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WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL
WORLD VISION RELIEF ORGANIZATION

END OF PROJECT REPORT

1985 DROUGHT RELIEF FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN MALI

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I. INTRODUCTION

World Vision International is a Christian humanitarian organization with the world headquarters in Monrovia, California, and currently active in major relief activities in four African nations using US PL480 food commodities. USAID requested the World Vision Relief Organization to assist with the international response to the Malian drought in 1985 by distributing 10,000 metric tonnes of grain under a Direct Grant from the AID Food for Peace Office. World Vision was to take full responsibility for transport and management of commodities from transfer of title in Ghana, through distribution in the target areas of Nioro du Sahel (1st Region), Gao, Menaka and Ansongo (7th region), Republic of Mali.

The goal of the project was to prevent starvation and stem the massive migration toward urban centers in these areas which had been severely affected by 5 years of inadequate rainfall. The Cercles selected for the distribution had been declared disaster areas by the Government of Mali and were targeted by World Vision after discussion with the Government, the USAID mission and other relief agencies operating in Mali. World Vision had undertaken small scale distributions in the Nioro Cercle and in the 7th Region in 1984 using our own funds to purchase rice on the local market. We were also involved in planning a long-term presence in the 7th region.

The Transfer Authority No. 688-XXX-000-5622 and 641-XXX-000-5603 called for a delivery of 10,000 M tonnes of white maize from the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation to World Vision in exchange for United States Rice at a ratio of 1.63 MT of maize per 1.0 MT of rice. Procurement Authorization No., 899-950-XXX-5784 provided for USG reimbursement to World Vision of all transport related costs from Kumasi Ghana to the designated points of entry in Mali.

World Vision contracted a private U.S. corporation, Marine Overseas Services, Inc. (MOS), to handle all aspects of transport, as well as to provide food monitors in Ghana, Bamako and the distribution centers who would be responsible for assuring good commodity management and fulfilling USAID Title II reporting requirements. MOS contracted with a private Ghanaian transporter for inland transport from Kumasi Ghana to the four major distribution points in Mali: Bamako, Gao, Menaka and Ansongo. The maize received in Bamako was forwarded via Malian private transport to Nioro.

At the time the project was planned, and in the early implementation stages, project management was based in the World Vision West Africa Office established in Dakar. Logistical, administrative and government-relations backstopping was provided by the World Vision Mali office in Bamako which had been active since 1982 in small-scale rural development projects in Southern Mali. Project management teams were established in Gao, Menaka and Nioro in May and these were responsible for obtaining sufficient

reliable warehousing, establishing fuel depots and vehicle workshops and for surveying the population and undertaking the distribution. Because they were established as separate and independent projects, and because World Vision found the existing situations in the 1st and 7th regions very different, the regional management teams took different approaches to distribution planning and management.

In October 1985, as a result of a WV management reorganization and in response to the need for closer control of the Mali program, particularly in view of planned long-term and expanded programs, a World Vision Relief and Rehabilitation office was established in Bamako.

Distribution was completed in Nioro on November 30 1985 and continued on a limited, narrowly targeted basis in the 7th region into February 1986 in response to continued need. This report attempts to describe and evaluate the various aspects of project planning and implementation in each of the major areas served. The major phases of the project to be addressed include inland transport and storage, population surveys, distribution, and end-use control. Special focus is given to problems encountered, achievements, lessons learned and recommendations for improvements in the 1986 program.

II. SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

In general, we believe it can be fairly stated that the World Vision drought relief distribution project for Mali achieved its primary goals despite a myriad of logistical, managerial and time constraints, many of which were external to our control. In Nioro we distributed a reduced target of 1770 tonnes of maize to about 110,000 people. In the 7th region we served about 450,000 people through dry distribution and another 2000 malnourished children and women in feeding centers, with a total of 5800 tonnes. Without doubt, this distribution saved thousands of lives, especially among Tuareg nomads stranded in remote regions without food or means of obtaining it. By delivering grain throughout remote areas, we made it possible for the affected populations to remain in their home villages and pastures, rather than migrating to urban centers where congestion was already straining meager municipal resources and causing outbreaks of infectious disease. The food helped provide farmers with the calories necessary to plant and harvest their crops during an excellent rainy season. These assertions are based on our own observation of the population before and after the distribution, on reports from local authorities and NGOs, and on the numerous voluntary expressions of thanks from the people themselves.

These goals were achieved with negligible loss or damage of commodities, despite a late start and an unforeseen record rainfall, and not without some management problems from which we have learned hard lessons.

A general source of management problems recognized from the start both by World Vision and USAID is our relatively recent entry into the domain of emergency food distribution under PL480 and the short lead time allowed for the Mali program. The AID Food for Peace Office nevertheless urged WV to undertake the Mali program, our first such project in West Africa, following close on the heels of a rapid program expansion in Ethiopia. In the rush to get started, the bulk of program research and design was done at the headquarters level, never a recommended procedure, and the recently-established Dakar regional office was called on at very short notice to implement the project. Rapidly assembled field teams had insufficient time to do thorough and careful population surveys and distribution plans before the arrival of rains. In order to facilitate fast start-up and experienced management, World Vision contracted with Marine Overseas Services to provide Food Monitors and through its parent company, Fetting and Donalty, transport services. This contract relieved WV staff of numerous complicated and crucial tasks, and contributed to the overall success of the project, but at the same time the coordination of two separate yet closely linked organizations presented its own set of problems. Finally, to add to the strain and confusion, the newly appointed Mali Relief Coordinator was called home before project start-up due to family illness. During the crucial early stages of project implementation, before the appointment of the current Relief and Rehabilitation Manager, the country management vacuum resulted in some regrettable lack of coordination with the AID mission, the Dakar management office and among the country operational projects.

Project implementation was plagued with delays which began when the Transport Agreement between the USG/WV and the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation had to be re-negotiated at the last minute and wasn't finally signed until the end of June, a month late. This meant that the commodities began arriving in Mali in early July just as the first torrential rains had begun to make rural roads impassable. In addition, while all planning discussions between World Vision and USAID had assumed an eight to nine month distribution program, we were surprised by a Mission decision to restrict the distribution to the three-month period before the harvest. This resulted in a last-minute attempt to speed up distribution, which caused problems of control and supervision especially in the 7th region where the target tonnage was greater.

The World Vision staff at all levels have responded to the challenge of these constraints with a continuous and vigorous effort to surmount them and to apply the experience gained to correction and improvement. During the absence of a Country Program Director, a management presence in Bamako was maintained by a qualified logistician (British nationality) who was supervised and assisted by the Dakar program management staff, including the Regional Director (an American), the Technical Services Advisor (Dutch) and the Program Officer (Swiss) who made frequent visits to Bamako and the field sites.

The present Country Manager, who had been Project Manager in Niore previously and had earlier managed food relief for World Vision in Mauritania was appointed in October and immediately began to focus on improved management systems and control. Among the priorities addressed first was intensive recruitment of qualified international staff for the field to supplement or replace those whose terms were nearing completion. He also concentrated on improved information gathering and reporting from the field and better coordination with AID and other NGOs. Finally, planning for the 1986 distribution began in October 1985 and has been undertaken entirely at the field level in close cooperation with the AID mission, local government authorities and other NGOs. All our experience from the 1985 distribution has been poured into the 1986 plan.

At the field level, the staff worked tirelessly under rigorous conditions and had to be continually flexible and imaginative in finding ways to get food into seemingly unreachable remote areas during the rainy season.

Therefore, while we are satisfied that we achieved our goals during the 1985 campaign, we are confident that the 1986 program will gain considerably from our experience, mistakes and successes.

III. TRANSPORT, STORAGE, LOSS AND DAMAGE

After arduous negotiations and re-negotiations in Accra, between the USG, GOG, World Vision and MOS representatives, which were extended due to numerous disagreements over banking and currency arrangements as well as rebagging of maize from 100 kg to 50 kg sacks, a transportation contract was finally signed on June 21. MOS contracted with Socopao in Burkina Faso and with Nitra in Niger for customs clearance and freight forwarding services in those countries and hired a Ghanaian logistician to supervise all discharge in Kumasi. The first convoys left Kumasi on June 25th, each truck sporting USAID and World Vision identification decals and carrying WV Bills of Lading, phytosanitary certificates and a letter from the Malian Ambassador to Ghana to ensure ease of entry to Mali.

In Bamako, MOS signed handling and transport contracts with private Malian contractors for the 2000 MT destined for Niore du Sahel. At the time, it was assumed that the bulk of the maize would be directly transshipped from Ghanaian to Malian trucks, so only a minimum of warehousing for an emergency overflow of 200 tonnes was provided at no cost in the transport contract. Soon, however it became apparent that with the rains cutting off the Bamako-Niore road, transport would be slowed down and an additional 1000 ton storage capacity was leased from five separate landlords in Bamako.

