

PD ABL-563
45884
UNDP



PROJECT MOZ/93/016

**ASSISTANCE TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
IN MOZAMBIQUE**

FINAL REPORT

*USAID Assistance provided under
MOZAMBIQUE DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT (656-0227)
and through grant no. 656-0227-G-00-4025-00 to UNDP.
Grant amount: \$9,157,500. Duration: April 94 - April 95.*

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Technical Assistance Team

April, 1995

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NOTES:

1. The original of this Report was written in portuguese, except Sections IV and V of Part II which were originaly written in english.
2. Part I was written by the CTA of the Project, F. Bruno Soares. Each Section in Part II was written by the Coordinators and/or Advisors of each area, whose names are referred to in the Sections.
3. The portuguese original of Part I has 4 annexes, 3 of which were not translated into english (TSAE Plan of Actions; list of registration and voting materials; Report on the situation and future use of equipments purchased by the Project).

PART I

GENERAL REPORT

D

INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND TO PROJECT MOZ/93/016

The General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed in Rome on 4 October 1992 between the Government of Mozambique and Renamo brought to an end a devastating war which had lasted for more than 16 years.

Protocol V of the GPA established the "Timetable for the Implementation of the Electoral Process", according to which elections for the Assembly of the Republic and the President of the Republic would be held one year after the signing of the Peace Agreement. The same Protocol V and Protocol III also established that the Government should request the United Nations to provide technical and material assistance for the electoral process and to participate in supervising them.

Project Moz/93/016, signed in Maputo on 13 May 1993 by the Minister of Cooperation of Mozambique and the UNDP Resident Representative, was conceived in response to this request. It provided for technical assistance for the organisation of the elections as well as the mobilisation and coordination of international support for the electoral process.

The United Nations Department for Development Support and Management Services (UNDDSMS) fielded two missions to Maputo (December 1992 and January-February 1993) in order to prepare the project document and discuss it with the Government, by way of the Ministry of Justice. The final version was approved in April and signed on 13 May 1993.

2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

The immediate objective of the project was to help organise and carry out free and fair elections in Mozambique - the first multiparty general elections - and thus ensure one of the basic conditions for political stability and the reconstruction and development of the country.

The project's medium-long term objective was to contribute, during the implementation of the electoral process, to the creation of national institutional and technical capacity for the organisation of future elections in Mozambique.

3. CONCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT

In order to achieve these objectives, the project was to provide technical assistance for the National Election Commission (NEC) and the Technical Secretariat for the Administration of the Elections (TSAE), once these were established, and prior to this, for the "Interministerial Elections Commission".

From the very beginning, it was conceived as an "umbrella project", which would integrate and coordinate all the international community's financial, material and technical contributions and assistance to the election process. This concept was to be of the utmost importance, since it permitted cohesion, coordination and mobilisation of donors around the process, thus avoiding gaps or duplication in assistance. The involvement of UNDP as the coordinator of donor assistance was a determining factor in the final outcome of the project.

The first version of the project (May 93) was just the "seed", which produced the larger UNDP programme in Mozambique. Initially financed by a USD 670 thousand IPF loan, this version ensured basic technical assistance and the establishment of the institutional framework through which donor contributions amounting to USD 59.1 million were to be channeled.

Starting with a small nuclear team of 4 advisers, who arrived in Maputo on 14 March 1993 under a technical assistance contract financed by the European Community, in its most intensive phase the project mobilised 90 people of 26 different nationalities, including 16 international advisers and experts, 43 United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) and 31 administrative support staff.

Working both at central (23 people) and provincial level (67 people), this team assisted the Mozambican electoral authorities in the organisational, training, civic education, logistical, juridical, social communication and financial management aspects of the electoral process.

The team worked in a decentralised manner, leaving the team members assigned to each activity area and each province with considerable scope for initiative, within the framework of the pre-established objectives, timetables and common guidelines. In each area the team members tried to work closely and permanently with their Mozambican counterparts in order to avoid the creation of barriers between advisers and counterparts. This ensured that their work was more effective and there was a permanent transmission of know-how.

Apart from the resulting difficulties - in the coordination within the team and in the clear definition of the "borders" for the technical assistance - this "philosophy" was a key element in the project and made a substantial contribution to the success of the support provided to the electoral process.

4. RESULTS ACHIEVED

The electoral process in Mozambique occurred in an extremely complex politico-social context, the resulting of mutual distrust between the parts involved, the social breakdown and physical destruction caused by the war, the return of thousands of refugees and the internal movements of displaced populations.

The Mozambican people's clear desire for peace, the efforts of the main parts involved to achieve reconciliation and political understanding, the favourable international context and the support of the international community were decisive in overcoming the difficulties, misunderstandings and crises which were inevitably to arise throughout the process.

Strong, coherent and independent direction by the National Elections Commission, and the dedication and civic and patriotic awareness of the tens of thousands of Mozambicans who conducted the electoral process, were decisive in overcoming obstacles and achieving its fundamental objectives.

The election results, announced in public by the Chairman of the National Election Commission on 19 November 1994, were accepted by the parts, and the elections recognised as free and fair by the United Nations and the international community. Many observers consider them to be an example to be followed in other countries in Africa.

With their peace process, the Mozambican people have given a lesson to the world, creating new hope for their country and for other peoples and nations undergoing serious internal conflict.

UNDP, UNDDSMS and the technical assistance team can take pride in having contributed to this success, working and living intensively the difficulties, advances and setbacks of the process with their Mozambican colleagues and counterparts.

But, in addition to the immediate political results of the elections, the electoral process also gave Mozambique the opportunity to train and directly involve in the elections more than 64,000 people (2,600 members and officers of the electoral structures; 8,000 registration agents, 1,600 civic education agents, 52,000 polling station officers), to acquire registration and voting materials, to carry out voter registration for the first time in Mozambique which can be used in the future, to acquire more than 200 vehicles of various kinds as well as other logistical and technological equipment, and to obtain unique experience in the preparation of an electoral process conducted under complex and difficult political and material conditions. **This represents an experience and a patrimony - human, material, and information - which can form the basis for the forthcoming local elections.**

5. CONTENT OF THE REPORT

Given the context in which the project operated, it is difficult to separate out the electoral process as a whole from the technical assistance provided by UNDP/UNDDSMS. To a certain extent, this report reflects this difficulty, in that the description and analysis of the development of the process includes the technical assistance which supported it for more than two years.

It is also virtually impossible to separate out the activities financed through the various funding sources and methods (project MOZ/93/016 cost sharing, the Trust Fund of MOZ/93/BO2, and parallel financing by various donors), since the process was treated as a coherent whole, requiring an integrated approach to its various phases and components.

This report is aimed at the entities and persons who followed closely the whole electoral process: the NEC, Government, donors, UNDDSMS, UNDP. It will therefore not detail ("write the history") all the moments of the process. It will rather analyse the essential content and the most relevant steps in each phase, identify the main problems which arose and the solutions adopted, and assess the work done by UNDP and the technical assistance team.

Since it is a Technical Assistance Report, it will not cover extraneous issues, except in instances where they had a substantial influence on this assistance and on the development of the electoral process itself.

Wherever necessary, the main text, prepared by the Chief Technical Adviser (CTA), refers the reader to Part II, which contain the reports of the advisers responsible for the various technical assistance areas (Organisation, Logistics, Training, Civic Education, Social Communication and Financial Management), thus avoiding repetition and gaps, and permitting a more careful analysis of more general issues and the insertion of the process in its overall context.

CHAPTER 1

OVERALL SETTING OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

1. THE COUNTRY SITUATION

Mozambique is a large country covering a total of 799,380 km². It has 4,330 km of land borders with Swaziland, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania and 2,470 km of coastline.

While the population - estimated at about 15.6 million (1993) - has Portuguese as their official language, they speak more than 14 national languages, eight of which are spoken by significant population groups.

The war between the Government and Renamo, which started in 1976, had tragic consequences for the country and the Mozambican people, aggravated by serious droughts in 1991/92. By the time the General Peace Agreement was signed on 4 October 1992, the net results of these dramatic years were about 1 million dead, 1.5 million refugees in neighbouring countries, 4 million people displaced internally, 1 million mines scattered throughout the country and the massive destruction of economic and social infrastructures.

At that time Mozambique was, and still is, one of the poorest countries in the world, with a GDP per capita of less than USD 90 dollars (USD 87 in 1992), with an illiteracy rate of more than 80%. Its social and economic fabric was in shreds.

The country is heavily dependent on external economic and financial assistance, illustrated by the fact that more than 60% of the state budget is supported by external grants and finance. Under these circumstances, the weight and role of the donor community in Mozambique is crucial and indisputable.

2. THE GPA AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

This was the context in which the General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed in Rome aimed to achieve peace in the country - including the demobilisation of the two opposing armies and the formation of a single national army - and to start a democratisation process which would culminate in the holding of general elections for the Assembly of the Republic and the President of the Republic.

The long and destructive 16-year war between the Government and Renamo had traumatic consequences for the people and created a profound and permanent atmosphere of distrust between the signatories of the Peace Agreement, and between these and other political and social entities involved (political parties, social and religious organisations).

The establishment of security (individual and collective) and mutual confidence was a constant requirement throughout the peace process, resulting in successive advances and setbacks, reformulations and negotiations, in which the United Nations - acting principally through the ONOMUZ peace-keeping mission - and the international community, played an important role.

In addition, the war situation and the resulting fragility and gaps in public administration meant that there was no information about the real situation in some parts of the country (the resident population, accessibility, usable infrastructures). This meant that solutions had to be adapted to this reality as it became known.

As an integral part of the peace process, the electoral process could not be isolated from this context, nor could it be separated from the other components, in particular the assembly and demobilisation of troops and the formation of the single national army, the demining programme, the return of refugees and the integration into public administration of areas controlled by Renamo.

The conception and development of the electoral process had to reflect the principles laid down in the GPA, and at the same time respond to the enormous human, material, organisational and financial difficulties presented by the country's situation. It also had to contain the safety mechanisms, transparency, impartiality and independence which would ensure its strong credibility before the former belligerents, the Mozambican people and the international community, and hence acceptance of the election results.

Many of the technical and organisational solutions - from the preparatory stage to registration and the vote - were determined by this constant concern for credibility and acceptance. The consequences often influenced effectiveness, implementation deadlines and costs, although the final result has undoubtedly been positive.

The rule of decision by consensus in the NEC, the composition of the electoral bodies, the use of security materials in the registration and vote (voter's card, ballot paper) and strict controls over the production, transport, storage and distribution of these materials, the use of helicopters to gain access to difficult areas in the interior, are just some of the many examples of the solutions adopted to make the process as credible as possible.

Initially anticipated for October 1993, one year after the signing of the GPA, the elections were eventually held one year later, on 27-28-29 October 1994.

It soon became clear, just a few months after the Rome Agreement, that this delay of one year was inevitable. Indeed, not only the initial steps in the electoral process were delayed - the preparation and approval of the Electoral Law and the establishment of the National Election Commission (NEC) - but also all the other essential components of the peace process were successively delayed, with immediate consequences for the election timetable.

3. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The traumatic experience of Angola, where demobilisation and the creation of a single army were not concluded prior to the election date, had a positive influence on the way the Mozambican process was handled, leading to greater interdependence between the steps taken on the various fronts of the peace process. Indeed, references to Angola were constant throughout the Mozambican process, and influenced it in various ways.

In addition, the influence of the changes in neighbouring South Africa and Malawi, should not be underestimated. Elections (April and May 1994 respectively) altered substantially the political scene in the region and had a strong positive influence on the political and social atmosphere in Mozambique, to some extent counteracting the "Angola trauma".

The international community's commitment to the Mozambican peace process, and that of the United Nations in particular, the desire to make it a success story, was also a highly positive factor.

This commitment was decisive in making such a complex, lengthy and expensive process feasible.

4. CONDITIONING FACTORS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

The country's specific reality and the political, economic and social context could not but influence the electoral process, from its conception to the practical implementation of the solutions identified.

The following areas in particular were affected:

- **Political:** reflected, for example in the lack of mutual trust between the main parts involved in the peace process, which thus required finding solutions which were acceptable to all, but complex and slow to implement;
- **Operational:** as in the logistical field where various means of road and air transport had to be acquired, used and made available for the electoral structures;

- **Financial:** given the additional costs of the solutions which had to be adopted, and the subsequent need to resort to substantial funds from the international community.

The electoral process was conceived and implemented on the basis of:

- **institutional solutions** which were independent of the public administration and politically "shared" at all three levels (central, provincial and district);
- **organisational solutions decentralised** to provincial level, and to a large extent to district level;
- **high security technical solutions subject to strict political control.**

It is clear today that such solutions were insufficient to avoid accusations of fraud - usually not duly proven - by Renamo and some other parties, but it is also clear that they were **vital in order to ensure that the conditions of the electoral process guaranteed its credibility and acceptance by the Mozambican people and the international community, and made a decisive contribution to its extraordinary success.**

On the other hand, however, they produced an excessively heavy electoral apparatus, with complex and time-consuming decision making processes, loss of effectiveness and efficiency in the executive bodies (TSAEs) and in their chains of direction, increased costs and subsequent dependence on the donor community.

CHAPTER 2

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

1. THE PRELIMINARY STAGES

"Officially", the electoral process in Mozambique lasted for a short period of about nine months. Indeed, the National Election Commission (NEC) took office on 11 February 1994 and the final election results were announced publicly by its Chairman on 19 November.

In effect, however, this nine-month period cannot be analysed independently from earlier periods which contributed to the establishing the basic conditions for the implementation of the electoral process.

These periods, which we can term preliminary stages, comprise the following:

- **the negotiation and signing of the General Peace Agreement (1990-October 1992),** Protocols III and V of which defined the fundamental principles of the electoral system and the timetable for the first multiparty general elections;
- **the Rome Donors' Conference (15-16 December 1992),** where the Government presented a global budget for the electoral process and obtained significant funding commitments from the international community;
- **the period between the Rome Conference and the Multiparty Conference (December 92 - July 93),** which included the following:
 - * the beginning of permanent technical assistance for the "Interministerial Elections Commission", financed by the European Community (14 March);
 - * presentation of the Government's draft Electoral Law to the political parties (26 March);
 - * signing of the MOZ/93/016 Project Document - Support for the Electoral Process in Mozambique - by the Minister of Cooperation and the UNDP Resident Representative (13 May);
 - * the Donors' Conference in Maputo, designated a "Follow-up Meeting to the Rome Donors' Conference" (8-9 June);

- * the preparation and discussion of the first version of the Action Plan for the preparation of the electoral process (May-June);
- * the launching of the international pre-qualification tender for the supply of materials for voter registration (30 June);
- **the Multiparty Conference and the proclamation of the Electoral Law (29 July - 28 December 93), a period which included the following:**
 - * seven weeks of debates, interruptions, advances and setbacks in the Multiparty Conference, which ended on 17 September, without having got beyond Article 16 (Composition of the NEC);
 - * monthly donor meetings ("Aid for Democracy Group"), coordinated by UNDP, to exchange information and mobilise support for the electoral process;
 - * the visit to Mozambique by the Secretary General of the United Nations (17-20 October) which helped unblock some important issues in the peace process (the assembly and demobilisation of troops, the Electoral Law, etc.);
 - * a meeting between the President of the Republic, Joaquim Chissano, and the President of Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama, which made it possible to formalise various agreements (Understandings) on the Law and the electoral structures (24 November);
 - * the launching by the Government of the international tender for the supply of materials for the voter registration, financed by the European Community (10 December);
 - * approval of the Electoral Law by the Assembly of the Republic and its proclamation by the President of the Republic (28 December; Law 4/93).
- **the period until the NEC took office (28 December 93 - 11 February 94), which included:**
 - * revising, updating and improving the "Action Plan" for the electoral process, including new phasing and a new implementation timetable;
 - * the reception and evaluation of bids, and the adjudication of the supply contract for voter registration materials (early February);

- * appointment by the Government and the political parties of the 20 NEC members and their subsequent unanimous appointment of Dr. Brazão Mazula as Chairman of the Commission;
- * swearing in of the NEC by the President of the Republic (11 February 1994).

2. STAGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

2.1. The TSAE Action Plan

When the NEC took office, this marked the official start-up of the electoral process, the beginning of the implementation stage.

Although the preliminary stages established some basic conditions for the beginning of the process, in practice virtually everything still had to be done.

The frame of reference for the implementation of the process was the "TSAE Action Plan" mentioned above, conceived and prepared by the technical assistance team in collaboration with Mozambican counterparts appointed by the Interministerial Election Commission.

This plan, and its respective phasing and timetable, were presented to the NEC in a series of sessions, which began on 15 February 94.

The Plan had the following structure and components:

- . Organisation;
- . Training;
- . Civic Education;
- . Transports and Communications;
- . Information Technology

and programmed the development of the electoral process through the following five stages:

- . 1st stage: Preparation and Inception
- . 2nd stage: Voter Registration
- . 3rd stage: Preparation for the Electoral Act
- . 4th stage: Electoral Act and the Count
- . 5th stage: Publication of Results and Termination
of the Process

The TSAE Action Plan and its timetable were an important instrument for the organisation of the elections and provided a permanent frame of reference for their preparation and implementation.

By articulating the various stages and components of the process, the Action Plan helped it to be seen as a whole and gave it internal coherence, while at the same time permitting monitoring and control of its various components.

2.2. 1st Stage: Preparation and Inception (11 February - 31 May 94)

This stage contained the most important steps for the organisation, recruitment, installation, equipment and funding and "start-up" of the electoral machine, namely:

- the internal organisation of the NEC and the central TSAE and the official appointment of the latter (26-27 May);
- the appointment, organisation, installation and training of the electoral commissions at provincial (took office by end March) and district level (April-May), and the respective TSAE offices, totalling more than 2,600 people;
- the supply and distribution of the materials for the voter registration (April-May);
- the recruitment and training of 8,000 registration agents and 1,600 civic education agents (April-May) and the production of manuals and other training materials (see Part II - Section II);
- the preparation and launching of the civic education campaign (May) supported by the respective promotional materials: posters, leaflets etc. (see Part II - Section III);
- the launching of international tenders (May) for the supply of vehicles (purchase and hire), camping materials and foodstuffs, and for the hire of planes and helicopters etc (see Part II - Section I);
- the establishment of funding agreements between UNDP and donors, and the materialisation of the first financial contributions for the electoral process, through cost-sharing (Project MOZ/93/016) and the Trust Fund, established through a document signed in April between the Minister of Cooperation and the UNDP Resident Representative (see Part II - Section V).

As the process evolved, the electoral timetable was adjusted accordingly. Consequently, on 31 March, the Chairman of the NEC announced in public that voter registration would begin on 1 June and would end on 15 August.

These dates were subsequently confirmed by an official notice of the NEC, published on 28 April.

On 11 April, a Presidential Decree fixed the dates of the elections: 27 and 28 October 1994.

On the whole, this 1st stage was perhaps the most difficult and complex of them all, both politically and from a technical and organisational point of view.

The atmosphere of distrust and political conflict, the inexperience and professional and institutional insecurity of the members of the electoral structures, the lack of almost everything - from funds to vehicles, buildings and furniture, particularly in the provinces and districts - coincided in this stage with the need for immediate practical activities to launch the process and to meet the (tight) electoral deadlines.

The need to reach consensus within the NEC sometimes caused delays in taking decisions, thus provoking operational difficulties in the work of the TSAE. However, with hindsight the importance of this procedure by the NEC is recognised, contributing to its internal cohesion at critical moments in the process and to the image of coherence, independence and reflection it conveyed to Mozambican public opinion and to the international community.

Shortcomings in the functioning of the central TSAE and difficulties in establishing correct articulation with the NEC were perhaps the greatest obstacle to the correct development of the process at this stage, causing delays in decisions and in the implementation of activities, and hampering the provision of assistance to the provincial structures. Although the situation improved slowly over time, this problem persisted throughout the electoral process.

The reasons for these shortcomings can be related to the following:

- the "political sharing" of the TSAE resulting from the "understandings" of 24 November 93 (50% of the members appointed by the Government, 25% by Renamo and the remaining opposition parties, 25% by the United Nations for technical assistance) and the persistence of "party blocks" with strong mutual distrust;
- the existence of substantial professional and salary differences among members of the same level but with different origins (seconded by the public sector or coming from other sources);
- internal instability caused by substantial delays in defining hierarchical positions and appointing TSAE technical staff;

- the limited experience of operational work and the frequent absence of some important members of this structure;
- poor management and coordination methods at various levels.

Under these circumstances, the pondered and firm NEC leadership, the dedication and spirit of sacrifice of the thousands of Mozambican cadres spread throughout the country - many of them young people - and support from UNDP and the international community, were determining factors in meeting the first "historical target" of the electoral timetable: the beginning of registration on 1 June 1994.

This undoubtedly also resulted from the correction of conceptions and strategies in the Action Plan ("cascade training", decentralised operations, the conception of the organisation of registration etc.) and the prior identification of the action required.

Throughout this 1st stage, the technical assistance team was strengthened, with the arrival of the first group of UNVs (end March) and three advisers for civic education, social communication and legal matters (May).

From 21 April onwards, the monthly meetings of the donor "Aid for Democracy Group" became fortnightly meetings of the "Electoral Monitoring Group". The group retained the same composition and continued to be coordinated by the UNDP Resident Representative, but the meetings now concentrated exclusively on the development of the electoral process and donor assistance to this process.

2.3. 2nd Stage: Voter Registration (1 June - 2 September).

Initially planned to run from 1 June to 15 August, registration was extended twice:

- from 15 to 20 August
- from 24 August to 2 September

These extensions were decided by the NEC, initially due to the existence of special cases (Art. 57 of the Electoral Law) and later due to alterations to the Electoral Law approved by the Assembly of the Republic (23 August), which permitted an extension to 2 September, and expanded its coverage to all eligible Mozambican citizens and to the whole country.

These extensions arose essentially in response to three kinds of situations:

- the need to complete or intensify registration in rural areas where the process (for political and/or logistical reasons) had been subject to delays, namely, areas controlled

by Renamo (districts of Muanza, Cheringoma, Maringué, Chigubo and Mavago, for example);

- the need to register as many returning refugees as possible;
- the need to register recently demobilised soldiers, or those demobilised during the extension periods, and who had returned to their home areas.

Registration was undertaken by 1,600 brigades, each with 5 members (1 supervisor, 1 photographer, 2 interviewers, 1 card issuer), totalling 8,000 agents.

Calculations as to how many brigades would be necessary were based on the estimated number of voters (8.5 million), the number of working days for registration and an average daily rate of about 80 registrations/brigade.

Many of these teams worked in rural areas which had been severely affected by the war, and thus required assistance in the form of camping equipment and food.

The registration materials for each brigade were provided in a set of numbered metal boxes (kits) containing all the items necessary for registering 3,000 voters, from a Polaroid camera to pens and registration forms. The concept of the complete kit - which was to be used again for the voting phase - proved to be extremely effective and secure, and permitted rigorous planning and control in the distribution of materials. In all, 1,600 "registration kits" were distributed.

Registration resulted in three documents:

- the Voter's Card, printed on security paper, with a black and white photograph of the voter, and covered in plastic;
- the Voter Registration Form, an A4 sheet containing information identifying the voter, his/her photograph, signature and finger print;
- the Electoral Register containing a list of the voters registered by the brigade, up to a maximum of 1,000 per register.

For the registration period as initially planned (2.5 months) it was estimated that each brigade could register about 5 to 6,000 voters. The brigades were distributed and located on the basis of this estimate of voters. In some places where people were more dispersed it became necessary to send teams out to the more distant populations, while attempting not to exceed a radius of 10 km (2 hours on foot).

At the beginning, the process faced many difficulties, particularly with regard to organisation and logistics. Indeed, the first vehicles only arrived in the provinces at the end of June-early July. The constant failure of suppliers to meet deadlines and time-consuming customs procedures were the main causes of the substantial delays in essential supplies.

There were also difficulties and delays in obtaining and distributing food supplies for the registration and civic education brigades, particularly during the initial registration period. Assistance from WFP - which provided its traditional products (maize, beans, oil, sugar) and the acquisition of canned fish, plus the payment of cash allowances, helped alleviate this situation. However, the problem of food for the brigades was not completely resolved, particularly in rural areas which were hard to reach.

In addition, many district structures in some provinces still had no funds, installations, furniture etc. The central TSAE continued to work deficiently and had difficulty in articulating with and supporting the provinces.

From 9 June onwards 3 light planes became available (in Maputo, Beira, Nampula) and 6 large helicopters (Inhambane, Beira, Quelimane, Nampula). During this initial period they had to make up for the lack of road transport, with serious consequences for operating costs.

These problems were gradually reduced throughout July and August, owing to the purchase and hire (at central and province level) of various kinds of vehicles.

Support for the registration brigades - blankets, tents, food - also improved, although delivery deadlines were frequently not met and there were distribution problems, particularly in the rural areas.

This situation forced the provincial and district structures and the brigades themselves to try and resolve problems on their own, sometimes with help from the population. In many instances, however, only the spirit of sacrifice and commitment to the process kept brigade members at their posts for days or weeks on end in very precarious living conditions.

The number of voters registered each week rose steadily from about **260,000 in the first week** (1 - 6 June) to maximum of almost **700,000 in the 7th week** (11 - 17 July), subsequently falling to about **300,000 in the final week of the extension** (29 August - 2 September).

At the end of the process, 6,363,311 voters had been registered, surpassing the expectations of many observers (when registration started some people considered that it would be difficult to register more than 4 million!).

This final figure corresponds to about 81% of the estimated 7,894,850 voters, a figure "officially" adopted by the NEC during the 2nd national Meeting of Electoral Bodies (25-27 July), on the basis of calculations by the Directorate of Statistics.

The number of potential voters had previously been estimated at 8,500,000 and it was this number which had served as the basis for calculating many aspects of the process (registration materials, number of brigades required etc.). However, it was found that this figure had been overestimated and it was subsequently corrected. It is possible that even the corrected figure (7,894,850) is still overestimated, but it was not possible to obtain more precise data at the time.

Throughout this period there were serious financial management problems at central and provincial level. Despite the transfer of substantial amounts by UNDP to the central TSAE, administrative and banking procedures delayed the provision of funds in the provinces and districts, interrupting cash flows and thus affecting the productivity of the electoral structures.

The problem of the emigrant vote was a "hot subject" throughout the months of June and July. The TSAE made a study of the subject which, after various improvements, was submitted for consideration by the NEC. Since there was no consensus within the NEC as to the existence of conditions for holding elections abroad (Art. 11 of the Electoral Law) voting by emigrants, and thus their respective registration, did not take place.

The problem of the computerisation of the count was also the subject of special attention by the NEC and the political parties. The doubts and distrust raised about the possibility of "computer fraud" - aggravated by recent news of sabotage of the electoral computer system in South Africa - delayed approval of computerised solutions and the respective (technical and political) guarantees from February (presentation of the Action Plan) to August.

The identification of technical errors and irregularities by registration brigades led to frequent and persistent accusations of fraud by Renamo and the other opposition parties. This resulted in complicated situations to which the NEC and TSAE tried to respond, correcting the most serious situations and giving guidance as to future action. Nevertheless, these problems were subsequently reproduced during the Preparation of the Electoral Act stage, when the TSAE issued Instructions 28 and 29, which provoked much heated discussion.

The existence of these errors - except for some isolated cases of fraudulent voter registration - was essentially due to poor training and qualification, and the limited educational level of the brigade members recruited in some districts, aggravated by poor (or non-existent) integration and monitoring of the work done by the brigades (see Part II - Section III).

In general, however, and despite the enormous difficulties encountered on the ground, voter registration was a success, and made a decisive contribution to the credibility of the electoral process in the eyes of the Mozambican people and the international community.

Various factors could have contributed to this success. Among the most important was the mobilisation undertaken through the civic education campaign and by political, civic and religious organisations. In addition, the fact that the voter's card (with a photograph) was of high, durable quality, and was the only identification document which many people possessed, served to mobilise many potential voters. Underlying this mobilisation there was also the Mozambican people's strong desire for peace and change.

Given the current circumstances in Mozambique - the fallibility of demographic statistics, inadequate and poor Civil Identification (Identity Card) coverage, the return of refugees and substantial population movements - registration was essential in order to identify the electoral universe, how many voters there were and where they were. It also provided the fundamental basis for planning correctly all the components of the electoral act (how many polling stations and where, election materials, the logistical resources required, the training plan etc.).

Throughout this 2nd stage various activities were begun in preparation of the following stages, namely:

- the tender and adjudication for the supply of voting materials;
- the preparation and production of training manuals for the 52,000 polling station officers and refresher courses for the 1,600 civic education agents, and starting the respective training of trainers (29 August);
- the preparation and production of civic education materials (graphic materials, video and audio programmes, promotional materials, etc.).

Throughout this period, UNDP maintained intensive contacts with donors, both bilaterally and through the fortnightly meetings of the Monitoring Group. The effective mobilisation of funds speeded up, thus demonstrating the donor community's willingness to provide financial support.

The chairman and deputy chairman of the NEC were invited to participate in monthly meetings of this group. This participation was extremely useful since it enabled donors to obtain information directly from the NEC about the development of the process, the problems and the need for additional support from the international community. These meetings strengthened the credibility of the electoral process and confidence in it.

By June the technical assistance team was complete, reaching 80 people that month, including advisers and support staff.

2.4. 3rd Stage: Preparation for the Electoral Act (2 September - 26 October)

The third stage comprised all aspects of the preparation of conditions for holding the elections on 27-28 October, namely:

- completing the process of checking and accepting candidatures (12 candidates for President; 14 political parties and coalitions running for the Assembly of the Republic);
- drawing lots for the positioning of candidates on the ballot papers (13 September);
- the production, transport to Mozambique and distribution of voting materials;
- the correction, at provincial level, of mistakes which occurred during the registration;
- termination of voter registration and the publication of the definitive list of seats per constituency;
- preparation of the distribution plan and location of polling stations throughout the country (7,417 stations in about 2,600 locations);
- recruitment and training of polling station officers and their respective assistants (about 52,000);
- running the civic education campaign, including simulation sessions on the vote and on mobilising people to vote;
- tender and adjudication for additional logistical resources for the voting phase (vehicles, helicopters);
- preparation of the communications system (Fax) and the computer system for the count, at central and provincial level;
- the acquisition and installation of radio equipment (HF and VHF) in provincial capitals, to service the respective PECs and TSAEs;
- the installation and inauguration of the Press Centre, which functioned from 24 October to 13 November (see Part II - Section IV);
- the transport of voting materials and staff to the polling station locations.

There was considerable political tension during the weeks immediately preceding the vote, particularly during the week 20-27 October, and all the electoral structures had an excessive workload. The intensification of the civic education campaign, the organisational demands and the enormous logistical operation which preceded the 27th (involving more than 300 vehicles, 6 planes and 26 large capacity helicopters) all required a tremendous effort and dedication, which warrants special mention.

Meanwhile, the election campaign ran from 22 September to 27 October. With the exception of a few small localised incidents, it was conducted peacefully and without interference. Prior to the launching of the campaign, in the presence of the NEC and the international community, the political parties and candidates for the Presidency of the Republic signed the respective Codes of Conduct (16 and 19 September), an event of great political and civic importance, since it represented a commitment made before the Mozambican people.

One extremely important activity during the preparation of the electoral act was the training of the party monitors throughout the country (about 35,000), undertaken by foreign NGOs with international funding. The presence of adequately prepared "monitors" at the polling stations was to be essential in ensuring the transparency of the process and in reducing tension and mistrust among the various political parties.

The international community financed and organised the logistical operation to transport party monitors to polling stations and their stay there.

From 8 September onwards, the meetings of the Monitoring Group coordinated by UNDP became weekly, thus permitting constant monitoring of the process by donors and faster and more effective response as and when the need arose. In this way, in a short space of time it was possible to obtain various additional contributions which completely covered the outstanding deficit in the electoral budget, amounting to some USD 5 million at the end of September.

In early October the technical assistance team was reinforced by 7 specialists in air traffic operations, who worked with the central TSAE and in various provinces.

2.5. 4th Stage: The Electoral Act and the Count (27 October-19 November)

Voting took place on 27 and 28 October and was extended to the 29th, by a NEC decision announced on the second day.

More than 5.4 million voters turned out, about 85% of those registered. Throughout the country, voting took place in an atmosphere of tranquility and civility - which came as a surprise to many foreign observers, and even nationals. On the first day, long queues formed

hours before the polling stations opened. The population thus expressed clearly and massively their confidence and desire to participate in the process, contributing to the consolidation of peace and democracy in the country.

The enormous tension which arose during the night of the 26th to the 27th when Renamo announced its withdrawal, had little influence on the attitude of the electorate, and was resolved on the afternoon of the 27th when the President of Renamo announced his party's return to the electoral act.

Once again, the firmness, cohesion and coherence of the NEC in the face of this situation contributed substantially to the confidence of the people and the international community in the electoral process.

The direct linkage of each voter to one polling station ("his/her" polling station) with a maximum of 1,000 voters each, greatly facilitated the organisation of the process. After the first few hours of voting, when there was some confusion owing to delays and inexperience, the electoral act proceeded at a reasonable pace.


In many polling stations more than 60-70% of registered voters turned out on the first day, making the second day calmer and the third almost unnecessary. In general, voting procedures were impeccable and the polling station officers showed that they had been well prepared, a fact widely acknowledged by the many international observer missions (see next page - "EUMOZ" Press Release).

Given the total number of registered voters, **7,417 polling stations were established, each with 5 officers and 2 assistants, amounting to 52,000 people.** If we add the 35,000 party monitors and the members of the electoral structures, almost **90,000 Mozambicans spread throughout the furthest reaches of the country, were directly involved in the electoral act.**

As in the case of registration, **voting kits** were used. These comprised metal boxes containing all the materials necessary for each polling station: 2 numbered metal ballot boxes (Assembly of the Republic and President of the Republic), 2 dismountable voting booths, ballot papers, printed forms for the public notices and the records of the electoral acts, bottles of indelible ink, ink pads for stamping the ballot papers, pens, pencils, lamps, batteries etc.

For reasons of credibility and security, the ballot papers were printed on paper with a water mark and supplied in numbered blocks. The kits were also numbered and their distribution strictly defined and controlled by the central TSAE and by the provincial and district election structures.

The combination of voter card - electoral register - indelible ink made it virtually impossible for fraud to occur during the vote, either through double voting or voting by ineligible people.

**EUMOZ**

Missão de Observação Eleitoral
da União Europeia em Moçambique
European Union Election Observation Mission
in Mozambique

02/11/94.....
Maputo
Hotel Polana
Tel.
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PRESS RELEASE (Nov.2, 1994)

The European Union Election Observers Mission in Mozambique is satisfied that the elections in Mozambique have been conducted in a calm, peaceful and effective manner.

The election campaign involved a certain amount of heated rhetoric. But no major incidents occurred and there were no serious injuries reported. On the eve of the polling complaints were presented claiming that the conditions required for the elections to be free and fair had yet to be established. In a spirit of constructive co-operation such anxieties were however successfully overcome. Agreement was reached to prolong voting for a third day and to set up a special commission to deal with complaints, thus enabling RENAMO to participate fully in the electoral process.

The voting proceeded in an orderly and dignified manner and without any disturbances. Despite some administrative and logistic problems, Mozambicans turned out in enormous numbers to vote. Long queues formed in the early hours of the first day of voting before polling-stations opened. People evidently felt confident about the secrecy of the ballot and were able to participate freely in the elections. In some areas the turnout reached up to 90% or more. Irregularities which were noted proved to be of a minor character and had no significant effect.

Counting procedures at polling-stations were characterized by a high degree of transparency, conscientiousness and diligence on the side of the Mozambican polling staff, excellently trained by both national and UN personnel. As the counting proceeds at provincial and national levels we are hopeful that the elections will end successfully marking a new point of departure towards lasting peace and a stable development in Mozambique.

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In addition, strict controls over the distribution and use of ballot papers prevented "stuffing", ie. the fraudulent introduction of extra votes in the ballot boxes in a polling station.

The presence in all polling stations of party monitors for the various parties and candidates as well as more than 3,000 international observers guaranteed the transparency of the process and was of great importance in its final acceptance.

The counting of votes at the polling station itself, in front of all the polling staff, the party monitors and observers, and the immediate publication of the results, was another factor which contributed to the credibility of the process.

Various kinds of errors were found in the counting and registration of votes. The most important and those most difficult to resolve concerned the count and the way special votes (polling station officers, police, and party monitors who voted away from their registered polling station) and contested votes, were registered.

The reasons for these errors may have been the following:

- inadequate practical training in filling out the public notices and election records;
- late approval of the legislative alteration authorising special voting situations, which prevented polling officers from being properly informed about the procedures to be followed in these cases;
- accumulated fatigue after three days and nights in the polling stations.

To a large extent it was these errors which initially blocked the computerisation of the public notices in the central and provincial TSAEs, since they required the revision and local correction of the figures in these notices and greater flexibility in the control of data input in the computer system.

It should be mentioned that, given the persistent mistrust among the parts, the TSAE proposed and the NEC approved, the transport of all the notices to the central TSAE by land or air, with fax being used only in exceptional circumstances (lack of transport), which did not occur.

This method, contrary to that suggested by the UNDP advisers, guaranteed the desired conditions (credibility, confidence) but made the collection of the notices excessively time-consuming. This made it impossible to publish partial results of the count quickly.

Consequently, the process entered a phase which gradually became increasingly critical. As the days passed without any announcement of significant official results, tension rose both

National Election Commission
GENERAL ELECTIONS 1994
NATIONAL RESULTS

Presidential Election Total ballot sheets in boxes: 5,405,836 Total voters registered: 6,148,842	Legislative Election Total ballot sheets in boxes: 5,405,611 Total voters registered: 6,148,842
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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION			LEGISLATIVE ELECTION		
NAME OF CANDIDATE	VOTES	%	PARTY/COALITION ABREV.	VOTES	%
MÁXIMO DIOGO JOSÉ DIAS	115,442	2.34	AP	93,031	1.95
CARLOS JOSÉ MARIA JEQUE	34,588	0.70	UNAMO	34,809	0.73
CASIMIRO JOSÉ NHAMITAMBO	32,036	0.65	PT	26,961	0.56
MÁRIO CARLOS MACHELE	24,238	0.49	FUMO/PCD	66,527	1.39
CARLOS ALEXANDRE DOS REIS	120,708	2.44	FRELIMO	2,115,793	44.33
AFONSO MACACHO MARCETA DHLAKAMA	1,666,965	33.73	SOL	79,622	1.67
JACOB NEVES SALOMÃO SIBINDY	51,070	1.03	PIMO	58,590	1.23
PADIMBE MAHOSE KAMATI ANDREA	24,208	0.49	RENAMO	1,803,506	37.78
DOMINGOS ANTÓNIO MASCARENHAS AROUCA	37,767	0.76	PRD	48,030	1.01
VASCO CAMPIRA MAMBOYA ALFAZEMA	58,848	1.19	PACODE	52,446	1.10
WEHIA MONOKACHO RIPUA	141,905	2.87	PADEMO	36,689	0.77
JOAQUIM ALBERTO CHISSANO	2,633,740	53.30	PPPM	50,793	1.06
			PCN	60,635	1.27
			UD	245,793	5.15

Total Valid Votes	4,941,515	100.00	Total Valid Votes	4,773,225	100.00
Total Blank Ballot Sheets	312,143	5.78	Total Blank Ballot Sheets	457,382	8.46
Total Invalid Votes	149,282	2.76	Total Invalid Votes	173,592	3.21
Total Voters	5,402,940	87.87	Total Voters	5,404,199	87.89
Total Abstentions	774,587	12.60	Total Abstentions	773,583	12.58

among public opinion and within the electoral structures. This peaked on the eve of 19 November in the final reappraisal of invalid and contested votes.

