

# **TAJIKISTAN**

## **RESULTS, REVIEW AND RESOURCE REQUEST (R4)**

**USAID Central Asia Regional Mission  
Almaty, Kazakhstan  
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The attached results information is from the FY 2001 Results Review and Resource Request (R4) for Tajikistan and was assembled and analyzed by USAID/CAR.

The R4 is a ?pre-decisional? document and does not reflect results stemming from formal USAID reviews. Additional information on the attached can be obtained from Jeff Evans, ENI/PCS

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## **Please Note:**

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## **I. OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE**

### **U.S. National Interest and Goals**

USAID/CAR directly supports U.S. foreign policy in Tajikistan. In his March 1999 testimony before a subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich reaffirmed U.S. interest in Central Asia and said that "Today, our overarching goal in American policy in Central Asia remains securing the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the states of the region. To advance this objective, our diplomacy focuses on four key issues: formation of democratic political institutions, market economic reform, cooperation among these countries and with us, and responsible security policies."

This is echoed in the U.S. Embassy Mission Performance Plan priorities for national security in Tajikistan: ensuring that local and regional instabilities do not threaten the security and well-being of the United States and its allies; increasing government adherence to democratic practices and respect for human rights; recovery and broad-based economic growth after five years of civil war; supporting privatization and reform of the banking systems. USAID assistance is concentrated on promoting the peace process, encouraging of democratic and economic reform, and providing humanitarian assistance. The fragile peace and potential for disintegration threaten regional stability and deflect attention from critical social, economic, political and environmental reforms.

### **Summary Progress in Implementing the Strategic Plan**

Work in Tajikistan takes place in a challenging, politically unstable environment. USAID/CAR provides important support for the transition to a transparent and accountable government. USAID/CAR has provided assistance to the Commission on National Reconciliation as it endeavored to amend the Constitution and monitor full implementation of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord. Under the terms of the peace agreement, parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in 1999, followed by presidential elections. In preparation for these elections, USAID/CAR is helping develop an orderly voter registration system, guaranteeing that all citizens can exercise their right to vote. In June, USAID/CAR sponsored a conference which for the first time successfully brought together the government and opposing groups to jointly identify election-related Constitutional issues and agree to resolve those issues.

USAID/CAR supported the empowerment of citizens by targeting socioeconomic development activities of local communities and organizations and linking them to larger, longer term development across the country. USAID/CAR directed its civil society efforts toward political reconciliation, demobilization and the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. Development efforts centered on areas most affected by the influx of returnees. Rural communities hardest hit by the conflict are now involved in participatory development approaches implemented by U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs).

Last year the government delicensed all broadcasting stations, requiring them to relicense under new regulations which had not yet been passed by the *Majlisi Oli* (Parliament). Through USAID/CAR's advocacy, eleven television stations were eventually relicensed.

### **Country Factors That Have Influenced Progress**

Safety conditions for international workers declined during the year. In July, four observers from the United Nations Mission to Tajikistan were killed in the Karetegin Valley and international assistance to the area was curtailed. In mid-July and at the end of August, combat broke out among the opposition groups in several areas. The government denied humanitarian groups access to these areas; there were reports of gross human rights abuses on civilians by the military on both sides. In October, due to the lack of a secure Embassy facility, the U.S. Ambassador and all U.S. employees, including the USAID/CAR Officer, were relocated from Dushanbe to Almaty, Kazakhstan. At present official travel is severely curtailed, and USAID/CAR assistance is largely limited to grantee organizations. New systems to monitor grantees are not yet developed.

The implementation of the peace process has clearly been set back. Little progress has been made on issues of power sharing, disarmament and integration of the opposition forces, and agreement on the Constitution. Elections were delayed until 1999. The rescheduling of the proposed elections may prove beneficial, as it should allow for a more orderly voter registration process that will in the long-term give the results more credibility.

Progress on economic reform also faltered in 1998. Macroeconomic stability suffered, and the Tajik ruble continued to decline. In October the government began to implement International Monetary Fund (IMF) fiscal austerity policies, and the macroeconomic situation regained some lost ground. While progress in privatization remained slow, there have been some hopeful signs, including changes in the antiquated tax laws.

### **Key Mission Management Actions**

The relocation of the USAID/CAR Officer limited USAID/CAR's capacity to support reforms and the Peace Accords. Neither USAID/CAR nor contractors have easy access to partners or counterparts. However, a USAID/CAR FSN remains in Dushanbe and will be supplemented by new hires. Several U.S. PVOs and local NGOs maintain their presence continuing and expanding work on USAID-funded activities. Given security clearances for periodic travel to Dushanbe, USAID/CAR will be able to support earlier initiatives and maintain the momentum of the existing grantee activities. USAID/CAR is also resuming limited expert assistance to legal reform through consultations and training. Discussions are underway with the World Bank on possible collaboration to improve the government's capabilities in bank supervision and accounting reform.

### **Prospects for Progress through 2001**

Future USAID assistance will continue to support the peace and reconciliation processes through electoral systems, community development and selected governmental reforms. The conduct of the elections will be a determining factor in the direction of the USAID's assistance. Since these elections will potentially be among the first truly competitive elections in Central Asia; USAID/CAR will provide substantial support. After elections, USAID/CAR expects to assist the government in building its macro-economic institutional capacity. USAID/CAR will continue to support the independent electronic media, focusing on how the media can contribute to public understanding of the peace initiatives, the elections and constitutional changes. USAID/CAR will also increase assistance in health care in FY 2000 and FY 2001, particularly for infectious diseases.

## **II. RESULTS REVIEW BY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE**

### *S.O. 1.3: Accelerated development and growth of private enterprises*

#### **Summary**

This objective is critical to rebuilding Tajikistan's war-torn economy and providing income and jobs to those displaced by years of civil conflict. While the economic policy environment has improved noticeably, chronic security problems resulted in the relocation of USAID personnel to Kazakhstan, and thus diminished progress toward objectives. Long-term USAID development activities are just beginning.

USAID initial training in commercial law reform has been well received in Tajikistan. The government is pressing to begin adoption of a civil code this spring; USAID is helping to elaborate this legal backbone necessary for the emerging private sector. The government made significant progress toward a market economy in 1998 by privatizing 23 percent of Tajikistan's enterprises, raising the total privatized from 50 to 73 percent. Currently, the government is in the process of conducting an international tender for privatization of 22 cotton gins in Tajikistan.

#### **Key Intermediate Results**

Three key intermediate results are necessary to achieve this objective: 1) an improved operating environment for private sector growth, which would include the strengthening of business and business advocacy groups, and the implementation of sound trade laws necessary for growth of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); 2) improved human resources, so as to enhance the functioning of a market economy; and 3) increased availability and accessibility of capital and technological resources for the private sector.

