PD-ABW-401
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Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund

A Final Report

Democracy Development Programs



Submitted by:
The African-American Institute
The International Republican Institute
The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

September 30, 1996

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Africa
Regional
Electoral
Assistance
Fund
(AREAF)

FINAL REPORT

COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT NO. AOT-0486-A-00-2134-00

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Preface

The Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF) was a partnership of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the African-American Institute (AAI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI), in collaboration with the Carter Center of Emory University (CCEU). As the recipient of the Cooperative Agreement and managing partner, AAI maintained communications with a committee that included representatives of USAID and the Africa Bureau of the Department of State for coordination of the various projects. AREAF was a direct result of the US government's commitment to provide technical assistance, commodities, training and international observer missions to African countries undergoing transition to democratic governance and multiparty electoral processes.

Beginning in August 1992, the AREAF partnership conducted eighty-three programs in thirty-five sub-Saharan African countries. The purpose of this report is to fulfill the contractual commitments of the cooperative agreement and to present a thorough analysis of the democracy and governance programs and activities funded through this mechanism over the past four years. The report includes a synopsis of each funded project or program activity and is organized into four descriptive areas.

The past six years have revealed serious shifts in the political attitudes and aspirations of Africans. No longer content with the victories of the post independence period, Africans are demanding their rights and popular participation and accountability in governance. Despite various differences in language and colonial heritage, African countries share common successes and challenges in the struggle for greater democratization.

Since its inception in 1992, AREAF program activities have had a positive impact in many countries in Africa, with different degrees of success, as these countries are in transition from single party states to fledgling democracies. The direct impact of AREAF programs is often intangible, but they convince the implementing partners that AREAF has had a substantial influence on the development of African strategies for social and political development. In the new post-Cold War political environment, Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing unprecedented political and economic change. Progress and stability in Africa will require long-term support by the international community of efforts to promote peaceful change and political transition, resolution of conflicts, stable democratic institutions in emerging civil societies and sustainable development.

To assure sustainable democratic transition, African nations must create a vibrant and engaged civil society that will demand accountability and responsiveness from its government. While no single project would claim to have accomplished this, examining the cumulative effect of the multiple programs and projects is important, and their spin off effect over the years. A specific project might have seemed insignificant, or not have met all its project goals, but adding all 83 begins to build a critical mass of individuals and organizations committed to democratic development. Of course, AREAF was primarily focused on the election processes themselves, however, the institutions carrying out these focused projects viewed the actions and activities in the broader context of democratic consolidation.

Therefore, the narrative portion of this report as it pertains to the various election observations and monitoring exercises, is the least tangible as to measuring the impact on building a democratic tradition. Certainly, there were many successful elections, such as Benin, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Malawi, Eritrea and Uganda. Others, such as Gabon, Guinea, and Cameroon were flawed or not as successful. In

the first instance, the AREAF partners have little doubt that we contributed in some small way to those successes. In the latter, we have no doubt that an international presence, expressing concern, gave confidence to the voting public and organs of civil society. The enduring measure of the impact of AREAF's work lies in the voters' education, the training and underpinning of civic organizations, and the creation of networks of democratic minded administrators and activists.

Since the first sustained 'wave' of political liberalization on the African continent in 1989, African NGOs have grown and matured. Often set up as neutral watchdogs of governmental electoral activity, they have sought support from the international community to achieve their objectives. AREAF conducted several projects which focused on the ongoing need and importance of assistance and training for NGOs. In Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone for example, NGOs have begun to take their rightful place as service providers to civil society by becoming closely involved in the electoral process. It is natural that NGOs bridge the gap between state administration of electoral activities and the public's understanding of the state's actions. With AREAF training, domestic African NGOs have undertaken activities during elections that have done much to enhance popular confidence in the electoral process.

In Côte d'Ivoire, AREAF sponsored a seminar to share experiences on the design of democracy materials. The seminar was Pan African in scope and provided an opportunity for NGO representatives to share their experiences and ideas. The seminar helped the participants to develop their skills in creating new material. A particular emphasis was placed on the development of civic education tools for use at the grassroots level.

Concrete evidence of the impact of this training is the Ivorian umbrella civic association group, l'Observatoire National des Elections (ONE). Following the seminar, the Ivorian participants decided that the best approach to distributing useful information on the highly controversial electoral process of 1995 was through an umbrella organization. The advantage of the umbrella was to reach the widest segment of the Ivorian population. The ONE followed the process closely, reporting on administrative decisions, and analyzing political developments through a weekly newsletter. The ONE was Ivorian civil society's first effort at collaborative programming. Timely AREAF assistance helped that effort.

Multiple projects by AREAF partners in specific countries have also had considerable impact on the African democratization process. In the period leading up to the legislative elections in Côte d'Ivoire, two of the AREAF partners collaborated on a two-part mission: i) election monitoring and observer training for the ONE, and ii) fielding, training and deploying an international observer delegation. AREAF partners' work with the ONE afforded the organization greater domestic visibility, and influenced the Ivorian government's decision to accord it official domestic observer status. The 1995 elections mark the first time in the history of Côte d'Ivoire that a domestic monitoring group received government accreditation.

Benin is another excellent example of sustained, multi-partner programming. Over a four-year period, two of the AREAF partners have conducted separate but complementary projects there. One partner concentrated on political party training, providing platform development, campaign management and coalition building training services to emerging political parties. Another organized international observers, trained regional civic groups and provided technical assistance.

AREAF partners have shared information and lessons learned over the years, and this has enhanced program effectiveness. In February 1994, one of the partners initiated the African Democracy Network (ADN) at a conference in Botswana. The conference brought together political party officials, electoral commission members, and NGO representatives from 22 east and southern African nations. The gathering enabled the participants to meet their counterparts from other countries, and exchange

views and practical experiences. The conference also provided an opportunity for Africans to meet with international donors, technical assistance organizations and electoral equipment manufacturers. The first ADN conference marked the beginning of an ongoing exchange among African electoral officials in east and southern Africa.

AREAF partners organized a colloquium for African electoral officials and NGO representatives involved in election processes on the continent in November 1994. The colloquium was an unprecedented gathering of expertise on African elections. The colloquium was a catalyst for improved inter-African communication on electoral issues. The decision by participants to form an Association of African Election Authorities attests to the need for continued collaboration.

Overall, AREAF's focus on institutional capacity building and targeted civic education programs has contributed to the development of tolerance and accountability in the African democratization process. Civic education may not create democrats, but it does create the type of environment in which the abuse of citizens' rights within a polity becomes unacceptable. The empowerment of African NGOs legitimizes them in the eyes of their governments, and, more important, in the eyes of their people. AREAF has made important and lasting contributions - both tangible and intangible to ongoing African attempts at political liberalization.

The report is organized around four categories of program activity: (1) Training, Education and Capacity Building, (2) International Election Observation, (3) Regional Networking, and (4) Focused Assistance to Governments and Non-Government Organizations. Each section presents summaries of all of the programs conducted on each topic. At the end of each section, we include a full final report of an AREAF project, written by the implementing partner, as an example of the detail of such projects. Since many AREAF projects were multifaceted in their approach, some projects could have been placed in more than one section (e.g., an observer delegation which carried out extensive civic education), but, for organization, have been contained in one chapter. Within each section, we organize projects chronologically.

Midway through the AREAF program USAID contracted for an interim evaluation of program activity under the cooperative agreement. The purpose of the evaluation was to "assess contributions to the electoral processes across Africa, how they fit into US democracy and governance strategies, AREAF's continuing relevance as Africa changes, and its future role, form, and functions." The aim of the evaluation was to "identify AREAF's strengths that should be incorporated into the ongoing program of USAID's new Center for Democracy." The evaluation also provided specific recommendations for improving procedures during the last year of the cooperative agreement, and recommendations for future electoral assistance in Africa. The Executive Summary of this evaluation, along with a detailed response from the implementing partners is contained in Appendix One.

Section One

Training, Education, and Capacity Building

Training, education, and capacity building have been major components of AREAF's project activities. AREAF partners view adequate training as a prerequisite for successful popular participation in Africa's democratic reform. The recent history of political regimes in Africa has left varying levels of technical skills to administer elections and to promote participation in democratic governments. These variances are manifested in the differences between urban and rural areas, younger and older populations, and the educated and illiterate populations, all of which necessitate innovative approaches to reach specific groups.

AREAF program activities utilized workshops, conferences, and civic and voter education programs to encourage a participatory approach in the enhancement of African democracies. This approach employed the skill and abilities of local community leaders and NGOs to develop and design training projects in order to achieve the maximum benefit for each program. Civic education programs have been in the form of community forums, posters in ethnic languages and radio and television broadcasts.

AREAF partners have conducted civic and voter education, and political party training at local, national and regional levels. These programs have provided training for over 60,000 government officials, NGO representatives, national electoral commission officers, media organizations and women's groups, and private citizens. In addition to the pollwatcher and party monitor training, additional topics of these training exercises have included coalition building, strategies to increase women's participation in the political process, the effective role of the media, parliamentary procedures, and parallel vote tabulation and resolving electoral disputes.

AREAF programming reflected a thoroughness which recognized the need for addressing the proper role of the media and military in a democratic government while at the same time emphasizing the need for government accountability in countries such as Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and Namibia.

The programs reported on in this section are programs which primarily targeted training needs for democratic development. However, several other programs included in other sections also contained key components which emphasized the importance of training and education. Please refer to these sections for further information. At the end of this section, a full report is included on a training program administered by the National Democratic Institute in Namibia.

NIGER
POLITICAL PARTIES ELECTIONS TRAINING
NDI

Background

NDI's political party seminars constituted the Institute's second program in Niger. It was decided to hold these seminars in October because Niger was slated to hold the first multiparty elections within the next few months and its political parties were eager to improve their capacity to conduct effective election campaigns, develop voter outreach programs and engage in a constructive relationship with the media.

Project Activities

From October 26 to October 31, 1992, NDI held two election-related political party training seminars in Niger, the first in the capital, Niamey, and the second in Zinder, Niger's second largest city and its former capital. Each seminar consisted of a series of workshops. The international trainers who conducted the workshops were: Momar Diop, head of information for Senegal's Democratic Party; Fernando Marques da Costa, Member of Parliament for Portugal's Socialist Party; Ruairi Quinn, Member of Parliament for the Labor Party of Ireland; and Laszlo Rajk, Member of Parliament for the Alliance of Free Democrats in Hungary.

The seminar in Niamey was attended by 48 representatives from 16 political parties. The turnout was less than expected because NDI had invited each party to send four delegates. Almost all of the officially registered parties did send four, but some sent only two. The attendees included civil servants, technicians, educators, economists, students, and nurses. In the provincial city of Zinder, the seminar was attended by 41 delegates, representing an equally wide range of professions, but with a greater number of teachers, agricultural technicians and businessmen. The turnout was better in Zinder where each party had been invited to send three delegates. In fact, several traveled quite a long distance from northern cities to attend the seminar. Six women attended the Niamey program, but only one attended the program in Zinder, despite the fact that all the parties had been urged at the time invitations were extended to include women and young people among those designated to participate. It was gratifying, however, that several student party activists were present and active participants in the workshops.

The structure of the seminars was the following: 1) an opening plenary session with an introduction to the workshop topics followed by a question and answer period; 2) a special session on the electoral code; 3) individual workshops; and 4) a closing plenary at which the workshop groups presented the results of a practical exercise devoted to drafting a code of ethics for political parties. At the final session, each of the international trainers gave a summary of his observations and recommendations. The trainers held workshops on the following topics: implementing a campaign plan, communicating with the voters via radio, communicating via techniques other than radio, getting out the vote, and election observation.

Findings and Evaluation

At the conclusion of both seminars, the participants were asked to complete an evaluation questionnaire. In general, their reaction to the program was quite positive. They were most satisfied with the workshops on how to organize an election campaign, getting out the vote and election observation. Many indicated that they planned to put into action many of the ideas they had learned in the upcoming campaign. On the other hand, some complained that the presentations were too general in the workshops on getting out the vote and election observation. Some also suggested that in the future more attention be paid to the issue of how political parties might work together to forge alliances or coalitions. The evaluation results indicated a division of

opinion on the utility of the electoral code workshop. Those who found it useful appreciated having the chance to discuss specific information with an election official; however, others found it too general and not long enough to allow for discussion of particular provisions. In general, the tenor of the remarks was that the participants welcomed NDI's support for the democratization process underway in Niger.

NAMIBIA
VOTER EDUCATION
NDI

Background

By mid-1992, there was growing pressure in Namibia for elections to establish Regional and National Councils as well as for local elections to install municipal governments which more closely reflected the populations they governed. But in order for these elections to take place, a new census had to be taken, new constituencies created on the basis of the census results, and, finally, new legislation passed to establish electoral procedures for both the regional and local elections. The passage of the Electoral Act, the Regional Councils Act, and the Local Authorities Act in August 1992 paved the way for an Electoral Commission to begin its work in September.

Namibia and its government institutions virtually shut down for the summer holiday from December 15 to January 15. Therefore, if elections were to be held in 1992, they would have to be completed by December 4 to allow sufficient time for the ballots to be counted and verified before the annual close of business. Having already allowed two years to slip by since independence in March 1990, the Namibian government was under considerable pressure to complete the regional and local elections before the end of 1992.

Project Activities

NDI entered into a cooperative agreement to conduct a voter education project with the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) for the 1992 regional and local elections. NBC had the capability to broadcast to an estimated 90 percent of Namibia's 1.4 million population through its extensive radio and television broadcasting network. This agreement was focused on:

- informing voters about their rights and responsibilities and educating them about the complicated electoral process;
- motivating the public to participate and exercise their democratic rights embodied in this process;
- educating the Namibian public about the importance of the electoral process, and;
- informing voters on the choice of options as detailed in the policy statements of the parties, candidates and organizations competing in the elections.

This program was undertaken in a fair and objective manner without bias toward any party or individual.

NDI assisted NBC in the production of broadcast materials that would inform the public about the offices under contention, the registration and voting procedures, the places and dates for registration and voting and where to obtain information about the election process, the candidates and the political parties. To achieve this goal, NDI assisted in the development of interactive talk shows to be broadcast including candidates and party leaders. NDI and NBC also recorded and broadcast endorse-

ments from non-political, community leaders about the importance of registering and voting. Finally, newspaper advertisements would be used to promote NBC listenership while simultaneously encouraging people to vote.

In 1996, the Institute reprogrammed the remaining AREAF funds to conduct a focus group study. The research allowed NDI to measure the effectiveness of the AREAF-funded voter education efforts for the 1992 regional and local elections. Moreover, the focus groups allowed NDI to assess Namibians' level of understanding of democratic concepts and processes, ascertain methods of legislators' performance as elected representatives and explore the most effective methods of communication between Members of Parliament and the public. In addition, the data collected and reports produced will continue to help NDI to determine ways to proceed in implementing programs.

Findings and Evaluation

This project sought to achieve a voter turnout of approximately 60 percent of eligible voters. In spite of a late start and delay in equipment deliveries that necessitated major last-minute program revisions, the project was a considerable success. Overall voter turnout nationally was 82.9 percent. This turnout prompted the US Embassy in Windhoek to report to the State Department on December 1, "Although there were some kinks in getting started, the first day of the first elections organized by Namibians themselves went smoothly. The AREAF/NDI-sponsored voter education campaign with NBC has paid off. In spite of the predictions of mass apathy, there was no shortage of voters anywhere."

RWANDA
STRENGTHENING POLITICAL PARTIES
NDI

Background

In September 1992, NDI proposed to implement a program in Rwanda to strengthen the country's nascent political parties. The proposal sought to enhance the parties' capability to compete in elections, which were then scheduled to take place during 1993. The holding of these elections was also dependent on the conclusion of a peace accord between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The Arusha Accord was signed in May 1993 which formally ended the three-year civil war, but hostilities continued.

Project Activities

A number of factors influenced NDI to indefinitely postpone full implementation of program activities in Rwanda. Delays in signing the Arusha Accord initially postponed NDI's establishment of minimal working conditions in Rwanda. Second, implementation of the Arusha Accord was never fully achieved, thereby preventing a viable atmosphere for elections to occur. National reconciliation had not been achieved, and NDI concluded that its presence in Rwanda would be most effective only after reconciliation of the warring ethnicities.

NDI did conduct minimal activities in Rwanda from July 4 to 6, 1993, sending two staff members to Rwanda. These staff members, who had been conducting NDI program activities in Burundi, met with the prime minister, representatives of 10 of the country's 16 political parties, representatives of civic organizations, election officials, military commanders and the US ambassador. These consultations were to maintain contacts for the future establishment of the party training. However, NDI decided that due to the violent circumstances beyond its control, program activity in Rwanda would be suspended for an indefinite period of time.

MADAGASCAR
CIVIC EDUCATION
AAI

Background

Significant progress toward the establishment of a democracy with a transparent, competitive electoral process in Madagascar had been made throughout the early 1990s. The presidential elections scheduled for early November through early December 1993 were a critical test for the development of Malagasy democracy.

Project Activities

The African-American Institute provided support for the National Commission for the Observation of Elections (CNOE) in facilitating a series of discussions of decentralization issues as a civic education tool. The goal was to bring together representative leadership to exchange ideas about the tenets of a decentralized, democratically elected political system.

AAI provided financial assistance to the Coordinating Committee of National Observers for the printing of 1,500 questionnaires in Malagasy. These questionnaires, or voter report forms, were to be used by local observers, particularly those belonging to new observer groups recently accredited by the National Electoral Commission.

AAI also financed the printing of 5,000 posters for the CNOE. Printed in Malagasy, these posters were very helpful in explaining the complex legislative electoral process. They were the main tool in the CNOE's civic education program and were highly valued by the electorate.

Funding and technical assistance to the CNOE was also provided for the development of a civic education documentary intended to serve as a permanent educational tool for the future training of trainers and election monitors. Finally, AAI facilitated the deployment of local and national observers by providing transportation and per diem.

Prior to the legislative elections, AAI also intended to organize a training seminar in French at the national level for trainers of local non-governmental observers. This did not take place, however, as local monitoring organizations decided to decentralize the process and hold training sessions in many localities in the Malagasy language.

Findings and Evaluation

Though not all of AAI's project activities were completed, AAI found that its assistance to the CNOE was needed and well-received. The CNOE was far better equipped to conduct civic education and increase voter participation with the funding and assistance AAI provided.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
ASSISTING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
NDI

Background

NDI's programs in CAR were designed to assist that country's transition to multiparty politics and civilian rule. In advance of presidential and legislative elections scheduled for October 25, 1992, NDI Senior Program Officer Eric Bjornlund and adviser Jill Pilgrim visited Bangui in October 1992 to advise US Embassy personnel on issues related to election observation. The trip also provided an opportu-

nity for a pre-electoral assessment. NDI's team was reasonably encouraged about the ultimate prospects for democratization in CAR and returned with the impression that NDI involvement could make a difference. Unfortunately, on election day, incumbent President (and candidate) Andre Kolingba abruptly halted the electoral process and annulled the elections apparently because early returns indicated he was losing.

When it appeared that the elections would take place in the spring of 1993, NDI's Michael Stoddard, associate counsel for electoral processes, conducted a pre-election assessment from February 17 to 22, 1993. After extensive consultations with election officials, government and political party leaders, and representatives of various civic organizations, specific objectives were identified for further NDI involvement, including election-related training. Recommendations from these two missions formed the basis for NDI's programs in CAR, which were timed to coincide with the elections, finally scheduled for August 22 and September 19, 1993.

Project Activities

The training model adopted for CAR was a pyramid approach in which experts from NDI and GERDDES-Afrique trained prospective trainers and senior officials from political parties and civic organizations in pollwatching and election monitoring techniques. Those trained then organized other seminars at the grassroots level of their respective organizations. The political situation in CAR and the lack of previous experience by polling officials in administering competitive elections led to an expansion of the list of participants and the program subject matter to include topics of particular concern to election administrators. Members of the Election Commission at the national level as well as supervisors from the provinces were invited to attend in anticipation that they would further share their knowledge with members of the local committees at the level of electoral districts and polling stations.

Some 120 delegates participated in the three-day core seminar in Bangui, 46 of whom were representatives of political parties and independent candidates, 40 members of the Mixed Electoral Commission, and 34 from GERDDES-CAR and other civic groups such as the Association of Women Jurists. The 46 seats reserved for political party representatives were allocated through a weighted system in which the "major" parties such as the Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain (MLPC), Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain (RDC), Front Patriotique pour le Progrés (FPP), and Mouvance Dacko had three seats each while the rest received one or two.

After one half-day plenary session, participants were divided into three workshops for smaller practical exchanges. Discussions in each of the workshops were moderated by one of the foreign experts assisted by a Central African facilitator. The three Central African facilitators had been participants at an election observation training seminar organized by NDI in Benin in 1991. An election day simulation was organized in plenary session at the end of the seminar.

At the close of the seminar, evaluation forms were distributed and the 120 participants were requested to critique the program. It was intended that their comments would help in the planning or design of future NDI programs.

Twenty-four of the 34 participants from civic organizations were selected as trainers in the provinces of the country. Three of these 24 participants were alumni of the 1991 NDI training seminar in Benin. The 24 CAR instructors were divided into seven teams and deployed to cover 14 of the 16 divisions of the country for a two-week period beginning July 27. Before departing Bangui for the provinces all 24 participants attended an extra day of training and thereafter were given an opportunity in the presence of the international faculty to train 96 election administrators from the eight districts of Bangui.

As was the case during the core training program in Bangui, NDI provided the logistical support and all documentation required for training in the countryside. The

documentation included copies of the electoral code, a voter's guide, a guide for polling officers and NDI publications on election monitoring. Specific guidelines were drawn up underscoring the objectivity and neutrality required of the instructors. The CAR trainers presented team reports upon return at a debriefing session organized on August 10. These reports were based on data collected on questionnaires designed to determine the numbers and diversity of participants at the training sessions in the countryside.

Findings and Evaluation

At the request of the US Embassy in Bangui, NDI sent a team to evaluate the impact of the training program. To facilitate the sampling of opinion on the impact of the July/August training seminars, a questionnaire was designed and distributed with the help of Central African trainers to some of the former seminar participants who played a role in administering or supervising the elections of August 22, 1993. The report summary indicates that well over 4,000 Central Africans participated directly in these training sessions, a majority of whom were members of the local committees charged with supervising or administering elections at the district level. Many of those trained were later called upon by the electoral commission to serve as polling officers, others served as political party pollwatchers, while some conducted informal observation missions on election day.

BURUNDI
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
NDI

Background

Although the five-year democratic transition in Burundi opened political dialogue to opposition voices and officially legalized opposition parties, contentiousness and mutual suspicion between the ruling party (UPRONA) and the opposition parties nonetheless dominated Burundi's political climate. Opposition parties argued that they were granted a merely pro-forma role in the transition process while real decision making remained with the single-party government. Opposition leaders urged the convocation of a national conference that would name a multipartisan transitional government to administer elections. The government refused this and other requests for greater dialogue.

As elections approached, fears grew about possible rejection of election results or about hostilities after elections. To address these issues, NDI proposed to conduct training programs with the country's nine political parties. The project was later expanded to include representatives of civic organizations. NDI designed the program to promote confidence in the electoral process and to help strengthen the base of understanding of the role of parties and civic organizations in a democracy.

Project Activities

NDI conducted a three-day seminar in Bujumbura, April 28 to 30, 1993. The seminar provided training in party pollwatching, in an effort to increase party participation in the election system and enhance confidence in the process. In addition to explaining how party delegates observe elections, seminar trainers helped participants plan pollwatcher training programs and implement pollwatching systems. An important element of this session was a presentation by the president of the national election commission on the electoral code. The session provided the first opportunity for many opposition party members to raise questions and concerns about the fairness of the electoral system. The president of the commission fielded questions for four hours, two more than scheduled, and demonstrated his personal commitment to insuring a transparent process.

The seminar also featured a plenary discussion on the new parliament to be established after elections. By focusing on the parliament, the program provided a forum for discussion on how political parties can create a successful transition to democracy.

An important section of the seminar was devoted to training members of civic organizations to monitor the elections. Shortly before the seminar, a group of five civic organizations had raised the idea with NDI of organizing a domestic monitoring mission. Consequently, NDI included a separate element of the seminar for members of civic organizations, who discussed the methodology of implementing a comprehensive election monitoring mission including a statistical verification of results.

Trainers for the seminar included Momar Diop, activist from the Senegalese Democratic Party; Laszlo Rajk, Member of Parliament in Hungary; Hillary Fyfe, a leader of the National Women's Lobby and an election observer in Zambia; Michael Stoddard, Assistant Counsel for Election Processes at NDI; Adamou Kombo, former President of the Commission for the Supervision of Elections in Niger; and Hugo Von Rompaey, Belgian Senator.

Eighty-six participants attended the seminar. Parties and civic organizations were invited as organizations, with each organization naming its own attendees. Twenty-one participants were invited from outside of Bujumbura, and their expenses were covered by the project.

Findings and Evaluation

The NDI training team recognized a number of areas where program expectations were not met. Most participants seemed unable to focus on the seminar sessions devoted to post-election Burundi. NDI had hoped to defuse tensions and lay the groundwork for the post-election period through these sessions, but most participants were too focused on the elections for this to be of much use.

Training for pollwatchers and national observers succeeded in that a massive number of these observers turned out on election day. While there were variations in the training and expertise of some monitors, the overall effort was a considerable success, and had the effect of reinforcing the understanding of the elections as legitimate and reflecting the will of the people of Burundi. The observer reports featured prominently in journalistic and other accounts of the elections, and several international observer delegates used the model of the domestic Burundi observer effort as the base of similar missions in their own countries.

GUINEA
PARTY BUILDING, CIVIC EDUCATION AND POLLWATCHER TRAINING
IRI

Background

Guinea's political conditions are a direct outgrowth of the post-independence, single party government of President Ahmed Sekou Touré. Since the post-independence expulsion of the French, Guinea has relied primarily upon foreign assistance - first from the former Soviet Union, then, after 1961, from the United States. Upon the death of Sekou Touré in 1984, the Military Committee of National Redressment (CMRN), led by Colonels Lansana Conté and Diarra Traoré, staged a successful coup. Thus began a long-term political and economic liberalization program.

A new constitution was adopted in 1990; and in 1991, a predominantly civilian Transition Council for National Recovery (CTRN) was established that has continued political reforms. Legislative and presidential elections, originally scheduled for 1992,

were postponed until spring 1993. However, with another postponement and a government switch in the order of elections, presidential elections were moved to December 1993, with legislative elections scheduled for early 1994.

An October 1992 IRI assessment revealed a great need for assistance in the transition to multiparty rule. Through IRI's work with 42 Guinean political parties and 12 civic organizations, vital information has been disseminated to trainers throughout the country. This information consisted of civic education training on the basis of democracy, political party building training focusing on organization structures and theme development, pollwatcher training, and proper tallying of votes.

Project Activities

IRI took advantage of the new opportunity created by the postponement of the December 27 elections in Guinea and further developed the program of electoral assistance. The objectives of the program remained to assist in ensuring a more viable election environment and to increase the likelihood for electoral transparency and a peaceful voting process.

The IRI delegation advanced these goals through projects in civic education and political party training. Civic education projects focused on explaining the basic theory of democracy and the general practice of voting procedures to political party and civic group representatives. Delegates also trained trainers in pollwatching to assist in creating a body of domestic observers capable of judging the transparency of voting and vote-tabulation procedures. Delegates further supported political party development by providing party leaders with training in party organization and communication with the electorate.

Civic education and pollwatcher training was conducted in five cities and allowed two-week sessions for each project. Two teams of four trainers conducted sessions for up to 75 participants in Conakry and four surrounding regional centers. Training was followed by a distribution of evaluations to participants regarding the effectiveness of training sessions.

IRI deployed a second mission comprised of six members to assist in ensuring that the upcoming elections would be as transparent and as peaceful as possible. The mission aimed to increase voter confidence in and acceptance of the democratic process by training trainers in the principles of pollwatching and transparent elections and by fostering a basic understanding of the democratic process.

Upon their arrival in Guinea, the six member delegation divided into two teams to conduct training sessions in Conakry and surrounding regional centers. The training consisted of basic lessons on the democratic process and detailed explanations of techniques in polling-day activities, voter registration, vote tabulation and voter fraud prevention. Training sessions targeted primary actors in the election process, focusing on representatives of political parties and civic associations designated by those groups.

Findings and Evaluation

After several postponements of the election by the government, the election was finally carried out in mid-December. Although IRI had planned to send an international observer mission to the elections, IRI advance observation teams concluded several days before the election that the administrative and logistical procedures were flawed to the extent that meaningful elections could not take place. Therefore, no observers were deployed, though a small monitoring team was left in place.

GUINEA-BISSAU
VOTER EDUCATION AND POLLWATCHER TRAINING
IRI

Background

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guinée e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) directed a military campaign against Portuguese colonists. On September 25, 1973, the PAIGC won independence and declared the independent Republic of Guinea-Bissau under the leadership of revolutionary leader Luis Cabral.

Since independence, Guinea-Bissau has been struggling to achieve a viable democracy. One of the poorest nations in the world, Guinea-Bissau's low literacy rate and the absence of any institutions of higher learning have resulted in a serious deficiency of technically, academically or civically educated citizens. Economic depression precipitated a coup in 1980, leaving Major Joao Bernardo Vieira the undisputed ruler of Guinea-Bissau and the legislative body with only slight power. In early 1991, the PAIGC concluded that it would have to open Guinea-Bissau's political system if the nation was to receive additional foreign assistance. Despite legalizing other political parties and scheduling elections for 1993, the PAIGC failed to create the conditions necessary for free and fair campaigning.

Project Activities

Following the recommendations of the IRI's April pre-election assessment team, the Institute continued its election assistance program to Guinea-Bissau. The IRI sent a training team in the autumn of 1994 to support the development of democratic institutions in preparation for upcoming multiparty elections. The team conducted a civic education program concentrating on three areas integral to promoting participation in the elections process: voter education, radio voter education and political party pollwatcher training.

The objectives of the voter education project were to increase the knowledge about the rights and responsibilities of citizens under democratic governance, improve informed political participation and strengthen indigenous organizations involved in civic education. The radio voter education pursued similar goals through a different means in addition to encouraging a conducive working relationship between the National Radio and the National Election Commission (CNE). Finally, training political party pollwatchers aimed to develop the capacity of independent election monitors in order to increase transparency and voter confidence.

Findings and Evaluation

The three programs were implemented in a fair and objective manner without bias to any party or individual.

UGANDA
POLLWATCHER TRAINING
IRI

Background

President Museveni's Ugandan government was established by a 1986 National Resistance Movement (NRM) military coup. Upon taking power, President Yoweri Museveni invited members of existing major political parties to join a new "broad-based government," and proposed a time period of four years to draw up a new constitution and hold elections. In November 1989, Museveni and his NRM government extended NRM rule another five years. Museveni asserted that delaying elections was neces-

sary "to complete the task of building institutions that would guard democracy."

Constituent assembly elections in March 1994 signaled the possibility for a return to more democratic rule, but their legitimacy was damaged by Museveni's suspension of party political activity "to consolidate the peace ushered in by the NRM government." The IRI spent two weeks in September/October, 1993 on a logistics mission for a previously planned political party pollwatcher training program. Due to the change of events within Uganda which barred political party representatives from pollwatching activity, IRI changed the focus of its program.

After consultations with the Embassy, the UN, oppositional parties, and AAI representatives, as well as the Government of Uganda, the IRI team determined that pollwatcher training for candidates' representatives could be accomplished.

Project Activities

In October 1993, IRI began to implement a program of pollwatcher training for candidates' agents as well as a civic education program for political parties. To assist the political parties in their own internal development and capabilities, the IRI conducted a Kampala workshop with representatives from the parties, the NRM, and nongovernmental organizations to discuss how Uganda should move toward democracy. Workshop training concentrated on how political parties can more effectively use the avenues open to them under the current government restrictions to engage in political debate. IRI also conducted regional candidate pollwatcher seminars to train candidates and their agents to cover the monitoring and pollwatching provisions of Uganda's electoral law, and to provide organizational support to the parties to coordinate pollwatching activities.

BENIN
POLITICAL PARTY TRAINING AND GRASSROOTS INPUT
NDI

Background

During prior program work in Benin and the West Africa region, NDI developed an understanding of the need for political parties to strengthen grassroots participation in the political process. Parties tend to be centered in the major urban areas and are focused on the personality of the leader and/or regional and ethnic affinities. NDI thus developed a proposal which would feature the presence of an NDI field representative with considerable political party experience and a series of seminars addressing party organization and constituency development at the grassroots level. NDI designed and conducted a series of three political party training seminars in Benin from September to December, 1994.

Program Activities

The first seminar took place from September 16 to 18 in Cotonou. Attended by approximately 60 activists from more than 15 political parties, the seminar focused on the role of grassroots activists in political parties. The seminar was designed to provide practical information and technical advice to Beninese parties on subjects such as party organization, local fundraising and party communications. The second seminar, conducted from October 27 to 30, in Parakou, a city in north central Benin, focused on the importance of public opinion-gathering in the development of party platforms and the elaboration of public policy in general.

From December 8 to 10, 1994, NDI conducted the third political party training seminar in Lokossa. The focus of this seminar was on grassroots involvement in election related activities. Attended by approximately 50 activists from more than 25 political parties, seminar participants discussed campaign organization and voter con-

tact strategies as political parties in Benin prepare for the second round of democratic elections. Participants also discussed the electoral code, which is undergoing substantial changes, as well as the legal environment of the elections. The seminar was composed of plenary sessions involving all participants, and workshops in which the larger group was divided into working groups of approximately 20 participants. Some of the themes addressed during the workshops were candidate selection, message development and targeting, get-out-the-vote campaigns, and voter relations.

The international faculty comprised: Isobel Finnerty, director of the General Election campaign for the Liberal Party of Canada; Didier Triscos, a magistrate in France who has previous experience with election observation missions; and Walter Van Wolputte, special advisor to the President of the Socialist Party of Belgium.

The international trainers were joined by four Beninese facilitators: Virgile Akpovo, Cabinet Director at the Supreme Court representing the Human Rights Institute; Reine Alapini-Gansou, a lawyer from the Women Jurist's Association of Benin; Dominique Adjahouinou, Special Advisor at the Justice Ministry; and Paul Ayemonna, of the Centre Afrika Obota. The seminar was organized by NDI Field Representative Michael Smith, Logistics Coordinator Lorry Yamamoto, and Program Assistant Leslie Koerner.

Findings and Evaluation

The program was successfully completed. Comments from the participants indicated that they found the seminar topics as well as the training methodology to be interesting. Some of the participants complained that a few of the suggestions did not take into consideration the realities of the Beninese political situation such as illiteracy, the fact that voters do not vote for a program or party but for an individual, and the fact that parties are generally supported financially by one person. However, the participants seemed pleased with the large number of documents that were distributed as well as with the performance of Beninese and international facilitators. Despite few criticisms about insufficient time to more fully explore he issues, many participants felt that the workshops and plenary sessions were enriching.

TANZANIA
CIVIC EDUCATION
AAI

Background

For the first time since independence in 1961, Tanzanian leadership has conceded to the introduction of competitive multi-party elections. With the adoption of constitutional amendments authorizing such a system, political change has begun in Tanzania, building a momentum toward greater democratization. The Tanzanian government and the US Embassy requested electoral assistance to Tanzania during this transformative period. In response to this request, and believing that a thorough evaluation of the Tanzanian political environment and the government's commitment to pluralistic governance was required, AAI sent a four-member team to Tanzania. The purpose of the mission was to seek out NGO and political party representatives, members of the government, and the media to determine the government's commitment to democratization. Also, the team sought to determine the capacity of the current infrastructures - governmental and non-governmental, and their ability to provide effective electoral support to Tanzanians.

Project Activities

In October 1994, AAI conducted a project design mission to Tanzania. The purpose was to design a civic education program with a focus on voter education in

preparation for the country's first multi-party municipal elections in October 1994 and national elections in October 1995. The team focused on designing a long-term civic education program to support and further develop the civic and voter education efforts of Tanzanian NGOs and the National Electoral Commission.

The team met with staff at the US Embassy, the USAID Mission, other international donors, Tanzanian NGOs, the National Electoral Commission, human rights groups, law associations, members of the media, educators, labor union activists and religious organizations to estimate how best to support effective civic education that will not only address the short-term needs, before the October elections, but also continue during the run-up to the 1995 national elections and beyond.

Findings and Evaluation

The project was successfully completed. Team members were impressed by the level of interest and excitement within the Tanzanian citizenry for civic education. The AAI team conducted an extremely comprehensive and multi-faceted assessment, interviewing a wide-range of groups. Based on the mission's findings, AAI concluded that a civic education program would be feasible and desirable in the run-up to national multi-party elections in October 1995 and beyond. The project design mission identified Tanzanian organizations and institutions with sufficient capacity to develop a broad-based civic and voter education program.

AAI further found that there is significant interest among both governmental and non-governmental entities to collaborate on the design and implementation of such a program. Finally, the mission concluded that there is a particular need for aspects of the civic education program to be directed at women and citizens of rural communities. Based on these findings, AAI has maintained contact with the most active organizations and individuals, and proposed a comprehensive civic and voter education project leading to the 1995 Tanzanian presidential and legislative elections. However, due to stringent mission requirements, AAI was not able to continue with the follow-on activities envisioned, as a result of this program.

NAMIBIA
VOTER EDUCATION
NDI

Background

To promote greater involvement by political parties and the electorate in the Namibian presidential and parliamentary elections held on December 7 and 8, 1994, NDI undertook a six-month program designed to: 1) educate voters about their rights and responsibilities in a democracy; 2) motivate the public to participate and exercise their democratic rights; 3) use the mass media to instruct Namibians about the electoral process; 4) inform the voters on the choice of options presented by the political parties; and 5) encourage a dialogue between the media, political parties and NGOs about how broadcast media can be used in innovative and creative ways to inform and motivate voters.

To achieve these objectives, NDI's program focused on the use of broadcast media to educate voters about the electoral process, competing parties and key campaign issues. NDI's project incorporated a sub-grant to the Namibian Broadcast Corporation (NBC) to facilitate the use of broadcast media to conduct voter education.

Program Activities

NDI field representatives Erin Martin and Mary Elizabeth Johnson worked with the NBC to design and implement a comprehensive radio and television campaign to help increase voter turnout.

Through an NDI sub-grant, NBC aired a variety of campaign and election programs, including a four-week radio series addressing specific election-related topics. These programs and other election-related programs and announcements were translated and broadcast in nine languages. NDI also assisted the NBC in planning an unprecedented political debate between presidential candidates President Sam Nujoma of SWAPO and challenger Mishake Muyongo of the opposition DTA. Unfortunately, the debate had to be canceled when SWAPO decided not to permit its presidential candidate to participate.

The sub-grant to the NBC was initially approved at $120,000 but later amended to a total of $113,640 when the NBC indicated to NDI that it would not utilize all of the sub-grant funds. NDI utilized the $6,360 to assist Namibia's first independent, commercial radio station, Radio 99, in implementing its own voter education and campaign information initiative scheduled to run one week before the elections. This was accomplished at the point when the NBC ended its voter education programming. Radio 99's effort complemented the much larger NBC voter education program and broadened overall outreach to Namibians. By working with both stations, NDI was able to help reach a greater number of Namibian voters.

In mid-October, NDI organized a workshop and interactive video tele-conference which focused on the importance of media strategy in a campaign. The tele-conference linked three political experts in Washington with 50 party leaders in Windhoek to discuss the role of the media in elections. NDI staff members also facilitated a four-day media training program from November 16 to 19, which focused on increasing political parties's access to and effective use of media techniques. Following the workshops, NDI instituted a series of intensive individual media consultations, which were offered to all parties competing in the December elections.

In 1996, the Institute reprogrammed the remaining AREAF funds to conduct a focus group study. The research allowed NDI to measure the effectiveness of the AREAF-funded voter education efforts for both the 1992 regional and local elections and 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections. Moreover, the focus groups allowed NDI to assess Namibians' level of understanding of democratic concepts and processes, ascertain perceptions of legislators' performance as elected representatives and explore the most effective methods of communication between Members of Parliament and the public. In addition, the data collected and reports produced will continue to help NDI to determine ways to proceed in implementing programs. After five years of AREAF-funded project activities in Namibia, the focus group research offered perspective on their contribution to consolidating Namibian democracy.

Findings and Evaluation

The project was successfully completed. Despite widespread predictions that Namibian voters were apathetic and would not turn out for the elections, overall voter turnout nationally was more than 76 percent of the registered voters. The NBC called its voter education project a success, and commented that the effort would not have been possible without NDI's assistance.

NIGER
ELECTION-RELATED TRAINING
FOR THE 1995 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
NDI

Background

In response to requests made by the National Election Commission of Niger, local civic organizations, and the U.S. Embassy in Niamey, NDI proposed a program of limited technical assistance to train individuals and organizations involved in ad-

ministering and monitoring Niger's parliamentary elections held on January 12, 1995.

Program objectives were: 1) to train and advise non-partisan domestic monitors, political party pollwatchers and election authorities on their roles in the election administration process; 2) to enhance public confidence in the electoral process; 3) to reinforce the role of domestic civic organizations and expand their role in election monitoring; 4) to assist Nigeriens evaluating the election process and assessing the legitimacy of the elections; and 5) to assist Nigerien NGOs in coordinating the domestic observer effort.

Program Activities

NDI assistance centered around the design and implementation of a two-day training of trainers program held in Niamey and subsequently repeated in the two regional capitals of Zinder and Tahoua. The seminars, attended by domestic monitoring groups, political party representatives and election commission officials, were designed to help ensure a legitimate electoral process.

Six international experts and selected Nigeriens familiar with the electoral process served as trainers for the seminar in Niamey on December 26 and 27, 1994. The international training faculty included: Theo Noel, a Canadian who has participated in electoral operations and training programs around the world; Hilary Miezah, who is currently the executive director of ELECTA, a non-profit organization based in London which seeks to assist developing democracies to conduct free and fair elections; Hannah Baldwin, Deputy Chair of the African Area Studies Program at the Foreign Service Institute; Mariana Drenska, the National Coordinator for the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights (BAFECR); and Aminou Taofiki and Zakari Tchagbale who are members of Benin and Côte d'Ivoire chapters of the Groupe d'études et de recherche sur la democratie et le développement (GERDDES), respectively.

Following the Niamey seminar, the team split into two groups. One group traveled 900km to Zinder and the other traveled 600km to Tahoua for further training on December 29 and 30. One hundred and five Nigeriens attended the Niamey seminar, 92 participated in Zinder and 68 in Tahoua.

Because the program was intentionally designed to train trainers, the Nigerien participants were encouraged to organize subsequent training programs across the country at the grassroots level. The National Election Commission and some of the civic organizations pursued the follow-up training, making it possible for several thousand Nigeriens responsible for the administration and monitoring of the elections to benefit ultimately from the program. A small team of NDI staff and advisors remained in the country through election day to observe the activities of political parties and civic organizations in the pre-election period and provide informal assistance to the election commission and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) with the briefing and deployment of international and domestic election monitors.

Findings and Evaluation

The project was successfully completed. The NDI team observed activities in the immediate pre-election period and on election day and assisted with the briefing and deployment of international and domestic monitors.

BENIN
TRAINING AND COMMODITIES ASSISTANCE
AAI

Background

Since the advent of political pluralism in Benin, AAI has had the opportunity to carry out several programs designed to support democratization and encourage the consolidation of transparent democratic values in that country. Through its observation and training missions, AAI has sought to confirm US interest and commitment to the Beninese democratization process, as well as encourage Benin as a model for other fledgling democracies in Africa, and to stimulate ongoing citizen-to-citizen contacts and exchanges between Americans and Beninese.

Benin enjoys a reputation as a leader in political development in sub-Saharan Africa. Just as it was one of the first countries in which the military overthrew civilian rule in the early 1960s, Benin also was the first to initiate democratic reform in the 1990s, and used the national conference model to do so. This model was subsequently emulated by many countries in the region as they moved toward adopting democratic forms of government. Benin also was the first country in which individuals outside government were commissioned to play a prominent role in organizing election monitoring. The government of Benin has remained receptive to both international and national NGO involvement in the conduct of transparent electoral processes.

The March 1996 presidential elections marked the first return to the polls of a Beninese president elected through a multiparty system. Former Marxist leader Mathieu Kerekou, and Speaker of the National Assembly Bruno Amoussou ran against Soglo, which created a highly visible and competitive campaign.

Project Activities

AAI's project was designed to include electoral assistance commodities, a civic education training of trainers program designed to assist members of civil society, and a training program to assist new electoral staff in electoral preparations.

AAI coordinated an extensive civic education training of trainers program for members of civil society. AAI focused its assistance on two northern NGOs who had designed a voter education for the northern provinces of Benin, in an effort to quell budding political violence there, and to increase voter participation. Working through their Cotonou representative, AAI trained thirty Beninese trainers who then conducted training seminars for a total of one hundred and twenty individuals in the Atacora and Borgou regions. The training took place in both plenary sessions and smaller workshops. Each training session covered a review of the electoral code, election day procedures and the role of non-partisan election observers. The training seminars provided participants with the materials and knowledge necessary to conduct future sessions.

On election day, the NGO representatives arrived before the opening of the polls and traveled in their assigned provinces throughout the day. Arriving early allowed observers to watch the initial operations, verify the starting time of the voting, and confirm that ballot boxes were empty and properly sealed. No predetermined itineraries or routes were used; rather, observers drove and stopped at voting polls at will.

To carry out the project, AAI worked closely with former members of Benin's Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA). The CENA, originally created six weeks prior to the 1995 legislative elections, was a new organization whose members were named just before each election period. Former members shared thoughts and ideas with AAI about the weaknesses of the process during the legislative elec-

tions, which helped AAI to better orient its training objectives. AAI's work with local Beninese NGOs allowed AAI to forge strong cooperative relations with a local grassroots NGO that is well implanted at the provincial level, as well as to help build capacity in a remote region of the country that has not had much exposure to civic education.

Responding to a specific USAID request for commodities, AAI provided the CENA with indelible ink and ballot box seals. AAI worked with the American Manufacturers Export Group (AMEG), an AREAF subcontractor, for commodity procurement to review and evaluate specifications and bids.

Findings and Evaluation

AAI feels that this project was executed successfully. The project exemplified US interest in the continued democratic development of Benin. Internally, the project assisted in encouraging the consolidation of transparent democratic values in Benin by promoting civic education and general understanding of citizen participation in a democracy. Further, through the commodities support, the program assured that the elections took place with adequate electoral materials.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE
TRAINING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR ELECTIONS
NDI

Background

As a result of a joint NDI/AAI assessment mission prior to the presidential, legislative and municipal elections in Côte d'Ivoire, NDI designed and implemented a political party training program from July through September, 1995. The training focused on a number of areas including: expanding party bases of support, encouraging parties to promote the involvement of women and other neglected constituencies in the electoral process, and sharing with Ivorian political leaders candidate-selection methods used in advance of elections to improve party electoral chances.

Project Activities

Building on its work with political parties in Côte d'Ivoire during 1994, NDI devoted the period from July to September to two major training seminars, while at the same time assessing NDI's role during the elections and the post-electoral period. The first political party training seminar, which explored "Campaign Strategies", took place in Abidjan from July 25 to 27, 1995. This seminar brought together 60 representatives from nine Ivorian political groupings and parties, and 12 representatives of major NGOs for three days of plenary sessions and workshop exercises. A unique component of the seminar was the use of an extended simulation exercise which required participants to role-play over a three-day period. Based upon the characteristics of their respective simulated groups, the participants were asked to develop a campaign strategy and theme, identify and cultivate resources, and select a candidate who could best present their team's goals to the imaginary electorate. The trainers and workshop moderators included elected officials and experts from Belgium, Canada, Malawi, Sweden and the United States.

From August 31 to September 2, 1995, NDI held its second political party training seminar in Bouaké. NDI field staff continued to conduct consultations with political party leaders, government officials, civic organizers and international organization representatives to assess what role NDI could play during the presidential elections scheduled for October 1995 and the legislative elections scheduled for November 1995.

Findings and Evaluation

These efforts identified several areas of work needed to accomplish transparent multiparty elections. Findings from field staff led to a recommendation for a joint NDI/AAI international observation effort of the legislative elections of November 26, 1995.

ZAMBIA
CONSOLIDATING MULTIPARTY POLITICS
NDI

Background

In April 1996, NDI received a two month extension for its election support program in Zambia. NDI continued to encourage dialogue between the competing political parties as they prepared for the country's local, presidential, and parliamentary elections.

Project Activities

NDI conducted party agent training for most of Zambia's main political parties from April 18 to 23 at the Mulungushi Village Complex in Lusaka. The training agenda included an overview on elections and democracy, the role of political parties and their agents in elections, the relationship between agents and nonpartisan monitors, pre-election and election day monitoring, an overview of the Zambian electoral law, a review of the NDI Zambia Party Agent Training Kit, and an election-day simulation.

Workshop participants included the following parties: Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), United Independence Party (UNIP), National Party and Zambia Democratic Congress. A separate, all-party workshop for the smaller opposition parties was conducted for the Liberal Progressive Front, National Democratic Alliance, National Party for Democracy and Labour Party.

During the NDI party agent training workshops, it became apparent that there exists a high degree of mistrust between the parties concerning issues such as the use of multiple voters' cards and voters' certificates. NDI attempted to use the party agent training as a way to inform the parties about techniques for monitoring this aspect of an electoral process, to alleviate mistrust between electoral stakeholders. Among the specific concerns raised were the possibility of an inaccurate voters' register, switching of ballot boxes, ghost voters and "partisan" security personnel.

In June, NDI sent three teams into the provinces to begin conducting training for domestic monitoring groups and political parties. The three teams traveled throughout the country conducting workshops simultaneously. The program focused on training party polling agents and centered around the issues of tolerance and cooperation during an election, emphasizing the need for a code of conduct between parties. The training also was conducted in a single party format and was scheduled to take place in the eight provincial capitals outside of Lusaka. Due to political developments in Lusaka and the subsequent decision to discontinue the Zambia program, the training schedule was cut short.

Findings and Evaluation

The provincial trainings illuminated the continued need for political party development in Zambia. Most of those present were receiving information on basic election techniques for the first time, and several suggested that the most valuable use of resources in the future would be to conduct the training at the district level, where the information disseminated will reach the grassroots political organizers more effectively and efficiently. In addition, participants indicated that the party agent simula-

tion was extremely beneficial to their parties. Participants indicated a deep understanding that effective election day monitoring is an intrinsically valuable aspect of party activities, in particular so that a party can guarantee that its hard work and use of resources during the election period are not wasted by an illegitimate voting process. More significantly, the training workshops and consultations illustrated that inter-party cooperation is possible on the provincial level with the approval of the national leadership.

MADAGASCAR
THE ROLE OF AN EFFECTIVE LEGISLATURE
NDI

Background

The current Malagasy National Assembly is the first elected under Madagascar's 1992 democratic constitution. Most of the deputies are first-time elected legislators, elected for a four-year term. Unlike the previous single-party dominated parliaments in Madagascar, this Assembly, elected in 1993, has unprecedented responsibility due to the importance of the structure of Madagascar's nascent democratic institutions. The Malagasy National Assembly made an official request to the U.S. Department of State for help in organizing a legislative workshop.

To play its full role in the system of checks and balances, the parliament would benefit from assistance in a number of issues including: legislative oversight over the executive branch; the exercise of legislative initiative; defining a majority; effective house rules and house administration; committee organization; the role of party caucuses; ethics and sanctions; and public relations.

Project Activities

NDI began its legislative training program with an advance visit by a small team of NDI staff members and one parliamentary expert to identify key issues and opportunities for NDI programs. Following this advance visit, NDI began a legislative training program for the National Assembly of Madagascar in April, opening a two-person field office in Antananarivo. Approximately 80 members of parliament and chiefs of service attended NDI's May 29-31, 1996 training seminar which focused on ethics and the roles of committees. Following the May seminar, NDI arranged for a six-person delegation of Malagasy deputies and staff members to visit the parliaments of South Africa and Namibia from June 9 to 15. The study tour was designed to complement the May training program and to further enhance and reinforce the issues discussed in the NDI seminar by exposing the Malagasy parliamentarians to the functions and procedures of the South African and Namibian parliaments. Following the study tour, NDI sent a legislative staff expert to Antananarivo to conduct a week-long series of consultations with Malagasy members of parliament.

Findings and Evaluation

As a direct result of these recommendations, a Bureau for Institutional Relations was established the following week within the government's Ministry of Communication and Culture. The lawmakers also requested regular consultative metings with the prime minister and cabinet ministers.

CAPE VERDE
CIVIC EDUCATION, COMMODITY ASSISTANCE AND POST-ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE
AAI

Background

AAI was asked on January 23 to field a project design team to help the Cape Verdeans organize a voter education program to stimulate popular participation in the presidential elections scheduled for February, 1996. Voter apathy had been a severe problem in past elections, with only 30 percent of the population participating in the last presidential election. To compound this problem, according to Cape Verdean electoral law, not only does a candidate need to secure 51 percent of the votes in order to win, 51 percent of the electorate has to vote in order for the victory to be considered valid.

Project Activities

AAI team members worked with the National Election Commission (CNE) to coordinate a presidential election civic education final blitz in major population centers. The CNE leadership had focused its attention on encouraging voter participation through the media and the organization of civic institutions. The 1996 presidential election was conducted on the weekend before the commencement of Carnival. AAI worked with the commission and local government to organize free concerts in local parks and town centers as pre-carnival events using local talent to highlight a voter participation message. These concerts took place on the two days preceding the election and were conducted simultaneously. Sixteen major municipalities throughout the country were targeted with the same messages, flyers, posters and newsprint.

The AAI team was also responsible for providing commodity assistance to the CNE. Responding to specific requests for commodities, AAI gave the CNE toner cartridges and paper for existing copy machines. Short term training on alternative uses of automation, logistic planning and administration was also provided.

AAI worked with the government and several civil society institutions on designing and documenting a series of seminars. All political parties, prominent NGOs and church organizations participated in the series of seminars and summary roundtable discussions. These seminars worked in conjunction with a series of workshops sponsored by the prime minister to consolidate participation of civil society in the democratic process.

Findings and Evaluation

Members of the CNE replied to evaluation surveys that AAI's assistance was quite useful in developing their capacities in election administration and management. They added that as a result of AAI's support, the Commission realized to what extent it needed to work on creating permanent structures of operations.

There was a unanimous response that AAI's assistance was useful to the democratic process of the country, not only as far as administration and management of elections was concerned but also on role of the civil society. Prime Minister Veiga disclosed that without AAI's involvement, his proposed workshop might have been a repetition of the past series of conferences. He added that after the conferences, the Cape Verdean public questioned what was next and whether the exercise was worthwhile. However, with the workshop, he expressed hopes that people's fears will be allayed on his government's commitment to build a partnership with civil society for the governance of the country. In light of this, he affirmed that AAI's role has had short and medium term impact on Cape Verdean politics.

SIERRA LEONE
CIVIL MILITARY CONFERENCES
AAI

Background

Sierra Leone's February/March, 1996 presidential and legislative elections, held under a cloud of uncertainty, were successful despite violent armed attacks aimed at disrupting the electoral process. Following the peaceful handing over of power from the military NPRC government to the newly elected civilian government, renewed fighting broke out in neighboring Liberia. This renewed violence has serious implications for Sierra Leone and could potentially renew rebel activities along the Sierra Leone/Liberia border. Sierra Leone's fragile and recent democratic gains were in need of support.

Following a request by US Embassy staff, AAI developed a proposal to hold a series of conferences designed to clearly define the role of the military under Sierra Leone's new civilian government.

Project Activities

The African-American Institute (AAI) worked in collaboration with the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), and the Ministry of Defence to coordinate a series of four regional conferences on civil/military relations in Sierra Leone. The objective of these conferences was to improve the often contentious relationship between civilians and soldiers throughout the country. Organizers successfully met this goal by implementing four two-day conferences, in which civilian and military leaders in each of the three provinces and the Western Area met and discussed both the problems in this relationship and the recommendations for solving those problems.

The conference format included both small, closed session meetings with local military and civil leaders as well as larger meetings which incorporated a broader civilian and military audience. Each conference was held over a two-day period and was facilitated by civil/military experts. Presentations were made at the beginning of each conference on the role of the military in a democracy and managing civil/military relations.

Media Component

On June 19 & 20, AAI sponsored a media workshop in cooperation with the Ministry of Information, the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ), and the Mass Communications Department at Fourah Bay College. The aim of this project was to facilitate the consolidation of democratic governance following the successful election of a civilian government in March 1996 after five years of civil war and rule by the military decrees of the National Provisional Ruling Council.

The workshop brought together approximately 70 members of the general press and government officers responsible for information gathering and dissemination. It also factored in the current and potential training capabilities of Fourah Bay College, Mass Communications Department. The workshop was designed to provide a forum for these groups to develop a comprehensive assessment of the needs (physical, managerial, and legislative) of the media industry and the government's information operations. This comprehensive review can then be presented for both internal and external funding possibilities.

Findings and Evaluation

AAI was impressed by the receptiveness of both civilians and military leaders to these conferences. The timing of this project was key to its success. Sierra Leoneans are conscious of the difficulties in transitioning from a military to civilian regime. They are also concerned by the fact that the war between the RUF and the government

of Sierra Leone continues. Citizens now want to see things operating in a more open and accountable environment and they want to be included in decisions and reforms which are currently taking place. Both military rank-and-file as well as citizens were anxious to discuss this issue of civil/military relations in the hopes of resolving some of the tensions within their communities and the nation as a whole. The Head of State is currently looking at ways to address issues of reform within such institutions as the military, the police, and the various ministries. These conferences have provided him with a study of civil/military issues as well as public recommendations for reform.

It is clear that there are popular misconceptions of the role of the military in a democracy. These conferences were helpful in terms of clarifying the role of the military and how to better manage the relationship between the military and the civilian authorities. Civil/military facilitators conveyed the message that relations between civilians and the military, particularly during a war, will never be easy. Facilitators stressed that one way to assist in resolving civil/military conflicts is to properly manage communications between civilian and military authorities. These conferences resulted in specific recommendations to create permanent civil/military committees and other forms of communication in each of the local communities.

It is evident from these meetings that the Sierra Leonean military leadership recognizes the authority of the current civilian government over the military. During the conferences, the military openly discussed many problems, including the fact that many soldiers are poorly trained and do not conduct themselves in a professional manner. After the problems were aired by participants, there was a consensus that civilian and military leadership will need to cooperate fully to find resolution. Many of the challenges the military is facing were created by the recruitment and training policies of past governments. Others find their roots in deeper, societal problems.

Overall, participants consistently commented on the fact that the recommendations on all issues should be implemented as quickly as possible. Many of the issues discussed are presently on the table at the ongoing peace negotiations with the RUF. Civilians and military leaders stressed that better civil/military relations can help to identify resolutions to the most pressing local and national issues, which will have an impact on the peace talks.

The Namibia Voter Education Project

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

in cooperation with the

Namibian Broadcasting Corporation

I. SUMMARY

From October 15 to December 15, 1992, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) conducted a voter education project in Namibia through a cooperative agreement with the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). The project's goal was both educational and motivational -- to inform Namibians about the process and purpose of the 1992 Regional and Local Elections and to motivate them to participate by registering to vote and, ultimately, to cast their ballots. This project sought a turnout of approximately 60 percent of eligible voters. In spite of a late start and delay in equipment deliveries that necessitated major last-minute program revisions, the project was a considerable success. Overall voter turnout nationally was 82.9 percent. In many of Namibia's more heavily-populated constituencies, more than 90 percent of the registered voters turned out. A few polling stations even recorded a 100 percent turnout.

II. BACKGROUND

The 1992 Regional and Local Elections in Namibia

The 1992 elections in Namibia differed fundamentally from the 1989 elections that led the country to independence. Not only were the objectives different, the electoral system changed and so had many of the voting procedures. Furthermore, these were the first elections to be conducted by Namibians themselves. The vast international community that had assisted the 1989 elections had long since departed.

Namibia's democratic development has had both symbolic and tangible value in Africa, particularly in the region of southern Africa. The 1989 elections provided the region with firsthand exposure to the use of the election process as a mechanism for conflict resolution. Since those elections, Namibia has been under a microscope where all developments are examined for the lessons they might provide to others in southern Africa: Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, and even South Africa itself -- each of them at an earlier stage in the democratic transition process.

The Namibian constitution establishes the requirement for a second house of parliament, an elected National Council based on regional representation. Although the constitution did not specify a date when the National Council would be formed, it was generally accepted at the time of independence that the second house of parliament should be functioning within two years.

The constitution also provides for elected local authorities to include "all municipalities, communities, village councils and other organs of local government." Several of Namibia's previously all-white municipal governments, including Windhoek and Swakopmund, had been serving for nearly 20 years since the last local elections.

Thus, by mid-1992, there was growing pressure in Namibia for elections to establish Regional and National Councils as well as for local elections to install municipal governments more closely reflecting the populations they governed. But in order for these elections to take place, a new census had to be taken, new constituencies created on the basis of the census results, and, finally, new legislation passed to establish electoral procedures for both the regional and local elections. The passage of the Electoral Act, the Regional Councils Act and the Local Authorities Act in August 1992 paved the way for an Electoral Commission to begin its work in September.

Led by Professor Gerhard Totemeyer, head of the Political Science Department at the University of Namibia, the Electoral Commission established a registration period from September 21 to October 26 (later extended by two days). The nomination deadline for candidates was set for November 2, and the elections were scheduled to take place from November 30 through December 3, 1992.

This timetable allowed for little more than a month to register an estimated 600,000 voters and less than a month to carry out an election campaign for 13 Regional Councils and 47 municipal governments during two separate elections held on the same days. Given Namibia's low population density, the vastness of its territory (larger than Germany and France combined) and the limited capacity of its existing communications and transport networks, this accelerated calendar was an admittedly ambitious, if not heroic, undertaking.

But the schedule took into account an essential reality: Namibia and its government institutions virtually shut down for the summer holiday from December 15 to January 15. If the elections were to be held in 1992, they would have to be completed by December 4 to allow sufficient time for the ballots to be counted and verified before the annual close of business. Having already allowed two years to slip by since independence in March 1990, the Namibian government was under considerable pressure to complete the regional and local elections before the end of 1992.

The Official U.S. View

In a joint U.S. State Department/Agency for International Development/U.S. Information Service message on September 29, the American Embassy in Windhoek reported to the State Department that "in a very real sense, these elections will be a test of post-independence Namibia's commitment to democratic practices and values. At this writing, we are convinced that they will be free, fair and transparent. Even so, the Namibian government lacks any previous experience in conducting elections and faces considerable logistical and organizational difficulties. These are compounded by the lack of an institutionalized democratic culture in Namibia and short lead times for civic education, registration, selection of candidates and the electoral campaign."

The same telegram commented on the possibility of a low voter turnout and its effect on Namibia's democratic process. "Reports from every region indicate that Namibians are unaware of, misinformed about, or simply do not understand the meaning and purpose of the current registration exercise and the forthcoming local and regional authority elections. If the level of popular participation remains as it is, these critical elections will fall below expectations, dealing a severe blow to Namibia's budding democracy and the effort to decentralize national decision making. (A very low turnout could also bring into question the legitimacy of the National Council, which is the central element of "check and balance" in the legislative process."

"Clearly, what is needed is a more rigorous program of civic education to make certain that all Namibians are aware of the critical importance of these elections," reported the U.S. Embassy in Windhoek. "Radio is by far the best medium for achieving this. While the Namibian government's political will to see these elections succeed is certainly manifest, the ability to do so on the first attempt without additional assistance may not be there."

III. THE NDI/NBC VOTER EDUCATION PROJECT

NDI's Functional Expertise

The centerpiece of NDI's program initiatives in Africa has been civic education as it relates to elections. Activities have ranged from training nonpartisan election monitors to designing mass voter education programs in partnership with NGOs to encouraging election administrators to conduct aggressive public education campaigns. These initiatives have been credited with enhancing confidence and participation in the electoral process.

In addition, NDI has conducted two major studies in southern Africa on public attitudes toward elections: one in Botswana, a country with a tradition of conducting five elections in 28 years of independence and one in South Africa where democratic elections have yet to become a reality. The two studies used public opinion survey techniques and reached strikingly similar findings regarding public apathy toward participating in elections and cynicism toward politicians. Both studies strongly suggested the substantial need to motivate people to vote and to educate them about the registration and voting processes.

NDI's Program in Namibia

NDI has been active in Namibia since 1988 following the signing of the Tripartite Accords, which heightened the prospect for holding elections in accordance with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435. Ambassador Donald McHenry and UN Special Representative Martii Ahtisaafi encouraged NDI's involvement because of the Institute's election expertise and reputation for impartiality in election monitoring. Now in its fifth year of in-country program activity, NDI has conducted projects that have addressed voter education, monitored the broadcast media's coverage of elections and critiqued the electoral process; has held seminars on constitutional issues specifically emphasizing the role of the media; and has trained members of parliament. The Institute is currently engaged in an extensive program of legislative staff training and educational workshops for members of Namibia's Parliament, including the recently-elected members of the National Council.

NBC as a Channel to the Namibian Voter

At independence in March 1990, Namibia inherited from South Africa an extensive and technically up-to-date national broadcasting network. Its nine language services in radio use 31 FM, medium-wave and short-wave transmitters to reach an audience estimated (by NBC) at more that 90 percent of Namibia's 1.4 million population. Since independence, NBC has designed and installed a computerized radio and television newsroom that is reputedly the most advanced on the African continent.

NBC television currently broadcasts only in English and therefore reaches a much smaller, but steadily growing audience, varying from 5 up to possibly 25 percent of the population. This programming is restricted to Windhoek, Swakopmund and the northern regions of Namibia. However, because of the excellent quality of the color programming and NBC's access to top U.S., British and French satellite news coverage, television is watched regularly by Namibia's most influential audiences, particularly those engaged in business and government.

In addition to this excellent technical plant, NBC has invested heavily in human resources since independence. The staff inherited from South Africa was mostly white, apart from the African language services, and had to be merged with broadcast personnel returning from the exiled Voice of Namibia liberation radio stations. This pooling of

resources, accompanied by the Namibian government's strong affirmative action program, has created continuing staff problems at NBC. To its credit, NBC's management has taken huge strides toward resolving these difficulties by increasing emphasis on personnel training, innovative programming techniques to make NBC more immediately relevant to its Namibian audiences, and greater community involvement through audience participation programs, including a hugely successful live "National Chat Show," which encourages Namibians to call in their views on controversial subjects.

Guidelines for NDI-NBC Cooperation

In entering into a cooperative agreement to conduct a voter education project with NBC for the 1992 regional and local elections, NDI was guided by four specific objectives:

- To inform voters about their rights and responsibilities and educate them about the complicated electoral process;
- To motivate the public to participate and exercise their democratic rights embodied in this process;
- To educate the Namibian public about the importance of the electoral process;
- To inform voters on the choice of options as detailed in the policy statements of the parties, candidates and organizations competing in the elections.

This program would be undertaken in a fair and objective manner without bias toward any party or individual.

NDI proposed assisting NBC in the production of broadcast materials that would inform the public about the offices under contention, the registration and voting procedures, the places and dates for registration and voting and where to obtain information about the election process, the candidates and the political parties.

Also proposed by NDI were interactive programs, using a live call-in format and taped interviews with Namibians around the country speaking about the importance of the elections to them and their communities, problems they were experiencing in fully participating in the process and issues they would like to see the candidates address. These interviews would be taped on recorders purchased by NBC with NDI funds, since NBC did not possess the appropriate equipment to do the job.

The NDI-NBC program anticipated broadcast debates between candidates and party leaders, as well as town hall meetings where local audiences could ask candidates questions directly, or phone them in from outlying regions.

NDI and NBC would also seek to record and broadcast endorsements from non-political, community leaders about the importance of registering and voting in the elections.

Finally, newspaper advertisements would be used to promote NBC listenership while simultaneously encouraging people to vote. NBC, using funds provided by NDI, would place the advertisements in all of Namibia's leading newspapers representing the spectrum of political opinion. [See Appendix I.]

To oversee the joint project locally, NDI would retain the part-time services of Sean Kelly, a retired Voice of America correspondent residing temporarily in Namibia. Kelly has more than 30 years of broadcasting experience, much of it in Africa. He would advise NBC on content and format, take primary responsibility for program direction and evaluate the project at its conclusion.

How the Project Worked

Administrative delays postponed commencement of the project until October 20

-- less than a week before voter registration was due to end. NBC had nonetheless gone ahead on its own and sent teams out to begin recording interviews with the equipment at hand. However, the belated starting date posed real limitations on NDI's ability to influence the voter registration process.

Kelly met with Cyril Lowe, chairman of the NBC Election Task Group on October 20 and remained in contact with him on a daily basis throughout the duration of the project. Lowe had already established an Elections Discussion Forum, which included representatives from the six political parties and three community associations registered to take part in the elections.

The Discussion Forum held its first meeting at NBC on October 2 and met at least once a week thereafter through December 8. Kelly began attending these meetings regularly, as well as the NBC weekly election programming meetings.

On October 26, Kelly was able to report that NBC expected the 21 Marantz PMD 222 broadcast-quality tape recorders funded by NDI to arrive in Windhoek by the end of the week. In the meantime, radio and television teams were being sent to the Caprivi and Okavango regions in the far northern part of Namibia to record interviews and panel discussions with political and traditional leaders on the importance of registering and voting. The interviews were to be broadcast by NBC when the teams returned to Windhoek. A similar trip to Oshakati in the Ovambo-speaking area of the north was planned for the following week.

This pattern of dispatching combined radio-television teams to outlying areas and broadcasting their interviews and panel discussions soon thereafter seemed to Kelly to be a far more effective technique for arousing voter interest than the generic public service announcements NBC had been using. He therefore recommended that NDI fund NBC to charter local aircraft so that the movement back and forth from Windhoek to the field could be accelerated, and the broadcast materials aired more quickly.

Unfortunately, the use of NDI funds for NBC television coverage, as opposed to radio broadcasting, was considered to fall outside the mandate of NDI's original proposal and was therefore not permitted.

The comments by NBC on this issue as stated in their final report on the voter education project are worth noting here:

> *As for the funds made available by NDI for the NBC's coverage of the process a serious constraint was the fact that television was excluded from the agreement. The NBC, and for that matter probably most of the public broadcasting institutions in the developing world, do not have the facilities and resources enabling them to at all times maintain a clear distinction and separation between radio and television. In most cases television is just as important as radio in informing the average Namibian. Television reaches the leadership and opinion makers who in turn pass on information to their supporters from where it filters through to the grassroots level. Most projects tackled by NBC are aimed at coverage for both radio and television at the same time. Leeway in this regard would have enabled the NBC to utilize funds made available more effectively. [See Appendix II.]*

Another issue that surfaced repeatedly during NDI Program Assistant Nicholas Van Slyck's November 7-18 visit concerned the tape recorders purchased by NDI for NBC's use during the campaign. It was understood that these would be available well in advance of the actual campaign. An investigation initiated by Kelly and Van Slyck revealed a serious error in NBC's ordering process: there had been no follow-up in October to the original telefax message ordering the equipment -- which apparently had

gone astray. As a consequence, there seemed little likelihood on November 13 that the original equipment would arrive in time to be used at all during the project. By checking various retail outlets in Johannesburg, NBC's engineering staff was able to locate similar, but more expensive Marantz recorders. At Kelly's recommendation, Van Slyck approved the purchase of 15 of these units in order to furnish NBC the equipment it desperately needed while at the same time remaining within the NDI budget constraints.

The new recorders arrived November 19, were thoroughly checked out with the NDI-funded Electrovoice 635A microphones in Kelly's presence, and sent to outlying areas in time to be used in the final days of the campaign. They proved very successful, and the sound quality of the interviews broadcast on NBC improved substantially.

On November 23, Kelly reported to NDI Washington that NBC intended to use the new equipment in a series of broadcasts aimed at stimulating voter turnout, by reporting directly from polling stations in the language of the area. Because of the vast distances and the short period of time involved, NBC believed that it was imperative to use charter aircraft to fly the radio reporters from one region to another. Kelly was asked to obtain NDI approval to reprogram travel funds for this purpose. The money was available in the NDI budget for the project, but needed to be reprogrammed from 4 x 4 vehicle rental to aircraft charter.

Approval was eventually obtained to charter three flights during the voting period. Kelly flew on two of them, accompanying NBC National (English), Otjiherero and Damara/Nama radio reporters to polling stations in Oshakati, Ongwadiva, Opuqo, Khorixas, Swakopmund and Walvis Bay. In most cases, the interviews were broadcast the same day on NBC's National, Otjiherero and Damara/Nama services. The NDI-provided equipment thus received a rigorous work out in time to make a considerable difference during the electoral process. In Kelly's view, this intense usage tended to help compensate for the recorders' late arrival; NBC's Election Task Group agreed.

Election Programming

The National and Language Services of NBC Radio served as the principal channels to convey routine information about the elections to the public. NBC produced a variety of programs aimed at making people aware of the purpose of the elections and the necessity to participate in them. The following program formats were utilized by NBC in an effort to reach its listeners:

- Panel discussions were conducted where political leaders and election administration officials were asked questions phoned in by listeners.
- Quiz programs were devised to test the general knowledge of the public on the purpose of the elections.
- Several of the language services held concerts with the election as the central theme.
- The NBC introduced a series of weekly programs that reflected the attitudes of the people and the problems surrounding the election process from remote regions.
- During the period of registration from September!21 to October 28, 1992, daily schedules of the mobile registration teams were broadcasted in all the vernaculars.
- Information on polling stations, both mobile and fixed, was made available for the duration of the voting process from November 30 to December 3, 1992.
- The results of the elections were transmitted by the NBC National Service as they became available from 11 pm on December 3 until 9 pm the following

night. The language services concentrated on the constituencies covered by their respective services.

- NBC commissioned a radio play entitled "We Are Going to the Polls." [See Appendix III.] The original English script was translated, produced and broadcast repeatedly in eight languages. NBC's German Service felt the setting (an African village complete with chickens, roosters, horses and a wise old man) was not appropriate for its listeners. Kelly obtained a cassette of the play's Otijiherero version and had it monitored by several randomly selected Hereros who all agreed it was a fascinating program.
- NDI also sponsored Namibia's first-ever "Town Meeting of the Air" with all the political parties in Namibia represented on a single panel and a studio audience asking questions. It proved a major success in both radio and television where it was aired during prime time.
- Advertisements ran in all of the major newspapers that informed the readers of the date, time and frequency of the NBC radio programs.
- A final panel discussion on the eve of the elections featured representatives of all the political parties and associations participating in the elections. This discussion provided the parties and groups with an opportunity to inform the public of their policies.

As noted above, NDI's provision of new microphones and tape recorders made it possible for NBC to expand its programming to include distant areas of Namibia. The use of charter aircraft assured that the interviews obtained with this equipment were broadcast in time to have impact on the voting process.

The Role of the Political Parties

As noted earlier, NDI and NBC worked closely with representatives of the political parties and community groups participating in the elections. But from the very beginning, it was clear that the parties were not prepared for the elections in 1992 and most of them, including the ruling South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), sought a postponement. When this proved impossible, they belatedly started devising campaign strategies and began the process of selecting candidates. Only SWAPO fielded candidates in all constituencies. The opposition Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) matched SWAPO in presenting candidates in most constituencies, but declined to compete in some regions where it knew it would not fare well.

