RESULTS REVIEW AND RESOURCE REQUEST
(R4) FY 1996 - 1999

USAID/SENEGAL

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I. OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE [1]

Introduction: Senegal's people face a brighter future than five years ago, albeit still beset by steep challenges. Reforms are taking hold; economic, political, and social tensions are revealing a healthy struggle between the old and new orders. One of Senegal's strengths-- its stability--, seems also to have borne a reluctance to change. While the roots of Senegal's difficulties are deep, so too is the will to build a new social and economic order. U.S. development assistance this past year helped bring about many significant results such as reductions in total fertility rate, more transparent elections, large increases in rice yields, substantial privatization and liberalization of agricultural markets. Progress against other strategic objectives was less positive, in large part due to the factors cited below.

Senegalese Factors: After 37 years of independence and rule by one political party, Senegal's approach to a cross-roads accelerated greatly. USAID/Senegal's program this past year was affected by a mixture of excitement and apprehension. At times Senegalese partners exude a sense of urgency and frankness, and at times seem indecisive due to competing pressures. Rapid population growth, environmental degradation, unemployment, years of inadequate investment in human and physical infrastructure, and an increasing gap between the minuscule modern sector based in Dakar, and the rest of the economy are fueling societal pressures.

Politics: Senegal has had only two presidents since independence. Half of Senegal's population was not even born when President Diouf came to power in 1981. They will be entering a workforce with approximately 45 percent under-employment. In 1996, in partial response to this situation, Senegal revised the electoral code and passed one of the most progressive decentralization laws in francophone Africa. Elections in November 1996 marked a milestone in Senegal's post-independence political development, and were assisted by USAID/Senegal and others donors. Formerly administratively appointed local officials were replaced by 28,000 elected officials-- a genuine step towards greater decentralization and accountability to local constituencies. For the first time in years, the elections were not marred by arrests of opposition leaders. Where there were irregularities including fraud and mis-management, the expanding private radio and press media were able to inform the citizenry, and convince the government to re-open some polling stations.

The elections showed that the ruling "Parti Socialiste" (PS) has both the will-power and organization to remain in power. It regained Dakar and Thies, which fell to the opposition in the 1993 presidential elections. Relatively low voter turnout indicated: (a) organized attempts to discourage voting by those opposed to the PS: (b) apathy or alienation with the political process; (c) and/or some incompetence among officials organizing the elections. USAID/Senegal's program was and will continue to be affected by intense political competition both within the PS and among all the parties as senatorial elections are to be held in 1997, legislative elections in 1998, and the presidential election in 2000.

In addition to an active electoral process and the increasingly powerful independent media, the political landscape is being transformed by urbanization, the growth of civil society including local private voluntary organizations (promoted actively by USAID/Senegal), the changing (but still significant) role of the French in Senegal, and the liberalization of markets. Under Strategic Objective #3, liberalization of markets, there has been excellent progress (see the details in Section IIC), but not without encountering some resistence from vested interest groups and those who misunderstand the nature of the changes. Clearly USAID/Senegal's assistance is at the forefront of significant development change, which often requires a tough fight.

Senegalese politics also directly affected the performance of USAID's other two Strategic Objectives. For Strategic Objective #1, Decrease Family Size, the overall health sector generally has benefited from having a strong Minister from the opposition party. However, progress in strengthening the Ministry of Health was constrained by questions about and delays concerning decentralization and general government austerity as

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[1] For further descriptive material about Senegal and our program, refer to the FY 1997 Congressional Presentation, FY 1995 R2A/R2B, and the USAID/Senegal management contract. These are available through AFR/WA-Senegal. Please also note that USAID's country strategy in Senegal is scheduled to end in September 1998. We have, therefore, limited speculation about results attainment in FY 1999 and thereafter. We expect a new strategy will be authorized by mid FY 1998.

part of the IMF structural adjustment program. Under Strategic Objective #2, encompassing agriculture and natural resources management, USAID/Senegal observed that even the directorship of the agricultural research institute is not immune from national politics.

Overall, USAID/Senegal responded well to these changing and challenging circumstances. Re-engineering, with its emphasis on customers and partnerships, allowed the Mission to pick up some signals from partners earlier than it would have formerly, and work through new solutions. Senegalese, almost without exception, welcomed USAID assistance and advice, even if they exercised the right at times not to heed the advice. USAID access to almost anyone in the public or private sector attests to the strength of USAID's partnership and the quality of U.S. development assistance over the years. Interest in U.S. goods and services has also increased, due in part to Senegal's increasingly constructive reaction to the imperatives of global competitiveness.

Civil Unrest: In the southern Casamance region, where a rebellion has episodically flared since the early 1980s, the incipient separatist movement of democratic forces of the Casamance (MFDC) continued an armed defiance of government control, but the cease-fire agreement generally held. Turn-out for the November elections was light, but violence free. Embassy travel restrictions remain in effect for only a small area of the Casamance.

Economics: Senegal's macroeconomic indicators for FY96 were much improved over prior years. Senegal continued to show strong commitment to structural reform, despite political counter pressure and a lag in social improvements. The GDP rose by 5.2 percent in 1996 (compared with -3.5% in 1993). Inflation remained steady at less than 3 percent (compared with 33 percent in 1994). The debt service burden was reduced, including settlement of all commercial debt (having been sold at 16 percent of face value), which helped Senegalese businesses access credit in international financial markets.

The GOS also made major strides with privatization. The October Applications Decree on Law 95-34 provided broader incentives to export-oriented businesses. The impending sale of 33 percent of the state telecommunication company to an American-Swedish consortium bolstered Senegal's attractiveness for investment, and not just from traditional partners. The energy sector is scheduled for privatization, and USAID/USEA's partnering of a U.S. private utility with Senegal's state electricity company was a much welcomed development. In addition, the fiscal deficit continued to fall, estimated at 1.9 percent of GDP in 1996. However, agricultural and animal production, which continues to represent 21 percent of GDP and 60 percent of employment, was negatively affected by poor rainfall in 1996; increases in area planted of approximately 5 percent did not offset decreases in crop yields.

Despite generally excellent 1996 macroeconomic results, the lack of tangible social benefits was disturbing. With the 50 percent devaluation of the currency in 1994, domestically produced exports, such as groundnuts, should have gained marketability. Indeed this happened, but economic "rents" were captured principally by the groundnut and groundnut oil exporting monopoly, with very little gain to farmers. Consumers now have more choices in the rice market, although they are not yet benefiting from lower prices as much as hoped, due to an as yet incomplete market information system (subject to a USAID intervention). Also, the death rate of children aged 1 thru 4 may be increasing slightly, due possibly to poverty-induced malnutrition and a drop-off in vaccinations over the past few years. Low education levels and earlier years' economic stagnation led to Senegal's 1996 UNDP Human Development Index score of 153 out of 174 countries.

Table 1 captures some of the discrepancies between these macroeconomic and microeconomic trends. In analyzing the trend data, the effects on prices of the 1994 50 percent devaluation must be considered. For example, the indicator, "Per Capita Income from Natural Resources in Zones of Reliable Rainfall," when expressed in constant 1990/91 prices shows increases of 2.0, 2.6, 12.6 and -18.8 percent in FYs '93, '94, '95, and '96. The large deviations from trend in FY '95 was due to usually good rainfall, and in FY '96 it was due to poor rainfall. Table 1 shows also that with all indicators but one, we exceeded our targets.

USAID/Senegal Factors: During FY96, the Mission spent a great deal of time and effort developing Results Frameworks and Results Packages, customer service plans, and negotiating first-ever Strategic Objective Agreements. The Mission also continued with internal reorganizations (including two months spent on heavy involvement of the Workforce Planning Committee), the RIFing of 10 percent of its Foreign Service Nationals

(in addition to the Agency's 10 percent cut in USDH employees), and a three-day Mission-wide retreat to assess where we need to go next. While the creation of teams and changes in procedures and mentalities have shortened the time for delivery of assistance, it has lengthened the up-front planning, participation, and partnership process. Teamwork and cultural change are taking longer to develop than initially planned. However, counterparts in the GOS, contractors, and PVO/NGO partners are beginning now to internalize the full implications of USAID's management reforms which include empowerment coupled with delegated responsibilities.

USAID/Washington Factors: USAID/Senegal benefited from many USAID/W information transmittals, guidance, technology transfer, and management reform consultancies. However, countless NMS updates and training sessions consumed much of the Mission's staff time and OE resources. Congressional and Administration "directives" were often at odds with what the "customers" want, and even at odds with the U.S. (Embassy) Senegal Mission objective of strengthening the private sector. Congressional holds on notifications delayed program action. The furlough was demoralizing and reduced output. There were delays in OMB budget guidance. The lack of clarity about how to program and budget for Field Support resulted in less than optimal budget allocations. Decreases in technical and administrative back-up in USAID/W due to RIFs and reorganizations also affected achievement of program results. All of this was in a context of uncertainty about overall USG foreign affairs objectives, strategy, and resource levels for West Africa.

Table 1: USAID/SENEGAL PROGRAM GOALS

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                                                   5Baseline * FY91 * FY92 * FY93 * FY94  * FY95  * FY96*
* FY96* FY97* FY98 5

6444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444v)))))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3)))))))3)))))))3)))))))3
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  5                                                *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5GOAL: INCREASE PRIVATE INCOMES                  *(1986-89)*      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5        FROM NATURAL RESOURCES                  *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5                                                *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  K)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5                                                *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5Indicator:                                      *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5   1. GDP Growth Per Year (%)              [a] *  2.6    *  1.0 *  2.9 * -3.5 *  2.0  *  4.8  *   5.2
* 3.2 * 3.2 * 4.8  5
  5                                                *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5   2. Natural Resources Annual Growth (%)  [b] *  3.3    * -3.5 *  2.5 * -5.6 * 11.7  *  0.0  *   7.9
* 3.6 * 3.6 * 5.6  5

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  5                                                *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5SUB-GOAL 1: INCREASE NATURAL                    *(1986-89)*      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5         RESOURCES (NR) INCOME PER CAPITA       *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5                                                *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  K)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5                                                *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5Indicator:                                      *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5   1. GDP Growth Rate Exceeds Population       *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5     Growth Rate  (%)                     [c] *  -0.1   * -6.2 *  0.2 * -6.2 * -0.7  *  2.1  *   2.5
* 0.5 * 0.5 * 2.1  5
  5   2. Growth Rate of NR Per Capita Income      *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5     in Zone of Reliable Rainfall (%)      [d] *  -0.6   *-12.2 * -5.9 *  2.3 * 48.4  * 31.4  * -18.1
* 1.8 * 1.8 * 7.6  5

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)))))3)))))3))))))M
  5                                                *          *      *      *      *       *       *
*     *     *      5
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  5SUB-GOAL  2: INCREASE VALUE OF                 *(1989-91)*       *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5      MARKETED OUTPUT (CFAF Billion)           *          *      *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  K)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1          *      *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5                                               *          *      *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5Indicator:                                     *          *      *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5      Value of Marketed Production         [e] *  80.3   * 77.7 * 67.0 * 73.9 *115.9  *157.4  * 132.7
*85.3 *91.9 * 97.0 5

K)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3
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  5                                               *          *      *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5SUB-GOAL 3: INCREASE VALUE OF                  *(1989-91)*       *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5     HOME CONSUMPTION (CFAF Billion)           *          *      *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  K)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1          *      *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5                                               *          *      *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5Indicator:                                     *          *      *       *       *       *       *
*     *     *      5
  5      Value of Home Consumption            [f] * 113.5   *113.7 * 86.5 *109.9 *125.5  *205.5  * 192.6
*108.0*116.3*122.8 5

9444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444N444444444N444444N444444N444444N4444444N4444444N4444444N
44444N44444N4444448
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Notes: * FY 1996 data might be revised

[a] SOURCE: GOS/Finance Ministry/Statistics & Forecast Direction. DESCRIPTION: Real GDP variation per year (Jan-Dec).

[b] SOURCE: see [a]. DESCRIPTION: NR does not include Fishing and Mining. The aggregate value added of Agriculture, Livestock, and Forestry is in real terms. These figures are on calendar year basis and thus not comparable to the crop year figures for Indicator 2 under Sub-Goal 1.

[c] SOURCE: see [a]. DESCRIPTION: GDP growth rate minus population growth rate.

[d] SOURCES: GOS/Ministry of Agriculture/Agriculture Direction; GOS/Ministry of Environment/Forestry Services; USAID/ANR Core. DESCRIPTION: The variation of the ratio of income to population in reliable rainfall zone per crop year (starting in May). The 48.4% growth reflects a 50% currency devaluation in January 1994. The 31.4% growth reflects excellent weather conditions. The -18.1 growth reflects relative poor weather conditions.

[e] & [f] SOURCES: GOS/Ministry of Agriculture/Agriculture Direction; USAID-Senegal/ANR Core. DESCRIPTION: It is assumed that the proportion of millet, sorghum, maize, and cowpea production actually marketed is between three and five percent; the proportion marketed is respectively 50, 60, and 100% for rice, groundnut and cotton. The values could be expanded by 20% to include the value of fruits, vegetables, and livestock.