#### **Performance and Prospects**

Overall progress in achieving this objective in 1998 did not meet expectations. USAID had expected to make material progress in 1997, but has been set back at least two years by the civil war.

USAID provided short-term assistance in privatization during the spring of 1998, helping the government to comply with International Financial Institution (IFI) conditionality. This enabled the government to reach an agreement with the IMF on an Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in July 1998.

Commercial law assistance programs began early in 1999. USAID will assist the government in developing a market-oriented commercial infrastructure by making key reforms in commercial law through FY 1999 and 2000. This assistance centers initially on the Civil Code, which the government plans to enact early in 1999, then on assistance with drafting laws on bankruptcy, collateral, company, and foreign investment. Practical constraints to business formation and operation, such as licensing,

certifications and registration procedures will also be addressed. In addition to commercial law reform, USAID will provide in-country or third-country training of parties key to the implementation of a market-friendly regulatory regime. Work under this strategic objective will promote the rule of law, and thereby the solidification of peace.

In the past year, the Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund (CAAEF) has expanded its loan portfolio in Dushanbe and southern Tajikistan; during FY 1998, CAAEF made eight loans totaling \$730,468 to private businesses in Tajikistan. CAAEF also continues its regular activities in the Khojand area of the Ferghana Valley, which is one of the most dynamic regions for private enterprise growth in Central Asia. As parts of the valley have been untouched by the civil war, the International Executive Service Corps (IESC) will also now concentrate its efforts on the Ferghana Valley.

### **Possible Adjustments to Plans**

The most immediate concern is whether the peace process is successful and internal security improves. USAID closely monitors the situation and adjusts assistance accordingly.

CAAEF has determined that southern Tajikistan is an area ripe with development opportunity; it is considering redirecting up to \$5 million of its regional resources to Tajikistan if the security situation permits.

### **Other Donors Programs**

The World Bank and IMF are directly engaged in private sector development and economic restructuring issues. USAID coordinates closely with these donors and, in some instances directly supports their programs. Two such examples are the recent placement of a privatization advisor in Dushanbe and financial support provided to the World Bank-sponsored Tajik Social Investment Fund for civic projects. The EU and UNDP are also interested in issues of economic reform and rural reconstruction. GTZ and the Asian Development Bank are both commencing legal assistance efforts in Tajikistan, with USAID serving as coordinator. USAID is also working with the Centre for International Legal Cooperation in Leiden, The Netherlands, to develop a multinational program of assistance to Tajikistan in the elaboration and adoption of its proposed Civil Code.

### **Principal Contractors, Grantees and Agencies**

ARD/Checchi does commercial law drafting and implementation, and commercial law training. IESC provides short term technical assistance and consulting services to develop business plans, CAAEF provides loans to small and medium sized private enterprises and takes equity positions in private companies.

## Performance Data Tables

<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:</b> 1.3 Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 7/12/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Tajikistan, USAID/CAR			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> 1.3 Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Increase in Private Sector GDP Market Shares			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Percent  <b>SOURCE:</b> European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> Share of GDP Generated by Private Enterprises  <b>COMMENTS:</b> Targets developed in 1999. 1998 data will be available in summer 1999.	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995	0	15%
	1996	0	20%
	1997	20%	20%
	1998	30%	N/A yet
	1999	50%	
	2000	65%	
	2001	75%	

<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:</b> 1.3 Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 7/12/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Tajikistan, USAID/CAR			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> 1.3.3 Increased Availability of and Access to Capital and Technological Resources for the Private Sector			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Loan and Joint-Venture Funds Invested			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Millions of Dollars  <b>SOURCE:</b> CAAEF Semi-Annual Reports  <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> Dollar Volume of Joint-Venture Funds Invested  <b>COMMENTS:</b> New indicator	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1996	0.00	0.8
	1997	3	1.4
	1998	5	4.4
	1999	7	
	2000	9	
	2001	11	

## *S.O. 1.4: A more competitive and market-responsive private financial sector*

### **Summary**

Tajikistan's financial sector must be restructured if Tajikistan's war-torn economy is to meet the needs of its citizens. For this to happen, it will be necessary to develop a regulatory framework and reporting systems that are broadly applied and can effectively screen out deficient financial institutions. USAID was only able to provide two months of assistance to the banking sector in 1998 before the work was suspended for security reasons. Consequently, USAID has accomplished relatively little.

Financial market professionals are the direct beneficiaries of this work. Indirect beneficiaries include the emerging Tajik entrepreneurs who are in search of financing for their enterprises. All citizens of Tajikistan will eventually benefit from having more secure banks to deposit their savings, allowing expectations of higher standards from increased investment.

### **Key Intermediate Results**

Two intermediate results are necessary to achieve this objective: 1) government regulatory agencies supervise, administer and enforce legislation; and 2) more forms of financial intermediation are institutionalized and effectively supply the private sector on a competitive basis.

### **Performance and Prospects**

Overall progress in achieving this objective in 1998 did not meet expectations. In early 1998, a USAID bank supervision consultant began a long-term assignment with the Tajik Central Bank. Unfortunately, this assignment ended after two months because of security problems. As a result of this brief assistance, however, the Central Bank did begin to put minimum reserve requirements and other prudential standards in place in the banking sector. The most recent estimate is that only one of the five major banks now meets these reserve requirements. Enforcement of bank supervision is weak and the Central Bank lacks adequate staff to exercise effective monitoring.

If security improves, USAID's efforts in FY 2000 will be targeted at the legal regulatory structure of the commercial banking sector. Further goals are: increasing the number and quality of financial services available, improving Central Bank access to information about the banking system and its capability to enforce prudential norms in the financial sector, and the introduction of international accounting standards.

### **Possible Adjustments to Plans**

These activities are currently on hold. If the security situation permits, USAID will consider re-initiating a support program in the banking area. An assessment is currently being undertaken to determine if assistance for financial sector reform could be provided with USAID resources through the World Bank.

### **Other Donor Programs**

USAID has worked closely with the various governmental entities involved in financial sector restructuring. The World Bank and IMF are also directly engaged in this effort, and have recently organized a financial sector restructuring program.

### **Principal Contractors, Grantees and Agencies**

Arthur Andersen performs bank supervision.

### *S.O. 2.1: Increased informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making*

#### **Summary**

Citizen participation in political and economic decision-making is not only a foundation for democracy in Tajikistan, but a cornerstone for building peace in the aftermath of the five year civil war. A return to war may preclude further progress and would likely reverse any democratic gains made to date. Thus, this assistance is closely linked to the process of building lasting peace.

