

RWANDA

INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN

FY 1997 - 1999

USAID/RWANDA
March 1997

Rwanda and its people face enormous challenges. Their economy and their social systems were largely destroyed in the war. The Government of Rwanda has made impressive progress in rebuilding the country's infrastructure, but much remains to be done to restore the people's confidence in themselves, in their government and in their future. The United States can and does play an important role in promoting Rwanda's return to stability and the wellbeing of its people.

This Transition Action Plan is a central element in the U.S. Mission's goal to help get Rwanda back on the right path. It represents a progressive trend in bringing together the human, technical and financial resources of the U.S. Government to achieve common objectives of economic and social growth. USAID's various offices are working closely with the State Department and other agencies such as DOD, DOJ and USIA to achieve the most effective impact. Consistency of resource application is not yet perfect, but I believe we are moving in the right direction. In 1994, the international community was powerless to prevent the Rwandan genocide. Donors must be better prepared to anticipate and respond in advance to the signals of mounting crisis. This Plan demonstrates the indispensability of planning for contingencies while hoping for positive change. Building people's stake in their society and enhancing their role in good governance are essentials in crisis prevention; they are the thrust of the USAID transition strategy and program presented herein.

This Plan, if accepted and approved by USAID/Washington, offers the hope Rwanda needs and the assistance for which Rwanda is now ready.

Robert E. Gribbin
Ambassador

Early in 1997 this report was known as:

RWANDA

TRANSITION ACTION PLAN

FY 1997 - 1999

USAID/RWANDA
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AOJ	Administration of Justice
BHR	Bureau for Humanitarian Response, USAID
DA	Development Assistance
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DOD	Department of Defense
ERMA	Emergency Refugees and Migration Assistance
ERRP	Emergency Reintegration and Reconstruction Plan
ESF	Economic Support Funds
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FFW	Food for Work
FFP	Office of Food for Peace, USAID
GHAI	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
GOR	Government of Rwanda
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRFOR	UN Human Rights Field Office for Rwanda
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program
IR	Intermediate Result
ISP	Integrated Strategic Plan
IEC	Information, Education and Communications
LGI	Local Government Initiative
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
NDO	National De-mining Office
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID
PROCAP	Program Support for Capacity Building
PRM	Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration, State Department
PSC	Personal Services Contractor
REDSO/ESA	Regional Economic Development Services Office for East & Southern Africa, USAID
ROL	Rule of Law
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SO	Strategic Objective
STD	Sexually-transmitted Diseases
TA	Technical Assistance
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Childrens Educational Fund
UQAM	University of Quebec at Montreal
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
WIT	Women In Transition

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Transition Action Plan (TAP) supports Rwanda's efforts over the next two to three years to prevent renewed conflict and pave the way for development investments after the transition. It provides a detailed analytical rationale for amending the existing two Strategic Objectives (SOs) for USAID/Rwanda and presents a plan for allocating USG resources from FY 1997 through FY 1999. The TAP also serves as input for the FY 1999 Results Report and Resources Request (R4).

The Program: The USAID/Rwanda transition program goal is stability and strengthened development capacity. SO#1 will continue to address administration of justice at the intermediate results (IR) level, in addition to two other IRs: security and governance. The new SO#1 formulation is: Increased Rule of Law and Transparency in Governance. SO#2 promotes reintegration by addressing social services, especially health, economic and food security issues. It reads: Reintegration of Communities, with Access to Social Services and Productive Opportunities.

SO#1 continues activities to build capacity within the Ministry of Justice, including direct support; it also carries to completion current work in police training and demining, and continues a local governance initiative (LGI) already funded and just getting underway. New initiatives are planned in legal education, the Bar Association and the National Judicial Council, the National Assembly, civil society and civil-military relations.

SO#2 has two major implementation components: health, and food security and productive opportunities, plus some special support activities. In health, the Mission will continue building capacity within the health delivery system by strengthening accounting and administrative systems, integrating STD/HIV interventions into decentralized services, and creating a national health communications capacity. Other activities will re-establish two health training institutes damaged or looted in the war, and provide technical assistance in policy development. In food security and productive opportunities, activities will produce greater professional staff and analytic capacity in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), increase economic opportunities in reintegrated communities, using both DA, OTI and monetized PL480 resources, and respond to economic and social needs of vulnerable people, notably women-headed families and the institutionalized.

This Plan is guided by the principles of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) as presented in the GHAI Draft Strategy on Conflict Prevention and Food Security (January 1997) and Linking Relief and Development: Report of the Interagency Transitions Team (May 1996):

1) It integrates USG policies and resources and links relief to transition and development assistance (USAID/AFR and BHR, State/PRM, USIA and DOD). It shows a progressive decline in relief/emergency resources and a higher proportion of development funds. At the same time, the document recognizes that the TAP's goal of increased stability may not be realized in the next two to three years, and instead the existing underlying factors of instability may continue. For this reason, we have provided some "crisis modifiers" in Section IV. F to allow for both contingency planning and program flexibility in the event of a renewed or emerging crisis. It demonstrates progress in linking OFDA resources to the transition, and suggests that improvements can be made in the event of future crises. It links the use of PL480 Title II resources to DA funds in support of agriculture and food security through capacity-building, targeted use of monetization and provision of services to farmers.

2) The plan supports Rwandan ownership of its transition. It is consistent with the Emergency Reintegration and Reconstruction Program (ERRP) which the GOR asked the World Bank and UNDP to develop at the November 1996 donors' meeting in Geneva.

3) The plan proposes doing business differently: section V.E suggests a new model for dealing with transition programs, focusing on specific problems rather than overall strategic issues; reporting at outputs and intermediate-results levels during the normal two-to-four year period of most such programs, rather than at the SO level; reducing other reporting requirements; and using flexible mechanisms to procure services and commodities.

4) The paper demonstrates extensive consultation with other donors and describes the role and participation of other donors.

5) Finally, the Plan recognizes the regional aspects of Rwanda's prospects for the transition, both for their positive implications (trade, food security and employment) and for the possibly negative ones (the pervasive instability in much of central Africa).

Program Management: USAID/Rwanda's approved staffing level is 44 positions, of which six are U.S. Direct-hire, eight USPSCs and 30 FSNs. Four of the USPSCs and two of the FSNPSCs are program-funded. In addition, four BHR-funded positions in the Mission do not count against the Africa Bureau's ceiling. This brings the total effective staff position numbers to 48 (44 AFR and four BHR). Slight adjustment of staff composition is indicated, but this plan requires no increase in currently approved levels.

To provide flexibility for procurement and services, and in the spirit of doing business differently and more efficiently, the TAP suggests consideration of an innovative funding mechanism, Program Support for Capacity-Building (PROCAP). This would manage the procurement process for short-and long-term technical assistance (TA) which is not easily accessed through IQCs or buy-ins. It would cover the programming and management of Mission training activities, and would possibly manage a fund to strengthen NGO capacity in civil society and social service objectives.

II. SETTING

A. Background

Rwanda has a violent history of politically-manipulated ethnic conflict. After decades of colonial rule which hardened divisions through explicit ethnic policies, the majority Hutu population ousted the Tutsi leadership in 1959. The ensuing violence targeted Tutsis and caused several hundred thousand people to flee. The Habyirimana regime claimed that the Tutsis who had fled had no home in Rwanda and no right to return, prompting the creation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), whose forces then invaded northern Rwanda in 1990. Mediation efforts led to the signing of a series of protocols called the Arusha Accords, which outlined a power-sharing agreement between the RPF and the Kigali regime. The Arusha Accords asserted the rights of refugees to return, created a coalition government, allowed for the creation of political parties, and projected a transition to democracy.

Neither the letter nor the spirit of the Arusha Accords was implemented, however, and in April 1994 extremist elements of the ruling regime launched a genocide to maintain power. Up to one million people were killed during the genocide. This genocide targeted Tutsis and Hutus in the political opposition. After the victory of the RPF in July an estimated 800,000 of the "old caseload"—the refugees of 1959 and their children—returned. Of the refugees who fled the RPF advance in 1994 to Zaire and Tanzania, a small number trickled back over the next two years; the majority, an estimated 1.3 million, however, returned suddenly in late 1996.

The situation in Rwanda today is thus characterized by demographic shifts affecting as much as one-half of the population, resettlement and rehabilitation needs in all parts of the country, and a huge loss of human resources whether through flight, participation in the genocide, or death. Fundamentally, it remains an open question whether Rwandans can recover from the polarizing effects of years of ethnocratic rule culminating in the genocide. The country faces an enormous struggle in overcoming the historical tendency to see power as indivisible. An increase in the influence of an extremist ideology could undermine the GOR's pledge to share power and create an equitable society for all Rwandans.

In short, the instability of the transition period during which USAID will implement its programs cannot be over-emphasized. This instability is further compounded by ongoing events in the Great Lakes region. Burundi's civil war and the ethnic nature of its conflict exert a polarizing and de-stabilizing influence on Rwanda. The crisis in eastern Zaire has the potential to affect many of the countries in the region, Rwanda included. On the other hand, relative stability in neighboring Tanzania and Uganda may help pull Rwanda onto a path of peaceful development, and the as-yet unknown resolution of the rebellion in Zaire also has the potential to provide a positive influence.

B. USAID Activities since 1994

USAID has been providing humanitarian assistance since the onset of the crisis, delivering over \$230 million worth of food aid for refugees in the region and vulnerable populations in Rwanda through 1996. Assistance within Rwanda from 1994 through 1996 amounted to another \$38.5 million, mostly in the areas of health and nutrition, water and sanitation, seeds and tools, and food and non-food distribution. In response to the massive return of refugees from Zaire and Tanzania during the end of 1996, in FY 1997 USAID is providing \$72.5 million in food aid and over \$26 million from OFDA/DART to cover immediate, unmet needs for re-integration, such as water and sanitation, shelter, seeds and tools, and health services. While most of these grants were made to NGOs, two direct grants to the GOR address transitional needs and support capacity building: 1) the provision of communications equipment to the outlying offices of the Ministry of Reconstruction and Social Reintegration; and 2) supplies to the Ministry of Health. Approximately \$35 million will be provided from the Emergency Relief and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund. These large amounts of assistance which for the most part do not pass through the Government of Rwanda color the context in which the Government not only lacks capacity but struggles to assert its ownership of decision-making regarding the distribution of assistance.

In addition to the humanitarian assistance, USAID/Rwanda has been implementing activities with funds from the Africa Bureau (DA), the Office of Transition Initiatives in the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR/OTI), and the State Department (ESF). In 1995, two strategic objectives were adopted. SO#1 focuses on the administration of justice and issues related to governance. Activities have included the

support of a post-genocide policy conference, support to rehabilitation of the judicial infrastructure, the training of lawyers, training for public safety forces, assistance to the government's new non-ethnic identity card program, and an equipment assistance package—early in 1995—enabling the Government to function. SO#2 supports the re-integration of the population at the community level, paying attention to governmental capacity, the needs of women and children, community health needs, particularly HIV/AIDS, and ongoing emergency assistance. Key activities have included the award of grants to international NGOs to help communities deal with orphans and separated children, training of social service professionals for the Government, provision of small grants to women's groups in rural areas, and assistance to the Government, particularly regarding community outreach and education for its sexually transmitted diseases program.

C. Other Donor Programs

Other donors have been providing assistance, based in part on the Round Table conferences that have been held periodically since January 1995. A number, including the U.S., Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, have contributed to paying Rwanda's arrears to the international lending institutions. Other donors, particularly those which either do not have a presence in Rwanda or have limited capacity for project implementation, pass funds to a UNDP Trust Fund for activity implementation. Disbursal of these funds has been slower than expected, and the Trust Fund was recently redesigned. Donors are beginning development activities in a variety of sectors, paying more attention to justice than is perhaps normal because of the genocide. The framework for donor assistance in the transition was presented at the November 1996 Geneva meeting to review Rwanda's proposals for an Emergency Reintegration and Reconstruction Program (ERRP). At that meeting, a joint GOR/World Bank/UNDP Assessment Mission was launched, which has prepared a detailed program which the GOR is currently reviewing. It is expected that most donors will develop programs within the framework of the ERRP.

D. Rwanda Facts

There are approximately 7.2 million Rwandans living in a country the size of Maryland. With 590 people per square kilometer, it is the most densely populated country in Africa. Its per-capita income plummeted from \$373 in 1990 to \$179 in 1996 by World Bank estimates. Predominantly rural—90% of the population engage in agricultural activities—Rwanda was self-sufficient in food until population growth pushed the country into a structural food deficit in the 1980s. By 1997, agriculture had returned to about 80% of pre-war levels, and the small industrial sector to about 62% of pre-war output. International donors finance more than half of the recurrent budget. About 40% of the recurrent budget goes to the military. The Government of National Unity was proclaimed in July of 1994 for a transition period of five years. In establishing the Government, the RPF took the Arusha Accords as a guideline. For example, the distribution of seats in the Assembly follows the negotiated arrangement of the Accords, except for those political parties which have been outlawed for their promotion of the genocide. (Further information is provided as relevant in the sections presenting the Strategic Objectives and results packages.)

III. CURRENT ANALYSIS

A. Description of Key Problems

There is significant agreement between the GOR and the donor community on the key problems facing Rwanda after the genocide and war of 1994, and the rapid and massive return of 1.3 million refugees to the country in late 1996. The overriding issue which must be addressed is stability and conflict prevention. The key elements of stability within Rwanda are adequate financial and human resources--which will ensure physical and livelihood security; justice and the end of impunity; and good, effective governance.

Rwandan efforts to achieve stability depend on the successful reintegration of returned refugees into Rwandan society and to build capacity to achieve justice and effective governance, to rebuild the country's human resources and to repair damaged physical infrastructure. Capacity-building is crucial to rapid improvement in government, local NGOs, and the private sector in a country which has lost between fifty to seventy percent of its government personnel to genocide or flight, where new leadership has limited experience, and where private sector investment is severely curtailed.

Stability in Rwanda has complex regional dimensions. This document faces some of the negative aspects with "crisis modifier" scenarios, and focuses on ways to encourage opportunities and manage events positively, e.g., cross-border trade and successful repatriation.

Rwanda is in a critical transition period. After the next harvest cycle Rwanda may no longer face "life-threatening" emergency problems related to refugee return, although special problems of land tenure conflicts, justice, vulnerable populations (orphans, female- and children-headed households), demobilization of a large standing army, and the need to reduce a large budget deficit will remain. The TAP assumes that over the next three years the country's progress towards development and its ability to effectively absorb development resources will be limited because of:

- a lack of human capacity in the government, the private sector and indigenous NGOs;
- continuing insecurity in some regions, with sporadic outbreaks of violence;
- an unsettled physical landscape as re-integration of refugees gradually takes place throughout the country;
- the government's lack of key economic and social data for decision-making, and the demand of short-term crisis management; and
- an absence of consensus within the coalition government on national priorities.

