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Reference Center Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
Room 108 II Corps Tactical Zone APO San Francisco 96240

MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM
Headquarters

AVFA-CORDS-DC

19 May 1970

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report

Deputy COMUSMACV for CORDS
Headquarters US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO 96222

Transmitted herewith is subject report applicable to my tenure of duty as
DEPCORDS II Corps Tactical Zone.

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END OF TOUR REPORT - DEPCORDS II CTZ - MR. JAMES MEGELLAS

In these observations which mark the completion of my Vietnam tour, I will delineate what I consider the key elements of activities within the II CTZ, discuss them in terms of principle supported by sufficient details to place the principle within appropriate focus, include my personal evaluations and for the benefit of more detailed perusal by interested readers, provide applicable tabular information pertaining to the key elements discussed. To provide an orderly framework for the broad coverage of pacification responsibilities, I have followed the organizational structure of CORDS, II CTZ. Within the areas of responsibility assigned to the Office Directors, the complete gamut of pacification activities in the II CTZ were, of course, covered. And perforce, this organizational structure represents the configuration which I feel is best suited to the accomplishment of pacification goals within the II CTZ. Before going into the particulars of this report I want to cite a specific deficiency which I feel inhibits to a marked degree the desired degree of accomplishment which we have set for ourselves. That deficiency is the over-centralization of control vested in the Saigon hierarchy on both the American and the Vietnamese sides. I shall go into the details of this at the end of my report. Suffice for the moment to emphasize it nominally and call attention to its later appearance in this report.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS:

No other field of pacification is more important and less publicized, recognized and appreciated than those programs which concentrate on the formation, growth, enhancement, continuation and improvement of the activities and institutions which constitute the very fiber of the nation.

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It is these programs of development which contain the essence of pacification. While lacking the spectacular qualities of military victories, the drama of battles, the headline appeal of daring exploits and happily the opportunity for personality aggrandizement (which unfortunately has characterized many other endeavors here in Vietnam), the struggles associated with the development of on-going and permanent programs designed to improve the betterment of individuals and nation alike have produced successes to date which auger well for the future of Vietnam. True, there have been set backs in this area, also, but the advisory effort, much like the leading hitter in the major leagues, never bats 1,000. Here are some of the noteworthy accomplishments as well as some of the disappointments.

AGRICULTURE

After several years of "carrying coals to Newcastle," it appears that this portion of Vietnam will again be self-sufficient in rice at the end of the 1970 crop year. When viewed against the cynicism with which the professional critics decry our efforts here in Vietnam, this fact standing alone, refutes the validity of their negative declarations. Woven into the simple statistics which predicts the production of over a half a million metric tons of rice for the 1970 crop year are the multi-factored essentials of land security, technical assistance in crop production, agricultural credit, farm organizations, irrigation and land reform; each in itself a complicated matter involving the highest degree of advisor expertise. In addition to the purely technical advice rendered, our advisors have also contributed valuable guidance in the field of financial management. In the irrigation services alone, the management of the 19 projects approved for 1970 represented a financial involvement of 115 million piasters.

Transmitting the necessary skills to the Vietnamese in the management of such sums further increases the capabilities and sophistication of the agricultural program. The problem of high transportation costs from Saigon feed mills to the Montagnard areas remains; however, the installation of two feed mill plants in Nha Trang and Qui Nhon scheduled for early completion will alleviate this problem and mark another vital advancement in II CTZ. It is noted, not parenthetically, that accomplishments in the agricultural field were effected despite a decrease in advisor complement of over 50% between May, 1968 and the present. A bright future for agricultural expansion exists in the II CTZ. Comprising as it does, nearly half of the land mass of Vietnam, this region possesses the variety of natural land resources which provide the capability for wide diversification of crops in those areas where the main crop is other than rice. Such diversification, through the production of marketable and potentially exportable foodstuffs, is a requirement to insure the economic well-being of many farmers. In respect to this, there should be an increased application of technical assistance and availability of resources for the production of feed grains such as corn and sorghum, and fruits and special crops such as coffee, tea, sugar cane and silk. Feed grains particularly have a high export potential and internally may be marketed in the form of meat products resulting from increased livestock production. Increased fruit production, a field especially adaptable to this region, could well be made a matter of national GVN/USAID interest. Not only could this result in decreased fruit prices for the local population, but it could place fruit products into an economical export position. As an offshoot of decreased fruit prices, the beneficial dietary effects among the populace would be an added gain. This region is

essentially agrarian not only geographically, but following the natural bent of its terrain, the people of this region are agriculturally oriented. It is this combination which should be capitalized upon in order to attain the maximum developmental possibilities of the region.

RECOMMENDATION: That advisory effort continue to give attention to coordination of construction, receipt and installation of required machinery and timely training of labor and management to preclude delay in actual mill operation following completion of construction.

LAND REFORM

Although the total land reform programs includes several major elements, when considered within the scope of overall impact for the future of the II CTZ, the importance of that segment associated with Montagnard Land Identification may well prove to outweigh the others. Since a primary cause of Montagnard disaffection from the Vietnamese government in the past has been Vietnamese encroachment upon lands traditionally held by the Montagnards, success of the Montagnard Land Identification program could have far-reaching beneficial effects throughout the II CTZ. In general, GVN officials have displayed little concern for the protection of Montagnard land ownership rights and furthermore, displayed little acumen with respect to understanding the political ramifications involved. This is an area in which continued guidance and direction, plus perhaps some judicious application of pressure may be necessary, in order to counter the problem. At the same time, great discretion must be exercised to insure that no portion of the Land Reform Program is associated with American aegis. It must remain completely a Vietnamese program. The Land Reform Program is another example of the patience and long term activity with which developmental

programs are concerned for it is estimated that it may take as long as five years to complete identification and registration of Montagnard lands.

RECOMMENDATION: That close, but unobtrusive observation be maintained by representatives of this region, and at Saigon level, with respect to equitable treatment afforded to Montagnards through the Land Reform Program.

