



Civic Initiatives  
Program for  
Democratic and  
Economic Reform  
in Russia (CIP)

**Mid-Term Evaluation Final  
Report**

Submitted to: USAID/Russia

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# Civic Initiatives Program for Democratic and Economic Reform in Russia (CIP)

## Mid-Term Evaluation Final Report

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# Executive Summary

## Background

The non-governmental organization (NGO) movement is becoming a major factor in the post-Communist social and political development in Russia. Government can no longer provide many of the social services the public expects and has turned to the NGO community as a substitute. At the same time, citizens are beginning to see the possibilities through their own organizations to play a more active role in addressing local and, to a more limited extent, national social and political problems.

USAID developed the Civic Initiatives Program (CIP) as a continuation of an effort to strengthen the NGO sector in order to promote and assist the development of a democratic society “with the aim of strengthening [NGOs] as sustainable institutions with the ability to participate in democratic and economic reforms.” In March 1995, this program became the Civic Initiatives Program for Democratic and Economic Reform in Russia with the objective of finding “innovative ways that the program could support NGO and citizen initiatives in democratic and economic processes (Scope of Work, Mid-Term Evaluation).”

In September 1994, USAID awarded a grant to Save the Children (Cooperative Agreement #110-0007-G-00-4046-00) to establish a consortium to implement the program with the Johns Hopkins University, Educational Development Center, Counterpart Foundation, Center for Democracy, and ORT/Russia. They form the Technical Units in Moscow to provide primarily a range of training support to NGOs, with some technical assistance consultation. Two regional NGO support centers were established: Novosibirsk (Siberia) and Krasnodar (Southern Russia). These centers are coordinated by the Fund for Democracy/ECHO and the Citizens’ Network for Foreign Affairs, respectively. CIP/Moscow supports NGOs in Central Russia.

The mid-term evaluation of the CIP project took place between June 17 and July 6, 1996. A team of four Datex evaluators visited both regional centers as well as the project offices in Moscow. They met with the relevant staff members of USAID, the CIP Consortium members, training and technical assistance groups and consultants supporting the CIP project, and a large number of NGOs that have participated in CIP activities, including those groups that have been recipients of CIP grants and those currently being considered for these grants. The team also met some local government officials in the Office of the Mayor of Moscow, and in Novosibirsk and Krasnodar.

## Major Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

### Purpose and Objectives of CIP

The CIP activities have been successful in training a large number of new as well as existing NGOs in organizational development in such areas as management, fundraising, computer literacy, planning, and public relations. The recipients have expressed their satisfaction and are pleased with this training. However, the evaluation argues that this organizational training, responding to a need to strengthen the capacities of NGOs to strategize, plan, attract new members, publicize their activities, and manage personnel and funds, has developed the organizational skills of the NGOs but

not their abilities to plan, design, implement, manage, and evaluate their social service and civic action programs for which they were established. "Civic action" is defined here as planned activities of organized groups of citizens, often in collaboration with other citizens and public and private institutions, agencies, and organizations, including government and business, to educate and mobilize members of the community to solve a problem of priority concern to them. The evaluation team believes that developing expert skills to plan, design, implement, manage, and evaluate successful civic action programs should have been included in the definition of "strengthening the NGO sector" and are critical to achieving the fundamental objectives of the Civic Initiatives Program.

Most of the NGOs interviewed believed that the training they received was all the training they needed, fully addressing all the skills required to make them successful, sustainable organizations. NGO members equated training in fundraising with creating successful NGOs, rather than setting up successful service programs that benefit the constituents of the NGOs and their communities. They do not necessarily understand that program successes will attract members and are a better predictor of sustainability than fundraising and media skills alone.

Therefore, the evaluation team concluded that while the original strategic objectives of USAID are still valid and should guide the CIP project, i.e., "to facilitate the participation of NGO and other citizen initiatives in democratic and economic reform processes" with assistance from the Consortium to provide "innovative ways that the program could support NGO and citizen initiatives in democratic and economic processes," even so the objectives and programs for the second phase of the project need to be rearticulated and programs redefined by USAID to focus on training and technical assistance to NGOs to help them develop the capability to organize successful civic action programs for their constituent members and communities. Training and technical assistance in organizational development and in processes for successful civic action programs should constitute a fuller definition of "strengthening the NGO sector."

This recommendation is based on the conclusion that successful provision of both social services that would otherwise not be available and public education and mobilization of citizens to participate in democratic processes of local governance are vital and necessary to the sustainability of these NGOs. More than anything else, the successes of NGOs in achieving their mission will assure the continued interest and support of those citizens and community institutions that benefit from their actions. Achieving their mission is the very reason for the creation of the NGOs and the support CIP gives to them must ultimately contribute to their successful achievements. As important as organizational development is to the establishment and management of an NGO, its ability to successfully deliver the product implied by its mission is the over-arching reason for its existence. The skills to do so are not as yet a substantive part of the CIP training and technical assistance agenda.

To achieve successful civic action programs, citizens must be experts in both the issues that they are facing and in the process of developing civic action programs. However, to provide relevant and expert training and technical assistance, the management, technical units, and regional center staffs of CIP must first themselves develop expertise in those very skills needed by their NGO clients -- or must develop skills in and systems for identifying and employing expert trainers and technical advisors in response to the needs of their clients. It is only through the development of both expert

organizational and civic action skills that CIP's NGO clients will achieve USAID's goal of a "vibrant and viable NGO community" in Russia.

### **Strategic Design and Implementation**

The evaluation proposes that a regionally based NGO "hub" model be the vehicle for the development of the second phase of the CIP project, that is, the regional centers in Novosibirsk, Krasnodar, and a third that should be established in Moscow for Central Russia. These will provide support training and technical assistance to their "filial centers" in the region and to key NGOs that have active linkages to other NGOs with similar missions. Similarly, the filial centers and these key NGO hubs, in their turn, will support other NGOs.

The regional centers will be responsible for developing the skill training and technical assistance focussing on civic action, as well as continued support for organizational development activities with the support from CIP/Moscow and local, national, and international trainers and technical experts.

The evaluation team proposes that each regional center hire two to three trainers selected from the TOT program and recommended by JHU and the directors of the regional centers, and trained to expert levels in both training and civic action process skills. They will be responsible for providing, directly and indirectly, the training and technical assistance required to support the focus on developing the capabilities of NGOs to successfully implement their civic action programs.

To accomplish this proposed focus on civic action and the development of the training and technical assistance support hubs, the evaluation team recommends that USAID extend support to the regional centers and to a core technical support group in CIP Moscow for an additional year beyond the current end of project date of September 1997, setting the new completion date at September 1998.

### **CIP Management and the Restructuring of the Consortium**

The current consortium model is not providing adequate program and management support to CIP. Because of lack of internal clarity in project objectives, a less than optimal management system, personnel difficulties, competitive institutional agendas, and lack of coordinated and cooperative development and delivery of training programs, the Consortium, as it exists today, is not providing the technical and administrative support CIP requires.

The evaluation team strongly recommends an immediate effort to assess the relevance and impact of the existing training programs, client needs, the quality of training performance, the needs for and current levels of technical assistance, and the abilities of the members of the Consortium to provide expert training and technical assistance for civic action. CIP must benefit from a highly professional needs assessment in each region so that it can establish a program of training and technical assistance that will respond to the needs of NGOs for expert skills and performance levels. This assessment will also establish the levels of skills required for trainers and technical advisors.

CIP must move to restructure the Consortium to eliminate costly redundancies in management, program resources and program responsibilities; remove internal conflicts between members; and establish higher professional standards for the performance of its members. The evaluation team

recommends that all components of the technical units and the regional centers be regrouped and restructured as a “*training and technical assistance support group*,” reporting directly to Save the Children. At the same time, Save the Children must carefully reassess the skills and resources that each current member of the Consortium can bring to implementing a focus on civic action and terminate any relationships that are unable to provide appropriate professional resources. To establish a more effective management system, USAID, Save the Children and the technical units should thoroughly reassess the value of the Consortium model to CIP and consider replacing it with some type of more conventional “prime and sub-contractor” model. The CIP Consortium model has only been moderately effective in determining and responding to the needs of the regional centers or the NGO sector as a whole.

Unless the current communication and collaboration issues between the principal members of the Consortium -- Save the Children and Counterpart -- are resolved, and Save the Children and USAID are satisfied that future services of Counterpart will be necessary to CIP, the evaluation team recommends the termination of Counterpart as a member of the Consortium no later than the end of December 1996, transferring the coordination of training and technical assistance directly to Save the Children management. To the best knowledge and observations of the evaluation team, the performance of Counterpart, both as a source of expertise and as a critical component of the management and programs of CIP, has been inadequate.

For reasons of improved management and cost reduction, the evaluation also recommends a review of the role of the Citizen’s Network for Foreign Affairs and the Fund for Democracy in the administrative support of the Siberian and Southern Russians Centers. Their participation no longer seems necessary to the successful management of CIP and represents funds that could be diverted to other content/program activities.

The evaluation team recognizes the need to identify funding sources to support an extension of the regional centers. The proposed restructuring of the Consortium should make a useful contribution to solving this problem.

## **Section 1 Purpose of the Evaluation**

The primary task of the Mid-Term Evaluation was to identify and analyze problems and constraints to the successful achievement of the purpose of the Civic Initiatives Program for Democratic and Economic Reform Project in Russia and “recommend actions needed to improve project implementation and/or for the design of other NGO development programs.” The Scope of Work also asked the team to review the objectives of the program and their validity and “viability” at this time.

### **1.1 Background and Methodology**

In September 1994, USAID awarded a grant to Save the Children (Cooperative Agreement #110-0007-G-00-4046-00) to establish a consortium to implement the program with the Johns Hopkins University, Educational Development Center, Counterpart Foundation, Center for Democracy, and ORT/Russia. They form the Technical Unit in Moscow to provide primarily a range of training support, with some technical assistance consultation. Two regional NGO support centers were established: Novosibirsk (Siberia) and Krasnodar (Southern Russia); these are coordinated by the Fund for Democracy/ECHO and the Citizens’ Network for Foreign Affairs, respectively. CIP/Moscow supports NGOs in Central Russia.

The evaluation team spent from June 17 to June 21 in Moscow to meet with the USAID Russia Democracy and Economic Reform staff, members of the project Consortium, some of the CIP NGO grantees, various trainers, a key administrator at the Moscow Mayor’s office of Family and Youth, the Eurasia Foundation, Deloitte-Touche Business Centers, and present and potential training and technical assistance resource personnel. From June 23 to June 28, the team visited the regional Civic Initiative Program (CIP) center in Novosibirsk to meet with the staff of the Siberian Center, its NGO city coordinators from Omsk, Tomsk, Barnaul, and Novokuznetsk, several NGO grantees and non-grantee NGOs, and local government officials. In sum, the evaluation team met with more than 40 NGOs and spoke with nearly 100 leaders and members of NGOs.

On June 28 the team continued to Sochi, where the director and staff of the Southern Russia CIP center were attending a regional NGO meeting. In addition to the CIP staff at Sochi, the team was also able to meet NGOs that have either received grants or are currently developing grant proposals. From Sochi, the team traveled to Krasnodar on June 29 to meet with the entire regional center staff, NGO grantees in Krasnodar, and other non-grantee NGOs. The team returned to Moscow on July 2 to meet again with the members of the Consortium, organize the conclusions and recommendations for the evaluation, and brief USAID/Moscow staff on July 5. The team left Russia on July 6.

A significant challenge for the evaluation team was the absence throughout the project of a preliminary needs assessment of the NGOs and organizational profiles of the sector and the individual groups to be served (membership data, program objectives, time lines for program implementation) and predetermined objective indicators by which the success of both the Technical Units/resource centers and the NGOs themselves could be measured in the future and objective data that measured the program achievements of the various institutional and organizational components supporting CIP. In the absence of such fundamental baseline data, the scope of the evaluation was

limited to a series of individual interviews with key CIP project personnel, NGO leaders, local government officials, and U. S.- based Consortium representatives. Although the interviews were guided by the issues raised in the Scope of Work for the evaluation, there were deliberately open-ended in style and respondents were encouraged to discuss their needs, perceptions, and expectations beyond the specific expectations of the Scope of Work. (The indicators defined by the Technical Units as part of the CIP's revised Overarching Objectives -- and the strategies designed to implement them -- were developed too recently to be useful to the evaluation team in measuring the current achievements of the project.)

There were two other important limitations of the evaluation: the team did not have sufficient time to do either a systematic evaluation of the quality and relevance of the specific training programs or an in-depth financial analysis of the cost benefits of the various components of the project. Although we were able to develop anecdotal information about training and assess some of the issues related to the training component, we strongly recommend that USAID undertake a more thorough evaluation of the actual training programs, a thorough needs assessment of the NGOs for both organizational and civic action development, the adequacy of the responses to the needs of the participants of past training programs, the impact of the training on performance, and the Training for Trainers program -- as soon as possible. Similarly, USAID should undertake a full cost-benefit analysis of all components of the project, especially the training programs.

The evaluation team tried to give priority to reaching constructive recommendations for the future rather than emphasize any issues and errors of the past. The Team hopes that this report will be seen as a positive contribution to the success of an important project.

## **Section 2 Current Project Status and Achievements**

### **2.1 Objectives of the CIP Project**

The objective of the CIP project, as defined by USAID/Russia, is to help create an NGO sector capable of playing “a critical role in providing social services and permitting the government to continue privatizing social services, supporting and encouraging private business, providing a structured vehicle for public participation and providing the civic fora essential for a democratic society.” The CIP is intended to support the Mission’s 2.1 Strategic Objective of “increased, better informed citizen’s participation in political and economic decision-making, and aims at achieving the following intermediate results:

- By developing their capacity to represent and serve their client populations through effective advocacy, NGOs will give people another mechanism for participating in economic and political decision-making;
- By developing their capacity to manage resources well, to develop programs of interest to the public, and by honing fundraising skills, NGOs will be stronger institutions and capable of providing a sustainable service to citizens;
- Citizens who understand the potential of NGOs to advance their interests are more likely to support and become involved with NGOs and to value the services provided.

Clearly, CIP has successfully facilitated the establishment of a large number of NGOs and trained many new and previously existing NGOs in management skills, fundraising, promotions and the use of the media, computer literacy, accounting, and to a lesser degree, planning. Many have received computers, modems, and faxes -- important technologies to open these NGOs to information necessary to their missions and linkages to other organizations within and outside of Russia. Most NGOs that have received training and technical support are deeply appreciative.

### **2.2 Role of the NGO Sector and the Contribution of CIP**

The NGO movement is responding to both the deterioration of available social services and the new, unprecedented openness of the Russian political structure to the input and involvement of citizens and citizens organizations committed to pursuing solutions to serious social and political issues and in participating actively in community decision-making and governance. Because of their willingness and demonstrated ability to provide services that the government cannot, NGOs, the so-called Third Sector, are playing a growing political role in Russian society. CIP can play a critical role in helping to develop this sector into an effective citizen institution in a new democratic process of governance in Russia.

The NGO sector does not come without a large degree of distrust and suspicion. Traditionally in Soviet society, decisions were made only by the highest governmental institutions, with little tolerance for “grassroots” actions of citizens. It was also a Soviet practice to create and use NGOs

to promote and drive government policies. Therefore, the CIP project has an important and historic role to play in the complex evolution of democracy in Russia.

The CIP has already made an important contribution, limited as it must be by the size of the country and the resources that USAID can provide and stimulate from others.