This reappraisal took more than a week. It suffered the consequences of the absence of clear initial NEC criteria for the validation of invalid and contested votes sent by the provinces. This meant that the operations had to be repeated and the determination of the final results was delayed.

Finally, on 19 November, before many national and foreign entities and individuals, the chairman of the National Election Commission announced the results of the national count.

It was a very emotional moment for all those who had lived through this election process, and one of great joy at its success.

2.6. The 5th Stage: Publication of the Results and Conclusion of the Process (19 November 94 - 23 March 95)

As determined by the Electoral Law, the results announced on 19 November by the NEC President were officially published in the Government Gazette.

An analysis of the table with the national results (see next page) warrants the following comments:

- there is a significant discrepancy between the "total number of voters recorded in the electoral registers" mentioned in this table (6,148,842) and the number of people registered as announced by the NEC at the end of registration (6,363,311). The reason for this discrepancy of more than 200,000 voters has still not been adequately explained;
- given this discrepancy, effective voter participation would have been 87.4% or 85%, depending on the registered voter figure used; in either case, the high percentage of voters confirms the Mozambican people's commitment and interest in the election process;
- the final number of invalid votes in both elections (149,282 and 173,592) and the respective percentages for the votes cast in the ballot boxes (2.76% and 3.21%) are very low. This leads to the conclusion that the reappraisal by the NEC allowed many of the invalid votes sent by the provinces to be retrieved.

Once the stage of the dissemination and publication of the results was over, the NEC and TSAE entered a phase of "preparation for the conclusion of their mandate", which ran until 23 March 95 for the NEC and 23 April for the TSAE.

This has been essentially a period of settling accounts, preparing the NEC's Final Report, and reflecting on the future of the election institution.

Since late November, the UNDP technical assistance team has been progressively reduced. A limited number of advisers (3), a team of 6 UNVs and some administrative support staff have remained to work with the central TSAE until the end of the project (31 March 95).

They have been engaged mainly in the following activities:

- writing the final reports for the various areas, and the final project report;
- closing the administrative processes relating to project MOZ/93/016 (cost-sharing) and MOZ/93/BO2 (Trust Fund);
- assisting the TSAE in the collection of the materials left over from registration and the forms on the election officials, for future use;
- assisting the central TSAE in its accountability for the funds transferred from the Trust Fund, amounting to about USD 9.8 million.
- conducting a physical inventory of the equipment in the provincial and central TSAEs, which was acquired by the project;
- discussions and decisions about the destination of this equipment (vehicles, computers, radios, tents, bicycles etc.)

UNDP, guided by the Resident Representative, has continued to promote and chair fortnightly donor meetings, where regular information has been provided on the steps being taken to conclude the process (accountability, audit, inventory and the destination of the assets acquired).

2.7. SOME SIGNIFICANT DATA ON THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

A. Costs and sources of funding

. Funds committed	US\$ 64.5 million
. Sources of Funds:	
. Government of Mozambique	US\$ 5.4 million
. Donor community	US\$ 59.1 million
. Donor countries and institutions	17
. Modalities of grant funding	
. Cost-Sharing	US\$ 6.4 million
. Trust Funding	US\$ 24.5 million
. Parallel Financing	US\$ 28.9 million
. Final cost of the process (estimate)	US\$ 62.3 million
. Cost per registered voter	US\$ 9.8
. Cost per voter	US\$ 11.5

B. People involved

. Permanent election structures: ± 2,600
. Trainers for registration and voting: 1,700
. Registration agents: 8,000
. Civic education agents: 1,600
. Polling station officers and assistants: ± 52,000
. Party Monitors: ± 35,000

C. Registration data

. Number of days: 91
. Maximum number of brigades: 1,600
. Registration Agents: 8,000
. Estimated electoral population: 7,894,850
. Registered voters: 6,363,311 (80.6%)

D. Voting data

- . Number of days: 3
- . Polling stations: 7,417
- . Voting locations: ± 2,600
- . Polling station officers and assistants: ± 52,000
- . Voters: 5,405,836 (85%)

E. Logistical resources

(maximum figures for the period prior to voting)

- . ± 350 vehicles
- . 26 helicopters; 280 crew and support staff
- . 4 light planes
- . 1 cargo plane
- . 1 tanker plane
- . 1,200 tents and camping equipment
- . 1,600 bicycles
- . 11 fixed broadcasting-receiving HF radios, 25 mobile
- . 230 walkie-talkies
- . 30 faxes

F. Training data

- . Total participants: ± 65,000
- . Trainers: 1,700
- . Hours of training: 107,000

G. Civic education data

- . Civic education agents: 1,600
- . Mobile propaganda units: 17
- . Comic strip leaflets: 2,250,000
- . Giant posters: 120
- . Other posters: 425,000
- . Election newspaper (3 issues): 450,000
- . Sundry promotional materials: 1,100,000 units

2.8. The Process as seen by an Observer

In the "Final Report by the SARDC Observer Team" (Southern African Research and Documentation Centre) there is an interesting article by a South African observer, published in the newspaper "The Star" of 28 November 94 (see following page).

CHAPTER 3

PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PROCESS

1. FRAMEWORK, METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS USED

Planning and managing such a vast, complex process as the election was no easy task.

The planning and management methods and instruments had to take into account comprehensive factors which determined their form, depth and reach. The most important of these factors were:

- **the real characteristics and conditions of the country** (size, population distribution and movement; meteorological conditions; accessibility and infrastructures in the various provinces; general shortage of material, human and financial resources; lack of up-to-date information on the conditions in those parts of the country most affected by the war; lack of telecommunications facilities and weak coverage by the media etc.);
- **the juridico-institutional framework**, in particular the norms and procedures laid down in the Electoral Law;
- **the political context** and factors stemming from it, factors which conditioned the technical solutions to be adopted (requiring transparency and security in processes, reducing the atmosphere of distrust).

In practice, it was to be expected that the process would be affected by alterations in its overall context - political issues in particular - and also by the gradual accumulation of new information in less well known fields and parts of the country (demographic statistics, population movements, accessibility etc. particularly in areas controlled by Renamo).

Thus, inevitably, the pace and timetable of the process would be subject to alterations and adjustments, requiring adaptability and the capacity to find appropriate solutions for new situations.

Under such circumstances there was a need for **flexible and adaptable planning and management methods, with a minimum of formal procedures, and which were not too demanding technically.**

Contrary to expectations, the Mozambican election was better organised than South Africa's mammoth April election, argues Hanif Vally

Poll that puts us to shame

If you think South Africa had problems, the Mozambican election started off on a far rockier road.

Mozambique has a population of 16 million and at least half was directly affected by the war. By the end of 1991 at least 1 million people had died, 2 million had fled to neighbouring countries, and between 2 million and 3 million were displaced within the country.

The 15-year war devastated the country's infrastructure, with wanton destruction of bridges, railways, health posts and schools.

But despite what seemed like insurmountable obstacles, the organisation of the Mozambican election holds many lessons for South Africa.

The Independent Mozambique National Elections Commission was responsible for the organisation of the election, registration of voters, voter education and management of complaints.

It set in place systems and procedures which made for an election free of the last-minute and unfore-

seen hitches that plagued the South African election. The voters roll was one of the foundations. In registration, each of the 6 398 061 people who registered (7 894 850 were eligible) was issued with a voter registration card bearing the holder's photograph and a voter's number. This card will be used in subsequent elections. Millions were spent on temporary voter cards in South Africa which will never be used again.

The card was easily verified at the polling station as the first part of the number matched the station's identifying number. So, immediately upon registration, voters knew which polling station they should vote at. There was an electoral register at each polling station containing the names and numbers of all registered voters of that specific station.

Compare this with our election which was characterised by long queues, dire shortages of voting materials at many polling stations, and excesses at others. Each polling station in Mozambique received a kit of voting materials in a steel trunk, and

not one that I was assigned to did not receive theirs.

A voters roll would have simplified our polling system. In Mozambique, there was no technology that could fall victim to the power cuts or an unplanned absence of electricity which rendered many UV lamps inoperable, and there were no snarls caused by additional queues for temporary voters' cards on voting day. The voters roll also significantly reduced the possibility of cards being fraudulently issued to under-age voters, as happened in South Africa.

Party delegates were assigned to each polling point by their parties. This, more than even the presence of international observers, ensured transparency and secret voting. In South Africa, the party agent system failed at many points where often only one agent was present. What struck me was that despite a divisive civil war, there did not appear to be any no-go areas in Mozambique during the actual poll.

The decision to make every polling station a counting station resulted in a transparent and efficient tallying

procedure. Opportunities for fraud were substantially diminished as the reconciliation of votes cast and the scrutinising of each ballot by the party agents was done on site. There was none of the chaos associated with the transporting of ballot boxes to central counting stations.

The dispute-settling procedure was also more decentralised than South Africa's and was designed to cause as few hitches in the voting procedure as possible. Where a ballot was disputed, the polling station's officials took a majority decision, with the president of the station holding the casting vote. The complaint and the decision were recorded on the reverse side of the ballot which was then counted in accordance with that decision.

In Mozambique, the results of each polling station were posted outside, often written by hand on boards. Immediately, people had an idea of the results and were kept involved in the process right to the end. The simple tallying procedure excluded opportunities for computer fraud as happened in South Africa.

Should any Mozambican political party honestly dispute the election result, the counting system used and the presence of party delegates at each polling station would make it an easy exercise to confirm or reject any allegations. Most importantly, there will not be the kind of secretive horse-trading that took place in South Africa.

Relief at the relatively peaceful democratic transition in our country should not overshadow the need for democratic and transparent electoral processes. A local government election is looming, and a national election will again take place in 1998.

Whoever runs the next election should remember that it is the processes of democracy which legitimise democracy. Besides, the electorate will not be as forgiving the next time around.

Hanif Vally was an international observer for the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre during the Mozambican election. He is also the director of the Legal Resources Centre in Pretoria.

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It was also concluded that institutional and operative solutions should be adopted, which combined **normative centralisation** (in NEC and the central TSAE) with **executive decentralisation** (in the provincial and district bodies).

These principles and methods were not always understood or implemented by the electoral structures - sometimes owing to conditioning factors external to these structures - and this had a negative effect on their efficiency and ability to respond to problems which arose throughout the process.

The fact that the cadres in these structures had had no training in specific areas and issues related to planning and managing an electoral process of this kind also contributed to some of the difficulties which arose during implementation. Although this had been foreseen in the February 1994 Action Plan, the training was not given with the necessary breadth and depth.

The planning of the election process began long before the NEC took office. Among other factors, the country's lack of experience with multiparty elections, the shortage of resources, the difficult conditions created by the war, required time to study appropriate solutions for this reality, to prepare and train the human resources and to collect and mobilise the essential funds and materials for conducting the process within the established timetable.

The fundamental planning and management instruments were:

- . **The TSAE Action Plan**
- . **The Election Budget**

Although inter-related, throughout the process these two instruments were used separately and were directed at different entities. Thus, while the TSAE Action Plan was intended as a "guide" or "frame of reference" for its operative work, the budget was essentially an instrument for predicting financial needs, mobilising donor funds and for supplying information to the NEC and the donor community.

2. THE TSAE ACTION PLAN

As already mentioned in Chapter 2, **the 1st version of the Action Plan was prepared and discussed in May-June 93**, within the context of the assistance being provided to the Inter-Ministerial Elections Commission.

At that time, it was anticipated that the election process would run for 15 months (August 93 - October 94) following approval of the Electoral Law, then foreseen for July 1993. Since the Multiparty Conference went on longer than expected, the Electoral Law was approved late,

and the appointment of the NEC was delayed until 11 February 94, the effective period for undertaking the whole process was reduced to about nine and a half months.

As already mentioned, the **Action Plan was revised, updated and improved** by the technical assistance team and their Mozambican counterparts immediately after the approval of the Electoral Law (January-February). It could thus be presented to the NEC a few days after this took office, in its session of 15 February 94.

The revised and updated version included an "Information Technology" component, which had not existed in the 1st version of May 1993.

The plan thus had five components:

- . Organisation
- . Training
- . Civic Education
- . Transport and Communication
- . Information Technology

An attempt was made to define a **strategy** for each component, to identify and quantify the resources to be used, and to identify and describe the **activities to be undertaken** in each phase of the process.

As already mentioned, there were five development stages:

- 1st Stage: Preparation and Inception
- 2nd Stage: Voter Registration
- 3rd Stage: Preparation for the Electoral Act
- 4th Stage: Electoral Act and Count
- 5th Stage: Publication of Results and Termination of the Process

At the end of February, given the complexity and dimension of the questions raised in the plan, the NEC decided to approve only the first of these five stages, putting off approval of the others until later.

Since the plan's information technology component touched on a politically highly sensitive area within the NEC (as was to be the case throughout the process) this was also left for subsequent discussion and approval. The respective department, which had Italian advisers, was made responsible for detailing the study and identifying solutions, safety guarantees and transparency in the systems to be used.

The election timetable submitted to the NEC subsequently underwent various adjustments as the process advanced, but the objective of holding the elections at the end of October always remained a fixed point of reference in the Action Plan, particularly after the specific dates had been set by the President of the Republic, on 11 April 94 (see next page).

Throughout the process, other events and dates were fixed by the NEC, and thus became reference points for the timetable and operational objectives to be achieved by the whole "election machine". Such was the case, for example, of the date for the start of registration (1 June). This mobilised all election structures and required tremendous effort and dedication, given the enormous difficulties and shortages at that time.

It should be noted that the planning of each component's activities - including the definition of the respective strategy and the quantification of the resources involved - were based on certain precepts of the Electoral Law which facilitated this planning.

Perhaps the most important of these were the following:

- **the definition of the maximum number of voters per polling station (1,000)**
- **the assignment of each registered voter to a specific polling station and its respective electoral register.**


These principles, combined with other basis data obtained from the Electoral Law or elsewhere (estimates of the electoral population and its provincial and district distribution, registration and voting procedures, daily productivity of the registration brigades etc.) made it possible to define activities and to quantify the resources required to implement them.

In this way, for example, it was possible to identify the number of brigades needed for registration (1,600), and their distribution by province and district (estimated electoral population/daily productivity x number of working days for registration). It was possible to specify and quantify exactly all the materials required by each registration brigade and each polling station, and hence the creation of the kits, and their codification, numbering and rigorous control. It was possible to draw up and structure the Training Plan, with a cascade of training, to quantify the number of participants and courses to be given at each level, the number of trainers, the training materials necessary etc. It was possible to prepare the Logistics Plan, quantifying the resources needed (road and air) and their distribution by province, planning the transport of people and materials etc. It was possible to prepare and progressively adjust the election budget.

The civic education campaign was drawn up to match the information and mobilisation requirements of the electorate at each stage of the process. Its basic philosophy was inter-personal contact (direct contact with the voter). This involved 1,600 civic education agents

CALENDÁRIO DO PROCESSO ELEITORAL

11 ABRIL 1994



- Até 31 de Março: Publicação do Decreto do STAE;
- Até 10 Abril: Tomada de posse de todos os Gabinetes Provinciais do STAE;
- 09/10 Abril: Seminário CNE;
- Até 15 Abril: Tomada de posse das Comissões Distritais de Eleições e Gabinetes Distritais do STAE;~
- 15 a 27 Abril: Chegada dos Kits de treino às capitais de Província;
- 19/22 Abril: 1º Encontro Nacional das Estruturas Eleitorais;
- 23 Abril a 27 Maio: Chegada dos Kits de Recenseamento às capitais de Província;
- 25/29 Abril: Curso de Formadores para Agentes de Educação Eleitoral e de Formadores para Agentes de Recenseamento (Maputo);~
- 29/30 Abril: Reunião de Transportes e Comunicações;
- 02/06 Maio: 1º Encontros Provinciais das Estruturas Eleitorais;
- 09/11 Maio: Cursos de Formadores para Agentes de Educação Eleitoral e Agentes de Recenseamento (Províncias);
- 16/18 Maio: Formação dos Agentes de Educação Eleitoral (Distritos);
- 16/21 Maio: Formação dos Agentes de Recenseamento (Distritos);

from NEC, NGOs, civic and religious organisations, information centres etc. and the media as the vehicle for mass information.

The Action Plan was revised at the beginning of August, and various adjustments made to its component activities and the timing of the stages.

Moreover, certain changes in the election timetable - extension of registration, the establishment of a third day for voting - and some minor decisions by the NEC made it necessary to introduce minor changes into the various components, either dates of events or in the organisation and content of planned activities. The areas of Logistics, Training and Information Technology were those which were altered most.

Under these circumstances, **the flexibility and adaptability adopted from the very beginning of plan management** - as opposed to a philosophy of rigour, detail and rigidity as was sometimes suggested - permitted the introduction of the required adjustments **without jeopardising the essential deadlines of the process.**

During the most intensive stages - preparations for the start of registration and the days preceding the vote in particular - emergency procedures had to be adopted. There was thus an atmosphere of "**crisis management**", where operative responses often could not wait for formal decisions, since this would make it impossible to meet the deadlines.

During the 3-4 days prior to the opening of the polling stations the situation in the central TSAE, and probably also in the provincial TSAEs, appeared chaotic. The intensity of the work and the constant appearance of new problems made these days a critical but crucial period. The "**management of this chaos**", however, always occurred within a clear frame of reference, in which the objectives to be achieved and the activities to be undertaken were known. All that was required was to find adequate answers to emergency situations and problems/unforeseen situations. (Operationally, the creation of an "Emergency Office" under the NEC/TSAE would have been useful, but the technical team's proposal in this respect was not implemented).

Under these circumstances, on the one hand the composure and deliberation of the main participants and on the other hand prior experience of crisis situations, were crucial in maintaining overall control of the process and its eventual success.

The final outcome of this effort, and the way in which it was managed, only became evident on 27 October when most of the polling stations throughout the country opened their doors to voters at the established time and with few significant delays. There were no ballot papers or ballot boxes missing. No polling officers and their assistants were missing. And the electorate could freely exercise its right to vote.

3. THE ELECTION BUDGET AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

3.1. Budget Conception and Funding Modalities

Since November and December 92, when a start was made (with technical assistance provided by the European Community and UNDDSMS) on preparing the budget to be presented to the Rome Donors' Conference, it had been decided to prepare a **global budget for the election process**, covering all foreseeable costs directly related to implementing the process, irrespective of their eventual source and funding method (state budget, direct grants, funding through the United Nations system etc.)

It was also decided to organise the budget in a "non-traditional" manner, as opposed to the habitual structure of the state budget, in order to facilitate rapid interpretation and to get donor attention and support.

Consequently, the main budget lines consisted of expenditure "packages" which could be immediately related to the most important components of the electoral process or to expensive materials and equipment.

This concept, which was retained throughout the process with only slight adjustments, had the following basic objectives:

- to provide a global and articulated view of all the components and budget lines;
- to facilitate the mobilisation and appropriate channels for donor contributions, avoiding gaps and duplication;
- .. to permit monitoring and control of the extent to which requirements were being covered by the funds received.

This integrated concept contributed to some extent to the success of fundraising among the international community, from the Rome conference to the eve of the electoral act.

Once the global budget had been formulated, this was used to define the funding modalities to be adopted and to negotiate the financial or material support of each donor, under UNDP coordination, either in bilateral meetings or in the periodic meetings of the Aid for Democracy Group.

The modalities of funding and assistance adopted were the following:

- .. **cost-sharing**, through project MOZ/93/016 implemented by UNDDSMS, aimed essentially at covering the UNDP technical assistance costs and some budget lines not

covered by other methods (certain equipment, civic education promotional materials etc.);

- **trust funding**, implemented nationally through project MOZ/93/BO2, which covered a substantial part of the budget and almost all budget lines;
- **parallel financing**, which supported some "large items" in the budget (registration and voting materials and the hire of helicopters) and various grants in kind (vehicles, computers, some technical assistance).

In addition to these modalities, there was **Government funding through the specific mechanisms of the General State Budget**.

This diversity of funding modalities was vital to ensure full support from important donors, and a response to the various (political, technical and administrative) positions and conditions.

Consequently, different administrative and bureaucratic procedures had to be adopted, depending on the modality used in each case.

3.2. Evolution of the Budget and the Funds Obtained

The election budget passed through various versions during the preliminary stages before the NEC took office, the most important of which were:

- **the December 92 version**, presented by the Government to the Rome Conference;
- **the June 93 version**, presented to the Maputo Donors' Conference (Follow-up Meeting);
- **the January 94 version**, prepared following approval of the Electoral Law.

The total amounts budgeted in these versions were as follows:

	USD million
- December 92	
* Total Budgeted	66.9
* Contingencies (15%)	10.0

Total	76.9

-	June 93		
	*	Total Budgeted	70.6
	*	Contingencies (9%)	6.3

		Total	76.9
-	January 94		
	*	Total budgeted	70.6

The June 93 and January 94 versions included USD 3 million for "Complementary Civil Education Actions" (NGOs, churches, civic associations) but these were subsequently withdrawn from the election budget since funding for these activities fell outside the responsibilities of NEC/TSAE. Consequently, the total budget for these two versions amounts to USD 67.6 million.

Once the NEC had taken office, the budget was revised and updated on a monthly basis. Later, after voter registration had begun, it was updated even more frequently and technical and organisational alterations and adjustments were introduced.

Over time, the donors assumed certain funding commitments, gradually establishing a sound financial basis for the process to be able to advance.

The following illustrates the evolution of the situation between June and November 1994:

			USD million
-	June 16	Budget:	56.2
		Commitments:	52.3
-	July 20	Budget:	60.0
		Commitments:	55.0
-	August 26	Budget:	64.2
		Commitments:	57.6
	Septemb.12	Budget:	64.8
		Commitments:	58.4
-	October 26	Budget:	64.0
		Commitments:	63.5
-	Novemb. 8	Budget:	64.5
		Commitments:	64.5

This shows how the budget total was progressively adjusted throughout the process, owing to the increasingly precise definition of implementation conditions, and alterations to solutions and to the election timetable. The most important of these were the two extensions of the registration period (from 15 August to 20 August and from 24 August to 2 September), which implied additional unplanned expenditure (subsidies, logistical resources, food etc.). In addition, the need to use more air transport (helicopters and planes) throughout the process caused the overall budget total to rise between June and November 94.

However, it is interesting to note that the final total (USD 64.5 million) is very close to the amount presented to the Rome Conference in December 92 (USD 66.9 million).

A total of 17 countries and international institutions contributed in one way or another, financially and materially, towards the electoral process, providing funds totalling some USD 59.1 million, distributed as follows (see next page):

•	cost sharing:	USD 6.4 million
•	trust fund:	USD 24.5 million
•	parallel financing	USD 28.2 million

The government contribution through the state budget was about USD 5.4 million (8.4% of the total). The overall total was thus USD 64.5 million.

The definitive termination of project MOZ/93/016, planned for 31 March 1995, will provide the final figures on effective expenditure.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the **final cost of the electoral process will be about USD 62.3 million**. The absence of a second round in the Presidential Election meant that part of the European Union funding for the respective voting materials was not used and there was a reduction in expenditure in some budget lines.

However, the election process as a whole implied complementary expenditure outside its own budget, without which the final outcome would not have been the same. These are essentially:

- training costs, travel and subsidies for some 35,000 party monitors totalling about USD 2.5 million;
- investment and operating costs born by the government during the preliminary stages (installations and equipment for the NEC/TSAE, Multiparty Conference, operating costs for the Inter-Ministerial Commission etc.) totalling about USD 1 million.

FINANCIAMENTOS DA COMUNIDADE INTERNACIONAL
PARA O PROCESSO ELEITORAL

1. Os financiamentos obtidos através dos 3 sistemas coordenados pelo PNUD (Trust Fund, Cost-Sharing e Parallel Financing) foram os que constam do quadro seguinte:

Sources of Financing:	Nat. Currency	US\$ Pledged
Trust Fund:		24,481,420
- Canada	CANS 1,000,000	729,927
- Finland	FM 6,300,000	1,211,645
- Italy	LIT 15 Billion	9,230,769
- Netherlands	FH 1,850,000	1,000,000
- Norway	NK 22,000,000	3,151,579
- USA		9,157,500
Cost-sharing:		6,391,930
- Denmark	DK	1,200,000
- Portugal	PTE	338,000
- Spain	PTS 40,000,000	299,267
- Sweden	SK 27,000,000	3,454,716
- United Kingdom	LB 600,000	891,480
- UNDP/IPF		208,467
Parallel Financing:		28,205,000
Austria	AUS	300,000
Canada	CANS 200,000	145,000
European Union	ECU	26,210,000
France	FF 5,000,000	700,000
Italy	LIT	750,000
Portugal	PTE	100,000

O valor total destes financiamentos é de, aproximadamente, 59,4 milhões de USD.

2. Na lista de países doadores há ainda que incluir a República da África do Sul (que suportou parte dos custos da operação aérea da fase da votação e emprestou tendas de campanha) e a República da Alemanha (empréstimo de tendas de campanha).
3. Assim, o número total de países e instituições doadoras foi de 17. A União Europeia foi o maior doador, seguida da Itália e Estados Unidos da América.

Maputo, 28 de Novembro de 1994

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- the cost of training and civic education activities undertaken by NGOs and civic and religious organisations, which may be estimated, perhaps, at more than USD 4.2 million.

3.3. Financial Management

The funds of the election budget were disbursed through different procedures depending on the funding method adopted and the use made of the funds.

Thus, parallel financing and grants in kind followed the procedures of each donor, without intervention by UNDP or the technical assistance team.

The same occurred with the state budget funds.

Cost-sharing funds were used in two ways:

- payments for project staff (advisers, UNVs, administrative and support staff), which followed the habitual routine procedures;
- payments for material and equipment for the technical assistance team and the process in general (vehicles, radios, civic education materials etc.) for which tenders were held and which sometimes faced serious implementation delays (see the case of civic education - Part II - Section III).

Trust Fund finance was used in the following manner:

- through transfers to the central TSAE (totalling some USD 9.8 million), which in turn transferred funds to provincial TSAEs, essentially for the payment of subsidies (registration and civic education agents, polling station officers, trainers, electoral commissions), for the local hire of vehicles, for training activities etc.;
- through direct payments by UNDP to suppliers of equipment and materials acquired or hired through public or limited tender (vehicles, helicopters, planes, audiovisual materials and products, camping equipment, food etc.);
- through direct payments by UNDP to suppliers of limited materials and services, after some market research.

In all these cases, decisions as to expenditure (and the subsequent requests to UNDP for payment) were always taken jointly by the technical assistance team (CTA or Programme Officer) and by the TSAE (Director-General or Administrative and Financial Director). There was thus always total agreement and joint responsibility in these decisions.

In the case of tenders - some worth many hundreds of thousands of dollars - bids were always evaluated and adjudicated by an "Evaluation Commission" comprising various representatives of the TSAE and various members of the technical assistance team, as well as by a representative of the UNDP office. These procedures sometimes led to delays in decisions and in their administrative implementation, but they were essential in order to ensure transparency and rigour in processes totalling USD 23 million.

One complicated situation - still not completely resolved - were the UNDP financial transfers to the central TSAE and by this to the provinces, totalling some USD 9.8 million. These transfers were essential and crucial for the implementation of the election process and UNDP, through its Resident Representative, assumed the heavy responsibility of immediately authorising the amounts requested, when they were requested. Indeed, the implementation in such a short period of time of the vast range of tasks required by the registration and the electoral act, was only made possible by decentralising the management of financial resources.

However, the limited technical preparation of many election cadres in the provinces and districts, excessive "liberalism" when transferring and using funds at these levels, and excessive tolerance with regard to the submission of accounts to the central TSAE, resulted in a difficult situation at the end of the process. Only through the substantial efforts and dedication of certain central TSAE and UNDP technicians was it possible to gather, check and correct credible accounting documents to justify expenditure in each province.

This situation was aggravated by the fact that, over a four month period (June to October) the central TSAE hampered the participation of UNDP team leaders in the management of the funds transferred to each province. Indeed, despite the fact that UNDP officially proposed this participation to NEC at the beginning of June, and the fact that this was immediately authorised by the Commission chairman, the respective Directive only took effect from the beginning of October - by which time virtually nothing could be done. And in any event, it had little practical effect in most provinces.

Financial management during the preparation and start-up stage required certain precautions, since the financial commitments of some donors materialised more slowly than anticipated. This delayed some payment decisions and authorisations, particularly during April and May, although there were no serious consequences for the advance of the process.

In some instances, alternative funding was found to resolve some minor situations (such as the 1st national Meeting of Electoral Bodies and the Provincial Meetings, which received parallel financing from Austria, instead of Trust Fund finance). In other instances, however, disbursements had to be withheld, and this caused problems for the management of staff and supporting items.

Donor trust in and commitment to the election process was translated into a permanent, positive attitude of financial and material support, and the acceptance of great flexibility in the budget and the financial management by UNDP, UNDDSMS, and the technical assistance team. Without this trust and commitment it would have been much more difficult, and the task of the technical assistance team would have been much more complex and onerous.

3.4. Structure of Expenditure and Some Indicators

On the basis of the 8 November budget (see next page), but subtracting the USD 1.7 million for material not acquired for the second round of the presidential election, the structure of expenditure is as follows:

election structures	USD 9,030,000	14.4%
equipment and materials	USD 22,038,000	25.4%
transport	USD 17,351,000	27.6%
civic education	USD 3,574,000	5.7%
training	USD 4,561,000	7.3%
technical assistance	USD 6,215,000	9.9%
Total	USD 62,769,000	100.0%

The budget line "Election Structures" included all the subsidies paid to the registration agents (USD 1.1 million), civic education agents (USD 0.65 million), and polling station officers (USD 2.6 million), which amounted to 48% of the costs of these structures.

In the budget line "Equipment and Materials", the largest items were the registration materials (USD 9.5 million) and voting materials (USD 9.5 million), which together accounted for 31% of the total election budget.

In the budget line "Transport", important items were the purchase of vehicles, totalling USD 5.1 million (29.5% of this budget line). However, the hire of air transport, helicopters and planes (USD 7.7 million) and fuel for them (USD 3.1 million) were the largest items in this line (62%). This item alone accounted for 17% of the total election budget.

About 48% (some USD 30 million) of the total election funds were spent within the country, either through payments to election structures or through the acquisition of goods and services on the national market.

As regards contracts with companies for the supply of materials, equipment and services financed through cost-sharing and the Trust Fund, about 75% were adjudicated to

Date: 8 November 1994

ELECTORAL PROCESS:		OVERALL BUDGET			
Component	A Financial require- ments	B Pledge	C Donor	D Financing Gap (A-B)	
1. ELECTORAL STRUCTURES					
1.1. Elections Commissions (CNE,CPE,CDE)	900,000	900,000	TF/CAN	0	
1.2. STAB Personnel (incl. Travel Expenses)	1,587,000	1,587,000	GOM/TF	0	
1.3. Registration Brigades	1,066,000	1,066,000	TF	0	
1.4. Civic Education Brigades	633,000	633,000	TF	0	
1.5. Election Brigades	2,419,000	2,419,000	GOM/USA/TF	0	
1.6. Monitors and Drivers	708,000	708,000	TF	0	
1.7. Recurrent Costs/Office	664,000	664,000	GOM	0	
1.8. Investments/Construction & Rehabilitation	933,000	933,000	GOM	0	
Total Electoral Structures	9,010,000	9,010,000		0	
2. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS					
2.1. Telecommunications Equipment & Installations	565,000	565,000	UN(CS)/GOM	0	
2.2. Data Processing Equipment	450,000	450,000	ITA	0	
2.3. Voter Registration Materials	9,300,000	9,300,000	EU	0	
2.4. Polling Materials	11,600,000	11,600,000	EU	0	
2.5. Camping Equipment for Brigades	400,000	400,000	TF	0	
2.6. Food Rations for Brigades	1,223,000	1,223,000	TF/CAN	0	
Total Equipment and Materials	23,738,000	23,738,000		0	
3. TRANSPORT FACILITIES					
3.1. Aircraft Leases	1,000,000	1,000,000	TF/UN(CS)	0	
3.2. Helicopter Leases	6,710,000	6,710,000	TF EU	0	
3.3. Aircraft Fuel and Operations	3,070,000	3,070,000	TF/GOM/UN(CS)/EU	0	
3.4. Purchase of Light Vehicles (24)	4,400,000	4,400,000	TF/FRA	0	
3.5. Light Vehicle Leases (49x4m + 15x1m)	800,000	800,000	TF	0	
3.6. Purchase of Trucks and Mini-Buses (12)	735,000	735,000	TF	0	
3.7. Vehicles/Fuel, Operations, Maintenance	676,000	676,000	TF/CAN	0	
Total Transport Facilities	17,351,000	17,351,000		0	
4. CIVIC EDUCATION					
4.1. Audio-visual Equipment and Programmes	730,000	730,000	TF	0	
4.2. Graphic Materials	910,000	910,000	TF	0	
4.3. Promotional Materials	1,166,000	1,166,000	UN(CS)	0	
4.4. Theaters, Seminars and Other Initiatives	240,000	240,000	TF	0	
4.5. Information Centres	75,000	75,000	TF	0	
4.6. Mobile Civic Education Units	453,000	453,000	TF	0	
Total Civic Education	3,574,000	3,574,000		0	
5. TRAINING					
5.1. CNE, CPE and STAB (Maputo & Provinces)	300,000	300,000	AUS	0	
5.2. Registration and Civic Education Brigades	994,000	994,000	TF	0	
5.3. Electoral Officers and Civic Education Agents	3,367,000	3,367,000	TF	0	
Total Training	4,561,000	4,561,000		0	
6. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE	6,215,000	6,215,000	EU/UN(CS)/POR/ITA	0	
GRAND TOTAL	64,469,000	64,469,000		0	

UN(CS): UNDP Technical Assistance Project
 Cost-sharing Donors: Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK
 TF: UNDP Trust Fund
 Co-financing Donors: Canada, Italy, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, USA
 AUS: Austria
 CAN: Canada
 EU: European Union
 FRA: France
 GOM: Government of Mozambique
 ITA: Italy
 POR: Portugal
 USA: USAID

Mozambican companies or foreign companies based in Mozambique (about USD 16 million).

The following are some global indicators:

. cost per registered voter:	USD 9.8
. cost per voter:	USD 11.5

The following are some specific indicators on sectoral expenditure:

. training per participant:	USD 78.0
. civic education per registered voter:	USD 0.7
. civic education per voter:	USD 0.8

CHAPTER 6

THE ROLE OF UNDP AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

1. THE COORDINATING ROLE OF UNDP

As already mentioned, the International Community, through Project MOZ/93/016 gave UNDP responsibility for the overall coordination of its support for the electoral process.

This coordination was undertaken directly by the Resident Representative. Two main channels were used:

- bilateral contacts with donors
- periodic meetings of the Aid for Democracy Group

These contacts and meetings began very early on, during the preliminary stages. But it was after the signing of Project MOZ/93/016 (13 May 93) in particular, that they took formal shape, became more dynamic and concentrated more specifically on obtaining the necessary support and funding.

Thus, between June 93 and April 94, under UNDP coordination, the donor group known as the Aid for Democracy Group held monthly meetings on the electoral process. Representatives of all 17 donors contributing funds to the process participated in these meetings, as well as representatives of other non-donor countries.

As of April 94, the Aid for democracy Group adopted the designation "Electoral Process Monitoring Group". Meetings were held more frequently, once a fortnight, and the agenda focussed exclusively on the development of the electoral process and the assistance to be obtained from the donor community.

Finally, from 8 September to 24 November 94, the meetings of the Monitoring Group became weekly, so as to permit permanent monitoring of the process by donors and facilitate a more rapid and effective response to needs as they arose at this critical and decisive stage in the electoral process.

From June 93 onwards the technical assistance team participated in all the meetings of the Aid for Democracy Group and the Monitoring Group, through its CTA and other members of the team. They provided donors with current information on the development of the electoral process and explained the requirements with regard to donor financial and/or material support.

These donor meetings were extremely important, since they made a positive contribution towards mobilising, materialising and coordinating donor assistance, strengthening confidence and a favourable climate for the development of the process.

Institutional coordination on the electoral process between UNDP and ONUMOZ was assured through the participation of a UNDP representative in the weekly coordination meetings chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary General.

2. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE ELECTORAL STRUCTURES

2.1. Conception

The donor community's acceptance of UNDP coordination and the role of **Project MOZ/93/016 as the umbrella project** for all contributions and assistance to the electoral process was essential for the efficiency and effectiveness of the technical assistance provided to the Mozambican electoral structures, since it made it possible for:

- **all donations to be made compatible with and be integrated into the project**, whatever their origin, funding method or form of contribution (financial or material);
- **all technical support to be articulated and coordinated under the global project** for the electoral process, irrespective of its origin or the way it was contracted.

The first case includes the **financial contributions** channeled through the three funding methods agreed between donors and UNDP (cost-sharing, Trust Fund and parallel financing) and **contributions in kind**, donated or loaned (French all-purpose vehicles, food from WFP and Spain, tents from South Africa or Germany etc.).

The second case includes the team of advisers (area coordinators) financed as of March 93 by the European Community, the Italian technical assistance team for information technology, and the Air Traffic Operation and Control team provided by Portugal during the voting stage (October-November 94).

The basic concept of the position of the technical assistance team was based on the hypotheses that:

- **the electoral process was a Mozambican process, the responsibility of Mozambicans, and thus run and implemented by Mozambicans;**
- **the technical assistance team had as its objective and obligation - towards the United Nations and the international community - to contribute actively to the holding of free and fair elections on the dates set by the President of the Republic, and to establish a national capacity for future electoral processes.**

The resulting attitude and position of the team in its relations with Mozambican counterparts should not be one of imposing decisions or solutions, but should actively contribute to their formulation and to the correct implementation of the electoral process within the established timeframe.

Comprehension and the practical application of this position were not easy, either on the part of some Mozambican counterparts (who sometimes regarded the advisers as "intruders", while others saw them as "officials" of the electoral structures), or on the part of some members of the team, where there was a tendency to exceed their competence and take decisions or do things which were not within their mandate, when the Mozambican structures were not being effective.

The pressures on the team, in one way or another, were felt at all levels - from the CTA to the UNVs in the provinces - and came from within and from outside the electoral structures, sometimes making it difficult to maintain a constructive and balanced attitude to problems and crisis situations.