II. PROGRESS TOWARD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

A. Strategic Objective 1: Decrease Family Size

1. Introduction and Results Framework

The Mission judges progress towards attaining Strategic Objective #1 (SO1) to be good. SO1 is measured by the Total Fertility Rate (TFR). TFR levels decrease directly with increases in: *age of marriage (coitus); use of (effective) contraception; post-partum infecundity (especially from breastfeeding); abortion rates; and infecundity (usually due to sexually transmitted diseases [STDs])*. These reproduction factors are influenced mainly by: *education levels (especially of females); administrative, public health measures; prevailing customs and values surrounding marriage and sexuality; and, historical tendencies of infant and child mortality*. Of these main direct and indirect determinants of TFR, USAID's assistance in Senegal addresses: *contraception; breastfeeding; STD/HIV/AIDS control; and, infant and child mortality*. Progress is determined by a combination of USAID interventions and processes over which the program has limited or no control. [2]

USAID assistance focuses especially on four of Senegal's ten regions. USAID assistance--including substantial field support from Global Bureau--also fills gaps in key national-level systems and policies: virtually all contraception and oral rehydration (ORS) packets, as well as logistics technical support, in the public and non-government organization (NGO) sectors in Senegal. The program supports training for key Ministry of Health and Social Action (MOHSA) staff throughout the country and has helped bring about important policy and strategy decisions by the central MOHSA, including formalization of family planning service guidelines. It provides equipment, provider training, and technical follow-up, to a maternal and child health/family planning (MCH/FP) center of excellence in each of the ten regional capitals. USAID also supports two major family planning NGOs, ASBEF (local NGO for family welfare) and SANFAM (local NGO for family health), providing services throughout the country. These NGOs account for about 35% of family planning acceptors. In addition, USAID's PVO/NGO program provides seven grants to national grassroots organizations for family planning, HIV control and maternal/child health. National demographic and health surveys, analyses, and policy presentations, national management information systems, and advanced applied research in reproductive health also are important features of USAID assistance and are essential elements of the Results Framework.

The SO1 Results Framework (RF) centers on three key intermediate results (KIRs): (1) increased access to MCH/FP and STD/HIV-AIDS services; (2) increased demand for MCH/FP and STD/HIV-AIDS services; and (3) improved quality of MCH/FP and STD/HIV-AIDS services. For each KIR USAID and its partners have defined a series of intermediate results (IRs) along with associated activities and necessary resources estimated appropriate to achieve them. Performance, progress, and target indicators have been established for the SO, KIRs and IRs, whenever possible. The Strategic Objective Agreement (SOAG) was signed in September 1996.

The SO target is the reduction of TFR from 6.0 in 1992 to 5.5 in 1998. Three intermediate objectives should lead to the objective: (1) Increased nationwide CPR from 4.8% in 1992 to 15% in 1998; (2) Reduction in infant mortality from 68 per 1,000 in 1992 to 59 in 1998; (3) Stabilization of the increase in HIV prevalence at about 1.9% in 1998.

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[2] Some interventions, in fact, marginally increase fertility; for example, reducing infecundity through STD control, and discouraging abortion explicitly as part of promoting contraception. Also, family sizes--in the short run--are not decreased by improving infant and child survival. Rationales for including these elements, however, need not be elaborated here.

Results Framework: Strategic Objective One

2. Performance Analysis

Program results in SO1 appear to fully meet or exceed those for other, similar Agency programs for countries in this region or elsewhere for countries at similar levels of socio-economic development and stages of program implementation. Recent data on fertility suggest substantial declines in recent years and, further, that the decline is due to the conjunction of mostly successful program implementation and favorable trends in non-program factors. The data show that TFR decline, furthermore, correlates closely with results obtained at the intermediate level, confirming the underlying logic of program design. One disturbing trend was identified, important in its own right, as a correlate of fertility, and as a broad program indicator-- probable increases in young child mortality. This poses an important challenge to be countered in the coming year. Overall, we judge USAID's assistance on track in this sector in Senegal.

a. Key Results, Nationwide: Based on preliminary 1997 DHS data, USAID estimates that the total fertility rate (TFR) decreased from 6.0 in 1992 to probably 5.7 in 1996, consistent with the projected target of 5.4 for 1999 (Table 1.1). During this same period, use of modern contraceptives (CPR) increased from 4.8% to 9% nationwide (Table 1.2). This is less than the target of 11.6% for 1996, although the rate of increase falls within the norms for active family planning programs, at roughly 1% average annual increase. CPR in the four USAID target regions shows a more modest increase which is improving steadily as service delivery points (SDPs) for family planning increase (Table 1.3).

Child mortality in Senegal decreased steadily over recent decades, from over 300 per 1,000 live births around 1960 to about 130 by 1988-92 (Table 1.4), which is among the lowest levels in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Mission had expected this trend to continue with the combined efforts of various donors and the GOS Ministry of Health and Social Action programs. However, GOS/UNICEF data from late 1996 and preliminary estimates from early 1997 GOS/Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data suggest that child mortality may actually have increased to about 140 per 1,000 in recent years. Intensive analysis is underway to pinpoint ages and causes; the main reasons for the increase might include basic hygiene factors linked to poor living conditions (especially malnutrition) and to a rise in vaccine-preventable diseases (perhaps especially measles). GOS/UNICEF documents do show a roughly comparable decline in child vaccination rates over the period, 1991-1994. GOS/UNICEF and GOS/DHS data may not accord closely regarding levels at specific age-groups. Infant deaths appear to have decreased in the four USAID target regions, from 72 per 1,000 in 1992 to 65 per 1,000 in 1996 (Table 1.5). The 1996 DHS survey team is in the field at this writing and these figures will be verified in the near future; comparative analysis of the two surveys is an analytical priority.

National HIV seroprevalence (about 1%), though slowly increasing, remains well below other African countries, and continues to follow the "best case" curve projected by the National AIDS prevention program sentinel surveillance system (Table 1.6). This containment of transmission is a clear and major success for HIV control in West Africa, and is expected to remain below 2% for the general population through 1999. HIV seropositive cases continue to be predominantly men, representing roughly two-thirds of cases in 1996.

b. Key Intermediate Results, Target Regions: The four target regions for maternal/child health and family planning encompass roughly one third of the women of reproductive age (WRA) in Senegal. STD/HIV-AIDS prevention activities also cover the regions of Dakar and Thies.

Increased Access to Services: The program increased access to key services over the past year. The proportion of service delivery points (SDPs) offering family planning services increased from 13% in 1994 to over 60% in 1996, well on its way to achieving the 1998 target of 70% of SDPs offering family planning services.

Couple Years of Protection (CYP) from contraception increased over 8% from 1995 as contraceptives became more accessible (Table 1.7). However, this performance did not quite meet the target for 1996 (based on projected contraceptive use), due mainly to delays in expanding family planning services to rural health posts. Training of regional GOS/MOHSA staff in logistics for management of contraceptives in "non-AID" regions were to be financed by UNFPA and World Bank programs, but in several important regions these programs failed to implement the training, and contraceptive supply suffered. Furthermore, GOS/MOHSA renovations of family planning reference centers with UNFPA support were not completed on schedule, which slowed provision of equipment and staff training by the SO1 program to increase service access in three regions.

SOMARC (NGO) contraceptive social marketing activities have up to now been restricted to condoms, and that only in formal pharmacies. This conservative MOHSA policy has hampered SOMARC's ability to ensure broad access to condoms, though this program did sell 1.5 million condoms in 1996 (exceeding its target for the year). The Mission had planned to initiate a community-based distribution (CBD) program for condoms in collaboration with the MOHSA, though the MOHSA has deferred this initiative probably to 1997. ASBEF and SANFAM, increased their condom distribution this period through their Mission-supported CBD programs.

Increased Demand for Services: The program has demonstrated progress in generating demand. Knowledge of 2 or more modern contraceptive methods among women of reproductive age increased from 57% in 1992 to 70% in 1996, closely approaching the 1996 target of 75% (Table 1.8). The 1997 AIDSCAP Behavior Surveillance Survey (BSS) indicates that 86% of potential clients know where to obtain condoms, and half of these could arrive at the nearest service or distribution point in ten minutes or less. Through a concerted effort of local information and outreach activities, potential clients are now more aware of where they may obtain family planning services.

Demographic survey data from 1996 show an increase in the total demand for family planning services from 27% of women in 1992 (current and desired future use) to 34% in 1996 (Table 1.9), close to our 1996 target of 37%. The SO1 program is equipping remaining health posts in the four target regions for family planning services and expects to see a marked increase in users of contraception from the pool of women stating unmet demand for these services.

The great majority of Senegalese mothers breastfeed an average of 22 months, and 17% continue exclusive breastfeeding for 4 months. This is a large and very welcome increase from the 7% in 1992, considering the strong prevailing norms that have encouraged early addition of other liquids and weaning foods and have slowed progress in promoting exclusive breastfeeding.

Use of oral rehydration salts (ORS) for child diarrhea has increased from 19% to 34% of cases between 1992 to 1996 (Table 1.10). This result is on track with projected benchmarks and is expected to fully achieve the 1998 program target.

Senegalese are becoming more aware of HIV and AIDS. The BSS, February, 1997, shows that over 95% of school-aged youth could cite at least 2 means of protection from HIV transmission. Condom use has become very prevalent among high-risk groups; among prostitutes, 90% of sexual encounters reportedly now are protected by condoms use. This high level of awareness has been a key factor in Senegal's ability to keep HIV transmission at low levels unheard of in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.

Improving Service Quality: In 1996, virtually all higher level family planning centers were offering all contraceptive methods approved for that facility type (Table 1.11). All regional reference centers and 76% of rural health posts were providing family planning services. The program is strengthening staff competencies and equipment, making these sites more fully functional, offering all methods at all times and improving service quality indicators. Staff have been trained in the majority of centers and some have started offering such services as they can without these new equipment and supply packages.

Counselling now is a stronger program element, as indicated by the 66% of family planning clients receiving adequate counselling during clinic visits (as observed by Population Council Situation Analysis). This element has already exceeded the 1998 target of 60% (Table 1.12). The most encouraging and meaningful result in quality improvement demonstrated by the current data is that 60% of women who begin using modern contraception continue at least one year. The Mission is optimistic that the program will achieve the 75% continuation target in 1998.

MOHSA and USAID have launched an aggressive dissemination campaign for the newly approved family planning protocols to all MOHSA staff in our four regions as well as to key NGO partners. This will be the basis of a program of training in counselling down to the peripheral health post level. Several key partners are now engaged in adapting clinical service supervision guidelines and implementing training facilitative supervision techniques in target regions. This improved counselling and technical service monitoring will improve service quality and family planning acceptance rates.

Roughly half the MCH/family planning centers receive regular supervision visits for quality improvement, compared to the 1996 benchmark of 63%. This is widely recognized as an essential activity, and the program is fully engaged in strengthening the technical competence, approach and tools for improved supervision by regional and district medical teams.

3. Expected Progress Through FY 1999 and Management Actions

Achievement of SO1 depends on continued donor support for population policy, family planning, reproductive health and service delivery programs, and on engagement on the part of the government of Senegal to ensure access and quality of contraceptive services to all segments of the population. If these past trends continue in Senegal, the Mission is convinced that the USAID program will achieve the SO result of decreased total fertility rate by 1999. However, several profound changes are currently taking place in the health and population sector in Senegal which will condition achievement of SO1. The GOS appears to be well into what promises to be a sweeping reorganization of MOHSA programs and administrative mechanisms, including a sectoral ("Sectoral Investment Program") approach to donor interventions. The new approach by the MOHSA for reproductive health including family planning services has not yet been clearly and fully articulated, and the real priority to be placed on contraceptive services by the government of Senegal and MOHSA programs remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the strong, new rhetoric favoring reproductive health is welcome.

USAID achievement of SO1 at the national level depends on effective activities by the GOS in the non-USAID regions, especially those assisted by UNFPA and World Bank--USAID's main family planning donor partners. These two donor programs at present seem somewhat unclear in their future direction. The current GOS policy of regionalization of administrative and technical services will also have major impact on the relation of outside donors with regional government administrative and technical services. If these collective, mostly quite well coordinated influences do not continue to support and strengthen access to contraceptive services and raise family planning as a GOS priority, USAID will not be able to achieve this SO. We believe this coordination will be effective though perhaps more Mission effort will have to be engaged in this domain.

Table 1.**1 Total Fertility Rate Nationwide**

OBJECTIVE 1: Decreased Family Size APPROVED: 12/6/92 COUNTRY: Senegal			
RESULT NAME: Decreased total fertility rate in Senegal			
INDICATOR: Total fertility rate			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Children per woman SOURCE: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Estimated number of children born to a woman during her fertile lifetime, following age-specific fertility rates. COMMENTS: Partial 1996 DHS; to be completed in April 1997	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1992 (B)		6.0
	1996	5.7	5.8
	1997	5.6	
	1998	5.5	
	1999 (T)	5.4	

Table 1. 2 **Modern Contraceptive Prevalence Rate Nationwide**

OBJECTIVE 1: Decreased Family Size APPROVED: 12/6/92 COUNTRY: Senegal			
RESULT NAME: Increased use of modern contraception in Senegal			
INDICATOR: Modern contraceptive prevalence rate			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent (Women 15-49) SOURCE: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: % women currently using a modern contraceptive method COMMENTS: Partial 1996 DHS; to be completed April 1997	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1992 (B)		4.8
	1996	11.6	9
	1997	13.3	
	1998	15	
	1999 (T)	19	

Table 1.3 **Modern Contraceptive Prevalence Rate Target Regions**

OBJECTIVE 1: Decreased Family Size APPROVED: 12/6/92 COUNTRY: Senegal			
RESULT NAME: Increased use of modern contraception in target regions			
INDICATOR: Modern contraceptive prevalence rate			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent (Women 15-49) SOURCE: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: % women currently using a modern contraceptive method COMMENTS: Partial 1996 DHS; to be completed April 1997	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1992 (B)		2.5
	1996	7.5	4.8
	1997	12.5	
	1998 (T)	17.5	
	1999	22.5	

Table 1.4 **Child Mortality Rate Nationwide**

OBJECTIVE 1: Decreased Family Size	APPROVED: 12/6/92	COUNTRY: Senegal	
RESULT NAME: Decreased child (0-59 mons) mortality in Senegal			
INDICATOR: Under-five mortality rate (U5MR)			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Deaths per 1,000 live births	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
SOURCE: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)	1992 (B)		131
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Estimated child deaths under age 5 in a given year per 1,000 live births of that year	1996	125	140
	1997	123	
COMMENTS: Partial 1996 DHS; to be completed April 1997	1998	122	
	1999 (T)	120	