### **2.3 Need for Civic Action Phase of Program Implementation**

The activity of CIP to date has been focused on the establishment of NGOs and strengthening their capacities to manage and develop systems to raise the funds needed to survive. That is how “strengthening the NGO sector” was defined when the project began. At the heart of this evaluation is the recommendation that, having successfully accomplished this first phase of support for the organizational establishment of potentially sustainable NGOs, CIP should now move swiftly to focus on the strengthening of NGOs to plan, implement, manage, and evaluate the program activities of their missions -- the reasons for which they were created -- to put muscle on the organizational skeleton. “Civic action” is defined here as planned activities of organized groups of citizens, often in collaboration with other citizens and public and private institutions, agencies, and organizations, including government and business, to educate and mobilize members of the community to solve a problem of priority concern to them

This recommendation is based on the conclusion that successful provision of both social services that would otherwise not be available and public education and mobilization of citizens to participate in democratic processes of local governance are vital and necessary to the sustainability of these NGOs. More than anything else, the successes of NGOs in achieving their missions will assure the continued interest and support of those citizens and community institutions that benefit from their actions. Achieving their missions is the very reason for the creation of the NGOs and the support CIP gives to them must ultimately contribute to their successful achievements.

The evaluation feels that training and technical assistance in developing and implementing civic action program skills should have been included in the original definition of CIP. Since it was not, the program was too narrowly focussed at organizational development. As important as organizational development is to the establishment and management of an NGO, its ability to successfully deliver the product of its mission is the “over-arching” reason for its existence. The resources of the CIP project have for the most part gone into building of the NGO organizational structure but little into imparting the skills that NGOs need to educate the public about the social and political issues they are concerned and the difficult task of motivating and mobilizing people to take action to solve these problems. The skills to do so are not as yet a substantive part of the CIP training and technical assistance agenda. It is essential that become its central focus for remaining life of project.

Developing a long list of NGOs is not a sufficient goal for CIP. According to key NGO leaders, only a small percentage of NGOs survive (as few as 20%, according to one estimate). Many leaders in the NGO community advise that the best contribution to survivability and sustainability of NGOs will be the successful accomplishment of their missions and the delivery to their constituents of the services that attracted their interest and participation. The development of the NGO sector with the

capability of successfully accomplishing their missions would not only contribute to the development of democracy through greater participation in the social and political process but would in turn give both citizens and government representatives reason to support these organizations. Similar projects in Poland and Romania are now seeing active interest and offers of support from local government and business.

Expert experience and judgment in developing NGO/citizen participation in community governance and service delivery argue without question that the ability of NGOs and other citizen initiatives to become sustainable, effective organizations depends not only on becoming well organized but primarily to be able to demonstrate to their constituencies that they are able to provide the service which they said they would. This expertise should have guided the development of the CIP project conceptually so that today there would be no argument about the necessity of developing both aspects of NGO competence: good organization and public communication and strong abilities to build programs that educate, motivate, and mobilize citizens to take civic action. This evaluation is recommending a refocus on civic action skills in the remaining half of the project to address this gap.

## **2.4 Development of Civic Action Expertise**

The evaluation urges that the successful development of NGOs with skills to manage their organizations be viewed as only the first leg of a fuller NGO development effort. In the second half of the project, CIP should focus on developing the skills of NGOs to develop and carry out successful programs to achieve their stated missions. This second leg completes the full development of NGOs and the NGO sector, and achieves both the primary objective of the CIP project to “promote an effective and sustainable non-governmental nonprofit sector in Russia,” and the Over-Arching Objectives described in June 1996:

- An improved external operating environment for NGOs;
- Promotion of action-oriented networks of NGOs with members who represent a broad, diverse constituency of Russian citizenry;
- The development of a target group of NGOs ... who lead and manage themselves efficiently, act effectively on behalf of their constituents, and serve as models for the NGO sector.

In recent descriptions of its Strategic Objectives, USAID/Russia has emphasized the importance of “increased, better informed citizens’ participation in political and economic decision-making,” and the development of the capacity of NGOs to represent and serve their constituents “through effective advocacy.” The report also states that the development of the capacity of NGOs to manage resources and develop programs that motivate constructive citizen participation will produce “stronger institutions... capable of providing a sustainable service to citizens.” Lastly, the report affirms that “citizens who understand the potential of NGOs to advance their interests are more likely to support and become involved with NGOs and to value the services provided.” (April, 1996)

In response to these clearly defined priorities, the observations and recommendations that follow will stress the focus of the second half of the project on enabling NGOs to successfully achieve their

program missions in both social service delivery and in civic action. These recommendations support continued training and technical assistance to existing and future NGOs in the management, communication, promotions, and fundraising skills that have been an effective part of the program to date, but will also strongly emphasize new steps to develop and strengthen their abilities to plan, design, implement, manage, and evaluate programs that serve their citizen constituents and, through successful achievements, encourage their support.

For the purpose of the evaluation, the following criteria for civic action programs may be useful in focusing training and technical assistance needs. (This definition is based on similar definitions developed for USAID Democracy and Economic Reform projects in Poland and Romania.) Generally speaking, in order to be successful, civic action programs should promote and support the following:

- Establishment of permanent communication systems between citizens and local government;
- Development of on-going civic education programs on issues of priority concern to the community and local government and on the structure and functions of local government;
- Collaboration between citizens, business, and local government to solve priority community issues; and
- Strengthening and facilitating the ability of citizens to address localized problems without the support of government.

To be successful in providing social services and civic action, NGOs need skills in becoming expert in both the issues they intend to address and the process by which they will educate and mobilize their constituents and campaign to achieve their goals. A priority skill is the expertise in how to carefully plan successful programs, including:

- Defining the problem, its causes, effects, and solutions;
- Establishing general objectives;
- Determining relevant target groups;
- Researching the target groups with practical research methods;
- Establishing measurable objectives;
- Identifying and implementing communication and action strategies appropriate to the successful achievement of the objectives of the NGO's program;
- Producing the informational and motivation materials needed to support the program; and
- Developing and implementing practical methods for managing, monitoring, and evaluating the program;
- Revising on-going programs and developing new programs in response to the evaluated effectiveness of the first program to achieve the objectives of the NGO action.

As with any mission-driven organization (including government and business organizations), NGOs must become expert in both the content of the issue they want to address and the process by which they will achieve their goals. Increasingly, NGOs in Russia are actively looking to CIP to provide the training and technical assistance to develop this expertise.

CIP has been able to assist a large number of new and old NGOs to organize and manage their internal structures, promote themselves, and know how to conduct fundraising efforts. Now, it is critical and appropriate to address the programmatic, service provision and advocacy side of the project to achieve the whole objective of the CIP program to create “a vibrant and diverse community of NGOs in Russia.”

## Section 3 Progress of Program Implementation

### 3.1 Definition of the CIP Objectives

“Has the Civic Initiatives Program’s objectives been clearly articulated and are they relevant to the needs of Russian NGOs served through the project?”

From its inception, the CIP project has suffered from a conflicting understanding of what strengthening the NGO sector meant and what should be the objectives of an effective project that would achieve the Mission’s Strategic Objective 2.1. SO 2.1 directs a policy to develop projects that will create NGOs able to provide “sustainable service to citizens” because citizens “who understand the potential of NGOs to advance their interests are more likely to support ...NGOs and to value the services provided.”

Historically, World Learning’s strong emphasis on direct service delivery, and not on institution building, argued in favor of focussing on strengthening the NGOs organizationally. However, that process seems to have moved support for NGO development entirely to the organizational development of NGOs and forgot the necessity of strengthening the abilities of NGOs to plan and implement successful civic action programs that would accomplish what is clearly expressed in Strategic Objective 2.1.

Although the definition of the project moved from “Strengthening NGOs” to “Democracy and Economic Reform,” the explicit objectives of USAID did not change: “increased, better informed citizens’ participation in political and economic decision-making” and strengthening the capacity of NGOs “to represent and serve their client populations through effective advocacy” and “...to develop programs of interest to the public...” in addition to developing their organizational skills. However, the Consortium remained locked into a definition of CIP as only concerned with the organizational components of NGO development, not with the development of processes for achieving their program/mission goals.

Some members of the Consortium insist that they initially had supported a strong emphasis on facilitating civic action, but were instructed that facilitating civic action did not fall within the scope of the program. Furthermore, if there had been agreement from the beginning that the CIP program needed two foci: (1) developing skills in organizational development and public communication and (2) skills in planning and implementing civic action/citizen services, then it would have been easier to determine what training and technical support services should be provided and which organizations had the competencies to provide them. However, lacking a broader, more client-informed picture of NGO growth and activity in Russia, the Consortium leaders understood the focus of the project as limited to building NGOs and their organizational structures.

In the early months of CIP, strong leadership in planning and integrating strategies -- both short-term and long-term -- seemed to be missing. Each member of the Consortium is a strong, independent organization with considerable experience in development. Also, it seems to the evaluation team that the Consortium began with built-in tensions: some organizations with prior, on-going programs in Russia and members which could have provided the same training and technical assistance. Therefore, one of the reasons for the internal tensions was the redundancy of resources and the resulting competition and territoriality from previous activities, apart from the question of their competence and commitment. These problems have persisted from project start-up. Save the Children bears responsibility for not assuming the leadership role that they had been assigned for the Consortium and for not addressing these issues, not only at the program's outset, but throughout implementation

In addition, there were five other organizations participating in training or in managing the regional centers. And there were funding sources other than USAID that supported and influenced training programs, particularly in the Siberian Center. On top of all this was the U.S. based Program Planning Committee (representing the Consortium members) that also frequently participated directly in the management of the project. Furthermore, the regional centers faced issues of distance from Moscow and, in the case of the Siberian Center, previous established experience in developing and running programs independently, and they felt frustrated with the planning and scheduling of training support from Moscow. They would prefer to manage their own affairs without intrusion from what they view as outsiders. Lastly, since the beginning of the project, USAID has made several staff changes that have interrupted the flow of the project.

As a result, there were too many managers and not enough Consortium leadership to organize and control all the participants effectively in relation to overall program objectives, with its members frequently sidetracked by inter-organizational hostility and competition. There is openly expressed hostility between Save the Children and Counterpart that is damaging the project and must be resolved as soon as possible. It is regrettable that Save the Children and USAID were not able to provide stronger direction for the project in the past. This seems to have led to the conflicting interpretations of activities and achievements by the various members of the consortium and, above all, to the absence of a true sense of collaboration and integration of the components of CIP. Save the Children, as lead agency, must take a strong and constructive leadership role to restore the collegial collaboration that CIP requires and the Russians expect. This has not occurred to date. Today, most members of the Consortium have simply resigned themselves to the confusion and deliver what they are asked for, rather than contributing as proactive, collaborative partners toward a common goal.

Caught up in organizational conflicts and increasingly isolated from the citizens groups in the field, CIP Moscow has become contractor-driven rather than client-driven. As a simple matter of organizational survival under these conditions, each consortium member has defined its own, separate programmatic agenda. These may or may not, depending on the circumstances, contribute positively to the achievement of USAID's and CIP's objectives. At a time when collaborative planning and strategies are essential to the program's success, the members of the Consortium continue the internal tension, while the regional centers tend to ignore much of what they have to offer. The technical units are communicating with the regional centers not as a Consortium or as

representatives of the Consortium. In fact, the regional centers are really dealing with the technical units more as different people, not even as technical units within the Consortium. Unfortunately, the Russian staff working with CIP are well aware of all these problems.

It is the impression of the evaluation team that there was no clear Consortium strategy at the beginning, developed collaboratively by all the partners. A strong management role of Save the Children should have been established at that time and seasoned professional management should have been provided in the field, a flaw that Save the Children has admitted and believes has been overcome. The proposed shift in project focus may be a good opportunity to restructure the Consortium, establish very clear zones of responsibility, and create some true collaboration. The current state of affairs cannot persist if there is any hope for the program to meet its goals and make a significant, sustainable impact. There is too much tension among people and organizations.

This evaluation aims to propose constructive interventions that will move away from criticism and toward positive steps to achieve the purpose of the CIP program with maximal collaboration of the members of the Consortium. At the same time, the evaluation will recommend moving quickly toward significant "Russification" of personnel and operations to ensure that the project will have enough time to resolve issues that may deter the sustainability of the CIP efforts after the close of the project.

At this stage of the program, it is crucial that the program's overall objectives be clearly defined and fully supported by all members of the Consortium, the field directors and staff, and the supervisory team of USAID/Moscow. As CIP moves into the second half of the project, more attention must be given to helping NGOs develop skills in involving citizens in democratic processes that give them their strong voice in local governance, a basic objective of the Democratic and Economic Reform program. Most importantly, each member of the Consortium must demonstrate that it has the skills and resources to support this objective.

### **3.2 Operational Systems and Management: Consortium Planning, Activities, Support**

The members of the Consortium meet and plan together but then proceed basically independently to implement activities that meet their agendas. There seems to be little sense of collaboration. In fact there is more competition than collaboration, or simple disinterest, which is coming from the regional centers. They feel they are almost islands that can manage their own programs. Other than EDC, which is seen by the regional centers as helpful and friendly; CFD, as important and cooperative; and ORT, as a very professional resource, the technical units are not seen as an unified service group but rather as offering their skills almost as if they were of separate projects.

Furthermore, there is no substantive needs assessment data, that the evaluation team is aware of, that describes where the NGOs were developmentally when the project started and their specific needs on which to base the training and technical assistance, and where they are after the investment of CIP in the past year and a half. All of the information is anecdotal: the recipients say that they appreciate the training and report various activities that indicate that they have benefitted from these courses and are better able to fundraise, to communicate their missions, and seem better organized. But they

frequently volunteer the need for more “in-depth” training and technical assistance as follow-up to their training programs, suggesting their recognition of the importance of developing expert process skills as well as issue knowledge for the NGOs institutionally as well as individual members. As stated above, this evaluation strongly recommends that the remainder of the CIP project emphasize the development of this expertise as a critical element to the strengthening of an NGO.

The grants process does not seem very focussed on organizational strengthening or on civic action processes. The present and future grantees need more technical assistance as they develop their proposals and during the implementation of the grant to insure an effective use of the money to achieve the objectives of the CIP project. The regional centers are aware of this need but say they feel considerable pressure from USAID to accelerate the grants process. The grantees, however, represent a wide range of different levels of NGO development and experience and many have not as yet completed their grants. To the best knowledge of the evaluation team, there has been no evaluation of the grants.

It is also difficult to say if the Consortium overall has “successfully built upon the successes and lessons learned by Consortium members and from other NGO support programs in Russia.” The Siberian Center has. Much of its program is building on work that ECHO had been doing before. Counterpart has worked in the region for several years, and JHU has an Eastern European regional TOT program that in fact is not funded by USAID except for Russia. However, the lack of integration and collaboration among Consortium members diminishes the interest in sharing and benefitting from each others experiences.

The Eurasia Foundation is an important example of the need for greater interaction and collaboration with CIP. There is no conflict here but not enough effort to see how the two USAID-funded projects could indeed work together more often. For example, the Eurasian Foundation plans to support several NGO centers in areas in which CIP is not working. And, with the concurrence of the U.S. based office of the Foundation, the intention of this new effort will be on helping NGOs develop their capacities to move to civic action. It would seem that both the Eurasia Foundation and CIP programs would benefit from close cooperation and sharing of resources and experience to help contribute to an influential critical mass of active, well trained NGOs and NGO support centers throughout the country.

In answer to the question of whether the activities of the Consortium are “meeting the needs of the NGO sector,” the evaluation feels that the answer is “only part of the way.” This is again because the definition of CIP is limiting inputs to organizational development. The Consortium activities, despite the disharmony within it, are supporting the organizational development. But the evaluation argues that this level of skill training is not fully serving the Russian Third Sector, the NGOs, that need to know how to implement their missions successfully so that their constituents, and local government as well, recognize their value and will support them. As long as the perception and the activities of CIP to strengthening of the NGO sector stops at the level of organizational development, the project will not achieve, in the opinion of the Mid-Term Evaluation, the Strategic Objectives of USAID.

