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**THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO THE 1991/92 SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT**

Evaluation Synthesis Report

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Prepared for:

USAID/Bureau for Humanitarian Response

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MAP OF SOUTHERN AFRICA




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ACRONYMS

BCG	Beira Corridor Group, one of six regional transport groups managing cargo from a port in the region (in this instance Beira, Mozambique) to recipient country destinations
BHR	USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
DESA	Drought Emergency in Southern Africa
DAA	USAID's Deputy Assistant Administrator
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System, a project of USAID's Africa Bureau
FFP	USAID's Office of Food for Peace
FSTAU	Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit of SADC, based in Zimbabwe
ILO	United Nations International Labor Organization
LAC	Logistics Advisory Center, SADC and WFP, based in Zimbabwe, with a sub-office in Johannesburg established in 1992 to facilitate the handling of grain imports
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MT	Metric ton
NEWU	FAO-Assisted National Early Warning Unit
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Overseas Development Administration, U.K.
BHR/OFDA	USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
PORTNET	South Africa Port Agency
PL480	Public Law 480, U.S. law enacted in 1954 authorizing overseas food aid
PVO	U.S. Private Voluntary Organization
REDSO/USAID	Regional Economic Development Services Office, a part of USAID
SADC	Southern African Development Community, formerly SADCC
SAFIRE	Southern Africa Food Resource and Information Exchange
SATCC/SADC	Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission, in Maputo, Mozambique, a part of SADC
Section 416(b)	Provision of the Agricultural Act of 1949 under which surplus agricultural commodities are made available through USDA
SCF	Save the Children Federation
STATE/RP	U.S. State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs
SPOORNET	South Africa Railway Agency
TAZARA	Mozambican Railway, used to transport cargo from Dar es Salaam port
UN	United Nations
UNDHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, headed by an Undersecretary General
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

USAID
USAID/AFR
USDA
WFP
WHO

United States Agency for International Development
USAID's Bureau for Africa
United States Department of Agriculture
World Food Program
World Health Organization

FOREWORD

We appreciate having had the opportunity to perform this evaluation. After undertaking field research in nine countries, reviewing volumes of documents and conducting hundreds of interviews, our overwhelming conclusion is that due to the massive and well-managed U.S. Government relief effort, in collaboration with other donors, and especially the World Food Program, countless thousands of deaths were prevented. The 1991/92 drought in southern Africa was perhaps the worst the area had faced this century and resulted in crop failures which placed over seventeen million people at risk of starvation. With the exception of Mozambique, which was involved in a fifteen-year-old civil war, there were no deaths reported which resulted from famine. The U.S. was at the forefront of the international response and, by a large margin, was the largest contributor to the effort. U.S. relief allocations totalled about \$806 million.

The breadth of the operation, together with its decentralized approach, has provided an excellent opportunity to compare and contrast the relative effectiveness of a range of relief strategies. And, because the overall effort was such a success, the study has provided a rich opportunity for identifying the right way to run a relief operation. It has been our experience that there are many ways development and relief efforts can fail or go astray, and that identifying successful strategies is often elusive. In this case, however, the relief operation's success has revealed numerous lessons which we hope will be useful in guiding future emergency responses.

In one of our initial interviews we heard how one of the first planning actions of USAID/Washington's Southern Africa Drought Emergency Task Force was to review lessons learned from previous drought relief efforts. We did our best to let this thought guide our work and have attempted to present conclusions and lessons learned in a concise and operationally useful manner.

Those who deserve thanks for the success of the United States Government response to the southern Africa drought are too numerous to name but all deserve special acknowledgement for their heroic efforts--especially USAID field personnel throughout southern Africa, staff from the Offices of Food for Peace and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, and USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service. The professionalism, commitment and generosity brought to bear in this effort represent the United States' best qualities and values.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The drought that struck southern Africa during the 1991/92 agricultural season had a devastating impact on agricultural production and placed an estimated sixteen million people at risk of starvation. Usually a net food exporter, during the 15-month period from April 1992 to June 1993, the southern Africa region imported 11.6 million metric tons (MT) of food, at an estimated food and transport cost of four billion U.S. dollars. South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia were severely affected and had to import massive quantities of food. Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, although less seriously affected, were required to increase grain imports above the levels they normally depend on to meet their consumption needs.

The United States contributed approximately \$806 million to the relief effort, about 86 percent of which was food, primarily yellow corn. The overwhelming share of U.S. relief assistance went to Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Approximately four percent of combined U.S. relief allocations went to Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia. An additional five percent was directed to Angola to address drought-related needs in the southern provinces, as well as other needs caused by years of continuing civil unrest. The U.S. channeled 1.9 million metric tons of food aid through the World Food Program (WFP) and provided another 420,000 tons of food aid through bilateral arrangements with Zambia and Zimbabwe. The U.S. also provided \$112 million in non-food assistance, primarily in support of transportation and logistics coordination, agricultural rehabilitation, emergency water supplies and emergency health activities.

WFP was given primary responsibility for managing the transport of 3.5 million metric tons of food into the region. The U.S., principally through the Section 416(b) surplus commodities program administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), committed approximately 55 percent of total food handled and transported by WFP. The next largest contribution of food through WFP was from the European Community, at nearly ten percent. WFP did an exemplary job of managing the transport, storage and handling of a massive amount of food.

Food was supplied to southern Africa in a timely manner and starvation was prevented. Unlike previous droughts in Africa, food was delivered to needy populations before it became necessary for them to leave their homes in search of food. No major migrations occurred, and the formation of displaced persons camps was avoided. Preventing migration kept down the costs of the relief operation and permitted agricultural rehabilitation to begin once rain returned in late 1992. Funds provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the rehabilitation of water systems were also critical in preventing off-farm migration, particularly in Malawi.

USAID, USDA, WFP, and certain governments within the region, particularly Zimbabwe and Zambia, deserve credit for their effective handling of the situation and for the tremendous amount of resources that were quickly committed to the relief effort. Management and distribution of the huge volume of emergency food involved a level of regional coordination never before undertaken in southern Africa.

Highlights of the Relief Response

Food Assistance

- USAID missions, particularly Zimbabwe and Zambia, reported the potential seriousness of crop failure early on. USAID/Washington was attentive to these early warnings and was able effectively to organize to provide substantial amounts of foreign assistance to the region.
- By a wide margin, the U.S. contributed the largest share of food to the relief effort -- total food aid contributions amounted to nearly 2.5 million metric tons.
- The U.S. provided significant quantities of food to southern Africa sooner than any other donor.
- The decision by the Government of Zimbabwe to purchase large quantities of grain before any donor-supplied aid had been committed or procured was critical to saving lives.
- Both Zambia and Zimbabwe, with the support and encouragement of USAID missions, were able to eliminate consumer maize subsidies during the relief operation. In part, this was possible because the majority of relief grain was supplied through established food distribution channels and sold at retail outlets. The lifting of maize subsidies has created incentives for increased agricultural production in both countries.
- Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa did an impressive job in off-loading over seven million metric tons of drought relief commodities which were used in the SADC countries. About 50 percent of these drought-relief commodities came through the Republic of South Africa, and almost 40 percent through Mozambique. To put this volume of food in perspective, transporting one million metric tons of food aid requires 30 ocean vessels and 26,500 rail wagons.

Non-Food Assistance

- The U.S. provided \$112 million in non-food assistance, primarily on support of transportation and logistics coordination, agricultural rehabilitation, emergency water supplies and emergency health activities.
- Relief management experts financed by USAID assisted in various aspects of the drought response in several countries, including identification of the most vulnerable populations, and logistics management.
- USAID-funded water projects were critical in preventing off-farm migration, particularly in Malawi.

- The U.S. played a lead role in supplying agricultural inputs to drought-affected farmers so that they could resume planting once normal rains returned in crop year 1992/93. This enabled normal plantings that yielded above-average agricultural harvests in most of the affected countries, including Malawi, which had an all-time record harvest in 1993.

Principal Lessons Learned

Donors should begin shipping food as quickly as possible. The fastest that relief food can be programmed, shipped and delivered is in the range of two-to-three months. During the 1992 U.S. relief response, an average of four-to-five months was required to deliver U.S. food to inland destinations within landlocked countries. This suggests that emergency food procurement and shipping should begin even if final destinations are uncertain and distribution plans have yet to be finalized.

In early 1992 USAID/Washington shipped 45,000 metric tons of maize to Durban, South Africa, in response to the first indications of a serious regional crisis. This entire quantity of food was subsequently allocated to Malawi and arrived in-country in June 1992, a full five months before any other Malawi-specific relief food. This timely arrival of food assistance was critical to the prevention of widespread famine in Malawi, a country in which 6.2 million out of a population of 9.6 million were identified as in need of food assistance.

Donor-supplied relief food should not be viewed as the sole solution to a food shortage, but can be used to ensure that sufficient quantities of food are available over the term of the crisis and to help offset the relief costs incurred by the affected country. Most countries cannot rely on donors to provide food quickly enough to meet total consumption needs in the months immediately after the onset of a drought. Experience from the 1992/93 drought response suggests that governments faced with extraordinary food shortages should quickly purchase cereal from commercial sources to satisfy early drought-relief requirements. Commercial grain purchases reduce reliance on donor-supplied food which cannot always be supplied quickly enough in sufficient quantities to meet the extraordinary needs caused by severe drought.

The ability of certain countries to purchase commercial food stocks quickly once the magnitude of the southern African drought was understood was critical to their being able to avert famine. This was particularly true for Zambia and Zimbabwe. The large quantities of commercial food brought into the region reduced reliance on donor-supplied grains and usually arrived sooner.

Use existing food distribution channels. As a first and preferred choice, a disaster response should consider the feasibility of using existing food distribution systems. Such an approach is likely to be more cost effective and logistically efficient than setting up a parallel distribution system. A principal goal of a food relief response should be to ensure that affected populations are able to continue to access food from the same supply sources that they rely on under normal conditions. If relief food is monetized, through sales to private sector wholesalers or to parastatals, then the receipts generated can be used to support NGO targeted food distribution, or to provide the most vulnerable households with increased means to purchase available food - for example, vouchers.

In the case of the 1991/92 drought, the decision was made by USAID to move supplies as much as possible through existing food distribution systems for sale through retail outlets, including using parastatal marketing systems in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and this strategy proved highly successful. The strategy was driven by the desire to distribute food quickly, to ensure that food remained widely available for purchase at retail outlets, and to supply quantities sufficient to maintain retail price stability.

Food-for-work projects may be an appropriate food distribution strategy if they are operational prior to the emergency, or if the affected country has an inventory of already-designed labor-intensive projects which it has the ability to implement once an emergency arises.

In general, however, short-term food-for-work projects are not necessarily an effective and viable alternative to free food distribution. Food-for-work projects created in response to the drought emergency were often poorly designed, did not always have sufficient access to the management skills necessary to oversee implementation, and resources were not always available to complete projects once the emergency was declared over. And, in several countries, emergency food-for-work programs were not able to be implemented quickly enough, or on a large enough scale, to meet their stated employment objectives. Thus, they were ineffective mechanisms for the delivery of targeted relief food. More often than not, free food distributions may be less costly, quicker, and easier to manage than attempts to distribute emergency food through work programs.

Botswana's cash-for-work program appeared to be an effective alternative to the food-for-work programs designed in other southern African countries and should be studied as a model for how to increase the purchasing power of rural populations affected by drought.

NGOs are an effective vehicle for distribution of targeted food assistance. In most countries targeted food relief operations were turned over to NGOs. The use of NGOs was, by and large, a resounding success at getting food to those most in need. In several countries, most notably Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and Lesotho, relief efforts would not have succeeded without NGO participation.