Table 1.5 **Infant Mortality Rate Target Regions**

OBJECTIVE 1: Decreased Family Size	APPROVED: 12/6/92	COUNTRY: Senegal	
RESULT NAME: Decreased infant (0-11mos) mortality in 4 target regions			
INDICATOR: Infant mortality rate (IMR)			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Deaths per 1,000 live births	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
SOURCE: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)	1992 (B)		72
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number child deaths under age 1 in a given year per 1,000 live births of that year	1996	64	65
	1997	61	
COMMENTS: Partial 1996 DHS; to be completed April 1997	1998	59	
	1999 (T)	58	

Table 1.6 **HIV Seroprevalence Rate Nationwide**

OBJECTIVE 1: Decreased Family Size	APPROVED: 12/6/92	COUNTRY: Senegal	
RESULT NAME: HIV seroprevalence rate stabilized in Senegal			
INDICATOR: HIV seroprevalence rate			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent (infected persons in general population)	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
SOURCE: HIV sentinel surveillance system (MOHSA and AIDSCAP)	1995 (B)		1.19
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: % general population 15-49 HIV seropositive	1996	1.42	
	1997	1.66	
COMMENTS: HIV seroprevalence remains within the "best-case" projections for Senegal	1998	1.91	
	1999 (T)	2.00	

Table 1.7 **Couple Years of Protection Nationwide**

OBJECTIVE 1: Decreased Family Size	APPROVED: 12/6/92	COUNTRY: Senegal	
RESULTS NAME: Increased modern contraceptive services offered in Senegal			
INDICATOR: Couple Years of Protection (CYP)			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Couple Years of Protection (CYP) SOURCE: Contraceptive logistics reports and Contraceptive Procurement tables (CPTs), Ministry of Health and Social Action (MOHSA) and Management Sciences for Health (MSH) INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Estimated protection against pregnancy provided for one year, based on contraceptive distribution COMMENTS: Includes distribution to MOHSA, NGOs, social marketing, and AIDS programs. Planned figures are projections from CPTs.	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1994 (B)	134,000	129,000
	1996	193,500	177,000
	1997	200,000	
	1998 (T)	250,000	

Table 1.8 **Knowledge of Contraceptive Methods in Target Regions**

OBJECTIVE: Decreased Family Size	APPROVED: 12/6/92	COUNTRY: Senegal	
RESULT NAME: IR-2.1. Increased knowledge of contraceptive methods			
INDICATOR: Women of reproductive age who know at least 2 modern contraceptive methods.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent (Women 15-49) SOURCE: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: % women who know at least 2 modern methods COMMENTS: Partial 1996 DHS; to be completed April 1997	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1992		57
	1996 (B)	75	70
	1997		
	1998 (T)	90	
	1999	95	

Table 1.9 **Total Demand for Contraceptive Services Nationwide**

OBJECTIVE: Decreased Family Size	APPROVED: 12/6/92	COUNTRY: Senegal	
RESULT NAME: IR-2.2. Increased proportion of non-users desire to use contraception in the future			
INDICATOR: Proportion of women not using a contraceptive method desire to avoid or delay future births			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent of women 15-49 SOURCE: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: % of women not using contraception who wish to avoid or delay future births COMMENTS: Partial 1996 DHS; to be completed April 1997	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1992 (B)		27
	1996	37	34
	1997	39	
	1998 (T)	43	

Table 1.10 **Use of Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS) in Target Regions**

OBJECTIVE 1: Decreased Family Size	APPROVED: 12/6/92	COUNTRY: Senegal
RESULT NAME: Increased use of oral rehydration salts (ORS) or home solutions for diarrhea in 4 target regions		
INDICATOR: Proportion of child diarrhea cases treated with ORS in target regions		

UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent (diarrhea cases) SOURCE: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: % cases of diarrhea treated with oral rehydration salts COMMENTS: Partial 1996 DHS; to be completed April 1997. The SO1 program promotes both ORS and home solution for diarrhea treatment. Exclusive ORS use is therefore a conservative indicator of program progress. The Mission is satisfied with this level of achievement. See Performance Analysis under Demand for Services.	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1992(B)		19
	1996	37	34
	1997	41	
	1998(T)	46	
	1999	50	

Table 1.11 **Family Planning Centers in Target Regions Offer Complete Range of Methods**

OBJECTIVE: Decreased Family Size	APPROVED: 12/6/92	COUNTRY: Senegal
RESULT NAME: IR-3.1. Family planning centers offer a complete array of contraceptive methods		
INDICATOR: Proportion of service delivery points (SDPs) offering a complete array of contraception methods, according to the facility type		

UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent (family planning centers) SOURCE: Situation Analysis, Population Council INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: % SDPs offering all contraceptive methods, approved for that type of SDP Comments: 1996 Situation Analysis; to be completed March 1997. This indicator has already exceeded its targets. SO1 program is working to increase demand for services at these facilities to increase contraceptive use. See Performance Analysis under Quality of Services. **RH**: regional hospital (only 1) **RC**: FP reference centers (base: 1996) **HC**: health centers **HP**: health posts	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1994 (B)		RH: 0 HC: 50 RP: 40
	1996		RH: 0 RC:100 HC:100 HP: 76
	1997		
	1998 (T)	RH: 80 RC: 90 HC: 60 HP: 80	

Table 1.12 **Family Planning Users Receive Adequate Counselling in Target Regions**

OBJECTIVE: Decreased Family Size APPROVED: 12/6/92 COUNTRY: Senegal			
RESULT NAME: IR-3.2. Family planning clients receive adequate counseling			
INDICATOR: Proportion of family planning clients who receive adequate counseling on contraceptive choices			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent (family planning clients) SOURCE: Population Council Situation Analysis INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: % family planning clients receive adequate counseling on choices. "Adequate" is defined by national MOHSA norms and protocols. COMMENTS: 1996 Situation Analysis; to be completed March 1997. This indicator has already exceeded targets. SO1 program will continue to address other service quality issues, including infection projection, to increase contraceptive use. See Performance Analysis under Quality of Services.	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1994 (B)		44
	1996	52	66
	1997	56	
	1998 (T)	60	

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B. Strategic Objective #2: Increase Crop Productivity Through Improved Natural Resources Management (NRM) in Zones of Reliable Rainfall [3]

1. Introduction and Results Framework

Overall progress in meeting the targets of Strategic Objective #2 (SO2) was very positive. Note that SO2 is a combination of two separate, crop productivity and forestry-related SOs which were in the original USAID/Senegal CPSP, approved in February 1991. This combined SO2 statement was approved by USAID/W in March 1995. This change was based largely on the need to focus implementation on a smaller, more coherent set of objectives, and the termination of the main forestry activity in March 1995. The Strategic Objective Agreement (SOAG) was signed in September 1996.

Prior to the approval of the revised SO2, there was discussion of the indicators. It was agreed that the crop production indicators for the zone of reliable rainfall were largely contextual in nature, and not indicative of results and impacts attributable to SO2 activities. The NRM practice indicators were thought to be the most appropriate of the original proxy indicators of trends toward increased crop productivity in the zone of intervention. Given the shortness of time remaining before the development of a new strategy, it was decided that the NRM practice indicators would be maintained with the revised SO2 and used as an analytical tool to study trends and corroborate site specific results within the zone of intervention.

In evaluating the data used to measure performance against the targets for adoption of NRM practices, it is understood that *national* trends picked up by the *national* KAP surveys must be analyzed along with trend data obtained in the SO2 zone of intervention.[4]

SO2 has four Key Intermediate Results (KIRs): (A) increased land investment; (B) improved NRM practices mastered and used by farmers; (C) increased access to commodity and input markets; and (D) increased access to capital. A series of Intermediate Results (IRs) support each KIR.

The bulk of the activities and SO2 resources are concentrated in KIR B. There are limited resources in KIR A, and even fewer SO2 resources devoted to KIR C and D. Other donor partners are engaged in the four KIRs, both within and outside the SO2, 400mm zone of intervention. Canada, Germany and France are providing policy assistance to the GOS for the AG/NRM sector related to KIR A. Germany, Finland, IBRD, UNDP and French are contributing partners related to KIR B. The French and IBRD are currently considering further interventions in agricultural research and extension. Regarding KIR C, in addition to the substantial work under SO3 (see Section II.C. below), most major donors, including the UN, IBRD, IMF, French and Germans are involved in assisting Senegal to improve commodity and input markets. Credit and savings interventions (KIR D) are supported by numerous partners, including the French, European Union, Canadians, and the Catholic Relief Service (CRS).

Despite encouraging data about the expanded use of NRM practices, general trends of decreasing fallow and forest areas, high population growth rate, reduced production per capita, decreased AG/NRM subsidies and continued degradation over the last 10-15 years are troublesome. Will the current and planned interventions be ample enough to offset these negative trends in order to give

[3] "Zone of reliable rainfall" is defined as the 400mm rainfall zone. Currently this can be defined as roughly the southern half of Senegal, including the Regions of Kaolack, Fatick, Kola, Tambacounda, Ziguinchor, and the lower part of Thies.

[4] KAP is Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey. KAP surveys have been conducted in 1992, 1994 and 1996 to monitor trends in use of NRM practices and agricultural activities.



Senegalese agriculture the investment boost it needs? Or, are more radical policy changes

necessary?

2. Performance Analysis

SOT2 progress is considered to be very positive, based on analysis of current data on use of improved NRM practices. Results highlighted include very high rice yield increases this year in the south due to anti-salt dikes, positive trends in improved NRM practice use, and positive influence of SO2 partners on the decentralization law. However, it is not anticipated that SO2 will be achieved within the FY97 time frame of the current CPSP.

a. KIR A, Land Investments Increased

KIR A concerns the establishment of an appropriate enabling environment, which is as critical to the adoption of AG/NRM practices for enhanced productivity, as it is to increased investment in the AG/NRM sector, in general. While there is ample evidence that the trends toward adoption of technologies are positive, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly where we are on the NRM practice "learning curve". It is also difficult to predict exactly when the "multiplier effect" will kick in, showing wide-spread adoption of NRM practices.

National KAP data, as well as EROS and SO2 intervention-specific data, show that the use of NRM practices is spreading.[5] The spread is not only in the 400mm rainfall zone, but in the northern, more stressed regions as well, according to data collected by PVOs intervening in the northern regions.[6]

Consistent efforts under SO2 continue to focus the attention of policy decision makers on the increased pressure being exerted on the natural resource base.[7] The GOS is even reconsidering the 1964 national domain law and taking a fresh look at the tenure issues in Senegal. Further enabling conditions under SO2 are described below.

The landmark decentralization law, passed in March 1996 allows for the devolution of decision-making authority and transfer of competence to the *"Communauté Rurale"* (CR) level for nine sectors, including ENV/NRM.[8] The SO2 CBNRM partners successfully lobbied for the application of this landmark law to include provisions for each CR to benefit from a democratically elected NRM committee structure to better manage the CR's natural resources.[9] Pursuant to Article 40 of the Decree related to the transfer of powers to the *"collectivités locales"*, the CRs can establish advisory committees for the ENV/NRM sector.[10] The organization, composition and mode of operation of these advisory committees are to be determined through consultation by the Rural Councils. No other sector included under the decentralization law has provisions for this type of democratically elected structure.

The SO2 team activities were integral in shaping the decentralization law and its implementation. The SO2 team was at the forefront of helping CRs develop and implement an appropriate model of the NRM committee. The democratically deliberated AG/NRM committees have become a model structure for execution of this landmark law.

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[5] EROS Data Center is the Earth Resources Observation Systems Data Center in the US Geological Survey of the Dept. of Interior.

[6] Winrock's OFPEP BHR/PVC Fourth Annual Report, 10/96; Rodale BHR/PVC Matching Grant Annual Reports.

[7] The National Domain Law of 1964 holds all land to be the domain of the government and generally does not provide for individual title holders.

[8] A *"Communauté Rurale"* (CR) is an administrative unit composed of a group of 20 to 80 contiguous villages "having common interests and being able to find the resources necessary for their own development". CR populations range from 5,000 to 10,000, and areas are from about 10km2 to more than 10,000km2. There are 320 CRs presently in Senegal.

[9] CBNRM is the Community Based Natural Resources Management Activity financed by SO2 and implemented through the Southeast Consortium for International Development (SECID).

[10] A *"Collectivité Locale"* is made up of three local administrative units: the Region, the Communes and the Communautés Rurales, headed by elected Presidents, of the Conseil Regional, Conseil Communal, and Conseil Rural, respectively.

The National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) preparation process through CONSERE has heightened awareness of environmental issues nation-wide and provided for cross fertilization of ideas due to the participatory approach being used.[11] The NEAP is scheduled for completion August 1997.

The EROS Data Center's long-term environmental monitoring activities in Senegal provided an unprecedented bio-physical database for sensitization, education and future policy improvements. Considerable institutional strengthening of CSE by EROS scientists also took place. Sophisticated technical monitoring tools were transferred, including aerial videography, and analysis of aerial video image data collected by the EROS/CSE team in 1994.[12] ERDAS, a sophisticated image processing software package, was also provided to CSE. EROS and CSE continued work on a method for integrating the EROS and CSE methods to long-term monitoring, with a goal of a unified approach. Strengthening CSE continued to be important for sustainable long-term environmental monitoring in Senegal.

b. KIR B, AG/NRM Technologies Mastered and Used by Farmers

AG/NRM Technologies, Training and Extension: Successful NRM technologies included compost, improved seed, windbreaks, stone lines, improved stoves and field trees. The table below summarizes the Section 4 performance data tables for the FY92, FY94 and preliminary FY96 national KAP survey data on selected NRM technology use. The data reinforce most of the SO2 "site specific" data findings.

