

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART I

PD-ABJ-697
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1. BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM, READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS.
2. USE LETTER QUALITY TYPE, NOT DOT MATRIX TYPE.

IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Reporting A.I.D. Unit: _____ Mission or AID/W Office <u>USAID/EL SALVADOR</u> (ES# _____)	B. Was Evaluation Scheduled in Current FY Annual Evaluation Plan? Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Slipped <input type="checkbox"/> Ad Hoc <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation Plan Submission Date: FY <u>93</u> Q <u>3</u>	C. Evaluation Timing Interim <input type="checkbox"/> Final <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ex Post <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>
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D. Activity or Activities Evaluated (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated; if not applicable, list title and date of the evaluation report.)

Project No.	Project / Program	First PR0AG or Equivalent (FY)	Most Recent PACD (Mo/Yr)	Planned LOP Cost (000)	Amount Obligated to Date (000)
519-0281	Emergency Program: Health and Jobs for Displaced Persons	1982	May 1993	\$79,600,963	\$79,586,584

ACTIONS

E. Action Decisions Approved By Mission or AID/W Office Director	Name of Officer Responsible for Action	Date Action to be Completed
Action(s) Required		
No further actions are required. Evaluations concluded Program had met its goals and any additional assistance should not be continued under this Project.	n/a	n/a

APPROVALS

F. Date of Mission Or AID/W Office Review Of Evaluation: _____ (Month) _____ (Day) _____ (Year)
 10 14 93

G. Approvals of Evaluation Summary And Action Decisions:

Name (Typed)	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission of AID/W Office Director
Signature	<i>Marc Scott, IRD</i>		<i>Karen Freeman, PRD</i>	<i>Henry Reynolds, DIR</i>
Date	<i>10.28.94</i>		<i>10/28/94</i>	<i>11/31/94</i>

ABSTRACT

H. Evaluation Abstract (Do not exceed the space provided)

The purpose of the Emergency Program: Health and Jobs for Displaced Persons provided employment, food, health, resettlement, and relocation assistance from 1982 to 1993 to population displaced by the civil conflict in El Salvador. The project evolved during its eleven year history in response to the unpredictable course of the conflict, changing circumstances of the displaced, and periodic evaluations. Initially the project focused on emergency relief through provision of temporary employment, immunization and oral rehydration salts, curative health services, and food distribution. Beginning about 1987 the project emphasized reintegration and graduation through assistance for relocation and resettlement.

This final evaluation was conducted in June 1993 by a Checchi and Company, Inc. team on the basis of documentation review; interviews with available government, Mission, and non-government organization personnel who had worked on the project; and visits to displaced persons settlements. The purpose was to assess project accomplishments and identify lessons learned for similar future programs.

The major findings and conclusions are:

- ▶ The project successfully provided a safety net for many of the displaced when the GOES could not and helped to settle or relocate in rural areas many who otherwise would have migrated to over-crowded urban centers.
- ▶ The project adjusted and responded well to changing circumstances through timely use of evaluations and flexible management.

Lessons learned are:

- ▶ Adjustable project design and rapid response capacity are critical ingredients for a displaced persons program.
- ▶ A too proactive donor role may lead to the host government making less effort to support the program.
- ▶ Graduation from relief support should occur as early as possible in accordance with a specific plan and criteria.
- ▶ Coordination is often lacking and needs attention in emergency programs to stretch resources and avoid duplication.
- ▶ If availability of implementing institutions is limited in a civil conflict context, strengthening support for inexperienced institutions may be needed.