In fact, it is not easy to define clearly the line between advice and implementation when confronted with a process with precise objectives and deadlines, and having assumed and accepted the responsibility of actively contributing to achieving them. It was not always possible to obtain the right balance between "adviser" and "executor", since the pressure of events and the practical ineffectiveness of some structures sometimes forced the team to intervene decisively in some areas.

The complex political context in which the process developed, particularly as the elections approached, heightened tensions and this had a direct effect on the team. Renamo accusations - never proven - about some members of the team are the most obvious example of this. UNDP was even obliged to take a strong public stand in the most serious case, through the publication of a press release.

The development of the electoral process, the common desire to succeed, "smoothed over" these difficulties and permitted positive, collective work.

Thus, in short, it can be stated that the technical assistance provided by UNDP/UNDDSMS was conceived and implemented as :

- **Integrated technical assistance**, articulated through Project MOZ/93/016;
- **active, participatory technical assistance** at all levels and in all its areas of intervention.

2.2. Recruitment, Organisation and Performance of the Team

2.2.1. Recruitment

The nuclear team of four advisers which began the technical assistance for the electoral process in March 93, was recruited under a technical assistance contract financed by the European Union. This contract ran until March 1995, thus ensuring the team's continuity and stability until the end of the process, which was a positive factor.

The initial team included a person who was subsequently appointed CTA for Project MOZ/93/016, the Mozambican Government having agreed in principle to this appointment at the end of 1992.

The recruitment of these four advisers was based on three determining factors:

- **previous electoral experience**, particularly the Angolan process;
- **prior knowledge of Mozambique**;
- **command of portuguese**.

These conditions could hardly be maintained for the recruitment of the remaining 60 advisers who subsequently joined the team. However, wherever possible, an attempt was made to combine two or more of these factors.

This objective was achieved with the central team. Of its 12 advisers, 9 satisfied all three conditions and the remainder satisfied two of them.

The provincial teams of advisers were made up exclusively of United Nations Volunteers. An attempt was made to include in each team:

- **3-4 people with previous electoral experience (Cambodia, Angola, South Africa) and command of the Portuguese language, or at least Spanish**;
- **1 person recruited in Mozambique, with knowledge of the respective province and command of portuguese**.

These recruitment criteria and the composition of the provincial teams was shown to be correct and appropriate to the needs of the process, as was illustrated by their strong capacity to adapt and the effectiveness of their work.

The few problems which arose - some of a personal nature and others with a collective character affecting one or other team - were usually resolved through measures by the central team (the CTA and the coordinator for the Organisation Area).

The diversity of nationalities (26 in total) and cultures within the teams also produced some misunderstandings and problems in attitudes towards the work. However, it also enriched the teams' human social experience, creativity and capacity.

All the administrative support staff (31 people) were recruited locally, through a selection process based on individual curriculum vitae presented to UNDP. The list of the technical assistance team and the support staff who participated in the process, irrespective of the entity financing the respective contract (UNDDSMS/UNDP, European Union, Portugal) and the period of their participation, is presented at the end of Part I of this report.

2.2.2. Organisation

AS already mentioned at the beginning of this report, the technical assistance team assisted the central and provincial electoral structures.

At central level, this assistance covered the following functional areas:

- . organisation
- . training
- . civic education
- . logistics
- . legal
- . social communication
- . financial management

In order to ensure direct and permanent links between the advisers and their Mozambican counterparts in each functional area, the team was distributed among the TSAE Directorates and Departments responsible for these functional areas, namely:

- Directorate of Organisation and Operations: 1 Coordinator
 - . Department of Registration and Suffrage: 1 Adviser
 - . Department of Transport and Communications (air operations sector): 1 Adviser + 2 at the voting stage
- Directorate of Legal Affairs, Training and Civil Education
 - . Department of Training: 1 Coordinator and 1 Adviser
 - . Department of Civic Education: 1 Coordinator + 1 Adviser
 - . Department of Legal Affairs: 1 Adviser

Given his specific functions, the Programme Officer worked more directly with the central TSAE Directorate of Administration and Finance, but did not have any permanent links with this directorate.

The Information Technology Department was assisted by 3-4 advisers financed by Italian Cooperation, under an existing project which was reoriented in support of the elections. This team of Italian advisers worked in coordination with the UNDP/UNDDSMS team, but had complete technical, operative and financial autonomy.

At provincial level, the technical teams covered the areas of organisation, logistics, civic education and training, but their internal organisation varied from province to province, depending on local factors and the characteristics of the team members.

As already mentioned, (Chapter 3, point 3.3.) in practice financial management area was not covered by these teams, and this resulted in problems in the management of and accountability for funds transferred from the central to the provincial TSAEs.

In general, in addition to the team leader, who had coordination functions, one member was responsible for logistics and the other for civic education.

The coordinator of the organisation and operations area was directly responsible for the central team's support to and general monitoring of the provincial technical teams. He was assisted in this task by the CTA whenever necessary.

In order to clarify specific questions, the team leaders or individual members could report directly to the coordinators of their respective areas (training, civic education) whenever necessary.

2.2.3. Performance

The team sought to work in a highly decentralised fashion, both at central level and in the provinces, giving the teams of advisers in each area or province room to act on their own initiative, within the framework of the objectives, timetable and common guidelines.

This way of working caused some problems for internal team coordination, which might eventually have been reduced by periodic joint meetings. However, this does not deny the validity of the decentralisation principle adopted, which contributed to the highly effective performance of the technical assistance.

Guidance for the work of the provincial teams was assured through frequent contacts (via telephone and fax) with the team leaders, as well as various joint meetings in Maputo and some visits to the provinces (either as part of NEC/TSAE visits or independently). However,

it is felt that the CTA and/or the area coordinators should have visited the provinces more often, in order to provide better assistance to the teams and have direct contact with the problems in each province.

Consequently, it was principally each team's own capacity, its great professionalism, its understanding of the importance of the objectives to be achieved, dedication to the job, creativity and spirit of initiative which resulted in the solutions identified being successful in each province and in each area of work.

2.3. Final Assessment of the Work done

The overall final assessment of the work done by the UNDP/UNDDSMS technical assistance cannot be separated from that of the development and implementation of the electoral process as a whole. Indeed, the electoral (or pre-electoral) structures and the technical assistance team worked side by side from the preliminary stages to the termination of the NEC's mandate.

Consequently, the assessment cannot but be positive since the final assessment of the electoral process is also positive, culminating in the holding of free and fair elections with strong participation by the Mozambican people, and the acceptance of the results by the signatories of the Rome Agreement.

However, a final assessment of the technical team's work should also take into account the objectives specified in the MOZ/93/016 project document, which served as its point of reference.

A brief summary of this assessment is as follows.

2.3.1. Objective 1: to strengthen the capacity of electoral bodies

This objective anticipated the following results from technical assistance support to electoral bodies:

- **preparation of budgets**
- **preparation of operational plans**
- **donor technical and financial support**
- **implementation of organisational and logistical activities for carrying out a technically efficient and politically fair electoral process.**

Chapter 3 of this report responds essentially to the first three lines. Chapter 2 and the attached Area Reports (Part II) respond to the last line. The problems and solutions, the successes and failures, have been adequately described there.

Project MOZ/93/016 activities within the ambit of Objective 1 were all covered by the team's work. However, one warrants special mention: the conception of the computer systems for the electoral process (Activity 1.3).

As already mentioned, Italian cooperation provided NEC/TSAE with a team of computer advisers exclusively dedicated to providing assistance in the conception of computerised solutions, the specification and acquisition of the necessary equipment, the development of the software and the management the computer systems.

The team's work was extremely positive, and made a decisive contribution to the computerised handling of the candidature processes (involving the computerised verification of data from more than 130,000 supporters of these candidatures) and the results of the electoral count.

During an initial stage, the technical assistance team helped prepare the overall conception of the information system for calculating the results and the "architecture" of the information system to be used.

2.3.2. Objective 2: to provide adequate information for electoral officials and prepare information materials.

The achievement of this objective was expected to produce the following results:

- . **adequate training of electoral officials** at all levels of the electoral structure;
- . **the preparation of training materials** covering all the steps in the electoral process.

The description in Chapter 2 of this report, and the Information Area Report (PartII - Section II) in particular, are sufficient to conclude that this objective was achieved and that certain lessons - positive and negative - must be drawn for the future in this field.

All the activities under this objective were undertaken, although there were shortcomings in the supervision of training activities, as mentioned in the Area Report.

As regards the production of training materials, it should be stressed that, in addition to preparing manuals, the technical assistance conceived, specified and quantified the "training kits" used in the preparations for the registration and the vote.

2.3.3. Objective 3: to support the development and implementation of the civic education campaign

This objective was to have the following results:

- **to make a large proportion of the population and all relevant social and political groups conscious of the importance of the elections for the country's future;**
- **to provide information for the population and these target groups about the procedures to be followed throughout the electoral process.**

The Civic Education Area Report (Part II - Section III) covers these two questions, pointing out the positive results and the gaps, and Chapter 2 of this report integrates efforts in this area into the general context of the development of the electoral process.

Various sources have criticised the civic education work done by NEC/TSAE with assistance from the UNDP team. Without denying the validity of some of these criticisms and the need for further reflection on them in the future (namely, with regard to closer collaboration with civic associations, churches, NGOs etc.) it should be stressed the Mozambican people participated massively, peacefully and in an orderly and determined manner in the electoral process: the figures of 6.3 million registered voters and 5.4 million voters illustrate this.

Various factors will have contributed to this. The NEC/TSAE's civic education was certainly not the least important. The overall assessment of the work done is therefore positive.

All the activities under Objective 3 were covered by UNDP technical assistance.

2.3.4. Objective 4: to ensure that the first registration exercise would serve as the basis for a permanent electoral register.

The expected result under this objective was:

- **to study the creation of a permanent electoral register as the basis for future electoral processes and, if necessary, as the basis for a national identification document.**

This objective was not achieved completely, although some conditions have been created for further work in this field:

- **the introduction, during the registration, of the Individual Registration Form for each voter and the Electoral Register;**

- preparing and providing each voter with a high quality, durable Voter's Card, containing his/her photograph, signature and finger print, as well as other data;
- the collection and transport to Maputo of the registration forms (6.3 million) and copies of the electoral registers (more than 7,000).

The Action Plan for the Information Technology Area initially included the computerisation of the registration forms, and before the elections, a pilot exercise in Maputo city resulting in the establishment of a computerised file of voters and the automatic issue of the respective electoral registers.

For various reasons related to the atmosphere of distrust at the time, the NEC decided to exclude this pilot exercise from the Action Plan.

Further work in this field is no longer possible prior to the termination of the NEC's mandate.

The following chapter - Recommendations - returns to this question.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Mozambican electoral process provides many valuable lessons in all fields, both for the country itself and for the United Nations and the international community.

However, selecting and ranking recommendations for the future requires the specification of the ambit and objective of these recommendations.

In the present case, it has been decided to present a set of general recommendations which could be useful for the preparation and holding of the local elections planned for 1996.

These general recommendations cover:

- . activities to be developed
- . concepts to be adopted

The various Area Reports presented in Part II contain specific recommendations for each sector which on the whole complement these general recommendations.

1. ACTIVITIES TO BE DEVELOPED

1.1. Immediate activities (timeframe: 2-3 months)

These activities are essentially aimed at ensuring the preservation of the (material and non-material) assets acquired throughout the electoral process and to ensure that preparations begin immediately to create the necessary conditions for holding local elections in 1996.

The following are therefore recommended:

- a) **The immediate institutionalisation of a technical electoral structure of a permanent nature with the following basic characteristics:**
 - a structure with central and provincial bodies and a rational internal organisation which ensures the utmost efficiency and effectiveness in its work;

- institutional dependence on the Government, through the Ministry of State Administration, outside election periods; dependence on the future NEC during these periods;
 - a small permanent staff of full time civil servants, duly motivated and with the appropriate professional profile; strengthen this staff by requisition or contracting additional technicians during election periods.
- b) **Conclusion of the inventory and collection of all the material assets acquired for the election process and final decisions as to their destination, so as to ensure their immediate conservation and their availability for the local elections.**
- c) **Conclusion of the collection, organisation and systematisation of the informational patrimony obtained during the registration (registration forms, electoral registers) and during the training of electoral structures (forms of election officials), in such a way that they can be reused in the near future.**
- d) **An immediate start on studying the technical and organisational solutions to be adopted for the local elections, taking into account the experience gained, the new context in the country, the substantial reduction in usable funds and the time available until the elections (maximum October 96).**
- e) **A start on studying the preparation of new electoral legislation, with priority for laws on:**
- . Voter Registration
 - . Electoral Bodies
 - . Local Elections
- f) **The preparation of a new civic education campaign, aimed at the next elections;**
- g) **Continued coordination with and mobilisation of the donor community to obtain (technical and financial) support for the new electoral process.**

The activities listed in lines b) and f) fall within the future jurisdiction of the new permanent technical electoral structure.

1.2. Medium term activities (by the end of 1995)

These activities are aimed at the effective launching of the electoral process for the local elections, which must enter its practical stage in early 1996.

The following is therefore recommended:

- a) to begin, within the context of the technical electoral structure, **preliminary planning and budgeting for the electoral process**, with more detailed studies as to the technical and organisational solutions to be adopted;
- b) **approval by the Assembly of the Republic of the new legislation required in order to proceed with this process** (Voter Registration Law; Law on Electoral Bodies; Law on Local Elections);
- c) to launch a new civic education campaign;
- d) to start obtaining (material, technical and financial) support from the international community, ensuring effective coordination of this support, preferably through UNDP;
- e) to create all the necessary conditions for updating voter registration, in accordance with the law to be approved by the Assembly of the Republic.

2. CONCEPTS TO BE ADOPTED

The experience gained from the electoral process now ending provides some lessons for the future regarding the conception of the system, structures and electoral procedures.

While not ignoring the fact that **future elections will be held in completely different political, social, economic and financial context from the last one** nevertheless, positive recommendations can be drawn with regard to some concepts to be adopted.

Thus, with regard to the pursuance and implementation of the electoral process, the following is recommended:

- a) **attribute direction of the process to a National Election Commission independent of State powers**, in which the political parties will have a seat; this commission should have bodies at province and district level;
- b) **attribute the implementation of the process to the above-mentioned permanent technical body** which will be dependent on the NEC during the election period (to be defined); while this will have bodies at province level, further reflection is required as to whether there is a real need for specific bodies at district level (or whether to rely on the public administration); **these should be non-party bodies**, the independence, scrupulousness and political impartiality of which must be guaranteed and controlled.

- c) **maintain the principle of linking each voter to a specific polling station and electoral register, with a maximum of 1,000 voters per polling station; indelible ink should continue to be used to avoid double voting and the necessary materials should preferably be supplied to the stations in complete kits.**
- d) **strengthen the decentralisation of the implementation to the provinces, which implies that the central bodies must define correct and clear norms and procedures which are well known and disseminated in time;**
- e) **begin planning and budgeting the process as soon as possible and ensure an integrated and global approach; the management of the plan and budget should be flexible and adaptive; control and accountability should be rigorous and periodic and done according to pre-established norms for the finance and patrimony field;**
- f) **rationalise and simplify bureaucratic and administrative procedures, allowing sufficient time to apply them in practice (customs procedures, bank transfers etc.);**
- g) **hold public and limited tenders for the acquisition of essential materials and equipment for the process sufficiently in advance, demanding guarantees and imposing penalty clauses in the event of non-fulfillment by the adjudicated company; suppliers should be required to provide samples of some materials, in order to check quality (eg indelible ink, ballot papers etc.);**

With regard to donor assistance, the following is recommended:

- a) **maintain coordination and cooperation between donors, using the experience already gained by UNDP, thus ensuring integrated support and assistance for the process;**
- b) **ensure efficient and flexible mechanisms for mobilising, disbursing and managing the resources obtained (financial, material, technical etc.);**
- c) **ensure the timely availability of the necessary funds;**
- d) **ensure rigorous and timely controls over the funds used by national structures at the various levels.**

ANNEX
LIST OF THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM

LIST OF THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM

TITLE	NAME	NATIONAL.	START	DEPARTURE
Chief T. Adviser (CTA)	F. Bruno Soares	Portugal	14.03.93	31.06.95
Org. & Logist.Coordinator	Adamo Valy	Portugal	14.03.93	15.04.95
Training Coordinator	Leonor Mendes	Portugal	14.03.93	15.04.95
Civic Education Coordinator	Maria Lecticia Silva	Angola	14.03.93	02.12.94
Programme Officer	Christian Manahl	Austria	05.10.93	23.11.94
Social Com. Coordinator	Pepe R. Diniz	Portugal	13.05.94	02.12.94
Civic Education Adviser	Juarez F. de Mala	Brasil	09.05.94	28.02.95
Logistics Adviser	Alexander Margach	U.K.	27.05.94	12.11.94
Legal Adviser	Fernando Vieira da Cruz	Portugal	25.09.94	25.11.94
Legal Adviser	Antonio Duarte Silva	Portugal	15.05.94	14.08.94
Training Adviser	Marlusia Saldanha	Brasil	08.08.94	29.09.94
Air Operations Adviser	A. Anacleto dos Santos	Portugal	05.10.94	16.11.94
Air Operations Adviser	Jose L. R. Pinto	Portugal	05.10.94	16.11.94
Air Operations Adviser	Alfredo J. S. P. da Silva	Portugal	05.10.94	16.11.94
Air Operations Adviser	Nuno C. M. L. de Faria	Portugal	06.10.94	16.11.94
Air Operations Adviser	Jose Oliveira Azevedo	Portugal	06.10.94	16.11.94
Air Operations Adviser	Alexandre M. Figueiredo	Portugal	06.10.94	16.11.94
Air Operations Adviser	Joao Manuel M. Sintra	Portugal	06.10.94	16.11.94
Air Operations Adviser	Joao M. L. Tavares	Portugal	22.06.94	03.08.94
Air Operations Adviser	Albano M. C. Coutinho	Portugal	22.06.94	03.08.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Patrizia Mauro	Italy	21.03.94	31.03.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Zaad Lathiff	SriLanka	30.03.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Frits Mioulet	Netherlands	22.03.94	15.12.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Ginette de Paul	Canada	20.03.94	15.01.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Carlos Del Castillo	Peru	24.03.94	31.03.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Deryck Fritz	Trinidad-Tobago	30.03.94	31.03.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Luis Alberto Salgado	Peru	42.03.94	15.01.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Irma Chavez	Peru	01.04.94	31.03.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Simon Nanitelamio	Congo	27.03.94	31.03.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Marissa Ragraio	Philippines	30.03.94	15.01.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Yann Brehant	France	01.05.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Claudette Lavallee	Canada	15.05.94	15.01.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Antonio Spinelli	Italy	15.05.94	15.01.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Emile Mani	France	20.03.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Monique Van Hoof	Netherlands	18.04.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Fernando Guerra	Portugal	22.04.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Maria Bustamante	Peru	18.04.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Steven Rothfunchs	Canada	26.04.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Christopher de Fonseca	SriLanka	26.03.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Kelly Smith	USA	15.04.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Ricardo Polastro	Italy	22.04.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Luca Gueneri	Italy	06.05.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Nicholas Lamade	Germany	06.05.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Therese Laanela	Sweden	10.05.94	31.12.94

Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Pita de Oliveira	Portugal	15.05.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Nicole Seibel	USA	30.03.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Cesar Vilagra	Peru	19.05.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Sebastian Mototiwa	Malawi	05.05.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Lucia Italia	Italy	30.03.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Navneet Singh	India	08.06.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Jacoba Hartmans	Netherlands	17.06.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Victor F. Braganca	Angola	15.06.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Miguel Ganga	Angola	15.06.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Gilbert Urlyo	Tanzania	04.05.94	15.01.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Nadia Maamer	Tunisia	18.07.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Guillermo Jaramillo	Mexico	14.07.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Luis Goncalves	Angola	20.07.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Joao Lopes Sanfa	Guinea-Bissau	01.08.94	31.03.95
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Joao Antonio Lazary	Angola	06.07.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Jose Farinas Gay	Cuba	09.10.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Plutarco Pantelis	Bolivia	10.08.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Taniele Gomah	Tanzania	16.06.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Catherine Pascal	France	19.05.94	01.09.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Alessandro Caldarone	Italy	15.05.94	31.12.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Joao Pereira da Silva	Portugal	08.04.94	07.07.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Edward F. Chimwendo	Malawi	20.04.94	02.09.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Cheryl Clark	Canada	15.05.94	29.06.94
Provincial Adviser (UNV)	Westley Harrison	Canada	15.05.94	29.06.94
Administrative assistant	Ana Maria Alegria	Portugal	03.03.94	31.05.95
Secretary	Gloria Catarina Cunha	Mozambique	04.04.94	31.03.95
Secretary	Elisa Pedro Tembe	Mozambique	23.05.94	31.05.95
Secretary	Soraya Aly Dauto	Mozambique	27.06.94	31.03.95
Secretary	Hercilia Albazine Almeida	Mozambique	13.09.94	30.11.94
Secretary	Telma Augusto MBeve	Mozambique	2/10/94	31.12.94
Driver	Mario Oliveira Faduco	Mozambique	21.04.94	28.02.95
Driver	Manuel Matsinhe	Mozambique	23.05.99	30.11.94
Driver	Ricardo W. Chauque	Mozambique	01.06.94	31.05.95
Driver	Joaquim Nhacume	Mozambique	07.07.94	30.11.94
Secretary	Isabel Fumo	Mozambique	01.06.94	30.11.94
Driver	Mario Tigonte	Mozambique	11.7.94	20.12.94
Secretary	Maria Helena C. Real	Portugal	01.06.94	30.11.94
Driver	Simao Queio	Mozambique	07.06.94	30.11.94
Secretary	Moiseis Raul Sitei	Mozambique	12.09.94	30.11.94
Driver	Pedro William Parruque	Mozambique	05.09.94	30.11.94
Secretary	Jaine Sambocuane Come	Mozambique	05.09.94	30.11.94
Driver	Antonio M. Arouca	Mozambique	07.6.94	30.11.94
Driver	Deolindo Fernandes	Mozambique	25.07.94	30.11.94
Secretary	Maria Teresa da Costa	Mozambique	15.06.94	30.11.94
Driver	Jose Tinai Panete	Mozambique	01.06.94	30.11.94

Secretary	Adelino Antonio	Mozambique	22.06.94	30.11.94
Driver	Silvestre P. J. Dias	Mozambique	22.06.94	30.11.94
Secretary	Maria Dulce da Silva	Mozambique	03.06.94	30.11.94
Driver	Estevao A. Parruque	Mozambique	29.06.94	30.11.94
Secretary	feliciano Leao Jose	Mozambique	01.08.94	30.11.94
Driver	Rogério Tiadeno	Mozambique	20.10.94	30.11.94
Secretary	Nilan T. A. Issimall	Mozambique	07.07.94	30.11.94
Driver	Germano P. da Silva	Mozambique	12.05.94	30.11.94
Secretary	Joana Sadiqe Mussa	Mozambique	08.08.94	30.11.94
Driver	Abiho Ali Talbo	Mozambique	19.07.94	30.11.94
Secretary	Paula Pardal	Mozambique	25.04.94	08.08.94
Driver	Jorge da Silva Serra	Mozambique	23.05.94	11.09.94

PART II

AREA REPORTS

PART II

AREA REPORTS

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SECTION I

ORGANISATION AND LOGISTICS

MOZAMBIQUE
GENERAL MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS
27-28-29 OCTOBER

ORGANISATION AND LOGISTICS

MOZ/93/016
ADAMO VALY

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I. INTRODUCTION

The signature of the General Peace Agreement between the Government and Renamo on 4 October 1992 ended a war situation and opened the way for the peace process and the democratisation of the country. The reconciliation process included the concentration in assembly points and demobilisation of the warring forces and the creation of a single army, the return of refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced populations, the "unification" of state administration, and the holding of multiparty general elections (presidential and legislative).

The whole process should have been concluded within a year but implementation difficulties and the need to develop and strengthen the reconciliation process meant that it had to be delayed until October 1994.

The General Peace Agreement also established that there should be voter registration (of all those over eighteen), as the basis for determining the number of deputies for each constituency. Registration ran from 01 June to 02 September 1994.

The first general and multiparty elections, the culmination of the peace process, were held in Mozambique on 27, 28 and 29 October 1994.

About 81% of the estimated electoral population had been registered. About 86% of those registered voted.

The people made the elections a celebration; the electoral process was generally considered to have been a success. The country began a new stage in its existence.

II. ELECTORAL STRUCTURES

The preparation of the activities leading to the electoral act began even before the promulgation of the Electoral Law and the appointment of the National Election Commission (NEC). It was the Inter-Ministerial Commission which first studied the relevant legal, structural, organisational, operational and financial aspects of an electoral process of the kind never before held in the country.

The draft Electoral Law presented to the Multiparty Meeting, the proposed structure of the technical body TSAE - the Technical Secretariat for the Administration of the Elections, the first election budget presented to the donor community in Rome in December 1992, the launching of the international tender for the supply of voting materials and the preparation of installations to house the central and provincial election structures were all undertaken by the Inter-Ministerial Commission.

By stressing that the electoral process was a responsibility and a task of the whole population, not just of the signatories of the Rome Agreement and/or the election structures, the NEC was able to mobilise great enthusiasm throughout the country.

The TSAE (Technical Secretariat for the Administration of the Elections) a body subordinated to the NEC, was responsible for the administration and technical implementation of the electoral process. Members of the TSAE were designated by the various parts involved, including the United Nations which had 25% of this structure.

The Electoral Law established that there would be both provincial and district electoral commissions and local TSAE offices. These structures, the provincial ones in particular, played an important role in voter registration and the elections.

As anticipated under the General Peace Agreement, the donor community, first through the EC (European Commission) and later through UNDP, provided the technical assistance needed to plan and implement the electoral process. Consultants worked in the central structures and in the provinces.

III. ORGANISATION OF THE ELECTORAL OPERATIONS

After the NEC had taken office and the TSAE had been set up, the plan of activities was drawn up. This established the essential objectives, the activities to be implemented and their phasing. There were to be four phases:

1. Preparation and inception of the process;
2. Voter Registration;
3. Preparation for the Electoral Act;
4. Electoral Act and Count;
5. Publication of the results and conclusion of the process.

The requirement that the elections be held by the end of October 1994 and the deadlines established by law for the different electoral activities, were the main factors influencing the programming of activities. It was clear that there was little time and that only with strong commitment and a great deal of creativity would it be possible to achieve the election target on time.

Coordinated and timely participation by donors, who were expected to provide USD 60 million of the total USD 65 million required, was also essential. The UNDP Resident Representative was responsible for this coordination.

As part of the broader peace process, the electoral process would be influenced by the way in which the other components evolved, especially the demobilisation of the two armies, demining, the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of displaced people.

1. Preparation and inception of the process

The main activities during this phase comprised the implementation and structuring of the central, provincial and district electoral bodies and the preparation of conditions for voter registration.

1.1. The following activities relating to electoral structures were undertaken:

- organisation of the central NEC and TSAE structures (TSAE was only sworn in on 26 May).

- appointment of the Provincial Commissions and the respective TSAE Offices by the end of March.
- appointment of the District Commissions and the respective TSAE Offices during April and May.
- the I Meeting of Election Bodies, from 19 to 22 April 1994.
- placement in the provinces of the first members of the UNDP technical assistance teams (UNVs).

The delay in establishing the local structures was mainly due to the fact that the different political parties were late in filling their places.

In a process with such a tight schedule, the only way to ensure success was to decentralise as much as possible. This decision had to be accompanied by the training of the members of the local commissions and TSAE offices. Documents governing the electoral process were studied in the I Meeting of Electoral Bodies. This also defined the base structures of the local bodies, established and set priorities for activities at each level, sought to provide solutions for the specific difficulties of each province, and stressed the vital importance of the provincial bodies' role for the success of the elections.

1.2. The following activities were undertaken to prepare for registration:

- on the basis of the statistical data available, the number of potential voters was identified and hence the number of registration brigades which would be needed.
- the simultaneous recruitment and training of the 8,000 registration agents required (1,600 brigades x 5 agents) and 1,600 civic education agents (1 per brigade).
- identification of the support materials required for the brigades (camping equipment and food).
- updating charts detailing logistical conditions by province and district.
- reception and distribution of kits containing registration training material.
- reception of registration kits in the provinces and their distribution to the registration brigades.

First estimates put the number of voters at 8.5 million. There was no concrete data on the detailed location of the population and the numbers involved. Given the precarious situation of the majority of the population and the logistical difficulties, it was decided to organise

registration brigades which would get as close as possible to potential voters. Previous experience had shown that each brigade could register about 75/80 people a day. A national total of 1,600 brigades was established, divided by province and district. The provincial and district bodies were responsible for defining the operational area of each team.

Registration agents were recruited from areas as close as possible to the brigade's operational area, so as to avoid heavy transport requirements. The minimum education level established was 6th grade. The agents were trained in the district capitals.

Once the local structures had been established it was possible to identify in more detail actual logistical conditions on the ground. In order to compensate for the lack of accommodation for about 600 brigades, it was decided to acquire 1,200 tents and the respective camping equipment (rucksacks, cooking equipment, canteens, towels and plates). WFP provided the basic food (maize, beans, cooking oil, sugar and tinned goods) for the brigades to be able to operate in rural areas. Those operating in urban areas received a daily allowance of 5,000 Mt per agent.

Means of air transport were also identified: 3 light planes and 6 helicopters. The light planes, carrying 7 - 11 passengers were to be based in Nampula, Beira, and Maputo.

The helicopters, for 15 passengers and 1,000 kg of cargo, would be placed in:

- . Nampula: 2, serving Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces
- . Zambezia: 2
- . Sofala: 1, for Tete, Manica and Sofala provinces
- . Inhambane: 1, for Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo provinces.

Decisions were taken on the vehicles to be acquired and their allocation by province was determined, and it was also decided to immediately hire vehicles locally to attenuate the immediate critical situation.

The options adopted were influenced by the urgent need for transport, the effective availability of funds and the delivery schedules.

It was decided to use the mozambican market as far as possible. The principle of public and international tenders was always followed. The first batch of tenders were won by Mozambican companies, except for the helicopter hire tender. The experience also showed that some companies did not respect agreed delivery dates, complicating even further the existing difficult situation and requiring new transitory solutions.

The supplier delivered the kits with voting materials in the provincial capitals. The TSAEs were to be responsible for distributing the 1,600 kits (3,200 metal boxes) weighing in all 150 tons, from the provincial to the district capitals, and from there to the operational areas of the

brigades. Each registration kit contained sufficient material to register 3,000 voters (polaroid camera, film, registration forms, voter cards, registers, pens, glue, scissors etc.). The kits made the brigades selfsufficient; they merely had to be "resupplied" with additional material, and in complete boxes, to register groups of 1,000 voters.

The "complex" and expensive registration system adopted and the quality of the material used arose from the prevailing distrust and fear of fake documents. The voter's card was printed on security paper, bore a photograph, and was covered in plastic. Given the high cost of the material, there was a registration form containing all the data needed to identify the voter (parents, date and place of birth), the place of registration/residence, a photograph and a finger print. To complete the controls, voters were listed in registration books (up to 1,000 per book) which would then determine the polling station. The need to control the registration materials required a distribution list of the kits by registration brigade. In addition, the whole operation of packing the materials into kits, storage and transport for the journey from London to Mozambique was monitored from the place of origin by a multiparty team of NEC/TSAE members.

Management difficulties arising from the shortage of materials, funds and staff were aggravated by the fragility of the central TSAE, both in its internal functioning and in its relations with the provincial structures and the NEC. The TSAE was only sworn in four days before registration began (26 May), and until then there was an atmosphere of instability, no clear assumption of responsibility by some senior staff and some members were absent for lengthy periods.

After the TSAE had taken office the hierarchy of responsibilities was clarified once and for all, although these responsibilities were not assumed or translated into daily practice immediately. However, the situation improved as time passed and people gained experience and confidence.

When the election date was fixed for 27 and 28 October, this helped stabilise the electoral process, since it ended doubts and established a clear target to aim for. Once the announcement had been made, all objectives and activities were programmed around these dates.

After donors began to make funds available, the above-mentioned tenders could be launched. Since almost all the equipment, vehicles and air transport would only be available until after 1 June, the starting date for registration, it was decided to provide the provinces with funds to enable them to hire vehicles and purchase some food locally.

These circumstances resulted in the decision that registration would begin as a priority in the provincial capitals and other cities, in the district capitals and in other small urban centres. Areas more difficult to reach were put off until the air transport and vehicles were available.

2. Voter Registration

Voter Registration began on 1 June 1994. The NEC had fixed 15 August as the end of the registration period.

The efforts and spirit of sacrifice of the members of the electoral bodies and brigades, and popular participation, made it possible for 60% of the brigades to start working on the first day of registration. All available means were used to ensure that the small and large urban centres would see the beginning of the population's active participation in the electoral process.

When air transport became available in the provinces on 9 June, the attack on the more inaccessible areas began. The brigades were gradually installed as planned. There were considerable delays in Niassa, Sofala and Gaza provinces, owing to delays in resolving the question of a single integrated administration.

From the end of June - beginning of July the logistical difficulties had been attenuated and the brigades were more productive. During the first week about 260,000 voters were registered compared to 700,000 in the seventh week. More vehicles were distributed to the provinces and assistance to rural brigades improved with the provision of camping equipment, blankets and food.

The II National Meeting of Electoral Bodies was held at the end of July to assess registration and anticipate the post-registration tasks. It was decided to strengthen logistical support in some provinces, to increase the number of brigades in Sofala and Tete and send more registration materials.

On 15 August 5,635,053 voters had been registered, corresponding to 71% of the anticipated total.

On 2 September, the date set for the end of registration, 6,363,311 voters had been registered - about 81% of the anticipated 7,894,850. These results were only possible thanks to the commitment of the local structures, the spirit of sacrifice of the brigades, popular enthusiasm and participation and the provision of funds by the donor community. Considering the numerous difficulties, voter registration can be considered a success.

Despite the care taken in training the registration agents, many errors were found in the way the registration documents had been completed. The NEC and TSAE gave instructions which enabled most of the errors to be corrected. However, this did not prevent some parties from claiming that these situations represented "fraud".

The Plan of Action approved by the NEC anticipated that the registration data would be processed by a computer in at least one province. This did not occur because the NEC only took decisions about the use of computers in the electoral process at the end of August.

The fear of fraud meant that a complex set of technical and political guarantees had to be set up.

During this phase, an international tender for voting materials was launched, considered and adjudicated. As in the case of registration, the materials were to be supplied in kits, with one voting kit for each polling station.

3. Preparation for the Electoral Act

After the registration results of each province had been reconfirmed the NEC fixed the definitive list of seats.

On the basis of the operational areas of the registration brigades and the number of voters listed in each electoral register, lists of polling station locations in each province were prepared. Each polling station corresponded to a maximum of 1,000 voters, normally registered in a single electoral register. Local logistical conditions were also taken into account in the location of the polling stations. These lists were subject to slight alterations and updating up to the eve of the election.

There were to be 7,417 polling stations in 2,600 locations.

Once the number of polling stations had been established, work started on recruiting and preparing the polling station officers and their assistants, about 52,000 people, with priority for those who had worked as registration agents. As in the case of registration, wherever possible people were recruited from the area around the polling station.

The logistics plan showed that the most acute transport requirements were from provincial to district capitals, and from there to the polling station locations. Consequently, management of the means of transport had to be considerably decentralised.

The following aircraft were contracted:

- . 24 helicopters (12 of which from the South African AirForce) + 2 in reserve;
- . 3 light planes;
- . 1 tanker plane for supplying fuel;
- . 1 cargo plan with a capacity of 6.5 tons.

Two hundred and seventy TSAB vehicles were distributed, funds made available to hire vehicles in the provinces, and assistance was requested from Non Governmental Organisations. In all, about 350 vehicles were made available.

Technical assistance in the form of seven Portuguese officers supported the air operation. The South African Air Force fleet operating in Mozambique's Northern provinces brought its own support staff.

Storage tanks for aircraft fuel used in the helicopter operation were acquired and placed in areas of difficult access.

An operation using so many means and with a very brief implementation period required a system which allowed permanent communication. A fax and voice communication system was installed, linking the NEC to all provincial capitals. It had voice links between provincial capitals and almost all district capitals, permitted the use of portable radios in the provincial capitals, and included two vehicles per province equipped with long distance radio communication equipment.

The UNHCR communication system was also put at the disposal of the electoral process.

The voting materials - each kit comprised two metal boxes for each polling station - reached the provincial capitals by 22 October. As in the case of registration, the electoral structures were responsible for transporting them from the provincial capital to the location of the polling stations.

Each voting kit contained all the material necessary for the polling station to function: ballot sheets, forms for the public announcements and minutes of the electoral operations, 2 numbered metal ballot boxes, 2 dismantlable voting booths, stamp pads, pencils, pens, lamps etc.

Staff and materials were transported from the provincial capital to the district capital between 17 and 22 October. From 23 to 26 October they were transported from the district capitals to the polling station locations.

From the moment they went to the polling station site, the polling station officers and their assistants were paid a fee and a living allowance. This was an improvement on the registration experience when there were constant delays in sending funds to the provinces and consequent delays in paying the registration agents.

In addition, equipment for the computerisation of the election results was installed in Maputo and the provincial capitals.

4. The Electoral Act and the Count

As had been announced, Mozambique's first multiparty general elections were held on 27 and 28 October. On the 28th the NEC announced that it was extending the vote for another day, 29 October.

More than 5,400,000 people voted, about 86% of the total voters registered. Once again, the high level of participation and civic behaviour shown by the voters was a positive surprise to all observers.

Except for less than half a dozen polling stations which did not open on the first day, all the others - more than 7,400 - operated as planned. Some opened later, causing a certain

confusion. The gigantic logistical operation to place more than 52,000 polling station officers and more than 7,400 voting kits (more than 14,800 metal boxes) weighing more than 500 tons, had worked.

In general, voters had no difficulty in obtaining access to the polling stations. The fact that they functioned in the same location as registration, and that each voter was registered in a book containing a maximum of 1,000 names, made the voting process easy and relatively fast. The inexperienced of the polling officers and the voters was overcome after a few hours of voting.

Party monitors were present at the polling stations, thus ensuring that the vote was fair. Thousands of international observers were also present.

After voting had ended, the votes were counted in the same place with the participation of the party monitors and international observers. The result of the vote was immediately posted there, and a copy of the public announcement and the minutes was sent to the Provincial Commission for the constituency count.

5. Publication of the results and conclusion

The long wait for the official announcement of the results created a climate of tension and expectation since parallel information circulated; unfounded accusations of fraud were also made.

On 19 November, in a formal session the NEC announced the official results of the elections. The issue of the high percentage of invalid votes was overcome with the reassessment of votes by the NEC, which extended the scope for votes to be considered valid.