The relief effort's success in Zambia was helped by the establishment of a technical assistance unit to coordinate NGO activities and provide assistance in the design, implementation and monitoring of targeted food distribution. This helped NGOs with little or no prior relief experience to quickly mobilize and effectively manage relief efforts.

Planning and administrative capability is a country's best preparation for effectively managing a drought. Those countries that responded most effectively to the drought were the ones that had strong planning and administrative capabilities, were able to rely on the skills of existing government agencies to design and execute the response, and were able to use the private sector as a component of their relief responses. Simply having a unit in place charged with managing the crisis does not automatically mean good crisis management. Several of the countries, e.g., Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi, had pre-existing structures charged with managing emergencies, but these structures in no way guaranteed an effective response.

The willingness of governments to decentralize food distribution operations also was a factor in success. The Government of Botswana has effectively decentralized drought relief implementation to the district level, with corresponding transfers of authority and financial means, and provides a model for structuring a relief response capability. This approach avoids creation of parallel bureaucracies by implementing programs using existing field officers. By design, relief activities are carried out and monitored by the same officers who plan and manage the country's overall economic development program.

In general, the degree of control maintained by donors in allocating resources and managing relief efforts should be based on an assessment of the recipient government's capabilities, legitimacy and accountability to its citizens.

This report contains a synthesis of detailed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in each of nine country drought evaluation reports. Annex A contains a country-by-country summary of relief strategies and effectiveness, and Annex B examines the relief role played by USAID/Washington and selected multilateral agencies, including the World Bank and WFP. Field research in southern Africa was conducted during October and November 1993.

The report is organized as follows:

- Chapter 1: Presents a record of the drought's severity and the enormity of the international response.
- Chapter 2: Describes the results of the 1992/93 southern Africa drought relief response and identifies noteworthy successes.
- Chapter 3: Presents lessons learned that may be relevant to the design and management of future food shortage emergency responses.

For detailed descriptions of the various relief strategies referenced throughout this report the reader is encouraged to consult the individual country reports written for Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

I. DESCRIPTION OF DROUGHT EMERGENCY

A. The 1991/92 Drought¹

Southern Africa's rainy season normally lasts from October into April. Maize, the region's primary subsistence crop, is planted after the rains begin and can usually be harvested sometime around April. In the 1991/92 agricultural year, the rains began normally but then, throughout southern Africa, abruptly diminished, or altogether stopped in late December.

The 1991/92 southern Africa drought was related to weather patterns associated with *el nino*, the periodic warm current that has affected fishing and agriculture in the Pacific basin countries, including the United States. The rainy season is established by an Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone resulting from high pressure patterns in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. A high pressure system with counterclockwise airflow develops over the Mozambican channel. At the same time, a parallel low pressure system of clockwise air currents is established over Botswana. As the two systems converge, moist air is normally produced, bringing rain to the entire southern Africa region. In 1991/1992, the pressure systems reversed, no convergence occurred, and rainfall throughout most of southern Africa abruptly ceased in late December.

Droughts are not new in this region; in fact, the area was plagued by drought through much of the early 1980s. However, the 1991/92 drought was exceptional. Together, the ten Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)² countries and South Africa experienced a greater crop failure than the Horn of Africa in the mid-1980s. In all, 11.6 million metric tons of food, at a total cost of over \$4 billion³, was imported into the region. The 1991/92 drought was, overall, the worst since 1949, and in some of the most affected areas was the worst of the century; for example, in Zimbabwe this was the worst drought since 1901.

Table 1 on the following page presents the drought's impact on cereal production in the affected southern African countries.

¹ This evaluation was performed under contract to USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (COMMODITIES-0085-I-00-3001-00, D.O. 9). Evaluation methodology is described in Annex C.

² In accordance with a treaty concluded by member governments in 1992, the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) became the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The latter name is used throughout this report. SADC countries include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Angola has not been included in this report because the team was not permitted, given security concerns, to travel to Angola. However, Angola was a recipient of the U.S. response and the general response tables include Angola as a recipient country. Tanzania was not included in the U.S. government drought response.

³ Unless otherwise indicated, all monetary values in this report are expressed in U.S. dollars.

Table 1. Cereal Production (in metric tons)⁴

Country	Normal Production	1992 Crop Year	Change in Net Yield ⁵	1992 Production as % of average
Angola	316,000	371,000	55,000	117.0
Botswana	60,000	21,000	(39,000)	35.0
Lesotho	190,000	88,000	(102,000)	46.3
Malawi	1,474,000	678,000	(796,000)	46.0
Mozambique	551,000	226,000	(325,000)	41.0
Namibia	91,000	32,000	(59,000)	35.2
South Africa	12,000,000	4,731,000	(7,269,000)	39.4
Swaziland	139,000	55,000	(84,000)	39.6
Zambia	1,536,000	603,000	(933,000)	39.3
Zimbabwe	2,295,000	505,000	(1,790,000)	22.0

As can be seen from Table 1, 1992 crop year cereal production was dramatically below normal levels throughout southern Africa. Of particular regional significance was the fact that production was substantially reduced in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the region's two largest producers of grain, and the two countries in the region that are normally maize exporters. In South Africa, the drought's effect was to reverse the status of the country's maize stocks from a normal surplus of one-to-two million metric tons to a deficit of 5.5 million metric tons. Though the country did not require donor assistance in financing grain imports, its position as the guarantor of adequate cereal stocks for several of its smaller neighbors was made more difficult. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that Zambia, another of the region's most populous countries, and one generally capable of producing enough maize to meet its own consumption needs, was also required to import large quantities of maize.

⁴ Source: *Africa Recovery*, Briefing Paper No. 9, August 1993.

⁵ Negative changes in net yield are enclosed in parentheses.

Table 2 below presents the number of persons per country that were identified as needy by the joint United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and WFP needs assessment team.

Table 2. Numbers of Persons Identified as In Need of Food Assistance Due to Drought

Country	Total Population ⁶	Affected Population ⁷	Percentage Affected
Angola	10,300,000	1,400,000	13.6
Botswana	1,292,261	100,000	7.7
Lesotho	1,801,000	180,000	10.0
Malawi	9,605,342	6,200,000	64.5
Mozambique	15,814,000	3,100,000	19.6
Namibia	1,520,000	341,300	22.5
Swaziland	882,891	330,000	37.4
Zambia	8,745,284	1,700,000	19.4
Zimbabwe	10,720,000	4,000,000	37.3

The exceptional factor related to the 1992/93 southern Africa response and recovery program was the pan-regional nature of the drought. Had deficient rainfall conditions occurred only within individual countries as, for example, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, and Lesotho, a massive donor response would not have been warranted because the relatively small "vulnerable" populations within those countries could have been accommodated rather easily from cereal stocks on hand, or by increasing commercial food imports from South Africa or other regional suppliers.

⁶ Source of population statistics: World Bank, Social Indicators of Development, 1993.


⁷ According to United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN/DHA) and SADC appeal as contained in Drought Report on Southern Africa, Report Number 1, August 1992.

B. The International Response

As the extent of southern Africa's food shortfall was realized, donors began committing substantial amounts of resources to the relief effort. In total, 3.5 million metric tons of food were pledged to the region through WFP. The United States was the largest provider of food coordinated through WFP, followed by the European Community. The proportional commitments of various donors through WFP are presented in the chart below.

Commitments of Food Aid through WFP⁸ (in metric tons)

Total Food Aid = 3,536,982 metric tons*



* This chart does not represent all food-aid provided to southern Africa but only lists food contributions channeled through WFP. Significant quantities of food were also sent to southern Africa through bilateral agreements between European and North American countries and individual southern African nations.


⁸ Source: United Nations DESA Situation Report, June 1993. World Bank commitments through WFP made up about 11 percent of total commitments; however, this assistance was in the form of available credit rather than actual food. A percentage of the food purchased with the use of World Bank credits arrived too late to be of use in addressing agricultural production shortfalls which resulted from the drought. Additional countries which contributed through WFP included Belgium, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan.

In addition to food supplied on a grant basis, several countries executed commercial purchases to address production shortfalls and/or complement grant donations. The Republic of South Africa purchased 5.5 million metric tons of grain; Zimbabwe over 1.2 million tons; and Zambia over 150,000 tons. Botswana and Namibia also increased commercial grain purchases as a response to the drought.

The total United States contribution to the relief effort in fiscal years 1992-93 was approximately \$806 million. Of this amount, about \$694 million was for food, or 86 percent of the value of total U.S. contributions. Over 80 percent of U.S. relief commitments went to Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia; an additional ten percent was used mainly to support regional transport and logistics operations. The chart below presents the country breakdown of U.S. relief allocations. Additional statistical tables on U.S. government assistance in the Southern Africa Drought Emergency are contained in Annex D.

Allocation of U.S. Relief Assistance⁹
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

FY 1992-93 Total Expenditures: \$806,591,190



⁹ Source: Southern Africa Drought Emergency Task Force, USAID, March 31, 1993. Less than four percent of total U.S. assistance went to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.

C. Summary: The Drought's Magnitude and the International Response

- Southern African cereal harvests from the 1991/92 agricultural year were 11.4 million metric tons less than average. This resulted in more than 17 million persons being identified as in need of emergency food assistance. Most affected were Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia, in which 15 million persons were determined to be at risk due to drought.
- By a significant margin, the United States was the largest contributor to the southern Africa relief program--contributing approximately \$806 million to the effort. About 86 percent of this assistance was food, primarily yellow corn. The total value of food aid supplied by the U.S. was approximately \$694 million. Of this total, \$441 million was from USDA. The U.S. also provided \$112 million in non-food assistance, primarily in support of transportation and logistics coordination, agricultural rehabilitation, emergency water supplies and emergency health activities.
- Of the 3.5 million metric tons of food aid channeled through WFP, about 55 percent was provided by the U.S. The next largest contributor was the European Community, which supplied nearly ten percent. In addition to the 1.9 million metric tons of food the U.S. channeled through WFP, the U.S. also provided approximately 420,000 metric tons of food through bilateral arrangements.
- The largest share of U.S. relief assistance went to Mozambique (33 percent), followed by Malawi (22 percent), Zimbabwe (14 percent) and Zambia (11 percent). Angola received about five percent of total U.S. relief assistance and less than four percent went to Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa.
- Commercial grain purchases by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia accounted for over seven million metric tons of food brought into the region as a result of the drought, including about 5.5 million metric tons imported by South Africa to satisfy domestic needs.

II. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DROUGHT RESPONSE: MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The international relief response to the 1991/92 drought in southern Africa was a tremendous success in averting famine, preventing off-farm migration, and facilitating post-drought agricultural recovery. With the exception of Mozambique, which had been experiencing prolonged civil war, there were no famine deaths reported. This was because of the massive and timely international response, which included over five million metric tons of relief food shipped to the region.

There were a number of conditions that contributed to the successful drought response, including:

- The food shortage emergency was the result of natural causes. With the exception of Mozambique and Angola, there were no civil conflicts in the region which inhibited access to vulnerable populations. And, Mozambique's conflict came to a peaceful settlement during the drought, increasing the access of relief efforts to many of those who were most affected.
- The generous U.S. food response was possible because, at the time the magnitude of the drought became known, USDA happened to have record amounts of surplus yellow corn available. Corn is the staple grain throughout southern Africa.
- Several countries in the region were undertaking transitions toward democracy, and this increased the United States' political interest in ensuring stability within the region.
- The region's linked rail systems, which had received massive support from USAID and other donors, were sufficient to carry the extra volume of food imports. In addition to a reliable rail system, the region also has relatively good road and communications systems.
- Normal rainfall returned for crop year 1992/93 allowing plantings that yielded above-average harvests in most of the affected countries. The cost of the relief effort was so enormous that it is unlikely a second year of drought could have been dealt with as effectively.
- Considerable cooperation was exhibited between the Republic of South Africa and its SADC neighbors. South Africa was instrumental in the handling and transport of large volumes of food and did so in a collaborative manner. Representatives from many of the SADC countries, including Zambia and Zimbabwe, were invited to work in Johannesburg alongside South African transport professionals to coordinate food shipments to inland destinations. Such cooperation was unprecedented.