Under these circumstance, USAID and other key donors agree that a two-to-three year transition period, with gradually improved stability and increased human and physical capacity, will be needed before Rwanda can attract private sector significant investment and before the government can tackle effective sectoral reforms or major structural adjustment.

B. Government of Rwanda Strategy and Priorities

At the November 1996 meeting of donors in Geneva to review the GOR's emergency plan for short-term emergency and re-integration assistance, assembled in response to the rapid return of refugees, it was agreed that the World Bank and the UNDP would work with the GOR to elaborate a more detailed transition plan. The GOR framework for reintegration and reconstruction commits the government to

improving the prospects of people displaced by the cycle of conflicts since 1959, and to develop necessary socio-economic conditions for all Rwandans to reintegrate into their communities. The GOR is currently reviewing the jointly-prepared Bank/UNDP report entitled: Emergency Reintegration and Reconstruction Program (ERRP), but has not yet indicated its ownership of the program.

With returnees safely back in their communes of origin, the six-month emergency phase discussed in the GOR's framework and the ERRP is coming to completion. Implementation of the second phase, the two-year Transition Program, is now required to create conditions for successful integration. The GOR/World Bank/UNDP Joint Assessment Mission estimates the cost of the Transition program at \$338 million.

The objective of the Transition phase of the ERRP is to promote the economic and social reintegration of Rwandan returnees into their home communes and to enhance their ability to re-engage in economic-livelihood activities. Targeted beneficiaries are the most vulnerable population groups, and strategies focus on strengthening the service delivery capacity of the Government, and identifying and implementing income/livelihood generating activities at the community level. The program responds to rural and urban settlement and social infrastructure needs (housing, water, sanitation, roads, schools, health facilities), sustainable livelihoods (agriculture, micro-credit, income and employment schemes), and national capacity building. Expected results are: successful reintegration; improved living standards among vulnerable groups; rehabilitation of key social and economic infrastructure; improved coordination between the GOR and donors; and regular participation of beneficiaries in project conception and implementation.

The GOR has created a National Development Program Coordination Commission under the President's Office, which is responsible for overall coordination. The ERRP document proposes that overall supervision of the ERRP rest with the Joint Assessment Mission (GOR/World Bank/UNDP). A UNDP Trust Fund is used by several donors as a conduit for assistance. This Fund, along with a GOR Counterpart Fund, is seeking donor contributions to reduce a major public sector finance gap, with particular concern for recurrent budget shortfalls.

IV. USG ASSISTANCE FOR THE TRANSITION FYs 97-99

A. Goals, Program Themes and GHAI Principles

The overall goal which this program strives to support is Increased Stability and Strengthened Development Capacity.

Donor focus during this period must be on addressing the pre-conditions to development and democracy: reintegration, justice and governance, rebuilding physical infrastructure and capacity-building. USAID and the USG will do their part in addressing these pre-conditions.

USAID's Transition Plan focuses on two key Strategic Objectives:

- #1) Increased Rule of Law and Transparency in Governance, and
- #2) Reintegration of Communities with Access to Social Services and Productive Opportunities.

For both of these SOs the program themes will be Capacity Building and Laying the Foundations for Development.

In addition to these two SOs, the USG will continue to respond to special problems which face Rwanda, such as emergency feeding and disaster relief, if necessary. Under the PL480 program we propose food security initiatives targeted within the GOR development budget. These are described as support activities under SO#2.

GHAI Principles: Most importantly, this Plan is driven by the overarching principles of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI). These principles characterize the program as a whole as well as its individual components. They are:

Integrated USG Policies and Resources: This document reflects an explicit effort to plan the coordinated use of \$140 million in FY97 funds pledged by the USG to address Rwanda's needs as well as USG-wide resources which will be provided in FYs 98 and 99. Thus, the TAP team includes individuals representing the key funding sources within USAID (AFR, FFP, OTI, OFDA) and the team has worked closely with the U.S. Embassy to coordinate this plan with the State Department, USIA and DOD resources being programmed for Rwanda.

African Ownership: This plan was developed in response to the ERRP after consultation with all the relevant GOR ministries. The program framework and budgetary allocations set forth in the TAP respond to expressed GOR priorities, consistent with USAID's goals and policies.

Doing Business Differently: Section V.E of this document presents a typology which categorizes the key differences we see in Emergency Assistance, Transition Assistance and Development Assistance. Based on this typology, which stresses the critical need for flexibility and a short- to medium-term program focus during the transition period, the Mission presents a list of specific modifications in program structure, program reporting and program management which, if approved, would significantly enhance USAID's capacity to respond effectively to Rwanda's needs during the transition. This TAP (and probably any transition program) cannot achieve its maximum effectiveness if the USAID bureaucracy continues to use normal USAID procedures. We urge USAID/W to take immediate action to reduce the bureaucratic workload placed on the small USAID/Rwanda Mission and to modify procurement and program management systems to allow for maximum speed and flexibility in the delivery of USAID assistance. This program cannot be "business as usual" and at the same time effectively manage USG resources for results.

Donor Coordination: This Plan reflects an intense process of donor consultation and coordination across all elements of the proposed program. As indicated in each section of this plan, USG resources have been carefully programmed to complement, rather than duplicate, those of other donors. The GOR has not chosen thus far to bring donors together to discuss and review donor and government programs regularly on a sectoral basis, nor has it particularly encouraged the UNDP to take the lead in calling donor coordination meetings. This young government prefers to program, ad seriatim, with individual donors, sometimes submitting the same request for assistance to several donors. This approach appears to be equated in the GOR thinking with its ownership and control of their program, and GOR officials seem reluctant to cede "control" to UNDP or any coordinated

multi-donor body. In response, the donors attempt to avoid program duplication through informal but time-consuming attempts to keep current on government requests received and programs planned. The recent establishment of a National Development Program Commission in the President's Office could bring order into the process.


Linking Relief, Transition Assistance and Development: This USAID program will continue to make appropriate conceptual and programmatic linkages between activities funded from Emergency, Transition or Development offices or sources. We agree with GHAI that the relationship is not linear--that transition or development activities can be designed to help prevent future emergencies. We are also cognizant that during this transition period, internal or external circumstances could push Rwanda or a region within Rwanda back into circumstances where emergency or relief-mode assistance is required. For this reason, Section IV.F contains a set of crisis modifiers in order to be prepared for the less predictable events which too frequently strike the Great Lakes region.

Regional Approaches: Stability and conflict prevention, an overriding goal of this Plan, require analysis of both the domestic and regional situation. The Plan focuses on activities to promote stability within Rwanda. However, Rwanda's neighbors, particularly Burundi and Zaire, could create further instability within Rwanda. At the same time, economic reforms and growth in Uganda and Tanzania offer promising trade and employment opportunities. The food security component of SO#2 discusses these prospects.

These conceptual and programmatic linkages will be managed within the USAID Mission by integrating all sources of funding and all personnel within SO teams. The USAID director will continue to provide leadership for the use of all USAID resources within the U.S. mission in Rwanda and will continue to plan the use of these resources in close consultation with the Ambassador and other members of the country team.

Although the Mission expects tangible results during this critical two-to-three year period, this program will also have a complementary impact on longer-term development problems. Decisions on whether to focus health training resources more on doctors or on primary care providers will have a significant impact on longer-term health sector policies and program capacity. Emergency and humanitarian feeding decisions and initial agricultural policies established during the transition period must be made with the longer-term objective of food security firmly in mind. Finally, improving Rwanda's human resource capacity will bring dividends for many years. Thus, while USAID must focus its transition program on short- to medium-term achievements, the impact of those program decisions on longer-term development will be carefully analyzed.

The Transition Plan program for Rwanda, outlined above can perhaps be seen as a whole in the following graphic depiction:



IV.B Strategic Objectives

IV.B.1: S.O.1: Increased Rule of Law and Accountability in Governance

This TAP expands on the Mission's previous SO#1. It reflects the growing understanding by USAID of the evolving national and regional context in which assistance to Rwanda is being programmed and the new challenges brought about by the return of 1.8 million Rwandans since 1994.

Background:

USAID's involvement in the justice sector began in late 1994 when two USAID democracy/governance experts participated in a multi-donor assessment mission. The report of this assessment defined the approaches for donors to take: restoration of the justice infrastructure, training of judges and prosecutors, provision of human rights monitors and creation of an international tribunal to deal with the genocide.

Subsequently, while other donors began to work on technical capacity-building in the Ministry of Justice, USAID worked with the Office of the President to organize a conference to debate the policies appropriate to re-establish justice and deal with the caseload of genocide cases. The Genocide Conference resulted in recommendations which have become law for dealing with those accused of genocide, who have since become a prison caseload of over 100,000 people, creating a serious situation for the GOR. The lack of judges, prosecutors and lawyers makes timely and fair disposition of these cases unfeasible. This problem cannot be discernibly addressed within the two to three year timeframe of the transition period. However, during this period, USAID expects to help Rwanda to improve its administration of justice, with emphasis

on capacity building and policy formulation. This assistance, in addition to the work with other groups such as the Bar Association, will contribute over the long term to a gradual decrease of the prison caseload.

In addition, the USG is a key donor of the UN Human Rights Commission's Office in Rwanda (HRFOR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

Rationale: The three intermediate results under this SO promote increased security during the transition period. Separate activities under the IR packages will complement each other to achieve the goal of increased stability. A viable, institutional justice system is key to dealing with the huge prisoner caseload and restoring confidence of the population in government. Police training will support efforts in local government and demobilization, while civil-military relations will be improved and strengthened through activities with the legislature and in the area of administration of justice (AOJ).

This SO contributes to USAID Agency Goal 2.1--Strengthening the Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights, and USAID Agency Goal 2.4--More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions.

In this moment of transition from crisis to development, SO#1 identifies three IRs which, if achieved, would contribute greatly to increasing stability in Rwanda during the transition period. The three IRs take into account USAID's comparative advantage, other donor activities, and urgent needs.

The IRs are:

- 1) strengthened capacity for administration of justice (AOJ), which addresses the fundamental need to combat the pervasive sense of impunity in Rwanda;
- 2) an increased sense of security on the part of the general population through de-mining, increased trust and confidence in the police forces, and the establishment of a civil-military dialogue conducive to a stabilizing role of the military in society; and
- 3) an increasing sense of accountability and transparency in governance, specifically through increased participation of communities in local governance, increased NGO influence, and a responsive legislature.

Constraints: The justice sector suffers from a severe lack of trained professionals—there are fewer than 20 practicing lawyers in the country—and minimal physical infrastructure. The overwhelming burden of some 100,000 prisoners accused of participation in the genocide, most of whom lack case files, presents the greatest constraint to success in this area. More broadly, the security situation may present the greatest obstacle to programs under this SO. Increased violence instigated by extremists and/or violent response on the part of the Government could limit areas where we could work, drain time and energies on the part of the Government and USAID and our partners which should be spent on development activities and, most fundamentally, destroy an environment in which the foundations for development can be built. Finally, as the current Government is not elected and formally accountable to the people of Rwanda, there is the risk that the Government will retreat from its stated position of openness and inclusiveness upon which many of the activities in this SO are built.

Intermediate Result 1: Improve Administration of Justice (AOJ)

IR 1 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE	RESULTS	FY97 (000's)	FY98 (000's)	FY99 (000's)	Total (000's)
Activity 1.1: Law School	150 new lawyers		500		500
Activity 1.2: Bar Association	Professional legal advocacy. Lawyers receive continuing training.	500			500
Activity 1.3: National Judicial Council	Independent Judiciary. Judges receive continuing training.	500			500
Activity 1.4: MOJ Increased Institutional Capacity	Policy formulation and decision-making enhanced; Policies effectively communicated	500	1000	500	2,000
Staff Resources:	D/G Officer 35% SO1 Assistant 35%	see budget section for finances			
	TOTALS	1,500	1,500	500	3,500

Under this SO, Rwanda will have a functioning Bar Association which will act as an advocacy group for attorneys and for the protection of human rights. For the first time in Rwanda, the appointment of judges is independent of the Executive. Given full autonomy by the Arusha Accords, the National Judicial Council is charged with appointment and promotion of judges. As with the Bar Association, it is a new institution that needs extensive capacity building to succeed.

Building capacity in the National Judicial Council and Bar Association is necessary to provide continuing legal education, specialized courses for senior judges, and the opportunity to bring the Rwandan judiciary and legal professionals up to date on modern legal practices. These two organizations will help Rwanda create a transparent and fair judiciary, with an equivalent legal counterpart in the private sector.

Rwanda's legal system follows the civil-law system. The U.S. follows the common-law system. While differences between the two systems are significant, the U.S. does have access to notable capacity in this area, for example through the National Center for State Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, the International Law Branch of the American Bar Association, the International Development Law Institute (IDLI) in Rome, and the University of Alabama Law School.

To achieve IR1, to build capacity and improve operations, standards and practices in administration of justice in order to combat the pervasive sense of impunity in Rwanda, USAID proposes the following activities:

IR 1.1 Law School

With support from the University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) Law School, the Law School at the Rwandan National University has begun an English language law program aimed at graduating a class of English-speaking lawyers trained in the civil law system. This program addresses the needs of old caseload returnees who are English speaking but need to operate in a civil law system.

Intermediate Results: 150 new lawyers will be trained by the end of 1998.

Performance/Achievements to Date: Two initial grants amounting to \$730,000 have been signed with UQAM. The program began in June 1996 and will continue through 1998.

Role of Partners and other Donors: While other donors are providing short-term technical training to legal professionals, USAID is the only donor supporting education of full-time English speaking law students at the National University of Rwanda.

Resource requirements: D/G Officer 5%, SO1 Assistant 10%

IR 1.2 Bar Association

The Bar Association can play a fundamental role in the development of a transparent and timely justice system in Rwanda. In the long term, a functional Bar Association should be instrumental in the effort to reduce the prison caseload. To build the capacity of the national Bar, USAID will seek to provide in-country technical assistance (administrative skills, professional development, continuing legal education programs and legislative drafting), and observation tours abroad.

Intermediate Results: The National Bar will:

- contribute to capacity building of the MOJ;
- be an advocate for timeliness, transparency and human rights;
- provide continuing legal education programs for its members; and
- create a professional/advocacy association of Rwandan lawyers which protects the integrity and promotes the professional development of its members.