World Vision purchased two 400 MT-capacity waterproof storage tents for the Menaka and Gao sites and leased additional small

privately-owned buildings in Menaka and Ansongo. In addition, Gao benefited from a loan of indeterminate duration of two 800 ton OPAM warehouses and also rented the fenced, open-air dockyard of the Compagnie Malian de Navigation with 1000 MT dry season capacity. In Nioro the team encountered numerous difficulties locating adequate storage but finally leased two private houses and the unused Lycee for a 400 ton capacity. With some additional private storage contracted as needed, and a fair amount of juggling, these facilities proved adequate for storing the grain even during the peak August delivery period when 1500 tonnes came into Bamako and 2000 tonnes arrived in Gao in a three-week period.

The rate of grain delivery from Ghana was a source of some frustration. First came the four-week delay during which field staff, especially in Menaka, were confronted by terrible human suffering without the means to alleviate it. Then, after six weeks of regular arrivals of eight 6-truck convoys, came the August deluge mentioned above. This occurred due to a decision taken by the American Ambassador, USAID and World Vision staff in Ghana that the grain evacuation should be speeded up in view of current events in Ghana. This decision was communicated to Bamako MOS and World Vision management, but we had little say in the matter since the double and triple convoys had already been loaded up and, in some cases, dispatched. Field staff rapidly expanded storage, altered distribution plans and frequently worked throughout the night to monitor the deliveries. They naturally objected to disruption of a planned schedule, the reasons for which were not clear to them.

Clearly there was a breakdown of coordination here due partly to circumstances outside of our control, i.e. the political situation, and the slow communication between Ghana and Bamako (often telexes from Ghana had to go to Bamako via Washington or through USAID which is not lightning fast). In addition, there was a somewhat unrealistic impression on the part of field staff that deliveries could be made on a schedule approaching the efficiency of the US military. Even without extenuating circumstances, it is doubtful whether such a standard could be reached in the African milieu. However, the strain might have been alleviated somewhat by better coordination between WV and MOS in Bamako, between Bamako and the field, and a stronger and faster response by MOS Bamako to the MOS logistician in Kumasi calling for a more moderate speed-up. As soon as it became evident that the new delivery schedule was causing difficulties, it was halted after delivery of 5290 tonnes and a breathing spell allowed during the month of September. Deliveries at a manageable rate resumed in October and were completed December 7.

In addition to delivery rate, land transport across three international borders provided numerous challenges. Illegal demands by border police mainly in Burkina Faso, as well as truck breakdowns, caused delays. At the end of August a visit to Burkina Faso and Niger was made by the MOS Program Director to seek solutions to these problems with positive results. By mid-

July, road washouts virtually cut off Menaka from both sides, with the result that two convoys had to be offloaded temporarily to the highest sand dune east of Menaka. This 350 tonnes was gradually and painstakingly moved into Menaka stores by World Vision pickups without any damage to the commodities. The Tillabery-Ansongo road was cut in 4 places so that until September, Ansongo distributions had to be fed by deliveries in World Vision vehicles coming from Gao.

The Bamako-Nioro road had become impassable due to rain by the time the first grain arrived in Bamako, so that during August and September delivery was made to Kayes by rail and forwarded by private truckers. Promises of freight wagons consistently proved unreliable. Private transport capacity in Kayes consisted of about 6 fairly new 15-ton trucks and some 30 others in varying stages of decay, which had to serve all private, government and NGO needs for the 1st region. We faced serious competition from a large private construction project in a nearby village which was luring truckers, despite government attempts to divert them to food aid, with fees that we could not responsibly match. As it was, with two price hikes, numerous conferences with the authorities both in Kayes and Bamako, constant cajoling and considerable help from the ONT Director in Kayes, we managed to move 537 tonnes to Nioro via rail to Kayes by the end of September. In early October, we arranged for a trade for 500 tonnes of USAID red maize in the Kayes Opam warehouses, and this was all delivered to Nioro by October 31, via the same private transporters supplemented by five six-ton trucks rented from UNDR0. We also persuaded a few courageous Bamako transporters to brave the Bamako-Nioro road in early October, at a premium, which sufficed to open the way for the last evacuation of 733 tonnes by the first week of November.

Despite these difficulties, all 10,000 tonnes of maize was properly received, stored and sent out on distributions according to established systems and with negligible loss or damage. All loading/unloading was closely monitored by trained Malian storemen supervised by MOS monitors. Every commercial truck load carried a waybill on which was registered all loss and damage on receipt. Warehouse ledgers recorded each entry or sortie including truck or waybill number, tonnage and date. Warehouse lot cards identified the source and date of each lot to assure "first in-first out". (See attachments)

There were negligible losses en route from Ghana. However a considerable number of sacks arrived wet due to heavy rains en route. MOS monitors supervised WV storemen and laborers in the drying, sorting and rebagging of wet grain which resulted in 90 percent recuperation. During the first such exercise in Gao, crowds of hungry people surrounded the laborers who were spreading out wet grain to dry and about one ton was pilfered before the job was finished. From then on, police agents were present for triage operations in Gao and there were no such further occurrences there or in any other location. Total loss and damage en route after the final delivery in December was

21.58 tonnes or about .21 percent of the total, far below acceptable levels.

Additional but negligible loss and damage occurred in World Vision/MOS warehouses in Mali. The bulk of this occurred in Bamako where high humidity levels during the rainy season resulted in spoilage to about 30 bags or about .01 percent. There were a few minor incidences of loss which occurred in storage, during triage, loading or internal transport which altogether amounted to .04 percent of total tonnage. All loss and damage has been documented in reports to the USAID mission.

IV. DISTRIBUTION IN THE 7TH REGION

The population of the 7th Region is estimated at 450,000 to 500,000 people, the majority of whom are nomadic. The major ethnic groups represented are Tuareg, Sonrai, Bella, Arab, Moor, Peuhl (Fulani), Dossag and Ibogolitane. The region is divided administratively into five cercles: Gao, Ansongo, Menaka, Kidal and Bourem. The only improved road in the region runs for about 215 km on the west-east axis between Ansongo and Menaka. The vast savannah/pastures stretching north to Kidal and south to the Niger border are crossed by desert tracks which are mostly impassable during the rainy season. During this period, a Magirus 4-wheel drive truck frequently sinks up to its door handles in mud and unchecked torrents run down the sand dunes to form vast deep lakes which may completely cut off villages or whole arrondissements for three months at a time.

World Vision first became aware of the worsening situation in the 7th region during visits in November 1984 and January 1985. Destitute nomads were flowing into Menaka and Gao seeking food and outbreaks of measles, cholera and meningitis, aggravated by severe malnutrition were claiming lives. Menaka being the worst off, and with no other NGO yet operational, World Vision began an emergency interim food distribution in March using locally purchased rice, while planning for the AID-donated grain got underway. Thus, long before the massive grain distribution, we had established good relations and credibility with the people and authorities of the region, especially in Menaka, and had begun to know the terrain.

A. Project Personnel

World Vision established three bases in the 7th Region - in Gao, Ansongo and Menaka - with housing, office space, warehouses and fuel depots. The Project Manager for the 7th region worked out of Gao and was principally assisted by 3 expatriate Logisticians based in the three cercles and three MOS Food Monitors, all American. Two expatriate driver-mechanics had to leave early in the program due to illness but luckily since the vehicles were all new, temporary assistance from the Niore mechanic and Stromm

driver-mechanics sufficed until eventually three new mechanics could be recruited. A fully equipped vehicle workshop was established in Menaka. Due to various staffing and logistical problems, the idea of a permanent team in Ansongo was abandoned early in the program, and the cercle was served from Gao for most of the time.

The Gao Malian staff included 3 supervisors, three storekeepers, seven drivers, 18 distributors, 2 accountants, 2 secretaries plus various watchmen, cooks etc. An additional 2 storekeepers and 5 watchmen remained permanently in Ansongo as long as grain was stored there.

In Menaka the expatriate nutritionist who established the feeding centers was followed at the end of her contract by a "locum" nutritionist and later by two expatriate nurses. Feeding center management is discussed later in the report. Menaka grain distribution was supported by a Malian team of storekeeper, 4 supervisor-distributors, 4 drivers, one mechanic, and 2 watchmen.