Despite the confluence of favorable conditions, the importance of the skills and commitment of those who planned and implemented the drought response should not be underestimated as the critical factor in the relief operation's success. USAID, USDA, WFP, the Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs (State/RP), selected governments within the region, and other

donors deserve credit for their handling of the situation and for the tremendous amount of resources that were quickly and efficiently brought to bear. The relief effort involved a level of regional coordination never before undertaken in southern Africa, which enabled the transport of 11 million metric tons of food aid throughout the region under pressing emergency conditions.

A. Synthesis of Conclusions

This section examines particular aspects of the relief effort, including vulnerability assessment, relief program planning, food importation and food distribution. Detailed country-specific conclusions and recommendations are presented in each of the nine drought assessment country reports.

A.1 Vulnerability Assessment

Throughout the southern Africa region, drought response needs assessments were conducted starting in March 1992 by a joint WFP and United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) team. A few weeks later the U.S. sent a needs assessment team composed of representatives from the Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (BHR/OFDA) and Food for Peace (FFP) within USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR), USDA, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). An NGO representative also participated on the U.S. assessment team.

Before any external needs assessment teams had arrived in the region, most SADC National Early Warning Units (NEWUs) had already calculated initial food needs. Their estimates were credible and were not significantly disputed by the subsequent assessment teams. The SADC Regional Early Warning Unit in Harare and most of the National Early Warning Units functioned well and fulfilled their assigned roles. Their performances justified the support received from their respective governments and the donor community.

The assessments by the U.N. agencies and USAID/BHR, while somewhat duplicative, lent credibility to the U.N.'s 1992 relief appeal and, considering the massive size of the necessary relief response, were justified. The U.S. assessment could have been even more useful had it given increased attention to analysis of existing food distribution systems and transportation capabilities and then used these analyses for developing country-specific food distribution strategies.

In general, the needs assessments tended to over-emphasize the number of people in need of targeted food aid, as well as per-capita food requirements. The tendency of international agencies to over-estimate emergency food needs in southern Africa may have been related to their prior experiences in providing food to displaced persons populations in situations where no other sources of income or food supply were available. There also seems to have been a tendency to use domestic cereal production shortfall as the primary factor in assessing needs, and over-reliance on standard per-capita calculations to determine national food requirements.

In Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) project of USAID's Bureau for Africa (USAID/AFR) was used to bring in experts to help target food

distributions through analysis of country data to identify areas most in need of assistance. In Zimbabwe, this assistance was used to help the Department of Social Welfare assess that adequate quantities of food were reaching those most seriously affected by the drought. In Zambia, FEWS analysis helped to ensure that the information developed to identify the vulnerability of different population groups was used by those directly involved in the design and implementation of food assistance activities. In Malawi, a vulnerability reassessment conducted by the FEWS team reduced the number of persons determined to be eligible for free food assistance; however, food distribution rations were not altered as a result of revisions to the number of persons determined to be in need of assistance.

There were a few factors related to vulnerability assessment problems. In several countries, for example, governments and multilateral donors failed to distinguish between the pre-existing structural food deficit and the incremental deficit created by the drought. Since no common set of technical and economic criteria was established to determine what constituted a country's structural food deficit and what constituted the exceptional demand on the food system, there was no empirical basis for determining how much additional food was needed specifically for drought relief, i.e., over and above stocks that individual countries should have been required to handle through normal commercial channels. This was particularly true in Namibia, Lesotho and Malawi.

Additionally, in some countries, most notably Malawi, Namibia and Lesotho, host country requests for food assistance were not arrived at strictly according to actual needs, but rather were influenced by government efforts to garner political benefits.

Lastly, although data on agro-meteorological conditions, average cropping patterns and yields, and nutritional status of children under five years of age were generally available and reasonably reliable, information on socio-economic factors and trends within rural households was limited and often of dubious value. This deficiency made it extremely difficult to set precise and relevant criteria for defining vulnerable individuals and households in many countries, or to monitor changes in status of the vulnerable groups during and after execution of drought relief activities.

A.2 Relief Program Planning and Management

The magnitude of the 1991/92 drought, understandably, was unanticipated by southern African governments and international donors. Those countries that responded most effectively to the drought were the ones that had strong planning and administrative capabilities and were able to rely on the skills of existing government agencies to design and execute the response. The willingness of governments to decentralize food distribution operations and, in the absence of a strong government capability, to turn over major elements of targeted food distribution to NGOs was also effective.

Several of the countries (Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi) had pre-existing structures charged with managing emergencies, but these structures in no way guaranteed an effective response. In contrast, those countries most adept at development planning, using open and participatory processes for decision making, and having available socio-economic data, were best able to plan

effective responses. Botswana provides an administrative model for organizing drought relief which should be studied for its larger applicability.

Relief Program Planning and Management: Affected Countries

Even though timely and well-documented drought warnings were issued by Early Warning Units in early 1992, these warnings alone were sometimes insufficient to prompt governments to organize and implement a relief effort in a timely manner. This was particularly true for Malawi, a country whose authoritarian system of government constrained its ability to quickly make decisions, react to changing situations, and effectively interact with a wide array of stakeholders, including local government, donors and NGOs.

Once the drought's magnitude was understood, certain countries, particularly Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana were able to purchase commercial food stocks. The large quantities of commercial food brought into the region reduced reliance on donor-supplied food aid and were critical to avert famine. Sufficient quantities of food would not have arrived in a timely fashion had there been exclusive reliance on donor-supplied food.

Drought relief operations in Zambia and Zimbabwe were innovative and successful models in drought management. Both countries relied heavily on existing food marketing systems to distribute the majority of food imports through commercial retail outlets, and then used NGOs to distribute judicious amounts of targeted food to those most at risk.

Relief Program Planning and Management: USAID and Other Donors

The formation of a USAID/Washington Drought Task Force was an effective mechanism for identifying and tracking key actions, sharing information with key players in and outside of USAID, and tracking international food and non-food pledges. It was important also to have high-level political attention to secure large commitments of USDA food for use in southern Africa. Marilyn Quayle, as Chair of the International Disaster Advisory Committee of USAID, made a trip to southern Africa in early 1992 together with the Directors of USAID/BHR/OFDA and USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) to assess the drought situation, at which time the region's overwhelming needs became apparent. Ms. Quayle's high-level political access was apparently influential in the U.S. decision to allocate to the region large volumes of surplus corn held by USDA. USAID/Washington was also instrumental in assuring the provision of non-food aid assistance.

As a result of the rapid response and flexible planning by USAID, the United States was able to provide significant quantities of maize to southern Africa considerably sooner than any other donor. The decision by USAID/BHR to "pre-position" food when the extent of the regional crisis became known was essential to saving lives in Malawi. Without the final destination being known at the time of shipment, USAID/BHR procured and shipped food before a disaster had been declared.

USAID/Washington funding which provided emergency management experts to several of its southern African missions was important in augmenting existing mission expertise and was

necessary to help USAID missions handle the increased management requirements generated by the drought response.

- In Malawi, BHR/OFDA funded a Drought Relief Specialist who made frequent trips into almost all districts to monitor food distributions. His observations and reporting enabled USAID to recognize where adjustments were required and then take corrective actions. Also in Malawi, BHR/OFDA provided support for logistics management and communications.
- In Zambia, BHR/OFDA funded two contractors to manage the drought response, one working at USAID/Lusaka, and the other at WFP/Lusaka. Experts supplied by FEWS were helpful in enabling the USAID mission to develop an overall relief strategy, to effectively coordinate its actions with other donors and to facilitate the flow of information concerning the government's response program.
- In South Africa, BHR/OFDA funds provided for the services of an individual experienced in water supply projects to coordinate activities with the Consultative Forum on Drought, an independent forum organized to coordinate relief activities among government agencies and dozens of NGOs.

USAID/Washington funding to address emergency water needs in southern Africa was effective in making water accessible to thousands of inhabitants who otherwise would not have had access to water. Recipients of USAID/Washington grants to address emergency water needs included UNICEF, Africare, the International Medical Corps, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision and the U.S. Peace Corps. The largest grants for emergency water activities were given to Africare by USAID/AFR and USAID/BHR/OFDA. These grants were used to rehabilitate existing water points in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe and to construct new wells, boreholes and dams in several southern provinces in Zimbabwe. In total, the Africare program rehabilitated 300 wells in Zimbabwe, 70 shallow wells and 200 boreholes in Zambia, and over 220 water points in Malawi.¹⁰ BHR/OFDA also supported emergency water rehabilitation activities in Namibia, Mozambique, Lesotho and South Africa. Emergency water programs were a priority because they were deemed necessary in order to prevent migration.

Timely provision of agricultural inputs by donors, particularly seeds and fertilizer, accelerated drought recovery in several countries in the year following the drought. In the case of Malawi, this led to a record agricultural harvest in 1993. USAID's regional program in Zimbabwe provided funds to help Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Namibia acquire seeds of drought-tolerant small grains to plant at the time of the next rains. This effort drew on the results of USAID's ten years of support to the Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) research station located at Matopos, Zimbabwe. This activity contributed to successful 1992/93 agricultural harvests in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia. The improved and tested varieties matured in a

¹⁰ For a detailed description of Africare's Emergency Water Relief Regional Project see BHR/OFDA-funded evaluation of January 1994 conducted by Basic Health Management (Mason and LeBlanc).

shorter time than traditional small grain seeds, and therefore produced a harvest in the short period available for growing that year. In Malawi, the government did not approve this specific seed distribution program until it was too late in the rainy season to be effective.

The USAID Mission in Zimbabwe was at the forefront of regional drought operations. Its performance was particularly outstanding in the following areas:

- Alerting USAID/Washington and other donors to the drought's severity;
- Recognizing that regional transport logistics required priority attention and then committing funds for logistics management and the leasing of South African locomotives and rail wagons by the railways of other countries of the region;
- Drawing on the capabilities of the institutions it supported to introduce transport efficiencies, break logistic bottlenecks, improve border procedures, and produce improved varieties of grain for planting after the drought; and
- Bringing in experts funded by USAID/AFR's FEWS project to help analyze country data and identify the most vulnerable people.

The success of the relief effort in Zambia was helped by:

- Involving the government, private sector, donors and NGOs in a collaborative process to design a relief strategy and then clearly delineating roles and responsibilities among participants.
- Establishing a technical assistance unit to coordinate the roles of various NGOs and provide them assistance in the design, implementation and monitoring of targeted food distribution operations. This helped NGOs with no prior relief experience to quickly mobilize and effectively manage relief programs.

USAID/Zambia was also successful in developing innovative strategies and flexible procedures to maximize donor resources. At the Consultative Group Pledging Conference in Geneva, for example, USAID proposed to pay for 150,000 metric tons of Title III maize for Zambia if other donors would pay the transport costs. This enabled USAID/Zambia to purchase three times more U.S. maize than otherwise would have been possible.