Nonetheless, when Nicholas Van Slyck and Sean Kelly visited the heavily pro-SWAPO Oshana Region (formerly Ovamboland) on November 10 to 11, the disorder at the DTA campaign headquarters was apparent. One candidate for the Oshakati regional elections, DTA's national publicity secretary, was unable to explain his party's campaign strategy, apart from simply attacking SWAPO on its home ground. He eventually received 104 votes to his SWAPO opponent's 8,242.

Other DTA candidates in the north fared poorly as well, but the surprises came in the southern and eastern area of Namibia where DTA had succeeded in 1989. The main opposition party was only able to win two out of Namibia's 13 regions while SWAPO expanded its stronghold in the north and made serious inroads into constituencies previously thought safe for the DTA.

Throughout the registration and campaign period, NBC found fruitful cooperation with the political parties difficult. The weekly Discussion Forum provided an opportunity for the parties to work closely with NBC, but they rarely (according to NBC) took real advantage of it. In its final report, the NBC Election Task Group observed that:

A major drawback was the fact the political parties were not always that well informed about the issues at stake...the NBC should have been able to draw on the expertise and knowledge of political leaders to convey important information to listeners. However, the political parties themselves did not fully understand the process and procedures to be followed and thus were not always able to serve as reliable sources of information. Furthermore, the political parties failed to mobilize their supporters. The campaign only started in all earnest about four weeks before the elections. The parties were ill prepared and were of little help to the NBC in preparing the electorate for the elections.

IV. CONCLUSION

The high voter turnout throughout Namibia speaks for itself. Some of it is no doubt attributable to the NDI/NBC Voter Education Project. As the U.S. Embassy in Windhoek reported to the State Department on December 1: "Although there were some kinks in getting started, the first day of the first elections organized by Namibians themselves went smoothly. The AREAF/NDI-sponsored voter education campaign with NBC has paid off. In spite of the predictions of mass apathy, there was no shortage of voters anywhere."

In its final report on the project, NBC said:

In conclusion, the NBC would like to thank NDI not only for its financial support but also assistance rendered by its representatives monitoring the process in Namibia. Without this support, the NBC would certainly have been at a disadvantage and would not have achieved what we did in the end. Throughout this project NDI contributed towards the furthering of democracy in Namibia. The funding also enabled the NBC to gain valuable experience that can be put to good use in similar programs in the future.

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE:

GRANT TO NBC FOR VOTER EDUCATION PROGRAMME:

FINAL PROGRAMME REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION:

The Namibian Broadcasting Corporation's coverage of Namibia's first elections for regional councils and local authorities was aimed at creating awareness among the Namibian electorate of the importance of the elections and to motivate the public at large to participate and in so doing exercise their democratic rights. With its coverage the NBC endeavored to further the principles of democracy enshrined in Namibia's constitution and to meet its obligations in terms of the Broadcasting Act to provide the Namibian nation with relevant information.

This the NBC undertook to do in a fair and objective manner. In order to ensure objectivity, a consultative forum was established involving all political parties and groups participating in the elections. The NBC consulted with these groups continuously throughout its coverage of the elections and also accommodated agreements reached with these groups. Participating organizations were supplied with a copy of the NBC's policy guidelines for the coverage of the elections outlining the modus operandi and special projects to be undertaken.(See Addendum A)

The first meeting of the Discussion Forum was held on 2 October 1992 and since then regularly every week throughout the whole process. Political parties and groups were kept informed of all projects and activities undertaken by the NBC with an opportunity to raise objections, propose alternatives or present the NBC with recommendations. The six political parties and 3 community associations that registered for the elections were all represented on the discussion forum.

2. DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN:

2.1. News and Current Affairs:

To ensure proper coverage of the elections an Elections Desk was established with the assignment to cover all news events related to the elections, to coordinate the gathering of information and to monitor all material broadcast and televised by the NBC. This desk was the key to the whole operation and also facilitated coverage by the NBC's Radio Programme Services. The terms of reference of the Desk was to focus in reports on the informative aspects of the elections by identifying needs for information and supplying the relevant information to the services concerned.

The Desk also covered the political rallies of the individual political parties and non-political organizations.

Most of the informative items broadcast by the NBC emanated from this Desk and audio contributions with a total duration of 554 minutes, focussing on the elections, were broadcast in the 66 days the Desk was in operation. Hard news reports on the elections accounted for a total of 438 minutes.

The audio contributions were broadcast in the two Radio News current affairs programmes, Deadline and Update Namibia. Most of the contributions, as well as the hard news items, were repeated in the nine Language Services being Damara/Nama, Otjiherero, Oshiwambo, Rukavango, Tswana, Lozi, Afrikaans, German and National

Radio broadcasting in English.

These contributions reflected important announcements by the Elections Directorate, explanatory items on procedures and appeals by community leaders for the public to actively participate. These contributions and reports included the following:

- Dates of registration of voters, registration of political parties, nomination of candidates, dates of the elections and details of the announcement of the results.
- Procedures to be followed when registering as a voter.
- The Code of Conduct for political activities during the elections.
- Problems experienced with the registration of voters, as well as voting procedures and how to overcome these problems.
- Interviews with political and traditional leaders explaining the significance of the elections and urging the electorate to participate.
- A radio talk show in all languages on how to vote. (Copy attached as Addendum B)

2.2. Programme Services:

The Language and National Services of the NBC served as the main channels to convey routine information to the public. At the same time the Services also conducted panel discussions highlighting the elections and making people aware of the necessity to participate.

The following programme formats were utilized to reach listeners of all the services:

- Panel discussions with Political leaders and officials of the Elections Directorate with listeners phoning in and putting questions to the panelists.
- Quiz programmes testing the general awareness of the public and at the same time conveying important information about the elections.
- Several services conducted variety concerts with the elections as the central theme.
- National Radio presented a series of weekly programmes reflecting attitudes and problems related to the elections from remote regions.
- A Radio Play - We are going to the polls - was presented by all the Language Services with the exception of the German Service.(Addendum C)
- During the period of registration from 21 September 1992 until 27 October 1992 information on the programme of registrations teams and venues to be visited was supplied in all the vernaculars on a daily basis.
- Information on polling stations, both mobile and fixed, was made available for the duration of the voting process from 30 November 1992 until 3 December 1992.
- The results of the elections were broadcast by National Radio as it became available from 23:00 on 3 December until 21:00 on 4 December 1992 with the Language Services focussing on the constituencies covered by their respective Services.
- All the radio programme services conducted "vox pops" programmes involving the public to assess attitudes and to identify vague areas which were followed up with interviews and programmes addressing these issues.

- A final panel discussion on the eve of the elections featuring representatives of all the political parties and associations participating in the elections. This discussion provided the parties and groups with an opportunity to inform the public of their policies at the hand of questions asked by an audience of supporters of all the different groups.

(Copies of the Minutes of meetings of the NBC's Election Task Group as well as the reports submitted by the various Language Services and News Department are attached as Addendum D - I. These minutes and reports reflect details of programmes produced and presented as well as audio and news items produced and broadcast by News and Current Affairs.)

2.3. Public Service Programmes:

As a public service and in an effort to provide political parties with the opportunity to reach supporters with vital information on their manifestos, the NBC made available free time to political parties and groups participating in the elections. The allocation was done proportionally to the number of candidates nominated for the elections. The parties and groups had full, jurisdiction over the content of these slots without any censorship by the NBC except for blatant transgressions of the NBC's internal Code of Conduct and legal requirements regarding libel.

Apart from the free time, political parties and groups could also make use of weekly slots on all the Language Services to inform the public of meetings or events.

2.4. Advertising Services:

In order to inform listeners about election-related programmes to be broadcast by the NBC a pro-active campaign of advertisements was launched via the local printed media. Advertisements in the Namibian vernaculars were published in the local dailies and weekly newspapers such as the *Advertiser, Namibian, Republikein, Tempo, New Era* and *Allgemeine Zeitung*.(Copies of some of these advertisements are included as Addendum J)

3. ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT:

The only way by which the NBC can assess the success of the project is to determine whether the objectives of maximum participation was achieved. From the outset the Corporation saw its task as one of informing listeners about the process in order to ensure participation of each and every eligible voter. To achieve this we first had to motivate the public to register and then to convince them to exercise their right to vote. With limited resources and a largely centralized infrastructure it was just not possible to go to the extent of introducing individual candidates and what they stood for to the electorate. This we regarded to be the responsibility of political parties.

The final registration figure of 80 comma four per cent of the estimated population aged 18 years and older far exceeded expectations of the Elections Directorate. By any standard the final polling percentage of on average 82,9 per cent for the regional elections and 81,7 percent for the local elections were very high.

With the NBC being the only medium able to reach most of the Namibian population living in remote areas without access to printed media or other sources of information, the success of the registration campaign and the voting process can largely be attributed to the efforts of the NBC to inform and motivate people to register and vote.

Probably the main factor contributing to the success of the Corporation's campaign was the direct involvement of the public in programmes. The programme formats used to involve listeners to participate in programmes and to air their views freely availed the NBC with the opportunity to use the most reliable sources of information being the people themselves. In the case of problems being identified, the swiftness of the medium made it possible to address issues without delay. Close cooperation with

the Elections Directorate was of vital importance and this we had at all times.

A major drawback was the fact that political parties were not always that well informed about the issues at stake. Being the leaders of the people the NBC should have been able to draw on the expertise and knowledge of political leaders to convey important information to listeners. However, the political parties themselves did not fully understand the process and procedures to be followed and thus were not always able to serve as reliable sources of information. Most of the time when they were called upon to participate in discussion programmes, they saw this as an opportunity to campaign which the NBC could not afford due to pressure on the Corporation to act in an objective manner.

Time and again Government office bearers of the ruling party misused their positions to campaign for their party. In future elections this issue will have to be addressed on a very high level with the Government of the day.

The real issues at stake in regional and local elections were never addressed in political campaign by the participating audience. The elections were fought mostly on part-political lines without going into details such as the changes and renewal envisaged by the main actors in regional and local Government. This was probably due to the fact that it was the first time ever that Namibians had the opportunity to elect such councils.

Furthermore, the political parties failed to mobilize their supporters. The campaign only started in all earnest about four weeks before the elections. The parties were ill prepared and were of little help to the NBC in preparing the electorate for the elections.

For the NBC it was a case of trial and error. There was no precedent to go by as this was also the first time the Corporation tackled a project like this. A major drawback was the fact that we started at a very late stage with our planning. The Task Group planning and coordinating coverage was established only two months before the elections. This was due to the fact that legislation paving the way for the elections was delayed. Financial constraints forced the NBC to make do with what little funds were available and without the funding by NDI the Corporation would not have been able to achieve the level of success it did in the end.

As for the funds made available by NDI for the NBC's coverage of the process a serious constraint was the fact that Television coverage was excluded from the agreement. The NBC and for that matter probably most of the public broadcasting institutions in the developing world do not have the facilities and resources enabling them to at all times maintain a clear distinction and separation between Radio and Television. In most cases television is just as important as radio in informing the average Namibian. Television reaches the leadership and opinion makers who in turn pass on information to their supporters from where it filters through to the grassroots level. Most projects tackled by the NBC are aimed at coverage for both radio and television at the same time. Leeway in this regard would have enabled the NBC to utilize funds made available more effectively.

What the NBC did not succeed in doing is to present listeners with an overview of the alternatives as projected by the political parties.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

Recommendations the NBC can offer on the basis of the experienced gained with this exercise will probably be applicable mainly to broadcasting institutions in the Third World.

A prerequisite for success with a project of this nature is full commitment from the Management cadres of the institution tackling such a programme. A multi-disciplined approach should be followed involving all departments. It is therefore important that

a project of this nature start off with a workshop for top management who should clearly define the objectives. It follows that planning and preparation should start at least 6 months prior to elections.

In order to promote democracy which entails propagating a variety of views and alternatives the institution tackling such a project should see its task as twofold. Education programmes should be aimed at the general public, but at the same time and just as important is a programme aimed at educating the main actors in the process being the participating political parties. In our case political parties waited until the last minute before they started organizing party structures and selecting candidates. To a large extent a public broadcasting institution can assist by aiming their programmes at informing political leaders of the requirements and demands as well as timely preparation for political campaigns.

Political parties should be guided as to the manner in which the broadcaster can be of assistance to them to further their aims but at the same time serve the nation as a whole. In our case we relied on the political parties to work out a plan of action with the means made available to them by the NBC. However, the broadcaster should assume a much more assertive role. In broadcasting they are the experts and therefore are in a position to guide and advise.

Programmes should be aimed at highlighting issues at stake. The NBC could have steered the process towards addressing the real issues at stake by involving political leaders well in advance in panel discussions focusing on their policies on issues pertaining to regional and local government. The broadcaster should take the lead and be pro-active rather than wait for the political parties to identify issues. What happened in our case is that the real issues were never addressed. Candidates fought their campaigns on party-political lines. If going by the content of political discussion during our campaign it could just as well have been a general election for parliament rather that regional and local structures. Supporters did not know what candidates stood for on regional and local government level and voted only along tradition lines of support and choice.

For a public broadcaster it is absolutely vital to stay neutral and not to be seen as partisan or supportive of only one line of thought. Although difficult to achieve it is worth the effort to maintain objectivity and to be fair. Consultation with political parties should be formalized and should go hand in hand with signed minutes of agreement. This pre-emts possible disagreement and provided the basis for sound cooperation. In our case time and again representatives of political parties agreed to certain options only at a later stage to claim that they never informed about decisions affecting their campaigns.

5. CONCLUSION:

In conclusion the NBC would like to thank NDI not only for its financial support but also assistance rendered by its representatives monitoring the process in Namibia. Without this support the NBC would certainly have been at a disadvantage and would not have achieved what we did in the end. Through this project NDI contributed towards the furthering of democracy in Namibia. The funding also enabled the NBC to gain valuable experience that can be put to good use in similar programmes in the future.

CHAIRMAN

NBC ELECTION TASK GROUP

To vote is your right

Switch-on to
NBC Radio
and find out more

* **Rukavango Service**
* **20:00**
* **Saturday 21 November**

Informing the Nation

Who will you be voting for?

Switch-on to NBC Radio's **Election File** and find out

* **National Service**
* **07:30**
* **Thursday 19 November**

Informing the Nation

Newspaper Advertisement in Afrikaans

Skakel-in vir die verkiesings

- Nuus
- Inligting
- Opvoeding van kiesers

..met op
NBC Radio/TV

nbc

Lig die inwoners in

Newspaper Advertisement in Ostiwambo

Pwilikina

komahoololo

- Eenghundana Nomauyelele
- Okuhonga ovahoololi

..mo **NBC Radio**
no mo **TV**

nbc

Okushiivifila Oshiwana

Newspaper Advertisement in Kwangali

Paturura

komahoroworo

- Mbudi
- Mapukururo
- Erongo lyovahorowoli

..ko Radio **NBC**
no Tv kwelike

nbc

Kupukurura Muhoko

Newspaper Advertisement in Silozi

Kwalula ku ba liketisa

- Makande
- Lizibiso
- Tuto ya baketi

..Zeo Kaufela u kona ku li teleza fa moya mwa Wayalesi ya ba **NBC** hamoho cwalo ni ya Maswaniso yona TV

nbc

Zibiso ya Sicaba

APPENDIX III

WE ARE GOING TO THE POLLS

BY

MOSHê M. BAITSEWE

CHARACTERS:

1. JOHN MONARENG
2. BEN MONARENG
3. BULL
4. ANGELINE/ELECTION DIRECTORATE
5. DODO
6. LETTIE

JOHN: He is an elderly man of appr. 55 years who is talking with a slow and somewhat shivery voice.

BEN & BULL: They are two young men of appr. 35 years.

DODO & ANGELINE:

Two young women.

LETTIE: She is a woman of appr. 45 years of age.

SOUND EFFECTS

CICADA

HEN & CHICKEN

A CROWING COCK

FLEEING CHICKEN

A VEHICLE COMING TO A HALT

A MATCH BEING PULLED

A GALLOPING HORSE

A NUMBER SHUFFLING FEET

BIRDS SINGING

A BUSTLE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE

AT POLLING STATION

SIGGI UP AND FADE TO THE BACKGROUND

... INTRODUCTION DONE BY PRESENTER...

SIGGI UP AND FADE OUT AGAIN

FX: A CICADA IS SINGING AND A HEN AND HER CHICKENS ROAM ABOUT LAZILY WAITING TO BE FED

JOHN: (IMPATIENT) Hey... ! You Poppie!! C'mon get away from me. Get away from here. Away I say!!! (MEDITATIVE) I know you're hungry, so am I. Now where do you expect me to get you chicken-feed from? I don't even have food myself.

FX: A COCK CROWS NEARBY.

JOHN: (ANNOYED) Oh no! Not you also. Get away from here! Get...! Get away!!

FX: CHICKEN SCRAMBLE AWAY AS HE CHASES AFTER THEM

JOHN: My goodness... (A DEEP SIGH) Dare these chicken...!

FX: A VEHICLE STOPS NEARBY

JOHN: (SURPRISED) And this... (MUMBLES TO HIMSELVES) I won't like to hear another word about registrations. They're just looking for another way to waste our time.

E/DIR: (AS SHE ALIGHTS) What's the matter with the chickens old man?

JOHN: (ABRUPT) Don't you old man me! I don't want to hear another word about registrations and elections. And you can forget...Your smooth talking won't help you much.

E/DIR: (APPROACHES) It's because you don't understand. Shall we have a seat so that I...

JOHN: (CURTLY) No! You won't. Go away. Just get into your car and go away. I won't have you wasting some more of my time. Just get away!

E/DIR: (CALM) Not before I have explained to you why it was necessary to register yourselves and why it is important to vote in the forthcoming elections.

JOHN: (ASKANCE) Oh? And why was that?

E/DIR: Shall we sit?

JOHN: (LIGHTING UP A PIPE/STERN) We shall not sit. I told you that your sweet talk won't help you much. Why don't go?

E/DIR: You don't get rid of me that easily. I have a responsibility here. The elections you've registered yourself for are of prime importance if we were to have a well nurtured democracy.

JOHN: (MEDITATIVE) Democracy... ?

E/DIR: The idea is to bring government to the people. It's thus the responsibility of the people to choose their own representatives to go and stand for them in parliament.

JOHN: (GIGGLES) Please... don't kiddy me. Don't make me laugh. (LAUGHS) It won't work! No! It simply won't work. Where on earth is the money going to come from. My dear, my advice to you is for you to return this car to where you got it from and go and look for something else to do.

E/DIR: Why?

JOHN: Who is going to pay for such people. Let us look at it from this angle.

CROSS FADE...

FX: A GENTLE GALLOP.

BEN: (THINKING) I wonder who is at my father's house. That car has been standing there for too long now. I must go and check-out what's taking place there.

CROSS FADE TO PREVIOUS SCENE.

A CICADA SINGING AND CHICKENS IN THE BACKGROUND.

JOHN: Whatever angle you're looking at it from, you would still have to pay him. And for that purpose you do need money.

E/DIR: Oh yes! That's for sure. But what if we could have development and industry decentralized to your region and the people of your region could generate wealth, upgrade their standard of living and by means of taxes make it possible for the government to pay your delegate's salary.

JOHN: (JEERINGLY) That's fantasy! Day-dreaming. Without water and electricity, Aminius is as good as dead. Here is no future for our children.

E/DIR: Aha! You see. Now you have it. You have already identified your needs. But whom are going to send to the government to go and speak on your behalf?

JOHN: Could that be done?

E/DIR: Why not?

CROSSFADE...

FX A GALLOPING HORSE AND SOMEONE WHISTLING. A HORSE GRADUALLY SLOWS DOWN AND HALTS.

BEN: What's the matter Bull? I'm in a hurry.

BULL: Okay Ben, I won't keep you long. (WHISPER) What's the election officials doing at your parent's place? They've been there for quite some time now.

BEN: That's why I'm rushing there. I must go and chase them away.

BULL: Okay. You better hurry up if that's the case.

FX: HORSE STARTS OFF AGAIN

BEN: See you later Bull.

BULL: (CALLING OUT AFTER BEN LEAVING) Okay Ben! CROSS FADE TO PREVIOUS SCENE AGAIN

JOHN: I'm serious!

E/DIR: So am I. All we have to remember is that Rome did not come into being overnight. But yes, it could be done and it is going to be done. Think of the development that is going to come to the people. Just mushrooming... Poultry-farming, vegetable cultivation and...

JOHN: (EXCITED) And thus stopping the young people from abandoning their old people and streaming to cities.

E/DIR: You've got it right.

JOHN: Come on, let's sit down. I need to hear...

A GALLOPING HORSE APPROACHES.

BEN: (OFF MIKE) Dad, are you allowing yourself to be persuaded.

JOHN: Easy now. (LIGHTS UP PIPE AGAIN) Come nearer. This lady has a lot of very important information for us.

BEN: (STILL OFF MIKE) I'm not going to let this lady waste my time with cheap talk.

JOHN: We'ne been in the dark all along, Ben.

BEN: (APPROACHES) In the dark... ? About what?

E/DIR: Besides it being your constitutional responsibility to vote in the forthcoming regional and local authorities elections Mr.. (SHE HESITATES)

BEN: (ON MIKE) Monareng... Ben Monareng.

E/DIR: Pleased to meet you. I am Angeline Mosadi. Mr. Monareng, it is also your social responsibility to make sure that your region does not miss out on future developments.

JOHN: Come on. Let's sit down.

BEN: I have better things to do than...

JOHN: Just for a short while... Please.

E/DIR: We won't be long Mr. Monareng.

JOHN: (WITH PIPE BETWEEN TEETH) Mmmm... This lady says we would be choosing a representative of our own to go and speak for us at parliament. (SUCKS HIS PIPE) And you know... I just thought how good it would be to have a man who is also affected by what is affecting us, speaking for us; Presenting our complaints to the government.

BEN: (JEERINGLY) That'll be the day!

JOHN: (ANNOYED) Am I lying? Huh? Am I lying?

BEN: Okay dad. For whom do we vote?

E/DIR: Participative government.

BEN: What ?

E/DIR: That's right. You vote for the best person for the job and...

JOHN: Isn't that an approach too business-like? Well... that is exactly what it's suppose to be. You don't go putting your money in the care of untrustworthy brokers.

BEN: Whom do we vote for?

E/DIR: The right man for the job. As for the names of the participants, be it the political parties or independent candidates, those will be borne by the ballot paper. The important thing at this point in time is to make sure that each and every individual knows how and why to vote.

JOHN: The best way to do that would be to call everyone together. (AS HE KICKS BACK HIS CHAIR) C'mon let's go right away.

FX: FEET SHUFFLING AS THEY LEAVE.

FADE OUT... MUSIC BRIDGE. FADE IN

BIRDS CHIRPING IN THE BACKGROUND AND MUFFLED HUMAN VOICES.

JOHN: (CLEARING THROAT/LOUD) People... May I please have your attention. (SILENCE) Thank you. I am very very pleased to see you all here, especially on such short notice. And I won't like to keep you here a minute longer than is necessary.

DODO: Get to the point. We don't have the whole day. We've got work to do.

E/DIR: Please allow him some time, lady.

DODO: Listen who is talking.

BEN: Auntie Dodo please. Please give us a break.

DODO: Hey you, don't bark at me like that!

BEN: I was asking you politely.

BULL: (SHOUT FROM THE BACK) Why beg her? Throw her out!!

DODO: Never! Do I resemble dirt that is being thrown out just like that?

JOHN: Dodo please keep quiet and sit down. No-one is going to be thrown out.

DODO: Why don't you speak to Bull? He's the one who promised to throw me out.

LETTIE: Is this what we had been called to come and witness ?

E/DIR: No ma'am. There has just been some misunderstanding.

(THE DIN SUBSIDES)

JOHN: Thank you very much.

FX: A WHILE'S SILENCE AND A COUGH HERE AND THERE.

JOHN: (CLEARS THROAT AGAIN & CONTINUES) I know how you feel. Please believe me. You feel I've let you down. I can understand that. But now I can tell you this. We were in the dark about the registra-

tion and especially about the forthcoming election.

BULL: Don't you try to be smart. Get to the point.

JOHN: I'd rather call the lady to come and address you. Okay lady... Help me. Come nearer.

E/DIR: Okay Mr. Monareng. Thank you. (CLEARS THROAT) People, we are going to the polls.

DODO: The country is already independent, why should we vote?

E/DIR: I like that question. We are going to vote so as to bring the government to the people. To really allow the people to rule, to have a say in their government. Now, why did we have to register ourselves?

LETTIE: Don't ask us tell us. Why ?

BULL: That's right. Tell us.

E/DIR: We registered ourselves so that we could check before hand that the people who were going to vote are Namibians. So, why do we have to vote?

DODO: Why don't you explain without asking questions? We are not kids!

E/DIR: Okay okay... ! Now suppose the good Lord gave you an arm. Only an arm... without the hand. Only an arm up to the wrist. Without the hand. No palm. No fingers. Nothing at all. What could you accomplish with such an arm ?

BULL: What are you trying to pull?

E/DIR: (IGNORES HIM) You will always have to be assisted by others. (PAUSE) Would you call that independence? Not being able to hold your pen! Not being able to hold your mug! Not being able to button-up your shirt, your dress or tie your shoe laces! Would you call that independence? No! That's certainly not independence. (SOFTER) Our parliament is like that arm. Our national assembly is like that arm. Our cabinet is like that arm and so is our government. Let us give that arm a palm and fingers.

FX: APPLAUSE

Thank you. Regional and local authorities will provide government with hands and fingers to reach out to the people in all regions and villages.

APPLAUSE

I like that spirit! I like that very very much!

BULL: (EXCITED) We are going to the polls!

LETTIE & DODO:

Yes! We are going to the polls.

BULL: How do we vote ?

DODO: Yes. How do we vote? Please tell us more.

E/DIR: (ELATED) Okay, let me just get to my files here. (PAPERS RUSTLE) For those who read and can get hold of the government gazette, the electoral act is set-out in detail in the August 31st copy of this year. Section 82 of act 24 is the one dealing in the manner of voting at

elections.

DODO: What about us who never saw the inside of a classroom?

FX: LAUGHTER

LETTIE: Some of us dodged school at the first break.

FX: LAUGHTER EVEN LOUDER

E/DIR: (AS LAUGHTER SUBSIDES) That's why I am here. On arrival at the polling station you'll have to identify yourself and prove that you're a registered voter.

BEN: Do you need to see the registration card ?

E/DIR: Yes! You need to proof to us that you're a registered voter. That's why. It is also necessary for the polling officer to compare the information on your registration card to that on the voters' list. Sippose I'm the election officer at a polling station and you want to come and vote.

DODO: What...?

E/DIR: (TABLE & CHAIRS BEING MOVED) Come and vote.

FX: LAUGHTER

E/DIR: Come and vote. (SHUFFLING FEET) Good morning ma'am. May I have your ID. Thank you. Let me see your registration card ma'am Goodman.

DODO: Oh! I'm sorry, let me look for it in my purse.

E/DIR: At your leisure ma'am. (PAPER RUSTLES) Thank you very much. May I have your left hand please.

DODO: Why do you put that liquid onto my fingers?

E/DIR: Ma' am, this is an identification mark. We will be able to see it on your fingers for about seven days.

DODO: Is that why you first put my fingers under that thing?

E/DIR: Aha!

DODO: Does it mean I would not be able to come and vote for a second time if I had wished to cheat.

E/DIR: That's right. Now you can have your ballot paper. Let's rush through it before you go to the voting compartment to draw your cross.

DODO: Thank you.

E/DIR: I'm sorry. Before you go, let me just enter your voter's number on the counterfoil and also stamp your ballot paper for you. Thank you very much for your cooperation, ma'am.

DODO: Thank you.

E/DIR: Happy voting and please don't forget to put your ballot paper in the ballot box when you leave the voting compartment.

FX: APPLAUSE

That's how one votes.

JOHN: (SHOUTING) We are going to the polls! We are going to the polls!

ALL JOINING: We are going to the polls!

LETTIE: (SHOUTING ABOVE THE NOISE) Wait!! (NOISE SUBSIDES) Whom are we voting for? To participate in government. We don't intend ordering you whom to vote for. The choice is yours. You draw your cross next to the name of any of the candidates, political party or organization of your choice.

DODO: (SHOUTING AGAIN) We are going to the polls! We are going to the polls!

ALL: We are going to the polls: (STAMPING FEET) We are going to the polls! We are going to the polls!

GENTLY FADE OUT... AND FADE IN

FX: BIRDS IN THE BACKGROUND. LIGHT-HEARTED CHATS.

BEN: (ENTHUSIASTIC) They' re doing exactly like that lady told us. Look now, there's Bull. He is going to vote.

JOHN: Where is he? Do you see him?

BEN: Over there. Come and stand here. In that queue.

JOHN: Oh! I can see him now. He is producing his documents. The ID... The registration card...And Lettie there, only a few metres behind him, is holding her passport... That's also a form of identification. Isn't it?

JOHN: Yes.

BEN: Bull's fingers are being check at under the light for the identification mark. Now the officer is entering his voter's number onto the counterfoil. There he receives his ballot paper and now he is going to the voting compartment.

JOHN: It's nice because they allow you enough time to make-up your mind. You decide at your leisure where you want to draw your cross.

BEN: That is very important I should say. You should not afterwards come and say your cross is not where you actually intended it to be.

BULL: (APPROACHES) We are going to the polls.

BEN: Hallo Bull.

BULL: Hallo hallo.

JOHN: Hallo Bull.

BEN: Whom have you voted for?

BULL: What?! You must be kidding my friend.

JOHN: Tell him that you've voted for representation of the people in government.

BULL: That's right. There you have it. For participative government. (LOUDER THIS TIME) We are going to the polls! We are going to the polls! We are going to the polls!

GENTLY FADE OUT AND CROSS TO THE SIGGI BACK ANNOUNCEMENT

SIGGI UP AND OUT

FINIS

Phase Two of the Namibian Voter Education Project

I. SUMMARY

From September through December, 1994, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) conducted a voter education project in Namibia through a cooperative agreement with the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) funded by the U.S. Government AREAF grant. The project's aim was to promote greater involvement by the electorate and enable citizens to cast a more informed ballot during the presidential and parliamentary elections held December 7 and 8, 1994. In spite of widespread predictions of voter apathy, overall voter turnout nationally was more than 76 percent of the registered voters. In many regions it was greater. NBC called the project a success which it said would not have been possible without NDI's assistance.

II. BACKGROUND

This was NDI's third election in Namibia and its seventh year of in-country program activity. Prior to the 1989 Namibian election for a pre-independence constituent assembly, NDI brought a five-nation team of election experts to Namibia to critique the proposed election system and recommend specific changes. The Institute subsequently carried out a voter education project leading up to the elections and ultimately served as an international observer during the actual balloting in November 1989.

During the campaign for the 1992 Regional and Local Elections in Namibia, NDI cooperated in a voter education project with the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). Using radio exclusively, but broadcasting in all nine NBC language services, the project included panel discussions, quiz programs, a radio play, and a "Town Meeting of the Air." NBC considered the project a success, limited only by the lack of fruitful cooperation between the broadcasting corporation and the political parties (See NDI's Final Report: The Namibia Voter Education Project, October 15-December 15, 1992, page 9).

III. THE ELECTION FORUM

When a similar project was proposed for the 1994 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, NDI suggested involving the political parties more directly in the NBC voter education programming. "As a first step," stated the NDI project proposal, "NDI and the NBC will ask each political party to select two representatives each to serve on a party liaison committee to provide party input into programming and help bring agreement on the information to be broadcast."

This committee, which became known as the Election Forum, met weekly from September 14 to November 29 under the chairmanship of Vitura Kavari (Senior Controller, NBC News and Current Affairs) with NDI attending as a participating observer. The major political parties (SWAPO, DTA, UDF, DCN, FCN) invariably sent senior representatives and the Forum meetings proved vital both to the NDI-NBC working relationship, as well as the actual voter education programming carried out by NBC with NDI's help.

IV. NBC-NDI COOPERATION

NDI's role in this effort fell into two broad areas: (a) supporting NBC financially in expanding voter education activities already scheduled by the radio and television services and making possible totally new voter education programming in both radio and television. There was also a modest equipment component to the project: NDI helped fund the purchase of additional television camera recording cassettes to replace those used in NBC's expanded voter education programming.

NBC's radio staff had developed many of their own voter education program ideas during the 1989 and 1992 elections. In addition to expanded news coverage of election events, these included radio dramas, quiz shows and panel discussions. NDI funding made it possible to do substantially more of these than originally scheduled; including the commissioning of a new radio theater series entitled "The Silent Voice of the Ballot Paper" written by Moshe Baitsewe and produced in nine languages by NBC. Because' of radio staff shortages, and to ensure the widest possible listenership, NDI's Windhoek team ended up writing the spot announcements used to promote the radio series in nine languages.

Television news coverage of the registration and the campaign was also expanded with NDI's help, making it possible for more political rallies and other election activities to be aired. But the major television project planned by NBC was an unprecedented political debate between the two presidential candidates, President Sam Nujoma of SWAPO and his challenger Mishake Muyongo from the opposition DTA. The debate was to be televised live and broadcast simultaneously on nationwide radio.

V. THE FAILED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE

With the help of NDI's Sarah Malm in Washington and Janet Brown of the US. Commission on Presidential Debates, NDI's team in Windhoek was able to obtain quick answers to specific questions posed by NBC on how to conduct a presidential debate, as well as transcripts from the 1992 US presidential and vice-presidential debates.

When the debate proposal was first put to the Election Forum on November 7th, both SWAPO and DTA representatives greeted it enthusiastically, but then SWAPO, for reason best known to Sam Nujoma's immediate advisers, decided to withdraw. The SWAPO representative at the November 14th Election Forum meeting (according to the official NBC minutes of the meeting) "expressed his regret towards the NBC for the (SWAPO) decision taken and said that although SWAPO was in favor of the original proposal, it will not allow its Presidential candidate, in his capacity as the Father of the nation, to participate in a debate with a candidate who seemed to be hitting at the lowest possible level."

It ultimately became clear that SWAPO had decided not to allow President Nujoma to appear on live television during a debate or press conference situation where he might be provoked into making statements that could prove detrimental to his candidacy. He was already being attacked by the opposition for having reportedly stated at a campaign rally that Namibian police should shoot, without question, anyone trying to cross the Kavango river to or from Angola. SWAPO continued trying to make it appear that its decision to withdraw from the Presidential debate was taken because of DTA tactics, but it was obvious to the Election Forum that other motives were involved.

Forum Chairperson Vitura Kavara expressed his disappointment that the debate would not take place because it would have been a history-making event for Namibia and the NBC. NDI's representative at the November 14th meeting was Mary Elizabeth Johnson who (again, according to the NBC minutes) "also expressed disappointment that the debate did not materialize. She said the NDI staff in Washington went out of their way to gather scripts from past Presidential debates, as well as instructions and rules for such debates. The Presidential debate in South Africa was a monumental success. It was a rarity in Africa and it would have been a tremendous step forward for Namibia if they could have the same event. She said such a debate would be of importance for the present election as well as for the future since it would set a precedent for Namibia as part of the country's democratic evolution."

VI. THE PANEL DISCUSSION ALTERNATIVE

The loss of the presidential debate was discouraging, but SWAPO would not reconsider, preferring instead to have President Nujoma record all his television appearances in advance. In the interests of having at least some live election coverage on NBC, NDI's Sean Kelly suggested changing the format of an already scheduled election panel discussion into a live 90-minute "Town Meeting of the Air" with all political parties sending representatives to answer questions from a panel of local and international reporters. The program was broadcast live on both radio and television December first, just a week before the actual voting, and it proved to be the highlight of NBC's scheduled election programming.

NBC' news coverage of the electoral process was of course unscheduled, but it remained a key element of the NBC-NDI voter education project. NDI's funding for transportation and overtime made it possible for NBC to cover more political rallies and other election events than would otherwise have been possible, including the actual voting on December 7th and 8th.

VII. NDI AS FACILITATOR

NDI chartered several aircraft to take Namibian journalists to rallies in outlying areas during the final days of the campaigning. Three planes were chartered December 7th so that NBC and local press (on a space-available basis) could report the voting from polling stations throughout the country on the same day it took place. NDI made a point of assuring that radio reporters from the principal NBC language services (English, German, Nama/Damara, Oshivambo, and Otjiherero) were also included on the flights and given opportunity to report from the scene.

Throughout the period of the project, NDI worked closely with NBC, offering proposals during the Election Forum and Election Task Force meetings for broadcasting the scope of the voter education effort and meeting frequently with NBC's budget staff to find areas where there could be more cooperation between the two organizations. NDI's insistence on close accountability for funding while the project was underway occasionally resulted in NBC's expressing its irritation, particularly when it became clear that NDI's requirements for accountability from NBC were often greater than those that NBC required of itself.

Some of this irritability becomes evident in the final recommendations made by Vitura Kavari, who served as chairperson of both the Election Forum and the NBC Task Force:

> *"That the NBC agrees well in advance about the nature, scope and implementation mechanisms and methods for any sponsoring/participating institutions. This may help to avoid a situation whereby NBC would be negotiating continuously about certain concessions as regards the utilization of funds 'right in the middle of the storm' as it happened at times with the NDI Fund during the 1994 Presidential and National Assembly Elections."*

In short, NBC would simply prefer being granted the voter education funds in advance to use as it sees fit. Unfortunately, US Government accounting procedures rarely allow such programming flexibility.

Kavan nonetheless took time out in his report to express NBC's gratitude to NDI and its Windhoek team, as well as NDI in Washington. "We want to take up this opportunity," he said, "to thank the National Democratic Institute for its most needed assistance. The success that the NBC boasts pertaining to the public information/education campaign would not have been possible without the financial and moral assistance from NDI."

VIII. NAMIBIA'S ALTERNATIVE RADIO

Early in 1994, Radio 99 began offering news, music and features in FM stereo to English, Afrikaans and German-speaking listeners in Windhoek. The station began on a modest scale, but quickly picked up an enthusiastic following among urban whites dissatisfied with NBC's increasingly Afrocentric programming. Commercial advertising poured in, much of it from South Africa. By September, Radio 99 had acquired a growing African audience and was launching repeater stations in Swakopmund and Walvis Bay.

Aware of Radio 99's growth and concerned over the exclusivity of its support to state-funded NBC, NDI began exploring the possibility of some form of voter education assistance to Namibia's only private enterprise radio station. Initial discussions centered on, purchasing air time on Radio 99 for Namibian political parties to broadcast political announcements. NDI would also assure that Radio 99 news reporters were included on chartered flights with NBC staffers covering political rallies and other election events in outlying areas.

Four Namibian political parties took advantage of NDI's offer of Radio 99's facilities. The DTA, UDF, Swanu, and the FCN all prepared 60-second political announcements which were broadcast during the period shortly before voting began. These followed some of the suggestions made during NDI's media workshops, including the use of sound effects and clear, simple writing styles. Radio 99 also carried several public service announcements prepared by NDI. Several Radio 99 reporters were included in the chartered flights to political rallies and polling stations. Altogether, the level of voter education support provided by NDI to Radio 99 was probably about as much as the commercial station could absorb.

IX. CONCLUSION

As noted above, the NDI-NBC working relationship was occasionally strained by NBC's assumption that it had been granted voter education funds for use on an as-needed basis. When NDI asked how the money was being used, or suggested that more voters might be reached by NBC radio language services than NBC television (radio reaches 90 percent of the Namibian population, television only 45 percent -- by NBC's own estimates), there was an occasional note of resentment expressed by NBC.

It should be stated that NBC is going through a difficult period of intensified competition by commercial radio and television and that morale among news and programming staff is at a low point. Tension exists along racial and ethnic lines, as well as between employees hired prior to independence and since. In spite of these problems, NBC did a commendable job of educating voters how and why to participate in the 1994 electoral process. It also did outstandingly in its attempts to report this process to the Namibian people by radio and television. To the extent that NDI was able to expand these efforts through AREAF funding does credit both to the AREAF and to NDI. By any measure of the project, it was money well spent.

THE SILENT VOICE OF THE BALLOT PAPER

Author: Moshê M. Baitsewe

Episode: 1

Characters:

1. Alma
2. Thansti
3. Tjikuru
4. Ttjikuume

SIGGI UP AND FADE TO THE BACKGROUND... ...OPENING ANNOUNCEMENT BY PRESENTER... ...SIGGI UP AGAIN THEN GRADUALLY FADE OUT.

FX: A RUNNING MINIBUS WITH TWO OF THE OCCUPANTS HAVING A CHAT. SOFT MUSIC AUDIBLE FROM RADIO.

Alma: Driver...What time did you say we are going to arrive in Windhoek? I don't want to arrive there during the night because I'm afraid of the botsotso's. I don't know Windhoek you know.

Thantsi: Alma please... How many times must I tell you not to worry. I told you to relax. I know you don't trust me as yet. It is only eleven o'clock now. I expect us to be in Windhoek by lunch hour. And I promised to deliver you right at the front gate of your people.

Alma: I know you told me so and I'm very sorry if I sound as if I'm doubting you. I'm very thankful for your kindness.

Thantsi: It's enough just to say Mahenke because that man is a very successful businessman and also a very popular man. I'll deliver you right in front of his gate. And please call me Thantsi. I'm not denying that I'm a driver but that's but merely my means of earning a living. Jobs are difficult to come by.

Alma: (WORRIED) Please don't be impatient with me. If you leave me, what'll happen to me in a city full of botsotso's like Windhoek. They'll grab me.

Thantsi: (LAUGHS HEARTILY) You are so infatuated with this botsotso thing of yours. Where did you hear about them?

Alma: What do you mean? The people are talking.

Thantsi: I agree, but then we must first consider the root cause of the evil.

Alma: What could be the...?

Thantsi: (MAKING HER SILENT) Hush! A CATCHY TUNE COMES OVER THE RADIO. IT'S AN ELECTION JINGLE, MUSIC FADES TO THE BACKGROUND. ANNOUNCER: Remember that you did not register just in order for you to have a registration card. It's not a certificate for you to frame and hang up against the wall or to simply add to your pile of frame documents. Remember this... You must vote!!! Even if voting is optional. It is your civil responsibility to make your vote count. The silent voice of the ballot-paper speaks louder than a loudspeaker. FADE UP MUSIC AND CROSSFADE INTO SOFT MUSIC AGAIN.

Thantsi: I like to listen to these jingles. They are so beautiful.

Alma: I must be honest with you. I really don't like them. Not at all.

Thantsi: Why? You seem so disturbed. What's the matter?

Alma: No. The fault lies with Tjikuru...

Thantsi: (ASKANCE) Tjikuru?

Alma: Yes my grandmother.

Thantsi: What? Your granny...What did she do?

Alma: Oh Thantsi, forget it. It's rather a very long story.

Thantsi: Oh no, Alma. You are not going to shrug me that easily. I really want to know. I have made it my job to study the modern youth. They find fault with almost everything old people do or say. Maybe it's not even the oldtimer's fault at all. Let me hear the story. Please.

Alma: You can't back-off. Can you?

Thantsi: I insist.

Alma: Okay. If you say so but I'll give it to you in a nutshell.

Thantsi: I want the whole story. It's only then that I'll be able to assess it.

Alma: (EXCLAIMS) Thantsi!

Thantsi: Please...

Alma: Okay then... It was late in the afternoon and one of those... What did you call them again...?

Thantsi: Jingles.

Alma: Yeh. One of them started to play over the radio and Tjikuume had just arrived home with the goats which had been missing for a couple of days.

(REVERB AND GRADUALLY CROSSFADE INTO THE NEXT SCENE)

FX: LATE AFTERNOON SOUNDS AT A HOMESTEAD IN THE COUNTRY, FOR EXAMPLE THAT OF A HEN WITH CHICKS AND IN THE BACKGROUND A GOATBELL CAN BE HEARD AS THE SMALLSTOCKS APPROACH.

Tjikuru: Am I hearing a goatbell approaching? has he really found them?

Alma: Yes Tjikuru. It's our goats. They're coming and Tjikuume is behind them.

Tjikuru: Then you must hurry up and add some more wood to the fire to get the water boiling. He must be very tired and only a big mug of hot tea will refresh him and give him his strength back. Hurry up now.

Alma: Okay Tjikuru.

FX: SOUND OF WOOD BEING BROKEN: FIRE STARTS TO FLAME.

Tjikuume: (APPROACHES) Hallo Tjikuru.

Tjikuru: Mbiri nawa mundu nansje. It must've been a tough day for you. Where did you find them?

Tjikuume: Quite a day, I'm telling you. My feet are killing me! I found them on the other side of the koppie. Alma, bring me my radio please.

Alma: Okay Tjikuume (WALKS AWAY ON GRAVEL).

Tjikuru: Are they still together?

Tjikuume: Fortunately yes. It's not the four-legged jackal one is always worried about but the two-legged one you know.

Tjikuru: I know.

Alma: (APPROACHES) Here is the radio Tjikuume.

Tjikuume: Thank you my girl. (HE SWITCHED THE RADIO ON).

FX: ANNOUNCER ON RADIO: Vote! Vote for the party of your choice. Remember, the cross you make speaks for you. Whatever you do, please do vote. It's important! Remember that democracy is a baby that needs to be nurtured in order for it to grow strong.

Tjikuume: (SWITCHING OFF THE RADIO) What is this democracy thing they are talking about these days?

Tjikuru: What do you expect me to tell you? You know that we have been to the same school decades ago and they did not talk about things like democracy then. There is your granddaughter Alma. Why don't you ask her? At least she is also of the modern material she's supposed to know these things.

Tjikuume: You're right you know. Alma, please explain to me this democracy thing is all about. What is it?

Alma: (FROM A DISTANCE) I also don't know what that really is, Tjikuume. I never learned about it when I was at school.

Tjikuru: How could you not be knowing. You have a matric and we sold all our cattle to pay for your schooling. How is that really possible.

Alma: Tjikuru, please. Why don't you try and understand my side of the matter also. I mean this is a newly found independence we are having and all the things that came along with it are as new to me as they are to you. The teachers did not teach us about democracy and neither did they tell us about votes and rights.

Tjikuru: But you've dragged us here so that we can go and register. Why did you force us to go and register if you do not even know what is was all about?

Alma: The announcement came over the radio that everyone who did not register in 1992 must go and register.

Tjikuru: But how could you just blindly walk into something without knowing where is leads? And above all drag us along. Maybe it's something only for young people.

Alma: Tjikuru... I don't know. I did not drag you along. You could have refused if you did not want to go and register. Why didn't you just say no?!

Tjikuume: (STERN) Child, I don't like that kind of a tone when you're speaking to adults!

Alma: But you're unreasonable because you expect me to know things I was not taught at school. Having a matric certificate does not make me a know-it-all.

Tjikuume: What's got into you child?!

Tjikuru: That's what I've been trying to tell you all the time but you would

not listen to me. She's getting out of hand. It's because she is just hanging around here and doing absolutely nothing! Her equals are there in the cities. They've gone to look for work.

Alma: (RUDE) It's okay! If that's what you want. I'll be gone first thing tomorrow morning.

REVERB AD GRADUALLY CROSSFADE BACK TO PREVIOUS SCENE

FX: RUNNING VEHICLE WITH OCCUPANTS CHATTING.

Thantsi: (SURPRISED) And that is your reason for leaving home?!

Alma: Yes.

Thantsi: Even if you don't know Windhoek like you claim? I think you were unreasonable. They surely did not mean what they said. I mean you know how old people are.

Alma: I know what you mean but there are limits. I could not take it anymore. I had no choice.

Thantsi: How could one be angered by a little thing like that?

Alma: (ASKANCE) Little thing?! What are you talking about? Since the registration I have been under constant attack from them. They for example want to know from me, why do we need to keep voting if we already have a president and a government that has been elected by the people, in place or can they as old people also vote or who can vote and who can be voted for? I don't know all these things. All I know is that one should be older than eighteen years if he or she wants to register to vote. That's all I know.

Thantsi: I'm sorry if I should sound too harsh but I still think you were unreasonable. You should have sought information about voting. What it's all about and what democracy means from party representatives in your area. Better still you could have contacted the election directorate's training and voter education section for information.

Alma: I don't have their number, Thantsi. You make it sound so easy.

Thantsi: The NBC's election desk would also have helped you had you contacted them and if you did not have their number you could have phoned the chat show. They would've helped.

Alma: You're right you know. I did not think about all the possibilities then. I just wanted to get away. Don't you think I should gather all the information about voting, the whole election process and why it is necessary to vote.

Thantsi: (ELATED) Are you serious?!

Alma: Yep! Dead serious.

Thantsi: Okay then. First of all I'll take you to your people and then I'll pick you up at seven-thirty this evening so that we can go and attend a workshop on voter education.

Alma: I would really love that. (PAUSE) Oh my goodness!!

Thantsi: What's the matter now Alma?

Alma: (EXCLAIM) Windhoek is so big!

Thantsi: Oh yes, of course. It's the big bowl.

Alma: You can say that again. It's really contained within the mountains and it resembles one gigantic bowl. Look at the multitude of people. Are the houses really enough to house them all? The streets are thronged with people!

Thantsi: Wait till you get to the heart of Windhoek and then you'll tell me. And no, all the people can be housed at this moment, because the resources of this country does not allow it. On the other hand our independence is only four years old.

SIGGI TUNE UP AND FADE TO B.G.

Closing announcement .....

SIGGI UP AND OUT

NBC ELECTION DRAMA PROMOS BY SEAN KELLY

"THE SILENT VOICE OF THE BALLOT PAPER"

EPISODE #1, PROMO #1:

(Take from Page 1)

THE CATCHY TUNE COMES OVER THE RADIO. IT'S AN ELECTION JINGLE. MUSIC FADES TO THE BACKGROUND.

ANNOUNCER: Remember that you did not register just in order to have a registration card. It's not a certificate for you to frame and hang up against the wall or to simply add to your pile of documents. Remember this... You must vote!!! Even if voting is optional. It is you civil responsibility to make you vote count. The silent voice of the paper speaks louder than a loudspeaker.

FADE UP MUSIC AND HOLD BRIEFLY THEN FADE AGAIN.

(New material)

2ND ANNOUNCER: NBC presents the first episode of its new election radio theater "The Silent Voice of the Ballot Paper" Be sure to be listening at (hour) on (day) to hear how one Namibian family comes to terms with the 1994 elections!

Section Two

International Election Observation

The presence of AREAF-sponsored international observers has helped legitimize and build confidence in African electoral processes throughout the last four years. International observers serve as the representatives of the international community, and draw attention to successful elections and electoral processes. If necessary, observation missions expose and publicize misguided or openly fraudulent electoral practices. AREAF international observer delegations regularly made recommendations to governments, election commissions, and NGOs as to potential improvements on existing electoral systems.

Throughout the duration of AREAF, providing international observer missions for elections in Africa was one of the most fundamental areas of work for the implementing partners. These programs deployed diverse observer teams, combining experts from throughout the world with African expertise to maximize the credibility and scope of work for each mission. International observer missions are usually accredited by a local electoral authority, and work in conjunction with the electoral commissions and domestic non-governmental organizations interested in promoting transparent elections.

During the onset of AREAF activities, many of the international observation missions were short-term missions, with large numbers of observers coming from developed countries. These large teams lent an aura of local and international credibility to an electoral process and a newly-installed President or legislature, if the process went smoothly. These groups also exposed electoral fraud if it occurred, and made specific recommendations on how the country and its electoral commission could better prepare for the next round of elections.

Over its lifetime, AREAF adapted quickly to the ever-advancing African democratization process. As more and more African countries took their first steps toward and beyond multi-party, competitive elections, the focus of AREAF observer delegations changed. Over the past three years, the AREAF partners chose to emphasize smaller, longer-term delegations. AREAF delegations arrived in-country earlier, and stayed later. This gave the teams the opportunity to observe not only election day, but also:

- the registration process for voters, candidates, and political parties;
- the political campaign and civic education practices before the election;
- the vote tabulation process and transmission of results; and
- immediate public and private reaction to the announced results.

This long-term approach proved of particular benefit and importance to AREAF partners and the U.S. Government in countries where doubts existed as to the integrity of the electoral process. AREAF thus had the opportunity to comment on many aspects of the electoral process, not just the day of the vote itself.

AREAF partners have consistently included Africans in international missions, to increase African observing capacity, and to provide African election authorities with the opportunity to learn more about electoral systems in neighboring countries.

Upon arrival in-country, international observer delegations normally held preparatory meetings with appropriate government, political, civic and electoral officials before deploying for pre-election assessments or election day observation upcountry. Upon returning from their deployment sites after the election, the team members reconvened in the capital city for a debriefing session and to draft a preliminary statement.

Many African countries have now gone through the first round of national presidential elections. The emphasis now is shifting to the next phase, namely legislative and local or municipal elections. AREAF partners undertook several successful international observer missions designed to support these subsequent elections, e.g. in Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Uganda.

Electoral assessment programs designed to determine the readiness of nations to successfully execute elections are also included in this section. These programs aided the organizations responsible for implementing the elections in identifying areas where focused assistance would be the most useful. These programs also assisted in examining any impending trouble areas.

Most election observation programs included project components aside from witnessing the machinations of electoral procedures and verifying results. Many of these projects included components meant to assist local institutions in promoting open and fair elections. Such programs included direct commodity assistance to electoral commissions, training of domestic monitors through local NGOs, press and media capacity building, and other related projects. A separate section is included in this report for those programs which provided focused assistance to governments and NGOs.

GUINEA
PRE-ELECTORAL ASSESSMENT
FOR THE 1992 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
IRI

Background

The Government of Guinea, through the US Embassy in Conakry, requested that the IRI train government poll workers and political party poll watchers for the 1992 Legislative elections. In order to determine how best to train those involved in the December elections, the IRI conducted an in-country pre-electoral assessment mission.

Program Activities

In order to properly assess the political and social situation in Guinea, the IRI team met with a wide array of government electoral officials in the Interior Ministry, as well as other top government officials; top officials of the CYK (the French consulting firm reportedly given 50 million French francs to perform a major technical and training role in the elections); the Chief Judge of the then newly-installed Supreme Court; leading officials of the 42 registered political parties; members of the government controlled and independent media; activists; civic associations; religious leaders; foreign and Guinean business persons, and citizens in the capital city of Conakry and the cities of Kankan, Kindia and Mamou.

Findings and Evaluation

The pre-electoral assessment was successfully completed. The IRI found, however, that there were four major problems which mitigated against the holding of free, fair and transparent elections scheduled to be held on December 27. These problems were the following: 1) there was a dearth of cooperation between the government and political parties that threatened the development of a truly democratic process; 2) there was a crippling lack of knowledge about the democratic process and experience in operating an electoral system; as well as a lack of information necessary to hold elections at the time; 3) there was a widespread tension emanating from several social and political sources that threatened to explode in post-election violence if not taken into account in electoral planning; 4) procedural delays and uncertainties, combined with systematic infrastructural shortcomings, which made the holding of elections on schedule a daunting task at best.

The aforementioned problems, as well as several others, led the IRI team to conclude that absent changes in the then current process, a free, fair and transparent election process would be impossible. While transparency could have been achieved on some level, it would have had little or no meaning in the context of an election process that was patently unfair in its then current form.

IRI noted however, that there was an apparent interest in and support for democracy among government officials and the political opposition. With appropriate outside assistance and the cooperation of both sides in Guinean politics, it remains possible that this situation could be corrected.

KENYA
PRE-ELECTORAL ASSESSMENT
FOR THE 1992 GENERAL ELECTIONS
IRI

Background

Following the suspension of foreign aid from major donor nations in November 1991, Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi began certain political and economic reforms. In early December 1991, Moi convinced his political party colleagues to agree to multi-party elections. On December 10, 1991, the constitutional clause 2(a) declaring "there shall be in Kenya only one political party, the Kenyan African National Union" was officially repealed, signaling an intent to return to multi-party competition for the first time in 26 years.

Program Activities

The International Republican Institute conducted an extensive pre-electoral assessment in Kenya over a two-month period. From October 29 through November 6, a six-person team including International Republican Institute staff and election experts conducted its first comprehensive analysis of the pre-election environment and the feasibility of organizing an international election observation mission in Kenya. From December 4-16, 1992, the IRI deployed several teams of campaign, media, academic, and election law experts throughout the country for a detailed pre-electoral analysis.

The IRI delegation met with individuals from the Government of Kenya, foreign diplomats, political parties, academics, media, churches and non-governmental organizations in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Kisii, Machakos, and Nakuru. The IRI team specifically sought to assess the country's electoral framework, the role of the media, the role played by the NGOs and political parties, and the feasibility of organizing an international observer delegation.

Findings and Evaluation

The findings of this 20-person assessment team were released in a press conference held on December 16, 1992 in Nairobi. In their preliminary statement of findings, the IRI team noted that they were encouraged by pre-electoral actions of the Electoral Commission to promote greater transparency in the administration of the elections. However, they did note fears that the overall process was significantly compromised by the Government of Kenya on behalf of the ruling party.

In addition, the IRI team noted its grave concern over the frequency with which various political participants were promising wide-scale, violent confrontations before, during, and after election day. IRI appealed to all Kenyans to refrain from such pronouncements, to stop the harassment of candidates and their supporters, and seek nonviolent resolutions of perceived campaign and election irregularities. The IRI asked that individuals directly contact international observers with documented evidence, if possible, regarding perceived problems.

KENYA
ELECTION OBSERVATION
FOR THE 1992 GENERAL ELECTIONS
IRI

Background

Following an extensive two-phase assessment of the Kenyan pre-electoral environment, IRI fielded a team of international observers for the December 27 general elections. These elections offered an historic opportunity for Kenyans to select their leadership from an array of political parties.

Program Activities

From December 16-28, 1992, the IRI sent small teams to areas of special concern throughout the country. On election day (December 29), the IRI deployed 54 people nationwide to observe the voting and counting. This delegation was comprised of political, academic and democratic development specialists from 13 countries throughout the world. The group was deployed in more than 25 teams over 46 constituencies for the period of the election.

On election day, observers visited 229 polling stations and spoke with many presiding officers. They also spoke to 68 returning officers, thousands of party agents and 438 domestic election observers.

Findings and Evaluation

The IRI issued a preliminary statement of findings on December 31, 1992. After most of the counting process had been completed on January 4, the IRI released a follow-up statement. In their final January 4 statement, the IRI delegation noted confusion and irregularities in the counting of votes. Breakdowns in ballot security at various counting stations, coupled with an electoral environment favoring the government, and ingrained suspicions because of Kenya's past electoral experience raised questions about the validity of the election.

The IRI delegation found the electoral environment to be unfair and the electoral process to be seriously flawed. They questioned whether all Kenyans were able to freely express their will, although millions did, but from the IRI's perspective the process was still a significant step in Kenya's transition to a genuine multi-party democracy. To ensure that democracy takes root, the IRI recommended that parties create mechanisms to resolve their disputes. The IRI noted that Kenya's democratic aspirations put a heavy responsibility on both the governing and the opposition parties. Restoring national harmony and the avoidance of further ethnic and political polarization and violence is a shared responsibility.

DJIBOUTI
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
AAI

Background

Since its independence from France, Djibouti had been governed by single party rule. This pattern was broken after a national referendum on September 4, 1992, which allowed the adoption of a new constitution for Djibouti. The new constitution mandated that multiparty elections be held. These elections would be the first multiparty elections in Djibouti since 1977. Due to the uncertainty of the electoral environment and questioning of the general political will to go forward with these elections, the US Embassy requested electoral assistance.

Project Activities

In response to the Government of Djibouti's invitation to international observers and the American Embassy's request for observers, the African-American Institute sent a three-person observer team to Djibouti. The AAI team conducted a two-day interrogatory survey immediately prior to the elections to assess the pre-electoral environment. The team met independently with all the significant actors in the process, including leaders of the three legal political parties, an Afar human rights activist and other Afar leaders residing in Djiboutiville. The AAI delegation coordinated an election observation mission to be deployed jointly with other international observers.

The results of the elections were a three-to-one victory in the popular vote for the ruling party. Djibouti employed for these elections a winner-take-all list system, by which the party that wins 50 percent plus one of the popular vote in a district takes all the seats for the district. Consequently the ruling Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progres (RPP) secured all of the seats in the National Assembly.

Findings and Evaluation

This project was successfully carried out under extreme time constraints. In a matter of days, the AAI team assessed the pre-electoral environment through an interrogatory survey identifying the salient actors and issues involved in the elections. While the AAI team observed some procedural irregularities on election day and heard credible reports of others - particularly in areas outside the capital - the team did not witness systematic fraud. However, these elections cannot be taken as a fully representative reflection of the will of the Djiboutian people, considering the well-organized boycott by the Afar people and the non-participation of one of the three legal political parties.

AAI's willingness to rapidly respond to the Government of Djibouti's request for assistance exemplified US interest in democratic development and more specifically, electoral assistance. AAI's observer delegation presented effective analysis of the electoral process and made concrete recommendations for future elections in their final report. The final report was distributed to various members of the government, political parties and civic groups and was well received by national electoral officials.

CAMEROON
ELECTION MONITOR TRAINING AND ELECTION OBSERVATION
NDI

Background

In late August, 1992, Cameroon's President Paul Biya announced that presidential elections, which were to be held by mid-1993, were scheduled for October 11, 1992. Most political parties had previously indicated that they would participate in the elections, although the electoral code under which the elections would take place was not clear. The provision of trainers and election observers by NDI came in response to a request made by the Government of Cameroon before its recent legislative elections.

Project Activities

NDI sponsored an election monitoring seminar in Yaoundé in collaboration with the Study and Research Group on Democracy, Economy, and Social Development (GERDDES), a nonpartisan regional democratic development organization. More than 170 Cameroonian political activists attended the conference, which took place from October 2 to 4, and discussed in detail aspects of organizing domestic election ob-

server missions. The seminar sought to "train trainers," who then would share this information with their organizations or political parties before the election. In all, approximately 1,000 party and civic leaders participated in the seminar in Yaoundé and follow-on training sessions conducted by the international trainers in Douala, Bamenda and Garoua from October 5 to 8.

NDI also fielded a thirteen-member international observer delegation supplemented by six staff members. Nine countries were represented: Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Hungary, Mexico and the United States. Delegation members were sent to nine out of the ten provinces. The election observation delegation was led by Canadian Senator Al Graham and James Tierney, former Attorney General of Maine.

From October 7 to 9 the international delegation received a series of orientation briefings in Yaoundé. These included meetings with representatives from the diplomatic community, the press, academia, the government, election officials, Supreme Court officials and the political parties. All observers spent time before the election meeting in their respective regions with election officials, representatives of the various political parties and ordinary citizens.

On election day, each team visited twenty to thirty polling sites to assess the different stages of the voting process. The observers also interviewed voters and other individuals with information pertinent to the observation mission. In addition to monitoring at the polling station level, the observers also followed the vote counting process at the polling place, subdivision and division levels well into the next day.

Findings and Evaluation

NDI's project in Cameroon was an important beginning in helping to identify key issues in the electoral process of a country where a former de facto single-party government was attempting to show its democratic bonafides. Through training of Cameroonian poll watchers and through the delegation's report, commonly accepted norms and standards for elections received broad dissemination, not only in Cameroon, but throughout the region. The delegation's reports were widely read and cited. The message was clearly sent, for example, that what transpires in the pre-election period is as important as what happens on election day itself, and that a government that spouts the rhetoric of democracy without internalizing democratic values will not receive the embrace of the international community of democracies. NDI hopes the groundwork has been laid for a democratic Cameroon to arise out of its 1992 "false start."

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SURVEY MISSION NDI

Background

The Central African Republic was scheduled to hold presidential and legislative elections on October 25, 1992 with run-off elections to be held on November 9. The CAR was actually a decade ahead of the curve in Africa when it held a national conference in December 1980 followed by multi-party elections in 1981. Unfortunately, the democratization experiment failed when the elections were apparently stolen with the apparent complicity of France. The opposition candidates never accepted the results, and a decade of poor governance ensued.

Led by the US Embassy, the international community stressed to the CAR government that it would not receive any electoral assistance unless it met three conditions relating to (1) media access, (2) an independent electoral commission, and (3) the appointment of an appropriate interlocutor in the CAR government for the diplomatic

community. The CAR met the last of these conditions on September 26, but the US was unable to find any means of providing either technical assistance or international observers.

Pursuant to discussions with the State Department, USAID, and embassy personnel, NDI agreed to send a two-person team to Bangui, CAR for a brief survey mission prior to the October 25 elections. After participating in an NDI program in Cameroon, the NDI team traveled to Bangui for a two-day period from October 18-19, 1992.

Project Activities

NDI's brief visit to Bangui had two goals: to assess the political environment as the country neared multiparty elections on October 25, and to advise embassy personnel about the process of election observation. Over the two-day period, the NDI team met with political and labor leaders, election officials and members of the diplomatic community. Despite the fact that no outside U.S. election observer delegation was organized, the US Embassy organized its own election-day observation efforts. During the survey, NDI met with embassy staff to discuss and advise on their plans and the possibility for coordinating efforts with other members of the diplomatic community in Bangui.

The NDI team briefed the Americans who would be observing on election day on a number of issues, including: (1) how observers should conduct themselves when they noted problems, (2) coordination with other observer efforts, and (3) what to do with the information after the elections. More specifically, the team discussed how observers could check or assess a number of issues relevant to CAR: (a) voter lists, voter disenfranchisement and the possibility of phantom voters, (b) the presence of various party representatives for the polling and counting process, (c) the secrecy of the balloting process, (d) the sufficiency of the number of ballots for all parties, (e) the counting process, (f) transmission of local results to Bangui, (g) problems of intimidation and (h) the relative impartiality of local election officials.

Findings and Evaluation

After the team's visit, CAR attempted unsuccessfully to hold elections. Citing disruptions of the process at various locations, the CAR government halted the balloting process on election day. Despite these setbacks, NDI's team was reasonably encouraged by the ultimate prospects for democratization in CAR and returned to Washington with the impression that NDI involvement could make a difference in future elections. Based on its findings during this initial visit to CAR, NDI developed training programs to assist in the realization of a successful future election.

NIGER
COORDINATING INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS
NDI

Background

NDI first conducted programming in support of Niger's democratic transition in March 1992, when it sponsored an election observer training seminar in Niamey. In October 1992, NDI organized political party campaign training programs in Niamey and Zinder. For Niger's legislative and presidential elections in spring, 1993, NDI conducted a pre-election assessment and co-organized a series of coordinated observer missions.

Given the growth in the number of international election observation delegations, and the demands that have been placed upon NDI to conduct observation-related

programming, NDI used Niger as a model to test an innovative approach to ensuring the quality of international observation efforts. The idea was to provide NDI staff expertise, in collaboration with the UN, in preparing briefing material, a joint observer deployment plan throughout the country, and a common debriefing. The purposes of this program, in addition to the broad objectives of encouraging transparency and adherence to the electoral laws and assessing the credibility of the process, were 1) to limit the prospect of widely inconsistent assessments based on a lack of information by observer groups; 2) to avoid duplication of efforts; and 3) to use limited resources effectively.

Project Activities

NDI, in close cooperation with the United Nations Electoral Assistance Bureau and the United Nations Development Program, conceived a program to coordinate all impartial observers attending the elections in Niger. An NDI consultant was present in Niger from January through the second round of the presidential election. The consultant and staff wrote a pre-election assessment report, explained and implemented the coordinated observer program to the international community, and helped to provide the conditions under which the consensus of the international observers could be developed and made public.

Findings and Evaluation

The project was highly successful. As anticipated, a sense of common purpose developed amongst the international observers and their conclusions about the elections reflected their access to more information about the elections than would have been the case without this project. The situation was facilitated by the fact that the process of conducting and competing in the elections was generally professional, transparent and without fraud. More important, the results were accepted by all political parties.

Subsequent to the elections, NDI has focused on the evaluation of its program and drafting the final report. NDI held an in-house roundtable discussion on the lessons learned from the effort to coordinate election observers. The major points noted were the importance of preserving individual delegations' autonomy and the improvements in efficiency and quality of observation. In addition, NDI has written an extensive evaluation of lessons learned from the experience in Niger in the "Reflections" chapter of the final report.

SENEGAL
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
NDI

Background

In January 1993, NDI proposed to organize an international election observation program for the February 21 presidential election in Senegal. This program was intended to supplement NDI's AREAF-funded pollwatching program for political parties. The six program objectives were 1) to demonstrate the support of the international community for free and fair elections; 2) to promote public confidence in the election process; 3) to provide credible observers for the presidential elections and to assess the electoral process; 4) to report to the international community on the electoral process; 5) to increase the chances that losing candidates and parties will accept the results of a reasonably fair process; and 6) to recommend to the Senegalese government possible solutions to electoral problems.

In April, due to serious problems that were noted during the presidential elections, NDI reprogrammed money left over from the presidential election observers program and send a four-member assessment team to the May 9 legislative elections. NDI sought to lend support to a transparent process and assess the changes made in electoral administration following problems encountered during the presidential election.

Project Activities

NDI representatives Jill Pilgrim, Steven Siegler and Program Assistant Maryam Montague were present in Senegal for a number of weeks before the election and throughout the three-week presidential campaign. They closely followed the pre-election period, and assessed media fairness, voter registration and other election preparations. They also held regular meetings with election officials, political party representatives, journalists and Senegalese electoral experts who provided information regarding the conduct of the election. Based on these observations, NDI released a pre-election report shortly before the election.

For the election, NDI sponsored a 38-member international observer delegation comprised of parliamentarians, political party leaders, electoral experts and regional specialists from 16 countries in Africa, Europe, North America and the Middle East. Following their arrival in Dakar, the delegates were briefed by Senegalese political party representatives, journalists and government officials. Two days before the election, the delegation leaders held a press conference in Dakar to describe their activities.

Before election day, the delegation was divided into nine teams, eight of which were dispatched outside of Dakar. The delegation leaders remained in Dakar to meet with several presidential candidates. Upon arrival at their destinations, the teams met with the local mayor, governor and a member of the departmental election commission. Observer groups were dispersed on election day to allow for a maximum number of polling sites to be visited in each assigned region.

At each polling place, delegates completed election-day checklists and interviewed voters. Following the closing of the polls, delegation members observed the counting of the ballots at the polling stations. Most delegates were assigned responsibility of collecting polling results from a number of pre-selected polling sites as part of a vote count verification exercise. Some delegates also observed the tabulation of the results at the departmental level.

Official results were proclaimed on March 13. Announcement of results was delayed due to the failure of the National Vote Tabulation Commission to complete its work because of internal partisan divisions. On April 8, NDI issued an interim report based on observations made by the Institute's field representatives. The report concluded that insufficient evidence existed to call into question the re-election of Abdou Diouf. The report also contained a number of recommendations to establish voter confidence and participation in the Senegalese electoral process.

NDI continued to observe the Senegalese electoral process by organizing a four-member international assessment team for the May 9 legislative elections. The team convened in Dakar for briefings several days before elections. On election day, the team traveled throughout Dakar and nearby regions assessing the voting and counting processes at the polling places. The team reassembled in Dakar after the election for debriefing and informational meetings.

Findings and Evaluation

NDI was successful in meeting most of its objectives. The NDI delegation was the largest international observer delegation present during the presidential election and the only organization that maintained a continuous presence in Senegal from before the campaign period until the official proclamation of the results and the only

organization to return to assess the parliamentary elections. NDI's decision to remain in Senegal throughout the tabulation process proved significant in light of controversies that arose when the National Vote Tabulation Commission became deadlocked over vote counting procedures.

NDI was therefore able to promote confidence throughout the entire presidential election process. NDI's press conferences and executive summary report of April 8 provided the international community and the Senegalese population with an objective and independent assessment of events surrounding the presidential election.

KENYA
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION FOR THE 1993 BY-ELECTIONS
IRI

Background

In April 1993, amid widespread rumors of bribery by the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU), the sitting members of Parliament in Banker and Magyar defected from opposition parties to KANU. In accordance with the Kenyan constitution, when an MP switches parties, a by-election must be held for the parliamentary seat. As a follow-up to their previous electoral assistance in Kenya, IRI assembled and deployed a team of international observers for the May by-elections.

Program Activities

The by-elections were held on May 20 in both constituencies of Bonchari and Migori. From 16-24 May 1993, a four-person team composed of International Republican Institute (IRI) program officers and two academics observed the by-elections in both constituencies and conducted an analysis of the election environment. The IRI team focused on assessing the progress made in Kenya since December with respect to multi-party democracy, paying particular attention to the election environment.

Findings and Evaluation

IRI successfully completed the election observation mission. The IRI released a press statement summarizing their initial findings while still in Nairobi. A full report was released by the IRI in early July which presented the team's analysis of the by-elections as well as a political update. The IRI team found that although election day procedures were followed, for the most part, the atmosphere in the days leading up to the polls clearly affected people's willingness to vote and their faith in the democratic process.

The IRI noted its disappointment in the lack of progress by the Kenyan government in creating an electoral environment more conducive to pluralistic democracy since the general elections of 1992. IRI made final recommendations to enhance public confidence in, and improve the transparency of future elections.

UGANDA
ASSESSMENT MISSION
AAI/IRI

Background

After years of delays and undemocratic actions, such as the arrest in January 1992 of fifteen leaders of the two major parties, the time table finally seemed to be falling in

place for the process that would lead to a democratic Uganda. The Constitutional Commission, after hearing testimony throughout the country, finally brought its work to a close and submitted a draft constitution to President Museveni. This submission signaled the fact that multiparty elections would follow. In light of this, AAI developed an assessment mission prior to the constituency assembly (CA) elections.

Project Activities

AREAF fielded an assessment team, led by AAI, to Uganda for two weeks. The team consulted with US Embassy, USAID, the Government of Uganda, NRC members, Constitutional Commission members, the chair and deputy chairs of the Commission for the Constituent Assembly, opposition party members, human rights and community leaders, members of the press, academia, NGOs, and other relevant parties including the donor nations to assess the best way to proceed in developing and implementing overall election support.

The team traveled throughout the country to constituencies in the north and east (Gulu, Lira or Iganga); the south (Mbarara along the Rwanda border); and the west near Fort Portal and Tororo. A visit to the Jinja area was included as the second largest Uganda city and an industrial and agricultural center. The assessment team concentrated on issues of the constitutional and legal framework of the elections, technical training and assistance, election observation, and security issues.

Findings and Evaluation

The team found in general that the situation in Uganda appeared to provide the opportunity for a transparent election. A number of positive aspects the team found include:

- A free press which frequently criticizes the government.
- Free speech at the Resistance Council (RC) meetings.
- A commitment on the part of the Government of Uganda to hold an election which would be judged by the outside world to be free and fair.

The one action of the government which raised most doubts about its commitment to free and fair elections was its hostility to political party activity as most dramatically manifested in its ban on political party participation in the Constituent Assembly elections.

BURUNDI
ELECTION MONITORING
NDI

Background

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) developed a comprehensive program to assist the Burundi democratization process up to and through national elections. The program included assessment and technical assistance missions, a seminar on election issues, a sustained field presence, training for domestic monitors and international observation teams at election time. Its goal was 1) to provide advice, where appropriate, on issues that develop during the preparations for elections; 2) to strengthen confidence in the election procedures and encourage cooperation among the parties; 3) to evaluate the election process in order to properly assess the legitimacy of the elections; and 4) to support the development of civic organizations dedicated to strengthening democratic institutions.