Once the electoral operations had been concluded, there began a phase of preparing the conclusion of the electoral process, namely:

- . physical inventories of all the vehicles, equipment and materials;
- . the preparation of area reports;
- . closure of the accounts;
- . collection of the registration books and forms, to be organised in archives;
- . preparation of a proposal on the distribution of the vehicles and equipment used during the electoral process.



IV. THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The so-called UNDP technical assistance team covered all areas of activity in the electoral process. Structurally, it comprised the CTA, coordinators for the areas of organisation and logistics, civic education and training and various consultants in all fields of activity.

The following advisers worked in logistical organisation at central level:

- . 1 area coordinator;
- . 1 adviser in the Registration and Suffrage Department;
- . 1 adviser in the Transport Department - air operations plus 2 advisers during the voting period;

The teams in the provinces comprised 4/5 UNVs covering all areas. The team leader was usually the adviser for the organisation area, with another UNV for logistics. In the provinces where planes and helicopters were based, one UNV was given executive tasks and responsibility for their management, under coordination and guidance from Maputo.

The advisers participated constantly in the respective electoral structure, using their experience to try and find the best solutions. They worked on the organisation of the structures, the planning of activities and their implementation.

There was more executive work than is customary in the air operation field, owing to the special nature of this activity and the need for rigorous control over programmes, hours of flight and the amount of fuel used.

In general, it was possible to maintain a relationship of mutual respect and transmit experience, thus improving the functioning of the electoral structures.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Lessons which help to improve the structures and better prepare future electoral acts can and must be drawn from this electoral process, which was an intense experience for all concerned.

The following are some recommendations based on this experience:

1. On the electoral structure

A technical structure should be created to substitute the actual TSAE, under the Ministry of Public Administration, as laid down in the law. This structure should start before the current TSAE ends. During electoral periods this structure should obviously be dependent on the NEC;

The documentation and information at central and provincial level, installations, means of transport, equipment and materials justify a national central structure, with smaller provincial bodies;

The experience gained by the current members of the electoral structure cannot be wasted, and should constitute the basis for staffing the new structure.

2. Work to be done

Carry on working on the archives of the more than 7,400 registration books and more than 6,300,000 registration forms. Once this has been completed, a start can be made on the computerisation of the registers;

Reception of the vehicles, equipment and materials to be handed over by the TSAE and the creation of storage conditions which permit their permanent control and their use in the next elections.

3. Local Elections

Preparation and approval of the legal framework, including the electoral law and the law on the voter registration;

Study ways and means of updating the electoral register. The current registers and registration forms must be computerised. Each register should continue to have a maximum of 1,000 entries;

- **Study and establish the organisational system at central, provincial and district level. There is also a need to define which structure will be responsible for updating the registers (administrative authorities?);**
- **Prepare a preliminary electoral calendar;**
- **Study solutions for the question of the registration and voting materials which take maximum advantage of what remains of the kits used in these first elections.**

SECTION II

TRAINING

PROJECT MOZ/93/016

SUPPORT TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN MOZAMBIQUE

**MULTIPARTY GENERAL ELECTIONS
27-28-29 OCTOBER 1994**

PROJECT MOZ/93/016
LEONOR MENDES

**TRAINING
OF ELECTORAL STRUCTURES**

Final Report

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PREAMBLE

Work on the organisation of the general multiparty elections has finished. The NEC, TSAE and their provincial and district bodies, the thousands of Civic Education Agents, Voter Registration Agents, Polling Station Officers have done their job well! We can all take pride in having worked on what is considered to be the most perfect component of the whole peace process in Mozambique, the electoral component.

Work started a long time ago, almost two years ago in March 1993, months before the Multiparty Conference, when the Action Plan started to be conceived. A dynamic and decentralised plan and thus one which could be altered, adapted to conditions and the electoral timetable, yet without changing any of its basic concepts.

With this as our guide, we all knew what had to be done and when it should be done. Little by little we consolidated our (un)certainties, we expanded out into all the provinces, all the districts, we entered every home, we stopped to teach in many schools or, where there was nothing else, under a tree or in a destroyed railway wagon.

We invented boxes (blue, black, green) and called them kits, yet another of the words (many) which have remained. We filled them with everything we needed to teach about elections (cameras, ballot boxes, ballot sheets, stamps, forms, indelible ink). We drew bar charts, we counted the time minute by minute, sometimes we said "there isn't enough time!". then we thought again, and invented other solutions.

We studied the Electoral Law and turned it into manuals.

Then, we went out to teach: first, hundreds of teachers, then thousands and thousands of people - 107,000 hours of teaching and learning!

Little by little the teaching kits were emptied and the knowledge remained. Knowledge acquired, in many cases, by people who walked proudly with the manual under their arms because they had never had (or read) any other book; people who had never done so many sums in their lives, but now they had to, because they were counting the future of Mozambique. Virtually illiterate people, many of whom were hungry but all of whom wanted to participate in and produce the elections.

Then, on the days of the celebration, the doors were opened to the people; queues were organised, people taught how to vote, the vote was monitored, people slept with the ballot boxes. Lamps were lit, voices became hoarse announcing the names with a cross by them.

Ballot sheets were counted and recounted, sums were added, and then more sums and subtractions were done. Everything started all over again until the numbers came out right.

The electoral records were written, the public notice was posted. Then, everything into the bags, everything into the kit, as taught in the lessons.

The return home, mission accomplished!

For all those who had made the elections, electoral work had ended for the time being.

In this report we relate how the 65,000 Mozambicans who made these 1st General Multiparty Elections in their country, were trained.

Maputo, December 1994

Maria Leonor Mendes

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On 27, 28 and 29 October 1994 over 5.4 million Mozambican voters exercised for the first time their right to vote in elections recognised as free and fair. Previously, from 1 June to 2 September, 6.3 million citizens had been registered and had received the voter's card which assured them of this democratic civic right.

For this to come about, more than 65,000 people had been directly involved in the preparation and implementation of the electoral process, carrying out a variety of functions during the various phases of the process:

- about 2,000 members of the electoral structures (Commissions and TSAE);
- the 1,600 civic education agents;
- the 8,000 registration agents;
- about 52,000 polling station officers and assistants

This real "election army" had to receive intensive training for these functions within very short periods of time and under very difficult circumstances.

Direct responsibility for training these 65,000 citizens fell to about 1,700 national and provincial trainers who provided in all more than 107,000 hours of training throughout the country.

The national structure officially responsible for this enormous task was the Training Department of the Central TSAE, assisted under Project MOZ/93/016 by a permanent adviser, the Training Area Coordinator, reinforced by an additional consultant for a period of two months.

The point of reference for all training work was a "Training Plan", part of the "TSAE Action Plan" conceived and prepared by the UNDP adviser in collaboration with her Mozambican counterparts.

The objectives of this report - by the UNDP Training Area Coordinator - are, on the one hand, to describe this Training Plan (its conception, strategy, methodology, materials used, people involved etc.) and on the other hand, to present observations and recommendations considered useful for the future.

The structural fragility of the Central TSAE often forced the UNDP team to go far beyond the habitual functions of advisers, a fact which cannot but be reflected in this report.

However, the advisers were always concerned to transmit their knowledge and this helped create a national technical capacity which has become an extremely valuable "human electoral asset" for future electoral processes.

Thousands of Mozambicans successfully organised their country's first multiparty general elections. Training was one of the "pillars" of this success. The determination, will, spirit of sacrifice of the Mozambicans and their desire for peace were the solid ground on which these pillars rested.

CHAPTER 2

THE TRAINING PLAN

The Training Plan for the Election Structures formed part of the TSAE General Action Plan approved by the NEC (National Election Commission) in March 1994. This document contained the first survey and general guidelines on training requirements and covered:

- . Structures to be trained (who to train)
- . The moment of training (timetable)
- . Number of people to be trained by function
- . Content
- . Materials
- . Methodology

2.1. WHOM TO TRAIN

These elections were the first such experience for all those who directed and implemented them. It was therefore necessary to train the members of **all the election structures** which, under the **Electoral Law**, were responsible for directing and carrying out the electoral process:

- . Provincial Election Commissions
- . District Election Commissions
- . Technical Secretariat for the Administration of the Elections (TSAE) and its provincial and district offices.

Carrying out elections also meant mobilising and training a broad "army" of agents who, in each phase of the process and in accordance with the electoral timetable, carried out the most important tasks of the electoral process:

- . 1,600 civic education agents
- . 8,000 voter registration agents
- . 52,000 polling station officers

The TSAE Training Department also helped train other participants who, although not part of the election structures, had a relevant role in the voting phase:

- . Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), through the conception of the respective manual
- . Party Monitors, advising the American Republican Institute on the conception of the respective manual

International Observers, advising ONUMOZ on the conception of the respective manual.

The same training materials used in training agents were provided for the training of these participants.

Consequently, through both the production of and advice on the production of these manuals, it was possible to achieve pedagogical uniformity in the messages. This was shown to have been extremely effective for the work done on the voting days. Everyone knew the tasks, rights and duties of each person, whether he/she was a polling station officer, police officer, party monitor or international observer.

2.2. MOMENT OF TRAINING (Timetable)

The training plan was part of the global timetable "Stages of the Electoral Process". It was thus possible to know exactly when each structure had to "be ready" to start work, duly prepared.

The phases of the electoral process were the following:

- . 1st Phase: Preparation and Inception of the Process (11 Feb.-31 May 94)
- . 2nd Phase: Voter Registration (1 June - 2 Sept. 94)
- . 3rd Phase: Preparation for the Electoral Act (3 Sept. - 26 Oct. 94)
- . 4th Phase: Electoral Act and the Count (27 Oct. - 18 Nov. 94)
- . 5th Phase: Publication of the Results and
conclusion of the process (20 Nov. 94 - 23 March 95)

(Training, of course, was done before the above dates, which can thus be considered the deadlines for its conclusion.)

In the 1st Phase, the final touches were put to the training plan (which had been being studied and adapted since January 1993) and the training of Provincial and District Election Commissions Provincial and District TSAE Offices began. The civic education agents and members of the voter registration brigades were trained. The respective manuals and support materials for this training were also conceived and produced.

In the 2nd Phase the Plan of Action was reformulated (to bring it into line with alterations in the timetable as they arose, for example, the extension of the registration period), and manuals and other materials for activities in the 3rd. Phase were conceived.

In the 3rd Phase the civic education agents had a refresher course (for the voting phase) and polling station officers and the heads of the provincial and district TSAE Civic Education and Registration and Suffrage Departments were trained. They in turn trained the heads of their respective departments in each district.

Assistance was also provided to training for the Police of the Republic of Mozambique on rules of behaviour during the voting days, and advice was given on the training of party monitors and international observers.

It was also intended to prepare in September the provincial and district Election Commissions and provincial and district TSAE Offices for the electoral act. The NEC was hesitant about the methodology (national meeting or provincial seminars) and in the end this initiative did not take place, given the enormous workload of the local structures, the central TSAE itself and the NEC at that time.

However, considering the way in which the vote proceeded, it can be concluded that on the whole the experience gained by the local structures throughout the electoral process was enough to ensure the success of the final operation - the electoral act.

In the 4th Phase, the national trainers of the polling station officers became the coordinators of the teams which, under the Electoral Law, would check invalid and contested votes in the two elections. This work ran without interruption for ten days.

For the 5th Phase, still running, the Training Department prepared a project on the establishment of a data base containing individual information on all those who had worked in the electoral process throughout the country. The department believes that the enormous "know-how" acquired by thousands of Mozambicans is a precious asset which should not be lost, but used in the next elections or in initiatives launched even before then such as, for example, updating voter registration, or a population census.

2.3. NUMBER OF PEOPLE TO BE TRAINED BY FUNCTION

On the basis of population estimates - the 1980 census and data provided by the National Statistics Institute - the Registration and Suffrage Department quantified the number of registration brigades that would be needed, how many people each brigade should have and the function of each.

The Electoral Law established how many members the provincial and district commissions should have. The decree establishing the TSAE did the same for this body at national, provincial and district level.

Subsequently, based on the total population registered, the number of polling stations was estimated and at the same time the number of polling officers to be trained was finalised. This number had been estimated earlier by the department before ordering the training kits.

The total number of people trained was roughly the following:

. members of Provincial Election Commissions	66
. members of District Election Commissions	1,200
. members of Provincial TSAE Offices	66
. members of District TSAE Offices	440
. civic education agents (with one refresher course)	1,600
. trainers of civic education agents	300
. voter registration agents	8,000
. trainers of voter registration agents	366
. polling station officers	52,000
. trainers of polling station officers	1,042
Total	65,062

After combining the total number of people to be trained, the time available and the location, the following could be determined:

- . the method to be adopted;
- . the number of trainers needed;
- . the total number of courses and how many would have to run simultaneously;
- . the budget.

2.4. CONTENT

The **Electoral Law** was the basic training document for all election structures, and to this was added training for each (and all) election structures on **practical aspects** of directing and implementing the process.

The Electoral Law determined the **attributions and competence** of the election commissions and TSAE offices at all levels. the **procedures** for voter registration and for the voting and counting operations, the rules governing the forces for the maintenance of public order, the rights and duties of party monitors and international observers, and the behavioural norms and work objectives of the civic education agents.

Throughout this report, the points dealing with each of the department's training activities detail the topics covered in each of these activities.

The department's main concern was to provide each structure with the **practical knowledge** needed for its activities, since the extremely tight electoral calendar and the degree of literacy of most of those trained did not allow a lot of time to be spent discussing theoretical concepts (nor was this advisable). In our opinion, the **balance between understanding the reason for the procedures and how to carry them out** was transmitted in sufficient "quantity" to equip all, in general, for the job they had to do.

And if formal training was weaker in some cases, the sense of responsibility felt by everyone involved in organising the elections, together with the experience gained rapidly in the day-to-day resolution of problems (many of which could not have been foreseen and thus their solutions taught), contributed decisively to the success of the work.

2.5. MATERIALS

As already mentioned above, the **Electoral Law** was the basic document for all training. Working from this, specific documents were prepared for training the respective structure: interpretive documents for the election commissions, manuals for the members of the registration brigades, the polling station officers and the civic education agents.

In addition to manuals, **training kits** with materials and documents simulating those to be used in registration and voting were produced for the courses for registration agents and polling officers. In both cases the kits were produced by the English company which supplied the voter registration and voting materials, according to specifications included in the respective tender documents. The NDI (National Democratic Institute) also produced **voting simulation kits** for training the civic education agents and to be used in their work.

The training of the members of the provincial and district TSAE offices covered the Plan of Action and the structural organigram of the TSAE, which were used to explain the tasks (and the moment of their implementation) of each department at district and local level.

2.6. METHODOLOGY

The enormous number of people to be trained in each structure directing and carrying out the elections, naturally required "cascade training".

The method consisted in training first provincial trainers (in Maputo), then district trainers (in each provincial capital) and finally training the civic education agents, registration brigades and polling station officers in each district.

It was decided that training for the Provincial and District Election Commissions (PEC and DEC) should include training the PEC chairmen and deputy chairmen in Maputo. When they returned to their provinces, they organised similar seminars for the remaining members of the commission together with the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the DECs.

A similar procedure was adopted for the members of the provincial and district TSAE offices. The directors, assistant directors and department heads of all provincial TSAE offices came to Maputo and then trained the respective persons in the district offices. The training of the remaining members of the election commissions and district TSAE offices was informal, that is, there were no training seminars and the work began immediately. This was because there remained only a few staff who had not been trained.

The Training Plan was thus highly decentralised and gave considerable autonomy to each province which could then adapt the national guidelines, within reasonable limits, to their own reality.

CHAPTER 3

MAIN TRAINING ACTIVITIES

3.1. TRAINING OF PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS; TRAINING OF PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT TSAE OFFICES/1st Phase

(1st NATIONAL MEETING AND PROVINCIAL MEETINGS OF THE ELECTORAL BODIES)

From 19 to 22 April (5 weeks before voter registration began) the 1st National Meeting of Electoral Bodies was held in Maputo, and from 2 to 6 May the provinces held provincial meetings.

These substituted the planned "training seminars for election commissions and TSAE offices", which could not follow the "cascade method", due to lack of time. It had been planned that the election commissions (Maputo and provincial capitals) would be trained first and then the TSAE offices (also in Maputo and the provincial capitals). If conducted separately, these two activities would "take up" about four weeks of the timetable. This was impossible with the start of registration just around the corner, and provincial and district TSAE offices needing to be informed quickly about how the process would be conducted and properly trained to implement it.

3.1.1. Objective

The objective of the meeting was to provide the electoral organs with the necessary knowledge and means to successfully undertake all the activities necessary for the first general multiparty elections in Mozambique.

3.1.2. Topics

The following topics were discussed during the meeting:

- . the electoral process as a component of the peace process
- . aspects of the Electoral Law
- . role of the electoral bodies
- . the phases of the electoral process:
 - civic education
 - voter registration
 - suffrage
 - protection of election material
- . functioning of the TSAE and provincial offices
- . assessment of preparations for the electoral process in the provinces.

3.1.3. Participants

Chairmen and deputy chairmen of the Provincial Election Commissions, directors and assistant directors of the Provincial TSAE Offices and officials from the central TSAE participated in the meeting, about 150 people in all.

3.1.4. Monitors

The monitors in the 1st. Meeting of Members of the National Election Commission were TSAE department directors, advised by the UNDP technical team.

3.1.5. Training of the District Election Commissions and the District TSAE Offices.

The following week, in each province the 1st National Meeting of Election Bodies subdivided into **Provincial Meetings of Election Bodies**. The agenda was the same and the participants were the members of the District Election Commissions and the TSAE District Offices in each province. The meetings were directed by the respective provincial commissions and the TSAE provincial offices who participated in the national meeting.

3.1.6. Assessment of the 1st National Meeting

As the nature of the 1st National Meeting of Election Bodies went far beyond just training, the National Election Commission decided to run it.

The 1st National Meeting of Election Bodies was the first opportunity to bring together at national level **all those involved in directing and implementing the electoral process**. It was an occasion for exchanging experiences, assessing the start of voter registration in each province and drawing up guidelines for the implementation of the first phase of the Action Plan.

The 1st meeting was thus the moment when **electoral work began** throughout the country.

However, the methodology adopted did not fully equip the staff of the provincial and district TSAE Offices for the onset of voter registration in all its components: training, civic education, logistics etc. When the training seminars got transformed into a national meeting, the **practical** training component was reduced. Consequently, when senior staff of the TSAE Offices returned to their provinces to start work, they only had vague information about how the registration phase would be implemented in practice. Nevertheless, the provincial and district structures gradually overcame this lack of information and through dedication, initiative and their profound knowledge of each province and district, they were able to find their own solutions, assisted by the central TSAE.

3.1.7. 2nd National Meeting of Election Bodies

In August - during the final phase of voter registration - the National Election Commission held the 2nd National Meeting of Election Bodies with the aim of assessing how registration was progressing and drawing up guidelines for the voting phase.

3.2. TRAINING THE CIVIC EDUCATION AGENTS

Training for the 1,600 civic education agents was provided in two phases:

- 1st Phase: Training for registration (26 to 29 April). There were 150 courses, each lasting three days, making a total of 3,600 hours.
- 2nd Phase: Training (refresher course) for the election campaign and voting phases (29 August - 2 September). There were 150 courses, each lasting four days, making a total of 4,800 hours.

Training followed the cascade method (training provincial trainers, then district trainers and finally the civic education agents themselves.)

3.2.1. Objective

As explained in more detail in the respective department's Action Plan, the objective in training (and creating) civic education agents stemmed from the weak radio and television coverage in Mozambique. In addition, inter-personal communication (a basic concept for electoral civic education) is the culture of the Mozambican population, especially in rural communities, so this was adopted as the first vehicle for transmitting the NEC's messages.

Consequently, training for NEC civic education agents was intended to provide them with the necessary knowledge for their electoral work among the population.

3.2.2. Topics

1st Phase (Registration):

- . Electoral Law
- . Explanation of the electoral phases/timetable
- . Electoral civic education

2nd Phase (Voting):

- . General principles
- . Civic rights
- . Democracy
- . Electoral Law
- . Presentation

- . Candidatures
- . Election campaign
- . Bodies to be elected
- . Voting system
- . Presentation of manuals
 - . The tasks of civic education agents
 - . The voting act
 - . Organisation and activities of agents/practical exercises
 - . Voting mechanisms: simulation and practical exercises

3.2.3. Participants

1st Phase (Registration)

- 26 national trainers (2 per province) recruited in the provincial capital
- 296 provincial trainers (2 per district) recruited in the district capitals
- 1,600 civic education agents, distributed as follows:

Cabo Delgado	138
Niassa	72
Nampula	308
Zambezia	292
Tete	83
Manica	70
Sofala	142
Inhambane	149
Gaza	132
Maputo prov.	101
Maputo cid.	113
Total	1,600

The provincial and district heads of the Civic Education Department also participated in the training.

2nd Phase (Voting)

In the second phase (refresher course for the election campaign and voting act phase) training was organised as in the first phase, except for the recruitment of provincial trainers. It was decided to recruit them in Maputo in order to obtain a main group of trainers with a higher educational level and more experience in transmitting messages.

They were thus recruited from among students from the **Higher Pedagogical Institute** who replied to an advertisement published by the TSAE. After their course, these trainers left for the provinces to train district trainers and monitor the training of the civic education agents. All trainers also monitored the work of the agents on the ground, and so were contracted until the eve of the elections.

3.2.4. Monitors

The central trainers were trained in Maputo by members of the Civic Education Department, advised by the UNDP team working in this area.

3.2.5. Materials

The Civic Education Department produced **Manuals on Civic Education and Guides for Civic Education Agents** (two volumes each, one for each phase of the electoral process) to help the trainers and agents in their work.

The NDI produced "**Teaching How to Vote Kits**", which were distributed to all agents as the basic material for their work in the voting phase.

Needless to say, in their work the agents also benefitted from other material prepared for the civic education campaign by the respective department.

3.2.6. Assessment

The training given to civic education agents was decisive for their work during the electoral process. It occurred while the election structure - provincial and district - were still being set up and thus had little capacity to help out with training (transport to the districts to **monitor and control** the quality of training, logistical support etc.) Problems arose when funds to finance the courses and pay trainers and agents arrived late, and there were some faults in recruitment, not to mention (since it does not belong in this report) the agents' working conditions.

Delays in the electoral timetable prevented the training of civic education agents (at all levels) from starting earlier, so that the civic education campaign could start several weeks before voter registration as planned.

This problem, which was more related to when the agents started work than the training itself, was compensated by the fact that it was planned to have one of these agents in each registration centre from the start of registration, to work with the people living within its "radius of activity".

The **recruitment** of trainers and agents also suffered from the same "rush" to keep up with the electoral timetable. Recruitment was therefore "hasty" (especially in the voter registration phase) and those selected in the provinces and districts were not the best for the task. Finally, there was the salary and allowance question, which was always decided late and not always in the fairest way, especially in the case of the trainers.

In any event, and on this work front too, both trainers and civic education agents managed to overcome their difficulties and carry out their functions with the highest degree of professionalism, patriotism and sense of responsibility, which has been lauded unanimously by everyone. The electoral population participated in registration and was present on voting day.

3.3. TRAINING THE MEMBERS OF THE VOTER REGISTRATION BRIGADES

The training of the 8,000 members of the voter registration brigades ran from 26 April to 25 May (at national, provincial and district level) and followed the cascade method. Each level of training lasted 3.5 days. Throughout the country, about 510 courses were held (14,280 hours) with an average of 25 pupils per class.

Each registration brigade comprised 5 people: 1 brigade supervisor, 2 interviewers, 1 photographer, 1 card issuing agent. In each registration post, one civic education agent worked with the brigade, but did not belong to it.

3.3.1. Objective

The objective of this training was to enable brigade members to carry out the voter registration operations laid down in the Electoral Law.

3.3.2. Topics

- . Electoral Law (general outline)
- . Voter Registration:
 - . General concepts
 - . Organisation of voter registration brigades
 - . Registration material
 - . Tasks of each member of the brigade
 - . The registration centre
 - . Rights and duties of party monitors
 - . Rights and duties of international observers
 - . Stages of registration
 - . Resolving problems
 - . Instructions on filling out documents (Voter's Card, Registration Form, Electoral Register)

3.3.3. Participants

- 26 trainers at national level (2 per province except for Nampula and Zambezia which needed 4 trainers)
- 340 district trainers (proportional to the number of registration agents to be trained in each district and the time available for training)

- 8,000 registration agents, distributed by province as follows:

. Cabo Delgado	690
. Niassa	360
. Nampula	1,540
. Zambezia	1,460
. Tete	415
. Manica	350
. Sofala	710
. Inhambane	745
. Gaza	660
. Maputo prov.	505
. Maputo city	565
Total	8,000

The heads of the Operations Departments of the provincial and district TSAE participated in the three levels of training for the voter registration brigades.

3.3.4. Monitors

The training of national level monitors was given by staff from the English company which supplied the registration material (Thomas de La Rue Identity Systems) and UNDP technical assistance in the Training Department. Members of the central TSAE Training and the Registration and Suffrage Departments were also present.

Training in provincial and district capitals was given by the trainers already trained, and there were always two trainers for each course.

3.3.5. Materials

The basic materials for training the registration agents were the **Voter Registration Manual** (produced in the Training Department by the UNDP adviser) and **Training Kits** containing registration material produced by the Thomas de La Rue company. This company also produced the **Trainer's Manual** (an auxiliary manual for the organisation of each course) under Training Department supervision. The **Registration Manual** and the **Training Kits** were fundamental for the training of registration agents. All the material to be used during registration was reproduced (in some cases simulated, for example the voter's card) which meant that during the courses all the brigade members could train as much as necessary until the trainers were certain that the future agents were capable of doing the job properly. Consequently, when voter registration began, nothing was new to them, and this gave them the will and self-confidence to quickly reach a good pace in their work (indeed, most registration brigades achieved a much higher daily production level than expected).

In logistical terms, as in the case of the registration and voting kits, all training material was easily distributed since everything was packed in two boxes, and there was no great problem in organising distribution.

3.3.6. Recruitment

The trainers were recruited in the provincial and district capitals according to a profile drawn up by the central TSAE Training Department.

Whenever possible, registration agents were recruited from the localities where the brigades were installed, and observed a predefined profile established in the Electoral Law: a minimum educational level of 6th grade, at least 18 years of age, and at least one member of the brigade should speak the local language.

In some districts, however, it was not possible to recruit citizens with the required minimum education level from among the local population. It was therefore decided to recruit and train people in the provincial capitals; the trainers or brigade members were then sent to the places where they would work.

3.3.7. Monitoring

Monitoring of registration brigade training and work was inadequate, for the following reasons:

- a) Following a NEC decision to this effect, central monitoring of the **training of district trainers** (given in the provincial capitals) was done by TSAE members from all departments. Since many had not participated in the training (nor should they have), and despite the effort and good will they evidenced in the work they did in the provinces, it is clear that not all of them were capable of clarifying the doubts which arose. Another mistake during monitoring arose from the fact that these cadres did not request assistance from the Training Department (by telephone or fax), which could have quickly clarified any doubts.
- b) The work of brigade members during registration was not monitored. The Training Department prepared a document in which it proposed that the work of brigade members should continue to be monitored and supported during registration. This assistance would have been provided by the provincial and district trainers, who could have clarified any doubts of brigade members during visits to the centres, and could even gather information on how registration was progressing (productivity indices, the main problems arising from training or from work with the population etc.)

This proposal was rejected first by the Registration and Suffrage Department, which considered that once registration had started the work of the Training Department had ended, and later by the general management, which preferred the trainers to be integrated into registration brigades as supervisors. Consequently, since the number of trainers was not the same as the number of brigades (340 trainers/1,600 brigades) most registration agents were left without any support. We have no hesitation in stating that many of the mistakes made by brigade members could have been avoided if the importance of continuing training work during the registration period had been understood.

3.3.8. Assessment

The training of voter registration agents was one of the most difficult tasks in the electoral process due, on the one hand, to lack of time (which prevented any course from lasting more than 3.5 days) and, on the other hand, because it took place while the electoral structures were still being installed and had no funds, logistical resources and no time to work as planned.

It was no small effort to train about 370 trainers (provincial and district) in 25 days and 8,000 registration agents. Achieving this required considerable organisational work and a massive recruitment effort, particularly by the provincial and district TSAE offices, which from the very beginning were really the great workers in all training activities.

The high illiteracy level in some districts greatly reduced the desired level of recruitment of agents. And if, as stated above, this problem was sometimes overcome by recruiting in the provincial capital and by very practical and insistent training, material mistakes were in fact made during the registration of some citizens, the most important of which were:

- . voter's card incorrectly filled out
- . cards without a stamp (not authenticated)
- . voters' names omitted from the electoral registers.

However, during the period established in the Electoral law for "overcoming material errors which occurred during the registration process", brigade members and district TSAE offices worked together and were able to correct mistakes, thus enabling the whole electoral population to exercise its right to vote.

In order to assist this work, the UNDP adviser in the training area prepared "Instruction No. 16", a document-guide for "Correcting irregularities and material errors which occurred during voter registration". This instruction was then adopted by the Registration and Suffrage Department, which sent it to all the provinces.

Another problem in the training of registration agents was related to the late installation of some State administrations (for example, Cheringoma, Maringue and Muanza in Sofala; Mavago in Niassa and Chigubo in Gaza). Since there were no District Election Commissions, it was not possible to start training courses there (nor registration itself).

As a result, training in these districts took place late and "raced against the clock", using reserve kits sent from Maputo and trainers sent from the provincial capital. In some cases, the recruitment of brigade members in these districts and localities had to observe delicate criteria, where level of education and performance during training were not always the prime reasons for admitting them as brigade members (in this regard, the highest percentage of errors occurred in Macomia/Cabo Delgado, where most brigade members only had 3rd grade.)

3.4. TRAINING OF POLLING STATION OFFICERS

The training of the 51,954 polling station officers ran from 26 August to 14 October (national, provincial and district levels) and followed the cascade method. Each course lasted seven days, and about 1,500 courses were held throughout the country (84,000) hours.

Each polling station had 1 chairman, 1 deputy chairman, and 3 scrutineers. Collaborating with them, but not belonging to the polling station team, were 2 assistants per station, whose main task was to show voters to the voting location.

3.4.1. Objective

The objective of the training was to prepare polling station officers to carry out their tasks during the vote and the count in each polling station.

3.4.2. Topics

- . Electoral Law (general framework)
- . Polling station:
 - . definition
 - . creation
 - . working hours
- . Polling station officers
 - . definition
 - . composition
 - . working materials
- . Voting operations
 - . Preliminary operations
 - . General manner of voting
 - . Special voting cases
 - . Closure of the polling station.
- . Counting operations
 - . Preliminary operation
 - . Counting votes and ballot sheets
 - . Validity of votes
 - . Participation by party monitors
 - . Completing the documents: public notice, the record of the electoral operations.

3.4.3. Participants

- 24 national trainers (2 for each province, with the exception of Nampula and Zambezia, which needed 3 trainers);
- 1,000 provincial trainers (proportional to the number of polling officers to be trained in each province);

- 51,954 polling station officers, distributed as follows by province:

.	Cabo Delgado	4,725
.	Niassa	3,394
.	Nampula	10,381
.	Zambezia	10,381
.	Tete	3,248
.	Manica	2,646
.	Sofala	4,382
.	Inhambane	3,934
.	Gaza	3,367
.	Maputo prov.	2,702
.	Maputo city	3,472
.	Total	51,954

Note: * In each provincial capital an additional 5% over and above those required were trained as a reserve.

* Anticipating that some people would fail the course, an additional margin of 10% was admitted for training.

* The heads of the Registration and Suffrage Departments of the provincial and district TSAE offices also participated in training activities.

3.4.4. Monitors

The training of national monitors (done in Maputo) was conducted by staff of the English company which supplied the voting material - Thomas de La Rue Identity Systems, in collaboration with the UNDP adviser for the training area. Members of the central TSAE Training and Registration and Suffrage Departments coordinated. Provincial training was conducted by national trainers.

3.4.5. Methodology

As in the case of the registration and civic education agents, the trainers always worked in pairs. The reason why lessons were given by a pair of trainers was to ensure that if one of them fell ill or was a little uncertain about some of the subjects to be taught, he/she could be replaced or aided by his/her colleague. On occasion, when there was not enough time to stick to the training timetable, the trainers separated, each one teaching the respective course assisted by a pupil who had performed well in the previous course.

Each class had a maximum of 35 pupils, and each pair of trainers should prepare 105 pupils.

Each Voting Training Kit had enough material for all the work to be done by each pair of trainers, so additional kits only had to be provided in a few cases.

The behaviour and abilities of each pupil were evaluated throughout the 7 days of training and all underwent various tests (written and practical) on each of the main stages of their

work - voting and counting operations. At the end, those who were most capable were proposed by the trainers as chairmen and deputy chairmen of the polling stations, those less proficient as scrutineers and the remainder as assistants.

When the trainers were not completely sure about the performance of the class, it was decided to provide two additional days teaching in smaller classes, comprising only the future chairmen and deputy chairmen, since they would be responsible for directing and carrying out the main operations in the polling station.

This notion of training the chairmen and deputy chairmen separately - and that they would undertake the specific preparation of the respective scrutineers and assistants - was the Training Department's initial proposal, but this was not accepted by the NEC. So the training effort in all subjects was extended to 52,000 people, 2/3 of whom would never carry out all of them, under the restrictions imposed by the Electoral Law.

3.4.6. Recruitment

3.4.6.1. Of National Trainers

Recruitment of the national trainers for polling station officers was done through a public advertisement by the central TSAE for students at the Higher Pedagogical Institute and the Institute for International Relations. The curricula vitae of those who responded were analysed and all underwent preliminary interviews in order to ensure that those admitted for training would be those who seemed to be those most capable of doing the work. However, the final list of candidates and trainers was inexplicably "cut in half" at the last minute, so that other candidates could be included. These were not interviewed, nor in most cases did they provide curricula vitae or diplomas when they were admitted.

After seven days of training, the technicians responsible for the teaching gave their opinion on each candidate, after which the TSAE general management accepted and contracted them as national trainers of polling station officers.

This report cannot fail to mention the work done by this group of trainers, young students and graduates, since their work in the provinces and districts far exceeded the job of "just" training. The Training Departments of the provincial and district TSAE offices relied on them to organise the courses, prepare timetables, resolve problems.

3.4.6.2. Of Provincial Trainers

The provincial trainers were recruited in a similar way, according to a profile determined centrally: a voting citizen with a minimum of 11th grade or equivalent, with preference for tertiary level teachers at least.

However, in some provinces and districts it was impossible to obtain the number of trainers required. In districts in Tete and Niassa, for example, there was no-one with the educational level requested. The NEC therefore requested the Ministry of Education to make available serving teachers to train polling officers in the districts and provinces where this was

necessary. The request also included the loan of classrooms for training and, on voting days, for use as polling stations.

Good collaboration with the Ministry of Education varied from province to province. The endeavor in Nampula, which needed 364 trainers, warrants special mention since virtually all lessons came to a halt given that almost all the teachers in the province were involved in the electoral process.

The national and provincial trainers received attractive salaries which provided a good incentive for them to work, despite subsequent conflicts over payment delays and/or confused interpretation of the guidelines issued by the central TSAE Finance Department.

3.4.6.3. Of Polling Station Officers

Recruitment of polling station officers observed the following profile:

- . a voting citizen;
- . respected and recognised by the population as an exemplary citizen;
- . with knowledge of the local language in that area;
- . with good marks during training.

The polling station officers were recruited from among the voters listed in each electoral register (since each register corresponded to one polling station) as laid down in the General Peace Agreement and the Electoral Law. However, the low level of literacy in Mozambique - particularly in rural areas - prevented this rule from being applied throughout the country, since many polling stations were staffed by illiterate citizens.

The UNDP advisers in the Training Department and Legal Department prepared a draft Deliberation on this issue when the Training Plan for Polling Station Officers (chapter on recruitment) was presented to the NEC in June 1994, but no decision was taken at that time.

At the end of August, the NEC presented to the Assembly of the Republic a package of alterations to the Electoral Law, which included the possibility of recruiting people from other areas to serve as polling officers, with the right to vote. (The delay in altering this article of the Electoral Law had serious consequences for the counting operations in the polling stations, as we shall see in point 3.4.12 of this report.)

It is estimated that about 37,000 polling station officers were sent from provincial capitals to district capitals to work in polling stations, particularly in rural areas.

3.4.7. Appointment of Polling Station Officers

The appointment of polling station officers occurred at two moments:

- appointment for training
- definitive appointment (after training)

3.4.7.1. Appointment for Training

The Electoral Law (Article 114 - 4) stated that "After consultation with the representatives of the candidatures, the provincial and district electoral commissions shall name the polling station officers, and train them for the performance of their duties". Consequently, the lists of polling station officer candidates resulting from replies to advertisements published in newspapers and broadcast on the radio, were posted in the headquarters of the electoral structures so that the population and the political parties could, if they wished, comment on the profile and suitability of the persons whose names were on the list.

Later, each District Election Commission studied the comments received, deliberated and prepared the final lists of candidates to be admitted for training.

3.4.7.2. Definitive Appointment

Once the training had ended, all pupils were rigorously tested (namely, writing up the records). Based on the trainers' opinion as to the standard and individual capacity of each candidate, a jury comprising three members of the District TSAE Office (1 for each political tendency represented) made the final evaluation of the course participants and published a definitive list of the district polling station officers.

3.4.8. Monitoring

The quality of monitoring of the training for polling station officers at central level was considerably better than that during registration training. Even so, it was insufficient. There were few trips to the provinces and districts and the expected feedback from the central trainers working in the provinces did occur.

At local level, monitoring varied from province to province depending on the greater or lesser "sensitivity" of each TSAE to the importance of monitoring the trainers' work in the districts and localities. Thus, for example, the central trainers working in Nampula always received the necessary logistical support for their journeys, whereas in Tete and Sofala they lost all control over the progress and quality of training in the districts.

3.4.9. The main difficulties in recruitment and training

The main problems in the recruitment and training of polling station officers were related to the large number of people required (about 52,000), the fact that the Mozambican population has a high illiteracy rate, and the very complicated operations for the count (established by the Electoral Law) in the polling stations.

In almost all districts (with the exception of Maputo city) the "army" of polling officers had to be completed by people recruited and trained in the provincial capitals (in Sofala, for

example, on the day before the elections 650 polling officers were transported from Beira to the districts).

However, of all the subjects taught by the Training Department throughout the electoral process, the complex operations involved in the count (the calculations needed to fill out the public notices and records) were the most difficult to assimilate. Indeed, if the innumerable sums, the cross calculations, the procedures for votes contested by party monitors, are difficult to assimilate in any country, they are much more so in Mozambique where the population is not very literate and, even more important, not used to dealing with numbers.