Role of Partners and other Donors: No activities have begun pending final ratification of the law creating the national Bar. When the law is enacted, it is expected that a French group will provide technical assistance.

Resource Requirements: D/G Officer 10%, SO1 Assistant 5%

IR 1.3 The National Judicial Council

The National Judicial Council, strengthened by the Arusha Accords, is the institution charged with the appointments and promotions of judges. As in other civil-law countries, this is an autonomous organ which ensures the independence of the judiciary.

Intermediate results:

- an independent and competent judiciary, a key to Rwanda's rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Role of Partners and other Donors: Switzerland and Belgium have rehabilitated the MOJ's Nyabisindu training center (with a capacity for 100 students) where court clerks and other staff are trained. At present there is no indication that other donors are involved with the Council itself.

Resource Requirements: D/G Officer 10%, SO1 Assistant 5%

IR 1.4 Increased Institutional Capacity in MOJ

The Ministry of Justice remains the central institution for rule of law, encompassing everything from managing prisons to implementing the new genocide law to re-establishing the role of the courts in the countryside. Increased MOJ managerial capacity will affect more broadly USAID's interest in promoting democratic practices for stability, through more timely and higher quality drafting of laws, improved ability to communicate relevant issues, increased exposure on the part of policy makers to drawing on aspects of common-law concepts as appropriate, and increased exposure of MOJ managers to the need for better communication with other state and non-state apparatus. In terms of building the foundations for development, providing direct assistance to the Ministry of Justice also builds USAID's relationship with this institution, fundamental for future movement towards democracy and the rule of law.

Intermediate results: 1) increased capacity to draw more widely for models in drafting appropriate policies, 2) increased capacity to implement policy decisions, 3) increased capacity to communicate proposals and/or decisions to the broader governmental and non-governmental audience.

Role of Partners and other Donors: The Dutch (through the UNDP Trust Fund), the EU and the Canadians work with the Ministry of Justice and are providing basic equipment, stop-gap training of several months' duration of judicial officials, salary supplements, increased hiring of staff on a contract basis (EU), technical assistance in identifying prisoners (Canada), and technical assistance in drafting legislation. The Belgians finance an NGO which provides defense counsel to the accused and civil claimants of genocide trials.

Resource Requirements: D/G Officer 10%, SO1 Assistant 10%

Intermediate Result 2: Increased Security

IR 2 SECURITY	RESULTS	FY97 (000's)	FY98 (000's)	FY99 (000's)	Total (000's)
Activity 2.1: Police Training (ICITAP Contract)	Assignment to the field of 1400 additional professional police, taking over roles from the military	700	0	0	700*
Activity 2.2: De-mining (RONCO Contract)	Reduction of mined areas; more capacity of GOR to carry out de-mining	2,100	0		2,100
Activity 2.3: Civil-military dialogue (IQC or Grant)	Increase in the capacity of civilians: assembly members, government officials, and academics engaged in discussions about the role of the military through the transition period	500	0	0	500
Staff Resources	D/G Officer 25% SO1 Assistant 25%	see budget section for finances			
	TOTALS	3,300	0	500	3,800

* \$500,000 of waived 1995 funds is available immediately, for a total of \$ 1.2 million.

To move from social and political disintegration to sustainable development, Rwanda must maintain stability and, in turn, increase security. At the heart of this challenge are timely issues related to the functions of the State's security apparatus and the role of the military.

IR 2.1 ICITAP/Police Training

A professional civilian police force is essential if Rwanda hopes to break the cycle of impunity and reestablish a stable democracy based on the rule of law and respect for human rights. Justice and the rule of law enforcement in reconstruction, rehabilitation, and conflict mitigation will not be possible without a disciplined, trained police force.

In furtherance of this effort to develop an effective professional, civilian police force, USAID proposes to:

- establish a cadre of experienced Field Training Officers to ensure professionalism and adherence to standard rules, regulations and internationally accepted police conduct.

- expand assistance in curriculum development and training beyond the basic recruit level by development of a national training strategy for the Gendarmerie and Communal Police.

Performance/Achievements to Date: USAID/ICITAP's efforts have concentrated on developing basic training and initiating dialogue on the institutional development of the country's two police forces (the National Police, or Gendarmerie, and the local, or Communal Police). USAID has already funded six Ugandan police instructors, whose six-month assignment ended with the graduation of 750 Rwandans for the communal police, doubling the size of the communal police. Basic supplies and equipment necessary for office operations of these two organizations has been provided.

Intermediate Results: 1) advanced training and consultation for supervisory and executive level management, 2) expanded curriculum beyond the basic level, 3) both organizations operational nationwide.

Role of Partners and other Donors: Approximately \$10 million has been budgeted or spent in this sector since 1995. Most activities have focused on capacity building through training: UNHCR on human rights, GTZ for basic training, and commodities and operational supplies and construction/rehabilitation of police structures by Denmark, Netherlands and the U.S. The Canadians and the state of Rheinland Palatinate of Germany have also provided some specialized training in forensics, traffic police, and training of trainers.

Resources Requirement: D/G Officer 10%, SO1 Assistant 10%

IR 2.2 Civil-Military Dialogue:

Several key ministries are committed to the reform of the role, composition and purpose of the armed forces (Justice, Interior, and Defense). (A demobilization plan aims at reducing the army at 60%.)

USAID is weighing assistance to the GOR in the following ways:

--providing technical assistance to agencies, departments or committees of the legislative and executive branches to increase competence in analyzing and formulating reform policy and legislation;

--bringing together on a bilateral or regional basis principal military, government and civil-society leaders to participate in a series of civil-military workshops on key issues regarding the role of the military in a civilian government.

Intermediate Results: 3-6 workshops to create opportunities for interaction between military and civilians on the appropriate role of the military.

Role of Partners and other Donors: USAID will continue to consult the Embassy as well as the World Bank and UNDP, which are working with the GOR on its demobilization and re-integration programs.

Resources Requirement: D/G Officer 5%, SO1 Assistant 5%

IR 2.3 De-mining

USAID will continue technical services and limited commodities in support of the National De-mining Office (NDO). Additional Rwandan personnel will be trained in the use of mine-detection equipment. Mine field survey crews and trainers will also be trained. Finally, training of supervisory staff and technicians for logistics, inventory control, equipment maintenance and other administrative functions will also be carried out.

Intermediate Results: The NDO is capable of using mine-detection equipment, supervising mine field survey crews, and training trainers, with supervisory staff and technicians for logistics, inventory control, equipment maintenance and other administrative functions also trained.

Achievements/Performance to Date: In 1995, the U.S. Special Forces helped the Rwandan army to begin establishing the capacity of the GOR's NDO with training and commodities. Following this initial assistance, the Department of Defense, with the State Department, funded a 15-month contract for de-mining training. This contract expanded the de-mining effort by adding a mine-detecting section to the National De-mining Office and fielding a mine survey and mapping team.

Role of Partners and other Donors: No other donor is engaged in this activity. The GOR will coordinate with USAID, DOD and Embassy in development and implementation of the activity.

Resources Requirement: D/G Officer 10%, SO1 Assistant 10%

Intermediate Result 3: Improved Governance, Accountability, and Transparency

IR 3 GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY	RESULTS	FY97 (000's)	FY98 (000's)	FY99 (000's)	Total (000's)
Activity 3.1: Local Government Initiative (CA; IQC's)	Increased participation in local government; progress in de-centralization efforts	500* 2,000	2,000*	2,000	6,500**
Activity 3.2: National Assembly-- (IQC)	Trained Assembly staff; Exchange visits for parliamentarians	500	0	600	1,100
Activity 3.3: Civil Society	Through an umbrella grant small amounts of institutional support are provided to civil society groups.	1,000	0	500	1,500
Staff Resources	D/G Officer 40% SO1 Assistant 45% OTI MinInter PSC 100%	see budget section for finances			
	TOTALS	4,000	2,000	3,100	9,100

* Funds provided by BHR/OTI, and will include a TA advisor / project manager in the Ministry of the Interior

** This activity has been started with \$1.4m of FY96 funds.

This Intermediate Result aims to improve stability in the communes through increased participation of the population with their local governments. By encouraging new mechanisms for representative participation in lieu of what was traditionally the sole domain of local administration officials, activities under this IR will promote community building and thus stability.

These activities are relevant during the transition period not only because of the need for community building, but also because the Government is currently undertaking initiatives for the "de-concentration" of resources, de-centralization of authorities, and institution of mechanisms for increased accountability. First, the Ministry of the Interior intends to reform the communal council structure. The reform will make the new council structure more diverse by including representatives of different segments of the commune's population: women's groups, youth, business people, farmers, etc. The new council will be more empowered vis-à-vis the mayor, who will become more like the chairperson of the board, accountable to the council. The draft legislation is being discussed within the Government. A second proposal aims to "de-concentrate" power from the central administration to the provinces. These two initiatives are opportunities for making local government more participatory and accountable.

USAID proposes to take advantage of these windows of opportunity by implementing the following governance activities:

IR 3.1 Local Government Initiative

It is in the communes where the peaceful resolution of conflict, re-integration, participation, and security will be most tested. USAID's Local Government Initiative (LGI) is a pilot attempt to provide a mechanism for the GOR to put into practice its stated objective of ruling fairly for all Rwandans. The activity aims to bolster stability in communities during the transition period, while laying the foundation for the GOR to engage in broader governance issues in the longer term.

LGI will engage the services of an intermediary organization to help implement the activity at the commune level. At the national level, OTI will provide support. The activity will consist of:

- establishment of a participatory mechanism through which the community will make resource allocation decisions for rehabilitation/development activities. The key is the modeling of new ways for communities to have decision making power over resources traditionally controlled by center-oriented local governments.

- technical assistance to local governments to help manage funds and evaluate and monitor projects, and to work with the Ministry of the Interior to find other ways of providing services to local communities which foster grass roots development.

- technical assistance to the Ministry of the Interior to help with the implementation of the communal reform initiative and to monitor the pilot activities from within the Ministry so as to be able to identify in a timely way lessons learned and promote their broader implementation.

Intermediate Results: Sustained empowerment of selected communities through greater participation and control over community resources, with the result that:

- representative community groups participate more in resource decisions;
- local governments use more mechanisms to get community participation;
- community members articulate that this experience has led to feeling of empowerment beyond simply these project activities; and
- GOR identifies national policies encouraging community participation.

Role of Partners and other Donors: Other than the UNDP, which has provided the Ministry of Interior with technical assistance for planning, the donors are only now turning attention to local-government capacity. USAID activities in this area can inform and perhaps be a catalyst for donors as they solidify plans. As in other activities in this SO, the GOR will play the lead role in the development and implementation of the activity. USAID will work in close consultation with the Embassy on all LGI activities.

Resources Requirement: D/G Officer 10%, BHR/OTI-funded PSC will be assigned 100% to the Ministry of the Interior to oversee the Local Government Initiative and manage supplementary funds provided by OTI for technical assistance to the Ministry.

IR 3.2 National Assembly

The current GOR Parliament is the product of agreements reached in the 1993 Arusha Accords. It is a non-elected coalition body of various political parties. It is hampered by poor infrastructure and insufficient professional staff.

To assist the National Assembly increase its capacity to address major legislative issues, USAID proposes to provide assistance to:

- improve administrative procedures;
- more effectively represent citizens and groups in society;
- build greater capacity to draft legislation; and
- build capacity for professional staff to analyze the budget.

Intermediate Results: Professionalized Assembly staff (seven committees); parliamentarians exposed to how other legislatures are organized and operate.

Role of Partners and other Donors: To be determined.

Resources Requirements: D/G Officer 10%, SO1 Assistant 15%

IR 3.3 Civil Society

Civil society advocacy organizations which aim to address fundamental political and human rights issues are re-emerging. Others are entirely new such as IBUKA, a survivor's organization whose name means "remember". Others are pre-war associations such as CLADHO, the human rights umbrella group, which are re-grouping after the events of 1994. These and other groups are working to reformulate a role for civil society. Professional organizations such as the Rwandan Association of Journalists are slowly coming

back to life or, like the Bar Association, being created. The media will demand particular attention, given the importance of radio for the dissemination of information in Rwanda and the need to overcome the negative reputation that the media developed due to its role in the genocide.

However, all civil society organizations suffer from the same lack of capacity either to satisfy their own constituencies or to attract international donors to fund their activities. Basic, generic technical assistance is required to strengthen the institutional capacity of organizations to operate and to be responsive (by-laws, budgeting, board elections and functions, membership, advocacy and media). USAID proposes to use an umbrella grant to provide basic technical assistance to national NGOs so that they can better represent their constituencies and can acquire some capacity to carry on the necessary debates in public.

Intermediate Results: Increased visibility of civil society organizations (indigenous NGOs) in debates about fundamental issues for Rwanda; increased willingness of the Government to consider the opinion of civil society groups.

Role of Partners and other Donors: While some of these groups currently receive support from fraternal organizations around the world, like the International Human Rights League which helps CLADHO, many of them receive little or no institutional support. Before activities in this area are undertaken, a study will have to be done to determine more precisely gaps that USAID funding can fill. A small amount of funding can provide significant assistance to these organizations.

Resources Requirement: D/G Officer 10%, SO1 Assistant 15%

Integrated Budget for S.O.#1

Budget (in 000's)

IV.B.2: S.O.2: Reintegration of Communities, with Access to Social Services and Productive Opportunities

This TAP reformulates the Mission's SO#2 to more accurately capture the program, and to reflect a deeper understanding of the evolving context and the challenges in a post-genocide society which is reintegrating approximately 1.8 million refugees, returned since 1994.

Strategic objectives/ Activities	FY 1997			FY 1998			FY 1999			T O T A L Life of TAP
	Apppr. account			Apppr. account			Apppr. account			
	DA	BHR, OTI	517	DA	BHR, OTI	517	DA	BHR, OTI	517	
SO#1: Rule of law										
IR1 Strengthen administration of justice	1,500	0	0	500	1,000		500			3,500
1.1. Law school				500						
1.2. Bar association	500				1,000					
1.3. MOJ technical assist. (1)	500									
1.4. Natl judiciary council	500									
IR2 Increase security	500	0	2,800	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,300
2.1. Police training (2)			700							
2.2. Demining activities			2,100							
2.3. Civil-Military ...	500									
IR3 Improved accountability & transparency		2,500	1,500	600	2,000	1,300	3,400			11,300
3.1. Local Governance Local govt. & participative activities TA/TRG to Ministry of Interior		2,000 500			2,000	300				
3.2. National assembly			500	600						
3.3. Civil society			1,000			1,000				
Other SO support activities		250	50	900	0	0	500			1,700
Local governance TA/TRG		250		500			500			
Program management (PSC)				400						
FSNPSC			50							
TOTAL SO#1	2,000	2,750	4,350	2,000	3,000	1,300	4,400	0	0	19,800

(1) In FY 98, OTI contribution will be requested for continued TA to MOJ, HRFOR,

(2) The total cost for police training is estimated to USD 1.2 million
Mission request is 0.7 million which will be complemented by existing waived funds in the pipeline.