Responding to invitations from Prime Minister Sibomana and Burundian political

leaders, NDI undertook a series of programs to support the democratic transition in Burundi. Recognizing the importance of the situation there, and the risks if the elections should fail, NDI committed itself to a comprehensive program to provide support, advice and monitoring at each step of the process.

Project Activities

An NDI team traveled to Burundi April 2 to 10, 1993. The team consulted with party leaders and government officials involved in the elections, and examined developments that have taken place subsequent to NDI's December mission. On the last day of the mission the team met with Prime Minister Sibomana to discuss a number of concerns about the upcoming elections. The prime minister provided reassuring answers to a number of issues including: the independence of international observers, the legal acceptance of national observers, the ratio of voters per polling station, safeguards to be employed during the transport of ballot boxes to counting centers and the importance of a liberal interpretation of the press code.

NDI adviser Jean Lavoie remained in Burundi to establish a field office and begin election monitoring programs. In late April, he was joined by NDI Program Officer Kevin Johnson. The field representatives were responsible for monitoring developments in the country and organizing NDI's election related programs. They were present in-country from the beginning of April until the middle of July.

NDI organized a three-day seminar on the role of political parties and civic organizations in election monitoring. The seminar took place in Bujumbura from April 28 to 30, 1993. In addition to explaining how party pollwatchers observe elections, seminar trainers from Belgium, Hungary, Niger, Senegal, the US and Zambia also helped participants develop pollwatcher training and implementation programs. Based on concerns identified during the seminar, NDI President Kenneth Wollack issued a letter to the prime minister outlining NDI's intentions to closely monitor key issues such as voter registration and media fairness.

In order to be in a position to comment on possible allegations of irregularities during the registration process, NDI conducted a comprehensive monitoring of the voter registration process. NDI observers selected a representative sample of urban and rural registration centers from 37 communes in 15 of 16 provinces where observers conducted interviews with registration officials, party observers, government officials and citizens. In many cases, specific allegations of irregularities presented by party representatives were investigated. The NDI team concluded that the registration had been conducted in a peaceful, cooperative atmosphere, which allowed for the free and fair registration of the Burundian electorate. A small number of irregularities were noted in certain provinces, and these concerns were brought to the attention of the National Election Commission.

To ensure NDI's position to substantiate or refute allegations of undue bias or unequal coverage of the campaign, NDI conducted a systematic analysis of the content of radio, television, and public newspaper reporting. This analysis recorded the amount of coverage given to each candidate and whether the coverage presented the candidate in a positive, negative or neutral light. The analysis found that considerable improvement had been made in public media coverage allowing for generally neutral coverage of the campaign.

Following the April seminar, NDI staff worked closely with the non-partisan Group of Independent Observers (GIO) to develop and implement a domestic monitoring mission. With NDI consulting, the GIO recruited and trained 900 observers, developed an operations headquarters, and organized a statistical verification of election results through a parallel vote tabulation. For the presidential and legislative elections, GIO observers verified voting and counting processes in 10% of the polling stations.

NDI organized a 16-member international observation mission May 28 to June 5, 1993 for the presidential election and a four-member mission June 24 to July 4, 1993 for the legislative elections. For the June 1 presidential election, the delegation visited more than 300 polling stations and counting centers in eight provinces. During the mission, NDI delegation leaders former President of Sao Tome and Principe, Manuel Pinto Dacosta and former Canadian foreign minister Charles Lapointe consulted with President Buyoya and President-elect Ndadaye.

Findings and Evaluation

NDI's program was successful. NDI was seen as a major advocate of free, fair and transparent elections. The Institute's long-term presence in Burundi served to provide an objective international presence, monitoring and advising on electoral issues. The international delegation concluded that the election permitted the free expression of the Burundian people in choosing their new president. In addition, the election results obtained by local observers in sample polling stations, differed from official results by less that 1%, providing further confirmation of the accuracy and fairness of the process.

CONGO
OBSERVER DELEGATION TO LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
AAI

Background

Congo's recent political history has been fraught with violence and confusion. Following presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992, gridlock between the two branches of government quickly ensued. President Lissouba dissolved Parliament and called for new legislative elections in May 1993. Opposition political parties challenged the President's action in the Supreme Court, but new elections proceeded nonetheless.

Project Activities

AAI sent observers to all three rounds of legislative elections in Congo. During the first round, observers found the atmosphere generally to be calm and orderly. Most problems noted were administrative in nature, with some exceptions. Many had expected the first round to leave a number of seats undecided, but according to official results, only eleven seats were involved in the second round.

The context for the second round was dramatically different. During the first round, the opposition contested election results and declared a boycott. The boycott led to increased tensions during the second round. Voter turnout ranged between very low (30 percent) and negligible. In the urban areas, where about half the population lives, armed opposition supporters enforced the boycott by storming some polling stations to collect election materials, and by using or threatening violence in a number of areas.

The third and final round followed a series of negotiations culminating in the "Libreville Accord." This agreement eased tensions between the ruling coalition and the opposition, and observers found the atmosphere again to be generally peaceful and orderly, with some exceptions.

Although the political climate for each round was significantly different, many difficulties present during the 1992 elections remained unresolved.

Findings and Evaluation

The political context for each election round was distinct. AAI successfully completed observation missions to all three rounds of the elections. AAI's observer delegation expressed concern over the presence and activities of security forces during polling and tabulation. Following the electoral cycle, AAI made several recommendations including: 1) during future elections, military and police activities must be restricted to maintain a secure environment, free from intimidation; 2) soldiers should not be present inside the polling stations or counting centers, and police should only enter upon the request of election commission officials; 3) military and police personnel should not be engaged in checking voter identification, helping with vote counting or any other activity that falls under the purview of the election commission; 4) joint training of military and police officers along with election commission representatives should be held, to clarify the roles on both sides.

TOGO
MONITORING PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
NDI

Background

With the signing of the Ouagadougou Accord on July 11, 1993, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) moved to renew its programming in support of presidential and subsequent parliamentary elections in Togo. NDI's planned observation program included maintaining an international assessment mission in Togo for the pre-election period, providing financial and technical support for a large scale domestic monitoring mission, and deploying international observer delegations. Recognizing that previous agreements had not succeeded in establishing the necessary political climate for meaningful elections, NDI made full implementation of its program contingent on establishing minimum conditions for legitimate elections.

Project Activities

A team initially composed of two NDI staff members and two international experts arrived in Togo in early August 1993 to conduct a pre-election assessment. Additional staff supplemented the team as the election date approached. Besides NDI staff members, the team included Therence Sinunguruza, former president of the National Election Commission of Burundi. (He had played an instrumental role in organizing that nation's successful elections in June 1993.) The team also included Maxime Faille, legislative assistant to the Canadian House of Commons. The team focused on election administration; material preparations; electoral lists; access to media; political party concerns and preparations; the role of domestic monitors; and security and refugee issues. The team's assessment was to form the basis of NDI's decision on whether or not to observe the election.

As the August 25 election date approached, however, the possibilities for meaningful elections in Togo began to diminish. Concerned about administrative preparations, the principal opposition candidates withdrew from the race, demanding a postponement. The president of the National Election Commission (NEC) raised similar concerns in a letter to the prime minister.

On August 23 and 24 President Carter, who had arrived in Togo, attempted to persuade President Eyadema to postpone the election for a sufficient amount of time. He asked this to resolve at least the most pressing election-related problems. Despite Carter's urging in an 11th-hour diplomatic effort, Eyadema refused to delay the vote. On August 24, when it became clear that the election would proceed as scheduled,

Carter made a public announcement in Lome of NDI's decision not to deploy international observers for the election. Carter and the NDI team immediately left Togo.

The decision to leave Togo was also based on a suspicion of massive registration fraud and the unwillingness of the government to allow domestic election monitors to witness the vote.

Findings and Evaluation

It is always difficult to establish a single yardstick by which a project of this nature could be measured. Certainly, it is not realistic under the circumstances described earlier to expect a legitimate presidential election to have been the outcome of this project. To expect as much, however, is probably to have unattainable expectations about how much NDI could have achieved given the circumstances. The project did accomplish a number of more modest, but important, objectives. The project facilitated a clear understanding on the part of the international community of the lack of legitimacy of the presidential elections and contributed to the development of internationally accepted norms regarding legitimate elections.

The project accomplishments arguably influenced the outcome of subsequent legislative elections by demonstrating to the Togolese government that illegitimate elections would not go unnoticed by the international community.

GABON
PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT
NDI

Background

In March 1991, Gabon adopted a new constitution that provided a detailed bill of rights, and a clear separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers in a presidential system. In addition, the Constitution created an independent Constitutional Court and National Communication Commission, designed to ensure the independence of the judiciary and the press, respectively.

Both institutions were tested during the 1993 presidential election. Political party publications were hotly contested and presidential polling results were questioned. The future of transparent, multiparty elections was being built or destroyed in these early years of the new constitution.

Project Activities

In coordination with a team from IFES, a two-member NDI mission visited Gabon on May 8-15, to assess the political climate and evaluate the possibilities of conducting program work before presidential elections in December, the country's first competitive presidential polls in thirty years. The team was well received across the political spectrum; meeting with President Bongo, leaders of all the important political parties, a number of government ministers and elections officials, and representatives from Gabon's nascent civil society.

The team found a political culture emerging from thirty years of single-party rule. As was expected, the building of democracy was proceeding extremely unevenly. A number of nascent political institutions existed which were beginning to provide the rudiments of checks and balances. This may have suggested a sincere desire on the part of the ruling elite to democratize Gabon's political life. Alternatively it may have merely reflected considerable sophistication at manipulating the political process. Whatever the case, perhaps the most important fact is that the process had begun.

There remained, with considerable justification, widespread suspicion about the bona fides of the government's commitment to democracy. The legacy in Africa of

elections held by governments over the past couple of years was not a good one. The electoral code highlighted the extensive role of the Ministry of Territorial Administration in the electoral process, while the code gave parties a mere advisory or minor participatory role in different elections commissions. In addition, the idea of civic involvement in overseeing democratic development was at an early stage of gestation. In many of its meetings, the team elaborated on the concept of civic involvement, and hosted a meeting where civic groups sat down and talked with one another about working together.

Findings and Evaluation

The level of mutual suspicion, unfamiliarity with the new electoral code, and a doubling of the number of polling places in comparison with the 1990 legislative elections was expected. For these reasons, a pre-election training program for civic organization monitors (the government agreed to this idea in Libreville), political party observers and possibly polling place officials was warranted. Such a project would also help empower local civic groups, most notably GERDDES-Gabon, a democratic development organization. This program was approved to take place in September, three months before the election.

GABON
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1993
AAI

Background

On December 5, 1993, the citizens of Gabon voted in the country's first multi-party election for president. At the invitation of the Government of Gabon, the African-American Institute (AAI) fielded a 17-person international delegation to observe the final days of campaigning, the voting and the vote count for the presidential election. A pre-election assessment team arrived on November 16, 1993 and was joined by the full team several days before the vote. The team remained in country through the ballot casting, the vote count, and the Constitutional Court's validation of the results on December 13, 1993. The observer team traveled extensively throughout the country to more than 140 bureaux de vote (polling stations) and attended the vote tabulation in fourteen different bureaux.

Thirteen candidates, including four independent candidates and eight representatives of the opposition coalition, contested for the nation's highest office. Popular interest in the election was avid, evidenced by a voter turnout of more than 86 percent. However, poor planning and inconsistent administration hampered the election, diminishing voter confidence in the results. Opposition party members, seeking a re-vote, raised a court challenge. The Constitutional Court denied their claim and declared incumbent President El-Hadj Omar Bongo the winner with 51 percent of the vote.

Project Activities

On December 3, 1993, the AAI observer team issued a pre-election statement noting widespread concern throughout the country about election preparations and the condition of the voters' list. This statement was issued because of the gravity of the number of voters that could have been affected by inadequate preparation, training and distribution of materials. The following observations were also borne out in the AAI Preliminary Statement:

- The national administration of the electoral process was both disparate and uncoordinated.
- The national electoral registration system was not completed in time to allow

ample inspection and review, thereby rendering electoral lists worthless.

- Election administrators did not use uniform methodology and did not adequately train polling station officials, thereby falling below credible international standards.

Voting Process

- There was widespread general confusion over the necessity of the voter card and its usefulness. Barely 50% of the nation's voters had received voter cards by election day.
- Polling station officials received no standard guidance on the use of voter cards.
- Polling stations in Libreville, where nearly one third of the nation's registered voters are found, had no electoral registration lists, or, if these lists were present, they were illegible or incomplete.
- Election materials were not delivered in a timely manner.
- The Electoral Code was not applied consistently throughout the country. This practice occurred, in the experience of AAI observers, both to the detriment of the opposition candidates and the incumbent.
- In various areas of the country, officials either did not include, or arranged particular candidates' ballots in a manner that could influence a voter's choice. In most of these reported instances, various candidates benefited from the actions of the officials.
- There was general ignorance of technical procedures.

Vote Tabulation

- There were precise national electorate totals but polling stations did not have local register lists.
- There were no provisions for segregating and validating the tabulated vote at the local polling station level, providing ample opportunity for mishandling or fraud.
- Observers were not able to witness the transmission of procès-verbaux (report of the signed, official polling station results) from voting stations to the National Commission for the Centralization of Voting Results.

Findings and Evaluation

AAI made a preliminary statement on the conduct of the December 5, 1993. This report commented on conditions before the election. during the election, and after the election. The general conclusions of the report are as follows:

- This election marked an important phase in the country's ongoing transition to pluralistic democracy; it was the first multi-party presidential election in the thirty-three years since the nation achieved independence.
- Election day was relatively peaceful and voter turnout was quite high.
- The election was poorly organized, and as a result, poorly executed.
- Chaotic electoral conditions caused Gabonese citizens to question the results.
- The arbitrary and ad hoc administration of the election provided multiple opportunities for the process to be manipulated in a fraudulent manner.

- Team members did not make a judgement whether these conditions were calculated or purposeful. It appeared that different candidates benefited from the misadministration in different locations.

To promote the continuation of the democratic process that began in Gabon in March 1990 and progressed in the December 1993 presidential elections, The African-American Institute (AAI) strongly recommends that the Gabonese government take the following actions:

- Clarify the Electoral Code.
- Institute systematic and uniform international standards for conducting future elections through the appointment of an independent Electoral Commission with statutory responsibilities, oversight and control.
- Engage the opposition in consultation before unilateral corrective action in the interest of continuing democratic development.

CHAD
PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT
AAI

Background

In mid-January 1993, President Déby opened the National Conference with a memorable pledge, "I come to bring you democracy." Approximately 800 delegates attended the conference, representing the government, thirty political organizations, trade unions, NGOs and professional associations.

In April, the Conference adopted a transitional charter and elected Dr. Fidel Moungar, the Minister of National and Higher Education, to be Prime Minister. The Conference established a 57-member Conseil Supérieur de la Transition (CST) to act as the interim legislature. Lol Mahamat Choua, who had briefly served as president of Chad in 1979, was elected Chairman of the CST. Under the terms of the Charter, President Déby would remain in office as Head of State and Commander in Chief for one year, with the possibility of one extension.

Project Activities

In December 1993, AAI sent a two-person assessment team to Chad. The team met with representatives of the Government of Chad, political party leaders, NGO representatives, religious leaders and officials at the US Embassy and USAID. The team found some indicators that a genuine democratic transition was underway in Chad, such as an increase in freedom of expression. Independence of the media has increased markedly and most people the team met with were willing to express their views candidly.

Findings and Evaluation

The team found that most of the necessary steps for holding democratic elections according to international standards had not been taken. In particular:

- The army is not under civilian control and is extremely undisciplined. Most Chadians perceive the military to be a threat to their own security. In addition, the military showed resistance to acceptance of civilian control and transition by election.
- No constitution is in force in Chad nor are there laws governing electoral procedures, the rights of political parties, and the rights of citizens as voters.
- No electoral commission, codes or regulations guiding the anticipated presi-

dential election have been established.

- Respect for human rights is questioned by many Chadian organizations and individuals. Human rights' concerns include the treatment of political opponents and of citizens in general.

The team found that the government capacity to address these serious issues, particularly the role of the military, to be lacking. The National Conference established a tripartite transitional government composed of President Idriss Déby, who took power in a coup in 1990, the Prime Minister and the Conseil Supérieur de la Transition (CST), which is the primary governing and sole legislative organ. The CST makes all governance decisions.

The real issue is the degree to which the CST is free to carry out its legislative or parliamentary tasks. Many decisions taken by the CST have been disregarded by the military and other affected elements. In addition, the Transitional Government lacks resources to carry out its mandate and the country is suffering an intense economic crisis.

In addition, no laws exist which govern pre-electoral activity such as registration, candidate nomination and campaigning, nor are there laws governing the election. The Conference called for the establishment of a committee to draft a constitution, an electoral code and a charter for political parties. The committee was not named until December 18 and it was given an impossible two-month deadline in which to draft all three documents.

Despite the lack of preparation, most parties consider the spirit of the National Conference to be alive and that elections will eventually take place. Under the terms of the Charte de Transition (transitional charter), the interim parliament could extend presidential elections from April 1994 to October 1994. However, on April 5, 1994, the CST acknowledged the lack of progress in preparing for elections and extended the transitional period until April 9, 1995.

AAI communicated to the Chadian government its readiness to assist the process in Chad as soon as conditions are ripe for AREAF to provide an effective program.

TANZANIA
PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT
IRI

Background

Because an electoral process is a continuum, it is essential to insure a smooth transition from pre-election enthusiasm to post-election reality. This ongoing democratic development is important in the areas of legislation, negotiation, and administration of introducing democratic pluralism to Tanzania. Consultations with the American Embassy confirmed support for IRI to conduct a mission to assess the needs for democratic institution-building and electoral assistance.

Project Activities

IRI sent a pre-election assessment team to Tanzania in preparation for municipal elections in 1994 and national elections in 1995. The team met with representatives of the Government of Tanzania, political parties, NGOs, civic groups and the US Embassy and USAID.

The team traveled outside Dar es Salaam to gauge the commitment to democratization throughout the country. The team concluded that conditions were such that assistance to the process was warranted.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE
JOINT SURVEY MISSION
NDI & AAI

Background

In October of 1994, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the African-American Institute (AAI) sent a joint survey mission to Côte d'Ivoire to assess the state of preparations for presidential, legislative and municipal elections to be held there in late 1995. Through the assessment, the two institutes also hoped to determine possible program activities that they could undertake to support the Ivorian electoral process.

NDI and AAI planned the assessment as Côte d'Ivoire faced a turning point in its political history. A new group of leaders was emerging to fill a vacuum created by the December 1993 death of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the country's founding president. Internal pressure to democratize the country's political system was intensifying as the new president, Henri Konan Bédié, sought to solidify his hold on power. Also, Côte d'Ivoire's position as a sub-regional power meant that the outcome of its political transformation would be felt well beyond its national boundaries. NDI and AAI considered the assessment mission to be a useful prerequisite to future program activity in support of this important electoral process.

Program Activities

On November 29, 1994, NDI Senior Program Officer Carol Smetana and Program Officer Tim McCoy joined AAI's Program Coordinator Hillary Thomas and François Sita, AAI's representative from Congo, in Abidjan where they began a series of meetings with US Embassy officials, political party leaders, government authorities and civic organization representatives. To increase the number of contacts during the assessment, the NDI team decided early during the mission to divide the meetings. Carol Smetana traveled to northern Côte d'Ivoire where she conducted meetings in the northern cities of Korhogo and Bach. Tim McCoy remained in Abidjan to meet with high-ranking government officials, national party leaders and presidents of various civic organizations. AAI representatives also remained in Abidjan.

Findings and Evaluation

The program was successfully completed and marked the first time that AREAF partners conducted a joint assessment mission. The assessment meetings revealed an almost-unanimous enthusiasm for the two institutes to conduct programming in Côte d'Ivoire as soon as possible. Political party and civic organization representatives identified voter education and political party training as primary needs.

AAI's assessment revealed an immediate need for building NGOs' capacity in preparations for the elections. Opposition political parties also requested that NDI sponsor international observer delegations to the upcoming elections.

The government, however, was more reserved on the issue of election observers. Government officials indicated that they prefer international NGOs to become involved at an earlier stage, as opposed to being present only for the elections.

Election preparations were in the spotlight for the duration of the assessment mission. A new electoral code, which will govern the organization of the elections, was moving toward final adoption in the National Assembly. A government-conducted electoral census had recently been completed. Results of this census will be used in 1995 to finalize voter lists. These preparations figured prominently in the discourse of the country's political and governmental leaders. Opposition parties were complaining that the electoral code sought to exclude political party participation in the preliminary

stages of the electoral process. These parties also criticized the electoral census, saying that the government had deliberately omitted their supporters from the census in order to affect adversely the opposition's electoral chances. The government countercharged by saying that parties would be allowed to take part in phases of the process, detailed in the electoral code.

GHANA
SURVEY MISSION
NDI

Background

During Ghana's 1992 presidential elections, the major opposition parties argued that the incumbent president, Jerry Rawlings, rigged the elections by inflating the voter registrar. The opposition therefore boycotted the subsequent legislative elections. This led to widespread suspicion that permeates the political climate today. There is a lack of confidence in the electoral process and fear of fraud during the upcoming elections.

During these elections, NDI, in conjunction with the Carter Center, developed a plan for a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) of election results in Ghana. The initial phase of the project involved training Ghanaian election monitors and determining the feasibility of a PVT. The plan called for using the first round of the presidential elections on November 3, 1992, as a "dry-run" for a PVT methodology, to determine whether conducting a PVT during the second round of elections would be possible. In September 1994, NDI organized a meeting of scholars and representatives of the US Department of State, the Ghanaian Embassy and the NGO community in Washington to discuss Ghana's pre-election environment.

Project Activities

NDI's proposal to conduct this survey mission grew, in part, out of these activities. From December 9 to 21, 1994, NDI sent a three-member survey mission to Ghana to assess the feasibility of conducting political development programs in preparation for the 1996 national elections. The survey team identified three broad areas in need of AREAF assistance: political party training, civic education, and election related training. The mission tried to meet with a cross section of individuals to get a comprehensive overview of the situation on the ground.

The primary goal of the survey mission was to identify areas in Ghana's political arena that could hinder progress toward successful presidential and legislative elections in 1996. Because of the 1992 elections boycott and the allegations of voter fraud and inflated voter registration lists, the survey team paid special attention to political parties. The delegation held meetings with all the major political parties, including the ruling and opposition parties, to reinforce NDI's nonpartisanship.

Findings and Evaluation

The program was successfully completed. The presidential and legislative elections in 1996 will be a test case for Ghana. For those elections to be conducted properly, some of the country's democratic institutions need strengthening. Political parties are poorly organized. They lack resources and their leaders seem to be out of touch with their constituents. The parties could benefit from basic political education and training. Civic organizations are weak - they lack an institutional base and have few resources.

The legislature is overburdened; legislators seem to lack fundamental parliamentary skills. The media, although free and independent, suffers from a lack of credibility.

There is a lack of confidence in the electoral process and suspicion permeates the political climate. The election commission is generally viewed as nonpartisan although it has on some occasions been accused by the opposition of having government leanings. Most voters are in the rural areas, and outside of NDC campaign activities, little attention is given to these areas except during elections. Parties tend to organize only during the elections and have not been effective in developing their political agendas, messages and recruitment techniques since they boycotted the 1992 legislative elections.

CONGO
PARTIAL LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
AAI

Background

Congo's recent political history has been fraught with violence and confusion. The crisis follows in the wake of a string of successful elections. Beginning with a referendum on the preferred type of political system, the people of the Congo went to the polls six times during 1992. The final poll, in which Lissouba was elected president, was August 16. Following presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992, gridlock between the two branches of government quickly ensued. President Lissouba dissolved Parliament and called for new legislative elections in May 1993. Opposition political parties challenged the President's action in the Supreme Court, but new elections proceeded nonetheless.

The first round of legislative elections held in 1993 resulted in eleven of the 126 seats needing to be decided in runoff elections, as none of the candidates had received more than 50 percent of the vote. In addition, the opposition petitioned the Supreme Court to invalidate the results in twelve additional districts, while the Government contested the legitimacy of twenty-four seats gained by the opposition. Runoff elections were called for June 6 and the opposition boycotted. Civil disorder, confusion, and tension followed. Through the efforts of international mediation, the opposing parties signed the "Libreville Accord" in early August, paving the way for a re-vote of the boycotted second round. Elections for the eleven contested seats took place in early October and results left an unchanged overall majority. Although the elections were peaceful, in the following months, conflict arose again between the opposition militias and the security forces, resulting in more than 100 fatalities. By the end of January 1994, both parties agreed upon a cease-fire, thus restoring relative calm. However, occasional outbreaks of instability occurred during this cease fire. AAI organized international observer delegations for the Congolese elections of May 2, June 6, and October 3, 1993.

A committee of international arbitrators that had investigated the conduct of the first round of legislative elections, concluded that the results of the October 1993 elections in nine of the legislative districts were invalid and thus recommended a re-vote. The government of Congo, along with the signatories of the "Libreville Accord," agreed to conduct a re-run of these legislative elections.

Project Activities

AAI, in response to a late request in March 1995, from the US Embassy in Brazzaville sent a three-person delegation to observe the legislative elections in the Congo for nine electoral districts that were being re-run as a result of challenge petitions following the 1993 elections. The nine seats being contested were: Makoua I, Mossaka II, Loukolela, Bacongo II, Abala II, Epina, Lumumba I, Dangou II, Ouenze I.

AAI fielded a delegation composed of participants from the past election exer-

cises. The AAI observers' delegation deployed with international observers from other donor nations, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the OAU. Only nine districts were being re-voted, and the majority of these districts are in the greater Brazzaville area. The nine districts scheduled for elections were Makoua I, Mossaka II, Loukolela, Bacongo II, Abala II, Epina, Lumumba I, Dangou II, and Ouenze I. However, on the scheduled day, April 23, 1993, elections proceeded in only two of the nine designated districts --Ouenze 1 in Brazzaville and Lumumba 1 in Pointe Noire.

Findings and Evaluation

The program concluded with observation in only two of the nine districts scheduled for these elections. The group duly observed these two districts. For political and/or logistical reasons, elections in the other seven districts were postponed for April 26. When it was, however, determined that the elections may again be delayed beyond April 26, observers departed Brazzaville on the 28th. The findings of the AAI observation only reflect elections in the two districts of Ouenze 1 and Lumumba 1. In the two districts cited, the elections as observed did proceed in a calm and lawful manner. On a whole, voting stations operated satisfactorily.

BENIN
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
AAI

Background

Benin's March 28, 1995 legislative election was the culmination of the democratization process that began with the burgeoning of a reform movement in 1989. This movement led to the 1991 presidential elections, the sudden restructuring of government, creation of multiple political parties, guarantees of an independent judiciary, and the founding of many non-governmental organizations, including an independent Human Rights Commission.

AAI has had a long history in Benin's politics. AAI organized a delegation that observed Benin's presidential elections, March 10 and 24, 1991. In November 1994, a Beninese delegation of NGOs and government officials traveled to Washington, D.C. to study and observe the US congressional electoral process.

Project Activities

In response to a request by the US Embassy Cotonou, AAI sent a five-person international observation delegation to observe the March 28, 1995 legislative elections. Along with its resident representative in Cotonou, AAI closely followed the entirety of the electoral campaign. The observer team arrived in Benin on March 23, 1995 and left the country around April 3, 1995 following the release of the official election results. The members of the team covered parts of the following regions: Mono, Altacora, Ouémé, Atlantic and Zou. They visited a total of 119 polling stations representing 47,663 registered voters.

Findings and Evaluation

The program was successfully completed. AAI's experience in Benin was invaluable in responding on short notice to the observer request for the 1995 legislative elections. These elections marked the first time that Beninese elections were organized and administrated by an autonomous election commission. The creation of the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA) has since served as an example to other African countries and is frequently referred to in terms of democratic developments within the region.

Overall, the election observers concluded that the elections were conducted freely and fairly and the vote was conducted without any major hindrance or obstacles. The level of voter participation was high and in particular the number of women voting was remarkable. The team also observed that the general populace exhibited a high level of political maturity that AAI saw in the massive turnouts at polling stations. The team concluded that the creation of the CENA greatly contributed to establishing a peaceful climate and at the same time maintained the trust of the various social groups, Beninese voters, and the international observers. The AAI team strongly recommended that the CENA be maintained as a permanent body.

THE GAMBIA SURVEY MISSION NDI

Background

The Gambia was considered a democracy through the first twenty-nine years of independence until July 1994 when a military coup deposed the president. Immediately after the coup, the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) announced a four-and-a-half year timetable to return the country to democratic, civilian rule. The United States reacted to the coup by suspending aid until the country returned to civilian rule. Faced with further criticism from the international community and some elements within Gambian civil society about the expected duration of military rule, the ruling council appointed a commission of civilian leaders --the National Consultative Committee --to study the issue and advise the AFPRC.

The Committee traveled across the country, met with a cross section of representatives of Gambian civil society and finally recommended that the transition's duration be shortened to two years from the date of the coup. The ruling military council accepted that recommendation. A new transition timetable was drawn up with benchmarks that included the rewriting of the constitution and election law, the organization of a constitutional referendum in November 1995, and the conduct of local elections in March 1996 and national elections in June 1996. The transfer of power to a democratically elected president was scheduled for July 1996.

Project Activities

NDI conducted an assessment mission to The Gambia from April 9 to 15, 1995 to observe the country's progress in undertaking a democratic transition to civilian rule by July 1996. NDI undertook this survey mission to gain a better understanding of political developments in The Gambia since the July 22, 1994 coup d'état, and to respond to requests for assistance from the AFPRC chairman, Captain Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh; deposed president, Dawda Jawara; and Gambian citizens residing in and out of the country.

The NDI delegation met with the Chairman and members of the AFPRC, government ministers, political party leaders, representatives of civic organizations, members of professional associations and labor unions, traditional and religious leaders, journalists, members of the diplomatic community. and other independent observers. The team met with Gambians in the greater Banjul area, which includes Serrekunda and Bakau, as well as in the towns of Kerewan, Farafenni, Soma and Brikama.

These meetings gave the delegation members the opportunity to gather relevant information on political developments in the country and the attitudes of Gambians at the grassroots level.

The broad range of meetings provided the delegation with an opportunity to gain insights into different perspectives on the current political climate and ongoing prepa-

rations for a return to democratic, civilian rule. The delegation also examined prospects for democratization within the transition framework, looking at possibilities for outside assistance in constitutional development, political party development, election processes, and civic and voter education.

Findings and Evaluation

The assessment was successfully completed. NDI began to start multifaceted assistance programs that will support Gambian efforts to implement a genuine transition process. A program proposal was submitted and approved by the USAID mission in Banjul for this support. The first phase of these programs was conducted in the period between July and December 1995. Proposed activities included the following: providing technical assistance to the constitutional review commission and the electoral review committee; conducting political party building activities; providing capacity building training to civic organizations; and working with these groups to design civic education materials.

GUINEA
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
AAI

Background

Guinea's presidential and legislative elections, originally scheduled for 1992 under the Transitional Council for National Redressment, were postponed several times. Presidential elections were finally held in December of 1993, with President Lansana Conté declared the victor. Before the presidential election, opposition political parties and representatives of the international community requested that the elections be postponed. Citing inadequate logistical preparation, the opposition questioned the transparency of the process. The circumstances surrounding the long delays in announcing the results, numerous flaws in electoral administration, and a lack of transparency brought into question the legitimacy of the elections. Following these elections, there were protests and random clashes from opposition and government supporters. Overall, the situation before and after the election did not bode well for the consolidation of Guinean pluralist democracy. The Government of Guinea has insisted that many of the perceived irregularities were due to a lack of experience and training. In order to alleviate a recurrence of these problems, the government extended invitations to international donors and NGOs to observe the legislative elections of June 11, 1995.

Project Activities

The African-American Institute, (AAI), in response to a request by the US Embassy Conakry, fielded a sixteen-member observer mission to the June 11 legislative elections. At the onset of this project, AAI sent a two-person assessment team immediately to review the preparations for the upcoming legislative elections in Guinea. The historically unstable electoral environment in Guinea required a high level of cautiousness in observing these elections. In sending a two-person team out immediately, AAI's intention was to obtain a clear picture of the improvements that had reportedly occurred since December 1993, and thus determine what type of international observer delegation would be appropriate. These improvements included the ability of the opposition political parties to participate freely, the relative freedom of the media, the independence, preparation and mandate of the National Electoral Commission, and adequate logistical preparations. Subsequently when it seemed that these conditions existed and that open and transparent legislative elections were possible, AAI fielded the rest of the observers to observe the June 11, 1995 legislative elections.

The AAI team consisted of experienced international observers familiar with the political environment in Guinea and its electoral processes. The AAI observer delegation deployed throughout the country, and it focused primarily on those areas in which there was controversy during the presidential elections of 1993.

Findings and Evaluation

The program was successfully concluded. Despite doubts regarding the will of the ruling party to hold elections, and amidst fears of national violence, the elections were held in an atmosphere of relative calm. AAI's final observations of the elections included, among other things:

- The National Electoral Commission (CNE), being neither an independent nor permanent body, played only a marginal role in organizing the elections.
- Training of election officials was inconsistent, and generally inadequate. Prior to and on polling day, officials showed ignorance regarding the contents of the Electoral Code, and the way in which it should be applied.
- The distribution of voter cards was poorly organized. The distribution commissions were not balanced in their composition (most commission members were overtly strong supporters of the PUP), and in some regions (such as Labé and Kankan) a significant number of opposition party activists and supporters did not receive voter registration cards.
- In several regions, the local officials, notably from the "prefect" and "sub-prefect" levels, displayed partisan behavior that favored the PUP. In the region of Labé, we obtained overwhelming evidence of partisan appointments.
- The time lag between the tallying of the results and their communication to the National Commission was too long. The CNE only began to receive partial results four days after the polls had closed.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE
JOINT OBSERVATION MISSION/NGO CAPACITY BUILDING/ POST ELECTION CONSOLIDATION
NDI/AAI

Background

A new cast of Ivorian political actors emerged in 1995, attempting to fill the vacuum created by the death in December 1993 of Felix Houphouët-Boigny, the founding president and leader of the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire - Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (PDCI-RDA). These elections were the first competitive multiparty elections organized in Côte d'Ivoire in the post-Houphouët-Boigny era.

Project Activities

NDI and AAI sponsored a joint delegation to the legislative election of November 26, 1995. The joint delegation comprised 43 observers from North America, Europe and Africa. Observers included election officials, political organizers, academics and members of professional and civic organizations. The joint delegation was co-chaired by the Honorable Karen English, former US Representative from Arizona (for NDI) and Dr. Guy Martin, professor of African Politics at Clark-Atlanta University (for AAI).

Upon arrival in Abidjan, the observers received intensive briefings from NDI field staff and AAI Washington staff on the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as in the specific region to which they would travel on election day. Two days prior to the

elections, the delegation members were deployed to 20 sites in all 10 regions of the country where they subsequently observed the voting process at 451 polling stations. The delegation's mandate included the examination of the environment, the proceedings on election day, and the tabulation of results. After the observation itself, the observers returned to Abidjan for a series of debriefing sessions with NDI and AAI staff, and drafted a preliminary statement which was released to the Ivorian government, political parties, civic organizations and press on November 28.

In addition to international observer activities, AAI provided direct support to Ivorian NGOs involved in the electoral process. AAI worked with the Observatoire National des Elections, (ONE), an umbrella organization comprised of six Ivorian NGOs. The ONE conducted pre-electoral voter register verification as well as local observer training and deployment. AAI provided funding to the ONE for the deployment of 180 civil society members to participate in voter register verification. AAI also worked with the ONE to lead a training session for 120 local monitors from various areas of the country. AAI assisted in funding the deployment of over 100 trained monitors, and facilitated a national monitor de-brief following election day.

Following the legislative elections, NDI's field staff began planning post-election activities. NDI's original post-election plans included the organization of a roundtable and a training/orientation of the newly constituted Ivorian National Assembly. NDI/ Washington staff members and NDI's Abidjan field representative conducted consultations and made arrangements in preparation for the training seminar which was tentatively scheduled for mid-June. Due to scheduling conflicts with the National Assembly and President Bedie, the Institute was not able to conduct the seminar before the expiration of the Côte d'Ivoire and other AREAF projects on June 30. NDI field staff did however, observe the delayed municipal elections which took place on February 11, 1996.

Findings and Evaluation

The AAI/NDI delegation found that election day activities and tabulation during the legislative election were, for the most part, fairly transparent. However, the delegation noted concern over the inaccuracy of the electoral lists; the high number of non-distributed voter cards; and the inconsistencies and delays in the implementation of the court ordered procedure intended to allow eligible voters whose names did not appear on the electoral lists to cast ballots. These elections signified the importance of assessing the pre-electoral environment and analyzing the voter registration process and the enfranchisement of voters. The municipal elections, which were delayed for technical reasons, appeared to proceed smoothly and calmly; voter turnout was low and the ruling PDCI party gained the majority of seats.

These elections marked a step in the right direction for Côte d'Ivoire's democratization process. The legislative election marked the first time in the history of Côte d'Ivoire that local civic organizations became directly involved in the election process. Members of civic groups were used both to verify the voter registration lists and to observe the voting process on election day. Local NGOs developed training and deployment plans for local observers throughout the country. They also coordinated a national de-briefing for local observers and presented a press release of their findings.

SIERRA LEONE
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION & TRAINING TRAINERS
AAI

Background

In 1994, AAI was funded to conduct a country assessment. At the time, the US Embassy was preoccupied with the military situation in Sierra Leone and never agreed to a terms of reference for the assessment mission. However, then US Ambassador-designate John Hirsch began discussions with AAI about potential involvement in Sierra Leone and requested an international observer mission. AAI has closely monitored the democratization process in Sierra Leone since 1994.

These elections represented the first step in Sierra Leone's return to civilian-led, multiparty democratic governance and would be the country's first multi-party election for president and parliament since 1977. AAI began to develop a proposal for an international observer team and local observer training program for the February 26, 1996 elections.

Project Activities

At the invitation of the Sierra Leonean Government and the US Embassy in Freetown, the African-American Institute (AAI) fielded a 17-person international delegation to observe the elections, and assess the electoral environment. A three-member advance team of AAI staff arrived on February 3, 1996 to: a) observe the pre-electoral environment and b) to conduct a domestic monitor training of trainers workshop for Sierra Leonean non-government organizations (NGOs). The second tier of observers arrived two weeks before the first round of elections. They witnessed the final days of campaigning, and the voting, vote count, and transmission of results for the presidential and parliamentary elections.

AAI Executive Vice-President Steve McDonald led the observation mission that included: African and North American election experts, individuals with vast experience in Sierra Leone, congressional staff, and representatives from labor and law enforcement organizations. Dr. Amare Tekle, former Chairman of the Eritrean Referendum Commission and Director of the African Association of Election Authorities, co-chaired the delegation.

Working in affiliation with the United Nations Joint International Observer Group (JIOG) and funded by the United States Agency for International Development, the 17-member AAI delegation deployed throughout Sierra Leone. Sites included Freetown and its environs, Lungi, Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Kono. Team members observed voting at more than 250 polling stations nationwide during the first round.

AAI also fielded an eight-member observer delegation for the presidential runoff election that occurred on March 15, 1996. Members of this delegation deployed to Freetown, Lungi, Koidu, and Bonthe and their surrounding areas, in coordination with other delegations of the JIOG. A supplemental voters list had been completed just before the first round of voting, enfranchising approximately 90,000 voters for the first round.

The second round of elections began with a surprising announcement from the Attorney General's office, declaring the supplemental voters' register invalid for the second round. This led to confusion and initial delays at some polling stations, where presiding officers learned of the new procedure at the last minute. The Attorney General's decision effectively disenfranchised 90,000 voters. Despite voter anger over this decision, the election commission's chairman and the two presidential candidates worked together to appeal to the public for calm. Unlike the first round, the runoff election took place in a peaceful and calm atmosphere. There were no reported armed attacks in any areas of the country.

Findings and Evaluation

Despite violent acts meant to intimidate voters, popular interest in the election was intense. Voter turnout in the first round was estimated at 50% and over 70% in the runoff. AAI observed that Sierra Leone held the first round elections under a cloud of uncertainty and substantial logistical difficulty. The causes of these problems included a lack of adequate infrastructure and minimal election experience and training. Finally, a significant displaced population due to hostile military action during and prior to the date of the first round of elections contributed greatly to these difficulties. AAI was pleased to find that overall, the second round elections, like the first, represented a valid expression of the will of the Sierra Leonean voters.

AAI's presence in Sierra Leone expressed American interest in the country's democratic development. Throughout the election period, AAI's international observer delegation was a highly visible force. The delegation's extensive presence throughout the country added a tremendous amount to the public's confidence and public belief that the elections would go through, particularly in areas besieged by armed attacks. AAI's presence in Sierra Leone was seen by the electoral commission, government, political parties and NGOs as an important force working to ensure transparent elections.

Kenya
The December 29, 1992 Elections

A Report by

The International Republican Institute

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report and the Kenyan campaign/election observation missions undertaken by the IRI were possible only through the tireless efforts of scores of individuals. The assessment and observer missions undertaken throughout October, November and December 1992 required substantial demands on IRI staff and volunteers. Many observers spent the holiday season away from home in order to make the mission a success. Their unfailing devotion to the IRI's mission is gratefully appreciated. Deserving of special mention are Tom Bayer, Laurie Cooper, Craig Engle, Michael Ford, Catherine Garber, Robert Henderson, Keith Kline, Shawn McCormick, Steve Orvis and Vincent Woolcock who all spent long hours on all phases of the Kenyan program. U.S. Department of State and Agency for International Development officials in Washington and Nairobi provided the IRI with valuable guidance and assistance in this endeavor.

Finally, the IRI would like to express its gratitude to the people of Kenya--the political leaders, civic and church activists, government representatives, election officials and the ordinary voters--who provided our delegations with information and friendship. They are the people for whom this entire effort was undertaken.

The IRI's Kenya Election Observation Mission program was made possible through funding by the U.S. Agency for International Development's Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund.

This document represents the views and opinions of the IRI and should not be considered the opinion of any single observer.

INTRODUCTION

From October 29 through November 6, 1992, a six-person team including International Republican Institute staff and election experts conducted its first comprehensive analysis of the pre-election environment and the feasibility of organizing an international election observation mission in Kenya. The findings were released publicly in late November. From December 4 -16, 1992, the IRI deployed several teams of campaign, media, academic, and election law experts throughout the country. The findings of this 20-person assessment team were released in a press conference held on December 16, 1992 in Nairobi. From December 16-28, 1992, the IRI sent small teams to areas of special concern throughout the country. On election day (December 29), the IRI deployed 54 people nationwide to observe the voting and counting. This Final Report synthesizes the findings of these survey teams and covers the period from late October 1992 through early January 1993.

Chapter I is a brief political background of Kenya. Chapter II focuses on the pre-election environment. Chapter III addresses the campaign playing field. Chapter IV covers election day issues. Chapter V includes an update of events after the election and offers recommendations for improvements in the administration of future elections.

CHAPTER I: POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The modern era in Kenyan politics commenced in 1960 when negotiations began to establish the country's independence from Great Britain. The British had been active in Kenya since 1885 when the country became a British protectorate. By 1920, Kenya became a colony of the British Empire. White settlers occupied most of the country's arable land and later Indian immigrants began to dominate retail trade. During this period, land problems, rising unemployment and lack of a voice in the colonial government led to disaffection among most Kenyans.

In 1944, the Kenya Africa Union (KAU) was established as a means to address the complaints of native Kenyans related particularly to land issues in Kikuyu areas. In 1947, Jomo Kenyatta was chosen president of the KAU. In 1952, as a result of the slow pace of action on land issues, a secret Kikuyu society known as the Mau Mau began a series of terrorist acts against British settlers. The following year, the KAU was banned after it was mistakenly linked to the Mau Mau rebellion; Kenyatta was imprisoned. Following the imposition of a state of emergency, British forces with local support killed 13,000 Kenyans (mostly Kikuyus) before the fighting ended in 1956. A total of 32 Europeans died in the conflict.

As Kenya began its transition to independence, the state of emergency in place since 1956 was lifted and two principle political parties emerged: the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU).

KANU was dominated by the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups. KADU included primarily members of various minority ethnic groups. (In an interview in 1964 with Sunday Nation, in his capacity as Chairman of KADU, Daniel arap Moi noted that "without opposition, a government goes to sleep.") Kenyatta was released from jail in August 1961 and named President of KANU. KANU easily won national elections against KADU in May 1963. On December 12, 1963, Kenya established its full independence with Kenyatta as Prime Minister.

The Kenyatta Era

The KADU leadership was given high level positions within the KANU government and, in order to become politically active, Kenyans were obliged to cooperate with the dominant party. As a result, KADU faded into obscurity. The ethnic allegiances of the cadre and the leadership of KADU, however, remained intact, and ties to the former colonial power remained closer than in other countries of post-colonial Africa. Kenya retained a larger proportion of former settlers than did other African countries and the economic, political and military relationship between Kenya and Great Britain remained warm. In March 1964, Kenya signed a formal defense treaty with Britain. British companies and technical experts continued to play an important role in the administration of the government and the management of many large enterprises. The level of education in Kenya was higher than that of other countries in post-colonial Africa and the distribution of large agricultural holdings, immediately after independence, created opportunities for native Kenyans to participate in the economy. These factors helped to produce a comparatively advanced managerial class.

In 1965, political divisions began to arise within KANU. Conservative forces loyal to Secretary General Tom Mboya began pressuring populist Vice President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. These men were the two leading Luo politicians. Odinga abandoned KANU and formed the Kenya People's Union (KPU), which accused the government of "promoting vigorously the development of a small privileged class of Africans."

Of the 30 parliamentarians who joined the KPU, only nine were returned in the 1966 by-election. Later that year, the upper and lower houses of parliament were merged into a unicameral house and in January 1967, Minister of Home Affairs Daniel

arap Moi (from the minority Kalenjin group) was promoted to Vice President, replacing Odinga. The Kenyatta government moved Kenya into a de facto one party state, and as long as the center was not challenged, other aspects of a competitive, democratic system were allowed to function. Ethnic tensions grew, especially among the Luo, who perceived that their power was being usurped by the Kikuyus, headed by Kenyatta. In July 1969, Tom Mboya was assassinated by a Kikuyu, inciting a series of violent Luo-Kikuyu clashes. During the same week, Odinga was arrested and the KPU banned.

In the December 1969 elections almost 65 percent of incumbents were defeated. KANU was the only party allowed to compete in the elections. The following years were relatively peaceful as attentions were focused around the extension of provincial and rural administration. Elections in 1974 resulted in defeat of 88 of the 158 members of Parliament. Kenyatta, running unopposed, won another five-year term as President. Again, only KANU was allowed to contest the elections.

Standards for performance in the Kenyatta government were high, and the high level of turnover in parliament ensured that talented, ambitious leaders were given important opportunities. In the later days of the Kenyatta regime, however, ethnic tensions flared, the state resorted to force to retain rule, and personal and institutional corruption became a growing issue. In 1975, leading politicians were murdered and massive student protests began against the government.

Kenyatta, whose rule had become increasingly autocratic, died on August 22, 1978 at the age of 82. The Kikuyu-Luo domination of Kenyan politics ended when Vice President Moi became President.

The Moi Era

Moi was elected President of KANU on October 14, 1978 to complete Kenyatta's five-year presidential term. In legislative elections the following November, more than 740 candidates stood for parliamentary seats under KANU's one-party system. As with previous contests, almost half the incumbents were defeated. Shortly after the elections, two developments signaled Moi's desire for closer relations with the United States: the appointment pragmatic Dr. Robert Ouko as Foreign Minister, and the arrival of a negotiating team from Washington to begin talks on U.S. access to Kenyan military facilities.

In June 1982, following months of political disturbances and attempts to form opposition (notably the Kenya African Socialist Union proposed by Oginga Odinga and George Anyona) Parliament voted to amend the constitution making Kenya officially a one-party state. August 1, a division of the Kenya Air Force attempted a coup against Moi's government. Forces loyal to Moi quickly crushed the rebellion, which lasted only a few hours, but more than 3,000 soldiers and civilians were arrested. The official death toll was 159; however, some Kenyan political parties and media accounts indicated thousands were killed.

Following the attempted coup, the climate of fear and suspicion culminated in May 1983 Moi's declaration that foreign powers had conspired to replace him with the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Charles Njonjo. Njonjo resigned his cabinet post and seat in Parliament. Moi also called for national elections a year earlier than mandated. Only 48 percent of the eligible voters participated in the September 26, 1983 elections. Moi ran unopposed for the presidency, and was re-elected to another five-year term.

During the following years, Moi was plagued by continuous student opposition and demonstrations. In 1984, Moi met with student leaders in an effort to diffuse tension over a youth service program and syllabus restructuring. In February 1985, following student clashes with police during which one student was killed and 65 were injured, Nairobi University was closed. Although the school reopened in April, disturbances in early 1986 again forced its g for two months.

Political unrest escalated again in March 1986 when the government uncovered what it considered to be a political plot by opposition forces. The Mwakenya (a kiswahili acronym for Union of Nationalists to Liberate Kenya) movement encompassed diverse personalities and groups, all opposed to KANU. Moi alleged that members of these groups were of the same "tribalist elite" that had organized the 1982 coup attempt. Within a year, more than 100 suspected members of Mwakenya were being detained under the Public Security Act. In anticipation of upcoming elections, KANU's 1986 party conference scrapped the secret ballot and approved a queue voting system[1], mandating that in the primaries all votes be cast by voters publicly lining up in support of a candidate.

Early the following year, reports of increasing human rights violations prompted the international community to focus attention on Moi's government. In response, several police officials were dismissed and the Minister of Foreign Affairs was sacked. Neither action swayed Amnesty International from issuing, in July 1987, a harsh attack on the Kenyan government for attempting to silence dissent through detention and torture.

In March 1988, National Assembly election primaries were conducted using the queue system which led to international charges of intimidation and fraud in the process. Shortly thereafter, Moi demoted his popular Vice President, Mwai Kibaki (a Kikuyu), to Minister of Health and replaced him with the relatively unknown Josephat Karanja. In July, the Assembly amended the constitution to extend the period of detention for suspected criminals from 24 hours to two weeks, and to give the President authority to sack judges without reason. These actions increased international human rights groups' condemnation of the Moi government. KANU elections in September saw Moi re-elected President. Just three months later, the Minister of Transport and Communications, Kenneth Matiba, was stripped of all party posts following his criticism of the electoral process, widely viewed by both Kenyans and the international community as blatantly rigged.

The role of ethnicity in the Moi government was clear. The accumulation of administrative power, wielded through the offices of provincial and district commissioners, ensured that Kalenjin dominance in the government was complete. Contracts for government work, licenses for commerce, foreign and domestic trade, university appointments, and much of the social life of the country began to reflect the dominance of the Kalenjin-controlled one-party state.

Until the mid-1980s, the press in Kenya was among the freest in Africa; nevertheless, self-censorship, intimidation and repression by the government curtailed the free flow of information. The penal code allowed the government to ban any publication in the interest of public order, health, morals or national security. The foreign-owned newspapers accommodated the new political realities by engaging in self-censorship in order to avoid potential hostile government actions.

Press freedom began to erode considerably in 1985 with numerous detentions of journalists critical of the government. A once-lively press became cautious and self-censoring under threat of impoundment, permanent closure, violence or detention

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[1]A system of voting developed for use in societies where a high percentage of the population is illiterate, or where fraud involving ballots and ballot boxes has become so rampant that no confidence remains for secret ballots. Voters line up for the candidate of their choice at the polling site and are counted by officials. The results are entered onto tally sheets for reporting. What the system gains in simplicity and speed, it loses in privacy. Threats, bribes and post-voting retribution are commonly associated with queue voting.

of its publishers and journalists.[2]

Media repression included but was not limited to the following incidents: detainment of a reporter from Kenya Times for questioning about sources of information concerning a story of corruption (1985); government prohibition of "the importation of any publication depicting or containing any symbol, emblem, device, colors, slogan, motto, words or letters signifying any association with or support for a political object or political organization" (April 1986); seizure of an entire edition of Weekly Review (April 1986); numerous arrests of individuals for possession of "subversive" publications (throughout 1986); arrest and detainment of journalists on charges of involvement in Mwakenya; barring of Swedish and Norwegian journalists from visiting Kenya after reporting alleged human rights abuses of political prisoners; announcement that work permits for all foreign journalists would be reviewed (September 1987); detention and beating of four Western journalists by police during student unrest at the University of Nairobi (1987), sentencing to prison of an editor of a Christian magazine and a magazine banned for criticizing election procedures (August 1988).

These events had a chilling effect on the country's news media. For example, when a demonstration protesting the government's opposition to multi-party democracy was crushed in July 1990, foreign journalists reporting on the incident were detained for questioning. Kenya Times did not report the event. Other media outlets responded to the potential for intimidation and toned down their criticism.

In early 1989, Karanja resigned as Vice President and was replaced by Minister of Finance George Saitoti, who assumed the Vice Presidency and retained both positions. In June, Moi ordered the release of all political prisoners who had been detained without trial. After his return from Washington in February 1990, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ouko was found murdered near his home in western Kenya. Reports that other government officials may have been involved sparked riots in both Ouko's hometown and Nairobi. The government requested the assistance of Scotland Yard to investigate Ouko's death. A report was issued to the government in September 1990 but was not released to the public. It was widely believed that Minister of Industry Nicholas Biwott and Internal Security Chief Hezekiah Oyugi were somehow involved in the murder. Biwott is considered Moi's closest ally. Moi reportedly considers him "a son."

In May 1990, a coalition of intellectuals, lawyers and church leaders formed an alliance to challenge KANU's one-party domination. The group was headed by former Minister of Transport and Communications Kenneth Matiba. Moi ordered his detention and that of other group leaders. Riots quickly followed in various parts of the country. In Nairobi alone, 28 people were killed and more than 1,000 arrested during four days of demonstrations and street fighting. The government accused supporters of multi-party politics of being "tribalists" and in the pay of "foreign masters." The US Ambassador delivered a strongly-worded speech calling for political reforms -- at the local Rotary Club.

In November 1991, Kenya's major foreign donors met in Paris and jointly decided to suspend $350 million in quick disbursing aid. In addition, they postponed future aid for six months pending Kenya's progress on political and economic reform. The donors outlined four main conditions: privatization of state corporations, reduction of the budget deficit and size of the civil service, accountability and transparency in eco-

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[2]The Kenya Constitution states "No person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and information without interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information without interference (whether the communication be to the general public or to any person or class of persons) and freedom from interference in his correspondence."

nomic management, and greater adherence to human rights, focusing on civil and political liberties. President Moi's first response to pressure by the international community was to arrest Minister of Industry Biwott and Internal Security Chief Oyugi in connection with Ouko's death.

At the KANU party conference in early December 1991, Moi convinced his colleagues to agree to future multi-party elections. On December 10, 1991, the constitutional clause 2(a) declaring "there shall be in Kenya only one political party, the Kenya African National Union" was officially repealed, signaling an intent to return to multi-party competition for the first time in 26 years. This news was greeted with both joy and skepticism since President Moi refused to suggest a possible election date, referring to his power as President to call elections as his "secret weapon."

Political parties began to emerge immediately. The Democratic Party of Mwai Kibaki was established in early January 1992, as was the Forum for the Restoration of Democratic Party (FORD) under Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. In March a huge rally was held; nearly one million people gathered to hear FORD's message.

Violence accompanied the newly-open political scene. In spring 1992, unprovoked attacks resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of displaced persons on the Molo and Kisii-Kericho border of the Rift Valley Province, in the Sondu area of Nyanza Province, and in the Mt. Elgon area in Western Province. Separate investigations into "tribal" unrest by the National Council of Churches and a special parliamentary committee claimed that violent confrontations were instigated by high-ranking government ministers and key figures in the KANU establishment. Many claimed that these crises were staged as tribal clashes in order to prove Moi's contention that Kenya was not yet ready for multi-partyism.

In a September 1992 report to parliament, MP Kennedy Kiliku attempted to uncover government involvement in the unrest. Following a very hostile reception, the report was rejected by parliament. Three of the six committee members voted against their own report. Some still maintain Kiliku is a courageous defender of the displaced, while others maintain he is a scapegoat who "took the heat for Moi." Further investigations were sidetracked by the November 1992 announcement of elections, possibly made by Moi at a strategic time in an attempt to deflect attention from what is now known as "the Kiliku Report."

CHAPTER II: THE PRE-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

Terms of reference for assessment of the pre-election environment are included in Appendix 1. In general, the teams analyzed the following.

- *The Electoral Framework* -- the extent to which the Electoral Commission administered the electoral process under its jurisdiction in an independent, representative and efficient manner.
- *The Campaign Playing Field* -- the extent to which the electoral playing field allowed competing political parties: to have equitable access to material, financial and informational resources, to move and gather freely throughout the campaign, and to operate without fear of violence or intimidation.

In this context, the 20 members of the November-December 1992 assessment team divided into four subject groups to comprehensively analyze the electoral framework, political parties, the media and non-governmental organizations.

Introduction

On October 28, 1992, President Moi announced dissolution of parliament, fueling speculation that elections would soon be held. Parliament was constitutionally required to reconvene three months after dissolution or by January 28, 1993.

On November 3, Electoral Commission Chairman Zaccheaus R. Chesoni, announced that Kenya's presidential, parliamentary and civic elections would be held December 7 with candidate nominations on November 9. Following the long-awaited announcement of the election date, the IRI team noted a mix of euphoria and fear among Kenyans and their political leaders. The Electoral Commission itself was concerned about administering these historic elections with only 34 days advance notice. Opposition parties angrily complained that the nomination and campaign periods had been illegally cut short by the Attorney General and the Electoral Commission had not intervened to rectify the situation, and concluded that these factors proved the election authorities were merely pawns of the ruling party.

Eight days after the initial announcement, the elections were postponed. A Court of Appeals ruling stated Attorney General Amos Wako had stepped beyond his mandate by changing the wording of electoral law stipulating the amount of time allowed for parties to nominate candidates. The original wording "not less than three weeks" had been changed on October 23, 1992 to read "not more than three weeks" were allowed for parties to nominate candidates. Attorney General Wako noted at the time that the change was simply a "clerical error."

On November 17, the Electoral Commission announced a revised election date of December 29, 1992, thus allowing exactly three weeks for political parties to nominate candidates, and three additional weeks of official campaigning prior to election day.

The Electoral Framework

In their review of Kenya's electoral laws and administration, the IRI teams sought to determine the extent to which the basic tenets of a democratic system were promoted and protected, including an independent, transparent, representative and efficient election administration process.

Administrative Structure

Created in 1963, the governmental administrative structure of Kenya has traditionally served as the structure for election administration. The country is divided into eight provinces and subdivided into 45 administrative districts and 188 constituencies. Because the centrally appointed authorities at each level are responsible to the Kenyan government, the basic structure of election administration is particularly problematic.

Kenya's eight provinces are administered by Provincial Commissioners. Provincial lines were drawn in 1963 and are the primary administrative boundaries for organization and governance. The boundaries were originally based on tribal and geographic considerations and, therefore, vary greatly in size and population.

Within the eight provinces is a total of 45 administrative districts. Each district is headed by a government-appointed District Commissioner with primary authority for governing the area. Before the advent of multi-party elections, the District Commissioners were the exclusive election administrators. They were answerable only to the existing government and their election administration was often perceived by Kenyans and alleged by the international community to be biased and abusive.

A constituency is the primary political subdivision, similar to congressional districts in the United States. On average, there are between four and six constituencies within a government district; most contain between 100,000 and 200,000 residents. Each of the 188 constituencies in Kenya has one representative in the National Assembly. The National Assembly consists of 200 members, 12 of which are appointed by the President.

With the establishment of an ostensible independent Electoral Commission, all authority for election administration was removed from the 45 District Commissioners. Prior to this election, the Electoral Commission had been a relatively powerless body, however, in 1992 it was authorized to establish its own entirely new and independent system for election administration. This responsibility prompted the Commission to completely re-configure election administration and necessitated the hiring of more than 100,000 people nationwide to assist in the election.

In removing all election-related authority from the 45 governmental District Commissioners, the Electoral Commission opted to use the 188 political constituencies as the basis for administering elections. The election process in Kenya is described in detail in the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act (Cap. 7) as amended in the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulation 1992 (PPER).

The Electoral Commission

The nine Electoral Commission members were appointed by President Moi before the repeal of Section 2(a)in September 1991 and early 1992. Each serves a five-year term. According to Kenya's Constitution, the Electoral Commission is an independent entity with between five and 11 members. Subsection 9 states: "In the exercise of its functions under the Constitution, the Commission shall not be subject to the direction of any other person or authority."[3] A December 17 report issued by the Government of Kenya noted:

> *"The Commission is not associated with, or affiliated to, any political party. The Electoral Commission is independent of political influence in performing its functions, which must be seen as fair, impartial, and without fear or favour."*

Chairman of the Electoral Commission Z.R. Chesoni was appointed by President Moi in October 1991 and was not previously a member of the Commission. The IRI held several productive meetings with Chesoni to discuss the code of conduct for electoral observers, as well as other issues. The IRI was impressed with Chesoni's willingness to revise procedures in response to the IRI concerns. As the campaign period progressed in November and December 1992, the Commission appeared increasingly responsive to the complaints of Kenyan political parties. The Commission also issued directives to the Police Commissioner, the Head of the Civil Service and the Attorney General requesting them to control the Civil Service.

Rumors of conflict of interest, however, plagued Chesoni throughout the election period. News stories in the London Independent and the Kenyan press claimed Chairman Chesoni's debts were "written off" by a government-owned bank not long before he was named Chairman of the Commission. If this story were true, serious doubts about Chesoni's loyalties could be raised. Throughout 1992 these doubts contributed to the distrust many Kenyans felt toward the Electoral Commission.

The Electoral Commission's responsibilities include registering voters, appointing and training returning officers in each constituency, dividing the constituencies into polling areas, publishing the appointed polling places in the official gazette, procuring and distributing voting materials and announcing the winners of parliamentary and presidential elections. The Commission played an instrumental role in all aspects of the election. The important dates of activity were as follows:

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[3]The Constitution further states that, "the Electoral Commission shall be responsible for the registration of voters and maintenance and revision of the register of voters; directing and supervising the Presidential, National Assembly, and Local Government elections; conducting referenda; and such other functions as may be described by law."

Voter registration	June 8-July 20
Announcement of election day	November 3
Announcement of revised election day	November 17
Parliamentary/civic candidate nomination day	December 9
Presidential nomination day	December 14
Election day	December 29
Announcement of results	January 4

Voter Registration

Voter registries provide the means by which voters can participate in elections. The ability of voters to be included accurately in registry lists is central to the entire election process. Fairness in implementing this stage of election administration is paramount to conducting legitimate elections. Therefore, the regulations outlining voter registration procedure must be applied equally to all citizens, and implementation of these regulations must include a wide range of political and civic activists and government workers.

One of the initial duties of the Electoral Commission was that of registering voters. National voter registration was originally expected to require only one month, beginning on June 8, 1992. The closing date was extended by the Electoral Commission twice, and finally closed on July 20, 1992.

In order to register to vote, citizens are required to show a national identity card. which can (in theory) be obtained locally at government administrative offices. According to law, an identity card must be issued when a citizen reaches age 18. In addition, a citizen must prove residency at an address in Kenya for not less than one year prior to the election. Eligible voters must have resided in Kenya for an aggregate of four of the past eight years. Finally, eligible voters must have lived, been employed. conducted business or owned land or buildings in the constituency for at least five months of the preceding year.

Once registered, voters receive an elector card which, according to electoral law. must be presented along with the identity card to the Presiding Officer at the polling site in order to vote. The elector cards issued in 1992 were valid only for the 1992 elections. Kenya's voter registry is not computerized and was last updated prior to the 1988 elections. Since that time, an estimated 3.5 million Kenyans reached the voting age of 18. The Electoral Commission estimated Kenya's population at nearly 24 million: however, the most recent census results (1989) were never released by the government so actual population numbers were unknown.[4] Nearly eight million voters registered to vote, the highest number in Kenya's history.

The abruptness with which voter registration began and the brief time allowed for its completion were considered by many to be calculated moves on the part of the government to disenfranchise voters. The process was carried out by 30,000 registration clerks in 5,631 centers countrywide and was highly criticized by opposition and church groups. These groups charged, specifically, that newly-eligible youth voters were either unable to register or gave-up trying, given the complications encountered in obtaining valid government-issued national identity cards.

For three weeks, the opposition boycotted the voter registration process. Charging that the composition of the Electoral Commission was unfair, the boycott was

[4]Kenya's estimated 1991 population according to Encyclopedia Britannica (1992) was 25.9 million.

meant to send a strong message to the Kenyan government. Rather than achieving its goals, the boycott served to confuse the public and ultimately disenfranchised a large number of eligible voters. Realizing the result of their scheme, the opposition canceled the boycott in the final week before the deadline and urged their supporters to register. The IRI team noted that during this period Chairman Chesoni extended the deadline several times in order to accommodate logistical problems and other delays.

Registration lists are often organized alphabetically, numerically by address or by identification or elector card number. In Kenya, lists were generally organized alphabetically and typed in the local districts. Lacking the time and resources to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the voter registry, the IRI was unable to assess accuracy. The IRI noted, however, that several independent NGOs and foreign groups examined registries in selected districts and have provided documentation regarding specific irregularities. Many registration problems noted by NGOs to the IRI in the pre-election period were substantiated on election day.

In most cases, domestic monitors appear to have been granted access to voter registries. Anomalies highlighted in the reports of these domestic observers were not verified by the IRI. The accusations, however, mirrored the IRI complaints based on meetings throughout the country. Aside from irregularities which appeared clerical in nature, the most important concerns included inconsistent listing of names, addresses and identification card numbers. In some cases, identity numbers were listed without corresponding names or names were listed with no address or identity number. In several cases, surnames were confused with "other names" making them difficult to locate alphabetically. In the registers examined by the IRI, only the first letter of each name appeared to be organized alphabetically while the second and third letters were not.

Availability of Registration Lists for Public Review

Typically, registration lists are available for review in an accessible public place for a period of several weeks before an election. During this time, registered voters have an opportunity to verify voter registration information and to make any necessary corrections or revisions. Access to voter lists is often an important means by which parties independently verify information in order to develop "get-out-the-vote" campaigns.

On August 12, Electoral Commission Chairman Chesoni announced that voter registries were open for inspection. Any complaints were to be reported within 14 days to the registration officers who, in turn, would respond within seven days by publishing a list of claimants at district headquarters. Actual availability of voter registries for public review varied from district to district, but in all constituencies review began well after August 12. In some locales, such as the Tana River District, registers were not available for inspection until mid-October. In addition, the IRI heard complaints that many Kenyans were unaware of their right to confirm voter registration information. In many instances, the dates for public review did not appear to have been announced publicly.

The Electoral Commission informed the IRI team that anyone was permitted to purchase pages of the current voter registry at a cost of two shillings per page. During the assessment period, only the IRI team in Mombasa was able to purchase a voter registry/or review. The IRI team realized that this unavailability was due, at least in part, to lack of time and advance notice. In two separate instances in the Nyanza Province, District Commissioners informed the IRI assessment team that only the Registration Officers had access to the lists. These officials were reportedly not in the area.

Registration lists were often kept in the offices of the District Commissioner, rather than in the local polling areas. Therefore, registered voters in remote villages experienced difficulties in checking the lists. The IRI team also noted that many people did not appear to realize the importance of verifying voter information. This problem

could have been remedied had the Electoral Commission taken a more active role in voter education.

It is estimated by the opposition that between one and three million eligible voters were disenfranchised as a result of voter registration problems. Although the estimates cannot be verified, this large a number of voters could have significantly affected the outcome of the election. On election day, voter registration problems, described previously, combined with missing registration lists give credence to allegations that the registration process was seriously flawed. It is essential for the integrity of the democratic process that in future elections the registration process be efficiently carried out and proper voter education procedures implemented.

The Announcement of Election Day

In a legitimate electoral process the period between the announcement of elections and candidate registration is sufficient to allow parties to organize and adapt to the electoral structure. In this case however, the election day announcement exacerbated opposition mistrust regarding both the independence and the possible ill intent of the Electoral Commission.

As noted in the introduction, the period between the announcement of elections (November 3) and the deadline for parties to nominate their candidates (November 9) was impossibly brief. On November 12, the High Court issued a temporary injunction nullifying the eight-day nomination period. Attorney General Wako contended that the wording of Section 13 of the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act had been changed from "not less" to "not more" than 21 days in accordance with his powers under the Revision of Laws Act.[5] This position was overruled by the High Court. The Judge noted that the change, termed by Wako a clerical error, was "a misuse, if not an abuse, of the powers conferred upon him by his office." Although the election date was subsequently rescheduled, the credibility of both the Attorney General and the Electoral Commission had been damaged by this incident, calling into question their sense of fairness and their intent to abide by the election laws.

Selection and Training of Election Personnel

On October 21, the Electoral Commission announced it expected to hire at least 100,000 election officials nationwide. On election day, administrators included 400 Returning Officers, 10,000 security personnel, 18,000 Presiding Officers and 90,000 clerks. The Commission announced the Returning and Deputy Returning Officers on November 9 and published the names in the official gazette. The responsibilities of Returning Officers are described in Chapter IV.

Given the complexity and magnitude of election administration, adequate training of the newly-hired officials was paramount for successful administration of the election. At the invitation of election authorities, the IRI team attended several workshops for Returning Officers and was given a copy of the Presiding Officer training manual. Generally, both the training sessions and the manual were well organized. Nevertheless, on election day, the IRI observed significant confusion that can be attributed only to insufficient training of election administrators.

Nomination of Civic and Parliamentary Candidates

Candidate nomination day was a critical juncture in the electoral process. The process as manifested on December 9 was very damaging to the integrity of Kenya's electoral process.

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[5]This act allows the Attorney General to correct only printing and clerical errors.

According to electoral law, candidates were to present their papers to the Returning Officer between 8 a.m. and 1 p.m. on a day not less than 21 days before election day. Each candidate was required to be affiliated with a political party and to present nomination papers naming a proposer, a seconder and from seven to 18 additional supporters. The candidate and his or her supporters had to be members of the same political party and had to reside in the constituency for which the candidate was being nominated. Each candidate was required to pay Ksh 5,000 at the time the nomination papers were submitted.

The Returning Officer could reject nomination papers if they were improperly completed or were inconsistent with official procedures; if they were not subscribed as required by the regulations; if the candidate was not qualified for nomination or election to the National Assembly, or if a sufficient number of proposers or other supporters were disqualified such that the number of signatories fell below the required number of seven. The Returning Officer was required, however, to render such a decision immediately upon presentation of the nomination papers. The reason(s) for rejected nominations had to be detailed in writing and signed by the Returning Officer.

At the close of the nomination period, Returning Officers reviewed all nomination papers. For seats where only one candidate had presented valid nomination papers, the Returning Officer had the authority to declare that the candidate had effectively won the seat in Parliament. In such cases, the Returning Officer was required to report the information to the Electoral Commission and the Commission would then announce the results in the gazette.

More than 40 parliamentary and civic candidates alleged that during the period between 8 a.m. and 1 p.m. on December 9, they were forcibly prevented by political opponents from presenting their nomination papers to Returning Officers. As a result, their names were not placed on the ballot and their candidacies were effectively nullified.

No independent Election Court existed for the investigation or adjudication of election related complaints prior to the election. Election cases were tried in court through Kenya's judiciary system. Many cases relating to allegations of election improprieties were heard by the High Court and the Court of Appeals throughout the pre-election period. Immediately after the parliamentary nominations, the Electoral Commission was besieged with more than 70 complaints from civic and parliamentary candidates who had faced various difficulties when trying to present their nomination papers.

One case, known as Cheboiwo, was filed in the High Court demanding that candidates be allowed to contest the elections because "felonious means" had been used against them. Arguing against the nine candidates who filed the complaint, counsel for the Electoral Commission stated that the nominations could not be accepted because the decision of the Returning Officer was "irreversible." Furthermore, as reported in Daily Nation in late December, the Electoral Commission did not have the power to prevent such "felonious acts." The High Court Judge overruled the Electoral Commission stating that "the Electoral Commission has the power to see that elections are held in accordance with the law, that the election process is free and fair, and the nominated candidates get access to the Returning Officers."

On December 24, the Cheboiwo case was sent to the Kenyan Court of Appeals. As reported in Daily Nation in late December, the court ruled that to allow Returning Officers and the Electoral Commission to treat as sole candidates those KANU candidates who presented their nomination papers, while rivals were physically prevented from doing so by KANU supporters, would give a "seal of approval" to the unbridled use of violence and strong-arm tactics in the election process. In essence, the Court of Appeals held that the Electoral Commission did have the power to accept the nomination papers.

In an apparent rejection of the Court of Appeals ruling, the Electoral Commission decided that the cases of those candidates abducted on the way to file their papers could be heard only after the election by a three-judge tribunal set up specifically to hear election-related cases. The IRI heard that this tribunal would convene after December 29. Chesoni noted at the time that the elections could not be postponed to accommodate these disenfranchised candidates. The IRI learned from Chairman Chesoni on February 26, 1993 that the election tribunal would convene in late March 1993 and that Cheboiwo had not bothered to file a petition by the deadline date.

In December, the IRI was invited to a special meeting of the Electoral Commission, at which political party representatives were included, for the purpose of discussing these complaints. At the meeting, the Commission established a three-person subcommittee to hear cases involving claims of harassment and to make recommendations or decisions regarding the placement of candidates' names on ballots. Complaints were organized into three categories: those which were within the jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission because the complaints focused on the Returning Officer; those alleging physical intimidation, abduction or kidnaping, which were within the jurisdiction of the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Police, and those in which candidates had been declared elected and therefore, according to the Constitution, could be reviewed only through the post-election court process.

Nomination of Presidential Candidates

Nomination day for Presidential candidates, December 14, 1992, proceeded without incident and eight candidates were registered. In order to run for President a candidate must be at least 35 years old, be nominated by a registered political party and be nominated as a candidate for the National Assembly.

As amended on August 5, 1992, the Constitution requires that a Presidential candidate obtain at least 25 percent of the votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces. According to Attorney General Wako, this provision assures not only a mandate from the highest number of voters, but also ensures a wide geographic distribution of the votes.[6]

Procurement and Distribution of Voting Materials

Procurement of voting materials began in late September. At that time the British High Commission announced that 35,000 ballot boxes would be manufactured by a British company and donated to Kenya by the British government. Opposition candidates immediately expressed concern at what they deemed the excessive number of boxes ordered by election authorities. According to the opposition, only 27,000 were needed -- three for each of the 9,000 polling stations -- and 35,000 boxes in circulation would present an opportunity to rig the election as had been accomplished in 1988. Upon arrival, each shipment of ballot boxes was transported to a secure storage area near the airport and remained under guard until distribution began. It is the IRI's opinion that the ballot boxes were well secured during the pre-election period and few, if any, were used to rig the election.