The World Bank played a useful role in assisting affected countries to respond to the drought by relaxing target dates for structural reform actions and by making credit available so countries could commercially import needed grain. However, adherence to standard World Bank procurement procedures meant that the process could not always be executed swiftly enough to be effective. USAID played a useful role by putting a discussion of the drought's economic effects on the World Bank's agenda.

Experiences in the region showed that it is not easy to assure that the effects of structural adjustment are separated from those of drought, so as to encourage governments to continue their

planned economic reforms. Drought puts stress on government budgets and foreign exchange reserves that threatens a country's ability to implement structural reforms.

Direct costs are incurred for imports of food and other needed items, and indirect costs are incurred as losses in revenue when a drought forces an economic downturn. It is often difficult to avoid increased budget deficits because welfare programs need to be financed. Moreover, retrenchments in public employment are very difficult in the face of reduced opportunities for alternative income generation.

Nevertheless, both Zimbabwe and Zambia were able to accomplish major market and price liberalization objectives that were large components of their structural adjustment programs during the 1992/93 drought recovery period. In both cases, consumer maize subsidies were lifted during the relief emergency. In Zambia, this was possible, in part, because the government judiciously controlled the amount of food targeted for free distribution so that it would not be in competition with food being sold through retail outlets. Both Zambia and Zimbabwe ensured that retail food grains remained available in quantities sufficient to limit inflationary pressure.

Overall, program planning and management for the drought response would have been even more effective had drought relief planners always taken into consideration the fact that most countries in the region have well-established and efficient commercial networks to facilitate the procurement and distribution of a full range of food products. Food distribution strategies did not always appreciably distinguish between countries with large populations of subsistence farmers and those where the economies, even in rural areas, are highly monetized.

A.3 International Food Transport and Handling

In general, logistical coordination was a resounding success in the response to the 1991/92 drought. The critical importance of an extensive transportation and communications infrastructure system was a major factor in the drought relief effort. The transport of tremendous amounts of food aid placed enormous and unprecedented demands on regional infrastructure, especially ports, railways and roads. Usually a net food exporter, the southern Africa region imported 11.6 million metric tons of food at an estimated food and transport cost of \$4 billion. Three factors influenced the success of the food transport effort:

- The donors' decision to rely largely on WFP for management of pooled relief food contributions facilitated movement of enormous quantities of cereals throughout the region.
- The competence and experience of personnel managing South Africa's port facilities and rail systems was crucial in facilitating the efficient movement of cereal from four South African ports to six neighboring countries. In total, South African ports handled an unprecedented 8.6 million metric tons of drought-related commodities in 13 months. Overall, about 50 percent of all drought-related commodities for SADC countries came through South African ports, mostly Durban and Port Elizabeth.

- The ability of the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo to handle the almost 2 million metric tons of drought-related commodities destined for Mozambique and other SADC countries that came through those ports between April 1992 and April 1993 was also a factor in success. Beira handled about 22 percent, and Maputo 18 percent, of all drought-related commodities sent to SADC countries.

A.4 Food Distribution

In the case of the 1991/92 drought, the decision was made by USAID to move its supplies as much as possible through existing food distribution systems for retail sales, including using parastatal marketing systems in Zambia and Zimbabwe. The strategy was driven by the desire to distribute food quickly, ensure that food remained widely available for purchase, and to supply quantities sufficient to maintain retail price stability.

Given the generally excellent functioning of commercial markets in southern Africa, all evidence suggests that the major problem created by the 1991/92 drought was a significant reduction in purchasing power among vulnerable households. Although higher-than-normal grain imports were necessary due to the massive decline in agricultural production, in most countries there was never an absolute absence of food for consumers to buy in local markets and stores.

In most countries targeted food relief operations to get food to those most seriously affected by the drought were turned over to NGOs. In several countries, most notably Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and Lesotho, relief efforts would not have succeeded without NGO participation.

In Zambia, the government chose to use the existing parastatal food distribution system to satisfy needs for the majority of the population. In fact, 90 percent of imported drought food was distributed through the parastatal marketing system and sold through retail outlets. Implementation of this decision was facilitated by the high degree of urbanization in the country, which meant that most Zambians were fully accustomed to purchasing maize meal and other food products from retail outlets. Revenues from retail sales were used to support targeted food distribution, as well as to finance cereal transport costs from ports to distribution points.

In Lesotho, Namibia and Botswana, countries which normally import a majority of their grain, it may have been preferable for donors to directly increase the purchasing power of targeted groups, rather than supply food for direct distribution. The financial alternative may have been less disruptive of existing commercial systems and more capable of supplying vulnerable recipients with a wider range of commodities more in line with their own consumption preferences. This strategy would have involved selling donor food to private sector importers or wholesalers and then using the proceeds to increase the purchasing power of those identified as in need of humanitarian assistance.

The use of contracted private sector transport in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe was a cost-effective and efficient means of managing in-country food transport. In Malawi, the award of a transport management contract to a single broker was the only practical option available to get the drought relief maize distributed in a timely manner. No other option would have optimized the use of the internal trucking fleet to provide an acceptable level of service to 825 distribution

centers throughout the country. The contractual obligation for the broker to arrange for truckers to be given an equitable mix of short, medium and long journeys ensured that each district was, in broad terms, adequately served in terms of availability of transport. In Mozambique, bidding food distribution contracts to the private sector helped solidify gains made by USAID/Mozambique in privatizing the country's trucking industry.

a. Free Distribution Programs

Several governments, perhaps encouraged by multilateral donors, wanted to minimize free food distribution on the assumption that this would avoid "creating dependencies among recipients." There is no empirical evidence to support the assumption that free food distribution in southern Africa engendered more dependency among recipients than food-for-work projects. A case in point was Malawi, where all food was distributed for free, but which had a record agricultural harvest in 1993.

Free food distributions were effective in ensuring that beneficiaries with few, if any, resources were able to eat. Without this assistance, many truly vulnerable households would have faced near-famine conditions. However, in countries where free food was widely distributed, it also appears that some households identified as vulnerable did have significant residual purchasing power throughout 1992 and 1993. If they had been required to use these resources, it seems likely that the costs of relief programs could have been reduced. Since large portions of the costs of relief operations are borne by the governments of the affected countries, reducing costs eases budgetary pressure and ideally increases funding available to address development priorities such as health and education.

b. Food Distribution Through Work Programs

Irrespective of the alleged superiority of food-for-work programs in avoiding dependency among recipients, it was difficult for several of the emergency programs in southern Africa to meet their stated employment objectives. This was because concerned governments, and the international agencies who advocated such approaches, ultimately proved themselves to be unprepared to mount and supervise sufficient numbers of emergency projects on short notice. Since projects could not be launched quickly enough, the programs could not accommodate the needs of all the people declared eligible to participate in them.

In several countries, particularly Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Namibia, food-for-work programs failed to accommodate the large numbers of needy people who were declared ineligible for free food rations. In one of the worst cases, over 300,000 persons had been designated as eligible to participate in the national food-for-work program, but only about 6,000 persons per month were actually able to find employment and, thereby, gain access to available food rations. Zimbabwe's original drought response policy was to distribute food through work programs, but the policy was never fully implemented because of lack of projects and administrative capacity.

Where responsibilities for designing and implementing food-for-work activities were assigned to groups at the regional, district and village levels, people, often with no prior training or experience in designing or implementing such projects, were asked to proceed without adequate

financial and technical support. The resulting activities often proved to be poorly planned and executed, and of excessive cost per participant. Moreover, some projects mounted in haste were abruptly terminated in mid-stream when governments declared the emergency over.

In general, there appears to have been a failure in government/donor/NGO discussions to make clear distinctions between food-for-work activities appropriate in the context of short-term emergency drought relief efforts and those appropriate for long-term development programs where they can be supported with programmed food aid.

Botswana's cash-for-work program appeared to be an effective and innovative alternative to the food-for-work programs designed in other southern African countries and should be studied as a model. It is one of the government's principal vehicles for affecting income transfers to the most needy households in the rural areas. The program was adopted by the government because of its financial efficiency and low recurrent costs. According to government records, the program has been able to transfer over 60 percent of its total costs to participants as wages for work on development projects.

It should be noted, that food-for-work and cash-for-work programs in southern Africa tended to elicit majority participation by women. Employment of women in these programs was reported to generate some negative consequences because it forced women to reallocate their time toward project work and away from household activities -- particularly, child care.

c. Targeting Food Relief to Those Most Affected

Targeting appears to have been problematic across the board and reflected the general lack of preplanning and baseline data in the majority of the countries surveyed. Again, the basic pattern emerged: Zambia and Zimbabwe were fairly successful, Mozambique was unable, and Malawi unwilling. In Zambia, needy persons were self-selected by their willingness to participate in food-for-work projects, and Zimbabwe relied on a registration system. Botswana seemed to be successful at self-targeting emergency cash-for-work programs by setting wages at slightly below market rates.

Targeting efforts in many countries generally did not take into account the differential levels of drought-induced vulnerability within the broad recipient groups identified, but rather assumed that all individuals within identified areas should be equally eligible for assistance. Although such approaches may be appropriate in severely affected areas, as was sometimes the case in Malawi and Mozambique, in other instances, they resulted in large numbers of persons not severely affected receiving free food. Targeting efforts also failed in large measure to recognize that local coping strategies which reduced vulnerability were operative in many areas.

Targeting criteria using multiple classifications for determining "vulnerable" recipients eligible for free food were seen in retrospect as too complicated to be practical and largely inappropriate to the social context. This is because households in southern Africa tend to share available food among members and do not usually prepare different diets for individual family members based upon age, gender or other criteria. Attempts to define and distribute different relief ration packages for different vulnerable groups based upon individual characteristics were elegant in theory but proved largely unworkable in practice.

III. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESPONDING TO FUTURE FOOD EMERGENCIES: LESSONS LEARNED

This chapter identifies lessons that emerged from the 1992/93 southern Africa response that seem to have applicability to the design and management of future relief efforts. Two of the most significant lessons are:

- **Use of existing food marketing systems, if possible, is the preferred vehicle for channeling the majority of food supplies; and**
- **NGOs are an effective means for distribution of targeted food.**

Lessons specific to particular aspects of the relief effort are outlined below:

A. Vulnerability Assessment

- If systems for identifying and servicing vulnerable populations are to be improved in southern Africa, effective mechanisms for collecting and analyzing reliable information on socio-economic trends within households must be installed and maintained on a permanent basis. Without such baseline information, there is no objective basis for differentiating between those households placed at significantly greater risk by the drought and the larger number of households that are chronically poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged for reasons unrelated to drought. Moreover, this information can serve as a counterfoil to the practice of allocating resources based on political grounds. Another safeguard is to rely on self-targeting by offering food for work or cash for work at remuneration levels below market rates.
- Systems used to classify "vulnerable" groups should be kept as simple as possible to minimize logistical problems in distribution and lower costs per unit of food delivered. Governments should be encouraged to redefine criteria for assessing vulnerability in drought situations, with concentration on definition of vulnerable households within communities, rather than vulnerable individuals within households.
- To the extent that it is deemed necessary for individual donor agencies to conduct their own needs assessments, the schedules and methodologies of assessment personnel should be coordinated to permit teams to conduct joint evaluation activities in the field, or at least to reduce duplication. Needs assessments should include an analysis of local food distribution systems and transportation capabilities, which should then be used for developing country-specific food distribution strategies.
- Reassessments of needs conducted at frequent intervals by local government and donor teams during an emergency are useful for adjusting resource allocations in line with changing field conditions.