Background and Rationale

Interventions promoting the resettlement and reintegration of Rwandans through improved economic opportunities, food security, and increasing access to basic social and family services evolved from and complimented the humanitarian interventions and resources which followed the events of 1994. In an effort to assist Rwanda transition from crisis to recovery, USAID has been integrating humanitarian, rehabilitation and long-term recovery resources to promote stability and create an environment for development and investment in Rwanda since the Mission re-opened in early 1995.

Two years on, indicators of recovery are promising: there is a functioning civil administration, much physical infrastructure has been repaired, education and health systems are beginning to function, agriculture production is up to 80% of pre-war levels, a National Assembly and Supreme Court are established and some macro-economic indicators are improving. Nonetheless, national stability and unity remains fragile. Humanitarian assistance to Rwanda was critical during the crisis and contributed to national rehabilitation efforts. Much needs to be accomplished in re-establishing Rwanda's national capacity. Transition assistance is designed to address the critical need to build both public and private capacity and assist the government in policy formulation and implementation.

Peaceful reintegration, increased access to basic social services and productive opportunities are crucial to long term stability in Rwanda. Achieving enduring stability in Rwanda is, in turn, an imperative among solutions to tumult in the Great Lakes region. The three intermediate results under this SO promote increased access to social services --specifically for health and unaccompanied children -- increased food security, and access to productive opportunities during the transition period.

This SO contributes to USAID Agency Goals: Providing Humanitarian Assistance; Stabilizing World Population and Protecting Human Health; and Encouraging Economic Growth.

Strategic Objective 2 identifies three Intermediate Results which will contribute to stability and peaceful reintegration in Rwanda during the transition period. The three IRs are:

- 1) Health.
- 2) Food Security and Productive Opportunities.
- 3) Support Objectives.

Strategic Objective 2: Reintegration of Communities, with Access to Social Services and Productive Opportunities

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS	RESULTS	FY97 (000's)	FY98 (000's)	FY99 (000's)	Total (000's)
Health	Increased Rwandan national and local capacity to plan, manage and implement effective and sustainable STD/HIV prevention and control interventions and other primary health-care support programs in target geographical areas	5,850	3,050	2,500	11,400
Food Security & Productive Opportunities	Increased food security and access to productive opportunities	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
Support Activities (*)	1. Food Security Budget support via commodity monetization 2. Productive opportunities via women in transition (wit) projects 3. Vulnerables assistance 4. Relief/humanitarian assistance 5. Demobilization	125,375	TBD	TBD	TBD
	TOTALS	131,225	-	-	-

(*) Includes: 72.5 million Emergency Title II Food Assistance (FFP)
26.0 million disaster relief (OFDA)
10 million ERMA requested (STATE/PRM)
10 million PL 480 Title II for monetization
4.5 million for Demobilization
2.4 million for WIT (OTI)

IV.B.2.1. IR 2.1.: Health: Increased Rwandan national and local capacity to plan, manage and implement effective and sustainable STD/HIV prevention and control interventions and other primary health care support programs in target geographical areas.

Background and Rationale

Since 1994 the Ministry of Health (MOH) has conducted a series of assessments of the health sector, including a comprehensive health facility and manpower review, analyses of the health problems of the population and in December 1996 a rapid assessment of the returning refugees from Eastern Zaire. These reviews point to a large disease burden on the population and excessive mortality due to preventable and treatable illnesses. Major causes of mortality are malaria, diarrhea and acute respiratory infections. HIV/AIDS is identified as a growing epidemic and priority health and development problem. Preliminary 1996 data from the HIV Sentinel Surveillance System indicate high HIV prevalence. Infection rates as

high as 32.6% were recorded in urban Kigali and are similar to pre-war prevalence studies. Infection rates in rural and semi-rural areas range from 3% to 10% and are significantly higher than pre-war data. A data validation study -- to be carried out by the MOH and the World Bank -- is scheduled for 1997.

Rwanda's capacity to plan, manage and implement basic health services has been severely damaged by the genocide. Most health facilities have been rehabilitated; however, the quantity and quality of health manpower remain a critical problem and basic accounting and administrative systems need to be strengthened. Local expertise to develop and implement innovative and effective information, education and communication (IEC) programs is extremely limited at a time when there is a tremendous need in Rwanda for information. The overall government budget for health is severely limited, resulting in reliance on donor funding, although cost-recovery schemes are being re-introduced in limited areas of the country.

As outlined in the 1995 Health Sectoral Policy and the 1996 and 1997-1998 Health Action Plans, the MOH recognizes that it must begin to systematically rebuild its overall capacity by focusing on human resources development, strengthening priority support systems for primary health care such as administrative and financial accounting and IEC, and developing key national policies and strategies for health-care financing. The Ministry has initiated a process of decentralization with emphasis on development of the health district and an integrated approach to services.

The next two years are critical for the health sector. Strong leadership at the Ministry has defined a course of action that aims at increasing the sustainability and effectiveness of primary health services. Donor support is essential to help rebuild capacity and identify implementation strategies and approaches that address priority needs given existing financial and manpower constraints. Health interventions under SO 2 address one of the most serious health problems in Rwanda: HIV/AIDS; while strengthening the public sector's capacity to deliver quality health services.

Criteria for USAID Investments: The following criteria were used to identify the key strategic elements of a health result under the TAP:

- The MOH has stated its highest priorities for investments are health manpower development and HIV/AIDS/STDs prevention and control.
- USAID has focused since 1994 STD/HIV prevention and control. Cooperative Agreements (CAs) have developed innovative communications and capacity building models that are ready to be expanded to other regions and adapted to a decentralized health delivery system.
- Complementing other Donors: The World Bank, the EU, the UNICEF, the GTZ, Belgium, Switzerland, the World Health Organization and many international NGOs are supporting the MOH in its process of decentralization, reforming the pharmaceutical sector, and specialized health programs.
- During a 2-3 year transition period with the limited budget allotted it will be impossible for USAID to start major new initiatives that support country-wide implementation of services. It should capitalize on existing programs and adapt decentralized approaches. Two years is an adequate

period to build important capacity in the Ministry -- at central and local levels -- enabling it to better plan, manage and deliver more effective decentralized services. This is also a learning period for the MOH and donors to identify effective approaches to service integration, decentralization and sustainability.

Activity Package 2.11: Effective HIV/AIDS and STD prevention and control strategies/approaches developed and implemented in target areas

Building on its pilot work in STD/HIV, USAID Rwanda will support the improved planning, management and implementation of integrated STD/HIV services in three additional regions. USAID proposed to reduce STD transmission and increase awareness through improved clinical practices, provider and client information dissemination, peer education in the community and assistance to regional and district level in the integration of STD interventions into existing primary health programs. Models of effective decentralization strategies would be developed in a two-year period for replication nationwide. Activities in four regions would include:

- 1) technical assistance to Regional/District Medical Teams to plan and manage the integration of STD/HIV services into existing health services;
- 2) development of tools, methodologies and materials to improve the quality of services;
- 3) training;
- 4) limited financial support to regions to support local programs including community-based education and awareness raising; and;
- 5) continued support to an NGO to develop a sustainable model for peer education in one region that will be replicable in others.

Activity Package 2.12: Increased MOH Financial Accountability and Transparency at the Central and Regional Levels

Weak financial accounting and administrative systems impede the MOH from efficiently managing its resources and attracting direct donor budget support. USAID Rwanda will strengthen the MOH's central and regional accounting and administrative systems in order to increase MOH management efficiencies and transparency. This element will enable the four target regions to obtain direct donor and government funding in support of decentralization.

USAID is providing technical assistance to assess and improve the administrative and financial accounting systems at the central level and in four regions. Activity:

Support technical assistance to respond to recommendations from the on-going financial and administrative systems evaluation in four regions. Additional TA will be provided to improve the procedures and transparency of accounting systems.

Activity Package 2.13: Expanded National Information, Education & Communications (IEC) capability

Limited Rwandan IEC capacity affects the overall design and impact of all STD/HIV and PHC programs. This activity supports a Rwanda Health Communications Center with the development of a Rwandan national capacity and functioning center as the primary objective. A proposal for the Center is being developed as a collaborative effort with the MOH, the World Bank and a private-sector NGO partner. The Center will be a privately-run, non-profit Rwandan organization. Funding for the start-up of the Center will be shared with the World Bank. Negotiations are on-going with the MOH and the World Bank. Activity:

Support creation of a national health communications capacity through assistance to the Rwandan Health Communications Center.

Activity Package 2.14: Increased Rwandan Capacity to Train Health Workers

A severe shortage of well-trained health manpower impedes the effective management and delivery of all services. Activity 2.14 commits USAID to rehabilitate two key health training institutions. The Kicukiro Center, originally constructed by USAID in the mid-1980s and badly damaged in the war, is the site for most in-service training. The Kigali Health Institute is the chief training institute for mid-level nurses who are to serve as trainers of trainers and supervisors at the district level. USAID will help increase the capacity of the MOH to train in areas related to STD/HIV and integrated management of childhood illness to address the high rates of mortality from preventable and treatable diseases. Activities:

- 1) rehabilitation/re-equipment of the Kicukiro Training Center
- 2) material support to the Kigali Health Institute, and
- 3) support to curriculum development and training in STD/HIV and integrated management of childhood illness through short term technical assistance

Activity Package 2.15: Policy & Strategy Developed for Health Care Financing & Health Personnel

A lack of policies and strategies in health-care financing and manpower planning decreases the MOH's ability to efficiently utilize financial and human resources. This activity assist the MOH to develop key policies particularly in health care financing and health manpower planning that need to be developed over the transition plan period through long- and short-term technical assistance.

Activities:

- 1) technical assistance to develop a health manpower strategy; and
- 2) technical assistance to advise the MOH on its health care financing policies and strategies.

Intermediate Result 2.1: HEALTH

IR/ACTIVITY PKG HEALTH 2.11 STD/HIV/AIDS	RESULTS	FY97 (000's)	FY98 (000's)	FY99 (000's)	Total (000's)
Activity: Integrated STD activities in 4 pilot regions: TA	MOH has capacity to plan, manage & implement effective STD/HIV programs	600	1,000	400	2,000
Activity: Integrated STD activities in 4 pilot regions:DS	“			1,000	1,000
Activity: Peer Education Pilot in Gitarama	Increased MOH & community capacity to implement STD IEC	1,000		600	1,600
Activity: Community IEC Capacity-building	Increased MOH & community capacity to implement STD IEC	250	250		500
ACTIVITY PKG 2.12 FINANCE & ADMIN.					
Activity: Account & Admin. Support to MOH	Capacity of MOH to plan for and manage resources	500	500		1,000
ACTIVITY PKG 2.13 NATIONAL IEC CAPACITY					
Activity: Health Communications. Center	National Capacity to develop IEC	1,000	800		1,800
ACTIVITY PKG 2.14 Health Training Capacity					
Activity: Kigali Health Institutes	MOH training capacity	600			600
Activity: Center Kicukiro	MOH Training Capacity	400			400
Activity: Support to Mutara	TBD	1,000			1,000
ACTIVITY PKG 2.15 POLICY & STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT					
Activity: Long- and Short-term TA	Increased MOH capacity to support a sustainable PHC system	500	500	500	1,500
	TOTALS	5,850	3,050	2,500	8,400

IV.B.2.2 IR2.2: Increased Food Security and Access to Productive Opportunities

Background and Rationale:

Agriculture is the economic mainstay for 90% of the population of Rwanda. Emergency and rehabilitation interventions have provided food assistance, farm implements, seeds and the other inputs to farmers to resume production. The emergency needs generally will end in June/July, at the end of the 1997(b) growing season. With these high-priority needs met and most Rwandan farmers back in country, the Ministry of Agriculture is now focusing attention on the institutions, policies and programs that will help promote agricultural rehabilitation to reduce Rwanda's food gap.

USAID/Rwanda's interest in agriculture and food security reflect GHAI principles of reducing dependence on external food aid, while enhancing local production capabilities in order to diminish the potential for crises generated by food insecurity. We foresee continuation and moderate expansion of USAID's effort in this sector.

Since 1994, food for work and food for farmers under the seeds protection program have assisted more than 1,000,000 households and been a contributing source of household food security and food security improvements in Rwanda. While FFW has assisted in putting over 5000 hectares of land into new production in traditionally food deficit prefectures, food for farmers has assisted rural households to meet their food needs prior to the planting (lean) seasons in coordination with the delivery of seeds and tools. Improved targeting mechanisms and assessments have ensured that those most in need receive assistance.

With USAID support, between 1982 and 1994, the Ministry of Agriculture had the most comprehensive agriculture statistical and analysis unit in sub-Saharan Africa. Restoring the GOR's capacity to collect and analyze agriculture statistics is a precondition to planning long-term interventions which address the food security needs of Rwanda.

Despite the predominance of agriculture in the Rwandan economy, most analysts agree that this sector can no longer provide sufficient income for Rwanda's growing population. Most families must also rely on non-farm income to attain a sustainable livelihood. Providing alternative productive opportunities is also essential to decrease land pressure and protect Rwanda's natural resource base. Ways to achieve these goals are: (a) adding value to agricultural products (e.g. processing and marketing) in rural areas; (b) creation of more urban and rural-service-sector employment opportunities; (c) stimulating the development of micro-enterprises; and (d) improving current farming practices to maximize use of available land resources.

GOR policies encourage the role of the private sector in the creation of productive opportunities. At present, however, much of the indigenous private sector is more oriented towards speculation and trade than the provision of inputs and services. The GOR hopes to encourage and stimulate the private sector by providing credit and establishing a conducive investment climate (including establishment of a new investment code to attract foreign investment); however, there are few specific proposals on how to move towards these objectives.

Based on USAID's previous experience in agriculture and productive opportunities in Rwanda, and an initial analysis of transition-period requirements, USAID plans a modest, gradually-increasing level of support to the sector. With a PSC agricultural expert on the Mission staff and a long-term planning/policy advisor in the MOA, it is anticipated that additional priority activities will be identified for FY 98 and FY

99 using Economic Growth Funds. These funds would support the expansion of the agricultural private sector and the continued enhancement of food security in Rwanda. USAID assistance will build capacity to create a strong policy environment for agricultural production and an active role for the private sector. The following activities are highest priority, and the Ministry of Agriculture has orally requested USAID assistance for them.