The boxes, however, arrived without serial numbers. Professional international election specialists, including the IRI, urged that serial numbers be required to ensure the integrity of the process. This was paramount as ballots were not counted at the polling sites and often had to be transported several kilometers to the nearest counting center. Serial numbers were ultimately painted onto each box, to the satisfaction of most observers and opposition members.

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[6]While the new amendment perhaps succeeds in blocking those seeking a tribal majority, it gives sparsley-populated provinces far more influence than the comparative number of registered voters in densely-populated provinces.

Each ballot and counterfoil (the stub attached to the ballot) were also marked with the distinctive serial numbers. The IRI noted strong concern to the Electoral Commission about the manner in which counterfoil serial numbers could be linked with an individual voter, thereby jeopardizing the secrecy of the ballot. In Kenya, each voter is assigned a unique elector number, and each ballot (and counterfoil) has a unique number upon which the voter number (elector card number) is recorded. As a result, it is possible to determine how individual citizens have voted by matching numbers after the election. This system obviously undermines the secrecy of the process and the confidence of citizens in the privacy of the vote.

Other voting materials procured by the Electoral Commission included stamps to be used by Presiding Officers. Rather than order one stamp for each polling stream, the Electoral Commission ordered only one stamp per polling station. (See Chapter IV for a description of polling streams.) The over-used stamp had to be passed from polling stream to polling stream, and, in many cases, the stamp broke before voting was completed. These problems caused huge delays and frustration.

Ballot papers were procured in Great Britain by the Electoral Commission. The brief period of time between candidate nominations and the election itself led to many problems with the ballots, the foremost of which was the tight schedule that allowed no time for nomination problems to be redressed in time for candidates' names to be printed on the ballots.

At the polling sites on election day numerous mistakes were discovered. These included candidate names missing from ballots, misspellings, candidate names listed without the party logo and constituency names listed above the wrong slate of candidates. The Electoral Commission claimed the inaccuracies were not noted in advance because ballot papers were procured from abroad, and time between receipt and distribution was short. In the future, utmost attention must be given to the accuracy of the ballot papers prior to election day. If necessary, the length of time between candidate nomination and election day should be extended.

Local distribution of voting material was the responsibility of the Returning Officers. In many areas, physical transportation of materials was carried out by police. The distribution procedure was insufficiently described in the electoral law and created massive problems on election day as materials arrived late throughout the country.

Conclusions: The Electoral Framework

In transitional societies, procedural irregularities and administrative confusion can occur as a result of inexperience with multi-party elections. Often, the advantages of incumbency are extreme. However, in transitional elections previously observed by the IRI, the government usually attempts to accommodate the opposition by responding to their ideas and opinions in the development of the election and political party laws, the implementation of the law via the Electoral Commission and the design of safeguards to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.

Kenya's electoral code was revised in March 1992 to accommodate multi-partyism and to establish procedures safeguarding the election process against fraud. The IRI is very concerned that in the ensuing months the Kenya government has made few attempts to accommodate the opposition's demands for access and transparency.

The Electoral Commission lacked political party representation and appeared to lack independence. Prior to November 1992, the Electoral Commission did not hold meetings with opposition political parties to accommodate their suggestions in regard to the design of the election law, the procedures for registration and election administration, the development of training materials or the training of election officials.

Despite persistent requests by opposition political parties to participate in these deliberations, President Moi refused. Because the Kenyan President would not agree to include even one opposition voice in the Commission, the IRI believes Moi intended to appoint only electoral commissioners he could influence.

The IRI notes, however, that as the campaign progressed, the Commission as a whole became more responsive and communicative with parties and the general public. Meetings were held with political parties and there was an effort to promote voter education through posters, newspaper inserts and radio and television spots. In addition, the Chairman initiated a daily press conference to respond rapidly to developing issues concerning the election. The Commission never recovered, however, from initial suspicion about its commitment to a transparent and fair election process.

The IRI seriously questions the Commission's independence because it appeared to lack the authority to negotiate without prior consultation with higher authorities. Further, when the nomination period was shortened (to the disadvantage of all parties), the Electoral Commission neither formally nor publicly advised the Attorney General of the consequences of the decision. At this key juncture of the electoral process, the Electoral Commission appeared to side with the Attorney General rather than represent the interests of the political parties and the Kenyan citizens.

In addition, the IRI is concerned that Chairman Chesoni may have had a conflict of interest due to the questions surrounding the resolution of his financial problems. The IRI has received conflicting information concerning the allegations. If it is true that the KANU government played a role in writing off Chesoni's debt or in assisting with the payment thereof, this is a significant concern. If the allegations prove false, the IRI condemns those who would perpetrate lies in an attempt to influence public opinion about the impartiality of Chairman Chesoni and the Commission in general.

The registration process was seriously flawed. As a result, as many as three million voters may have been disenfranchised. During the assessment period, the IRI heard many reports that the registration process was inefficient, and that logistical delays were deliberately devised to disenfranchise young voters. After the registries were available for inspection, the IRI heard that the lists were deliberately inaccurate to the point that many voters would be disenfranchised on election day. In response to repeated complaints, the IRI analyzed one voter registry from Kisuani constituency and noted inaccuracies, omissions and inconsistencies. On election day, the IRI observers noted several instances where voters did not appear on lists and therefore could not vote. The IRI was not able to conduct a thorough cross-check to determine whether or not election day problems with registration lists systematically disenfranchised certain ethnic groups, constituencies or political parties. Nevertheless, registration reform is a critical step before future elections.

Insufficient time was allowed to carry out key pre-election activities. The timing of the elections and the sporadic interruptions in the process led to inefficiency and confusion. The voter registration period was too brief to allow potential voters time to resolve problems in obtaining national identity cards. Although the voter registration deadline was extended by the Electoral Commission, general delays and confusion warranted additional extensions.

The candidate nomination period was illegally shortened by Attorney General Wako. The Courts overruled his decision, but not before strong suspicions were reinforced about the government's lack of commitment to a fair and open process. The IRI believes Attorney General Wako's attempt to manipulate the electoral code was an egregious misuse of power and highlighted the Government's lack of commitment to a fair electoral process.

The Electoral Commission and Returning Officers did not efficiently organize distribution of voting materials or funds to pay election personnel. Election admin-

istration is highly complex, and the Commission should be commended for attempting to orchestrate the complicated logistics. On election day, however, the process was significantly marred by late arrival of materials, inaccurate ballot papers, missing or inaccurate registration lists, unpaid polling clerks and other problems. The Commission is ultimately responsible for all administrative confusion related to election day procedures.

Inadequate means of grievance and redress were offered under the Electoral Code, especially during the nomination and campaign periods. The electoral dispute resolution process in Kenya was highly inefficient. By design, most allegations of misconduct were to be presented to the Kenyan judiciary system. The Electoral Commission and the courts were not prepared to respond to the large volume of electoral complaints and court cases which this highly litigious society produced. Whether in the context of registration, nominations, voting, or tabulation, the Commission's responses seemed to be ad hoc, contradictory, or a result of inadequate review and comment by relevant authorities. The pace of events did not allow time for all nomination grievances to be addressed and, consequently, many candidates were unable to compete. The IRI notes strong concern that many nomination and election day complaints remain unresolved. As of early March 1993, the tribunal appointed to hear such cases had yet to convene.

District Commissioners discriminated against opposition groups by delaying processing time for key documents. One of the most serious problems in the election was chronic and intentional delay in delivering or processing essential documents, including national identification cards in the June registration period, rally and meeting permits throughout 1992, and ballot papers and other voting materials on election day. Of these three key delays, two (national identification cards and rally permits) were the direct responsibility of the civil administration, not the Electoral Commission. Distribution of voting material was, in part, the responsibility of the local police who serve under the District Commissioner. It is the IRI's opinion that some "inefficiencies" were instead calculated attempts to discourage voting in select areas, silence the opposition in specific constituencies, and otherwise disenfranchise voters who because of ethnic or perceived political affiliation may have voted against the ruling party.

Many procedural revisions under the jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission appeared to safeguard the process against manipulation. However, high level civil servants -- including the Attorney General, Police Commissioner and Head of the Civil Service -- still retained significant enough power to exploit the electoral process. This was a notable problem in past elections. The IRI believes that their blatant misuse of government power impacted the fairness of the entire electoral process. High-level civil servants have the obligation to act and to be seen to act in an impartial manner. This did not appear to be the case during the recent pre-election period.

New oversight procedures designed to ensure fairness and transparency led to election day inefficiencies. The weakness of the election day process appeared to be its newness rather than its design. Returning Officers, Presiding Officers, table personnel and security personnel performed admirably under difficult circumstances. The Kenyan voters, in particular, showed great patience and commitment as they endured various delays. (See Chapter IV).

In summary, the IRI notes that the Attorney General and many District Commissioners were responsible for egregious pre-election irregularities related to the electoral framework. An electoral environment seething with mistrust requires an accessible, transparent and representative process. While election day inefficiencies can be attributed to inexperience, shortcomings related to transparency cannot be excused. Before the next elections, significant reforms in this area are needed.

Included in Chapter V are specific recommendations suggesting areas where the electoral law and its administration could be improved.

CHAPTER III: THE CAMPAIGN PLAYING FIELD

When evaluating whether an election is free and fair, the campaign period is often far more illustrative than voting day itself. In some elections, the majority of irregularities potentially influencing the outcome take place weeks or even months before election day.

When assessing the extent to which opposing political parties are able to compete on a 'level playing field' during campaigns, the IRI focuses on three principle areas: equitable access to and legal utilization of financial and material resources, essential freedoms of movement and assembly required for party organization, campaigning, and access to the polls, and balanced coverage in and access to electronic and print media. These criteria share importance in the evaluation but vary in degree depending on the political culture, the type of election and the condition of the physical infrastructure.

Political Parties

Political parties are a critical component of any democratic system. The success of a pluralistic democracy hinges on the ability of political groups, with various policy prescriptions, to compete within a framework that allows the freedom to organize and to disseminate their views without undue interference. At the same time, the competing parties must have sufficient vision and organizational and communications skills to convey effectively their campaign messages to voters. Only in this context are citizens genuinely able to select the political party they feel best represents their views and visions for the future. Without an election date toward which to build campaign momentum, unity and organizational strategies, opposition groups in Kenya became fragmented.

Of the ten parties legally registered in the Kenyan elections, only four were considered national forces. The other parties were small, regionally- or ethnically-based and their platforms tended to be ill-defined. Kenya's opposition parties have received great criticism for their inability to make strategic campaign decisions without selfish interest. Throughout the pre-election period, internal ideological and personal differences were not put aside, and ambitious party leaders refused to forge strategic alliances.

Ten political parties registered to contest the December 29 elections: the Democratic Party (DP), the original Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD Asili), the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD Kenya), the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the Kenya National Congress (KNC), the Kenya National Democratic Party (KENDA), the Kenya Social Congress (KSC), the Labor Party Democracy (LPD), the Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) was not allowed to register because its platform was based on a religion rather than an ideology.

On the following pages are brief descriptions of the four major parties and their leaders. The extent to which voters were informed or cared about policy positions of the candidates, or the parties they led, is unclear. Voter education problems are discussed in later pages.

The Democratic Party

The Democratic Party was formed in early 1992 by a group of defecting former cabinet ministers and assistant ministers from Central Province. Led by Mwai Kibaki, former Vice President (1978-88), the Democratic Party is largely composed of members of the Kikuyu tribe. A graduate of the London School of Economics, Kibaki is considered an accomplished economist and technocrat. He was a founding member and served as the first National Executive Officer of KANU. In 1960 he left his teaching

position at Makerere University to work for independence and remains a political activist. Another central figure in the party is James Njenga Karume, former Assistant Minister for Cooperative Development until his defection from KANU.

Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Asili (FORD Asili)

FORD Asili chairman, Kenneth Stanley Njindo Matiba, is the former Minister of Communications and Transportation. He entered national politics in 1979 by defeating a long-standing cabinet minister. His slogan in that campaign was Kugan Gwika ("Saying and Doing"). Alleging the 1988 election was rigged, Matiba resigned his ministerial post and was subsequently expelled from KANU. He was placed in detention without trial under the Preservation of Public Security Act and was released from prison in June 1991 after suffering a stroke. He recuperated in London for a year and returned to Kenya in May 1992. Matiba is a successful businessman who maintains hotel chains, agricultural interests and highly-respected and profitable private schools; he was for many years the chief executive of Kenya Breweries.

Upon his return to the country in 1992, Matiba initially joined forces with the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) but on October 12 the two FORDs officially registered as separate parties. The split was attributed ostensibly to differences of opinion in regard to nomination of parliamentary and local candidates. As a Kikuyu, Matiba's move from FORD was extremely divisive because it split not only the strongest opposition political party but also the Kikuyu vote between FORD Asili and Kibaki's Democratic Party. FORD Asili's slogan for the 1992 campaign was "Let the People Decide."

Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD Kenya)

FORD Kenya is led by the country's first Vice President (1963-66) Jaramogi Ajuma Oginga Odinga. In 1991 Oginga Odinga, along with Masinde Muliro and Martin Shikuku founded the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) as a pressure group to lobby for multi-party democracy. Oginga Odinga is known as the father of opposition politics in Kenya. In 1958-59, he was President of the Kenya Independent Movement. From 1960-65 he was Vice president of KANU. In 1966 he resigned the Vice Presidency and left KANU to form the Kenya People's Union, a populist party. The party was banned by the government in 1969 and Oginga Odinga was detained by the Kenyatta regime until 1971. KANU amended the constitution turning Kenya into a de jure one-party state, because of Oginga Odinga's attempt, with George Anyona, to form the Kenya African Socialist Party.

FORD became the first new registered political party after the December 1991 repeal of Section 2(a). In early 1992 many believed FORD would become a prominent, perhaps unbearable, voice of the opposition. Although Oginga Odinga is a member of the Luo tribe, FORD Kenya did not align itself with any single ethnic group and was considered to be the most pan-ethnically popular political party. Nearly a million people gathered in early 1992 at FORD's first rally at the Kamukunji grounds in Nairobi. The split with Matiba in the fall of 1992 severely weakened Oginga Odinga's party, and tribal alignments resulted in a large portion of Kikuyu support going to FORD Asili.

Kenya African National Union (KANU)

The Kenya African National Union is led by President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi. Now in his fifteenth year as President, Moi has participated in politics for more than three decades, first as a member of parliament and then as Vice President for 12 years under Jomo Kenyatta, and later as Kenyatta's successor. Under Moi's leadership, Kenya moved from a de facto to a de jure one-party state and then to a de jure multi-party system. His tenure has been marked by increased centralization of power in the office of the President and the encroachment of "the party" on civil society.

Access to Resources

In transition societies, disparities frequently exist in resources available to ruling parties and those available to opposition parties. In Kenya's elections, there were allegations by the opposition, although difficult to independently verify, of improper use of state resources by the ruling party. The interwoven nature of KANU and government linkages were evident throughout the campaign period. For example, the IRI was able to confirm that government properties, including vehicles and printing facilities, were available to KANU candidates and supporters. The IRI delegates frequently observed government vehicles (Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, among others) bearing KANU campaign posters. The IRI also witnessed government officials conducting campaign-related business from their government offices.

Over the years, KANU has amassed considerable real estate holdings. No other party had access to comparable facilities. This situation is similar to other transitional electoral environments and does not automatically disadvantage the opposition, however, in this case the opposition clearly lacked the organizational infrastructure including offices, equipment and trained staff to compete evenly with KANU. In areas considered "KANU zones" (in the Riff Valley and North Eastern Province) the disparity was especially evident. In these areas opposition parties were not allowed to stage rallies until late in the campaign or to open branch offices. In an environment where access to telephones and transportation is limited, the branch office often assumes great importance by serving as a nexus for party communications and activity in the province. Opposition parties were clearly disadvantaged by this disparity resulting from anti-opposition bias of District Commissioners.

Business enterprises owned, controlled or influenced by the candidates of all parties found dual usage throughout the campaign. The IRI observers witnessed numerous examples of commercial establishments providing services and facilities to the four major parties. The disparity in this area, if any, appeared to be limited to the resourcefulness and contacts of party leaders, and seemed to disadvantage the smaller parties in particular.

Despite the rampant flow of money used both to lure voters and their families and to persuade candidates to defect back and forth from party to party, the main opposition parties expressed to the IRI surprisingly little concern about funding inequities. In its visits throughout the country, the IRI noted that although opposition parties appeared to lack comparable material resources, access to funding did not seem to significantly hinder basic organizational efforts, or to dampen confidence and enthusiasm. In some cities visited by the IRI, the major opposition parties seemed to be able to finance the establishment of "store-front" branch offices. As noted earlier, however, permits for branch offices were often not approved by District Commissioners.

The Role of Money

Kenya's present electoral code and constitution do not provide for public financing of any portion of political campaigns. Recent amendments to the law specifically stipulate that each political party must bear the expense related to the nomination of candidates for contesting parliamentary elections (Section 17 in Cap. 7). The law does not call for public disclosure of the source of campaign funds, making it virtually impossible for the public to learn where parties have obtained funding support.

Money played an instrumental role in the election campaign as millions of shillings were openly disbursed nationwide to eligible voters, their families and candidates. While money campaigns are not unusual in Kenya, this election saw a vast increase in spending because the formerly fixed spending ceiling of Ksh 40,000 per candidate for parliamentary candidates was amended in October 1992 by Attorney

General Wako. There is presently no spending limit. The spending limit had, in previous elections, led to a number of nullifications.

Allegations of Currency Infusions

Members of opposition parties expressed concern to the IRI that the Kenyan Government was underwriting some costs of KANU campaigns. Related to this, according to the January 11, 1993 edition of *Economic Review*:

> *"The IMF has noted growth in the monetary sector. Failure by the Central Bank to enforce strict control on commercial bank operations has lent credence to reports that the currency in circulation may have irregularly expanded by over Ksh 11 billion. Unconfirmed reports said that the alleged release of paper money into the economic mainstream and monetary control had already been raised with senior government officials by the World Bank headquarters in Washington. The importation of currency has been vehemently denied by the Central Bank, although its monthly balance sheets show large unmatched direct advances to the central government during the past year."*

Throughout the campaign, the IRI heard allegations that the country's money supply may have increased by more than 40 percent in the second half of 1992, and that this infusion may have led to the country's increasing inflation rate.

While requesting not to be quoted or named, at least one local bank executive suggested that the money supply appeared to have increased measurably during the campaign period. In an article in *Daily Nation* (December 17, 1992) the Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya wrote:

> *"The profits cheque given to the President by the Governor of the Central Bank in October of this year to the tune of Ksh 5.5 billion indicates that direct advances to central government over the period 1991-1992 were in the region of Ksh 30 billion. This far exceeds the statutory minimum based on recurrent revenue estimates for that year of Ksh 44 billion...The government of Central Bank of Kenya appears to be powerless in the face of directives from the executive arm of the government..."*

The IRI heard several allegations that the Government increased the money supply in order to finance KANU campaign efforts. FORD Kenya reported to the IRI that they had calculated that the KANU government placed a special order of Ksh 9 billion in new banknotes from the government's customary banknote printer, De la Rue of Britain. Currency is usually sent by sea route. The special order was reportedly sent by air. This order of Ksh 9 billion was reportedly in addition to the Ksh 2 billion, thought to be for routine currency replacement. (It is unknown whether the 2 billion of old notes was taken out of circulation.)

Within the last few months prior the election, therefore, the country's money supply could have increased from the usual Ksh 15 billion to Ksh 26 billion via 11 billion in new banknotes mostly dated January 2, 1992. This infusion into the money supply remains ungazetted.[8]

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[8]Details in this paragraph were provided by FORD Kenya in its Directorate's report on the December 29 elections.

Cash Handouts to Build Party Support

KANU leadership was remarkably open about utilizing shillings to build and maintain party membership. One leader in the Coast Province stated that the party budget prior to the announcement of election day was Ksh 3 million per day and, after the announcement, the total daily expenditures would jump to Ksh 5 million. Financial resources were available to the three other major parties and were also used liberally.

The IRI heard scores of rumors regarding exorbitant campaign expenditures in the form of cash disbursements to individuals and parties. The IRI was not in the position to verify most reports, but the following alleged incidents are representative of many stories heard throughout the assessment periods:

- FORD Asili candidate Matiba personally financed more than Ksh 22 million to support grassroots civic and parliamentary nominations, not including printing and distribution costs for written materials.
- Youth for KANU '92 had access to Ksh 1.2 billion through the National Hospital Insurance Fund.
- *Operation Moi Wins* stated at least Ksh 500,000 would be distributed weekly in one constituency alone (Gachoka) to ensure Moi's victory. They reportedly told a crowd at Embu stadium: "There is nothing to hide; we are going to pour an amount of money you have never seen here before to ensure that President Moi is voted in again."

The IRI heard estimates from one KANU official that the party was spending between three and five million shillings daily, and would spend Ksh 1.5 billion by election day to ensure victory. A senior ruling party official in the Coast Province openly stated to the IRI that he was going to pay each family in his constituency between Ksh 2,000 and Ksh 5,000 shillings on election day to support him. The IRI did not hear expenditure estimates from other parties but notes that substantial sums were disbursed by each of the major groups.

The sheer volume of money distributed in the Kenyan elections raises a fundamental question about the campaign. In Kenya, clearly two-thirds of the voters selected someone other than Moi to serve as President. Whether the money distributed by KANU had any purchasing power when it came time to cast a secret ballot is unclear. In transitional societies, this phenomenon is often seen. In the Philippines in 1986, Cardinal Jaime Sin advised Filipinos:

> *"...to take the money offered by the parties and then vote your conscience. You need the money and it is wrong not to vote as you choose. They who offer you the money are doing wrong."*

The observation that elector cards were being purchased by persons with large amounts of cash is another matter. Some discrepancies between anticipated turnout and actual turnout could be explained by the absence of elector cards. The IRI teams witnessed elector cards being purchased for cash at several sites. In Oyugis, local citizens accosted a woman with a purse full of cash and elector cards and demanded to know the source of cash. When the woman refused to talk, the group reportedly placed her in the center of old tires splashed with paraffin and threatened to set her on fire. The police intervened and took her into custody. The IRI sent a team to investigate these allegations but local police said they were not authorized to discuss the case.

In Kisumu, the IRI team saw approximately 200 national identification cards in the office of the ruling party's youth wing. When questioned, the youth official said the cards had been lost and were being held for "safe keeping."

Elector card buying was so widespread that Chairman Chesoni finally responded by lifting the requirement that voters had to show their elector cards in order to vote.

While this was an important gesture on the part of the Electoral Commission, many voters and election officials did not learn of the change prior to election day.

Party Defections

Liberal cash disbursements also led to party defections. In the last month of the campaign both voters and candidates began "jumping" from party to party. In many cases, supporters switched party allegiance because Kenya has weak political parties and potential voters have little experience with multi-party options. In many cases prior to December 9, local party leaders failed to be nominated by one party so defected to another.

Defections of candidates who had been officially nominated on December 9 by a party for a civic or parliamentary seat were a significant and serious issue. Electoral law offered no provisions for parties to nominate new candidates when original candidates defected. A party was thus effectively blocked from running a candidate in those constituencies where candidates had defected and citizens were, therefore, deprived of a full slate of choices. It is unknown whether or not post-nomination defectors were planted by KANU, paid off or promised something in the future. In some cases, candidates were clearly coerced into defecting.

Voter defections occurred in both ruling and opposition parties. Most candidate defections, however, were of opposition candidates switching to KANU. Some strategic defections, particularly in the North Eastern Province, crippled opposition efforts to field candidates and mount a campaign. FORD Kenya provided the IRI with sworn affidavits alleging that several of its candidates had been coerced to defect and to return to KANU. The IRI heard from multiple sources that one candidate was paid up to a million shillings not to stand as an opposition candidate. The IRI heard that in some cases cash was not the only reward for defection. One affidavit received from FORD Kenya alleges that certain candidates were picked up by KANU operatives and driven directly to see President Moi who personally encouraged the candidates to defect.

As of December 28, 49 candidates nominated by opposition parties had withdrawn from their respective races and rejoined KANU -- FORD Asili lost 18 candidates, FORD Kenya 17 candidates, Democratic Party 11 candidates, and the Kenya National Congress three candidates.

Freedom of Assembly and Movement

The ability of all political parties to organize freely, to assemble their supporters and to move their candidates around the country is a fundamental component of any campaign. In Kenya, the opposition parties were frequently denied this vital ability to organize and to disseminate their messages.

Since the repeal of Section 2(a), opposition political parties have been allowed to hold meetings and public rallies. According to Kenyan law, however, the opening of branch offices and meetings of more than nine people can occur only upon issuance of a permit from the local District Commissioner. All applications must be received by the District Commissioner no less than 14 days before the scheduled meeting.

Until mid-December, District Commissioners appeared to discriminate against opposition parties when enforcing the government regulation requiring rally and meeting permits. While opposition parties faced considerable government obstacles limiting their ability to assemble, the IRI team heard of no instance where the ruling party was denied a rally permit. The IRI was given several lists detailing rally rejections in various parts of the country.

To counter complaints voiced by opposition parties, a statement addressing the licensing issue was released on November 17 by the Secretary to the Cabinet and Head

of Public Service. The statement noted that in certain areas of the country "opposition parties had held more meetings than the ruling party, KANU." The statement added:

> *"In Kitui district of Eastern Province, the Government has so far issued 39 licenses to DP for public meetings since December 1991, while both FORD Asili and FORD Kenya have held a total of 91 meetings, and KNC 24 meetings. In Mombasa, during the month of November alone, DP has held a total of 14 meetings. In Nairobi, both FORD Asili and FORD Kenya have been granted 20 licenses to hold public meetings while 10 licenses were approved but the parties concerned did not collect them. And, in Nakuru, both FORD Asili and FORD Kenya have held 42 licensed meetings, while DP has held 25 licensed public meetings since February this year."*

This statement provides evidence that in at least some areas, district officials approved meeting permits. It is unclear how many meetings described in this statement were public rallies. Nevertheless, opposition parties in some areas had opportunities to assemble early in the pre-election period.

In some cases, opposition parties were granted permission to hold a rally one or two days before it was to be held, allowing little time to publicize the event. In other cases, rally permits were revoked at the last minute for "security reasons." Often, permits were rejected without explanation. FORD Kenya provided the IRI with copies of its correspondence with Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service, Professor Phillip Mbithi, regarding specific instances where rally permits had been delayed or denied.

Commencing December 9, the beginning of the official campaign period, Chairman Chesoni announced that parties were not required to apply for permits to hold rallies. From December 9-16, however, parties in many constituencies were still forced to apply to District Commissioners for permits. In the IRI's opinion, it is highly unlikely that District Commissioners did not know this important regulation had been revised.

The IRI team discussed the issue of rally and branch office permits with District Commissioners in several provinces, who in all cases denied delaying permits for political reasons. They assured the IRI team that permits were delayed only for "security reasons," and, in many cases, the opposition had not abided by the 14-day requirement. While the IRI team notes that security was, indeed, an issue at many public rallies, the widespread reports describing situations where permits were withheld or delayed seemed to indicate security was not the only decisive issue in the application process. The IRI heard of no instances where KANU rally permits were rejected, and thus concludes that District Commissioners deliberately hindered opposition efforts to hold rallies. Government intervention clearly tilted the playing field to the strong disadvantage of opposition parties.

The ruling party declared certain constituencies and districts as their exclusive operational zones (known to citizens as "KANU zones"). In many cases, opposition permits were rejected and local candidates were harassed into submission. District officials also failed to allow opposition groups to open branch offices in several areas. Without exception, KANU candidates from KANU zones won handily on election day. The entire North Eastern Province was a de facto exclusive zone of the ruling party, and leading opposition figures were rarely allowed in the area by the government. Though this province is a sparsely populated area, its importance increased when the government changed the election law to require that the winning presidential candidate receive at least 25 percent of the total vote in five of the eight provinces. The Rift Valley was another problem area where freedom of movement and assembly were officially or forcibly discouraged. Final election results indicate the success of the "KANU zone" strategy: in the Rift Valley Moi won 67.8 percent of the vote; in North Eastern Province he won 78.1 percent.

Transportation Ban

In the final days before the election, President Moi banned the movement of all lorries (a type of bus). On the evening of December 27, the President stated that lorries could potentially be used to illegally import voters. While lorry service was restored on election morning, the late announcement of the unavailability of transportation could have been a very significant factor. A substantial number of voters spent the holidays at places distant from their registered voting location. They were thus forced to rely on mass transportation to return to polling stations to vote. Concerned in early December about the possible impact of the election date on voter turnout, some church leaders had even urged parishioners not to go home for the holidays unless absolutely sure they would be able to return to their polling site for election day. The IRI heard few complaints, however, about voter transportation problems on election day.

Violence and Intimidation

The Kenyan security apparatus, centered in the Provincial Administration in the Office of the President, is a highly efficient organization. District Commissioners explained to the IRI observers that the District administration office was responsible for all local security matters. District Commissioners refused to estimate the total number of security personnel in their respective districts, citing this was classified information.

The campaign period was marked with violence. Many confrontations were attributed to tribal conflicts. Others were blamed on youth groups affiliated with various parties. Opposition groups alleged that Youth for KANU '92 was a paramilitary support group created by the ruling party to threaten, harass, intimidate and violently attack people involved in the electoral process. FORD Kenya also had a youth wing which was charged with several violent attacks on KANU candidates.

In a December 18 article in *Daily Nation*, Chairman Chesoni expressed concern that parliamentary candidates had not emphasized to their supporters the need to "avoid acts of violence and hooliganism." He also asked that "the new parliament introduce a law empowering the Commission to disqualify candidates who perpetrated violence during the campaign."

It is unlikely that violence during the campaign period would have continued if security forces were committed to preventing it. Similarly, the IRI heard of few cases where perpetrators of election-related violence had been arrested and brought to court. Election-related violence and intimidation is a critical concern. The fact that few perpetrators have been prosecuted indicates a severe lack of respect for the rule of law.

Access to the Media

Despite a well-developed media infrastructure, Kenya suffers from a series of problems inherent to societies in transition from one-party rule to multi-party democracy. While the print media are largely privately-owned and, theoretically, enjoy freedom of the press, Kenya's most influential media -- radio and television -- are still a state-controlled monopoly. During the assessment period in November and early December, the IRI team noted the electronic media was grossly biased in favor of KANU.

Radio and Television

State-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corp. (KBC) controls Kenya's most important medium, radio. KBC's two radio channels -- one English and one Swahili -- broadcast daily from 4 a.m. to midnight. Its 17 relay stations provide 75 percent of Kenya's population access to the radio. Established in 1989, KBC attempts to create nominal distance between the government and broadcasting while attracting commercial advertising.

KBC also owns one of two Kenyan television stations -- the only station with nationwide broadcasting. There are an estimated 400,000 television sets throughout

the country, each with approximately five viewers, and most in urban centers. A privately-owned television station, Kenya Television Network (KTN), is controlled by the Kenya Times Media Trust, whose board consists of prominent businessmen with close ties to KANU party and senior KANU officials. Its broadcast range is restricted to Nairobi.

Television and radio coverage provided through the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) is estimated to reach 80 percent of the population. Although the print media remains a major source of news for urban Kenyans, government-owned KBC disseminates news (radio and television) to both urban and rural areas. The IRI team noted that KBC's television and radio coverage during most of the assessment period seemed to focus on positive news as related to KANU and negative news as related to opposition parties.

No provisions in the electoral law guaranteed political parties equal access to the broadcast media, although on November 25, 1992 the Ministry of Information pledged "up to 90 seconds" of air time would each day be allocated to all presidential candidates. After discussions with the Ministry, the IRI discovered that this 90-second allotment was for paid advertising. The IRI subsequently learned that the paid prime-time spots were frequently unavailable because they were already committed to KANU advertising.

Without question, KBC consistently slanted its election coverage toward KANU. One member of the assessment team noted that the Swahili-language radio broadcast rarely mentioned the opposition prior to December 21 (eight days before the election). Between December 21 and 29, the opposition was mentioned only briefly. Each broadcast began: "Today. His Excellency President Daniel arap Moi said..." and offered a story lasting at least five minutes in a ten-minute news broadcast. This information added to the IRI belief that KBC was extremely biased.

The Ministry of Information acknowledged that the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Act must be adjusted to accommodate the needs of a multi-party democracy with full freedom of the press. Toward the end of the campaign period, KBC introduced regular and repeated civic education programs describing voting procedures and regulations as well as the role of the Electoral Commission.

A civil suit against Moi, KBC and KANU filed by FORD Kenya in early November 1992 demanded that KBC be compelled to stop campaigning for KANU and Moi. The suit, filed by FORD Kenya, asked that opposition parties be given the same air time on both KBC radio and television as was given to KANU. The Democratic Party sought to be joined in the suit. Defendants objected to the suit, saying it was frivolous. The case was subsequently dismissed by the judge who expressed regret, stating that the case raised important issues but did not meet technical legal standards.

Daily Newspapers

Kenya has two privately-owned English-language newspapers, an English-language pro-government paper and a number of Swahili-language dailies. The country's English papers —*Daily Nation, Standard* and *Kenya Times* -- are widely seen as influential although overall newspaper circulation is relatively small for a country of 23 million people.

The Lonhro-owned *Standard* and Aga Khan-owned *Daily Nation* each gave KANU and the opposition ample campaign coverage. For the most part, these two papers attempted to maintain an image of neutrality. *Kenya Times* -- rounded as a KANU party organ in 1982 — openly sympathized with the ruling party. Ironically, news coverage in *Standard* of the IRI's December 16 news conference showed far more bias than that of the government-owned *Kenya Times* which printed the press release in full. *Standard*, on the other hand, buried the story in an inaccurately rendered editorial. *Daily Nation* gave the report exclusive front page coverage.

Journalists noted that the political climate in the country forces them to be cautious in how critically they approach the government. As a result, they said, they sometimes shied away from in-depth reporting of more controversial issues such as government corruption. However, they indicated they would back-off certain stories only when warned or threatened to do so by individuals or institutions.

Editors of all three papers noted that their reporters had been harassed at rallies by people who viewed their publications as hostile to either the government or the opposition. In some instances, reporters were said to have been dragged out of their hotel rooms and beaten. All three papers said they feared for the security of their reporters involved in election coverage and expected increasing violence against local journalists as the elections drew nearer. The IRI election observer team heard no reports, however, of harassment of journalists on election day.

Opinion Weeklies

Kenya's main opinion weeklies -- *Finance, Society, Nairobi Law Monthly* and *Nairobi Weekly Observer* -- have borne the brunt of government attempts to intimidate publications hostile to KANU and the authorities. Representatives of these weeklies told the IRI that the purpose of their publications was to fill a void in media reporting on the opposition. Their publications emphasize alleged government corruption as well as alleged government and KANU attempts to rig the elections.

While a few of the weeklies did make some outrageous claims and need to adhere to minimum standards of responsible journalism, government response was widely disproportionate to the nature of the presumed transgressions. Using vague and nebulous security considerations as justification, the government seemed determined to drive these weeklies out of business. The government also went to some length to squelch publications that supported the opposition and to prevent the public from freely having access to them. Among the measures to which the government resorted were:

- Frequent impoundment of complete editions of the various weeklies.
- Creation of a climate in which the country's largest printing presses felt the need to discontinue printing of the weeklies. This forced many publications to use the same privately-owned printer whose restricted printing capacity severely limited the number of copies they were able to print.
- Harassment of the weeklies which made businesses reluctant to place advertisements with them. Weeklies have had no choice but to dramatically raise their cover prices.
- Detention of editors who were charged with sedition while at the same time facing a battery of libel suits filed against them.

The atmosphere of intimidation, for example. led at least one editor to seek a protective court injunction ordering his release on bail even though there is currently no warrant of arrest against him. Similarly, unidentified perpetrators earlier this year fire-bombed the offices of Society, causing severe damage. A report issued on December 17 by the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation noted:

> *"There is no restriction - other than on direct incitement to violence or laws of libel - on coverage or comments published in Kenya's newspapers or news magazines. Certain magazines are virulent and unrelenting in their attacks on the Government and public figures."*

As the editor of *Finance* was arraigned in February 1993 for sedition, the exact meaning of this statement needs clarification.

The Role of Local Non-governmental Organizations

Democracy is preserved by civic institutions and organizations that provide citizens an opportunity to define and pursue their interests and to participate actively in making decisions which affect their lives. Civic organizations, church groups and cultural organizations have never been absent from the struggle for independence and freedom in Kenya, even when their efforts were curtailed or proscribed by the government.

Non-partisan domestic monitoring and voter education programs not only ensure confidence in the electoral process but also encourage participation by those who will ultimately create and sustain a democratic culture -- the citizens of Kenya. The IRI notes that civic groups and churches played an instrumental role in domestic monitoring and civic education prior to the elections.

Domestic Election Monitoring

In Kenya, the principal civic organization involved in the elections was the National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU). NEMU is a joint effort of the National Ecumenical Civic Education Programme (NECEP), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) and the Professional Committee for Democratic Change (PCDC). This consortium was established specifically to monitor the 1992 elections. Approximately 5,000 domestic monitors and count certifiers participated in election day activities. Monitors were paid approximately 1000 shillings each for their work. On election day, 5,000 domestic monitors were deployed throughout Kenya.

NEMU received substantial funding support from the community of international aid donors, through an informal multilateral consultative mechanism called the Democratic Development and Governance Group (DDGG). The DDGG was chaired by the Canadian High Commission and provided a coordinating mechanism for assistance to NEMU and other organizations. The DDGG also served as a clearing house for the various international election observation groups prior to the agreement by the United Nations to provide a facilitation mechanism for the smaller observer missions. The DDGG channeled the financial resources which allowed NEMU to achieve its national reach by election day.

NEMU experienced several management problems resulting from internal struggles among its member organizations. Organizational disunity resulted in delays in implementing activities. While NEMU originally projected it would field 23,000 monitors on election day, only 5,000 were finally deployed. NEMU was also frequently criticized for being biased against KANU. The IRI heard from KANU supporters that they did not believe NEMU would be objective in its monitoring effort.

During the campaign period, NEMU also administered and published a public opinion poll, on both presidential and party preference, which received front page media coverage. The NEMU leadership received criticism from various political parties claiming the poll was biased and decided not to conduct further polls. The IRI delegation was generally impressed with the scientific and non-partisan nature of the poll and believes such efforts are a vital part of the democratic process. As part of the campaign monitoring effort, the PCDC, an individual constituent within the NEMU umbrella, also conducted a content analysis of KBC and KTN television and radio news coverage.

Religious Organizations

The churches of Kenya are the preeminent bases of associational life in Kenya, and their reach and influence are vast. Domestic election monitoring efforts outside Nairobi were fundamentally a project of the churches. NEMU, or one of its constituent groups, provided workshops and training, and published material throughout the country; but it was the church leadership and parishioners who were actively engaged on a

day-to-day basis in nurturing and implementing citizen involvement in Kenyan politics. The work accomplished by the churches to create an effective and thorough election monitoring effort and to undertake civic education projects was truly impressive.

Church members throughout the country were recruited to serve as election monitors, and most were provided training in poll-watching and count-watching procedures. Although the churches never were able to fully implement the overall election monitoring strategy developed by NEMU, they accomplished a great deal on relatively short notice.

Voter Education

Although various groups were involved in educating Kenyan citizens about the democratic process, most work was carried out by the churches through the Legal Education and Aid Programme of the Kenya Adult Education Association (LEAP) and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK). LEAP produced and distributed several books and posters describing the electoral process, and conducted several voter education workshops. Given the dearth of civic education in Kenya, the role of LEAP and NCCK was invaluable. The delegation noted that LEAP's posters and publications throughout the country were perhaps the only real education effort other than the obviously biased efforts of the political parties.

Church leaders reported no significant difficulties in civic education activities as long as workshops were held at the churches. However, churches were often the victims of the same fate as opposition politicians when they sought to hold civic education meetings in public places: permits were denied in some cases or were delayed long enough that the proposed meeting had to be canceled.

The fears expressed by church leaders were not unique. The same serious concerns were raised by opposition politicians and ordinary citizens extremely disturbed by the significant amounts of money being distributed in an effort to shape the outcome of the election. One priest in Coast Province indicated he had been offered money to influence his parishioners in favor of a particular candidate.

Church leaders also made clear their concern for the safety and security of citizens, opposition politicians and domestic election monitors. Most reported incidents of violence and intimidation were during the campaign period. They confirmed reports that some areas had been declared KANU zones and that citizens risked their lives by defying this declaration and aligning with a prohibited group. Church leaders noted, in addition, that opposition politicians worked under a severe handicap as they had little success in holding meetings. At the same time, they praised the new opportunities resulting from the transition to multi-partyism and expressed reserved optimism about prospects for democratic elections in future years.

Conclusions: The Campaign Playing Field

The playing field for the pre-campaign and campaign periods was slanted sharply to the benefit of the ruling party. KANU's advantages included access to the resources of the state and control of the media. Other intangible advantages, including political expertise of activists and tactical flexibility, were important components of the elections but did not seem to be utilized by the ruling party beyond normal practices in transitional societies.

Breaches of democratic norms and accepted practices included the use of the state's administrative apparatus in order to deny freedom of assembly and movement, as well as utilization of bribery, violence and intimidation.

Political Parties

During the pre-election period there was little separation between the government and KANU. As was stated in the IRI's December 16 preliminary statement "The electoral process... has been severely damaged by the Government of Kenya's centralized and systematic manipulation of the administrative and security apparatus of the state to the ruling party's advantage...with few exceptions, there is no discernible difference between the Government and the ruling party." This blurring of distinction between the apparatus of the government and the ruling party is a feature of one-party states and becomes more apparent in transitional elections to multi-party government. These formal and informal linkages became of particular concern in Kenya because they offered KANU decisive advantages of incumbency. See conclusions regarding the actions of the District Commissioners in Chapter II.

Lack of opposition unity was the single most important factor in the eventual outcome of the elections, despite a playing field highly advantageous to the ruling party. While each opposition party, as an organization, was young and relatively inexperienced, party leaders were sophisticated political veterans. Despite the stakes involved, it appears that Kibaki, Odinga and Matiba chose to exercise their prerogatives of leadership and contest the election singly. The IRI firmly believes that opposition disunity, more than any other factor or combination of factors, led to Moi's Presidential victory and KANU's majority in the National Assembly.

Ethnic sensitivities were heightened during the pre-election period. Whether or not the multi-party transition or government-instigated clashes raised ethnic sensitivities in Kenya is a question that lies beyond the scope of this report. The IRI is strongly concerned that there appears to have been government involvement in the instigation of ethnic clashes. Certainly, the campaign period and election outcome reflected a strong ethnic component. The IRI notes concern that the tensions among Kenyans of different ethnic origins can serve only to inhibit the emergence of a new political order based on the rule of law, tolerance and respect for the civil and political liberties of all Kenyans.

Acts of violence and threats of violence by political pressure groups create an atmosphere of intimidation which undermines full participation and open competition. The full weight of Kenyan law should be brought to bear on the perpetrators of violence or those who would seek to intimidate public adversaries. The IRI observers heard credible evidence that the youth wings of various parties were involved in violent activities during the campaign. If these allegations are true, it is a troubling indication that the leadership of at least two of the major parties was willing to encourage young people to resort to criminal means to ensure party victory. Further, the unresolved allegations of government involvement in the ethnic clashes throughout 1992 are very disturbing and deserve further investigation. The future of multi-party democracy in Kenya depends on leaders with the vision to learn and widely disseminate their commitment to peaceful conflict resolution.

Access to Resources

The IRI is gravely concerned about allegations that the Moi government put at risk Kenya's economic stability by introducing billions of shillings into the monetary system in order to finance the KANU campaign. If the allegations are true, Moi's reckless disregard for the health of Kenya's economy seriously underscores widespread foreign criticism concerning his commitment to multi-party democracy. While linkages between these cash disbursements and the electoral outcome are tenuous, the judgement of the international financial community vis-a-vis Kenya's fiscal health should inform bilateral policy judgements for other governments.

Widespread cash disbursements by political parties in order to garner votes damaged the integrity of the electoral process. The IRI heard about the disbursement

of millions of Kenya shillings to buy party loyalties and votes. The IRI assessment teams directly observed several transactions. As Kenya's political parties become more sophisticated, financial resources can be more efficiently used to establish and nurture grassroots organizations, to reinforce constituency services and to develop programs that more accurately reflect the interests and aspirations of Kenyan voters.

KANU, and to a lesser extent the major opposition parties, intentionally disenfranchised thousands of voters by purchasing their elector cards. A strategy designed to keep voters from voting is antithetical to the principles of democracy. Deliberate disenfranchisement by political parties preys on economic vulnerability, undermines faith in a democratic system and significantly weakens the formation of democratic beliefs. Although Chairman Chesoni made an important and timely revision of procedures enabling voters to cast ballots without electors' cards, a majority of voters did not seem to learn of this revision.

Opposition candidates were bribed by KANU to defect or to drop out after they were nominated. The time-honored influencing of candidates, which sometimes occurs in parliamentary systems, was exceeded in these elections. Cash disbursements and other methods of coercion were used by KANU to convince opposition candidates to withdraw after their names had been formally registered. As a result, voters in several constituencies did not have the opportunity to choose between a variety of ideologies and candidates. The resulting impact so seriously damaged public confidence in the integrity of this electoral process that severe legal sanctions should be developed to discourage these practices in the future.

Freedom of Assembly and Movement

Delays in granting rally permits to opposition parties and the capricious use of public security regulations to deny rally permits represent intentional skewing of the electoral playing field by District Commissioners. The Moi government's refusal to enforce equitable administrative practices by District Commissioners and other high-level civil servants underscored the darkest suspicions of the opposition and the international community about the government's commitment to an open and competitive democratic process. Despite revisions in the electoral law, and repeated requests by opposition parties, observers and even the Electoral Commission for equal treatment under the law, District Commissioners continued to abuse their authority.

Opposition parties were denied access to provinces and regions known as "KANU zones." A deliberate strategy to block the access of Kenyan citizens to competitive political messages through violence, intimidation and the use of the state's administrative apparatus reinforced the mistrust and suspicion with which the government's commitment to multi-party democracy was viewed by Kenyan citizens. Full and open access to information about various candidates is vital to the democratic process.

Access to the Media

The electronic media in Kenya showed significant bias in favor of KANU. KBC and KNA seemed both influenced by the KANU government and encouraged to provide such unbalanced news coverage. Full access to balanced information is critical in the campaign process. In this election, KBC and KNA failed to provide adequate information to the Kenyan people. The IRI is hopeful, however, that both KBC and KNA will realize their new role in a multi-party system and will soon address this issue. In actuality, near the end of the campaign period improvements were already apparent.

Continued intimidation and threats on the print media indicate the Moi government fears the impact of alternative viewpoints. The IRI learned recently that the editor of *Finance* was arraigned again on February 3, 1993 for a January 31, 1993 cover article entitled "Moi Family has 150 Billion Shillings Abroad." According to a BBC report, the editor was charged because publication of the story "was calculated to

bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the person of the President of the Republic of Kenya." The IRI realizes the need to enforce libel laws when necessary, however, utilizing repression or intimidation to silence information is never acceptable. Enacting the Preservation of Public Security Act to detain those who express negative opinions is an extreme reaction of a paranoid government. Freedom of expression is an inalienable right in a democratic system. Enduring media scrutiny, and even attack, is the price of democratic freedoms. Those who cannot endure criticism should not participate in public life. At the same time, Kenyan journalists need to adhere to a professional code of conduct that does not include exaggerated or libelous allegations.

The Role Of NGOs

NEMU and the churches of Kenya played an exemplary role in the campaign and election process. Despite internal conflicts which decreased their effectiveness, these civic groups offered an invaluable service to the Kenyan people and should be highly commended. The IRI believes that in some instances domestic monitors were biased in favor of the opposition, but noted no indication of biased monitoring on election day. The IRI cautions, however, that objectivity is a key component of election observation. Domestic monitoring and voter education efforts were impressive examples of the Kenyan people's persistent and courageous commitment to democracy.

Included in Chapter V are specific recommendations suggesting areas where the campaign playing field could be improved.

CHAPTER IV: ELECTION DAY

The following chapter presents the findings of the IRI election day mission. The delegation was composed of observers from 13 countries including Australia, Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Germany, Italy, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On election day, the delegation, composed of political, academic and democratic development specialists, was divided into 25 teams to observe voting and counting activities in 46 constituencies. The IRI delegation observed election day voting in more than 230 stations throughout Kenya. The teams spoke with more than 100 Presiding Officers, 68 Returning Officers, thousands of parry agents and 438 domestic election observers.

The objectives of the Kenya election observer mission were:

- to provide some deterrence to election day fraud;
- to offer international moral and political support for those engaged in the process, and
- to report to the international community on the conduct of the election.

Observers remained at each polling site an average of 15 minutes but no longer than an hour. During this period, observers usually interviewed the Presiding Officer, deputies, clerks staffing the table, parry agents, domestic observers and security personnel. When appropriate, the observers spoke with citizens who had completed voting.

Introduction

Approximately 5.5 million voters (more than 65 percent of the registered voters) cast ballots for civic, parliamentary and presidential candidates on December 29 or

soon thereafter. There were 713 candidates for the 188 seats in parliament. Seventeen seats were uncontested. There were more than 7,000 polling stations, many of which were located in rural areas, particularly in schools, community centers, church halls, outdoor soccer fields and village centers. Most polling stations were the same as those utilized in previous elections. Polling site locations were published in local newspapers well before election day, as required by the electoral laws.

The Electoral Commission had primary responsibility for the overall administration of the election. The March 1992 Election Laws (Amendment) Act revised the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Regulations (PPER) to accommodate the repeal of Section 2(a) of the Constitution. The revisions were designed to establish the Electoral Commission's independence and to enable it to perform its constitutional functions in a multi-party system.

The revised administrative structure for the December 29, 1992 elections was designed largely in response to the irregularities and outright fraud experienced during the 1988 elections when blatant theft and switching of ballot boxes were common. The IRI heard accusations throughout the assessment period that the primary perpetrators in 1988 were civil servants, particularly Provincial and District Commissioners. Throughout the 1992 campaign there was pervasive fear that high-level civil servants would again misuse the administrative apparatus of the government to benefit the ruling party's favorite candidates. Despite the newly-mandated independence of the Electoral Commission, opposition parties remained skeptical because their pleas for representation on the Commission were ignored.

In response to the dramatic increase in voters registered at some stations, "voter streams" were established in order to process voters more expeditiously. These streams allowed many more voters to cast ballots at each polling station than would normally be accommodated by a single line. Some polling stations had as many as 20 streams; nationwide, the Electoral Commission established 10,449 streams. The Electoral Commission allotted one stream for every 800 voters assigned to a polling station. In theory, streams were to be organized alphabetically with each stream serving as a complete polling station, including its own voter list, voting booths and ballot boxes.

On election day, actual implementation seemed to be decentralized. Returning Officers had numerous responsibilities, including serving as liaisons between the Electoral Commission and the local voting sites. Presiding Officers and Deputy Presiding Officers were responsible for polling station activity. The counting phase was also under the jurisdiction of the Returning Officers of each constituency. The duties of Returning Officers and Presiding Officers, mandated in the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations (PPER), are described in the following pages.

Returning Officers: The Electoral Commission selected Returning Officers from lists provided by District Commissioners. Returning Officers were responsible for local voting activities in each of the 188 constituencies, including distribution of materials before the election and counting afterwards. All election materials, including used and unused ballots, were to be given to Returning Officers at the counting centers.

Other responsibilities of the Returning Officer included:

- organizing and managing the counting of the votes, including settlement of disputes and challenges to the count, on-site if possible, or through referrals to higher authorities, if required, and
- releasing results to the local public and formally to Nairobi.

Generally, Returning Officers were older, well-educated males. They were not allowed to be current members of the civil service. Most were retired school teachers or retired civil service employees.

Presiding Officers: Presiding Officers were responsible for activities at their assigned polling station. Their duties included:

- regulating the number of voters admitted to the polling station at a given time;
- excluding all persons from the polling station except the candidates and their agents (a limit of two per candidate), election officers on duty, police officers on duty, persons assisting blind or incapacitated voters, accredited election observers and voters;
- keeping order at the polling station;
- postponing or adjourning the proceedings at a polling station if interrupted by riot, open violence or natural catastrophe;
- resuming the proceedings as early as possible, or extending the hours of polling, when interruptions resulted in delays if the polling station opened late, the Presiding Officer was authorized to extend the hours of polling by the same amount of time, and
- enforcing the regulation stipulating that, without the Presiding Officer's permission, no one other than an election officer or police officer on duty could communicate with a voter in the immediate vicinity of the polling station for the purpose of voting.

General Voting Procedures

On election day, polling stations were to receive registration lists, writing materials, ballot boxes and papers, official stamps, security seals and indelible ink. These were distributed from Nairobi by the Electoral Commission before election day, in most cases. Returning Officers, with the aid of local police, were charged with distribution of voter material.

Voting procedures were detailed in the Electoral Code. Briefly summarized, procedures were as follows:

- Immediately before voting commenced, the Presiding Officer was required to allow the candidates and their agents to inspect the ballot box to ensure it was empty.
- The box was then to be sealed and placed in the polling station in view of the Presiding Officer and candidates or party agents at all times.

Ballot papers for the Presidential election were to be a different color than those for use in the parliamentary and local elections. Only persons validly nominated were allowed to have their names placed on the ballot papers.

According to the PPER, each ballot should:

- contain the candidates' names and party symbols;
- be able to be folded, and
- reflect identical numbers or combinations of letters and numbers on both the front and counterfoil.

The Presiding Officer was also required by electoral law to allow candidates or their agents to inspect the ballot papers and serial numbers. Before a voter was given the ballot paper to complete, the following procedures were to take place:

- The paper was to be stamped with the official Electoral Commission mark;
- The number and name of the voter was to be called out as stated in the register and marked on the ballot paper counterfoil;

- A mark was to be placed in the register next to the electoral number;
- The elector card was to be stamped, and
- The voter was to dip his or her finger in indelible ink (as proof of having voted) and then submit his or her identity card to be imprinted with a seal.

Following completion of these steps, the voter was to be given the ballot papers. Upon receiving the ballot papers, the voter was to proceed to a voting compartment, secretly mark the ballot, fold it to conceal the vote, and then place the ballot paper in the ballot box in the presence of the Presiding Officer. The voter was then required to immediately leave the voting station.

Summary List of Election Day Irregularities

The IRI issued a preliminary statement of findings on December 31, 1992. After most of the counting process had been completed on January 4, the IRI released a follow-up statement. (See Appendices 10 and 11). The IRI observers saw and heard about many irregularities, resulting primarily from lack of familiarity with the new procedures and lack of experience in administering multi-party elections. The following list includes the most commonly-observed irregularities:

- Late delivery of voting materials
- Late opening of polling stations
- Boycott by polling clerks
- Insufficient voting materials (especially ballots and stamps)
- Errors on ballot papers (missing names, symbols, etc.)
- Ballot boxes with lids which could not be closed properly
- Storage of surplus boxes in areas accessible to voters
- Non-representation of smaller parties among party agents
- General confusion resulting from large numbers of people in a polling station
- Crowded access to polling stations
- Confusion as to whether or not elector cards were required to vote
- Armed police officers walking around inside stations (usually in a non-menacing manner)
- Registration lists with voters' names missing
- Registration lists with pages missing
- "Imported" voters
- Lack of secret ballot for illiterate voters

The following sections address in greater detail the most problematic areas.

Late Delivery of Voting Materials: Responsibility for distribution of voting materials lay with the Returning Officer. Local police could assist if authorized by the Returning Officer. Electoral law does not address delivery of materials other than to assign responsibility to the Returning Officer. This phase of the electoral process was highly inefficient. The IRI observers were unable to determine what factors led to the chronic delays in the distribution process, however, the IRI did not detect a systematic attempt to delay delivery of materials to targeted polling stations or constituencies.

Late Opening of Polling Stations: Election day, December 29, 1992, began late throughout the country. Polls generally opened two to three hours late. In some in-

stances, no voting at all occurred on the 29th. Some polling stations were unable to procure materials until December 30th, 31st, or even January 1, 1993. Despite such long delays, the majority of voters were remarkably enthusiastic, patient and peaceful. For the most part, election day violence was far more isolated than expected.

Presiding Officers and Deputy Presiding Officers told the IRI the late starts were caused by difficulties in polling station set-up or by the late delivery or unavailability of voting materials. According to the Training Manual for Presiding Officers, "The Presiding Officer will receive from the Returning Officer the following equipment for use at the polling station... "It is unclear at what time before the election Returning Officers actually received voting materials or where, within the elaborate procedures, the distribution system failed.

Some polling stations opened late because locations were changed without prior announcement just before election day. In the Mvita constituency in Mombasa, the original site was changed to a larger one across the street from KANU headquarters. Opposition candidates voiced strong complaint and, ultimately, the location was moved back to the original site, but by that time many voters had abandoned efforts to vote. The local KANU chairman had contested a seat in the Mvita constituency, and it was likely no accident that the polling station was moved across the street from his office.

Polling stations also opened late because Presiding Officers had difficulty managing the numbers of official observers who were permitted to check the ballot box before it was sealed. Furthermore, the Presiding Officer was legally obligated to allow candidates or their agents to inspect the ballot papers and serial numbers. These initial safeguards in the process caused many delays.

The IRI notes that polling delays may have resulted in disenfranchising thousands of voters, particularly women who were forced to return home to care for children. The IRI obtained no evidence, however, that the late opening of polls was a systematic attempt to decrease voter turn out in affected polling stations.

Boycott by polling clerks: The IRI heard of several instances throughout the country where poll openings were delayed because polling clerks were not paid as promised. Many clerks decided to boycott until they were paid. In several polling stations, considerable delays resulted from this administrative oversight.

Insufficient voting materials: The Electoral Commission clearly underestimated the number of Presiding Officer stamps needed to process voters efficiently. This oversight resulted in long delays and confusion, as did a more serious error which occurred in some constituencies where polling stations were provided with insufficient ballot papers. The latter oversight led to increased suspicion that shortages in certain areas had been systematically planned. The IRI obtained no evidence, however, that ballot shortages were intentional.

Errors on ballot papers: Serious ballot paper errors created chaos in some polling stations. Ballot papers for civic candidates in particular, often contained incorrect names or were missing names or party symbols. Many voters suspected that the Electoral Commission had made a systematic attempt to delay voting or disadvantage certain candidates. The IRI found no evidence to support these concerns. The Electoral Commission explained that it did not have time to review each set of ballots to ensure accuracy.

Confusion regarding documents necessary to vote: As a result of widespread concern about the buying of elector cards, Chairman Chesoni announced shortly before the election that registered voters could cast ballots without presenting their elector cards, as long their national identification card number matched the register.

Voters whose names did not appear on the register were to be allowed to vote if the files containing their original registration form showed they were indeed registered.

Such files were to accompany the voting materials to the polling station. Voting would not be allowed for those without national identification cards, or for those with temporary cards. The IRI witnessed two instances where Presiding Officers did not allow voters without elector cards to vote.

While the IRI commends the Electoral Commission for revising regulations to address the problem of elector card buying, this information did not appear to be widely known on election day. As a result, inconsistent procedures led to confusion and mistrust of both electoral officials and the integrity of the process.

Voters' names missing from registration lists: The IRI observers witnessed more than 1,000 voters who were disenfranchised on election day because their names did not appear on a registration list. As noted in Chapter II, in several polling stations voters' names did appear on lists or entire pages were missing. While in some cases the voters were able to prove they were registered, this was not the rule. The IRI was unable to verify the number of voters disenfranchised by registration list inaccuracies and omissions.

"Imported voters": Several weeks before the election, various opposition parties in Mombasa told the IRI that arrangements were being made to "import" voters to selected constituencies in Coast Province. These voters were allegedly Somali refugees. On election day, opposition groups (in particular the IPK) stopped a bus alleging that passengers were being illegally transported to polling stations. Several members of the IPK group involved in the roadblock were stoned by local youth groups. The IRI heard reports that security personnel shot two people who were trying to block the bus. The IRI also heard that in various other border areas voters were imported, but the IRI teams were not in a position to verify this information.

Lack of secret ballot for illiterate voters: The Presiding Officer had the authority to help illiterate voters read and mark their ballot papers. On election day, the IRI observed Presiding Officers or their Deputies marking the ballot paper for voters--in the presence of all party agents. The IRI observers also noted that this completely compromised the secrecy of the ballot for illiterate voters (the 1990 estimate for illiteracy is 40.8%). In at least one constituency, this abuse by KANU enabled its party agents to make sure paid voters actually voted "properly." In another constituency, the IRI heard reports that literate voters were told by KANU to declare they were illiterate in order for their votes to be checked by KANU party agents. While this may have occurred in isolated polling stations, the IRI did not hear reports that it was a widespread occurrence.

Case Analysis: Starehe 26, Nairobi

While few polling stations observed by the IRI team saw as much drama and near tragedy as Starehe 26 in Nairobi, the same types of delays and procedural irregularities, while more serious there than in other locations, were encountered nationwide.

At the Starehe 26 polling station on Moi Avenue in Nairobi, late poll openings appeared to be caused by the inexperience of the Presiding Officers. Their lack of familiarity with new polling station layout led to frustration and chaos.

The voting lines were located in a playing field below the main buildings of the Moi School. The view of the actual polling site was obstructed. Voters stood in line for more than two hours beyond the scheduled opening of the polls without information about the nature, cause or likely extent of delay. Rumors began to circulate that "rigging" of the election was underway. The crowd of approximately 2,000 surged past the small complement of security personnel and rushed to the voting streams which were not yet ready to receive voters. Police equipped with riot gear were called in to restore order. They remained -- equipped with helmets, shields and truncheons -- through the end of the day, and patrolled the entire area.

The heavy police presence at Starehe 26 was exceptional. Importantly, there was no evidence of partisan intimidation on the part of the police there, or at most other sites across the country. By most accounts, police conduct in maintaining or restoring order in the voting lines was exemplary.

Voting began at approximately 7:30 a.m. As the voting progressed, it became apparent that serious gaps appeared in the voter registry for polling streams 1, 7, 14 and 17. Voters' names in these streams had been deleted from the lists provided by the Electoral Commission. (See the following chart). Voters, party agents and foreign and domestic observers noted with concern that otherwise accredited voters were turned away in significant numbers. A series of protests was lodged with the increasingly harried Presiding Officer.

By mid-afternoon, the Presiding Officer had taken steps to supplement the missing pages from the Registry with the original registration forms. This was a reasonable solution for the voters who were in line after the original lists arrived. Voters previously turned away, however, had effectively been disenfranchised. Some voters returned to the polling station late in the day but the party agents believed large numbers simply gave up or could not be contacted. On analysis of the voting turnout, it appears that approximately 700 voters were disenfranchised as a result of this administrative error.

Approximately 800 voters had been assigned to each voting stream, but in the 17 streams at Starehe 26 the average turnout was 428 persons per stream--already a low number. The average turnout in streams 1, 7, 14 and 17 was only 255 per stream. The IRI team was able to confirm with the party agents that the problems were localized only with streams 1, 7, 14 and 17. By these calculations, of the 6,589 votes cast at Starehe 26, more than 10 percent of the voters registered at that polling station were disenfranchised.

Starehe 26 Presidential Vote
Total Returns by Polling Stream

Stream Number	Location in Alphabet	Numbers by Stream
1	*A,B,C, (1-120)	292
2	C (121) D,E,F,G, (1-600)	449
3	G (601) H,I,J,K (1-270)	420
4	K (271-1,140)	376
5	K (1, 110-2,039)	528
6	K (2,040), M (1-480)	594
7	*M (481-1,321)	219
8	M (1,322-2,190)	444
9	M (2,191-3,090)	440
10	M(3,091-3,960)	411
11	M(3,961), N (1-420)	303
12	N (421-1,290)	434
13	N (1,291) O (1-59)	423
14	*O (60-930)	270
15	O(931), T (1-55)	314
16	T (56), W (1-720)	448
17	*W (721), Z (1-17)	242
Total		**15,556**

*It is assumed the number of citizens assigned to each polling stream is approximately 800. Polling stream #11, for example, contains all the registered voters in Starehe 26 whose names begin with letters A, B and C, up to 120 in the alphabetical list of voters.

**The IRI team was able to confirm with party agents that the registration list problems in Starehe 26 were localized within polling streams 1, 7, 14 and 17, all having fewer than 300 voters actually turn out to vote in the Presidential contest.

Heated discussions throughout the day with increasingly frustrated party agents came to a close as the polling station completed the initial accounting of the ballots and sealing of the boxes. The movement of the boxes to Jamhuri High School was uneventful. However, the Presiding Officer broke procedure by securing the unused ballots, counterfoils and other Paraphernalia in the trunk of his private vehicle. These materials should have been transported immediately, along with the voting materials, to the counting center. While attempting to return the unused materials to the counting center on December 31, the Presiding Officer was attacked by a crowd of citizens who had gathered outside Jamhuri High School. The outraged citizens set upon him because they perceived the presence of voting paraphernalia in his car as evidence of election 'rigging.'

This attack on the Presiding Officer, the destruction of his vehicle, the scattering to the wind of the materials in question and the ensuing rescue by police firing tear gas and wielding truncheons, was witnessed directly by the IRI team co-leaders.

Any anomalous behavior whatsoever by election authorities was perceived evidence of "rigging" and contributed to opposition suspicions. In conclusion, it is important to note that the returns from Starahe 26 were not challenged, even though FORD Kenya presented the counterfoils and the unused ballots (scattered during the attack on the Presiding Officer) as evidence of "rigging."

Counting procedures

Counting centers were located in each constituency. When the polling stations closed, voting materials were to be transported to counting centers by caravans composed of election officials, party agents and observers. This entourage was to remain constantly with the voting materials. Electoral law stipulated that all boxes were to be received by the Returning Officer before counting could begin. Since the polls opened late, counting also began much later than expected.

Counting did not begin until after midnight at most stations visited by the IRI. Observers noted that widespread delays in arrival of the ballot boxes often created tension, confusion and suspicion. In some cases, Returning Officers began counting ballots even though all boxes had been received. Results in some constituencies were announced within two days, though, in most cases, results were not known for three or four days.

The following irregularities were noted by the IRI observers or substantiated from news and political party reports:

- Inefficient management of the counting process by exhausted election officials
- Party agents being forced out of counting centers
- Arrival of ballot boxes at counting centers unaccompanied by party agents or with broken seals
- Transport of voting materials to counting centers in private vehicles and separate from ballot boxes
- The ignoring of party agent concerns during the counting process
- Counting taking place with only one lamp, thus diminishing the ability of monitors and party agents to see the process

The IRI noted in its pre-election assessment report (available separately from the IRI) that the electoral law did not provide for a "second-shift" of counting agents and Returning Officers and urged that such a contingency be planned for. It was not. As a result, many of these electoral officials worked around-the-clock for several days. In some cases, alternate counting agents were recruited. The IRI heard from one opposi-

tion party that many of the replacement counting agents were from Youth for KANU '92, were KANU operatives or relatives of candidates. Questions about the neutrality of these new counting clerks were raised by the opposition but the IRI observers saw no first-hand evidence of this problem.

Case Analysis: Meru, North Imenti Constituency

In Meru, the IRI observers were present at the polling station as the ballot boxes were sealed (under lamps and in the presence of agents, NEMU officials and other interested individuals). The assembled group watched the boxes "with the alacrity of a mother watching her newborn being moved," according to one observer.

The counting began late in a large counting hall. Box seals were cut in front of counting agents and NEMU monitors. The emptied box was flipped upside-down to demonstrate that no ballots remained. The counting agents unfolded the ballots and then separated them according to the candidates selected. The ballots were counted, bundled into stacks of 50 and given to the Returning Officer.

This system of checks and balances created a probationary environment as each agent watched: party agents observed other agents; NEMU watched both agents and boxes, and Presiding Officers watched both boxes and agents. "To slip in ballots in this atmosphere seemed near impossible," according to the Meru observer team.

By 9 a.m. on December 30, approximately 80 of 185 boxes had been counted. The counting had ceased at 7 a.m. when counters walked away complaining they had "no food, no tea and no one had been paid." The IRI observers talked with the counters as they rested on the curb outside the counting hall. They told the IRI there was no problem with the ballots themselves.

The Returning Officer told the IRI observers that he didn't expect a final tally until late on December 30 or on December 31. Contrary to what observers had been told, the Returning Officer said he would not announce the results locally, instead, he would call in the results to Nairobi headquarters and let the Commission make any announcements. He did, however, make a few announcements of local returns.

Conclusions: Election Day

The IRI found no evidence to indicate widespread "rigging" on election day itself. It is the IRI's considered judgement that the combined impact of administrative inefficiencies did not affect the overall outcome of the elections. Campaign irregularities described in Chapter Three, however, may have significantly influenced the results in selected parliamentary and civic contests.

Returning Officers, presiding Officers and other election personnel appeared to administer the election procedures with honest intentions, but insufficient preparation and training.

The IRI did not note a systematic pattern of late poll openings. It is the considered judgement of the IRI that the majority of delays resulted from lack of experience, training, and inadequate logistical preparation. Although a thorough analysis was not conducted, the IRI found no evidence to indicate that delays were systematic or deliberate.

Transparency of the counting and initial tabulations appeared adequate, with isolated exceptions.

Included in Chapter V are specific recommendations suggesting areas where election day procedures can be improved.

CHAPTER V: POST-ELECTION UPDATE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Post-Election Update

President Moi won 36.45 percent of the votes cast. The other seven contenders won 63.55 percent. Three of the Presidential candidates did not even win seats in Parliament. President Moi was sworn in on January 4, 1993.

On January 19, President Moi announced his new cabinet, a disheartening mix of defeated ministers and KANU loyalists, not at all representative of Kenya's ethnic majorities. Cabinet ministers include five Kalenjin, four Luhya, four Kamba, two Maasai, two Kisii, two Meru, one Somali, one Embu, one Mijikenda, one Taita, one Kikuyu and one Luo. The only Kikuyu and Luo nominated were two defeated ministers from Moi's previous government, Dalmas Otieno (who won only one percent of the vote in his South Nyanza constituency) and KANU Secretary General Joseph Kamotho. Many believe these appointments were retaliations against Luoland and Central Province for failing to elect a single KANU candidate. Illustrating the strong and troubling ethnic divisions that characterized these elections, KANU has no elected members of Parliament or ministers from the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups.

Despite campaign promises, few women were named by Moi to positions of power. As in the past, only one assistant minister (in the Ministry of Culture and Social Services) is a woman. Two women retained their seats as permanent secretaries. Not a single woman was nominated to Parliament although six from various opposition parties had been elected.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The December 1992 elections moved Kenya in the direction of multi-party democracy. With the exception of the Constitution, however, few institutions of governance in Kenya have been transformed into multi-party entities. Kenya has made steps toward representative government but has not yet achieved it. The following recommendations address important areas of reform necessary before truly transparent and representative elections are possible in Kenya.

The recommendations below are offered in the hope that Kenyans of all political persuasions will work together to build an electoral system which will produce future representative governments, and will stand as a model of multi-party democracy for transitional societies across Africa and the world.

The Electoral Law

The new Parliament, scheduled to convene in March 1993, will confront the challenges of a pluralistic political system in Kenya. Among these challenges will be electoral law reform. The new Parliament should undertake a comprehensive review of the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Act. While the March 1992 amendments moved Kenya's laws toward a multi-party framework, the current code remains vague in some areas and inappropriate in others.

1. The composition of the Electoral Commission should reflect the new multi-party character of the Constitution.

2. Given the problems with civil service bias in favor of KANU during the campaign, the civil service, especially the Provincial Administration, should be subject to greater supervision from Parliament in order to insure that all parties are treated equally.

3. Voter registration responsibilities must lie with the Electoral Commission until civil service is sufficiently de-politicized. Oversight of the registration process should be multi-partisan.

4. An on-going voter registration process is necessary. The IRI strongly urges that new voter registration process be conducted well before the next election.

5. Underage voting must be eliminated. Standards for eligibility to register and to vote should be understood by those responsible for the registration process.

6. Voter rolls must be published in a timely manner. The process of correcting voter rolls needs to be reviewed.

7. Intermediate and final registration totals for public viewing should be published by province, district and polling station.

8. Voters must vote either where they live or where they work. Other options, though important, open the process to manipulation and abuse. Coordinating registration with place of residence is the most preferable means, since it can ease the technical administration of preparing voter lists.

9. A clearer Electoral Code (in regard to political party formation) will lead to coalition-building and less factionalism. Minimum requirements should be specified in order for a party to be officially registered.

10. New and efficient procedures need to be designed that will safeguard the transparency of election day procedures without introducing confusing and time-consuming redundancies.

11. Timely dispute resolution of all alleged electoral offenses is essential. Parliament should consider the creation of an independent mechanism whereby election-related cases are heard both before and after elections.

12. Increased campaign time between nomination and election day is essential. Citizens need access to information; the Electoral Commission needs time for planning and organization; political parties need time to disseminate their messages; suppliers of voting materials need time to make their deliveries; and those alleging pre-election irregularities need time for resolution and redress of grievances.

13. Rather than three separate ballots, one ballot with all election races listed together will simplify the counting process.

14. The authority to issue rally permits must be reconsidered by the Parliament as a result of recent problems with District Commissioners.

15. Specific standards are needed for challenging ballots at the counting stations.

16. Revised counting methods, in an effort to streamline the process, would save time and could add safeguards against fraud.

17. Revised campaign finance regulations are needed to ensure a more level playing field and to discourage exorbitant or illegal use of funds. The Parliament could take many different approaches to these issues, but it is important that an equitable solution involving all the parties in Parliament be chosen. The Parliament should codify these decisions to ensure implementation.

18. A system for absentee balloting should be considered.

The Campaign Playing Field

Political Parties

1. KANU should make a significant effort to separate its identity from that of the government.

2. KANU should reconfigure its youth organizations in order to offer genuine opportunities for leadership training.

3. Pressure groups intending to become political parties need to develop the organizational infrastructure, established leadership, trained cadre, and the discipline required of Parliamentary parties in order to function effectively.

4. The international community should support various democratic development programs including leadership training, policy research and development, coalition building, grassroots communications methods, campaign strategy and general organizational development.

Access to Resources

1. Allegations regarding the infusion of unbacked currency into the Kenyan monetary system for election-related purposes should be investigated immediately.

Freedom of Assembly and Movement

1. Responsibility for granting rally permits should be transferred to a more independent body until the civil service is de-politicized.

2. Civil servants should be made aware and should communicate to citizens that intimidation and harassment of persons stating political beliefs is unacceptable behavior in a society that guarantees freedom of movement and assembly.

3. There should be a complete end to politically-motivated violence. The security apparatus is in a unique position to assist in implementing this critical reform.

Access to the Media

1. As Kenyan society moves in the direction of multi-partyism, laws should ensure a non-partisan broadcast media.

2. The new electoral law should provide specific allocations of time on electronic media for each registered political party.

3. Fundamental changes in sedition and treason laws should be considered by the new Parliament.

ELECTION DAY

1. Voter materials must be distributed more effectively.

2. When using numbered ballots, the elector's identity card number should not be recorded on the ballot stub.

3. The polling station clerk selection process must be standardized to avoid partisan polling station staff.

4. The roles and responsibilities of each local election official should be redefined, and the decision-making hierarchy among poll-workers clarified.

