linkages between all levels of the GRP and the MNLF ex-combatant groups by forging village project agreements that require matching funds from each. Each village project promotes self-help concepts and enhances the agricultural economic and social well being of the MNLF ex-combatants, their families, and other members of their community.

OTI will consider its 1999 program in Mindanao successful if it has:

- **Mobilized GRP and MNLF group counterpart funding that represents fifty percent of the total cost of each village project; and**
- **Created a dialogue between local, provincial, and national government officials and the rural MNLF village groups in all operational areas.**

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: Phase II began in April 1999, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the GRP. OTI administrative, operation, and staff systems were established by mid-May and field staff deployed to their assigned MNLF areas by May 15. The first village grant was issued in June and by December 1999, 130 village projects assisting 8,288 families and 5,635 ex-combatants were approved. The total cost of the 130 village projects was \$715,864, with \$358,586 (50%) being provided by the GRP and MNLF village groups.

Targeting: One of the root causes of the conflict was the inability of the GRP to deliver basic government services to the Muslim communities in Mindanao. It was recognized in the beginning of 1999, that the GRP would have to be more actively involved in delivering assistance to MNLF areas in order for the Muslim community to change its perception that the GRP was not in good faith implementing the 1996 Peace Agreement. OTI's primary goal was to use tangible village projects to facilitate positive and meaningful interactions between the rural Muslim communities supporting the peace process and local, provincial, and national GRP officials. In order for perceptions to change, GRP officials will have to visit targeted Muslim villages and deliver needed projects. The program was designed to facilitate this basic, yet critical, government service.

Resource Leveraging:

- In FY 1999, the USAID Mission provided \$4.7million for expanding the ELAP program to assist an additional 7,000 MNLF ex-combatants by October 2001.
- In FY 1999 OTI provided \$500,000 as leverage capital to draw in GRP and MNLF village group resources to implement priority village projects. Of the 130 village projects approved in 1999, the following counterpart was provided: OTI - \$357,278 (50%), GRP - \$215,151 (30%), MNLF village groups - \$143,435 (20%)
- Due to the success of reaching the under-resourced rural MNLF villages, in November 1999 OTI finalized negotiations with the Philippine Department of Agriculture to create the Village Partnership fund (\$575,000).
- OTI has worked with the UNDP, FAO, World Bank Social Fund, and Canadian Government. No other donor program has required the Government of the Philippines and MNLF groups to provide counterparts. Several are now looking at redesigning their programs to require matching contributions.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: In 1999 the following results were accomplished:

- 130 village projects were approved and 76 delivered. These projects fell in four categories: Agriculture Production Machinery (22 projects), Post-Harvest Machinery and Facilities (94 projects), Village Infrastructure Improvements (12 projects), Capacity Building (2 projects).

- 5,635 ex-combatants benefited and assisted in designing and implementing the village projects. 8,288 rural families directly benefited from the village projects. 650 individuals from ex-combatant families have completed the second level of functional literacy training through the pilot literacy program. Due to the high demand for literacy training, the local NGO partners have trained an additional 100 learners using their own resources.
- The involvement of all members of an MNLF village group in designing a given village project led to a growing appreciation that each project is to assist all members of the group and not just one or two individuals. By requiring the group to provide in-kind contributions, they have also begun making the shift from a feeling of entitlement based on the peace agreement to a belief in self-help and group ownership of their future.

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: At the municipal and provincial level progress has been made in achieving support for MNLF villages. Three of the seven provincial governors have provided tangible support to the program in 1999. The implementation of the OTI Village Partnership will further demonstrate the National government's support.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999: OTI's capacity-building assistance is a critical component of the program, and many of the village groups will require additional follow-up training to continue managing the assets they have been provided. Technical training is also needed to ensure that the machinery provided is properly operated and maintained. OTI discovered that, due to cultural issues village projects have been predominantly controlled by men. By the end of 1999, OTI began developing village-based projects targeted towards women.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI's relationship with the USAID Mission enabled the Mission to fund the ELAP program in 1999. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has also had discussions with the Philippine Department of Agriculture.