COSTS

I. Evaluation Costs

1. Evaluation Team		Contract Number OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (U.S. \$)	Source of Funds
Name	Affiliation			
Henry Johnson	Checchi & Co., Inc.	35	\$36,217.52	Project Funds (519-0281)
Daniel Santo Pietro	Checchi & Co., Inc.	30		
2. Mission/Office Professional Staff Person-Days (Estimate) <u> 5 </u>		3. Borrower/Grantee Professional Staff Person-Days (Estimate) <u> 4 </u>		

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART II

SUMMARY

J. Summary of Evaluation Findings - Conclusions and Recommendations (Try not to exceed the three (3) pages provided)

Address the following items:

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Purpose of evaluation and methodology used ● Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated ● Findings and conclusions (relate to questions) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Principal recommendations ● Lessons learned |
|--|--|

Mission or Office
USAID/EL SALVADOR

Date This Summary Prepared:
October 27, 1994

Title And Date Of Full Evaluation Report:
Final Evaluation Emergency Program: Health and Jobs
for Displaced Persons

PURPOSE & METHODOLOGY:

With the termination of project 519-0281, USAID/ES contracted for a final evaluation to: a) record the costs, accomplishments and failures of the Project; b) present "lessons learned" for use by AID and other donors faced with similar displaced persons problem; and c) recommend any needed follow-up activities for the few remaining displaced or ex-displaced which are not currently underway or planned.

Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. sent a two person team to El Salvador in June 1993 to carry out the evaluation. The team consisted of Daniel Santo Pietro, a project management specialist with an extensive PVO background, and Henry Johnson, a retired AID senior foreign service officer, who served as Team Leader.

The team spent five weeks in El Salvador. They reviewed documentation and records available in USAID/ES. They reviewed documentation and records available in USAID/ES. GOES, NGO and USAID/ES personnel who had worked with the Project were interviewed. Because of the Project's long history and the departure from El Salvador or disappearance of a number of the institutions involved, it was not possible to locate and interview as complete a range of the key participants as would have been desirable.

The team also made three field trips to visit displaced persons settlements and to talk with mayors and Federation of Credit Agencies (FEDECCREDITO) personnel. The team talked with some beneficiaries encountered on a random basis but it was not practical given time and resource constraints to attempt to reach any representative or systematic sample.

PURPOSE OF ACTIVITIES EVALUATED:

The civil conflict and violence that engulfed El Salvador between 1979 and 1992 generated a serious problem of displaced persons. The displaced population grew until 1986, when it peaked at over one half million persons, more than 10 percent of El Salvador's population. The original agreement for Project No. 519-0281 was signed on May 12, 1982 to provide \$3 million for employment, food and health assistance on an emergency basis to the displaced. Subsequent amendments brought the total grant funding to \$79,800,963 and the PACD was extended to May 31, 1993.

The purpose of Project 519-0281 was to provide income earning opportunities, basic health services, and adequate nutrition for the displaced population, while efforts were developed and tested to relocate those displaced persons, who were willing and able, into more productive lives. The project included four components:

- a) employment component (to provide short-term job opportunities through which the displaced could earn cash to meet basic needs);
- b) health component (to provide preventive (immunization campaign and distribution of oral rehydration salts) and curative health services because Ministry of Health facilities were non-existent, abandoned, or lacking in pharmaceutical supplies in areas where the displaced were located);
- c) food distribution component (to meet the basic nutritional needs of the displaced and provide supplementary feeding to the most vulnerable among them); and
- d) reintegration component (to provide assistance to the displaced to enable them to support themselves as they returned to their homes, relocated in a new permanent site, or settled where they were located).

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:

Project 519-0281 successfully met its principal objectives. It provided a safety net for many of the displaced when the GOES could not. It helped to settle or relocate in rural areas many who otherwise would have migrated to already over-crowded urban centers, especially San Salvador.

The jobs program provided cash for some basic needs and a sense of dignity to the large numbers it reached. Useful community improvements and basic infrastructure were produced. Between 150,000 and 200,000 of the displaced population worked occasionally in the program. Some of the principal accomplishments of the 4,968 work projects completed during the life of the jobs program were 28,390 latrines installed, 316 community potable water projects realized and 1,665,000 square meters of cobblestone streets rehabilitated. The initial projects were short-term, such as clearing trash, but gradually more ambitious projects were undertaken to repair roads and build community facilities. Tight controls on the rotation of workers meant that in this first phase an estimated 50,000 persons benefitted from some part-time employment in the program. The jobs activities also involved a broad cross section of the displaced population both from camps and dispersed communities. Family members participated including youths whose schools had closed because of violence and women who engaged in equal manual labor with the men.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS (CONT.):