### **3.3 Technical Units**

“Are the technical units providing sufficient and appropriate technical assistance to NGOs in all three of the program’s geographical areas?” This is an important question for the past as well as the future. From the points of view of the Siberian and Southern Russian centers, the answer is “to some extent.” Both have indicated that EDC has helped them with the communication/social marketing activities and have invited EDC to place a staff member in each center. The TOT program is yet to become very active regionally but this evaluation will recommend much greater full time participation of trained TOTs. The regional centers are interested. Both centers prefer to be independent of Moscow and arrange for their own training and technical assistance resources. In fact, some of these may come from the United States and bypass CIP/Moscow. (For example, the Siberian Center has received support from the Soros Foundation to conduct training programs.) Part of the training needs assessment to be undertaken will have to determine what contributions the technical units can make to the regional centers during this new phase.

### **3.3.1 Effectiveness of Technical Units in the Field**

Have the technical units provided sufficient and appropriate technical assistance to NGOs in the three regions? It is difficult to judge the true capacity of each of the technical units because they were constrained to focus largely on the organizational development of NGOs. Some of the training under the TOT program has been effective, but, apart from anecdotal descriptions, there has been no formal evaluation of its effectiveness.

#### **Social Marketing**

The social marketing component has not really had a chance to demonstrate all its capability. It has helped many NGOs to understand how to work with the media, how to develop promotional campaigns, and the importance of creating an image that will promote the support of the community. It has also been given the task of trying to change public understanding of the NGO and its important role in Russia today. It has helped produce several radio and television programs that reach out to the public to communicate this message. That is a very limited definition of what this component should be contributing. Although social marketing has many definitions, the real purpose of this component was to train and support NGOs not only to use the media and make promotional TV films and print material, but to help NGOs develop the skills to plan campaigns and to motivate citizen action to solve priority community problems.

The social marketing office in Krasnodar regional center, for instance, has developed a sophisticated and appropriate media market as well as individual channels to reach its constituents. In fact, both regional centers have enjoyed a degree of success in generating the interest of local television programmers in the NGO sector that would probably continue even without project support (for example, regular spots on the Novosibirsk television news and a popular weekly series on NGOs in Krasnodar.)

These are important skills for NGOs to develop. But creating a better understanding of and more public support for the NGO comes from its successful achievement of its mission to provide its constituents the services and products, the education and action that improves their lives. Media campaigns pass quickly and, although images are important to the uninvolved public, especially the

public governmental official, the critical test is the successes of the NGO. There are many NGOs in the world, and certainly in the United States, that are not the best organized and have little recourse to the media, but who are very popular and well supported because “they deliver.”

The real success in promoting the NGOs will not result from media blitzes but from demonstrating their importance to Russian society today by fulfilling what the NGOs say they will do for the community. The social marketing unit already possesses many of the skills and resources to provide this type of support, but it has rarely been called on to provide this training and technical assistance nor has it been used to help develop a group of expert Russian planners of civic action. For the remainder of the CIP it needs to be called upon in this capacity.

The social marketing unit, especially Chris Ebner, has the skill to help NGOs plan their action programs. He comes from many years of experience developing marketing and advertising campaigns, large public education and persuasion programs. He, the staff, and other national and international consultants could quickly move to train and provide technical assistance directly to NGOs in each region and to train the training and technical assistance staffs in the regional centers. He is eager to do so. The NGOs need these skills to plan and implement their action program and the EDC unit can begin that process immediately.

#### Legal Services

The legal services of CFD has demonstrated its ability to respond to the needs of its constituency, both by its shift from a national to a regional/local approach to legislative education and change, and in its recent movement from special programs and workshops on legislative issues and toward a consultancy model in response to the specific needs of specific organizations.

In recent months, changes at the Duma and local municipal level have had a much greater and more immediate impact on the lives of local organizations than developments in federal law. NGOs at the regional centers have expressed an increasing interest in seminars and other special events in which information has been prepared on local laws and legislative processes. Surprisingly, the greatest interest in local CIP initiatives has been from local government officials themselves, who are often as ill-educated as NGO leaders about NGO-related laws and welcome the opportunity to learn from and participate in public events in which such issues are discussed. Publications and handbooks on legislative issues, such as the recently prepared “How a Bill Becomes a Law, are equally relevant to the needs of local officials and more advanced NGOs.

According to the Director of Legal Operations for the Foundation for the Development of Parliament in Russia, CIP’s primary strength in all regions of Russia is the neutral role it plays in facilitating communications on legal issues between NGOs and Duma and municipal authorities. Government officials at each of the unit’s cities openly acknowledge the importance of CIP functions in bringing citizen groups and government representatives together as respectful, if reluctant partners in the creation of a new system of self-governance. This point was made most forcefully by the Director of Femida, a legal assistance NGO in Novosibirsk who is not currently funded or working with CIP. “If the center is closed now,” she insisted, referring to the positive interaction among the NGOs, CIP

staff and the Communist government, "the democratic process will slow down or cease altogether in this very city."

The current redirection of the legal program from group training events toward individual one-on-one consultations in response to specific needs has been in direct response to the clients' repeated requests for a more direct, immediately relevant nuts and bolts approach to legal training. More than any other area of institutional development, participants grow quickly bored and frustrated with lengthy presentations on legal issues and legislative processes, a reality that has been exacerbated by the pedantic, decidedly non-interactive training approach preferred by many lawyers. In this regard, the combination of one-on-one consultations and training with issue-specific publications appears to be a more effective and client-driven response to the legal/legislative needs of NGOs.

A more enduring problem is, how to get NGO members -- apart from the exceptional few -- not only to become more compliant with the existing law, but actually become involved in the process of drafting and introducing legislation at the local level. Many of the obstacles identified by NGOs -- lack of clarity about their current rights, fear of being influenced or regulated by the government -- must be satisfactorily addressed and clarified before NGO involvement on this level can advance significantly. This is an area in which ongoing cooperation between the legal and social marketing components of CIP is vitally important -- using direct communications, newsletters and other media sources to share success stories, profiles of effective behavior, and changes in relevant legislation as they occur. NGOs will only change their behavior when it becomes clear that such change is both reasonable and in their interest. In this regard, the continuing interaction of CFD and some of the more advanced NGOs in Moscow (such as Interlegal) with representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the tax department, the Department of Civic Organizations and other high-level authorities serves as an important model to encourage other NGOs to take a more active role in the legal process -- as long as this information is effectively and compellingly communicated to NGOs throughout CIP.

### Computer Training

ORT's computer training service has been greatly appreciated by virtually everyone who has used it -- a natural outgrowth of the clarity of its mission and the thoroughness and professionalism with which it has been addressed. Interestingly, the length of ORT's training programs -- one or two weeks or even longer -- has never been questioned. Why, then, has there been no concern for the very limited time provided to the many other training components in the CIP project that should have been accorded considerably more time than was actually provided? Hopefully, better assessments of needs, based on required levels of performance will address this issue.

Computer training by ORT is seen as well executed and appreciated. However, the NGO data base is largely ignored in the field as being too distant and uninformed to be helpful. The computer and E-mail components have been useful but not very critical to most of the NGOs, although E-mail often gets through when telephone connections may not. In any event, these technologies will not make the difference in the success of the local NGOs. They do need links to external information sources and occasionally to link up with other similar organizations. For the most part, however, the NGOs are territorial and somewhat competitive and may not always feel the necessity of working together with others.

### **3.4 Cost Benefit Analysis of Technical Units**

The Technical Unit services are costly and the question of cost benefit must be raised, particularly if the regional centers are not using all the training and technical assistance resources that might come from Moscow. The proposed refocus on training and technical assistance for civic action is an opportunity to make the support from the technical units more useful; the regions clearly need more support in training and technical assistance in developing expert level NGO skills in program planning, community research methods, communication and motivational strategies, and evaluation. JHU and EDC have proven experience in these areas and would be welcomed, either directly or through their staff assigned in the regional centers.

If the CIP is refocused, the technical units will become more useful and more extensively used. The cost benefit ratio should improve considerably. The argument throughout this evaluation is that the refocus is absolutely essential to achieve the strategic objectives of the Civic Initiatives Program for Democracy and Economic Reform in Russia. At least some of the Technical Units are essential to that refocus. The operational emphasis should be on strengthening the capacities of the regional centers and include in the "consortium," or whatever management structure is developed, only those organizations that can demonstrate that they have the experience and the technical abilities to provide directly or indirectly the requisite training and technical assistance skills. The regional centers feel that they are perhaps in a better position themselves to use the resources in their regions to provide that support but are eager to have occasional but relevant support from Moscow when they need it, not when it appears as a scheduled offering. This position must be considered as CIP determines how exactly it is going to restructure and refocus.

### **3.5 Full Time TOTs**

The evaluation proposes that at least two or three TOTs in each region be hired full time to become expert trainers in the skills required to develop the programmatic civic action components. JHU suggests a program of three, one week training cycles for these potential NGO organizational development and civic action experts. The proposed program will also help to rationalize the costs of the current TOT investment of approximately \$60,000 per TOT. The present plan that gives a \$200/month stipend to the certified TOT for occasional service. The expectation that the NGOs will be interested and have the money to hire them does not seem as realistic and as useful as hiring some of the best in full time support roles, a much better outgrowth of the technical unit concept.

### **3.6 Computer and E-Mail**

The computer and E-mail training has been useful and is of interest to those NGOs who must communicate with constituents in other communities and who have adequate telephone links. The group that provides information on economic activities to journalists throughout the region responsible for writing on this subject is an excellent example. For other NGOs, E-mail may not be very practical at this time but with improved telecommunication facilities should find it of regular usefulness. The computer is of course a modern typewriter as well. All of the NGOs visited appreciate the generosity that gave them the technology. It should be left up to the local NGOs to seek out further training and assistance with linkages if they need them and not burden CIP.

### **3.7 Russification**

The evaluation feels that the Russification of the management and technical resources should be accelerated. The evaluation team met several impressive and talented Russians on their way to becoming expert trainers and technical advisors in many of the concerns of the CIP activities. To support the process of the development of Russian experts in NGO organizational development and civic action programs, CIP should also increase the involvement of national and international expert trainers and technical advisors so that the transfer of this expertise will come sooner. For this reason the evaluation proposes that at least ten Russian experts in NGO organizational and civic action skills in each region be developed each year, many more if possible. Ten seems a modest, but practical number to aim for each year. If CIP feels that more can be prepared, then so much the better.

### **3.8 Regional Centers**

The regional centers are different in experience, constituencies, and local NGO activities. The Siberian Center has been active now since 1995 in what was described as an environment that encourages independence and one that's more liberal than in Southern Russia. ECHO has the advantage of being an established presence there as well. Southern Russia has to work hard in a more conservative, rather pro-communist environment. In any event, both seem to be functioning well and quite independently of most of the other components of CIP. Both have strong directors with considerable field experience. The centers are perhaps too identified with "Americans" right now but both directors are very much aware of this and are eager to start the process of Russification. Despite the inevitable strains that foreign management can create in a development project, the two directors are appreciated for their energy and competence. Hopefully, the movement towards fully Russian staff can be accelerated in the very near future.

Both centers, in their distinctive ways, are supportive of moving more focus onto civic action for the remainder of the CIP project and can use support from CIP technical resources to help train local and regional staff. Here is where the technical units can be important if the focus shifts to civic action and they do indeed have relevant skills and experience. In any event, the best way to improve the effectiveness of the regional centers is to provide increased training and technical assistance to key NGOs and above all to regional staffs. The evaluation argues that the needs of the NGOs should be seen as developing expert skills, not simply basic knowledge.

To achieve such expert levels requires certain resources that the technical units should bring: training TOTs as experts in training and specific areas of technical assistance; training in planning public education and action campaigns; training and technical assistance in legal and legislative efforts in support of NGOs; and ORT, as computer skill needs arise. Each one of these units would also have the responsibility of identifying other national and international training and technical assistance resources that it can provide to the regions as they need them. Then, the evaluation recommends a planning and strategy meeting in each region with the key managers and technical coordinators of the technical units as soon as possible.

With this approach, it may be possible to think of establishing a network of regional training/technical assistance/support centers in the current regional centers and in their filial cities. If truly useful in supporting the broad as well as specific needs, NGOs may be willing to pay for these services if the cost is modest and the service helps them achieve their missions. The evaluation will offer specific recommendation to advance this possibility.

“Are the regional centers providing sufficient information to the technical units about the needs of NGOs in their regions?” As mentioned before, the regional centers say that they are getting more and more able to provide for themselves. They do not feel that the past patterns of training are functional, that is, being informed of training courses rather than being NGO/regional center driven. Their responses have been to pick those resources from the technical units that could respond to their needs and schedules and forget about the rest. The proposed shift in project emphasis could provide an opportunity to create new and more productive relationships between the field and CIP Moscow. There is some open communication: the social marketing program now has a staff member in each center more for training services than as a communication link. Distance and telecommunications difficulties certainly interfere with good communications between the regional centers and Moscow. More importantly, they do not really feel Moscow is that important to them.

### **3.9 Grants**

The grants program - the micro-grants in particular - could have substantial impact on the future of the NGO movement because it provides important opportunities for worthy NGOs to practice what they have learned in the training programs and to actually “deliver” successful program services and actions that will win the support of the community. The program has made it possible for small NGOs to hire full time staff and to receive computer and fax equipment. Above all, the grants have empowered NGOs; they have become aware of their ability to be serious organizations.

But the grants program should be clearly linked to the specific objectives of the development of the NGOs, that is, really using the grants process to help the NGOs involved to strengthen their organizational and program process skills to the “expert level.” This means that in proposals, NGOs that demonstrate a reasonably sound organizational structure - even if they are small in membership and management - and are clearly relevant to the missions of the NGOs should benefit from professional technical assistance in the conceptualization and preparation of the program the NGO wants to implement and even more importantly in the actual implementation of the grant program.

The products of these grants should also be evaluated to determine if and why they had any impact towards the achievement of the goals of the NGO and if they helped the NGO strengthen or perhaps even develop their skills. No one becomes expert from just a training course. It is through the experience of implementing an activity of importance to the mission of the NGO and the training and technical assistance that are brought to it in practical support of the implementation of the grant that help the NGO move up the ladder of expertise. This suggests consideration of the expansion of the micro-grant program if adequate technical assistance can be provided.

However, the regional centers feel that there is considerable pressure from USAID to accelerate the grant giving and they would prefer to be sure that the recipients are worthy. CIP Moscow also feels

that several grants were given out, especially in environmental health, that did not meet the criteria for the CIP project. The evaluation team met some of these grantees and agrees. Their missions seem important but are not related to the objectives of CIP. For example, one project based at the University of Moscow is really a job placement service for Russian scientists. Of course, EcoJuris is an impressive example of a NGO action program that has “delivered” and is managed by an aggressive, deeply committed physician. The criteria for micro-grants should be reviewed, especially if the focus moves more to civic action, to be sure that the CIP objectives are really supported by the grants.

A restrained but generous institutional support grants program could help develop the strengthening of the regional centers by providing support for the centers and similar support efforts in their filial cities. This would assure more time for these centers to mature and find their own funding niches. In any event, the institutional grants, like the micro-grants, should be focussed on supporting the objective of strengthening the NGOs to fulfill their missions. But unlike the micro-grants, they should be able to sustain the institution and its support functions for a longer period of time.

There are no linkage grants in force at this time. These rather costly relationships apparently did not prove to be productive enough to continue. It is tempting to suggest more technical linkage grants that would provide specific U.S. technical content support to, for example, the farmers near Sochi that are planning a market information system. The CIP center there will provide a U.S. consultant to help them develop their grant proposal, but more long term support would probably be useful. However, more long term grants mean more management problems and more dependence on U.S. technical resources rather than developing Russian expertise and encouraging domestic support.

On the other hand, close interaction with U.S. NGOs can mean important learning opportunities for Russian NGOs and may create long term relationships. It would therefore be useful to see if funds can be found at least to provide an increased number of study visits to the United States to observe and work with successful U.S. NGOs.