ECONOMY

While the economy of the II CTZ is basically agricultural and cannot be classified as dynamic nor expensive in nature, neither is it dormant. The impact of Tet 1968 was to leave it in a virtual state of shock, but from then until now, the story has been one of the quiet growth. While prosperity has not expanded to the districts, villages and hamlets to the degree desired, at province level the markets are well stocked with essential goods and many luxury items. Commercial traffic generally moves well with few restrictions between Saigon and the province capitals and from the countryside to district and province markets. Despite the high price of building materials, there has been an appreciable amount of private construction. An outstanding example of recovery has been the lumber industry. From a point of being practically idle, it has progressed to a position where the mills have more business than they can handle. Oddly enough, this has produced the unfortunate situation where the production of rough lumber is sufficiently profitable that the mill operators have shown little inclination to either improve the quality of their product or the efficiency of their operation. Essential to the further development of the economy is the need for skill training to be placed under a single ministry. Presently, a pretense at vocational training is being conducted by several ministries, each of which claims poverty with respect to budget, facilities and

instructors. Consequently, the splintered effort divides the available resources and the end product of each ministry suffers as a result. There also remains room for improvement in the expansion of credit and the establishment of credit institutions to keep pace with the increased need for capital by the small farmer, fisherman and businessman. And finally, continued effort must be applied to raising about 25% of the population, the Montagnards, above the subsistence level in agriculture so they cease to be net consumers, as such, and thus continue to constitute a drain on total resources available.

RECOMMENDATION: That effective credit institutions be established now and thorough dissemination of procedures involved in their use be made to potential borrowers; that appropriate future projects for capital funding be determined through technical and economic feasibility studies, e.g., irrigation and water resources management in Ninh Thuan and fishery upgrading in all coastal provinces.

VILLAGE SELF-DEVELOPMENT

The Village Self-Development Program is long on promise, but critically short in one vital area...the placement of ultimate responsibility for its accomplishment. The exigencies and multiplicities of tasks involved in administering the VSD program has simply proved too difficult for many of the village chiefs. They have been given responsibilities which would, in fact, tax the abilities of an experienced City Manager in the United States. Adding to the complicating factors is the prevalence of a state of semi-literacy among the village chiefs, the lack of knowledge of the Vietnamese language among many of the Montagnard village chiefs and the very, real, constant threat of assassination and abduction by the VC.

The VSD program concerns itself with a complexity of matters to include, for example, the control and use of an allocation of 453 million piasters during CY 1969. Although a number of successful projects have been completed, the program has generally fallen short of achieving its major objectives especially in the Montagnard communities. A major step toward solution of the problems in this program will require additional training of the village chiefs and training and assignment of competent technicians to village staff level. Another major correction indicated pertains to the administrative procedures which presently call for a plethora of forms for each project, to the extent that the format of performance outweighs the substance. Of course, this affliction is present in many other areas of pacification as well. But particular attention in the Village Self-Development Program must be paid to the relationship between the process involved and the product which results from the application of the process. Simply accomplishing a list of self-help projects does not in itself lend stature to village development. We must look at the title of this program to realize its intent and purpose. This is a program of self-development; therefore, the process, self-help, must produce a product, a meaningful contribution of overall benefit directed towards a felt need of the community; and the process and product, in concert, must, through the mutual efforts of the participating community members advance the political, i.e., democratic processes or forces necessary for self-governing maturity. The relationship of process to product to development cannot be separated into single entities. Only by their combination can the impact of the whole exceed, as it were, the sum total of the parts.

RECOMMENDATION: That mobile Vietnamese VSD Assistance Teams be provided

from national level to provide technical assistance and monitoring of village programs pending upgrading of village officials to the degree of managerial skills for program implementation.

EDUCATION

The heart and future of Vietnam, or any nation, lies in its youth. Particularly is this true in an underdeveloped country where advancement to the stage of economic competitive capability in an ever-increasing world of technical proficiency requires a marked upgrading in the educational levels of the population. This is an upgrading which cannot be achieved overnight, nor can the results of a program to achieve this upgrading be expected to be immediately discernible merely by the fact of program inception. Our education program in the II CTZ is no exception to these accepted principles; yet, an examination of the progress made within the past two years certainly lends optimism to any glimpse into the future. There has been positive improvement both in quality and quantity of education made available to the elementary and secondary level of students and the pupils eligible for such education have responded by a display of steadily increasing attendance. It must be noted, though, that despite the marked upswing in school attendance, a sizeable segment of children within the age groups to whom elementary and secondary schooling is a vital necessity remain unenrolled. Problems remain, of course, especially that of the shortage of teachers. Most of the present teachers are Vietnamese who display a reluctance to go to the more remote Montagnard villages. As Montagnard graduates of the new Montagnard Normal School at Ban Ma Thuot become available upon graduation of the initial class in 1971, this problem will be on the road to solution. Encouraging in the educational picture in the II CTZ is the constantly

increasing participation of the Vietnamese in the planning and administrative aspects of the program. This element of the program is self-increasing for as the graduates of the various educational levels take their place in Vietnamese society, the educational community will undoubtedly receive its proportionate share of the more highly trained segment of the population for use within its own field.

RECOMMENDATION: That continued teacher training be conducted to fill existing and future shortages; that school construction be programmed to accommodate the approximately 900 thousand of eligible elementary and secondary school children not yet enrolled in formal schooling programs.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

When considering the many programs promulgated within the panorama of pacification one comes upon a tendency to apply the term 'significant' time and again. Certainly, by definition, it is applicable literally across the board, and particularly, I find it appropriate to be used with respect to the programs dealing directly with the GVN policy to establish responsive local government. Responsive local government from the standpoint of terminology is synonymous with acceptance by the population of the central government in Saigon. Willing response and participation at the hamlet and village level to the decrees and proclamations of the central government must be forthcoming if the governmental structure of South Vietnam is to have any real meaning. Equally important is the need for the central government to be responsive to the needs of the local levels of control. In fact, the response from the subsidiary levels cannot be expected to be forthcoming until the feeling permeates throughout the whole country that the central government is indeed dedicated to the welfare of all its citizens. The functioning

of the political parties and the practical application of working politics must be developed if the processes of government are to achieve the broadly based appeal essential to political maturity.