This difficulty, which arose from the Electoral Law itself, was compounded by the teaching conditions. Many courses ran without the food subsidy and so the pupils had one small meal a day and slept in the open air. In some classrooms visited by the UNDP adviser the pupils (and the trainer) were hungry! It is impossible to teach such complex, and especially such new, subjects to pupils studying under such conditions for seven days. Many failed and others just gave up because frankly they could not cope with the subject matter.

Having anticipated that this kind of problem would arise and would be a major obstacle to the proper training of all polling station officers, when the respective manual was prepared it was decided that the main voting and counting operations in the polling station would be concentrated in the chairman and deputy chairman. So from the 52,000 people who underwent training, it was possible to choose 17,000 chairmen and deputy chairmen from among those with the best results, and in some cases give them a further two days training. The remainder were assigned the functions of counters and assistants, with very simple tasks.

3.4.10. Materials

The **Manual for Polling Station Officers** was prepared by the UNDP adviser. As in the case of registration training, the company which supplied the voting material produced **Voting Training Kits** containing copies of the materials to be used on the election days (for example, signposts, polling booths, ballot boxes, stamps, pens and stamp pads with ink for marking the ballot sheets) and simulations of the polling station documents (ballot sheets, public notices, records of the electoral operations).

A **Rapid Reference Guide for Polling Station Officers** was also prepared - as the name suggests, it was a kind of chronological "crammer" covering the main tasks of each officer from the opening of the polling station until it closed. However, this small brochure was never published, and is only attached to this report as a possible source of ideas for future elections.

The amount of material each kit should contain was calculated according to the total number of pupils for each pair of trainers (105 pupils in three courses with 35 pupils) and the number of copies needed to train each pupils.

3.4.11. Support by Polling Station Officers and the Training Department for civic education work

(The joint work in this field by the civic education and training areas was a most positive example of mutual assistance between two departments in a common effort to resolve problems affecting the work of each. This way of working was rare in the life of the TSAE.)

As the election date approached, the NEC became concerned by what it considered to be weak civic education in the rural areas. Its concern centred principally on the apprehension that people still did not know how to vote.

The Training Department (which offered to assist the civic education area during trips to the provinces) also proposed that polling officers should get out into the street and they themselves undertake voting simulation in the places where the polling stations were to operate, in the period between the end of their training and the election date. The aim of this proposal was, on the one hand, to provide the needed reinforcement of civic education and, on the other hand, to provide "live" training for polling officers and the respective population before the "final test" on 27, 28 and 29 October.

This proposal was well received by the NEC and commended by ONUMOZ and the local electoral structures which heard about it. However, for reasons which never became clear, this initiative was not followed through except perhaps in or two places. However, this is yet another good idea which, although not put into practice, could be implemented in the next elections if necessary.

This central support for civic education work in the provinces confirmed on the ground that there was in fact just cause for the misgiving that some voters would indicate their choice incorrectly on the ballot sheet. So it was felt that (since there was no time to teach those who still did not know how to make a cross on a ballot sheet) the best way of reducing the percentage of invalid votes would be to expand the qualification of votes considered valid.

The NEC subsequently did extend the qualification of valid votes.

3.4.12. Assessment

Assessing the training of polling station officers means remembering their work on the election days, and recalling the opinion of the national and international observers. In each and every polling station they visited, they were unanimous in praising the high degree of professionalism, the excellent technical preparation, the dignity and impartiality revealed by the work and behaviour of the polling officers during the three days of the elections. It also means recalling the insignificant number of complaints and protests presented by the party observers in the polling stations.

The existence of the Manual during the voting and counting operations was of the utmost importance, as a guide and aid to the work of these officers. It was often consulted in order to clarify doubts on the procedure to be followed and on how to resolve problems. Mention

should also be made of the "ease" and speed with which the officers handled the materials (setting up the booths, placing the signs, organising the table etc.) the result of all these items having been included in the training kits.

However, and while this must not obscure the overall excellent technical quality of the work done by the polling officers, since the objective of this report is also to serve future electoral acts, less positive aspects must also be mentioned.

1. Some polling officers did not know how to calculate the totals of the valid votes

Perhaps during training there should have been more insistence on addition exercises or, alternatively, the calculators in each kit should have been much simpler, so as not to inhibit their use by the counters. However, the rules of the European Union (which financed this supply) prevented selecting a simpler machine from outside the European market.

2. Some (a few) Electoral Operations Records were written up incorrectly when crossing the numbers because:

- The records are extremely complicated;
- The counting operations in the polling stations began after three consecutive days of intensive work and two nights with little sleep;
- Counting the votes and writing up the records extended into almost the whole night of the third day;
- Everyone was suffering from great fatigue and tension.

All these factors influenced the performance of the polling officers; they are problems which cannot be resolved by training because the conditions under which this is ministered, although also difficult, are not the same as the real thing.

For future elections, it would be useful to consider an Electoral Law where procedures which have to be carried out by a large number of officials are simpler (voter registration or the counting operations in the polling station). It is possible and necessary to conceive much simpler records of electoral operations, adapted to the real Mozambique.

3. In their Public Notices the polling officers forgot to add to the total number of voters listed in the electoral registers, the number of polling officers, police officers or party monitors who, although not registered at that polling station, exercised their right to vote in that station (the so-called "special votes").

This was the most serious mistake made in almost all the polling stations and was due, in the first instance, to a shortcoming in training.

The problem of many polling officers, police and monitors having to move, because of their election duties, from the places where they were registered as voters to work in other polling stations, was first raised by the Training Department in June, in a document - "Organisation and Recruitment" - presented to the NEC in June. This was

because the procedures for these voters had to be defined, so as to be able to include them in the Polling Officer's Manual and in the course materials for training national trainers.

The decision on the procedures for these voters was taken in a package of alterations to the Electoral Act presented by the NEC to the Assembly of the Republic and approved in August. For this reason, they were not included in the Polling Officer Manuals (by then already printed in London) nor were they properly explained during the training of national trainers.

Consequently, the error went on being multiplied, without any document (which should have been produced by the Training Department and/or the Registration and Suffrage Department) explaining that in the public announcements these votes should be added to the total of registered voters. However, the polling officers acted correctly in noting information about these voters in the records and the electoral registers.

CHAPTER 4

THE OPERATION OF THE TRAINING DEPARTMENT (THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE)

4.1. ORGANIGRAM, COMPETENCE AND COMPOSITION

The Training Department in the central TSAE was part of the Legal, Training and Civic Education Directorate, the respective provincial and district bodies of which were the Training and Civic Education Sectors.

The competence of the department is stated in the decree establishing the TSAE, Article 24.

The department's staff complement at central level was a head of department and a technician D. In the voting stage it was strengthened with another two technicians, graduates of the Higher Pedagogical Institute.

4.2. OPERATION

As far as the Mozambican cadres are concerned, the central Training Department functioned erratically and inadequately. The department's management and cadres did not, in practice, take responsibility for the conception and implementation of the Training Plan. As a result, UNDP technical assistance had to be more involved than initially anticipated or was desirable. Under these circumstances, the transmission of knowledge and training for future electoral processes were obviously affected.

The consequences of this situation were not minor; and if the department can take pride in what was done, one should not forget what was not done, and the extent to which the work could have been better and more comprehensive.

The absence of effective direction had the following consequences:

- isolation and underestimation of the department within the TSAE;
- little interdepartmental work;
- weak support for monitoring training activities in the provinces and districts.
- substantial delays in the approval of documents.
- the UNDP technical assistance found it difficult to transmit knowledge.

In addition, for example, more solid training should have been provided for the central TSAE structures, but the department clearly lacked the capacity for this; "in extremis" it only trained

those who absolutely needed to be trained in formal activities, because otherwise the elections could not be held.

In the voting phase, the department was reinforced with two cadres specially contracted to assist in monitoring the provinces, which substantially improved its performance during this phase of the process.

In essence, however, the great labourers of the training work were the local structures and the national and provincial trainers! It was possible to provide them with the "know-how of carrying out elections" and it is they who can be counted on in future processes.

4.3. ARTICULATION WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS

On the whole, work with other TSAE departments was poor, particularly between the Departments of Training, Civic Education, Registration and Suffrage, and Information Technology. There was great reluctance to undertake horizontal work, and working meetings to define strategies were rare. When these happened, they were informal and between the advisers in each area.

The hermetic way in which each area functioned (as if the objective were not to carry out the elections collectively, but rather to fulfill the "obligations" of each department) was prejudicial to the quality of the work of each and all of them in their respective areas.

In the Training and Registration and Suffrage Departments, for example, it was never clearly defined where the work of one ended and that of the other began (or whether, conversely, the two departments should work together up to the last minute.)

When the count was being prepared, the Training Department could also have made a strong contribution to the preparation of the programme for the computerisation of the results because it had the "perception" (and sufficient experience) to "know" which were the critical points in filling out the public notices and records.

Although on several occasions the department insisted that an interdepartmental working meeting would be beneficial, it was never requested to participate in one.

CHAPTER 5
THE BUDGET (USD)

* Training of Provincial and District Election Commissions and Provincial and District TSAE Offices (1st Phase)	300,000
* Training of Registration Brigades and Civic Education Agents	940,000
* Training of Polling Station Officers and Civic Education Agents	3,916,000
Total	<u>5,156,000</u>

(This budget does not include the cost of the training kits.)

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CHAPTER 6

RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout this report on training activities during the electoral process, it is clear that from the very outset of the Training Department's work the main problems were always the same.

These problems are related to the following:

1. lack of time;
2. little (or poor) monitoring in the provinces and districts;
3. materials which were complex for an illiterate population;
4. political circumstances, in two aspects:
 - 4.1. in the appointment of the TSAE central structure
 - 4.2. in the recruitment of staff for the polling stations
5. Operational problems within the TSAE itself:
 - 5.1. given its fragile composition and poor attendance by some Training Department cadres;
 - 5.2. given the absence of inter-departmental work.

Combining these negative aspects with the (many) good achievements over almost two years of work, we can point to the following as examples to be weighed and applied in future electoral processes, if considered necessary:

1. Conceive an Electoral Law more appropriate to Mozambican reality, in which the operations to be carried out by a large number of people (registration, voting and counting operations in polling stations) are simplified to the maximum, while obviously safeguarding the necessary control and rigour.
2. Take advantage of the experience and know-how acquired by the trainers and agents who provided strong evidence of their dedication, hard work and competence in these first elections.
3. Create better teaching and logistical conditions for pupils and trainers, through the rigorous control and use of funds.
4. Provide more and better monitoring by the central training structure of activities in the provincial capitals and localities. This will require greater attention to the composition of the central Training Department, which should be prepared (through formal or informal activities) for steadfast work in directing and carrying out the training plans.

The department should include officials linked to education and pedagogy, who work closely with the Legal Department. It should also have enough cadres to be able to monitor work in the provinces effectively. Each department requiring some work in the training field should also appoint one of its officials to be a link between the two departments. This joint work is fundamental.

5. Active intervention by the Training Department during the work of the agents it has trained, in close collaboration with the department to which they belong.
6. More and better horizontal operations within the TSAE.
7. Conceive a decentralised training plan for the provinces and districts; this decentralisation also includes the allocation of funds to the provinces for paying salaries and organising courses.
8. Use training kits (one box containing all the material), produced in Mozambique or not, reproducing exactly all the material that those trained will be using.
9. Produce manuals for training the agents and for their work. These must therefore be included in the training and work kits.
10. Rigorous recruitment and demanding selection of those trained (both trainers and agents) once training has ended.
11. Solid training/information for the electoral structures directing the electoral processes.

CHAPTER 7

THE MAIN DUTIES PERFORMED BY THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

7.1. ADVISING THE TRAINING DEPARTMENT

Since advice was constantly being provided to the department, it is impossible to specify the work done with the Mozambican structure on a day-to-day basis. However, the primary activities were the following:

- conception of the Training Plan: strategy, phasing, quantification, timetable;
- writing the Voter Registration Manual and the Manual for Polling Station Officers;
- Local monitoring of training activities in provincial and district capitals;
- Visits to registration centres (while these were working) to check the work of the brigade members;
- Assistance to members of the UNDP technical team working in the provinces (UNVs) in the implementation of the Training Plan.

7.2. OTHER WORK (requested by the UNDP CTA)

- "The Mozambican Electoral Process" (comparative analysis of the General Peace Agreement and the Electoral Law). This was done in conjunction with the adviser to the civic education area;
- Participation in the conception of the Civic Education Plan during the first months of work;
- Participation in various seminars organised within the context of the peace process, namely, the Linguistics Seminar (promoted by SARDC) to prepare the "dictionary of electoral terms" to be used in the civic education campaigns. However, the NEC did not allow this document to be distributed during the training of the civic education agents.
- Participation in the preparation of tender documents for the registration and voting materials;

- Computerisation of the map of Mozambique down to district level. Production of the first provincial and district maps indicating the number of registration brigades to be installed etc;
- Design of the voter's card and the electoral register (in accordance with the Electoral Law);
- Design of the ballot sheets, Records of the Electoral Operations and Public Notice (in accordance with the Electoral Law);
- Design of simulations of the possible ways of casting a vote, for NEC approval of those which should be considered valid, for inclusion in the "Manual for Polling Station Officers". When it first analysed these simulations, the NEC opted to stick to "the letter" of the Electoral Law (Article 154), and only considered valid those votes with the cross drawn and placed correctly. Later "at the mouth of the ballot box", and on the basis of specific cases identified during voting simulation in various districts, new drawings were made for the NEC to be able to reconsider its earlier decision. The cases presented in the annex to this document were approved. On the basis of this work, the qualification of votes was extended, thus reducing the percentage of invalid votes from 8% to 2.7% in each election.

Once the analysis of invalid votes had been concluded, a study was made of the "mistakes" made by voters when marking the ballot sheets (in the same annex to this report) from which it can be concluded that the simulation corresponds very much to the cases which occurred.

SECTION III

CIVIC EDUCATION

CIVIC EDUCATION

AREA REPORT

**CENTRAL TSAE
NATIONAL ELECTION COMMISSION**

**UNDP CONSULTANTS
JUAREZ FERRAZ DE MAIA
LECTÍCIA SILVA**

Maputo, 15 December 1994

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

With the signing of the General Peace Agreement between the Government and Renamo on 4 October 1992, Mozambique began a decisive phase in its history: the pacification and democratisation of the country. General and multiparty elections would institutionalise this process and mark a new principle of social interaction, reunification and national reconciliation.

Demobilisation and the establishment of a single army would be crucial for the creation of the objective conditions required for elections to be held. The tranquility and confidence necessary for free participation by citizens and political forces would not be possible until these elementary guarantees existed. When demobilisation and the creation of the single army fell behind schedule, a new timetable for the pacification process had to be drawn up and hence the elections were delayed.

Initially foreseen for one year after the signing of the General Peace Agreement, the elections would finally be held in October 1994. However, this delay did not mean more time to organise, plan and carry out the election process. It merely transferred the date to one year later.

There were two prerequisites for the elections: the establishment of the Electoral Law as the legal-institutional regulator for the organisation of the electoral process and the creation of the National Election Commission, NEC, as the directing body responsible for implementing it. The NEC only took office in 1994, on 11 February. The preparation and approval of the Electoral Law took eight months.

The plans and programmes prepared during 1993 at the initiative and under the guidance of the Inter-Ministerial Commission responsible for creating the conditions elections, would only have legal force if approved and institutionalised by the NEC. This officialisation happened in the first quarter of 1994.

However, 1993 was not erased from the national calendar. It represented the first year of peace. The war activities had ceased. Although the absence of armed hostilities did not mean the end of distrust between the protagonists of the war.

Although the country was living in apparent tranquility, it also lived under the threat of the dissension and conflicts between the various political interests at stake. Peace was not so much an enduring certainty as a hope, the greatest desire of the whole population. In 1993, Mozambique lived peace, but was not at peace.

It was within this scenario of uncertainty, of permanent apprehension that the conclusion of the elections would have the same outcome as in Angola, that the electoral process began one year later.

The electoral process was as follows:

1. Preparation and approval of the Electoral law in December 1993.
2. The NEC took office on 11 February.
3. The civic education campaign began on 19 May.
4. Voter registration took place from 1 June to 2 September.
5. Voting took place on 27, 28 and 29 October.
6. The results were officially announced on 19 November.

During the period between February and November, Mozambique lived the electoral process in all its intensity. Once again the population knew how to give a great history lesson. They participated massively throughout the process. They participated with civic behaviour and in an organised fashion. Their participation was a great weapon in this electoral battle.

CHAPTER 2

CIVIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGN

The General Peace Agreement laid the foundation for a plural and equal nation, as the cradle of a citizenship arising from the individual and collective participation of citizens. Elections are the most direct expression of this participation. Promoting the participation of citizens in the election was the ultimate aim of the civic education campaign.

In Mozambique, this participation meant regaining national dignity; reclaiming Mozambique as the country of everyone, different from that which in the past differentiated between Mozambicans and set them apart from each other; reunifying diversity and rejecting national uniformity.

A nation of citizens is built on confidence, believing in and convinced of their own power. Consequently, the civic education campaign was aimed at projecting confidence in the electoral process, making the NEC credible as a body independent of the opposing political forces and ensuring the free participation of citizens in state power.

The fulcrum point of the civic education campaign was the following appeal "THE FUTURE OF MOZAMBIQUE LIES IN YOUR VOTE", which echoed throughout society, and was repeated throughout the country as a triumph for everyone. The strength of the slogan's impact struck home throughout society, which constantly repeated it, children in particular.

The identification of participation in the elections with the future of the country became patently obvious throughout the campaign, and people made the connection that by voting they would be determining their future and that of their country.

In addition, when the slogan was repeated it was followed by: **NEC - National Election Commission**. Finally, the association was made and the image projected of NEC as being responsible for the country's future.

2.1. The National Election Commission, NEC

The Electoral Law gave the NEC, the National Election Commission, this exclusive competence.

Institutionally, the NEC had sufficient legal force to direct and guide all electoral activities. Socially and politically, the establishment of the NEC represented a fundamental guarantee that free and democratic elections would be held.

The outcome of strong political debate, the NEC grew as a body of consensus and national representativity. Its plural composition gave it independence, impartiality and objectivity, decisive factors for establishing its credibility and confidence in the process.

Its creation and operation institutionalised for the first time the essence of a democratic organ comprising different national tendencies. The unanimity in the choice of its chairman as a figure above political forces conferred the NEC with unique authority to conduct the elections with impartiality and legitimacy.

Once the NEC had taken office the country had an essential prerequisite for collaborative activity carried out under the pretext of similar objectives but dispersed in uncoordinated initiatives.

The signature of the Rome Peace Agreement galvanised NGOs and civic and religious associations into carrying out educational work and consciousness raising activities among citizens. Their objective rapidly became that of explaining about the election process and mechanisms. Initial attempts to coordinate these initiatives were supported by the technical assistance team for the electoral process.

Alerted to the danger of the multiplication of campaigns without a common thread and strategy, the donors (the main funders of these organisations) began to submit projects in this field to the technical assistance team. However, this coordination only became really effective when the NEC was established as the body directing the electoral process, when mechanisms had been created and the general direction of all civic education activity had been established.

Under the NEC mantle the NGOs, civic and religious associations and others acted in partnership, all pursuing the same course, converging with each step on the same objective.

2.2. Approval of the Campaign

The first campaign plan was presented in May 1993. Subsequently revised to fit the new electoral timetable, the project was submitted for NEC approval on 15 February 1994. The campaign started officially one and a half months later, on 15 February 1994. One special event marked the beginning: the national meeting of the NEC with NGOs, civic and religious organisations. On this occasion, Dr. Brazão Mazula, Chairman of the NEC stated: "*The teaching material used by the NEC should be adopted as a basic guide, in order to avoid confusion among the population*".

Under the slogan "*The future of Mozambique lies in your vote*", the civic education campaign was officially launched as the backbone of actions aimed at the civic education of the voter.

2.3. The NEC Symbol

The NEC symbol received special attention by the members of the National Election Commission.

Various proposals for symbols were presented to the NEC in its first session to analyse civic education activity, held in the second half of February. The various drawings and the set of

slogans and watchwords were produced by the national companies which had agreed to contribute to producing a symbol.

One of the ideas was adopted definitively. The NEC accepted one of the proposals but decided there should be alterations in the graphical presentation, which dragged on for some time. The final design was approved one month later, on 18 March. This influenced the production of materials and the official launching of the campaign.

CHAPTER 3

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CAMPAIGN

For the first time in its history, Mozambique was going to hold elections based on direct, personal and secret consultation with the population. New concepts, procedures and rules would be exercised introduced into the citizen's daily life. Their dissemination had be of an educational, and don in stages, in order to ensure comprehension. The Electoral Law gave the NEC, National Election Commission, exclusive jurisdiction in this field.

There was a need to balance the country's reality, the need for the campaign and the technical, financial and human resources available. The most vital aspect was to ensure the citizen's maximum participation in the electoral process. The population had to take up the elections. In this case, the need for peace and harmony between opponents was projected.

When we planned the philosophy of the campaign, we felt that it should reflect three fundamental points:

The citizen - The election - Participation

The definition of a citizen should be based on a new way of living in society. Living in society would imply being a conscientious, active and democratic citizen. Active citizenship would give the citizen the possibility to reflect on its reality and future.

For the Mozambican citizen, elections were something which neighbouring countries had experienced and which had a tragic outcome in Angola. However, they were very positively aware of the election of Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa. In this scenario, elections appeared as something positive. the object of which was to choose the president and other representatives.

Participation is the fundamental element which consolidates the whole process. Without participation there would be no elections and without elections there would be no peace and consequently no citizen.... So it was necessary to participate, to elect.

Active citizenship was only possible with elections, and the vote of each could determine the country's future. There was no other way out. The only solution was to participate and participation required citizens reflect, think, discuss and finally choose.

CHAPTER 4

OBJECTIVES

4.1. General Objectives of the Project

The general objectives of the civic education campaign were to call the entire Mozambican society to participate in the project, organised sectors and opinion makers in particular. The aim was to communicate with each citizen wherever he/she might be such that he/she actively discussed the electoral process and its importance for the community.

There was specific coordination with organised sectors and NGOs in an attempt to make actions and resources compatible, to make them as productive as possible and expand the multiple activities of the Civic Education Department in an organised manner.

4.2. Specific Objectives

- 4.2.1. To reach society as a whole through information, training and socio-cultural mobilisation activities which promoted the citizen's conscious participation in the electoral process.
- 4.2.2. To disseminate the Electoral Law as the centre of the process.
- 4.2.3. To educate the population in general on the role of elections in democracy and their role in the new society being built.
- 4.2.4. To target opinion leaders as decisive elements in communication with the population.
- 4.2.5. To coordinate the various activities with NGOs so that they all converged on a single civic education message for voters.
- 4.2.6. To promote the image of the NEC and its executive bodies as impartial and honourable administrators of the whole electoral process.
- 4.2.7. To create a new culture based on the electoral process.

CHAPTER 5

STRATEGY

The communication strategy which was to orient the whole "civic education" campaign was based on an analysis of the country's situation, the existing mass media, the legal definitions contained in the Electoral Law, the kinds of materials to be produced, and above all the target public.

What was the situation of the country and its mass media? How to reconcile the needs of the campaign with the resources available? How to create the great machine of information conception and production?

The conventional media - radio, television and the press - have limited national coverage in Mozambique. Radio Mozambique provides poor coverage over about 60% of the country. There are television broadcasts in three cities: Maputo, Beira and more recently Nampula. Newspapers have a very limited circulation.

This fact, related to the fundamental aspect of a population with an oral tradition, speaking a wide range of different languages (only a small percentage of whom speak portuguese) and with an illiteracy rate of almost 90%, led to the definition of inter-personal communication as the principal means of contact with the population.

The whole social marketing strategy was guided by the principle that the space for each medium would depend on its communicational productivity. Setting up the machinery of who does what, where, how and why ultimately governed the decisions on launching the project throughout the country.

It was decided that the campaign would have one single track, which would only vary in the way it was presented in each medium. The track for the whole process was defined in the objectives of the project.

CHAPTER 6

THE TARGET PUBLIC

The population in general, and citizens with the constitutional right of political participation in particular, were the target public to be reached.

The essence of this campaign and the time available under the electoral calendar, required identifying very clearly the methodology, means and techniques which would enable the objectives to be achieved in the time available: laying the foundations of a political culture based on universally accepted principles, but never experienced in the country.

Opinion leaders have additional authority in societies structurally organised around figures who have traditionally represented the community's interests. Traditional leaders, pastors and priests, teachers and nurses have direct influence over the behaviour of communities, given the prestige and respect acquired during their daily work for the welfare of the population.

A communication campaign aimed at gaining the adherence and massive participation of citizens could only project itself through the personal leadership of those able to influence social and political behaviour. This conclusion would mean practical activities and the creation of specific instruments for direct intervention among the people.

Instead of the widespread dissemination of concepts and notions, there had to be a strategy based on training, information and on building individual awareness among opinion leaders as the best vectors and channels of communication with the population in general. Courses and training seminars which would equip them to provide explanations for citizens and mobilise them, and the production of communication materials to provide theoretical support for this intervention, would make it possible to concentrate efforts and ensure a coordinated chain for the transmission of information and the intended messages.

The technical options should therefore be translated into programming training activities, the production of radio and television programmes, the production of graphic material and the organisation of cultural activities aimed at preparing the structures and organisations geared to working closely with the population.

This meant that the success of the campaign would lie in the ability to gain traditional authorities, NGOs, civic and religious associations, community activists and agents, teachers and social integrators etc., as direct partners.

Their identification as specific targets of the campaign was the basic and decisive point of the whole communication strategy. Teaching them the theoretical concepts and practical aspects of the electoral process, tracing the general philosophy of their intervention, made it possible to combine the efforts and means fundamental to a campaign which such a limited time frame but an enormous and vast field of action.

CHAPTER 7

PHASES OF THE CAMPAIGN

The conception of the civic education campaign for the Mozambican electoral process was thus based on the technical-theoretical considerations presented above and the methodology and strategy identified.

The campaign was divided into five distinct phases, according to the periods and moments of the electoral process.

1. From the moment the NEC took office up to voter registration;
2. Voter Registration;
3. Civil Rights;
4. Voting;
5. The Count.

In each phase the planning, content and production of materials was organised around the following objectives:

1st Phase: Projection of the NEC and its bodies

In order to establish confidence and credibility in the process, and to confer the necessary authority on the NEC, the campaign began by projecting this body. Its independence from state power, the honesty and impartiality of its actions, were the primary aspects of this promotion.

2nd Phase: Mobilisation for Voter Registration

The aim of this phase was to get millions of voters to the registration posts. In order to ensure this mobilisation, a civic education agents was included in each registration brigade. His/her main function was to explain and to notify the population about the need for registration as an indispensable condition for exercising the vote.

3rd. Phase: Democracy and Civic Rights

Prior to the election campaign by the parties, coalitions and candidates for political office, there was a phase of disseminating civic rights and establishing democracy as the universal model for the participation and freedom of citizens.

The right to freedom of expression, opinion, religion, association and political participation were explained in detail and examples given.

Democratic social interaction as the basic principle of living together in society was projected, as citizens followed and participated in the electoral campaign. Plurality, diversity of

tendencies and direct relations of representation and representativity in the exercise of political power were described in detail in the light of the Electoral Law.

4th Phase: Participation in Voting

Getting the nation to vote was our biggest and main challenge; all other activities were merely supportive activities for the voting act itself. The NEC as the main institution of the elections would only be justified if the majority of citizens voted. And, more to the point, if voting citizens voted conscientiously and with transparency.

The main task was always to create all the necessary conditions for the voter to know how to exercise his/her right, through simulated voting activities throughout the country.

5th Phase: Acceptance of the Results

Anxiety and phantoms of post-election convulsion and conflict recommended organising radio and television programmes dealing with recognition of the acceptance of the election results as the most elementary rule of the democratic game.

Radio and television programmes gave voice to the opinions of citizens, religious leaders, athletes, writers etc. and followed the practical aspects of the count and calculation of the results, projected the function and competence of the organs of power in a democratic society, promoted the participation of the people in the election, and discussed the perspectives for the role of political parties and the opposition in a pluralist system.

CHAPTER 8

THE MEDIA AND THE PRODUCTION OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF MATERIALS

The central project team worked in the Civic Education Department in the Maputo headquarters, where it prepared the conception and publication of various communication materials. All the material produced was subject to rigorous analysis of the complementarity of each message and each medium. The standardisation of the content used in the different media made it possible to say the same thing in several different media and in different places. This meant that under no circumstances would there be differing of ideas and content.

All the materials, whether graphic, for television and radio broadcasts, or theatrical, had the same message nationally, the same language and the same content, and followed the phases of the programme.

Centralisation of content gave the electoral process the unity it needed in order to be known throughout the country and avoid distorted interpretations of the various concepts used during the campaign.

8.1. Civic Education Agents

The civic education agents were the communicational basis of the whole campaign. All the project's efforts went into creating a network of agents throughout the country. Their training was the prime concern, so that they would be able to do their job confidently on the ground. The agents were the link between the villages and the district and between the districts and the provincial capitals.

The civic education agents had the main function in this communication campaign. Not only were they able to compensate for the weak coverage by the conventional media - radio, television and the press - but they also made practical use of one of the most important forms of communication in Africa: oral tradition. Orality is the main chain for transmitting messages and information. In the vast majority of cases, it reverberates sounds most among the elderly and children.

The agents projected their activities through them. Consequently, the agents' work was directed in particular at respecting and establishing links with community structures. Their work consisted essentially in giving "*life and voice*" to the campaign. The agents would thus have to be interpreters of the objectives of each step in the electoral process.

Using the technical resources and the instruments produced as aids for their intervention, they would have to contact the people and make their discourse appropriate to the popular language of each region. They would have to gain the sympathy of the people and rely on their traditional structures in order to be heard.

Taking the elections to the people implied two specific moments: calling the people to registration; explaining the voting mechanisms. The first consisted basically in mobilising the people to go to the registration centres. The second involved instructive explanations about the steps and the meaning of the vote.

During registration, the agent acted around the registration brigade. Fixed in one place, in a village, a suburb, the brigade was the centre of all activity. The agent travelled throughout the surrounding area, announcing the work which was being done, its objectives and procedures.

In towns, this activity was very much restricted to the place where the brigade was operating, mostly schools. In rural areas, the agents had to cover long distances. The first part of this activity required walking many kilometers. Later, however, they had bicycles, the only means of transport possible for these journeys. The bicycle, "the mule", did not need fuel or any other kind of logistical support impossible to ensure permanently in areas far from district capitals.

For more than three months he/she and their fellow brigade members were the centre of attraction. They brought another life, introduced a new routine into the daily lives of the people.

"This is fine work we are doing... this contact with the people. We like contacting the people... many of us were afraid to stand up and speak in front of the people, to interview them... we were afraid of interviews, of contacts with the people. But now we can stand in front of the people, for example, sometimes we speak before one hundred, two hundred voters and talk about registration, about elections... we open up to the people and show them what they should do, why they should register, why they should vote... before there was no registration, they did not vote..."(...)

We did not have any transport, we had to walk 50 kilometers... we arrived tired, hungry, but the people were waiting for us. We had to give them a civic education lesson... but afterwards the people were kind and gave us something to eat. We ate and then we went on our way. I often went alone.

Things have improved recently. Now I have a bike, I have my canteen, my food can... I take my can and arrive there, civic education...then I get on my mule and return..."(Venancia, in the programme "Mozambique Election Special". 21.8.94)

"I like making contact with people because this work is for the future of Mozambique. My life has changed a lot in terms of knowledge because I learn a lot in this work.

People sometimes ask if this registration is for going into the army because they hear that people must be 18 years old. Even when old people or women come, many still think it is registration for military service. Others think that it is in order to obtain a new identity card. Very few know what voting is all about. But when they know that it is to choose the country's leaders they are very pleased. They say that they want peace and so they want to choose, they want to participate." (Isabel, in "Mozambique Elections". July 1994)

CIVIC EDUCATION AGENTS

PROVINCE	Civic Ed. Agents	Registered Voters	Polling Officers
C. DELGADO	138	568,169	5,145
NIASSA	72	282,513	2,702
NAMPULA	308	1,365,796	11,501
ZAMBÉZIA	292	1,270,098	10,892
TETE	83	397,260	3,094
MANICA	70	322,201	2,611
SOFALA	142	530,066	5,313
I'BANE	149	471,524	5,572
GAZA	132	398,381	4,921
MAPUTO(PROV)	101	330,887	3,780
MAPUTO(CID)	113	459,166	4,221
TOTAL	1,600	6,396,061	59,500

Simulation

In the period prior to voting, the challenge was much greater. The short time available required a faster pace and more intensive work. In the final phase, this activity consisted of "voting simulation".

Following a refresher course during the first days of October, the agents were able to undertake this unique activity for the first time in people's lives. They had a kit containing replicas of all the voting materials. For aids they had a photographic manual and a poster showing "the steps in voting". The kit was in the form of a rucksack, which helped identify the civic education agents during this period. In towns, in workplaces, on the roads and in villages, a young person on a bicycle carrying a rucksack, announced his/her presence.

More than the small paper flags they all placed on the handlebars of their bikes, they were the real flag of the NEC in this final marathon to take visual presentation of the voting act to all the corners of the country.

This work was done in less than 20 days, mostly in the provinces and districts. They were supported by the theatre groups which had helped mobilize the people during the previous phase. With the kit as his/her personal baggage, each and every one traversed the country.

They followed timetables and plans prepared by the Provincial Election Offices, aimed at concentrating and coordinating their efforts. Their aim was to guarantee the maximum number

of simulations in the areas and places where the polling stations would function. Helicopters, cars, trucks or small buses, all means were used to ensure this enormous operation.

8.2. Theatre

One of the most popular forms of expression, theatre played an important role in the campaign.

Seven plays were written as the basis for action by the theatre groups which performed more or less everywhere. The plays corresponded to the phases of the process and were presented in accordance with the objectives of each phase. Taped on video, they were subsequently shown in mobile units and in information centres, in sessions to mobilize and educate the population.

Dozens of groups performed throughout the country, activating and animating populations before explanatory and information sessions.

In contrast to the enthusiasm of the projects promoted at local level, formal administrative and financial questions created obstacles for these initiatives. In some instances these impediments were overcome by resorting to sponsorship and the involvement of NGOs and foreign entities, as in Sofala, which obtained financial support from French cooperation, and Manica which started these activities through REDD BARNA.

Although a special budget line to fund these initiatives had been planned, it was only available in an initial form in August, and the rules for the local financial rules for their management were only established at the end of September. This undermined all the forecasts and perspectives drawn up for this contribution to the campaign. When oral communication and the use of traditional forms of expression were planned, it was felt that this would be the natural medium of communication with the population. In addition, the country's rich resources in this field made its impact within the community undisputable.

The management and financial norms required by the administrative procedures hampered this project. The activities which were the simplest and easiest to promote became special and exceptional, owing to changes in the administrative criteria and rules.

8.3. Mobile Units

Seventeen video projection units installed in all terrain vehicles crossed the country with images of the electoral process. For the first time in their lives, citizens saw political leaders, party and religious leaders participating and expressing their confidence in the elections.

This powerful medium of communication was a decisive element in the mobilisation of the population. Operated by technicians from a specialised national body with great experience in this field, the Institute for Social Communication (ISC), and accompanied by civic education agents, it provided complementary activities among the population.

In addition to the projection of videos produced centrally, the vehicles carried graphic materials. At the end of each film show, the civic education agent took advantage of the audience's presence to present his/her explanations and distribute campaign materials.

These units were acquired through an international tender held in May. However, the successful company did not live up to its commitments and the vehicles were only delivered in the middle of August. This limited their usefulness to two working months, and was yet another aspect which altered campaign predictions and plans.

The mobile units had received priority within the project precisely because of the weak national television coverage. It was felt that this technical medium would enable the people to see the participation of their leaders, as fundamental factors for their trust and belief in the process itself.

These objectives were achieved in the crucial phase of explanations and information about the vote. Here they served as a means of assembling people for the dissemination of information on the voting procedures and steps.

The video produced by the NDI as an aid to the "voting simulation", played an important role. The people could see a polling station working, the role of each polling officer, ballot sheets being marked, voting by the disabled etc.

8.4. Information Centres

The information centres were set up in public squares with a lot of movement in provincial capitals, and were the "point" where people could make direct contact with the electoral structures.

Here, doubts were clarified, material distributed, competitions held, shows presented. Everything relating to the elections happened there. Voting simulations were also presented there. The competitions had prizes of promotional material and portable radios distributed by ONUMOZ. Another of their grand attractions, particularly for children, were the video images. They could watch television there. Each centre had a video cassette player, two television sets, an amplifier and a cassette player. So they became obligatory places to be.

Children's voice reproduced loudly the sound, dialogue and the interventions in each video shown. They had seen them so often they could remember them all in every detail.

Children were the strongest link in the reproduction of messages. Their curiosity makes them interested in everything. They fix all aspects, interpret them and give life to any event. They were without doubt the main spectators and animators of the information centres.

In Maputo, for example, a children's group constantly repeated the voting act. Everything was done on a small scale: they created their own "polling station" and polling officers, and directed the voting through each step of the operation. In Manica, they helped civic education

agents identify citizens who entered competitions more than once so as to win another "capulana", T-shirt, flag or scarf. They put order into the celebration that was for everyone. They themselves were the party. On "National Civic Education Day" held throughout the country on the eve of voting, they headed the parades and marches which in most places ended at the information centres.

The centres were another campaign novelty, because of what they symbolised, promoted and provided. The design proposed for the building was a copy of the traditional African hut, a place of community social gatherings. In addition to its significance, it did not require resources or special materials. They can be easily built anywhere in the country.

However, although the design proposal was approved in June, it was only possible to inaugurate the centres in almost all provincial capitals in September. There were two reasons for this: on the one hand problems in accessing the budgetary funds allocated for their construction; on the other hand non-observance of delivery deadlines for equipment by the company which won the international tender.

Always the same contradiction: ideas, projects and initiatives clashed with administrative norms and procedures. Major efforts were spent not on developing and doing work, but on creating and materialising the conditions in which to work.

This is perhaps one of the aspects requiring more critical consideration, particularly in a final report such as this which is intended to be useful for future development projects.

8.5. Radio

Radio was extremely important throughout the electoral process, especially at controversial moments when there was an urgent need to contact the population as a whole. It was by radio that we communicated with the various regions in national languages. It was also by radio that we talked to the whole country, always in the knowledge that the civic education agents and the mobile units would complete the information in areas not covered by radio broadcasts. Although it does not cover the whole country, Radio Mozambique is still the principal medium of communication in the country, because in addition to the national broadcast it has 11 regional stations which broadcast in local languages. Through the Civic Education Department, it created and broadcast the following programmes:

- a) "Mozambique Elections" - an information programme on the activities of the NEC and its organs. Lasting five minutes, the programme was transmitted three times a day: at 5.05h, 12.15h, and 17.15h.
- b) "ABC of the Elections" - a programme of questions and answers providing clear guidance for listeners. The programme went on the air on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays at peak listening times: 6.20h and 19.20h.
- c) Direct Line - Radio Mozambique dedicated three of its phone-in participation programmes to the elections until the end of the electoral process.