B. Logistics

World Vision purchased from our own funds four Magirus 10-ton trucks, one Magirus 15-ton, and one Unimog 4-ton truck for the distribution in the 7th Region. These were supplemented by a loan of 3 trucks from the Stromm Foundation during August and part of September. When these were no longer available we rented six Mercedes and Fiat trucks of 6-8 tonnes capacity from UNDRO. Frequently we also rented privately owned trucks (not 4-wheel drive) in Gao for distribution or secondary transport on improved/laterite roads. Seven Toyota pickup trucks and three 4-wheel drive station wagons completed the motorpool. Originally, our garage was located in Menaka because of its proximity to Niamey where spare parts were easier to find. The garage was fully equipped with generator, welder and Magirus spare parts and tools. Currently we are in the process of building a garage in Gao.

Fuel was stored in underground tanks of 20,000 litre capacity in Gao, 7,000 litre capacity in Ansongo and 20,000 litre capacity in Menaka. Fuel was generally purchased from a private dealer in Gao. We never experienced any supply problems.

C. Start-Up and Inter-Agency Coordination

The grain distribution project teams started work in early June, about one month before the arrival of the maize. First of all, contacts were made with the government officials at the Regional and Cercle level as well as with all the NGOs operating in the area. The purpose of these discussions was to determine what type of assistance other organizations were providing and in which geographic areas. At the same time, as much information as possible was gathered concerning the level and principal

areas of need.

While these initial contacts were clearly necessary to avoid duplication of effort and to establish good relationships, and in most cases they provided vital information, they were often frustrating exercises. There are around ten NGOs operating in the region including: The League of Red Cross Societies who were planning 160 feeding centers for children and dry distribution to their families throughout the region; UNDR0 which planned free distributions; the White Fathers; the Baptist Church; Euro-Action Accord, principally undertaking water projects; the Association of French Volunteers; Medecins Sans Frontieres; and the Norwegian Church in Gossi who were involved principally in development but planned some distribution.

The Gao region is vast, (about 322,000 sq. kms., covering 26 % of Mali, population close to 500,000) and the famine great, so there was never any question about the need for so many agencies. Yet, our team often met up with a kind of territorial possessiveness on the part of NGOs that had began to establish themselves and felt that somehow World Vision would infringe on their operations. Our response to this problem at all times was that we were desirous of good coordination and cooperation with the other agencies in order to focus our limited resources on the areas of greatest need which were not being met by others. However, the other NGOs were still in the beginning or middle stages of planning their programs and were not willing or able to be specific about where they would operate and what level of assistance they would provide. Thus while our WV-Gao team tried to develop a distribution plan around the other agencies, we sometimes found them changing their plans and coordination breaking down.

For instance, World Vision did not originally plan to distribute in Bourem and Kidal because Red Cross was establishing feeding centers there and UNDR0 was taking responsibility for free distribution. However, by September, WV found that many parts of these cercles had not been served at all and significant pockets of people were in severe nutritional stress, so we altered our distribution plan to provide food to these areas in October and November. In contrast, Gao town received far too much grain when distributions in Gao town were made at almost the same time by World Vision and UNDR0. This occurred because although UNDR0 had taken responsibility, they ran out of grain temporarily and World Vision agreed to step in to help out, principally because the "flottant" population which had mushroomed to 50,000 people was in bad shape. During the same week, UNDR0, having received more grain and under pressure to distribute it, did so, with the result that grain quickly began appearing on the market.

Coordination was much better in Ansongo and Menaka Cercles, where only Red Cross was operational in food relief. It was decided that World Vision would operate feeding centers in Menaka town only, and do free distribution throughout the cercles wherever Red Cross was not operating.

Improved coordination and communication among the NGOs in the region has been a continual concern and WV was instrumental in setting up a regular monthly meeting of organizations in Gao. However, coordination presented and still presents a considerable challenge which calls for continual effort as well as frequent program review and flexibility.

D. Population Surveys

As a result of initial discussions, Population surveys and ration card distribution began in mid-June in InTillit, Djebock and Haoussa Falane in Gao Cercle. Then, in early July, one experienced team went to Ansongo to survey Tessit and Tellataye while another team covered Gao Central. Menaka, with its own base and personnel, was able to complete surveys of Anderamboukane, Inekar and Menaka Central by the third week in June. Ansongo Central, considered the least needy area was surveyed last in the first phase.

The first step in a survey in any arrondissement was to meet with the Arrondissement authorities to inform them of our plan to do a survey and ask for guidance as to which villages or nomad "fractions" required priority attention. A guide would be found who could lead the team to favored water points and remote villages or isolated fractions. At the village level lists would initially be made up from the village cahiers. However, this method alone was in no way satisfactory, since such lists were usually years out of date and did not include the nomadic population or village flottants. The WV survey team would attempt to update village lists by intensive questioning of village leaders in order to: eliminate the deceased and departed, identify the new immigrants or new families created by marriage of listed sons, identify single or widowed women, and flottants. Distribution cards were handed out to all flottants around the village, and in smaller villages to the sedentary population as well. In large towns, the distribution cards were given out at the first distribution. In most cases, civil servants or others with sufficient means were ineligible unless extenuating circumstances were found such as cases where government salaries had not been paid for months on end.

The majority of the population in the region, however, are nomads with no fixed place of residence. These people were usually in the greatest need of assistance, and were sometimes stranded in remote areas having lost all means of animal transport with which to move to the nearest water point. Our project goal was to reach the neediest, in spite of the overwhelming logistical obstacles involved. Thus, while one team of surveyors was working in the villages, other teams, with the help of local guides, would criss-cross the arrondissement, following the principal nomadic routes, doing tent-to-tent surveys of the nomadic population. At each camp they would ask for information on the whereabouts of other camps. Where tracks were impassable or non-

existent, surveyors often went on foot to reach fractions they had heard about. Each family was entered on the list and given a ration card with name, number of family members, and the name of the closest identifying village or water point. The latter information helped to prevent the nomads from moving their tents to subsequent distribution sites. They were informed that the grain distribution would follow within a week to ten days, that they would not be served in other areas, that they must keep their distribution cards and would not be served without them.

There was little doubt that the people who received distribution cards were in bad need of help. Cards were given to any resident found in need, including all local ethnic groups as well as Nigerians, Mauritians and Burkinabe. There was little way of knowing at the time of the survey whether other needy people did not receive cards. And it was difficult to identify a nomadic family who moved into another area with the intention of being counted again since they usually do not carry any Carnet de Famille or other identification and are if anything more mobile than the distribution team. In order to avoid such occurrences, the survey schedule was to the extent possible not made known in advance, even to local officials. When it seemed necessary and feasible, verification of the identity of a head of family might be checked with another family and checked on other lists, but this cumbersome method was hardly fool-proof and seldom seemed called for.

Following the card distribution, lists were tallied and distribution plans drawn up. However, even before the first arrival of maize from Ghana, it was evident that the whole extensive and exhausting survey effort could produce nothing but a general impression of the reality at any one time, and that the number of families and tonnages would remain forever fluid. When deliveries from Ghana were late, and teams went back to inform the population to hold on a bit longer, they found whole villages vacant or new camps where none had existed before. Rather than make additional futile efforts to pin down a moving target, it was decided to attempt the first cycle of distribution according to plan, and to deal with problem cases as they arose.

The survey phase presented a number of other problems as well. In Gao, the teams were not adequately supervised because there were too many of them going out in too many directions at once. In addition, the Gao logistician was himself on the road too much leaving him less time in Gao to control, advise and supervise. With hind sight it can be said that it was probably unrealistic to attempt even an equitable distribution over such a large geographic area. The surveyors occasionally failed to establish good contacts with authorities, failed to improve village lists, did not properly fill out distribution cards or did not distribute cards at all. The result was that in some cases, arrondissement, village or fraction leaders attempted to manipulate lists to their own advantage, some families attempted to be counted more than once, and some were left off lists altogether. These problems would usually show up and be dealt with during

distributions.

The Menaka cercle was smaller and more manageable and a different type of survey management gave different results. Here the project logistician personally accompanied and supervised each survey, with the result of a much more manageable plan in a more limited area. However, some people, such as in the Valle l'Azaough north of Menaka town were not surveyed for the first round of distributions.

However, by far the greatest single problem with the surveys in the 7th Region, was caused, as noted above, by the tendency of the population to move during the time between survey and distribution.

When a new Gao Project manager and logistician arrived in October, near the completion of the first round of distributions, they began to address these problems in the following ways. First, the number of distributors was quickly cut down to a manageable nine. Second, for the final round of surveys in Ansongo and for surveys in Kidal and Bourem, which it was found had not been served by Red Cross or UNDR0, the survey team was immediately followed (sometimes the same or next day) by the distribution team. The survey team followed the same rigorous method of making up lists, which were then shuttled to the distribution team following behind, as the survey team moved on to the next area. Grain was called up from Gao via mobile radio. Following completion of distributions in Menaka, Ansongo, Gao, and Bourem cercles in November, (Kidal was completed in January) survey teams continued to go out occasionally to check out villages or fractions specifically identified by authorities, other NGOs, or other sources. If the survey team found by interview and inspection of camp and tents that the group was truly in need, and had not been previously served, a distribution would follow immediately.