B. Relief Program Planning and Management: Affected Countries

- In drought-affected countries, appointment of a high-level task force within a government for drought relief activities may formally empower inter-ministerial coordination, but it does not guarantee that individual ministries and agencies will comply with task force orders completely or in a timely manner. The actions of experienced and devoted personnel in key decision-making positions frequently have more to do with ensuring the quality and effectiveness of a country's disaster response than do the actions of pre-existing formal structures.
- Good development planning and administrative capability is a country's best preparation for effectively managing a disaster. The Government of Botswana provides a model for structuring a relief response capability. It has effectively decentralized drought relief implementation to the district level, with corresponding transfers of authority and financial means. By design, relief activities are carried out and monitored by the same field officers who plan and manage the country's overall economic development program. This approach avoids the creation of parallel bureaucracies.
- Experience from the 1992/93 drought response suggests that the first action governments should take is to attempt to mobilize donor interest as quickly as possible while providing for the commercial purchase and importation of those foods needed to satisfy early drought relief requirements.
- When severe drought compounds conditions of chronic structural food deficits (Lesotho, Mozambique and Namibia), emergency relief programs, no matter how well-run, ultimately do not contribute much to resolution of fundamental food insecurity issues. These must be tackled in the context of sound long-term development plans that address job creation, basic poverty reduction and promotion of fundamental changes in land management and agricultural practices.

C. Relief Program Planning and Management: USAID and Other Donors

- If well-established channels for importation and distribution of food products exist, donors should support the monetization of emergency food aid. The receipts generated from sales can then be used to support NGO targeted food distribution, or used to provide the most vulnerable households with increased means to purchase available food, e.g. vouchers, to ensure that those most seriously affected are able to obtain an adequate supply of food.
- It is useful, and perhaps necessary, for major U.S. disaster interventions to have high-level political visibility in order to ensure inter-departmental cooperation, obtain necessary resources and to resolve differences.
- Even when reliable drought warnings are issued by Early Warning Units in a timely manner, exceptional efforts may be required of donor representatives to focus the attention

of government decision makers on the emerging crisis and prompt them to take appropriate actions.

- A disaster response program tends to be more efficiently run from a logistical standpoint when a single lead agency is designated to manage pooled food contributions and facilitate a unified importation and first-level distribution operation.
- Direct participation of USAID missions in planning emergency responses to drought will ensure a better tailoring of U.S. resources to specific country conditions.
- For every emergency where substantial movements of commodities are required, USAID should promote formation of national and/or regional units for coordination of logistics and field operations. Any such unit will be most effective if it includes representatives from both commercial firms and NGOs, as well as key government decision makers.
- If NGOs are to continue their leadership and organization role in response to disaster, they will require further development of their capacities. When NGOs, particularly those not experienced in relief operations, are to be prominently relied on to implement emergency food distribution programs, USAID should consider creating an in-country technical assistance unit to provide advice in targeting, food distribution and management, as was effectively done in Zambia.
- NGOs and private sector grain wholesalers and importers should be included in formulating food distribution strategies and helping to determine required volumes of needed food imports. In countries where the private sector is active in food importation, private sector importers will often increase their import volumes in years of low agricultural production, particularly if they can be assured that targeted relief food will be judiciously distributed so as not to be in competition with private sector sales.
- In countries with chronic food import requirements, USAID should work with the government, representatives of local milling companies, and other donor representatives to establish clear and commonly agreed-upon criteria for defining the dimensions of the structural food deficit.

Having established the bounds of the structural food deficit, the donor community should make it clear to senior government officials that requests for emergency food commodities will be entertained only when evidence has been presented that the local government has already made best efforts to fully satisfy its structural deficit through normal commercial channels. If a country is unwilling to make such a commitment, and the U.S. nevertheless decides to mount a relief effort in response to humanitarian concerns, then the U.S. should maintain firm control over the level of resource inputs and distribution decisions.

- In the context of drought-preparedness programs within the region, USAID should offer technical assistance to certain governments for the design of systems for converting relief aid to programs able to directly increase the purchasing power of vulnerable households.

Programs based on provision of direct cash grants, or vouchers resulting from monetization of donated foods, wherever feasible, would reduce the costlier and more cumbersome free food distribution to vulnerable recipients. The intent would be to find methods that are less expensive than widespread food relief delivery, easier to manage, and supportive of free market distribution systems.

D. Food Distribution

- Based upon 1992/93 drought response experience, existing food distribution channels are likely to be more cost effective per unit of food delivered than non-commercial, parallel distribution systems set up on short notice. Using private sector importers and retailers may obviate the need to set up costly extraneous systems to monitor accountability. However, it will still be necessary to monitor the nutritional and health status of affected populations to ensure they receive adequate quantities of food.
- Implementation of food relief programs in the southern Africa region demonstrated that decentralized management can improve selectively on the central government systems, particularly in managing and monitoring local food distribution. When regional, district and village-level committees are given responsibility for the design and implementation of food distribution, the transfer of responsibility should be accompanied by management training and financial resources adequate to complete the activities within a reasonable time frame.
- Employment of women in food-for-work and cash-for-work programs can have negative consequences for vulnerable households if participants allocate their time toward project work and away from household activities -- particularly child care. When designing emergency food-for-work programs, one should keep in mind the opportunity costs of labor. For example, the assumption that beneficiaries receiving free food are not engaged in activities productive to society may be erroneous, particularly when the intended beneficiaries are women.
- In Malawi, the award of a transport management contract to a single broker proved an efficient and effective way to manage in-country logistics. The contractual obligation of the broker to arrange for truckers to be given an equitable mix of short, medium and long journeys ensured that each district was, in broad terms, adequately served in terms of availability of transport.

D.1 Free Food Distribution Programs

- If free food distributions are properly planned and implemented to address specific and short-term vulnerabilities caused by exceptional conditions, they are likely to be self-terminating without engendering long-term dependencies among local constituencies.
- In countries without recent experience in managing large-scale emergency or supplemental feeding programs, assistance from experienced donor agencies and/or NGOs is often needed to help organize and manage efficient distribution programs.

- Experience during the drought demonstrated that there is considerable scope for standardization of operational procedures to provide effective approaches to common problems in disaster relief operations. In this regard, sharing of the tremendous disaster relief experience of international NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, CARE, World Vision and Save the Children Federation, can contribute to the development of efficient humanitarian relief operations. Development of simple and effective food targeting methodologies should receive particular attention.

D.2 Food Distribution Through Work Programs

- The greatest risk for creating undesirable dependencies exists when governments and donors confuse short-term drought relief activities with long-term development projects and then seek to capitalize upon a temporary emergency situation to mount long-term development projects using food rations as payments for local people.
- USAID Missions should avoid involvement in local food-for-work programs unless the U.S. determines it has an interest in promoting this intervention as a long-term food aid activity. Hastily-conceived, short-term food-for-work programs in the region have clearly demonstrated that they are not necessarily viable alternatives to free food distributions for vulnerable groups. In many cases, they have not been a cost-effective way of using donor and government resources.
- Southern Africa governments and USAID should study the institutional structures, management methods and operational techniques used in Botswana's successful cash-for-work program to determine its broader relevance.

KEY DEFINITIONS

Food Security All people at all times have access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life.

PL 480 Food Aid: The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (Public Law 480).

PL 480 Preamble: It is the policy of the United States to use its abundant agricultural productivity to promote the foreign policy of the United States by enhancing the food security of the developing world through the use of agricultural commodities and local currencies accruing under this Act.

Title I: Bilateral program managed by the USDA. Title I is a credit program providing for the sale of agricultural commodities on concessional terms to developing countries. The money earned can then be used for various developmental purposes. Thirty-year credits with a five-year grace period on repayment of principal. Interest of two percent for first five years and three percent thereafter. Under Title I ocean freight costs are the responsibility of the borrower, but the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation will reimburse the difference between cost on U.S. and non-U.S. carriers.

Title II: Project and emergency food aid, managed by USAID. Grant food assistance usually provided through private voluntary organizations, cooperatives and intergovernmental organizations. Commodities may be used (1) to meet emergency food needs through governments and private agencies (PVOs/NGOs), intergovernmental organizations such as the World Food Program and other multilateral organizations; (2) to combat malnutrition, especially in children and mothers; (3) to carry out activities on a non-emergency basis to alleviate the causes of hunger, mortality and morbidity. Implementing organizations may also barter or sell ("monetize") the commodities and use the proceeds, often local currency, for development purposes. Ocean freight, as well as inland freight to landlocked countries, is paid by USAID.

Title III: Government-to-government grants, managed by USAID. This program is restricted to those countries deemed to be least developed, according to specified criteria. Food commodities are provided through the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation. There is a strong emphasis on food security. Commodities may be used for direct feeding (especially those addressing special health needs of children and mothers), for developing emergency food reserves; or the currency generated may be used to finance specific development activities. The use of local currency is to be integrated with the overall development strategy of USAID and the recipient country. At least 10 percent (if feasible) of the local currency generated is to be used to support indigenous non-governmental organizations and/or cooperatives working to assist poor people and/or implementing environmental protection projects.

Section 416(b): as of 1985 amendments, a 100-percent grant program offering available U.S. surplus food commodities through the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation to carry out programs of assistance in developing and friendly countries, as approved by the Secretary of USDA. The U.S. pays international shipping and inland transportation costs.

Target food aid is intended to be distributed to those most vulnerable to malnutrition or starvation. This food may be distributed free of charge or given as remuneration for labor used in social and economic development projects (Food-for-Work). Sometimes referred to as humanitarian food assistance.

Program food aid: donor-provided commodities to assist governments who are unable to import sufficient commercial supplies to feed their people.

Famine: A famine is a shortage of food of sufficient duration to cause widespread privation and a rise in mortality.

Rise in death rate can result either from outright starvation or from diseases that afflict the undernourished. If caloric intake is reduced to 50 percent of normal, body weight will drop within a few months by about one quarter. Thereafter, a reduced level of activity can be maintained for many months. With prolongation or further drops in intake, however, additional weight losses will occur, and the incidence of diseases that traditionally accompany famine (typhus, cholera, plague) will rise. Although starvation will occur mainly among the poor, epidemics of disease can afflict all. With restoration of normal supplies of food, recovery can be rapid for adults, but young children can be permanently impaired both mentally and in height and weight.

Drought: Meteorologically, drought is defined as a sustained and regionally extensive, though temporal, occurrence, whereby the average precipitation or naturally available water supply records a deficit of 25 percent or more. Hydrologically speaking, a drought occurs when there is a sustained deficit in surface runoff below normal conditions, or depletion of groundwater levels. For agriculture, crop and/or livestock yields fall markedly because of diminished rainfall and soil water reserves, poor rainfall distribution and high evaporation losses.

Drought alters daily and seasonal earnings and destroys the future income-earning capacity of individuals and families. As a season of drought advances, many more pass into the "most vulnerable" category, through loss of job or selling off of cattle and/or other assets to survive. Disease, malnutrition and forced migration reduce the ability to regain quickly any former levels of production.

Most vulnerable to drought are those with below subsistence income and lacking assets, e.g., farm animals, with inadequate access to productive resources. Thus, the designation includes many more than children under five, expectant and lactating mothers and the elderly, who are often designated as "nutritionally" most vulnerable. This category includes about twenty percent of southern Africa's total population during normal years. In 1992, in much of the region, only a small segment of the population could be considered "not affected."

ANNEX A

Country Briefs: Relief Strategies and Effectiveness

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Country Briefs: Relief Strategies and Effectiveness

This annex presents a brief discussion of the drought situation in each of the affected countries, along with the strategy and success of drought relief interventions. Discussions of country relief programs are presented in order of the value of U.S. Government resources provided, beginning with Mozambique, which received the largest amount of U.S. drought relief assistance. Country discussions provide a brief overview of: the severity of the event, the drought response strategy and the general success of those efforts. Detailed findings, conclusions and recommendations can be found in each of the nine individual country drought assessment reports.