ETHNIC MINORITY AFFAIRS

Programs that deal with Ethnic Minority Affairs extend throughout the Vietnamese ministerial structure, i.e., education, agriculture, social welfare. Most favorable, from a long range standpoint, has been the general willingness of the ethnic minorities to work with the GVN rather than against it. This, despite a long period in which the ethnic minorities have not been accorded the full recognition due them as citizens of Vietnam. While at the moment this willingness is more of a "wait and see" attitude rather than complete and genuine rapport, it is a starting point from which the GVN can advance to full absorption of the ethnic minorities into the life stream of Vietnam. It behooves the Vietnamese, particularly with respect to the Montagnards in whose hands the real control of the Highlands rest, to take the actions which will meet the expectations of the Montagnards. Should this not occur, the border provinces within the II CTZ will pose ever-increasing security and social welfare problems. Resolution of differences between diverse elements of any population is recognized to be a time consuming process. The avenues of redress which the GVN have provided for the Montagnard have not been utilized to any appreciable degree because to date, the Montagnard lacks sufficient political sophistication and know-how to take advantage of them. The role of the advisor in this situation must be similar to that of a lobbyist to the GVN whose efforts on behalf of the ethnic minorities is calculated to encourage the GVN to grant them the full partnership in Vietnamese society which ultimately will serve to strengthen that society through

the infusion of the talents and capabilities of the ethnic minorities.

YOUTH AFFAIRS

Depending on the direction from which one wishes to view this area, it may be marked as either a success or a program that is verging upon failure. Through governmental channels under the direction of the Directorate General of Youth (DGOY), youth affairs efforts are marginally adequate. Little rapport appears to have been created between the nation's youth and the government agency established to coordinate such affairs. So from this standpoint, it would be easy to regard the matter with pessimism. However, there are two salient features connected with the youth programs which override the lack of GVN success and tend to shed an air of optimism to the future of youth activities. First, private youth groups such as the Boy Scouts, the Catholic Youth and the Buddhist Youth Groups are doing quite well. Large numbers of youths are involved and reasonably well planned and managed programs are being carried out. This participation by the private sector of the nation provides excellent training to the youths involved and early in their formative years makes them realize that they need not look to a central government for every aspect of guidance connected with their lives. This possible far-reaching effect may prove more beneficial than had the GVN directorate concerned achieved success with a centralized system of youth activities. Secondly, in several provinces within the II CTZ, the youth programs of the Rural Development Cadre and the Peoples' Self-Defense Force have taken hold and shown signs of durability. Here again, this enters into the mainstream of hamlet and village life and as such, holds great future promise.

LOGISTICS

The continued development and improvement of the GVN civil logistics system has been encouraging. The GVN Central Logistics Agency (CLA) has assumed responsibility for the management and operation of the II CTZ regional depot complexes at Nha Trang and Qui Nhon. This represents the many aspects of logistic management concerned with the receipt, accountability, storage and distribution of food commodities, construction materials, automotive spare parts and equipment, Rural Development Cadre clothing and equipment and various related supplies in support of the pacification program. In addition, the Vietnamese have established Ministry of Rural Development (MORD) warehouses at province and district levels for onward distribution of these items to the end users. Also, construction was completed in each province and in Cam Ranh City of equipment maintenance shops. A two year training program for Vietnamese operators of these equipment maintenance shops has also been recently completed. This training was conducted by Korean personnel under the provisions of a USAID financed contract with the Philco-Ford Corporation, an excellent example of the teamwork involved in this section of the pacification program. These logistical achievements are forerunners of the continued advancement in capabilities which may be expected in this field due to the efforts of advisory personnel, and this in spite of reductions in the advisory staff of fifty percent within the period of this report.

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PUBLIC HEALTH

In a country where the average life expectancy hovers at the 35 years mark, the subject of public health has received concentrated attention. In many respects public health practices have come a long way and in others, despite diligent advisory efforts, nothing has disturbed the long standing status quo. Major efforts were put forth in the Plague Program, the Impact Hospital Program, the Civilian War Casualty Program, the Joint Utilization Program and the Sanitary Hamlet Program. Some met with success, some bore disappointment. The Plague Program began auspiciously with much preliminary fanfare and publicity. Although initially successful, it soon fell victim to local loss or theft of equipment which was not replaced due to lack of funds from the Ministry of Health. The momentum thus lost was never regained and as a result, later phases of the program calling for dusting and inoculation were either delayed or not accomplished. The resultant increase in plague cases during this year may be traced to difficulties encountered in the program. Conversely, the Civilian War Casualty Program whereby military and civilian hospitals participate in caring for war casualties has been an unqualified success. Likewise, the Joint Utilization Program, in which military and civilian personnel and facilities were combined in certain areas has proved a boon to medical care. Four provinces have adopted this program and two more are slated to do so in the near future. Aside from the medical benefits gained, the teamwork engendered between the military and civilians concerned is a further building block towards national unity. The Impact Hospital Program, designed to provide or increase hospital capabilities in those provinces which either lacked facilities or had extremely inadequate ones have been overall successful, although beset with many problems principally in the construction

of facilities. The problems have been largely overcome. Three such hospitals are in operation and a fourth should be completed and operational by late July or August of this year. This program has spread hospital care into regions hitherto devoid of such basic necessities with an attendant increase in well being among the inhabitants of those regions plus providing another indication to them that their government is concerned with their concern. Another medical program which reaches into the very heart of the hamlet is the Sanitary Hamlet Program. Nineteen such hamlets are in various stages of health programs designed to serve as models for improved water supply, human waste disposal, garbage collection and overall hamlet cleanliness. The hamlets thus modeled will be copied by surrounding hamlets and raise the sanitary condition level throughout the area. This program was conceived and has been operated with a minimum of participation by American advisors. Although measurable progress has been made in Public Health, it would be unrealistic to assume that the Vietnamese are prepared at this stage to take over and effectively operate their own programs in this field. Because of the large number of specialties in the field of medicine and surgery, and because most province hospitals have assigned only one or two physicians, it verges on the impossible to train the relatively small number of counterparts available in all the various specialties. Accordingly, in many instances, our advisors were required to become operational, whether they wanted to or not, to preclude the death of patients for want of a counterpart to advise with respect to the specific medical or surgical action required at the moment.

RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be placed on training of medical technicians and specialists in all fields of medicine and surgery.

ENGINEERING

Pacification in Vietnam, which has been engaged in some kind of warfare on a nearly continuous basis since 1942 until the present, must include planning and accomplishment of reconstruction. Until major emphasis was placed upon reconstruction by CORDS, normal expansion had ground to a halt and maintenance and rehabilitation was non-existent or barely adequate on highways, railroad lines, water commerce and community services such as streets, water systems, waste disposal, electric power, hospitals and schools. Restoration of these vital facilities will require a continuing major commitment of engineers and architects, since both design and construction are involved. The predominant advisory effort must continue to come from CORDS engineers at regional level. Several pressing problem areas exist with respect to the Ministry of Public Works, where a large portion of the engineer advisory effort is concentrated. Obsolete and scrap equipment must be eliminated from all levels of Public Works functions. Although a start has been made on this, emphasis must continue to be applied to complete the purging of such equipment to assure that foreign exchange expended for imported replacement parts is expended only for economically reparable equipment. Then, the logistic support system must be perfected to assure the optimum utilization of equipment. The present system employs US Federal Stock Numbers and military ordering and expediting practices. This method is incompatible in two respects: (1) Parts ordered to military specifications are frequently costed inordinately high; and (2) Parts thus obtained are military ordnance in nature rather than commercial design directly applicable to the equipment for which ordered.

In reconstruction, as everywhere in the Vietnamese system, the development

of a private sector contractor population is necessary to provide close and long range future solutions to the supplying of adequate Public Works services to civil and pacification activities.

RECOMMENDATION: That foreign exchange expended for imported replacement parts be certified applicable to only such equipment as is economically reparable; that a commercially oriented ordering system be initiated.

BRIGHTER LIFE FOR WAR VICTIMS

Statistics have played a large part in showing results of our pacification effort, and as such, have been subject to question and even criticism upon occasion. However, in the matter of refugees, statistics may be regarded as solid indicators of success. Following the enemy Tet Offensive of 1968, an incredible total of nearly a half a million refugees of all classifications were present in the II CTZ. Now, two years later, the figure stands slightly above 35,000 and is steadily on the decrease. The Return-to-Village Program has resulted in nearly 180,000 persons again living in their original hamlets and villages, and again, the number is moving upwards at a constant rate. When viewed against the complexities of security, materiel support, agricultural development, communications, road networks, renewal of hamlet and village administrative structures and the provision of necessary social welfare services, this accomplishment is indeed monumental. This, intrinsically, is the very being of our purpose, to permit the people to live among their traditional homesights, secure in their chosen pursuits, amidst their own cultural surroundings. All of this is part of the GVN policy of bringing security to the people and eliminating any forced repatriation which has proved to be a hindrance rather than a help in the past. The attachment of the Vietnamese peasant to his traditional land site is so deeply rooted as to

defy any violation regardless of the apparent correctness of any outside induced rationale which deals with the impersonal efficiencies to be gained by a course of action designed to place him elsewhere.

RD CADRE

The RD/STRD Cadre Program has suffered the twin afflictions of over-emphasis and under-emphasis. Conceived in idealism, inaugurated with unprecedented fanfare in both Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese news media, personally endorsed by the nation's leaders, accorded the highest priority of support from the American side to include supervision by groups of advisors, housed in relative training splendor at Vung Tau, protected from interference with its meticulously established curriculum and in every way promulgated as perhaps the ultimate approach of the government to the basic root levels of the hamlets throughout Vietnam, the RD/STRD program, thus started perhaps unwisely at crescendo pitch, has diminished to the point where now a realistic decision on both its immediate and long range future must be made. With the continuing withdrawal of US personnel and support, this program may eventually have to be abandoned completely unless the Vietnamese national planners are prepared to absorb at least the top level cadre into other existing national programs which contain the seeds originally planted by the RD/STRD Cadre Program. There remains much still to be gained by continuation of the RD/STRD Cadre, or a similarly goal-oriented group in the fields of youth programs, village self-development and resettlement. Consideration is now indicated to be appropriate with respect to selection of the more highly qualified cadre for inclusion in training programs which will prepare them for integration into career civil service type positions. It would be extremely wasteful

of the highly potential manpower resources contained in the present RD/STRD Cadre structure to allow a withering away of the organization without incorporation of the more skilled and proved successful cadre members into governmental programs in which their talents may be applied to the future benefit of their nation.

RECOMMENDATION: That the RD/STRD Cadre Program be the subject of a study at national level to determine its future role and mission, including the use of human and financial resources.

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TERRITORIAL FORCES

General. In view of the continuing decline in the availability of regular forces for employment in support of pacification, the optimum employment of Territorial Forces assumes a position of paramount importance. That this trend will continue is evidenced by the announced withdrawal plans for US forces and the fact of present operations in the sanctuary areas. The enemy is primarily targeted on the destruction of the pacification program. This, coupled with the pattern of employment of regular forces, places the task of providing protection for the hamlets and villages squarely upon all elements of the Territorial Forces. Let no one underestimate the psychological meaning involved here as well as the purely military meaning; for the Territorial Forces are composed of the individuals and families who live in the areas in which they are facing the onslaughts of the enemy. Far more than the mere military activity engendered by this situation is the test of will which must ensue between those who would place the hamlets and villages under insurgent rule and the hamlet and village inhabitants themselves, i.e., the Territorial Force members, who are fighting for their very own homes and lands. For in truth, unless the Territorial Forces are motivated to the degree of successful combat against the enemy, then all other planning and programming for the future of Vietnam is academic in nature and self-defeating by default.