It must be noted that the latter survey-and-distribute method would probably not have not been feasible for the initial large-scale, mass distribution. In the first place it was not known that grain delivery from Ghana would be delayed, thus lengthening the time between survey and distribution. Secondly, we wanted to draw up general distribution plans in advance for the government and AID approval as well as for our own logistical and commodity management planning needs. However, on a small scale, such as followed the first mass distribution, and which is planned for 1986, this method is more manageable and produces more accurate and equitable results.

E. Distribution

Grain distribution started as soon as the first convoy of commodities arrived in Gao. At first a 20 kg ration per family per distribution was given because it was felt that a severely weakened nomad without animal transport would not be able to

carry more at one time. During the course of distributions, this was found to be more the case in Menaka than in Gao or Ansongo. We also quickly realized that due to the greater distances in the latter two cercles and slow-down caused by the rains, the planned second distribution would probably not be possible there. So after an initial distribution at 20 kg in Intillit, and part of Haoussa Foulane, the ration was raised to one sack, or 50 kgs for each family in Gao and Ansongo cercles. This pre-packaged ration size considerably speeded up the distribution which often was a mobile operation. It also rendered unnecessary a second distribution which would probably be greeted in most cases by an entirely new population.

In Menaka a 20 kgs. ration, was distributed five times for a total of 100 kg. This larger ration was necessary in Menaka where the population by all indicators was already falling over the brink of starvation. The ration size was maintained throughout the distribution and proved manageable in view of the limited area involved. In all areas the same ration was given to all families with up to 10 members, and doubled if it could be confirmed that the head of family was responsible for more than 10 people. Since Carnet de Famille were rarely available, this "one-size-fits-all" ration was chosen to prevent misrepresentation of family size in order to receive more grain.

In Gao, the order of distribution was set according to the level of need ascertained during surveys. Thus Intillit was served first followed by Haoussa Foulane, Djebock, Arrondissement Central, then Tessit, Telataye and Outagana in Ansongo and finally Ansongo Central. The first round including all of Gao and part of Ansongo was completed by the end of September. During October, Ansongo Central was completed and Kidal was served. Bourem was served in November, additional small targeted distributions in Ansongo were made in December, and in January additional targeted distributions were made in Kidal.

A few days in advance of the distribution, local leaders would be notified and asked to call nomads into village centers or water points. The logistician gave the order for the planned tonnage with some extra to the warehouseman who supervised loading of trucks, and recorded the sortie with the drivers signature. At the distribution site each head of household presented his distribution card and was checked off on the distribution list.

In some cases where someone other than the registered head of family arrived with the card, his identity and reason for replacing the actual head (usually illness or temporary displacement) was verified by other members of the fraction or village and the ration was issued. In no cases were more than two family rations given to any one person.

At practically every distribution there were numerous people present who claimed to have not been registered. If these were few, and grain was available on the truck, their identities were verified by others present, they were added to the list and given

rations. In the cases where large numbers were present, their fraction or village leader was asked to draw up a supplemental list, which if time and logistical constraints allowed, was checked against other lists, and rations served in a follow-up distribution.

Major problems cropped up early in the first distribution in Intillit. This being their first effort, the distribution team did not really know how to respond to the appearance of unregistered people and even whole villages. Here again, the lack of adequate supervision resulted in some arbitrary, on-the-spot decisions and lack of consultation with arrondissement authorities which resulted in a great number of families being skipped over and intense displeasure on the part of authorities. Their displeasure was increased when World Vision refused to deliver into their hands the quantity of maize they claimed was still required to meet the need of the arrondissement. Instead, the team undertook supplemental surveys and decided to correct the omissions during the next cycle. This was not at all satisfactory to the Chef D'Arrondissement who decided to turn to the Norwegian Church (AEN) for additional grain. Although AEN had not originally planned to operate in Intillit, they agreed to finish the distribution there to avoid further clashes between WV and the Chef d'Arrondissement. For all further distributions, the distributors were instructed to deal with unregistered families in the manner described earlier.

In Tessit (Ansongo Cercle), cards were not distributed during the survey due to a temporary shortage. Also, because of the difficulties of terrain and heavy rains, the surveyors had too heavily relied upon lists provided by Arrondissement authorities. At the time of distribution it became clear that these lists were nowhere near accurate as hundreds of desperate people not registered clamored around the distribution site. The distributors tried to follow the now-established system of drawing up supplemental lists and refused the demands of one Chef de Fraction to give him grain for people not present but the situation soon began to grow out of control. The distribution supervisor did his best to serve all those who could be fairly identified until the available supply of corn was depleted. Then he called off the distribution.

Similar problems occurred on a lesser scale throughout the distributions and were for the most part dealt with on a case by case basis with relative ease. To some extent such situations must be expected in a distribution which seeks to equitably serve a mobile population over a vast territory. However, certainly a less ambitious distribution plan coupled with closer supervision of distribution teams and better contacts with local authorities would have produced better results. A major problem was that for about two months, the Gao logistician was also acting as Project Manager and staff capabilities were simply spread too thin.

In Menaka, where as noted the distribution plan was much more moderate, the logistician was able to provide close management

supervision. If anything, it was possibly too close, since he accompanied almost every distribution, which while providing more control, meant that less coverage was possible. The Menaka distribution plan consisted of 15 villages which on principal were to be served each month for five months, at the rate of one distribution every day or every other day, depending on distances and vehicle service requirements. The ration remained 20 kgs. per family per distribution throughout the cycle. In actuality, due to rains, vehicles getting bogged down, and unforeseen logistical difficulties, some villages often had be skipped each month, and thus received double rations the next month. All villages received their full entitlement of 100 kgs per family by the end of November.

At the request of the Commandant, distributions were then terminated in Menaka for the month of December. In January additional small distributions were made in the Valle l'Azaough (200 families) in response to a special call for help from the population there, and in Tinessako, east of Kidal (320 families) in direct response to a call for help from the Red Cross. These areas had never received any distribution. One sack (50 kgs) was given to each family.

The main problem in Menaka was the failure to keep lists of each distribution. In all other locations, each distribution card presented was checked against the master list, which was tallied at the end of the day and balanced against stocks issued for good inventory control and reporting. In Menaka, grain was given on presentation of a distribution card only with no attendance list being kept. At the end of the day, the tonnage distributed was divided by 20 kgs to come up with the number of families served. The logistician felt this speeded up the process and that his presence and personal supervision provided adequate controls. However, with the arrival of a new Project Manager in Gao and a new logistician in Menaka, the system was brought into conformity with the method established in other areas.

E. Distribution in Gao Ville

Distribution in the town of Gao was saved until last both because it was assumed the need was less and in order to prevent further in-migration to the urban area. Although we had long been aware of the desperate situation of the some 50,000 flottants who had set up their miserable tents around the town, both the Governor and the Commandant de Cercle had prevented us from helping them in the hope that they would pull up stakes and move. Finally, however, after completion of distribution in the rest of Gao Cercle, we were permitted to distribute about 355.5 tonnes at 50 kgs per family to the flottants and 177 tonnes at 20 kgs per family to the neediest in the town, according to lists drawn up by committees in each quartier. The distribution went on smoothly in all quartiers from 12 to 20 August except in the 4th quartier. Here we became aware that flottants were attempting to be served twice and distribution had to stop while we consulted again with

the quartier committee. Finally it was decided to do a new survey on the spot, chef de fractions were required to settle their own differences, and the distribution was completed.

Soon we discovered the appearance of alarming quantities of our grain in the local markets. The price of corn fell to about half the official price - 1500 CFA per bag in some shops. As soon as we became aware of the situation, distribution was terminated.

The reasons for this situation were numerous and not difficult to pinpoint. First, as already noted above, UNDR0 unfortunately and unexpectedly distributed grain in Gao town during the same period as World Vision. Further, the town dwellers, who depend on the same drought stricken economy yet have relatively higher standards of living and more varied consumption patterns, had gone deeply into debt. They were also more easily within the reach of the tax collector and the Party dues collector than the nomads. Many of them sold or bartered their sacks of grain to pay off these debts and taxes or to acquire other available preferred grains such as rice and millet or other household goods. It is also quite possible that despite our efforts to limit distributions to the neediest, quartier lists included some commercants or otherwise self-sufficient people. In this sense, the Gao WV team was probably not sufficiently cautious or conservative in drawing up the Gao distribution plan, due to the pressures they felt from AID to finish distributions before the mythical harvest deadline and because of the pressures on storage capacity caused by the push to evacuate the grain from Ghana quickly.