The jobs program was labor-intensive, i.e., they were simple infrastructure projects where most of the funds (60-70%) went to pay for labor. Not only did the community benefit from the infrastructure project, but it employed the displaced and stimulated the local economy. **Conclusions:** 1) In a period when local employment was almost nil this program made the difference between severe deprivation and meeting minimal basic needs in a way that fostered dignity among the displaced. 2) The program contributed to an extensive range of durable community projects even though this was not a primary objective. 3) The jobs program effectively spread work projects through the country in accord with where the displaced population had migrated. 4) The wages paid in cash were vital to the program's success. The small amount of forced rotation avoided a dependency on this income. 5) A drawback of this program was that many community improvements were not in places where the displaced settled. 6) After 1987 when significant numbers of the displaced began to return home or to look for more permanent solutions, providing incentives for resettlement through the jobs program was complicated by difficulties in shifting the program's mechanisms to support of work projects in the resettlements.

The health program provided preventive and curative care to the displaced during ten years. During the Project's life, CONADES and PVOs vaccinated almost 100,000 displaced mothers and children against disease and tetanus infection. Mothers received nearly 100,000 ORT doses. There were 588,000 home visits and 83,000 referrals to MOH clinics for treatment. Thousands of the displaced were trained to deal with community health problems. To carry out curative activities, a team of two doctors and twelve nurses within CONADES was organized to deliver assistance directly to major concentrations of displaced. For the first three years of the program the team averaged 10,000 home visits a month and 6,000 referrals annually to the MOH clinics. In 1985 a baseline survey found that the health and nutrition status of the displaced was poor. Many of the MOH facilities were abandoned during the conflict. With the assistance of Project HOPE, 83 health dispensaries were constructed and operated near large concentration centers of displaced families. After 1987, many of the PVOs managing resettlement activities also included health components in their programs until the MOH facilities were reopened. **Conclusions:** 1) Health impacts sought were largely achieved. There were no major epidemics among the displaced, and their health status by 1988 was no worse than the general rural poor population. 2) The flexible approach to providing health care to the displaced adapted well to changing circumstances. The use of the health dispensaries by Project HOPE continued for too long, especially after large numbers of displaced left the communities the dispensaries served in search of permanent resettlement. 3) Better use of resources could have been achieved if there had been a closer coordination with the MOH, especially regarding the CONADES and Project HOPE activities. 4) USAID/ES showed proper flexibility in recognizing the impossibility of establishing health services only targeting the displaced. 5) PVO health assistance activities correctly emphasized community health training and health promoters, but there has been little provision for sustaining these improvements.

The food assistance component had three phases: 1) a dole feeding program that peaked at nearly 270,000 beneficiaries in 1984, a supplementary feeding program that expanded the program to over 300,000 between 1984 and 1987, and a food for work program that reached a reduced number of beneficiaries of around 120,000 because many former beneficiaries deselected themselves from the program. CONADES was responsible for the distribution of food donated to it from the World Food Program (WFP). USAID/ES hired a team of food monitors to oversee the distribution of food commodities by CONADES. In 1984, USAID/ES signed a cooperative agreement with CESAD (local PVO) to establish 164 distribution centers, which fed an average of 35,000 displaced monthly. In addition, they opened 24 CENAS to feed about 5,000 children under five as well as pregnant or lactating mothers. The CENAS prepared regular meals on site and gave nutritional instruction and special attention to cases of severe malnutrition. After 1987, food for work became the dominant approach. CONADES distributed food to 13,000 displaced families who were resettling with assistance from PVOs. Food for work had the most positive results in reintegration activities where PVOs brought the additional resources to carry out community projects. Since farmers had to sign an agreement not to seek food after their second harvest, these projects had the advantage of a clearly defined end point. Clearly the introduction of food for work substantially deselected many people who had been receiving food, which is reflected in the sharp reduction of registered displaced after 1987. **Conclusions:** 1) Food assistance during the critical period of rapid growth of the displaced population alleviated the worst effects of malnutrition. 2) CONADES created a distribution network that reached most of the targeted population that was accessible and willing to accept GOES assistance. 3) The CENAS and dole feeding were effective short-term measures, but had less utility when the peak period of the displaced had passed. 4) The shift to food for work had the desired effect of reducing substantially the rolls for food distribution mostly because the displaced that had other sources of income either from employment or remittances from relatives would not work for food. 5) CONADES never made the transition from a food distributor to an organization capable of fomenting self-help among beneficiaries. 6) The PVOs preferred to convince beneficiaries of the value of undertaking community projects on a volunteer basis rather than depending on food for work for community infrastructure projects.