The table below and the Section 4, Tables 2.1 - 2.7 show the largely consistent and positive trends indicated from the three national KAP surveys for selected NRM technology use in the zone of intervention over time. The trends for live fence, improved seed and windbreaks are particularly consistent and positive. Manure and fallow trends show relatively consistent upward trends, which are consistent with the expansion of agricultural lands and the increasing costs of chemical fertilizer caused by the January 1994 currency devaluation. The in-field, nitrogen producing Acacia albida trees proved the most surprising trend, showing a dramatic rise from 2.4% of farmers using this practice in 1992, to 13.8% in 1994, and 55.4% in 1996 (see Section 4, Table 2.7 for further details). A puzzling finding in the preliminary FY96 KAP data was the negative trend for compost, which fell from 12.1% in 1992, to 8.4% in 1994, and to 6.3% for heads of households in the preliminary 1996 KAP data. This data is contrary to site specific intervention data, but may be explained by more competitive use of manure for cooking fuel, as firewood becomes more and more scarce.

The FY96 KAP survey data disaggregated gender for the first time, and showed that much remains to be done to close the gender gap with regard to knowledge and use of adapted NRM practices.

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[11] *CONSERE* is the Conseil Supérieur de l'Environnement et des Ressources Naturelles established by decree in August 1993 for the purpose of coordinating natural resources and environmental policy reform at the national level. The US Ambassador represents the donor community on the CONSERE Steering Committee.

[12] CSE is the *Centre de Suivi Ecologique* or the Center for Ecological Monitoring in Senegal.

Percentage of Farmers Using NRM Technologies in Zone of Intervention

NRM Tech	92 KAP	94 KAP	96 KAP[13]
live fence	2.7%M	6.8%M	20.4%M 9.1%F
compost	12.1%M	8.4%M	6.3%M 3.3%F
improved seed	14%M	49.2%M	41.5%M 18.3%F
wind breaks	4.5%M	9.4%M	16.2%M 7.3%F
fallow land	15.3%M	43.4%M	53.6%M 32.1%F
manure	51.7%M	70.6%M	63.6%M 31.4%F
field trees	2.4%M	13.8%M	55.4%M 34.6%F

Under the KAED Activity in the Kaolack Region, where NRM practice interventions have been coupled with income generating agro-enterprises in selected villages (see also KIR C below), NRM technologies have been transferred from demonstration plots to farmers' fields.[14] Windbreaks, stone lines/grass strips for water erosion control, and improved stoves were the most successful technologies introduced under the KAED Activity. Soil erosion due to wind and run-off water are significant problems in the Kaolack Region. Other technologies and cultural practices which were disseminated include compost, in-field trees, thinning cereal crops, improved seeds, and strategic timing of planting.

Under the PVO/NGO Activity, 15 grants were issued to grassroots organizations for the dissemination of the technologies listed above. Women constituted 75% of those who received training. These technologies were applied to at least 500 hectares and resulted in increased agricultural productivity.
Rice yields in the 22 valleys under the SZWM Activity have increased 50.5% this year over last year (from 963 kg/ha in 1995 to 1,450 kg/ha in 1996), due to the expanded use of anti-salt dikes and other NRM techniques.[15] The success of the SZWM interventions is evidenced by the rapid rate of adoption and expansion of the contour berm techniques. In 1995, only one test contour berm (777 linear meters) was constructed by villagers (388.5 person/days). In 1996, 3,781 person-days (including 2,406 men and 1375 women) constructed 79 contour berms totaling 13,275 linear meters. From January through June 1997, villagers, with the assistance of the SZWM and PVOs, plan to build 102 contour berms, totaling 21,713 linear meters. This significant increase in villagers' participation was a positive indication of ownership of these NRM technologies.

EROS photographic data for 1996 indicated that in the Kaolack and Fatick regions there were new wood lots or reforested plots, new fruit tree orchards, especially cashew, and new live fences which were not there in the 1984 photos. Initial ground truthing and analysis revealed that this increase in NRM practices was attributable to several factors: (a) farmers' growing understanding of the new Forestry Code (which empowers villagers with

[13] M = head of household. F = female leader of household. Both were interviewed for each household in the FY96 KAP, but for the FY92 and FY94 KAPs, only heads of households were surveyed. Therefore, the general trend data must continue to be compared only for heads of households across the three surveys. For the FY96 data, the female household leader percentages cannot be added to the head of household percentages, and then compared to the FY92 and FY94 data.

[14] KAED is the Kaolack Agricultural Enterprise Development Activity, financed under SO2 and implemented by AFRICARE.

[15] SZWM is the Southern Zone Water Management Activity.

greater control over trees resources); (b) NRM interventions of USAID in selected villages in Kaolack, which are beginning to have a multiplier effect in nearby villages; and (c) NRM interventions of donor partners which contribute to SO2 (such as the German financed village tree planting intervention). However, EROS data also showed areas of increased degradation, especially in mangrove/wetland areas, where tree cutting continues.

Applied AG/NRM Research: USAID/Senegal continued to support applied research on AG/NRM techniques. A key feature of the NRBAR Activity is the strengthening of PVO-farmer-researcher linkages which continue to have high pay-off, both in terms of institution strengthening, verification of technologies, heightened awareness of NRM technology options, and enhanced productivity.[16]

An **SO2 financed impact evaluation** NRM technologies on food security, completed recently, showed an interesting socio-economic impact of SO2 activities.[17] In response to increasing degradation of the ecosystem and an aggravation of the food deficit in the southern part of the Thies Region, Winrock worked in close partnership with NRBAR-ISRA, Christian Children's Fund (CCF) and farmers in selected villages for several years to extend adapted NRM technologies (i.e., compost, live fence, and improved millet seeds). The impact evaluation was done with 4 types of rural households having a range of 1.5 to 5 months of annual food deficit. The research results showed that when these households used a combination of improved millet seeds, compost, and live fence, their yield increases ranged from 37% to 46%. This resulted in an improvement in food security, with the grain deficit decreased from 5 months to 3 months for the poorest households, and from 1.5 months of grain deficit to 2.5 months of grain excess for the better-off households.

With regard to strengthening institutional capacity of research structures, 35 male and 29 female ISRA researchers completed training programs. As a result, the long-term research strategy of ISRA was finalized, and the 1997 results-oriented research program was prepared and approved. While institutional strengthening through training and increased planning capacity are evident results of SO2 team interventions, the ISRA financial management capacity enhancement has continued to be illusive. Significant efforts launched by SOT2 in consultation with the IBRD have served to bring the need for better financial accountability to the attention of policy makers.

More AG/NRM technologies have been developed. New technologies including fish by-products as fertilizers for millet, maize, sorghum, cowpea and peanuts have been developed. An additional 35 technologies are being tested both on-station and on-farm. Five technologies, including 3 improved varieties of millet, compost use on improved varieties of millet, and live fencing in association with cassava crops have been successfully validated in the Peanut Basin. These technologies are now being extended to potentially benefit 100,000 farm families with cropping activities on over 500,000 hectares. In addition, 15 other technologies are in final stages of on-farm validation.

Farmer exposure to improved AG/NRM technologies was increased and productivity improved. Through the partnership that was successfully developed between ISRA, collaborating PVOs, and farmer customers, the number of farmers directly exposed to improved AG/NRM technologies extended by the program increased from 200 in 1993 to more than 5,000 in 1996. Farmers indirectly benefitting from these technologies through farmer to farmer contacts and other non-participating extension agencies are estimated at 20,000. It is also estimated that 20,000 hectares of cultivated land benefitted from the extension of these improved technologies in 1996.

c. KIR C: Access to Commodity and Input Markets Increased

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[16] NRBAR is the Natural Resources Based Agricultural Research Activity (685-0285) financed under SO2 and implemented by the Consortium for International Development (CID) at ISRA, the Senegalese National Agricultural Research Institute.

[17] Evaluation des impacts socio-économiques du Projet Collaboratif Winrock International - ISRA - CCF - NRBAR sur les ménages ruraux, Aïfa Fatimata Ndoye, Novembre 1996. This was a joint ISRA/NRBAR/Winrock/Christian Children's Fund (CCF) Collaborative Research and Extension Program research study financed under NRBAR.

Agricultural Enterprises: Because many AG/NRM practices take 5-15 years to show impact, potential for adoption is much greater when the sustainable AG/NRM practices are coupled with income generation in the shorter term. Under the SO2-financed KAED Activity, credit and training tools were used to stimulate agricultural enterprises in the Kaolack Region. The number of enterprises increased from 8 in 1994 to 56 in 1996. This trend is an indicator of impact on several levels described below.
To date, improved stoves, grain mills, grain banks, village level forestry, cattle fattening, fruit tree nurseries, and vegetable and fruit production are among the most sought after agro-enterprises. Women's groups make up 79% of the "customers" of the SO2 agricultural enterprise interventions. All enterprise interventions include some capital investment financed by KAED, in addition to access to credit, and a strong base of training, including literacy, numeracy, enterprise specific management technical skills, and financial management. Over 1,500 people were trained in functional literacy (85% F, 15% M). These basic skills are improving the beneficiaries lives beyond the scope of the focus activity, as they apply the skills outside the focus activity. AG/NRM practices described under KIR B above are easily linked with most of these enterprises. Villagers also benefit from demonstrations plots which host an array of practices, applicable to the zone and particular problems encountered.

Spin-Off Effects: Women have benefited substantially in terms of secondary commercial enterprises which have further augmented their incomes and thus their quality of life. Women also report numerous other benefits, such as new found empowerment and capacity to express themselves in public fora, and better communication among villagers due to need to work more closely as teams. The training has served to enrich their capacity to manage family and village affairs.

Linkages to SO3: The SO3 grain market liberalization interventions, merged into SO2 effective October 1996, fall under this KIR C of SO2. For purposes of this R4, SO3 is reported as a separate SO. See SO3 performance analysis below.

d. KIR D: Access to Capital Increased

The flow of loans has doubled and the repayment rate has remained close to 100%. Section 4, Table 2.8 shows the number of loans increasing from 14 in 1995 to 29 in 1996, and from FCFA 50.9 million to FCFA 108.3 million respectively in participating KAED villages. This is a positive trend which indicates a building momentum among village-based groups to change their lives. Diversification of village-level enterprises and economic activities, as well as increasing numbers of villagers participating are also positive indicators that capacity is being built at the local level. Another indicator of progress in building local capacity is that the commercial credit institution, CNCAS has recently agreed to lower the guarantee fund requirement from 100% to 50% for third generation loans; further indication of progress toward a more sustainable credit program. [18]

Unanticipated Results: SO2 also contributed to building civil society, the democratic process and improved self-governance at the community-level. See details of SO2's contribution under the Special Objective: Democracy/Governance.

3. Expected Progress through FY 1999 and Management Actions

All indications are that FY98 targets can be met given the positive trends across data sources. [19] Significant momentum is underway, building a strong and sustainable base of NRM practice users and a better enabling environment. Exactly where we are on the learning curve, and precisely when the "spin off" effect will produce wide-spread adoption of NRM practices is difficult to predict. What is clear is that the trend is positive.

Key References Used/Cited:

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[18] CNCAS is the Caisse Nationale du Credit Agricole au Senegal, a commercial banking institution.

[19] Note that Section III.2 describes the rationale for discussing progress only through FY98.

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4. Performance Data Tables

Table 2.1 Live Fence

OBJECTIVE: Increased crop productivity through improved NRM in zones of reliable rainfall
APPROVED: 2/91 **REVISED:** 3/95 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: KIR B: Increased use of adapted NRM technologies in zones of reliable rainfall

INDICATOR: Percentage of households using adapted technology: **live fence**

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of households surveyed

SOURCE: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) surveys FY92, 94, 96.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Percentages in "Planned" and "Actual" columns are incremental, not additive. NS = not set. NA = not available, as no FY93 or FY95 KAP surveys were done. B = baseline. T = target. RE = reassessed (see comments below). M = head of household. F = female household leader.

COMMENTS: Original FY93, FY95, and FY96 targets have been reassessed and deleted in light of fact that they had been set using 1989 baseline, and these targets were not adjusted when baseline was changed to FY92 KAP data. New indicator targets have been set for FY98, using the three KAP data points to determine trends, and taking into consideration the gender differentiated data of FY96 KAP.

KAP surveys have been done every 2 years (FY92, 94, 96). FY96 "Actual" is preliminary FY96 KAP data. Data for FY96 KAP was collected separately for heads of households and female leaders in each household surveyed. Data for FY 92 and FY 94 KAP surveys were collected for "heads of households" only.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
FY92B	NS	2.7%M
FY93	RE	NA
FY94	NS	6.8%M
FY95	RE	NA
FY96	NS	20.4%M 9.1%F
FY97	RE	
FY98T	30%M 15%F	

Table 2.2 Compost

OBJECTIVE: Increased crop productivity through improved NRM in zones of reliable rainfall
APPROVED: 2/91 **REVISED:** 3/95 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: KIR B: Increased use of adapted NRM technologies in zones of reliable rainfall

INDICATOR: Percentage of households using adapted technology: ***compost***

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of households surveyed

SOURCE: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) Surveys FY92, 94, 96.

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:
Percentages in "Planned" and "Actual" columns are incremental, not additive. NS = not set. NA = not available, as no FY93 or FY95 KAP surveys were done. B = baseline. T = target. RE = reassessed (see comments below). M = head of household. F = female household leader.

COMMENTS: Data for use of compost indicates a negative trend, which contradicts SO2 "site-specific" data sources. This data requires further analysis, once final FY96 KAP data is available.