5. A limit on the number of voters allowed inside the immediate polling area should be established.

6. A ballot counting form must be designed and utilized. The form (in duplicate and triplicate) would record the ballots received at the beginning of the day, their serial numbers, and their status at the end of the day (i.e., "x" left over, "x" spoiled, "x" deposited). Recorded on the same form should be the serial numbers of the ballot boxes and seals. The form should be signed by poll-workers, delegates and domestic monitors. The Presiding Officer would carry this sheet, along with the boxes, to the counting center. He would keep one copy and give the original to the counting center supervisor.

7. Standards should be developed for the mobile polling stations. The implementation of mobile stations could be based on population density, registration figures or areas of recent population movement. Their locations and routes should be communicated to the general public, observers and to all political parties.

Section Three

Regional Networks

AREAF's regional network programs have evolved through an effort to share institutional knowledge and lessons learned among countries and donors. These programs have served to maintain regular contacts, build consensuses and identify strategies for starting cooperative democratic reforms. Regional networks thus demand close coordination among a diverse group of players who may not be in the habit of communicating among themselves, but are nonetheless working to achieve the same goals of democratic reform. AREAF regional programs have worked with governments, NGOs, political parties, and local communities.

The strengthening of regional links and communications is intended to enable local groups to help each other in developing their own internal knowledge. Regional networks allow for the cross-fertilization of ideas and approaches that have been successful in other countries. Over the years of AREAF activity, the implementing partners developed a variety of projects to promote regional links for groups and individuals interested in specific issues such as civic education, parliamentary consolidation, women in politics, the role of the military in a democracy and electoral administration.

As civic groups developed on the continent, AREAF partners supported their continued growth and ability to interact with each other. Under AREAF, civic education seminars were organized which brought together African NGOs to discuss a variety of issues including strategic planning and financial management skills. Building upon the success of these seminars and the natural evolution of African civic groups, a Pan African Design of Democracy Materials conference was later held in Côte d'Ivoire. This conference allowed African organizations to share effective materials used in their countries to enhance civic and voter knowledge.

Taking a multifaceted approach to democratic consolidation, an extensive network of democratic leaders was formed under AREAF. These democratic leaders were recruited from a variety of sectors including: political parties, electoral commissions and NGOs. Focussing primarily on eastern and southern Africa, the network was officially established under AREAF during a conference held in Gaborone, Botswana. Entitled the African Democracy Network (ADN), the program began a continued exchange of practical experiences that will enable Africans to learn the techniques of democratic consolidation from each other.

Other networks were developed, focussing on specific topics. Responding to the need for assisting African women in developing their own regional networks, AREAF partners assisted several forums for African women's issues. The network originated during the Botswana Consultation for Women in Politics which was held in cooperation with UNIFEM, Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF) and the Botswana based women's political advocacy NGO. Emang Basadi. Following the consultation, the links among west African women were strengthened through a subregional political skill training seminar for political activists.

AREAF also developed the internal capabilities of national parliaments, while at the same time strengthening regional links among parliamentarians. Work began in this area with a democratic consolidation program involving parliamentarians from Benin, Niger and Mali. Parliamentarians from these newly emerging democracies shared common experiences and learned from parliamentarian trainers from around the world. Building upon the success of this project, an additional program was developed for parliamentarians in central African states. Again, parliamentarians discussed common problems and solutions to their work while being trained in a variety of political skills.

Two of the trainers for this conference from Mali and Benin helped to provide a broader African perspective and provide regional links between central and western Africa.

Over AREAF's four-year history, the highlight of the Fund's regional network activities was the first African Election Administrators Colloquium held in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe. Developed by AREAF partners in coordination with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and the United Nations, the Colloquium brought together electoral administrators from various electoral commissions and Interior Ministries. In addition, NGOs involved with voter and civic education and key political figures attended. The Colloquium served to develop the internal capabilities of African election institutions and enhance communications among countries. Colloquium participants selected a working committee to examine the possibilities of creating a permanent independent organization that would later be entitled the African Association of Election Authorities (AAEA). Following the Colloquium, AREAF partners supported two additional meetings for members of the Working Committee to prepare a final AAEA Charter and to discuss details of formally founding the AAEA. The final report of the AAEA Colloquium is included in this section in its entirety.

REGIONAL PROJECT REPORT
ABIDJAN CIVIC EDUCATION SEMINAR
NDI

Background

NDI organized a seminar in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire from February 19 to 21, 1993, to train members of civic organizations in strategies and management skills necessary for implementing democratization projects. Roughly 50 individuals representing 14 countries and 20 different organizations participated. Program sessions, which were led by a four-person team of international trainers, focused on topics related to democratization strategy and civic organization administration and development. NDI organized the seminar, part of a worldwide series of civic group support programs, to enable organizations to conduct the activities necessary for strengthening civil society in the transition to democracy.

Program Activities

To meet these objectives, NDI assembled a team of international experts with significant experience in civic organization development. The training team was composed of Jean-Christophe Bas, a leading member of European Fund for the Freedom of Expression, Meredith McGehee, senior lobbyist for Common Cause, Ned McMahon, senior program officer at NDI, and Mars Quesada, founding Secretary General of the National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections in the Philippines.

The seminar program combined two related but distinct objectives: to transfer organizational skills necessary to developing civic organizations, and to plan upcoming activities. Through a series of plenary and workshop sessions, seminar trainers led discussions that allowed participants to exchange experience and develop skills.

Many of the participants had at least some experience in conducting democratic development activities. The task of the trainers, therefore, was to facilitate a fruitful exchange of experience and to help participants focus attention on what steps could be taken to improve their programs and strengthen their organizations.

The program consisted of workshop and plenary sessions on the following topics:

- *Grass Roots Democratic Development* This session provided an overview of what different civic organizations have accomplished in democratic transitions around the world and focused on some of the common attributes of successful organizations, such as nonpartisanship and grass-roots involvement.
- *Public Relations* This workshop session focused on using the press and other means to convince governments and political parties of a civic organization's credentials as a nonpartisan advocate for democracy.
- *Communications* Particularly in Africa with its large rural and illiterate populations, the challenge of democratization is often a challenge of communication. This workshop session allowed participants to share ideas about how to reach the masses and how to explain such ideas as voting and democracy.
- *Recruitment and Training* One of the greatest handicaps that most participating organizations face is lack of manpower. The workshop on recruitment and trained described techniÿues that different organizations have used to broaden their support base and their organizational capacities by recruiting volunteers.
- *Strategic Planning* Two plenary sessions devoted to planning in the pre and

post election environment allowed participants to share ideas on what kinds of activities to undertake in different strategic situations.

- *Activity Planning Workshops* This exercise required participants to work together in groups to plan in detail one specific activity. The session was followed by a review period where participants presented their plans for general comment.
- *Financial Management* A number of topics were discussed during this plenary session including fundraising, grantwriting, relations between civic organizations and western donors, and accounting.

Findings and Evaluation

NDI's seminar for civic organizations provided the first opportunity for many participants to meet with colleagues from other organizations in other countries. The network established through this exchange has already produced concrete results in support of African democracy. For elections in CAR, Togo and Gabon, this network provided a team of international observers.

The seminar helped GERDDES-Afrique strengthen its administrative and accounting capabilities in its offices in Abidjan and Cotonou, which enabled it to administer a $150,000 grant from the government of France to observe elections in the CAR.

Seminar participants used strategic planning sessions to prepare a range of programs which were later implemented, including a conference on corruption in Benin, and a conference on women in democracy in Côte d'Ivoire.

Many participants responded to the sessions on recruitment and training and reaching out to the masses by extending programs to a wider national audience. GERDDES-Togo, for example, changed its plans for monitoring elections from a small-scale team working out of Lome, to a national network of one thousand local observers.

REGIONAL PROJECT REPORT
AFRICAN DEMOCRACY NETWORK SEMINAR
IRI

Background

In 1993, ten African nations held presidential, legislative, local elections or referenda. While very encouraging as a trend, democratic advances remain incomplete in a number of countries. In eastern and southern Africa, the focus of this IRI project, democratic experiences range from nations such as Botswana, which has developed a tradition of multi-party democratic elections, to Malawi, which had not made the transition from one-party control.

Project Activities

The goal of this program was to enable Africans to learn, from each other, the techniques of democratization in the most cost-effective manner. In February 1994, IRI initiated an African Democracy Network, beginning with a conference in Gaborone, Botswana. The conference brought together political party officials, electoral commission members and non-governmental organization representatives from 22 eastern and southern African nations. This gathering enabled the Africans to meet their counterparts and begin a continuing exchange of practical experiences and views on party organization, election administration, and civic education. African electoral experts were also able to meet representatives from donor countries and organizations, technical assistance organizations and electoral equipment manufacturers.

Findings and Evaluation

In addition to forming a viable network of African democrats, the anticipated tangible benefits from this project will be the compilation of a database on the conduct of elections in the two regions from an African perspective, and a listing of African electoral experts in eastern and southern Africa. The latter will provide a pool of African talent to be tapped for future efforts to advance democratization on the continent.

REGIONAL PROJECT REPORT
AFRICAN DEMOCRACY NETWORK II
IRI

Background

IRI helped establish the African Democracy Network (ADN) I, in early 1994 at a conference in Gaborone, Botswana. The goal of ADN was to enable Africans to learn, from each other, the techniques of democratization in the most cost-effective manner. The conference brought together political party officials, electoral commission members and non-governmental organization representatives from 22 eastern and southern African nations. This gathering enabled the Africans to meet their counterparts and begin a continuing exchange of practical experiences and views on party organization, election administration, and civic education. African electoral experts were also able to meet representatives from donor countries and organizations, technical assistance organizations and electoral equipment manufacturers.

Project Activities

As a means to facilitate networking and training practical methods for the conduct of elections among representatives of indigenous election-related organizations, the African Democracy Network II (ADN II), was started as a follow-up to the previous project activity - ADN I.

ADN II entailed a one-year program consisting of seminars, video training materials and continuing networking mechanisms. The year's programs began with the ADN seminar on democracy that was held in Mombasa, Kenya on March 8-10, 1995. Nearly 60 ministers, parliamentarians, election commissioners, political party representatives, non-governmental organization officials and journalists attended this seminar. The purpose of the seminar was an attempt to create a definition of democracy in the African context, taking into account on how widely-accepted pillars of democracy could be embodied in a constitution. These pillars are: free and fair elections, equality before the law, constitutional limits on government, social, economic and political pluralism, due process of law, guarantee of basic human rights, minority rights, sovereignty of the people, and government based upon consent of the governed.

Findings and Evaluation

Program activities were successfully completed. According to the responses on a questionnaire circulated prior to the conference and comments at the seminar, the more than 150 ADN members polled generally subscribe to the principles of democracy, albeit with variations in interpretation. The pre-seminar questionnaire, the presentations and discussions of delegates confirm the belief that there is no such thing as "African democracy" distinct from anywhere else in the world.

REGIONAL PROJECT REPORT
AFRICAN ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS' COLLOQUIUM: ZIMBABWE
NDI & AAI

Background

The African Election Administrators Colloquium was held on November 15-18, 1994, in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe with the purpose of strengthening African electoral institutions. The sponsoring organizations, AAI, the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), NDI, and the United Nations Department for Development Support & Management Services (UNDDSMS), worked in cooperation to present a comprehensive program that combined interactive workshops with group plenary lectures. Drawing upon each others' strengths, the five organizations collaborated on a proposal that was approved and partially funded under AREAF. Additional and supplementary funding was provided by UNEAD, IFES, UNDDSMS, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

The idea for the colloquium grew out of the sponsoring organizations' experience in electoral assistance and in the African region. This experience led them to conclude that there is a need to improve the electoral process in the African region and that much of it needs to focus on improving support for election administrators, ministries charged with administering elections, and NGOs working to ensure greater transparency.

Project Activities

The objective of the colloquium was to advance the democratization process in Africa through the strengthening of internal African electoral capacities and electoral institutions. Noting the limited opportunities for actors in African elections to share experiences, ideas, recommendations, and lessons learned, the sponsors saw this colloquium as a great opportunity to share information. The major goals for the colloquium were to discuss and disseminate lessons learned from recent African elections, to produce recommendations for strengthening election administration in Africa, and to establish important networks and lasting contacts among Africans involved in the electoral process. The organizers hoped that the colloquium would provide an opportunity to discuss the idea of establishing an independent association of African election administrators and to develop communications links among NGO and citizen participants.

The sponsors devoted a great deal of time and effort to devise a strong participant list for the colloquium. Care was given to balance the participants by region, job position, experience, and gender. Limiting the number of participants was also important to facilitate a manageable level of discussion.

Priority was given to election administrators- that is, those who had already been or were likely to be officially appointed by their governments to oversee an election. The goal was to attain a mixture of two-thirds election administrators and one third NGOs or political party representatives. The actual participants closely resembled the goals that the sponsors set forth: there were approximately 75 participants from 33 African countries, about 20 of whom were women, and there was roughly a two-thirds ratio of electoral administrators to all other participants.

Each sponsoring organization was responsible for developing workshops and plenaries. The plenaries provided a more formal structure where presentations were generally given with no planned time for discussion. The workshops were designed for discussion where the facilitators gave a brief (roughly 10 minutes) presentation and

then concentrated efforts on facilitating discussion among the participants. The topics of the workshops and plenaries were carefully chosen by all the sponsoring organizations in order to include the most relevant issues in such a limited time. Effort was also made to balance the backgrounds of the presenters to ensure that there were both Africans as well as non-Africans; practitioners as well as academics; and women as well as men.

The sponsors felt that it was crucial that every participant be exposed to each colloquium workshop topic. Workshops were conducted simultaneously with repetitions. The participants were divided in small groups of 15-25 for the workshops (size depended on the number of workshops per day) and care was given to provide diversity in each workshop group to facilitate a more interesting discussion. This effort paid off, as feedback revealed retention of valuable information learned from other participants.

The colloquium conducted seven plenaries and eleven workshops. These activities opened with a keynote address by Andre Milongo, President of the National Assembly in Congo, followed by welcoming remarks by the sponsoring organizations. Plenary and workshop subjects included: an overview of the democratization process in Africa, computerization and electoral administration, election day case studies, the role of election observation, creation of an association of African election administrators, comparative electoral systems, organizational structure of electoral systems, electoral operations in a democratic system, civic and voter education, training of electoral officers, electoral campaigns and pre-election issues, voter registration and computerization of voter lists, requirements for election day logistics, vote tabulation and complaint resolution, election observation scenario, strengthening electoral institutions and defining a post-election role and structure for electoral commissions and authorities.

Findings and Evaluations

The program was successfully completed. Overall, it was concluded that the objective and goals of the colloquium were met and that this was achieved by the careful planning of the colloquium.

Although having women presenters was an important goal, the sponsors fell short of this goal and in follow-up discussions about the conference, it has been noted that better efforts need to be made in achieving a gender balance in future events, understanding that at this point there are a limited number of women who have been called upon to serve in this area.

Organizing a colloquium for election administrators provided the best forum for the administrators to learn more about the process, and more importantly, share experiences. Feedback from colloquium participants was positive, and as a result of formal and informal discussions at the colloquium, a study committee was formed to explore the possibilities of establishing an association of African election authorities, including associated professionals.

REGIONAL PROJECT REPORT
AFRICAN ASSOCIATION OF ELECTION AUTHORITIES
NDI & AAI

Background

The African Association of Election Authorities (AAEA) was established as a direct result of the African Election Administrators' Colloquium held in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, November 15-18, 1994. The purpose for establishing the AAEA was to

create an instrument that could play an essential role in strengthening support for African election administrators who are directly responsible for the organization and implementation of elections in Africa. These administrators will not only learn from each other, but can also share resources and technical support.

At the colloquium it was decided that there was a strong need for a standing African Association of Election Authorities to serve a number of functions related to the consolidation of transparent and efficient election administration in Africa. The participants appointed an eight-member Working Committee, chaired by Dr. Amare Tekle from Eritrea, to conduct a feasibility study for the Association. The United Nations committed to supporting the Working Committee's efforts. After three months of study, the Working Committee concluded that the Association is feasible, viable and greatly needed.

Project Activities

AAI and NDI supported the founding meeting at which delegates represented at the colloquium officially established the AAEA. NDI and AAI conducted a three-day meeting for the Working Committee to prepare a finalized Charter and work on other details of founding the Association.

The objective of this assistance was to advance the democratization process in Africa through the support of the establishment of an independent association of African election administrators. The establishment of a Charter is the first and most essential step in achieving an independent AAEA. The support also provided the funds for the Association's Charter Drafting Committee to meet, review and adopt a Charter, as well as develop a plan and program of action that will advance the democratization process in Africa.

The major goals of partners' support were:

- To provide the opportunity for the Charter Drafting Committee of the AAEA to meet in order to establish a Charter for its Association;
- To provide technical assistance and advice to the Charter Committee, while appreciating its need to remain independent; and
- To encourage membership of the AAEA by facilitating information about its Charter.

Findings and Evaluation

The program was successfully completed. The Drafting Committee submitted a final report in May 1995. AAI and NDI will conduct short-term and long-term evaluation of the association. Short-term evaluation of this program will entail measuring the level of participation in the founding meeting, evaluating the degree to which the Committee accomplishes its goals for founding the association and evaluating the role of American NGOs in striking the appropriate balance between support and respect for the independence of the Association. Long-term evaluation will include continuing dialogue with the Association about its work, while respecting the independence of the association.

REGIONAL PROJECT REPORT CONSULTATION FOR AFRICAN WOMEN IN POLITICS AAI

Background

AAI organized the first Africa-Wide Consultation for Women in Politics, in May 1995, to provide women elected to political office and women activists with a forum to: share political experiences, develop strategies to increase the number of women in

elected office, construct a five-year plan for more gender balanced participation of men and women in political leadership, and decide upon the next steps for implementing such a plan. This program was co-sponsored by Emang Basadi of Botswana, the United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF).

The African women who attended the event were an extraordinary and powerful group. Twenty-five of the participants were deputies in national assemblies and members of parliament and three were mayors or city councilors. Eight represented women's leagues, commissions or organizations, and eleven were working with centers or similar organizations for democracy, political activity and/or human rights.

Project Activities

The three-day meeting was planned as a consultation rather than a conference. As a result 1) much of the action occurred in three breakout groups, each of which reported back in plenary sessions, and 2) the agenda was flexible and open to change if participants identified alternate major concerns they wished to see addressed. The program included two speeches, a keynote address by Ms. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, African Regional Administrator of UNDP, and an evening talk by Ambassador Geraldine Ferraro. Participants also made presentations in two panels, one on the first day providing case studies of women's political activity in Uganda, South Africa, Benin, and Botswana, and a later session of successful political strategies. The latter panel included contributions from Mali, Kenya, and Zambia as well as two presentations from outside of Africa by Ms. Geraldine Ferraro of the US and Ms. Aud-Karen Reigstad of Norway. A plenary session was devoted to women's visions of politics in the future. The agenda of the last two days was revised to include two additional sessions on the Fourth World Conference on Women at Beijing and presentations by women from the war-torn countries of Eritrea, Angola and Mozambique.

The Consultation's discussions raised many issues which were reiterated during the final plenary session and which provided a check list for further examination. For example, the quota system, its merits and its operation in various African countries as well as world wide, was one of the topics that demands both research and further discussion. Programs of political education, candidacy, campaign management, and advocacy were also of keen interest. Participants stressed the importance of support programs with skills and information for women once they gain political office.

There was also considerable discussion during all meetings about how to engage men in the struggle, what types of coalitions might be developed, how to win against corrupt politicians, how to raise money, maintaining effective constituency relations, how to gain an understanding of global issues and their national implications, and how to monitor women's progress in politics. Although the mandate of the Committee was not fully determined, investigation and action on some of these issues and strategies are certain to be included among the new committee's mandates.

Findings and Evaluation

The program was successfully completed. The work on the plan of action was superseded by discussions on the importance of institutional arrangements. Participants used the final group meetings to discuss the existence and development of organizations that work to increase women's political power. In the final plenary, participants agreed on the formation of a committee consisting of eight members, two from each of the Central, East, Southern and Western regions of the continent, with ex officio representation from each of the cosponsors. Several of the committee members selected by the participants of each region represented established centers and institutions. WiLDAF was nominated and agreed to serve as the African base, for the committee.

The Committee formed by participants at the end of the Consultation provides an important vehicle for further action which can harness the participants' serious commitment, and enthusiasm for the service of women's political empowerment. AAI has also developed a database of African women in politics as well as a list of centers and organizations working to increase African women's participation in politics. This data base will serve as a foundation for further networking.

REGIONAL PROJECT REPORT
WEST AFRICAN WOMEN IN POLITICS
AAI

Background

AAI has continually been working with women in politics on the African continent. The AAI-sponsored women's consultation in Botswana was previously a very successful program in involving women in political processes. Further momentum was gained for women in politics at the UN-sponsored NGO Forum on Women in Huairou, China. This program was a continuation of capacity building for African women.

Project Activities

From February 28 - March 3, 1995, AAI hosted a colloquium for west African women in politics. The sessions were practical training workshops in the following four areas: platform development/campaign management, fundraising, coalition building, and media relations. These four subjects were chosen in direct response to needs expressed by women politicians and activists with whom AAI had worked previously.

The four-day meeting analyzed the role of west African women politicians and activists in the democratic process. American and African experts and facilitators examined methods for reinforcing the role of women in the African political process through role-playing, and examples presented by the women of the subregion. Thirty-seven women from eight west African countries attended the colloquium.

Findings and Evaluation

The West African Women's Colloquium was a successful forum for sharing common political experiences. Discussions during the four days raised many issues which warrant further examination through program initiatives. Some of these issues include: the quota system, political training, candidacy, fundraising, campaign management, civic education for women and political advocacy. The colloquium encouraged a solidarity and commitment among participants to work toward attaining those rights in the future. In addition, the personal relationships that developed and grew during the meeting will serve to buttress AAI's continued work with women in politics.

REGIONAL PROJECT REPORT
INTERIM PREPARATORY MEETING
THE AFRICAN ASSOCIATION OF ELECTION AUTHORITIES
AAI

Background

In preparation for the founding meeting of the African Association of Election Authorities (AAEA), key figures in the field of electoral management from throughout Africa met in Windhoek, Namibia from June 19-21. The goal of the meeting was to develop a consensus on key issues regarding the establishment of the AAEA. Once established, the AAEA is expected to serve sub-Saharan African nations in institu-

tionalizing democratic practices by serving as an information clearinghouse, elevating professional standards in electoral management, developing training programs, and providing a uniquely African forum for interaction between election authorities and non-governmental organizations in civic and voter education activities.

Project Activities

The topics on the agenda for the meeting included the discussion/revision of the organization's draft charter, financing the institution, a participant list for the founding meeting, a tentative agenda for the founding meeting, and the date and venue for the meeting. Discussion of the charter was the focus of the majority of the sessions. This debate produced a more refined document which clearly lays out the structure of the organization (including interim provisions), the statement of purpose for the organization, and various procedural standards for the association.

Delegates decided that funding for the organization will stem from a number of sources. Transnational corporations are expected to be major financial contributors. With the establishment of democratic governance being a prerequisite for favorable transnational investment, AAEA expects that transnationals will be willing to support an organization which works to facilitate stable democratic environments. Delegates also agreed that membership fees will be required for all participants. Fees will be calculated based upon the nature of the participant's organization, with different schedules for government related bodies and non-governmental organizations. AAEA will also look to international donors, including international NGOs for partial sponsorship.

All participants agreed that the founding meeting should attempt to include diverse, inclusive participation from throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Each nation's Electoral Commission or Ministry of Interior will be invited to participate. In addition, NGOs from throughout the continent, including regional NGOs, which work for better democratic governance will be identified and invited. Finally, individuals who have made significant contributions to the progress of democracy, such as academics or non-affiliated civic organizers, will also be issued invitations.

The founding meeting will consist of three days of conferences regarding the future of the organization. The preparatory meeting resolved to give ample time for the discussion of the charter by all participants. The agenda will also include discussion groups to encourage members to formulate goals and expectations for the organization. Interim officers to serve for three years until the next AAEA meeting is convened are to be elected at the founding meeting.

The tentative site of the AAEA's founding meeting will be Kampala, Uganda with the approximate date of October 26-28.

Findings and Evaluation

The conference was convened successfully. All members contributed to a productive debate which brought the AAEA's founding meeting closer to actualization. Participants remained eager to achieve the realization of the Association and committed to seeing this project through.

AFRICAN ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS COLLOQUIUM

Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe

November, 1994

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The colloquium was made possible by a grant from USAID's Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF). Additional funding was provided by the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UN-EAD), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the United Nations Department for Development Support and Management Services (UN-DDSMS), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) offices based in several African countries.

The sponsors extend their appreciation to Catherine Haberland of AAI for her coordination of colloquium preparations during the final phase. We also gratefully acknowledge the administrative and on-site management assistance provided by AAI staff persons Sonjah Chin, Frances Coble, and Dianne Hawkins.

The sponsors are indebted to Brian Kelly for editing and preparing the final report. Special thanks also to Kevin Cassidy for his assistance with the report design and lay-out.

Colloquium planning was guided over many months by a working group composed of Stoney Cooks and Hillary Thomas of AAI; Keith Klein of IFES; Ned McMahon, Patrick Merloe and Palmer Kipperman of NDI; Horacio Boneo and Will Kennedy of UN-EAD; Almaz Atnafu and Helena Alves of UN-DDSMS.

Finally, we extend our appreciation to the interpreters who skillfully translated the proceedings for the benefit of all participants; especially Chari Wager for her exceptional contribution.

FOREWORD

Since 1990 more African voters have been to the polls than at any other time since independence. Many countries in the region have held competitive, multi-party elections for the first time. Within this context and following the first round of transitional elections, the African Election Administration Colloquium offered an opportunity for election practitioners from throughout sub-Saharan Africa to:

- review common challenges to the organization and execution of transparent elections;
- discuss the specific roles and responsibilities of election administrators in order to further develop African electoral expertise and technically effective administrative systems;
- exchange experience and disseminate lessons learned from recent African elections, including practical strategies for institutionalizing election procedures that have proven successful;
- foster a mutually supportive network and explore the feasibility of establishing an inter-African Association of Election Administrators.

The colloquium emphasized the importance of building self-reliant African electoral institutions and provided a forum for participants to share their insights and discuss the challenges of building sustainable electoral systems and processes in their respective countries.

In his opening address The Honorable Andre Milongo, President of the Congo's National Assembly and formerly transitional Prime Minister, urged participants to use the colloquium to look for solutions they could adopt in order to have free and fair elections in their countries. He observed that while it might take considerable time before many African countries were in a position to have free and transparent elections, such elections were a vital "key to truly democratic societies with choice." He also emphasized the important roles for civic and voter education since "without democrats we will not have democracy."

Together with the other sponsoring organizations -- The African American Institute (AAI), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the United Nations Department for Development Support and Management Systems (UNDDSMS) - we extend our gratitude to the participants themselves whose contributions and insights were the basis of the colloquium's success. This report attempts to capture the rich dialogue and exchange of ideas that characterized the proceedings.

Horacio Boneo
Director
Electoral Assistance Division
Department of Political Affairs
United Nations

SECTION ONE
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

This introduction was prepared by Keith Klein, Director of Programs, Africa and the Near East, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, on behalf of the sponsoring organizations.

More than 100 participants including representatives from 33 African nations attended the African Election Administrator's Colloquium in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe on November 15-18, 1994. For three and a half days, the participants discussed the success stories, the failures, the challenges and the promises of organizing, monitoring and participating in elections in Africa, past and future.

The colloquium in Zimbabwe was an unprecedented gathering of expertise on African elections. Late 1994 turned out to be an auspicious vantage point from which to assess the gains and the setbacks in electoral administration in African and to look toward the future as many countries began to prepare for "second generation" multiparty elections. As electoral commissioners, ministry officials, leaders of election monitoring groups, or electoral candidates, colloquium participants gained that expertise "in the trenches," in the ongoing effort to make multi-party elections a regular, peaceful and credible part of democratic governance in many African countries. The colloquium, by concentrating that expertise in one place for several days, allowed experts from countries at different stages in the process of democratization to share lessons learned from diverse experiences. The colloquium also sought to strengthen elections in Africa's democratic processes and to support and strengthen electoral administration as a profession.

Election administrators stand perhaps in the same relationship to the electoral process as elections themselves do to the democratic process. They are crucially important, yet at the same time they are not the full story. Democracy without periodic elections is untenable, but elections alone do not create democracy. Elections are a high point, but not an end point, for democracy. Elections must have election administrators, but administrators alone cannot create good elections. Even the best administrators and the most efficient electoral administrations are at the mercy of political leadership and political culture. But just as a bad election can doom an infant democracy, election administrators without adequate resources, skills and integrity can doom an election.

Holding elections is a central responsibility of any democratic government, but election administration is often relegated to an ad hoc, underfunded and poorly staffed operation. It is an unheralded activity, yet it is vast, complex and expensive. Sometimes the quality of election administration can make the difference between a healthy democracy and a disintegrating one. The African Election Administrator's Colloquium was held with an awareness of these problems.

The principal assumptions on which the colloquium's agenda was based were that the accumulated African expertise in election administration needed to be shared across national, regional, and linguistic boundaries; that there were skills and technologies developed outside of Africa that could be usefully applied to future elections on the continent; and that the long-term strengthening of African election processes must be supported by intra-African information exchange and association.

On the basis of those assumptions, the colloquium's program combined presentations by the sponsoring organizations and international specialists with opportunities for African participants to share lessons learned with their colleagues. The colloquium's plenary and workshop sessions covered a wide range of election issues in a variety of formats. The colloquium provided the opportunity for the acquisition of new knowledge and skills to be applied by the participants to future elections where they work. This report and the papers presented in Victoria Falls are other outputs resulting from the colloquium. An additional result of the colloquium has been the creation of a working group to explore the feasibility and the means of establishing an association of African election authorities.

The Participants

Representatives were invited to participate in the colloquium from all sub-Saharan African countries where multiparty elections had been held or were scheduled soon to be held. In most cases, one or two individuals from each country's electoral commission or election administering ministry were invited. Approximately two-thirds of the participants were election administrators. In order to broaden the scope of the discussion at the colloquium and to mirror the interaction of various groups in the electoral process, one or two representatives of civil society were invited from each country. Most often, these were leaders of civic organizations active in election monitoring, civic education or human rights. Political party leaders from several countries were also invited.

The mix of participants resulted in a fertile exchange transcending national, linguistic and professional boundaries. The strengths and weaknesses of electoral systems influenced by one tradition were brought into sharper relief when contrasted with electoral systems largely shaped by the traditions of others. In the course of the colloquium's proceedings, the challenges and constraints faced by election administrators began to be better understood by civic association leaders, while election administrators were able to deepen their appreciation for contributions of citizen organizations to the electoral process. When the problems of one country were examined in light of solutions found in other countries, new possibilities for improvement were acknowledged and general standards and expectations for fair and well-run elections were raised.

Themes for Reflection

These fruitful discussions were initiated by plenary and workshop presentations made by the sponsoring organizations, other international election specialists and by the African participants. There were no official statements or conclusions at the end of the conference, but a number of themes were raised during the three days which merit further attention. They include:

- A key to effective election administration is long-range planning rather than crisis management. This conclusion argues for the establishment of permanent electoral structures that can continue strategic electoral planning and activities between elections.
- Electoral commissions and election administering ministries need to strive for openness and transparency in their operations. Actively reaching out to political parties and NGOs increases the effectiveness and the democratic nature of election administration.
- Organizing credible and periodic elections will continue to require some degree of dependence by many African countries on international assistance in the short run, but both African countries and their bilateral and multilateral partners should search for ways of reducing and eliminating that dependence.

- Domestic non-partisan NGOs have a legitimate and useful role to play in civic education and election monitoring.
- Technology, including an increased use of computers, has the potential to make election administration more efficient and economical in certain areas such as voter registries. Computerization, however, must be planned carefully, with an eye on short term costs and efficiency gains and on long term resource requirements for maintenance and upgrading.
- The hallmark of good election administration is its neutrality and integrity. Election administrators are important guardians of the public trust and of the democratic system.
- Governments and election administrators should move toward a professionalization rather than a politicization of election administration. One way to do that is through the creation of permanent and independent electoral commissions, with a membership of individuals of high integrity and with a professional staff.
- The colloquium was a useful catalyst for improved intra-African cooperation and communication in electoral matters. The interaction of African election administrators should go beyond the three and a half days in Victoria Falls and extend to an on-going association.

If election administrators are essential but partial components of good elections, and if elections are essential but partial components of democracy, it can also be said that international partners have often been important but partial components in African elections in the past few years. In many elections, international assistance has been indispensable - elections could not have taken place without donor support. But no matter what the size of international support might have been, nowhere has donor assistance alone been responsible for the success or failure of an electoral event. Much more important than external assistance are internal forces. At the beginning of the day and at the end of the day, credible, legitimate and fair elections are dependent only on a country's people and most importantly on its leaders.

In the short run, external actors may need to continue to play their indispensable but marginal role in African elections. Discussion at the colloquium in Zimbabwe focussed on the temporary nature of this assistance. African countries, particularly their election administrators, and international partners must work together to reduce and eventually eliminate the current state of dependence. Both the sponsors and the participants hope that the African Election Administrator's Colloquium has been able to make a significant and lasting contribution toward that goal.

OVERVIEW OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

Keynote address by Dr. James Jonah, Chairman of Sierra Leone's Interim Electoral Commission and former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

Establishing the right to vote in and of itself should not be seen as a definitive determination that democracy has taken root in Africa. Even the South African situation, where a majority, denied the right to vote for so long, turned out in great numbers for the new experience, merits careful examination. Many people in Sierra Leone, he noted, are currently very nervous about holding another election.

Organizing, planning and financing are key tools in determining the freedom and fairness of elections. Cost is the major factor. Mozambique, whose Electoral Commis-

sion cost about $60 million, might not have had successful elections without international donor support to the tune of $55 million plus. Logistics also play a vital role. South Africa was forced to mount an expensive, logistical exercise to get ballot papers and boxes to Natal at the last minute. How much more difficult and expensive must it be for very poor countries with weak transport and communications networks to guarantee good electoral planning and logistics?

Transitions in governance

Shifts in systems of governance bring their own set of problems. The move from a colonial to an independent system presents a different set of electoral problems than those associated with the shift from an authoritarian regime or a one-party system to a multi-party system. Perhaps the most difficult transition is the one unfolding in Sierra Leone ~ the shift from a military regime to a multi-party system.

Sierra Leone's Election Commission felt the circumstances warranted international involvement from an early stage, to ensure at least that the election timetable set by the military regime would be followed. Now, with almost a year and a half to go, the United Nations and the Commonwealth are engaged in helping the electoral process. This, despite the fact that governments tend to prefer that the UN becomes involved at a later stage.

Strengthening the democratic process

Building democracy in Africa also requires developing tolerance and the concept of periodic accountability. Just as the people have to be allowed to judge the performance of government, so the idea of accepting the judgement of the people through the acceptance of election results needs to spread further.

The fact that there are not many democrats in Africa as yet should not be allowed to stop multi-party elections. Civic education may not create democrats the first time round, but it does make it more likely that elections will be easier to conduct second time around. The political parties also have an important contribution to make to the evolving democratization process. A belief in democracy requires a belief in free choice and free assembly.

The international community should help create and finance democratic institutions, especially where liberation movements are in the process of making the transition to democracy. Funding can be made available through United Nations trust fund mechanisms. True, there is a danger that political parties can manipulate these funds, as happened in Mozambique, something the international community would be wary of in the future. The political parties are so essential to the overall process that the issue of public financing of campaigns will have to be addressed in building African democracies.

Inclusiveness

In order for there to be stability in building young democracies in Africa there must be full participation and broadly-based acceptance of the results by all the people. Yet, governments or parties, asked to accept the principle of coalition even before they enter elections, quite properly respond:' "Why do you want us to agree to form a coalition government before we know the people's choice?"

South Africa's political leaders opted for a five-year interim government, giving all the people a stake in government. This was clearly understood before the elections and it produced a relatively stable government.

Proportional representation (PR) is an option for all that at least guarantees a basis of stability. In Namibia, PR produced a balanced outcome, and the same appears to be true in terms of Mozambique's provinces and legislature. However, any move toward proportional representation requires extensive public debate and civic educa-

tion since people are not used to the system. It is also a given that PR requires the existence of strong political parties to ensure all-round representativeness.

The security issue

Free and fair elections cannot prevail in situations where security conditions make it impossible to guarantee that everyone can exercise their vote. Circumstances can also arise where those opposed to elections attempt to manipulate or exploit a security situation to prevent elections taking place. This should not be allowed.

The United Nations Security Council went ahead with the Cambodian elections despite the threats to the process being posed by the Khmer Rouge. Similarly, diplomacy and common sense prevailed in South Africa when fears of violence threatened a postponement of the elections there.

The fact is that without ongoing international involvement and support, the building of African democracy could die a natural death. This is why organizations such as the colloquium's sponsors should remain engaged in the democratization process in Africa.

FIRST KEYNOTE RESPONSE

Response by Professor Joel Barkan, University of Iowa and former USAID Regional Democracy and Governance Advisor for East and Southern Africa. Dr. Barkan gave a summary of his paper "African Elections in Comparative Perspective."

Internal demand for political renewal by Africans and a changing global context have led to multi-party competitive elections in nearly three dozen African countries since October 1990. This upsurge is part of a global process in which more than 60 countries have made or have begun the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic role since 1972.

Two factors are key in the transition to democracy in Africa and the institutionalization of competitive electoral practice: a consensus among elites that free and fair elections and other attributes of democracy are essential for renewing and maintaining the political health of a country; and, widespread public support and participation in the holding of elections.

Both conditions are essential for the institutionalization of democratic electoral practice in Africa. One without the other is insufficient. Without both, the transition to democracy will never be completed. As a gathering of election administrators and members of NGOs concerned with the holding of elections, the colloquium is mainly addressed to achieving and implementing the first condition.

Failure to overcome the technical and administrative problems inherent to the holding of democratic elections could lead to conflict between competing elites. Without the support of that elite consensus, the transition to democracy could break down.

Often lost sight of, however, is what is on the minds of the millions of ordinary citizens who comprise the electorate. Without the support of the electorate in terms of high rates of participation and turnout, the efforts of those responsible for organizing the elections would fail.

African governments and the elites who ran them during the first three decades of independence failed to appreciate the rationality of the typical inhabitant of the rural areas. Because these people are often uneducated and live out their lives in mostly rural communities, it was often assumed that they must be told what to do.

Yet in country after country it is clear that most citizens are quite capable of defining their self-interests and acting accordingly whether by selling their commodi-

ties on the informal market when official prices are artificially low, withdrawing from cooperation with the state when unfairly taxed or refusing to vote in meaningless or rigged elections.

Most voters are not concerned with issues of national policy or ideology. Their interests lie in which candidate or party or what likely government can deliver the goods in respect of schools, health clinics, water, roads, etc., to their home areas.

This can draw voters to support political parties with a regional or ethnic basis. This is why voters have no long-term loyalty to a single political party or individual and why they often desert incumbents given the chance. Even under the prevailing one-party format in Kenya during the 1970s, two-thirds of the incumbents were regularly turned out at the subsequent election.

The electoral process must be widely accessible to all citizens irrespective of where they live. The administrative apparatus should reach down into the local community. It should also be open to all in terms of universal registration, accessible polling stations etc. It should see to it that all regions are on a par organizationally. Subject to minimal rules, campaigning should be free and open. Candidates should have access to all regions. There should be no "no-go" zones. Voters should feel secure when they go to the polls, reassured perhaps by the presence of domestic monitors.

After the elections, efforts should be made to involve voters from all regions in the final organization of the government.

On this issue of power-sharing, a word of caution about proportional representation which in certain circumstances can strain voter confidence in the democratic process.

While the PR system lends itself to transitional elections, it poses long-term problems of accountability in societies that are fundamentally rural. Those elected by a party list system to serve in a national legislature without responsibility for specific geographic areas risk losing contact with the very people who elected them. A mix of PR and single-member districts such as exists in Namibia could ensure power-sharing while maintaining the direct connection with the rural areas.

SECOND KEYNOTE RESPONSE

Response by Professor Guy Martin, Associate Professor; Political Science Department, Clark Atlanta University, and Carter Center African Governance Program associate. Dr. Martin gave a summary of his paper "Democratization and Governance in Africa."

Progress in Africa's transition towards democracy has been slow and difficult. Transition processes vary from country to country depending on the historical and cultural conditions, the nature or combination of the specific social political forces, and the external inducements offered based on progress towards democracy. The achievements of the democratic revolution are very fragile and need to be strengthened and consolidated. A multi-party system is not sufficient in and of itself to constitute the conditions for a democracy.

A typology of democratic transition

A typology of democratic transition in Africa covers four distinct groups of countries. First are the countries with established democratic traditions dating from the early 1970s -- Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal. Even these countries are not immune from manipulations by the parties in power (Senegal) or to setbacks (The Gambia).

Second are the francophone Africa countries where transition has been catalyzed by means of a national sovereign conference. The people, investing themselves with popular sovereignty as it were, create new institutions not only for the transition phase but, looking ahead, even set about drafting new constitutions.

Next are countries where the democratic transition has been "arrested" or confiscated by a military or civilian authoritarian government. In these instances, anticipating the wind of change, the government quickly organizes elections and by manipulating the political/electoral process is able to vote itself back into power. Examples include Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Djibouti and Nigeria.

Last are the countries where the transition is subject to total authoritarian reaction. In these instances, having seemingly conceded to the democratic demands of the people, military leaders first refuse to give up power and then stage a comeback through fraud and manipulation and whatever else is deemed necessary to either reinstate or maintain themselves in power. Togo and Zaire fall into this category.

Nevertheless, despite failures such as Cameroon, Kenya, Togo and Zaire, the "democratic revolution" has scored some notable achievements. There have been the relative successes in Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Central African Republic, South Africa, and Zambia. Significantly, the defense and promotion of human rights is everywhere accepted as a given. The civil society is becoming stronger and basic institutions are being created.

Obstacles and problems

Obstacles and problems to democratic transition start with the institutional weaknesses of the new political parties. Their weakness is structural and they lack orientation, focus or ideology. Often, they are based on individuals or groups rather than a clear program. This makes them prey to clientelism and at risk of becoming ethnicized.

Moreover, the democratic momentum requires popular participation yet the process has been frequently hijacked by groups of elite. Rural or urban masses do not appear to be engaged in the process.

Then, African countries are asked to democratize in a context of increased economic and financial scarcity. The situation is made even more difficult by IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs. In addition, there is now a new political conditionality with many donors requiring that the democratization process be initiated as a prerequisite for aid.

Finally, there are structural/institutional weaknesses inherent to most existing political systems. The separation of power is not really ingrained. Rather, a confusion of power reigns between executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. There is need for independent institutions to effectively control the political, financial and economic management of a country and to avoid corruption. The absence of a democratic culture is a serious problem both at the level of the government leaders, where the sense of State accountability is lacking, and at the level of the mostly uneducated and illiterate popular masses.

Some possible solutions

Possible solutions include constitutional and institutional changes to guarantee the separation of powers, a limit to the terms of incumbent presidents, and individual freedoms with specific empowerment of judicial or other institutions, including possibly an ombudsperson, to prevent executive-level abuse of power.

An essential condition for effective popular participation in democratic processes is the promotion of mass civic education. The civil society can be further strengthened by setting up NGOs which are committed to the democratization process. It remains

necessary also to promote the effective and more direct involvement of women in the political process in general and especially in the political institutions of a democratizing Africa.

SECTION TWO
COMPARATIVE ISSUES

ELECTORAL OPERATIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

A workshop led by Gabriel Murillo (IFES), Chairman, Department of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia, and Patrick Merloe, Senior Associate for Election Processes, NDI. This workshop discussed the relationship between respect for human rights, transparency and citizen participation in democratic election systems.

Democracy implies participation in government and a government respectful of the human rights of its citizens. The degree and quality of citizens' participation in the electoral process can be an indicator of the overall strength and sustainability of the democracy.

The ground rules for citizen participation in elections have been established with growing specificity through a number of international conventions created in the past decades and through states' practices, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The right of citizens to participate in their government is stated most fundamentally in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

> *Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his [or her] country, directly or through freely chosen representatives... The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent voting procedures.*

All of these internationally agreed-upon freedoms provide basic guidance for governments and election authorities as they shape the mechanisms through which the will of citizens is expressed. These freedoms have very specific implications for the administration of elections.

The citizen's right to participate in government has its complement in the government's obligation to permit and facilitate that participation. Citizens' participation in government through elections is enhanced by governmental measures intended to build confidence in the electoral system. A primary means of building confidence is to permit and encourage citizen participation in all aspects of the electoral process.

Patrick Merloe described several means in which public confidence in electoral processes could be enhanced.

"Transparency" in the process is an important factor in enhancing confidence. The electoral process should be open so that political contestants can view all its aspects from the drafting of election laws and selection of electoral administrators through to the tabulation of results and resolution of electoral complaints. Likewise,

the public should be able to witness all the steps in the election process through citizen monitors and the media.

The second way to enhance confidence is to involve the political parties directly in the process whether it is negotiations on the electoral law, a party code of conduct, representation on the electoral administration or oversight bodies, or participation in electoral monitoring and dispute resolution. Citizen groups should also have a role in monitoring the electoral process and their monitoring function should not be limited to observing the events of election day itself but should be extended to cover campaign and count.

Another means of enhancing public confidence and participation in the electoral process is through guarantees of due process in all aspects of electoral administration. Election authorities must be empowered to take effective and independent action to protect the integrity of the election process, using all legislative, regulatory and judicial means to prevent unfair treatment of political contestants and voters, and to redress violations when they occur. Finally, the international community can provide election assistance through monitoring efforts that can help deter fraud while supporting the public and by providing technical assistance to strengthen electoral administration.

Gabriel Murillo followed with a brief presentation on strengthening participatory democracy. He described the need for a new, active partnership between citizenry and government which would acknowledge the need to enhance citizen participation in decision-making beyond the election of representatives. Such participatory democracy requires respect for fundamental human rights and rule of law but it also requires additional mechanisms for citizen input. Examples include, referenda and plebiscites, impeachment, citizen legislative initiatives, town meetings, and citizen monitoring of government programs (and elections).

Building and sustaining a participatory democracy implies the need for election administrators to be guided by certain principles to guarantee neutrality, non-partisanship and an openness to input from citizens and political parties. Election authorities have the responsibility of encouraging participation and consensus-building from political parties and civic organizations on electoral processes; guaranteeing the provision of timely and equal information to all relevant actors in elections; channeling resources to civic and voter education; promoting citizen involvement in election monitoring; coordinating the equitable use of the mass media in election coverage and information dissemination; supporting legal mechanisms for the resolution of complaints, disputes and election violations; and opening the door to the international community for monitoring and assistance.

Discussion

The discussion continued the themes of participation and confidence-building, centering around three areas of action needed to ensure the sustainability of a democratic electoral process and of a democracy as a whole: education, monitoring, and the institutionalization of checks and balances. All three of these areas of action have implications for election administrators, political parties, NGOs, and the international community.

Citizen participation requires an informed citizenry. Civic and voter education should be an important priority of electoral bodies. It is a task that election authorities share with political parties. NGOs also have a role to play. Some participants noted the need for civic and voter education programs to be objective and nonpartisan. If NGOs are to undertake such programs, election authorities may need to monitor the programs to ensure that accurate and nonpartisan information is being disseminated.

Some participants stated that training programs should also be extended to political parties leaders and election administrators. These two groups need to be well-versed

in the principles of democratic elections and in the details of electoral laws and regulations.

Increasingly, electoral processes in Africa are being monitored by domestic and international bodies. Although some participants thought that the international role should be limited to observing and reporting, others believed that the international community provides valuable and needed technical assistance and should be more engaged in the electoral process. Assistance should be part of a long-term commitment to democratic institution building.

In addition to election-day activities, the international community should be involved in the pre- and post-election periods and work with all the actors in the electoral process, particularly domestic monitoring groups. Several participants suggested seeking regional assistance in addition to international assistance. International observers are particularly valuable when governments do not allow domestic monitors to organize and operate. It was also suggested that long-term international monitoring can be useful in helping electoral authorities to keep pressure on the government to respect the law and maintain a level playing field.

It was generally agreed that domestic election monitors can play a positive role in building confidence and participation in the electoral process by adding to the credibility of the work of the electoral administration and the legitimacy of the electoral process. Their value is enhanced by the degree to which they operate in a nonpartisan and professional manner. Therefore, continued training for domestic election monitors was considered a priority by workshop participants.

Perhaps the key underlying theme of the workshop was the recognition that democratic elections cannot be created by the electoral law itself, or even by the electoral authorities alone. Democratic elections, and sustainable democracy, are built through a partnership of electoral authorities, political parties, NGOs, ordinary citizens, and sometimes, international support.

While working toward the common goal of credible and legitimate elections, these partners also can find themselves in an adversarial relationship which, far from being negative, is the primary guarantor of a sustainable democracy, if kept within bounds.

Political parties, election observers and electoral authorities, working together while monitoring each other's behavior, provide the checks and balances that can ensure compliance with the law and a sufficiently fair and open electoral process so that the will of the people can be accurately expressed.

ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS AND PRE-ELECTION ISSUES

This workshop examined prerequisites for free and fair elections and the relation of a "level playing field" for political competition. The discussion covered legal recognition of political parties, candidate and party ballot qualification, adequate resources for campaigning, media access and coverage, misuse of government resources, impediments to campaigning, party codes of conduct, party liaison committees, complaint mechanisms and dispute resolution. The presenter was Patrick Merloe, NDI's Senior Associate for Election Processes.

Mr. Merloe noted that the issue of whether elections are truly democratic is often determined by developments preceding election day. He noted that the recognition of political organizations as legal entities, with the right to seek governmental power through the electoral process is fundamental to pluralist democracy. Any examination of an election system thereby must include the political party law and other elements necessary for genuine political competition, often referred to as a "level playing field."

Delimitation of election districts, candidate and party qualification for the ballot, and the voter registration process are important elements that often proceed the official election campaign.

The principle of non-discrimination is central to these elements as well as to those at work during the election campaign itself. At the core of the level playing field question is the degree of equity political contestants actually obtain in matters such as campaign financing, media access and coverage, and availability of material resources. A second core issue is the effective compliance with and enforcement of election-related laws and regulations.

Time may be the most valuable resource. As election administrators need time to prepare the election apparatus, political contestants need time to set campaign strategy, develop a program and message, recruit campaigners, raise money and other resources as well as communicate their messages to prospective voters. Timing of elections must allow competitors sufficient opportunity to accomplish these tasks in a meaningful way.

While it is almost impossible to provide equal resources to every political contestant, equitable resources are necessary to a genuine electoral contest. It may necessary to differentiate between major and lesser competitors; however, all qualified contestants either should possess or be provided with at least those resources required to ensure a fair opportunity to compete. This could be done with full public funding, partial public funding supplemented with private fundraising, by providing public matching funds or solely by private fundraising where such sources are adequate. Campaign spending and contribution limits as well as disclosure requirements are important related issues.

Steps are necessary to prevent misuse of government resources for the electoral advantage of any one contestant. Such resources belong to the citizens of a country and should not be used for certain contestants only. These items include government employees campaigning on official time or using government equipment, using one's position as a government official to gain media coverage for electoral purposes, and using government jobs, public works or services to gain votes.

Gaining fair access to the mass communications media to deliver campaign messages is another important element to the level playing field, as is the issue of objective and balanced news coverage of political contestants and issues of import to the elections. The mass media are also central to adequate voter education programs.

Impediments to campaigning such as violence against candidates, campaigners and prospective voters was also discussed. Party codes of conduct were seen as useful tools when arrived at through dialogue among the competitors. The role of election administrators in facilitating such dialogue and in setting up party liaison committees at the national, regional and local levels was also addressed. Liaison committees were seen as useful in building relationships among the parties as well as with election officials which can help to avoid conflicts or resolve them informally.

It was generally agreed that an effective electoral complaint mechanism is critical to a fair electoral process. Whatever the specific mechanism (within the election commission, by special electoral tribunals or by regular courts with expedited process), it was agreed that appropriate legal sanctions must be available to deter and punish violators. The participants also noted the experience in South Africa where electoral disputes were subjected to mediation as a regular part of the complaint process. Such alternatives to litigation were seen to have value in appropriate circumstances.

Participants agreed that the level playing field issues were critical to holding genuine democratic elections and that early involvement of election officials, political contestants and citizens in addressing these issues is crucial to electoral success.

ELECTION DAY CASE STUDIES: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND NIGER

Adamou Kombo, formerly second Vice-President of Niger's High Council of the Transitional Parliament and President of the Supervisory Election Commission, and Patrick Merloe, NDI's Senior Associate for Election Processes, examined reasons for the positive experience of one election and the negative experience of the other. Mr. Merloe's presentation dealt with the Dominican Republic, Mr. Kombo's with Niger.

Case Study 1 - Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic's post-Trujillo history of turbulent presidential elections included the 1990 contest, when opposition charges of voting count manipulation threatened to spark another popular revolt. All parties appealed to former President Jimmy Carter, then heading an international observer delegation at the elections, to mediate. The ensuing agreement agreed to by all the political parties called for a retabulation of the vote. However, soon after the international delegation departed, the Election Commission canceled the process and the incumbent President was declared the winner.

Despite this, domestic and international pressure resulted in a number of electoral reforms which were to play a critical role in the electoral crisis of May to August 1994. The Dominican Republic also accepted international technical aid from both IFES and the Organization of American States (OAS) in the 1994 electoral process.

The first reform was to reinitiate the voter registration process using a computerized system with photo ID cards. This required collecting and processing a lot of data at a large number of sites selected by the Election Commission. Much of the data was recorded or transcribed wrongly. Many voter cards turned out to be inaccurate and had to be turned over for correction, necessitating further delays. Many people were frustrated and did not complete the process, while an estimated 200,000 failed to return to pick up their cards. This caused a lack of public confidence in the voter registry.

The second reform was the reconstitution of the Election Commission which was expanded from three to five members. All three parliamentary political parties could nominate candidates. However, the incumbent President was given the power to nominate two of the members. Since his political party also had a nominating vote, this meant that it controlled three of the five positions. This caused a lack of public confidence in the independence of the Election Commission.

The third reform was to increase the number of polling stations by one-third. This created a problem with the large number of personnel who had to be recruited and trained to serve as first-time polling officers which did not get underway until the last minute.

NGOs did not mobilize for domestic monitoring, and in general there was insufficient civic involvement in the election process. However, a major change was the Catholic Church's decision to intervene and get all the political parties to sign a civility pact (or code of conduct) regulating their behavior towards one another. A "Civility Commission" was set up to oversee this process.

Of note too were some apparent minor technical hitches in preparations for the election. The most significant was the fact that the political parties did not receive copies of the electoral lists that were used at polling sites. The copies the Election Commission sent them had been printed approximately two weeks prior to the election.

The international community was invited to send observers. OAS, IFES, NDI and CAPEL (an inter-American association for election assistance) sent delegations. IFES, NDI and OAS coordinated their activities very closely.

Within two hours of the polls being opened, thousands of voters with apparently valid voter ID cards were being turned away because their names were not on the voter registry. Their names did, however, appear on the lists sent out earlier to the political parties. The problem was widespread, the pattern suggesting that those being disenfranchised were supporters of the two main opposition parties. Observer delegations confirmed this with polling site presidents and even with the incumbent party's agents.

The Election Commission rejected the parties' appeal that these people be allowed to vote using a form of "challenged ballot." Only after the international observer leadership and the "Civility Commission" also recommended remedial action did the Election Commission reverse itself. However, the Commission's decision was announced 12 minutes after the polls closed. While they announced a three-hour extension of polling hours, most of the polling stations had no way of knowing the announcement had been made. The action of the Election Commission, largely undermined by its timing, had caused yet another electoral crisis in the Dominican Republic.

NDI and the OAS issued statements immediately following the election. NDI, noting it could not quantify the magnitude of the problem, said it was apparent, with only about 28,000 votes separating the incumbent from his closest challenger, that it could affect the election outcome. NDI also stated that the pattern of disenfranchisement suggested there might be a deliberate manipulation and urged the Dominican authorities to launch an investigation and take the appropriate remedial steps. The international delegations also called on the opposition parties to remain calm and to use all legal avenues available to resolve the situation.

The Election Commission set up a special investigative commission which included two technical experts provided by IFES and OAS. They were able to establish that a minimum of 28,000 people had been disenfranchised but that it may have been as many as 45,000.

The final margin of victory in the preliminary count was 22,000 votes. Pressure mounted for new or supplementary elections. By a vote of three to two the Election Commission certified that the incumbent had won, ignoring its own investigation, and precipitated a major political crisis that was only resolved by an extraordinary political solution.

Backed by the Civility Commission and the international community, the opposition parties negotiated a political solution to the crisis. As a result, parliament amended the Dominican constitution in two important respects. The incumbent would remain in office for only two years, with a special election to fill the final two years of term, and Presidents would no longer be allowed to succeed themselves to a second term of office.

Lessons learned

Technical improvements such as computerization and other reforms do not necessarily make for free and fair elections. Where an election administration lacks political will and independence, the result can be electoral failure. When the opposition remains rational, uses the courts and is politically inclusive, it can solve problems politically. Civil society must play an active role to ensure genuine democratic elections, and the international community can at times play a constructive role in monitoring election processes and supporting resolution of potential conflicts.

Case Study 2 - Niger

Niger's successful political transition and elections stem from the determination of the people to have a free, just and transparently run society. The creation of an independent national conference catalyzed the drive to consolidate the nation's electoral and democratic processes. The Electoral Commission was created by law of the transitional parliament which mandated it to supervise all aspects and phases of the elections.

The Commission supervised another national body which, under the direction of the Minister of the Interior, was in charge of electoral logistics. Members included the Ministers of Finance and Justice, plus representatives of the political parties. The decision to involve the executive branch was deliberate because government on all levels, regional, local and municipal, had the tools essential to the material and logistical organization of the elections. Also, it was felt that not to involve the executive might prove less beneficial overall.

The Electoral Commission's membership comprised nine members of the Transitional Parliament, plus representatives from the different human rights associations, worker and student unions, and the country's various judicial organs, as well as a number of individuals chosen by consensus based on their moral integrity.

Four sub-committees served the Electoral Commission. One handled civic and voter education. The finance sub-committee was in charge of technical and logistical aspects for the elections and worked closely with the Interior Minister's group. The legislative sub-committee ensured that the Minister's group observed the electoral law. The fourth sub-committee was responsible for ensuring that the executive branch took all the necessary security measures during the campaign and election.

In addition, the Commission set up representatively staffed regional and local offices throughout the country which were tasked with ensuring that administrative arrangements and preparations for the elections were carried out promptly, properly and efficiently. To reinforce this point, the Commission regularly conducted on-site evaluations.

The Electoral Commission remained neutral and impartial in its efforts to ensure fair electoral practices and thereby reinforce public confidence about the elections. It also ran a radio and TV voter education campaign in all the main national languages in addition to French, Niger's official language.

Two important goals were accomplished. There was no disruption of the electoral process due to intimidation or violence and voters were encouraged to come out and make their personal choice through the secret ballot, assured that the results would be announced as quickly as possible.

Other reasons contributing to the success of Niger's first elections include the support of the international community, starting with the efforts of the United States and France and the truce that set up the elections. Also, a series of NDI organized conferences and programs held between 1991 and 1992 dealing with electoral issues, including training and civic education, was significant. So too were the services of the NDI electoral expert whose advice and expertise proved to be a great asset to the Commission's work.

COMPARATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Michael Krennerich of the Institute of Political Science at Heidelberg University dealt with the range of choices available between proportional representation and single member type systems, the combinations in between, and some criteria for evaluating electoral systems in general. His remarks were followed with a presentation by Professor John Makumbe of the University of Zimbabwe. This workshop session was chaired by Prof. Joel Barkan of the University of Iowa.

All electoral systems in use around the world stem from the two fundamental electoral principles of majority and proportional representation. The main objective of the former is to produce a parliamentary majority for one party or for a coalition of parties. The latter aims to reflect the existing social forces and political groups in a given country so that the share of a given party's votes and seats are relatively equivalent.

Electoral systems contain four distinct elements covering districting, the type of candidacy, voting procedures and the decision formula or rules used to convert votes into seats.

Districting -- drawing up electoral districts determines the effects of electoral systems on the vote-seat relationship and is among the most controversial issues in assessing an electoral system.

Type of candidacy -- fundamental distinction between individual candidatures and different list forms is important because of the role political parties can play in the nomination process and the type of selection that can be made by the voter.

Voting procedures -- delineating whether electorate votes for an individual candidate or a party list.

The decision formula -- rules used in the conversion of votes into seats which provide the basic distinction between the majority formula and the proportional formula.

These technical elements have political effects for example with regard to the degree of proportionality between votes and seats, the relationship between voters and representatives, and the relationship between the elected candidate and the party.

Mr. Krennerich offered five criteria for evaluating electoral systems:

Representation -- Are the nation's socio-political interests adequately reflected in the elected representative bodies. Some interpret this criterion to mean representation for "all" -- i.e., representation of different societal groups such as minorities and women; others see it as meaning "fair" representation --i.e., more or less proportional to the social and political forces and a fairly equivalent relationship between seats and votes.

Concentration -- The aggregation of social interests and political opinions to facilitate political decisions and empower the public for political action. Formation of a stable government based on a parliamentary majority formed by a party or coalition is a good indicator that this criterion is being achieved.

Participation -- Refers specifically to the extent to which the voter is able to express his/her political will within the framework of either the single candidate vote or party list vote.

Simplicity -- Extent to which the electorate is able to understand the electoral system, the implication of its vote, and appreciate basic electoral administration considerations.

Legitimacy -- Whether or not the electoral system is accepted by a pluralist society as a proper and credible institutional means of establishing a representative government. Do losing minority groups or parties accept the electoral results? Although the requirement for legitimacy of an electoral system is obvious, it is often difficult to assess.

There is no ideal electoral system. No single system can satisfy the many competing societal and political demands at the same time in an absolute manner. Conflicts between different socio-political objectives are the rule. The increased capacity of one electoral system to respond to a particular functional demand inevitably means a diminished capacity to meet another. The choice of an electoral system should be based on socio-political conditions and other factors specific to each country.

Mr. Krennerich expressed the personal view that in the case of segmented societies, one of the most important demands an electoral system should meet is a representative function. Proportional representation systems are best suited to meet this objective. He conceded that it may not make sense to break with the political tradition by

introducing a proportional representation system in countries which are used to plurality systems. Such a transition may not be politically viable since successful reform requires a consensus among the main political forces or parties, especially the party in power which seldom has an interest in weakening its base of political power. In such cases, he recommended opting for incremental reforms.

One possible strategy for furthering electoral reform in African countries which use the plurality system may be to introduce some elements of the proportional system into the prevailing electoral system as a compromise. For example, such a strategy could combine a plurality system in single-member constituencies with an additional proportional list at regional or national level. This would offer voters the possibility of voting as they are accustomed to in single member constituencies and procure, at the same time, minority representation as people also vote (with the same or a second vote) for a party list of proportional representation at regional or national level.

Professor John Makumbe of the University of Zimbabwe directed his remarks to the specifics of African elections. Under a series of admonitory headings, he presented capsulated guidelines as to how elections should be conducted and identified a number of problems commonly associated with electoral systems in Africa.

Establish a level playing field -- Too often, electoral systems are manipulated or subject to arbitrary rule changes, bringing into question the legitimacy of the elected government. To the extent that electoral systems determine the rules and procedures that are followed in converting votes to seats, it is important that these rules and procedures remain stable and are not changed regularly to suit the interests of incumbent parties at the expense of their opponents.

Build consensus -- Most electoral systems in Africa are borrowed from former colonial powers. Developing or modifying them to meet a country's needs is a national responsibility. Groups representing all facets of a given society, including NGOs and various civil groups should be involved in designing a fair, appropriate and nationally accepted electoral system. The principle of electoral monitoring should be recognized as an important human right in promoting democracy and adopted by all countries as standard procedure to further transparency.

Nurture political tolerance -- Given Africa's general experience, electoral systems should promote political integration, unity, and national stability in order to foster a culture of political tolerance.

Keep it simple and inexpensive -- Elections are a financial and material burden on the limited resources of many African nations. Incumbent political parties are able to marshall resources necessary for conducting and competing in an election. Opposition parties are less able to. Africa needs electoral systems that are simple -- not reliant on extensive technical requirements -- and that allow everyone to participate in the process.

Start registration early -- Establishing accurate electoral districts is a major challenge, given the large number of persons in Africa who lack valid ID, are displaced or transient, and otherwise not registered. Greater attention should be given to collecting sound census data and significantly extending the average electoral registration period prior to an election.

Promote freedom of association -- Political parties facilitate mobilization of the electorate, educate voters on the issues at stake in an election, highlight local and national problems and suggest policy alternatives. "Freedom of association" is a democratic principle. An electoral system should neither discourage the formation of political parties nor the formation of coalitions if democracy is to be upheld and promoted.

Represent the interests of all citizens -- An electoral system should ensure that those who win elections have a duty to represent the interests of all the citizens of their respective constituencies irrespective of their political affiliations. Here again, the role of political culture is decisive.

Discussion

Some of the election administrators in attendance wondered whether a session on electoral systems was necessary. "Our powers are limited and do not include influencing the choice of electoral systems." The response: "legislators look to you to educate and guide them in their efforts to select or modify an electoral system." Politicians depend on the electoral administrators for informed expertise and judgement. The electoral authorities/commissions can provide a neutral arena for proposing an acceptable electoral system formula.

Participants agreed that the fair representation and political integration of minorities was an important function of an electoral system and essential for the legitimacy of a political system. Discussion centered on methods of achieving a more inclusive form of representation through the choice of proportional representation or single member districts or some combination of the two.

A major problem with the plurality system is that it often fails to produce an outcome that is broadly representative of the political forces and corresponding constituencies within a given society. In particular, it does not permit the representation of ethnic minorities which do not have regional strongholds. This can contribute to ethnic tensions.

Mr. Krennerich identified three types of election results in countries using plurality systems: (1) one party wins all the seats (Lesotho); (2) one party wins over two-thirds of the seats (Zimbabwe, Zambia); (3) different parties win in their ethnic strongholds. Such outcomes suggested lack of representativeness.

Professor Barkan reminded participants that an electoral system is only one mechanism for achieving inclusiveness in a political system and creating a more stable form of representative democracy. Other mechanisms include federalism, bi-cameral legislatures, appointment of a prime minister representing minority interests in a country, reserved seats, etc. Proportional representation has to be considered on a country by country basis and backed up by good demographic statistics and a close scrutiny of past electoral behavior.

Professor Barkan stressed the need to carefully evaluate the structure of the electoral system that is being considered with the distribution of political interests that actually exist within a country. In Africa, this mainly means the distribution of linguistic and ethnic interests and how they are distributed spatially across a society. There is a great variation in the structure of ethnicity among African countries. How those various groups are situated and distributed has a lot to do with whether or not some form of proportional representation will actually encompass all these interests or whether it won't make any difference.

Some participants thought the proportional representation system was flawed to the extent that it encourages a proliferation of small political parties, hindering efforts to build national unity. Others felt that proportional representation denied voters the opportunity to have their concerns represented through an individual member of parliament directly elected by them rather than the party that he or she represents. They stressed the importance of having a clear and direct link between constituents and their elected representative.

Participants agreed that there is no ideal electoral system. African countries must adapt their electoral systems to fit the particular circumstances found in their respective countries. Senegal and Guinea were cited as examples of countries which have

modified electoral laws to achieve greater minority representation through a combination of majoritarian and proportional representation systems.

SECTION THREE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

IFES staff members, Joe Baxter, Chief Technical Advisor, Ghana, and Tom Bayer, Senior Program Officer, Africa and Near East, presented the workshop which focused on the theme "successful election management means effective organization."

Mr. Baxter characterized the task of administering an election as a highly complex exercise involving hundreds of subtasks, complicated scheduling, and intricate monitoring of activities. It is also a political activity that must be perceived as impartial yet sensitive to the political processes at work in the country. The best-intentioned election administrators ultimately fail if they lack a sound administrative structure for effectively managing the conduct of elections. Developing that structure is their primary responsibility.

There are two basic types of election commissions. Those that function as an oversight body where the commission acts as a policy-making/regulatory authority with a strong administrative staff and those where the election commissioners themselves take an active role in the day-to-day administration of an election. In either case, for the commission to be effective, its organizational structure has to be independent, impartial and competent.

An election commission must be free to act in the interests of all voters and not of any particular candidate in order to build the trust needed so that political parties will respect the process and the results of the election. Generally, election commissions are made up of individuals perceived by political parties and public alike as impartial and worthy of their confidence. They can also be composed of representatives of the major political parties or movements, bringing a balance to the commission's work that promotes impartiality and transparency.

To maintain credibility, election commissions must apply the law in a consistent and even-handed manner. However, the most independent and impartial election commission is ineffectual if it cannot register the voters, qualify the candidates, train the polling station officials, or deliver the ballots on time. The public and political parties must see that the commission is capable of fulfilling its mission.

Mr. Baxter acknowledged that organizing and training thousands of employees, procuring hundreds of items in huge quantities, writing regulations, developing and implementing a civic education plan, registering voters, monitoring the campaign, developing balloting and counting procedures, developing a public information strategy, or coping with the logistical and severe time constraints, challenges even the best administrator's management skills.

Faced with this reality, an effective election administrator supervises, organizes, and directs but does not attempt to micro-manage every detail. A successful election administrator establishes an effective election management team and delegates accordingly.

Mr. Baxter outlined some general techniques of election administration that have proven effective in managing the complex electoral process.

Establish a clear purpose --The election administrator's first task is to create a common purpose and vision among the commission staff. It should be concrete and easily understood by all election staff from the commission chairperson to the officials in the polling stations.

Identify the major task -- The election calendar is the most valuable management tool of any election administrator. It should contain every major task to be completed by the election commission, provide a timeline for completing each task, and identify a person/entity responsible.

Identify, organize and assign subtasks -- The major tasks of putting an election together consist of a series of subtasks that must be assigned to various staff and departments. Subtasks should be detailed and specific and organized chronologically into areas of related activities.

Set deadline dates -- The election administrator must establish deadlines for completing each task and subtask. Extra time should be factored in to cover the delays and problems that inevitably arise. It is useful to establish periodic milestone dates to evaluate progress, address problems and modify the work plan if necessary. Setting deadlines and enforcing them is vital to election calendar scheduling.

Monitor the progress -- Develop assignment sheet listing each task and, in order of progression, subtask, with the names of assigned staff members, plus dates for progress reviews and completion. Sheets should be regularly updated to keep track of all subtasks.

Management of the public process

Both Mr. Bayer and Mr. Baxter emphasized that being a successful election administrator also requires having a strategy for managing public relations and the press, political party relations, and relationships with NGOs in order to build and sustain public trust and confidence. A proactive public information campaign which allows public interest groups to know how the electoral process is going can serve to increase confidence in the elections process. It can be the equivalent of a de facto monitoring or oversight network.

Candidates, political parties, civic organizations, and other independent groups should have access to the same information that is available to election administrators. The more people that understand the electoral process and the work of the election authority and/or commission, the more likely an election system will be effective. Moreover, every election office has a mission and a message that must be relayed to the people. However, the press has an agenda of its own that is not necessarily compatible with that of the election commission. Therefore, developing a public relations strategy that puts the election commission in a position of control is essential.

Questions and discussion

While there is no one perfect election management system designed for all circumstances, experience has shown that applying an organized systematic approach to each phase of the process is the most effective way of ensuring successful election administration. Challenged as to what two pieces of advice they would give their colleagues about running elections, the participants embarked on a wide-ranging discussion, a recurring note of which was the need to be realistic and not get over-extended whether in terms of scheduling or budget.

Issues which came up repeatedly included the importance of planning and logistics -- of allowing sufficient time to plan and conduct the election properly; transparency and the need for public accountability; the role of voter and civic education; establishing and updating the voter's register; maintaining a realistic electoral calendar; preparing budgets consistent with expectations and available resources, and, as necessary, identifying low-cost ways of achieving objectives.

Other aspects which were touched upon included knowing the perimeters of the electoral authority's powers and ensuring it had a balanced and representative make up; liaising closely with all donors throughout the process; resolving major problems that arise at the grassroots level directly by going to the region; establishing contact with all constituencies, keeping the public informed; and, setting up a complaint resolution process.

There was general recognition that the independence of the electoral authority was closely linked to the integrity of the election administrators themselves. Said one participant, "our job is to protect the democratic process." Therefore, the Commission's independence has to be clearly spelled out in law.

Others said it was important to establish the civil society as a full partner in the electoral process. Representatives of NGOs and the private sector are often able to provide essential resources such as personnel, expertise, and training. In addition, the involvement of civil society lends greater credibility and legitimacy to the electoral process.

COMPUTERIZING ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

In his plenary presentation, Harry Neufeld, a management consultant specializing in the application of information technology to electoral administration, and formerly Director of Information Technology at Elections Canada, discussed the benefits and risks of computerizing elements of electoral administration.

Applying information technology to more efficiently and more cost-effectively manage information has become a management challenge for many electoral administrators. It will continue to be a challenge as computer technology becomes more affordable.

Senior election administrators who have managed the transition generally concur that benefits center around four major areas: the re-use of information from previous electoral events; streamlined research and planning methods; enhanced reporting ability; and cost avoidances. Most also admit that introducing technology costs more money and takes more time than anticipated.

In a world where ten years from now computers will be 60 times faster and cost only 15% of what they do today, the risk of technical obsolescence is a very real consideration for election administrators who might have to plan for only two elections in the same time span.

Clearly the fusion of computer and communication technologies is going to change how election administration operates all around the globe. Systems designed to support electoral administration should be fast, simple, robust and "user-friendly" to allow for the untrained or undertrained people who most likely will be using them. They should also be reliable and accessible since, at the height of the election period, some systems must run 20 hours a day, seven days a week.

All election administrators need to be good contingency planners, especially in parliamentary democracies where there is no fixed schedule for elections. The most

elaborate information technology computer system contingency plans generally involve a special site where data back-ups can be loaded and processing fully resumed in the event of a system failure. The simplest level of contingency planning is to have an ample supply of spare parts.

Special security procedures to protect confidentiality are an essential feature of computer systems used in elections but they have to be transparent if citizens are to have confidence that voter list information and election results will be tamper-proof.

Election administrators generally give priority to office automation needs such as word-processing, spreadsheet, electronic mail, when they first introduce information technology. Next comes voter lists or the register of voters.

Other computer technology applications cover logistical planning, supply management, election financing, PR system seat allocation programs, digitalized cartography, political party registration, election official profiles, systems to monitor adjudication and legal challenges, and programs to track training, and asset and site management processes.

The fundamental objective in constructing electoral information systems should be to manage the organizational information so that those who have access to it can easily find it. This assumes an organization is willing to treat information as an asset that needs to be managed at least as rigorously as it manages its fixed assets and finances. In this regard, given the cyclical nature of electoral administration information needs, electoral agencies should explore possible partnerships with other government or private sector organizations facing similar challenges in applying computer technology.