Other partnerships:

- OTI's primary partner has been the Department of Agriculture. The OTI Village Partnership represents only the fourth GRP project that directly targets MNLF ex-combatants.
- Developing close working relationships with the Provincial Governors has improved the involvement of provincial government offices in OTI activities and is anticipated to lead to future support for MNLF villages.
- Municipal officials are critical to sustain relationships established during the implementation of the program.
- Sustainability of the program will be based on the MNLF villages' ability to manage the OTI-provided assets.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: Targets will be increased for 2000.

Exit Strategy: In March 1999 the USAID Mission took over full funding of the Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program. OTI designed the program with a timeframe of 18 months. By December 2000, OTI's involvement in the Philippines will phase out. The program will leave behind village groups that

have the capacity to manage the assets provided to them and serve as role models for other Muslim groups in their area. OTI is working to ensure that the relationships facilitated with municipal, provincial, and national governments will be sustained.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

Governor Candao of Maguindanao accompanied USAID Mission Director Patricia Buckles to two OTI village delivery ceremonies. During his speech to the MNLF group the Governor stated that he was embarrassed that the staff of a foreign donor had to be the one to introduce him to a village within his constituency. He said that he sees this as a challenge to all local government officials to provide better leadership. Within one month of the governor's visit to the village, his office had funded the infrastructure repairs.

RWANDA	Start Date: 11/1994 Exit Date: 12/1999
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$702,596 [IDA plus \$151,000 transfer from AF]

Context: In April 1994, an airplane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana and the President of Burundi was shot down, killing both presidents. Immediately thereafter, military and militia groups began rounding up and killing all ethnic Tutsis and political moderates, regardless of their ethnic background. The killing swiftly spread from the capital throughout the country and neighboring areas, leaving an estimated one million dead. The international community responded with one of the largest humanitarian relief efforts ever mounted, and the U.S. was one of the largest contributors. Continued insecurity in the northwest of the country increased throughout 1998 as Hutu rebel groups trying to overthrow the Rwandan government launched cross-border attacks from bases within neighboring countries. Attacks and harassment by the rebels within Rwanda drove almost 680,000 people away from their homes and sources of food. Security conditions had improved in the northwest by the end of 1998, allowing Rwandans to begin returning to their homes, and for international assistance to refocus on the region.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: Since the immediate post-genocide period, U.S. Government interests have shifted from strictly humanitarian assistance to include the prevention of renewed regional conflict, the promotion of internal stability, and renewed economic development. A major focus of bilateral relations is USAID’s transition program, which aims to promote internal stability and to increase confidence in the society.

OTI Role: OTI has played a critical and catalytic role in Rwanda since 1995. OTI provided assistance to the United Nations’ human rights monitoring effort in the immediate aftermath of the genocide and as the new multi-ethnic government took control. OTI’s interventions have provided input to the formulation of U.S. policy towards Rwanda, pilot tested new transition mechanisms and programs, created a successful model for rural women’s assistance programs, and advanced the ability of citizens to participate in democratic processes.

Relationship of OTI program to USAID Mission strategy and MPP: OTI has worked collaboratively with the Mission on an Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) and on OTI’s hand-off strategy. OTI has also closely collaborated with the U.S. Embassy, U.S. Government agencies, and other donors. US Ambassador Robert E. Gribbin’s farewell address in December 1998 noted that “... the Women in Transition Program has played a key part in Rwanda’s reconciliation process.”

Focus/Program Design: OTI’s objective in Rwanda was to advance the post-genocidal recovery process by: 1) addressing social justice concerns of surviving Rwandans; 2) promoting self-help activities identified by rural women’s associations; and 3) increasing citizen participation in local government decision-making.

OTI’s Program Design: During FY 1999, OTI programs in Rwanda comprised the following activities:

- Women's self-help activities: In partnership with the Ministry of Gender & Women's Development, the USAID Mission, the U.S. Embassy and the International Rescue Committee, OTI's Women in Transition (WIT) program provided 322 grants in FY 1999 (for a program total of 1,800 grants) to women's associations in 11 out of 12 provinces). This assistance is focused on supporting participatory decision-making processes and has included self-help priorities: such as agriculture, livestock, income generation, and shelter.
- Women's communal funds: During 1999, the WIT project worked closely with the Ministry of Gender and Women's Development to support the creation of Women's Communal Funds (WCF). The WCFs are managed by elected representatives from each commune. They are designed to support the political decentralization effort underway in Rwanda and give rural women more involvement in funding determinations and management of funds while helping support rural economic and agriculture activities.
- Emergency transition assistance in the Northwest: To strengthen links between relief and development, and to build local capacities for peace in areas of Rwanda where violence continued and emergency needs were great, the Mission targeted the northwest for specific interventions. Through the OTI/WIT project, new communes and women's associations in Northwest Rwanda -- Gikongoro, Kibuye and Gisenyi -- received agricultural and livestock raising assistance. By November 1998, OTI funding provided critical assistance to 86 women farmer associations (3,198 members) in five Gisenyi communes. Because each commune was still subject to insurgency attacks, military escorts were required to accompany OTI staff to meet and determine women's critical needs. The Gisenyi Prefect commended OTI/WIT's quick response in helping provide quality planting seeds and restarting potato production, one of their staple crops.
- International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: In partnership with InterNews, the Department of State, international media organizations, and the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, OTI managed an activity that disseminated information on the tribunal process and progress. OTI's grantee remains the only news organization that covers the Rwanda Tribunal in English on a daily basis. All of these original ICTR-related articles and analysis pieces are carried by Africa News Service, posted on both InterNews' and Hirondelle's web sites, and carried by Africa News Online, which distributes to more than 50 newspapers around Africa. Five radio news spots have been provided to National Public Radio, three radio news spots and an interview to the BBC, and ten radio news spots to Network Radio Service for radio stations in South Africa.
- Local governance: OTI has provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Interior on political decentralization processes, including assistance in the elections process for local citizens' development councils.

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: By November 1998, three weeks after meeting with prospective communes, and two months after the Ambassador gave permission for the OTI/Rwanda team to explore opportunities to expand WIT into the Northwest once the security conditions had improved, OTI funded its first grant in that area. The time range for making grants through OTI ranged from two to four weeks.

Targeting: In FY 1999 OTI re-targeted this activity to include vulnerable communes in the Northwest, where internally displaced and refugee populations began to return. OTI also re-targeted its WIT activities to focus on women's communal funds.

Resource Leveraging: In FY 1999, the Department of State agreed to fund an extension of OTI's ICTR activities, while OTI continued to manage the activity. This leveraged approximately \$151,000 additional funds (around 50%

more). The WIT project requires each women's association to contribute an amount equal or greater than OTI's grant amount, usually in the form of labor or commodity contributions.

Advancing Change: OTI's most significant program achievements in the last year were the breakthroughs in local government and decentralization. OTI continued to fund technical assistance to the ministry responsible for decentralization efforts. OTI's support for reporting on the progress and process of the International War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda enabled ICTR activities to grow in its capacity to inform African readers about the Tribunal. With OTI support, African News Online is one of the most frequent users of InterNews dispatches, and redistributes news coverage to more than 50 national papers in Africa. According to journalists associated with this activity, the importance of such coverage within Africa cannot be overstated. Women's self-help activities in the northwest have meant that that USAID, in conjunction with OFDA and OTI, has been the major donor with a stabilization strategy in that part of the country. The Mission reports that as a result of increased production and improved security in the northwest, the prices of staple crops have either stabilized or decreased this year.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

Relationship of program to overall country context: According to the USAID Mission, the WIT project contributes to the reconciliation process underway in Rwanda. Participation in joint activities related to agricultural production, processing, and marketing is helping women find common ground. WIT has increased tolerance and acceptance through shared activities that improve livelihoods. WIT's contributions to the reconciliation process were highlighted in the 1999 OTI/CDIE evaluation of the WIT program. The evaluation showed that women's economic activities, contribute to the overall reduction of tension in post-conflict settings.

Lessons learned: Because WIT operates outside of USAID and the GOR, it maintains a higher degree of autonomy that increases the credibility of the program among its beneficiaries. Working in close collaboration with the GOR Ministry and local officials, WIT has proved to be an effective way to test the organizational capacities of different communities, understand local power dynamics, identify effective community leaders and workers, and demonstrate a community's willingness to invest in the peace process. Small grants transition activities need to be monitored on almost a daily basis, in order to capture the impact that the activities have provided. Through such daily monitoring, OTI found that many women, especially heads of households that have benefited from WIT's assistance, are now able to make their own financial decisions and are not dependent on handouts. OTI's objective to provide direct grant-support to large numbers of vulnerable women to help them sustain themselves, their families and begin to re-establish basic relationships, trust and peace within their communities, has had a remarkable impact on the lives of vulnerably populations.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI collaborates with other bureaus of USAID, USIA, the National Security Council, the Department of State, and Inter-Agency taskforces on the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, and Preventing Genocide.