The effects of the drought on the region's countries varied considerably. South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia were severely affected and required considerably larger imports than would have been necessary in normal years. In the case of South Africa and Zimbabwe, both countries went from being maize exporters to having to import large quantities. In other countries the drought's effects were less drastic, particularly in Namibia, Lesotho and Botswana, which usually import up to 80 percent of their grain needs. Over 85 percent of the amount of U.S. relief assistance went to Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe.

1. Mozambique

The government's limited administrative capability, 15 years of ongoing civil war, and years of ineffective economic policies conspired to aggravate the drought's effects in Mozambique and put over three million people at risk of starvation. Effective relief management by USAID, WFP and numerous NGOs, combined with the massive volume of U.S.-supplied food, prevented the 1991/92 drought from turning into massive famine. NGOs did an outstanding job of feeding rural populations and no major dislocations of people occurred.

The drought drastically reduced Mozambique's 1992 harvest, perhaps by as much as 60 percent, and agricultural losses were severe in most parts of the country. By May 1992, an estimated 1.3 million people were in need of food as a result of the drought. Including those already dependent on food aid due to the war, this placed 3.1 million Mozambicans in need of food aid. Mozambique, with a per capita GDP of \$80, is southern Africa's poorest country.

The U.S. supplied the majority of food aid that was brought into Mozambique for drought response. In 1991, a total of 379,015 metric tons of food aid was brought in by the U.S., representing 57 percent of Mozambique's imports. In 1992, in response to worsening conditions caused by the drought, the U.S. increased its contribution to 489,000 metric tons, 93 percent of Mozambique's 1992 imports.

Distribution of relief goods was a combined effort of WFP, NGOs and the Mozambican Government. WFP estimated that of the 40 percent of the population that was provided food aid, half were served by the government and half by WFP and NGOs.

One of the most impressive aspects of relief operations in Mozambique was the substantial contribution made by international NGOs. About one-third of all food distribution during the course of the emergency in Mozambique was handled through NGOs. At least 23 national and

international NGOs participated in food distribution, nutritional rehabilitation, health programs, water projects, local purchases of food and logistical support.

In October 1992, during the early stages of the drought, a peace accord was signed in Rome between Mozambique's government and rebel forces (RENAMO). There is general consensus that the severity of the 1991/92 drought in Mozambique created conditions that made it difficult to continue the military conflict. The peace accord permitted humanitarian relief programs to expand operations into parts of the country that were previously accessible only by airlift. With the exception of mined areas, all of Mozambique was suddenly opened to the relief effort.

The peace accord also enabled large numbers of dislocated persons to return to their places of origin during 1992. Taking advantage of this, USAID provided agricultural packages to help with resettlement and agricultural regeneration, and this program has met with substantial success. Indicative of improving conditions, WFP estimated that Mozambique's 1994 food imports, as compared to 1993 imports, will drop by up to 200,000 metric tons as a result of increased agricultural production.

In certain geographic regions, oversupply of donated food depressed food prices and may have had an adverse effect on agricultural production. Obligated amounts surpassed the need, primarily in the form of shipments to WFP which arrived in the middle of 1993. The lead time in obligating, procuring and shipping food constrained the ability to respond rapidly to a changing situation. It is believed that more food than was needed for emergency relief was brought into Mozambique in 1993; but, under the circumstances, this was understandable. First of all, there was no guarantee the drought would be over in one year. Secondly, large parts of the country had been inaccessible due to the civil war so it was not possible to gather data to determine rural food needs. Finally, the unpredicted peace accord led many people to return to abandoned farms and, as a result, 1992/93 agricultural production increased. Because of Mozambique's massive needs, donors took a cautious approach to ensure that famine would not result from insufficient availability of food.

In general, years of USAID support directed towards policy reform, deregulation and infrastructure development greatly facilitated the effective 1992/93 drought response. USAID/Mozambique used the emergency as a means of supporting its initiatives in privatizing the trucking industry by entering into competitive contracts with several firms for the internal transport of relief food.

2. Malawi

The donor response to drought in Malawi accomplished its primary objectives of preventing starvation and migration, and enabling a successful agricultural recovery. The success was possible because of the responsiveness and flexibility of the international aid community and a high degree of regional and local coordination. The relief program was a success in spite of the attempts of the Government of Malawi (GOM) to garner political capital from the event and its inadequate managerial and financial contributions.

The Republic of Malawi is one of the most densely populated and poorest countries in Africa, with 69 persons per square kilometer and an annual per capita GDP of \$230. In southern Malawi, where maize is the predominant crop, the 1992 crop failure reached 100 percent in many areas. In late April 1992, initial reports from USAID/Malawi indicated that crop failure would leave 3.2 million people with little or no food. The government's own estimates revealed the suddenness and severity of the drought's impact: January 1992 forecasts projected a record harvest of 1.6 million metric tons; by June the estimate had fallen to 641,000 metric tons, a 60 percent reduction.

The lateness of the government's disaster declaration, the lead time between ordering and receiving commodities, the severity of needs in Malawi, and the reluctance of the government to use any of its strategic grain reserve for free distribution, all conspired to create the possibility of widespread famine. The U.S. was instrumental in preventing this from happening in three ways.

There were 20,000 metric tons of P.L. 480 Title II emergency food in-country as carryover from a previous relief effort, which, at USAID's urging, the government began distributing in the worst affected areas by April 1992.

USAID/Washington had pre-positioned 45,000 metric tons of maize in Durban, South Africa, in response to the first indications of a serious regional crisis. At the U.S. Ambassador's request, the entire quantity was allocated to Malawi. It began arriving on June 5, 1992, a full five months before any other Malawi-specific relief maize arrived.

44,700 metric tons of U.S. maize was borrowed from the Mozambican refugee program and distributed in July and August 1992.

These three sources of maize permitted early delivery and allocation of nearly 110,000 of the 163,000 metric tons of FY 1992 total U.S. food aid contributions for Malawians. The total U.S. contribution of food aid was about two-thirds of all relief food provided to Malawi. The early availability of U.S. commodities enabled relief distributions to start almost immediately after the disaster was declared and continue until other donor maize arrived. Moreover, after the emergency, the flexibility to de-program food pledged to Malawi when it was determined the food would no longer be needed allowed considerable savings in effort and funding. During FY92 and FY93, the U.S. supplied approximately 190,000 metric tons of food valued at approximately \$82 million. In addition to food aid supplied to drought-affected Malawians, 208,500 metric tons of food was supplied to the Mozambican refugee support program during this same period.

The Government of Malawi attempted to unilaterally control the process of food allocations from the national to the district level. Food allocation decisions were calculated to ensure that a majority of Malawians received free food and the government given credit.

Government food targeting and district allocations were not cost effective. While highly vulnerable individuals received food, so did a great many who faced less dire circumstances. Lack of clarity in defining those considered needy, lack of differential rations according to

circumstances, and unwillingness by the government to adjust food allocations according to estimates of need resulted in free food having been provided to significant numbers of people willing and able to pay, including many not dangerously affected by the drought.

Malawi was the only country where all donor-supplied food was distributed free to all recipients. Free food distribution was effective in preventing famine, and was necessary to avert starvation in the country's worst affected areas. However, some purchasing power existed and could have been utilized more effectively. In fact, the unavailability of food for purchase from government stores resulted in riots in several areas--many were willing and able to purchase food had it been possible. In May 1992, the World Bank did make concessional funds available to Malawi for grain purchases, but the government did not initially act on the offer, preferring instead to rely on free donor contributions.

Food aid was distributed for free because household purchasing power was believed to be too low to sustain subsidized sale, and food-for-work projects were rejected because it was judged that necessary management skills were lacking and there was no local experience with such programs. Also, since Mozambican refugees within Malawi were already receiving free rations from United Nations agencies, it was feared that serious social problems would arise if Malawians were made to work for relief food.

At the time of the drought, GOM maize pricing policy resulted in substantial losses on the sale of grain imported at world market prices. While price increases were announced during the drought, domestic sales prices for maize were only a fraction of the landed cost of imported maize. Thus, there was little incentive for the government to purchase maize through international commercial channels, either with its own funds or using resources obtained through international assistance. Shortfalls in the market, of course, increased pressures to expand free food distribution. Under intense pressure due to commercial sector shortfalls, the GOM eventually decided to use \$50 million from an IBRD drought-relief loan for maize purchases.

Distribution of free food did not pose any disincentive to agricultural production, as evidenced by the 1992/93 record harvest. Contributing to this recovery was an NGO program that distributed 12,000 metric tons of improved maize seed to 1.1 million households.

3. Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe managed successfully to avert the drought's potentially disastrous consequences: there were no deaths from famine; deaths from drought-related disease were minimal; and people did not have to leave their homes, and thus were able to resume planting when rains returned in late 1993.

Zimbabwe's rainy season began in November 1991 but then abruptly stopped. This led to an almost complete crop failure in most of Zimbabwe and threatened the welfare of a very large portion of the country's population and economy. Maize production was only about 20 percent of recent annual averages. By mid-August 1992 critical water shortages affected major towns and parts of several provinces, as 30 percent of wells and boreholes dried up and more than half the big dams were below 30 percent of capacity. The effects of these shortfalls were felt most

severely by the 6.2 million communal farm residents in rural areas who depend largely on agriculture for their survival.

Had it not been for the unprecedented magnitude of grain imports required, Zimbabwe could have responded successfully on its own:

Fully half of total maize imports was financed by Zimbabwe from its own reserves or borrowings, and another 27 percent was provided by donors on credit terms. Thus, less than one-fourth of required imports was provided to Zimbabwe on grant terms;

Physical infrastructure and internal distribution systems were adequate to get the food to the needy without major gaps in coverage; and

Coordination among public and private bodies concerned with movement of food was achieved at the national level under high-level inter-ministerial subcommittees of the National Disaster Task Force and, to a lesser degree, at provincial and district levels. Through assistance from the U.S., other donors and NGOs, relief programs were carried out by existing government structures.

The success of Zimbabwe's drought response is attributable in largest measure to the commitment of its government's own resources as well as the prompt and effective mobilization of external assistance, most notably by WFP and the U.S., for food and assistance in transport logistics. Nevertheless, since it takes a full five months from the signing of an agreement to delivery of donor food, the commercial purchases were essential, especially in the early stages of the food shortage.

USAID/Zimbabwe was in the forefront in:

Alerting USAID/Washington and other donors to the severity of the drought;

Recognizing that regional transport logistics required priority attention;

Drawing on the accomplishments of the Southern Africa Regional Program, and the capabilities of the institutions it supported, to introduce transport efficiencies, break logistic bottlenecks, improve border transit procedures and produce improved varieties of grain seeds for post-drought recovery planting;

Bringing in experts funded by USAID/AFR's FEWS project to help analyze country data so as to identify the most vulnerable districts; and

Committing funds for the leasing of South African locomotives and rail wagons by the railways of other countries of the region and other actions to improve transport logistics.

The U.S. provided the largest amount of food assistance to Zimbabwe, and was the largest bilateral contributor of non-food aid. The 590,939 metric tons of maize provided by the U.S.

bilaterally represented 27 percent of the total consumption during the period January 1992 through May 1993.