USAID's activities focus on political reconciliation. The upcoming parliamentary elections which will take place in the fall of 1999 will be the first post-conflict elections in Tajikistan. Based on USAID experience, a nation's first post-conflict elections can determine whether that country remains at peace or returns to war. If elections are administered properly and legislation is fair, the results are far more likely to be accepted by all involved parties.

In the area of civil society, USAID supports local NGOs working to rehabilitate the country through the repatriation of refugees, conflict resolution and other activities. The media support program complements the civil society and political process activities by supporting the free flow of information during the elections, and by highlighting to journalists the importance of unbiased and accurate reporting about the peace process. In addition, USAID judicial support aims to bolster rule of law in the war-torn country.

#### **Key Intermediate Results**

Three key intermediate results are necessary to achieve this objective: 1) NGO participation in civil society must be strengthened; 2) information on domestic economic policies and politics must become readily available; and 3) the government must become more responsive and accountable to citizens and citizen organizations.

#### **Performance and Prospects**

Overall progress in achieving this objective in 1998 was on track. However, it must be emphasized that expectations are somewhat lower than elsewhere in the region. Periodic outbreaks of violence between fringe opposition groups contribute to an already de-stabilized security situation in Tajikistan; in this context, any progress made is significant.

Over the last year, all of USAID election-related activities in Tajikistan—voter civic education, electoral legislation reform, election officials training, and voter registration system development—have contributed directly to the peace process. These activities are helping to establish the foundation

for elections that both meet international standards and take a concerted step toward making the peace process succeed. Support goes to the Council for National Reconciliation (CNR) and the Central Election Commission (CEC), to lay the legislative foundation for free and fair elections. USAID is also working to establish a voter registration system to address population shifts which have made the previous system obsolete. Establishing a transparent and non-discriminatory voter registration system reduces the likelihood that losing parties will refuse to accept the results of the elections. In 1999, USAID will mount a nationwide voter education campaign to inform citizens of their electoral rights and responsibilities and educate them about the new Constitutional, electoral, and voter registration frameworks in development. This will allow voters to make more informed decisions on election day. Because ex-combatants, returning refugees, and displaced persons are populations with the greatest potential to make or break the peace, the campaign will target these groups.

Since 1997, the USAID civil society program has been entirely focused on working with NGOs devoted to peace and reconciliation. As a result of this assistance, these NGOs have become more effective advocates, gaining increased contact and receptiveness from governmental bodies. For example, the USAID supported NGO Fidokor has taken a leading role in addressing problems related to the peace process by working with returning refugees on issues of conflict reduction and reconciliation, and collaborates with the CNR on projects related to the reintegration of demobilized soldiers into civilian society. As a result of USAID-financed training with the League of Women Voters of Colorado, the local NGOs Modar and Orzu have begun a series of activities focused on women's participation and political party involvement in the election process. USAID's civil society activities and development activities are coordinated: by assisting indigenous civil society groups to build a sustainable peace while simultaneously supporting organizations to implement small development projects, both sectors are strengthened.

To promote civil society, USAID in cooperation with local NGOs made amendments to the existing Law on Public Associations and contributed to the drafting of a new tax code that includes a tax exemption for passive income non-profit organizations. The government is seeking the assistance of USAID and local NGOs in drafting a new NGO law and a law on charitable organizations.

USAID continues to provide support to independent media. As a result, the average minutes of daily independent news has risen over the last year. Independent media has become more accessible throughout the country as independent stations are opened in almost every region. To improve the quality of news available, USAID sponsors a news exchange. These broadcasts demonstrate an increased willingness among journalists to report on local public policy issues. Over the next year, USAID assistance will be oriented toward supporting the media's role in the upcoming elections.

USAID assistance has supported the fledgling Tajik association of independent broadcasters (ANESMI) with office space and legal advice. This new association has petitioned the Ministry of Communications, the state committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting, and the CNR to issue

broadcasting licenses in a fair and timely manner. Although some issues remain unresolved, most stations have received licenses and are now broadcasting.

### **Possible Adjustments to Plans**

In addition to an increase in election-related assistance this year, USAID anticipates an intensive, strategic focus on conflict crisis management and the peace and reconciliation process. However, the continuation of all USAID efforts depends on the maintenance of internal security and relative peace in the country.

### **Other Donor Programs**

USAID works closely with the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to coordinate election-related assistance, as well as specific collaborative projects. Joint activities include co-sponsoring a Constitutional reform workshop in 1998 and an upcoming election law seminar. The OSCE and UNMOT have indicated a possible interest in providing commodities to support USAID's development of a voter registration system. Other donors, including the European Union and various United Nations agencies, are involved in democracy and peace efforts. Donors meet regularly to discuss areas of common concern, and this coordination will continue. The international community, including USAID, is paying particular attention to the country's all-important first post-conflict elections.

### **Principal Contractors, Grantees and Agencies**

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the American Bar Association/Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI) and Internews are U.S. NGOs at work promoting democratic political processes and freedom of information in Tajikistan. USAID also has a cooperative agreement with the Counterpart Consortium to administer assistance in the sphere of civil society development. ISAR: the Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia, has worked for many years assisting the development of local environmental NGOs.

## Performance Data Tables

<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:</b> 2.1 Increased, better-informed citizens? participation in political and economic decision-making			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 10/1/97		<b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Tajikistan, USAID/CAR	
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> SO 2.1 Increased, better-informed citizens? participation in political and economic decision-making.			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> SO 2.1C: Government responsiveness: % of NGOs receiving positive responses (see Indicator Description) to their contacts with government bodies.			
<p><b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Percent</p> <p><b>SOURCE:</b> Counterpart Consortium data base</p> <p><b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> Percent of sample of NGOs who report attempting to influence government that indicate that officials contacted listened to their positions and appeared interested in understanding their viewpoint, whether or not policy was changed as a result. This indicator is a proxy for acceptance by government of increased citizen/citizen group participation in decision-making.</p> <p><b>COMMENTS:</b> Last year, the wording of this indicator read ?Ratio of number of contacts by NGOs on government decisions that have positive reception to total number of such contacts?. In fact, the indicator measured percentage of NGOs that received such positive responses. Therefore, this year we have changed the wording.</p> <p>* The substantial increase in the results for this indicator are likely due to the increased work USAID/CAR has been doing encouraging NGO advocacy and NGO-government social partnerships on peace process related issues. The social partnership model of advocacy, in particular, appears to be more palatable to government, eliciting more positive response.</p> <p>**Targets have been adjusted upward due to higher results than expected in FY98.</p>	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1997	NA	1%
	1998	5%	10.6%*
	1999	15%**	
	2000	20%	
	2001	25%	

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:** 2.1 Increased, better-informed citizens? participation in political and economic decision-making

**APPROVED:** 10/1/97

**COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** Tajikistan, USAID/CAR

**RESULT NAME:** IR 2.1.1: NGO participation in civil society strengthened.

**INDICATOR:** IR 2.1.1C: NGO advocacy: Increase in number of indigenous NGOs that seek to influence the government or get government support or attention for their activities (advocacy).