REGIONAL FORCES/POPULAR FORCES

RF/PF activities have been marked by expansion, modernization, intensive training and continued application of advisory effort to cast these forces into a mobile role. Their persistent proclivity towards occupation of static defensive positions, which serve only to provide self-protection, and that not

always adequately, and do nothing to protect the populated areas, is a major deficiency which must be overcome if these particular forces are to make the essential contribution toward the achievement of area security for which they are admirably suited by organization, manpower and equipment. A recent trend of declining area security conditions can be reversed provided the RF/PF are assigned appropriate missions concerned with the protection of the pacification effort; without the security thus provided, the pacification effort will deteriorate. The modernization of a military force does not in itself produce a corresponding increase in effectiveness. Certainly it affords a boost to individual and unit morale, but until that morale factor is translated into offensive aggressiveness as evidenced by an increased rate of friendly initiated contacts, it is not a factor in the furtherance of pacification. Recommended procedures which have been published and disseminated pertaining to the improvement of RF/PF performance remain valid. The decline in the security situation has only made the requirement for their implementation that much more urgent. It is this implementation which must be forthcoming through the Vietnamese RF/PF command structure and towards which the maximum advisory effort must be directed if we are to attain and maintain the proper degree of security in, and contiguous to, the populated areas. However, it is apparent that before the Vietnamese RF/PF command structure can effect the required implementation, the Vietnamese RF/PF command structure itself at II CTZ level must be upgraded and bolstered. As presently constituted and operated, it lacks the command emphasis, staff strength and influence to perform effectively in the crucial area of territorial security. There is an obvious need for the Corps level RF/PF staff supervisory function to be placed under the control of a general officer and manned with sufficient experienced officers and administrative staff to supervise and conduct a full program of field inspections and immediate

investigatory actions as required; in a word, assume the activities which now must fall upon the CORDS RF/PF advisory staff in the absence of an acceptable capability within the Vietnamese command structure. It is essential that this be accomplished at II CTZ level because it is only at Corps level that the required mutually supporting actions of the Territorial Forces and the ARVN can be command directed and controlled. Continuation at Corps level of the present inadequate degree of emphasis on RF/PF supervisory responsibilities, coupled with the existing lack of mutual support between ARVN and Territorial Forces, can only lead to lack of progress, if indeed any progress, under the area security concept, or under any other form of security concept.

PEOPLES' SELF DEFENSE FORCES

This is really the "rice roots" level of the Territorial Security situation. This is where the eventual hope of hamlet and village security lies in order to free the RF/PF for a more active role in the area security concept. Without an active, operationally qualified PSDF for the close-inner defenses of the hamlets and villages, the RF/PF will be unable to range at greater length from the close-in populated areas and take up the slack occasioned by the absence of regular units. So ultimately, it may well be that the cornerstone of the whole Territorial Security concept will be recognized to be the PSDF effort. Quantitatively much progress has been effected with the PSDF. There remains, however, basic requirements in training, particularly of the Key Inter-Team leaders. The numerical mass of the PSDF is not in itself meaningful insofar as the achievement of local security is concerned. The potential in this quantity, though, is virtually unlimited when through skilled and dedicated local leadership, it is molded

into an effective security force for the defense of its own homes. So it is that the leadership training program is the key to the success of the PSDF program which in turn is the foundation of the hamlet and village defense system. It is to the goal of training these leaders that the thrust of the advisory effort has been pointed and to date is ostensibly on the road to reaching the goals established for Phase I of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan.

PUBLIC SAFETY

When the shooting ends, which hopefully it will, the foundation of internal security will be placed principally upon the forces under the control of the National Police. To this end, the Ministry of Interior advised and assisted by the US elements assigned to the Public Safety Division, have patiently and skillfully constructed a three-fold organization designed to perform the vital mission of Public Safety. The three GVN elements are the National Police, the Directorate of Corrections and the Combined Telecommunications Directorate. During this period of insurgency and hostile combat activities, the National Police and their supporting directorates have been deeply committed to major efforts in resources control concentrated on confiscation of foodstuffs, medicines and contraband of foreign origin; security operations focused on uncovering of VC and VC suspects; population control through proponency of the National Identity and Registration Program; extension of civil law enforcement to rural areas through the placement of national police personnel at district level and below; activation of a Marine Police Unit; a vigorous and consistent drive against corruption and venality; the construction and operation of nine provincial Correction Centers; establishment of temporary detention centers; and the implementation

of a fast, efficient and reliable telecommunications system which presently includes 2,000 radios connecting police centers throughout the II CTZ and 8,500 village/hamlet radios in service for civil security, administrative and paramilitary operations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

General. In the II CTZ, a complete integration of all psychological operations under the single managership of one Office Director directly responsible to the command section of CORDS was effected to eliminate the previously splintered efforts in this area. This is the only corps area in which this type of organization is in being, although such an organization was directed in MACV Directive 10-1 published on 12 June 1969. The combination of civilian psyops, military psyops and civil affairs into one coordinated, cohesive operation has proved its effectiveness and is considered highly appropriate for situations such as Vietnam.

CIVILIAN PSYOPS

JUSPAO assets manned the operational level in the provinces for this portion of the psychological operations field. At no time were all the provinces in the II CTZ provided with full time JUSPAO representatives, however, due to a 1969 MACCORDS policy that set a limit of 100,000 population for a province to qualify for assignment of a full time province advisor. This shortage was further increased in late 1969 when personnel reductions in JUSPAO caused the withdrawal of advisors from several other provinces leaving only six of the twelve provinces with full time advisors. The Vietnamese Information Service, the operational arm of the Ministry of Information, and the point of emphasis for the psyops advisor, rather consistently showed little initiative, except in several provinces. With the lack of

advisors a more widespread reality, the VIS overall slumped from a state of lethargy to one of being virtually moribund. Much of this can be attributed to the many changes in personnel and policy at the ministerial level in Saigon resulting in a continual state of flux within the provincial services with respect to the changes initiated by each new group which assumed power. Communications media in the II CTZ have been generally at a low level. There are no commercial newspapers published in the region and attempts by advisory personnel to interest local businessmen in the larger population centers to enter the publishing business met with no success. The basic reason advanced is that "conditions are too unsettled". GVN radio coverage has been and remains an area of disappointment and frustration. When compared to the blanket coverage achieved by Radio Hanoi throughout the corps area, the miniscule shawl thrown over a minor portion of the populated areas by GVN radio output suffers badly by comparison. We have unquestionably lost the battle of the airwaves. The future holds promised completion of a four station network which is reportedly engineered to provide 99% coverage of all Vietnam, but the operational date has slipped from 31 December 1969 to February 1971 and that is an estimate only. The delays and lack of a sense of urgency in providing on a timely basis the vital and full radio coverage essential to the psychological battle are prime examples of bureaucratic inefficiencies and bumbings on both the GVN and US side of the communications media fence. Television has fared slightly better, but only by comparison, not on the merits of the coverage which it has achieved. The airborne television transmitter carried aloft by the Blue Eagle aircraft orbits gracefully over Qui Nhon City and provides a signal which covers the main population areas of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen

Provinces. Other than that, with the exception of a few private sets with expensive antennas capable of picking up the Saigon signal, Vietnamese television set owners, and there are some 10,000 such in Nha Trang alone, content themselves with a diet of "Bonanza" and the "late, late show" over AFN-TV.