Relief foods were distributed through existing government and parastatal systems, with some assistance from NGOs in the final distribution to remote areas. The combination of monitoring systems employed by the national government, private sector, and USAID assured that the U.S.-provided food was delivered with a loss of less than 1.5 percent, that the food reached intended beneficiaries, and that households in the most remote areas managed to get enough food for survival.

Not only was the drought response managed without negative impact on the country's Structural Adjustment Program, but the increasing differential between domestic prices and border prices for maize forced a decision to eliminate the consumer subsidy on maize meal. The changes in maize pricing were instrumental in promoting a high level of production in the 1992/93 season. Those reforms, and others that followed, show promise of having a positive effect on Zimbabwe's long-term development.

The distribution to smallholder farmers of agricultural input packets, some of which were USAID-funded, contributed to a significant agricultural recovery.

Both public and private sectors made extraordinary contributions to regional logistics management, ensuring not only that Zimbabwe's food import needs were met, but also those of its neighbors.

4. Zambia

The Zambia relief operation should be considered a model of successful drought management. The severity of the drought and the magnitude of the food gap, combined with the new government's limited resources and capabilities, could have led to widespread famine and economic catastrophe had the consolidated response not been successful. Although conditions were certainly difficult during the drought, there is no evidence of starvation having occurred. A great deal of special credit is due USAID/Zambia for its creativity and leadership in assisting the Government of Zambia in managing the crisis.

As in much of the region, Zambia's rains ceased in January 1992 during the critical tasseling period for maize, and 60-70 percent of the 1991/92 harvest was wiped out. This put an estimated 1.7 million people, about 20 percent of Zambia's population, in need of food assistance. To complicate matters, Zambia's government had been in office only four months and had no experience managing emergency programs. It had no time to prepare for the event and no money with which to implement a relief response.

It was fortuitous that just prior to the onset of the drought USAID had called forward 66,000 metric tons of P.L. 480 Title II and III food and was assisting the government to import 150,000 metric tons of grain from South Africa. These food imports were intended to bolster national grain reserves which were low from the previous year. Thus, by the time the massive import

needs became known, significant amounts of grain had already been ordered and were to arrive shortly.

The relief response in Zambia was executed in a timely manner and 90 percent of emergency food supplies was channeled through the private sector. Zambia pursued a two-pronged approach to food distribution. First, the government-controlled commercial distribution system was supplied with enough imported food to ensure that maize would be available for purchase throughout the country at normal prices. Second, NGOs were responsible for distributing food, mostly through food-for-work schemes, to those who were identified as unable to purchase adequate supplies. Both the retail sale of maize and the NGO-run targeted food relief operations relied on existing import and in-country distribution systems. Only at local distribution points did the NGOs trade vouchers for food from local depots. This arrangement avoided creation of parallel distribution systems for targeted emergency food and thus reduced distribution costs and supplemental management requirements.

Food reached the retail market system without interruption of supplies so that the operation was basically invisible to consumers. The success of channeling relief food through existing distribution systems enabled life to go on without major disruption, despite the terrible drought. Throughout the drought, maize was widely available for purchase, and humanitarian emergency food reached vulnerable groups before widespread debilitating nutritional consequences occurred.

NGOs were effective in delivering targeted emergency food and were appropriate organizations on which to depend in the absence of a reliable government relief structure. NGOs, in spite of their inexperience in food relief, were able to mobilize and manage effectively. To organize the distribution of emergency food the government created a coordinating organization, Program to Prevent Malnutrition, composed of government staff who worked in collaboration with WFP, NGOs and key donors. In addition, WFP created a technical assistance unit, the Project Against Malnutrition, which provided training to NGOs in the logistics and management of emergency food operations. This assistance was effective in enabling NGOs inexperienced in relief efforts to quickly develop well-run and effective operations.

USAID's creativity and leadership in procuring maize imports was cost-effective and critical to the relief effort's success. USAID/Zambia used two creative mechanisms to pool donor resources. In the first instance, USAID persuaded other donors to finance transport of U.S.-sourced yellow maize from point of embarkation to Zambia. In the case of Title III food allocations, this permitted USAID/Zambia to purchase three times more U.S. grain than otherwise would have been possible.

The strategy to use existing (parastatal) retail outlets was effective in providing sufficient food while preventing disruption to structural adjustment activities. The channeling of maize through existing marketing systems, combined with judicious use of targeted relief food, prevented significant distortions to Zambia's existing food distribution system. This ensured adequate and consistent availability of maize for purchase and prevented the formation of any significant secondary grain market. Under these conditions, the government was able to lift consumer maize subsidies. This would likely not have been possible had massive relief stocks been in competition with "commercially" marketed grain.

Despite the success of relief efforts, the cost to Zambia was estimated at \$300 million in additional public deficits, bringing the 1992 deficit to \$1.7 billion. GDP declined 2.8 percent in 1992, primarily from a 39.3 percent reduction in agricultural output, reduced manufacturing output from agricultural processing, and reduced hydroelectric power.

5. Swaziland

The drought in Swaziland began in January 1992, following good rains in November and December 1991. The drought was unusual in several respects. Poorly-distributed rainfall, coupled with strong heatwaves, severely reduced the crop harvest. Production of maize, the country's staple, was less than a third of normal production. Furthermore, where there had been better rains and plants had survived, hail storms destroyed them before the maize crop could be harvested. The result was total grain production under 46,000 metric tons, as compared to a normal level of 139,000 metric tons.

In April 1992, WFP estimated a food deficit for the coming year of 80,000 metric tons, half of which would be required for emergency food programs for some 250,000-to-300,000 people (Swaziland's population is an estimated 800,000). By May, the estimate had been refined to 44,350 metric tons of maize for 270,000 subsistence farmers for the period May 1992 to April 1993.

As a member of the South Africa Customs Union, Swaziland received a guarantee that its maize import needs would be included in the import contracts of the Maize Board of South Africa. The government, with significant assistance from WFP, transported relief food to 16 zones designated as severely affected, but local distribution of food was carried out entirely by a group of 12 NGOs. Ultimately, the food distribution program served 410,000 people, residing in 16 designated zones. This represented approximately 48 percent of Swaziland's population.

Although nutrition status deteriorated, there were no deaths from famine. USAID provided over 50 percent of the 20,000 metric tons distributed in the first phase of the relief program and was the only significant donor to respond to a government request for financing for crop input packages for small-scale farmers for the growing season of 1992/93. Some \$1.87 million was provided to five NGOs to distribute packages of seeds, fertilizer and pesticide to farmers in severely affected areas. The farmers were expected to repay some of the costs of production and were able to do so by using income earned from the 1993 harvest. The program was an outstanding success and was estimated to have increased maize production by 24,000 metric tons in the 1992/93 crop year.

6. Lesotho

The 1991/92 drought in Lesotho was devastating for many rural households in that it destroyed standing crops and severely reduced forage production on the country's rangelands. Subsistence agriculture and livestock raising employs 86 percent of the domestic labor force and provides 21 percent of GNP. Maize, sorghum and wheat yields for the 1991/92 crop year were reduced by over 50 percent and U.N. estimates, as of May 1992, indicated that 300,000 people, out of a total population of 1.8 million, were in need of targeted food assistance. This situation was

exacerbated by recent reductions in the number of mine workers employed in South Africa -- workers who normally send remittances back to Lesotho and provide a significant source of revenue for many Basotho households. This further decreased households' ability to purchase food and agricultural inputs.

Prior to the drought, WFP was already feeding 30 percent of Lesotho's population through programmed food aid. This is an indication that food insecurity at the household level in Lesotho has its roots in circumstances other than the periodic occurrence of droughts. Under such conditions, emergency relief programs, no matter how well run, do not contribute much to resolution of the fundamental food insecurity problems. These must be tackled in the context of a sound long-term development plan that addresses basic poverty reduction and promotes fundamental changes in land management and agricultural practices in Lesotho.

Disaster management is not a new challenge for Lesotho, yet the handling of this emergency by the new government could be called improvised at best. One might have expected Lesotho, based on past experiences, to have developed a functional disaster management system long before the current drought arrived. This was not the case. There was little evidence of much preparedness in terms of effective and functioning institutional structures, procedural manuals detailing responsibilities for emergency relief actions, or any sort of standing orders for line ministries at the start of the emergency. This was so even though Lesotho's own National Early Warning Unit provided the government with ample warning of the impending crisis.

Relief food importation and initial distribution in Lesotho were managed by a government agency and WFP. Local distribution responsibilities from regional warehouses were given to local NGOs. The Lesotho Council of NGOs assumed a lead role in representing local NGOs and took primary responsibility for relief operations management at the district level. Despite lack of prior relief experience, the Lesotho Council of NGOs became operational very quickly, benefitting from the expertise of the Lesotho Red Cross, working in collaboration with the International Red Cross. Food was distributed through a combination of food for work and free distribution schemes.

The U.S. Government decision to turn over the distribution of relief food to WFP facilitated movement of enormous quantities of food throughout the region. However, the strategy used by WFP in designing mitigation programs was essentially the same for traditionally food-surplus countries as for chronically-deficit countries. It seems likely that USAID/Lesotho, had it been given the latitude, could have better tailored the U.S. drought response to the specific conditions of Lesotho. In this regard, there is a considerable difference between assigning the logistical arrangements for a drought emergency to WFP, and turning over to it the responsibilities for both designing and implementing the response strategy.

In light of the well-established commercial channels for cereal importation and distribution in Lesotho, donors might have better served the needs of vulnerable consumer groups by monetizing relief cereals, distributing maize meal and other food products through the commercial network, and then using the receipts generated to provide the most vulnerable households with vouchers or other means of financial access to normal commercial channels. Moreover, to the extent that

it was appropriate to distribute free food, effective cash-for-work projects, rather than food-for-work projects, would have been better suited to Lesotho's monetized economy.

While the targeted food aid program went reasonably well in Lesotho, considering the mountainous terrain, there remains the question of the cost effectiveness of direct delivery of food to vulnerable households. Both Save the Children Federation and CARE -- organizations with considerable experience in disaster assistance -- had serious doubts about the efficacy of this approach and raised these with WFP at initial meetings in early 1992. They concluded that a targeted feeding program, considering the inaccessibility of many Lesotho mountain villages, would require such massive logistical backup that it would not be cost effective. These issues were seemingly not addressed by WFP.

Lesotho's food security at present is more directly linked to South Africa than that of any other SADC state. Given the political changes occurring in South Africa, continuation of past supply relationships should not be seen as guaranteed, and it would be prudent for Lesotho to develop contingency plans for meeting its food import needs from other sources in the event that South Africa is unwilling or unable to be the guarantor of Lesotho's food security in the future.

7. Namibia

Considering that the Government of Namibia, only in power since late 1990, had no experience with national drought management prior to the 1991/92 drought, and thus had no structures or systems in place to deal with the event, the overall response to the drought was creditable and reasonably timely. There were no famine deaths reported as a result of the drought. The main activities undertaken by the government were to: distribute food to needy persons through free distribution and food for work schemes; subsidize livestock purchases by abattoirs in an attempt to increase livestock offtake while reducing financial losses; and drill boreholes to supply water for human and animal consumption. Some organizational problems were encountered in setting up a relief management structure, but, overall, the relief operation was handled well.

The drought in Namibia, while serious for certain populations, was far from the worst occurrence of poor rainfall in recent history. Nevertheless, localized problems were caused by poor rainfall, mostly in the northern areas of the country where the majority of the population resides. As a consequence, cereal production was reduced significantly in some portions of the country and dry season grazing for livestock was problematic throughout Namibia. Overall, cereal production was reduced from normal averages of 91,000 metric tons per annum to around 32,000 metric tons. In May 1993 the FAO/WFP drought assessment team determined that 341,000 persons out of a population of 1.52 million were in need of food assistance.