Other Partnerships: The Government of Rwanda, the International Rescue Committee, and InterNews

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Exit Strategy: OTI began exiting its Rwanda program in FY 1999 by handing-off activities to the Mission.

HIGHLIGHTS

Success Stories: In little over three years, WIT has funded 1,768 rural women associations' activities with over \$3 million, directly assisted 40,922 women association members, and reached women's activities in isolated and insecure communal sectors. WIT funding increased agriculture production outputs and improved food security by responding to women's farmer associations and priority needs. OTI also supported Rwanda's decentralization process by providing management training, supervision and financial support to elected communal Women's Committees to establish Women Communal Funds. The programs contributed to the reduction of social tensions and helped foster peace by responding to the priority needs of impoverished women's groups, and provided indirect assistance to a total of 182,808 family beneficiaries of association members.

During a recent visit to Gisenyi, Rwerere commune, a woman handed the OTI team a letter as they prepared to leave. It stated, "By this letter, we want to thank WIT for the sincere love that you have shown to our women. Mamas of Rwerere were close to death when you first arrived. Now women, widows and their orphans sing a song to praise WIT. This letter is a small nothing, but it means a lot because it comes from the depths of our hearts." A woman association member in Kayove commune noted, "not only do the families of the 15 WIT-funded women associations have Irish potatoes to eat, but ALL families in Kayove can now afford to buy potatoes and feed their families."

Quotes Regarding OTI's Work:

"WIT funds are especially helpful to women because they go directly to the associations and do not pass through other intermediaries...this gives associations absolute responsibility in managing their funds and activities...I encourage other NGOs, donors and even the Rwandan Government to use WIT's model in providing assistance to Rwandans...I hope that WIT's assistance will encourage other women to join or form associations as a unified means of dealing with their problems..."

Gisenyi Prefect, Captain Jean-Baptiste Muhirwa, addressing WIT-funded women associations in Mutura Commune, Gisenyi Prefecture, December 1998

Evaluations: **In FY 1999, CDIE and OTI co-sponsored an evaluation of the WIT initiative.**

SERBIA & MONTENEGRO	Start Date: 7/1997 Exit Date: 8/2001
OTI Principal IR: <i>Democratic Political Processes Initiated, Reestablished, or Expanded</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$2,156,956 [IDA funds]

Context: In 1999 Slobodan Milosevic’s policy of stirring ethnic hatreds in the former Yugoslavia finally brought the wrath of the international community directly home to Serbia. Throughout the summer and fall of 1998, Yugoslav forces waged a campaign of terror against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. After several months of failed peace negotiations, it became clear that another campaign of ethnic cleansing was occurring in Kosovo. On March 24, 1999, NATO forces began air strikes against Yugoslavia that lasted through mid-June 1999 when Serb authorities signed Resolution 1244, authorizing a NATO and UN presence to govern and protect Kosovo.

Throughout the airstrikes, the democratically elected government in Montenegro maintained a courageously neutral position. They welcomed Kosovar refugees to their republic and refused to join Yugoslav Army forces in their attacks on Kosovo. Following the NATO action, Serbian opposition leaders re-invigorated their stance against the Milosevic regime with large demonstrations throughout Serbia in the late summer and early fall of 1999 that called for an end of the Milosevic regime and early elections.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: The U.S. has a strong interest in the stability and democratic development of the Balkans. Continued conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) threatens the safety and territorial integrity of neighboring countries.

OTI Role: OTI’s Serbia and Montenegro program opened in July 1997, following a series of street demonstrations in January and February that signaled a possible opening for democratic change. In FY 1999, OTI suspended its program three times, and the Serbia program was completely closed down from March to July 1999 during the NATO action. OTI re-opened the Serbia program in late 1999 with a focus on more direct and more intense support to democratically-oriented opposition groups.