## Section 4 Operational Systems and Management

### 4.1 Problems with the Consortium Model

In the Scope of Work for the evaluation, the question was asked, “How effective has the Consortium model been?” Perhaps the question should have been, “Has this Consortium model been effective?” Unfortunately the answer to the second question is, no. The Consortium model can only work effectively if its objectives are clear and shared by all its members, and all of the members have worked together to plan, integrate and coordinate unified strategies to accomplish their tasks. The members of a Consortium must see themselves as members of a team, dependent on each other to achieve their common goal. Some of the current members of the Consortium do not see that interdependence and a common goal.

It seems that few, if any, of the Consortium members really understood at the outset of the project what was fully necessary to develop sustainable NGOs in Russia capable of playing significant roles in democratic reforms. Though the Scope of Work for the evaluation states, “At the March 1995 Quarterly Programming Meeting, the Consortium agreed to focus the program’s objectives on facilitating the participation of NGO and other citizen initiatives in democratic and economic reform processes,” the Consortium members did not seem to understand what inputs would be required to achieve that objective. Rather than developing “innovative ways” to support the overall program, as they had promised, the members agreed to a limited definition of “strengthening the NGO sector” and stopped at organizational development. The NGOs which have participated in CIP are grateful for the training they have received. For the most part, however, the NGOs do not understand what they should know in order to deliver the services for which they were created and which would win the continuing support from those in the community who benefit from their actions.

JHU and Save the Children staff report that, because their organizations had considerable experience with community development and civic action, they initially argued for more of a complete program that would have combined training in organizational development and planning for programs for civic action. This direction apparently did not get enough support from other members of the Consortium, USAID, or from inside their own organizations. The TOTs do get some training in program planning but, as JHU admits, not enough to make them experts.

Each partner in the Consortium has something to contribute to the project. Yet there are shortcomings with them all. Unfortunately, the Consortium was set up so that each participating organization could operate quite independently if it wanted. JHU had an on-going TOT program in Eastern Europe to which Russia seemed like a natural add-on. Counterpart had been operating in Russia for some time and felt its own sense of independence. EDC and CFD were much more a part of the Consortium team because their roles were very precise and more limited than the others. In Siberia, ECHO had established a presence that preceded CIP and it was difficult to convert entirely to an identification with CIP, although it is not an issue at this time. In reality, it was redundant to have both JHU and Counterpart in the Consortium even though their initial responsibilities were different. But, apart from any criticism of their capabilities, they were both training organizations. The competition was inevitable. Furthermore, the institutional members of the Consortium have not always sent their best managers and resource people into the field. Unfortunately, Save the Children

did not provide strong enough on-site management, further contributing to the lack of team collaboration and coordination. Many of the Consortium members are critical of the lack of management leadership of Save the Children, especially in the first year of CIP. All of these factors made it difficult to keep a consortium acting like a team, the purpose after all of a consortium.

Did it meet the needs of Russia's NGO sector? Despite the time and energy spent on internal tensions, the Consortium in general was significant to the accomplishments of the CIP organizational development goals, not as a Consortium but as a number of individuals -- Americans and Russians -- that came into service. As the regional centers have said, they don't really need much of the Consortium now and can find many of their own training and technical assistance resources regionally with only an occasional help from Moscow.

The future value of the Consortium depends on the focus of CIP for the remainder of the project. If attention goes to NGO civic action, the regional centers will need the help of the Consortium, managed through the CIP office in Moscow. If training and technical assistance remains focussed on organizational development, there will probably be fewer and fewer requests for support from Moscow.

Another answer to the question of whether or not the consortium model meets the needs of the Russian NGO sector is that the concept of the consortium is irrelevant to that objective and very costly. The training component is the most expensive element of the project and probably the lowest in cost benefit at present. And if the regional centers continue to develop their own training and technical assistance resources and ignore the Consortium, the cost benefit question will become more serious. This evaluation offers some recommendations to streamline the structure and management of the present Consortium and propose budget cuts and rearrangements that may help to shift important resources to more efficient uses. These issues must be seriously discussed and addressed by the Consortium in order to reconfigure the program in the best possible way to meet program objectives in the remaining time available to CIP implementation.

Does the Consortium model support or inhibit the administration and management of sub-grants? The sub-grants in the Central Russia region seem to be handled well by Save the Children; the grants in Southern Russia are not numerous and the center there seems to be working closely with them. In Siberia, the center has several grantees throughout the region and again seems to be managing them well. Each region is at a different level of NGO development and the grants they give reflect and will continue to reflect these differences for a long time. In Central Russia, and particularly in the Moscow region, there are many sophisticated, experienced NGOs with professional leaders. In Siberia, the NGO movement has only recently started and is developing with some rapidity. In Southern Russia, in a conservative, pro-communist environment, the birth of NGOs is slower and requires more "from the ground up" support. The grants, then, for each of these regions will -- and should -- reflect these differences and be awarded carefully to help their NGOs develop their capabilities, not merely reward energetic groups with interesting ideas. Each NGO should be learning new skills that are necessary to achieve their missions.

All grantees could use more technical assistance and hopefully will occur through the proposed stronger emphasis on technical assistance in the second half of the project. Although the evaluation

would argue that the grant program should more diligently support the CIP objectives of NGO development and provide more monitoring and technical assistance, it is clear that the grant program is not dependent on the Consortium, and the Consortium as it stands today neither supports nor inhibits the program.

“Sound technical assistance in a timely manner?” The principal concern and focus of the CIP project today is training. In the future, the emphasis must shift more attention to technical assistance. It is difficult to say if the Consortium will be any more proactive and supportive in its technical assistance than it is today. Nevertheless, the ability to provide a range of expert technical assistance, directly or indirectly through national and international consultants, should be one of the prime criteria for continuing as a member of the Consortium for the second half of CIP.

“Has the consortium model supported/inhibited the project’s ability to...formulate roles of technical units and regional centers?” Here, the model has not been as significant, as the partners reveal their inability to develop integrated and coordinated support services. One can argue that the conventional prime contractor/sub-contractor arrangements are more controllable and more able to assure the deliver of contractual agreements.

According to members of the Consortium, reporting and communicating with USAID has often been difficult because of the many staff changes in the USAID project offices and difficulties in getting decisions made. Another obstacle has been the structure of the Consortium requiring that the different components communicate with their U.S. based offices first, who in turn communicate with USAID/Moscow. Also, the U.S. Program Committee seems to be too intrusive to communication within the project and the field management role that it often tries to play. One option would be for USAID to reduce the role of the Committee to a supportive and not a management one.

The current Consortium structure also seems to encumber the reporting systems and is a drain on the time and enthusiasm of the regional centers and the technical units. Currently, the regional center directors must regularly report to three (and in the case of the Siberian Center, four) management offices. Restructuring of the Consortium should include a significant simplification of reporting requirements. The current process does overburden the grantees and subgrantees. This is a problem that can be easily remedied by reducing the number of levels of reporting required from each member of the Consortium. If CIP management is streamlined, then it may be logical to make Save the Children the principal communication link with USAID. This should simplify the process considerably.

Cost effectiveness? As mentioned before, the Consortium model does not appear to be very cost beneficial. There are too many overheads and, in the case of one of the members of the Consortium, even full overhead on the overhead of one of its sub-grantees. Again, the evaluation will recommend steps to try to deal with this issue.

“Develop sustainable NGOs or NGO support activities.” In principal, this is the best role the Consortium should be able to play. Its members should be excellent sources of on-going support for training and technical assistance. But that has not happened. JHU has its very specific regional program and Counterpart, from the perspective of the evaluation, has not delivered the kinds of

support and coordinating resources it was supposed to. Again, Save the Children needs to assess the specific capabilities of each member of the Consortium as CIP goes into the second half to determine which ones have the specific resources the second half will need. The evaluation will try to contribute its recommendations in this report. In sum, it is the impression of the evaluation team that if the Consortium, as a model, had worked, it would have understood and directed the activities of the project better and would have provided essential components of the activities of the regional centers. Each member of the Consortium should have been known for its expertise in NGO organizational development and civic action, not simply trainers and technical advisors. Instead they tended to impose their particular agendas rather than develop collaborative strategies to achieve the strategic objectives of the project.

Most of the members of the Consortium interviewed seemed quite committed to giving their best efforts to being productive but felt very frustrated at not being able to do more than just produce what was asked of them. Each training component seems to be operating its own separate program, rather than as a part of a whole, unified project. There is little enthusiasm for facing the challenges of the project or feeling of ownership for the program as a whole among the Consortium members. The regional centers also feel the impact of this, resulting in a decreasing interest in, and receptivity to, what the technical units have to offer or are doing. This has reinforced the regional centers' desire to remain as independent as possible from the technical units and minimize the communication requirements with Moscow. Save the Children needs to take responsibility for their lack of Consortium leadership, resulting in so little collaboration. The fragmentation of the program is jeopardizing the potential impacts of CIP in Russia.

There have been a number of important exceptions to this, however. There is appreciation in the regions for the efforts and responsiveness of the social marketing unit, which has now placed a full-time representative from that unit in each region. The legal/legislative unit is valued because there is still much work to be done and few trained local lawyers and few NGOs members who understand the complex legal environment for the NGO sector. Also, ORT is well liked because it is straightforward in its promises and provides professional services with a professional attitude.

Consortium members have expressed frustration with USAID for changing program objectives at the time that the project was renamed "Democratic and Economic Reforms." Based on a thorough examination of relevant documents during the evaluation process, however, it appears that USAID's overall strategic objectives remained the same: strengthening the abilities of NGOs to increase "better informed participation in political and economic decision-making" based on a belief that "Non-governmental (NGOs) and private sector options are expanding the ability of citizens to influence the actions of government, business and community leaders on the issues which affect citizens' lives (SO.2.1)." The fact remains, however, that communications between the Consortium and USAID/Moscow suffered during this stage of the project's evolution, and the program became entirely focused on a single component: organizational development.

Lastly, no one seems to be "resolving implementation problems." The answer to the internal strains in the project seems to have been to isolate oneself from the others and operate as independently as possible. A great deal of time has been spent on internal conflicts rather than on project activities. Morale has been low and frustration is high. This is evidenced by considerable anxiety among

technical unit and regional center staff that the mid-term evaluation was going to upset the status quo again and once more change the objectives and program activities. Some key people have talked about leaving. Yet, there is still a deep commitment to CIP and this mid-term point in the program is a good time to realistically look at the problems and, for the sake of the Russian NGO sector, take strong steps to correct these issues through a new commitment to renewed goals for the remainder of the project

## **4.2 More Effective Use of TOT Program**

Cost is another serious question. Unless the TOTs can be used in full-time positions and support technical assistance in the regions, it is questionable that the overall cost for the TOT program can be justified. From a brief survey of costs, it would seem that the total cost for the development and involvement of each of the eventual 20 TOTs will be approximately \$60,000. This cost is rationalized by the argument that each of the TOTs will be used to train large numbers of NGO members. But in the future the NGOs will have to pay for their service. There is no assurance that many of the groups who most need the service will be able to afford the costs.

The proposal to hire several of the TOTs full-time seems a good rationalization of the cost and creates a greater likelihood that the intended multiplier effect will be achieved. In addition, TOTs should receive more specialist training to become expert technical advisors in areas important to civic action. This is critical to the future of the second phase of CIP.

## **4.3 Counterpart's Role and Responsibilities within the Consortium**

It is clear to the evaluation team that Counterpart's involvement in the program has presented an ongoing and serious problem for both Save the Children and the other members of the Consortium in their attempt to develop a unified, team approach to program implementation. On the organizational level, it is difficult at this stage to understand why Save the Children developed the current management arrangement with Counterpart (in its supervisory role with ORT and JHU), other than simply to fulfill the formal requirements of the original Request for Application document. Counterpart controls a disproportionately large budget in relation to its actual responsibilities and achievements in the field. It also seems questionable that Counterpart should receive full overhead on the direct costs of its subcontractors. An analysis of the fulfillment of the contractual responsibilities of Counterpart should be reviewed. On the level of actual programmatic cooperation among the Consortium members, most of the other members of the Consortium do not see Counterpart as a real member of the "team" and do not see any significant services in either providing or coordinating training.

For example, Counterpart did not deliver an adequate assessment of training needs, as required. (At training courses, its trainers use a four question written questionnaire that could not possibly serve the purpose of an assessment.) Nor has it provided large amounts of training so far: it focusses primarily on Central Russia/Moscow and its three new TSP training program for trainers will not realistically produce the skills the project needs. Some Consortium members reported incidents where Counterpart personnel expressed the "territorial imperative" of their activities and refused to collaborate. Based upon our observations, it seems that Counterpart, sensing the questions that have

been raised about the long-term impact of the TOT component, developed the TSP program more as competition with JHU than as a complementary initiative focusing on the real needs of NGOs. The plan to train TSP trainers suggests an inefficient use of time and money, given the current need for more in-depth training and the acquisition of expertise.

In any event, the Counterpart TSP program should have been a matter for serious discussion and analysis by the Consortium and its advisors. Given the importance of training and the presence of training expertise in the members of the Consortium, the decision should have either waited for the mid-term evaluation or at least have been thoroughly analyzed before moving ahead. Had the other members been fully informed about and invested in the program, perhaps the TSP concept could have been developed out of the TOT investment without attempting to introduce another training component in an already confused, uncoordinated program.

Given the many expressions of conflict between Counterpart and Save the Children and others, the relationships within the Consortium -- both in terms of program support as well as institutional cooperation -- must be reviewed and reassessed. The U.S. field representative of Counterpart was not in Russia during the evaluation to discuss these issues and the evaluation team could only report on the reactions of other members of the Consortium. In any event, the entire Consortium management structure needs reexamining, as well as the potential contributions of each member, if the Consortium is to fulfill the objectives of the remainder of CIP.

## **Section 5 Conclusions**

The CIP project is of great importance to the gradual unfolding of democratic processes in Russia. People are experiencing for the first time what democracy can do for their lives when they participate in the activities of an NGO or are the recipient of these actions. In Russia, because of the pressures of a weakened economy and dramatically changing social and political systems, the NGO sector has been called into existence as an institutional leg for the new Russian society. There is a New Democracy in which NGO/citizen participation is as vital to the functioning of society as government, public institutions and the private business sector. Those involved in the new NGO or Third Sector are fortunate to have the interest and support of USAID. But that interest and support comes with equally significant responsibilities -- to provide the best ideas, concepts, and resources the United States has to train and assist the NGO sector in Russia and to provide the best model for nurturing and sustaining this newborn community.

The mid-term evaluation compliments USAID for initiating this effort and providing a first leg to the NGO development process. This first phase of CIP can boast of contributing to the development of new NGOs and training them in important organizational development skills. However, the Civic Initiatives Program has been hampered by a limited understanding of what else is essential to achieve the very strategic objectives it has established.

### **5.1 Need for New Emphasis on Civic Action in Second Phase of the Project**

The second phase of the project must address the critical need to develop in the NGOs the skills to plan, implement, manage, and evaluate the programs for which the citizens created them. The NGOs exist to provide services that the community needs and the government or the private sector cannot provide. They also provide the power and motivation to participate actively and constructively in local governance.

Perhaps even more important to the development of democratic governing processes is the role the NGOs can play to educate people about key community issues and motivate and mobilize them to take constructive action with or without the assistance of government to solve those problems. However, this ability to organize civic action requires training in skills to plan, implement, manage, and evaluate; research the community; select appropriate action strategies and motivate people to change; get the resources necessary to bring about the action; and identify problems in the process that can then be corrected.

The second phase of CIP should be devoted to an increased focus on civic action skills and processes. This does not mean that new and old NGOs cannot turn to CIP for assistance in developing strong organizations. In fact, these additional program skills should be build on the organizational base developed in phase one, and CIP should continue to provide whatever organizational development skills NGOs may still need.