Original FY93, FY95, and FY96 targets have been reassessed and deleted in light of fact that they had been set using 1989 baseline, and these targets were not adjusted when baseline was changed to FY92 KAP data. New indicator targets have been set for FY98, using the three KAP data points to determine trends, and taking into consideration the gender differentiated data of FY96 KAP.
KAP surveys have been done every 2 years (FY92, 94, 96). FY96 "Actual" is preliminary FY96 KAP data. Data for FY96 KAP was collected separately for heads of households and female leaders in each household surveyed. Data for FY 92 and FY 94 KAP surveys were collected for "heads of households" only.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
FY92B	NS	12.1%M
FY93	RE	NA
FY94	NS	8.4%M
FY95	RE	NA
FY96	NS	6.3%M 3.3%F
FY97	RE	
FY98T	12%M 5%F	

Table 2.3 Improved Seed

OBJECTIVE: Increased crop productivity through improved NRM in zones of reliable rainfall
APPROVED: 2/91 **REVISED:** 3/95 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: KIR B: Increased use of adapted NRM technologies in zones of reliable rainfall

INDICATOR: Percentage of households using adapted technology: **improved seed**

	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of households surveyed **SOURCE:** Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) surveys FY92,94,96 **INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:** Percentages in "Planned" and "Actual" columns are incremental, not additive. NS = not set. NA = not available, as no FY93 or FY95 KAP surveys were done. B = baseline. T = target. RE = reassessed (see comments below). M = head of household. F = female household leader. **COMMENTS:** Original FY93, FY95, and FY96 targets have been reassessed and deleted in light of fact that they had been set using 1989 baseline, and these targets were not adjusted when baseline was changed to FY92 KAP data. New indicator targets have been set for FY98, using the three KAP data points to determine trends, and taking into consideration the gender differentiated data of FY96 KAP. KAP surveys have been done every 2 years (FY92, 94, 96). FY96 "Actual" is preliminary FY96 KAP data. Data for FY96 KAP was collected separately for heads of households and female leaders in each household surveyed. Data for FY 92 and FY 94 KAP surveys were collected for "heads of households" only.	FY92B	NS	14%M
	FY93	RE	NA
	FY94	NS	49.2%M
	FY95	RE	NA
	FY96	NS	41.5%M 18.3%F
	FY97	RE	
	FY98T	50%M 25%F	

Table 2.4 Windbreaks

OBJECTIVE: Increased crop productivity through improved NRM in zones of reliable rainfall
APPROVED: 2/91 **REVISED:** 3/95 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: KIR B: Increased use of adapted NRM technologies in zones of reliable rainfall

INDICATOR: Percentage of households using adapted technology: **windbreaks**

	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of households surveyed **SOURCE:** Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) Surveys FY92,94,96 **INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:** Percentages in "Planned" and "Actual" columns are incremental, not additive. NS = not set. NA = not available, as no FY93 or FY95 KAP surveys were done. B = baseline. T = target. RE = reassessed (see comments below). M = head of household. F = female household leader. **COMMENTS:** Original FY93, FY95, and FY96 targets have been reassessed and deleted in light of fact that they had been set using 1989 baseline, and these targets were not adjusted when baseline was changed to FY92 KAP data. New indicator targets have been set for FY98, using the three KAP data points to determine trends, and taking into consideration the gender differentiated data of FY96 KAP. KAP surveys have been done every 2 years (FY92, 94, 96). FY96 "Actual" is preliminary FY96 KAP data. Data for FY96 KAP was collected separately for heads of households and female leaders in each household surveyed. Data for FY 92 and FY 94 KAP surveys were collected for "heads of households" only.	FY92B	NS	4.5%M
	FY93	RE	NA
	FY94	NS	9.4%M
	FY95	RE	NA
	FY96	NS	16.2%M 7.3%F
	FY97	RE	
	FY98T	20%M 10%F	

Table 2.5 Fallow Land

OBJECTIVE: Increased crop productivity through improved NRM in zones of reliable rainfall
APPROVED: 2/91 **REVISED:** 3/95 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: KIR B: Increased use of adapted NRM technologies in zones of reliable rainfall

INDICATOR: Percentage of households using adapted technology: **fallow land**

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of households surveyed

SOURCE: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) surveys FY92,94,96

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Percentages in "Planned" and "Actual" columns are incremental, not additive. NS = not set. NA = not available, as no FY93 or FY95 KAP surveys were done. B = baseline. T = target. RE = reassessed (see comments below). M = head of household. F = female household leader.

COMMENTS: Original FY93, FY95, and FY96 targets have been reassessed and deleted in light of fact that they had been set using 1989 baseline, and these targets were not adjusted when baseline was changed to FY92 KAP data. New indicator targets have been set for FY98, using the three KAP data points to determine trends, and taking into consideration the gender differentiated data of FY96 KAP.

KAP surveys have been done every 2 years (FY92, 94, 96). FY96 "Actual" is preliminary FY96 KAP data. Data for FY96 KAP was collected separately for heads of households and female leaders in each household surveyed. Data for FY 92 and FY 94 KAP surveys were collected for "heads of households" only.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
FY92B	NS	15.3%M
FY93	RE	NA
FY94	NS	43.4%M
FY95	RE	NA
FY96	NS	53.6%M 32.1%F
FY97	RE	
FY98T	55%M 35%F	

Table 2.6 Manure

OBJECTIVE: Increased crop productivity through improved NRM in zones of reliable rainfall
APPROVED: 2/91 **REVISED:** 3/95 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: KIR B: Increased use of adapted NRM technologies in zones of reliable rainfall

INDICATOR: Percentage of households using adapted technology: **manure**

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of households surveyed

SOURCE: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) Surveys FY92,94,96

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:
Percentages in "Planned" and "Actual" columns are incremental, not additive. NS = not set. NA = not available, as no FY93 or FY95 KAP surveys were done. B = baseline. T = target. RE = reassessed (see comments below). M = head of household. F = female household leader.

COMMENTS: Original FY93, FY95, and FY96 targets have been reassessed and deleted in light of fact that they had been set using 1989 baseline, and these targets were not adjusted when baseline was changed to FY92 KAP data. New indicator targets have been set for FY98, using the three KAP data points to determine trends, and taking into consideration the gender differentiated data of FY96 KAP.

KAP surveys have been done every 2 years (FY92, 94, 96). FY96 "Actual" is preliminary FY96 KAP data. Data for FY96 KAP was collected separately for heads of households and female leaders in each household surveyed. Data for FY 92 and FY 94 KAP surveys were collected for "heads of households" only.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
FY92B	NS	51.7%M
FY93	RE	NA
FY94	NS	70.6%M
FY95	RE	NA
FY96	NS	63.6%M 31.4%F
FY97	RE	
FY98T	65%M 35%F	

Table 2.7 Field Trees

OBJECTIVE: Increased crop productivity through improved NRM in zones of reliable rainfall
APPROVED: 2/91 **REVISED:** 3/95 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: KIR B: Increased use of adapted NRM technologies in zones of reliable rainfall

INDICATOR: Percentage of households using adapted technology: **field trees**

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of households surveyed

SOURCE: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) surveys FY92,94,96

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Percentages in "Planned" and "Actual" columns are incremental, not additive. NS = not set. NA = not available, as no FY93 or FY95 KAP surveys were done. B = baseline. T = target. RE = reassessed (see comments below). M = head of household. F = female household leader.

COMMENTS: Original FY93, FY95, and FY96 targets have been reassessed and deleted in light of fact that they had been set using 1989 baseline, and these targets were not adjusted when baseline was changed to FY92 KAP data. New indicator targets have been set for FY98, using the three KAP data points to determine trends, and taking into consideration the gender differentiated data of FY96 KAP.

KAP surveys have been done every 2 years (FY92, 94, 96). FY96 "Actual" is preliminary FY96 KAP data. Data for FY96 KAP was collected separately for heads of households and female leaders in each household surveyed. Data for FY 92 and FY 94 KAP surveys were collected for "heads of households" only.

Tremendous jump in users of field tree technology in preliminary FY96 data may be related to a flaw in questionnaire, and/or improvement in surveyors ability to interpret responses as compared to earlier KAP surveys.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
FY92B	NS	2.4%M
FY93	RE	NA
FY94	NS	13.8%M
FY95	RE	NA
FY96	NS	55.4%M 34.6%F
FY97	RE	
FY98T	60%M 40%F	

Table 2.8 Credit

OBJECTIVE: Increased crop productivity through improved NRM in zones of reliable rainfall
APPROVED: 2/91 **REVISED:** 3/95 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: KIR D : Access to Capital Increased

INDICATOR: Number of loans processed in KAED participating villages

UNIT OF MEASURE: number

SOURCE: KAED Semi-Annual Program Performance Reports

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: NS = not set. NA = not available. Indicator was established in FY96. B = baseline. T = target.

COMMENTS: This indicator target has been set for FY98, based on the number of villages involved in the KAED Activity.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
FY92	NS	NA
FY93	NS	NA
FY94B	NS	0
FY95	NS	14
FY96	NS	29
FY97	NS	
FY98T	56	

C. Strategic Objective 3: Increase Liberalization of the Market for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products [20]

1. Introduction and Results Framework

The positive performance of this Strategic Objective #3 (SO3) in fulfilling its objectives ahead of schedule, plus pressure to rationalize the organization of USAID/Senegal staff, finally brought the Mission to graduate this SO on September 30, 1996. Residual activities were folded into SO2.

SO3 comprises two operational Key Intermediate Results (KIRs): (1) decreased government role; and (2) increased private sector participation. These KIRs are reflected in the Mission's principal interventions that contribute to market liberalization, with focus on the rice sector, aimed at reorienting public and private sector roles in selected agricultural markets. Up until 1994, the rice sector in Senegal was constrained by a pervasive system of government controls: (1) two parastatals dominated importation, distribution, and overall rice marketing and production; (2) regulated prices and fixed marketing margins; and (3) a cumbersome and inefficient rice supply system.

To help the Government of Senegal (GOS) overcome these constraints, USAID/Senegal designed the Rice Sub-sector Adjustment program (RSA) within the framework of the World Bank-led multi-donor Agricultural Sector Adjustment Program (PASA) with the stated purpose of "establishing a private market for rice importation and distribution that is competitive, sustainable and subsidy-free." USAID/Senegal also supported reform objectives under a PL 480 program to: (a) encourage the GOS to adopt a Forestry Code to improve the policy environment for natural resources management planning; and (b) foster greater participation of the private sector in rice marketing. Also, USAID/Senegal has supported GOS efforts to privatize the state owned peanut oil processing company (SONACOS) as part of the liberalization of peanut market. While the privatization process in the groundnut sector is moving at a slower pace, most of the reform measures under the RSA program were fulfilled ahead of schedule. Overall, USAID/Senegal's effort to foster the emergence of competitive markets for agricultural and natural resources-based products progressed well.

2. Performance Analysis

Selected performance indicators are discussed below. Because this SO is being folded into SO2, no attempt has been made to collect gender disaggregated impact data. In general, however, removal of government controls of rice production and marketing creates additional opportunities, particularly for women who were disadvantaged under prior arrangements. Actual data used in evaluating progress toward SO3 are presented in the annexed performance data tables.

Margins Reduced: Marketing margins for cereal were chosen as the indicator best able to capture the effect of price deregulation and market liberalization. This indicator is defined as the differential between FOB (from sources such as India or Thailand) and consumer price for imported cereals, and as the differential between farm gate price and consumer price for locally produced cereal.

[20] The Market Liberalization Strategic Objective was discontinued at the end of FY 1996. Given the determination to discontinue, the results framework and results package developed with partners and clients was not used to formulate a strategic objective agreement. The performance analysis is being conducted using indicators initially developed, discussed and refined during a results framework development workshop in January 1996.


SO3 RESULTS FRAMEWORK
SO3: Increased Liberalization in Market for Agriculture and Natural Resource Products
KIR 1 Increased Private Sector Participation
KIR 2 Decreased Government Role
KIR= Key Intermediate Result
IR1 = Level 1
IR2= Level 2
IR3= Level 3
IR4= Level 4
1A Increased access to information facilities
1B Increased access to market information
2A Administrative process simplified; consumer protection
2B Improved Private Sector Participation
2C Government disengaged
3A.1 Existing information identified and processed, and collected
3A.2 Increased transparency and accountability
3B.1 Increased access to CBS information
3B.2 Performance NGO, CBO, non-profit orgs
3C.1 Increased institutional capacity strengthened
3C.2 Public services marketed
4A.1 Increased information flow & structure created
4A.2 Increased private sector capacity strengthened
1.B.1 Increased information collection
1.B.2 Increased DTS information access
1.B.3 Increased DTS control bureaus
1.B.4 Increased DTS management bureaucracy capacity
1.B.5 Increased information access cost
1.B.6 Increased investment
1.B.7 Increased More services offered
1.B.8 Increased information dissemination
1.B.9 Increased Customer system established
1.B.10 Increased Risk monitoring up to date
1.B.11 Increased Consultation time-frame

As shown in Table 3.1, the actual margins improved beyond what was planned. The liberalization of the cereal market was also expected to affect operations such as FOB purchasing, sea transport, port handling of imported cereals, and milling and distribution of local cereals. Meaningful analysis of changes in marketing margins is quite complicated, requiring greater disaggregation of data on cereals by category, quality, location, and quantity sold (eg. lot, sack or kilogram). USAID/Senegal continues to monitor changes in margins.

Private Sector's Share Increased: As shown in Table 3.2, the private sector's share of marketed agricultural products has steadily increased. This increase is attributable to a combination of factors including, CFAF devaluation, privatization, and liberalization effects. In 1996, as a result of the liberalization of the groundnut market, the private sector's share exceeded expectations. SONAGRAINES (the marketing branch of SONACOS) was able to purchase only 100 thousand metric tons of peanuts against a forecast of 200 thousand metric tons. The poor marketing performance of SONAGRAINES contrasts with the vitality of the private channel.