PVOs and CONADES helped 13,218 families reintegrate themselves in the last eight years of the Project. Three principal PVOs (World Relief, International Rescue Committee and Creative Associates (CREA), carried out the greatest part of reintegration activities by giving substantial assistance to 10,027 families in 173 communities. USAID/ES created the granos basicos program, which supplied any farmer who wanted to resettle agricultural packages with enough seeds, fertilizers and selected pesticides to plant corn, beans and sorghum on 3.4 acres. Over 27,000 of these starter packages were distributed to about 13,000 farmers for their first two harvests. USAID/ES initiated a project with ISTA (GOES agency responsible for the Agrarian Reform) called the plan vincular. ISTA identified land and CONADES identified the eligible displaced that could relocate on the ISTA state properties. Each family purchased their lots individually and the PVOs provided housing and other productive projects for the resettled community. Some of the PVOs, like IRC, were able to find other available properties from municipalities or private owners for relocating displaced families. The PVOs also provided infrastructure needs for the communities, such as water & access roads. **Conclusions:** 1) The various PVOs, together with CONADES, did contribute to reintegrating a significant part of the displaced population needing assistance even though the final phase fell 20% short of its goal of assisting 16,500 families. The shortfall is reasonable considering the demand driven nature of the program. 2) The shift of focus on reintegration successfully graduated most people from the social welfare programs. The most successful approach was the agriculture starter kits which established a clear end point (two harvests) for all assistance. 3) The assistance given displaced families to reintegrate varied greatly during the life of the reintegration activities. Tailor-making the program to each community was responsive, but also resulted in some groups who received total assistance packages while others received much less. 4) USAID/ES might have achieved more had it developed a low-cost housing strategy early with CONADES and the PVO involvement that could have been adapted during its implementation instead of the trial and error approach used. Asking beneficiaries to repay a part of the cost of the building housing might have been considered to extend the benefits

SUMMARY (Continued)

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS (CONT.):

of this program. 5) IRC and CREA proved adept at providing organizational training, and the communities they helped build appear ripe for further development efforts.

Apart from the World Food Program (WFP), other donor assistance represented no more than 25% of total external resources provided by AID. Other donor assistance tended to be channeled to specific geographical areas and communities with little overlap. Many donors sought to operate as independently as possible to preserve their neutrality and accessibility to the displaced. Coordination among donors with respect to assistance to the displaced tended to be minimal, and under the circumstances, probably was not all the necessary because donors tended to work separately with their own groups. CONADES did attempt to coordinate donor meetings in which USAID/ES participated, USAID/ES did try to keep track of other donor support and did share information with the U.N. USAID/ES and WFP coordinated effectively in forming a united front to bring pressure on CONADES to decentralize and strengthen controls on its food distribution.

PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS:

The lessons learned section below incorporates many of the evaluation team's recommendations on relevant considerations for any such future programs. The team recommended that no further special program activities be carried out for the displaced. The safety net objectives of project 519-0281 have been met.