Focus/Program Design: The goal of the OTI program in Serbia and Montenegro is to trigger peaceful, democratic reform for the whole of Yugoslavia, through support to the democratically-elected government in Montenegro, democratic opposition leaders, free media, and supporters across the region. To achieve this goal, OTI is focusing on:

- Ensuring that the region’s free media is able to function and play an active role in demanding government accountability and providing alternative sources of information to the general public.
- Cultivating civil society initiatives and NGO efforts to open the political system, expand civic participation, and increase democratic practices.
- Supporting opposition leaders in their efforts to promote peaceful, democratic reform in Serbia and Montenegro.

OTI will consider its program successful in Serbia and Montenegro if:

- The country embarks on the path towards democratic change; and

- The democratically elected government in Montenegro is able to complete its government reform plans.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: In Montenegro, OTI laid the groundwork for longer-term USAID engagement in the areas of local governance, judicial reform, support for independent media, and political reform.

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: While much of the Serbia program was suspended during FY 1999, Montenegro programming intensified during the NATO action. During the two months of the NATO campaign, the Montenegro program signed over 17 new grants totaling \$300,000. When OTI re-engaged in Serbia in August 1999, the OTI team was immediately re-assembled. Within one month of the decision to re-engage, nine grants were signed promoting the Serbian democratic movement.

Targeting: In Serbia, OTI has a very narrow target of opposition activists (NGOs, media, local governments). The ideal model for OTI support is the student movement, which OTI has funded for a majority of its activities over the past several months.

In Montenegro, the target groups are civil society and government players who are attempting to move the democratically-elected government's reform agenda forward.

Policy Leveraging: OTI's presence in Montenegro throughout the crisis provided invaluable information and insight to interested U.S. Government agencies. It allowed other USAID organizations to quickly re-group and re-engage following the crisis, with OTI staff constantly serving as the first stop for new programs.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: In FY 1999, OTI made a total of 152 grants in Serbia and Montenegro totaling \$1,637,044. Of this amount, 92 grants totaling \$631,055 were made to Serbia, and 60 grants totaling \$1,005,989 were made in Montenegro. As the only US government office to maintain open collaboration with the Montenegrin government during the NATO action, OTI served as a reminder of U.S. commitment to government reformers.

Key reforms in Montenegro:

- Reinforced the effectiveness of reform-minded local governments in the politically and economically vulnerable northern regions via provision of visible community improvements, such as cultural centers, internet cafes, garbage trucks and infrastructure repair.
- Ensured the survival of core free media organizations in Montenegro during the NATO crisis through emergency support grants.
- Provided a safe-haven for human rights activists and journalists during the NATO action.

Key reforms in Serbia:

- OTI contributed to the U.S. Government sponsored "Ring-Around-Serbia," which provides citizens of Serbia with reliable news and information.
- Provided computers with internet connections to opposition local governments and media outlets in Serbia, ensuring their ability to share information and experiences via their own network.

- Funded the civic activities of activist student groups in fall 1999, to highlight the power of citizen engagement.
- Aired public service announcements promoting ethnic tolerance and anti-corruption messages through the independent television network, Mreza.
- Provided emergency operational support to key media outlets, such as the Media Center, the Press Club and Radio Index during the fall of 1999.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999: When working in a hostile environment, OTI should always be cautious of the danger that partners may face. This was a hard lesson learned in Serbia when an OTI media partner was assassinated shortly after the NATO campaign began. OTI's ability to protect activists in these countries should never be overestimated. The current Serbia program provides a model for how OTI can work in countries with whom the U.S. Government does not have diplomatic relations. The strategic decision to keep Serbian program staff on-board as OTI waited for a resolution of the conflict meant that OTI was well-positioned when opportunities re-emerged.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: OTI actively engages in policy dialogue with other U.S. Government agencies, both in Washington and in the field and participates in meetings with the Department of State, other offices within USAID, the Department of Defense and Congress.

Other Partnerships: OTI coordinates with other organizations, including non-governmental organizations, which are also working on Serbia and Montenegro. An example of OTI's coordination is support to student-led groups with US NGOs: the International Republican Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the National Democratic Institute. OTI works in tandem with its implementing partner, RONCO.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: In FY 2000, OTI will move its office for Serbia from Montenegro to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The office will remain in Bosnia until it is safe and feasible to return operations to Belgrade.