USAID/Senegal has supported three phases of a study intended to assist the GOS to privatize SONACOS. During the third phase, bids were solicited for the purchase of 51 percent of the total outstanding shares of the company. While the phase three process progressed in an open and transparent way, the GOS rejected the proposals for price reasons and lack of compliance with the bid document. The GOS, as of September 1996, was at the initial stage of phase four, re-launching the privatization process (Table 3.7).

Increased Numbers of Private Wholesale Cereal Traders: Tables 3.3 and 3.4 indicate a slight decrease of 1.8 percent in the number of Dakar-based wholesale rice traders, whereas outside Dakar this number increased by 3 percent. So far, private rice importing remains competitive and without collusion. Customs records indicate that 40 private importers participated in rice imports in 1996. The concentration ratio defined as the cumulative market share of four largest importers was at 42.8 percent (100 percent being a pure oligopoly). Another concentration ratio defined as the sum of the squares of individual market shares weighted by the coefficient of domination was at 4.76 percent (100 percent characterizing a monopoly situation while 0 percent means the participants have an equal share).

Increased Deregulation: In less than two years of effective implementation, the GOS has made remarkable progress in achieving almost all of its operational policy reform objectives as agreed to under the RSA: Prices and imports of whole-grain rice deregulated (1993); the regional parastatal (SAED) privatized (1994); the wholesaling of local rice by the marketing board (CPSP) eliminated (1994); implementation of the Forestry Code; and elimination of the rice transport subsidy (1995). With the ongoing liquidation of CPSP (1996), rice prices (including paddy, wholesale, and retail) became subject to the forces of supply and demand. Also, the private sector has now taken over rice processing, importing and distributing.

Enhancement of Decision-making Capabilities: Training, informational workshops, and various analytical studies were carried out during this current year. Training was provided especially for analysts from the Economic Analysis Unit (UPE) at the Ministry of Finance and the Agricultural policy Unit (UPA) at the Ministry of Agriculture. The training focused on policy analysis techniques, with particular emphasis on financial and economic implications of agricultural investment decisions. The training proved quite timely and has induced continuing debate among policy-makers about the validity of food self-sufficiency (vs. food security) as a viable strategic option for Senegal.

Also, useful analytical work (see bibliography) has been carried out both to monitor progress in policy implementation and to assess the effect of the reforms on the various market participants. The study results were recently presented in a workshop where, for the first time, over 130 representatives of all public and private sector groups in Senegal concerned with rice (from producers, millers, marketing agents, GOS officials from a dozen agencies, importers to consumers, and including donors) had a chance to debate the results and discuss opportunities for further public and private actions to improve the economic performance of the rice sub-sector in Senegal.

In a recent meeting with USAID/Senegal Mission Director, the Minister of Agriculture expressed his full satisfaction with the performance of UPA by underscoring that "the GOS cites UPA as an example of the type of structure that needs to be replicated in other GOS Ministries."

Institutionalization of a Rice Market Information System (RMIS) to Sustain Achievements: A market information system is an essential ingredient to a well functioning private marketing system, bringing more transparency to the domestic rice market, and with it, more price efficiency through spatial and temporal arbitrage. The RMIS, which is expected to be operational at the end of March 1997, will provide timely, reliable and regular information about international and domestic rice markets. Every week, a one-page RMIS bulletin will be prepared and diffused by national TV, radio, and at least 2 national newspapers. In addition, an extensive bulletin will be sent by fax to interested wholesalers, trade and consumer associations and government services. The RMIS minimizes speculation and vacillation in policies, and gives private sector market participants and government decision-makers advance warning of any possible supply disruptions. The RMIS is therefore a cornerstone in the consolidation and sustainability of the rice market liberalization in Senegal.

3. Expected Progress and Management Actions

Increased Cost Savings: Preliminary data from an in-depth analysis suggest that the savings attributable to subsidy elimination resulting from liquidation of CPSP amounts to about 20 million dollars a year.

Increased Income for Traders and More Choices for Consumers: Post-reform prices have been higher, particularly from mid 1995 to early 1996, because of the poorly coordinated closings of CPSP wholesale warehouses in the interior, and then in Dakar. In addition to the creation of large "rents," this has produced some short-run reductions in consumer income and somewhat greater food insecurity for low income consumers. Once significant stocks of private broken rice began to enter the country (late 1995-early 1996), the rice market stabilized very quickly.

Consumers have also been given a greater choice in the type of rice they buy and its price. For example, from October 1995 until its closing in February 1996, the CPSP contracted to buy rice from three foreign exporters only. In contrast, private importers contracted with 15 foreign exporters to buy rice from October 1995 to May 1996. This suggests that private importers have diversified the base of supply assuring competitive prices for the benefit of Senegalese importers and consumers. Over time, with development of more mature and stable rice markets, consumers should benefit from substantial improvements in marketing efficiency due to dismantling of the CPSP. But, the amount of savings to be gained will depend on how heavily the GOS decides to protect domestic rice production.

Improved Resource Allocations Based upon Clearer Market Signals: The elimination of the inefficient government subsidy for rice production in the Senegal River valley has forced farmers, particularly those with larger areas and high water costs, to diversify and to grow several new crops such as cotton, peanuts, potatoes as well as other vegetables and cereals.

The Demonstration Effect of a Successful Policy Reform. The success of this USAID supported liberalization and privatization of the rice sector contrasts sharply with difficulties experienced in the past in restructuring various other commodity sub-sectors in Senegal. The demonstration effects of successful reforms in the rice sector are having positive impacts on the prospects for progressive liberalization of other commodity chains. [21]

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[21] Results reported in this R4 frequently draw upon data as recent as late February. As the final draft was being prepared, a February 20, 1997 ministerial "Arreté" reflected backsliding against the condition precedent for the second tranche met in 1995. As the GOS rice parastatals have divested, subsidies eliminated, and market prices are reigning over government-administered prices, interest groups adversely affected in the near term by the reforms influenced decision makers to protect their respective interests by reimposing price controls for a maximum four-month period (see the cable DAKAR 02166 dated March 1997). USAID believes that this temporary re-imposition of fixed margins in no way represents a weakening of GOS commitment to the broader agricultural sector reform and the rice sector structural adjustment reforms. It is clear that the arreté was provoked by an highly-flawed, inflammatory analysis, based on questionable data provided to the GOS by Caisse Francaise de Developpement. At this time, despite all attempts to disrupt the reform, the liberalization process is continuing satisfactorily. Overall, there are clear indications that GOS is now strongly committed to keeping the momentum on structural reforms. USAID intends to continue to work closely with UNDP, the World Bank and the GOS in fostering future deliberations to minimize counter reactions to the reforms and ease backsliding pressures on the liberalization process.

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9. Ismael Ouedraogo and Abdoul Aziz Gueye, "Protection du Riz Local au Sénégal: Quel Mécanisme de Prélèvement Dégressif sur le Riz Importé?" March, 1996

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15. Ismael Ouedraogo, "Une Nouvelle Mesure de la Concentration: L'Index de Concentration Normalise," February 1997

4. Performance Data Tables

TABLE 3.1

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: Increased Liberalization of Markets for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products **APPROVED:** 02 / 1991 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: Increased Market Liberalization

INDICATOR: Reduced Marketing Margins

UNIT OF MEASURE: Margins (percent)

SOURCES: Market Information System (SIM) of the Food Security Agence (CSA); ACG

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Ratio of retail prices minus farm prices to retail prices of locally produced cereals, and/or ratio of the difference in retail prices between cereals of local and imported origin to retail prices of imported cereals. Since the margin varies depending on the agricultural products, a decision was made to provide a range of margins.

COMMENTS: Actually there are no a priori numerical objectives. The objective is to eliminate to the extent possible the distortions of prices.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
89-91 (B)		17-26
1993		17-29
1994		15-28
1995		23-24
1996	10-15	2-20
1997 (T)	10-15	
1998 (T)	10-15	
1999 (T)	10-15	

TABLE 3.2

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: Increased Liberalization of Markets for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products **APPROVED:** 02 / 1991 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: Increased Market Liberalization

INDICATOR: Increased Private Sector's Share of Marketed Products

UNIT OF MEASURE: Percent of total

SOURCES: GOS/Agriculture Direction; SONAGRAINES; USAID-Senegal/ ANR Core

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The annual ratio of agricultural products marketed through the private sector to the total marketed agricultural products. It is assumed that the proportion of cereal grain production actually marketed is between 3 and 5 percent. On the other hand, the proportion marketed is respectively 50, 60, and 100 percent for rice, groundnut, and cotton.

COMMENTS: FY 1996 data might be revised.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
89-91 (B)		46
1993		63
1994		71
1995		74
1996	73	84
1997 (T)	95	
1998 (T)	95	
1999 (T)	95	

TABLE 3.3

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: Increased Liberalization of Markets for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products **APPROVED:** 02 / 1991 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: Increased Private Sector Activities

INDICATOR: Major Wholesale Cereal Traders in Dakar

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of Traders

SOURCES: GOS Market Surveys; GOS Merchant Registration; CSA/SIM

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: A counting of rice traders having each at least 10 clients

COMMENTS: FYs 1993 thru 96 data are related to rice only and are from the marketing board (CPSP) which is disbanded in 1996. The 1992 market survey underlies the projected figures. The market liberalization related structural reforms have inflated the number of cereal wholesalers. An update of the market survey will help reassess the projections.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
1992 (B)		279
1993		150
1994		200
1995		390
1996	300	383
1997 (T)	300	
1998 (T)	300	
1999 (T)	300	

TABLE 3.4

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: Increased Liberalization of Markets for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products **APPROVED:** 02 / 1991 **COUNTRY:** Senegal

RESULT NAME: Increased Private Sector Activities

INDICATOR: Major Wholesale Cereal Traders Outside Dakar

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of Traders

SOURCES: GOS Market Surveys; GOS Merchant Registration; CSA/SIM

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: A counting of rice traders having each at least 10 clients

COMMENTS: FYs 1993 thru 96 data are related to rice only and are from the marketing board (CPSP) which is disbanded in 1996. The 1992 market survey underlies the projected figures. The market liberalization related structural reforms have increased the number of cereal wholesalers. An update of the market survey will help reassess the projections.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
1992 (B)		185
1993		461
1994		566
1995		532
1996	195	548
1997 (T)	200	
1998 (T)	200	
1999 (T)	200	

TABLE 3.5

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: Increased Liberalization of Markets for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products **APPROVED:** 02 / 1991 **COUNTRY:** Senegal			
RESULT NAME: Decreased Government Regulations			
INDICATOR: Deregulation of Prices for broken Rice			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Qualitative (yes/no) **SOURCES: GOS/UPA; USAID-Senegal/RSA program Records** **INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:** Condition Precedent (CP) under RSA **COMMENTS:** CP fulfilled ahead of schedule, yet being watched for possible back-sliding in early 1997.	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1995		yes
	1996	x	

TABLE 3.6

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: Increased Liberalization of Markets for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products **APPROVED:** 02 / 1991 **COUNTRY**: Senegal			
RESULT NAME: Decreased Government Regulations			
INDICATOR: Elimination of CPSP from rice imports, handling, and marketing			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Qualitative (yes/no) **SOURCES: GOS/UPA; USAID-Senegal/RSA program Records** **INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:** Condition Precedent (CP) under RSA **COMMENTS:** CP fulfilled ahead of schedule	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1996		yes
	1997	x	

TABLE 3.7

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: Increased Liberalization of Markets for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products **APPROVED:** 02 / 1991 **COUNTRY**: Senegal			
RESULT NAME: Decreased Government Regulations			
INDICATOR: Privatization of SONACOS			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Qualitative (yes/no) **SOURCES: GOS/Ministry of Finance; USAID-Senegal Records** **INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:** Condition Precedent (CP) under Title III PL 480 agreement **COMMENTS:** So far four phases have been financed	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
	1999	x	on track

TABLE 3.8

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: Increased Liberalization of Markets for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products **APPROVED:** 02 / 1991 **COUNTRY** : Senegal			
RESULT NAME: Decreased Government Regulations			
INDICATOR: UPA Reorganized and Functions Effectively			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Qualitative (yes/no) SOURCES: GOS/UPA; USAID-Senegal/RSA program Records	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Condition Precedent (CP) under RSA **COMMENTS:** on the right track. Actually the PACD was 1999.	1999	x	on track

TABLE 3.9

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: Increased Liberalization of Markets for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products **APPROVED:** 02 / 1991 **COUNTRY**: Senegal			
RESULT NAME: Decreased Government Regulations			
INDICATOR: Put in Place a Functioning Rice Market Information System			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Qualitative (yes/no) **SOURCES: GOS/UPA; USAID-Senegal/RSA program Records**	**YEAR**	**PLANNED**	**ACTUAL**
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Condition Precedent (CP) under RSA **COMMENTS:** on the right track	1997	x	on track

D. Special Objective : Democracy/Governance

1. Introduction and Results Framework

Results obtained under this Specific Objective exceeded expectations. Without specific resources set aside for Democracy and Governance (D/G) activities, USAID/Senegal's expectations were admittedly modest (but in keeping with our overall staff and budget resources). Examples of results include improved management of health centers, agricultural and NRM village associations, and greater transparency in the national elections. With this Special Objective, USAID/Senegal seeks to decentralize state authorities and resources, as well as to improve transparency and efficiency of public management.

The landmark decentralization law, passed in March 1996, marked a turning point in Senegal for the devolution of authority and transfer of technical competence to the local level. The fact that the application of this important law for the environment and natural resources management was influenced by USAID's partners is a significant accomplishment (see Section II.B.2 for details).

D/G is a cross-cutting theme in virtually all USAID/Senegal activities, fully complemented by 116 (e) activities. U.S. development assistance in Senegal is predicated on the view that long-term sustainability of activities promoting diffusion of public health and natural resources technologies, and economic reforms, depends directly on expanding participation and empowerment of people at local levels. USAID/Senegal's current efforts emphasize decentralized administration of health and continuing work in local administration of natural resources.