**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Number of NGOs

**SOURCE:** Counterpart Consortium data base

**INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:** Number of NGOs that contacted the media or government officials as reported in grant/contract monitoring documents in response to the following questions:

1. Did you have any contacts with media organizations regarding your NGO's work or issues during the past year?
2. Did you have any contacts with government officials regarding your NGO's work or issues during the past year?

**COMMENTS:** Out of 515 NGOs as recorded in Counterpart data base.

\* The significant increase in the results for this indicator are likely due to the increased work USAID/CAR has been doing encouraging NGO advocacy and media outreach as well as NGO-government social partnerships on peace process related issues.

\*\* Targets have been adjusted upward due to higher results than expected in FY98.

YEAR	PLANNED		ACTUAL	
	med	gov	med	gov
1997	NA	NA	9	9
1998	30	25	31*	44*
1999	40	50**		
2000	50	60		
2001	60	70		

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:** 2.1 Increased, better-informed citizens? participation in political and economic decision-making

**APPROVED:** 10/1/97

**COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** Tajikistan, USAID/CAR

**RESULT NAME:** IR 2.1.2: Information on domestic economic policies and politics available

**INDICATOR:** IR 2.1.2B: Increased number of viewers watching independent TV news.

**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Percent

**SOURCE:** Ratings survey by the private polling company.

**INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:** Interviews with a sample of citizens in Dushanbe will produce ratings of TV viewership.

Goals: Increased viewership on independent channels.

**COMMENTS:** This indicator was a new one introduced in the FY 98 R4.

Therefore, the first result has been obtained this year constituting the baseline for the indicator.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
1998 (B)	NA	11.6%
1999	15%	
2000	20%	
2001	25%	

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:** 2.1 Increased, better-informed citizens? participation in political and economic decision-making

**APPROVED:** 10/1/97

**COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** Tajikistan, USAID/CAR

**RESULT NAME:** LLR 2.1.3.2 More genuine and competitive political processes

**INDICATOR:** LLR 2.1.3.2G: Increase in citizen understanding of election procedures and rights.

**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Percent

**SOURCE:** Private survey firm.

**INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:** Public opinion survey will determine percent of population that is aware of basic election procedures and rights.

1. Which of the following organizations have the rights to nominate candidates for the Majlisi Oli?

- a. President
- b. Political Parties
- c. Hakim
- d. Public Associations
- e. Self - nomination
- f. Labor collectives
- g. Election commissions

(more than one choice allowed)

2. Does the election law allow you to cast a ballot in place of your spouse?

- \* Yes
- \* No

3. Candidates are elected to the Majlisi Oli on the basis of :

- \* which ever candidate receives the most votes
- \* which ever candidate receives 50% of the votes
- \* proportional representation

**COMMENTS:**

In the last R4, this indicator was at IR level. Whilst reviewing SO 2.1 Results Framework this year, we decided that this indicator is more appropriate for measuring LLR 2.1.3.2 ?More genuine and competitive political processes?, since it is more narrow and better measures the progress towards this LLR. Therefore, the indicator was moved to Low Level Result.

\*FY96 results are from a previous IFES survey which asked generally about citizens? knowledge of electoral procedures.

\*\*FY97 data on the questions above was not available because survey was not implemented that year.

\*\*\* The better than expected performance resulted from an increase in IFES activity.

\*\*\*\* Targets have been adjusted upward due to higher results than expected in FY98.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
1996	NA	19%*
1997	NA	**
1998	30%	45.4%***
1999	50%****	
2000	55%	
2001	60%	

### *S.O. 3.1 Reduced suffering and crisis impact*

#### **Summary**

Tajikistan has experienced five years of civil war between regional and ideological factions, a war which left 50,000 dead and 700,000 displaced along with a legacy of animosity and hatred. This objective aims to reduce suffering and the impact of two parallel crises: the civil war and the economic upheaval of transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy. However, there has been a conscious programmatic shift from strictly humanitarian assistance towards assistance which also promotes economic growth as opportunities for longer-term development emerge.

In June 1997, the Government of Tajikistan and key opposition leaders signed a peace accord and it seemed that the country had at last established the basis for genuine peace. A number of violent incidents combined with setbacks in implementation of the 1997 Peace Accords slowed USAID assistance. The closing of the U.S. embassy in Dushanbe and the withdrawal of all U.S. citizens compounded the problem.

Given the situation, support for the peace and reconciliation process has assumed utmost priority for USAID. Support to peacemaking is expected to lead to national reconciliation, reduction in the number of armed former combatants and reintegration of ex-combatants into society. Three quarters of the available development resources in 1998 were directed towards this end. This is expected to result in an improved capability to build an environment for peace at both the national and community level. USAID will introduce the communities most impacted by civil unrest to methods of reconciliation and reconstruction and provide support at the national level to peacemaking initiatives. Simultaneous support will provide tools for longer-term development initiatives. These activities will address specific development constraints in areas of health, family planning and income generation. Direct beneficiaries of this assistance are the communities impacted by the civil war, former soldiers who have elected to become engaged in implementing the peace agreements, and those displaced refugees who elect to resettle in designated areas.

#### **Key Intermediate Results**

Two key intermediate results were deemed critical to achieving this objective: 1) improvement in peace-keeping capabilities, and 2) the introduction of development-oriented programs wherever possible.

#### **Performance and Prospects**

Overall progress in achieving this objective in 1998 was on track. USAID support has provided the resources so that the two sides can meet and monitor implementation of the peace accords. A USAID grant to the United Nations Military Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) resulted in more effective cooperation among the co-chairmen of the Commission of National Reconciliation. Refugees have been successfully returned to their homes under terms of the peace agreement.

USAID's grant to the International Organization of Migration (IOM) assists in the implementation of social programs to assist ex-combatants with reintegration. A grant to Counterpart Consortium introduces reconciliation and peaceful resolution of conflict into school curricula and provides a program of teaching reconciliation to teachers. These activities all promoted an environment in which peaceful reconciliation of differences can be resolved. Despite these constructive activities, certain important terms of the Peace Accords have not been successfully implemented. There has not been sufficient integration of former United Tajik Opposition (UTO) fighters into the government power structure, total disarmament has not taken place, and violations of military protocol involving armed clashes between former UTO commanders continue. Although elections have been scheduled in 1999, there is still no agreement between the government and opposition about amendments to the constitution nor to details of a law governing political parties.