Electoral administrators can best manage expectations, timing and the costs associated with automating their information management by setting out their priorities in a succinct strategic plan. Good information technology systems require time: time for planning, for designing, for building, for testing, for training, for implementing, for supporting.

The costs associated with introducing information technology can be tremendous. The costs of taking risks with applying the technology can be even greater. Avoiding the information revolution altogether could prove to be the costliest option of all.

VOTER REGISTRATION AND COMPUTERIZATION

Harry Neufeld's presentation focused on voter registration issues and the use of computers to facilitate the production and updating of voter registers. It allowed participants to further explore the implications of applying information technology raised during Neufeld's plenary address.

Mr. Neufeld posed eight questions to three workshop groups, a format variation which elicited less direct dialogue but ensured full participation. Summaries of the groups' responses to each of these questions follow.

1. Why register voters?

An initial response was couched as a rhetorical question -- if an election is planned, how could the electoral administration not register voters? Other answers covered a wide range of applications and reasons. Foremost was the need to separate the eligible voting population from non-eligible persons.

Organizationally, it made sense for an election commission to register voters as an

initial logistics planning step. Principally, because organizing a registration drive is a good test run of existing polling sites and points out where others may need to be situated come the time of the election. Also, it helps ascertain and quantify equipment and supply needs which will have to be met in time for the election.

Politically, voter registration is a tangible sign of the government's intent to conduct a transparent election. A register helps political parties determine how to allocate their resources in the most populated areas. It can also be used as a gauge of voter interest in the election.

2. Why computerize the register?

Most respondents felt that computerizing the register would increase efficiency by reducing overall time spent on registration. The system would eliminate duplicate registrations, promote uniformity in voter lists, facilitate easier updating and preparation of different types of statistical information, while allowing for more compact storage and security safeguards.

3. Why a permanent register?

Because it saves the electoral commission a great deal of work in countries where special elections are common or may be called within 30 days of the dissolution of a government. Organizing a new registration drive for every election is costly and impractical for countries which cannot afford a permanent registration staff. A permanent register provides a basis for a uniform, efficiently ordered system which can be especially useful to the political parties in terms of tracking demographic trends among voters and monitoring issues like redistricting.

4. What are the essential elements?

Participants' answers varied, possibly reflecting differing interpretations of the terms. One group opted for listing basic data covering name, age, gender, citizenship status, residence, voting location etc. Another group posited that to have a register, a commission had to have sufficient staff, archive and office space, clear registration regulations, and equipment. The third group suggested that a political consensus about the register, its design and regulations was a prerequisite for determining any of the elements.

5. How is the register maintained?

Suggestions and methods examined included updating through the regional/district registration offices and, where registration and voting systems are voluntary, the use of voter education to encourage voters to report any changes in their registration status.

Examples of other systems cited were the United States, where new registers are based on the existing register and the number who voted in the previous election (less those voters whose names are automatically deleted from the register for failing to cast a ballot in a minimum number of elections); and Canada, where, until recently, registrars conducted a house-to-house enumeration prior to each election. Yet another is automatic updating by directly linking into the civil registry process.

6. How to apply computerization to the process?

The groups suggested that computers be used to integrate information from the civil and voter registries as well as other relevant sources. Computer use should decentralize data-gathering to the lowest possible level, linking field and main office computers via local and wide area networks (LANs/WANs). An alternative would be to send all field office data on diskettes to head office. The level and security of computer storage, maintenance and data gathering must prove acceptable to all the political parties.

7. How to keep the register up to date?

Mr. Neufeld suggested three yardsticks for measuring voter registry efficiency: coverage -- how many of the eligible voters are registered?; currency -- how many of the eligible voters are at their current address etc.?; accuracy -- does data listed differ from what was taken down during registration period? Systems should be designed to enable election administrators to answer these questions at every stage in the registration/voting processes.

8. How to make a voter register cost-effective?

Voter registers automatically linked to a civil registry as in Sweden are highly cost effective. However, Mr. Neufeld pointed out that in the United States and Canada there is public aversion to having so much personal data available in one location accessible to all levels of civil servants. Some make the case that a government that wishes to control the actions of citizens could isolate them much more quickly and efficiently aided by a central storage facility like an integrated register. Others argue that few countries can afford to maintain separate registers and personnel for each individual government activity.

The question facing most taxpaying citizens whose governments are constantly in the process of streamlining their data storage and gathering processes is, "should we sacrifice privacy for efficiency?" Put to the workshop participants, the answer was yes for two of the three groups with the remaining group unable to say yes or no.

VOTER AND CIVIC EDUCATION

Carl Larkin, Program Officer, NDI, South Africa, and Rev. Fr. John Maviiri, Joint Christian Council of Uganda, facilitated discussions of various aspects of civic and voter education, including message development, use of the media, training methodologies, voter education in the context of democracy education, resource utilization, and government role vs. NGO role.

Fr. Maviiri defined civic education as a carefully designed program to raise awareness about national events and to educate citizens about their own country, their rights and obligations, and their role as active participants in the democratic process. Civic education should be an ongoing, broad-based exercise made easier for all the actors involved by having a common goal and syllabus.

In his presentation on voter education, Mr. Larkin highlighted the significant relationship between government institutions and civic groups and the role both play in disseminating information to voters. Most participants acknowledged that the task of civic education is too large for any one agency to handle. It requires a coordinated effort by citizens, parties, election administrators, NGOs and the international community. Often these roles are defined in the electoral law.

There was general agreement that NGOs and political parties should play a role in civic education. However, while it is important for NGOs to be supported by the international community and to work in cooperation with the government, they should maintain their independence and neutrality. Some participants thought the political parties should refrain from civic education precisely because of their political status. Others suggested that election administrators serve as coordinators of civic education programs and, in this capacity, help ensure their impartiality.

Civic education programs should be on-going and not just confined to election periods. They should be well-planned, well-coordinated and seen as long-term processes. Many suggested incorporating civic education into school curriculums. On the issue of financial support for long-term programs, participants favored greater reliance on local resources rather than continued dependence on the international

community.

Radio, print media, music, dance and theater should all be drawn upon to disseminate voter education messages. Participants spoke about the importance of NGOs setting up civic activist networks involving trade unions, women's groups and religious assemblies, to make voter education information and material available at the local community level.

How to evaluate civic education programs sparked a lively debate. Participants cited voter turnout, the numbers of spoiled ballots and the ability of the electorate to explain the electoral process as common measures by which to ascertain the impact of civic education.

Several important themes ran through the workshop. The first was recognition that civic education is too big an undertaking to be handled by an individual group. It must be coordinated and shared among election administrators, NGOs, political parties and the international community.

There was unanimity too that civic education must be conducted in an impartial manner. Also, local resources, human, financial or material, must be sought after vigorously when designing and implementing civic education programs.

TRAINING OF ELECTORAL OFFICERS

This workshop examined several aspects of putting together training programs for electoral officers -- from training of trainers to selection of trainees. The presenters were Amare Tekle, former Commissioner, Eritrea Referendum Commission, and Stephen Akabway, Commissioner, Constituent Assembly Commission, Uganda.

Experience acquired while serving as electoral commissioners in their respective countries had made it clear to both presenters just how important a role logistics and planning play in any electoral process. The needs of each African country vary significantly, which is why careful planning and assessment is required before training programs are drawn up.

Eritrea had not held an election in 40 years and South Africa had never had a full participatory election at all. Yet their situations differed. Although both countries dealt with a majority of voters who had never voted, the South African history of participation in organized anti-apartheid protest meant that its electorate had a different level of need than that of Eritrea.

Knowing at the outset the number and level of personnel required for electoral training is of vital importance. In Africa where many different languages can be spoken in a country, language proficiency becomes an important determinant in recruiting and selecting candidates for training.

Having determined the type of training required, the first round of the training process is the training of trainers. Once trained, this core group of trainers will be deployed to outlying districts to teach polling station officials. Candidates should be experienced, mature individuals of good character and integrity. In Eritrea, retired professionals such as teachers, magistrates, and bureaucrats became election trainers. The numbers needed vary depending on the country and the number of polling stations.

Once the trainers are in place, the next phase is to recruit the polling station staff for training, drawing on college and high school students and members of youth organizations. It may be necessary to look to the open market for more experienced candidates to fill the posts of registration and presiding officers. This is an area where

the expert advice of experienced organizations such as IFES, NDI, AAI, and IRI can be helpful.

Determining what is to be taught and the level of training needed for each electoral officer is another key element in electoral preparations. It is not necessary to teach everything to everyone. For example, only senior officials such as provincial, regional and district representatives need to be totally versed in the electoral law and the entire electoral process. They are the ones who will have to deal with complaints and determine whether they should be referred to the national electoral authority. Presiding officials need to guide and supervise polling activities and to address minor complaints from party agents and voters. Polling station staff should be able to ensure the efficient functioning of the voting process on election day.

An important aspect of training involves instilling staff at all levels with confidence and a sense of independence and impartiality. Equally important is to advise electoral staff to guard against overzealousness or officiousness.

As the democratic process gains hold and more elections are held, future training needs will be less demanding and the training periods will become shorter. Eventually, there will be a pool of trained election officials available who will only need a few days' updating on changes in electoral law before each election.

Discussion

A concern shared by several participants in the discussion period was the difficulty of selecting dependable candidates to train as electoral officials. One participant noted a propensity among would-be trainees to seek payment advances and then fail to appear for the training sessions.

The need to carefully monitor all phases of the training process was also stressed. Participants pointed out that the content of training programs can get distorted or diluted as it is passed down. Hence the importance of having properly trained instructors as well as ensuring that training manuals are written in accessible language.

One participant said his organization, which favors a top-down approach, also offers training to senior political party officials to enhance their awareness of their role and responsibilities during elections. Another said his country trained magistrates and polling officials, as well as political party members. By empowering the magistrates to make on-site spot-checks at the polling stations on election day, any irregularities are brought immediately to the attention of the different parties and officials for action. Others conceded that polling staff tended to be more alert and conscientious if they are aware of the possibility that a senior official may show up at any time.

LOGISTICS OF ELECTION DAY - PART ONE

The facilitators set out to establish a working definition of election day logistics and to concentrate on the planning and preparation that takes place in the period between elections. They then turned to the need for flexibility in planning and action. The initial presentation was made by Tom Bayer, Senior Program Officer, Africa and the Near East, IFES, and Bruno Scares, Chief Technical Advisor, United Nations Electoral Assistance Project in Mozambique.

Even the most elaborate logistics plan is subject to the reality of the country in which the election is to take place. Better, therefore, to have a simple plan which can be adjusted according to the circumstances, with as many supporting contingency plans as deemed necessary by the electoral administrator. It had been stated in plenary that an administrator should look at pre-election, election and postelection phases. Of equal concern to good administration, said Mr. Bayer, is the pre-pre-election phase.

Mr. Soares differentiated between the terms "electoral system," a set of functions geared to one end, the election, and "electoral process," the physical preparation for and realization of an election. Logistics planning, he said, begins at the point of "process."

Mr. Bayer illustrated the symbiosis between electoral system elements and parallel logistics planning. A country's cultural, social and political climate, its human and financial resources, the legal elections, campaign, voting and counting procedures, and existing government structure inform the logistics preparations developed to carry out the law.

Conversely, logistical issues such as terrain, transport and communications infrastructure, climate, all effect the design of the ballot, voting and counting procedures, and campaign activities. Existing political/conflict situations can predicate the way an election will be conducted.

The primary task of the election logistics planner is that of reconciling the exigencies of the electoral law/constitution/peace accord with the current circumstances to produce an organized election process. The election administrator may draw on the commission's experience and expertise to recommend adjustments to the elections procedure that may eventually result in a change in the electoral law.

This requires the understanding that elections are a national effort and that all administrators and their fellow citizens are ultimately responsible for the success of their own election processes. Also, that adequate managerial and fiscal decision-making autonomy will be delegated to the commission, ministries, or departments responsible for the organization and implementation of all aspects of election logistics.

To point up the value of advanced planning and contingency back-up, Mr. Soares cited the experiences in Angola and Mozambique. Noteworthy for the amount of international technical and financial assistance they received, both countries had still been in a state of war when initial plans were laid for their respective elections. Thus, their electoral systems had little if anything to do with the reality faced by those who eventually administered those elections.

Discussion

The discussion revolved around election day planning, time allocation and whether it was possible to run future elections using national resources solely. One participant noted that the absence of a registration process in South Africa had complicated the entire logistics plan for the supply and distribution of ballots. He hoped planning would begin on the next elections while the lessons of the previous election were still fresh.

Uganda's experience of election funding, said one participant, was that there were many things the international community would not pay for. Countries should at least try for matching funds, he advised, since "democracy is by no means cheap."

While there had been financing for the Eritrean referendum, resourcing problems are anticipated in organizing the next elections, a participant said. On the other hand, electoral officials had learned about flexibility when they had to rebuild polling station huts blown down two days before the vote.

In Ghana, with 20,000 polling stations, a proper logistics plan was key to determining stocks and supplies and the other resources necessary. Even so, when the election got underway, it was with one rather than the three helicopters called for in the logistics plan. In Botswana, computer technicians failed to deliver on their promise to have voting and counting systems in place on time. The electoral commission's good standing with all the political parties enabled the process to go forward.

Finally, a participant argued that election planning in Africa is futile because

elections are political rather than technical exercises. This point of view was rejected by one of the facilitators who said that lack of adequate communications or planning between ministries, between ministries and election commission, or between political parties and government, stem from failures in the electoral process, not futility in planning.

LOGISTICS OF ELECTION DAY - PART TWO

Presenters IFES Chief of Staff, Jeff Fischer, and Joe Baxter, Chief Technical Advisor, Ghana, used the session to arrive at a working definition of election logistics, develop a logistics plan, and discuss the role of donor support in election logistics.

Mr. Baxter led off by identifying three key aspects of logistics planning: (a) proper coverage of the pre- and post-election phases in addition to the election day events; (b) contingency planning; and, (c) good communications.

Participants agreed that the term logistics served as an umbrella for a number of common characteristics or requirements including timetable, budget, staffing, transport, communications, contingency planning capacity, resources and supplies, even access to precise meteorological data.

Mr. Fischer pointed out that the budgetary process is also a starting point for the logistics exercise. The budget plan has to take into account materials and supplies, including communications and transport needs, the lead time for punctual delivery and the storage/warehousing security needs.

Mr. Baxter noted that presentation of a precise budget and logistics plan can increase the electoral commission's credibility with government. This can prove invaluable in transitional elections where ministries that were previously responsible for electoral matters are sometimes ill disposed towards the independent commissions.

There was general agreement that logistical problems can be tremendous in many African countries and that election day logistics really bring the election authority's capacity and competence into sharp public focus. Problems common to many participants included rough terrain, bad road conditions, inadequate and/or insufficient vehicles, poor communications and unreliable fragile distribution systems. Combined with unrealistic scheduling, these factors often make the logistical exercise unduly reliant on military transport for the timely distribution of sensitive polling supplies including ballots. The issue of credibility can also arise in circumstances where the military is closely identified in the public eye with the incumbent government.

A last-minute problem encountered in Senegal was the inability to count ballots at night where polling stations had no electric power. Paraffin lamps had to be rushed to the sites in question, mostly rural and difficult to reach.

Inadequate road infrastructure and poor communications in Angola greatly increased the cost of election administration. Helicopters had to be used extensively and these proved very expensive to operate, it was stated.

Poor election administration generally stemmed from poor planning. Malawi, a participant stated, had benefited from an extensive pre-election critical path analysis which made it easy to know what to do when. This pre-planning also allowed for flexibility in dealing with last-minute problems. For example, when it emerged that there was a shortfall in ballot allocations, an overnight print-run was delivered by 6 a.m. on the morning of the election, all duly monitored.

Fischer noted that elections are generally set by statute and cannot be extended because of inadequate preparation. Even when the numbers of kits and other supplies

and materials have been worked out for each polling site, the delivery schedule has to take into account terrain, and the bulk and weight of the supplies, plus security considerations, before determining the method of transport.

The sources of supply for each election commodity must be determined, as well as the costs, lead time for ordering and warehousing requirements. Some election commodities must be planned, at the outset, to be handled with a greater degree of care. For example, ballots and finger stain have their own security demands entailing the use of control numbers and transport logs from the time of initial preparation to the final delivery at each polling station.

Turning to the future of elections in Africa, Baxter suggested that governments would have to operate and fund their elections without donor assistance. How would they go about doing it?

One participant said that countries would simply need to learn to do "elections on the cheap." Others said they would place greater emphasis on training, recycling equipment, and planning. However, it was conceded that some assistance will be required for the next ten years at least.

According to a participating United Nations official, experiences in Mozambique had indicated that it was important for a country to "own" its electoral process and not to expect that all funding and management be provided by the donor community. It was suggested that donor interest is likely to remain substantial in high-profile, transitional elections. Others agreed that donor involvement can artificially inflate the overall costs of an election. There was also general consensus that some sort of continuing electoral administration is necessary to successfully stage elections in a cost-effective manner once donor involvement ends.

VOTE TABULATION AND COMPLAINT RESOLUTION

The workshop addressed issues related to the vote tabulation process, from polling place or local counting station up to the national level. Emphasis was placed on the importance of transparency at each stage of this process. Discussion included the utility of parallel vote tabulation, as well as the resolution of complaints prior to the official proclamation of results. Facilitators were Michael Carroll, Program Officer, AAI, Adrian Muunga, Foundation for Democratic Processes, Zambia, and, from NDI, Patrick Merloe, Senior Associate for Election Processes, and Ned McMahon, Senior Program Officer.

What happens from the time the polling station closes until the final results are announced was the major theme of this session devoted to the counting process. The goal was to identify the type of planning needed to make that process smooth including measures to reduce administrative error and increase confidence. Presentations and discussion included analysis of the types of challenge procedures that are in place.

The stage at which the votes are counted and the final vote tabulation is released is the critical point in the overall electoral process where winners and losers of the election are determined. Public confidence is often skeptical and suspicions of this phase because of past experiences where vote counts have been stopped in the middle, where there has been a lack of transparency in moving ballot boxes from polling station to counting center, or where there has been a prevailing mistrust of the counting officials.

The public must perceive that there are adequate procedures in place to resolve disputes about voting and counting prior to the announcement of the final results.

Thus transparency in the vote count and public confidence in the accuracy of the final vote tabulation are important for public confidence in the overall election. The high potential for trouble means that planning for the vote count is essential in gaining trust from the general public in the whole electoral process.

To control administrative errors during the vote count, it is necessary to put in place as efficient and transparent a process as possible. This requires advance planning. It is necessary to break down the process and talk about each step and to discuss ways to reduce the risk of error during each part of the vote counting process.

When asked if participants would like to see ballot boxes moved from the polling station to another point for counting, the overwhelming response was negative. When counting is done at the local level, results can be announced sooner which helps enhance public confidence. Counting at the local level also provides a system of checks and balances through pollwatchers who represent the different political contestants, domestic and international monitors and election administrators.

A further argument in favor of vote counting at the local level is that it promotes participation of the electorate by bringing the electoral process "closer to home," making the process tangible to voters. Additionally, participants believed that ballots were more secure if counted at the local level because it decreases the likelihood of fraud in transporting the ballot boxes. Lastly, participants cited numerous logistical constraints to transporting ballot boxes, including the need for reliable vehicles, transporting boxes in the dark and the lack of safety.

This led to a discussion of the rationale behind the laws requiring boxes to be moved in the first place. Reasons cited ranged from the availability of better lighting in non-rural areas to the possibility of integrating the transported votes into a bigger counting pool, thereby avoiding the potential intimidation factor of the identities of those who voted for each party becoming known in the circumstances of the smaller, more localized count.

Procedures available to challenge either the voting or the initial count and how those procedures affect the plan for releasing the final results were also discussed. The in-built tension between the public's desire for a quick tabulation and the need for due process for handling election challenges was acknowledged. Certain procedures have to be followed when doing the vote count. Election officials must think of what kind of audit trail there is in case a recount is needed. One participant revealed that in his country ballot boxes are kept secure for a year after they have been counted. Most participants accepted that recourse procedures were adequate for handling challenges and recount demands and other complaints.

Mike Carroll brought up the question of transportation. Whether it is decided to mix and move ballots or count at stations and move tally sheets, there is always a problem. As a commission, who decides how information is transported? Perceptions are important so it is important that the procedure chosen is well planned and transparent enough to allay misgivings among the skeptical.

Discussion turned to how electoral officials count ballots in different countries. The concept of a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) as another means of increasing public confidence in the vote count and the final results was also examined. Pat Merloe explained that a PVT is not an opinion poll but a tabulation of actual counting results based on a carefully drawn random statistical sample to ensure an accurate picture of the overall results. PVTs can be conducted by non-partisan NGO monitors or others. It was generally agreed that a PVT is acceptable if it broadly represents the electorate. However, the professionalism of administering the count is essential to both its credibility and its accuracy. In this regard, training for PVT administrators should be given priority.

THE ROLE OF ELECTION OBSERVATION

The role of election observation in building voter confidence in the fairness and efficacy of the electoral process was assessed from the international perspective by Horacio Boneo, Director of the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division. Then, Professor Tessy Bakary of Laval University, Quebec, Canada, and Grace Githu, Executive Director, the Institute for Education and Democracy, Kenya, reviewed strategies for strengthening domestic electoral monitoring capacities. Finally, Taofiki Aminou, GERDDES-Afrique, outlined his NGO's experience of election monitoring by Africans collaborating within an inter- regional NGO framework.

International Observation of Elections

The ultimate aim of international election observation is to enhance the internal and international credibility of the electoral process by issuing impartial and informed opinions about its freedom and fairness, assuming there is consistent positive evidence to support such conclusions. If all goes well, little difficulty is presented in pronouncing an election free and fair. If there are major problems in several dimensions, the contrary can be argued just as easily. The difficulty arises when there is evidence of some degree of manipulation in several dimensions of the process.

What would be the qualification of an electoral process where constituencies are found to be a very different size, with a clear trend to have smaller constituencies in areas favorable to the incumbent; where there are more resources devoted to registration in some areas than in others; when alliances are prohibited or hindered; where there is significant bias in the use of public resources, including public media; or when the electoral campaign is kept too short for the opposition to organize effectively?

Guidelines and criteria for monitoring and observing elections include what and how to observe as well as the use of relevant evaluative comparisons. A good observation methodology requires adequate functional, chronological and geographical coverage. Observation should ensure adequate coverage of the electoral process in all its key dimensions and not just the events of election day proper. Also, coverage should be geographically diverse since alleged irregularities or acts of intimidation at regional or local level can be distorted when viewed only from the perspective of the capital.

Relevant criteria are essential for evaluation. Comparing electoral processes in roughly similar countries can be helpful provided the information on the country used for comparison is adequate. In other instances, relevant standards may have been developed from prior observation or from other existent criteria. However, the most relevant comparison is invariably with past experience, where available.

Different approaches, different trends

United Nations full-coverage missions for large-scale operations such as Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Angola, South Africa and Mozambique deploy significant numbers of long-term observers to vantage points throughout the country from early on in the electoral process. These observers are charged with monitoring the registration and campaign phases in addition to the actual elections. Their numbers are significantly increased during the intense few weeks surrounding the actual polling dates to ensure adequate coverage. Despite the more significant role played by the initial group, mission "size" tends to be defined by the larger number deployed in this last stage.

A permanent presence is useful, but not essential for adequate chronological coverage. Many international organizations opt instead to send teams periodically for short visits to review development of the electoral process. A concomitant risk with this approach is that the information retrieved can be subject to urban bias, and thin on rural coverage. An advantage of the long-term presence characteristic of large-scale

UN observation, is that it facilitates the establishment of links with local organizations and individuals.

A disturbing trend and a questionable use of resources involves the practice known as "electoral tourism." This applies to those observer delegations which arrive a few days before the election date, attend the final political campaign rallies, conduct a few select interviews, and, then depart the country before the vote counting has even been completed. Given their inevitable dependence on second or third hand sources of information, the factual basis for such statements as these delegations might issue tends to be very weak.

Also distressing is the pressure exerted on the United Nations and other international organizations to send in large numbers of observers on election day. The rationale appears to be that the larger the number the better the observation and the greater the legitimacy. In South Africa and Mozambique, observer numbers peaked at 1,800 and 2,400 respectively.

Such numbers impose a huge strain on mission resources. The logistical strain of dealing with such a large influx in the immediate weeks before elections can be at the expense of time and energies better devoted to the needs of other more pressing and relevant aspects of the electoral observation process.

Two basic approaches have been used in determining international observation of election day events. One is the Namibian approach, where one observer or more was assigned to each polling site. This was possible in Namibia, given the available resources and the small number of polling sites (365). In the majority of cases, the number of polling sites is much higher -- 2,500 in Mozambique, over 90,000 in Mexico -- precluding a Namibian-style coverage. Instead, the norm is to deploy mobile teams that visit an average of 15 polling stations, and derive much of their electoral information from thorough questioning of the polling staff, the party agents or national observers present at each polling site.

As a result, the presence of incumbent and opposition party agents plus impartial national observers at each polling station has become an essential element to be factored into assessing the effectiveness of international observation. A limited amount of international support can help local NGOs to sustain such a presence. In Mozambique, where the cost of each international observer was close to $6,000, an innovative program intended to support local observers was able to field 32,000 observers at a total cost of about $1,500,000.

The importance of observation is the contribution it makes to the credibility and, therefore, the legitimacy of an electoral process. This is internally important because legitimacy in a democracy is directly related to the credibility of the elections. Also, it is externally important because in the post-Cold War world, donor disbursements are increasingly predicated on human rights criteria and the role of competitive elections as an essential step in the construction of pluralistic and open societies.

Domestic Monitoring and the Transition to Democracy

More than ever, post-authoritarian elections in Africa require the presence of international observers. Yet, building the capacity of African societies to monitor their own elections is essential to the process of consolidating democracy on the continent. A comparison of recent elections in which the international community was very involved (Malawi, Burundi), somewhat involved (Niger, Mali) or involved on a limited basis (Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon) shows that although international assistance played a decisive role, none of the countries concerned seemed ready as yet to organize elections without outside help.

Local Civic Organizations (LCOs)

A survey of various local civic organizations (LCOs) suggests that their level of development and exposure to transitional elections has been limited. Yet the growth of LCOs in Zambia, Kenya, Togo, Ghana or Benin clearly indicates the potential is there.

LCOs serve to bring together a large number of citizens representing a diverse cross-section of their respective societies. They are not dependent on an ethnic or regional base. They encourage popular participation among the masses. They are an effective means of re-socializing, re-politicizing, and reconciling individuals, social groups, and associations with politics and democracy. They also serve to inculcate democratic values and practices in local cultures.

While LCOs should be encouraged and strengthened, a number of problems have to be overcome, the chief of which is the ideological/cultural issue. Establishing a nonpartisan LCO can be difficult, given the extreme personalization and polarization of the political arena in Africa. In addition, there is the legacy of authoritarian governments which enacted laws limiting or forbidding associations from engaging in political activity. Despite the official restoration of political and civic liberties, it is still difficult, even illegal, for LCOs to engage in the political process.

The ultimate objective of programs that support democracy through electoral assistance should be the creation of African equivalents of the organizations responsible for the colloquium (i.e. AAI, IFES, NDI). This requires increasing both the resources and the capacity of selected LCOs so that they can broaden the support base for democratic elections and undertake all-phase electoral monitoring. Organizations with proven track records include Nigeria's Campaign for Democracy, GERDDES-Afrique in Western and Central Africa, Burundi's ITEKA, PAC/PACGEM in Malawi and NEMU in Kenya.

A Case Study for Kenya

The quest of the early 1990s for a return to democracy in African countries was characterized by peoples' demands for respect for the rule of law, observance of human rights, and calls for national conferences and general elections. In Kenya the main call was for the repeal of an amendment to the country's constitution which outlawed all political parties except the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). At the forefront of this struggle for change were legal and human rights organizations, church groups, and a number of other professionals. Having decided to monitor the 1992 multi-party general elections, the groups joined together under the name National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU). NEMU's main goals were to:

- monitor elections, ensure they were free to all, note all electoral malpractices;
- educate the electorate on their rights and the implication of their votes in a multi-party political system;
- build up expertise in the monitoring of elections;
- play a mediating role during the handing over of power;
- liaise with the Electoral Commission.

To ensure credibility, NEMU officials maintained a policy of strict neutrality with respect to the politics of the day. When it came to issuing its final pronouncement on the elections, it did so through a Council of Elders it had appointed for the purpose.

Despite its efforts to establish regular contact with the Electoral Commission, it took many months before NEMU received official accreditation, something international observers generally acquired without delay or problem. The presence of international observers did give domestic monitors some needed political space, infusing the electorate with greater confidence that electoral malpractices, intimidation and vio-

lence would be minimal. NEMU also relied on the international community's support to help fund its election monitoring project.

Afterwards, NEMU concluded that multi-party elections did not translate into democracy and that opposition MPs were not much different from ruling party MPs. In preparing for the next election, NEMU is already at work on a plan of action to further the democratization process, including civic education, a more efficient monitoring system and better training methodologies, programs for strengthening civic institutions, and networking at national, regional and continental levels.

Inter-Regional Monitoring

In 1991, GERDDES formed an inter-regional organization enabling Africans themselves to become directly involved in monitoring elections. The first electoral monitoring mission comprised representatives from several African countries who observed the legislative elections in Benin in February 1991. Next, GERDDES was responsible for logistical aspects of an electoral observation mission covering elections in the Central African Republic. GERDDES has since covered several more elections.

In GERDDES' experience, African election monitors face resource constraints and often encounter difficulties when trying to gain access to particular countries or in acquiring observer accreditation.

The growth of international observation efforts by Africans should be encouraged because it serves to increase awareness and knowledge of electoral matters among Africans themselves while involving them directly in the process of democratization. Over the years, GERDDES has benefited a great deal from its collaborations with international organizations involved in electoral observation and acknowledges their support.

ELECTION OBSERVATION SCENARIO

Participants divided into three working groups to role-play a hypothetical election day situation. As leaders of the non-partisan "Kayemba League for Democracy" monitoring group, each group had to prepare and issue a statement on the legitimacy of the national presidential elections. With 20% of the vote counted two days after the polls closed, the incumbent President leads with 51% of the vote, according to the Ministry of the Interior which administered the elections. Two main opposition candidates trail with 35% and 10% of the vote respectively. Votes from the major opposition candidate's home province have yet to be counted. There are problems with voter lists. If no candidate receives over 50%, a run-off will be required.

Spokespersons for two of the groups said that with only 20% of the vote counted, it is too early to make a formal statement. According to one group, the votes counted so far do not include the rural vote which forms the majority of the electorate. The other group, while refraining from issuing a formal announcement, urged the political parties to remain calm and await the final results.

Irregularities have occurred, the third group acknowledged, but it is too early in the count to presume bias in favor of any one of the parties. There should be dialogue between the parties and the electoral authorities. There should also be an independent election commission and an all-inclusive registry for future elections.

Asked whether the reported irregularities would have any effect on the 20% of the votes already counted, the group spokespersons replied that they did want to pre-judge the process. With 51% of the counted vote already going to the incumbent, one group said it felt that not to issue a statement might trigger "other consequences."

As to the effect of irregularities on the legitimacy of the process, all the groups said they stood by the process. At this early stage, it was more important to be supportive, to foster a spirit of cooperation and dialogue. One spokesperson characterized his group as having adopted a "developmental approach" in offering recommendations for improved election regulating mechanisms.

The spokespersons' responses stimulated a lively debate about the connotations of "free and fair" elections including the importance of separating fact from allegation. Some participants pointed out that while irregularities exist, the situation may not warrant criticism. One participant argued that the perception that a situation is not free and fair is as important as the facts and figures of a situation.

The overall exercise served to underline the importance of trying to develop and ensure a balanced statement before going public, said one participant. However, some argued that more could have been accomplished by dividing the working groups into distinct groups of election administrators, NGOs and political party representatives. This would have created a whole new dynamic.

Strengthening Electoral Institutions and Defining a Post-Election Role and Structure for Electoral Commissions and Authorities

NDI's Ned McMahon and Patrick Merloe addressed issues and raised questions while leading a discussion about the role of election administration in the post-election period.

There was general agreement that a permanent election commission is important and necessary given the tremendous responsibilities that are part of the electoral process. Permanence is also necessary because elections are ongoing, with by elections, municipal and local elections occurring in the periods between national elections. A permanent commission can be cost-effective too because it helps save money and time needed to create a new commission and new programs. In this regard, civic education programs should be long term.

Most participants also concurred that the election commission should be independent. However, there was much debate over the extent of its powers. Issues raised included whether a commission should have executive or supervisory power and what this power means in terms of legislative functions and interpretations of the law.

Another much discussed aspect concerned the chronology of national elections. Preparedness of the electoral law, party codes of conduct, the constitution, are all important factors to take into consideration when deciding the order of elections.

Participants identified tasks that an election commission should undertake between elections. These included updating voter registry, conducting civic and voter education, addressing legal and other electoral reforms, training staff members, and improving and maintaining equipment and centralizing an information book. Everyone agreed that the commission must address lessons learned and institute appropriate changes within the process of election administration.

CREATION OF AN ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS

In proposing the establishment of an association, Dr. Amare Tekle, former Commissioner of the Eritrean Referendum Commission, noted that when he was appointed to head his country's electoral commission he had no prior experience of electoral systems or processes. Looking around for advice, he could not find any relevant African organization that could help him. Other colloquium participants exposed to the recent winds of democratic change had shared this frustration.

Elections are an essential component of Africa's new revolution of democratization. Creation of an African Association of Election Administrators is timely, especially given the external assistance picture and the growing need for self-reliance. While the association's nature, status, and membership can be determined through further consultations, the need for credibility demands that it be completely independent from the outset.

Such an organization can:

- promote the independence and impartiality of electoral commissions;
- act as a purchasing consortium;
- facilitate sharing experiences, information technologies, and, hopefully, resources;
- be a documentation center for relevant literature, governmental and academic;
- facilitate the preparation of manuals, training kits and voter education material;
- help in the organization of observers;
- promote research to improve and simplify election laws and processes.

Jeff Fischer, Chief of Staff of IFES, said the Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO) could serve as a useful model for a potential African association because of the linguistic and cultural diversity of its membership.

Established in Budapest in 1991, ACEEEO comprises a network of institutions, NGOs and academia, committed to promote the professionalism of election administration in their respective countries. While funding has been a problem, a semi-permanent secretariat operates in Budapest. ACEEEO has had the benefit of some seed money from USAID, the Hungarian Government and the Mott Foundation. Its next meeting, to be held in Kiev, will be the largest to date, with several of the former Soviet republics having expressed interest.

Working Group Mandated

The plenary adopted the proposal to appoint Dr. Tekle to head a small committee and authorized him to select three or four members from among the participants -- making sure they were regionally as well as gender representative.

This working group is to prepare a study, to be completed within six months, and report back by mail. Comparative data based on associations in Latin America and Eastern Europe, and the association of English administrators, is to be included. The completed study is expected to help determine the direction to take and whether another meeting should be held to actually create an association of African electoral administrators.

FINAL DISCUSSIONS AND CLOSURE OF COLLOQUIUM

Participants reviewed the colloquium, offering comments and insights on the workshop and plenary sessions, and made some suggestions for consideration at a future meeting.

The colloquium achieved most of the goals its organizers had hoped for, bringing together the people who make elections happen so that they could share professional and personal experiences and lay the basis for an informal network, Steve McDonald, Executive Vice President, AAI, told participants.

The decision to create a working group to look into the feasibility of forming an association of election administrators was a major initiative. The organizers would now seek a small operational grant to assist the group's chairman accomplish his task.

Mr. McDonald invited the plenary to continue discussions on strengthening electoral institutions and defining post-election roles and structures for those engaged in the work of democratization. He asked participants to start from the premise of setting the agenda for a follow-up colloquium a year or so hence.

One agenda item would be the formation of an association of election administrators. Other items should be framed in the context of future needs, reflecting the immense change and growth in the understanding and application of democratic governance in Africa. How, for example, would the coming years change the continent's needs and the ways in which the international community might assist? How could dwindling resources be best leveraged and applied?

Responses and comments

Participants were unanimous in their appreciation of the learning and sharing experience afforded them by the colloquium. The workshops were described variously as "very informative," "educational," "a growing experience." Learning through sharing was particularly beneficial. Some complained of the lack of plenary time, a problem which arose because of early difficulties with the arrangements for simultaneous interpretation.

Many spoke of putting the lessons learned to practical use on their return home. Several participants expressed the hope that these lessons could be disseminated more widely. One participant wondered just how possible it would be to get the message out to electoral commissions and parties working in electoral processes and by what means. An NGO representative suggested using newsletters, press conferences and, where feasible, local workshops.

Most welcomed the proposed association of election administrators as a much needed resource and a sign of progress. One participant stressed the importance of the association being gender representative, urged that it take into account the concerns and needs of the marginalized. Another said that the association would enable Africans to share the knowledge of the resources to tap when it came to electoral administration.

A participant made the point that while general principles learned in workshops were fine, each country had its own specific needs. He had already applied the lessons learned to the upcoming elections in his own country. Inspired by the "Kayemba" scenario, he had co-opted his workshop colleagues to use their morning session to examine his country's impending electoral organization situation and needs.

Looking to an agenda for a future colloquium, a number of participants cited concerns and omissions they would like to see addressed. Said one electoral official, there is still a long way to go to convince governments and citizens about the importance of understanding democracy, creating democrats, and explaining the reasons why they should participate in elections. True, civic education can play a vital role in this area but it is often viewed in the broader context of human rights, and feared as such in some countries for its potentially "liberalizing effect."

According to one electoral commissioner, not enough had been said about the main object of free and fair elections -- "the development of democracy in our countries." He had hoped that more time would have been devoted to methods of assisting political parties and groups to observe democratic principles and their development as an element in deepening democracy.

For example, more needed to be said about the role of a free press in furthering the democratic process. Similarly, an exchange of views on the role of the military in this process, including the link between security considerations and the need for periodic elections and the trade-offs required would be useful. These were all issues worth focusing on at greater length in the future. The colloquium had broken new ground in stressing the importance of NGOs in the electoral process.

An OAU representative suggested that his organization should be more closely involved in organizing the next colloquium. He reminded participants that in 1990 and 1993 the OAU had adopted declarations endorsing the democratic transition in Africa. The OAU, he said, looks forward to continuing its positive work with the UN, AAI, NDI, and IFES. Its own experiences of electoral observation in Africa had been positive and it would continue to closely follow electoral processes throughout the region.

An electoral administrator urged the organizers to invite more parliamentary and governmental representatives to any future sessions. Most countries needed to change relevant legislation with regard to the democratic process. Since electoral administrators depend on governments for finances and for the independence of their electoral commissions, the participation of more legislators might help strengthen interaction between government, judiciary and electoral institutions.

At this point, the colloquium was declared adjourned.

Section Four

Focused Assistance to Governments and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Focused assistance to governments and NGOs, the most visible dimension of AREAF's democracy work, is the foundation for the development of societies and participatory democracies. Focused assistance relies on the capacity of government and civil society to allow for reform. AREAF partners believe in working with both governments and NGOs when there is sufficient momentum to initiate democratic reform.

AREAF projects have shown that the success of democratic reform depends on the understanding and acceptance by ruling groups that civic associations and governments are allies in the reform process. A major element in democratic reform is the accountability of governments to their citizens, through the competition for political power. Against this backdrop, working with NGOs to ensure greater citizen participation in the democratic process has increased during AREAF's existence.

AREAF partners designed and carried out projects to provide political party and parliamentarian training and capacity-building for NGOs. These programs were designed to enhance the ability of civic groups and political parties to positively influence policy debates on democracy issues, including elections administration, political and get-out-the-vote campaigns.

Over the years, AREAF partners provided focused assistance to African governments with projects from international observer delegations to commodity support to legal analysis of national electoral laws. Assistance to NGO's has also been provided in a variety of ways from internal capacity building to civic and local observer training programs to political and electoral analysis seminars.

Focused assistance to NGOs is exemplified by the AREAF cooperative agreement with the regional civic NGO Study Group for Democratic Development and Economic Social Research (GERDDES-Africa). AREAF support for GERDDES's democratization work marks the natural evolution of US-African NGO cooperation. GERDDES' cooperative agreement has provided for regional training seminars of international African election observers. It has also provided funding for African-based election observation missions throughout the region. Through AREAF technical and sub-grant assistance, GERDDES has developed an internal infrastructure and the human resource capabilities to conduct its own civic education, training and election monitoring programs.

Over AREAF's four-year history, partners have developed and maintained a strong relationship with the nationally-based NGO Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC). AREAF provided funds to the UJCC during the Constituent Assembly elections to develop civic education and local election observer training programs. Through AREAF support, the UJCC trained over 4,000 civic education trainers and 16,000 national election monitors. Two years later, during Uganda's women's and parliamentary elections, AREAF again provided support to the UJCC to retrain and deploy local observers. This assistance has developed the UJCC's internal knowledge and understanding of election observation terms of reference and administration. UJCC members are now fully capable of leading training, organizing observer deployment, coordinating debriefing sessions and writing initial press releases and final reports of electoral procedures.

Focused assistance to government has come generally at the request of national election authorities. During the 1996 Presidential elections in Benin, AREAF funded

an international observer team following a request from Benin's Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA). The delegation made a number of recommendations which were incorporated into the administration of the subsequent run-off election. In addition, AREAF funding was used to develop a national workshop, along with local NGOs, to evaluate the electoral process. Workshop participants discussed ways to improve the organization of future elections in Benin and examined the strengths and weaknesses of electoral institutions. The workshop was attended by a wide range of officials who played key roles in Benin's recent presidential elections, including members of the Beninese government, former election commission members, and representatives of the Constitutional Court. The workshop was a success in terms of promoting better cooperation and creating a dialogue between the government and citizen groups.

During Mozambique's national elections, the Mozambican National Electoral Commission (CNE) requested assistance from AREAF partners to provide technical and logistical support for the elections. AREAF funding provided daily operation support for the commission including an interpretation and translation team for the Commission's Press Office. AREAF funding also assisted members of the Commission to establish a computerized vote tabulation system.

At the request of the Malian government, AREAF partners provided a legal analysis of Mali's electoral code in preparation for the country's 1996-97 electoral cycle. Members of the Malian government and in particular, the President, Alpha Konaré, were highly receptive to the final recommendations made and supportive of the legal analysis team's work in the country. In addition, political parties engaged in substantive discourse with the legal analysis team by documenting their suggestions regarding electoral law reform.

Some of the more inspirational projects handled by AREAF partners were those involving newly democratizing nations requesting assistance for their first multiparty elections. An even more interesting project handled under AREAF involved the birth of a nation: Eritrea. At the request of the Provisional Government of Eritrea and the Eritrean Referendum Commission, AREAF partners were asked to develop an extensive electoral assistance project for the Eritrean national referendum election. Eventually, a program was developed that would have maximum impact and provide the most effective assistance for the Eritrean government. The international observer's role during the referendum was to monitor and report on the process in a constructive manner to assist the Eritrean election authorities to administrate future democratic elections. The full report of the Eritrean electoral assistance project is found within this section.

OAU STAFF TRAINING
AAI/NDI

Background

To improve OAU capabilities, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim requested that the African-American Institute (AAI) develop a training program for OAU staff. The training program would be designed to prepare the OAU to organize observer missions for elections on the African continent. AAI, in turn, solicited the assistance of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in implementing this training program.

Project Activities

AAI and NDI implemented a week long training program that assisted the OAU in responding to member state requests for observer delegations. The training program covered both the substantive aspects of organizing an observer mission and the practical issues that the OAU must consider in this endeavor. Issues that received the most attention included:

- when the OAU should accept a request for international observers,
- how to finance an observer mission,
- terms of reference for observations,
- coordination with other observer delegations,
- training trainers.

The conference included lectures, panel discussions, and role playing to facilitate discussion and debate. In the course of this program, AAI and NDI also advised the OAU on developing a more comprehensive election assistance program, along the lines of those implemented by other intergovernmental organizations.

Findings and Evaluation

The success of the seminar laid the foundation for a good working relationship between AAI, NDI and the OAU. At the end of the seminar, follow-up programs such as a seminar to train OAU trainers, or a seminar on parallel vote tabulation, were recommended.

GHANA
ELECTION OBSERVATION AND PVT TRAINING
CCEU

Background

Ghana, the first sub-Saharan African country to achieve independence from colonial rule, has experienced alternating military and civilian governments since the first indigenous government of Kwame Nkrumah in 1957. From December 1981, the country has been ruled by a Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. After several years of political mobilization against the PNDC government and for a return to constitutional multiparty democracy, Ghanaians were given the opportunity, once again, to elect a government.

Project Activities

The Carter Center of Emory University, in association with AAI and NDI, fielded an eighteen-member international observer team. The organizations collaborated with

400 Ghanaians who were recruited and trained as local monitors. Delegations from the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity, the European Community, and individual nations also observed the elections.

During these elections, the Carter Center developed a plan for a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) of election results in Ghana. The initial phase of the project involved training Ghanaian election monitors and determining the feasibility of a PVT. The plan the first round of the presidential elections was used as a "dry-run" to determine the feasibility of conducting a PVT during the second round. However, due to election results from the first-round, providing Jerry Rawlings with an absolute majority of votes, a second-round vote was not necessary. Therefore, final implementation of a PVT for the second-round was not conducted.

Findings and Evaluation

In its full report, the Carter Center delegation praised the government of Ghana, the election commission, and the people of Ghana "for the significant progress that had been made in laying the basis for a constitutional democracy." It also pointed out the many inconsistencies in the implementation of election procedures and the serious logistical difficulties that resulted in many voters being unable to find their names on registers. Despite the irregularities, the CCEU team did not find any evidence of the election's being rigged.

ERITREA
PROJECT DESIGN MISSION
AAI

Background

Eritrea's thirty year struggle for independence ended in the overthrow of Ethiopian sovereignty, giving Eritreans a monumental opportunity to opt for self-rule. The Eritrean Provisional Government created an Eritrean Referendum Commission to administer a vote for all Eritreans on the issue of national sovereignty. This was a singular opportunity for all Eritreans to determine the direction of their homeland's future.

Program Activities

In planning its electoral assistance program, AAI dispatched staff and consultants to Eritrea several months in advance of the referendum to gather information and conduct a series of fact finding meetings. Meetings were held with the Provisional Government of Eritrea and Eritrean Referendum Commission officials, private citizens, international organizations (including the Organization of African Unity and the UN Development Program), and donor community (including AID) officials. The objective of the visits was to assess needs, opportunities and constraints in order to design a program of assistance that would have maximum impact.

Findings and Evaluation

AAI's findings included the following:

- Universal franchise was an unfamiliar idea to the Eritrean people;
- Eritrea was in a fundamental state of transition — in spite of the call for a referendum, it was unclear whether the new leadership would embrace democratic governance in the future. Therefore, there was an urgent need to invest in processes and institutions that would help move the country toward democratic governance and away from the colonial and authoritarian regimes of the past;

- Although there was concern about the precedent-setting nature of the referendum and its potential impact on other regions in Africa engaged in conflict, the overriding consideration was to enable a free and transparent referendum to take place so that the Eritrean people could decide their future;
- The newly formed Eritrean Referendum Commission needed technical assistance and equipment for civic education programs; critical election related commodities were also needed;
- To build local capacity, citizen participation in election monitoring was crucial — however, civic education and an institutional base for a new citizen's group were needed to allow this participation to take place; also, citizen monitors had to be trained, deployed and debriefed; and
- A US-sponsored international observer delegation was requested.

Thus, although there was no guarantee that after the referendum there would be democratic governance in Eritrea, AAI chose to organize and prepare as though this would be the case. By doing so, internal capacity to encourage a next round of democratic elections would be built, and a tradition of transparency in future elections established.

ERITREA
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS FOR NATIONAL REFERENDUM
AAI

Background

The April 1993 referendum, conducted in Eritrea with United Nations observation, was the first genuine opportunity for the people of Eritrea to exercise their right to self determination in the territory's 30-year struggle against the central Ethiopian government. Prior to this exercise, the only experience in democratic practice in the enclave was a brief period during British occupation at the provincial and village council levels, and later within areas controlled by the liberation movements.

In a society dominated by feudal traditions, the universal franchise was a relatively new concept. It was important within the region that this referendum be conducted under internationally recognized democratic standards. Of equal importance was the perception that it was conducted in a free and fair manner. Peace and stability in the region require as much. The expectation that the outcome of the referendum would be an overwhelming majority in support of autonomy made the conduct of the referendum even more crucial.

In order to conduct a referendum that would be considered legal and legitimate in the eyes of the international community, it was important to have international participants observing the referendum process. Accordingly, the UNOVER delegation was given the mandate to validate whether or not the referendum was conducted in a free and fair manner. UN member countries, international organizations such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and NGOs were also invited by the Eritrean Referendum Commission (ERC) to participate in order to involve more deeply the international community in the referendum process and to add strength to observer numbers.

Project Activities

Organized by AAI and funded by AREAF, a 17-member observer delegation was sent to Eritrea from the United States to take part in the referendum. To maximize coverage and resources, the AAI delegation collaborated closely with UNOVER and the ERC. Deployed to five areas of the country (Asmara, Assab, the Sahel, Massawa

and Keren), the delegation visited 487 polling stations during the three-day referendum period.

The Eritrean Referendum was no ordinary election: there was no significant opposition and the likely outcome was known in advance. Unlike the UNOVER team, AAI observers were not in Eritrea to validate the legality of the referendum. Their mission was strictly to observe the conduct of the referendum. The goal was to monitor and report on the process in a manner that would be constructive for future elections in Eritrea.

Comprised of individuals with diverse backgrounds, the AAI delegation represented a wide range of institutions such as the US House of Representatives, the US General Accounting Office (GAO), universities, political action committees, non-profit foundations, development organizations and research institutes. AAI provided two distinguished Eritrean professors, living in the United States, as consultants to the delegation and the ERC.

Findings and Evaluation

The unambiguous conclusion of the AAI delegation was that the Eritrean Referendum was conducted in a free and fair manner. The training and organization of referendum and polling officials, workers, monitors and observers were thorough and comprehensive. The public was made aware of the referendum and the issues, the dates, times, and places of voting and, at least in the larger towns and cities, given a good orientation on voting procedures during public rallies and audio-video presentations. As a result (and in spite of difficult circumstances), the referendum went very smoothly. Every effort was made to reach all eligible voters, including women, Eritreans residing in other countries, desert nomads, residents of remote villages and unsentenced prisoners. The reported turnout was a phenomenal 98.52 percent of all registered voters.

The referendum also proved to be an excellent testing ground for future elections. As would be anticipated in a society that had not had an opportunity to conduct a national electoral exercise for at least 30 years, a number of procedural inconsistencies and lapses did occur. None would have altered the outcome of the referendum, but an examination and correction of these anomalies would be valuable for the future.

KINGDOM OF LESOTHO PRE-ELECTORAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE 1993 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IRI

Background

The Government of Lesotho invited the International Republican Institute to observe the first multi-party parliamentary elections held in the country since 1970. These elections were significant in that they would mark a return to civilian rule. In response to this request, the IRI sent a delegation of four election experts and IRI staff to Lesotho to assess the feasibility of sponsoring an election observation mission to analyze the pre-election environment.

Program Activities

The IRI conducted a seven-day assessment of the pre-election environment in Lesotho. During this period, the IRI also analyzed the feasibility of sponsoring an election observation mission for Lesotho's March 27 elections. During the assessment period, the IRI team met with representatives of the Government of Lesotho including Major General Ramaema. The delegation also met with King Letsie III, political parties,

the media, churches, non-governmental organizations and members of the international diplomatic community.

Findings and Evaluation

In general, the IRI found the pre-election environment to be calm and that the electoral procedures were adequate and would be competently administered. The people of Lesotho appeared to welcome the transition with wary enthusiasm. While not expressed directly, the IRI noted a strong undercurrent of apprehension. Many individuals, parties and organizations expressed strong concern—not about the potential for fraud on election day, but about the post-election transition. In addition, the IRI shared concerns with a variety of local groups and individuals over the issue of a constitutional amendment which would create a Defense Commission following the elections. This Commission would have given the military the authority to command civil servants and the parliament. The IRI was deeply concerned about this amendment because it appeared to grant sweeping powers to the military after an election which was supposed to mark a transition to civilian rule.

Despite concerns over the amendment, the IRI expressed hope that once a popularly elected parliament is convened, revisions acceptable to most parties would be debated and eventually adopted. The IRI expressed the hope that all parties involved in post-election debate would respond peacefully with tolerance for different viewpoints, and make the compromises necessary to ensure a stable, prosperous and democratic future for Lesotho.

MALAWI
ELECTORAL TRAINING FOR REFERENDUM
NDI

Background

Before this project, NDI had closely monitored the situation in Malawi for more than a year. In August 1992, NDI organized a meeting in Washington of policymakers, journalists and others to discuss the political situation in Malawi and to review strategies for encouraging political liberalization in the country. In March 1993, NDI Senior Associate for Election Processes Larry Garber traveled to Malawi to assess possibilities for NDI programs. During this visit Garber met with representatives of the National Referendum Commission, the Malawi government, the MCP, opposition groups and the international community. As a result of these meetings, NDI submitted a proposal to AREAF to conduct a limited program to train pollwatchers from the NGOs and the ruling party to help ensure the integrity of and the voters' confidence in the referendum process.

Project Activities

NDI subsequently developed a plan to train domestic monitors in Malawi in preparation for that country's June 14, 1993, referendum. NDI hired Tom Kevorkian, a specialist in grassroots organizing, to carry out the training program, which included the following elements: designing a training manual, conducting workshops, recruiting monitors, helping to design education materials and organizing a comprehensive field program for domestic election monitors.

Kevorkian conducted a total of six workshops on election monitoring in Malawi's three regional capital cities: Lilongwe, Blantyre and Mzuzu. The workshops sought to provide the interested parties with the capability to monitor the referendum effectively, to identify potential problems and questions, and to encourage the groups to remain active after the referendum period in order to promote long-term democratic develop-

ment. Three of the six workshops were attended by members of PAC, AFORD, UDF and MCP.

Kevorkian held three separate training sessions at each of the workshops: 1) "At the Polling Site," 2) "Code of Conduct" and 3) "After the Polls Close." During the three workshops attended by the pressure groups, Rev. Emmanuel Chinkwita Phiri, chairman of the pro-multiparty Public Affairs Committee (PAC), served as a moderator. In this role, he helped to provide an overview of the role of the monitors and outlined the voting procedure and the methodology of counting votes. Rev. Chinkwita was able to translate between English and Chewa as needed, and he frequently referred to his experience in Paraguay with NDI.

NDI designed and printed a total of 14,000 training manuals and checklists for the pro-multiparty groups, and 10,000 for the MCP. The four-page training manual included sections on the role of a monitor, why monitoring is effective, the rights and duties of a monitor, voting and counting procedures, irregularities and appeal procedures. The five-page checklist included areas for the monitor to review before voting, before balloting, during voting and after counting.

On the weekend before Referendum Day, Kevorkian consulted with Rev. Chinkwita on how his organization was planning to deploy their monitors. As a result of these consultations, it was decided that the 8,000 available monitors would be divided into teams of four -- two members from PAC, and one member each from the pressure groups UDF and AFORD. In this fashion, every one of the country's 2,065 polling stations was covered.

On the day of the referendum, Monday, June 14, Kevorkian visited 12 polling centers in the Central region of Malawi. He noted a number of monitors with checklists at those polling centers, and following the referendum he counted 650 lists that monitors in the Central region had completed and returned to the PAC offices. International observers reported that monitors in the North and South regions had brought and used their checklists at the polling centers.

Findings and Evaluation

NDI achieved all of its objectives for this program, although certain aspects of the actual program varied from the original proposal. First, the proposal stated that an NDI consultant would begin work in Malawi approximately April 25, or seven weeks before the referendum. Due to circumstances beyond the control of NDI or AREAF, however, NDI's representative was not able to arrive in the country until approximately four weeks before the election, on May 16. Second, the proposal indicated that NDI would focus on assisting "the opposition and other civic groups" in developing a referendum monitoring program. Ultimately, however, NDI offered virtually identical training programs and materials to the opposition groups and the ruling MCP.

NDI field representative Tom Kevorkian successfully assisted the pro-multiparty groups in developing an effective plan for monitoring the referendum process through individual consultations and training workshops. The workshops were well attended, and NDI was able to train a number of pollwatchers from both non-governing groups and the MCP in Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. In addition, the 24,000 training manuals and checklists were utilized on referendum day. NDI was the only western organization in Malawi providing this kind of technical assistance. NDI's monitor training program was one of many factors that allowed the referendum process to go forward in a manner acceptable to all interested parties.

MADAGASCAR
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION TO PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
AAI

Background

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a widespread, popular movement to achieve democratic elections in Madagascar erupted. Demonstrations, ethnic outbreaks and student strikes were evidence of the strive for democracy. On October 31, 1991 President Ratsiraka ceded his authority to a transitional government headed by his Prime Minister. A new High Authority of State effectively replaced the National Assembly and a Committee for Economic and Social Guidance provided guidance. The transitional government had 18 months to adopt a new constitution and hold presidential, legislative and local elections.

Significant progress toward the establishment of a democracy with a transparent, competitive electoral process in Madagascar having been made, the presidential elections scheduled for early November through early December 1993 were a critical test for the developing Malagasy democracy.

Project Activities

At the invitation of the Transitional Government of Madagascar, the African-American Institute sent three observer delegations to Madagascar to monitor and provide technical support to the presidential and legislative elections. The AAI delegation teams, which arrived well before each election to conduct pre-electoral assessments, were widely deployed throughout the country to monitor a representative sample of polling stations in both urban and rural areas on election day, observed vote counting and the recording of results, and following the presidential elections, remained in-country to witness the official proclamation of results. A total of 502 polling stations were monitored by delegation members.

Findings and Evaluation

The clear conclusion of all three AAI delegations observing the three elections was that they were open, fair and transparent. In spite of limited resources and past divisions, the performance of the National Electoral Commission, the High Constitutional Court, the political parties, the Malagasy monitoring groups, and the Malagasy citizenry was exemplary. A number of important observations and findings were made by the AAI delegation teams on the electoral processes of the three elections which were released in post-election statements to the local press.

GERDDES
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT FOR ELECTION OBSERVATION PROGRAMS
NDI

Background

In February 1994, the AREAF Senior Project Council and the joint AID/State Committee approved the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI's) proposal to provide a two-year sub-grant to the Study Group for Democratic Development and Economic and Social Research (GERDDES-Africa) for the purpose of expanding GERDDES' capacity to train domestic election monitors and to observe elections. The sub-grant included funding for a regional training seminar, two country-specific

training seminars, and five 10-member election observation missions. An NDI grant management sub-grant was also included.

Project Activities

While NDI's early work with GERDDES was focused on joint activities, it became increasingly clear that the organization was capable of carrying out activities independently. GERDDES had established its own institutional identity, and a group of individuals associated with the organization had begun to develop extensive elections-related experience. With the advent of AREAF in 1992, it was possible to consider providing GERDDES with its own funding with which to undertake election activities.

In early 1994 NDI provided a sub-grant to GERDDES-Africa to enable it to train election observers and conduct election observation missions. The objectives of the program were to: a) augment GERDDES' substantive and administrative capabilities to conduct election related programming; b) disseminate information more widely about election monitoring and standards for democratic elections; and c) help ensure that African electoral processes benefit from increased transparency.

With funding from the sub-grant, GERDDES monitored five elections in four countries and conducted a range of election-related training projects. GERDDES subsequently prepared narrative reports on its election observation activities.

South Africa: GERDDES sent a team of six monitors to the South Africa elections in April, 1994. This team was folded into a larger international delegation organized by NDI. The project was designed to expose the South African election process to election experts from other countries undergoing democratic transitions. The GERDDES team, which observed the elections in the Orange Free State, gained a detailed understanding of the functioning of the Independent Election Commission. This experience subsequently enhanced GERDDES' efforts to convince West African nations to adopt more transparent and accountable structures of election administration. The team also made contact and exchanged experiences with South African civic organizations and other international observers. As a result, the delegation gained greater expertise in election monitoring techniques through its exposure to the UN, OAU and other NGO observer delegations.

Guinea Bissau: In Guinea Bissau, GERDDES observed the first and second rounds of national elections in 1994. The delegation to the first round included nine observers from four countries. Based on its observations, the delegation called attention to the serious extent of deficiencies in the logistical preparations for elections. The authorities responded by extending the voting period in certain districts and implementing changes in the management of the second round of elections. These polls were observed by a six-member GERDDES delegation.

Regional Elections Seminar: To help disseminate information and exchange ideas on various electoral experiences, GERDDES organized a regional seminar in Cotonou in May 1994 on "Lessons Learned from African Elections." The seminar provided the opportunity for analysis and critique of the first round of democratic elections in Africa. NDI and NED sent representatives who participated actively in the Cotonou seminar. The seminar brought together 150 participants from 20 countries. The participants were not solely GERDDES members, but included other key political, governmental and NGO leaders. Issues discussed included:

- type, composition and management of independent electoral commissions;
- right to vote, including voting eligibility of resident foreigners;
- financing of elections;
- participation of women and other disadvantaged sectors of society;

- civic education;
- constituency delimitation;
- international and domestic observers;
- vote counting.

Niger: In coordination with the UNDP, GERDDES helped to organize, and participated in a series of training seminars for civic groups, political parties and Election Commission representatives prior to Niger's January 1995 legislative polls. In addition, GERDDES fielded a 20-member observer delegation to the elections.

Benin: With NDI's support, GERDDES played an important role in helping to ensure the legitimacy of Benin's 1995 elections. It helped train members of the Election Commission, local election officials and domestic monitors. It prepared a series of documents distributed by the Commission that educated voters, election officials and nonpartisan and political party monitors on their respective roles in the electoral process.

In response to a request by the Election Commission, GERDDES helped coordinate international observers. It also fielded 50 national observers who worked with a 50 member regional GERDDES observer delegation. While GERDDES' post-election statement was generally very supportive of the elections, reports of irregularities by GERDDES observers led to the annulment of election results in several legislative districts. These elections were later restaged successfully.

Administration of the Sub-Grant: NDI has monitored the administration of the sub-grant and had determined that GERDDES has developed an internal financial and accounting infrastructure to adequately administer grants. An accountant reviewed GERDDES' financial infrastructure prior to the establishment of the initial grant and concluded that GERDDES was capable of administering the grant. NDI grants administrators' and program staff visited GERDDES headquarters several times during the life of the grant to evaluate financial administration issues. Disbursements of sub-grant funds were made conditional on proper accounting of previously expended funds.

Follow-on Grant

NDI extended its agreement with GERRDES from October 1995 through March 1997. The sub-grant contains the funding for two regional seminars, one country-specific seminar, and three ten-member election observation missions, in addition to an NDI grant management sub-budget.

Findings and Evaluation

NDI's work with GERDDES-Africa exemplifies a natural evolution of US-African NGO cooperation. Through NDI's technical and sub-grant assistance, GERDDES has developed an internal infrastructure and the human resource capabilities to conduct its own civic education, training and election monitoring programs. GERDDES completed a number of proposed electoral observation programs and has proven to be an effective and visible force during elections in a variety of African countries.

UGANDA
CIVIC EDUCATION, DOMESTIC MONITOR TRAINING, PARALLEL VOTE TABULATION, COMMODITIES, AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS
AAI/IRI

Background

After the National Resistance Movement took power in Uganda in 1986, it put in place a process for democratic transition. A Constitutional Commission presented a draft constitution to the President in late 1992. The National Resistance Council (legislature) then passed a statute providing for the non-partisan election of a Constituent Assembly that would consider and adopt a new constitution. However, political parties would not be able to participate in the election. National elections were anticipated to follow in 1994 and 1995. The US Embassy and USAID Mission jointly requested AREAF assistance to the planned Constituent Assembly elections.

Following passage of the CA statute, AAI and IRI sent a joint assessment team to Uganda in May 1993. The team agreed with the Embassy's recommendation that substantial electoral assistance be provided for the Constituent Assembly election in order to support local efforts — particularly civic education and domestic monitoring. This support would provide a foundation for further civic education and election monitoring for the national elections.

Project Activities

AAI provided an assistance program that included training Ugandan election monitors and civic education trainers, providing technical assistance and commodities to the independent election commission, sending an international observer delegation and training local monitors to conduct a parallel vote tabulation (PVT). Due to delayed voter registration, the Constituent Assembly elections were postponed from December 1993 to March 28, 1994.

To support civic education and domestic monitoring, AAI worked with two umbrella groups, the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC), composed of the Catholic Church and most of the Protestant denominations, and the National Organization for Civic Education and Monitoring (NOCEM), composed of approximately 13 NGOs. Following an incident in which a NOCEM member departed from the group's principle of impartiality, the National Resistance Movement banned NOCEM from continuing its civic education campaign.

To coordinate its assistance program, AAI placed a field coordinator in Uganda. The field coordinator worked with the UJCC and NOCEM to recruit and organize civic education and election monitoring trainers, whom were trained by international trainers sent by AAI. AAI also worked with NOCEM and UJCC to develop the training materials. In addition, the field coordinator worked with the United Nations' representative and the Commission for the Constituent Assembly to avoid duplication in the area of civic education.

Following training of trainers workshops in fall 1993, the UJCC trained a total of 16,000 local election monitors and approximately 4,000 civic education trainers. Training was conducted in weekend workshops until the March 28 election. Election monitors were deployed during the campaign, at candidates' meetings (the only sanctioned forums for campaigning), and at the polls for voting and vote counting.

AAI also worked closely with the Commission for the Constituent Assembly, an independent body created to administer the election. AAI provided technical assistance to the Commission as well as fax machines and two-way radios to aid in rapid

transmission of the election results. The fax machines and radios remain in Uganda for use during national elections in 1996.

Approximately two weeks prior to the election, AAI trained UJCC monitors to conduct a statistical verification of results through a parallel vote tabulation (PVT). The UJCC conducted the PVT in 13 of the 214 elections for the Constituent Assembly. There was a 100 percent correspondence between the PVT projected winner and the official winner in all 13 elections.

Approximately 10 days prior to the election, AAI sent its advance team of international observers to conduct a pre-election assessment.

Findings and Evaluation

The advance team concluded that conditions were conducive for a fair and transparent election. Voters were given sufficient opportunity to register and the campaign was conducted in a controlled manner, and it was free from intimidation. Following this assessment, AAI deployed the international observer delegation, acting in cooperation with the United Nations, which was coordinating all of the international observers. The AAI delegation concluded in its statement that:

- The CA elections were not without flaws. While there were some problems related to voter registration, registration certificates, the late announcement of the polling places and the failure to display voter registers before the election in some areas of the country, there was no evidence of any systematic attempt to manipulate the outcome of this exercise. The AAI delegation further notes that these administrative weaknesses did not affect the election results and can be easily remedied before future elections are held.
- Based on sustained observations during the entire CA process, the African-American Institute international observer delegation finds that the Constituent Assembly elections held on March 28, 1994 were organized, conducted and tabulated in a manner that affirms the will of the Ugandan electorate.

MOZAMBIQUE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AAI

Background

On October 27, 28, and 29, 1994, the Mozambican populace voted in the first multiparty democratic elections in the country's history. After the country's experiences with colonialism and civil war, the people participated enthusiastically: 90% of eligible voters reported to the polls.

Since its independence from Portugal in 1975 until 1989, Mozambique had been characterized by the socialist-oriented government of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO.) In 1989, FRELIMO renounced its Marxist-Leninist orientation, and drafted proposals for a new constitution and the end of the one-party state. Political change was further advanced in 1990 with the approval of a new constitution and the announcement of elections.

A new assembly met for the first time in 1990. Legislation was passed permitting the formation of new political parties, and elections were set for an unspecified date in 1992. However, the date was later postponed with elections finally slated for October 27 - 29, 1994. Voters chose from a selection of twelve candidates for the presidency and twelve parties for the National Assembly.

Project Activities

Responding to a request from the Mozambican National Electoral Commission (CNE), AAI provided technical assistance to the Mozambique National Election Commission's Technical Secretariat (STAE). AAI sent an eight-person team to Mozambique for the October 1994 presidential and legislative elections to provide technical and logistical support to the national electoral commission, including interpretation/translation staffing for the press room of the CNE to facilitate daily press releases and press conferences held at CNE headquarters. AAI also provided technical support for the computerization of vote reporting.

AAI identified and fielded a telecommunications specialist for these elections, because Mozambique's communications infrastructure was inadequate for the purposes of election results communication. The fax and telephone capacity was assessed as below the provincial standard for handling 145-150 districts and 1,600 polling stations.

The STAE's telecommunications specialist prepared a needs assessment document for the donor community, and requested that a telecommunications specialist from neighboring South Africa be brought in to provide training and technical assistance in time for the October election.

The recent experience of the South African International Electoral Commission (IEC) in organizing communications logistics provided an appropriate reference point in assessing the needs of the STAE. This also served as an excellent opportunity for regional technology transfer.

To overcome the numerous challenges faced by the STAE in a short period of time, AAI supported the Commission by providing three staff aides to assist the Secretariat in organizing a reporting and documentation system for recording its proceedings during the plenary and individual sessions. The staff aides also back-stopped the members of the Commission in accurately and adequately reporting on and documenting its proceedings. These individuals were Portuguese speakers with high-level drafting, editing, and reporting skills. Additionally, AAI provided two interpreters to serve as aides to the Commission's press and correspondence operation which was organized for the electoral period. They provided interpretation services into English and/or French for the Mozambican Commission officials during press conferences, and helped to provide orientation for the foreign, non-Portuguese-speaking press covering the elections.

Findings and Evaluation

The program was completed. In attempting to meet the expectations made explicit by the proposal, the team encountered some difficulties. First of all, the team's arrival was considered by many to be too late for it to have the opportunity to adequately integrate itself into the existent administrative structure at the CNE. The Commission was quite politicized, and outside help at that late date was regarded with some hostility, even though the STAE had expressly requested it, and thought that it was crucial to the electoral process.

The team was initially stationed at the CNE/STAE offices, from where the majority of the members moved to the Press Center (Gabinete de Imprensa). Although the duties performed by the eight team members differed somewhat from those dictated by and expected from the original proposal, the team as a whole managed to function effectively, and it proved possible to facilitate the administration of the electoral process before, during and after the actual polling.

Although the elections of both the President and the Assembly were overall successes, and the high participation is considered by many as a sign of popular approval, the process was marred by a number of problems including : insufficient civic

education and voter registration, particularly in the local languages; inefficiencies on the part of the CNE; last-minute maneuvering by the main opposition party, RENAMO; and a perceived unwillingness to share power on the part of the ruling party, FRELIMO.

UGANDA
CITIZEN DISCUSSION OF THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS
AAI

Background

Since 1986, democratization in Uganda has proceeded at a slow pace. In 1989, President Yoweri Museveni extended the mandate of the interim government until January 1995. He then promised that there would be a new Constitution, an elected president and new legislature by that time. Unfortunately the timetable has been pushed back, due in great part to the difficulties encountered in ratifying the new Constitution. To hold elections, the constitution and electoral code must first be ratified and promulgated. As a result, the elections which cannot take place before the ratification of the constitution, have also been postponed.

In order to facilitate the constitution making process, the African-American Institute (AAI) provided funding assistance to the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) for a series of seven seminars in Uganda, with the objective of involving Ugandan citizens more directly in the constitution-making process. On March 28, 1994, a Constituent Assembly (CA) was formed through direct and indirect elections, with the mandate of ratifying a new, permanent democratic constitution. The issues at stake were highly sensitive, and since its election, the Constituent Assembly had some difficulties reaching compromise on key points. Through this series of seminars, AAI hoped to encourage greater discussion of these contentious issues outside the capital Kampala, and to provide a forum for interested parties to express their ideas and have those ideas transmitted to the Constituent Assembly. AAI has further advanced the course of civic education in Uganda by encouraging seminar participants to discuss with the people of their hometowns to better comprehend the debates' relevance to the new constitution, by promulgating public understanding of the constitutional issues.

Project Activities

The Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) provided primary organizational support and AAI provided monitoring support. For the presenters and discussants, UJCC relied heavily on Constituent Assembly Delegates from all sides of the political spectrum, political party leaders, members of the current government, educational authorities and religious leaders.

The actual participants, well over one hundred for each seminar, were identified primarily through non-partisan civic and religious groups, and personally invited to attend and share their opinions.

Each of the seminars had a parallel structure. Each seminar opened with a brief discussion of the progress made by the CA during the last year, and continued with presentations and discussions on two issues: multipartyism versus the Movement, and federalism versus decentralization. Although the above order was not always followed, all of the topics were presented and debated.

Before the closing of each seminar, the UJCC coordinators gave the participants the opportunity to draft resolutions which they wished to be forwarded to the Constituent Assembly in Kampala. At some sites, these were done individually by many of the participants, while at other sites, groups of 20-30 participants were organized and submitted resolutions reflecting group consensus.

The UJCC also asked participants and presenters to evaluate the success of the seminars. General support for the seminar format was almost unanimous. Specific complaints focused on the timing of the seminars so late in the constitution-making process, and the obvious constraints of limiting such an event to only one day. Although a concerted effort was made by the UJCC to invite participants from all walks of life, audiences consisted primarily of educated elites. The presenters (specifically the CA delegates) and the UJCC were advised not to take the opinions of the participants as indicative of the entire populace in that region, but as indicative only of the opinions of the teachers, religious leaders and professionals who were present. Audiences were consistently encouraged by presenters and the UJCC to share those lessons learned at the seminars with their friends and neighbors outside the cities. The audiences expressed willingness and interest in doing so.

Findings and Evaluation

The project was successfully completed. Despite initial difficulties encountered in confirming authority figures to present and discuss the topics, the series of seminars was a success. Over 700 people were present at the seminars, of which 30% were women. Many of the audience members displayed awareness of the sensitive constitutional issues, and they felt the series of seminars was worthwhile and thought-provoking, regardless of their political affiliations. At the end of each seminar, participants drafted resolutions indicating their preferences for the constitution, and the UJCC National Coordinators brought these back to Kampala to be shared with the Constituent Assembly.

Complaints also surfaced from the participants and the press about various biases present at the seminars. Some were seen as blatantly pro-opposition, others as pro-Movement, depending on the number and ability of the presenters from both sides.

AAI feels that the series of seminars to discuss the constitution-making process was profitable, and that the success of the discussion seminars encourages the furtherance of democratic principles in Uganda. Channels of communication between the capital and outlying areas were opened or strengthened by the seminars. Although most Ugandans are interested in the tenets of their new constitution, rarely do they have the chance to express their viewpoints or ask pertinent questions to individuals so closely involved in the process. The forum provided by these seminars is invaluable to the citizens, and offers the Constituent Assembly in Kampala a further glimpse of what will be best for the country as a whole when the Constitution is eventually promulgated.

KENYA
LEAGUE OF KENYAN WOMEN VOTERS
IRI

Background

Although women account for more than half the electorate in Kenya, they have not played as significant a role in the country's political development as their numbers might suggest. Currently, there are only six female members of Parliament out of a total of 200 members. Furthermore, women do not hold a significant number of local offices, and only one political party, the Democratic Party of Kenya, utilizes women to any significant degree.