Activity Package: 2.21: Increased Agricultural Manpower Capacity:

The MOA estimates that it has lost 70% of its central service cadre, 65% of its decentralized cadre and 44% of rural extension agents. Data on the magnitude of private-sector losses are not available but are believed to be similar. Strengthening of local agricultural training institutions and upgrading professional agricultural personnel through regional or U.S. training are essential components to the revitalization of the agricultural sector. Activities:

- 1) Refurbish and re-equip the Agricultural Training Centers at Rubilizi for public and private sector professionals and provide assistance to the country's four agriculture-focused secondary schools.
- 2) Provide selected regional or short-course training for senior- and middle-level personnel.
- 3) Assist the MOA in design and implementation of an updated manpower needs survey based on new GOR priorities giving the private sector a primary role in agriculture.

Activity Package 2.22: Increased MOA Capacity to make Policy Decisions which support Food Security and Agriculture Objectives:

USAID will help reconstitute the data base, manpower and operational systems needed for a Food Security and Market Information System in the MOA. The GOR wants to enlarge data collection to track regional food security issues as these may impact trade/food security opportunities for Rwanda. USAID will support this regional dimension, drawing on existing GHAI experiences.

A companion activity will be the establishment a famine early warning capacity (FEWS) in the Ministry and placing a long-term policy advisor in the MOA food security unit. The advisor will provide technical assistance in creating policies conducive to private-sector participation. These central functions will support the capacity of the MOA to help farmers select crops and market production, to anticipate situation of food insecurity, and to monitor the impact of food aid on local production..

Activity Package 2.23: Increased Production in Reintegrated Communities:

Food assistance will be provided through the World Food Program (WFP) to Food-For-Work (FFW) beneficiaries to promote agricultural recovery, increased food production and farming systems improvements with a focus on agro-forestry, housing construction and infrastructure rehabilitation in food insecure areas. Food assistance will also be provided to farmers in tandem with the distribution of seeds and tools during the next three planting/hunger seasons to ensure that seeds are planted and not consumed.

Activity Package 2.24: Increased Access to Agriculture Areas and/or Commercial Districts in Reintegrated Communities:

State/PRM has been requested to consider providing \$10.0 million from the President's Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) Fund for immediate rehabilitation and repair of five highest priority roads which: (1) provide access to new refugee resettlement sites; (2) provide access within the communes most heavily populated by recent returnees; and (3) facilitate improved access to agriculture areas and/or commercial districts and the movement of goods/services and people. Funds would be transferred directly to the IBRD using cost-sharing procedures successfully employed for integration of other donors' funds in the past. The road work would be carried out by private sector contractors, using labor-intensive techniques which would provide off-season employment for the local populations.

IR 2.2: Increased Food Security and Access to Productive Opportunities

ACTIVITY PACKAGE	RESULTS	FY97 (000's)	FY98 (000's)	FY99 (000's)*	Total (000's)
<u>Activity pkg 2.21:</u> Support agriculture training centers, secondary schools and assist MOA to increase the private sector role in agriculture.	Increased agricultural manpower capacity within both the public and private sectors.	700	800	200	1,300
<u>Activity pkg 2.22:</u> Support MOA agriculture statistics and market information system	Increased MOA capacity to make policy decisions which support food security and agriculture objectives including trade	200	200	200	600
<u>Activity pkg 2.23:</u> Food for Work and seeds protection	Increased production in reintegrated communities; and xxxx households supported in agriculture and food security related activities	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
<u>Activity pkg 2.24:</u> Road rehabilitation	Increased access to agriculture areas and/or commercial districts in new refugee resettlement sites and within communities most heavily populated by recent returnees; expanded local productive opportunity.	10,000	0	0	10,000
	TOTALS	10,900	1,000	500	12,400

IV.B.2.3: Support Activities: Time-limited assistance to save lives, reduce suffering and lay the foundations for development

- 2.31 Commodity monetization for food security budget support
- 2.32 Productive opportunities via women in transition (WIT)
- 2.33 Assistance to vulnerables
- 2.34 Relief/Humanitarian assistance
- 2.35 Demobilization

2.31: Commodity monetization for food security budget support

IR: Productive Opportunities and Capacity Building in Agriculture leading to greater Food Security.

Background and Rationale:

Increases in recurrent and capital spending have resulted in a \$90 million financing gap in the GOR's recurrent and core development budgets for 1997. The government's budgetary strategy for 1997 is based on several elements¹ the need to accommodate essential expenditures in support of the returned refugees; normalization of the government's payments through the elimination of outstanding arrears on payments for goods and services (including salaries); initiation of restructuring exercises for both domestic and external debt, which will have the effect of limiting the required budgetary allocations for 1997 to the service of highest-priority external debts; launching of systematic measures for improving the system of budgetary control and the revenue collection service; and avoidance of net government financing from the domestic financial sector.

In view of the magnitude of the GOR financing gap, the GOR, with IBRD assistance, is requesting special donor support in the forms of direct budgetary support in cash and the monetization of food. Initial efforts have reportedly resulted in pledges of \$30-40 million in cash from the IBRD, \$21 million in cash from other donors, and (potentially) \$10-13 million in local currency from the sale in Rwanda of \$10 million of US-donated food provided to Rwanda via WFP. A full discussion of the issues related to monetization ("Monetization of Emergency Title II Resources for Rwanda" and the "Summary of Findings from the Monetization Task Force") is found in Annexes 1 and 2.

This plan strongly recommends that the USG provide \$10 million in food commodities as soon as possible for a program managed by WFP with sales management responsibility contracted to an experienced international entity. If, as expected a) the initial monetization program proceeds without major difficulties; b) there is no disincentive effect; and c) there is demonstrable progress in reducing the budget deficit, we recommend that an additional \$10 million USG contribution from monetized food be provided in FY98. By FY 1999 we anticipate that the GOR and its Ministry of Agriculture will have sufficient capacity to engage in discussion on a possible Title III program which would link the provision of food and proceeds to support food security policy reforms.

from "Proposal for the Financing of Budgetary Support to the Government of Rwanda through Monetization of Commodity Assistance" (draft), Monetization Task Force, March 1997.

In FY97, monetization proceeds will be applied to food security and agriculture sector capacity building initiatives that are part of the GOR-financed contribution to the development budget (read, "host country contribution"). This could be done in such a way as to have an immediate impact on the GOR finance gap, and be directly linked to agriculture capacity building. Included in this line item are the elements of the USAID monetization activity package below. Once GOR budget details are available, the Mission will decide among line items that clearly contribute to food security. The European Union and the Government of Canada are considering contributing commodities to the monetization program, or cash.

Activity Package: Monetization of Title II Emergency Commodities to Support Productive Opportunities and Capacity Building in Agriculture leading to greater Food Security:

- 1) Support short-term measures to comprehensively collect and analyze food security data and develop an integrated food aid-agriculture strategy, and support a longer-term agriculture statistics and market information system within the MOA.
- 2) Partner 2-3 local NGOs with U.S. counterparts to provide training, low-cost productive opportunities to farmers/farmer associations and communities in transition.
- 3) Building and improving local and rural feeder roads.
- 4) Strengthen up to four professional secondary agriculture schools.

The following is an illustrative list of activities which could be partially or wholly funded using local currencies. The conclusion drawn from small-scale commodity monetization in Rwanda is that monetization will have a positive impact on Rwandan vulnerable groups, especially the rural populations and strengthen local markets.

IR 2.31: MONETIZATION in support of Productive Opportunities and Capacity Building in Agriculture Leading to Greater Food Security

ACTIVITY PACKAGE	RESULTS	FY97 (000's)	FY98 (000's)	FY99 (000's)	Total (000's)
<u>Activity pkg 1:</u> Support short and long term measures to comprehensively collect and analyze food security data	Increased targeting efficiencies among vulnerables and food aid redirected to the productive sector; Restored MOA food security data base and MOA Food Security Unit capacity to collect and analyze food security information.	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
<u>Activity pkg 2:</u> Partner 2-3 local NGOs with U.S. counterparts to provide training and low-cost productive opportunities to farmers/farmer associations and communities in transition	Increased number of trained farmer/farmer associations; Increased productive opportunities in reintegrated communities; Capacity building among the local NGOs; Increased demand for inputs and supply created;	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
<u>Activity pkg 3:</u> Building and improving local and rural feeder roads	Improved access to agriculture areas and/or commercial districts, and facilitating the movement of goods/services and people.	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
<u>Activity pkg 4:</u> Strengthen up to 4 professional secondary agriculture schools	Student access to agriculture studies; greater technical capacity in both public and private sectors.	0	TBD	TBD	TBD
	TOTALS	10,150	10,150	TBD	TBD

2.32 Productive Opportunities via Women in Transition (WIT).

IR: Livelihood of Vulnerable Women and Families Improved

Through USAID/OTI and Development Assistance funds, the Ministry of Family and Women's Promotion manages sub-grants to support women in rebuilding their lives, families and communities. WIT has trained and assisted members of women's organizations in their needs for shelter, livestock and income-generating activities. The project has become very highly regarded in the partner Ministry and the prefectures where it operates. Achievements include the reconstruction of 667 houses destroyed or damaged in the war; 54 associations enabled to replenish their small animal stocks, an important factor in household food security; and the provision of 62 grants for micro-enterprise-type activities, with more than 7,500 beneficiaries and loan payback of 95%. Such activities involve new roles for women, . WIT provides productive opportunities and meets needs, giving vulnerable women and families a means of reintegrating in their communities, giving them a stake in society, and thereby preventing conflict caused disempowerment and destitution.

Activity Package: Improve the Livelihood of Vulnerable Women and Families.

- 1) Provide income-generating inputs to improve local economies.
- 2) Provide housing for vulnerable families (75 to 80 percent are women heads-of-households).
- 3) Provide livestock ownership in support of household level food security.
- 4) Support national NGOs/women associations and groups mounting credit and training programs.

Intermediate Result 2.32: WIT Productive Opportunities: Livelihood of Vulnerable Women and Families Improved

ACTIVITY PACKAGE	RESULTS	FY97 (000's)	FY98 (000's)	FY99 (000's)	Total (000's)
<u>Activity pkg 1</u> : Provide housing for vulnerable families(75 to 80 percent are women heads-of-households).	Build an additional 4,838 homes, with more than 26,000 Rwandans benefiting.	1,525	TBD	TBD	TBD
<u>Activity pkg 2</u> : Provide livestock ownership	Household level food security increased	125	TBD	TBD	TBD
<u>Activity pkg 3</u> : Provide income generating inputs	Household level incomes increase.	315	TBD	TBD	TBD
Activity pkg 4: Support national NGOs/Women associations and groups to support credit and training programs.	Women trained in income generating skills. Credit provided to support new enterprises. All leading to increased household incomes.	285	TBD	TBD	TBD
	TOTALS	2,350	2700	1200	5,250

2.33: Assistance to Vulnerables:

IR: Strengthened Social Service for Vulnerables

Background and Rationale:

The 1994 genocide and war left millions of people displaced. Children throughout Rwanda were severely traumatized with over 90 percent experiencing a death in their immediate family. In the aftermath, UNICEF identified approximately 90,000 orphaned or unaccompanied children in the region. Emergency interventions targeted at Rwandan children were intensive, and by late 1996, over 6,000 children were reunified with families, foster-care structures were established in most communities, and the GOR was closing many unaccompanied-children centers as care policies emphasize community and family care.

Separated/unaccompanied children, orphans, children-headed households, elderly widows, the indigent elderly and disabled remain vulnerable in the transition period.. These are discrete, narrowly defined groups which meet a vulnerable criterion because they are unable to care for themselves and are at high risk of severe poverty which is manifest through: increased malnutrition and illness; limited access to basic health, education and social services; and limited access to resources and employment opportunities. This population is dependent on extended families, their communities and limited social services and will continue to require targeted assistance in the near term..

The international community allocated millions of dollars to address the emergency needs of these vulnerable groups since 1994. In the transition period, however, assistance in this sector must focus on the needs of the most vulnerable while strengthening Rwanda's own ability to respond to social problems at the national and local levels. Rwandan families have opened their doors to orphaned children of relatives and friends; community and women's associations have formed to address their problems and find joint solutions; and the Rwandan government is taking a clear role in the coordination and implementation of comprehensive social programs. The international community should relinquish its role as implementer and move to support and partner with national and local Rwandan government bodies, organizations, and associations. USAID resources in this sector are limited and will be carefully targeted to support activities which develop Rwanda's capacity to manage, implement and monitor vulnerable interventions.

Activity Package 1: Effective and Sustainable Strategies Developed and Implemented to Address the Needs of Vulnerable Children.

- 1) Support to communities, local associations, foster families and NGOs to address the psychosocial needs of approximately 12,000 children in 24 communes
- 2) Reunification of children with families or foster families
- 3) Promotion of the legalization of fostering and adoption procedures
- 4) Education programs and apprenticeship/vocational training to child heads of households and other unaccompanied children, and
- 5) School fee programs (as recommended for ERMA funding)

Activity Package 2: Effective and Sustainable Strategies Developed and Implemented to Address the Needs of the Sick, Handicapped and Elderly:

Support targeted food assistance to vulnerable groups: unaccompanied children centers and the indigent in an effort to maintain or improve nutritional levels.

2.33 Assistance for Vulnerable Groups: Strengthened Social Services for Vulnerables

ACTIVITY PACKAGES	RESULTS	FY97 (000's)	FY98 (000's)	FY99 (000's)	Total (000's)
<u>Activity pkg 1:</u> Effective and sustainable strategies to address the needs of vulnerable children	Increased Rwanda local and national capacity to coordinate, plan, manage and implement programs, and advocate for vulnerable groups	607	TBD	TBD	TBD
<u>Activity pkg 2:</u> Support targeted food assistance to vulnerable groups .	Maintained or improved nutritional levels.	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
	TOTALS	2,400	TBD	TBD	2,400

2.34 Relief/Humanitarian Assistance:

IR: Lives Saved , Suffering Reduced and Productive Opportunities Created

After the extraordinary events of 1996, the GOR requested and received major donor support in the form of emergency food and other emergency assistance. The USG is contributing approximately 40% of the emergency food aid required through the World Food Program (via FFP), and has funded grants to PVOs (via OFDA) to provide housing, health supplies, water and sanitation, seeds and agricultural implements. While the need for emergency assistance is coming to a close, Rwanda's unusual circumstances have led to requirements for special assistance from donors. The monetization, food security and agriculture capacity building components of this transition plan represent the "new era" applications of USAID food and non-food humanitarian resources.