Reorienting initial humanitarian assistance towards economic development has achieved increasingly successful results. A USAID-supported small loans for farmers permit loan repayment in-kind directly to local institutions such as hospitals and orphanages, thereby benefitting both farmers and vulnerable service groups. Other assistance has improved access to basic health services for 260,000 people, and established 62 village health committees covering approximately 85,000 beneficiaries. A revolving pharmaceutical fund established with USAID support enabled 17,000 patients to purchase or receive needed medications. USAID also supported UNDP/UNOPS activities, particularly a rural reconstruction project for war-affected areas. In 1998, USAID initiated assistance of an Aga Khan Foundation project to support the establishment of private farms in one war-affected area and promote community-based peace and confidence-building measures in the Gharm region. Additional assistance went to the World Bank for their Poverty Alleviation Project which improves access to social and economic services.

In the coming year, USAID will be making additional grants to U.S. partners and other international organizations for activities which promote the peace process, increase income, and create opportunities for the development of indigenous organizations. Special consideration will be given to programs targeted at vulnerable demographic groups such as children, female heads of households and the elderly.

### **Possible Adjustments to Plans**

Recent events in Tajikistan prove that the situation remains fragile. USAID needs to remain flexible in order to respond to changing circumstances, responding to funding opportunities when they arise. This may involve partnerships with international organizations and other non-traditional partners as well as with U.S. PVO partners. It is expected that assistance through the year 2000 will continue to focus on socioeconomic and social development activities which support both the peace and reconciliation process and longer-term development.

## **Other Donor Programs**

Donor coordination in Tajikistan is excellent; it is regarded as among the most effective in the former Soviet Union. Various donor groups meet weekly to discuss programs and exchange information on important developments and security issues affecting Tajikistan. Lead organizations include the United Nations (UNDP/UNOPS, UNICEF, WHO, WFP, UNMOT), bilateral donors including various European organizations, and a variety of American and international PVOs. Both the World Bank and the UNDP support initiatives that rely largely on local and foreign non-governmental organizations to deliver badly needed goods and services to many areas of Tajikistan.

### **Principal Contractors, Grantees and Agencies**

Groups that have received USAID funds to support the peace process and reduce suffering are: International Organization of Migration, CARE International, UNDP/UNOPS, Counterpart Consortium, Mercy Corps International, Save the Children - USA, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

## Performance Data Tables

<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:</b> 3.1 Reduced Human Suffering and Impact of Crisis			
<b>APPROVED:</b>		<b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Tajikistan, USAID/CAR	
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> Development oriented interventions to reduce suffering			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Percentage of ?Reduced Human Suffering and Crises Impact? resources implementing reconciliation programs			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Percent  <b>SOURCE:</b> USAID records  <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> Dollar volume of USAID assistance with peace keeping component as a percent of total 3.1 assistance in Tajikistan  <b>COMMENTS:</b> This is an input indicator, rather than a measurement of results. It reflects the changing nature of the situation in Tajikistan. USAID/CAR does not have necessary and sufficient resources to achieve a strategic objective. However, strategic and political concerns require USAID to remain engaged in this effort.	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1997 (B) 10%	50%	50%
	1998 50%	70%	70%
	1999 70%	80%	

#### *4.1: Special Initiatives: Preventive care services made available.*

### **Summary**

The civil war in Tajikistan dramatically disrupted the health care system, causing a deterioration in quality and access to health care services and a greater risk of epidemics. USAID support to reproductive health, infectious diseases and medical partnerships has been limited due to the difficult working environment, although some projects continue. Through a community-based approach, USAID is working to improve the availability and accessibility of reproductive health services in the Vose district of Tajikistan. A medical partnership program between the Dushanbe and Boulder provides technical skills transfer and institutional building. Emphasis in infectious disease control is on improving the system for treatment and prevention of water-borne diseases. Primary beneficiaries are the citizens of Tajikistan in the pilot areas, particularly the segments of the population most vulnerable to disease? children and the elderly.

### **Performance and Prospects**

Overall progress in achieving this objective in 1998 did not meet expectations. Despite the political instability, limited success in the area of family planning was achieved through a project wherein village health committees were established to provide information on family planning. Forty village pharmacies are now distributing contraceptives in collaboration with the Ministry of Health. Prospects for continuing USAID's assistance in the health sector through locally established U.S. PVOs are good. Therefore, USAID plans to channel resources to implement reproductive health and infectious disease control through PVOs already operating in Tajikistan.

The medical partnership program was constrained by the inability of U.S. partners to visit Dushanbe. If security permits, continuation of the Boulder-Dushanbe partnership is promising; both parties are extremely committed to the initial work begun under this program. In the meantime, the health partnership program will focus on training Tajik health professionals outside Dushanbe, possibly in Boulder.

Tajikistan is prone to water-borne infectious diseases, a problem exacerbated by the civil war. In the absence of external technical assistance through CDC, training courses in hepatitis laboratory diagnostics have updated the knowledge of local medical professionals. Prospects for further training in hepatitis surveillance exist outside of Tajikistan. In April 1999, a workshop on hepatitis surveillance will be held in Bishkek, where a hepatitis training plan for Tajikistan will be developed. There are also plans to train at least five laboratory technicians in smear microscopy, which will improve the standards of the current system.

### **Possible Adjustments to Plans**

If peace is secured in Tajikistan, USAID will assess how to integrate health initiatives in to the overall health reform project currently being discussed by the government and the World Bank.

## **Other Donor Programs**

UN Population Fund, UNICEF and WHO are key donors in the health sector. The World Bank is negotiating a health sector loan, which will open up opportunities for restructuring the current health care system. While the UN Population Fund is providing contraceptives on a humanitarian basis, problems with logistics and distribution continue. UNICEF provides support in areas of safe motherhood, immunizations and prevention of anemia. WHO is collaborating with USAID to address infectious diseases.

## **Principal Contractors, Grantees, and Agencies**

Alliance for International Health supports partnerships. Save the Children implements USAID special health initiatives in infectious disease and reproductive health.