Operationally, the SPO focuses on two key intermediate results (KIRs): (1) increased decentralization and de-concentration of state authorities and resources; and (2) increased transparency/efficiency in public management. For each KIR, a series of intermediate results (IRs) have been defined. Performance, progress and target indicators have been established for SPO, KIRs and IRs whenever possible. The common indicators for D/G performance, which the G Bureau provided in February 1997, will be useful as the Mission prepares Results Packages under the new Country Strategic Plan.

2. Performance Analysis [22]

Corruption: A three-day regional seminar on good government focusing on corruption held in March 1996 led to publication and dissemination by the University of Maryland (IRIS) of a "tool-kit" containing analytical and practical tools for the implementation of D/G reform strategies. In November 1996, USAID/Senegal also co-sponsored an international symposium on governance and development with an accent on corruption. The nature and effects of corruption were effectively highlighted in public, and USAID/Senegal and a number of our partners are pushing for effective follow-up actions.

National Elections: In November 1996, Senegal organized general elections at the local and regional levels under the new decentralization law, enacted in March, 1996. USAID/Senegal, through the International Foundation for Election System (IFES), provided assistance to the Government of Senegal for conducting civic and voter education to prepare voters for these elections. Elected were 28,000 regional, rural, and municipal councilors. The IFES assessment made the following recommendations for donor consideration: (1) comprehensive civic and voter education; (2) creation of an independent oversight body for elections; and (3) support for a strengthened civil society.

[22] Also, see U.S. Department of State 1996 Human Rights Report - Senegal.


USAID\SENEGAL SPECIAL OBJECTIVE
(SPO)
DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
KIR-A: INCREASED DECENTRALIZATION\DECON-
CENTRATION OF STATE AUTHORITIES & RESOURCES
KIR-B: TRANSPARENCY\EFFICIENCY IN
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT INCREASED
IR-A1: LEGAL\REGULATORY TEXTS
EFFECTIVELY APPLIED
IR-A2: ACCESS TO A FUNCTIONAL
JUSTICE FACILITATED
IR-A3: LOCAL ELECTED LEADERS
FULLY EMPOWERED
IR-A4: KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHTS AND
DUTIES INCREASED
IR-A5 I: LOCAL ASSEMBLIES FUNCTIONING
IMPROVED
IR-A5 I.1: FORMALIZATION
LEGACY IMPROVED
IR-A5 I.2: DEMOCRATIC CHOICES OF
REPRESENTATIVES ARE EFFECTIVE
IR-A5 I.3: LEVEL OF COMPETENCY OF
LOCAL LEADERS IMPROVED
A5: RESOURCES ALLOCATION
OPTIMIZED
IR-C: EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
PROMOTED
IR-B1: ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
DISSEMINATED
IR-B2: PUBLIC OPINION
STRENGTHENED
IR-B3: MECHANISMS FOR MANAGEMENT
CONTROL ARE FUNCTIONAL
IRB4: audit recommendations are
applied and sanctions taken

D/G and Health/Family Planning: In pursuit of improved mortality and fertility control (SO1), decentralized planning became fully functional in the public sector during 1996. Much greater regional administrative decentralization also is underway. During the past year, health posts in USAID's four target regions increased the proportion of total local costs recovered through sale of essential drugs and services. The performance of local health committees also improved markedly.

D/G and Natural Resources Management: The diffusion of NRM technologies (SO2) and the spread of modern D/G concepts are inextricably intertwined; progress on each domain depends on the other. For example, fifty-six village agro-business enterprises in Kaolack expanded numerous NRM technologies from demonstration phase to farm fields last year. This expansion was based on village associations set up on democratic, deliberative principles also involving credit and literacy training. The impact of these associations transcend their intended NRM focus, whether it be agro-enterprise development, technology transfer, functional literacy, or technical training (e.g., operating grain mills). Rural community-based organizations in the SO2 zone of intervention take responsibility for electing their own leaders, establishing their own rules and procedures for making and implementing decisions. People who had never come forth or spoken out in public have been in some cases selected to fill responsible positions. Not only are people, especialliy women, diversifying their sources of income, but there is evidence, from the improving rate of repayment of loans, that they are taking responsibility for those decisions. This also has been fueled, for example, by Africare dropping relationships with village associations based on demonstrated lack of commitment to living by the rules which they developed for themselves.

D/G and PVO/NGOs: USAID's PVO/NGO support activity encourages democratic and transparent management of sub-project funds for the promotion of good governance through grants provided to PVOs/NGOs working with grassroots organizations. Using the participatory approach, this brought positive changes in the implementation of grant activities. For example, interaction between recipient organizations' members is effective, management committees are set up and function democratically, revolving funds are managed and distributed in a transparent manner, and information on the results achieved is widely disseminated among all concerned parties/individuals. It is worth noting that 75 percent of targeted populations under these activities are women.

The 116e Program: The U.S Embassy-Dakar administers USAID's 116(e) Democracy and Human Rights Fund, and these funds are often used in concert with USAID activities. For example, a 116(e) grant was given to an NGO to develop a democracy module for its literacy program. The participative research involved the National Human Rights League. The recently completed test of the module in a number of villages greatly contributed to filling a big gap by increasing awareness of basic human rights, particularly among women. Another 116(e) grant was given to another NGO to finance a conference on Conflict Prevention and Democratic Transition in Africa. The conference grouped prominent African political leaders and aimed at attracting funding for a five-year follow-on program for tracking conflicts in Africa and assisting in their resolution. As a result of the conference, the establishment of a permanent non-governmental observatory to prevent conflicts as well as to promote democratic transitions in West Africa is well underway.

3. Expected Progress through 1998 and Management Actions

Over the next year, USAID will assist the GOS in its decentralization efforts through training, observational tours, medium-term technical assistance, and regional conferences. USAID will identify opportunities for training newly elected regional, municipal, and rural representatives to help them assume full duties and responsibilities. USAID/Senegal will also emphasize D/G through promotion of PVO/NGO initiatives and increased governance. Many USAID interventions will emphasize performance and will be geared towards Senegalese policy makers, whose improved decision-making capabilities and effectiveness will enhance good governance.

Depending upon further assessment of best approaches, in concert with other development partners, further consideration will be given to the three IFES recommendations cited earlier. Especially with respect to up-coming legislative elections in 1998, assistance could be provided to the GOS for a comprehensive and extensive voter education program. Further, irregularities in the November 1996 elections led nineteen opposition parties to persuade the President to create an independent commission to study administrative deficiencies of the present electoral system. The opposition seeks the creation of a permanent independent electoral commission to promote

transparency and openness in future elections in Senegal. Although it is premature to predict how the government will ultimately respond to this request, USAID could, if a non-partisan body for oversight of elections is approved, explore ways of providing assistance to the GOS to help in the establishment of this entity. Finally, USAID will explore ways of further promoting the growth of civil society through associations.

4. Performance Data Tables

Because the Mission does not have specific funding for D/G activities, and the Mission is soon to begin work under a new country strategic plan, performance data tables are not provided for this special objective.

III. STATUS OF MANAGEMENT CONTRACT

1. FY 1999 R4 in a Transitional Year Between Country Strategic Plans (CSP)

Between USAID/Senegal's current CSP (valid through September 1997) and the new one which will be presented to USAID/W in January 1998, there will need to be a transition. This gap was caused by factors cited in section I of this R4. USAID/Senegal recommends that implementation of the current CSP activities (subject to mid-course corrections) should continue through FY 1998 and possibly overlap with those under its new strategy until FY 1999. Such an approach seeks to assure a smooth transition from our current portfolio of strategic objectives and activities, to new ones.

2. How to Judge/Evaluate USAID/Senegal's Resource Request

Because USAID/Senegal has not defined yet its new strategic objectives for the period 1998-2006, it is difficult for the Mission to fully justify the FY 1999 resources that are hereby being requested in this Resource Request. USAID/Senegal recommends that USAID/W review the present Request on the basis of being an exception to the scoring system that has been developed. Factors which should be given more weight include Senegal's geo-political importance, assuring a smooth transition to new strategic objectives and activities, the quality of the USAID-Senegal partnership, Senegal's needs and absorptive capacity, etc. While the Mission realizes that this approach will render USAID/W's R4 review more difficult, it seems a better use of the time focusing on the proposed new CSP, rather than a detailed assessment of the Resource Request.

Nevertheless, USAID/Senegal's FY 1999 Resource Request is more than just a way of parking funding so that the Mission does not come up short two years hence. The request is firmly based on an honest attempt to weigh the factors mentioned above. USAID/Senegal, as per advice from AFR/DP, requests funds by generic sector titles such as "SO in Health and Population", "SO in Agriculture and Natural Resources Management" and "SPO in Democracy and Governance." At this point the Mission does not know if it will have such SOs. Instead it might have cross-cutting SOs, (e.g. decentralization) which would incorporate Agency-wide priorities. The requested FY 1999 level of funding of $29.8 million takes into consideration both the expressed needs of our customers for economic growth funds (the Mission knows that it is not alone) and current Congressional "directives"and Administration priorities.

3. The Pipeline

By the end of FY 1998, the Mission estimates that a total amount of $16 million will remain in the pipeline under the terminating strategy. USAID/Senegal plans to deobligate, or if permitted by the Bureau, requests reprogramming of these remaining funds when it switches to new SOs under the new strategic plan. While USAID/Senegal is aware that this pipeline will be a red flag for some, the Mission believes the pipeline should be viewed in the following context. USAID/Senegal has been complying fully with USAID forward funding guidelines. The Mission has been quite helpful to Bureau's requests for assistance to do a bit more to help the Bureau and Agency meet its earmark/target profiles. Also, after the current SOs were developed and generally fully-funded, the Mission has had to reduce some Project Activity Completion Dates (PACDs) for fully funded activities, without commensurately reducing the funding. As an example, it did not make much sense to de-obligate funds slated for the natural resource management (NRM) SO. While the PACD was cut to conform with the end of our current CSP, there is a high likelihood that the new CSP will include an SO which will require funding targeted for NRM.

4. Strategic Objective Changes and Refinements

USAID/Senegal has made several changes to its management contract which have not been formally recorded by USAID/W. USAID/Senegal is now reorganized to manage two strategic objectives and one specific objective (Democracy/Governance), instead of four SOs and three special objectives. These changes have been driven by two forces: (1) the ten percent of USAID/Senegal FSN staff were RIFed in 1996; and (2) the achievement of results ahead of schedule under SO3. **Strategic Objective #1, Decreased Family Size,** was modified to include HIV/AIDS in its Results Framework.

Strategic Objective #2, Increase Productivity through Improved NRM in Zones of Reliable Rainfall now encompasses a merger of two separate crop productivity and forestry-related SOs which were in the original

USAID/Senegal CPS. This combination was largely based on the need to consolidate objectives in accordance with reduced staffing and program resources, and the termination of the Mission's main forestry related activities.

The performance data tables contain new FY 1998 targets which were established based on the trends determined from the three data points now available from the Knowledge, Attitude, and Practices (KAP) surveys conducted in 1992, 1994, and 1996. The prior year targets have been deleted for this R4 submission, as they were set using 1989 as a baseline, and they were not updated when the baseline was changed to reflect the 1992 KAP data. The FY 1998 targets are gender disaggregated. Because the 1996 KAP survey was done for the first time by gender, it highlighted clearly gender equity gap.

USAID/Senegal considers these as minor adjustments to SO2 given the proxy nature of these indicators. Also, it was deemed a poor use of resources to spend additional time amending these indicators given that new Results Packages will be developed next year along with the new CSP. USAID/Senegal energies are being focused on the development of the new strategy.

SPO, Democracy and Governance: With D/G as the only special objective, the Mission developed performance indicators at the SO, KIR and IR levels whenever possible. These indicators have been refined based upon D/G common indicators provided in early 1997 by the G Bureau. USAID/Senegal's DG Results Framework reflects an emphasis on decentralization, good governance and elections. USAID will also continue to provide support for civic education training for voters. This training, coupled with support for other initiatives taken by the Senegalese population, will result in greater transparency and participation in Senegalese elections.

5. Formulation of the New Strategic Plan for USAID/Senegal

USAID/Senegal's current CSP strategy was developed prior to Senegal's devaluation and other structural reforms currently being implemented in Senegal, and prior to USAID's re-engineering and significant down-sizing. USAID's sectoral priorities remain fairly consistent, but there has been an evolution in thinking about how best to achieve results. Because USAID/Senegal is basing its FY99 resource request heavily on what will be forthcoming in the new CSP, we provide below a brief description of our CSP development process.

a. Retrospective Studies: In order to capture lessons from the past, USAID/Senegal completed a "History of USAID/Senegal," and will have specific ones for the agricultural/natural resources sector, as well as the population/health/nutrition sector.

b. Consultation with Customers and Partners:
-- Three Workshops were held with NGOs and private business, the GOS, and with other U.S. agencies. Common problems identified were costly food, insufficient social services, lack of access to information, and unemployment.

-- Customer Survey: The Mission, along with its partners, conducted an in-depth customer survey in January 1997 to stimulate and identify new thoughts about Senegal's future. The survey involved more than 7,000 people in all ten regions of Senegal. The extensive data collected is currently being analyzed.

-- Director and Program Officer USAID/W Consultations: The opinions and participation of USAID/W partners was sought during this February 1997 TDY.

-- "Dream Team": Approximately 30 Senegalese have volunteered for this team, which essentially are people who are known for articulating various visions for Senegal, and from whom USAID/Senegal can seek advice as it defines how best it can contribute to shaping Senegal's future.

-- Strategic Options Workshop: Scheduled for the end of April will be three-day workshop with 200+ of our partners and customers to review options and make recommendations about USAID/Senegal's future strategic objectives. USAID/W participation has been requested.