- d) **Radio serial** - a joint programme with NDI, broadcast for 15 minutes four times a week. It was a story about the electoral process in 12 episodes. This was a great success with the audience.
- e) **Radio Theatre** - a radio adaptation of the cartoon strips and plays presented during the civic education campaign. Each play lasted 10 minutes and was broadcast once a fortnight.
- f) **Spots** - Six times a day throughout the radio broadcast there were 30 second spots on the elections, covering registration, the observance of civic rights and mobilising for the vote.

Note: The radio programmes were broadcast in portuguese, tsonga, sena. yao, ximanica, macua, nyanja, nhungue and chuabo.

8.6. Television

The civic education programmes on television were a big celebration. They comprised six months of intensive production -resulting in 14 hours of television broadcasts - by five video companies under the direction of the Department. Mozambique Television (TVM) does not cover the whole country, but it does reach the elite which directs and leads the country. It broadcasts in the capital Maputo, Beira in the centre and Nampula in the north.

- a) **"Mozambique Elections"** This was like the radio programme and its function was to officially inform the public about the activities of the NEC. The programme lasted 2 to 3 minutes and was presented on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, and repeated three times during broadcasting hours.
- b) **"ABC of the Elections"** - An instructional programme explaining the electoral process and detailing the legal aspects of each electoral act. The programme lasted two minutes and was repeated three times a day on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays.
- c) **"Election Special"** - This programme was directed at young people in particular, and used modern language. The programme raised questions about "elections", democracy and the participation of young people in elections. The programme lasted ten minutes and was broadcast on Sundays before the soap opera (peak audience time).
- d) **"The Voter Has the Floor"** - A programme which contacted voters, and heard their doubts and concerns. It was broadcast for 45 minutes every fortnight on Thursdays, after the soap opera. This programme had a large audience.
- e) **Spots** - Every day during the television broadcast there were 30-second spots covering registration, democratic consolidation, civic rights and participation in the vote.

8.7. Graphic Materials

The graphic materials were targeted principally at civic education agents, activists, NGO mobilisers and opinion makers (teachers, nurses, religious leaders, traditional leaders, students, party leaders and journalists). The main items produced were:

- a) **Newspaper "Mozambique Elections"** - This publication was an important teaching instrument, given its graphic format and subject matter. It was a 20-page tabloid newspaper, each edition printed in 150,000 copies.

There were three editions: the first covered registration, the second covered civic rights and the third covered voting. Given its importance, the final edition was printed in four colours.

- b) **Comic Strips** - Sr. Matavele, the soldier guarding the offices of the Provincial Election Commission in Xai Xai was reading one of the comic strips "We must all participate", and smiling with satisfaction. "This is very good. Very nice!". "Why?", we asked. "It shows how to put an end to individualism".

Topics and Print Run

1. "NEC: Who they are and what they do"
2. "Civic Rights"
3. "Voting" (adults)
4. "The Mozambican Woman"
5. "The Woman's Vote" (adults)
6. "Civic Rights" (adults and children)
7. "Voting" (children)

Each was printed in 250,000 copies.

- c) **Manuals**

Two kinds of manuals (each with two volumes) were produced for training civic education agents, as guides during the courses and to orient their field activities. One was called the "Manual" and the other the "Guide".

A third manual called "Voting" was produced together with the NDI and contained photographs of all the steps in voting. They were used in the courses and also during work in the field:

1. Civic Education Manuals No. 1 and 2
2. Guide for Civic Education Agents No. 1 and 2
3. Voting Manual

Each was printed in 10,000 copies.

d) Posters

These were very popular and prominent during the electoral process, because they were coloured and visually attractive and used to decorate the many civic demonstrations. The first poster in particular, produced in two formats - giant (outdoor) and 50 x 70 had considerable public impact since they presented the main content of the campaign "The future of Mozambique lies in your vote" and because of the strength of their various tones of yellow.

POSTERS : (a total of 8)

1. Giant poster - The Future of Mozambique Lies in Your Vote.
(60 giant posters)
2. Giant outdoor posters - NEC (definition, competence, functions). These were pasted to special structures in all provinces in places with a lot of movement (main roads, town squares etc.) 100,000 copies.
3. Giant poster (6x3) - Let's all vote for Mozambique.
(60 copies)
4. Reproduction of the giant poster 50 x 70
(150,000 copies)
5. Photographic Strip - The Voting Steps
(60,000 copies)
6. Announcement Poster
(50,000 copies)
7. The Old Man (Secret Vote)
(15,000 copies)
8. Let's make this election the great national celebration.
(50,000 copies)

8.8. Promotional Materials

The promotional materials were the only ones which escaped production control. Production of these materials ("capulanas", flags, balloons, T-shirts and scarves) was subject to an international tender and adjudicated to companies which usually did not honour their contractual commitments.

Promotional Materials

	<i>Type of Material</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
01	capulanas	200,000
02	headscarves	200,000
03	Tshirts	200,000
04	paper flags	200,000
05	small cloth flags	100,000
06	large flags	20
07	balloons	200,000

In addition to their total disregard of delivery dates, quality did not meet the stipulated requirements. These aspects completely disorganised projections, particularly since it was impossible to control distribution throughout the country. Most of the materials were only distributed in early October. The main concern was to get them out to the provinces as soon as possible, so that their distribution did not coincide with that of voting materials, a vital operation for the final organisation of the process.

The electoral offices were informed of the criteria for their distribution. However, provincial visits by central TSAE officials found that these were not usually being followed. One particular exception was Manica, which decided to begin distribution in the information centre, as competition prizes. The districts were contemplated once there were guaranteed mechanisms for controlling distribution.

Public distribution as a way of attracting people to explanatory sessions, meetings and events was not practicable, given the incidents they provoked. In the city of Beira in Sofala province, the UNDP project official who was distributing material in a school during preparations for national civic education day, was hurt when a mass of people swarmed over the lorry carrying materials.

Direct distribution to companies through the management of workplaces, schools etc. became the safest and most practical method. This was the criterion followed at central level for the festivities of 21 October (National Civic Education Day). It was also decided to accept direct requisitions from outside entities. This made it possible to deal with many such requests without jostling and confusion.

The promotional materials had been conceived to serve as prizes and to give to people, to the population in general, as evidence and as a souvenir of their participation in this historic process. They would be a "memento" of the elections. However, they were seen by many,

donors in particular, as an expensive luxury. It was therefore not easy to arrange funds for their production.

However, despite the problems and even some abuse in distribution, it was still gratifying that the elections could be preserved in an article of practical use.

8.9. The distribution of material

One of the achievements of this process was the distribution throughout the country, in just under a week, of the material produced for the official launching of the campaign in May 1994. 150 thousand posters and 1 million pamphlets and brochures were distributed from the provincial capitals in a period of time never before achieved in the country. This was the result of perfect coordination between the civic education, supply and operations areas.

Under the TSAE's organisational structure, the Supply Department is responsible for storing all kinds of materials, and the Organisation and Operations Directorate is

responsible for all logistical aspects of their distribution. As these two sectors became more and more overloaded with work, they were less careful in the distribution of campaign material.

With no vehicle of its own and always limited to the same number of cadres, in practice it was the Civic Education Department which took charge of and controlled distribution. This seriously disturbed its work programme, diverting officials outside their field of activity. The situation got worse and worse, and reached the point where meeting the daily distribution plans was taking up much of the work time of the department head himself.

The methodology planned initially, of drawing up distribution charts to be implemented by the two sectors involved in the operation, became impracticable. Planes and transport to the airport in the department's own means of transport (a vehicle loaned by the general management) had to be requisitioned daily. Even so, the cargo plans were not always met. Delays in taking materials to the airport and the fact that planes gave priority to items belonging to the logistics area, left many civic education materials on the ground. All this made distribution a "headache" for the civic education sector, quite apart from the delays caused.

In effect, there was no capacity to get material to provincial capitals on time. The warehouses were still full on the eve of the elections. Even the hire of two cargo planes was unable to avoid some material, such as simulation kits, the final print runs of posters and promotional items remaining in store after voting had finished.

The central issue was not the various sectors' aversion to collaboration and coordination. It was always a structural situation: the way TSAE operated.

8.10. Observations on some of the graphic and audiovisual material

Each medium created and used by the civic education project had a specific function within the central strategy, and should also reproduce the same slogan in the period corresponding to each moment of the process. This made it possible to give the media and their content the same direction and permitted greater productivity from the set of media used.

In each phase of the electoral process, be it the registration, civic rights or voting phase, all the media had the same content at the same time, thus reproducing and multiplying the messages in different ways. This also made it possible to reach different publics in different parts of the country at the same time.

Of all the material produced, the newspaper "Mozambique Elections" was the educational instrument with the greatest projection and print run (150,000 copies of each edition). The pages of each issue contained the most important graphic material for the three moments of the process. Each of these materials were then reproduced in another format, with additional print runs: comic strips (250,000 copies), leaflets (500,000) and posters (70 - 150,000).

Two of these "detachables" aroused special interest.

First, the comic strips, the short stories recounting central aspects of the process - the relationships between voter registration and voting; the importance of citizens participating in the country's future; civic rights; the significance of the involvement of women, who form the majority in the country; the voting steps; the National Election Commission and its bodies.

Secondly, published on the back page of the final issue was the poster "Let's make the election the great national celebration". Reproducing the final slogan appealing for the dignification and acclamation of the greatest moment in the electoral process, the poster portrays a traditional dance with unusual beauty and colour, as the symbol of the unity and celebration of the whole nation.

The newspaper "Mozambique Elections" had an educational function and was directed at civic education agents, opinion makers, party leaders, teachers, health workers, trade unionists etc. "Gingão", the much loved character in the paper was reproduced in coloured comic strips telling entertaining stories about the various phases of the electoral process.

There were also programmes with the same name, "Mozambique Elections", on radio and television, following week by week the activities of the National Election Commission and its executive bodies. These programmes were presented in the form of news bulletins.

"The ABC of the Elections" on radio and television had the educational function of informing about the mechanisms and procedures of the electoral process. For example: "The significance of registration; its relationship with the voting act; the steps in voting, etc. Two programmes were specifically targeted at young citizens: "Mozambique Election Special" on television and "Youth and the Future", a radio competition. Both were broadcast once a week.

Radio, theatres and comic strips produced "Stories from Here", programmes in short episodes covering events in the electoral process. On television "Stories from Here" presented the plays produced for each phase of the electoral process. The plays were video taped for the mobile units in the rural areas and for the information centres in the provincial capitals.

The poster "Let's all vote for Mozambique" was reproduced and brought alive as a play where the same characters appealed for everyone to participate in the voting act.

The radio serial "There is room for everyone", conceived by the NDI and produced by the Civic Education Department, differed from the other programmes, given the pedagogical aspects woven into its 12 stories. This programme had a large audience.

Its characters made direct appeals for participation in radio spots. The sound track of the radio serial was used for mobilisation during Radio Mozambique broadcasts.

The wisdom of old Mateus overcame the family distrust, arguments and conflicts, with his ever present calm and sure words, (...) *"I have learned that everything takes its time. Before we have new things we have to make them..."*. Then he told his grandson the story of the young man who did not know what he wanted because he had not worked to obtain what he wanted. ... *"wanting something a lot means knowing what we want and working to get what we want. (...) If what you say about democracy is like that, then it is easier to want a lot something that you have chosen rather than something that others tell you that you should want"*. ("There's room for everyone", episode 11)

On television, the serial's music was illustrated with scenes of people in different activities, appealing for participation in the vote.

The television spots were an innovation in national video production: *"Working with the NEC meant a change in the dynamics of Golo... There was a lot of work, and we were not used to this; we had very short deadlines for delivering the work, so that the appeal could be broadcast on time... I think that the spots came out with the necessary quality and balance"*. (Tiago Fonseca in Mozambique Election Special/30 October 1994)

Tiago, the young producer of the television spots produced two unforgettable plays: twice the "traditional healer" confounds expectations. The elections do not play with little stones, the spirits cannot break the secrecy of the vote. On two occasions the traditional healer must give in to the power and strength of the elections...

On one occasion he advises people to register in order to guarantee the future. On another he is unable to predict the election results *"not for lack of wanting to"* but because the vote is really secret...

The civic education campaign was the greatest ever held in Mozambique in such a short period of time. It produced a vast amount of graphic, audio-visual and promotional material, each of which had a special purpose. The criteria used in their production and overall

conception provided a unique experience for Mozambican professionals in the communication field.

Leite Vasconcelos, author of "There's room for everyone", also wrote "The ABC of the Elections" for television: "Writing the programme required doing research in order to find the best way of conveying the message which had to be transmitted (...) On the whole I think we managed... to do what was possible in that short space of time. There is just one thing I would like to say about the process. This is that civic education is considered as something to be done at a time like this, when elections have to be prepared and elections are something new. But we should not fool ourselves. We have not transmitted completely everything there is to say about such a vast concept as democracy. I also think that the concept of democracy is not taught, and that if it had to be taught we are not the ones who should do it. It is a concept which must be learned live and through debate...(Leite Vasconcelos in "Mozambique Election Special"/30 October 1994).

Leite Vasconcelos is raising a profound question. A campaign which runs for a short time, with an immediate duration and objectives is just a "moment" in a process. However, it can set off a process. The democratic process does not end with an election. Democracy is a great exercise in learning, social interaction and changes in behaviour.

PRODUCTION - TOTAL COSTS (USD)

<i>Audiovisual Productions</i>	707,574
<i>Theatrical initiatives</i>	222,983
<i>Graphic productions (newspapers, comic strips, posters etc.)</i>	821,655
<i>Equipment for information centres</i>	14,808
<i>Services</i>	28,131
<i>Mobile Units (17)</i>	452,570
<i>Information centres (building)</i>	56,747
<i>Promotional material (capulanas, T-shirts scarves etc.)</i>	925,383
Total	3,029,852

CHAPTER 9

RELATIONS WITH NGOs, ISC, RELIGIOUS FAITHS AND ONUMOZ

Society in Mozambique has a basic nucleus with solid roots in civic training. This nucleus is the foundation of so-called civil society in Mozambique.

It was all these various institutions of civil society which for some have expressed most strongly the options for transformations of a democratic nature in Mozambique. With the creation of the NEC and TSAE, the civic education project took shape and its implementation started to be run directly by the structure with the mandate for organising the elections.

It was precisely at this moment that the project found echo in two structural poles with a vocation for civic education work. On the one hand civil society led by the religious faiths and on the other hand the Institute for Social Communication (ISC).

In addition to being an institution with its own profile, organisation and infrastructures, the ISC provided both the project and the Press Office with national staff.

9.1. Preparation of Agents and Activists

In order to harmonise the activities of the various institutions in the civic education field and to extend the network of agents in direct communication with the population, TSAE officials held many training courses for social activists. The courses followed a training plan drawn up at central level, and were held during the two moments preceding the two great electoral operations: registration and voting.

Social integrators, activists, provincial journalists, trade unionists, OMM activists, were prepared in national and regional courses to complement the activities of the NEC/TSAE civic education agents.

9.2. Coordination of Activities

Throughout the electoral process the Civic Education Department coordinated its activities with NGOs in order to increase the ability to intervene among the population. The NGOs which worked most with the CED were: Caritas, OMM (Mozambican Women's Organisation), CCM (Christian Council of Mozambique), OTM (Mozambican Workers Association) and NDI (National Democratic Institute).

This joint action was decisive at three specific moments: the registration campaign, national civic education day, and voting simulations in the last weeks of October. These institutions also had the important task of helping to distribute the CED's educational materials.

9.3. Relations with ISC, NDI and ONUMUZ

The CED had a special relationship with these three institutions. Materials were conceived and produced in collaboration with the NDI, namely, the poster and manual "The Voting Steps", the radio serial "There's room for everyone", and in particular the voting simulation kits used by the civic education agents. The NDI trainers did important work in complementing the civic education agents in various districts in the country.

The NDI also produced the video "The Voting Steps", which was shown by the mobile units in rural areas and in the information centres in provincial capitals.

The Institute for Social Communication provided useful collaboration with the CED, particularly in the management of the department and the TSAE Press Office. All the officials in these two sectors were, or had been, cadres of the Institute for Social Communication. The mobile units which crossed the country were operated and maintained by ISC technicians.

ONOMUZ played an important role in bringing together NGO activities in the civic education campaign, especially in the provinces. It also provided substantial logistical assistance to the civic education sectors in the electoral offices. In the final phase of the campaign the distribution of portable radios donated by the Japanese government helped provide an incentive for the competitions held in the information centres and in the districts. Some of these radios were distributed to encourage the civic education agents.

CHAPTER 10

TRAINING OF TRAINERS FOR CIVIC EDUCATION AGENTS

The essence of civic education was *"to make the whole country aware of the strength of the people in choosing and deciding about their destiny"*.

"Mozambique will not be the same after the elections. Mozambique will have laid the foundations of a new culture, based on another value system which has as its point of reference: freedom of expression, right of assembly, equality of rights, the need for participation and the right to vote".

"The electoral process itself launched a new model of social interaction, based on "a learning process grounded in the education of citizens as an active and leading force in the democratic process." (Dr. Brazão Mazula in "Mozambique Elections" July 1994).

Completely new elements started to arise as practical, concrete and objective aspects. The first was the question of language. Another concerned channels of communication. The last one concerned the creation of a transmission chain, the final point of which was the "civic educator" as the direct agent in contact with the population.

The challenge arose on different levels and platforms:

1. The standardisation of concepts and notions and the translation of the new electoral vocabulary into various national languages;
2. The identification and subdivision of structures in order to ensure the greatest possible contact with the population in the little time available;
3. The training of agents, activists, integrators, journalists and civic educators.

10.1. Methodology

The principle followed was based on the NEC general training plan, from the higher level prepared centrally in Maputo to provincial and then district level, where the agents for personal communication with the population were actually trained.

This methodology was followed in all training activities. In other words, the preparation of the agents who were the NEC's partners used this multiplier training method. In the same way, the courses were held so as to correspond directly with the operations of the electoral process.

The NEC materials provided the basis and civic education officials personally directed the training at central level.

10.2. Recruitment

Recruitment also followed generally defined principles: the agents were selected in the localities; the trainers in the districts and provinces. Minimum requirements were established: educational level (6th grade), ability to communicate in the language of the area where they would work; integration in and recognition by the communities where they were to work.

In some localities it was impossible to find people with the educational qualifications required for civic education agents. This meant that they had to be recruited from outside the area where they would work. This raised a problem which made the work of the agents much more difficult: operating away from their area of residence would mean journeys and additional expenditure on remuneration for their activities.

In the final phase in particular, when they worked without being part of registration brigades, some were isolated, without any local structure providing support or control. In order to minimise these aspects and to ensure greater monitoring for the voting phase, it was decided to establish a central corps of monitors. This group was made up of about 20 young university students, subdivided into groups of two each, which were sent to the provinces to be in charge of refresher courses and to monitor the activity of the agents during the final period of the process.

They made an important contribution as well as being a unique personal experience for each of them. They became an advance group for dynamising all the work. They became the most lively witnesses of this *"new learning process"*.

10.3. Subjects

The Electoral Law was the main "text book" for the courses ministered. The course plans, however, were based on specific objectives:

- a) To disseminate the legal mechanisms and procedures laid down in the law for each of the moments of the electoral process;
- b) To establish a direct relationship between the two great electoral operations: registration and voting.
- c) To run through each stage and phase of the process in the light of democratic concepts.

Each of these individual aspects had to be projected through the practical use of examples, stories, fables, and stories from traditional culture, in order to facilitate the exemplification

of each of the subjects taught. Consequently, each course plan had specific time allocated for exercises, simulations and practical oral communication activities.

Two separate volumes of the civic education manual and the guide for the civic education agents were prepared as aids for their work: one covering registration and the other the voting process.

Another important practical exercise was the educational use of the campaign materials, videos and the newspaper "Mozambique Elections". Knowing how to use, reproduce and articulate the materials produced centrally as direct aids for their work with the population would, in the final analysis, justify their existence.

Only in this way would the multiplier effect of the whole plan be achieved; the plan conceived centrally as a guide for activities and development, with each voting citizen its ultimate objective. It was this multiplier chain which guaranteed on the one hand direction and on the other hand the link between the NEC and the population, even those in the most distant and isolated parts of the country.

CHAPTER 11

DIFFICULTIES

In general, the practical difficulties have already been mentioned, namely, those of a structural, administrative-financial, logistical-operational and control nature. However, since this is a document with critical contributions for future events and initiatives, some specific aspects should be mentioned.

11.1. Structural Difficulties

The organisation of a process of this size in such a short space of time requires an operational structure, which integrates the various sectors in close practical coordination. The complementarity of activities requires that objectives and initiatives be in concert with each other. A collective vision of problems and difficulties enables efforts to be combined, avoiding dispersion and the individualised search for solutions.

The electoral process was a project which should have been managed as an emergency. However, it was managed as if it were a long-term programme. All sectors were working for the same objective. However, not all functioned at the same pace and even less did they follow the same criteria and norms. Some received priority to the detriment of others. Some were promoted institutionally, but downgraded in their practical implementation.

This permanent contradiction meant that situations dragged on, with enormous wastage, conflictual relationships and the compartmentalised operation of the sectors.

Small "houses" were created within the house itself, in constant dispute over space, place, means and materials. This attitude became everyone's way of working. No-one was excluded, not even the technicians from the bodies specialised as support sectors.

Civic education was always more exposed and subject to more pressures. It is a sensitive sector since it has a direct influence on the citizen, his/her behaviour and action. It is therefore an indispensable sector in the mobilisation and sensibilisation of the population.

Civic education was always promoted institutionally, both by the NEC and by donors. Its financial needs were always more or less covered in the various budget lines. It was the object of innumerable meetings, seminars and conferences, clearly demonstrating the recognition afforded it by national and foreign institutions.

Structurally, however, civic education operated according to other criteria and procedures.

11.2. Administrative-Financial Problems

The civic education agents received the lowest salaries of all election workers.

Although this criterion was not officially justifiable by the central administrative sector, it is true to say that all provinces followed the same salary criteria.

Even today, protests, requests and petitions are being received from agents complaining about delays in the payment of allowances. During the period when they were working alone, without being part of a registration brigade, the agents were thrown onto their own resources without any financial or logistical support. No province advanced money for this expenditure. On the contrary, the excessive sectorisation of the civic education areas created situations where mobile units were paralysed in some areas for lack of money to buy fuel.

In the first phase of the process, *the provincial civic education trainers received 300 thousand meticals whereas the registration trainers received 580 thousand meticals. At district level, they received 275 thousand for civic education and 400 for registration.* The agents started with a basic salary of 200, later raised to 300 thousand.

The specific civic education funds allocated to the provinces were destined exclusively for financing events and initiatives of a cultural nature. However, the transfer was only authorised at the end of September. Until then, administrative impediments not imposed on other sectors meant that these activities had to be managed centrally, on the basis of provincial proposals and projects, and their implementation was delayed accordingly.

COMPARATIVE TABLE

Civic Education	Province	330,000
Registration Trainers	District	580,000
Civic Education	Province	275,000
Registration Trainers	District	400,000

11.3. Everything Very Complicated

Official notes plus invoices for work done were the basis for funds being made available and payments for these services. In the vast majority of cases, there were no operating funds to permit advances for the initial expenditure of local theatre groups.

Observance of the norms either made it impossible to do anything or required money borrowed from other budget lines. Neither solution ever occurred. This situation meant resorting to other resources: external finance from international bodies and organisations.

Instead of creating and finding mechanisms to facilitate action on the ground, as required by its function of coordinating and directing activities, the central Civic Education Department ended up becoming the "spokesman" for complaints from the provinces, at times even running counter to norms governing the hierarchisation and organisation of work.

This situation was only definitively resolved when presented at the higher level of the National Election Commission. Indeed, it was under direct NEC orientation that the sector's work received priority. Only then were all available resources put at the service of the civic education agents. This was on the eve of the suffrage, in the first week of October...

11.4. International Tenders

The acquisition of civic education equipment, materials and manufactured items were all subject to international tender. There were six tenders. The evaluation of all bids was the exclusive prerogative of the Department.

The adjudication criteria should have followed United Nations norms, with the greatest weight being given to the price proposed by each company. In two specific cases, technical opinions were based on other conditions - the printing of the "Mozambique Elections" newspaper and the audio-visual productions.

In the first case, a decision was taken in favour of the company which guaranteed that the newspaper would be printed with the required quality and delivery dates. In the second case, given the nature of the productions, it was felt that the national companies in the tender were the only ones capable of portraying in language and content the desired messages and images. In both instances the winning companies were known in the national market.

This option, never contested by UNDP, made it possible to produce with professionalism and the necessary speed all the radio and television programmes, and to distribute the "Mozambique Elections" newspaper on time.

In the case of the other tenders, the choice fell to the companies offering the best financial conditions. Since there were no other points of reference, this prevailed as the determining factor for the adjudication of orders. In most cases this was a fatal mistake: the acquisition of the mobile units, equipment for the information centres and the production of promotional material are all good examples of this.

In order to avoid mishaps, dishonesty and even fraud, in future there should be contractual clauses on the presentation of bank guarantees and mentioning the services provided in this field. In two instances, after lengthy negotiations with the successful companies, there arose demands for credit, contrary to United Nations norms. It was then found that the companies

were in fact intermediaries who had submitted bids as the producers of articles made by others.

This situation required new decisions and in some cases second opinions, which obviously upset the production and delivery of materials. This fact alone explains why the promotional materials were only delivered in the first week of October.

In addition, another factor was the control mechanism for these productions. As time dragged on the submission of samples as a condition for the production of the full order was waived. Eliminating this guarantee resulted in some poor quality products, and which did not even respect the established designs and wording.

The amount of money at stake in tenders of this magnitude justify a technical control team, with sole responsible for administering, controlling and managing the production of these materials.

11.5. Monitoring

The final, or first, major difficulty was the lack of monitoring and control of work in the provinces and districts. Periodic visits to the provinces might have helped resolve many questions and provided a more detailed picture of work on the ground. This monitoring is not the same as administrative requests or weekly phone calls.

The department is still waiting to receive lists of the activities established for each medium - mobile units, information centres and cultural events. The pace of day-to-day work made it impossible to fill out bureaucratic control forms, particularly when most sectors in the provinces had little more than three people working in each area.

CHAPTER 12

UNDP TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

There were technical assistance advisers at three distinct moments: in December 1992 to prepare the budget for the electoral process, from March 1993 onwards to prepare the action plan for civic education, and to implement the project following the establishment of the national electoral bodies in February 1994.

In the first phase, an area consultant was included in the team to analyse and investigate local production and implementation conditions. Official institutions were contacted - Mozambique Radio and Television and the Noticias newspaper.

It was the independent producers who were receptive and had the capacity to ensure the volume of productions involved in the education project. The budget for the civic education area of the electoral process was based on the costs presented by these companies. The Mozambican government presented this budget at the Rome donors' conference in December 1992.

From March 1993 onwards there began the phase of conceiving and planning the civic education communication project. With the establishment of the electoral bodies and as defined in the Electoral Law, technical assistance expanded its participation in the electoral process.

In May 1994 the team was reinforced with another consultant at central level. In June, one member of the volunteer (UNV) team in each province was appointed to directly monitor civic education activity at provincial level.

With the creation of the central TSAE and the electoral offices, the team started doing practical work on the implementation of national tasks. The two advisers in the central TSAE took over direct coordination of the conception, planning and publication of all the productions of the project.

Given the special relationship established during the preparation of the electoral process, the technical assistance team was asked to give training courses to cadres of the NGOs and religious faiths.

In the provinces, the role of the team member appointed to the civic education area was to dynamise activities on the ground. Their main activities centred on cultural activities and the promotion of events. In some cases new theatre groups were created to take the election message to the population.

The funds for the civic education area were administered and managed by the consultants, both centrally in Maputo and at provincial level.

CHAPTER 13

THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGN

13.1. The Ghost of the Angolan Case

After the proclamation of the election results on 19 November 1994 the whole country breathed a sigh of relief. All the apprehension and anguish of the post-vote period had ended, with the Mozambican citizen the winner. The sensation of having achieved a "happy ending" was felt throughout the NATION irrespective of party tendencies. All the leaderships in the country felt they had done their duty, that these had been the elections possible in a real country, not an imaginary country.

Over the last few decades Africa has been the scene of direct confrontations between opposing forces. Reaching the end of elections has often meant the start of a new armed conflict in which the people are the martyrs. Fortunately, Southern Africa has been a great example of the ability to transform its old models and to seek solutions through the popular vote.

Nevertheless, the Angola experience was always the closest point of reference for Mozambicans. All the media, national and foreign, raised this possibility. The comparison with Angola was like a ghost floating through Mozambique. To some "analysts" rejection of the results seemed the most logical path for some. The emotional and irresponsible behaviour of the national media put nerves on edge and every day launched speculations about confrontations after the elections, and in particular rejection of the results.

It all seemed to be a pre-prepared, coordinated strategy commanded by the "conductors" of war. Between the vote and the announcement of the results, the country lived through days of tension, despite the fact that the three voting days had been extremely peaceful without any outbursts of conflict among the population.

Despite the population's civic behaviour and their joy at being able to exercise their rights, the rumours and news were disturbing for a people tired of war. On the one hand we had the reality of the desire for peace and on the other hand we had the "projects" of confrontation being spread by the national and foreign press, the daily absurd speculations of which encouraged the elites to distrust their partners and competitors.

Finally, on 18 November the agitated concern at the successive delays in announcing the results created endless speculation and rumours throughout the capital. The 18th ended with doubts hanging in the air and it seemed that all the efforts to celebrate the elections had been to no avail and that the end would be as in Angola: confrontation and chaos.

The 19th dawned brightly like the wave of a magic wand and the results were officially announced in the presence of all party leaders, the diplomatic corps, the international

community and national and foreign guests. On that occasion Mozambique heard declarations from almost all political party leaders, accepting the results completely. Angola started to fall away and Mozambique was the star which once again shone on the road to peace.

13.2. The Pacification Campaign

The electoral process in Mozambique was organised during a profound contradiction between war and peace. During the two years since the General Peace Agreement, the country had been reborn from the ashes and had begun a long new journey towards pacification. Confrontations diminished and gave place to debate between the power and the opposition and within society as a whole.

For 24 months, throughout the country the people heard a wide variety of speeches about the GPA and the electoral process. The people embraced the solution of peace, once again showing the way to understanding. They were two years of debate and growing awareness which helped the seed of pacification grow in Mozambique. All the religious faiths worked silently among their followers about the need for understanding. Dozens or maybe hundreds of NGOs held daily lectures, seminars and workshops about the role of elections in the democratisation of the country (read peace).

The holding of elections in South Africa and Malawi had an immediate effect on the population. The experience of their neighbours struck home at the people's desire for pacification, and particularly that of the conscientious and organised sectors in the country. The press, on the other hand, spoke about peace and war, but was unable to reflect the depth of the people's desire for peace. Working towards peace was a slow, silent and very efficient process.

The press and the party leaders were astonished by the mutinies of soldiers wanting to be demobilised because they were tired of the war. These were new times. It was the seed germinating and creating roots in all sectors of society, with the exception of the "eternal prophets" of armed conflict. This was why there was such amazement at the peaceful and orderly manner in which the people went to the ballot boxes on the voting days. On 27, 28 and 29 October the people killed all pretensions of a return to war, a return to confrontation.

13.3. The participation of the citizen

The strategy of educating the citizen for the electoral process was one of the various components of national pacification. In this context, the so-called "civic education" project was the most ambitious and went further than the primary confrontation between war and peace. It was the step to be followed when there is growing awareness of the formation of a new citizenship based on the conscientious participation of the citizen in the country's destiny.

The project presented two daring concepts in the middle of the great discussion about how to avoid war and obtain peace. The "civic education" project introduced the possibility of advancing towards the transformation of mentalities glued to fear and the panic of war. The civic education project proposed the conscientious participation of the citizen in taking decisions about his/her destiny. In other words, the destiny of each and all at the same time, depended only and exclusively on their conscientious participation in the electoral process.

This is what makes a qualitative difference between the phantom of war, national pacification and the conscientious participation of each citizen. The former two presuppose that someone decides to end, whereas the latter says that I can also help to end the war. My participation is also decisive and the basic slogan of the civic education campaign "THE FUTURE OF MOZAMBIQUE LIES IN YOUR VOTE" could not have been more fortunate in this context of appealing to individual and collective participation.

Over various months, using many different social communication socio-cultural animation media, the civic education campaign always struck the same chord: participation.

The central objective behind the preparation of various appeals for participation was to obtain emotional involvement and identification with the electoral process. To make people feel that the process was theirs, the result of their efforts, their community, the solution to their local problems. The project consistently used this concept during the various phases of registration, civic rights and voting. At the end of the civic education campaign the idea of collective participation was reinforced by the slogan "LET'S ALL VOTE FOR MOZAMBIQUE", creating the idea of national unity based on individual and collective participation by citizens.

In the last five weeks of civic education the watchword was "LET'S MAKE THE ELECTION THE GREAT NATIONAL CELEBRATION". This was the moment which attempted to break the burden of doubt and chase away the phantoms of war: participation with joy.

The central thread of the whole campaign was the appeal for participation by citizens. Different moments and media were used to broadcast the messages.

Grassroots work on the ground with the people was done in three different ways. Through popular theatre, mobile units and voting simulation by civic education agents. They were our spearheads among the rural and suburban population. It was through the activities of these three media that the people clarified their doubts, discussed, gave their opinions and fundamentally participated.

The final five weeks were decisive for the civic education project, with the intensification of popular theatre in the rural areas, socio-cultural events and activities, mobile units and voting simulation. A climate of generalised mobilisation was created, in which no-one wanted to be left out of the process.

In the final stretch the activities on the ground coincided with mobilisation by political parties appealing for voters to vote for their candidates. Civic education carried on with its work calmly and impartially, but taking to the people the message of hope and happiness. In the rural areas in particular, the elections acquired an atmosphere of duty, participation and enthusiasm.

13.4. The Image of the NEC

Research by the NDI in the second semester of 1993 indicated that Mozambicans did not believe that a national structure could organise the elections successfully and with credibility.

In September 1994 in a second NDI survey the NEC was recognized as being responsible for directing and organising the elections, except for some areas where it was considered to be jointly responsible with ONUMOZ. The NDI document states: *"We have confirmed the high degree of credibility which NEC has with participants. The names of its main members are generally known to people, and when they are cited produce favorable adjectives about their respectability..."*

From the very beginning it had been agreed that the image of the NEC to be projected was one of exemplary behaviour and impartiality, the image of a forum of magistrates, a council of notables, representing society as a whole. Despite the fact that its members were indicated by the Government, by Renamo and by the non-armed parties its image would be that of a body of judges comprising a kind of supreme court of citizens above any kind of suspicion. The aim of this marketing strategy was to show society that the elections were being handed over to capable and honest, and above all impartial and fair people. That the electoral process was being directed by Mozambicans.

Civic education acted very cautiously here, because it needed direct support from the local press. At the beginning, the national media did not spare the NEC, daily denouncing possible administrative irregularities or small glitches inherent to the process. There were various NEC meetings with directors and editors, to show them that the NEC really needed the support of the press.

In the meantime, the "Elections Mozambique" programmes on radio and television were projecting the "other" image which the local press did not want to see. On the ground, the work of the civic education agents was producing results.

Between July and November it was necessary to ensure that the positive image of the institution among the population was maintained, particularly among the opinion forming elite. In the period prior to voting, the local press was completely bewildered, producing and publishing the most alarming information or propaganda about certain candidates. Given this scenario, there was a need to maintain the same discourse of equilibrium in the civic education programmes.

During the crisis on the night of 26 October when the candidature of one of the contestants was withdrawn, the country was dealt a serious blow, the capital in particular. The NEC's immediate decision to put out a press release in the early morning of the 27th, not only tranquilised the population but gave it the image of being the true and only leader of the electoral process, definitively confirming its image as the supreme court of the elections in Mozambique. On the 18th of November, the NEC's image suffered a setback owing to the delay in publishing the results, but recovered the next day with the official announcement of the results and their acceptance by all party leaders and by the international community.

It should be stressed that marketing the image of the NEC only succeeded because of certain extremely important factors in the electoral process:

1. The political and moral position of the NEC members, in particular its chairman;
2. Consensus around the decisions taken by the NEC;
3. The position of NEC members who spoke on their own behalf;
4. The results of registration;
5. Its relationship with the political parties;
6. The massive and peaceful participation of voters on the voting days;
7. The low proportion of valid and blank ballot sheets.

At the present time the NEC is one of the most prestigious institutions in the republic. The NEC managed to disarm all speculations by the prophets of chaos. Various factors of a social, political and military nature also contributed to this success. We shall therefore leave these chapters to the sociologists and historians.

13.5. Simulating the Vote

The major communication effort during this phase was made by the civic education agents, theatre groups, associations, NGOs, by all those who came into direct contact with the population.

The visual presentation of the voting act was considered essential for creating confidence and guaranteeing the free exercise of the vote. A "voting kit" was produced for this activity, and a major "voting simulation" operation launched throughout the country.

Central officials went to the provinces to help plan, programme and dynamise these activities. This final effort to coordinate means and initiatives provided visual and educational perception of the voting act, if not throughout the whole country in at least a large part of it.

The Teaching-Learning Pedagogy

From the beginning of the civic education campaign the Civic Education Department made it clear that the campaign would only be centralised with regard to the definition of content, but that activities would be completely decentralised. During the electoral process dozens of non-governmental organisations received assistance from the CED, both teaching materials and training courses for their cadres, covering in particular the methodology of activities and the content of the project.

After a time, the contagion of the elections involved society as a whole, and coordinated action with NGOs and religious faiths was a determining factor in the domino effect reproduction of the slogan: voting simulation throughout the country.

Voting simulation had been one of the priority actions ever since the start of the civic education campaign in May 1994. However, from August onwards, following the second phase of the training of trainers, the pace of activity on the ground increased rapidly.

At the beginning of October the CED organised a seminar in the NEC/TSAE headquarters with dozens of NGOs and religious institutions and decided that from that moment on absolute priority was to be given to voting simulation.

In order to provide clear and precise guidance for this priority action, a methodology was identified whereby the main target public would be opinion formers, traditional leaders in particular.

For three weeks, thousands of civic education agents, 1,600 of whom were from the CED, and others from the NGOs and religious faiths carried out an enormous operation throughout the country, calling the people to participate in the electoral process and at the same time carrying out voting simulation.

This final activity was extremely complex because it involved the daily mobilisation of thousands of people, in rural areas in particular. This was the time when the two main lines of the project's civic education work came together: the appeal for the conscious participation of the citizen in the exercise of his/her rights and the pedagogical action of learning - teaching to vote.

The pedagogical question of teaching-learning to vote has a complexity which was not apparent at the time of the first contact with populations and traditional chiefs. Considerable thought had to be given to the main problems surrounding the "mystery" of the secrecy of the vote. How could the vote be secret? What to do in order to vote? These were the priority questions raised throughout the country by traditional leaders and the population in general. "Theoretical" explanations did not resolve the doubts, they just made people more anxious.