Exit Strategy: It is anticipated that OTI will end programming in August 2001. OTI will remain in Serbia and Montenegro until a stable, democratic government is operating, or until a USAID Mission is able to take over activities as appropriate.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

Success Stories: In recognition of the tremendous impact of the Montenegro program during the NATO action, a Montenegrin OTI local staff member received the USAID FSN of the Year Award.

SIERRA LEONE	Start Date: 1/1997 Exit Date: 2001
OTI Principal IR: <i>Citizen Security Enhanced</i>	FY 1999 Budget: \$1,031,811 [IDA plus \$995,860 carryover]

Context: The Lome Peace Agreement of July 7, 1999, between the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) brought a negotiated end to eight years of armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The war displaced a third of the population, resulting in the largest refugee population in Africa, and was characterized by terror tactics against civilians, including amputations of the limbs of children, and some of the most horrendous war crimes in recent history. The negotiators converged on the desire to end violence and suffering of civilians in recognition of the fact that Sierra Leone's future development is linked to establishing legitimate exploitation of strategic mineral resources, particularly diamonds, and promoting responsible and accountable government.

Unlike other peace agreements, the rebels recognized the constitutional government and agreed to transform their movement into a political party. In exchange, the GOSL granted amnesty and made a number of Cabinet-level appointments of the RUF and the leader of the mutinous army. The Lome Agreement called for a continuation of ECOMOG, the West African peace-keeping force. The UN, however, lobbied donors for a UN Peace Keeping Operation that was subsequently approved by the Security Council. Delays in deploying a peace-keeping operation are partially responsible for slow implementation of the Lome Agreement, which continues despite many setbacks and distrust between the parties.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests: Sierra Leone is a successful test of democracy in West Africa, and is the basis of a new doctrine of zero tolerance of military coups that was recently adopted by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The U.S. Government has responded vehemently against the atrocities and human rights abuses, and has provided approximately \$40 million per year in humanitarian assistance since 1992. The U.S. Government is also interested in the role diamonds have played in funding armed conflicts in Africa. Sierra Leone is the first country to address the problem to date.

OTI Role: OTI is providing programmatic support to U.S. foreign policy in a test case for a new USAID/Department of State relationship in conflict countries. OTI is further helping to resolve conflict in a complex emergency country which has received its largest share of donor assistance from the U.S. Government.

Focus/Program Design: In FY 1999, OTI assisted the Sierra Leonean peace process through 232 small grants to civil society groups supporting peace-building, human rights, and youth activism for community development. OTI fielded a technical team and three civil society observers to the Lome Peace Talks.

Relationship of OTI Program to USAID Mission Strategy and MPP: Sierra Leone is a non-presence country. There is no USAID Mission, and there are no plans to establish one. From 1997 to 1999, OTI co-chaired with the State Department a humanitarian working group. The group produced joint State/USAID "assistance strategy" documents, which were updated every three months due to the volatile situation immediately before, during, and after the military coup. This body evolved into the USAID/State Department Sierra Leone Working Group, co-chaired by OTI and OFDA.

PROCESS INDICATORS

Speed: OTI fielded a mission in July 1998, following restoration to office of the exiled GOSL on March 10, 1998. Civil society activities re-started in August 1998. OTI fielded its technical team to the Lome talks in April 1999 within 3 weeks of their commencement. OTI's response to the youth non-formal education program which supports DDR has been slow due to problems related to security restrictions and Embassy constraints. An OTI Field Director was fielded in January 2000.

Targeting: Despite extremely difficult conditions of access, OTI-funded activities in FY 1999 reached all regions of Sierra Leone with 232 small grants to 47 different Sierra Leonean NGOs.

Resource Leveraging: Civil society small grants are accompanied by substantial volunteer labor by the participating NGOs, equivalent to an in-kind contribution of fifty percent of the effort.

Policy Leveraging: OTI contributed substantially to the Lome peace negotiations. The OTI technical team provided the draft concepts and text for most of the political and governance section of the agreement. Since the negotiations, OTI has provided key technical assistance to the GOSL, and worked in partnership with the US Embassy, and Department of State on U.S. foreign policy.