-- Parameters Setting Meeting in USAID/W: Scheduled for the week of May 19th, USAID/Senegal will present its findings and recommendations for a strategy.

-- Agreement with our Senegalese Partners (Especially the Government) on the SOs: After the parameters setting meeting, USAID/Senegal will hold final discussions with the GOS and other partners.

c. Prospective Sectoral Analyses:

-- Agriculture: The agricultural sector analysis will be done during the period March - May 1997.

-- Health: This analysis will be carried out in several phases over the period, February - September 1997.

-- Macroeconomic and Private Sector: This analysis is also underway and will be carried out in two phases over the period, February - May 1997.

-- Political Context Study: To better understand the political context in which USAID/Senegal's new strategy will operate, this study of the Senegalese political climate is underway. The first draft has been received, and the final draft, will be completed in October 1997 after a series of workshops.

-- Education Sector Update: This analysis will be completed by mid-April 1997. This analysis is essentially an update of a sector analysis prepared in 1992.

-- Democracy and Governance: Global and AFR Bureau D/G support has been requested for this analysis.
d. Preparation of the Results Frameworks: From June through September, RFs will be prepared for each SO. This will be the heart of the CSP, since how we choose to achieve results is more difficult than merely selecting what the Mission should do among the many needs that exist.

e. Results Framework Workshop with Partners: In October 1997, USAID/Senegal will again convoke a large workshop to seek additional input and ownership of our strategy and the RFs.

6. Re-engineering Overview

USAID/Senegal is now in the third year of re-engineering. This has been an extremely beneficial voyage for USAID/Senegal, which had become bureaucratically ossified due to Senegal's unique form of French-based bureaucracy, and more than 30 years of USAID/Senegal's existence. However, these benefits have not been without costs which have affected achievement of results this past year.

a. Customer and Partnership focus: The change of paradigm away from the term "beneficiaries", and the passivity which it connotes, has been very helpful. The time spent developing partnerships has resulted in much quicker response times to our inquiries. The Mission attributes this to greater "ownership" of the expected results. But on the down side, participation and partnership have been more costly in financial, organizational and labor terms than previously envisaged, particularly as USAID has been down-sizing and seeing operating expense funds decrease to unacceptably low levels, while the tasks we must perform have remained virtually the same. In addition, the theory of a customer/partnership focus seems to have underestimated the problems of having partners who are not re-engineered and empowered as USAID staff have been in the field. Many of USAID/Senegal's partners who come to the negotiating table have not been "empowered" to make decisions due to their highly hierarchical chain of command. Similarly, USAID staff at times are not as empowered as our rhetoric would have us believe. As long as there are Congressional and Administration priorities (which there will and should be), USAID cannot truly respond to the needs of our "customers." We are re-engineered, but...

b. Team Structures and Teamwork: While only time and future evaluations will tell, it appears that a significant result of USAID/Senegal's new team structure is faster implementation of certain activities. This is primarily due to the inclusion of contracting, project development, and financial analysts directly on the teams. The prior system was designed to maintain certain checks and balances within the Mission. The extent to which this has been lost might be a topic for additional study. Also of note is that team-building is a continuous process, which benefits from outside assistance. Despite having had such assistance on a number of occasions, additional assistance would be beneficial. However, there is a trade-off on use of staff-time and scarce operating expense funds.

c. USDH and FSN Evaluations and Incentives: While the importance of team-work and team success is now clearly recognized as the best way to work, performance evaluations still reward individual performance for USDH, and do not sufficiently hold FSNs accountable for producing results. In addition, FSNs generally have faced the additional burden of increased responsibilities, without commensurate increases in wages or necessary training.

7. Environmental Compliance and Possible FY 98 IEEs

USAID continues to comply fully with the environmental regulations specified in 22 CFR Part 216. In 1996, USAID prepared several IEEs. Close Environmental monitoring will continue. No significant issues or problems are anticipated with 22 CFR Part 216 compliance. Most of the IEEs and/or EAs will be for the grants under the Community-Based Natural Resources Management (685-0305).

IV. RESOURCE REQUESTS

1. Program Funding by Objective [three pages separate LOTUS tables FY 97, FY 98, FY 99]

USAID 1997 Budget Request by Program/Country

[LOTUS spreadsheet transmitted separately]

USAID FY 1998 Budget Request by Program/Country

[LOTUS spreadsheet transmitted separately]

USAID FY 1999 Budget Request by Country/Program

[LOTUS spreadsheet transmitted separately]

2. Prioritization of Objectives

The Mission's current strategy focuses on the problems created by the high rate of population growth, poor economic performance, and the deterioration of the natural resource base. Given that the current strategy cycle terminates in 1998 and the Mission this year will be completely reviewing the priorities, there seems little to be gained by ranking the currently remaining two SOs. Also, both objectives are almost fully-funded; only SO2 will have a mortgage of about $5.0 million at the end of FY 1998. Should FY 1998 resource constraints require the elimination of one objective, activities under either objective would not be affected in the short-run.

For the above reasons, this Mission defers prioritization of objectives until the Senegal Strategic Plan is authorized early in 1998.

3. Global Field Support

[LOTUS spreadsheet transmitted separately]

4. Linkage of Field Support, Non-Emergency Title II/III

As shown in the supporting tables, progress toward achievement of SO1, Decrease Family Size, is heavily dependent upon the Field Support funded technical assistance of cooperative agreements and contracts of USAID/W's Global Bureau. In particular, Field Support funds are crucial to improving the quality of maternal/child and reproductive health services. This is also true for STD/AIDS prevention activities, management information systems, health policy change (through RAPID and health financing activities), and demographic research and evaluation.

Neither USAID/Senegal, nor the Senegalese have sufficient staff and other resources to achieve the SO1 without the Field Support funds. Without this flexible technical assistance mechanism, not only would the Mission be unable to achieve SO1, but the Mission would be unable to assist the Agency in meeting its targets for population and health "directives." For example: In 1996, cooperating agencies such as JHPIEGO and AVSC have been crucial in moving the Government of Senegal to develop and formalize service protocols and policies for standards of practices which had been languishing for over 2 years in the Ministry of Health.

New USAID/W guidelines now require that contraceptives be purchased with field support funds through the central contraceptive procurement program. The roughly $1 million which USAID provides through this

mechanism each year furnishes virtually the entire annual contraceptive needs of Senegal. Without these funds, there would be no program for contraceptive services under SO1. Other donors have expressed willingness to provide limited quantities of contraceptives, but they lack the procurement and logistics capacity of USAID to meet any serious demand.

Under SO2, a reduction in Field Support will not seriously affect achievement of the objective.

Breakdown of Field Support and bilateral funds by FY is as follows: ($000)

	FY 97		FY 98		FY 99
SO1					
Total OYB	9,906		11,500	14,500	
Bilateral	4,631		4,835		9,800
Field Sup	5,275		6,665		4,700
% Field Support	53%	58%	32%		
SO2					
Total OYB	13,400	15,600	12,400		
Bilateral	12,400	14,100	10,900		
Field Sup	1,000		1,500		1,500
% Field Support	7%	10%	12%		

5. Operating Expense and Workforce

1. Narrative

USAID/Senegal has prepared its FY 1999 budget request with the optic of supporting the final phase of its current strategy, while also allowing sufficient flexibility and funding for implementation of the "new" strategy. As a reengineering Country Experimental Lab (CEL), USAID/Senegal has greatly improved and streamlined its personnel levels and mix, as well as its operating procedures. The task is not as yet fully achieved. The FY 1999 budget reflects the ongoing requirement for support in terms of reviews, assessments, personnel training and incentives. FY 1998 and 1999 requests show increases of $164,500 and $215,900 respectively which are justified by factors discussed in the following sections.

USAID/Senegal has reviewed the targeted ceilings for personnel levels for FYs 1997 through 1999, and compared this with the Mission's actual personnel needs of 12 USDH, 86 OE funded locally hired staff, and 12 Program funded staff to achieve results and to protect its growing vulnerability due to recent cuts. The Mission's request is for the absolute minimum number of personnel it judges necessary to function as a full development mission with only two SOs and one special objective. If the Mission is not allowed to have this staffing level, then the management contract cannot be maintained, and Mission management cannot assume responsibility for actions resulting from vulnerabilities.

The USAID/Senegal's strategic objectives are not easily achieved, for reasons noted in the opening "Overview and Factors Affecting Performance." Even with re-engineering, the marked changes which the program is effecting require considerable amount of attention. Staff efficiency clearly cannot be measured by dollars obligated per staff-member, which is the case in other countries. In addition, since USAID/Senegal has embarked upon re-engineering, there is now an even greater demand for interaction with partners and customers. It cannot be stressed enough that with re-engineering still in progress, (i.e. NMS, training, continual modifications), the staff is working full out, with added permanent responsibilities and additional ad hoc tasks. In addition, USAID/Senegal is in the process of developing a new strategy which will not be in place until the end of FY 1998. This does not take into account the myriad of additional tasks and reports continually thrust upon the Mission by Washington (see a March 1997 cable from the Mission which focuses on this topic).

In FY 1996 USAID/Senegal RIFed 10% (11 persons) of its FSN staff . Since June it has been operating without them and has experienced serious problems and impedements. This RIF was as deep as it was so that USAID could hire some desperately needed FSN technical staff:

Sociologist	OE
Data/results specialist	OE
Reproductive Health Specialist	Program
Health Finance Specialist	Program

In addition, a slew of recent (and welcome) visits to Senegal (including Mrs. Hillary Clinton) have accentuated USAID/Senegal's need for one an additional higher level FSN to prepare briefing books, draft press releases, respond to USAID/W requests for general information, and manage special initiatives such as Leland and the New Partnership Initiative and to advise USAID/W and appropriate parties on its success stories in its programs. This person would be OE funded.

The above numbers also have to be looked at in terms of other personnel aspects: vacations, illness, training, etc. Full time bodies are not really full time. It is rare that USAID has all staff in the office at any one time. As a consequence, everyone is at one time or another doing someone else's job.

What is our current situation, even after eliminating one SO:

- Not enough time to focus on the field and results and take corrective actions;

- Quality of documents, reports, responses to Washington varies depending upon deadlines;

- Difficulty in meeting deadlines and sticking with priorities;

- Delays in implementation-- squeaky wheel syndrome;

- Possible vulnerabilities due to poor functioning of NMS.

In summary, we need the personnel cited above to ensure satisfactory continuity through FY 1999

We welcome changes which were included in the current notification of levels, i.e. doing away with the distinctions between USPSC, TCN and FSN personnel and consolidating them in one broad category. However, as we continue to work with workforce levels, it is anticipated that we will also request more latitude to define at post, the numbers of positions which may or may not be listed as program positions. Thus far, USAID/W still provides a mandated ceiling on program-funded personnel, without any input from the Mission in this process.

The travel budget line-item reflects the requirements to maintain satisfactory program oversight as well as continuous interaction with our partners. Conferences, seminars and training remain a cornerstone of our activities to ensure reaching our objectives as participatory teams, not just USAID in isolation.

The levels for advisory and assistance services remain consistent with past trends because we will continue to need timely monitoring and evaluation of our progress so we can make mid-course corrections as needed. Also note that the requested OE budget amount includes the new requirement for ICASS, an estimated amount of $762,800 in 1998 and a projected amount of $720,000 in 1999.

Overview of FY 97 Estimate. The budget request for FY 1997 has not changed from the current authorized level. The Mission was able to forward-fund FSN salaries for three months in September 1996. This permitted the Mission to fund unexpected, yet necessary expenses. As an example, Senior Mission Management is required to travel round-trip on at least three occasions to Washington for interaction on the development of the new strategy.

FY 97 requires more travel funds to support preparation of the Mission's new strategy. This is particularly true as we put into practice the re-engineering concepts of customer service and development partnerships. Such

interactions with customers and partners included an extensive survey in which USAID/Senegal and its partners interviewed more than 7,000 Senegalese throughout the country. In addition, FY97 funds will also be required for two workshops with Mission partners; one to define the new Strategic Objectives, and the second to define the Results Frameworks.

Concerning personnel, USAID/Senegal will fill its 12th USDH slot with a GDO/Democracy specialist. Given the highly participatory and interactive program which the Mission envisages, we will need the levels discussed in the narrative section above in order not to jeopardize our ability to deliver and monitor our assistance portfolio.

The procurement of minimum NXP equipment will take place this year after many postponements due to limited and scarce OE resources. Fortunately, the Mission received some used furnishings and equipment resulting from the closeouts of Chad, Cape Verde and The Gambia. However, these materials will soon need replacing. In particular, the Mission will procure some much needed residential furniture and appliances to replace those that are no longer serviceable.

Overview of FY 1998 and 1999 Requests. The FY 1998 budget covers only 11 months of FSN/PSC salaries due to having the balance covered by forward funding in FY 1997. FY 1999 will cover salaries for the entire year.

Excluding ICASS figures, FY 1998 exceeds the FY 1997 budget by $164,500 and FY 1999 exceeds the FY 1997 budget by $215,900. In FY 1998, the budget will cover travel in support of the development of new activities designed under the new strategy. The Mission will also incur some NXP purchases in FY 1998 to reinforce its inventory of residential and office procurement and replace obsolete computer equipment so as to implement the NMS.

In FY 1999, the Mission anticipates fewer NXP purchases. USDH transfers will have a major budgetary impact. Four arrivals and three departures are planned to take place in FY 1999. This will impact more post assignment travel and related expenses.

b. Overseas Mission Budget Request

[LOTUS spreadsheets transmitted separately]

c. Cost of Controller Operations

[LOTUS spreadsheets transmitted separately]

d. Trust Funds & FSN Separation Funds

[LOTUS spreadsheet transmitted separately]

e. Workforce Resources

[LOTUS spreadsheets transmitted separately]

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