Voting simulation activities were usually preceded by a required ritual to regain the respect of the chiefs. Before any practical activity the chief had to be approached, people had to present themselves, explain the reason for their visits and request authorisation to work. The name of the NEC was always associated with the people responsible for the elections in the country. The process usually involved the following steps: a meeting with the chiefs, getting them to understand the importance of the elections, the importance of everyone participating without exception, mobilisation for the voting simulation activity, a meeting with the people and finally the simulation itself.

The simulation act essentially comprised the following: naming the "polling station officers", party "monitors" and national and international "observers". Each person "named" took his/her place. The civic education agents had with them their simulation kits containing two ballot boxes for the elections for President and the Republic and Deputies for the Assembly of the Republic, the "ballot sheets", each with its respective colour, the different coloured shirts for the polling officers, monitors and observers.

Once the polling station had been set up, the civic education agents provided a detailed explanation of the "voting steps" and got the village and locality heads to help them. They

then passed to the "voting act", respecting the criteria established in the Electoral Law: first the blind, disabled etc....someone usually offered to play the part of a blind person.

The main questions of a cultural-educational nature arose at this crucial moment of the "explanation" of the voting steps:

First - When faced with a different situation which they had never experienced before the people were very timid about dealing with an unknown situation. However, at the same time they knew that they were "preparing for the great day" when they would choose their representatives. They knew perfectly well the importance of that moment when they could acquire the necessary experience.

The "ritual" of the voting steps had rules which had to be strictly obeyed. The first volunteers were people who had some kind of leadership in the community and were perfect "actors". The population's timidity gradually disappeared as they saw that everything was logical and not very complicated.

Secondly - After the simulation people interviewed in groups raised the technical difficulties they had during the rehearsal. Although the ballot boxes were the same colour as the ballot sheets, there were still some questions: why vote twice in a different way? Why vote for the president with the blue form and for the assembly with the white form?

Most people mixed up the pictures of the various presidential candidates and also the party symbols in the assembly election. This was the moment of considerable confusion, when it was necessary to think and look for "the face of your candidate" and "the symbol of the party which you prefer". The field work of the civic education agents was completed by the political parties themselves.

Some civic education agents told us that on 27, 28 and 29 October the people had been instructed by opinion leaders, party leaders and traditional chiefs as to which candidate to vote for and his position on the form, which party to vote for and its position on the form. Finally, the difficulties encountered during simulation had been overcome in principle and the people voted calmly.

Thirdly - Although they were familiar with all the voting steps, one major doubt still remained latent and grew in importance: the secret vote. It was hard for the civic education agents to explain and to convince the people that the vote was absolutely secret. Although they had simulated filling in the ballot sheet in a small booth far from people's eyes, had simulated being alone while they exercised their right to vote, the doubt still persisted that the "enemy" would know whether they had voted or not for their candidates and they would be punished. The population was unanimous in saying that "the sorcerers know who we are going to vote for".

The question of the secret vote versus the sorcerer was much talked about in both rural areas and towns, including Maputo. However, in Maputo the solution was a television spot showing the sorcerer trying to guess who would be the winner and finally giving up after many attempts, confessing that he had no way of knowing, because the vote was really secret.

However, the main problem was precisely in the rural areas, because television only covered Maputo, Beira and Nampula. The solution found was quite effective. Following the voting simulation the civic education agent mixed all the forms together and asked some participants to identify which one he/she had filled out. No-one was able to identify his/her form once it was mixed up with hundreds of others. It was argued that sorcerers would know because they had special spiritual powers which helped them to see through walls, and even to read thoughts. For this reason they were afraid of not voting for the candidate indicated by the sorcerer and of being persecuted.

The agents always repeated the scene of the mixed up voting papers and to a certain extent managed to reduce the emotion which always surrounded this subject. At the end of each voting simulation session the agents told the story of the secret vote, its origins and the fights of other peoples to obtain this victory. It was precisely because the vote was secret that the citizen could exercise his/her right without being pressured by the candidates, their supporters or relatives, and other social, religious or political forces.

13.6. Winning or Losing

After various years of war and confrontation, the people always feared that fighting would be resumed after the elections when one of the main belligerents, the government (Frelimo) or Renamo lost the elections. They understood that there was only one place for the president and so how would the defeated person react? This basic question of democracy was not well assimilated by the population. The civic education agents worked the concept of democracy in the broad sense that all gain because if there was only one place in the presidency there would be 250 placed for deputies in the Assembly of the Republic which would be shared between the parties with the most votes and so there would be no losers and everyone would be a winner. They also explained that within five years there would be new elections for the president. Democracy was like that: the people decided. This idea did not displease the people, who feared a return to armed conflict.

13.7. Invalid Votes

The local and foreign press raised the question of invalid votes as a great phantom to be faced by NEC/TSAE. The "*prophets of chaos*" raised the issue as if it were predetermined, part of a strategy to benefit one of the contestants or vice versa. The work of the Civic Education Department was presented as being carried out only in the urban areas and on television in Maputo. Fortunately, the results showed that the CED's strategy was in the right direction and that the thousands of civic education agents had served the country well.

In various sessions the NEC/TSAE discussed the mechanisms which would define what expressed the voter's will. After long legal-cultural interpretations, they decided on two alternative means of expression on the ballot sheet. The first was for the voter to indicate his/her preference with an X in the square beside the photograph of the candidate or party symbol. The second alternative was to mark the square chosen with the index finger stained

with ink. Throughout the electoral campaign there were heated discussions about whether or not other expressions on the ballot sheet should be accepted.

All political forces without exception, community and union leaders tried to convince the NEC/TSAE to accept other graphic expressions on the ballot sheets, fearing an avalanche of invalid votes. One of the major discussions around the X and the finger mark was that under no circumstances could they be placed on top of the candidate's photograph or the party symbol.

Throughout the country the invalid votes were usually of five different kinds:

1. finger mark on the candidate's face
2. X marked on the candidate's face
3. more than one X or finger mark
4. ballot sheet torn
5. ballot sheet with erasures

Following the final results, it was found that the percentage of invalid results was very small: 2.76% in the presidential and 3.21% in the legislative elections.

13.8. Blank Ballot Sheets

The great unknown factor which arose was the blank ballot sheet - 5.78% of presidential and 8.46% of legislative votes. Initial analyses and interviews point to two reasons: the first is that the voter's timidity and lack of knowledge prevented him/her from expressing his/her wish and the sheet was thus left blank; the second is that this was how the voter wished to express his/her personal option.

CHAPTER 14

CONCLUSIONS

The elections in Mozambique were a big box of secrets in which the most varied interpretations traversed the local and international press. Despite all the unforeseen events during the electoral process, the end was reached with very positive results, as one of the elections with the best results in Africa.

Following the General Peace Agreement the topic of the elections in Mozambique predominated in the national media, to a certain extent reflecting the feelings of the population, their greatest desire - peace.

For the citizen peace meant the end of the war and understanding between the main opponents. For the ordinary citizen, peace as such did not mean the need for elections to resolve once and for all the various problems which set the conflicting parts against each other. The elections were rather a requirement of the General Peace Agreement signed in Rome in October 1992.

The general elections were conceived by the various politico-party leaderships on the basis of universally accepted "western democratic models" stemming from the following rights - right of expression, the right to vote, right of assembly, religious freedom, equality of rights.

For a society which had lived for centuries under a colonial/dictatorial regime and after independence under the leadership of a single party, all the new concepts mentioned represented a new way of living in society.

The electoral process in Mozambique needed new informational foundations, based on the "civic education" of citizens, starting from the principle that all the rights mentioned are universal conquests which had not yet entered the country's reality.

The great question was knowing how to convert the General Peace Agreement into an educational base which represented the thinking of all political forces in the country and the electoral law. The holding of the elections does not mean that this objective has been achieved.

However, this civic education project had its beginning, middle and ending with the October elections. But elections are not an end in themselves. On the contrary, in Mozambique they represent the beginning of a new process: the construction of a democratic state.

The Civic Education Department project prepared by the UNDP technical assistance team in 1993 revealed through its final outcome considerable knowledge of the country's reality. The project's coordination with NGOs, religious faiths, the NDI and ONUMOZ enabled the set of activities to be carried out mainly in the rural areas.

The strategy of working with one great appeal: "*The future of Mozambique lies in your vote*" enabled all other appeals to complement and reinforce the central idea.

The use of 1,600 civic education agents as the basis of the project's civic education strategy in the rural areas was a determining factor for its success, complemented by radio, television, the mobile units, graphics and promotional materials. As the main dynamising factors in the rural areas, the civic education agents created the confidence that each citizen was important, each citizen should participate in the process. In the farthest corners of the country, there was an agent with his bicycle and his kit, talking about and discussing the elections.

The mobile units completed the work with their capacity for socio-cultural animation. The radio programmes broadcast in seven languages made it possible to cover 60% of the population. The popular theatres delighted the people who shouted and applauded each presentation and participated as "actors".

The paper "Mozambique Elections", the posters, the comic strips gave the agents, the opinion formers, community leaders, NGO activists, teachers and party leaders the basic texts to be able to understand the whole electoral process, the history of civic rights and educational explanations of the voting steps. Television was our broadcaster in the urban centres of Maputo, Beira and Nampula.

The participation of Mozambique in the elections was total, with a surprising level of adherence and comprehension of the process. Society lived a new history with greater awareness of its strength and capacity. Following the confrontation of war and the victory of all without exception in the October elections, the Mozambican citizen knows that democracy is the best place to resolve its problems.

Finally the obvious...

Mozambique was able to elect its president and its assembly deputies in free, fair and transparent elections. Mozambique had the opportunity for intense, frank debate, sometimes harsh words. But only words.

The NEC - National Election Commission - which earned respect and admiration from the north to the south of the country, from all party leaders and civil society in particular. *Despite the prophets of chaos* Mozambique showed that there is no chaos, that despite its enormous financial difficulties the country was able to rise out of the ashes, remove the debris, cry for its dead, the horrors of war, stand up and shout out loud: *The future of Mozambique lies in your vote.*

CHAPTER 15

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order for the civic education project to be implemented, a great national infrastructure had to be created which mobilised dozens of companies and hundreds of people.

The creation of a technical team at national level was a delicate and complex process. Precisely when it shows itself capable of pursuing the activity, the process comes to an end. It is thus contradictory, having on the one hand installed capacity with experience and on the other hand a population which needs to continue to be informed about the new democratic reality in the country.

Why continue?

Following the election results and with the swearing in of the new President of the Republic and the new Assembly of the Republic the country will start living under new institutions, legitimated by the popular vote.

The new institutions need leaderships which are aware of their new role in society. Despite the intensive work there is a need to consolidate immediately the idea that democracy is not just elections, but a long process which needs constant participation by civil society and party institutions, trade unions and community leaders.

How to continue?

The continuation of civic education work should be based on activities which ensure the development of the citizen as the basis of citizenship. Here we define "development" as not just investment in the production of consumer goods. In this instance development is the formation of the citizen for the new institutional activities required by the new political model: democracy.

Democracy in this case will mean conscientious and voluntary participation in the process of economic transformation which the country has chosen as its path.

However, it also means that the citizen can have the right to opt, decide, choose and above all else be free to express him/herself or to associate, giving strength to the basic institutions which will strengthen civil society.

We therefore propose the continuation of civic education activities, educational activities which provide citizens with information on their rights and duties, as presented in the following proposals:

- 1. Prepare a communication and training project which continues to provide civic education for citizens, aimed at opinion leaders, journalists, deputies, party and community leaders.**

The training courses, refresher courses and practical assignments must be based on the central thread of the post electoral period. Here we believe that training and communication are two sides of the same coin. The establishment of teams of civic education trainers will provide the pedagogical back-up for the material to be produced under the project.

- 2. Make use of the central team of 20 civic education trainers as the nucleus of the training project. These people gained considerable experience on the ground and should have refresher courses of various kinds:**
 - a) Scholarships to improve their knowledge and gain other experiences;**
 - b) Integration into the project team as provincial civic rights trainers;**
- 3. The communication and training project should be developed within the context of the activities of the new electoral structure. In the event that this structure is not established, the project should be integrated into the Institute for Social Communication.**
- 4. The project should last 24 months.**
- 5. Mobile Units: We propose that the 17 mobile units used for civic education should be allocated to the Institute for Social Communication to be used in development related projects. The ISC is the only institution in the country with the vocation and the conditions to use these vehicles.**

Maputo, 15 December 1994

SECTION IV

SOCIAL COMMUNICATION



PROJECT MOZ/93/016
SUPPORT TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN MOZAMBIQUE

CNE/STAE PRESS OFFICE REPORT

CONSULTANT: PEPE DINIZ

DECEMBER 2ND, 1994

AUSPICIUM MELIORIS AEVI

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PROJECT MOZ/93/016
SUPPORT TO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN MOZAMBIQUE



CNE/STAE PRESS OFFICE REPORT

CONSULTANT: PEPÉ DINIZ

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1 - INTRODUCTION

The first Multi-Party General Elections in Mozambique has been a tremendous "tour de force" for every person involved in it. It was, above all, a challenge for the people of Mozambique who demonstrated an admirable sense of dignity, discipline and civism during the registration period and the act of voting. Notwithstanding the difficulties, problems, time constraints and irritabilities which characterized the Electoral Process, this Consultant would like to emphasize that it has been a privilege and a honor to work for the United Nations (UN/DDSMS and UNDP), for the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and for the Technical Secretariat of the Electoral Administration (STAE). To have the opportunity to be at the epicenter of the Electoral Process, in daily contact with colleagues from UN/DDSMS, UNDP, STAE-CENTRAL and members of the CNE, has been a unique and extraordinary experience.

2 - BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PRESS IN MOZAMBIQUE

The first printing equipment arrived in Mozambique on April 19, 1854. On May 13, 1855, the first publication appeared in this country - "Boletim do Governo da Provincia de Moçambique", an official gazette which lasted until June 1875. The first newspaper, "O Progresso", was born on April 9, 1868. Due to a lawsuit brought by a government judge the newspaper was censored and its second issue never saw the light of day. From 1870 to 1886 a succession of newspapers and other publications appeared in Mozambique some of which became a source of historical information for the country, such as the "Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Moçambique". The first newspaper of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) was "O Districto de Lourenço Marques", published in 1888. The

first weekly newspaper to be edited by African journalists appeared in 1909 and was named - "O Africano". It was also the first newspaper to use, besides Portuguese, a local language - the Ronga. The "Brado Africano" followed, also run by African journalists. The Press Law of 1926 suppressed many of these publications and from 1940 onwards a strong colonial censorship hindered and closed many newspapers (*). Post Independence policy toward the press was marked by an effort to use social communication as a means of informing and educating the people. New legislation regarding the Press was added to the Constitution (Article 74) which guaranteed the right to freedom of expression, freedom of the Press and the right to information. A Public Sector was created by the Press Law of August 1991, with Rádio Moçambique (RM), Mozambique Television (TVM) and Mozambique News Agency (AIM) as its sole public institutions in the social communication structure. The most important medium was (and still is) RM which covers about 36% of the country (**).

(*) - Based on information from "Catálogo dos Periódicos e principais seriados de Moçambique", by Ilídio Rocha, Edições 70/Lisbon, 1985.

(**) - Based on information from brochure "Media - Mozambique", by BIP (Bureau de Informação Pública), Maputo, 1994.

3 - PRELIMINARY NOTE

Consultant arrived in Maputo on Friday, May 13th, at 12.00 Noon. At 2 p.m. he appeared at STAE headquarters and was directed to the Civic Education Department where he met with the Department Consultants. He was invited to participate in a meeting with members of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), also involved with civic education work.

At this point, the Press Office was non-existent. There was no Press Office Chief, office, desk, or computer. Civic Education

Consultants were kind enough to provide a chair and a spare table inside their Department so that this Consultant could start working.

On Sunday, May 15th, Consultant was once again invited to a meeting with the Civic Education Department where layout preparations for the journal "Eleições Moçambique" were discussed. Consultant provided some information concerning the photography for the journal.

On Monday, May 16th, the Press Office, using the Civic Education quarters, was fully operational. The Press Office Chief was nominated on June 6.

By mid-June, the Press Office was provided with a room for its quarters. Toward the end of June, a Rádio Moçambique journalist began working part-time at the Press Office and by mid-July another journalist joined the office staff. This reporter also began photographing events related to the Press Office and the Civic Education Department. A secretary was hired by the end of July. When the CNE Media Center became operational, two translators from the African American Institute joined the staff and two persons were hired to help the Press Office at the Media Center.

The Consultant's role lasted until December 2nd, 1994.

4 - THE ROLE OF THE CNE/STAE PRESS OFFICE DEPARTMENT

The main objective of the Press Office was to establish a close relationship with the CNE/STAE structures in order to promote an image of trust and respect from those two electoral organs to the world outside and to communicate to the people the developments of its activities. The Press Office function was to safeguard the interests of the CNE/STAE. It also had another purpose: to serve as a buffer for the wave of journalists seeking to gather information from the CNE/STAE. News coming from the CNE/STAE to the press and questions from the press to the CNE/STAE were siphoned through the Press Office. In order to satisfy Media demands, the Press Office had to obtain and provide the press with information, even if it was not as "hot" as the press wanted it to be. This information had to be sent out on a regular basis, either by phone, fax or press release. Weekly press conferences held by the CNE President provided a general update on the Electoral Process, the details were supplied by the Press Office. Another objective of this Office was to be in close contact with the Media so as to sense the feeling it was developing toward the CNE. The Media also provided the Press Office with information, particularly from the remote areas of the country. The Press Office did its best to reach those areas but it was not easy because of the volume of work and other responsibilities to CNE/STAE at the base in Maputo.





"INFORMATION CENTERS" WERE CREATED IN ALL PROVINCIAL CAPITALS. THE PURPOSE WAS TO INFORM THE PEOPLE ON ELECTORAL PROCEDURES.



ARRIVAL AND TESTING OF THE FIRST ELECTORAL "MOBILE UNITS" AT CNE/STAE HEADQUARTERS IN MAPUTO.

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4 - SUMMARY OF DUTIES PERFORMED

4.1 - COORDINATION WITH THE CIVIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

There was a close relationship between the Press Office and the Civic Education Department. All photographic material used by this Department was performed, at the beginning, by the Press Office. A few articles were also written by the Press Office and published in the journal "Eleições Moçambique" (N.1 and N.2), which was edited by the Civic Education Department. Special events which could be used for Civic Education purposes related to the Electoral Process were also covered by the Press Office (for example: "Childrens' Elections Day" which took place in Machava, near Maputo, on June 16. Organized by ADPP (Ajuda para o Desenvolvimento do Povo para o Povo), a NGO, this event had the participation of CNE President, Dr. Brazão Mazula and UN Secretary General Special Representative, Mr. Aldo Ajello).

It should be noted that from May 15th to June 6th the CNE/STAE Press Office was functioning with only the Consultant. A Mozambican counterpart had not yet been nominated. The Press Office, lacking a room of its own, was still operating from the Civic Education Department. Consultant reminded the STAE Director-General of this fact, stating that it was imperative that a Press Office Chief be nominated soon. Work at the Press Office was increasing by the day and becoming too burdensome for just one person.

Relevant information concerning the Civic Education Department was also sent to the press and published in the Weekly Bulletin, a publication elaborated by the Press Office. Events recorded and material produced by the Press Office for the Civic Education Department (written and/or photographed, or both) included:

- a) Meeting with NGOS - May 19.

- b) Portraits of CNE members for a poster - 17 to 20 May.
- c) Meeting with ONUMOZ Observers - May 21.
- d) Meetings with NDI - on several occasions.
- e) Essay on the Civic Education Campaign - Weekly Bulletin, May 21.
- f) Meeting with Caritas Organisation - June 4.
- g) Cover photo for "Noticias" on the occasion of the Independence day - June 25.
- h) Promotion material tender at STAE (Capulanas, T-Shirts, Flags, Portable Radios, Head Wraps) - June 28.
- i) The various phases of the Registration Process and other photographs - "Eleições Moçambique", N.1, July 11.
- j) Photographs for "Eleições Moçambique", N.2 - July 18.
- k) Arrival and demonstration of Mobile Units at STAE - August 4.
- l) Inauguration at Xai-Xai of the first Civic Education Electoral Information Center - August 7.
- m) Departure for the provinces of the first Mobile Units - Aug. 13.
- n) Training courses for Civic Education Agents and Polling Stations Presiding Officers - August 29 to September 5.
- o) Inauguration of Electoral Information Center in Maputo and announcements of final results of the Registration - Sept. 7.
- p) Photographs for "Eleições Moçambique", N.3 - Sept. 10.

The Civic Education Department also assisted the Press Office by:

- a) Developing a relation with the population, specially in the provinces, through radio, theater and other means of communication, thus covering a gap in the Press Office Department (see "Problems" chapter).
- b) Entertaining a series of interviews with the Registration Brigades later transcribed in the journal "Eleições Moçambique" and, by doing so, communicating to the Press Office the path the Registration was following in the provinces.
- c) Video coverage of the interviews with the Political Leaders.
- d) Undertaking supportive actions at the CNE Media-Center such as promoting the Center and covering on video some important press conferences.

4.2 - NEWSPAPER CLIPS

From the outset the Consultant began a press file containing news and information related to the Electoral Process both from the national and international press. The file was organized on a daily basis but compiled weekly and distributed to the CNE Presidency cabinet, CNE members, STAE Director-General and Deputy Directors, UNDP CTA, UNDP RES. REP. and Senior Economist and UN/DDSMS Public Administrator Officer. News was obtained mainly from the national press. These included: Notícias; Mediafax; Imparcial; Savana (Fridays only); Domingo (Sundays only); Tempo (weekly); Novos Tempos (weekly); Rádio Moçambique (RM - mainly from the 12.30 p.m. and 7.30 p.m. news hour); Agência de Informação Moçambicana (AIM); O Século (Johannesburg). TV news hour was taped regularly by the Civic Education Department. After other members of the Press Office were nominated, the Consultant gave directions for the continuation of the newspaper file.

4.3 - PRESS RELEASES AND PRESS CONFERENCES

Press releases and CNE/STAE announcements were sent regularly to the national press and the international correspondents stationed in Maputo (these included BBC; RTP-Portuguese TV; Agence France Presse; Lusa; Público; O Século). News of greater importance related to the Electoral Process was also sent via fax to Reuters-Johannesburg; SABC (South African Broadcasting Corporation); Argus Africa News Service (Johannesburg); WTN (World Television News - Johannesburg). Sometimes the information published by the press concerning the CNE/STAE was incorrect. This had to be rectified immediately by notifying the newspaper, radio or TV station at fault. Toward the end of June, a weekly interview with "Voice of America" in Washington, was carried out by the "Rádio Moçambique" journalist working part-time at the CNE Press Office.


The CNE President held a weekly press conference (first on Thursdays at 4.00 p.m. than on Tuesdays at 4.00 p.m.) coordinated by the Press Office at CNE headquarters, where he communicated to the national and international press (correspondents) an update on the Electoral Process. These conferences were preceded by a meeting of the Press Office Chief, assisted by the Consultant, with the CNE President, at which time the President was given a drafted memorandum containing the main topics of the week. The objective of this briefing was to prepare the CNE for the press and to inform the President of what would likely be asked and why. These conferences lasted for about 45 minutes and were attended by 15 to 20 journalists from the printed press, radio and television stations.

5.4 - WEEKLY BULLETIN

A draft for a Weekly Bulletin was prepared by the Consultant at CNE/STAE after the first week of work and sent to the Director-General for approval. The Bulletin contained an editorial note, a main topic on the Electoral Process, an update on each province regarding the Registration, and CNE/STAE information of the week. Photographs, maps and other graphic material were also included. The aim of the Weekly Bulletin was to provide information from CNE/STAE for circulation to CNE and STAE members in Maputo, Provincial Electoral Commissions (CPES), STAES nationwide, UNDP staff and also, subject to approval, to the press and international Agencies (Donor Community). The editorial note (half-page) gave the tenor of events related to the Electoral Process from a CNE perspective and, sometimes, contained a personal note from the Press Office. The editorial note was always supportive of the CNE/SATE effort in the Electoral Process. Because of difficulties encountered at the beginning (Press Office staff not yet available and lack of working space) the Consultant began to issue the Weekly Bulletin by himself on a very limited basis. The Weekly Bulletin



WEEKLY PRESS CONFERENCE AT CNE HEADQUARTERS IN MAPUTO.



CNE SPOKESMAN, FATHER DIONISIO SIMBE, SPEAKS TO THE PRESS AT THE CNE/STAE PRESS OFFICE.

contained 12 to 16 pages (later some Bulletins were 28 pages long) with written material and photographs prepared by the Consultant and photocopied at STAE headquarters on "A3" paper (which was folded in two). At first all of the work was done by the Consultant. When the Press Office Chief arrived (June 7th), Consultant showed him the Bulletin and discussed the importance of such a publication, not only as informative but also as a historic record of the Electoral Process. From this point on the Bulletin would be in his hands with the Consultant's assistance and guidance. In evaluating the need for the Weekly Bulletin, Consultant decided to divide the tasks necessary to the various Bulletin topics. Still, it was not easy to obtain the editorial notes and other material for the Bulletin from the Press Office staff, even though President Mazula, at a briefing with the Press Office Chief and the Consultant (June 16th), stated the importance of continuing such publication.

Information from CNE/STAE for the Press Office was obtained on a daily basis by constant visits to the Presidency cabinet and various STAE departments. It was difficult to obtain information because most Department directors were reluctant to provide information. This became more obvious during the Registration process when data from the provinces was needed to feed the national and international press and was not available (see "Problems" chapter).

5.5 - NEWSLETTER "CORREIO ELEITORAL"

Toward mid-September, a daily newsletter named "Correio Eleitoral" (Electoral Courier - which substituted the "Boletim Diário" which reported a summary of the daily news) was produced by the Press Office containing all relevant information concerning CNE/STAE activities. One of the Press Office journalists was put in charge of drafting the letter with information supplied by the Press

Office Chief, the Rádio Moçambique journalist working at the Press Office and the Consultant. As mentioned above, difficulties in obtaining data from the CNE and the STAE and waiting for approval from the Presidency cabinet (each newsletter needed the OK from this office), limited the issuance of the newsletter to two or three times weekly on a irregular basis.


5.6 - PHOTOGRAPHIC RECORD

All of the main events regarding the Electoral Process at CNE/STAE headquarters in Maputo were photographically covered by the Press Office. This Department also supplied the majority of the photographic work required by the Civic Education Department (see heading "Coordination with the Civic Education Department"). Main photographic activities included: CNE Members' Poster; Photos in journal "Eleições Moçambique" (N.1/2/3); Official take up of posts by STAE members at CNE headquarters; CNE meetings with national and international personalities; Registration process; special ceremonies (such as the event marking the end of the Registration process, the signing of the Code of Conduct, the presentation of candidatures, etc.); Visit of CNE delegation to Pemba, Tete and Chimoio; Photos for the Weekly Bulletin; Photos offered to other Agencies (such as UNICEF and AIM) and the Press; Meetings at UNDP; interviews; the voting process. The Consultant was present in all of these events and assisted the Press Office staff. When two events took place simultaneously Consultant divided the tasks among the staff and himself accordingly.

5.7 - VISITS TO SOME PROVINCIAL CAPITALS WITH CNE/STAE DELEGATION

The Press Office accompanied President Mazula and the CNE/STAE delegation to some provinces - Pemba/Cabo Delgado province (July 8, 9, 10); Tete/Tete province (July 15, 16); Chimoio/Manica province

MAPA DE MOÇAMBIQUE



PRESS OFFICE VISITS
IN MOZAMBIQUE

CONVENÇÕES

- | | |
|-------------|-------------|
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| -----○----- | -----○----- |

Fonte: 1960. Escala: 1:100.000. Modificado com base em 1971. In: O Estado



MEETING OF CNE PRESIDENT, BRAZAO MAZULA, WITH RSA PRESIDENT, NELSON MANDELA, IN MAPUTO.



UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL DELEGATION MEETING WITH CNE PRESIDENT IN MAPUTO TO DISCUSS MOZAMBICAN ELECTORAL ISSUES.



CNE DELEGATION MEETS WITH "BRIGADISTAS" OF A REGISTRATION POST IN TETE (TETE PROVINCE).



ON THE WAY TO A CONTROL VISIT TO A REGISTRATION POST IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE (MAPUTO PROVINCE).



REGISTRATION POST N.4 (FISHE AREA) NEAR BOANE (MAPUTO PROVINCE)



DELIVERY OF FOOD TO A REGISTRATION POST IN SOUTHERN MOZAMB

POSTO DE
RECENSEAMENTO ELEITORAL



"BRIGADISTAS" OF REGISTRATION POST N.8 IN MAHAU (MAPUTO PROVINCE).



MEETING WITH UN VOLUNTEERS AT UNDP HEADQUARTERS IN MAPUTO.



SIGNING THE REGISTRATION FORM AT A POST IN MATOLA, NEAR MAPUTO



"BRIGADISTAS" OF REGISTRATION POST N.3 IN TETE (TETE PROVINCE)

(July 17, 18); Maringué/Sofala province (August 17). Besides recording these events photographically, reports of the visits were prepared by the Press Office and provided to the CNE Presidency and its members and to UNDP CTA at STAE, Bruno Soares. These reports clearly stated the problems at the CPES and provincial STAES which were reflected in the work performed in the provinces. The reports also mentioned the corrections suggested by the CNE. During these visits Consultant met with UNDP Volunteers who also provided suggestions for the solutions of the problems.

5.8 - VISITS TO REGISTRATION POSTS

Whenever possible, the Press Office made visits to Registration Brigades in order to observe what was occurring in the field. These visits covered the following Brigades:

Brigade N.2 - Paquitequete, in Pemba (Cabo Delgado Province).

Brigade N.3 - Francisco Mnyanga in Tete (Tete Province).

Brigade N.26 - Tsalala near Machava (Maputo Province).

Brigade N.20 - Inhanguene in Inhaca Island (Maputo Province).

Brigade N.1 - Maringué (Sofala Province).

Brigade N.7 - Catuane (Maputo Province).

Brigade N.4 - Fische, Boane (Maputo Province).

Brigade N.8 - Mahau (Maputo Province).

Brigade N.2 - Escola 30 de Janeiro, Matola-Rio (Maputo Province).

Besides these Brigades, many Registration Posts were also visited in Maputo City. On every occasion the Press Office staff talked to the "Brigadistas", interviewed them and gathered information relating to the problems and difficulties that they encountered, and discussed the pace of the Registration Process. For example: a visit to Brigade N.4 at Boane (Maputo Province) showed that the Brigadistas had problems relating to transportation, electricity at the post and payment of salaries. These problems were communicated to the Presidency cabinet by the Press Office after the visit.

5.9 - STAFF MEETINGS

Meetings with the Press Office staff were held regularly for the purpose of solving problems and enlarging the scope of work to encompass other areas related to the Electoral Process. All the Press Office members attended these meetings.

5.10 - INTERVIEWS WITH POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS

At one of the staff meetings (July 28), it was decided that the Press Office would conduct a series of interviews with the Political Party Leaders to obtain the tenor of the coming elections. In all interviews the same questions would be asked, with a final statement from the Political Party Leader. Eight Party Leaders were interviewed as follows:

- 1 - WEHIA MONAKACHO RIPUA - PADEMO (Aug. 11).
- 2 - JOSÉ MASSINGA - PANADE (AUG. 16).
- 3 - MÁXIMO DIOGO JOSÉ DIAS - MONAMO (AUG. 16).
- 4 - DOMINGOS ANTÓNIO MASCARENHAS AROUCA - FUMO/PCD (AUG. 16).
- 5 - AFONSO MACACHO MARCETA DHLAKAMA - RENAMO (AUG. 29).
- 6 - JOAQUIM ALBERTO CHISSANO - FRELIMO (SEPT. 12).
- 7 - JACOB NEVES SALOMÃO SIBINDY - PIMO (SEPT. 23).
- 8 - VASCO CAMPIRA MOMBOYA ALFAZEMA - PACODE (Oct. 10).

Interviews were carried out by the Press Office Chief (except for Vasco Campira Momboya Alfazema who was interviewed by a Rádio Moçambique journalist working at the Press Office) and were filmed in video by the Civic Education Department (except for Jacob Neves Salomão Sibindy and Vasco Campira Momboya Alfazema). The Consultant was present in all of the interviews. A transcript of each interview was given to the CNE President and Vice-Presidents.

5.11 - INTERVIEWS WITH CNE AND STAE MEMBERS

With very few exceptions (these being of Rádio Moçambique, Notícias and Televisão de Moçambique, which had almost permanently one



WEHIA RIPUA/PADEMO



JOSE MASSINGA/PANADE




MAXIMO DIAS/MONAMO



DOMINGOS AROUCA/FUMO-PCD



AFONSO DHLAKAMA/RENAMO



JOAQUIM CHISSANO/FRELIMO



JACOB SIBINDY/PIMO



VASCO CAMPIRA ALFAZEMA/PACOD



MEETING AT CNE HEADQUARTERS IN MAPUTO WITH ERICK DE MUL (UNDP RES. REP., MAPUTO), MARIA HELENA ALVES (UN/DDSMS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR OFFICER, NEW YORK), ALIEU SALLAH (CHIEF DIVISION II, RBA, UNDP/NEW YORK), PICADO HORTA (UNDP SENIOR ECONOMIST, MAPUTO), BRUNO SOARES (CHIEF TECH. ADVISOR, MAPUTO) AND THE ASSISTANCE TECHNICAL TEAM.



BIWEEKLY MEETING OF THE MONITORING GROUP OF DONORS IN MAPUTO

person at STAE), all journalists soliciting interviews with CNE and STAE members had to be cleared by the Press Office. Interviews were conducted mainly with the CNE President and Vice-Presidents, STAE Director-General and the CNE spokesman (who was also a CNE member). Journalists were required to supply a list of the questions that they wanted to ask and the approximate date and time of the interview. Interviews were rarely refused by the CNE/STAE. The Press Office Chief and/or the Consultant were present at all of these press meetings. Besides the local and national press reporters who conducted many interviews with the CNE/STAE members, international journalists were also constantly present at the Press Office. These included, among others, people from The New York Times, The Baltimore Sun, The Chicago Tribune, The Times of London, The Voice of America, World Television News, South African Broadcasting Corporation, The Star of Johannesburg, the Público of Lisbon, SIC Television of Portugal, BBC, Reuters, Channel Africa of Johannesburg; etc. The number of international journalists increased during the election period.

5.12 - BIWEEKLY REPORT TO UNDP

The Consultant drafted a biweekly report for UNDP with an Electoral Process update. The main topics were: Registration Process (late to be changed for the Electoral Campaign update); Problems; Events Meetings; UNDP information. These reports were sent simultaneously to Mr. Horacio Boneo (Director, UN/EAU, New York), Mrs. Mari Helena Alves (UN/DDSMS Public Administrator Officer, New York), Mr. Alieu Sallah (Chief Division II, RBA, UNDP/New York), Mr. Ald Ajello (UN SRSG, ONUMOZ/Maputo), Mr. Erick de Mul (Res. Rep UNDP/Maputo). The report was cleared by CTA, Mr. Bruno Soares and by UNDP Senior Economist, Mr. Picado Horta.

5.13 - PRESS KITS

On two occasions, kits containing documents relevant to the Electoral Process were supplied to the press. These kits were approved by the STAE Director-General and by the CNE President. The second kit was given to the press at the CNE Media Center, a space which was especially conceived for the election period. This kit contained the following information:

- 1 - Map of Maputo with important locations singled out.
- 2 - Law 22/92 defining the establishment, management and exploration of telecommunications infrastructures and services.
(This document was aimed at television crews using satellite services. It contained an English translation).
- 3 - STAE structural composition of its various departments with the names of the department directors and chiefs.
- 4 - Addresses and telephone numbers of all the Political Parties and Coalitions with contact names.
- 5 - Final map of the registered population by province with percentages.
- 6 - Notes on the Bidding for the provision of election materials; on the organization of the polling station; and on the voting procedures (with an English translation).
- 7 - Map of Mozambique showing number of polling stations, of kits and of polling station members by province.
Map of Mozambique showing all provinces and districts.
- 8 - CNE Communiqué regarding the voting of Mozambican citizens residing overseas (with English translation).
- 9 - Candidacy for the President of the Republic.
Candidacy for the National Assembly of the Republic (both documents with English translations).
- 10 - Code of Conduct for Candidates for President of the Republic.
Code of Conduct for the Political Parties (both documents with English translations).


- 11 - CNE Communiqué on the role of the International Observation. (with English translation).
- 12 - CNE Regulation on International Observation (with English translation, both versions supplied courteously by AWEPA).
- 13 - Guide for the International Observer (supplied courteously by the STAE Legal Department).
- 14 - STAE Instruction N. 16, referring to the errors and irregularities which took place during the registration and its validity for the elections (with English translation).
- 15 - One copy of the latest Newsletter "Correio Eleitoral".
- 16 - CNE poster with photographs of all its members (courteously supplied by the Civic Education Department).
- 17 - Journal "Eleições Moçambique" (N.2 and N.3 - N.1 was out of print), courteously supplied by the Civic Education Department.
- 18 - 3 separate pamphlets with drawings about the "Mozambican Women"; "What is the CNE"; "Voting" (all courteously supplied by the Civic Education Department).

250 of these Kits were distributed to the journalists at the CNE Media Center.

5.14 - THE CNE MEDIA CENTER

From the time that the Press Office became operational (May 16), it was constantly visited by journalists, both national and international. As the critical days of the elections approached the number of reporters increased. It became obvious that a new place had to be located, not only to satisfy the demands of the Media, but also to create a working space for it; a center to accommodate the journalists, where all the electoral information could be sent. Another reason for the creation of this center was to isolate the CNE/STAE from the Media during the intense period before, during, and after the elections so that CNE/STAE member

and staff workers could carry out their work uninterruptedly. The Press Office was in charge of finding and creating such a Media Center. Three locations were initially inspected and rental inquiries were made. After deliberation at a Press Office meeting, the Press Office Chief, the Consultant, a CNE member (attached to the Civic Education and Information related areas of STAE) and the Chief of the Provision Department (a STAE member), came to a decision and the Telecommunications Center (Lar das TDM) at Av. of Zimbabwe in the Sommerschild area of Maputo was selected. The Media Center became operational on October 20 and operated through November 13 (the official opening was on October 24). Four rooms were rented (see diagram), two being large enough to install a Media Room and a Conference Room. Telephones, faxes, telexes and a Video/Satellite unit composed the set-up at this Center. The space was ideal because it had rooms that could be rented to the journalists (and many did rent rooms there) for a nominal fee, while being in close proximity to the Center. The Press Office did the whole set up which also included a bank (Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento - BPD) to facilitate foreign exchange for the use of international communications, two libraries (Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique and Bureau de Informação Pública) which supplied books related to Mozambique history and the Electoral Process, and, of course, a Bar. A Dining Hall and a Parking lot were also available at the site. One of the rented rooms was used for storage. There was an Accreditation desk and a Information desk. A photocopy machine was rented for the occasion. Television sets (3), VHS video recorders (2) and a computer (most journalists came with their own "notebook"), completed the set up. ONUMOS had an information desk of its own in the room. The Media Center was provided with a generator, a very important item because of constant power failures in the city. At the beginning, CNE press conferences were held daily at 6.00 p.m. (7.00 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays) and other Agencies could conduct meetings with the press as well (such as AWEPA, COMMUNITY OF SANTO EGÍDIO, CIVPOL - Political Parties and Presidential candidates could visit the



AN ASPECT OF THE MEDIA CENTER SHOWING THE FAX/TELEX AREA.