It is absolutely essential that everyone in this process understands the skills NGOs need to plan, implement, manage, and evaluate their programs -- especially the NGOs themselves. Within the next few months, CIP must organize activities to educate NGOs about the processes that are successful

in educating, motivating, and mobilizing citizens to achieve common program goals and the additional skills required to do this successfully.

An NGO must first define concretely what are its purposes and objectives -- its mission. For instance, is the NGO's purpose simply to make people aware of an issue? Or is it to give citizens information and "educate" them about the problem? Or both? Or is the mission of the NGO to motivate and mobilize citizens to take action to solve a community problem? Do they want to change the behavior of people? Do they want to persuade government to do something to satisfy the needs of citizens? A clear understanding by the NGOs of their mission, and an understanding by both the NGOs and those who are offering training and technical assistance of what these different NGOs need to be successful, are fundamental to the productive use of the resources that CIP can provide.

For example, the NGO in Novosibirsk that helps journalists in the region who write on the economy and have almost no access to national and international information is concerned with the problem of information, not with civic action. On the other hand, a highly motivated scientist of the Russian Geographical Society in Sochi is organizing a two-week cruise around the Black Sea ports to carry a message about environmental dangers, hoping to create public interest in blocking plans for the development of new port facilities. When asked about what the group will do to follow-up after the visit -- the action phase -- the project's organizer had no idea that it might be necessary to plan for organized public education and action after the cruise. Nor did she have any clear idea about how to go about this process.

"Southern Wave," an NGO that uses rock concerts to create awareness of social problems and provides public fora for citizens to voice opinions, also plans an environmental "Shock Wave" along the Black Sea coast, but knew nothing about the plans of the Russian Geographical Society. Here is an example of a special opportunity to launch a unified, potentially powerful civic action program, if only the two groups had been encouraged to communicate and plan together, and were equipped with the skills and resources to do it. Southern Wave also did not really understand its potential as a change agent.

In order to be more effective in responding to the needs of NGOs, each regional center must establish -- and in collaboration with each other to achieve some degree of standardization -- the criteria and guidelines for successful performance in each of the various kinds of NGOs and the various skills each group will need to achieve success. Today, most of the NGOs interviewed in the evaluation believe that some basic knowledge about fundraising, promotion and publicity, organizational development, accounting, and computer literacy are all that they need to be successful and sustainable organizations. In the instances cited above, the existing CIP emphasis on institutional development appears to have actually limited the NGOs' abilities to define their objectives and assess their own needs. A more responsive, client-driven design will enable NGOs to work collaboratively with program staff to assess their needs, plan creative strategies, and identify partners and resources in the surrounding community or beyond.

Aids InfoShare spends all its money on developing and distributing information about HIV infection and AIDS. But it can be demonstrated that information about AIDS is easily acquired but the

prevention is very difficult. The rate of sexually transmitted diseases is going up very rapidly, a predictor of near future HIV infection rates. AIDS InfoShare needs help to turn more of its energies into action programs such as condom social marketing for prevention. It really does not know how to do this or advise any of its network members on how to do this. It is interested in learning how to design a major action campaign and to develop itself into a supportive "hub NGO." Until then, it will continue to concentrate on its information activities for which it receives considerable funding.

Women Together was very eager to develop civic action skills so it can in turn organize and train the other similar groups in its network. The President of Women Together said that they need to teach their groups how to do community research, a spontaneous suggestion that was not prompted by the evaluation team.

NGOs need expert skills in planning, designing, implementing, managing, and monitoring and evaluating their programs and campaigns. Because some NGOs may not need the same kinds of skills as others, it is important to inventory the NGOs in each region to determine what their missions are, their levels of knowledge and experience in organizing and managing themselves as an NGO, and in developing and implementing successful programs, an assessment of both the organization and the people who make up its memberships, not just its leaders. Different NGOs may require vastly different training and technical assistance support, and the regional CIP centers must know this before they can plan the effective and efficient use of their resources.

The centers must also establish reasonable levels and standards of skills that must be attained to achieve successful and sustainable organizations and their programs. No one reasonably expects expertise after a brief training program; this can be more realistically achieved through training that is spread out over time with clearly communicated levels of the eventual expertise to be achieved. The important point here is that CIP must talk about strategies to develop expertise in the NGO community, and not simply be content to offer "basics," creating the mistaken belief among participating NGOs that such rudimentary skill levels are sufficient to achieve their missions successfully. Successful NGOs in the United States are experts in both the content of the issue and the process of civic education and action. In the words of a key administrator in the Moscow Mayor's Committee on Family and Youth, "the government must now depend on NGOs to provide social services because it does not have the money; NGOs must be and often are more expert in doing so and are better equipped technologically because they have access to international resources."

This proposal to refocus the CIP project to civic action is based on the professional expert judgment of the evaluation team and the recognition by experts in NGO/citizen participation in local governance that demonstrable success in achieving the missions of the NGOs is what brings support for sustainability. In Poland and Romania, the DIALOG projects are so important in local governance that the mayors of over twenty-five cities in Poland and nearly that number in Romania have asked for participation in the program. The priority training and technical support for the projects has been in planning and implementing civic action programs.

The community's self-interest is served by these NGOs. At the same time, experience has shown that the skills required in achieving this success are complex and must be provided to the committed NGO. Some NGOs working on issues that are dramatically urgent can develop community support

with little organization and program skills. But most often this happens because of the urgency of the issue. Most NGOs have to work hard to convince others to become involved in solving community problems.

It is the judgment of the evaluation team that the present CIP program does not provide enough training in those skills necessary to successful civic action and is giving the impression to the NGOs that organizational skills are sufficient. Organizational skills give no assurance that an NGO will survive and in fact the team was told that of the large number of NGOs created, very few do survive. The best means of increasing this survivability and providing and sustaining support to the development of democratic processes and citizen initiatives is to provide them with the many critical skills in the planning, implementation, management, and evaluation of their programs. In fact, some skills have been introduced already as part of the organizational development phase: social marketing, promotion and public relations, media relations, and legal and legislative support for NGOs.

In terms of resources, CIP has, directly and through its network of advisors and consultants, many of the training and technical assistance skills for civic action: for example, program planning, community development, motivation, community research, evaluation, coalition building, NGO-local government relations, and promotion and access to experts that can provide technical assistance on the issues various NGOs address.

If CIP focusses on civic action, Save the Children, as project manager, must reassess the capabilities of each of the current Consortium members to determine which ones have the skills, experiences, and resources needed and which ones, if any, may no longer be required. Continuation in the Consortium should be determined on the basis of the adequacy of these resources. CIP may no longer need some of the costly inputs from all of the current members of the Consortium.

A critical objective of the remainder of the project has to be the training and development of Russian experts so that they can support the regional centers, their filial centers, and key NGO networks. The resources of the Consortium must therefore be focussed on developing these new experts as soon as possible. There are several excellent candidates that met with the evaluation team.

The grants program must also be fully integrated into the civic action phase. Participating NGOs will grow substantially in skills and in reputation from their successes. Therefore the micro-grants component should contain adequate technical assistance and training support so that the activities of the grants serve as important learning experiences as well as demonstrations of how to be successful in delivering services, educating and mobilizing citizens and government to solve community issues collaboratively. It can strengthen and help institutionalize the role of NGOs in community governance. Institutional development grants can help develop the regional and local support centers that NGOs will need for the next several years especially for the new NGOs that will appear as they see others achieve success.

Therefore, the strategy to achieve this focus on civic action should include an assessment of the experiences, skills, and resources of the current members of the Consortium, identification and development of national and regional experts in training and technical assistance in NGO civic

action as well as organizational development, a renewed micro- and institutional grants programs that will support the development of experience and skills in civic action, and access to national and international experts as needed.

Key members of the Consortium, the coordinators of the regional centers, and several of the NGOs interviewed support the focus on civic action and have offered their institutional capabilities to support this effort. The CIP Moscow office, particularly Save the Children, has the job of pulling all this together and serving as a major support to the identification of needed regional, national, and international experts. This will require thorough discussion and agreement as to what the focus means, what resources are needed, and how best to provide them. Save the Children will have to assume a strong leadership and facilitation role. A planning meeting in each region should be the first step.

## **5.2 Need for Restructuring the Consortium**

To move to this second phase requires commitments from all participants in CIP, USAID, the members of the Consortium, the regional centers, and the NGOs and their members. Each must understand and agree on what civic action processes are and the skills needed to implement their civic action programs successfully. There must be a commitment to provide the best possible training and technical assistance during this last phase of CIP.

To accomplish this critical goal, the evaluation recommends that USAID restructure the Consortium as quickly as possible. The project and USAID have been hampered by a ponderous, dysfunctional consortium of institutions that have not served the program adequately. Members must be committed to move beyond the program's first phase -- organizational development -- to the crucial second phase of building program skills to make both CIP and its NGOs reach their strategic objectives.

The membership has never developed into a true consortium -- a team of mutually interdependent resources committed to the same common purpose. Instead, because of the many reasons already mentioned, each began to drive its component of the project in accordance with its own agenda. The confusion of institutional objectives and frequent lack of leadership to sort out the complex objectives/strategies/structure web, help redefine the project, and integrate the components of the Consortium have resulted in a Moscow office of the project that is Consortium-driven, rather than NGO-driven, and unintentionally encouraged the regional centers into distancing themselves into independence.

It has been difficult to filter reality from hostility between Save the Children and Counterpart, the two leading members of the Consortium. Anecdotes from both agencies are accusatory and conflicting. In any event, the tensions are real and the result has been destructive. Whatever may be the full truth, it is clear that both agencies did not provide the kind of in-country leadership and management skills that CIP required.

Those are the mistakes of the past. Today, this evaluation is recommending an opportunity for both agencies to show their capabilities to provide the resources that are critical to the final success of the project. This call is also directed at the whole Consortium. A refocus of the project on civic action

means a reassessment of the capabilities of all current CIP partners to determine if they can provide the professional and expert training and technical assistance that will be needed and if they have the willingness and ability to act cooperatively as a "team." The entire management of CIP needs to be restructured to be more functional, more streamlined, with more direct communication for decision-making, not a labyrinth of communication links and requirements that have resulted in the components of CIP moving off in their own self-propelled directions. This burden, it seems to the evaluation team, is by contractual agreement, the responsibility of Save the Children which, itself, must review with vigor its own capabilities and take on the leadership of CIP with a new commitment to professional excellence.

Counterpart has its own difficult responsibilities now. There is widespread hostility against Counterpart because of both program and personnel factors. That, too, is the past. However, unless Counterpart and Save the Children can restore comfort in their relationship and unless Counterpart can demonstrate that it can provide the level of professional resources needed for training and technical assistance in civic action, Counterpart should end its participation in CIP. The project cannot afford to spend the next year or two with these wasteful internal conflicts, ineffective in-country management, and independence of institutional agendas.

Given the criticisms of its work and relationships, Counterpart now has the task of resolving these issues and prove its is essential to the remainder of CIP. The need for a separate Consortium member to plan and coordinate training is in itself questionable. The lead agency could have managed that responsibility from the beginning. But that was not the project implementation plan that was created. Nevertheless, it is time for that plan to be reviewed to determine whether or not, today and with a different programmatic focus, that separation is indeed useful.

Counterpart is angry that the evaluation team has inaccurate information from members of the Consortium about its activities and insists that there is adequate data to commend its achievements. In fact, there is little documented evaluation of any CIP activity and the only external evaluation the evaluation team saw of Counterpart's training was an evaluation of business training programs for women in Russia in 1995, not a part of CIP, and some of the brief evaluations by participants after NGO training workshops, evaluation that are rarely objective and reliable. Counterpart blames JHU for not developing the evaluation instrument and process as it had agreed to. JHU says that it is now working on a serious evaluations of its programs as well. In any event, there has been no objective, serious evaluations to date.

Now it is critical that all of these internal strains be resolved immediately. This will require a willingness of all parties and perhaps the participation of USAID Moscow to first decide which of the Consortium members can really provide expertise in supporting civic action and a willingness to participate in a new management structure. That is the reality test that must take the place of anecdotal praise or criticism. All of the key members of the Consortium have contributed to the situation today, some more than others. But the key members of the CIP project are the Russians who are meant to benefit from the CIP. Open and honest assessments of the capabilities of each contributing member of the Consortium and the other technical assistance agencies involved must occur so that the project can get back on a constructive track and off the battlefield.

Success in the second half of the project requires substantial restructuring of the Consortium. The internal hostilities, discontentment and frustrations must end. These are costly and embarrassing to USAID as well as to the members of the institutions. Furthermore, the Russians involved in CIP are aware of these internal problems. CIP should be an example of the best American skills in training and technical assistance, a model that the Russians would enjoy emulating. Sadly, they too often witness inefficiency, wasted resources, and American openness in criticizing each other.

All of the members of the Consortium are eager to see a “new dawn.” This must be achieved within the next three months before new niches are established and a new status quo develops. The regional centers have given fair warning; they feel that they need very little from Moscow and are happier to be away from the internal tensions.

Restructuring of the Consortium means serious and difficult steps to remove some of the problems that the original Consortium concepts and arrangements created. It may be politically difficult. There is too much competition for limited USAID money these days and contractors will fight hard for these funds.

#### U.S. Program Committee

The role of the U.S. Program Committee should be limited to occasional consultation and should serve as a source of possible training and technical assistance resources. It should not play a direct management role. CIP has too many managers today, costing too much, and providing unnecessary and ineffective management, each trying to find a management role rather than being useful as a technical resource. Save the Children, with the support of USAID, should reexamine the involvement of the organizations responsible for coordinating the field centers. Unless there is clear evidence that these groups can support civic action and are necessary to support the field centers, they should be terminated by the end of 1996.

### **5.3 Need for Increased Responsiveness to NGO Needs**

There is now general agreement among many of the NGOs interviewed that the real “viability” of their organizations would come from the successful delivery of the services the NGO said it would provide to its constituents. Those who believed that fundraising and promotions, along with computers and faxes, meant sustainability were being misled. Now these NGOs need help to really become sustainable and viable by being successful civic educators and participants in community governance, giving to their members and the community what they expected from their NGO.

The overall conclusion from the too-brief evaluation is that CIP is a very important project that has the potential of becoming a major contributor to the development of structures, systems, and experiences for the evolution of democratic and economic reforms. The first phase made significant contributions to the development and strengthening of many NGOs throughout the regions in which CIP has worked. Now the project must move quickly into the second phase in which the NGOs will learn to create civic education and action and successfully play a role in social and political life in Russia that is now open to the citizen for the first time. They must be successful at this to become

credible, given the history of government in Russia to manipulate citizens and NGOs to serve its political purposes.

#### **5.4 Strengthening the Regional Centers**

To establish and implement this new focus, full attention needs to be given to strengthening the regional centers, the centers in their filial cities, and key NGOs with networks of other NGOs with similar missions. The Consortium must respond to that direction and provide its best resources directly and indirectly through its local, national, and international training and technical assistance advisors and consultants. Creating a significant roster of Russian experts in all of these skills is one of the priority goals to be achieved before the end of the project.

However, the new focus on program skills means the regional centers will need the best resources in Moscow, from the Consortium, and from external consultants. It is the responsibility of the Consortium and USAID to regroup and plan together with the regional centers what and how this new direction will be best served. This planning must also occur within the next three months before some of the current, less-focused activities become further institutionalized.

#### **5.5 Extension of Funding for Regional Centers**

As mentioned above, the restructuring of the Consortium toward a client-driven, civic action model will require an extension of funding to the regional centers for one year after September 1997, that is until 1998. The centers could, of course, use more time, but one year might be more realistic, looking at resources that might be available.

#### **5.6 Regional Structure**

The biggest challenge now facing the program is, how should the second half of the CIP program be structured to achieve the strategic objectives of the Democracy and Economic Reform project? Building on resources and systems already established, what new resources and strategies will be needed?