To begin the process of increasing political awareness on the part of Kenyan women, several prominent female political activists met to discuss the role of women in Kenya's pluralist electoral future, following President Moi's December 1991 decision

to allow opposition parties to function. On January 9, 1992, the League of Kenyan Women Voters (LKWV) was established, and the League was registered formally under Kenya's Public Societies Act on May 5, 1992 as a national, non-partisan voluntary lobby group. Officers of the LKWV were elected for a period of two years. The League's target group is women of all levels of development, but especially rural women, poor women, illiterate or semi-literate women, women with no formal employment and young women.

In February, 1995 the IRI provided program support to allow the LKWV to conduct its mission of promoting democratic change in Kenya and to provide limited technical assistance to enhance the League's ability to effectively operate its headquarters and conduct successful outreach programs.

Project Activities

The objectives for this project were to provide funding that would allow the LKWV to conduct its mission of promoting democratic change in Kenya, and to provide limited technical assistance to enhance the League's ability to effectively operate its headquarters and conduct successful outreach programs.

Under established terms of this grant, the League received funding for the management of its office and two outreach seminars. LKWV also continued to promote women's issues through its newsletters and work with other, like-minded Kenyan organizations.

In addition to the administration of the grant itself (i.e. monitoring of activity and financial reports), IRI made two site visits. During one of the visits, training was conducted by an IRI management grants expert. These visits allowed for on-site management of the grantee, as well as allowing IRI to provide technical assistance to the League's headquarters staff, Board of Directors, and, to a limited extent, one local chapter. The technical assistance was provided in the form of working meetings and mini-seminars. IRI also provided books and other materials on NGO management and leadership development to the LKWV.

Findings and Evaluation

The project was successfully completed. Project evaluation was in three forms: The first was that, LKWV was required to complete monthly financial reports, accompanied by copies of receipts, to document the spending of grant funds. Monthly grant drawdowns were tied to the League's ability to properly demonstrate the appropriateness of its spending. Secondly, activity reports were required on a monthly basis to explain League programming during that month and assess the effectiveness of this programming. Thirdly, the impact on the political process of those trained was measured -- not only their increased participation in strictly political activities, but also their understanding of their civil and human rights, and their ability to take action to defend their rights. Similarly, in the case of LKWV newsletters, booklets and advocacy projects, the measure of impact was how many participants took action to correct situations pointed out by the League, and how successful were those actions. Thirty participants in LKWV seminars were interviewed to determine how they utilized information gained from the League in promoting democratization in Kenya.

IRI also utilized AID accepted forms to conduct on-site management assessments. This allowed IRI to determine first-hand, the efficiency of LKWV headquarters and branch management, as well as outreach efforts. IRI sought evaluations of the League's effectiveness by interviewing organizations cooperating with LKWV on programming. These interviews solicited specific comments on joint events -- from logistics through the execution of the event itself through impact assessment.

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION PROGRAM IN NIGER, MALI AND BENIN NDI

Background

In January 1994 NDI conducted a three-day legislative training seminar in Niamey, Niger on parliaments in emerging democracies. The seminar was designed to bring together parliamentarians from Benin, Mali, and Niger. NDI had previously been involved in the democratic transition process in Niger in 1993 through various election related activities.

Project Activities

The primary objective of the seminar was to assist the national assemblies of Benin, Mali and Niger to increase their effectiveness in assisting the process of consolidating democratic governance in these countries. Another objective was to provide a forum for parliamentarians from these national assemblies to exchange information and experiences with one another and benefit from the broad comparative experience of international NDI experts. The international team of NDI experts assembled for the seminar included present and former legislators from Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Mauritius and the United States.

Through a series of workshops and plenary sessions, participants were given the opportunity to exchange experiences and develop skills. International experts made comparative presentations on the functioning of their respective parliaments and their responsibilities as members and how that relates to parliamentary activity in emerging democracies. The program was designed to encourage active interaction by the participants. Each day's program included presentations in a plenary session and interactive exercises in smaller workshops. These presentations focused on the following topics: political parties in parliament, legislative relations with the executive and judiciary branches of government, legislative oversight and access to information, and public representation and constituency servicing.

After the plenary sessions, participants were divided into three workshops. In these smaller groups, members discussed in further detail issues raised during the plenary sessions. They also took part in a simulation exercise designed to provide a more pragmatic approach to the training program. The main thrust of the simulation exercise was on the formulation of a national budget and how legislators could approach and influence the process in a constructive manner. Groups were set up to represent the parliamentary majority, the loyal opposition and in one of the workshops, a multitude of small moderate parties. Participants were then assigned specific roles and presented with different fact and thought provoking scenarios designed to stimulate debate.

In preparing for the simulation, a deliberate effort was made early on to interchange roles so that participants who were members of the parliamentary majority in their various assemblies played the role of opposition party leaders and vice versa. Fact sheets were given to participants at the end of each day in preparation for the next day's discussions. The facts were different in many respects depending on the role assigned to each group of participants. An overwhelming majority of participants found the simulation exercise to be both instructive and useful in improving negotiation skills, promoting mutual understanding and the tolerance of opposing view points.

Findings and Evaluation

Questionnaires were distributed as part of the briefing for participants at the beginning of the seminar. An overwhelming majority of the participants were pleased

with the overall effectiveness of the seminar and felt that the plenary and workshop sessions were interesting and beneficial.

Fifty-six evaluation forms were returned by participants. The respondents described the program as instructive, enriching and useful. The group did feel that the duration of the seminar should have been extended over a longer period of time. There was a mark of approval with respect to the usefulness of the workshops and the simulations/hypothetical cases, as well as the selected articles that were distributed at the seminar.

PAN AFRICAN DESIGN OF DEMOCRACY MATERIALS SEMINAR
NDI

Background

Many civic groups in Africa have developed innovative materials on democracy, but there have been few attempts to bring these groups together to share their views and further develop skills in creating new material. In Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, NDI sponsored a working group of ten African civic organizers involved in the design of democracy materials. This group examined methods of developing democracy materials and ways to be able to fully disseminate these materials throughout Africa.

The seminar stressed the use of print materials, electronic media, such as video and radio, and performing arts as democracy education tools. While much of the program focused on voter education, the workshop's curriculum also included women's participation in the political process.

Project Activities

The project planning stages included identifying participants, developing a specific agenda, collecting voter education and women's participation materials, and identifying specific goals for tangible project outcomes. The seminar's main aim was to: develop the capacity to produce democracy education materials for use at the grassroots level; share materials already created; to provide ideas for and training on the future development of low cost materials; and develop a group of individuals who could train others in these skills elsewhere on the continent. Abidjan was selected as the seminar site due to its upcoming national elections and its role as regional transportation hub.

Findings and Evaluation

The project was successfully completed. During the planning stage, there were indicators that this project was relevant and timely. All participants accepted their invitation, and in keeping with the project's collaborative nature, participants commented on the draft agenda and the issues to be covered in the workshop. Most invitees responded with thoughtful and detailed suggestions. Several follow-up initiatives between participants occurred subsequent to the seminar.

ZIMBABWE
CIVIC EDUCATION & INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IRI

Background

In Zimbabwe, the social and political environment conducive to the formation of a participatory and deliberative democratic culture is largely absent. The legislative body is devoid of debate on substantive public policy questions as the ruling party,

Zimbabwe African National Union - Political Front (ZANU-PF), controls 147 of 150 seats. All political institutions (including the Electoral Commission) are highly politicized, and activity is based largely on patronage or other forms of corruption. Public debate or discussion is stifled by fear, disorganization, and the government ruling party's tight control of the state-owned broadcast media and the self-censorship of the independent press. The consequent ignorance, apathy, and non-participation is widespread and is evident in voter participation levels, which were as low as four percent in some areas in the 1993 by-elections.

Certain sectors of Zimbabwean society are especially poorly mobilized, namely in the rural areas (which is 70% of Zimbabwe's population) and the increasing number of urban poor. The government has made no effort to educate voters in rural areas or poor urban areas, for fear of eroding a predictable block of support for the ruling party. Additionally, the government has made no effort to educate the populace on the meaning of the vote, the secrecy of the ballot, or the importance of voter registration.

IRI requested and received funding approval to implement a 14-month civic education program targeted at Zimbabwe's rural and urban poor populations. The program was designed to be executed primarily through a cooperative agreement with Zimrights, an indigenous human and political rights group with which IRI has had a previous working relationship.

Project Activities

The goal of the program was to encourage political participation through civic education in several districts that have had especially low voter turnout in the time preceding the 1995 legislative elections and the 1996 presidential elections and thereafter.

Through Zimrights -- one of a small number of groups that has made any efforts to increase pubic awareness and participation -- IRI proposed to provide the appropriate means and resources to combat the ignorance, apathy and non-participation that cripples Zimbabwe's political progress. Zimrights conducted the civic education efforts through workshops for community leaders and grassroots organizers who could then further organize greater participation in the elections.

To achieve the stated objectives, IRI and Zimrights outlined one primary and one secondary activity. The bulk of the program budget and time was vested in a series of community workshops aimed at training local leaders on the importance of the upcoming elections and how best to mobilize voters in a political atmosphere that has suffered from an unusual level of apathy and intimidation. The secondary activity was complementary to the community workshops but its specific focus was on managerial training to build the institutional capacity of Zimrights. Over time, the managerial training will endow Zimrights with the capability of initiating future projects fully under the auspices of their own organization.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY REGIONAL CONFERENCE: BENIN AAI

Background

AREAF provided a planning grant, and project support for a regional conference to examine the evolution of the role of the military in pluralistic democratic governance in Africa. The conference, held in Benin in May 1995, was a follow-on to the highly successful conference on the role of the military in the democratization process held in Burundi in February 1993. The Burundi conference brought together military and civilian representatives from nine countries to discuss, with guidance of Western and

African academic and military experts, the proper conduct and disposition of militaries in the process of democratization, as well the military's role within an established democracy. The participants in the Burundi conference felt that it would be of great use to replicate the conference in other geographic venues, both to new regional audiences and with the inclusion of former participants.

Project Activities

In response to the continent-wide challenge to authoritarian rule by military and civilian leaders, this conference was designed to engage the military and civilian participants to address the role of the military, its mission, structure, and relationship both to political order and to civil society. Issues addressed included the desirable outcome of how the military should function under democratic control and the military's role in the transition to a new political order. While some African countries' senior officers have begun to give serious thought to such issues, these structured conferences allowed for the significant advancement of the discussion. With the help of outside specialists, African civilian and military leaders were able to explore these issues, and learned from each other's experiences and plans.

Findings and Evaluation

As the Burundi conference, this conference was successfully completed. It was evident from both conferences that there is surprisingly little contact between civilian and military leaders within individual countries. This fact often leads to a certain distrust and suspicion between the government and military. In terms of inter-military relations between countries, there is very little contact as well.

The lessons learned in bringing these two entities together has demonstrated that much creative thought can be generated and that the process of intra-state discussion at these conferences were continued at home.

Organizations like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Commission on Africa (ECA) have informed AAI that these conferences have inspired them to delve in greater depth into the heretofore taboo subjects of military roles and ethnic divisions.

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES
NDI

Background

From October 10 to 13, 1994, NDI held an inter-regional seminar entitled "Multiparty Legislatures in Emerging Democracies" in Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR). Sixty-five deputies from the CAR, ten deputies from Congo, ten from Gabon, seven deputies from Burundi and three deputies from Madagascar participated in the seminar.

NDI planned the seminar in response to requests from deputies within the participating national assemblies. The program was implemented in three phases: an advance trip which was conducted by an NDI delegation in July 1994 to plan the seminar and develop a specific agenda; the seminar itself; and follow-up work by an NDI field representative to assess the impact of the seminar and to assist with any initiatives that resulted.

Project Activities

The structure of the seminar was developed following a 10-day program development mission to the CAR, Gabon and Congo. NDI invited parliamentary experts from four established democracies as discussion facilitators to permit an exchange of infor-

mation and legislative experiences with participants. The international delegation of parliamentarians was comprised of: Jim Higgins, a parliamentarian from Ireland; Isabel Espada, a former member of the Portuguese parliament; Donald Cravins, a US State Senator from Louisiana; and Alan Ganoo, former Minister of Justice and currently a member of parliament from Mauritius.

Assisting the international delegates during the plenary sessions and serving as co-moderators during the workshops were two "lead participants": Kané Nana Sanou, parliamentarian from Mali and Ramatou Baba Moussa, parliamentarian from Benin. These two deputies had previously served as chiefs of their country delegations to NDI's inter-regional seminar held in Niamey, Niger, in January, 1994. The participation of these West African deputies, who are slightly more experienced legislators than their Central African counterparts, helped to provide a broader African perspective to the panel presentations during the seminar.

The seminar was designed to have three separate but very complementary components which included a roundtable discussion, presentations in plenary session, and discussions in smaller workshop settings. This approach helped to provide the international faculty valuable exposure to the political realities of the host country.

It also had the advantage of familiarizing younger and less experienced deputies with the practice of participating in large public settings while at the same time allowing for more interactive and in-depth discussions in the smaller, hands-on environment of workshops.

In an effort to familiarize the trainers with some of the political issues currently being discussed in the Central African Republic, and to provide a preview of issues that were likely to be raised during the seminar itself, NDI organized a three-hour roundtable discussion on the role and functioning of the National Assembly in the CAR. The roundtable was also intended to initiate debate between civic activists and other political critics and Central African deputies on how the National Assembly has conducted its business since the October 1993 elections. Invited to the roundtable were representatives from over 15 civic organizations, three trade unions, leaders from each of the parliamentary groups of the CAR legislature, and local journalists.

NDI's West Africa Regional Director Christopher Fomunyoh, moderated the discussion, and the international trainers served on one of the panels. After opening the session with a series of thought-provoking questions on how participants perceived the role of legislators, the moderator let the Central Africans dominate the discussions, with only minor and occasional intervention from the international faculty.

Other issues discussed included: the reputed lack of access by minority parties to state media outlets, and the difficulties encountered by deputies in maintaining regular contact with their constituents, given the shortage of private transportation for constituents and the lack of private cars for the deputies.

Findings and Evaluation

The project was successfully concluded in December, 1994. Both civic leaders and deputies seemed to be misinformed about each other's proper functions in a democracy. Both groups admitted that they had never really tried to work towards achieving a constructive, interactive relationship. Particularly in countries like the CAR where civic organizations have a degree of popular support, civic groups may be able to influence the parliament to function more effectively and more in the interest of the citizens. Parliamentarians, on the other hand, may also benefit from increased contact with civic organizations which often have much needed information regarding the problems people face at the local level.

A major issue which surfaced was the lack of appreciation or understanding between civic groups and deputies of each other's role. Representatives from GERDDES,

the Association of Women Jurists and the Human Rights League voiced their opinion that the deputies, irrespective of their party, lack the courage to challenge the executive branch and automatically endorse government bills without debate or amendments. The deputies responded that the civic groups were only repeating platitudes and had no way of understanding the reality of the situation since they rarely bother to attend open parliamentary sessions.

In the course of the discussions, both sides stated that this was the first open forum in which they had the opportunity to exchange views on how the national assembly of CAR functioned. Participants encouraged NDI to consider replicating such roundtable forums of civic leaders and members of parliament in the future, in an effort to facilitate the exchange of information and discussions on ways in which the two could interact and contribute constructively to the consolidation of democracy.

ZAMBIA
SUPPORTING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
NDI

Background

Despite a highly charged political environment in Zambia and no new date being established for the local elections, NDI continued programmatic activity preparing for the upcoming local elections, emphasizing voter education and political party building. NDI assisted with the voter registration process, in particular by assisting the Zambian Election Office with the distribution of voter education materials using an NDI-established provincial NGO network. NDI completed provincial survey missions, which began in the fall of 1995, with encouraging results.

Project Activities

NDI's activities during this program responded to the changing political climate in Zambia. Therefore, program activities addressed various needs of the Zambian electoral climate. In late February, NDI staff attended the NDI Southern Africa regional consultations in South Africa for the 35-member field staff in the regional offices. The forum provided the NDI/Zambia team an opportunity to acquire program materials from colleagues working in other countries and to explore opportunities for coordinating program activities.

The NDI Southern Africa Regional Director visited Lusaka during February. Meetings were held with representatives of all the major political parties, the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), the Christian Council, the National and Local Government Election Commissions, trade unions, the US Embassy, and USAID to determine areas where NDI could provide electoral support for not only local, but also parliamentary and presidential elections.

In March, NDI Senior Consultant Keith Jennings traveled to Lusaka to develop a plan and lay the foundation for the intra-party dialogue envisioned for the new grant period. During his stay, the consultant also sought to help explain NDI's terms of reference to political party leadership and activists; to seek agreement among the political parties for a new relationship expressed in memoranda of understanding; and to assist the Lusaka-based staff in developing new approaches to bring parties to participate in provincial workshops.

Later in March, NDI President Ken Wollack visited Lusaka during his regional trip to meet with government and opposition officials and with representatives of the US Embassy and USAID. His primary objectives were to meet with Zambian government and main opposition officials to reinforce NDI's position as a neutral body which seeks to encourage dialogue among the parties, to assess the viability of NDI's future in-

volvement in Zambia, and to re-establish NDI's relationship with the Movement for Multiparty Democracy.

NDI continued to work with the Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC), a nonpartisan group of NGOs, church groups, student and labor organizations. NDI worked closely with CCC on several activities, including the production of a voter education newspaper.

NDI also produced a series of 30-minute radio dramas, translated into seven major local languages, addressing the topic of voter registration. The dramas were produced in conjunction with the support of the Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation, and reached most of the country. The dramas were intended to educate people on the importance of voting, and to motivate people to vote.

In addition, NDI sponsored a one-day series of debates featuring four secondary schools on the topic of voter registration. The event was well-received as more than 100 people attended the debates, including representatives from three Zambian NGOs and the local media. The debate was an excellent opportunity for the participants and observers to analyze the issue of voter registration from more than one point of view.

Findings and Evaluation

In keeping with the objectives in the project proposal, NDI achieved the following results and accomplishments through its activities:

- As a direct result of NDI's consultations and facilitation, the Committee for a Clean Campaign was created which is now Zambia's third domestic elections monitoring organization.
- Through the production of radio dramas and a voter education newspaper, NDI encouraged Zambian citizens to become involved in the electoral process by registering and voting, as well as educating them about the political system, including why voting is important; how and where to register; and where to vote.
- By laying the groundwork for provincial civic education and political party workshops and through continued work on the political party databases, NDI continued to work on the development of Zambian political parties, particularly with regard to their efforts to mobilize voters.
- Through NDI senior staff visits to Lusaka and consultations with political party officials, civic organizations, USAID and the US Embassy, and through provincial survey missions, NDI assisted Zambians in an evaluation of the Zambian electoral process, including an assessment of the structures supporting voter registration and education, particularly in anticipation of 1996 presidential and parliamentary national elections.

BENIN
ELECTION MONITORING FOR THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
NDI

Background

Benin's presidential elections in March 1996 were the second competitive presidential elections since the advent of multipartyism in 1991. In the aftermath of the national conference of 1990, the first democratic elections of 1991 took place in an atmosphere of consensus and a broad national commitment to the democratic transition process. The presence of international observers and electoral support activities

at the time promoted Beninese efforts in the democratization process. The elections of March 1996 were crucial in that they were conducted in a more competitive political environment under the auspices of a recently created independent election commission. NDI developed its project activities for Benin's second round of presidential elections to promote public confidence and greater participation in transparent, fair and peaceful elections.

Project Activities

In support of the 1996 presidential elections in Benin, NDI conducted a two-part program including a pre-election visit to assess the climate leading up to both rounds of the elections, and the organization and deployment of two international election observation delegations (one 22 member and another 17 member) to the first and second round of the elections. A four-member international pre-election assessment delegation organized by NDI visited Benin from February 20 through February 25, 1996. The delegation included election experts and political and civic leaders from the United States and West Africa. The delegation met with members of Benin's Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA), the Constitutional Court, the High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC), representatives of the seven presidential candidates, non-governmental organizations, journalists and members of the diplomatic community.

NDI organized two international observation delegations to both rounds of the presidential elections in Benin. The first-round delegation comprised participants from Africa, Europe and North America who witnessed the election in all six administrative divisions of Benin, including the Cotonou metropolitan area. The delegations included elected officials, former diplomats, political party and civic leaders, regional specialists and election experts. Both delegations held meetings with national election officials, candidates, political party officials, members of the news media and civic education NGOs.

The delegations divided into small teams and were deployed throughout the country. Upon arrival in each region, team members met with local election authorities and political party members. During each round of voting, team members observed election day activities in approximately 170 polling sites throughout the country.

As a follow-up to their work, NDI organized a workshop from June 6-8 entitled "Evaluation of the 1996 Presidential Election in Benin." The workshop, which was held in Cotonou, was organized in close cooperation with USAID-Benin, GERDDES-Afrique and the Benin-based Association for the Struggle Against Racism, Ethnocentrism and Regionalism (ALCRER). During the three-day workshop, participants discussed ways to improve the organization of future elections in Benin and examined the strengths and weaknesses of those institutions that organized the March elections. Participants emphasized the need for more permanent institutions to be charged with organizing elections in Benin and adopted a resolution calling for a permanent secretariat to be established for Benin's election commission.

Findings and Evaluation

The observation delegations demonstrated the US and international support for the democratic process in Benin and encouraged Beninese efforts to enhance the transparency of the process. NDI's activities during the electoral process were instrumental in promoting public confidence and widening public participation in transparent, fair and peaceful elections. Indicative of NDI's positive impact to the process, the Election Commission implemented a number of recommendations prior to the second-round election which were made by NDI's pre-assessment team and observer delegation. NDI's electoral work in Benin continued to exemplify the type of effective and multi-faceted assistance that can be provided by US NGOs.

MALI
ELECTORAL LAW AND REFORM
NDI

Background

Mali's current democratization movement was officially launched by the national conference held in July and August of 1991. The national conference resulted in the draft of a new constitution and electoral code and scheduled national elections for 1992. Despite low voter turnout and some election-related disputes, the national elections of 1992 resulted in major gains for the lead opposition party, Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali (ADEMA). The ADEMA candidate, Alpha Oumar Konaré, was elected President.

President Konaré has expressed his desire to conduct an open and transparent political process and appears willing to act to ensure that the next elections are as free and fair as possible. Konaré's government has demonstrated a commitment to creating an independent electoral commission to administer the next electoral cycle scheduled for late 1996 to mid 1997. The original constitution and electoral code created during the national conference constitute the legal framework presently in place in Mali.

Project Activities

NDI designed an electoral law assessment program for Mali in response to specific requests made by the Malian government. The project was designed to provide legal and electoral expertise to review the Malian constitutional and electoral framework. NDI opened its first program in Mali in February 1996 by deploying an international electoral law assessment mission for a series of meetings and consultations. Through their various consultations, the delegation members developed a clear sense of the issues at play on the Malian political landscape as the country prepares for the next electoral cycle. All delegates prepared reports detailing their observations and recommendations. In April, NDI compiled the delegates' findings into a final assessment mission report which was drafted in English and French.

In May, some members of the February delegation returned to Mali to formally present NDI's preliminary report and review its contents with representatives of Malian political parties, civil society, courts and the government. The delegation also convened a one-day roundtable in Bamako to discuss the report in more detail. Approximately eighty Malian political party leaders, civic organizers, jurists and government representatives attended the event and participated in discussions on comparative electoral systems, independent electoral commissions and a synthesis of NDI's findings and recommendations. At the end of the day, NDI distributed a questionnaire intended to gauge participants' reactions to NDI's report and the roundtable.

Findings and Evaluation

The NDI project was extremely successful in terms of the reception the delegation received and all interlocutors with whom the delegation spoke were very open and helpful. In particular the President, Alpha Konaré himself was extremely receptive to NDI's recommendations and supportive of their work in the country. The opposition political parties engaged in substantive discourse with the delegation's having taken advantage of NDI's advance notice that the mission would be coming in February to prepare documentation on their suggestions regarding electoral law reform.

The delegation found that Malians are deeply interested in suggestions and clarifications on various aspects of electoral systems, especially those that relate to the election administering body, the type of electoral system, civic/voter education and training of polling officials. NDI's work in Mali exemplifies the type of long-term

electoral assistance which can be provided to countries in the development of their electoral framework. It also provided political parties, particularly opposition parties, with an excellent vehicle through which they could effectively voice their opinions on the current electoral code and make recommendations for electoral reform.

The ultimate success of NDI's project was showcased in Mali's subsequent adoption of a new electoral code in September, 1996. The new law incorporates most of NDI's recommendations and calls for such measures as a 30-member independent electoral commission to oversee the country's up-coming electoral process.

UGANDA
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, DOMESTIC MONITORS AND MEDIA SUPPORT
AAI

Background

In 1994, AAI funded both an international observation mission to Uganda, and a domestic monitor training of trainers program which resulted in more than 14,000 trained Ugandan monitors being deployed on the day of the Constituent Assembly elections. AAI was also instrumental in implementing training seminars for journalists addressing the roles and responsibilities of the media during an electoral process.

Program Activities

AAI sent a delegation of ten members to Uganda to serve as international observers of the women's and general parliamentary elections held on June 20 and 27 of 1996. Working with the assistance of the Joint Secretariat for the Support of the International Observer Group, the ten-member AAI delegation was deployed throughout Uganda, visiting eighteen districts.

In preparation for observing the elections, the delegation spent several weeks meeting with government officials, the Interim Electoral Commission, political activists, media representatives, civic educators, and other interested parties. Members of the delegation also carefully studied the Constitution of Uganda, electoral statutes, civic education materials prepared for this election, and training materials used for preparing polling officials. The delegation attended numerous women's and general candidates' meetings in all eighteen districts.

The program also provided for retraining and deployment of a select group of AAI-trained domestic election monitors involved in the 1994 Constituent Assembly election. Domestic monitors were deployed in the most politically and demographically important of the 39 districts for the legislative elections. AAI provided assistance for the post-election statement and report-writing activities of the involved Ugandan NGOs, and also assisted the Ugandan and international media in objectively and accurately covering the elections throughout the entire country.

Findings and Evaluation

Based upon the overall observations of the delegation, the delegation concluded that the voting process in these elections was transparent. The elections were carried out in a calm and peaceful manner. In the polling stations that AAI observed, there were adequate supplies of polling materials, and the polling officials seemed well trained and effective. However, the AAI delegation did note some incidents of electoral malpractice which signaled the need for continued vigilance and improvement of the electoral process on the part of the officials and the electorate. These incidents did not compromise the overall manner in which the elections were conducted.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY REGIONAL CONFERENCE: MOZAMBIQUE AAI

Background

The last few years have seen a rising realization among Africans that their destiny is in their own hands. Corruption, mismanagement, and inefficiency of governments - with only few exceptions - have taken bad post-colonial situations and made them worse. The need for democratization and good governance, driven increasingly by popular demand and protest, was given further impetus with the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union.

In the spring of 1993, AAI organized and conducted a conference on civil/military relations in Burundi for eastern and central Africa. In May of 1995, AAI organized a similar conference for west Africa, held in Benin. Both events were well attended, and hailed by the African participants as a useful exercise in encouraging dialogue between the military and civilians. This conference continued on the example of past successes to study the role of the military in the democratic evolution of African states.

Project Activities

Participants from ten SADC countries attended the conference. The countries participating were asked to send six persons, three of them military, three drawn from the civilian realms of politics, civic leadership, administration, and the judiciary. The countries invited included both anglophones and lusophones, so Portuguese translation and interpretation was provided.

In addition to the SADC country representatives, a number of international experts were included as presenters. Military experts from the United States active and reserve forces were also involved, in consultation with the United States European Command. A World Bank specialist working on issues of military budget and demobilization would be included among the presenters. Professor Herbert Howe, Director of African Studies at Georgetown University coordinated the formal presentations and chaired the plenary working meetings. In all, 70-80 persons participated actively.

The conference focused on specific issues relevant to the southern African region. Topics included regional security, peacekeeping, force integration, and demobilization. In addition, individual discussion groups focused on specific issues in a smaller setting to allow for more detailed discussion.

One of the most valuable presentations in the past has been the case study, where the transition process in a country other than those represented at the conference is looked at in depth. Focus was placed upon the transition from military to civilian government in Sierra Leone as the case study for this conference. The keynote presenter for the Sierra Leone case study was Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, former Head of State of Sierra Leone.

Participants also went on a field trip to a training site for demobilized soldiers at the UN International Office of Migration in Maputo. This function served as an on-site session for participants to experience methods in retraining soldiers to become productive in civil society.

Findings and Evaluation

The civil/military conference in Maputo was a success. All of the goals of the conference were met, and both presenters and participants claimed to have benefited from the sessions. Communication and idea sharing between civilians and military

representatives opened several doorways for continued progress in civil/military relations. The US Ambassador to Mozambique, Dennis Coleman Jett and the Mozambican Minister of Defence, Aguiar Mazula were also very supportive of the conference's accomplishments.

Eritrea: Referendum on Independence

A Report by

The African-American Institute

PREFACE

Eritrea has a unique vantage point on the democratization process unfolding across the continent of Africa. Many in Africa, having thrown off the yoke of colonialism more than 30 years ago, are experiencing democratization as a second independence. But for Eritreans, the referendum held April 23-25, 1993 represents the culmination of a 30-year struggle to achieve its first independence: status as an independent nation. Having achieved a military victory in 1991, the Provisional Government of Eritrea introduced the first experience of democracy in that nation by putting the matter of independence to a vote.

As co-chairs of the AAI observer delegation to the historic Eritrea referendum, we would like to congratulate the Eritrean Referendum Commission, the Provisional Government of Eritrea and the Eritrean people on conducting an electoral process that was free and transparent, enthusiastic and instructional. The Eritrean people endured many hardships to reach this watershed event, and during the referendum, may have suffered even more by travelling great distances on foot or standing in long lines to vote.

There have been many opportunities to view up close jubilation in the aftermath of historic occurrences on the African continent. None would surpass the celebrations witnessed following Secretary General Afwerki's announcement of an independent Eritrea. We can only encourage the Eritrean citizenry to guard and cherish these freedoms for future generations.

Mervyn Dymally
Former Chair of the Africa Sub-committee
United States House of Representatives

Carl Schieren
Vice President for Programs
The African-American Institute

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is based on two AREAF funded projects for the African-American Institute participation in the April 1993 referendum in Eritrea. The initial project was for project design and provided an opportunity for AAI President, Vivian Lowery Derryck and Project Director, Stoney Cooks to travel to the region and conduct interviews with host participants, international organizations, donor countries and private citizens.

AAI wishes to acknowledge the invaluable contributions and consultations of officials of USAID/Ethiopia, Consul General Joseph O'Neill, Dr. Stephen Morrison, Dr. Woldemikael Tekle Mariam and Dr. Tekle Fessehatzion, Dr. Amare Tekle and Ms. Sewit Bocression of the ERC, Dr. Anne Forester and Mr. Michael Askwith of the UNDP, Ms. Gayle Smith, Mr. Paulos Tesfagiorgis, and the 230 participants of the Citizens Referendum Monitoring Group (CRMG).

Finally, AAI wishes to acknowledge the support and cooperation received from the AID/State joint committee and especially, Ms. Jennifer Windsor and Mr. William Douglass.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following the successful conclusion of a 30-year struggle with Ethiopia in 1991, the Provisional Government of Eritrea called for a referendum on the status of Eritrea. Eritrea was the first nation in post-colonial Africa to be militarily victorious in a secessionist war with an independent country and the planned referendum was the first opportunity in post-colonial Africa for a people to decide on independence or continued association with Ethiopia.

This report examines the referendum in Eritrea — its origins, goals and the opportunities it has presented to the Eritrean people and their new government. Chapter 1 of the report outlines the context for the referendum. It briefly describes the democratic movement now in progress in Africa and the particular problems supporters of democracy in Africa face. It then examines Eritrea itself — its history and people, its economic and political context — and focuses on the roots of Eritrean nationalism, the 30-year war with Ethiopia, and its aftermath.

Through an extraordinary effort made by the Provisional Government of Eritrea, the Eritrean Referendum Commission and the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), nearly all eligible nationals participated in the referendum held in April 1993. Women, nomads, residents of remote villages, unsentenced prisoners and even Eritrean refugees living in such distant places as the United States, Canada, Italy, Sweden, Sudan and Ethiopia were registered as voters. Virtually 100 percent of the voting population cast a ballot in favor of independence, with over 98 percent of all registered voters participating.

In order to conduct a referendum that would be considered legal and legitimate in the eyes of the international community, it was important to have international participants observing the referendum process. Thus, the United Nations (UN) was asked to supervise the referendum with assistance from individual nations, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Two days after the Referendum's conclusion — on April 27, 1993 — the UN Special Representative for the Eritrean Referendum announced, consistent with the findings of the AAI delegation, that the referendum had been conducted in a free and fair manner. On the same day, the leader of the Provisional Government declared Eritrea to be a sovereign country.

In addition to its historic significance, the Eritrean Referendum provided a unique opportunity for outside organizations concerned with democratic development to promote civic education and build indigenous capacity for sustained democratic governance in the country.

Chapter 2 of this report examines the work of one such organization during the referendum: the African-American Institute (AAI). First, the goals, operational approach and Africa-wide activities of AAI are presented. The report then discusses the specific program interventions that were designed by AAI to support the Eritrean Referendum. Finally, the primary findings and observations from the referendum are outlined, and recommendations are made for future democratic exercises in Eritrea.

The program interventions designed by AAI staff for Eritrea were based on visits to that country during the pre-referendum period. The objective of these visits was to gather information and assess needs, opportunities and constraints. AAI staff found that:

- Eritrea was in a fundamental state of transition — in spite of the call for a referendum, it was unclear whether the new leadership would embrace democratic governance in the future. Therefore, there was an urgent need to invest in processes and institutions that would help move the country toward democratic governance and away from the colonial and authoritarian regimes of the past;
- The Eritrean Referendum Commission (ERC) needed technical assistance and equipment for civic education programs; critical election related commodities were also needed;
- To build local capacity, citizens' participation in election monitoring was crucial — however, civic education and an institutional base for a new citizens' group were needed to allow this participation to take place; also, citizen monitors had to be trained, deployed and debriefed; and
- As part of an international team of observers, U.S. participation in the referendum itself was needed.

Thus, although there was no guarantee that after the referendum there would be democratic governance in Eritrea, AAI chose to organize and prepare as though this would be the case. By doing so, internal capacity to encourage a next round of democratic elections would be built, and a tradition of transparency (that is, fairness) in future elections would be established.

Under the U.S. Agency for International Development-sponsored Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF), a multifaceted program focusing on indigenous capacity building and international observer support was designed for Eritrea. The principal elements of the program were technical assistance, training, and financial and material support. The two targets of the capacity building program component were the ERC and the newly formed Citizens Referendum Monitoring Group (CRMG). To provide international observer support to the referendum, AAI recruited and sponsored a 17-member delegation of distinguished American citizens.

A number of conclusions were reached by the AAI-sponsored delegation concerning the conduct of the referendum:

- The Eritrean Referendum was conducted in a free and fair manner — there was no sign of intimidation or coercion;
- The training and organization of referendum and polling officials, workers, monitors and observers was thorough and comprehensive;
- The public was made aware of the referendum; the issues, dates, times, and places of voting; and,
- Citizen monitors played a critical role in the referendum process — they were present at every polling station visited, worked effectively with referendum officials and were often the best informed about voting procedures.

The referendum proved to be an excellent testing ground for future elections. Some procedural inconsistencies and lapses did occur, but none would have altered its outcome. An examination and correction of these anomalies would be important for future elections and the delegation recommends that:

- The ERC and civil administration carefully maintain strict neutrality and keep away from partisan politics;

- Training in proper voting procedures and ballot counting be reinforced to reduce any future possibility of error or confusion;
- Ballot box security be improved; and,
- Finger or thumbprint should not be relied on as the only form of voter identification — supplemental verification is needed.

Chapter 3 contains excerpts from AAI observer delegation reports and Chapter 4 highlights issues for the future of the democratization process in Eritrea.

The referendum revealed overwhelming support for independence and the exceptional ability of the Provisional Government and the EPLF to mobilize the country. What is still not clear is whether Eritrea will continue to move in the direction of a multi-party, fully democratic government by consent. It is important that it does. In the conflict-ridden Horn of Africa, Eritrea has unexpectedly emerged as a potential linchpin of stability and peace. A free Eritrea has international importance — not as a security base on the Red Sea for Western governments — but as an example to the rest of the region of the way in which diversity can coexist and prove to be an asset.

CHAPTER ONE: CONTEXT

1. Africa in Transition

Challenges to Democratization

For almost 30 years many African states were governed by authoritarian regimes with scant regard for citizen participation. Under such circumstances, the major institutions and processes of democracy, including free and fair elections, were compromised. During the past three years, a revolution has swept through Africa, a revolution in which citizens have demanded the opportunity to participate in decisions about who governs them. For the first time in the history of modern Africa, four countries changed government in 1990-91 by multi-party, competitive elections rather than by civil war, coup d'état or controlled succession. By late 1992, at least 22 countries had, or were planning to have multi-party elections within the next 12 months.

The democratic movement in Africa has been occurring in roughly four stages:

1. struggle
2. transition
3. election
4. consolidation.

The first stage — struggle — has been one of growing awareness that inefficient public administration and financial mismanagement have had a negative impact on development. Bankrupt economies, loss of donor funding and attention to global changes occurring in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and elsewhere have resulted in new assertions of the right to participate in governmental decision-making by ordinary citizens.

In the second stage, national conferences, other large meetings or referendums have given impetus to governments in transition. A government in transition has meant new (and often interim) leadership, or a restructured government with new or expanded top leadership. One of the primary tasks of the new leadership has been preparation for free and transparent elections.

In the third stage — electoral campaigns and elections — political parties formally compete for the right to rule. Governed by electoral codes and established laws, this phase shapes the future outlines of a country's government.

The last stage is that of consolidation. In turning to democratic governance, many Africans have anticipated that this will reverse years of steady economic, social and infrastructural decline, and attract international investment and new donor support. Once in place, a new government faces the formidable challenge of simultaneously addressing these expectations, educating the population about the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenry and strengthening the institutions of civil society. The implanting of a popularly elected, responsible government requires widespread understanding of and support for the basic institutions of democracy, building civil society and re-education for new understanding of the roles and responsibilities of citizenship.

In their efforts to adopt democratic processes and new leaders, the citizenry in Africa have had to cope with many obstacles:

- fragile democratic institutions;
- embryonic civil societies;
- illiteracy, a fact that hampers reaching potential voters;
- inexperienced electoral populations who have not had an opportunity to cast a ballot;
- poor infrastructure, meaning that it can be difficult to reach rural areas, electricity is uncertain, mail delivery is sporadic and addresses often unknown;
- understandable distrust of the electoral process as the ballot box has not been the traditional way of changing government and, moreover, elections have often been fraught with violence; and
- the rapidity with which elections are called and minimal time allowed for extensive preparation.

The impediments to democratization are poverty and declining growth. Most countries and regions are competing for limited resources. Thus, any initiative in Africa has to be balanced with genuine commitments to democratization.

An Agenda for Action

In the long term, Africans must be convinced that choosing their governments through free and fair competitive elections in which the winners are held accountable for delivering on their promises offers the best route to economic, social and political development. As a result, democratization in Africa is coalescing around four broad-based activities:

> Promoting efficacy in political participation. Leaders, civic groups and democratic development institutions are attempting to create a sense of efficacy in political participation between local populations and to strengthen their confidence in the effectiveness of open, pluralistic processes for choosing government.
>
> Introducing the idea of a competitive political environment. Supporters of democratization are introducing the concept of competition into traditional political cultures that rely on consensus for decision-making. Competitive politics is an integral part of a party-based democracy. Political parties and candidates are more willing to compromise when they experience firsthand the need to work collaboratively to achieve elected office. Civic education can reinforce tolerance of divergent

views between the citizenry and the fact that political competition need not be a zero sum game in which the penalties for losers may include deprivation of freedom and livelihood.

Ensuring the sustainability of new democratic structures and processes. Supporters of African democratization efforts are also concerned with how one sustains democratic advances, once achieved. Sustainability involves assuring that the electoral process is institutionalized, that a civic base exists in support of a rational, constitutional means of choosing leadership, and that mechanisms are in place to assure continued support during the consolidation phase of democratization.

Strengthening African capacity for long-term maintenance and sustenance of democratic institutions. Lastly, Africans must be empowered to maintain their own democratic institutions, most importantly, the institution of free and transparent elections. Much of the democratic process is learned on the job by politicians and activists in traditional cultures. However, considerable practical experience and expertise now exists in many parts of Africa and in the democratic development institutions of the major democracies. Regional exchanges, seminars, workshops and other venues are being used to facilitate both the sustainability and capacity-building aspects of democratization initiatives.

2. The Eritrean Context

Bordered by the Red Sea to the North and East, Ethiopia to the South and Sudan to the West, Eritrea occupies roughly 118,000 square kilometers (about the size the state of Pennsylvania) and has a population of 3.5 million people. During the 30-year military struggle for independence from Ethiopia, many Eritreans fled the area. Thus, as many as one million Eritrean refugees can be found living in other countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Canada, the United States, Sweden and Italy.

Principally Tigrinya-speaking peoples, nine ethnic groups reside in Eritrea, the majority of which are Christians and Moslems.

Roots of Eritrean Nationalism

Many centuries ago, present day Eritrea was part of the ancient Axumite Empire. Eritrean nationalists argue there has been no territorial connection between Eritrea and Ethiopia since that time — at least, not until Eritrea was formally annexed by the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in 1962. Eritrean nationalism is based on a shared identity that first emerged during the period of Italian colonization starting in 1895. The Italians attempted to colonize Ethiopia as well, but were defeated in Andowa by the forces of Emperor Menelik II in 1896. The Italian defeat and the subsequent Treaty of Addis Ababa established the boundaries of Eritrea as an Italian colony, distinct from the Ethiopian Empire.

Eritrea experienced colonialism in much the same way as other African states. Its land and labor were exploited by the colonial government and its traditional cultures suppressed. At the same time, Eritrea was exposed to modern technology and education, and was the recipient of a relatively solid infrastructure of roads and communications. Compared with Ethiopia, Eritrea had a much higher literacy rate, more hospitals, and a more productive agricultural sector. Not only did Eritrea develop differently than Ethiopia, it was developmentally more advanced.

A half century of Italian rule over Eritrea had a profound effect on the social and political transformation of Eritrean society. This transformation served to solidify the social and political differences of Eritrea and Ethiopia and was most pronounced in the political sphere. By the mid-1940s under British administration, Eritreans had formed

political organizations and trade unions. These organizations articulated an Eritrean identity clearly distinct from Ethiopia's, whether in support of union with Ethiopia or independence. The effects of some fifty years of colonialism and ten years of British administration had forged a strong sense of Eritrean nationalism.

The Struggle

Eritrean nationalism was fully formed during the protracted and violent struggle against the Ethiopian state following Emperor Haile Selassie's abrogation of the United Nations December 2, 1950 vote to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia. The General Assembly of the United Nations voted federation while recognizing the national identity of the Eritrean people and their territorial integrity. The mandate also provided for the respect of Eritrea's institutions, traditions, languages and religions, and promised the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Over the next decade, a series of limited-franchise elections were held in Eritrea, ostensibly to decide whether to come into union with Ethiopia. However, there was never a majority vote cast for pro-union. Soon after federation, the Eritrean constitution was suspended and political parties and trade unions were banned. Eritrean languages were replaced by Amharic in schools and in government. In 1958, the Eritrean flag was discarded; in 1959 the Ethiopian law code was extended over Eritrea; in 1960 what had been the Eritrean Government became the Eritrean Administration; and, in 1962 the Eritrean Assembly was persuaded by Ethiopian troops to vote itself out of existence.

On November 14, 1962, Emperor Haile Selassie voided the Eritrean Constitution and ended the federal status of Eritrea. Shortly after that, the Eritreans began a campaign of armed resistance to Ethiopian rule. Initially, the most prominent resistance group was the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which had close ties to several Arab countries. Eventually, however, internal disputes over strategy and tactics caused the breakup of the ELF; in 1970 another independence organization was founded, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). In 1977, the EPLF began to dominate militarily against the Ethiopian army that was now under the direction of a new dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam. By mid-1978, the EPLF controlled virtually all of Eritrea save for the city of Asmara. Much of this territory was lost later in 1978 after a massive military offensive from Ethiopia with assistance from the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany and Yemen. Nonetheless, a decade later, the EPLF launched a major counter-offensive that ultimately resulted in the defeat of the Ethiopian army in Eritrea.

Transition

Following the May 1991 fall of the Mengistu government, Eritrea became a de facto independent state. However, when the EPLF formed the Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE) on May 29, 1991, it was careful not to make a unilateral declaration of independence. Instead, the PGE assured Eritreans of its intention to hold the long-awaited referendum. Decades of attempts to resolve the question of Eritrea in the United Nations as well as the long struggle of the Eritrean people against Ethiopia had bred distrust of government. It was the PGE's intention to overcome this distrust by legitimizing the military victory through a democratic process. In addition, the EPLF and the PGE recognized that membership in, and acceptance by the international community would be based on a democratic and legal conclusion to the conflict with Ethiopia. A free and fair referendum to let the people decide the issue was the next step.

In April 1992, the PGE published two important proclamations, the Eritrean Nationality Proclamation No. 21/1992 that established conditions of nationality, and the Eritrean Referendum Proclamation No. 22/1992 that set the rules, regulations and procedures for a referendum on the future status of Eritrea. Determination of nationality and putting in place the mechanism to conduct the referendum was a high priority.

Subsequently, the PGE forcibly removed thousands of Ethiopian administrators, military related personnel and officials from Eritrea. Though there were hardships, the process of deciding who qualified to be an Eritrean citizen was completed without violence or lasting turmoil.

The legal basis for the referendum was a request to the United Nations (UN) from the Ethiopian Government in November 1992 that a referendum on independence for Eritrea be held. This was the first time the UN had been asked to verify a referendum that would ultimately lead to the secession of a region from a member state. If approved, this meant that sovereignty could legally be transferred, provided the people of Eritrea agreed. That same month, the UN Third Committee approved a draft resolution on the deployment of a UN Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER). The formal resolution was approved by the UN General Assembly and Fifth Committee and a UN Special Representative for the Referendum was appointed.

The UNOVER mission's 21-person core observer team was deployed in February 1993, three months in advance of the referendum. By April, UN observers in Eritrea had swelled to over 120 persons, representing 38 countries. Collaborating with this delegation was a 17-member observer team from the United States sponsored by the African-American Institute (AAI). In addition to the Eritrea-based teams, more than 40 UN observers were deployed in Ethiopia and Sudan to verify the vote of Eritreans in those countries, with other UN representatives in North America, Western Europe and Saudi Arabia observing the vote of Eritreans there.

The vote on April 23, 24, and 25, 1993 was overwhelmingly in favor of independence, with 99.8 percent of all voting Eritreans casting a "yes" ballot. Over 98 percent of all registered voters (1,156,280 out of a total of 1,173,706 people) voted. On April 27, 1993, the UNOVER Special Representative certified that "the referendum process in Eritrea can be considered to be free and fair at every stage..." On the same day, Secretary General Issaias Afwerki of the PGE and EPLF declared, "Eritrea is a sovereign country as of today."

CHAPTER TWO: SUPPORT FOR THE ERITREAN REFERENDUM

1. The AAI Approach

At the invitation of the Eritrean Referendum Commission (ERC) and in close consultation with the U.S. Consul General in Eritrea, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), AAI designed a program of support for the Eritrean Referendum. AAI's involvement began before the referendum was actually held in late April 1993 and was motivated by three factors:

- Eritrea was the first nation in post-colonial Africa to be militarily victorious in a secessionist war with an independent country;
- The referendum in Eritrea was the first opportunity in post-colonial Africa for a people to decide on independence or continued association; and
- The referendum was an important first step in gaining electoral experience and in establishing democratic processes and institutions.

Background

Founded in 1953 as a private, voluntary, non-governmental organization whose mission is to foster development in Africa, the African-American Institute has lengthy experience in human resource development and in building democratic institutions and processes in Africa. AAI views its work as paving the way for individual rights, ethnic diversity and the rule of law, as a foundation for sustainable economic growth and development. More than 17,000 Africans are graduates of AAI-administered short- and long-term training programs (including 2,700 graduates of Masters and Ph.D programs sponsored by AAI's African Graduate Fellowship Program). Over the years, AAI has established direct relationships with many senior political and diplomatic leaders in Africa. Likewise, AAI has strong ties with a wide range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), professionals, opposition politicians, media leaders, public and private donor organizations working in Africa.

AAI, its officials, staff and country representatives have participated in and organized civic education and election monitoring efforts in twelve African countries and two in the Caribbean. Under the AID-sponsored Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF) Cooperative Agreement, AAI and its partners are assisting democratic governance development throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.

Operational Approach

AAI is committed to developing and strengthening indigenous capacity in Africa. AAI works with local groups and organizations to develop training and civic education programs that will:

- Strengthen human resources and build local capacity;
- Further develop civil society; and,
- Encourage open, accountable, and effective governance to ensure the sustainability of democratic Institutions once the immediacy of government transitions or elections has passed.

Focussing on the electoral stage of the democratic development process, seminars, conferences, workshops, publications and forums on democratic institution building are organized. By supporting electoral processes the goal is to:

- Strengthen electoral systems and processes for greater participation;
- Enhance the conduct and monitoring of free and transparent elections;
- Increase popular confidence in the process as open, and sustainable;
- Strengthen institutions that support democracy such as civic organizations, a free press, an independent judiciary and strong NGOs, including political parties; and
- Increase civic participation in pre-election, election and post-election environments.

In addition, AAI seeks to replicate and facilitate the transferability of successful strategies from one country to another. Through its network, African experts who have developed unique responses to election-related problems are identified to be part of the technical and observer teams.

Participating as early as possible in the electoral process, program interventions are constructed around a thorough analysis of the social, economic and political environment (constraints as well as opportunities) and a needs assessment. The assessment determines the range of technical assistance and commodity inputs required. During the pre-election period these inputs may include:

- assistance with the formation of electoral commissions or other electoral authorities;
- technical assistance to electoral authorities;
- electoral code consultation;
- voter education programs;
- assistance with formulating electoral, political party and media laws;
- voter registration;
- assistance with non-partisan civic education campaigns; and
- monitoring the pre-election environment.

During elections, interventions may include:

- voter education;
- monitoring adherence to law during the official campaign period;
- support and training for non-partisan election monitoring organizations;
- observation and monitoring of elections — including organizing international election monitoring programs and international observer delegations;
- monitoring the vote count;
- arranging for independent vote counts; and
- parallel analysis of vote counts.

Training and Election Monitoring Materials

As part of its ongoing training and institution building effort, AAI has developed a Poll Monitoring Training of Trainers Manual, a general Electoral Process Terms of Reference and a Monitor Election Day Checklist that are adapted to the specific country or electoral exercise.

> The Poll Monitoring Training Manual is used in the training of trainers of indigenous non-partisan citizens' groups and democratic development institutions in the principles and mechanics of free and fair elections and election monitoring. Using the manual, these individuals in turn train other monitors. The manual describes conditions that determine an election's transparency, the types, roles, functions and responsibilities of non-partisan election monitors, and gives a step-by-step guide to what an election monitor does on election day including: checking whether the polling station is identifiable and accessible to all voters, and whether or not authorized personnel are present; establishing that requisite election materials are present; monitoring voting procedures and potential irregularities; observing the general atmosphere at the polling station; vote counting/tabulation; ballot box transfer; and, result declaration. An evaluation questionnaire for all participants has been developed as a companion to the manual to get responses and ensure its effectiveness as a training tool.
>
> The Electoral Process Terms of Reference is developed for each electoral exercise to prepare national and international electoral participants as observers and monitors. The Terms of Reference gives standard definitions for critical electoral terms, institutions, processes, and procedures. It also describes the basis of electoral law and the proper conduct of elections.

The Monitor Election Day Checklist is used by both national and international election monitors and observers to ease timely and accurate reporting. The checklist asks for detailed information on activities at the polling station itself (officials/monitors present, election materials in stock, the political environment — e.g., armed soldiers present, political propaganda in evidence, intimidation, arrests, etc.), number of voters registered, numbers voted, polling station closing activities, and counting of ballots.

2. Referendum Activities

Project Design

In planning its electoral assistance program, AAI dispatched staff and consultants to Eritrea several months in advance of the referendum to gather information and conduct a series of fact finding meetings. Meetings were held with the Provisional Government of Eritrea and Eritrean Referendum Commission officials, private citizens, international organizations (including the Organization of African Unity and the UN Development Program), and donor community (including AID) officials. The objective of the visits was to assess needs, opportunities and constraints in order to design a program of assistance that would have maximum impact. The findings included the following:

- Universal franchise was an unfamiliar idea to the Eritrean people;
- Eritrea was in a fundamental state of transition — in spite of the call for a referendum, it was unclear whether the new leadership would embrace democratic governance in the future. Therefore, there was an urgent need to invest in processes and institutions that would help move the country toward democratic governance and away from the colonial and authoritarian regimes of the past;
- Although there was concern about the precedent setting nature of the referendum and its potential impact on other regions in Africa engaged in conflict, the overriding consideration was to enable a free and transparent referendum to take place so that the Eritrean people could decide on their future;
- The newly formed Eritrean Referendum Commission needed technical assistance and equipment for civic education programs; critical election related commodities were also needed;
- To build local capacity, citizens' participation in election monitoring was crucial — however, civic education and an institutional base for a new citizens' group were needed to allow this participation to take place; also, citizen monitors had to be trained, deployed and debriefed; and
- A U.S.-sponsored international observer delegation was requested.

Thus, although there was no guarantee that after the referendum there would be democratic governance in Eritrea, AAI chose to organize and prepare as though this would be the case. By doing so, internal capacity to encourage a next round of democratic elections would be built, and a tradition of transparency in future elections established.

Under the Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF), a multifaceted program targeting indigenous capacity building and international observer support was designed for Eritrea. The principal elements were technical assistance, training and financial and material support.

Indigenous Capacity Building

The Eritrean Referendum Commission (ERC) had the primary responsibility for organizing the referendum. Critical technical and material support was provided by AAI to the ERC. This support was provided in cooperation with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which coordinated international donor assistance.

> Technical assistance was provided to officials in referendum monitor training, ballot processing, vote tabulation, voter education, the requirements of establishing a voters register and using registration cards, and in the development of civic education materials. Technical assistance also helped the ERC to focus on the lessons learned from the referendum process so that they may be used in a constructive way for future elections.
>
> Audio-Video Equipment for civic education was provided. Locally produced videos encouraging voting and explaining proper voting procedures were made for the public. AAI provided portable equipment that was used to screen civic education videos around the country in areas where there was little or no access to television.
>
> Election-related commodities were supplied, such as voter register journals, registration cards, ballot boxes and polling stations. All of these commodities were manufactured or printed in Eritrea. Due to the ravaging of schools, hospitals, community centers, and places of traditional assembly, the countryside was without suitable voting sites. Polling stations were designed as portable huts that could be stored and reused in the future.

Organizing a venue for citizen participation in referendum monitoring was not a simple task. Originally proposed by the Asmara-based Regional Centre for Human Rights and Development, the idea of a citizens' monitoring group languished because the PGE not had established rules to govern such an organization. However, a Citizens Referendum Monitoring Group (CRMG) was ultimately established with AAI assistance.

Although independent of the ERC, the CRMG worked collaboratively with the Commission, and the ERC encouraged leading citizens to participate in the group. Individuals considered as prospective CRMG members were citizens respected in their communities and representative of Eritrea's Moslem and Christian denominations, community organizations, elders, the university, local NGOs, and other independent groups.

More than 230 persons of known integrity were selected and a pointed effort was made to include women in the group. As poll monitors, CRMG members were to be deployed to polling stations in all 10 districts (Awrajas) during the referendum. Ultimately, the CRMG was able to effectively monitor several hundred polling stations during the referendum.

The CRMG was in need of technical assistance, training, media and financial support for deployment:

> Technical assistance. AAI staff worked collaboratively with the CRMG to help in defining its objectives, establishing its operations and selecting its members — as well as for deployment and debriefings on the conduct of the referendum;
>
> Training was critical to the development of the CRMG. Forty CRMG members representing the 10 districts (Awrajas) of the country were selected as trainers. Training of trainers workshops were held in mid-April at the University of Asmara, and all participants were provided

with the Poll Monitoring Training Manual, the Eritrean Proclamation No. 22/1992 and the Electoral Process Terms of Reference.

The training format included a review of the Referendum Proclamation, which served as the election law, the Terms of Reference, and the AAI Election Monitoring Manual. Discussion centered on the role of non-partisan election monitors, how to monitor and evaluate the pre-electoral environment and what happens on polling day and during the vote count. Following the discussion, a mock voting exercise was held during which participants practiced voting and observing voting while a number of scenarios were proposed, including how blind and illiterate voters were to be assisted, how monitors should interact with poll workers, and what procedures to follow if monitors encountered irregularities.

Immediately following the session, trainers were dispatched throughout the country to conduct further training sessions for all CRMG members using materials provided during the session.

Media support was used to educate the public about the existence, purpose and function of the CRMG. The training of trainers session and mock voting exercises were videotaped by Eritrean television and by Britain's Independent Television Network. Radio announcements on the CRMG were made in local languages.

Financial support was required in all of the above activities, including defraying the training and deployment-related expenses of CRMG members.

International Observer Support

In order to conduct a referendum that would be considered legal and legitimate in the eyes of the international community, it was important to have international participants observing the referendum process. Accordingly, the UNOVER delegation was given the mandate to validate whether or not the referendum was conducted in a free and fair manner. UN member countries, international organizations such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and NGOs were also invited by the ERC to participate in order to more deeply involve the international community in the referendum process and to add strength to observer numbers.

Thus, organized by AAI and funded by AREAF, a 17-member observer delegation was sent to Eritrea from the United States to take part in the referendum. To maximize coverage and resources, the AAI delegation collaborated closely with UNOVER and the ERC. Deployed to five areas of the country — Asmara, Assab, the Sahel, Massawa and Keren — the delegation visited 487 polling stations during the three-day referendum period.

The Eritrean Referendum was no ordinary election: there was no significant opposition and the likely outcome was known in advance. Unlike the UNOVER team, AAI observers were not in Eritrea to validate the legality of the referendum. Their mission was strictly to observe the conduct of the referendum. The goal was to monitor and report on the process in a manner that would be instructive for future elections in Eritrea.

Comprised of individuals with diverse backgrounds, the AAI delegation represented a wide range of institutions such as the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), universities, political action committees, non-profit foundations, development organizations and research institutes. AAI provided two distinguished Eritrean professors, living in the United States, as consultants to the delegation and the ERC.

The Voting Process

Each polling station had a number of ERC officials and workers present as well as citizen monitors from the CRMG and the community. Some officials checked voting credentials, others processed voters and gave them the necessary voting materials, and some — like the citizen monitors — observed the process.

Voters carried registration cards that were marked with numbers showing where they were to vote. Each station contained a registration ledger, a duplicate ledger and a computer printout listing all registered voters. Inside the station, voters (both male and female) filed past the registrar giving their names which were then entered into the original and duplicate registration ledgers. After the referendum, the duplicate ledger remained in the community while the original was sent to a central repository in Asmara to be verified. There were four ways of identifying voters: by photograph, signature, finger or thumbprint, or witness verification. After receiving the ballot, the voter went into a private curtained area to make a choice.

Each ballot consisted of two parts: one marked "no" (meaning the voter was for continued association) against a red background and the other marked "yes" (meaning the voter was for independence) against a blue background. The ballot was torn in half, each part folded to maintain secrecy. The red or blue ballot half was then placed in a green metal ballot box slot, with the unused portion going into a cardboard discard box. Although voters were supposed to vote in their home precinct, this was not always possible. Voters arriving at stations where they were not registered (and a good number of these were desert nomads or Eritrean refugees coming in from Sudan) voted a "tendered" or delayed ballot. Tendered ballots were verified at the central repository and thus were not immediately counted. The voter placed the tendered ballot in an envelope that was sealed and signed. This envelope was then handed to a polling official who placed it in a manila envelope with other tendered ballots.

As the voting was conducted over a three day period, there were closing procedures to be followed at the end of each day. All discarded ballots and used registration cards were burned, and ballots were locked and sealed in ballot boxes. At the end of the third day, ballots were counted in front of ERC officials, citizen monitors and if present, international observers; the count was then recorded on a form. Then, ballots were bundled into envelopes that were placed in pouches. The pouches were taped, signed and stamped, then placed in a metal box that was locked and sealed with tape. An ERC sticker was placed on the top and sides of the box holding the ballots, which was then stamped and signed by the first and second ERC officers present. A sheet on the box indicated count number, region and station information. Tendered ballots were placed inside of a stamped and sealed pouch, with the number of ballots marked on the outside.

3. Observations and Findings

Summary

The unambiguous conclusion of both the Citizens Referendum Monitoring Group and the AAI delegation was that the Eritrean Referendum was conducted in a free and fair manner. The training and organization of referendum and polling officials, workers, monitors and observers were thorough and comprehensive. The public was made aware of the referendum and the issues, the dates, times, and places of voting and, at least in the larger towns and cities, given a good orientation on voting procedures during public rallies and audio-video presentations. As a result (and in spite of difficult circumstances), the referendum went very smoothly. Every effort was made to reach all eligible voters, including women, Eritreans residing in other countries, desert nomads, residents of remote villages and unsentenced prisoners. The reported turnout was a phenomenal 98.52 percent of all registered voters.

The referendum also proved to be an excellent testing ground for future elections. As would be anticipated in a society that had not had an opportunity to conduct a national electoral exercise for at least 30 years, a number of procedural inconsistencies and lapses did occur. None would have altered the outcome of the referendum, but an examination and correction of these anomalies would be valuable for the future.

The Role of the CRMG

The CRMG played a critical role in the referendum process. It gave credence to the fact that the referendum was intended to be an honest and open expression of the will of the Eritrean people, and that the participation of citizens in the voting process was welcomed by the Provisional Government. CRMG involvement also demonstrated to the PGE that citizens could have a constructive role to play in an electoral process, could work successfully alongside election officials and could help legitimize the process.

At every polling station visited by the AAI delegation, citizen monitors were very visible. They were involved in every step of the voting process, including ballot counting, and there were no instances of conflict or tension reported between election officials and the monitors. Citizen monitors often appeared to be the best informed about voting procedures. Present at most polling stations were citizen monitors, elders, town officials and other respected citizens from the community witnessing all stages of the polling. In addition, being from the locality, citizen monitors had language and cultural knowledge that helped the process.

At the conclusion of the referendum, the CRMG presented a statement of findings to the ERC, which included:

- Polling stations opened on time, election materials were in place, and the organization needed to carry out the referendum in a free and fair manner was in evidence;
- No threats, intimidation, bribery, violence or confusion were witnessed by monitors;
- Procedures that guaranteed secrecy of ballots were followed;
- No problems were encountered during ballot counting; and
- Nothing that would affect or undermine the will of the people to vote according to their wishes was encountered.

AAI Delegation Findings

Throughout its work in observing the referendum, the AAI delegation was guided by the Electoral Process Terms of Reference and a series of analytical questions:

- Was the electoral law under which the referendum was conducted in conformity with internationally acceptable standards? Did the ERC establish reasonable rules and were the rules administered in a fair and equitable manner?
- Was there a known and reasonable appeal process?
- Were there attempts by the government to influence the results?
- Was there a conventionally organized list of eligible voters prepared in sufficient time and accessible to individuals, parties and citizens' groups?
- Were rules on voter conduct established in advance of the election and generally available to the citizenry?
- Were ballots uniform, standardized and protected against fraud? and
- Was the vote tabulation and the announcement of results transparent and timely?

From AAI delegate reports and debriefings, the following was consistently found:

Electoral Law and Referendum Rules: The electoral law under which the referendum was conducted met international standards, and was generally followed by polling officials and workers. Certainly if the letter of the law was not always followed, the spirit of the law was respected. At many polling sites, there were moments of confusion, but problem areas were identified and eventually resolved.

Preparation for the referendum seemed thorough and well-organized. Stations were set up, registration books, ballot boxes and discard boxes were in place and officials, workers and citizen monitors were present. Polling workers expressed that the training on rules and procedures they had received was adequate. The ERC had tried hard to educate the public on referendum rules, and officials reported that the pre-referendum community meetings and voter practice sessions had been well attended. Officials were also clear about rules and procedures, and many interviews with different officials produced no contradictions. Communications from Asmara to the provincial and district levels appeared to be effective.

The Appeal Process: The delegation did not witness an actual challenge to a prospective voter. Authorities may want to survey the discrepancy between the number of voters who chose to use their thumbprint rather than their signature (which appeared on their registration cards) as identification during polling. At polling stations visited by the delegation, the use of prints far exceeded signatures, even though many could write. Moreover, a print was often only a symbolic form of identification since it could not always be used to verify a person's identity: some prints were too faint or blurred. In the case of illiterate voters, witness verification of voter identity should be mandatory.

Government Influence on Results: The delegation noted that various EPLF organizations mounted active campaigns in favor of a "yes" vote on the ballot. Often, it was difficult to distinguish between the ERC's educational campaigns and those of EPLF youth groups, women's groups and other organizations. During the pre-referendum period, the level of organization and activity was clearly commensurate with what would be expected of NGOs attempting to garner popular opinion. However, during the actual voting period, more precise rules regarding campaigning in proximity to polling stations were needed; there were instances where campaigning was done in and around the polling station. In an election with multiple candidates, parties and issues, designating a zone within which all campaign activity is prohibited would be an effective measure. One delegate commented that if he had been a voter approaching a polling station surrounded by parading and celebrating citizens advocating a "yes" vote, he would have been intimidated to enter and vote "no."

Furthermore, civil administration during the voting period was very actively engaged in get-out-the-vote campaigning. Civil administrators clearly have a role to play in conducting civic education and awareness campaigns focused on electoral processes and issues. However, in a contested election, the motives of civil administrators actively transporting and exhorting voters to participate could very well be misunderstood. The participation of civil administration should be restricted to providing general and process-related information to voters.

There was no intimidation, or military/police presence throughout the voting period.

Voter Registration: National registration seemed well organized and computer printout lists of registered voters were present at most polling stations. Whether these lists were made available before the referendum to other groups was unclear.

There were some variations in how the registration ledgers were organized. In one instance, there was a register for local inhabitants and another for tendered ballots. In

another, the tendered ballots and known registrants were in the same ledger. In still another case, the computer printout of registered voters was used for tendered ballots.

Several other problems were also encountered: in some stations numbers of tendered ballots were so large, they exceeded the local population; occasionally the entries in the original and duplicate ledgers did not match; and the computer printout list of registered voters was not in evidence at every station.

Voter Conduct and Procedures: Through the media, public rallies and audio-video presentations, voters were provided with information on voter conduct and proper voting procedures. A serious effort was also made to train referendum officials and workers in procedures and practices. Nonetheless, there were procedural errors witnessed by AAI delegates, some more serious than others. For example, at one polling station a tendered ballot was processed incorrectly and at another there was confusion about the voter completion form and where it should go. In one other location, an observer observed the plight of a voter who had apparently deposited his chosen ballot (a "yes" vote) into the discard box by mistake, and was instructed by the poll worker to vote with the second part of the ballot ("no") even though this was not his choice. Clearly the worker's instruction was wrong in that it forced the voter to vote against his choice. The proper instruction should have been to discard the second part of the ballot as well, thus forfeiting the vote. Procedural errors such as these are well worth noting so that orientation and training programs for workers and voters alike can be revised to better prepare them for future elections.

Delegates observing voting in the Sahel believed the three-day voting period was essential because of the transport difficulties in getting to polling stations.

Ballots and Vote Tabulation: Ballots were uniform and simple in design. AAI observers noted that, contrary to proper procedure, many citizens chose to display their choice of vote while voting and after leaving the booth. Properly folding ballot halves (to ensure secrecy) before depositing them in the discard and ballot boxes was not enforced.

Although nothing amiss was noted during vote tabulation, issues and questions were raised by AAI and other international observers regarding ballot security. Some seals on ballot boxes were stamped but not signed. Tape used to seal the boxes could easily be removed and replaced. Instead, seals that close permanently until time of the count or count verification should be used. There was also a general lack of security regarding the ballot boxes themselves: locks could be easily picked; and, overnight security for ballot boxes was seldom adequate — boxes needed to be stored in a securely locked room without windows. There was also no clear system for what to do with unused ballots — sometimes they were stored properly in ballot boxes, but in others they were left out in the open. There were no indications of attempts to compromise the referendum process, however, security in a multi-party or multi-issue election would require more attention.

APPENDIX ONE

AREAF Evaluation

and

Partners' Response

AREAF INTERIM EVALUATION

Submitted by:
Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. THE AREAF MECHANISM

During the surge of 1992-93 elections across Africa, many of the countries which were then in transition from single party states to fledgling democracies asked for two kinds of immediate, short-term help from the United States Government (USG): technical assistance in organizing elections based upon democratic principles, and international observers to attest to the freeness and fairness of their elections.

This led to USAID's setting up an African Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF) as a rapid response, easily accessed, low AID/USG management intensity mechanism to support local and national elections in sub-Saharan African countries committed to free and fair elections. The fund provides targeted, focused assistance to governments and NGOs including: electoral assessments, election monitoring, organizing and implementing elections, civic education and training, and organizational support for election commissions and indigenous NGOs.

While focused on specific elections, the AREAF fund also seeks to promote sustainability through providing technical assistance in developing appropriate electoral codes, private and public organizational frameworks, and broad based participation in the entire process. Direct beneficiaries are African election commissions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in civic education and election monitoring, and indirect beneficiaries are all Africans who may benefit from a more participative and democratic form of government. AREAF's strategic objectives include: substantial African involvement in activity decision-making, targeting women; facilitation of transferability, and utilization of rapid-response capabilities.

Desired outputs are: improved electoral systems with wider indigenous participation, increased confidence in democratic elections, strengthened institutions that sustain democratic elections and society, and increased civic participation and education surrounding elections.

The fund is implemented through a cooperative agreement with three American NGO partners -- the African American Institute (AAI), International Republican Institute (IRI), and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), and an affiliate, the Carter Center at Emory University (CCEU).

B. PURPOSE OF THE INTERIM EVALUATION

This evaluation assesses AREAF contributions to the electoral processes across Africa, how they fit into USG d/g strategies, AREAF's continuing relevance as Africa changes, and its future role, form, and functions.

The evaluation also attempts to identify AREAF strengths that should be incorporated into the ongoing program of USAID's new Center for Democracy. It

provides specific recommendations for improving procedures during the last year of the current agreement, as well as recommendations for future electoral assistance in Africa.

C. AREAF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE AFRICAN ELECTION PROCESS

Activities

From September, 1992, through mid-August, 1994, the group of U.S. NGO partners that implement AREAF have engaged in 25 international observer missions, 16 pre-election assessments, 15 local civic group and 9 political party pollwatcher training workshops, 12 civic education and get-out-the-vote programs, and other projects such as commodities procurement and legislative training. Through all these projects (see the AREAF AT A GLANCE chart in Section IV-B), the partners have gained considerable expertise.

The partners have also intensified regional activities intended to transfer lessons learned across national boundaries in Africa. The coordinating partner, AAI, had been or was involved in five regional activities, NDI in four, and IRI in two, as of August, 1994.

Impact: USG elections assistance in Africa can be said to be contributing toward freer and fairer elections, and AREAF is part of that assistance; but it would be unrealistic to expect that AREAF projects would be able to create new democratic institutions and orientations.

It is not possible to quantify AREAF's impact on civil society, though numerous anecdotal comments can be made. In places where civil society and/or the transitional government was mobilized, AREAF was generally welcome and able to deliver timely assistance. The partners' autonomy created positive impressions, on the whole, that redounded both to the partner and the USG.

Without exception, local civic groups that worked with AREAF partners appreciate their assistance and would welcome them back. Even in countries where government officials strongly criticized a partner, they would not object to its return.

Awareness: AREAF is not perceived as a fund or consortium in places where there are AREAF activities; instead, local people become acquainted with the individual partner carrying out a particular activity. Local people seldom know that the partner's activity is funded by USAID, and neither organization publicizes the fact. Thus, "AREAF" is really only internally important to AID/State as a mechanism for facilitating rapid, short-term elections support characterized by flexible response, independent NGO management, streamlined AID/State oversight, and universal (NGO/AID/State/local/bilateral) access. In bilateral relations, political events shift quickly and a flexible assistance procedure will always be needed by U.S. posts abroad. (See Section V-B).

Appropriateness: The original choice of the AREAF partners was appropriate because their interests center in activities designed to promote free and fair elections. For example, international observer missions encourage nascent democracies to hold transparent elections and will probably be seen as needed for the next decade. Also, the presence of trained election monitors tends to deter fraudulent registration processes, and protects voting and vote counting.

While the partners' activities are important, they do not represent the full spectrum of assistance envisioned in the AREAF agreement. African governments and

USG missions often request technical assistance, but AREAF partners have generally preferred to work independently from host country governments and the USG, aligning instead with political parties and local NGOs, and to some extent with quasi-independent election commissions. Either the partners should expand their activities to provide technical and possibly other types of assistance, or the number and types of partners should be expanded by USAID.

Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability:

The AREAF cooperative agreement does not set any standards for sustainability, effectiveness, efficiency or sustainability. Whereas the needs for the first two in pursuing stated goals can be assumed, the issue of sustainability is far less clear, as most AREAF activities are short-term helpmates toward building democracies. Anecdotal comments, however, can be made.

Effectiveness: AREAF is fulfilling a need in USAID's strategic agenda in a timely fashion. At the time of AREAF's creation, USAID did not have the institutional capacity to respond effectively and rapidly to requests for electoral assistance. In addition, the USG often needed to provide such assistance in an indirect manner. Providing core funding to the consortium to initiate electoral assistance activities according to their own organizational agendas complemented USG and USAID strategic objectives.

In general AREAF has worked well in the field. Even those who were critical of the partners' concern with preserving their autonomy felt that the principles on which the consortium was rounded had been good ones. Occasional technical shortcomings occurred early in the life of the project, but considerable institutional learning ensued and the partners have acquired new skills and refined old ones.

The partners have sustained a high level of intense activity for over two years and appear to be able to continue, most likely due to a young and energetic staff, including some former Peace Corps volunteers who know local cultures and languages. Though some young staff members make initial errors, they usually make up for them in fast learning. Partners now have trained core staffs they want to keep.

The ultimate effectiveness of AREAF assistance often depends on the level of host government cooperation, rather than on the quality of the partner's activity. For example, incumbent governments sometimes refuse to credential newly trained pollwatchers on the grounds that local citizens are not neutral; elsewhere, smaller parties did not have sufficient funds to deploy their AREAF-trained monitors nationwide, or the monitors were not allowed to leave their homes, other than to vote, on election day. Thus, host country support, or at least acquiescence, should be a prerequisite to AREAF assistance.

Efficiency: AREAF projects are efficient in that they are geared to respond quickly under election timing constraints with appropriate assistance. Efficiencies have also been achieved through collaboration with the other donors such as occurred in Niger where AREAF collaborated with the U.N. in mobilizing joint international observation groups which used common recording forms, had combined briefings, and were teamed efficiently with domestic monitors for improved observational acuity.