LESSONS LEARNED:

- ▶ Flexibility is critical -- Flexibility, adjustable design is a crucial ingredient for a displaced persons program. Whatever the scenario that causes persons to be displaced on a large scale, it will be a crisis situation. To be able to respond rapidly to changing needs is essential for a successful program to assist the displaced. The Project's success was due to its rapid response capacity and rolling design.
- ▶ Responsibility should be placed on the host government as much as possible -- There is a natural tendency in an emergency program for an external donor to be proactive. The risk arises, however, of appearing to take responsibility from the host government. This in turn can lead to the host government assigning lower priority to the program and making less effective efforts to support it.
- ▶ Targeting a specific group must be carefully managed -- Targeting assistance to a special group such as the displaced will inevitably cause problems as distinctions are made with the poor majority. Those problems need to be carefully and flexibly managed. To keep such problems to a minimum, graduation from special status should occur as early as possible and in accordance with specific criteria and a deliberate plan.
- ▶ Coordination is often lacking and needs attention in emergency programs -- The natural tendency in emergency programs is to be proactive and to give priority to getting things done. Attention to coordination tends to suffer. The risk is potential for duplication and lost opportunities for more cost-effectiveness. Care must be exercised not to overlook coordination, risk of duplication, and potential for stretching resources as emergency activities are developed and implemented. This care is especially needed under the heightened pressures typical in emergency programs.
- ▶ The jobs program proved to be an effective model -- The experience for Project 519-0281 suggests that a jobs program is a useful tool for assisting displaced families. It helped people meet some basic needs while maintaining dignity. At the same time, many useful community projects were accomplished. There are several key principles to keep in mind. An emergency jobs program should be created within as simple a bureaucracy as possible, preferably in the private sector. Work projects should come from representative community organizations and have the approval of local authorities. The delivery system should have careful monitoring and various checks and balances that deter favoritism and corruption. Wages paid should not compete with prevailing job opportunities.
- ▶ Food is necessary to assist the displaced, but needs careful management -- Food distribution clearly has a key role in a displaced persons program. However, local governments often will not trim those no longer needing food from the rolls for political and bureaucratic self-interests reasons. Donors will have to press for updated lists of needy beneficiaries. Also, an institutional strengthening effort including specialized technical assistance is likely to be required for implementing institutions if food distribution moves from dole feeding to food for work or self-help activities.
- ▶ Implementing institutions need appropriate strengthening -- Attention to the strengths and weaknesses of implementing organizations is especially important when their availability may be limited in the context of civil conflict or other emergency situations. There is also a tendency to ask a lot of implementors to stretch their capacity.
- ▶ Beneficiary data, especially sex-differentiated, should be collected and used -- In an emergency, it is easy to forget the importance of understanding what is happening to beneficiaries, especially women. In a war environment women are likely to be heads of households in an even larger than normal percentages as their spouses are involved in or casualties of the conflict. Data gathering on the changing circumstances and needs of the displaced and the differential effects on women is essential.
- ▶ Strong financial monitoring is needed -- Extra measures may be needed to assure proper financial control when large amounts of resources are involved and channeled through several organizations to large numbers of beneficiaries. Also, when local organizations are involved, concurrent financial monitoring is especially needed because it can be difficult to recover unallowable costs after the fact. Project 519-0281 contracted with a local Bank (Banco Salvadoreño) to be a fiscal agent. For the jobs program the Bank had full responsibility to release funds, maintain accounting records and verify work progress. For other Program activities the Bank was responsible only to conduct periodic financial reviews. The Bank could be used to trouble-shoot financial problems, carry out special financial tasks and identify potential financial problems before they became future audit issues.

ATTACHMENTS

K. Attachments (List attachments submitted with this Evaluation summary: always attach copy of full evaluation report, even if one was submitted earlier; attach studies, surveys, etc., from "on-going" evaluation, if relevant to the evaluation report.)

Final Evaluation Emergency Program: Health and jobs for Displaced Persons (Proj. No. 519-0281), by Checchi & Co., Inc.

COMMENTS

L. Comments By Mission, AID/W Office and Borrower/Grantee On Full Report

The Project met its goals, as defined in the amended Project Paper, and the evaluators agreed with the Mission that any additional assistance should not be continued under this Project. This Project provided support to the new Peace and National Recovery Program (519-0394) that started after the signing of the Peace Accords. The Peace and National Recovery Program would provide any emergency assistance to displaced or refugee populations in the ex-conflictive zones.

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