Given the apparent effectiveness of the regional centers as well as their relative independence from the Moscow-based activities of CIP, the evaluation proposes that the CIP program further develop and strengthen three NGO support centers as hubs for the cities within each region that would in turn strengthen the capacities of "filial cities" in the region as "sub-hubs." Emphasis should also be placed on identifying and strengthening key NGOs that can help develop other NGOs that are part of a network of NGOs with similar interests and, of course, individual NGOs -- small and large -- that may appear as community needs arise. Examples of "key NGOs hubs" are AIDS InfoShare and Women Together.

To date, hubs have been successfully established at the Siberian Center in Novosibirsk and the Southern Russian Center in Krasnodar. In addition, it is recommended here that CIP should establish a third center in Moscow for Central Russia building on current activities in the region and plans to use the Marshak Foundation as a training, and eventually a technical assistance resource.

Because of the size of the country, it is important to ensure that CIP has a significant impact on the NGOS/Third Sector movement in the country. This can only be achieved if CIP's influence and resources are available throughout the country, not just in Siberia and a portion of Southern Russia. In response to this problem, the Eurasia Foundation has recently begun preparation for the establishment of NGO resource centers in several parts of the country. (Here, we would make a strong recommendation for active collaboration with the Eurasia Foundation.)

The focus must be on the regions, since that is clearly where NGO activity can be best supported. Apart from the chronic resistance of Siberian and Southern Russian citizens to aggressive leadership from Moscow, distance alone precludes any serious, constant support from a central Moscow headquarters. Therefore, these regional and sub-regional hubs should be strengthened to provide expert training and technical assistance for NGO organization and program development. CIP must become client-driven, rather than project and contractor-driven as it seems to be so often.

The focus of CIP must shift to strategies for strengthening the capacities of the regional centers to provide on-going professional training and technical assistance to help NGOs accomplish their missions successfully. That means that training and technical assistance are provided in response to well-researched needs. These will depend on the kind of NGO and its missions -- awareness, information/education, motivation for change, or all of these -- and the levels of knowledge of the issue an NGO is addressing and its abilities to design programs and processes to achieve their objectives. Training should no longer be offered on the basis of a pre-determined schedule but in response to specific needs.

If the focus of the second half of CIP is an emphasis on program delivery -- social service and civic action -- the critical first step is to be sure that everyone in CIP, in the regions and in Moscow, both understands and accepts this direction, and understands and plans for training and technical assistance to support the NGOs in their respective regions.

Once the regional centers are prepared to provide training and technical assistance to support NGO program activities, they must then determine how to do so directly and indirectly, i.e., by center staff and external national and perhaps even international consultants. It is important to note here that the emphasis is on both training and technical assistance. Many of the NGOs interviewed asked for technical assistance as a follow-up to their training. Sometimes this was expressed in the phrase: "more in-depth" training. But some of these NGOs need a consultant to advise on fundraising strategies, not another training program. Support for developing skills in the process of planning civic action programs may also require short-term consultancies in both the content of the issue and the process of public education and mobilization.

The CIP process must now become client-driven, responding to a careful analysis and understanding of the needs of the NGOS to successfully deliver their missions. After all, the best way for an NGO to find support is to deliver a successful product that generates the interest of government, the general public and potential constituents. Support for an NGO that delivers "the goods" is much easier to achieve than fundraising on the basis of a promise by an organization and its technology.

If this “hub” idea is to work, what are the specific steps that should be taken at the regional and Moscow levels? First, the regional centers must accept the focus on service and civic action in the second half of the program with continuing support for the organizational aspects of NGO development. Conversations with the center staffs found them very interested and supportive. However, they all felt that they needed more time to accomplish these objectives successfully.

The evaluation team agrees with the need for additional time to complete the program, and recommends that the regional center component of the CIP project be extended to one year from the current end-of-project date of September 1997 to September 1998. To cut them off in April 1997 would make it impossible to develop adequately both the resources for the new focus and to provide enough time for NGOs to put into practice what they have learned from training and technical assistance in program development. Savings in the management and in projected services of the current members of the Consortium should be reviewed to determine if funds could be shifted to make the extension possible.

## **5.7 Training and Technical Assistance**

How can CIP best provide the training and technical assistance for the new focus? First, the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the JHU TOT programs must be reexamined. By the end of the current CIP program, twenty TOTs will have been trained. Once trained, they are expected to be on call for a few days each quarter. One TOT in Novosibirsk and one in Krasnodar are to work full-time, paid by Counterpart, not JHU. The others will be on call.

### **5.7.1 Full Time TOTs**

The evaluation recommends that two or three TOTs in each region, selected by JHU and the regional office, be hired full-time to provide both training and technical assistance support for the region, training others to provide similar support in the filial cities and in those NGOs that can serve as a resource hub for their networks. These full-time TOTs will provide the training and technical assistance services themselves or identify competent trainers and consultants within the region, from other cities, and from other countries, if necessary. They will work closely with the CIP technical units in Moscow to assist them by providing training experts and technical advisors from the technical unit staffs or, as requested, identify and propose other national and international experts.

This means that the full-time regional TOTs will first have to understand what skills are required to develop effective NGO programs and campaigns, and TOTs will need to develop those skills for themselves on an expert level. Some of the current TOTs and the majority of those in training seem to be on the way to developing that expert level in a few of these skills. However, JHU does not suggest that they are at that level. Therefore, JHU proposes that, first, careful criteria of selection must be established to ensure that TOTs interested in full-time assignments in the regional centers come with high qualifications in training methods and a good start in the technical skill in which they are to become expert.

In addition, JHU proposes three one-week special training workshops in those areas of expertise to be developed in the TOTs, such as program planning, community research methods, small group

dynamics, communication strategies, and evaluation. These workshops would be scheduled to allow sufficient time for adequate practice of the new skills. Other non-TOTs with the potential for developing these expert skills could also be included in the training.

The employment and development of these full-time TOTs does not preclude a regional center from using other experts before and after the expert training of the TOTs. Ultimately, the training and technical resources should come from the center, but realistically there will always be a need for outside content experts and specialists in planning, research, communication strategies, evaluation, and other skills related to recruiting and motivating participation in the NGO program missions.

### **5.7.2 Social Marketing**

In terms of readily available resources in the area of social marketing and communication, CIP/Moscow's Chris Ebner has considerable expertise in planning public campaigns, advertising and marketing campaigns. Mr. Ebner's experience can be very relevant to NGOs, and he should be invited to shift much of his efforts away from promotion and public relations to training and technical assistance in planning NGO campaigns. The people he has assigned to work in the regional centers are very eager to learn these skills and should be trained as soon as possible. The Director of the Russian American Press Center in Novosibirsk is about to conduct a series of focus groups to learn about audience interests. The social marketing specialist assigned by Mr. Ebner to the center does not know how to conduct focus groups, an important and practical technique for community research, but is very interested in developing these skills and other practical research methods.

The social marketing unit can therefore play an important role in supporting civic action both by providing training and technical assistance directly to NGOs and, more importantly, developing the skills of Russian trainers and technical advisors at all levels: national, regional, and local. The skills that it can bring to civic action include program planning, community research methods (e.g. focus groups, interviews, observations, demographic research), communication and motivational strategies, program monitoring and evaluation, and the management of program implementation. The unit can continue to provide its current support for public communication, media promotions, public relations, and the design, testing, and production of media and informational materials, all important to civic action. Chris Ebner is very enthusiastic about providing all of these resources.

The social marketing staff assigned to the regional centers and some of the people from Galubka and Focus in Moscow are very interested in the program planning and implementation processes and are good candidates to become Russian experts in training and technical assistance for civic action. The social marketing unit, together with national and international experts, can move quickly to support the civic action program.

## **5.8 Central Russia**

Conceptually, the hub model proposed in this report already exists, except for the absence of a formal, site-based regional center in Central Russia. The only step in that direction is the grant to the Marshak Foundation to serve as a Central Russian training center. Following are recommendations

for building a Central Russian regional center with a similar impact to that currently achieved in Siberia and Southern Russia:

- Identify an existing association of NGOs in the region and provide some technical and financial assistance to develop its capacities to be a support center;
- Identify a specific existing NGO and assist it to become the regional center;
- Work with the Marshak Foundation to broaden its mandate and its ability to provide training and technical assistance;
- Collaborate with the Eurasia Foundation to develop a new Central Russian NGO support center; and
- Create a separate and identifiable regional center in the Moscow offices.

The Central Russian regional center should be established in Moscow because of the access to a wide range of available training and technical assistance resources. A decision should be made as soon as possible so that coordinated planning of the roles and resources of the regional centers for the second half of the CIP project can begin immediately.

## **5.9 Strengthening of Regional Centers as Hubs**

What should the regional centers look like and what should they be doing?

- First, the centers must understand and commit themselves to serving as hubs to strengthen the abilities of their “filial cities” to train and provide technical assistance to NGOs in their respective regions.
- Second, the regional centers must develop their own expertise in both training and technical assistance and accept the new emphasis on technical consultation in both issue content and program delivery processes and skills to successfully deliver the services and civic actions that are their stated missions.
- Third, the regional centers must educate their constituent NGOs in what personal and organizational skills and processes they need to be successful in their programmatic activities.
- Fourth, the regional centers must regularly conduct assessments of the needs for training and technical assistance that the differing NGOs in their regions will need, their current levels of knowledge of the issues they are addressing and processes, skills, and resources to implement their programs, and the levels of performance their activities require.

- Fifth, the regional centers must establish more standardized levels of performance that training programs must achieve and must regularly evaluate the impact of the training programs as well as the effectiveness of the training methods used.
- Sixth, the regional centers must be committed to helping interested NGOs become experts in both the issues they are addressing and the processes by which they will achieve their missions.
- Seventh, the regional centers will continue to provide training and technical assistance to all NGOs for establishment, management, and organizational sustainability.
- Eighth, the regional centers need to meet regularly with the technical units of CIP/ Moscow to plan together what resources will be needed and who will provide them in response to the needs of the NGOs the regional centers serve.
- Ninth, each regional center should establish a Planning Group of key and active local NGOs, local government representatives, and representatives of other community organizations and institutions to advise the center on policies and programs.

The hubs in the “filial cities” should also follow these criteria, substituting “regional center” for CIP/Moscow, that is, the “sub-hub” filial cities would follow these steps, provide their services to NGOs in their localities, and be supported in their development and services by the training and technical assistance resources from the regional centers and, if necessary, from Moscow.

The resource components of the regional centers will still include training and technical assistance in organizational development, sustainability, public relations and promotions, and legal and legislative support for NGOs. The proposed focus on NGO program delivery will require training and technical assistance in developing skills in program planning, community research, communication and motivational strategies, small group processes, monitoring and evaluation, and other management skills supportive of program implementation.

In response to the concerns of many of the NGOs interviewed, a major new emphasis is on more in-depth training and expert technical consultation to NGOs. In many instances it was technical consultation that was now being requested, rather than more training. Technical assistance will also reinforce and support the new skills learned in training and being put into practice in programmatic activities. The overall objective is to develop expert personal and organizational knowledge of the issues of concern to an NGO and the skills in planning and implementing the processes to achieve its objectives.

### **5.10 Role of CIP Moscow in Support of the “Hub” Model**

The extension of the CIP project to support the “hub” model needs continued, but somewhat reduced, support from the CIP Moscow technical units. If the stress is on developing the regional resources to sustain local NGOs, then the technical units will be needed to provide training of local and regional experts and expert technical assistance. Save the Children can usefully play the role of

coordinator of training and technical assistance support directly without a secondary institution. It may need only a few people, perhaps those currently employed, to concentrate on those services. JHU has already proposed a program to develop the expertise of the TOTs that might be hired full time in the regions. After the current JHU coordinator leaves in June 1996, JHU will ask its Eastern European Regional Director to maintain periodic supervision of the program while Save the Children's training and technical assistance coordination would work directly with JHU for its periodic training cycles to work with the TOTs (the three, one week sessions each year).

EDC would continue its activities and add those in support of planning public education and civic action. CFD, ORT, and other Russian training and technical assistance organizations and individuals would be rostered by CIP Moscow and called on to meet the needs of the extended program. Given that the Central Russian center is less structured today than are the other two centers, it may need more direct attention of CIP Moscow to advance its development. In sum, the extension of the regional program will need an extension of the support services of CIP Moscow for the same period of time.

## **5.11 Extension of CIP**

The proposed extension of the regional centers until September 1998 should include all three centers: Siberia, Southern Russia, and Central Russia. This extension will require some continued technical assistance from the CIP office in Moscow. The following schedule is suggested:

In 1997:

### Save the Children

Save the Children will provide overall management of CIP to support the technical units and the technical units will report directly to Save the Children. Save the Children will assure the fullest collaboration between Counterpart, JHU, EDC, CFD, ORT, and itself in planning and implementing all training and technical assistance;

A new and acceptable relationship with Counterpart must be established. Otherwise Save the Children will have to be responsible directly for recruiting and placing trainers and technical assistance consultants other than those provided by JHU, EDC, and CFD.

Save the Children must also be responsible for arranging an independent evaluation of training and technical assistance needs and of the impact of training and technical assistance;

Save the Children will hire a Russia CIP director before the end of 1997.

### JHU

In collaboration with Save the Children and EDC, JHU will conduct a needs assessment of skills required for civic action and evaluate and then continue training of the full time TOTs to strengthen their skills in training and specific technical skills relevant to the components of civic action and continue and complete the Russification process;

JHU will provide an overdue internal evaluation of the training and technical assistance program;

JHU should have a full time Russian coordinator in CIP Moscow by the end of calendar year 1996.

EDC

In collaboration with Save the Children and JHU, EDC will train NGO members in planning civic action campaigns and identify and train trainers to do so. They will continue to train NGOs in how to develop communication and promotional activities and work with the media, and they will aim to complete the Russification process;

EDC will conduct an internal evaluation of the effectiveness of the training and technical assistance in civic action program planning and communication skill development;

EDC should continue to have a full time Russian coordinator in CIP Moscow by mid- 1997;.

CFD

CFD will continue current activities and develop programs for the development of Russian experts in NGO law and legislation;

ORT

ORT will continue computer training activities as required. As a Russian NGO, it is considered "russified."

1998:

Save the Children

Save the Children will continue to manage the CIP project but the U.S. CIP directors will serve as technical advisors to the Russian CIP director;

JHU

JHU will continue its development of new TOTs as trainers and technical advisors and provide occasional national and international technical assistance as required;

EDC

EDC will continue to provide occasional national and international technical assistance, as required;

CFD

A decision to continue CFD in fiscal year 1988 will depend on accomplishments in 1997; that will be determined no later than September 1997;

ORT

ORT will continue, if needed and on request of new NGOs; NGOs will be required to cover a portion of the costs for computer training.

## **5.12 Training and Technical Assistance Needs Assessments and Evaluation**

Training and technical assistance in the second half of CIP needs to become more sensitive to the different levels of needs and competence. This will require the assessment of the need of various types of NGOs and their leaders and members in contrast to the current emphasis on institutional needs assessment. The training and technical assistance program must explain to participating NGOs and their members what skills different kinds of NGOs need to be successful, not only in organizational structure but in designing and implementing their missions. Again, most of the NGOs interviewed believe that success will come from having participated in training courses in fundraising, strategic planning, promotions and publicity (including how to work with the media), computer literacy, and having secured the presence of a computer, modem, and fax. Few have any understanding of the need to develop program planning and implementation processes and skills.