(a) Emergency Food Assistance (FFP):

The provision of emergency food assistance by the USAID Office of Food for Peace (FFP) to 1.3 million returnees since late 1996 has been essential to their survival and providing subsistence support to re-initiate their livelihood (building housing, planting crops, returning to schools, etc). In 1997, emergency food assistance through the World Food Program is expected to reach approximately 2.2 million persons. WFP estimates that short-term food recipients are: 1.3 million refugee returnees, 300,000 food-for-work beneficiaries and approximately 350,000 food rations to rural households to ensure seed inputs are planted during the 1997(C) season (in September). Food assistance will also be provided to some 275,000 vulnerables --institutional and indigent feeding . However, food assistance for vulnerables is expected to continue through the transition period, unlike general food distribution to returnees which is expected to be phased out at the end of June 1997, in tandem with the 1997(B) harvest. Food assistance programs beyond 1997 will be limited and highly targeted through food-for-work , discrete vulnerable groups and seed-protection programs.

Crisis modifier: General food distribution is expected to cease for 1.3 million returnees in June 1997. Targeted food programs for vulnerables will continue as necessary. Indicators of need (crisis modifiers) will include: (1) production levels during the 1997(B), 1997(C) and 1998(A) harvests ; (2) level of security in Rwanda; and (3) the rate at which dependency on external assistance is replaced by productive opportunities. Two additional eventualities that must be considered are (1) the sudden return of large groups of refugees who will need short-term food aid; and (2) poor harvests in the southern and central prefectures due to inadequate rainfall.

(b) Emergency Non-Food Assistance (OFDA):

The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provided essential assistance, in the form of clean water, sanitation and health supplies, seeds, agriculture tools, and housing materials, within days of the massive refugee return in November 1996. Final implementation and monitoring actions will be completed during FY98.

Every OFDA grant was reviewed and concurred in by the USAID Mission staff and the GOR to ensure coordination, technical merit and maximum consistency with the government's recovery and development objectives. OFDA grants initiated in response to refugee return have been completed and a summary appears in Annex 4. OFDA assistance focused on resettlement and an effort was made to balance the requirements of the all Rwandans. Shelter, water, sanitation and health interventions were delivered to communities and conformed to GOR Emergency Reintegration Program priorities. The OFDA assistance in these areas has

provided immediate relief as well as met basic rehabilitation needs that will help in longer term transition to development. OFDA provision of seeds and tools is helping many Rwandans to reestablish their agricultural livelihood and support for seed multiplication programs will be a key component of long-term agriculture recovery. In response to the specific characteristics of the Rwanda situation, OFDA initiated ground-breaking direct assistance with the GOR by allocating health supplies and communications equipment to assist the coordination of reintegration efforts. The communication assistance gave the Ministry of Reintegration, for the first time, a capacity to communicate widely and quickly, enhancing Rwandan participation and ownership in what is typically seen as a NGO domain. OFDA resources continue to assist Rwandans reintegrating into their communities and have ensured a solid foundations on which transition and development programs are being built.

Crisis modifier: If the situation in Rwanda deteriorates and emergency needs again arise to save lives and relieve suffering, new OFDA funding will again assist Rwanda, guided by the priorities and principles highlighted above.

2.35: Demobilization:

IR: Re-integration of Demobilized Troops Enabling Reduction of Military Budget

The Rwandan army of 40,000 absorbs almost 40% of the GOR recurrent budget. Plans for demobilization are being accelerated with IBRD assistance using regional models from Uganda, Mozambique and Eritrea. The GOR plans to complete a comprehensive program for staged demobilization and request donor pledges of financial assistance for this program within the next nine

months. If the program is technically acceptable and financially efficient, the USG will be asked to join other donors in contributing to a \$30 million program. A 15% contribution (approximately \$4.5 million) might be appropriate. These funds could not be provided from existing levels of DA resources without severely jeopardizing the integrity of this plan. Any USG contribution to demobilization should be provided from ESF or, possibly, OTI funds. Although the planned donor pledging conference may occur during late FY97, most of the funds pledged would not be needed until FY98 and therefore the U.S. contribution could be provided from FY98 allotments.

**Integrated Budget for S.O.#2
Budget (in 000')**

Strategic objectives/ Activities	FY 1997			FY 1998			FY 1999			T O T A L Life of TAP
	Apppr. account			Apppr. account			Apppr. account			
	DA	BHR,ESF, ERMA	517	DA	BHR,ESF, ERMA	517	DA	BHR,ESF, ERMA	517	
SO#2: Reintegration of communities Health activities										
IR1 Health (STD/HIV/AIDS)	1,500	0	350	1,000	0	250	2,000	0	0	5,100
1.1. Integrated STD activities Technical assistance	500		100	1,000						
1.2. Integrated STD activities Direct support										
1.3. Peer education pilot in Gitarama	1,000									
1.4. IEC capacity building			250			250				
IR2 Finance/admin. capacity building	0	0	500	340	0	160				1,000
2.1. Accounting & admin. support to MOH			500	340		160				1,000
IR3 National IEC capacity	1,000	0	0	0	0	800	0	0	0	1,800
3.1. Health communication center	1,000					800				
IR4 Health training capacity	0	0	2,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,000
4.1 Kigali health institute			600							
4.2. Rehabilit. Kicuro center			400							
4.3. Support to Mutara			1,000							
IR5 Policy & strategy development	0	0	500	0	0	500	500	0	0	0 1,500
5.1. Long and short term TA			500			500				
SUBTOTAL SO#2 Health	2,500	0	3,350	1,340	0	1,710	2,500	0	0	11,400
SO#2 Reintegration of communities Food security and productive opportunities	0	121,250	900	4,160	16,500	700	3,100			146,610
1. Capacity building in ag. sector										
1.1. TA and Training activities			700	800						
1.2. Data collection & analysis			200	200						
2. Support to women in transition		2,750			2,000	700				
3. Promote economic opportunities and recovery				1,960						
4. Technical assistance and training other than agriculture (EG)				1,200						
5. Road rehabilitation (ERMA)		10,000								
6. Food monetization		10,000			10,000					
7. Support reintegration of demobilized troops					4,500					
8. Relief and humanitarian needs										
Food		72,500			TBD					
Non food		26,000			TBD					
TOTAL SO#2	2,500	121,250	4,250	5,500	16,500	2,410	5,600	0	0	158,010

IV.C. Summary of integrated budget by objective (in 000's)

Strategic objectives/ Appropriation account	FY 97		FY 98 Planned	FY 99 Request
	Actual	Requested		
SO#1: Rule of law				
DA	2,000	2,000	2,000	4,400
BHR (OTI)	2,750	2,750	2,000	
517 account	3,500	4,350	1,300	
ERMA				
Food aid (monetization)				
ESF				
SUBTOTAL SO#1	8,250	9,100	5,300	4,400
SO#2: Reintegration of communities				
DA (HPN, CS, EG)	2,500	2,500	5,500	5,600
BHR (OTI)	2,750	2,750	0	
517 account	3,500	4,250	2,410	
ERMA		10,000		
Food aid (monetization)	10,000	10,000	10,000	
ESF		4,500		
OFDA	26000			
FFP	72500			
SUBTOTAL SO#2	117,250	34,000	17,910	5,600
TOTAL FOR THE FY	125,500	43,100	23,210	10,000

IV. D. Moving towards Development: Linkages to a Longer-term Program

This TAP covers approximately two and one-half years--through the end of FY99. While convenient bureaucratically, it is highly unlikely that Rwanda's transition phase will be by that date. In order to plan and implement effective development-oriented programs, many donors view the following preconditions as crucial:

- political stability
- increased physical security
- improved GOR capacity to plan and execute mid/long-term policies and programs
- increased GOR experience in working collaboratively with donors
- increased private sector willingness to invest in Rwanda, and
- increased human resource capacity in NGOs and the private sector.

This TAP assumes that USAID will continue to provide assistance to Rwanda beyond the transition period. The level of assistance would be modest, perhaps similar to the levels proposed in the final year of this TAP. Core funding sources would be DA and PL 480 Title II and/or Title III food.

During this post-FY99 Development phase, USAID would seek to build on its primary sectors of involvement during the transition phase. Some of the characteristics or emphases of this development program are likely to be:

- increased agricultural production capacity and improved food security via policy analysis and, perhaps, Title III-supported reforms;
- reducing population/land pressures via use of intensified agricultural systems and technologies, and by encouraging off-farm employment;
- support for a growing private sector role in the economy with less dependence on government to create employment opportunities;
- greater focus on longer-term governance and AOJ programs. End support for the security activity package (police training, demining);
- a comprehensive health-sector reform program, with USAID providing TA and training to complement hefty IBRD or AFDB loans; and
- capacity-building, with training more focused on problem-oriented, off-shore training needs, since local training institutions should be functioning without need for donor assistance.

IV. E. Roads not taken

Rwanda's needs for USG assistance at this time appear overwhelming. The areas of involvement proposed in this TAP were determined only after a careful review of many additional possibilities. The criteria used for selection of SOs, Intermediate Results, and illustrative activities included:

- clear GOR priority and demonstrated GOR leadership;
- USAID's experience in Rwanda and its comparative advantage;
- degree of need;

- activities and focus of other donors (opportunities for collaboration and avoidance of duplication);
- USAID and USG management capacity; and
- tangible progress attainable within the TAP period.

A major constraint at present is the Mission's difficulty in reaching and maintaining its authorized staffing levels, both USDH and USPSC. Until staffing levels are met, the USAID Director will move deliberately in initiating new activities. Below are listed a number of sector or sub-sector program proposals which did not meet the criteria and are not included in this Transition Action Plan:

- formal sector primary and secondary education
- strengthening Rwanda's University (with the exception of training lawyers)
- housing (other than via the Women-in-Transition program and OFDA/DART grants)
- family planning
- system-wide health (Present focus is largely HIV/AIDS.)
- funding now for a nation-wide Local Government program (the Mission decided to retain the integrity of the pilot Local Government Initiative);
- physical infrastructure beyond the roads rehabilitation package recommended for ERMA funding; and
- environmental initiatives, wildlife conservation and ecotourism..

Where new program areas have been included in the TAP, the Mission's approach is to move cautiously and incrementally, with relatively small amounts of assistance budgeted. With a few exceptions (such as the Roads Rehabilitation project, operated with significant IBRD technical support), the GOR does not yet have the capacity to absorb larger donor programs at this time.

IV. F. Reduced Scenario: Crisis Modifiers

The lesson of Rwanda is that no degree of planning can take into account the array of possibilities that could occur. The inherent instability of Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region brings a great degree of unpredictability. While this TAP anticipates progress towards stability and conditions for development, the opposite could happen. Therefore, we must factor in the real possibility for a worsening of the situation.

This TAP contains crisis modifiers designed to ensure sufficient flexibility within the Plan to respond rapidly and appropriately to either prevent or mitigate crisis. While each SO aims to prevent or mitigate potential crises, crisis modifiers allow for both contingency planning and program adaptation in the event of an emerging crisis. Crisis modifiers and their impact on the transition plan are presented in this section.

1. Instability continues or worsens, preventing implementation of our operations in some regions.

Inability to work in designated regions would affect the program as follows:

- SO#1 The Local Government Initiative might be forced to diminish programs if instability affected any of the 12 pilot communes. The GOR's goals of "deconcentration" and decentralization could be

compromised nationwide, but the LGI could help the local populations withstand the spread of conflict in those pilot communes where sufficient conditions of stability remained.

--SO#2 Food Security: Data Collection would be reduced to "safe" regions, leaving the nationwide picture on food security, production, prices, etc. incomplete.

Health--Training would be Kigali-based, but the newly-trained personnel would be ready to fill positions in the prefectures once conditions permitted.

Women-In-Transition--planned expansion could be curtailed somewhat, but in those areas still possible to work, WIT could create economic opportunities which would prevent the spread of instability.

PL480 Title II emergency programs could be expanded based on need.-- Food-for-Work would be cut back.

OFDA--A new Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) would be considered.

2. The GOR's performance or policy changes work against USG objectives.

The USG monitors human-rights performance closely. The growing numbers of prisoners suspected of genocide or related crimes in 1994 will become a major issue for the U.S. and other countries if the GOR does not make discernible progress on establishing dossiers and moving ahead on the judicial process. The State Department's 1996 Human Rights Report scored the GOR for the numerous incidents of the RPA's harsh treatment of civilians for suspected criminal or terrorist activity in its attempt to stem the brutal attacks by extremists on innocent civilians. If the USG concludes that the crackdown is incommensurate with the threat, it might decide to downsize staff and programs.

USG support to the GOR is based on the assumption that its commitment to broad-based, inclusive government will be successful over time in drawing widespread popular support, even if that is not the case today. If, however, elements within the "ruling class" become more oppressive, the objectives of the TAP may become more difficult to achieve. Periodic monitoring of the intermediate results will help determine the continuing appropriateness of the USAID program.

In either case, it is likely that USAID would reduce those elements of the program which involved direct support to the GOR and focus resources more on civil society and private organizations, such as the LGI, FFW and support to NGOs.

3. Massive refugee inflows from Zaire or Burundi impede the GOR's reintegration and reconstruction program.

This would require more funds from State/PRM in support of UNHCR programs, and possibly increased BHR funding. But such a development would not necessarily require curtailment of the transition program activities. The TAP is sufficiently flexible to respond rapidly and appropriately to such a crisis. As an example, since 1994 two DARTs have worked in Rwanda and a third is dealing with the crisis in eastern Zaire.

4. Dearth of capacity cripples program development and implementation, and inhibits GOR ownership.

Donor missions find that counterparts are spread too thin among several competing priorities. Any donor activities that require extensive use of counterparts find their efforts necessarily scaled back or incomplete. Policy direction from the top is of high quality. The country is led by committed, hard-working, visionary individuals. The gap is at the implementation levels. A recent study by the Ministry of Higher Education found astounding shortages: for example, the study reports that in the Ministry of Health only 17% of the workforce was in place. The TAP is attempting to address this problem by supporting training and re-training efforts in targeted areas related to the SOs. If, however, the overall staffing gaps are more widely deleterious than we presently believe, a longer transition period may result.

V. Program Management


V.A. USAID Staff

USAID/Rwanda's overall staffing level is 44 positions:

--USDH	6
--OE-funded internationally-hired PSCs	4
--Program-funded PSCs	4
--FSNDH	1
--OE-funded FSNPSCs	29
TOTAL	44

In addition, four BHR-funded positions which do not count against USAID/Rwanda's staff ceiling are also authorized. These are: FFP officer, OFDA officer, the OTI Women-in-Transition coordinator and a local governance adviser proposed to be funded by OTI.