#### *4.2: Special Initiatives: Cross-cutting programs*

USAID's Participant Training Project provides short-term third-country and in-country training in the areas of economic reforms, civil society development, judicial development, health care reform and the peace building process. Training programs in Tajikistan are also designed to support a stable, moderate and democratic government committed to peaceful solutions to the nation's problems. Tajikistan citizens from both the government and private sector participated in specially designed courses in the United States and in the Central Asia region. The trained individuals will form an important resource for economic restructuring once political consensus is reached and national reconciliation leads to stabilization in Tajikistan. The Training Project draws on technical expertise of USAID contractors in the region to deliver short-term training in a variety of formats: seminars, workshops, on-the-job training, internships, progressive modules, tiered training, observation and study tours, programmed learning and conferences. More than 300 Tajik citizens, of whom 104 were women, were trained through USAID supported training programs in FY 1998.

There are four unique features of the project in Tajikistan: significant cross-border training; a highly active bi-weekly Speaker series; the Business Initiative center, and the thematic emphasis on supporting the peace process. The cross-border training uses successful experiences in one country as the training context for another country. This method has been especially useful in the past year, when it has often been easier to bring trainees out of Tajikistan than to send trainers in. One particularly successful example was the Family Health Practices training for Tajiks conducted in Kyrgyzstan. The same model was used for Law Library and Judicial training related to democratic transitions, Treasury Bill training for fiscal reform, and NGO Development training.

The bi-weekly Speaker Series promotes active alumni involvement, extending and enhancing the impact of the initial training by having alumni reteach material to a broader audience in their workplace. The project actively solicited topics for follow-on or supplemental training for alumni and their colleagues. The Business Initiative Center, a locally registered organization originally funded by USAID, is the prime mobilizing agent to keep alumni involved. It rents venue for training, offers equipment support to alumni, provides business development services, and conducts business courses. Training Project support to the peace process stemmed from the strategic planning process which emphasized assistance that included coalition building, power sharing, demobilization, refugee health and legal rights.

## FY 1999 Budget Request by Program/Country

13-May-99  
01:47 PM

Program/Country: TAJIKISTAN  
Approp Acct:  
Scenario

S.O. # , Title		FY 1999 Request												Est. S.O. Expenditures	Est. S.O. Pipeline End of FY 99
Bilateral/Field Spt	Total	Micro-Enterprise	Agriculture	Other Economic Growth	Children's Basic Education (*)	Other HCD	Population	Child Survival (*)	Infectious Diseases (*)	HIV/AIDS (*)	Other Health	Environ	D/G		
<b>SO 1.3: Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises</b>															
Bilateral	650,000			650,000										455,000	195,000
Field Spt	0														
	650,000	0	0	650,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	455,000	195,000
<b>SO 1.3: Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund</b>															
Bilateral	1,000,000			1,000,000										700,000	300,000
Field Spt	0														
	1,000,000	0	0	1,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	700,000	300,000
<b>SO 1.4: A More Competitive and Market-Responsive Private Financial Sector</b>															
Bilateral														0	0
Field Spt	0														
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>SO 2.1: Increased, Better-Informed Citizens' Participation in Political and Economic Decision-Making</b>															
Bilateral	1,810,000													1,810,000	1,267,000
Field Spt	0														
	1,810,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,810,000	1,267,000	543,000
<b>SO 3.1: Human Suffering and Negative Consequences of Crisis are Reduced</b>															
Bilateral	2,790,000													2,790,000	1,953,000
Field Spt	0														
	2,790,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,790,000	0	0	0	1,953,000	837,000

<b>SO 4.1: Health Earmarks</b>															
Bilateral	800,000						100000		200000		500,000			560000	240000
Field Spt	0														
	800,000	0	0	0	0	0	100,000	0	200,000	0	500,000	0	0	560,000	240,000
<b>SO 4.1: Transfers and Allocations</b>															
Bilateral	2,720,000			120000			2000000						600,000	1904000	816000
Field Spt	0														
	2,720,000	0	0	120,000	0	2,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	600,000	1,904,000	816,000
<b>SO 4.2: Exchanges and Training (Global Training Project)</b>															
Bilateral	1,800,000			500000			300000				400,000	300000	300,000	1260000	540000
Field Spt	0														
	1,800,000	0	0	500,000	0	300,000	0	0	0	0	400,000	300,000	300,000	1,260,000	540,000
<b>SO 4.2: Eurasia Foundation</b>															
Bilateral	0													0	0
Field Spt	0													0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>SO 4.2: Special Initiatives (PD&amp;S)</b>															
Bilateral	300,000			99000							81,000	60000	60,000	210000	90000
Field Spt	0														
	300,000	0	0	99,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	81,000	60,000	60,000	210,000	90,000
<b>Total Bilateral</b>	11,870,000	0	0	1,869,000	0	2,000,000	100,000	0	200,000	0	3,771,000	60,000	#VALUE!	7,049,000	3,021,000
<b>Total Field Support</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	#VALUE!	0	0
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM</b>	11,870,000	0	0	1,869,000	0	2,000,000	100,000	0	200,000	0	3,771,000	60,000	2,770,000	7,049,000	3,021,000

<b>FY 99 Request Agency Goal Totals</b>	
Econ Growth	1,869,000
Democracy	2,770,000
HCD	2,000,000
PHN	6,071,000
Environment	60,000
Program ICASS	0
GCC (from all Goals)	0

<b>FY 99 Account Distribution (DA only)</b>	
Dev. Assist Program	11870000
Dev. Assist ICASS	
Dev. Assist Total:	11870000
CSD Program	0
CSD ICASS	
CSD Total:	0

## FY 2000 Budget Request by Program/Country

13-May-99  
01:47 PM

Program/Country: TAJIKISTAN  
Approp Acct:  
Scenario

S.O. # , Title		FY 2000 Request													Est. S.O. Expenditures	Est. S.O. Pipeline End of FY 00
Bilateral/Field Spt	Total	Micro-Enterprise	Agri-culture	Other Economic Growth	Children's Basic Education (*)	Other HCD	Population	Child Survival (*)	Infectious Diseases (*)	HIV/AIDS (*)	Other Health	Environ	D/G			
SO 1.3: Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises															Final Obligation: 2006	
Bilateral	800,000			800000										560000	240000	
Field Spt	0															
	800,000	0	0	800,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	560,000	240,000	
SO 1.3: Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund															Final Obligation: 2003	
Bilateral	1,000,000			1000000										700000	300000	
Field Spt	0															
	1,000,000	0	0	1,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	700,000	300,000	
SO 1.4: A More Competitive and Market-Responsive Private Financial Sector															Final Obligation: 2003	
Bilateral	700,000			700000										490000	210000	
Field Spt	0															
	700,000	0	0	700,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	490,000	210,000	
SO 2.1: Increased, Better-Informed Citizens' Participation in Political and Economic Decision-Making															Final Obligation: 2002	
Bilateral	1,500,000												1,500,000	1050000	450000	
Field Spt	0															
	1,500,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,500,000	1,050,000	450,000	
SO 3.1: Human Suffering and Negative Consequences of Crisis are Reduced															Final Obligation: 2002	
Bilateral	4,000,000										4,000,000			2800000	1200000	
Field Spt	0															
	4,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,000,000	0	0	2,800,000	1,200,000	