MILITARY PSYOPS

Organizationally, the formation of Regional PSYWAR Coordination and Development Centers at Pleiku and Nha Trang were noteworthy. This resulted in the formation of combined operations centers which handled all requests for PSYOPS development, production and dissemination from both tactical units and the provincial staffs. Coordination of PSYOPS activities and operational efficiency of development staffs, presses and use of aircraft was greatly enhanced by this consolidation. Increased ARVN participation in the actual operation of these centers has proceeded apace with the training afforded to ARVN military PSYOPS personnel and as the US military reduction is effected, the ARVN component should be able to move into full operational control with a minimum of difficulty or disruption.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

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A considerable number of high impact projects were completed in the field of civil affairs. Major civic action construction projects included National Police Substations, a Phung Hoang School, numerous school buildings, farm to market roads and the humanitarian accomplishment involving building of the Darlac Leprosarium. These were in addition to the vast quantity of every day civic action projects accomplished by units throughout the II CTZ. The presence of the 41st Civil Affairs Company in the II CTZ until its recent deactivation contributed significantly to the capabilities within the region. This unit was organized into eighteen operating platoons

and provided broad coverage and invaluable face-to-face contact with the populace, not only assisting in the performance of tasks but giving daily training assistance to the citizens within their areas of operation. The program of PF dependent housing has not been one blessed with success. Conceived with highest intentions, it proved contrary to the desires of the people for whom it was intended. The PF and their families displayed the desire to live in self constructed housing of single unit structure. The placing of five family dwellings together, the basic PF dependent housing unit, proved unacceptable in that the potential occupants felt that such distinctive construction marked them as inhabitants of a likely target area. A highlight in civil affairs activities was the operation of the Advisory Pacification Fund. In 1969 alone, over 80 million piasters were expended from this fund in support of provincial pacification projects.

PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG

CORDS assumed complete responsibility for this program in July 1969. Transfer of functions and personnel from OSA to CORDS was accomplished efficiently. The PHUNG HOANG Permanent Center was relocated from Pleiku to Nha Trang in October 1969, which made possible, for the first time, the co-location of the directing office and the Permanent Center in the same city. The increased administrative efficiency was noticeable. The follow-on development to this co-location occurred shortly after with the establishment of the II CTZ PHUNG HOANG School in Nha Trang at the end of October 1969. Although statistically impressive in 1969, no positive evidence existed that the PHUNG HOANG program had, in any significant way, damaged the VCI organization in the II CTZ. An estimated VC strength of over 12,000 remained in active operation at the close of 1969. Foremost among the

problems connected with the program is the lack of command emphasis on the part of the Vietnamese province and district chiefs. Although considered at the national level to be the second highest priority pacification program, PHUNG HOANG does not enjoy that status at the provincial and district levels. The lack of priorities, in terms of personal interest and available resources contributed by the province and district chiefs, is perhaps the most serious and intangible problem facing the PHUNG HOANG effort. This indifference by GVN officials has had a harmful effect on the morale and dedication of the PHUNG HOANG personnel assigned to the Province Intelligence Operation Centers and to the District Intelligence Operation Centers. It is further manifested in the lack of emphasis placed by the province chiefs on the requirement that the Province Security Committees take timely sentencing actions against captured VCI. The lack of this personal interest has caused the II CTZ to have the largest backlog of cases awaiting adjudication of any of the CTZ's throughout the country. Another serious detriment to the program is that no means of insuring inter-agency coordination is built into the system. Definite lines of authority, responsibility and control were never clearly established. Strong resentments soon emerged between National Police and ARVN personnel working at all levels and a general lack of trust manifested itself between the various agency representatives. These conditions, combined with lack of adequate managerial skills on the part of province and district chiefs to unite the efforts of the various agencies, created a fragmented and totally uncoordinated operational result. A solution to this problem would be the organization of PHUNG HOANG under the National Police. Staffing should be exclusively by members of the National Police, the National Police

Field Force and Police Special Branch at all levels. This would permit the required direct lines of responsibility, provide a realistic span of control to the province and district chiefs and facilitate funding through GVN channels upon the withdrawal of the US effort. A final note concerning a serious problem in the program has been the lack of qualified U.S. Phoenix advisory personnel at province and district levels. Authorizations for Majors and Captains have been predominantly filled by 2d Lieutenants, average age 22 years, equipped with no more than a college education and several weeks training at Fort Hclabird prior to their assignment to Phoenix. These totally unrealistic assignments placed these men in positions where they were responsible for advising and inspiring the Vietnamese on the very sophisticated requirements of the anti-VCI effort. Under these conditions it couldn't work and it didn't work.