Mission Staffing Pattern:



In addition, under PROCAP, USAID will place one adviser each in the Ministries of Justice, Interior and Agriculture. Since these will be institutionally-recruited personnel, they will not count against the USAID ceiling.)

Of the six authorized USDH positions, four are currently filled and the other two, Supervisory Program Officer (de-facto deputy director) and Executive Officer, will be filled in the fourth quarter of FY97.

Of the four authorized OE-funded internationally-recruited PSC positions, all are expected to be filled by the end of FY97.

Of the four authorized program-funded PSC positions, two are currently filled and the other two will be locally recruited.

V.B. REDSO/ESA Support

The participation of REDSO in USAID/Rwanda's program and its provision of TDY staff to cover vacancies and meet special needs since 1994 have been indispensable to the Agency's objective to mount a significant transition program. The Rwanda Mission has become among the heaviest consumers of REDSO services. In the three-year absence of an assigned program officer, the frequent visitations of REDSO officers have enabled the small USAID staff to prepare program documentation and reviews, conduct assessments and evaluations, prepare budget requests and complete project-development work. REDSO's expertise has played a vitally important role, through on-the-job skills transfer, in professional development of USAID/Rwanda staff as the Mission rebuilds capacity. REDSO's GHAI mandate and staff have shaped this document, and will be called upon in transition program implementation.

Continued REDSO support will be required to support the new initiatives proposed in the TAP for food security/agriculture and productive opportunities, as well as the proposed monetization program. The Mission will seek REDSO assistance in reassessing and updating indicators at a level and extent suited to the transition program outlined here, and RLA support for drafting SO Agreements is being requested. REDSO is the designated NMS center for this non-NMS Mission.

V.C. USAID/Washington Support

The continued involvement of the Global Bureau will be essential to planned achievements in both SOs. SO#1 envisages a number of new activities, and these will require close collaboration with and support from G/DG, especially in terms of lessons learned based on activities conducted elsewhere which could serve as references for Rwanda. G/PHN is already deeply involved in supporting the HIV/AIDS and orphan elements of the program and this support will continue.

All the offices of BHR (OFDA, OTI and FFP) are already fully engaged in the Rwanda program, and the TAP could not even begin were it not for the continued reliance on the quality of support and services which BHR has provided. The TAP proposes expansion of this support to include monetization and the Local Governance Initiative, in addition to the ongoing Women-in-Transition program.

V. D. Program Support for Capacity-Building

USAID/Rwanda plans to maximize the program's responsiveness and flexibility needed during this transition plan and advocated in the next section, *New Ways of Doing Business*, by letting a competitive contract for a program-wide instrument to be called PROCAP: Program Support for Capacity-Building. PROCAP will be structured to perform the following functions:

1. Program and manage all Mission in-country and third country training activities, as well as non-degree training in the U.S. ATLAS would be used for any degree training in the U.S.
2. Manage an NGO Fund with sub-grants to strengthen the capacity of NGOs in support of civil society, private sector and social service objectives.
3. Manage the procurement process for short- and long-term technical assistance which is not easily accessed through IQCs or buy-ins.

Priorities and ceilings for each of these functions would be established by the Mission. Task Orders would be issued to initiate actions. It is anticipated that the contractor would operate an office in Kigali with two-three professional staff, probably including one internationally-hired expatriate, with home office backstopping and support.

V. E. New Ways of Doing Business

Background: Rwanda exhibits many characteristics that clearly demonstrate that it is moving away from an emergency program situation, yet is several years from being ready for a USAID sustainable development program. Some of these characteristics include:

- continuing insecurity in some regions, with the possibility of outbreaks of violence which preclude program operations in certain regions;
- recent repatriation of 1.3 million refugees;
- a government with very limited capacity responding to short term crises and circumstances with less attention to longer-term development needs; and
- an absence of full consensus within the coalition government on objectives and government structure.

Building upon the analysis and recommendations in the GHAI Transition Team Report linking relief and development, the following typology attempts to categorize USAID/Rwanda's thinking on how best to differentiate Emergency Assistance, Transition Phase Assistance, and Development Assistance. Just as Emergency assistance operates under some special exceptions from normal agency regulations and requirements, we believe a Transition Assistance Program would operate best with some modifications from normal agency regulations. The modifications we seek flow from the typology and are listed at the end of this table.

EMERGENCY

TRANSITION

DEVELOPMENT

Objectives:

Save lives

Basic Problem Alleviation
-stability
-reintegration
-justice

Sustainable
Development

Duration:

1-2 yrs

2-4 yrs

5-7 yrs

Level of Assessment:

Rapid Assessment
of immediate needs
to ensure survival

Identify critical problems
and short/medium term
actions to help alleviate/
resolve these problems (in-depth)

Macro and
sectoral
analysis

Delegation of Authority:

USAID/W rapid approv-
al of DART-recommend-
ed activities

USAID/W agreement on:
-key problems addressed
-overall program strategy
-level of resources available.
Then full delegation to
USAID for implementation.
multi-year
strategy

Normally
full deleg-
ation after
review/
approval of

Level of Achievement

Required and Reported:

Inputs

Intermediate results
(outputs in
terminology of
host government)

S.O. & inter-
mediate
results w/
indicators

Role of USAID Staff:

Field-oriented,
short duration
minimum bureaucracy

Small permanent
staff out of office
half time. Focus on
problem resolution,
identification of
key activities, some
direct TA to the H.G.
Modest bureaucratic
requirements.

Fully staffed
mission/office.
Staff mostly
manages grantees
and contractors.
Limited direct TA.
Full bureaucratic
requirements.

Procurement Modes:

Short-term grants
to PVO/NGOs and/or

Use of flexible and
fast-moving instruments:

Competitive
procurement for

the HG. e.g., local grants, large, long-term
IQCs, buy-ins, umbrella programs.
grants and contracts
through task orders.

Exceptions Requested:

This Transition Action Plan proposes that USAID/Rwanda be excepted from certain normal USAID procedures. Some are listed below and others can be identified (see item 5). These exceptions are appropriate for Rwanda, but they may also be generic exceptions which should be considered for other "transition" programs. (See also recommendations of the AFR "Crisis and Transitional Program Management" memorandum, most of which USAID/Rwanda supports.

1. USAID SO reporting would be limited to intermediate results, outputs and activities. The Mission would not be required to report on SO-level results, linkage to intermediate results, or expending the considerable professional time in developing and reporting on indicators at these levels. This would result in a major saving in staff time (and the time of host government partners) and allow staff to focus on achieving the intermediate results. Focusing and reporting on higher-level indicators and linkages with results has little relevance in a fluid, oft-changing transition environment such as Rwanda.

2. USAID/W would develop a screen for greater selectivity from among the multitude of communications and initiatives which Missions are constantly called upon to respond to. This optional "Transitions Missions" category of dialogue would serve somewhat the same function as the "minimize" list for official cable traffic.

3. The Mission Director has authority to limit (short-list) or waive competition for grants or contracts under \$1,000,000. This will significantly reduce the time needed to complete procurement and initiate implementation for the Mission's most time-critical activities.

4. PVO registry requirements would be waived for indigenous NGOs which receive less than \$25,000 a year from USAID.

5. The burden of reports on Transition Missions, including some of the general program reporting requirements, would be reduced. M and PPC is asked to review overall Agency reporting requirements and identify those from which Transition Missions would be exempt.

6. And on the administrative side:

A. Blanket waiver from source/origin requirements for vehicle and office/home furniture requirements. USAID/Rwanda needs a blanket waiver for the procurement of vehicles. The requirement to purchase U.S.-made four-wheel drive vehicles (there is only one make) presents enormous difficulties due to lack of local support. The dealer does not have the proper tools, does not stock parts, and general servicing of vehicles is unsatisfactory. Additionally, these vehicles do not have adequate off-road clearance. It is essential to accomplish the Transition objectives to be able to buy vehicles that are more reliable and serviceable locally.

B. The Mission should be allowed to have a Class B Cashier. The demands of a growing program exceed the Embassy's ability to supply our immediate cash disbursing requirements.

C. A V-SAT communications system would improve reliability of communications enormously. The Mission has been plagued by a continuing series of communications breakdowns, which sometimes put the Mission out of real-time communications for days on end. The relatively inexpensive investment (\$15,000) would be recaptured by increased efficiency in the Mission's operations.

APPR: CP ()

DRAFT: JS ()

CLEAR: PG ()

UNCLASSIFIED

CLEAR: GB ()

CLEAR: JG ()

AID/AFR/EA:JSMITH:JS

CLEAR: RB ()

07/17/97 647-9062

AID/AFR/AA:CPEASLEY

CLEAR: FB ()

AFR/AA:PGARY

AFR/AA:GBOMBARDIER

AFR/DP:JGOVAN

STATE/AF/C:RBOGOSIAN

BHR/OTI:FBARTON

BHR/FFP:TOLIVER

BHR/OFDA:NBORTON

PPC/PC:KSCHWARTZ

ROUTINE KIGALI

ROUTINE NAIROBI

ADM AID NAIROBI FOR REDSO/ESA

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: RWANDA ISP RESULTS CABLE

1. SUMMARY. THE RWANDA INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN (ISP) WAS REVIEWED ON FRIDAY APRIL 11, 1997. THE STRATEGY WAS APPROVED WITH THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS: 1) THE MISSION WILL REVISE THE ISP TO ADD A THIRD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE FOR THE HEALTH SECTOR; AND 2) THE MISSION WILL REVISE THE ISP TABLES TO REFLECT A LOWER LEVEL OF OTI AND ERMA RESOURCES. BECAUSE THE REVIEW RAISED A NUMBER OF ISSUES WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER TRANSITION PROGRAMS, IT WAS DECIDED THAT GHAI WOULD ORGANIZE A SERIES OF SENIOR-LEVEL MEETINGS TO DISCUSS: 1) THE MISSION'S REQUEST FOR SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT EXCEPTIONS; 2) APPROPRIATE FUNDING MECHANISMS FOR HIGH PRIORITY TRANSITION ACTIVITIES SUCH AS DEMOBILIZATION AND DEMINING; AND 3) THE FEASIBILITY OF DOING MULTI-YEAR INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLANNING IN

TRANSITION COUNTRIES GIVEN THE NATURE OF IDA RESOURCES, WHICH ARE RESPONSIVE RATHER THAN ADDITIVE. END SUMMARY.

2. THE RWANDA INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN (ISP) WAS REVIEWED ON FRIDAY APRIL 11, 1997. THE MEETING WAS JOINTLY CHAIRED BY DAA/AFR GARY BOMBARDIER, DAA/BHR MIKE MAHDESIAN, AND AMBASSADOR RICHARD BOGOSIAN. PARTICIPANTS IN THE REVIEW INCLUDED A/AID/COS DICK MCCALL, AA/AFR CAROL PEASLEY, MISSION DIRECTOR GEORGE LEWIS AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM STATE (AF/C AND PRM,) AND AID (AFR/EA, DP, AND DRC; PPC, G, M, FFP, OFDA, OTI AND USAID/RWANDA).

3. DAA/AFR BOMBARDIER BEGAN THE MEETING BY THANKING THE RWANDA ISP TEAM AND THE MISSION FOR DEVELOPING THE PLAN IN SUCH A TIMELY FASHION. THE RWANDA ISP REPRESENTS ONLY THE THIRD ATTEMPT BY THE AGENCY AND STATE DEPARTMENT TO PRODUCE AN INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN FOR A CRISIS COUNTRY. THE AGENCY STILL IS LEARNING ABOUT THIS PRODUCT, WHICH IS NEITHER A TRADITIONAL CSP NOR A RELIEF-MODE ACTION PLAN, BUT SOME COMBINATION OF THE TWO.

4. A/AID/COS MCCALL COMMENDED THE ISP TEAM AND THE MISSION FOR A TIGHTLY WRITTEN AND FOCUSSED EFFORT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE USG HAS A LARGE STAKE IN SEEING RWANDA SUCCEED AND THE COUNTRY THEREFORE IS A PRIORITY FOR USAID ASSISTANCE. MCCALL PRAISED FFP FOR THEIR CREATIVITY AND HARD WORK IN RWANDA. THE COS WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH FFP'S WORK ON THE "CONCEPT CABLE" PRESENTED AT THE ISP REVIEW, WHICH OUTLINES THE MONETIZATION OF THE PL480 TITLE II FOOD COMMODITIES IN RWANDA IN SUPPORT OF REINTEGRATION AND NARROWING THE POST REPATRIATION FOOD GAP. FFP DIRECTOR TOM OLIVER EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF FLEXIBILITY FOR THE MISSION ONCE THE BROADER PARAMETERS OF THE ISP HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED.

5. AMB. BOGOSIAN COMMENTED THAT THE ISP REFLECTS A BALANCED APPROACH, AND THAT THE ISSUES ARE WELL-DEFINED. HE NOTED THAT THE USAID MISSION FORMS THE CORE OF THE USG PROGRAM IN RWANDA. HE ADDED THAT THE EMBASSY MIGHT WANT TO TAKE A STEP BACK AND LOOK AT THE LARGER CONTEXT IN LIGHT OF THE ISP AND CONSIDER THE ROLE OF USAID ASSISTANCE IN THE OVERALL USG OBJECTIVES IN RWANDA.

6. IN HIS OPENING COMMENTS, MISSION DIRECTOR LEWIS PRAISED THE ISP TEAM AND HIS STAFF FOR THEIR EFFORTS. HE DISCUSSED THE RECENT RETURN OF MORE THAN ONE MILLION REFUGEES, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN A 30-40 PERCENT INCREASE IN POPULATION IN SOME COMMUNES. THIS SERVES AS A GRAPHIC

ILLUSTRATION THAT THE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIO FOR RWANDA REMAINS EXTREMELY FLUID. AS A REFLECTION OF THIS RAPID CHANGE, CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION'S PROGRAM FOCUS ON THE ONGOING CRISIS, WHILE OTHERS, E.G. HEALTH, ARE MUCH MORE DEVELOPMENTALLY ORIENTED. THUS, LEWIS SAID, A TRANSITION PROGRAM SUCH AS RWANDA'S DOES NOT NEATLY FIT INTO EXISTING PROGRAMMING BOXES. AS A RESULT, THE MISSION MUST HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY, IN THE PARLANCE OF THE GHAI, TO DO BUSINESS DIFFERENTLY. HE CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE GOAL OF THE MISSION REMAINED: TO PROMOTE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY IN RWANDA.

7. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA'S MACRO-ECONOMIC SITUATION, LEWIS NOTED THAT INFLATION IS WAY DOWN BUT THAT THE GOR HAS A SIGNIFICANT FINANCING GAP. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE SEEKING TO GENERATE "EMERGENCY" CREDIT TO HELP FILL THIS GAP BUT THESE FUNDS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL LATER IN THE CALENDAR YEAR. THE DONOR COMMUNITY IS CONCERNED THAT THE GOR CONTINUES TO ALLOCATE ABOUT 40% OF ITS RECURRENT BUDGET TO DEFENSE. LEWIS NOTED THAT THE GOR IS WORKING TO DEVISE A PROGRAM TO DEMOBILIZE ABOUT HALF OF ITS ARMY.

8. PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED THE FOLLOWING ISSUES REGARDING THE PROPOSED STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, WHICH WERE:

- SO 1: INCREASED RULE OF LAW AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE,
- SO 2: RE-INTEGRATION OF COMMUNITIES, WITH ACCESS TO SOCIAL AND PRODUCTIVE OPPORTUNITIES.

9. WHILE PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE FIRST SO IS SOUND, THERE WAS CONCERN ABOUT THE BROAD RANGE OF IRS AND ACTIVITIES. SPECIFICALLY, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE MISSION IS DEALING WITH, OR PROPOSING TO DEAL WITH, A NUMBER OF NASCENT ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTNERS. PARTICIPANTS QUESTIONED HOW, IN SUCH A RAPIDLY EVOLVING SITUATION, THE MISSION WOULD DETERMINE THE BEST PARTNERS FOR ACHIEVING THE SO. IN RESPONSE, LEWIS NOTED THAT SOME ACTIVITIES SUCH AS DEMINING AND POLICE TRAINING WILL BE PHASED OUT AS OTHER COME ON LINE. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE ISP'S SECTION ON "ROADS NOT TAKEN" WHICH OUTLINES THE MISSION'S CRITERIA FOR SELECTING ACTIVITIES AND PARTNERS. THE G/DG CENTER NOTED THAT IT HAS ESTABLISHED A WORKING GROUP TO MONITOR TRANSITION SITUATIONS. THIS GROUP WILL BE FOLLOWING RWANDA CLOSELY AND WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST THE MISSION IN AREAS SUCH AS THE RULE OF LAW.

10. TWO ISSUES WERE RAISED WITH RESPECT TO SO2 WHICH HAVE BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES. AS THE AGENCY GAINS EXPERIENCE WITH ISP'S, CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS ARE STARTING TO EMERGE. THE AGENCY NEEDS TO BEGIN TO CLARIFY WHETHER THESE CHARACTERISTICS MEET EXPECTATIONS FOR A CRISIS/RAPID TRANSITION PROGRAM AND, IF NOT, CLARIFY WHAT OUR EXPECTATIONS ARE.

11. ONE CHARACTERISTIC IS THAT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES TEND TO BE BROAD BUT NOT DEEP. (PARA 15 IS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THIS BROAD APPROACH.) RWANDA'S ISP ARGUES THAT SO2 ADDRESSES KEY CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACHIEVING STABILITY IN RWANDA, WHICH ENCOMPASS THREE AGENCY GOAL AREAS (HUMANITARIAN, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND HEALTH). THE SO CASTS A WIDE NET OVER CAREFULLY SELECTED SECTORS IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE MISSION FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND TO AN EXTREMELY FLUID SITUATION. ACTIVITIES UNDER THE SO ARE AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF IMPLEMENTATION, WITH THE DEPTH OF INVOLVEMENT IN ANY ONE SECTOR LIMITED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS, INCLUDING GOR CAPACITY AND THE PACE OF CHANGE. PARTICIPANTS QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS "WIDE NET" APPROACH IS APPROPRIATE AND SPECIFICALLY 1) WHETHER THE MISSION WILL BE ABLE TO EASILY REPORT RESULTS AT THE SO LEVEL AND 2) GIVEN BUDGET REALITIES WHETHER HEALTH SHOULD BE PULLED OUT AS A SEPARATE SO.

12. LEWIS EXPLAINED THAT THE HIV/AIDS ACTIVITY IS IN FULL IMPLEMENTATION AND THAT THE MISSION GRADUALLY IS EXPANDING INTO THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR BECAUSE OF USAID'S PAST EXPERIENCE AND THE GOR'S DESIRE FOR USAID TO BECOME ENGAGED IN THE PRODUCTIVE SECTOR. THE SO ALLOWS FOR THIS EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.

13. WHILE THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT AROUND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE "WIDE NET" APPROACH, SOME PARTICIPANTS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF CAPTURING RESULTS AT THE SO LEVEL. LEWIS RESPONDED THAT ONCE THE ISP IS APPROVED, THE MISSION WILL DESIGN ITS RESULTS PACKAGES SO THAT IT IS ABLE TO OBLIGATE AT THE SO LEVEL. REDSO/ESA WILL ASSIST THE MISSION WITH THIS DESIGN WORK. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE POTENTIAL REPORTING PROBLEM DOES NOT PRECLUDE APPROVAL OF THE STRATEGY BUT THAT USAID/W WILL CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE WITH THE MISSION AS THE FRAMEWORK DEVELOPS. GIVEN THE SHORT TIME PERIOD AND THE NEED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE CHANGING CONDITIONS IN RWANDA, IT WAS AGREED THAT RESULTS WOULD BE REPORTED AT THE IR LEVEL ONLY AND THAT THE PROPOSED DESIGN WORK SHOULD IDENTIFY WAYS TO MEASURE

IR RESULTS ANNUALLY. OBVIOUSLY, WHERE RESULTS CAN BE DOCUMENTED AT THE S.O. LEVEL, EVEN IN THE NEAR TERM, THEY WOULD BE REPORTED.

14. GIVEN THE RELATIVE MATURITY OF THE HEALTH IR AND THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE MISSION WILL REMAIN ENGAGED IN THIS SECTOR, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MISSION WOULD RECAST ITS HEALTH IR INTO A SEPARATE SO. LEWIS INDICATED THAT CREATING A THIRD SO WOULD NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT.

15. USAID RWANDA HAS RESPONDED TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE WORDING OF THEIR SO STATEMENTS BY RECASTING MISSION ACTIVITIES INTO THREE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:

- 1. INCREASED RULE OF LAW AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE
 - (UNCHANGED)
- 2. INCREASED RWANDAN CAPACITY TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZED, SUSTAINABLE PRIMARY HEALTH CARE AND BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES.
- 3. INCREASED ABILITY OF RURAL FAMILIES IN TARGETED COMMUNITIES TO IMPROVE HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY.

16. A SECOND CHARACTERISTIC OF SO2 IS THAT IT IS NEITHER DEVELOPMENT NOR RELIEF, BUT INSTEAD REPRESENTS THE "GRAY AREA" WHERE THE PROGRAM BEGINS TO MOVE AWAY FROM HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TOWARD A FOCUS ON CREATING CAPACITY FOR SELF-DIRECTION. CONCERN WAS RAISED ABOUT WHETHER AGENCY RESOURCES CAN ADEQUATELY AND EFFICIENTLY ADDRESS "GRAY AREA" ACTIVITIES THAT ARE CRITICAL TO RAPID TRANSITIONS. SINCE NONE OF THE AGENCY'S RESOURCES ARE IDEALLY SUITED FOR THIS AREA, USAID RESPONSE OFTEN BECOMES CONTENTIOUS AND THEREFORE TIME-CONSUMING.

17. PL480 TITLE II RESOURCES WERE CITED AN EXAMPLE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF PROGRAMMING IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES. D/FFP NOTED THAT TITLE II HAS AN EMERGENCY AND A DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT BUT THAT THERE IS NOT A "SEAMLESS WEB" BETWEEN THE TWO. HE ADDED THAT TITLE III RESOURCES MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE IN THE RWANDAN CONTEXT. THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN RESOLVED FOR THIS YEAR, SINCE TITLE II EMERGENCY FUNDS WOULD BE USED FOR MONETIZATION, BUT THE ISSUE WILL NEED TO BE REVISITED NEXT YEAR. WITH THIS IN MIND, THE FOOD ASSISTANCE PORTION OF THE ISP SHOULD BE REVISED TO FOCUS ON THE NEED FOR TARGETED EMERGENCY FOOD IN BOTH 1997 AND, AS APPROPRIATE, IN 1998 EVEN THOUGH GENERAL DISTRIBUTION SHOULD DIMINISH AFTER THE 1997B AND 1998A HARVESTS.

18. COS MCCALL NOTED THAT IN INTER-AGENCY DISCUSSIONS HE HAS RAISED THE PROBLEM OF INCREASING NEEDS IN CRISIS TRANSITION SITUATIONS AT A TIME WHEN THE TOOLS TO ADDRESS THESE NEEDS - SUCH AS ESF - ARE BECOMING LESS AVAILABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH DEMOBILIZATION WAS NOT RAISED AS AN ISSUE FOR THE ISP, THE MISSION INDICATED THAT DONORS ARE ANTICIPATING A REQUEST FOR SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE FROM THE GOR AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PARTICIPANTS NOTED THAT HIGH PRIORITY TRANSITION ACTIVITIES LIKE DEMINING AND DEMOBILIZATION OFTEN ARE FUNDED WITH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, EVEN THOUGH THIS IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE USE OF DA RESOURCES. THE AGENCY (AND USG MORE BROADLY) THEREFORE NEEDS TO DEFINE APPROPRIATE FUNDING MECHANISMS. AMBASSADOR BOGOSIAN AGREED THAT DEMOBILIZATION/REINTEGRATION WOULD BECOME A CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PARTICIPANTS FELT THAT IDA AND ESF WERE THE BEST FUNDING SOURCES FOR DEMOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES. WITH THE LOSS OF THE DFA, THE AFRICA BUREAU STATED THAT IT HAD LOST FUNDING FLEXIBILITY IN ADDRESSING THIS TYPE OF TRANSITION ISSUE.

19. SINCE THIS ISSUE IS NOT UNIQUE TO RWANDA, IT WAS DECIDED THAT GHAI STAFF SHOULD ORGANIZE A SENIOR-LEVEL MEETING TO DETERMINE HOW TO PROCEED.

20. ALTHOUGH AN ISSUE WAS RAISED CONCERNING THE MISSION'S MANAGEMENT CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT, MONITOR AND REPORT IR RESULTS FOR THIS PORTFOLIO, THE MISSION ARGUED SUCCESSFULLY THAT IT COULD IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM AND ACHIEVE GOOD RESULTS IF:

- 1) ALL STAFF WERE ON-BOARD AND/OR "ENROUTE" INCLUDING THE SUPERVISORY PROGRAM OFFICER, THE ASSISTANT PROGRAM OFFICER AND THE AGRICULTURAL OFFICER, AND
- 2) THE PROPOSED "MANAGEMENT EXCEPTIONS" DESCRIBED IN DETAIL IN THE ISP WERE APPROVED. (THESE EXCEPTIONS WILL FREE MISSION MANAGEMENT TO APPLY MORE ATTENTION TO RESPONSIVE PROGRAMMING AND ACHIEVING RESULTS.) BECAUSE THESE EXCEPTIONS ALSO HAVE BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER TRANSITION COUNTRIES, IT WAS AGREED THAT THEY WOULD BE LOOKED AT OVER COMING WEEKS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GHAI SENIOR-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

21. THERE WAS ALSO CONCERN ABOUT WHETHER IT WAS REASONABLE AND/OR APPROPRIATE TO ASK THE MISSION TO REPORT ON RESULTS ACHIEVED WITH RESOURCES PROVIDED FROM NON-DA (I.E. FOOD AID AND IDA) RESOURCES, AND THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE MISSION SHOULD DO SO TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE.

22. THE FINAL ISSUE WAS WHETHER THERE WERE ADEQUATE FUNDS AVAILABLE TO ACHIEVE THE RESULTS OUTLINED IN THE ISP.

22A. OTI INDICATED THAT, CONTRARY TO THE PLANNING LEVELS OF \$5 MILLION PER YEAR DEFINED IN THE ISP, IT COULD COMMIT ONLY BETWEEN \$1-3 MILLION FOR FY98, DEPENDING ON OTHER REQUIREMENTS, AND WOULD MAKE NO FUNDING COMMITMENTS BEYOND FY98. OTI NOTED THAT IT HAS ONLY A SMALL AMOUNT OF FUNDS AVAILABLE WORLD-WIDE AND THAT IT MUST MAINTAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO BE "OPPORTUNISTIC" DURING THE COURSE OF ANY GIVEN FISCAL YEAR. OTHER PARTICIPANTS ARGUED THAT BECAUSE TRANSITIONS REQUIRE MULTI-YEAR PLANNING AND COMMITMENT, AN INABILITY TO COMMIT RESOURCES BEYOND ONE YEAR RAISES A GENERIC ISSUE ABOUT WHETHER THE AGENCY CAN, IN FACT, DO STRATEGIC PLANNING IN TRANSITION SITUATIONS.

AFTER MUCH DEBATE, IT WAS DETERMINED THE MISSION SHOULD ADJUST ANTICIPATED RESULTS TO REFLECT AVAILABLE OTI FUNDING OF \$3 MILLION IN FY97 AND \$1 MILLION IN FY98. THE MISSION AGREED TO ADJUST R4 REPORTS TO REFLECT DIMINISHED RESULTS.

22B. PARTICIPANTS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT DA FUNDING AVAILABLE TO THE MISSION CAME PRIMARILY FROM THE D/G AND HIV/AIDS ACCOUNTS. WHILE THE ISP HAS BEEN ABLE TO WORK WITHIN THOSE CONSTRAINTS, WHAT IS REALLY NEEDED IN RWANDA IS MORE BROADLY DEFINED CHILD SURVIVAL FUNDS RATHER THAN THE MORE TARGETED HIV/AIDS RESOURCES.

22C. THE ISP ALSO INCLUDED \$10 MILLION OF ERMA FUNDING FOR A RURAL ROADS PROGRAM. AT THE REVIEW, STATE/PRM INDICATED THAT SEVERAL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING THE FINALIZATION OF THE GOR'S EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY PROGRAM, REMAINED UNRESOLVED, AND THAT THEREFORE PRM WAS NOT INTERESTED IN JOINT PROGRAMMING OF THE RESOURCES AT THIS TIME. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE ISP SHOULD NOT INCLUDE ERMA FUNDING AND THAT ANTICIPATED RESULTS SHOULD BE ADJUSTED ACCORDINGLY.