SO 4.1: Health Earmarks														Final Obligation: N/A	
Bilateral	1,000,000						400000		400000		200,000			700000	300000
Field Spt	0														
	1,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	400,000	0	400,000	0	200,000	0	0	700,000	300,000
SO 4.1: Transfers and Allocations														Final Obligation: N/A	
Bilateral	3,750,000													n/a	n/a
Field Spt	0													n/a	n/a
	3,750,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	n/a	n/a
SO 4.2: Exchanges and Training (Global Training Project)														Final Obligation: 2006	
Bilateral	1,000,000			270000			170000				220,000	170000	170,000	700000	300000
Field Spt	0														
	1,000,000	0	0	270,000	0	170,000	0	0	0	0	220,000	170,000	170,000	700,000	300,000
SO 4.2: Eurasia Foundation														Final Obligation: N/A	
Bilateral	500,000	100000											400,000	350000	150000
Field Spt	0														
	500,000	100,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	400,000	350,000	150,000
SO 4.2: Special Initiatives (PD&S)														Final Obligation: N/A	
Bilateral	500,000			165000							135,000	100000	100,000	350000	150000
Field Spt	0														
	500,000	0	0	165,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	135,000	100,000	100,000	350,000	150,000
Total Bilateral	14,750,000	100,000	0	2,935,000	0	170,000	400,000	0	400,000	0	4,555,000	270,000	#VALUE!	#VALUE!	#VALUE!
Total Field Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	#VALUE!	0	0
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM</b>	<b>14,750,000</b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,935,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>170,000</b>	<b>400,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>400,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4,555,000</b>	<b>270,000</b>	<b>2,170,000</b>	<b>#VALUE!</b>	<b>#VALUE!</b>

<b>FY 00 Request Agency Goal Totals</b>	
Econ Growth	3,035,000
Democracy	2,170,000
HCD	170,000
PHN	5,525,000
Environment	270,000
Program ICASS	0
<b>GCC (from all Goals)</b>	<b>0</b>

<b>FY 00 Account Distribution (DA only)</b>	
Dev. Assist Program	14750000
Dev. Assist ICASS	
<b>Dev. Assist Total:</b>	<b>14750000</b>
CSD Program	0
CSD ICASS	
<b>CSD Total:</b>	<b>0</b>

## FY 2001 Budget Request by Program/Country

13-May-99

Program/Country:  
Approp Acct:  
Scenario

Tajikistan

01:47 PM

S.O. # , Title		FY 20001 Request													Est. S.O. Expenditures	Est. S.O. Pipeline End of FY 01	Future Cost (POST-2001)
Bilateral/Field Spt	Total	Micro-Enterprise	Agri-culture	Other Economic Growth	Children's Basic Education (*)	Other HCD	Population	Child Survival (*)	Infectious Diseases (*)	HIV/AIDS (*)	Other Health	Environ	D/G				
SO 1.3: Accelerated Development and Growth of Private Enterprises													Final Obligation: 2006				
Bilateral	800,000			800000										560000	240000	9000000	
Field Spt	0													0	0	0	
	800,000	0	0	800,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	560,000	240,000	9,000,000	
SO 1.3: Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund													Final Obligation: 2003				
Bilateral	1,000,000			1000000									0	700000	300000	N/A	
Field Spt	0												0	0	0	0	
	1,000,000	0	0	1,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	700,000	300,000	0	
SO 1.4: A More Competitive and Market-Responsive Private Financial Sector													Final Obligation: 2003				
Bilateral	700,000			700000									0	490000	210000	1190000	
Field Spt	0												0	0	0	0	
	700,000	0	0	700,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	490,000	210,000	1,190,000	
SO 2.1: Increased, Better-Informed Citizens' Participation in Political and Economic Decision-Making													Final Obligation: 2002				
Bilateral	1,500,000												1,500,000	1050000	450000	3599500	
Field Spt	0												0	0	0	0	
	1,500,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,500,000	1,050,000	450,000	3,599,500	
SO 3.1: Human Suffering and Negative Consequences of Crisis are Reduced													Final Obligation: 2002				
Bilateral	4,000,000												4,000,000	2800000	1200000	9000000	
Field Spt	0												0	0	0	0	
	4,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,000,000	2,800,000	1,200,000	9,000,000	

SO 4.1: Health Earmarks														Final Obligation: N/A		
Bilateral	1,000,000						200000		100000		700,000		0	700000	300000	N/A
Field Spt	0															
	1,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	200,000	0	100,000	0	700,000	0	0	700,000	300,000	N/A
SO 4.1: Transfers and Allocations														Final Obligation: N/A		
Bilateral	3,000,000												0	2100000		N/A
Field Spt	0															
	3,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,100,000		N/A
SO 4.2: Exchanges and Training (Global Training Project)														Final Obligation: 2006		
Bilateral	1,000,000			270000			170000				220,000	170000	170,000	700000	300000	2500000
Field Spt	0															
	1,000,000	0	0	270,000	0	170,000	0	0	0	0	220,000	170,000	170,000	700,000	300,000	2,500,000
SO 4.2: Eurasia Foundation														Final Obligation: N/A		
Bilateral	500,000	100000											400,000	350000	150000	N/A
Field Spt	0															
	500,000	100,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	400,000	350,000	150,000	N/A
SO 4.2: Special Initiatives (PD&S)														Final Obligation: N/A		
Bilateral	500,000			165000							135,000	100000	100,000	350000	150000	N/A
Field Spt	0															
	500,000	0	0	165,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	135,000	100,000	100,000	350,000	150,000	N/A
Total Bilateral	14,000,000	100000	0	2,935,000	0	170,000	200,000	0	100,000	0	5,055,000	270,000	2,170,000	9,800,000	3,300,000	25,289,500
Total Field Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM</b>	14,000,000	100,000	0	2,935,000	0	170,000	200,000	0	100,000	0	5,055,000	270,000	2,170,000	9,800,000	3,300,000	25,289,500

<b>FY 01 Request Agency Goal Totals</b>	
Econ Growth	3,035,000
Democracy	2,170,000
HCD	170,000
PHN	5,525,000
Environment	270,000
Program ICASS	0
GCC (from all Goals)	0

<b>FY 01 Account Distribution (DA only)</b>	
Dev. Assist Program	14000000
Dev. Assist ICASS	
<b>Dev. Assist Total:</b>	<b>14000000</b>
CSD Program	0
CSD ICASS	
<b>CSD Total:</b>	<b>0</b>