In our 1986 distribution we hope to avoid similar occurrences by avoiding distribution in the urban centers altogether, in light of the improved prognosis of cereals availability.

Additional small quantities of grain were donated to social welfare agencies or Food-for-work projects in and around Gao who made special applications for assistance. These included:

1. Institute des Jeunes Aveugles. Associated with the National Institute for the blind, this home currently cares for about 20 children providing Braille literacy and numeracy, gardening, sports and crafts training. The staff are government employees who from time to time fail to receive their salaries. Red Cross and other agencies also provide support. Therefore, at first only 1 ton maize was given to supplement student and employee meals. At another time, when Red Cross could not provide its usual food support we gave another 2.4 tonnes.
2. Physically Handicapped. This donation was requested by the Director of Affairs Social. 3.15 tonnes was given in two lots for about 100 physically handicapped people.
3. Mentally Handicapped. Also requested by Affairs Social, one donation of 3.5 tonnes was given.

4. Faribondeye Boye - Farmers Cooperative. The cooperative consists of about 30 recently settled nomads who have 1.5 Ha now under rice cultivation and are preparing another 1 Ha with a goal of 10 Ha. A total of 4 tonnes was donated in 3 consignments both for consumption and monetization to buy tools and to build a small store house.
5. Tailors Cooperative Training. This program, registered with Affairs Social, is training 18 displaced men and women in tailoring skills with the aim of sending them back to their homes to establish cooperatives. 7.55 tonnes were donated, partly to be used as rations for students and partly (3 tonnes) monetized to buy 4 manually operated sewing machines. We are satisfied that this donation was properly used. However, we are concerned that the project manager/trainer cannot meet the recurring costs of the program. He is beginning to lose students because without outside assistance he can no longer provide a food incentive. We have requested a long term plan before responding to another request for food.
6. Farandyirey Cooperative Construction - This is a consumer cooperative which buys grain in Bamako for sale in Gao. 15 tonnes was given as food for work to help them build a storehouse and outlet. They also sold some in the bush to buy tools. World Vision is not at all satisfied with the use of this donation which produced little more than the manufacture of bricks. A second request for assistance has been turned down.
7. Medecins Sans Frontieres. A total of 226 tonnes was given to MSF over 6 months to be used as Food for Work rations for construction workers, guards and other laborers in their rural health and immunization program, throughout the 6th and 7th regions.
8. Association Francais des Volontaires du Progres (French Volunteers) 1.1 tonnes was given in Ansongo to be used as partial payment for laborers and guardians in construction of on-farm storehouses.
9. Food-for-Work - WV Gao and Menaka. In Menaka, World Vision and MOS paid laborers loading and unloading trucks originally all and later one half of their salaries in corn. Workers organized by MOS to repair the two washed-out bridges at Menaka were also paid in corn, as were many of the Feeding Center employees. Small amounts were also given to MSF in Menaka for their construction projects. In Gao the laborers who unload trucks at the distribution sites were paid in corn. By January these issues had amounted to about 98 tonnes.
10. UNDRO/Affaires Sociales Flottants Resettlement. Affaires Sociales in Gao requested assistance in a program to transport flottants who voluntarily requested it back to

their home cercles. UNDR0 provided the transport, World Vision gave one sack of grain per family, once they had boarded the transport vehicles, and Red Cross agreed to provide further settling-in assistance once the flottants had reached their destination. At the time of completion of this report the exact amount of grain delivered for this program is not known but is in the range of 7 tonnes.

G. Menaka Feeding Centers

World Vision established feeding centers in Menaka in March 1985 to provide supplemental and therapeutic meals to malnourished children and pregnant and lactating mothers. The rice, milk, oil and other supplies for the centers were all provided by World Vision originally. Starting in September, small amounts of USAID corn were used to vary the supplemental diet.

Presently, the morning supplemental meal consists of a hot porridge of 30 gr rice, 30 gr. milk, 10 gr sugar and 5 ml of oil, while the evening meal substitutes 100 gr of ground maize for the rice. This program provides about 800 calories and 32 grams of protein per day. Children who are less than 80 percent of their correct body weight in relation to height, receive 4 rice porridge meals per day for a total of 180 gr rice, 150 gr milk, 60 gr sugar and 15 ml oil per day per child. This provides about 1500 calories and 70 gr of protein.

Children are entered into the Centers after weighing, measuring, and medical examination. Those found to be under 90 percent of weight in relation to height are entered into supplemental feeding, and those under 80 percent into therapeutic feeding. Their mothers are encouraged to wash them daily, but they often must be bathed at the feeding centers, where they also receive, along with mothers, elementary training in hygiene, safety, French alphabet etc. All children are weighed once a month at which time they may "graduate" from therapeutic to supplementary feeding or be discharged from the feeding center if they have reached and maintained 100 percent proper weight for one month.

At their peak, there were eleven feeding centers, or Centres Alimentaires Communitaires (CAC) serving more than 5000 children. In January 1986 there were about 2000 children in nine centers. Of these, one CAC was set aside for orphans, one for the old and sick, and one for contagious diseases.

An expanded curriculum is being planned for mothers and children in the Centers. to include home gardening, cooking with locally available foods, possibly fuel efficient stoves and so forth.

Management

Each CAC is run by a team of 10 locally hired persons. The team includes one Responsable (leader), 2 Secouristes (first-aid or

community health workers), 4 cooks, 2 water transporters, and one guard. Three of the Responsables and one of the Secouristes had received training from the Ministry of Health. The others received on the job training from the World Vision Nutritionist. All responsibilities for food inventory and record keeping belong to the Responsible. The Secouristes, treat minor illness with a stock of medications which is supervised by the World Vision-Menaka staff nurses. They are also responsible for health and sanitation education done in the centers. The health agents use David Werner's Where There is No Doctor as a guide to improve their knowledge of diagnosing and treating sicknesses, while referring all cases that surpass their abilities to the hospital in Menaka.

An expatriate World Vision Nutritionist, later replaced by two nurses, principally assisted by one Malian CAC supervisor, has overall responsibility for feeding center management.

Inventory reports are submitted by CAC staff fortnightly and each month a report is prepared providing all vital information concerning the status of the children. The following is a monthly summary of the 6 regular feeding centers (i.e. not including the orphanage and CAC malades) over a 5 month period:

Month	Total in Center	% who gained during month	Nutritional Status			
			90-100	80-90	70-80	60-70
Sept	1,393	58.7%	721	323	104	19
Oct	1,477	61.6	773	323	112	32
Nov	1,042	64.3	627	254	78	28
Dec	1,442	55.7	710	437	130	27
Jan	1,621	70.5	400	909	145	27

V. DISTRIBUTION IN NIORO DU SAHEL

The Cercle of Nioro covers approximately 9,500 km² and includes 7 arrondissements. World Vision distributed in 6 arrondissements with an approximate population of 152,110. Of these, between 5,000 and 8,000 are nomadic. The principle ethnic group is Sarikole (60%) with Peul, Bambara and Moor also represented. There is traditionally a lot of movement in both directions across the Mauritanian border and during the drought years a significant but unmeasured increase in emigration out of the cercle towards the regional capital, Kayes, as well as to Bamako, the coast and Europe. This emigration resulted in a disastrous

reduction of farm labor such that when the rains finally came, only about 50 percent of the fields could be planted, according to local estimates.

The closest arrondissement to Nioro, Simbi, is a distance of 40 km. which takes two hours under good conditions but is virtually impossible to reach during the rainy season. Korea-Kore is 80 Km from Nioro and can be reached in 4 hours in good conditions and up to five hours during the rainy season. There are virtually no improved roads in the Cercle and all roads are often impassable for days after a rain.

During 1984 World Vision had distributed 430 tonnes of locally purchased rice in the Cercle. This project was directed by the 1985 Project Manager, who thus had a good knowledge of the terrain and the local authorities.

A. Project Personnel

The Nioro World Vision team was in place by June 1st and initially consisted of a Project Manager (who later left Nioro to become Relief and Rehabilitation Manager for Mali), a Logistician (American), a nurse (American) a Driver-Mechanic (French), and an MOS Food Monitor (American), assisted by a Malian team of three distributor-supervisors and two drivers. Later on, the Malian staff grew to include six storekeepers, six distributors, and one driver.

B. Logistics

World Vision purchased two Magirus 8-ton trucks and one Unimog 3-ton truck for the project, as well as a Nissan station wagon and Nissan pickup (4-wheel drive). Trucks were also rented from time to time from Public Works and from local private sources, but these were expensive, unreliable and not suitable for rainy season off-road use. During October, seven 6-ton Mercedes were rented from UNDR0, 2 for use in Nioro distributions, and five to deliver grain from Kayes to Nioro.