## **5.13 Evaluation of Training Program**

In addition to the assessment and standardization of skills, training programs must be evaluated to find out how well they are really providing the knowledge and experience needed by the participating NGOs. Today, the only real feedback is anecdotal, the most common response being, "some good, some bad." There is certainly a widespread enthusiasm from the NGOs interviewed for the training they have received, but they have little or no understanding of the standards by which their training should be assessed. The evaluation team assumes that the training has been adequate because of the enthusiasm of the NGOs interviewed. But it would serve the project to do a more scientific assessment to determine which training methods, what content and curricula, and what kinds of schedules were the most effective and should be replicated by future Russian trainers. Given the large investment of the project's resources in training, to what extent was the training adequate? Johns Hopkins University (JHU) agrees that its Training of Trainers (TOT) program should be evaluated and intends to do so soon. Counterpart has also indicated that it is ready for JHU to evaluate its program's impact and effectiveness as well.

CIP must determine the current needs for any training and especially the training needs for the focus on civic action. Once the needs have been established, then the technical units can determine their training to adequately respond to those needs.

Past training programs need to be evaluated to understand the extent of their impact on the performances of the NGOs, if they were relevant to the real needs of the participants, and how well this training was done and how well those responsible for the training organized and delivered the training. Counterpart was supposed to coordinate training but in reality provided a few courses itself, conducted a training series for NGO leaders in Moscow, but left most of the actual training to JHU, EDC, and the other technical units. Counterpart is more often in competition with JHU than in coordination with it. A fundamental question is to what extent is Counterpart or any other component of the technical units necessary to the implementation of the CIP project.

Also, CIP must give technical assistance more emphasis. Therefore, the questions must be asked: which members of the Consortium are able to give needed training and technical services that other members cannot do? Which members can provide the training and technical assistance services that the proposed focus on civic action will require?

A training evaluation should ask, first, how was the training content determined, based on what needs and to achieve what objectives? How well was it organized, how were the curricula designed and developed, how was the training program received, and what was the impact of the training on the performance of the participants? What are criteria by which CIP should evaluate the past training programs? Here are some suggested questions:

- To what extent were training programs based on the assessment of the specific needs of specific NGOs or groups of NGOs?
- How were these needs determine? What sample of NGOs was used? Who conducted the needs assessment? Using what instruments?
- Who designed the training curricula?
- What skills were to be taught in the course? Who determined these skill learning objectives?
- For each training course, how much time was allotted for training? How was this decision made? By whom?
- What training methodologies were used? How were the trainers trained to deliver the courses?
- What was the evaluation of the course by the participants?
- Who else observed and evaluated the course?
- To what extent are the skills taught in a specific course being used by the participants in that course? Which ones are not being used or only partially being used? How are the use of these skills being measured?
- To what extent were these skills relevant to the responsibilities of the participants and the missions of their NGOs?
- What is the assessment of the specific training programs by the staffs of the regional centers?
- What related additional training and skills are the participants in the original training asking for?
- To what extent was technical assistance follow-up consultation asked for by the participants and provided by the responsible training support group and/or other support services?

Second, how well have the training programs been developed, coordinated with the regional centers, organized and implemented?

- Were the training programs developed in response to specific needs?
- Which member(s) of the Consortium decided on the topic and timing of the training course? To what extent was the training program offered as part of a training cycle as compared to developed in response to a skill need of the NGOs?
- Who had the responsibility for organizing the training and developing the curriculum?
- Who determined what and when the courses would be offered?
- To what extent were the training groups and the regional centers able to provide follow-up technical assistance after the training?
- To what extent were the training programs developed in collaboration with the other members of the Consortium and the regional centers? To what extent were the training programs coordinated with and integrated into the activities of the regional centers?

The most important issue for the future is the competencies of each member of the Consortium to provide training and technical assistance in all the skills relevant to civic action and to work together as a team. Which members and other trainers, consultants, and advisors can provide the resources necessary to make the second half of CIP successful?

Other questions that remain to be asked include: Which trainers are prepared to train NGOs in program planning skills? What levels of skills do these trainers have today and what training do they need to be able to train others? Many can provide training in organizational skills, but are there any that are expert enough to tackle in-depth training in program development skills? JHU recognizes the problem and is prepared to begin the process of developing the expertise of the TOTs to support the focus on program action in the second half of the project.

#### **5.14 Need for Indigenous Expertise**

The assessment of these needs will be achieved, not from a brief impersonal questionnaire, but from focus groups and individual interviews that go beyond self-assessment. As Russian NGO leaders will tell you, questionnaires have little value in determining the needs or opinions of Russian citizens. There are Russians capable of expert qualitative research who should be identified and actively involved in this assessment process.

The training interventions must constantly be monitored to be sure that this expensive investment is productive. In addition to the TOTs who may be selected to develop content as well as training expertise, both CIP/Moscow and the regional centers need to identify Russian experts, use the

limited number of Russian experts in civic action, bring in occasional U.S. and other foreign experts, and continue to train and expand the number of potential Russian civic action experts.

The evaluation team met several Russians who have been trained in the TOT program or have had other experiences and training that show that they are candidates for development as expert trainers and as technical consultants (such as the members of FOCUS) in working with NGOs to help them plan their civic action campaigns. Also, Chris Ebner could extend his unit's contributions by training the people he has placed in Novosibirsk and Krasnodar in campaign planning and community research methods.

### **5.15 Focus That Includes Members As Well As Leaders**

There is an important caution. Training must not be exclusively focused on NGO leaders. Their active members must also be trained. Otherwise, the training process may result in the creation of a new, domineering hierarchy in the NGO sector that will resemble the centralized control that the country has lived under for so long. Today there is top-to-bottom lack of knowledge and understanding of what is needed to do effective civic action. Experiences with the DIALOG project in Poland and Romania demonstrate the importance of training the membership and not just the leaders to develop and motivate civic education and action from the groups, and build long-term support from the constituent members.

When local government sees an entire organization capable of moving a community to action to solve priority problems, it takes the group seriously and will respond with financial and service support from the government. If nothing else, "the members of these groups vote," explained the Mayor of a town in Poland as he recently announced the intention of the local government to contribute to the organizational and program activities of the new DIALOG group there.

### **5.16 Grants Program**

As mentioned, the grants program also needs to be more focused on the development and application of processes and skills in achieving program/mission objectives. Although many of the current grants seem to support program activities, these and future grants should be more rigorously used to help the recipients develop and strengthen their capacities to plan, implement, and manage their programs, especially when they are directed to civic action.

#### **5.16.1 Need for New Criteria**

Therefore, new grant criteria should be established that gives priority to NGOs whose programs will directly contribute to strengthening the development of citizen-initiated civic education and action programs. These criteria might include:

- program activities that address a community issue that has been described as priority through some kind of community research process;

- preliminary program plans that describe what the program objectives are and how they relate to the purpose of the NGO and how the program objectives are expected to be achieved;
- NGOs willing and interested in technical assistance in planning their programs both for the preparation of the grant proposal and during the implementation of the grant; and
- NGOs that are committed to long-term social service and civic action programs.

### **5.16.2 Emphasis on Local Collaboration**

Grants should be awarded to both NGOs that propose collaboration with local government to deal with community problems and more local, neighborhood-based problems that NGOs will try to solve without government involvement. In each instance, the regional centers should be ready to provide the NGOs with technical consultation in both the issues and the civic action process, both for the development of the proposal and throughout the grant period. The grants awarded without continuous monitoring and technical assistance will not take full advantage of the possibilities that CIP provides for the real development and strengthening of NGOs.

The grants program should also give special attention to NGOs that have branches in several communities or are active and influential members of a network of NGOs with the same or similar objectives. An important part of the CIP strategy for the second half of the project should be to strengthen the abilities of key NGOs that will become hubs for the training and technical assistance of other NGOs in their networks. The regional centers and the central CIP office should actively seek out such NGOs as potential grant recipients, if they meet the other grant program criteria.

## **5.17 Russification**

The evaluation team recommends the acceleration of the process of “Russification” of the regional centers. Both centers remain dominated by the American presence, an influence most of the Russians welcome but are eager to begin to “take over.” The center directors agree. The American presence continues to be useful both for the information and experience it brings and the intermediary role the third party plays. But the CIP project will end in only a few years at most. Therefore, it is critical to begin the process of determining how soon the Russification process can be completed, with a clear time line and transparency of the process of selecting Russian directors.

### **5.17.1 Developing a Transition Timeline**

The difficult questions that need to be asked at this point include: When will the Americans have transferred enough of their “technology” in program and management skills as well as knowledge of the process of effective civic action? When is the best moment to introduce Russian management and American technical assistance rather than management? What should be the process of identifying and appointing the Russian managers? And what investment should USAID consider to help sustain the regional centers after the departure of the Americans? For instance, should USAID be asked to create endowments so that there is some assurance that the centers can continue for at least a few years after its departure?

## **5.18 Need for Immediate Action**

The general impression of the evaluation team is that the process of answering these questions and addressing these problems must begin immediately. It will probably be useful to actually begin to set specific dates, even for longer-term goals, so that management changes are not sudden and do not trigger internal conflicts within the centers. At the regional centers in particular, the sudden loss of the great strength and capability of the current leadership could pose significant problems for both remaining staff and the NGO community, if the transfer of responsibility is not handled sensitively and openly.

### **5.18.1 Development of Transition Planning Groups**

The creation of Planning Groups for each regional center will also help support the Russification process. The advice of these groups in the process will be helpful to the evolution of the center. The only caution here is to avoid any effort by the members of the Planning Group to introduce political agendas into the process. Therefore, it should be made clear that the members of the Planning Group should not be able to propose candidates for management positions. Rather, each center will have to develop very clear job descriptions and skill requirements.

## **5.19 Inter-Regional Communication and Collaborative Planning**

The increased role of the regional centers in the second half of the CIP project requires improved systems of communication, strategizing, and collaboration between the regional centers and CIP/Moscow and their various training and technical assistance consultants and advisors. To begin this process, everyone must agree with and accept the objectives of CIP, i.e., the focus on helping NGOs to become skilled in the processes of planning, implementing, managing, and evaluating their mission programs and the continuation of training and technical assistance to new and on-going NGOs in organizational development.

### **5.19.1 Need for Collaborative Program Assessment and Planning**

The next step is to begin a new collaborative process with meetings in each region of the Directors of CIP/Moscow, the relevant technical units, and a program representative of USAID, together with the Director and key staff of each regional center, to reach consensus on objectives and detailed strategies and plans for achieving them. These plans should include the assessment and definition of training and technical assistance resources each region will need and want from Moscow and the other regions for the following six months.

Each quarter, the Director of CIP/Moscow should organize a planning meeting that will bring together the directors and key staff of the regional centers, the coordinators of the technical units in Moscow, and training and technical advisors as needed. They will discuss progress in reaching the objectives of the program and possible changes in priorities; identify useful resources; review inter-regional communication systems and CIP-USAID reporting issues; and share accomplishments, problems, and recommendations.

## **5.20 Internal Evaluation**

Lastly, every six months each component of the CIP -- regional centers, technical units, and management -- should conduct an internal evaluation of the impact of their activities towards achieving project goals with the assistance of experts in training and NGO program design and implementation skills. At that time, each component should consider if any contractual and programmatic commitments should be revised and submit those proposals to Save the Children for discussion with USAID.

## **5.21 Making the Hub Model Work**

In summary, to make this model work, the regional centers will require several elements. They need to develop for themselves whatever expert skills in planning, implementing, managing, and evaluating social service and civic action programs they will need to support training and technical assistance to NGOs in their regions. Of particular importance is the eventual development of these capabilities in the "filial cities" and in key "hub NGOs." The regional centers, therefore, will need technical assistance to rapidly develop these skills and resources as well as full-time trainers and technical assistance coordinators.

The regional centers and the support services of CIP/Moscow need to develop a new sense of self-interested collaboration, openly sharing information, accomplishments, problems, and resources. The centers must develop and utilize a capacity for regular self-assessment as well as expert assessment of their work.

The regional centers, CIP/Moscow and USAID must develop regular systems of strategizing, planning, and sharing of resources to achieve the common goals of the project. These systems must be established within the next three months so that the project can begin to move strongly and effectively into the second half of its life. The process of Russification must be at the heart of the plan.

The regional centers, CIP/Moscow and USAID must be committed to the development of expert skills in those NGOs participating in CIP activities. Reaching these levels will give these NGOs the opportunity to deliver successful programs for their constituents and their communities. These successes are the best contributors to, and indicators of, institutional sustainability.

In order to achieve these goals, the evaluation team strongly recommends the extension of the regional centers and the support services of CIP Moscow for one year beyond the current end of the CIP project in September 1997 to September 1998. Neither the existing technical units of CIP/Moscow nor any other model of institutional/program support can contribute to the full achievement of the strategic objective of the CIP project, and therefore can be justified, without the continuation of the regional centers. The additional year will be necessary for: (1) to complete the strengthening of the NGO sector through the development of the civic action program expertise; (2) restructuring toward a client-driven regional center model, and (3) the process of Russification and enhancing of expertise and training, technical assistance, and evaluation capacities;

## **5.22 Restructuring the Consortium**

### **5.22.1 Need for a New, Regionally Focused Training and Technical Assistance Planning and Support Team**

In light of the continuing problems with Counterpart and the perceived inefficiencies of the TOT program in delivering action-oriented, regionally responsive training and technical assistance, the structure of the Consortium should be reduced to make the planning and delivery of training and technical support to the regional centers more efficient and reduce management costs. As a newly constituted training and technical assistance support group, JHU, EDC, CFD, ORT and Counterpart should be transferred directly under Save the Children management. In light of the new focus on civic action and regional responsiveness, current Counterpart functions should be replaced by a training and technical assistance planning and support unit reporting directly to the Director of CIP/Save the Children, along with the directors of the other technical units. The unit should be headed by an expert in NGO civic action and program delivery. If CIP determines that Counterpart cannot adequately provide this service in the proposed management framework, Counterpart should be removed from the Consortium no later than December 1996.

If the proposed focus on civic action is accepted, Save the Children must assess the capabilities of each member of the current Consortium to support that focus, either through training, technical assistance, or both and the ability to provide this support to the three regional CIP centers. If any member of the Consortium cannot provide these support services, is unwilling to work under the direct management of Save the Children, duplicates any training or technical assistance service that another member of the Consortium can provide more efficiently, indicates any unwillingness to work collaboratively with others, or does not provide at this point any critical management or administrative support role, it should be withdrawn from the Consortium. The need to streamline the management system, reduce redundancy and internal tension, and reassess the budgetary constraints requires immediate attention and action on these difficult but necessary questions.

NGOs will also need training and technical assistance in the content issue they are addressing. The technical resources of the members of the Consortium must be able to provide this assistance directly or indirectly through national and international sources.

CIP should use the following criteria to determine which member of the current Consortium should be retained:

- First, the Consortium member must accept the focus on civic action and demonstrate to the satisfaction of USAID and Save the Children that it has demonstrable experience in civic action, including the skills to provide specific training and technical assistance in planning, implementing, managing, evaluating, and other necessary components and the expertise to manage training and technical assistance resources to support that focus.

Also, it must demonstrate a capability to work collaboratively with all other members of the Consortium and the regional centers in a manner that does not duplicate the capacities of any

other member of the current Consortium to provide support services or to provide better or more effective resources.

- Second, Save the Children and the members of the Consortium must agree to a management structure that is agreeable to all under the direct management of Save the Children.
- Third, the Consortium member must accept its role as recruiter, coordinator, and logistical arranger of training and technical assistance under the supervision of Save the Children and must demonstrate that it can do this better than if such support were provided and managed directly by Save the Children.
- Fourth, the Consortium member must demonstrate that it is able to recruit trainers and technical assistance consultants to support the focus on civic action.
- Fifth, the Consortium member must agree to deliver a plan to accomplish these responsibilities within thirty days after the evaluation has been accepted.

#### CNFA and CFD

If the emphasis in the remainder of the project is on civic action, both these organizations must demonstrate why they will be necessary to the implementation of support to NGOs for civic action. Also, given the focus on the regional centers and the direct supervision proposed under Save the Children, do these centers need the U.S. based organizational support? The field centers complain of the multiplicity of reporting and their need for strengthening their own abilities to be more and more independent; evidence must be shown that continuing the overhead costs of CNFA and CFD must be of unquestionable value to CIP. Otherwise, they are using funds that would be better used for strengthening the regional centers and for the extension of the centers.