MISSION WORKSHEET

Last edit: 17-Mar-99

US ASSISTANCE TO TAJ (FY'99 PROGRAM BUDGET)-TAJKISTAN - USAID / CAR

(rounded amounts by '000)

in US dollar:

OFFICE	PROJ. No	S.O.	PROJECT COMPONENT	Budget						Obligation Location	FY 2000 CP	Remarks		
				FY98 C/O			FY99 OYB							
				Actual	Change	Total	Proposed	Changes	Total					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13		
OST	110-0001		<b>Special Initiatives</b>											
		3.1	<b>Emergency Human. Assistance</b>	1,656,000		1,656,000	2,790,000			2,790,000		4,000,000		
			IOM	60,000		60,000					MACS			
			CARE	295,000		295,000					MACS			
			TBD carry over	375,000		375,000					MACS			
			UNDP / UNOPS carry over	345,000		345,000					MACS			
			Counterpart - Peace process	60,000		60,000					MACS			
			Peace Process - TBD	496,000		496,000					MACS			
			Program Design and Support	25,000		25,000					MACS			
			TBD - New RFA				2,790,000	(90,000)	2,700,000	MACS			FY99OYB 02/19	
			Program Design and Support					90,000	90,000					FY99OYB 02/19
		3.1	<b>Other Emergencies</b>	1,000,000		1,000,000								
			MCI	700,000		700,000					MACS			
			IFRC	300,000		300,000					MACS			
PPS		4.2	<b>Program Design &amp; Support</b>				300,000		300,000	MACS	500,000			
			<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>2,656,000</b>		<b>2,656,000</b>	<b>3,090,000</b>		<b>3,090,000</b>		<b>4,500,000</b>			
OST	110-0004		<b>Health Care</b>											
		4.1	<b>Medical Partnerships</b>				500,000		500,000		1,000,000			
			AIHA				500,000		500,000	NMS				
		4.1	<b>Vaccine &amp; Pharmaceutical Security</b>	100,000		100,000	200,000		200,000					
			Save the Children				200,000		200,000	MACS				
			TBD	100,000		100,000				MACS				
		4.1	<b>Women's Health/Family Planning</b>				100,000		100,000					
			Save the Children				100,000		100,000	MACS				
			<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>100,000</b>		<b>100,000</b>	<b>800,000</b>		<b>800,000</b>		<b>1,000,000</b>			

## **Updated Results Framework**

### **SO 1.3 Accelerated development & growth of private enterprises.**

IR 1.3.1 Improved operating environment for private sector growth.

IR 1.3.1.1 Improved policies, laws and regulations in place to ensure competition and allow for easy market entry and exit.

IR 1.3.1.2 Administrative agencies strengthened to enforce policies, laws and regulations.

IR 1.3.1.3 Business and business advocacy groups strengthened.

IR 1.3.1.4 Government of Tajikistan complied with the international financial institutions' conditions.

IR 1.3.2 Human resources improved to function in a market economy.

IR 1.3.3 Increased availability of and access to capital and technological resources for the private sector.

### **SO 1.4 A more competitive and market-responsive private financial sector.**

IR1.4.1 Government regulatory agencies supervise, administer and enforce legislation.

IR1.4.1.1 Legal structure required for efficient operation of financial markets is defined and adopted.

IR1.4.1.2 Regulatory framework and reporting systems are broadly applied to effectively screen out deficient institutions.

IR1.4.2 More forms of financial intermediation are institutionalized and effectively supply the private sector on a competitive basis.

### **SO 2.1 Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making.**

IR 2.1.1 NGO participation in civil society strengthened.

LLR 2.1.1.1 Strengthened quality of NGO capacity.

LLR 2.1.1.2 Strengthened sustainability of NGOs.

LLR 2.1.1.3 Improved laws/policies enabling NGO formation and operation.

IR 2.1.2 Information on domestic economic policies and politics available.

LLR 2.1.2.1 Domestic news widely available via electronic media.

LLR 2.1.2.2 Increased quality of independent electronic media.

IR 2.1.3 Increased responsiveness and accountability of Tajikistan Government to citizens and citizens' organizations.

LLR 2.1.3.1 Increased government transparency and accountability to citizens and NGOs.

LLR 2.1.3.2 More genuine and competitive political processes.

LLR 2.1.3.3 More effective and independent elected officials.

**S.O. 3.1 Reduced human suffering and crisis impact.**

IR 3.1.1 Peace-keeping capabilities improved.

IR 3.1.2 Development programs introduced.

LLR 3.1.2.1 Provide flexible response mechanism to initiate pilot programs that reduce human suffering.

## **Evaluation Agenda**

### **GAO Audit December 1998**

#### **SO 1.3 (Market Transition - Private Enterprise Growth)**

Privatization Assessment, May 1998

#### **SO 2.1 (Democratic Transition)**

IFES Evaluation anticipated in 1999

Review of Internews conducted by P. Graves, ENI/DG, January 1998

Participatory Evaluation of the Counterpart Consortium Cooperative Agreement, December 1996

## **IV. APPENDICES**

### **Appendix A: Glossary of Acronyms**

ABA/CEELI - American Bar Association/ Central and East European Law Initiative  
ANESMI - Association for Independent Electronic Mass Media  
ARD/CHECCI - Associates in Rural Development  
CAAEF - Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund  
CAR - Central Asian Region  
CDC - Centers for Disease Prevention & Control  
CEC - Central Election Commission  
CNR - Council for National Reconciliation  
ENI - Bureau for Europe and the New Independent States  
ESAF - Extended Structural Adjustment Facility  
EU - European Union  
FSN - Foreign Service National  
FY - Fiscal Year  
GDP - Gross Domestic Product  
GTZ - German Agency for Technical Cooperation  
IESC - International Executive Service Corps  
IFES - International Foundation for Electoral Systems  
IFI - International Financial Institution  
IMF - International Monetary Fund  
IOM - International Organization of Migration  
ISAR - Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia  
LLR - Low Level Result  
NGO - Non-governmental organization  
OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
PVO - Private Voluntary Organization  
R4 - Results, Review and Resource Request  
SME - Small and Medium-sized Enterprises  
S.O. - Strategic Objectives  
UN - United Nations  
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme  
UNHCR - United Nations Commissioner for Refugees  
UNICEF - United Nations Children Fund  
UNMOT - United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan  
UTO - United Tajik Opposition  
USAID - United States Agency for International Development  
USAID/CAR - USAID/Central Asian Region  
WFP - World Food Program  
WHO - World Health Organization