Finding suitable storage in Nioro was difficult. Private owners demanded unreasonable prices and local officials were not of much help. However, approximately 350 tonnes capacity was secured from private sources, with a temporary increase of 150 tonnes, which was sufficient for safe, dry storage.

A vehicle garage and fuel depot was established in Nioro. Fuel was purchased mainly in Kayes, the regional capitol, and stored in drums and a small tank at the depot. Assuring a consistent supply and safe storage was always a challenge but distribution was never hindered by a fuel shortage.

C. Population Survey

As in The 7th Region, the survey in Nioro was preceded by a visit

to all the key members of the Cercle staff, other key government services, such as Public Works, OPAM, Police etc., as well as Islamic and secular leaders, and other NGO's operating in the region - Stromm, Medecins Sans Frontiers, and ODIK. The Project manager explained in detail the proposed WV distribution and solicited advice. Particular emphasis was given to the plan to distribute only to those identified as truly needy, rather than to the whole population as in the previous year.

The Commandant du Cercle assigned his 2nd Adjoint to accompany the WV team on initial visits to the arrondissement leaders, where they met with "distribution committees" which ususally consisted of local traditional and official leaders, such as village chiefs, representatives of the women's and youth organizations.

It was decided with the concurrence of the Cercle Commandant that the distribution would be effected in two cycles. Initially, only the five outlying arrondissements (Gavinane, Gogui, Korea-Kore, Simbi and Troungoumbe) would be served because they were judged to be in greater need. The Arrondissement Central and Nioro ville would be served at a later time, during the second cycle as cereal supply permitted. In the initial meetings with arrondissement leaders, they selected the neediest villages to be served. In Gavinane 33 were chosen, in Korera-Kore, 20, in Simbi, 21, and in Troungoumbe, 21. Only in Gogui were all villages, 8 in number, included. The number of needy villages was roughly 50 percent of all villages in the 5 arrondissements (excluding Nioro).

The distribution committees were responsible for making up the lists of the neediest people in their villages. They were usually of the opinion that everybody in these villages was needy and that it would be difficult or impossible to include some to the exclusion of others. We were sympathetic to this problem but pressed the committees to do their best and to provide lists by the end of July, which included name, Carnet de Famille number, and number of people in the family. Only a few of these lists were actually received at the Cercle level by the end of July, most came in during August and some later. Over half lacked all the requested information. The family size registered in the village rolls, and thus on the distribution lists, was usually incorrect because families normally avoid registering taxable family members. This tendency initially caused difficulty in computing need grain for distributions. To compensate, we added 30% to all lists for the initial distribution, and then we corrected the lists to include all family members listed on the Carnet de Famille.

It was very difficult to check the accuracy of these lists because most did not come in until all vehicles and manpower were involved in distributions. However, prior to the first distributions, several villages were visited and distribution cards were completed. At this time it was found that most lists were generally accurate as verified by family cards.

Occasionally, if someone was identified as a civil servant or businessman WV would discuss their eligibility with the village leaders. On the other hand, some civil servants who were at first deemed ineligible were later added to the list since it was found they were not receiving their government salaries. However, in most cases, once the distribution committee had decided on a list, we honored it. Lists were passed up through the arrondissement and cercle level, thus receiving government approval.

Unlike the 7th region, the majority of Nioro population is sedentary or semi-sedentary, so this method of list generation was acceptable and feasible, and a door to door survey did not seem necessary. The main challenge in Nioro was establishing criteria for and selecting out "the neediest". While the nomads of the 7th region were widely accepted as being generally and severely affected by famine, such a general consensus did not exist for Nioro. In fact, there existed some question as to whether Nioro should ever have been declared a disaster zone at all. World Vision was at all times concerned that the relatively small quantity (2000 tonnes) allocated to Nioro should go only to those who had no other source of food or funds, but screening the whole population or even the lists provided against a set of arbitrary criteria was clearly a highly improbable task. Thus, the Nioro WV team, after discussion with all involved, laid this responsibility completely and unequivocally at the village level, and for the most part we honored the decisions taken there. As to whether this was a reasonable or proper decision, the Nioro Logistician noted "The village leaders and people know the local situation best. If they err they must live with their decisions. They cannot blame a higher level or some (outsider). Being human they will make mistakes, unintentionally or due to politics and greed. But, on balance, if a society is to live under a form of rule, they should abide by it under all situations (unless completely intolerable) and not form some special committee which does not have to answer to anyone." The WV team did its best, either before or during distributions to redress "intolerable" decisions.

For the most part, the nomadic populations who were not known at the village level were not surveyed or listed. However, these people usually have ties with village families, and are sometimes listed as family members on the Carnet de Famille of villagers if they do not have their own Carnet. It is likely that those who required food but were not on lists could get it through the traditional family ties and responsibilities.

D. Distribution

After study and discussion with local leaders, WV decided to make two distributions to heads of family of a ration based on 20 kgs per adult and 10 kgs per child in the family. Family size was determined from the Carnet de Famille issued to every head of household. This ration was considered to be the most equitable

solution and one which would provide food for about one month. In general we found this ration, while limited, was sufficient to carry most families over the critical planting and harvest period. It also proved a manageable size, in relation to our distribution capabilities, grain delivery into Nioro and storage capacity.

The main problem with the ration size was with large extended families, which in some cases could contain 100 members. It is quite likely that the large amount (sometimes up to 1.5 tonnes) delivered to a family at one time was not kept in the family but was sold, bartered or otherwise exchanged. While we recognized this possibility, we felt that having established the ration card system, we could not arbitrarily deny the allotted amount of grain to the head of a large family. However, in isolated cases, such as one family which received 88 sacks, some corrective action was taken, such as reducing the ration in the second distribution. For the 1986 distribution we recommend that a limit be placed on the tonnage received by any one family at any one time. A mechanism for addressing this problem will be discussed with local authorities before the next distribution.

For the second distribution cycle, the general ration was reduced to 8 kgs per each family member, adult or child. In Nioro Central, which received only one distribution, the ration was 10 kgs per adult and 5 kgs per child.

In advance of each distribution, the WV team made up its own distribution lists and family distribution cards on the basis of the village lists. Our list and the distribution card contained the same information i.e. name of the Chef de Famille, number of children and adults in family, the family ration, Carnet de Famille identifying number and name of village. The tonnage required for each village distribution, plus a 30 % extra adjustment was calculated from these lists.

Distribution was made only to a family member holding a Carnet de Famille. The green ration card was given out at the first distribution and had to be presented again at the second distribution.

The distribution schedule and site information were passed to the Cercle office and from there to the arrondissements and villages. Instructions were forwarded in good order for the first distribution. During the second distribution, there were some mix-ups, especially in the Arrondissement Central. Where possible, distribution teams went out to the arrondissement or even to the villages. But this was often impossible due to impassable roads, especially during the height of the rains. During much of August and part of September, surrounding villages were called into Nioro for the distribution. Once the word went out, the people usually arrived promptly and continued to arrive until all were served.

Some villages organized communal transport. Some villagers came

with their own mules and horses. Some villagers paid for or traded some grain for private transport.

A distribution team normally consisted of one supervisor, one assistant, and one storekeeper (in Nioro) or "stevedore" (in the field) who measured and gave out the grain. For field distributions another assistant usually went along to make tea and generally help out. Usually an arrondissement official would also be present to help keep order and to consult on problem cases.

Each green ration card was checked and noted on the distribution list before the holder was passed on to the storekeeper to receive the ration. In cases where two ration cards were presented, the local authorities were usually consulted before two rations were delivered. In no case was anyone allowed to collect for more than three ration cards. The WV team generally refused grain to anyone not on the list. However, in cases where other villagers and/or the village or arrondissement leaders vouched for a family that had been mistakenly left off the list, a distribution was made and the village leader signed for it personally.

At the end of each day, tonnage and beneficiary figures were totaled and submitted to the Project logistician. Each warehouse entry and sortie was recorded on warehouse ledgers and stock balances kept up to date. Waybills were issued to each truck driver and signed on receipt at the distribution sites. The Project logistician gave weekly distribution reports to the Commandant du Cercle and a monthly summary was passed to the Regional Governor through the Bamako World Vision office.