BROADER RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Advancing Change: The technical team, supported by OTI, played a critical role at the Lome negotiations. Civil society organizations, supported by OTI together with the United Kingdom and the United Nations, also played a decisive role prior to, and during, the peace talks. With OTI's technical assistance, the GOSL will attempt to gain legitimate control over diamond production and trading, and give the RUF an acceptable and mainstream post-conflict role. It is anticipated that OTI's non-formal education program will help address the marginalization of 60,000 ex-combatants and youth activists, and give them a role in their country's reconciliation and peace-building process.

Relationship of Program to Overall Country Context: OTI's programs have furthered Sierra Leone's peace process, which is the overriding U.S. foreign policy goal in Sierra Leone.

Lessons Learned in FY 1999: The important lesson for OTI has been to focus on the root causes of the conflict and to include, from the beginning, the most important stakeholders in an effort to influence their behavior.

PARTNERSHIPS

Within U.S. Government: Assistance is tightly coordinated between OTI, OFDA, and FFP. In Freetown, OTI hired a Field Director in January 2000 who is serving as a liaison for all USAID offices. OTI has worked in very close partnership on the peace process with the State Department and the US Embassy in Freetown.

Sierra Leone is a prime example of two institutional developments. The integrated efforts of OTI and other BHR offices sought to resolve the political aspects of a complex humanitarian emergency. A new policy-making partnership between USAID and the State Department has developed, with OTI staff contributing expertise as development professionals. The Sierra Leone engagement demonstrates how synergy developing operational and comparative advantage can work to promote the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. humanitarian response.

Other Partnerships: OTI works in coordination with the Government of Sierra Leone, the UK, the World Bank, ECHO, UN organizations, as well as World Vision and MSI. OTI has coordinated co-funding arrangements between USAID and DFID, and will co-fund a communications program with Dutch, Swiss, UK and Canada/CIDA.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND EXIT STRATEGY

Planned Adjustments: In FY 2000 OTI will undertake the following activities:

- Assist in the establishment of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction, and Development (CMRRD) and other Commissions.
- Continue the small grant program for civil society's peace-building initiatives related to reconciliation, reintegration of war-torn communities up-country, and civic education in preparation for upcoming elections.
- In support of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts, OTI is embarking on a two-year, nation-wide, non-formal education initiative for 60,000 ex-combatant and non-combatant young adults, combining reintegration orientation and counseling, life-skills training, vocational counseling, agriculture skills development, civic education, and functional literacy training. This program of post-conflict recovery of ex-combatants focuses simultaneously on reintegration of war-torn communities and remedial education for youth.

Lesson Learned: OTI's first engagement in Sierra Leone, in 1996, pioneered the "contingency clause" that allowed OTI to suspend and eventually cancel programs with NGOs when a military coup or other contingency interrupted humanitarian and program access, saving the requisite resources. The pre-negotiation of the terms of the contingency clause made OTI's response unambiguous. OTI's NGO partners appreciated knowing in advance the U.S. Government policy on evacuations, or similar interruption of access.

Exit Strategy: OTI plans to exit Sierra Leone at the end of FY 2001. Discussions are currently underway with USAID to identify future development assistance for the country. Current programs will be handed off to the GOSL, and are not designed to require further international donor funding beyond OTI's contributions. The technical assistance for a new diamond policy and operations is expected to yield significant fiscal resources that will enable GOSL to fund its own social development and assist victims of the war, as per the terms of the Lome Agreement.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

Success Stories: Contributions of the technical team at the Lome Peace Talks helped resolve contentious issues and contributed to the post-conflict focus on management of diamonds and other strategic resources. Early support for civil society has enabled local groups to play a defining role in the peace process. It is anticipated that OTI's remedial education program will benefit a significant number of young people who would otherwise have no hope of acquiring functional literacy and basic arithmetic.

Quotes about OTI's Work: Sierra Leone President Kabbah has thanked the US on several occasions for OTI's contributions at the Lome Peace Talks. Sierra Leone Minister for Presidential Affairs Mamadou Koroma has stated that OTI's non-formal education program is the single most important contribution of any donor to the recovery from war, because it addresses both the root causes of the war (disenfranchisement of youth), and provides hope for the future through remedial education of ex-combatants who lost their education due to war.