One of the reasons the AREAF partners can operate on modest budgets is their ability to recruit pro bono experts for short-term election assignments. This also provides for specialized inputs that complement permanent staff's skills.

Sustainability: AREAF partners aim at training local groups to continue on their own. These groups will probably need less technical assistance in the future, and may need only financial assistance.

In other places, there is no evidence that the AREAF activity has led to sustained activities after the actual event. International observers missions are not

designed to be sustained as permanent activities. However the emphasis is now shifting to regional meetings which will help to promote sustainability.

Sustainability may be hampered by local law and cultural practice. In many francophone countries, elections are announced only 40 days beforehand allowing little time to fully activate and utilize partners' training.

Successes, Weaknesses, and Recommendations

AREAF work is often intensive, high profile, and controversial. There is often creative tension between partner, USG, and/or host groups, so that criticism should be expected. For example, providing assistance to one political group engenders antipathy from others, even when the AREAF partner assists them all. For the most part, the partners have developed skills that could be rated adequate to excellent for implementing most services provided by the current AREAF cooperative agreement.

Long term "successes and failures" cannot be measured because most AREAF work is short-term; however, recipients of AREAF assistance are fulsome in both thanks and explicit recollection of procedures and skills they've learned. Usually they had had no introduction to democracy or any materials on fair election practices before AREAF training. The evaluators found party members using AREAF materials to train new people and retrain others two years later. Clearly, pollwatcher training is one of the partners' most useful services and should be continued wherever possible.

Coalition Building: The partners have had some successes in fostering awareness of the benefits of building inter-party coalitions. Recipients credit the partners for helping parties to see that working together builds familiarity and trust. Occasional coalition building among political parties for certain issues is perceived as a very positive AREAF accomplishment, one that is very important. As entrenched regimes across Africa seek to fragment the opposition by encouraging many parties, democracy training should emphasize coalition building including the party in power.

Reporting: AREAF international observer missions receive high marks from opposition parties for reporting problems that would never otherwise have reached the international press and world attention. Some interviewees commented that partners' reports would have had much greater impact, and could have been more constructively used, had they been published within a few days after the election. A standardized election report format could be readily reproduced for fast publication. Also, more formal articulation by the partners of their observation standards would enable faster evaluative consensus and reporting.

Improvements: Partners have noted a variety of lessons learned that they are now applying regarding voter registration, election administration locus and codes, access to media, domestic and international observation, capacity building with political parties and NGOs. NDI appears to lead the way in picking up on lessons learned and continually trying new experiments. For example, NDI demonstrated the utility of international observer group coordination with the UN, started post election reviews involving all pertinent groups, and began parliamentarian training. The partners should be encouraged to innovate and to document their innovations.

Observer Mission Improvements and Cost Reduction: The cost of international observer missions is very high due to observers' travel and per diems. Partners have been experimenting with training and exchanging neighboring country observers to lower costs while enhancing productivity and greater observation acuity. It is recommended that DG consider limiting observer missions to countries that will allow domestic monitors to serve with the international group using preset observation standards, with all participants' signatory to a final report.

Interorganizational Relations: Whereas they have actively sought out local civic and human rights groups, AREAF partners have usually avoided working directly with

the USG and host governments, as well as with women's groups that are a USAID priority. They have also ignored students' groups and the rural world where the majority of Africans live and the needs for both civic education and voter education are the greatest. Partners should collaborate with more women's, youth, and rural groups.

Bias: A major area for concern, but one which seems to have no ready solution, relates to the perception of partner bias or partisanship. In some cases partners were seen as favoring the opposition, in others the incumbent regime. Given American competitive norms and antipathy to suppression, it is easy for partners to identify with opposition parties, or be seen as doing so.

What seems to matter are perceptions rather than actual fact. Partners should continue to strive to be impartial and convey an impression of objectivity, and should take specific steps to work with incumbent regimes as well as opposition forces, and to encourage election commissions and government election bureaus to work equally with all parties; also to foster and train domestic election, observers. They might refuse to train opposition parties unless the party in power is also provided with training.

Disassociation: Perhaps the most sensitive, high profile aspect of partners' relations with host governments lies in their independently deciding to stay in or pull out of election observation missions. Partner pull outs have been the target of both host government recriminations and U.S. embassy complaints. Policy should be established on this topic. Most respondents with field experience recommend that greater impact maybe achieved if once the project is undertaken, partners stay in and issue a prompt, factual report of what occurred both to the host nation and the international community.

Building Enabling Environments: AREAF was found to be most effective when the political environment was conducive and receptive to an opening up of the political system. Such a situation does not always obtain, and political work must be done by USG to create environments that will enable the likelihood that NGO intervention in the form of electoral assistance will be successful. Mission Democracy Committees and NGO partners need to work more closely together in this sphere during AREAF proposal development.

D. CONTRIBUTIONS TO USG, USAID AND AFRICA BUREAU D/G ARENA

Successes, Weaknesses, and Recommendations:

Rapid Response: In terms of the ability to generate rapid responses to emerging needs for electoral assistance with minimal USG administration, AREAF has performed very well. A large number of requests for assistance have been handled expeditiously and the quality of services, though differing from activity to activity and country to country, has generally been satisfactory. However, if judged by other criteria, for example, the ability to control product quality, the amount of learning resulting from activities or the likelihood of cumulative impact from AREAF activities, there appears to be scope for improvement in procedures.

Strategy Building and Implementation- The capacity of USAID and State in Washington and in the field to articulate a unified strategic agenda in democracy and governance has improved substantially over the past two years. As staff people familiar with d/g programming and collaborating with NGOs are reassigned, they take their expertise to new situations and spread the impact of d/g activities. As they have

gained experience, NGO partners have also improved the quality of their collaboration with USG missions, although inexperienced new staff often are ill at ease with both U.S. and host government officials, and so tend to avoid official contacts.

Collaboration can be improved through more assiduous Democracy Committee activity at all posts, productive AREAF (and other contractors') participation in the committee while incountry, documentation of each partner's program and institutional strategy and its relation to USG d/g strategy/in the country, and substantive USG/partner communication without compromising partner autonomy.

Skills: For the most part, the partners have developed skills that are adequate to excellent to implement many of the services envisioned by the AREAF cooperative agreement; however, there are some deficiencies as illustrated in the following summary "report card." The activities listed below are those called for in the AREAF Request for Application, and the ratings represent generalized opinion based on both field and headquarters interviews, as well as extensive readings of AREAF and related materials.

AREAF ACTIVITY	Good to Excellent	Adequate Satisfactory	Deficient
PRE - ELECTION			
Comprehensive Election Assessments			X
Diagnostic Surveys/Needs Assessments		X	
Tech. Asstnce to Elec. Supervisors			X
Civic Education, especially rural			X
Political Party Training	X		
ELECTION CAMPAIGN STAGE			
Commodities Provision		X	
NGO Pollwatcher Training	X		
International Election Monitoring	X		
Support to Electoral Commissions			X
Tech. Asstnce to Elec. Administrators			X
POST ELECTION ASSISTANCE (limited)			
Asstnace to Commn/NGO/Ed.gps, nets	X		
Legislative Training		X	

Field Communications: Missions are unclear about the full range of democracy building activities they should consider in determining their overall strategic d/g plan that might include both short-term support during transition periods, as well as longer development and consolidation assistance. AID/State Washington would improve AREAF use by more clearly and effectively communicating with posts concerning the callas and objectives of AREAF, and the manner in which the mechanism operates. It would be helpful to define short-term activities that are conducive to AREAF implementation vs those that require a long-term presence in country to be most effective.

An AREAF operations manual should be produced for use in the field. It should situate the AREAF activities squarely within the context of the USG's strategic d/g plans of and explain the rationale for the mechanism, how it is supposed to work, and the roles and responsibilities of all relevant individuals and units. This manual should be made available to all relevant USG employees in the field who might become involved with AREAF activities or an AREAF partner.

AREAF Proposals: The quality of AREAF proposals is inconsistent. These proposals seldom link assessment findings to the activities to be pursued, or proposed activities either to its own organizational strategy or to USG strategy.

The AID/State AREAF Committee should insist on tighter quality control of AREAF proposals on the part of the Senior Projects Council, on relating the partner's institutional strategy to USG policy in the country and on review of proposed AREAF activities from missions. This should not simply amount to the provision of country

clearance, but an actual assessment of the adequacy, appropriateness, and feasibility of the proposed activity given the political situation on the ground and the d/g policy of the post concerned. This should be possible since AREAF no longer has to operate in a crisis mode as it did in its early days.

Quarterly Reports: Reporting requirements set forth in the cooperative agreement are unrealistic and should be simplified as they are neither followed nor enforced. Quarterly reports should be sufficient, along with copies of each project's final report and any special interim reports or position papers they may produce for project monitoring purposes. It would be helpful to have joint inter-partner assessment criteria enabling partners to report using comparable information and shared definitions. This would enable quarterly progress analysis, project comparisons, review of lessons learned, and orderly future planning.

Self Evaluation: Partners should develop a system of self-evaluation that goes beyond that associated with training exercises. There should be more systematic attention paid to evaluating the performance of the AREAF mechanism itself as well as specific projects. This means proposals need more clearly defined goals which, however, should not be confused with unrealistic statistical or behavioral objectives.

E. RELEVANCY OF AREAF IN A CHANGING AFRICA

The political environment in Africa has changed and it's time to reassess the purposes of AREAF. The current partners need to build capacity to meet the needs of consolidating democracies where there have been initial breakthroughs. As election scenes become more sophisticated and complex, AID/State and the AREAF partners must maintain awareness of all electoral events and groups concerned in order to operate among them effectively. The partners, particularly NDI and AAI, are on the right track in actively engaging with the U.N. and IFES in networking across Africa through regional conferences for election administrators and women, for example, and with individual countries to the extent possible. Mission Democracy Committees should become more actively involved and welcomed into this network.

Moreover, the type of electoral assistance needed in Africa has changed. If AREAF is to continue, (1) more attention and resources should be devoted to mid-term transition and "consolidation" activities that start at the grass roots, such as municipal election organization, training, and districting; and, (2) the capabilities of the AREAF partners should be expanded and diversified to offer broader services through AREAF.

Moving Toward Consolidation: Consolidation activities that promote the broadening and deepening of viable civil societies and contribute toward the creation of the necessary environments for progress toward democracy should be designed and implemented. Looking to emerging needs, partners should demonstrate their capacity in more short-term "consolidation" activities such as regional networking seminars, continuing registration management, training in civic education after the introduction of a new constitution, election commission reform, and legislative training. Such activities might include basic units for school civics classes; mock election practice sessions for adults and teenagers soon to vote; municipal election organization, mayoral, city, and provincial council training; and political district mapping and administration. The AID/State Committee and partners should review partners' skills and interests in light of the full range of assistance the USG wishes to offer through AREAF and consider expansion needs.

F. AREAF FUTURE ROLE, FORM, AND FUNCTIONS

Mid-course Adjustments:

Refine and Continue Current Activities: It is hoped that the recommendations throughout this report will be helpful to DG both in improving current AREAF activities, and in establishing a continuing elections assistance capacity for Africa, whether it be called by that name or not. Indeed, such a capacity might be effectively used in other developing regions worldwide.

Test Expanded Assistance: During the final year of the cooperative agreement, the partners need to maintain services to early transition countries, but also expand services to mid-transition and new consolidation countries. To the extent the partners need different sets of skills, they should involve experts from other appropriate NGOs leading toward consortium expansion.

Long-Term Functions:

Need for Continued AREAF Capacity: Embassy staff at all posts have meager d/g capability and desire AREAF assistance. Political volatility requires flexible and unrestrictive funding support for activities driven by mission policy. There is room for expansion beyond the range of electoral assistance activities currently associated with AREAF, while at the same time remaining exclusively involved in electoral assistance.

Partner Expansion: As individual countries' experiences in democratizing proliferate, they will need a wider range of NGO assistance than has been offered through AREAF. In redesigning USAID/State's approach to electoral assistance, a judicious mix of cooperative agreements and contracts with organizations having expertise that is not possessed by the AREAF partners should be factored in. The number of NGOs involved in providing electoral assistance in Africa should be expanded.

Partner Coordination: AAI's double role as both coordinating and participating partner raises intra consortium conflict of interest concerns. The consortium has no expressed standards for deciding on country entries, leaving each partner to decide on its own program, and there is no mechanism for choosing between partners or specifying collaboration standards when partners want to work in the same country. The practice has simply been for them both to go in, which creates confusion and redundancy. Any new agreement should separate the roles of the coordinating partner and the participants.

AID and State Staff Training: D/G support is at the heart of USG policy, so mission staff will be expected to respond to election related requests for help. Department of State staff, however, are not trained in development funding and contracting to support their d/g interests. USAID field staff have divergent attitudes and know-how regarding the full range of available funding mechanisms. The field tends to use what it knows and has stretched 116-E funding to the limit for d/g activities. It is recommend that both USAID and State Department staff training programs include a functional unit on funding purposes and accessing of Embassy Self-Help, 116-E small grants, AREAF, bilateral AID-D/G, and USIS exchange programs to promote democracy.

Regional Fund Earmarking: The emphasis on more global approaches to problem solving with AID could well lead to a lack of concern for country specific issues, so it will be important to avoid marginalization of the Africa Bureau. In addition, too heavy an emphasis upon a global approach could result in needed resources not being provided or delivered in a timely fashion for electoral assistance in Africa. Ways wherein the Democracy Center and Africa Bureau may complement one another need to be sought. One way is to continue earmarking regional funds.

G. POLICY ISSUES CONSTRAINING OPERATIONS

Four related policy issues currently constrain AREAF operations and should be resolved as soon as possible.

Supporting Local Elections

AID missions and overseas Democracy Committees are unclear about supporting local elections and whether or not they should get involved. It is not clear how much interest the AREAF partners and State/AID have in local African elections, however would be a good place to start d/g assistance, especially as host governments seem to be far less concerned with local elections, leaving them largely to the political parties. AID and State need to address the policy issue of levels of support for national vs provincial vs local-municipal elections and transmit policy to the field. It is recommended that local elections assistance be strongly supported.

Election Assistance to Pre-Transition Countries

Do State/AID want to provide AREAF funding to closeout or pre-transition countries with poor debt repayment, human rights or governance performance? There are many that would argue that American interests are better served by encouraging democratization in pre-transition as well as transition and consolidation countries. This evaluation recommends that AREAF services be available to pre- during- and post-transition countries whether they have USAID missions or not.

Aid to Posts without AID Missions

Long-term USAID d/g contracting capability applies to only about half of the USG posts in Africa. The extent to which the USG and USAID wish to and/or will give ongoing bilateral assistance to closeout, non-focus, or small posts is a policy matter for State/AID consideration and decision.

There may be some merit to the position of many in USAID that "out is out" and if a mission does not have an AID operation, it should not receive AREAF support; however, few Ambassadors would probably espouse that point of view. AREAF may present an opportunity that enables the USG, through its NGO partners, to stay engaged in close-out and small countries, and even with intransigent governments, if judged appropriate by the Democracy Committee. If AREAF funding will not be available, then Global should determine, and inform posts about how to tap easy management elections assistance, if missions are expected to support, even nominally, the USG's core d/g strategy.

Disassociation with Pending Elections

The notion of USAID's working through autonomous NGOs to achieve certain d/g objectives is a sound one. Ideally, there is a prior mutual agreement between the NGO and the USG to stay in or pull out of an election, but conflicts emerge when the NGO determines it cannot effectively provide the electoral assistance it has been called upon to. For example, when it is clear well ahead of an election that it is destined not to be free and fair, the NGO itself might decide not to waste resources and risk the charge of endorsing bogus elections.

This is an issue that will have to be resolved at the highest political levels in the USG and between the USG and the AREAF partners. This evaluation concludes that greater impact can be achieved and democratic principles can most effectively be validated if the partners, once committed, stay involved and promptly document the problems they observe.

Partners' Response

to the

Draft Final AREAF Interim Evaluation Report

May 1995

Introduction

AREAF partners believe that in general, the "Draft Final Report - Interim Evaluation of African Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF)" presents a useful analysis of AREAF's purpose and partners' performance since 1992. It reflects a basic understanding of the utility of AREAF programming and the importance of the continuation of an AREAF-type mechanism. The evaluation's analysis of individual partners' performances also serves as a useful resource in planning future programs in Africa.

This document presents AREAF partners' comments on:

- Points of Agreement - These points include the evaluation's recommendation for continuing AREAF; the cost effectiveness of AREAF; and the sustainability of AREAF.
- Points of Disagreement - These points include the evaluation's analysis on working with election commissions; its misunderstanding of election observation; AREAF's proposal quality control; AREAF's inter-organizational relations; its suggestion for host country/ruling party cooperation as a prerequisite for AREAF assistance; its recommendation for policy on when to pull out of an election observation; and its concerns about consortium administration and partner coordination.
- Areas Recommended for Improvement - These include reporting requirements; program innovations; and evaluation standards.
- Suggestions for Future Election Assistance - These include the recommendation for expanding the partnership; provision of AREAF assistance to both USAID and non-USAID posts; and AREAF assistance to pre-transition countries.
- Other Issues - These include the evaluation's bias against political party training, and the unrecognized functional areas in AREAF's focus.
- Factual Errors or Omissions - These are errors where the evaluation mis-states project accomplishments of the implementing partners.

- Analysis of Country Trip Reports - Individual partners have provided explanations and/or corrections to the evaluation's analysis on relative country activities.

Points of Agreement

A. AREAF works and should be continued

AREAF partners strongly believe in the need for continued electoral assistance for Africa. As reflected in the "Draft Final Report - Interim Evaluation of African Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF)," AREAF's accomplishments in terms of its relevance as an instrument of US foreign policy in Africa; its impact; and its efficacy in Africa's democratization process, clearly support continuation.

On page 2, the evaluation states, "In bilateral relations, political events shift quickly and a flexible assistance procedure will always be needed by US posts abroad. AREAF is fulfilling a need in USAID's strategic agenda in a timely fashion. At the time of AREAF's creation, USAID did not have the institutional capacity to respond effectively and rapidly to requests for electoral assistance. In addition, the USG often needed to provide such assistance in an indirect manner."

The report also recognizes the major contributions of AREAF in Africa's steps toward good governance and democratization. The evaluation states that, "USG election assistance in Africa can be said to be contributing toward freer and fairer elections, and AREAF is part of that assistance; .... In places where civil society and/or the transitional government was mobilized, AREAF was generally welcome and able to deliver timely assistance."

As democratization proliferates in Africa, AREAF's quick response in election-related activities has been very useful in contributing to the democratization process in Africa. Furthermore AREAF ensures that the US is effective in its role as lead donor in providing electoral assistance. Since its inception in 1992, AREAF partners have engaged in 25 international observer missions, 16 pre-election assessments, 15 local civic education programs and 9 political party pollwatcher training workshops, 12 civic education and get-out-the-vote programs and other projects such as commodities procurement and legislative training. In undertaking these projects, AREAF partners are accomplishing improvements in electoral systems and processes; encouraging wider national participation in the electoral process; building confidence in electoral democracy and integrating the habits of democracy; and promoting democratic institution-building

AREAF partners interests and activities in Africa appropriately qualify them to conduct AREAF's activities. Overall, partners interests in Africa are based on activities promoting legitimate elections. Partners' knowledge of the African continent, and awareness of current issues related to democratic initiatives has equipped partners with the capability of providing appropriate electoral assistance in a timely and effective manner.

The African American Institute (AAI), the coordinating partner, was founded more than forty years ago to foster development in Africa, principally through strengthening people and improving the development of democratic institutions and processes. AAI has active country representation in Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), established in 1983, conducts nonpartisan, democratic development programs throughout the world.

NDI's programs are designed to help maintain and strengthen democratic institutions in new or emerging democracies. NDI has supported the development of democratic institutions in more than 60 countries.

The International Republican Institute (IRI) was established in 1984. IRI dedicates itself to the principal that strong and independent political organizations are fundamental to effective, representative elections and democratic systems of government. Moreover, IRI recognizes that successful elections also require the creation and maintenance of a civil society and strong electoral and non-governmental institutions. IRI has worked to enhance democratic development in over 50 countries around the world.

The Carter Center of Emory University (CCEU), which specializes in election observation, problem resolution, international democratization assessments and exchanges, is an affiliate of the AREAF Partners. Former President Jimmy Carter is often personally involved in conducting problem resolution activities.

B. AREAF's Cost Effectiveness

In reference to pages 34 and 40:

This section should be highlighted and placed in the beginning section of the final evaluation report. It is important to point out that the AREAF funding mechanism itself has been a very cost-effective and flexible means of providing election assistance to Africa. The concept of a master contract under which multiple projects are approved and implemented has allowed the AREAF partners to respond rapidly to election assistance needs with a minimum of administrative paperwork. At the same time the oversight of the Senior Committee and USAID Project Officers assures that programming is well-designed, coordinated with other activities, and timely.

This contracting mechanism has another benefit that it allows USAID funds to be used for smaller projects not normally funded individually because of high cost of preparing the initial grant agreement. It also provides a broader continuum of potential funding levels allowing a close match between needs and resources.

Adding to the cost-effective nature of the contracting mechanism is the reliance of the NGO partners on pro-bono expertise for short-term training purposes, both from the United States and Africa. Since 1992, African volunteers have participated in over 15 AREAF-country activities.

One of the most significant features of the AREAF mechanism is that its cost-effective use of pro bono experts saves the U.S. taxpayer money, and it permits the partners to utilize the wealth of experience developed by individuals responsible for similar issues under consideration in their countries. These experts are drawn from a variety of professions (i.e., political figures, civic activists, election officials, journalists) and could not have contributed their expertise if AREAF was restricted to using individuals who were only available for paid, longer-term consulting relationships. Compared with other development assistance programs, the overall cost of election assistance is very low.

C. AREAF's Sustainability and Regional Programs

On page 3, the evaluation notes that, "International observer missions are not designed to be sustained as permanent activities. However, the emphasis is now shifting to regional meetings that will help to promote sustainability."

AREAF was originally conceived as an instrument for programmatic activities in the immediate electoral period. Many AREAF sub-activities, especially in AREAF's early stage, were "traditional" international election observer missions. The evaluation is correct in pointing out that such activities have never been identified with

"sustainable" programming in a direct sense. Thus, the evaluation yardstick for sustainability should be applied carefully in these contexts.

AREAF programming has evolved over time, reflecting a greater appreciation for longer-term issues and elements that influence the creation of the environment in which the election takes place, and thus the legitimacy of the election. Depending on the focus of AREAF programming, an illustrative and non-comprehensive sampling of useful "sustainable" yardsticks that can be applied to current and future AREAF programming would include:

- The development of credible civic organizations;
- The development of innovative and useful civic education programming;
- The enhanced organizational capacity of political parties and civic organizations:
- The institutionalization of political party and civic organization election monitoring infrastructures;
- The ability of political parties and civic groups over time to positively influence policy debates on election administration;
- The creation of a capacity within African parliaments to orient and train members of parliament and parliamentary staff; and
- The ability of political parties to sample and analyze public opinion in the development of policy and campaign strategies.

Points of Disagreement

A. Working with Elections Commissions

Page 22, paragraph 2: "AREAF partners generally avoid working with Electoral Commissions . . . "

AREAF partners believe that working with political parties and civic organizations in newly democratizing countries is important. It is not, however, always appropriate to work with election authorities that may be unduly subject to the influence of or be under the control of the ruling parties. In many cases, the issue was not whether those countries had the administrative capability to organize elections. Rather, AREAF partners placed priority on assisting the capacities of contestants and civil society to effectively engage in an election and therefore make it a meaningful step in the democratization process. Partners have begun to work with government agencies, such as election commissions, in countries that have successfully undergone a first election and that have established independent election commissions.

NDI worked closely with Niger's COSUPEL, the transitional supervisory committee to the national election commission to develop an election observation training program. AAI's collaborations with Electoral Commissions have been fruitful. AAI worked productively with the election commission in Uganda, and was acknowledged by the Eritrean Referendum Commissioner for responding rapidly to commission needs with important behind-the-scenes work leading to referendum passage. IRI worked successfully with the Kenya Election Commission to identify problems with electoral procedures and to devise a code of conduct for international observers. IRI also has integrated election commissioners into its African Democracy Network. Partners successful working relationship with Electoral Commissioners, is evidenced by the November 1994 election administrators' colloquium in Zimbabwe, which has resulted in the establishment of the Association of African Election Authorities(AAEA).

B. Fundamental Misunderstanding of Election Observation

Major portions of the report reveal a basic misunderstanding of the universally-understood function, scope and operation of election observation missions. On page 25, the report surmises that "the main value of international observer missions is to put pressure on incumbent regimes to observe fair practices in the electoral law." This incorrectly implies that the proper function of observers is either to advise governments on proper election law and procedures or to hold governments to whatever electoral law they have written. Partners believe that the primary role of international observers is to be a neutral witness to an electoral process and in so doing express the international community's interest and support for the democratic process; help to raise public confidence in the election process; help deter fraud and irregularities; help to detect and expose fraud and irregularities when they occur provide domestic and international communities with valuable information about the electoral process; and provide recommendations for improvement of the conduct of elections.

On page 18 the evaluation states that the "mere occurrence of elections is not, by itself, a good indicator of democracy." Indeed, a transparent election process can be held on election day without the election being open or representative. It is the job of observers to take note of the electoral environment as a whole, and make their observations public so that reforms can be achieved.

On page 4, the report calls for "a standardized election report format" and concludes that "more formal articulation by the partners of their observation standards would enable faster evaluative consensus and reporting." Each country environment is different, however, and standardizing the various weights that should be accorded to the different criteria is impossible. The evaluation's focus appears to be on speed in calling an election "free and fair," rather than in providing the comprehensive evaluation of the electoral environment. Such an evaluation takes time, since it involves monitoring the process of vote counting and the handling of election complaints.

Also on page 4, the evaluation states, "It is recommended that DG consider limiting observer missions to countries that will allow domestic monitors to serve with international groups using preset observation standards, with all participants signatory to a final report." This requirement would detract from the flexibility that AREAF partners require when developing observation projects to fit particular circumstances. While partners seek to involve domestic organizations when appropriate, there are circumstances when this would not be advisable.

The draft evaluation makes little mention of the critical importance of post-election statements. These statements, which are often issued 2-4 days after the election, usually represent the partner's basic views about the legitimacy of the process. They are statements that garner the most public attention and, depending upon the specific circumstances, may considerably influence the views of the population as to the legitimacy of the election. Final reports merely serve to provide a more detailed, official record of the election and the organization's findings.

On pages 26 and 27, the report discusses joint operations between international observers and domestic observers as a practice that "should be replicated wherever possible." There are varying philosophies among the partners on the advisability of joint operations, although all three partners agree that we should consult and assist domestic observers where feasible. Given time constraints and credibility of reports, domestic observer assessments may be used in final election reports. Domestic observer groups are often consulted, and their views are often taken into account in such reports, even if they are not placed in special appendices.

The report in several places, discusses the "proper" number of observers. The case of Kenya is used as an example, and on page 26, the report states that most people believed the Kenyan observation mission "to have been too small to effectively moni-

tor the elections." Again, on page A2-20, the report states that "the Ambassador publicly promised that the U.S. would send at least 100 observers." While one of the main roles of international observers is to deter fraud by stationing personnel at polling sites, the principal purpose of deploying observers in the field is to achieve a representative cross section of the voting population. Properly situated, a relatively small number of people can be utilized to observe elections. The U.S. ambassador in Kenya arbitrarily picked this number at a donor's meeting in Nairobi without understanding the functions of an observer team. The IRI assessment team,with the experience of 32 observer missions since 1986, contended that approximately half that number would be adequate to achieve the cross-section necessary to render an opinion of polling day events. To have fielded more observers would have certainly satisfied the ambassador. However, it would have cost an additional several hundred thousand dollars and done little to deter fraud or enhance the cross-section. Indeed, most of the gross election irregularities occurred well before election day and were noted by the observer team.

Partners note the fact that international observer programs are expensive when compared to other AREAF activities. Currently, partners are using a blend of observers from the U.S., Europe and Africa which cuts down on transportation costs. Partners will continue to search for cost saving measures and develop alternatives to observer missions.

On pages 19 and 20, AREAF partners were criticized for pulling out of elections in Togo and Guinea and either "not living up to its obligation to act in accordance with USG policy" or failing to have "greater or more useful" impact.

The opinion expressed by the report is that witnessing a flawed election is a valid policy choice and can have a positive effect over the long term. However, the extent to which the elections are flawed must play a crucial part in determining whether to field an observation team on election day. Observers are generally sent to those elections where there is reasonable possibility for a legitimate democratic process. The minimal conditions did not exist for a credible election in Togo. By not dispatching observers to such an election, NDI and President Carter were able to publicize effectively the serious deficiencies in the process while not expending valuable taxpayer funds. Moreover, the U.S. ambassador did support NDI's decision, when the magnitude of election-related problems became clear. IRI had noted over a period of several months prior to the December 1993 Guinea election, that the electoral environment was seriously flawed. Again, this is a judgement call depending on how flawed the election process is. In Kenya and Gabon, the election process was flawed, but the decision was made to proceed with the observation mission. In Togo and Guinea, it was decided that the election environment was too flawed for any reasonable possibility of a valid election. AREAF partners are experts on making this determination and always seek to explain the rationale behind such decisions.

C. Proposal Quality Control

The report states on page 6 that AREAF proposals are "inconsistent" and recommends "tighter quality control of AREAF proposals on the part of the Senior Project Council." This contention ignores two key points.

First, AREAF proposal ideas are routinely discussed with relevant State and AID officials even before they are written. Embassies and AID missions are often notified well in advance of proposed programming, and their inputs are sought. Drafts of proposals are normally circulated among the partners before the official proposal is presented, and the standard practice is that all final proposals are presented to the partners a minimum of 72 hours in advance of official consideration. Therefore, by the time a proposal is up for consideration, the parties concerned usually have commented on the proposal. This is further evidenced by the fact that hardly any proposal pre-

sented passes the Senior Project Council without some amendment before being forwarded to the State/AID AREAF Committee for final approval.

Second, the purpose of AREAF is to function as a rapid response mechanism that allows for reactions to changing situations on the ground. Therefore, because the partners communicate about our mutual intentions, the Senior Project Council has been willing on occasion to approve what may seem to be vague language in order to allow a partner the necessary latitude to craft a workable program. This is not done often, but circumstances occasionally have required such accommodations. In these cases, however, the partner concerned will report back on the progress of more specifically defining the parameters of the program in question.

D. Criteria for Partner Involvement

> *"In practice, AID project managers express concern about the need for specified decision-making criteria, particularly with respect to country and project activity selection ....."*

The original cooperative agreement lays out some criteria for involvement. Proposals have reflected this criteria implicitly if not always explicitly. It is important to note, however, that given the scope and depth of needs in Africa for democratization assistance, much of the focus on this issue has not been on whether a particular need is or is not needed, but on how to prioritize those needs and to respond to those which carry the most potential for return on the investment.

Establishing more rigid and detailed criteria carries with it risks due to the still-nascent empirical knowledge about the relative efficacy of programmatic activities in support of democratization. In addition, the dynamic nature of political processes and the flexibility required to respond to changing circumstances differentiates democratic development work from more traditional development disciplines. This renders the task of creating standard criteria much more difficult. The "Involvement Criteria" enumerated on page 21, however, could serve as a useful discussion point for further consideration of this point.

E. Inter-organizational Relations

> *Page 4, paragraph 6: "AREAF partners have usually avoided working directly with the USG and host governments, as well as with women's groups that are a USAID priority. They have also ignored students' groups and the rural world where majority of Africans live....."*

AREAF partners make every effort to work with the USG and host governments in all phases of its programs - beginning with the channeling of requests for assistance; project design and implementation; to sharing project results.

Generally, the partners agree with the value of the broadest possible working relationships in order to advance democracy. AREAF partners have, when appropriate, actively sought the inclusion and participation of women, youth and rural activists in all phases of AREAF programs, and this approach has been successful. Limited funds often restrict bilateral programs to pressing overall needs, such as poll watcher training or civic education, which tend to touch all segments of a population. Therefore, it is seen as counter-productive to separate out members of these three groups for programming aimed only at their group, rather than to mainstream members of these groups into existing general programming. This has the benefit of integrating diverse interests into the democratization process and ending the current practice of marginalizing these groups and their issues.

Partners have frequently drawn on the expertise of women's groups to help design and coordinate training programs as well as serving as facilitators. Partners encourage the participation of women in training programs, delegations of experts and

as local partners in program activities. Partners have undertaken extensive work on the issue of women in politics and encourage women's participation in their training programs as part of AREAF's increasing commitment to democratic reform.

For example, IRI has worked with groups such as the League of Kenya Women Voters, the Rural and Agricultural Development Association (Angola) and Guinean Youths and Development, who have been valued partners in various projects. In assisting in the creation of the African Democracy Network's permanent organizational structure, IRI ensured that women were adequately represented. Currently, both the Chair of the ADN Board of Directors and the Executive Secretary are women.

Members of the Association of Women Jurists-C.A.R. actively participated in NDI's October 1994 legislative training program in Bangui. NDI worked with this organization in Benin during its 1994 political party training program, where members helped design the training program and served as faculty members in training activities. NDI has worked with MIFED, the Ivorian Movement of Democratic Women, in several programs. NDI also ensured women's participation by requiring the political parties to include women on their delegations.

In 1985, AAI sponsored a roundtable discussion on "women and political participation" in conjunction with the Non-Governmental Organization Forum at the Nairobi Conference. Since then, AAI has cooperated with the Nigerian Association of University Women (NAUW) in conducting workshops and conferences on topics including women and leadership, women in politics, voter education, political accountability and political participation. Presently, AAI is in the third phase of a two year exchange program for US and Nigerian women's organizations. The program encourages the empowerment of women with particular emphasis in politics. Also in June 1994, AAI initiated the Africa-wide consultation on women in politics and support program to women in Botswana, through Emang Basadi, a Botswana NGO. This initiative was undertaken to strengthen political participation by women in Africa. Phase one of the program was in June 1994 to support Emang Basadi's continuing voter education programs in Botswana. Phase two convened with an Africa-wide gathering of women parliamentarians in Botswana in August 1994 with approximately 60 African women parliamentarians for a three-day symposium. The meetings focused on overcoming obstacles women face in running for political office in Africa, with the ultimate goals of developing a five-year strategic plan for increasing the number of women elected to public office and examine methods for monitoring advances under such a plan and to encourage the development of a continent-wide African Women's Political Network.

F. Host Country/Ruling Party Cooperation as a Pre-requisite

On numerous occasions in the report (pages 3, 4-5, 17 and 30), it is stated that "host country support, or at least acquiescence, should be a prerequisite to AREAF assistance." It is a requirement under the AREAF process that partners receive embassy travel clearance for programming, and one of the factors the embassies use to determine the suitability of travel is the host government's concurrence, which also is signified usually by the issuance of visas.

However, the report goes beyond the necessity of government approval of AREAF programming to insist that partners "refuse to train opposition parties unless the party in power is also provided with training" (page 5). The current AREAF standard utilized is that training be made available to all parties.

The report contends that AREAF poll watcher training in Togo, Cameroon and Senegal was minimized by the government's refusal to allow domestic observers. This ignores AREAF training of political party agents and the ability of domestic groups to train political party agents. Furthermore, governments often don't make the determination that domestic groups will not be able to observe elections until just before the election. In Guinea, for example, the government entertained discussion of amending

the law to allow domestic observers until days before the December 1993 elections. It is obviously not feasible to delay poll watcher training until the last minute because this would prevent such training from being effective in the event domestic observers are allowed.

In cases in which the government/ruling party and the opposition are seriously at odds, AREAF training sometimes allows both sides to sit down together in a forum where they can discuss issues of mutual concern. However, it would be inappropriate for a competitor in national elections to co-sponsor such training. AREAF partners act as neutral sponsors of training. Government permission for training is normally sought and received, but actual co-sponsorship with governments would be unhelpful. It also would be improper, since it would give the impression of partner collaboration with the government/ruling party and undermine the neutrality the report insists is so vital to AREAF programming.

G. Disassociation - When to pull out from an election

In reference to page 5, paragraph 1: "Policy should be established on this topic (to address the issue of whether or not to pull out an election observation mission)."

Given the dynamic nature of a pre-election environment, it is unrealistic to establish a rigid policy. Rather, this option should be carefully reviewed on a case by case basis.

For instance, economic and diplomatic relations prevailing at the time, as well as security concerns, may be factors for consideration in making decisions to pull out of an election.

The AREAF partners strongly believe that the hallmark of the AREAF mechanism has been its flexibility, which has allowed the partners to develop creative and effective programs in response to an ever-changing atmosphere of democratization. Establishing a strict policy with regard to disassociation would be counter to the originally conceived nature of AREAF. In addition, it is important to consider what the implications would be if host governments knew that the partners would not pull out of an election process.

H. Consortium Administration & Partner Coordination

1. Page 8, paragraph 3: " AAI's double role as both coordinating and participating partner raises intra consortium conflict of interest concerns. The consortium has no expressed standards for deciding on country entries, leaving each partner to decide on its own program, and there is no mechanism for choosing between partners or specifying collaboration standards when partners want to work in the same country. The practice has simply been for the both to go in, which creates confusion and redundancy."

In response to a Request for Application from AID with regard to AREAF, AAI, NDI and IRI prepared and submitted a joint proposal to AID. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and AAI entered into a Cooperative Agreement to implement democratic development and electoral assistance programs funded by the Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF). As the direct grantee to AID, AAI is assigned the Project Director with responsibility for overall administration. The NDI and IRI Associate Directors work with the Project Director on overall coordination and administration. For all administrative and program activities taking place under AREAF, all three organizations are bound by the standard terms, regulations, and conditions contained in the Cooperative Agreement.

To further oversee partner activities, there is a Senior Project Council comprised of the Presidents of the three organizations. In the event that any president is unavail-

able for a meeting of the Senior Project Council, he or she designates another senior staff member to represent his or her institute at such meeting. The Council meets regularly and operates by consensus. The Council makes recommendations to AID regarding country and project selection; reviews and approves plans for each country or regional activity prior to submission for AID approval; assigns activities to partner organizations; ensures inter-organizational collaboration to maximize resources and share lessons learned; and resolves major strategic issues.

In project implementation activities, each partner organization submits to the Council through the Project Director proposals, with associated budgets for Council review and approval. Upon approval, the Council designates one of the partners as lead organization responsible for project implementation. The Project Director submits approved programs to AID for review and approval. Additionally, the Project Director and the Associate Director of the implementing organization work closely with the AID Project Officer to provide clarification as needed and work out modifications.

Partners work cooperatively and not competitively. Even though one organization may have lead responsibility for each activity, other organizations may, by mutual agreement, provide resources, including personnel, thereby expanding the pool from which activities may draw to ensure the success of implementing AREAF projects.

> *2. Page 56, paragraph 7: ".... the Senior Project Council which endorses or rejects project proposals in a not fully transparent manner.... The Consortium appears to function primarily to represent the interests and priorities of the individual NGOs, rather than as an effective instrument for advancing the state of art in electoral assistance."*

The evaluation report fails to specify why the authors believe the Senior Project Council (SPC) meetings are not transparent. In fact, the minutes of the SPC meetings are recorded and distributed to the partners and the State/AID AREAF Committee. Furthermore, the partners make themselves available at all times to the State/AID AREAF Committee and the embassies/missions for follow-up consultations. All AREAF-funded programs executed by an institute are done only after close consultation with the State Department. AID, overseas posts, and the SPC.

The conclusion implied by the statement that the "interests and priorities of the individual NGOs" are served to the detriment of "the state of the art of election assistance" is not only confusing, but possibly harmful to AREAF and the partners. All activities undertaken fall within the purview of the AREAF Cooperative Agreement. Programs are designed, executed and evaluated for the benefit of advancing democracy and US national interest in Africa, not the selfish concern of an individual partner, as implied by the evaluation.

The report acknowledges that the consortium was designed to be and has been a loose arrangement, with each institute exercising a degree of individual autonomy. AREAF was originally conceived as a loosely structured mechanism through which partners could conduct programs. More importantly, due to this very design in structure, partners have been able to develop state of the art electoral assistance. Indeed this evaluation cites many examples of innovative AREAF programming. Partners share their innovations with State/AID their African counterparts and with each other.

> *3. Page 33, paragraph 6: "They appear to stake out their own interests and express them independently. This avoids inter-partner controversy, but is not cost efficient. We recommend they compete in the future, ... or clearly define their separate in-country purpose and functions."*

The challenge of assisting meaningful electoral process in Africa is of sufficient magnitude that engaging in competition would be counterproductive in terms of resources and time.

Areas Recommended for Improvement

A. Streamlined Reporting Requirements

On pages 59 and 60, the evaluation states that "an elaborate set of reporting requirements was established in the Cooperative Agreement" and "that requirements, strictly interpreted, are exceedingly onerous, so it is not surprising they've been ignored by all concerned." The evaluation recommends that "meaningful reporting has to track a set of indicators of progress toward a desired goal."

Partners agree that reporting requirements should be simplified and that the intended use of the reports be clearly defined. Reports should not simply be generated to satisfy reporting requirements. Election assistance projects differ from other assistance projects, therefore they do not conform to requirements for standard planning reports, such as Project Implementation Plans, Annual Work Plans, etc.

B. Improvements and Innovations

On page 4, the evaluation notes that creative programming has taken place. It further urges that "partners should be encouraged to innovate and to document their innovations."

The AREAF partners agree that this is an important, and perhaps even key element in judging AREAF's effectiveness over time. Innovation requires a flexible approach. In addition, there are certainly ways to better document and disseminate information about programming, both to a USG and to a broader audience.

C. Enhance Evaluations

On several occasions in the report, for example page 7, the alleged lack of "systematic attention" by AREAF partners in evaluating the effectiveness of programs is lamented. On page 65, the report cites a partner conceptual view that every program is unique as invalidating "potential comparisons among activities and/or between an activity and any potentially applicable standards." While the partners generally agree that evaluation standards must be enhanced, there are differences that must be taken into account, such as electoral systems, legal systems, levels of democratic development, history, cultural development, etc. These differences do affect program design and evaluation, and this mitigates against rigidly uniform approaches to programming.

Nevertheless, the AREAF partners have been working to upgrade the evaluation process to reflect a more results-oriented review of the level of success of AREAF programs. In discussions over several months, the partners have been developing evaluation criteria, matched to objectives and activities, and measures progress over time in a manner that is more quantifiable. Some of these criteria include:

- independent evaluations to be conducted on a project-by-project basis;
- more sophisticated analysis of project participant questionnaires;
- tracking representative participants subsequent to project activities to determine their use
- of information conveyed;
- developing more quantifiable project benchmarks;
- implementing evaluation time lines/schedules;
- devoting more staff time/resources to evaluations; and
- conducting project evaluations over a longer period of time.

Suggestions for Future Election Assistance

A. Expand the Partnership

On page 7, the evaluations states that "The political environment in Africa has changed ..... Moreover, the type of electoral assistance needed in Africa has changed. If AREAF is to continue, (1) more attention and resources should be devoted ..... and (2) the capabilities of the AREAF partners should be expanded and diversified to offer broader services through AREAF."

Partners agree that consideration should be given to limited expansion of the consortium and should be considered solely in terms of increasing the current electoral assistance in Africa. This expansion will require an increase in funding. Therefore, partners agree with the evaluation that mechanisms should be put in place to identify and include only those institutions that can provide specialized inputs to complement and increase current activities.

B. Programming in Non-AID Presence Countries

On page 17 the report states "This evaluation team recommends that AREAF services be available to both USAID and non-USAID posts."

The evaluation thus clearly supports the concept that AREAF activities should not be limited solely to countries where AID missions are physically present. The AREAF partners strongly agree with this perspective.

AREAF programming has clearly been effective in countries where there is no AID presence. Five projects have occurred in countries where there was no AID presence (2 in the Central African Republic and the Congo, and 1 in Gabon). AREAF partners are autonomous organizations with experience in working in African environments, and there is no specified institutional requirement that an AID mission be present in-country. In cases where there is no AID mission, the AREAF partners' primary point of contact is the US embassy.

More importantly, the criteria used in closing out AID missions may in some cases be more focused on economic or other non-democratization criteria. Thus, compelling and convincing reasons may exist for AREAF programming which risk being stymied should a blanket prohibition on AREAF programming in close-out countries exist.

To cite one actual and one potential example, crucial national elections will be held in Cote d'Ivoire this autumn. The success or failure of these elections are certain to have a significant impact on the course of democratization, not only in Cote d'Ivoire, but also among francophone countries in the region. AREAF partners have a positive programmatic track record in Cote d'Ivoire and have the contacts and credibility necessary positively influence the process. Strict observance of the out-is-out rule and the resultant prohibition of AREAF programming activities in-country would thus run counter to the purpose of AREAF.

Political events may evolve in Zaire in such a fashion as to warrant AREAF programming, although substantial funds may have to be provided for meaningful programming. The history of US-Zairiois relations, as well as its size and geographic importance, would result in strong incentives, if not pressures, towards responding positively if circumstances so warranted. AREAF would not be able to do so, however, if the prohibition on activities in non-presence countries remained.

AREAF was designed to allow NGOs the flexibility to operate in the most effective manner possible. This flexibility should not be impeded by the establishment of a blanket out-is-out rule.

C. Assistance to Pre-Transition Countries

The evaluation urges that AREAF be permitted to operate in pre-transition countries (page 9); countries which have not yet placed in motion a meaningful political reform process.

The AREAF consortium agrees that carefully targeted programming may in some cases assist the democratization process in pre-transition countries. For example, support to help empower a nascent civil society movement in a given context may help to spur on political reform. In keeping with the emphasis on flexibility which AID ensured was a key underpinning of the AREAF structure, the partners agree that programming may be relevant and important in some pre-transitional contexts.

Other Issues

A. Political Party Training

The report generally ignores the importance of political party training, and this omission is most glaring in the discussion of democratization needs on pages 7 and 14. Certainly, "regional networking seminars, continuing registration management, training in civic education after the introduction of a new constitution, election commission reform, and legislative training" are all important parts of the democratization process. Political party training must be viewed as a central element in the democratization process. Political parties express the will of the people, and if for whatever reason they are unable to do so, the people who believe in their views are prevented from expressing their will through the ballot box or through the elected executive and legislative branches of government. Even if an election process is technically sound, the inability of political parties to compete would render any election less than a democratic expression of the will of the people. Therefore, political party training must be an integral part of any consolidation effort in Africa.

Moreover, the issue of bias raised several times in the report almost invariably refers to work with opposition political parties. Even though the AREAF partners abide by AID regulations on offering political party training to a cross-section of political parties, the report writers appear to believe that work involving the political opposition is unnecessarily troublesome and worth conducting only if the ruling party approves. Because strengthening of the opposition is not in the short term political interest of most ruling parties, they are often opposed to such training and may view any effort to help the opposition as biased in their favor.

The underlying theme of AREAF has been to help African countries conduct open and transparent elections and establish lasting, pluralist democracies. The likelihood of such an eventuality, however, is diminished if opposition political parties are left ineffective.

B. Functional Areas Ignored

Page 68, the evaluation cites a number of functional areas in which it asserts there has been no AREAF focus.

In fact, several of the areas cited have been the object of some of AREAF's programming.

For NDI, these include:

1. Donor Group Advisory Liaison (Niger, 1993; Burundi, 1993; CAR, 1993; and Benin, 1995);

2. Independent Election Commission building (GERDDES sub-grant, May 1994 conference); and

3. National Legislature Training (Niger, 1994; CAR, 1994).

For AAI, these include:

1. Civil and military roles and relationships (Bujumbura, Burundi, The Role of the Military in a Democracy, February 1993); and

2. Technical Assistance to Election Organizations (The Eritrean Referendum Commission, December 1992; Uganda's National Electoral Commission for the Constituent Assembly; and Madagascar's Comité National des Observateurs pour les Elections (CNOE)).

For IRI, these include:

1. Technical assistance to Election Organizations (Kenya Election Commission and National Election Monitoring Unit, Kenya Election Observation Mission, October 1992 -January 1993);

2. Local/regional/national government relations and models and international clearinghouse/information centers (African Democracy Network conference, Gaborone, Botswana February 1994); and

3. Local/regional/national government relations and models and international clearinghouse/information centers (African Democracy Network seminar, Mombasa, Kenya, March 1995).

C. Analysis of Direct and Indirect Costs (Table III - page 38)

Partners indirect cost structures vary, therefore rates differ. However, these costs are generally internally consistent if all costs not subject to indirect costs are excluded. By government regulation, within a particular fiscal year indirect costs must be applied in a consistent basis. In this light, table III and its accompanying language is confusing. If as the narrative indicates, all funds not subject to indirect costs have been excluded then the rates applied to each organization's projects should be consistent, varying only between fiscal years. Table III is also difficult to follow mathematically since it is unclear what numbers are being divided by, to arrive at the percentages cited.

Factual Errors or Omissions

A. Page 54, paragraph 6: "...Nigerian attendees learned about Benin's election management at a regional meeting in Cotonou."

This sentence should be modified to reflect that this meeting was an NDI-sponsored meeting.

B. Page 68, bullet #2: "National legislature training in committee utilization, constituency relations and service, legislative process, issues evaluation, role of the opposition, national/local budgeting and oversight, executive-legislative branch relations, function and role of party caucuses*"

This information should be modified to reflect that NDI conducted two regional training programs in the Central African Republic and in Niger.

C. Page A2-14: "After an extended assessment, IRI determined that a free and fair presidential election on December 19, 1993 was not possible, so declined to send observers."

This should be modified to read "After an extended assessment by members of the election observation team, IRI determined that a free and fair presidential election on December 19, 1993, was not possible, so declined to send the full team of observers." It should also be noted that there were two IRI observers in-country on election day.

D. Page A2-18 the report wrongly states that "the counting process was monitors {sic} by domestic observers only."

IRI not only had observers at counting stations on election night and the days following the election, but the institute had personnel at the Election Commission following the election to monitor the vote count and electoral complaints. In fact, IRI stayed in-country to monitor these developments longer than any other international observer group.

E. Page A2-20, the report states that "international observers arrived two or three days beforehand."

IRI deployed teams of observers in the field beginning early October. With the exception of a two week period in early November, IRI had multiple teams in Kenya until January 1993.

Responses to Country Reports

A. AAI

1. Eritrea, page A2-5, paragraph 4: "AAI did not organize and conduct formal training sessions, nor did they provide extensive inputs into the design of programs conducted by cooperating Eritrean organizations. For the most part, they approved of rough proposals submitted by the Eritrean organizations and provided funding or commodities."

AAI did not receive nor approve proposals submitted by Eritrean NGOs. AAI designed and implemented a multifaceted program targeting indigenous capacity building and international observer support for Eritrea. The principal elements were technical assistance, training and financial and material support. AAI worked with the Eritrean Referendum Commission (ERC) which had the primary responsibility for organizing the referendum, as well as the CRMG - Citizens Referendum Monitoring Group (CRMG): an ad hoc, indigenous assemblage of individuals respected in their communities, and representative of Eritrea's Muslim and Christian denominations, elders, local NGO's, and other independent groups.

Critical technical and material support was provided by AAI to the ERC. This support was provided in cooperation with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which coordinated international donor assistance.

Technical assistance was provided to officials in referendum monitor training, ballot processing, vote tabulation, voter education, the requirements of establishing a voters register and using registration cards, and in the development of civic education materials. Technical assistance also helped the ERC to focus on the lessons learned from the referendum process so that they may be used in a constructive way for future elections.

Organizing a venue for citizen participation in referendum monitoring was not a simple task. Originally proposed by the Asmara-based Regional Centre for Human Rights and Development, the idea of a citizens' monitoring group languished because the PGE not had established rules to govern such an organization. However, a Citizens Referendum Monitoring Group (CRMG) was ultimately established with AAI assistance.

Although independent of the ERC, the CRMG worked collaboratively with the Commission, and the ERC encouraged leading citizens to participate in the group. Individuals considered as prospective CRMG members were citizens respected in their communities and representative of Eritrea's Moslem and Christian denominations, community organizations, elders, the university, local NGOs, and other independent groups.

More than 230 persons of known integrity were selected and a pointed effort was made to include women in the group. As poll monitors, CRMG members were to be deployed to polling stations in all 10 districts (Awrajas) during the referendum. Ultimately, the CRMG was able to effectively monitor several hundred polling stations during the referendum.

The CRMG was in need of technical assistance, training, media and financial support for deployment. For these purposes AAI staff worked collaboratively with the CRMG to help in defining its objectives, establishing its operations and selecting its members. Training was critical to the development of the CRMG. AAI participated in selecting forty CRMG members representing the 10 districts (Awrajas) of the country as trainers. Training of trainers workshops were held in mid-April at the University of Asmara, and all participants were provided with the Poll Monitoring Training Manual, the Eritrean Proclamation No. 22/1992 and the Electoral Process Terms of Reference.

The training format included a review of the Referendum Proclamation, which served as the election law, the Terms of Reference, and the AAI Election Monitoring Manual. Discussion centered on the role of non-partisan election monitors, how to monitor and evaluate the pre-electoral environment and what happens on polling day and during the vote count. Following the discussion, a mock voting exercise was held during which participants practiced voting and observing voting while a number of scenarios were proposed, including how blind and illiterate voters were to be assisted, how monitors should interact with poll workers, and what procedures to follow if monitors encountered irregularities.

Immediately following the session, trainers were dispatched throughout the country to conduct further training sessions for all CRMG members using materials provided during the session. AAI provided an assistance program which included civic education, commodity support, training of domestic monitors, and international observers for the referendum of April 1993.

2. Uganda, page A2-42, paragraph 1: The Mission is positive about AAI and..., but has lingering doubts the autonomy .... AAI promised to refurbish part of a building ...

AAI did not promise to refurbish any building. Specifically, AAI provided an assistance program that included training Ugandan election monitors and civic education trainers, technical assistance to the election commission, and commodities for Constituent Assembly elections on March 28, 1993. In addition, AAI also provided Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) training to local monitors, technical assistance to the Election Commission, and sent international observers to the Constituent Assembly elections.

3. Madagascar, page A2-26, paragraph 3: "Subsequent to AAI's completion of its projects, the US Mission was disappointed by a lack of AREAF response to additional requests. The Mission wanted NDI(or is this AAI) to help strength civic education but never received ..., so went directly to NDI; but though interested, NDI did not want to venture into AAI's 'turf'."

AAI is interested in strengthening civic education in Madagascar and plans to conduct such activities in future Madagascar projects. Since this evaluation is not addressing future projects, it is in appropriate to include the Mission's additional requests.

B. NDI

1. Cameroon, page 46, paragraph 5: "All three partners have earned respect for their election observation work, especially for their materials and briefings, except in instances like Cameroon...where their findings were controversial."

This statement erroneously implies that the belief in Cameroon was widespread that NDI's report was controversial. This phrase should be more explicitly stated to indicate that only those who supported the manipulation of the process expressed the belief that the findings were controversial.

2. Niger, page A2-28 through A2-33:

This section is poorly constructed. Its syntax is difficult to understand. Subactivities are not properly identified. Furthermore, NDI strongly urges that the section on US Mission be reworked to reflect a more balanced report to include positive comment. The six paragraphs of negative reaction that were reported are in contradiction to the overall findings of the section and do not reflect NDI's overall excellent relationship with the embassy and mission during AREAF programming. NDI recommends that these conclusions be sent to the then U.S. ambassador for her review as to their accuracy.

3. Senegal, page A2-34 through A2-38 (also referred to in paragraph 3, page 57)

All statements regarding the issue of NDI's work on a proposal for AID on civic education should be removed from the report because the issue conference cited took place outside of the AREAF program. The consortium is being evaluated on its work under AREAF.

4. Senegal, page A2-37, paragraph 1: The seminar, though appreciated, had no sustainable impact for ..... . At one party headquarters ....., and will be using NDI materials and methods.

This paragraph should specifically identify the seminar referred to as the election observation seminar.

C. IRI

1. Guinea, page A2-15, last paragraph: "AID is not very informed about IRI as the Embassy Political Officer coordinated the project."

In fact, the embassy liaison for the IRI Guinea program was Alan B.C. Latimer, DCM. During his term and that of Ambassador Dane F. Smith, AID Mission Director Wilbur Thomas was kept fully informed about IRI activities in Guinea. This practice continued under Ambassador Joseph A. Saloom III, and was expanded to include daily briefings about IRI's findings concerning the political situation in Guinea.

2. Guinea, page A2-17, the first and second bulleted points state that IRI did not maintain open communications with the U.S. Embassy and that IRI failed to consult with the Embassy.

IRI maintained open communication with the embassy and AID, conducting twice-daily meetings for the three weeks preceding the December 1993 elections. The embassy consulted with IRI concerning each statement that was released in Conakry and offered suggested language for each statement. Ambassador Saloom and Political/Military Officer Edward G. Stafford, with whom IRI communicated and consulted, did not agree with IRI's decision to cancel the observer mission; they were determined that an official American observer delegation be fielded no matter what the electoral environment. This is contrary to proper standards for election observations.

3. Guinea, page A2-15, paragraph 2: "The Ministry of Interior participated in the seminars as a presenter, not as a co-sponsor, and it did not send participant trainees."

The Ministry of Interior and Security acted as presenters only in explaining the electoral law in the poll watcher training. The government agency responsible for managing the elections was the same one responsible for internal security, and therefore, it would have been counter-productive and irresponsible for IRI to have utilized this agency as a co-sponsor. MIS officials facilitated as liaisons with local government officials in other training as mutually agreed because local officials would not uniformly respect documents sent by the ministry from the capital. MIS officials did observe training where appropriate and reported learning a great deal about the democratic process. The ruling party, PUP, participated in civic education, political party and poll watcher training, although level of attendance tended to vary by region.

4. Guinea, page A2-16, the report, assessing only the poll watcher training portion of IRI's project, states that "there was little effective impact."

This charge is belied by the report's own mention of the multiplier effect of the training of poll watcher trainers in the third paragraph of that section and in its mention of the long-lasting nature of political party training as exemplified in Kindia, where party coordinators still use IRI materials (misidentified as NDI materials) in the first paragraph on page 51. The evaluation report depended on information provided by Edward Stafford, who, new to the post, was largely unaware of IRI programming before the election observation mission. The report's conclusions on IRI's effectiveness are based largely on sources resentful of IRI's decision to pull out officially and considers only one-quarter of IRI's program in Guinea.

5. Guinea, in several places in the Guinea field observation, including the first point under the "Lesson Learned" section on page A2-16 and the sixth point under that section on page A2-17, the report accuses IRI of being biased and of failing to maintain neutrality.

The report, however, fails to provide anything other than government allegations of bias and fails to note that IRI worked with the government and the ruling party cooperatively throughout the project, until the election observation portion. IRI had been reporting to both the Embassy and AID for a number of months that the government was not committed to an open and transparent electoral process. On this, IRI and the embassy under Ambassador Dane Smith were in agreement.

6. Guinea, in the final point in the "Lessons Learned" section on page A2-17, the report accuses IRI of trying to force the GOG to "knuckle under to USG election norms."

IRI's criticism of the election was based on Guinean electoral law and not allegations of the political parties or USG election norms. IRI presented a detailed listing of the violations of Guinean electoral law which both the GOG and the Embassy refused to consider.

7. Guinea, page A2-17 in bullet item 9: "Since IRI will no longer be working in West Africa, any new partner..."

IRI has stated that it will be concentrating on eastern and southern Africa. It has never been the position of IRI that the institute will no longer work in West Africa.

8. Kenya, page A2-22, the report contends that "the presence of 160 international observers at 40% of the polling places may have limited the vote manipulation to the other 60% of the polling places."

The contention that only 40% of the polling stations in Kenya were monitored is inaccurate since the number of observers does not necessarily correlate with the number of stations covered. IRI did coordinate with other international observers and domestic observers so that more stations would be visited. This statement is a facile use of statistics to try and make a point about a complex political situation and is another example of the evaluators lack of understanding of what they were evaluating. The report states "the 'bottom line' was not changed and a corrupt undemocratic government was 're-elected'." This implies that had IRI done something differently, the outcome would have changed. IRI would be interested in examples from the evaluators of where the mere presence of observers has changed the outcome of a patently unfair election process.

9. Kenya, page A2-20, the report accuses IRI of having "little contact with the GOK or the Electoral Commission."

IRI had cordial working relations with the GOK, and discussed a number of issues in meetings with the Office of the President, the Attorney General's Office and the Ministry of Foreign Relations and International Cooperation, which had appointed ambassadors as liaisons with IRI and met with IRI each day.

10. Kenya, page A2-20 and page A2-21, the report states that IRI did not seem to have "considered working with the Electoral Commission."

Actually, in addition to working with the Election Commission on observing the process of counting ballots and electoral dispute resolution, IRI advised the Commission on its electoral procedures, leading to a change in the training regimen for polling station officials, and IRI devised the standards for international observers that was accepted by the Kenya Election Commission and utilized for the December 1992 elections.

11. Kenya, page A2-18, the report states that "the counting process was monitored by domestic observers only."

IRI not only had observers at counting stations on election night and the days following the election, but the institute had personnel at the Election Commission following the election to monitor the vote count and electoral complaints.

12. Kenya, page A2-20: "The Ambassador publicly promised that the U.S. would send at least 100 observers, but IRI felt a much smaller delegation would suffice."

The report criticizes IRI for not sending the 100 observers Ambassador Smith Hempstone had recommended, but it never analyzes why 100 observers were needed from the United States. IRI worked with Joel Barkan, the AID democracy and governance adviser, in targeting polling stations that needed to be covered and liaised with foreign and domestic observer missions to ensure that necessary coverage of polling stations was achieved. The figure of 100 U.S. observers was not the result of informed analysis, but rather apparently was motivated by the embassy's desire to field the largest international observer team. The team fielded by IRI still was the largest observer team, but was more efficiently targeted and cost-effective.

13. Kenya, page A2-20, the report states that "IRI either arrived too late or stayed too short a time for maximum effectiveness."

IRI arrived in Kenya on October 28, less than a month after being asked to field an election observation mission, and except for a few weeks in early November, the institute maintained a constant presence in Kenya until approximately one week following the elections. At no time does the report indicate what IRI might have done during the brief window that its personnel were not on the ground. Without enunciated parameters and benchmarks, the term "maximum effectiveness" has no meaning.

14. Kenya, in the first paragraph on page A2-21, the report states that IRI was either late in releasing a report on the elections or "too cautious in reporting on the elections."

IRI released two reports prior to the election regarding the prevailing electoral environment in Kenya. IRI examined the electoral law and election administration, the political parties, civil society and the media through detailed interviews throughout the country. There were two statements on the elections themselves issued within one week of the election itself discussing the overall conduct of the elections and problems that were documented. The comprehensive report followed by several weeks and examined the aftermath of the elections. The reports and statements issued by IRI were comprehensive in their detail on the electoral environment and on the conduct of the election itself.

15. Kenya, page A2-22: "IRI didn't promise very much. They imagined they could support the multiparty transition' by `demonstrating international support for democracy in Kenya, disseminating information on international democracy standards and criteria, deterring electoral fraud and reporting outcomes and processes to the international community."

This statement is consistent with the naiveté of the report writers in assessing the role of international observers. IRI, as a neutral observer of the Kenyan election process, was heeded to a greater extent than domestic observer groups, who often were considered tied to local interests. Moreover, IRI was more thorough and more forthright in its analysis than most other international observer groups. The ability to identify standards and examine the Kenyan election in the context of those standards was the whole point of the election observation mission. No election observation mission can legitimately hope to determine the outcome of an election.

16. Uganda, page A2-41, the section entitled "Project Reception" states that UJCC "knows less about IRI's work."

The evaluators seem to put great stock in the opinions of both NOCEM and UJCC. While these are fine organizations, the IRI program was not focused on these organizations and our contact with them was limited to informational briefings. Therefore, any opinion these two organizations provided the evaluators should be treated as secondary.

Very little space is devoted to the opinions of political party leaders and no mention is made of candidates and candidate agents, the very people to whom the program was geared. IRI assumes that the evaluators did not take the time to interview candidates that had participated in the IRI program.

17. Uganda, page A2-41-42, describes the "complex" relationship with the USG.

The evaluators have reported only the USG's perspective on this point and failed to raise this issue with IRI. IRI found its relationship with the embassy, especially Ambassador Johnnie Carson, to be of the highest caliber. However, dealings with AID mission were frustrating and hampered IRI's work in-country, especially during the several months after Carson left his post and before the new ambassador arrived. Democracy and governance advisor Norman Olsen attempted to micro-manage the program to the point that IRI finally was forced to delay programming. The U.S. embassy later apologized to IRI for these problems. In a letter to IRI, the ambassador stated that the problems were due to "so many personal changes at the embassy and in Washington, but also because of the view some held (mistakenly as the new team came to know), that such training would be too sensitive in the current political atmosphere."

18. Uganda, page A2-42, "The Mission has sought IRI's cooperation since the election on a training session for women parliamentarians, but recently abandoned their efforts due to lack of IRI responsiveness."

Had the evaluators taken the time to ask IRI about this episode instead of simply including the mission's perspective in their report, they would had learned that, given the immediate democratic needs of Uganda, IRI gave a higher priority to political party development. IRI informed the mission of this opinion and referred them to another U.S. NGO that could provide appropriate training.

19. Uganda, page A2-42, Under the section entitled "Project Impact," the report states, "IRI's activities are likely to have been relatively inefficient due to the low turnouts at the earlier sessions; however, it is very difficult to measure the outcomes of IRI's activities."

This evaluation is flawed on several fronts. First, the evaluators offer the conjecture that the IRI program was "likely" to be inefficient. However, they offer no supporting findings to backup that claim. The team attempts to make training session attendance the sole criteria for success/failure. Finally, the evaluators simply give up, declaring that the program was "very difficult to measure."

These statements are irresponsible and demonstrate the inadequate methods of the evaluation team. The totality of the team's judgement on the IRI program was that it was "likely" to be inefficient. This cannot be accepted as a sound or complete conclusion. They continue their statements by wrongfully reasoning that if attendance was low at training seminars, then the program could not be successful. The evaluators have ignored the fact that only a small number of people (candidates and their agents) were targeted to participate in the program. Therefore, to link attendance with success is simplistic and reveals the team's poor understanding of the program.

IRI's evaluation of the program is much different. IRI invited registered candidates and their representatives to the series of nationwide seminars and conducted evaluation interviews immediately after the sessions. Follow-up interviews were carried out several months after the election to gauge participants' opinion of the relevancy of the instruction. In both interview regimes, participants consistently stated that the training was very useful and aided them by familiarizing them with the general principles of democracy, balloting/counting procedures, ballot security measures, and their rights under the election law. The most consistent negative comment by the participants was that the training did not last long enough.

IRI's assessment of the program is echoed in the statements of Ugandans interviewed by the evaluation team (See "Project Reception," page A2-41).

20. Uganda, page A2-43, "Democratic elections do not always have to be multiparty elections."

While IRI acknowledges that some types of democratic elections can be held without the participation of political parties, IRI strongly disagrees with this statement in the context of the Ugandan elections. While the Ugandan elections were administratively sound, many Ugandans would have preferred the range of policy choices and the competition that breeds accountability that can be found only in multi-party elections. Given the concerted and longtime efforts made by the USG and the AREAF partners to foster healthy parties, IRI urges that this statement be deleted from the draft.

APPENDIX TWO

AREAF Tables and Charts

AREAF Distribution of Funds by Project Area



Focused Assistance
Observation
Regional Networking
Training

AREAF TRAINING



Africans Trained by AREAF Programs by Year and Organization

	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	TOTAL
AAI	68	21,000	465	12,547	34,080
NDI	14,850	2,825	648	140	18463
IRI	770	7,420	188	0	8378
TOTAL	15,688	31,245	1,301	12,687	60921

COMMODITY ASSISTANCE

YEAR	COUNTRY	AREAF PARTNER	RECIPIENT	COMMODITY
1992	KENYA	AAI	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	INDELIBLE INK
	NAMIBIA	NDI	NAMIBIA BROADCASTING CORPORTION	
1993	ERITREA	AAI	REFERENDUM COMMISSION	VOTER REGISTERS, BALLOT BOXES, REGISTRATION CARDS, MOBILE VIDEO EQUIPMENT, POLLING STATIONS
1994	UGANDA	AAI	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	FAX MACHINES, TWO-WAY RADIOS, ANTENNAS
			UGANDA JOINT CHRISTIAN COUNCIL	COMPUTERS, PRINTER
	ZIMBABWE	IRI	ZIMRIGHTS	FAX MACHINE, TYPEWRITERS, COPIER
	REGIONAL	IRI	AFRICAN DEMOCRACY NETWORK	COMPUTERS
1996	UGANDA	AAI	UGANDA JOURNALISTS	FAX MACHINES
	BENIN	AAI	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	INDELIBLE INK, BALLOT BOX SEALS

AREAF Assistance by Country and Region

COUNTRY	ASSIST.	DATES	$ APP	INST.
OAU	Regional	14-18-Sep-9	$29,874	AAI/NDI
CAMEROON	Presidential	11-Oct-92	$249,515	NDI
GUINEA	Leg & Pres	19-Dec-93	$586,839	IRI
NIGER	Pres. #1 Pres. #2	14-Feb-93, 26-28-Mar-	$439,235	NDI
TOGO	Pres & Leg	25-Aug-93	$420,000	NDI
CAR	Pres. & Leg.	17-Oct-93	$154,748	NDI
RWANDA	Leg & Pres	TBD	$125,000	NDI,IRI
GHANA	Pres. Leg.	03-Nov-92 29-Dec-92	$453,822	CCEU



As of: 06/30/96

Duration *Progress*

Cummlative Total Approved: $14,907,182

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AREAF Assistance by Country and Region

COUNTRY	ASSIST.	DATES	$ APP	INST.	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
NAMIBIA	Reg & Local	30-Nov - 03-Dec-92	$395,000	NDI	NAMIBIA 10/15 6/29				
KENYA	Pres. & Leg	29-Dec-92	$1,044,916	IRI,AAI	KENYA 10/26 5/31				
ERITREA	Referendum	23-25-Apr-	$465,470	AAI	ERITREA 11/19 4/28				
DJIBOUTI	Leg Pres	18-Dec-92 07-May-93	$35,240	AAI	DJIBOUTI 12/13 12/20				
SENEGAL	Pres Leg	21-Feb-93 09-May-93	$559,029	NDI	SENEGAL 12/6 7/31				
MADAGASCAR	Pres #1 Pres #2 Leg # 1	25-Nov-92 10-Feb-93 16-Jun-93	$538,530	AAI	MADAGASCAR 11/15 6/30				
GERDDES	Regional	Feb - Jun -93	$550,599	NDI	GERDDES 1/31 6/29				
LESOTHO	Leg	27-Mar-93	$149,756	IRI	LESOTHO 2/27 3/31				

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Duration *Progress*

Cummlative Total Approved: $14,907,182

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AREAF Assistance by Country and Region

COUNTRY	ASSIST.	DATES	$ APP	INST.
BURUNDI	Pres Leg	01-Jun-93 29-Jun-93	$431,021	NDI
GUINEA BISSAU	Leg & Pres	07-July-94	$237,605	IRI
CONGO	Leg #1 Leg #2 Leg #2 repeat	02-May-93 06-June-93 03-Oct-93	$128,885	AAI
MALAWI	Referendum	14-Jun-93	$61,733	NDI
GABON	Pres & Leg	05-Dec-93	$365,666	AAI,NDI
UGANDA	Cons. Assmbly, Election Observation	28 Mar 94 June 96	$1,280,447	AAI,IRI
DEMOCRACY NETWORK SEMINAR	Regional	Sep-93 March-94	$549,245	IRI
ELECTION ADMIN. COLLIQ.	Regional	Jun-Aug-94	$212,104	AAI,NDI



As of: 06/30/96

Duration *Progress*

Cummlative Total Approved: $14,907,182

AREAF Assistance by Country and Region

COUNTRY	ASSIST.	DATES	$ APP	INST.	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLID: NIGER, MALI, BENIN	Regional	Nov 1993-March 1994	$177,602	NDI	DEMOCRATIC CONSOLID: NIGER, MALI, BENIN 4/1 9/1				
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLID: BURUNDI, CONGO, GABON	Regional	10 Oct 94	$246,503	NDI	DEMOCRATIC CONSOLID: BURUNDI, CONGO, GABON 4/1 9/1				
TANZANIA	Municipal Legislative	October 1994 October 1995	$109,755	IRI AAI/NDI	TANZANIA 12/1 12/1				
CHAD	Pres. Leg.	April 1995	$20,000	AAI	CHAD 12/1 2/1				
AFRICAN WOMEN IN POLITICS	Regional	March 1996	$366,959	AAI	AFRICAN WOMEN IN POLITICS 4/1 4/1				
BENIN	Local National Pres	1994 1995 1995	$690,433	NDI	BENIN 3/1 6/30				
ZIMBABWE	Leg. Pres	03/94 - 09/95	$125,000	IRI	ZIMBABWE 8/3 9/30				
CIVIL/MILITARY CONFERENCE	Regional	2/93 6/15-18/96	$292,719	AAI	CIVIL/MILITARY CONFERENCE 6/1 3/1				

As of: 06/30/96

Duration *Progress*

Cummlative Total Approved: $14,907,182

AREAF Assistance by Country and Region

COUNTRY	ASSIST.	DATES	$ APP	INST.	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
SIERRA LEONE	Pres. Leg. Regional	2/26 - 27/96 3/15/96	$577,748	AAI					SIERRA LEONE 2/26 3/15
MALI	ASSESSME	2/96	$198,534	NDI					MALI 2/1 4/4
CAPE VERDE	Technical Assistance	02 Feb 96	$170,354	AAI					CAPE VERDE 2/1 6/6
COTE D'IVOIRE	Pres Leg. Reg. Leg.	15 Apr Cct. 95 26 Nov 95	$1,087,306	AAI,NDI				COTE D'IVOIRE 4/19 6/26	
W. AFRICAN WOMEN	Regional	2/29 - 3/3/96	$199,046	AAI					W. AFRICAN WOMEN 2/29 3/4
AAEA	Regional	4/28 - 4/30/95 6/20-23/96	$177,087	AAI				AAEA 4/28 5/2	
PAN AFRICAN DESIGN	Reegional	May - July 95	$99,633	NDI			PAN AFRICAN DESIGN 5/1 7/31		
THE GAMBIA SURVEY MISSION	Regional	Apr 95 - May 95	$59,401	NDI			THE GAMBIA SURVEY MISSION 4/11 5/1		

As of: 06/30/96

Duration *Progress*

Cummlative Total Approved: $14,907,182

275

AREAF Assistance by Country and Region

COUNTRY	ASSIST.	DATES	$ APP	INST.	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
MOZAMBIQUE	Pres	28 Oct 94 31 Oct 94	$175,892	AAI			MOZAMBIQUE 11/1 | 11/5		
ZAMBIA	Pol. Party	3/96 4/15 - 6/30 96	$576,528	NDI					ZAMBIA 4/6 ▓ 6/30
EVAL. AREAF PROG. ACT.	Regional	5/96 - 6/27/96	$92,403	NDI					EVAL. AREAF PRO 5/23 ▓ 6/27

As of: 06/30/96

Duration ▨ *Progress* ▬

Cummlative Total Approved: $14,907,182

276