CHIEU HOI

This program has been marked by a dichotomy of accomplishments and continuation of long-standing problem areas which on the surface lend themselves to relatively simple solution, but which in practice seem to verge on being self-perpetuating. A comparison of the major accomplishments versus the shortfalls and continuing problem areas within several portions of the program will serve to illustrate the point. The Armed Propaganda Teams have effected an appreciable number of face-to-face contacts with VCI and VC connected families, a true measure of effectiveness, while at the same time displaying considerable lack of discipline and indecision of action on some assigned missions. Poor leadership continues to crop up in some instances despite intensive training programs and unwarranted interference by Service Chiefs with command channels is a recurring deficiency. The political training of Hoi Chanh in the various centers has shown an increase in the number of those undergoing such training while at the same time, the actual quality of the instruction has not always been very satisfactory. In the matter of vocational training we have virtually drawn a blank with respect to any real accomplishment. Looking into the future, a group of USAID contract instructors have been promised in order to set up and begin actual vocational training of Hoi Chanh. It does little good to release the Hoi Chanh back into the mainstream of Vietnamese life unless both adequate political and vocational training are provided. Without such training, the very real risk of slippage back to the other side becomes a prevailing factor. The exploitation of tactical and intelligence knowledge inherently present in the person of each rallier has not been seized upon to its utmost potential. While there

are instances in which spectacular results have been achieved, there continue to be adverse incidents of military units, both ARVN and US/Free World, mistreating ralliers during the initial interrogation period. In addition, some ralliers are held for excessively long periods by various units and have even been classified into prisoner of war status in a few cases where arbitrary judgments were reached locally with respect to the degree of cooperation being rendered by the rallier. While the above illustrations are by no means all inclusive, they do serve to emphasize the mixed degree of successes and downfalls connected with this integral portion of pacification. The simple, irrefutable premise which justifies continued emphasis on the Chieu Hoi Program is the basic fact that for every one that rallies, there is one less out there shooting at you, plus the beneficial influence which each rallier may then spread throughout his own family group.

MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

The amalgamation of U. S. civilian and military resources into an organization, CORDS, which of itself possessed no assets in personnel, money or materiel created unique managerial problems. Only through the efforts of the individuals involved has the system been made to work, for generally, the various civilian and military agencies have imposed somewhat restrictive policies, regulations and procedural controls over the use of their resources. The problem of overcentralization at national level loomed early in this matter. While substantial decentralization and delegation of authority has taken place when compared with the initial situation which existed upon the inception of CORDS, major problem areas remain. In materiel, the CIL action

offices lack the ability to supplement in-country assets with direct emergency off-shore or U.S. procurement in order to offset unpredictable or pipeline breakdown requirements for supplies and equipment. Delivery of materiel continues to be routed through civilian and military receiving warehouse chains rather than directly to the port of Nha Trang into CORDS distribution warehouses. Such excessive handling increases in-transit damage and total losses while adding considerably to the administrative load. With additional personnel losses imminent and no predicted reduction in mission requirements, the need for quality personnel becomes all the more evident. Anything less is a waste of taxpayer money and a severe drain on pacification accomplishments. The identification and removal from the personnel system of incompetents, U.S., Vietnamese and Third Country Nationals must be a matter of interest at all supervisory levels. In the fields of communications and transportation, a deterioration of service is occurring as a result of withdrawal of American operation. In both areas, the ability of the remaining advisory personnel to exercise effectively their influence upon Vietnamese counterparts will hinge upon maintenance and upgrading of available communications equipment and the availability of responsive air transportation. Unless the reduced staff has the ability to communicate and move rapidly throughout the II CTZ, its effectiveness could drop to the point of non-productiveness. In the field of management support, professionals and professional support are required across the board. Lack of either will defeat accomplishments of U.S. objectives as effectively as any tactic the enemy might employ.

GENERAL PROGRAM COMMENTS:

BUDGETING

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An area of pacification development which must be addressed at the national level in order for the regional levels to operate with even a modicum of

acceptable financial management is the question of ministerial budgets. The horrible fact is, that after all the years we have been in this country working for its political, social and economic welfare, we still don't know how much money the various ministries allocate to the provinces for their respective technical service programs. Rather blithely we have gone on our way preparing and implementing pacification and development plans, sinking men, money and resources into the programs, all the while being kept in the dark as to the total potential which might be applied to the pacification effort if only we knew what the Vietnamese were doing through their official channels. Without delving philosophically into the secrets of the Orient, continuation of such practices appears to be carrying to an extreme the mystique associated with the Far East cultural environment. It's about time that we realize any programming done without access to full financial information pertaining thereto is simply a waste of effort. Our regional economic experts have exerted themselves in this matter to no avail. Curiously enough, inquiry at the Vietnamese provincial level produces like negative results. It's as though a vacuum has been superimposed over another vacuum.

ON-THE-JOB TRAINING FOR VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES

This is a matter which could contribute immeasurably to the future of pacification. We have placed throughout Vietnam a vast infrastructure of installations which if properly utilized by the Vietnamese during the critical reconstruction years following the cessation of hostilities, hold great potential as the basis for a quantum leap into the future. Major installations such as ports, airfields, communication networks, warehouse and

maintenance facilities, land lines of communications and the installation of community service systems such as water works, sewage disposal, hospitals and schools are all in place to lend their share to the development of the country. The sum total of all these facilities, not in a monetary sense, but in the simple fact of their availability, is something which the Vietnamese could not have hoped to achieve for many, many years. The requirement now is that the potential be not wasted or lost. But wasted or lost it will be unless a concentrated program of training is initiated soon. It would thus appear that one of the primary missions assigned to the U. S. forces remaining in-country be that of on-the-job training of those members of both the Vietnamese military (and civilian forces) in the operation of the cited infrastructure and systems. Not that this would exclude the continuation of the US advisory effort from the civilian side of the fence; it's merely that numerically, there is a host of teaching talent within the military organizations which could well be applied to this need.

PROGRAMMING CYCLE

It was proposed in the II CTZ December, 1969 Overview that a 1971 Programming Cycle be established for the preparation of provincial pacification and development plans. This matter is considered to be of such key importance that it is being repeated here. In December, 1969, a ministerial level meeting under the auspices of the Central Pacification and Development Council and chaired by the Prime Minister was held in Nha Trang to review the 1970 II CTZ Province Pacification and Development Plans. The Prime Minister noted that many of the plans required reworking, modifications and additional data. He

further stated that the province plans would serve as future programs for national development and that consideration should be given to launching programs for two, five or as long as ten year periods. In view of these comments, it became evident that insufficient time had been allotted for the preparation of the plans and programs in accordance with the directives and schedules set forth by the CPDC. Also, the planning guidance and the "Sample Plan" had not been made available until late November and early December, respectively. Thus, it became apparent that there was a need for the CPDC to develop (with an assist from MACCORDS) a "1971 Programming Cycle", which would provide the criteria and guidance to the Province Chiefs and the Province Senior Advisors on a timely basis. A proposed schedule for such a programming cycle was included with the II CTZ Overview for December, 1969, and is available in your records, so it will not be repeated here. However, the need for such a programming cycle is strongly re-emphasized.