The main problems experienced in the Nioro distribution stemmed from the difficulties in supplying the maize from Bamako and Kayes. By the time the Nioro team had secured adequate storage and were ready to receive grain, the Bamako-Nioro road was cut off by rain and local truckers refused to try it. As noted above, the alternative system involving rail transport to Kayes and forwarding by local private vehicles produced a halting and inadequate trickle of about 60 tonnes per week during August. In early September, the trickle stopped altogether for more than one week and Nioro stocks were depleted as private truckers were lured to a lucrative construction project on the other side of Kayes. With supply uncertain, it was difficult for the Nioro team to schedule large distributions in advance. There were heart-rending days when villagers called into Nioro for a distribution had to be turned away for lack of grain. Later in September and October, when considerable effort from all sides had improved delivery rate dramatically, pressure on storage capacity caused some strain. As in the case of transport from Ghana to the 7th region, there were two fundamental reasons for these difficulties: One over which we have very little control is the African environment (natural, physical, commercial and administrative) itself. The second which can be improved on, is the coordination and communication between MOS and World

Vision regarding delivery schedules.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The pressures of distribution schedules and staff limitations did not allow formal, systematic end-use surveys following distributions in either the 7th or 1st regions. The resulting lack of hard data available for corrective and evaluative purposes is a major weakness of the 1985 distribution program. However, because WV teams functioned consistently at the "grassroots" level and distributed directly to the family, they were able to limit improper "diversion" of commodities through direct control and also remained constantly in touch with local authorities and the people themselves, so that a considerable flow of information, both specific and impressionistic, was available.

In addition, WV staff frequently checked the major market places for the presence of USAID grain and to monitor the cereals prices. Except for the Gao incident described earlier, we never found reason from these checks to believe that there was significant diversion of the grain to the marketplace or significant effect on local prices. In fact, the Commandant of Menaka remarked that one of the major achievements of the World Vision distribution was to bring the previously high cereals prices back into equilibrium with animal prices, so that the pastoralists were able to begin stabilizing and restocking their herds.

Many people sold or bartered a part of their ration to buy other necessary food and household supplies, to pay off debts, or to pay for transport of their ration. Occasionally we received complaints that someone had to turn over part of his ration to get on the list for distribution. But these were rare and never fully substantiated.

We know from our own observations and from the voluntary expressions of gratitude received from many sources, that the distribution helped thousands of people avoid starvation during the critical months before the crops and wild grasses could be harvested. Our distribution throughout the 7th region was one of the factors which helped reduce the flottant populations in Gao and Menaka. It is harder to evaluate how many people were missed altogether and how many received more than their fair share. During the distributions, such cases were often brought to our attention by the people or their leaders. Every attempt was made to verify and rectify the situations presented.

It is probable that in the 7th region a number of people may have received two or even three times their ration, due to the moving population, the vast areas served, and the problems of supervision and management of local personnel. Certainly a less than rigorous attempt was made to distinguish the "truly needy" people. But this is possibly a moot point in a population which in general is dependent on the natural environment for sustenance and had suffered repeated years of indiscriminating drought and

lost by most accounts 65-90% of their capital.

In Nioro, where a greater percentage of the population is settled in villages and working in agriculture, we were able to pay closer attention to identification of the needy and to project evaluation. We never found any significant evidence that the Nioro distribution depressed grain prices in the area. A limited follow-up survey using a standard questionnaire was done in Nioro. From it we learned the people felt the distribution had been adequate to carry them over the hardest months, and that in many cases it was the only food available. They felt the distribution was equitable and that those who were missed were able to share with their relatives who did receive a distribution. At the village and family level there was only a vague awareness of the donor, although some could identify World Vision. At the arrondissement and cercle level there was a better awareness that the donors were World Vision and the US government.

By November 30th, a reduced target of 1770 tonnes of US corn had been distributed in two cycles in Nioro to all the villages and villagers declared needy by their representatives. By January 30th, 5800 tonnes had been distributed throughout the 7th region and a surplus of 2400 tonnes remained in storage. There was very minor (less than half of one percent) loss or damage. A number of recommendations can be made for future distributions:

Recommendations

1. Commodities should be in country and pre-positioned in secondary distribution sites before the on-set of the rainy season. World Vision is already moving the 1985 surpluses into position for the 1986 distribution in the 7th region, and we are hoping to receive 1986 commodities during May in order to pre-position them also.
2. A delivery schedule for inland transport which is both workable in the African milieu and reasonable in terms of local storage and distribution capacity should be worked out in advance and made an integral part of the transport contract. Field staff should carefully assess their capacity to receive delivery, take note of the schedule and be prepared to stick to it, realising that it will be very difficult to change, once in motion.
3. Greater attention should be given to limiting the area and population covered by distribution plans to a manageable size and there should be improved coordination with other NGOs to help assure coverage while avoiding duplication of effort. WV staff began its initial surveys for 1986 in January and has gone to great lengths to coordinate with the other NGOs in Gao. This effort has been frustrating since they are all behind us in their planning, but we are encouraging a more coordinated geographic division of the area among participating NGOs for 1986. Distributions

should also be limited by establishing clearer and stricter criteria for identifying "needy" populations.

4. Malian distribution teams should receive closer supervision and better training from WV management. Distribution teams should be smaller in size and no more than two teams should be expected to operate at a time. During April we will start a training program for all our expatriate and Malian field staff to ensure that all are well versed in the World Vision commodity management system and know how to deal with various problems and issues that may arise according to World Vision and AID policy and regulations.
5. Independent end-use surveys should follow each distribution by no later than one week and the reports should be closely monitored and followed-up as indicated. We are currently recruiting Malian Food-Monitors who will be trained to do these surveys, using standard questionnaires.
6. Field teams should more closely monitor and report on the major economic and social indicators in their regions such as availability and prices of food in the local markets, rainfall data, progress of local crops, nutritional status of the population, especially vulnerable groups, and population movements. The Malian Food Monitors will be trained and provided with standard questionnaires to assist in this reporting.
7. Closer attention must be paid to recruitment of qualified experienced international staff and these should be hired for a minimum of one year instead of the current 6 months. The project was plagued by staff turnover which occurred not only at the end of contracts but frequently early due to both employee and employer dissatisfaction.
8. National staff should be hired locally rather than in Bamako which frequently results in problems of morale and cultural sensitivity in the local milieu. Salary scales for national staff should be standardized for all WV staff and to the extent possible should be commensurate with scales paid by other NGOs.
9. Closer attention should be paid to close coordination and cooperation with local authorities in the 7th region. International and Malian staff should have a prescribed protocol to follow in making contacts with and reporting to arrondissement and cercle officials and regular written reports should be made to the Governor of Gao, as was done in the 1st region.
10. A standard World Vision commodity management system should form the structure for distribution planning and management in all areas of World Vision operation, to assure that all distribution is carried out in conformity with AID and World Vision policies and regulations, on a systematic rather than

haphazard basis. The commodity management system should stress such steps as prior approval of distribution plans in writing by Cercle and Arrondissement authorities, and distribution lists signed by local authorities immediately following a distribution. It should correct current gaps in the auditable trail of commodity movement from receipt through internal transport and distribution. The most obvious gaps in the 85 program were the lack of distribution lists in Menaka and the haphazard use of waybills on World Vision distribution trucks.

11. Field teams should identify small, manageable, locally supported Food-For-Work projects and submit detailed proposals to Bamako before allocating any grain to them. Use of grain given to local or international NGO's for Food-For-Work or other purposes must be closely monitored and an end-of project report submitted to World Vision Bamako.
12. Feeding center personnel should be more closely supervised. Attendance must be taken every day and monitored by international staff. Secouristes should receive more systematic training in an expanded curriculum of nutrition, health and sanitation, as well as home gardening for mothers.

CERCLE	TONNAGE	RECIPIENTS
GAO	2538.25	259520
ANSONGO	1153.30	115220
MENAKA	1190.40	54097
BOUREM	708.30	70230
KIDAL	210.20	21020
TOTAL 7TH REGION	5800.45	520087
NIORO	1770.15	111000
TOTAL DISTRIBUTED	7570.60	631087
LOSS AND DAMAGE	26.80	
IN STOCK, 1/31/86	2402.60	
	10000.00	

GAO CERCLE

ARRONDISSEMENT	TONNAGE DELIVERED	RATION IN KGS	NUMBER OF* RECIPIENTS	NUMBER OF VILLAGES
In Tillit	46.75	20	11687	6
Haoussa Foulane	422.65	20/50	42265	15
Djebock	357.55	50	35755	27
Gao Central	890.20	50	89020	30
Gao Ville				
Flottants	355.50	50	35550	
Blind	3.40		35	
Phys Handicapped	3.15		100	
Ment Handicapped	3.10		50	
Farmers Coop	4.00		30	
Hospital	2.00		50	
Tailors Coop	7.55		18	
Fishing Co-op	0.60		60	
construction coop	15.00			
FFW (MSF)	226.00			
FFW, Gao (other)	16.80			
Gao Quartiers	177.00	20	44250	7
Total - Gao Ville	811.80		80143	
Nomad Resettlement	7.00	50	700	
TOTAL GAO CERCLE	2538.25		259570	85