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JOURNALISTS PREPARE FOR A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE MEDIA CEN

Center, but were not allowed to have meetings). Visitors to the Media Center did not escape being interviewed by the journalists (such as Mr. Erick de Mul and Mr. Aldo Ajello) and the National press carried out interviews with foreign reporters. Seventeen press conferences and more than thirty interviews were carried out at the Media Center which accredited 350 journalists. A accreditation form had to be filled out (approved by the Ministry of Information and the CNE) and a Press I.D. Badge issued (see Annex-III). This badge was conceived by the Civic Education Department and printed in Johannesburg. Journalists came mainly from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire, Swaziland, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana and Namibia, to name the African countries represented. Europe had people from Portugal, Spain, England, Germany, Austria, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, France and Italy. The Americas sent journalists from the USA, Brazil, Equador, Peru, Canada and Mexico. There were also reporters from Japan and Australia. Two translators (from the African American Institute) helped foreign journalists during the conferences and translated documents. While the Center fulfilled its purpose at the beginning, the information that it was supposed to supply to the journalists after the elections (number of voters per district and per province as the counting of votes progressed) was cut off, and the number of journalists was sharply reduced as they sought other sources of information (see "Problems" chapter)


5.15 - RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS

During the Electoral Process the Press Office always maintained a substantial degree of camaraderie with national and international journalists, trying to be helpful when they requested information and making the Press Office an open forum that welcomed the Media. However, the Press Office staff was aware of its limitations and obtained approval whenever necessary from the CNE before information was provided to the reporters. Local and national

journalists (and local correspondents) were given priority in receiving the news so as to get the information to the people faster. They were from Rádio Moçambique, Notícias (a newspaper), Diário de Moçambique (a Beira/Sofala based newspaper) and TVM, as well as, AIM (Mozambican news agency), Lusa (Portuguese news agency) and BBC. At times, the Press Office was forced to criticize the manner in which information was published, particularly in those instances when the Media distorted the facts. For example, on one occasion, while the selection of the Assembly deputies was still being carried out at the CNE Computer Center and the counting was far from being finished, a journalist reported that Renamo concurred only to 9 electoral constituencies (out of a total of 11), while the Press Office journalist reported that, at that moment, only 9 electoral constituencies had been counted for Renamo. This misunderstanding was later corrected in the press, but the mistake caused some anxiety.

6 - PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The modus operandi of the entire Electoral Process was marked by a series of problems reaching all the STAE Departments which, at times, hindered the flow of actions needed to keep the process healthy. But it was a first time operation and credit must be given to all those who exerted their best efforts in trying to solve the difficulties and alleviate the tension. As far as the Press Office Department is concerned, from the perspective of the Consultant, three basic problems shadowed the department at times:



THE ACT OF VOTING (IN A VOTING POLLING STATION IN MAPUTO).



COUNTING THE VOTES (AT A POLLING STATION IN MAPUTO).

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1 - SALARY DISCREPANCIES

Mozambicans working at the Press Office were hired and paid a subsidy by the STAE. This subsidy was ridiculously low. A journalist who was also a photographer, for example, was paid 300.000 meticalis per month (about 45 US dollars). He was a freelancer, so that was his whole income. To survive he would do other jobs outside the STAE, and consequently from time to time would not come to work. The situation worsened when a secretary, paid by the UNDP, was hired. Her salary was more than the two journalists working at the department and the Press Office Chief combined. This resulted in some discontent and somewhat decreased motivation at the office.

A possible solution would be to have all the staff hired by the same entity and paid on a more rational basis.

2 - DIFFICULT COORDINATION WITH CNE/STAE

Article 74 of the Mozambican Constitution guarantees, in addition to right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press, the right to information. The Press Office was there to receive and provide information. This did not occur on a regular basis, not because there was no information to provide, but because the STAE departments were somehow reluctant to communicate information to the Press Office. It was frustrating when news from the CNE appeared in the press before it even reached the CNE Press Office. Although the sensitivity of the political situation must be considered, lack of information from the CNE caused speculation in the press and was possibly more harmful in the end. For instance, at one point the CNE Media Center had made arrangements to provide the press with the results of the elections on an uninterrupted basis as the results were coming in. Journalists were very excited about this and visited the Center constantly. However, at the last minute, the whole apparatus was changed and no information was supplied; the reporters went to get it elsewhere and deserted the Center.

A possible solution to this situation would have been for the STAE Departments to have information cleared and ready for the Press Office on a daily basis. Whether this information was important is irrelevant, so long as the Press Office had information to feed to the Media on a regular basis.

3 - POOR COVERAGE OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE PROVINCES

The Press Office was located at STAE-Central in Maputo and covered mainly local events. Maputo was the "tip of the iceberg" of the Electoral Process. The soul of the Process was in the remote areas of Zambézia and Niassa, in the far-reaches of Tete and Cabo Delgado, on the streets of Chicualacuala and the huts of Espungabera. That soul was not encompassed in this effort. Attempts were made by the Press Office to open Media Centers in Beira and Nampula, but difficulties encountered (cost, staff and space availability and communication problems) made it impossible to have those centers fully operational.

From the start, every Provincial Electoral Commission should have a Press Office of its own, even if it was just one journalist. One journalist who would go into the various districts everyday, meeting with people and documenting every aspect of the Electoral Process. This journalist could then prepare a detailed report and send it to the main Press Office in Maputo.

7 - FINAL NOTE

Finally, this Consultant takes the liberty of stating that every member of the Press Office was a talented professional in his own right. The Press Office staff worked well together and there was a feeling of mutual respect and camaraderie. Financial hardship were, perhaps, responsible for the lack of motivation at times. However, on the whole, the work was carried out and performed well

ANNEX - I

POST - ELECTORAL DUTIES

The CNE/STAE Press Office Department might enhance its study of the Electoral Process if it concentrates on three important areas:

- 1 - Meeting with all the Provincial and District Electoral Commissions and respective STAES to conduct a series of interviews with its members for purposes of gathering information related to the problems and difficulties encountered during the Electoral Process and soliciting suggestions for improvement.
- 2 - Interviewing the population of the provinces and districts visited, covering all the social strata and inquiring about the following aspects:
 - A) What did all this process mean to him/her as a voter?
 - B) Has the voter a story to tell? (a story related to the elections that he/she witnessed or was told?).
 - C) What does Democracy mean for the voter? What does the voter expects from Democracy?
- 3 - Interviewing the members of the Brigades and the Polling Stations in those provinces and districts, as well as the Political Party Monitors and obtaining information related to:
 - A) Difficulties encountered and proposed solutions.
 - B) What stories relevant to the Electoral Process can they tell?

Independently from a complete historic account of the Electoral Process, it will be necessary to build a documentation center to

facilitate the work of the researcher and the historian. This collection of documents could be photocopied and binded (even before being computerized) and classified by topics following a date sequential. These documents would be available to the public and kept in a Library at STAE-Central. An example of such documentation would include:

- a) All reports of the "Multipartidária" meetings.
 - b) All reports of CNE and STAE meetings.
 - c) All CNE Comunicués.
 - d) All CNE Deliberations.
 - e) All the speeches by CNE President, Dr. Brazão Mazula.
 - f) All the STAE-Central Instructions.
 - g) All the Tenders which took place during the Electoral Process.
 - h) Documents relevant to the 1st and 2nd Electoral Structures Encounters with reports of all CPES and STAES.
 - i) Weekly assessment of the Registration Process, per District and per Province.
 - j) Voting assessment per District and per Province.
 - k) Civic Education reports (from all STAES).
 - l) Operation and Logistic reports (from all STAES).
 - m) Financial reports (from all STAES).
 - n) All newspaper press clips related to the Electoral Process.
 - o) Political Party decrees and programmes.
- etc.

SECTION V
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

**PROGRAMA DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS
PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO**



MAPUTO-MOÇAMBIQUE

**PROJECTO MOZ/93/016
APOIO AO PROCESSO ELEITORAL**



**MOZ/93/016
"Support to the Electoral Process in Mozambique"
MOZ/93/B02
"Electoral Process Trust Fund"**

FINAL REPORT

**Donor Coordination
and
Financial Management**

**Christian R. Manahl
Programme Officer
UNDP/DDSMS**

Maputo, 20 November 1994

I. GENERAL REMARKS

This report tries to summarize a unique experience, by which the technical assistance team of the UNDP/DDSMS Project MOZ/93/016 and the UNDP Country Office Maputo came to play a leading role in the coordination of donor support to the first multi-party elections in Mozambique. It was unique in the sense that, with a very small amount of its own financial resources, UNDP succeeded in raising and managing donor funds which exceeded the IPF "seed money" by a hundred times. It was unique also in the sense that a small technical assistance project, initially composed of only five experts, grew into UNDP's biggest Programme in Mozambique, eventually employing 12 international professionals and 45 United Nations Volunteers and indirectly paying, through the Trust Fund, more than 50,000 electoral officers, and a great part of the material and logistic support for the elections.

In view of this exceptional dynamic of the project, it is not my intention to repeat my own terms of reference and to evaluate them against actual performance. I believe that the success of the project, and of the electoral process as a whole, was not so much the result of diligent compliance with a pre-established plan, but of the commitment of each team member to the common goal and everyone's capacity to find unconventional ways of overcoming problems which were, in many cases, unforeseeable.

Preparing multi-party elections in a country which has gone through two and a half decades of war and an equally long period of one-party governance is a delicate task. The path which led to the 19th November 1994, the date of the public announcement of the election results, was paved with uncertainties, political tensions, distrust, numerous practical difficulties and even accusations of attempted fraud against some members of the technical assistance team.

Working conditions were difficult in terms of office infrastructures, the logistic situation in the provinces, and the overall time-frame which was reduced by half of the initially planned period, due to the time-consuming negotiations for the electoral law. In addition, the team had to work with national counterparts which were, by law, political appointees of opposing factions. Particularly in the beginning, working relationships were overshadowed by the fact that the National Elections Commission and its executive secretariat are politically balanced institutions, not independent technical bodies.

Despite these adverse circumstances, the way the electoral process developed was quite encouraging: Voter registration exceeded 80% of the estimated eligible population; apart from very few isolated incidents, there was no physical violence during the campaign and the polling; registration and polling officers were highly dedicated to their tasks; and the participation in the suffrage would have honoured the political consciousness of any population in the developed world. Last but not least, the members of the National Elections Commission showed an unexpected courage and non-partisan spirit at the most critical moment of the process, when one of the parties decided to withdraw its participation a few hours before the polling started.

Precisely at this critical moment, people so different as peasants from remote rural areas, who decided to cast their vote in masses despite the uncertainty, and high-level

politicians and diplomats from neighbouring or donor countries, pulled on the same string. Thanks to their determination, the electoral process became a success and the personal efforts of us, the technical assistance experts, became meaningful.

Electoral assistance is an interaction in a usually volatile political context. Its eventual success or failure depend highly on the commitment of the people and the political leaders involved in it. We should keep this in mind, when we evaluate our own work.

II. LEGAL BASE AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROJECT DESIGN

The primary legal base for the provision of technical assistance to the elections is the General Peace Agreement of Mozambique (Acordo Geral de Paz/ACP), which underlines "the necessity of seeking technical and material assistance from the United Nations" (Protocol 3, para. VI/c). This assistance began to materialize when UNDP, the United Nations Department for Development Support and Management Services (UN/DDSMS) and the Ministry of Cooperation approved the project MOZ/93/016 "Support to the Electoral Process in Mozambique" on 13 May 1993.

While the initial budget of this project was only US\$ 673,380, which was entirely financed from IPF funds, it already contained an estimated overall budget of US\$ 78,336,000. In view of the scarcity of Government funds, it was expected that the essential part of this amount would be financed by donor contributions.

Right in the beginning, when the technical assistance team was recruited, it was agreed that some of the experts which had been working under European Union financing, would continue under the same contractual situation, albeit under the overall supervision of the Chief Technical Advisor taken over by UNDP/DDSMS.

By the end of the negotiations on the electoral law, both the Government of Mozambique and the International Community became increasingly preoccupied about the short time left for the preparations of the elections. For this reason, the President of the Republic of Mozambique addressed, through his Ambassador in New York, a request to the United Nations Secretary General for increased technical assistance.

In consultations with the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Mozambique, it was decided that the existing UNDP/DDSMS project should be extended and that at least three United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) should be assigned to each province in order to support the decentralized electoral structures. This decision confirmed the initial distribution of roles between ONUMOZ and UNDP in the electoral process: UNDP/DDSMS provided technical assistance and get directly involved in the preparations and organization of the elections, whereas ONUMOZ assured an independent and impartial monitoring.

Nevertheless, the ultimate responsibility for the electoral process remained with the National Elections Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições/CNE) and its subsidiary structures, as it is stated in the ACP (Prot. 3, para. V/3,a) and the Electoral Law (Art. 13).

The fact that the technical assistance team was formally integrated into the STAE created a somehow ambiguous situation for the international experts. Responsible by oath of office to the United Nations, but technically dependent on the respective heads of Department of the STAE, each expert, and equally most of the UNVs, had to find ways to establish working relationships with the national counterparts which would allow them to maintain the neutrality and efficiency of the technical assistance without pretending to take over responsibilities which had to remain with the national electoral structures.

This was particularly difficult in view of the enormous time constraints of the electoral process, which often called for urgent decisions or actions when the national personnel was still hesitant.

In the area of financial management, this happened usually when project revisions had to be approved in order to formalize donor contributions which were received in many instalments as the process advanced. In fact, the nature of the project, and even more so of the Trust Fund, forced UNDP and the team throughout the process to proceed with essential payments before the pertinent budget revisions were formalized. Advance authorizations, which are usually the exception in UNDP project implementation, became the predominant feature of financial administration.

III. CHARACTERISTICS AND MODALITIES OF DONOR COORDINATION

Soon after the signing of the General Peace Agreement on 4 October 1992 in Rome, representatives of donor countries started to meet on a regular basis in an "Aid for Democracy - Group", initially chaired by the European Union and with a relatively wide agenda encompassing various issues regarding political transition and democratization. In one of these meetings, in December 1992, the first electoral budget estimate worked out by the technical assistance team was presented to the donors and discussed.

When the CNE and STAE were created and the preparations for the registration started, in March/April 1994, the interest of the international community focused more and more on electoral programme coordinated by UNDP. The chairmanship of what was by then re-named "Electoral Process Monitoring Group" had already been taken over by UNDP, following an explicit request of the donors, which were keen to maintain a neutral umbrella for a politically heterogenous donor group with sometimes diverging opinions and interests.

There is no doubt that the "Electoral Process Monitoring Group" played a key role in the success of the programme. Donors received at all stages first hand information on the progress of the electoral preparations and organization. On many occasions, they directly intervened in the process by discussing their preoccupations with the President of the CNE, who was periodically invited to the meetings. This close follow-up, or even participation in the electoral process, also allowed the donor representatives to become aware of unexpected financial constraints and to react rapidly whenever additional support was needed.

In terms of administration of funds, the project team offered the donors a wide "menu" of financing modalities, including cost-sharing, trust fund and parallel financing, and in-kind contributions. Nevertheless, the overall coordination of all inputs, including those outside the United Nations funding facilities, was always maintained by the project team.

IV. MANAGEMENT OF FUNDS

The overall electoral budget elaborated by the project team was broken down into six major components as indicated in table 1 (example of 16 June 1994). It was revised on a weekly basis in order to take into account actual expenditures in accordance with the progress of activities. In included, as mentioned above, all contributions independently from their origin and the modality of financing. It also gave an indication of the amounts pledged against actual deposits (table 2, example of 8 November 1994).

The major concern of the team with regards to the overall budget was to have, and to present to the donors, at all times the best possible estimate of actual costs, taking into account savings made at various stages relative to the previous estimates, and informing about unexpected additional requirements, such as in the case of a two-weeks extension of the registration period. At the time of the announcement of the elections results, with a few payments for continuing logistic support still outstanding, the overall budget stood at US\$ 64,469,000. This represents a considerable decrease in relation to the initial estimate of December 1992 (see II, para. 2 above).

Since the project MOZ/93/016 "Support to the elections in Mozambique" is executed by the UN/DDSMS, financial management and accounting is done by this Agency in New York. The role of the team was limited to negotiating and preparing cost-sharing agreements with donor representatives and to prepare budget revisions.

The project had started with an amount of US\$ 673,380 as "seed money" from UNDP/IPF funds, which was eventually reimbursed by two thirds from cost-sharing contributions. The final total amount of cost-sharing was nine times higher than UNDP's initial input (see table 3, budget revision "E").

The Trust Fund MOZ/93/B02, which was established upon request of some of the donors, became the most important financing instrument for funds channelled through UNDP. It was a rare example of quick mobilization of a large amount of donor funds and rapid implementation through a close cooperation of the STAE, the UNDP/DDSMS team and the UNDP Country Office. When it was approved on 8 April 1994, the Trust Fund had received an initial contribution from Norway in the amount of US\$ 676,361. By the time of the elections, end of October, commitments stood at US\$ 24,481,420, out of which almost 22 Million US\$ had already been received in UNDP bank accounts and more than 20 Million had been disbursed in direct payments or transferred to STAE (see table 4, budget revision "C").

Although formally executed by the CNE/STAE, it had been agreed with the CNE and the Ministry of Cooperation, and explicitly stated in the project document (paragraph 7), that all requests for transfers and direct payments should require joint signatures of the Director-General of STAE (or one of his Deputies) and the Chief Technical Advisor of Project MOZ/93/016 (or, in his absence, the Programme Officer). This co-management allowed the project team to monitor closely all expenditures and to maintain an expenditure balance on a day-to-day basis (see table 5, example of 23 October 1994).

The principle of STAE-UNDP co-management was also observed in the procurement procedures: A joint "Procurement and Contracts Commission" was established with representatives of UNDP, the STAE and the technically responsible expert of the technical assistance team. It launched and adjudicated a total of 21 international tenders for civic education materials and logistic support (vehicles, aircraft contracts, camping equipment etc.).

V. SHORTCOMINGS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

While the ambiguous status of the technical assistance team within the STAE, as referred under II above, was a professional challenge which everyone had to face in his or her own way, depending on the respective Department where the staff member was assigned to, it also caused major strains and difficulties. In the area of financial management, the reluctance of some of the key national officials share information on the internal accounting procedures of STAE lead to a situation where the two sectors, UNDP and STAE, worked in parallel instead of working together. Cooperation was eventually reduced to a joint appraisal of requests for payment and a post-facto verification of the accounts of STAE.

In addition, this verification took place only after the polling, since the provincial electoral structures did not manage to organize their documentation during the registration process and the preparations for the elections. If the principle of co-management had been extended to the United Nations Volunteers assigned to the provinces, then the project would have had the possibility to monitor provincial and district expenses throughout the process. Furthermore, the provincial structures of STAE would have received assistance in accounting right from the beginning.

Although this may not have cut down the expenses significantly, it certainly would have permitted a smoother and more transparent process of payment and accounting with less prejudice to the final beneficiaries, i.e. the registration, civic education and polling agents. In fact, these threatened on several occasion to boycott the process because of delayed payments, and some even provoked minor mutinies. Allegations were also made on incorrect, i.e. reduced payments, but none of these could be verified.

In a future programme of a similar scope, I would suggest to assign at least one staff members (UNV) with experience in accounting or financial management to each provincial capital to assist the national structures in the elaboration of provincial budgets and in financial reporting. Budgets for various phases of the electoral process, such as training, registration and polling, could be prepared sufficiently in advance to allow transfers to bank accounts in the provinces, and actual payments could be made by joint signatures of the international staff members and the responsible national counterpart.

Furthermore, provincial or regional tenders for the procurement of logistic support, particularly ground transport, could be launched under the supervision of international staff members. This could reduce the costs it would ensure a maximum use of local capacities.

Another problem was in my opinion a certain lack of coordination within the project, particularly in the crucial phase shortly before and during the polling. The fact that the project grew, at a crucial moment of the process, from a small group of five experts to a an

extended programme with almost 60 staff members, caused a critical disruption of organizational structures.

When the decision was taken by ONUMOZ and UNDP to extend the project, the electoral law had just been approved and the implementation was about to start. In the beginning, the STAE had obvious difficulties to absorb the external technical assistance. This context did not allow for careful planning of project coordination procedures, which had been quite informal, and well functioning, within the initial small group. However, when additional consultants arrived, the coherence of the team diminished and some colleagues expressed clearly that they might have been able to contribute more efficiently to the process in the framework of a more formal coordination structure and a clearly defined distribution of responsibilities.

This issue was discussed among the members of the team and opinions remain divided. It is important to mention that, in view of the difficult institutional integration of the team into the national electoral structures, the formal responsibility for coordination was with the Director-General of STAE. Isolated team meetings could have negatively affected the already slim base of confidence between national and international professionals of STAE.

Nevertheless, I believe that an open approach with periodic, well structured team meetings, from which interested national counterparts would not be excluded, could have increased the effectiveness of the technical assistance. It certainly would have enhanced the cohesion of the team and it would have allowed all of us to have an overall vision of the electoral process at all stages and to broaden our professional experience.

ANNEX

- 1) **Tabel 1: Overall Electoral Budget**
(example of 16 June 1994)
- 2) **Table 2: Donor Contributions**
(example of 8 November 1994; final status of pledges)
- 3) **Table 3: Budget of Technical Assistance Project MOZ/93/016**
(Revision "E")
- 4) **Table 4: Budget of Trust Fund MOZ/93/B02**
(Revision "C")
- 5) **Table 5: Balance of expenditures of Trust Fund MOZ/93/B02**
(example of 23 October 1994)

TABLE 1

Date: 16 June 1994

Component	OVERALL BUDGET			
	A Financial require- ments	B Pledges	C Donor	D Financing Gap (A - B)
1. ELECTORAL STRUCTURES				
1.1. CNE and STAB Personnel	1,000,000	1,000,000	GOM	0
1.2. Registration Brigades (8,700x3w/m)	1,350,000	1,350,000	TF	0
1.3. Civic Education Brigades (1,800x4w/m)	400,000	400,000	TF	0
1.4. Election Brigades (60,000x1w/m)	2,000,000	100,000	TF	1,900,000
1.5. Recurrent Costs/Offices	1,500,000	1,500,000	GOM	0
1.6. Investments/Construction & Rehabilitation	1,000,000	1,000,000	GOM	0
Total Electoral Structures	7,250,000	5,350,000		1,900,000
2. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS				
2.1. Telecommunications Equipment	850,000	850,000	UN(CS)	0
2.2. Data Processing Equipment	400,000	400,000	ITA	0
2.3. Voter Registration Materials	9,500,000	9,500,000	EU	0
2.4. Polling Materials	9,000,000	9,000,000	EU	0
2.5. Camping Equipment for Brigades	1,400,000	1,400,000	TF	0
2.6. Food Rations for Brigades	2,000,000	2,000,000	TF	0
Total Equipment and Materials	23,150,000	23,150,000		0
3. TRANSPORT FACILITIES				
3.1. Aircraft Leases (3,600 h)	1,500,000	1,500,000	TF	0
3.2. Helicopter Leases (4,700 h)	3,500,000	2,600,000	TF	900,000
3.3. Aircraft Fuel	1,250,000	730,000	TF	520,000
3.4. Purchase of Light Vehicles (200)	2,500,000	2,500,000	TF/FRA	0
3.5. Light Vehicle Leases (60x4m + 400x1m)	2,100,000	2,100,000	TF/EU	0
3.6. Purchase of Trucks (12)	475,000	475,000	TF	0
3.8. Fuel/Diesel	1,400,000	800,000	TF	600,000
Total Transport Facilities	12,725,000	10,705,000		2,020,000
4. CIVIC EDUCATION				
4.1. Audio-visual Equipment and Programmes	1,100,000	1,100,000	TF	0
4.2. Graphic Materials	700,000	700,000	TF	0
4.3. Promotional Materials	1,800,000	1,800,000	UN(CS)	0
4.4. Theaters and Other Initiatives	290,000	290,000	TF	0
4.5. Information Centres	110,000	110,000	TF	0
4.6. Mobile Civic Education Units	660,000	660,000	TF	0
Total Civic Education	4,660,000	4,660,000		0
5. TRAINING				
5.1. CNE, CPE and STAE (Maputo & Provinces)	250,000	250,000	AUS	0
5.2. Registration and Civic Education Brigades	900,000	900,000	TF	0
5.3. Electoral Officers	1,800,000	1,800,000	TF	0
Total Training	2,950,000	2,950,000		0
6. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE	5,500,000	5,500,000	EU/UN(CS)	0
GRAND TOTAL	56,235,000	52,315,000		3,920,000

UN(CS):UNDP Technical Assistance Project

Cost-sharing donors: Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK

TF: UNDP Trust Fund

Co-financing donors: Canada, Italy, Finland, Norway, USA

AUS: Austria

EU: European Union

FRA: France

GOM: Government of Mozambique

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TABLE 2

Date: 8 November 1994

Sources of Financing:	Nat. Currency	US\$ Pledged	Deposited
Trust Fund:		24,481,420	21,714,472
- Canada	CAN\$ 1,000,000	729,927	364,964
- Finland	FM 6,300,000	1,211,645	711,645
- Italy	LIT 15 Billion	9,230,769	9,230,769
- Netherlands	FH 1,850,000	1,000,000	
- Norway	NK 22,000,000	3,151,579	2,856,594
- USA		9,157,500	8,550,500
Cost-sharing:		6,391,930	5,902,340
- Denmark	DK	1,200,000	1,000,000
- Portugal	PTE	338,000	338,000
- Spain	PTS 40,000,000	299,267	299,267
- Sweden	SK 27,000,000	3,454,716	3,187,336
- United Kingdom	LB 600,000	891,480	891,840
- UNDP/IPF		208,467	185,897
Parallel Financing:		28,205,000	28,205,000
Austria	AUS	300,000	300,000
Canada	CAN\$ 200,000	145,000	145,000
European Union	ECU	26,210,000	26,210,000
France	FF 5,000,000	700,000	700,000
Italy	LIT	750,000	750,000
Portugal	PTE	100,000	100,000
Government	Mil MTS 33,845,140	5,390,568	5,390,568
OGE Allocation	Mil MTS 25,845,140	4,190,568	4,190,568
USAID Counterpart Funds	Mil MTS 8,000,000	1,200,000	1,200,000
Total		64,468,918	61,212,380

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TABLE 3

PROJECT BUDGET COVERING UNDP CONTRIBUTION
(in US Dollars)

Country: MOZAMBIQUE
Project Number: MOZ/93/016/E/01/01
Project Title: Support to the Electoral Process in Mozambique

BUDGET LINE	PROJECT COMPONENT	W/M	1993	AOB	W/M	1994	AOB	W/M	Total	AOB
10.	PROJECT PERSONNEL									
11.	INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL									
11.01	Chief Technical Advisor	5.0	78,001	7,020	12.0	156,000	14,040	17.0	234,001	21,060
11.14	Programme Officer	3.0	18,330	1,652	11.0	120,800	10,872	14.0	139,150	12,524
11.50	Electoral Advisor 1	0.5	12,120	1,091	0.0			0.5	12,120	1,091
11.52	Electoral Advisor 2				5.0	75,000	6,750	5.0	75,000	6,750
11.53	Social Communication Expert				7.0	60,000	5,400	7.0	60,000	5,400
11.54	Civic Education Expert				7.0	60,000	5,400	7.0	60,000	5,400
11.55	Training Expert				2.0	35,000	3,150	2.0	35,000	3,150
11.56	Logistics Expert				8.0	75,000	6,750	8.0	75,000	6,750
11.97	Short-term Consultants				6.0	70,000	6,300	6.0	70,000	6,300
11.99	SUB-TOTAL INTERNATIONALS	8.5	108,471	9,762	58.0	651,800	58,662	66.5	760,271	68,424
13.	ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT									
13.01	Administrative Assistant				10.0	13,000	1,430	10.0	13,000	1,430
13.03	Secretaries (19, Maputo and Provinces)				100.0	70,500	7,755	100.0	70,500	7,755
13.49	Drivers (13, Maputo and Provinces)		166		100.0	40,300	4,455	100.0	40,666	4,455
13.99	SUB-TOTAL ADMIN. SUPPORT		166.0		210.0	124,000	13,640	210.0	124,166	13,640
14.	48 UN Volunteers				336.0	1,084,219	97,580	336.0	1,084,219	97,580
15.	DUTY TRAVEL					55,000	4,950		55,000	4,950
16.	MISSION COSTS		10,497	945		26,785	2,411		37,282	3,356
19.99	TOTAL PERSONNEL		119,134	10,707		1,941,804	177,242		2,060,938	187,941
21.	SUBCONTRACTS									
21.01	SADC Seminar		36,844	4,053		(6,844)	(753)		30,000	3,300
21.03	Audit					30,000	3,300		30,000	3,300
19.99	TOTAL SUBCONTRACTS		36,844			23,156	2,547		60,000	6,600
40.	EQUIPMENT									
45.01	Local Procurement					280,000	16,800		280,000	16,800
45.02	Computers					87,701	5,262		87,701	5,262
45.03	Operations and Maintenance/Ground Transport					50,000	3,000		50,000	3,000
45.04	Civic Education Materials					1,164,285	69,857		1,164,285	69,857
45.05	Office Equipment (Fax and Xerox Machines)					15,525	932		15,525	932
45.06	Telecommunications Equipment					481,576	28,895		481,576	28,895
45.07	Operations and Maintenance/Air Transport					648,347	38,901		648,347	38,901
46.01	Vehicles		5,763	231		485,356	19,414		491,119	19,645
46.88	Adjustments					1,227			1,227	
47.01	International Procurement		70,000	7,000		85,861	8,586		155,861	15,586
49.00	TOTAL EQUIPMENT		75,763	7,231		3,299,878	191,646		3,375,641	198,871
50.	MISCELLANEOUS									
52.00	Reports					8,000			8,000	
53.00	Sundries		4,906			32,057			36,963	
59.00	TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS		4,906			40,057			44,963	
99.	PROJECT TOTAL		236,647	17,938		5,304,895	371,436	2,881	5,541,542	393,424
100.	COST-SHARING									
101.	Denmark					1,000,000	64,419		1,000,000	64,419
102.	Portugal					337,933	21,769		337,933	21,769
103.	Spain					283,688	18,275		283,688	18,275
104.	Sweden					3,404,724	219,328		3,404,724	219,328
105.	United Kingdom					891,840	57,451		891,840	57,451
109.	TOTAL COST-SHARING					5,918,185	381,241		5,918,185	381,241
158.	UNDP FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS									
158.01	Denmark					29,126			29,126	
158.02	Portugal					9,843			9,843	
158.03	Spain					8,263			8,263	
158.04	Sweden					99,167			99,167	
158.04	United Kingdom					25,976			25,976	
158.90	TOTAL UNDP FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS					172,374			172,374	
999.	Total UNDP/IFF		236,647	17,938		(47,490)	(5,752)		189,157	12,181

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TABLE 4

PROJECT BUDGET COVERING TRUST FUND CONTRIBUTION
(in US Dollars)

Country: **MOZAMBIQUE**
Project Number: **MOZ/93/B02/C/8B/99**
Project Title: **Assistance to the Electoral Process in Mozambique**

BUDGET

LINE	PROJECT COMPONENT	1994	Total
10.	NATIONAL PERSONNEL		
13.01	Drivers (130x4w/m)	52,000	52,000
17.01	Voter Registration Brigades (8,000x5m)	1,066,270	1,066,270
17.02	Civic Ed. Agents (1,600x6m + 4,500x0.5m)	652,567	652,567
17.03	Election Brigades (43,000x1m)	560,000	560,000
17.04	Training and Monitoring Agents (700x4m)	655,682	655,682
17.05	Elections Commissions (CNE, CPE, CDE)	900,000	900,000
17.06	STAB Central	160,000	160,000
19.	TOTAL PERSONNEL	4,046,519	4,046,519
20.	SUB-CONTRACTS		
	CIVIC EDUCATION		
21.01	Audio-visual Productions (USA)	700,000	700,000
21.02	Theatres and Initiatives (USA)	240,000	240,000
21.03	Production of Graphic Materials (USA)	850,000	850,000
	TRANSPORT		
22.01	Fixed-wing Aircraft Leases (USA)	1,000,000	1,000,000
22.02	Helicopter Leases	3,450,000	3,450,000
22.03	Vehicle Leases	800,000	800,000
29.	SUB-TOTAL SUB-CONTRACTS	7,040,000	7,040,000
30.	TRAINING		
31.01	Registration Officers Training (USA)	894,109	894,109
31.02	Election and Civic Education Officers Training (USA)	3,366,966	3,366,966
39.	SUB-TOTAL TRAINING	4,261,075	4,261,075
40.	EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS		
	CIVIC EDUCATION		
41.01	Civic Educ./Audio-visual Equip. and Materials (USA)	30,000	30,000
41.02	Civic Educ./Graphic Materials (USA)	60,000	60,000
41.03	Civic Educ./Mobile Units (USA)	452,570	452,570
41.04	Civic Educ./Information Centres (USA)	75,000	75,000
	VOTER REGISTRATION		
41.05	Equipment for Brigades	400,000	400,000
41.06	Support for Brigades (Food and Materials)	1,150,000	1,150,000
	TRANSPORT		
41.07	Air Transport/Fuel and Operations	1,217,833	1,217,833
41.08	Vehicles/Operations and Maintenance	600,000	600,000
42.01	Purchase of Light Vehicles and Pick-ups	3,700,000	3,700,000
42.02	Purchase of Trucks and Mini-Buses	735,372	735,372
49.	SUB-TOTAL EQUIPMENT	8,420,775	8,420,775
50.	ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS		
54.01	Canada	21,260	21,260
54.02	Finland	35,291	35,291
54.03	Italy	268,857	268,857
54.04	Netherlands	29,126	29,126
54.05	Norway	91,794	91,794
54.06	USAID	266,723	266,723
59.	SUBTOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS	713,051	713,051
99.	PROJECT TOTAL	24,481,420	24,481,420
100.	CONTRIBUTIONS		
101.	Canada (non-earmarked contribution)	729,927	729,927
102.	Finland (non-earmarked contribution)	1,211,645	1,211,645
103.	Italy (non-earmarked contribution)	9,230,769	9,230,769
104.	Netherlands (non-earmarked contribution)	1,000,000	1,000,000
105.	Norway (non-earmarked contribution)	3,151,579	3,151,579
106.	USAID	9,157,500	9,157,500
109.	TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS	24,481,420	24,481,420

(This budget will be adjusted in accordance with the actual value of the contributions depending on the exchange rate)

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TABLE 5

Date: 23 October 1994

FINANCIAL CONTROL

LINE	PROJECT COMPONENT	contrib. allocated	unliquidated obligations	disbursemts.	advances to STAE	total expendit.	unexp. balance
10.	NATIONAL PERSONNEL						
13.01	Drivers	51,968			51,968	51,968	
17.01	Voter Registration Brigades	1,066,270			1,066,270	1,066,270	
17.02	Civic Ed. Agents	652,567			652,567	652,567	
17.03	Election Brigades	388,924			388,924	388,924	
17.04	Training and Monitoring Agents	655,682			655,682	655,682	
17.05	Elections Commissions (CNE, CPB, CDE)	900,000			673,322	673,322	226,678
17.06	STAB Central	160,000			156,210	156,210	3,790
19.	TOTAL PERSONNEL						
20.	SUB-CONTRACTS						
	CIVIC EDUCATION						
21.01	Audio-visual Productions (USA)	700,000	301,535	358,147		659,682	40,318
21.02	Theatres and Initiatives (USA)	240,000		222,983		222,983	17,017
21.03	Production of Graphic Materials (USA)	800,000	159,982	620,955		780,937	19,063
	TRANSPORT						
22.01	Fixed-wing Aircraft Leases (USA)	550,000	139,558	339,299		478,857	71,143
22.02	Helicopter Leases	2,200,000		2,162,703		2,162,703	37,297
22.03	Vehicle Leases	700,000	182,970	112,547	277,311	572,828	127,172
29.	SUB-TOTAL SUB-CONTRACTS						
30.	TRAINING						
31.01	Registration Officers Training (USA)	894,109			894,109	894,109	0
31.02	Election Officers Training (USA)	3,366,966			3,366,966	3,366,966	0
39.	SUB-TOTAL TRAINING						
40.	EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS						
	CIVIC EDUCATION						
41.01	Civic Educ./Audi-visual Equip. & Mater. (USA)	30,000		14,808		14,808	15,192
41.02	Civic Educ./Graphic Materials (USA)	30,000		24,267		24,267	5,733
41.03	Civic Educ./Mobile Units (USA)	452,570		452,570		452,570	0
41.04	Civic Educ./Information Centres (USA)	55,000		54,982		54,982	18
	VOTER REGISTRATION						
41.05	Equipment for Brigades	368,239		333,587	34,652	368,239	0
41.06	Support for Brigades (Food and Materials)	1,225,000		189,744	947,491	1,137,235	87,765
	TRANSPORT						
41.07	Air Transport/Fuel and Operations	677,000		676,097		676,097	903
41.08	Vehicles/Operations and Maintenance	400,478		39,756	338,110	377,866	22,612
42.01	Purchase of Light Vehicles and Pick-ups	3,700,000	990,286	2,662,969		3,653,255	46,745
42.02	Purchase of Trucks	735,372	97,470	637,902		735,372	0
49.00	SUB-TOTAL EQUIPMENT						
50.	ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS						
54.01	Canada	21,117	10,630			10,630	10,487
54.02	Finland	33,918	20,728			20,728	13,190
54.03	Italy	268,857	268,857			268,857	0
54.04	Netherlands	29,126				0	29,126
54.05	Norway	91,940	83,202			83,202	8,738
54.06	USAID	266,723	249,044			249,044	17,679
59.	SUBTOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS						
99.	PROJECT TOTAL	21,711,826	2,504,261	8,903,316	9,503,582	20,911,159	863,667
100.	CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED	deposited					
101.	Canada	364,964					
102.	Finland	711,645					
103.	Italy	9,230,769					
104.	Netherlands	0					
104.	Norway	2,856,594					
105.	USAID	8,550,500					
109.	TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED	21,714,472					
	PLEDGES NOT YET DEPOSITED	2,722,547					

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