Based on the above, and for reason of cost reduction, we recommend that the role of the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs and the Fund for Democracy be reviewed to determine if they are still necessary and cost-effective ways to manage the regional centers. In addition to the issue of cost-effectiveness, problems involving the regional centers' conflicting institutional loyalties and at times overwhelming reporting requirements could be greatly reduced by the elimination of the stateside sponsors. A final decision regarding the termination of one or both of these sponsoring institutions should be made no later than December 1996.

Whatever management structure is implemented, it is crucial at this stage in the program that the training and technical assistance support function of the CIP project management system be directed and supported by people who are committed to NGO civic action, and who have demonstrated expertise, knowledge and skills in the following areas:

- planning, design, implementation, management and evaluation of civic action programs;
- expert qualifications as trainers;
- interest in and ability to conduct needs assessments and to build truly client-responsive training programs;

- proven ability to create a collaborative planning environment; and
- effective linkages to sources of relevant NGO training and technical assistance resources locally, nationally and internationally.

### **5.23 Restructuring Consortium Management**

CIP must refocus and restructure the Consortium to support the second phase of CIP if the project is to be successful. Even today the NGOs working with CIP have asked for different training or “more in-depth” and more technical consultations. However, the current plans of the training components of the Consortium call for more of the same kinds of training as in phase one, as opposed to continuing just some of that provided in the past while moving on to what the NGOs really need to support phase two. This calls for a major restructuring of the planning, decision-making and management structures of the project.

### **5.24 Focus on Civic Action and Regional Responsiveness**

Unfortunately, achieving the objectives of CIP is being submerged in continuing internal confusions and hostilities. What is needed now is a rebuilding of a new and collaborative Consortium or, if possible, a new, non-Consortium management system, to refocus on civic action and service delivery strategies and skills to be trained and supported in the regional centers. Now, more than ever, CIP needs the “innovative supports” promised from the Consortium.

Because the focus of the next phase should be on strengthening the regional centers to train NGOS in the new skills they will need to promote and enable citizen action, the size and the structure of the Consortium should be reduced to direct CIP’s efforts and resources toward the regions. Even the most qualified and client-sensitive Moscow-controlled model cannot work effectively because of distance, mistrust and resistance to leadership from Moscow. There is a much more urgent need for project funds in the regional centers than for the support of a large Moscow-based support system.

### **5.25 New Management Structure**

As stated above, the evaluation recommends restructuring the CIP Consortium to place Counterpart, JHU, EDC, ORT, and the Center for Democracy under the direct coordination of Save the Children. As previously discussed, in the event that Counterpart cannot, in the judgment of Save the Children and USAID, adequately fulfill its new responsibilities within this revamped management structure, it should be removed as a member of the Consortium and replaced by a training and technical assistance expert, to be chosen by the Consortium director, along with the local staff currently working for Counterpart. This implies a new commitment to collaborative project support and the capability of Save the Children to provide the management leadership. Save the Children must assure the field staff of its fullest intention to provide collegial support to participatory planning and decision-making.

The role of the U.S. Program Committee should be limited to occasional consultation and should serve as a source of possible training and technical assistance resources. It should not play a direct management role. CIP has too many managers today, costing too much, and providing unnecessary

and ineffective management, each trying to find a management role rather than being useful as a technical resource. Save the Children, with the support of USAID, should reexamine the involvement of the organizations responsible for coordinating the field centers. Unless there is clear evidence that these groups can support civic action and are necessary to support the field centers, they should be terminated by the end of 1996.

Cost savings, improved efficiency in management, easier planning and integration of Consortium components -- all argue for the restructuring as soon as possible. While the visit of the evaluation team was limited and insufficient to address in depth all of these organizational issues, USAID is urged to study these possibilities of restructuring to see if these changes are politically, as well as programmatically, helpful and possible.

## **5.26 End-of-Project Measurable Objectives**

Following are some specific measurable objectives and indicators of success for CIP by the end of the project:

- In each region in which CIP has established a regional center, all active NGOs will know how to plan, implement, manage, and evaluate civic action programs to achieve their stated missions and services;
- There will be at least ten experts in each region capable of directly or indirectly providing training and technical assistance for the organizational development of NGOs and for the planning, design, implementation, management, and evaluation of all requisite components of successful activities and specific campaigns;
- A resource center for NGOs sustained by membership, government, business, and internal and external donors, will exist in each region or subregion to continue the training and technical assistance until similar resources are fully developed in the various cities in the region and in NGOs that have significant constituencies and can themselves serve others.

The conclusion of the evaluation team is that the issue before CIP is not further clarification of the objectives of CIP, but the redefinition of CIP operationally beyond the establishment and organizational development of NGOs. Establishing and organizing NGOs is only half of the process, and CIP must now move to complete the NGO development program with substantive training and technical assistance in program development and implementation.

The argument has been made in the evaluation that the focus of CIP should shift to training skills in planning, implementing, managing, and evaluating civic action programs which the evaluation interprets as the stated strategic objective of the Democracy and Economic Reforms Program. CIP has given many NGOs a good start in organizational development and some are already actively implementing their missions. But most of them believe today that all they need to know is how to fundraise, to plan their organizational structure, how to use a computer, how to communicate and promote the image of an NGO, and some basic understanding of good management. However important these skills are to an NGO, the CIP must turn now to help develop the skills to deliver

successful action programs. Together these two elements will make the objectives of the Democracy and Economic Reform program realizable. The evaluation team could only speak to a small sample of all the NGOs that have worked with CIP. But it is clear that most of them are sincere and dedicated to achieving socially and politically critical goals. Some may intuitively know how to create successful civic action. Others do not. They need the support that CIP could provide in the short time left.

The quantities of NGOs established and training courses offered -- rather than their accomplishments and contributions to the democratic process -- will not be a measure of the true success or failure of the project. The focus for the second half of the project must now turn to completing the NGO development picture -- developing in NGOs the skills and processes to successfully achieve their social service and civic action missions as partners to promote the evolution of democratic processes and experiences in Russia. Once this has been successfully accomplished in a measurable way, the CIP will have indeed fostered "a sustainable, vibrating NGO community, contributing to the development of democratic processes and economic reform."

## **Section 6 Summary of Recommendations**

### **6.1 Purpose and Objectives**

- Beginning in September 1996, the CIP should focus its primary activities on providing training and technical assistance to NGOs to develop their skills in planning, designing, implementing, managing, and evaluating their service and civic action programs so that by the end of the CIP project, in each region in which CIP has established a regional center, all active NGOs will know how to plan programs to achieve their stated missions and services.
- Training and technical assistance for organizational development should continue to be offered to NGOs participating in CIP activities as well as to new NGOs that have not participated in the program or have only recently been formed.
- CIP should organize training programs to develop at least ten experts in each region capable of providing direct or indirect training and technical assistance for the establishment of NGOs and for the planning, design, implementation, management, and evaluation of all requisite components of successful activities and specific campaigns.
- A resource center for NGOs, sustained by membership, government, business, and internal and external donors, should be developed in each region or subregion to continue the training and technical assistance until similar resources are fully developed in the various cities in the region and in NGOs that have significant constituencies and can themselves serve others. The planning for these centers should begin in late 1996/early 1997. One of the first steps should be the development of profiles of potential funding sources in these communities.

### **6.2 Strategic Design and Implementation**

- The Siberian Regional Center in Novosibirsk, the Southern Russia Regional Center in Krasnodar, and a third center in Moscow for Central Russia should become the primary foci of NGO support. These centers should be strengthened in their capacities to train and provide technical assistance in the skills required to plan, design, implement, manage, and evaluate social service and civic action programs of NGOs, either directly by center staffs, with support from CIP/Moscow, and/or from local, national, and international experts.
- The Central Russia Center should be organized as a unit with the same status as the other centers and be built from an existing NGO association, an existing NGO that could play an eventual supporting role, and the expansion of the Marshak Foundation work to provide technical assistance as well as training and other support services that are provided in the other centers.
- Each center should hire two or three full-time TOT trainers, recommended by the JHU Consortium staff and the directors of the regional centers, based on detailed job descriptions and skill requirements. These TOTs will be responsible for training and technical assistance and identifying and coordinating external training and technical assistance resources in the

region, nationally, and internationally, to achieve the skills for NGO programs in planning, implementation, management, and evaluation. They will be trained by JHU, EDC, and other members of the Consortium, and external experts. They will also be trained in how to train consultants in providing consulting services.

- CIP and the regional centers should conduct needs assessments of NGOs to determine the levels of skills available and missing in the organizational development and civic action programs.
- All training to date and in the future should be evaluated by external experts to determine its impact on those who have received it and the CIP program as a whole.
- Greater emphasis should be put in the second half of CIP on providing technical assistance in both civic education and action processes and skills and the issues the NGOs are addressing.
- The technical resources of CIP/Moscow should prepare itself as quickly as possible to support the training and technical assistance for the refocussing of CIP on NGO civic action.
- USAID should continue support of the regional centers for one year from the current end of project date, September 1997, to September 1998.

### **6.3 Project Management**

- If the proposed focus on civic action is accepted, then Save the Children must first develop an Operational Plan for the support of CIP for civic action. This Plan must be presented to USAID within 30 days after the decision by USAID as to the focus of the second half of CIP.
- USAID and Save the Children should proceed immediately to review and restructure the current membership in the Consortium and the responsibilities of each.
- The structure of the Consortium should be reduced to make the planning and delivery of training and technical support to the regional centers more effective and efficient, and to reduce management costs. The direct management of Counterpart, JHU, EDC, and ORT units and the regional centers should be transferred directly under the management of the Save the Children director, under whose supervision they will be restructured as a training and technical assistance support group. Save the Children and USAID should review the current management status of the regional centers to determine if the centers still require the continued administrative support of Citizen's Network for Foreign Affairs and the Fund for Democracy; this decision should be made no later than December 1996. By the end of September 1996, Counterpart's responsibilities and continued involvement in the project should be reviewed by USAID and Save the Children in light of the proposed restructuring of management and service delivery. If, as a result of this review, it is determined that Counterpart cannot fulfill its responsibilities within the program design, it should be removed from the CIP program no later than December 1996. Its functions should be transferred to

a training and technical assistance support unit consisting of the CIP local hire staff involved in training and managed by an expert in training and technical assistance for NGO civic action. The unit would report directly to Save the Children.

- The entire program should move aggressively toward Russification in all aspects of its design and implementation. The recruitment and hiring of Russian regional center directors should be conducted as openly and expeditiously as possible, with clearly articulated incremental timelines for the interview and selection process, overlapping of Russian and U.S. leadership, and the eventual goal of becoming fully operational as a Russian center.

# ANNEXES

Mid-Term Evaluation of the Civic  
Initiatives Program for Democratic  
and Economic Reform in Russia  
(CIP) Final Report

# **Annex I**

## **Scope of Work**



# **Annex II**

## List of Persons Interviewed

## Annex II: List of Persons Interviewed

### Washington, D.C.

Robert Kramer, Associate Vice President, Save the Children  
Richard Hall, Program Operations Director, Save the Children  
Shannon Moncrief, Desk Office for Russia, Save the Children

Ronald Israel, Vice President, Education Development Center, Inc.  
Paula Johnson, Program Coordinator, Education Development Center, Inc.

Lester Salamon, Director, Institute For Policy Studies, Johns Hopkins University  
Carol Dugan, Program Manager, Institute For Policy Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Patricia S. Palmer, Vice President, The Center for Democracy  
Thomas B. Reems, Director Europe, The Center for Democracy

Kimberli Brown, Counterpart Foundation  
Karen Sherman, Counterpart Foundation

Lewis Townsend, Executive Director, Fund for Democracy and Development

Francis Rice, ECHO

William Witting, Program Director, Citizens' Network for Foreign Affairs  
Marty Tillman, Coordinator, NGO Support Program, Citizens' Network for Foreign Affairs

### Moscow, Russia

#### USAID

Jeanne Bourgault, (Out-going) Director, Office of Democratic Initiatives and Human Resources  
William Hammick, (In-coming) Director, Office of Democratic Initiatives and Human Resources  
Julie Allaire-MacDonald, Deputy Director  
Anne Mavity, CIP Project Officer  
Marina V. Grigorieva, NGO Program Specialist

#### Civic Initiatives Program

Directors and staffs of Consortium Members

Directors and staff of CIP Regional Centers in Novosibirsk and Krasnodar

## **NGOs and Business Development Centers**

Elena Vassilieva, Resource Manager, USAID Business Development Program, Moscow

Melanie C. Peyser, Director, The Eurasia Foundation, Moscow

Yuri Dzhibladze, The Eurasia Foundation, Moscow

Julia Timifeeva, The Eurasia Foundation, Moscow

Dima Grigoriev, Director, Marshak Foundation, Moscow

Marshak Foundation staff

Genia Alexeeva, Focus, Moscow

Julie Kachalova, Focus, Moscow

Len Topoleva, Focus, Moscow

Evguenia G. Alexeeva, Executive Director, Center for Experiential Education for Social Change and Democracy, Moscow

Various colleagues of Center for Experiential Education for Social Change and Democracy

Dr. Georg A. Cheremisin, President, Association for Independent Science, Moscow

Kuksa Lubov, Association for Independent Science

Oleg V. Zykov, President, NAN, Moscow

Igor Nicher, Environment and Health, Moscow

Alexei Avtonomov, Parliament Development Fund, Moscow

Vera Mischenko, Ecojuris, Moscow

Alena Pyroshinka, AIDS Infoshare, Moscow

Trina Tvanoava, Senior Specialist, Committee on Family and Youth, Office of the Mayor of Moscow

Chernobyl Union, Moscow

Anatoly Zabolotny, Director, Russian-American Press Center, Novosibirsk

Olga P. Andeeva, Executive Director, Regional Fund "Personal", Krasnodar

Natalya Kirichuk, Editor, Tretii Sector, Novosibirsk

Evgenii Smetani, Director, International Center for Biotechnical Medicine, Moscow

Removna Stupakova, President, ZHITO, Novosibirsk

Messrs Roxlin, Sukhanov, and Gorobstov, Oblast Office, Novosibirsk

Inna Chikunova, Deloitte and Touche, Novosibirsk

Olga Bezdenezhnikh, CIP Coordinator, Novokuznetsk

Galina Popova, CIP Coordinator, Tomsk

Galina Timoshenko, CIP Coordinator, Barnaul

Zinaida Tikunova, CIP Coordinator, Omsk

Andrei Beloglazov, Director, Siberian AIDS-Aid, Tomsk

Julie Riddler, Director, SAIC in Novosibirsk

Public Committee to Save the River, Novosibirsk

Condominium Initiative Group, Novosibirsk

League of Life Assistance, Novosibirsk

Committee to Defend Shareholders Rights, Novosibirsk

Faith, Novosibirsk

Association of Students of Management and Economics, Novosibirsk

Association of Economic Journalists, Novosibirsk

Farmers Education Consultation Center, Novosibirsk

Obelisk, Novosibirsk

Femida, Akademgorodok

Alyona Klochko, Program Director, Ray of Hope, Krasnodar

Southern Wave, Krasnodar

Director, staff, U.S. advisors of Russia Project, Wheeled Mobility Center, Krasnodar

Committee of Soldiers Mothers, Novosibirsk and Krasnodar

AKKOR Farmers Association, Sochi

People-to-People Foundation, Sochi

DOM Youth Association, Sochi

Russian Geographical Society, Sochi

# **Annex III**

## **Bibliography of Documents Reviewed**

## Annex III: Bibliography of Documents Consulted

### **USAID**

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### **Save the Children Federation**

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### **The Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs**

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## **Education Development Center**

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