BOUREM CERCLE

ARRONDISSEMENT	TONNAGE DELIVERED	RATION IN KGS	NUMBER OF* RECIPIENTS	NUMBER OF VILLAGES
Bourem Ville	6.00	50	120	1
Bamba	399.25	50	7985	24
Temera	216.40	50	4328	16
Agamhor	38.50	50	793	
Hersane	48.15	50	963	
	708.30		14189	

KIDAL CERCLE

ARRONDISSEMENT	TONNAGE DELIVERED	RATION IN KGS	NUMBER OF* RECIPIENTS	NUMBER OF VILLAGES
Kidal Ville	6.00	50	120	1
Kidal Central	25.00	50	500	
Bouressa	15.20	50	304	2
Tessalit	74.15	50	1483	5
Aguel-Hoc	89.85	50	1797	7
	210.20		4204	15

ANSONGO CERCLE

ARRONDISSEMENT	TONNAGE DELIVERED	RATION IN KGS	NUMBER OF* RECIPIENTS	NUMBER OF VILLAGES
Ouatagouna	247.40	50	24740	13
Talataye	235.90	50	23590	13 + flottant
Tessit	49.95	50	4995	
Ansongo Centrale	553.35	50	55335	19
Ansongo Ville	65.60	50	6560	1
AFVP (FFW)	1.10	20		
	1153.30		115220	46

MENAKA CERCLE

ARRONDISSEMENT	TONNAGE DELIVERED	RATION IN KGS	NUMBER OF* RECIPIENTS	NUMBER OF VILLAGES
Anderamboukane	295.40	20 x 5	14770	3
Inekar	74.30	20 x 5	3715	6
Menaka Central	194.15	20 x 5	9707	5
Menaka Ville	518.10	20 x 5	25905	1
FFW	91.45	60/month	(avg) 300	
Feeding Centers	17.00	.1/day	(avg) 2000	
	1190.40		54097	15

ARRONDISSEMENT	NIORO		CERCLE		TOTAL MT
	FIRST TONNAGE	DISTRIBUTION RECIPIENTS	SECOND TONNAGE	DISTRIBUTION RECIPIENTS	
GAVINANE	342.89	25697	291.52	23467	643.4
GOGUI	144.70	8400	66.05	8340	210.7
KORERA-KORE	138.82	10100	79.50	9608	218.3
SIMBI	128.80	4815	41.09	4823	169.8
TROUNGOUMBE	320.92	18275	166.83	18437	487.7
CENTRAL ARRD			337.43	22072	377.4
NIORO DU SAHEL			92.69	24105	92.6
TOTAL (1)	1076.14	67287	1075.12	110852	2200.2

NOTE (1): ABOVE INCLUDES 430T RICE PURCHASED BY WV

**WORLD VISION/VISION SUR LE MONDE
WAYBILL/FEUILLE DE ROUTE**

PAGE OF/DE

Waybill No./No. Feuille de Route

**NOM DU TRANSPORTEUR
CARRIER NAME**

**CARRIER ADDRESS
ADRESSE DU TRANSPORTEUR**

--

**TO/A:
Consignee/Consignataire**

Truck No./No. du Camion

Destination

ROUTE

FROM/DE:

**SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
INSTRUCTIONS SPECIALES:**

Shipper/Expéditeur

Origin

NO. UNITÉS NO. SHIPPING UNITS	TYPE D'EMBALLAGE, DESCRIPTION, MARQUES, EXCEPTIONS KIND OF PACKAGING, DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES, SPECIAL MARKS & EXCEPTIONS	POIDS WEIGHT	ACCEPTE PAR TRANSPORTEUR ACCEPTED BY CARRIER

COMMENTS/COMMENTAIRES

CONSIGNEE/CONSIGNATAIRE

A) ALL CARGO AS SHOWN ABOVE RECEIVED IN GOOD CONDITION.
LA CARGAISON A ETE RECUE EN BONNE CONDITION.

SIGNATURE: _____
NAME/NOM _____
(PRINTED/IMPRIME)
DELIVERY SITE: _____
LIEU DE LIVRAISON

B) REMARKS/REMARQUES:

SIGNATURE: _____
NAME/NOM _____
(PRINTED/IMPRIME)
DELIVERY SITE: _____
LIEU DE LIVRAISON

World Vision International

Fiche de Distribution de Marchandises

Lieu et Date _____ Magasin N° _____

ARTICLE	ELEMENT	QUANTITE EN KILOS	UNITES	CONDITION
---------	---------	----------------------	--------	-----------

--	--	--	--	--

Distribution autorisée par : _____ Pour le Compte de : _____

Date : _____

Observations _____

Type de Transport : _____ N° Permis : _____

Nom du Chauffeur : _____ Date : _____

Compagnie : _____

Arrivée à destination : _____ Date : _____

Condition à l'arrivée et observations : _____

Réceptionné pour le Compte de : _____ Agence : _____

-- VISION MONDIALE INTERNATIONALE --

NOM :

LIEU :

FRACTION :

NOMBRE
DE PERSONNES

DATE	RATION	SIGNATURE

FICHE INDIVIDUELLE

Arrdt _____

Village _____

Nom du Chef de famille _____

Ethnic _____

Personnes Adultes _____

en charge Enfants _____

Moyen d'existence

Etes-vous Agriculteur _____ Eleveur _____ Autre _____

Avez-vous un champ propre à vous même? _____

Si oui, combien d'ha avez-vous cultivé? _____

Combien de goudes avez-vous recolté? _____ Fonde _____

Combien de moudes avez-vous réservé pour la consommation? _____
pour les semences? _____

Quel pourcentage de récolté avez-vous perdu? _____

A cause de quoi? _____

Votre famille a-t-elle mangé bien? _____ Combien de fois _____

Combien de moudes de céréale consommez-vous/jour? _____

Actuellement, quel type de céréale mange votre famille? _____

Avez-vous reçu des dons gratuits de céréale? _____ De qui? _____

(Expliquez brièvement le travail de Vision Mondiale)

Le grain reçu a duré combien de temps? _____ mois

Avez-vous des animaux? _____

Le nombre de ces animaux a-t-il diminué _____ augmenté _____
par rapport à 1986.

Quel est le plus grand problème de votre famille? _____

Obeservations Générales

- L'état du grénier _____
- Santé des enfants _____
- Autres remarques _____

WORLD VISION

RELIEF PROGRAM

**MONTHLY RECIPIENT STATUS REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF _____, 19__**

Date _____

Signature _____

Name _____

Program by Category	No. of Recipients Reached During the Month	COMMODITIES—QUANTITIES IN Kgs											
		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	Total		
Food for Development	////////////////////												
Maternal and Child Health													
School Feeding													
Other Child Feeding													
Food for Work													
Emergency	////////////////////												
Refugee													
Disaster													
Welfare	////////////////////												
General Relief													
	////////////////////												
TOTAL													

WORLD VISION

RELIEF PROGRAM

**MONTHLY COMMODITY STATUS REPORT
FOR THE MONTH OF _____, 19__**

DATE _____
SIGNATURE _____
NAME _____

	COMMODITIES—QUANTITIES IN LBS.—NET WEIGHT								
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	Total
A. Physical Inventory beginning of month(1/)									
B. Receipts	////////////////////////////////////								
1. Arrivals according to B/L (i.e. Totals from item G, page 2)									
2. Commodities delivered by shipping companies and applied to cover previous shortages									
3. Loans returned from other agencies									
4. Commodities borrowed									
TOTAL RECEIPTS DURING MONTH									
C. Distribution During Month by Program	////////////////////////////////////								
<i>Food For Development</i>									
Maternal and Child Health									
School Feeding									
Other Child Feeding									
Food For Work									
<i>Emergency</i>									
Refugee									
Disaster									
<i>Welfare</i>									
General Relief									
x									
x									
TOTAL DISTRIBUTIONS DURING MONTH									
D. Balance According to Documentation									
E. Physical Inventory at end of month(1/)									
F. Difference between D and E									
a. Ocean Freight Losses									
x									
b. <i>Internal Loans</i> , Lost or damaged in agency warehouses, customer warehouses, or internal transport.									
e. Repayment of Commodities borrowed from other Agencies									
d. Loans made to other Agencies									
e. TOTAL DIFFERENCES ACCOUNTED FOR (a-d)									
f. TOTAL DIFFERENCES UNACCOUNTED FOR									

(1/) Physical inventory includes commodities in customs warehouses, in co-sponsors warehouses, in storage by co-sponsors counterpart distributing agencies and which are in transit in country from ports to internal warehouses or central points. It does not include stocks at schools, feeding centers, work sites, etc. for immediate consumption or stocks in transit from intermediate distribution points to recipients for immediate consumption.