INADEQUACIES OF REPORTING SYSTEMS

Massive efforts are devoted to the collection, evaluation, dissemination and portrayal of material incident to the pacification and development programs so that all levels of command may be as fully informed as human and machine capabilities permit. Notwithstanding these efforts, there persist areas in which both timely and accurate information elude those in search of the facts. Several outstanding examples exist in the reporting of the RF/PF equipment modernization program and in the number of weapons actually in the hands of PSDF members. While on the surface it would appear to be not too complex a problem to keep track of the number of M-16 rifles and AN/PRC-25

radios which pass through the Area Logistics Commands into the Support Companies and thence to the troop units, in fact, figures which reporting agencies will unquestionably vouchsafe are rare commodities. Approximations are offered with varying degrees of certitude, but positive statements are the exception. The case of weaponry existent among the PSDF poses a different situation in that a quirk of the reporting system causes those weapons issued to individuals in hamlets for which there is no change in figures for a several months period to be dropped from the issued total. Accordingly, even though from a practical standpoint we may be sure that more weapons have been issued than are officially recorded on the monthly report, the report itself says otherwise. Deficiencies in the reporting system such as these mentioned have been cited to the attention of those responsible and attention should be devoted immediately to necessary corrective action.

FINALE

As I indicated at the start of this report, I have some words to express with regard to the overcentralization of control vested in the Saigon hierarchy on both the American and Vietnamese sides. I believe it is a basic mistake to regard Vietnam as an homogenous area for which detailed directives and procedures can be established at central level and stipulated to be applicable throughout. Even within any specific CTZ the individual provinces have enough differences to preclude this type of direction being feasible at regional level, much less on a country-wide basis. Certainly, there can be no objection to the establishment of policy at the central level, the selection of programs and the objectives to be gained from those programs, the overall financial support and the allocation of material support based upon regionally submitted requirements and the furnishing of applicable reports by means of which the central mechanism may be informed and perform national evaluations. But there is objection to the rigidity with which the national level directs how the programs are to be managed and how the objectives are to be achieved. Much experienced and expensive talent is assigned throughout each regional, province and district operating level. In order to take advantage of the ability represented by this diffusion of personnel, the regional directors must be given more freedom of choice as to means to the ends which in turn they could pass to the operators at the subsidiary levels within the region. As a principle, centralized control and decentralized operation is an excellent managerial device. As a functioning method, however, it suffers when the decentralized operation portion is stripped of its vitality because of overcentralized control.

A word next with respect to the advisory situation as it is now and as I see it should be developed for the immediate and, subsequently, long range future. We have enough advisors. Their placement now looms as the key to continuation of a successful advisory effort. Certain programs, although promulgated by American recommendation or insistence, are by their nature, intrinsically suited for operation only by the Vietnamese. Such programs as Phung Hoang/Phoenix, Chieu Hoi, Civilian Psyops (VIS), and most aspects of the Refugee Program find our advisors acting not so much in an advisory capacity but more as expeditors. It is from these programs that the American advisory effort should be withdrawn and the assets thus gained be shifted into the fields in which the Vietnamese do not, at this time, have the capabilities to survive unassisted. The Vietnamese are outstandingly deficient in areas of Public Administration because of the lack of an adequately trained and developed Civil Service System. Technical advice and assistance here would advance pacification and development. Added advisory effort should be directed at the hamlet level in order to achieve successful implementation of the many programs which eventually filter down to the hamlet level for final accomplishment; and this represents the majority of the programs which are presently operational in Vietnam. Then eventually, as the requirement to reduce the advisory effort manifests itself, such reduction should be effected not by a flat, percentage-wise, across the board cut of the total number of advisors on board versus the authorized ceiling remaining, but rather through reduction or elimination of the advisory effort in those programs in which the Vietnamese have displayed the ability to assume operation without attendant loss of effectiveness.

Throughout my tour the aspect of the host-guest situation vis-a-vis the Vietnamese and the Americans has been a subject which has repeatedly been propelled into any discussion which pertains to our efforts to vitalize the Vietnamese into actions which given situations appear obviously to demand. It has become almost a crutch to support lack of results in vital areas attendant to the advisory effort. While I do advocate respect for their customs and culture, I do not, and cannot, advocate their abdication of the partnership responsibility which I feel much more accurately represents the true relationship which exists between the Vietnamese and the Americans than the aforementioned host-guest situation. If, in fact, the host-guest situation were the actual state of affairs under which we were operating, it would be the Vietnamese who would be inserting their physical presence between the main enemy forces and the Americans present in country rather than the prevailing situation in which it is the American forces which provide the bulwark of protection to the major population centers of the Vietnamese. And not only has the American effort provided the main physical bulwark for the Vietnamese, but without the economic shoring provided to the Vietnamese economy by American resources and financial support, there is absolutely no conceivable way that the Vietnamese could support the war effort required to surmount the pressures of the enemy. It is from this background that I feel we should insist on an effective partnership relationship with particular emphasis on both partners carrying their share of the load in direct proportion to their capabilities and interests. It is time that we make use at all levels of the full leverage of our side of the partnership relations to insist that the Vietnamese become actively involved in the management of their own affairs to a much greater degree than presently

displayed. Where reluctance or default is displayed, then I feel that we have no choice but to strongly insist that the job gets done by the Vietnamese rather than doing it for them. Our investment in human and material resources has been so great that to do otherwise would be a breach of faith to those who have sacrificed so much and devoted so much to the furtherance of our national interests here in Vietnam. Crucial situations require decisive actions.

RECOMMENDATION: That in the interest of our national policy to insure freedom for the Republic of Vietnam the quantity and priority of our pacification programs be examined to determine where the thrust of our short and long range efforts should be applied as opposed to simply continuing on with the status quo ad infinitum.

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