Even in normal years, Namibia uses export earnings from the mining and fishing sectors to import the majority of its cereal needs. Thus, Namibia's 65 percent cereal production shortfall in 1992 translated into roughly a 20 percent increase in necessary imports. Since Namibia has a highly developed commercial network for the importation and milling of grain, additional import requirements can usually be handled in collaboration with South African suppliers from existing stocks.

What made the 1991/92 drought exceptional for Namibia was its pan-regional nature. Had deficient rainfall occurred only in Namibia, it is unlikely any massive donor assistance would have been required, because vulnerable populations could have been accommodated by the commercial purchase of supplemental grains through existing mechanisms.

Namibia has the resources and capacity to withstand and manage local droughts. Taken as a whole, it has a highly monetized economy with strong and effective commercial networks for the delivery of grains country-wide. Private sector firms are the backbone of the Namibian economy and are strongly encouraged by the government in its national growth strategy.

Food distribution during the drought was undertaken through two parallel distribution channels. The majority of cereals and other foodstuffs was handled through normal commercial channels. Local millers increased their imports of cereals significantly to respond to early indications of drought. These commercial importers stated they could have increased their imports even more had they been encouraged to do so and had they received assurances that concessionary food would not be made available at levels sufficient to disrupt commercial sales.

Targeted food was distributed by NGOs through food-for-work schemes and free to those determined to be most vulnerable. Attempts to organize food-for-work activities as drought relief in Namibia were generally acknowledged to have failed in most cases. Although about 300,000 persons were deemed eligible to participate in food-for-work activities, only about 6,000 people participated in such schemes on a monthly basis. The expectation that such an ambitious effort could be undertaken on such short notice turned out to be unrealistic. This resulted in many of those being identified as in need not receiving any food allocations. In addition, the government set up a very complicated free food distribution scheme which established different relief packages for different vulnerable groups. This scheme proved unworkable at the district and local levels.

USAID and USDA provided approximately \$4 million in relief assistance including 10,000 metric tons of maize valued at \$2.5 million, which was channeled through WFP to support feeding programs for vulnerable groups. An additional 3,000 metric tons of U.S. military rations valued at \$6.5 million was also provided.

It seems unlikely that the drought will have negative long-term effects on the country's economy, and experience gained in 1992/93 will probably enable the government to better cope with future droughts. The government was quite frank in its assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of its own response to the drought and seems committed to maintaining and strengthening structures and procedures to manage such events in the future. Another positive outcome of the drought is that livestock grazing pressure on over-exploited rangelands has been reduced to some degree by forced sales and drought-induced mortality. In the short-term, this will provide a somewhat better production environment for the remaining livestock.

8. Botswana

Having had drought conditions in at least 20 of the last 30 years, Botswana has had tremendous experience dealing with such emergencies. In this context, the government concluded that, while

the 1991/92 drought was bad, it certainly was not the worst seen in recent times. While some of the other SADC countries were experiencing their "worst drought conditions in living memory," Botswana was reliving conditions on a scale more or less similar to any one of the drought years in the 1980s.

The 1991/92 drought reduced domestic cereal production by nearly 70 percent, but it must be realized that, even in "normal" years, Botswana relies on imports to satisfy over 80 percent of its grain requirements. Nevertheless, the government's relief and recovery program cost an estimated \$234 million. More than 90 percent of the costs were absorbed by the Government of Botswana (GOB).

Botswana has a population of 1.3 million, foreign exchange reserves exceeding that needed for a year's imports, reliable commercial trading links with South Africa, tremendous experience with drought, and a financially responsible government. These factors combined to make Botswana much more prepared to deal with drought-induced crop shortfalls than its neighbors.

Botswana's decentralized political and administrative system provides an effective base for both drought recognition and response. This is so because:

The GOB has installed effective mechanisms for institutionalized response to such emergencies. Statutory institutions designated to deal with emergencies meet regularly to maintain readiness to respond to natural disasters without delay. The statutory institutions, down to district level, work efficiently across ministries and sectors. A strong tracking and monitoring system provides regular assessments of local food security.

The government's approach avoids creation of parallel bureaucracies by implementing programs using existing field officers. Relief activities are carried out and monitored by the same officers who plan and manage the country's overall economic development program.

The GOB has effectively decentralized drought-relief implementation to the district level, with corresponding transfers of authority and financial means.

International assistance to Botswana was limited. The U.N. provided about 9,000 metric tons of grain and USAID supplied 4,300 metric tons of food for supplemental feeding programs. In addition, USAID made \$2.3 million available for locomotive rentals and communication equipment in order to facilitate transshipment of grain through Botswana.

9. Republic of South Africa¹

South Africa managed a drought response which was effective at preventing starvation. By and large, the food needs of the black majority were met, though allocations of government funds and food packs to the homelands were inadequate, and had to be supplemented by massive feeding

¹ U.S. policy limited the USAID program in South Africa to interaction with organizations that are neither financed nor controlled by the government.

efforts by large and small NGOs. Government budget allocations followed the usual pattern, however, with 81 percent of the drought allocation going to the white population (which constitutes 13 percent of the total of 40 million people), and actual per-capita benefits at a ratio of 1 Rand per black person to each 54 Rand per white person. Although famine was averted, there was suffering in rural areas and among pockets of the black population in towns and cities.

The impact of the failure of rain in 1991/92 was severe in South Africa. The drought reversed the balance in grain holdings from a one-to-two million metric tons surplus to a deficit of 5.5 million tons. The country, however, did not require donor funding for grain imports.

Regionally, South Africa played a critical and effective role in off-loading and transporting massive amounts of grain to its landlocked neighbors. The competent and experienced management of the port and rail systems of South Africa, as part of their all-out effort to move grain from four South African ports for domestic use and for six other countries, invited representatives of the grain boards and railways of their neighbors to work with them through a Grain Operations Control Center.

One of the most notable successes of the entire regional response to the drought crisis was the mobilization of the port, rail and road transport systems of southern Africa. The importation of over five million metric tons of grain for South Africa itself was unprecedented. In addition, the southern corridor of South African ports and railways carried an additional three million metric tons of grain to the region's landlocked countries. The grand total of drought-related imports coming in through South African ports was about 8,575,000 metric tons. The South Africa Railways Agency (SPOORNET) mobilized some 15,000 rail wagons to transport grain from South African ports to inland destinations.

Such a performance was beyond all previous expectations, a demonstration of professional capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, willingness to cooperate for the benefit of other countries of the region, and strong commitment to the job at hand. The underlying bases for South Africa's performance were:

A political determination to demonstrate a new attitude toward regional cooperation in the face of negative regional and world opinion;

The commercial interests of the South African port and rail systems, SPOORNET and PORTNET, which must earn their revenue without subsidy from the government; and

Sheer capacity and professionalism.

South African NGOs had hoped to attract substantial donations for their drought-related activities. Yet they faced an apparent donor perception that a country as rich as South Africa can and will make resources available to the most vulnerable members of its population. Unfortunately, such had not been, and was not, the case. Recognizing that homeland residents, whose water supply had failed, might receive food donations but could die from lack of water, USAID/South Africa called donors and NGOs together to alert them to the problem. USAID and the U.K.'s Overseas

Development Administration (ODA) were active supporters of the Consultative Forum on Drought Relief.

USAID/South Africa did not commit regular program funds to drought relief. It did, however, recommend that USAID/BHR/OFDA funds support NGOs working on the serious problem of rural water supply. A total of nearly \$700,000 in BHR/OFDA funds was committed for U.S. water specialists and NGO water projects.

ANNEX B

Role of USAID/Washington and Multilateral Institutions

ANNEX B: Role of USAID/Washington and Multilateral Institutions

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1. INSTITUTIONAL ROLES

A. USAID/Washington

Rains abruptly failed throughout much of southern Africa in December 1991 and resulted in massive crop failure. USAID missions, particularly Zimbabwe and Zambia, reported the potential seriousness of crop failure early on. In January 1992 field information led USAID missions to suspect that poor rains would result in production shortfalls requiring substantial amounts of foreign assistance, especially for Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe. During January and February reporting cables and early warning information were circulating from many of the countries in the region, and USAID/Washington was carefully following the situation. On February 11, 1992, the U.S. Embassy in Harare declared disaster, followed by a February 27th disaster declaration by the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka.

In USAID/Washington, the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) and the Bureau for Africa (AFR) concluded that the problem was serious and would likely require extraordinary amounts of imported grain, but that the food shortage could probably be dealt with before it turned into a catastrophe. At that point, in March 1992, USAID established a formal task force, attached to the office of the Assistant Administrator, USAID/AFR, to deal with the situation on an ongoing basis. The Task Force Steering Committee was co-chaired by the Deputy Assistant Administrators, USAID/AFR and USAID/BHR and, by March, was meeting once every three weeks. By April, meetings were weekly.

A U.S. interagency working group was also formed and included the Peace Corps, USDA, the State Department, and sometimes representatives from the Central and Defense Intelligence Agencies. This interagency group met once every two-to-three weeks to share information and coordinate actions.

The USAID/AFR Task Force was a small ad hoc group that had up to seven full-time members and operated through 1992. All full-time members of the Task Force were USAID employees and included professionals seconded from BHR/OFDA, AFR, and BHR's Office of Food for Peace (FFP). In addition, in April 1992, the Task Force used BHR/OFDA funds to hire a Personal Services Contractor (PSC) to assist with management and information coordination.

The three principal functions of the Task Force were to:

1. Coordinate the U.S. response to the drought. The Task Force had no budget or funding authority but concentrated on organizing and bringing together all of the various offices and organizations involved in the drought response.
2. Identify and task issues. Issues were identified, prioritized and delegated for action. The Task Force ensured that necessary actions were defined and the responsible office or bureau had a clear understanding of its responsibilities. Status of issues and actions taken was also monitored.

3. Distribute information. The Task Force acted as an information clearinghouse within USAID and between USAID and other U.S. and international agencies. This included tracking other donor contributions and the allocations and deliveries of U.S. food.

The Task Force also drafted cables which were sent by the State Department to U.S. embassies explaining the seriousness of the crisis and describing the magnitude of the U.S. response. These cables prompted embassies to inform other donors of the severity of the situation and were a first step to encourage them to think about contributing to the relief effort in advance of a formal U.N. appeal.

The work of the Task Force was collegial and decisions based on consensus. It saw its principal mandate as coordinating information, and identifying and tracking priority actions.

By June and July 1992, the emphasis of the Task Force was on logistics, but by fall, its focus had shifted to seed distribution and other rehabilitation programs. The Task Force was disbanded in October 1993. The PSC hired has since remained with USAID/AFR in the Office of Disaster Response Coordination, which was created for the purpose of continuing to address ongoing emergencies in Africa.

B. United Nations Agencies

In accordance with a draft U.N. General Assembly resolution of December 1991 mandating coordination of U.N. agencies in relief operations, an Interagency Steering Committee of U.N. agencies began operations in March 1992. The group was immediately aware of the need to mount an appeal for southern Africa and, following consultation with the World Food Program (WFP), concluded that the appeal should cover food and logistics, as well as emergency health and water needs and provision of seeds for the next planting season. Upon approval of U.N. General Assembly Resolution number 46/182 on April 14, 1992, a Deputy Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs was appointed, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) was formally established. Together with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)¹, whose Early Warning System had brought the first alerts of drought to the attention of U.N. agencies, the new Department determined that a consolidated appeal was needed.

First, however, despite the credibility of the reports from the Early Warning System, and verification by experts of USAID/AFR's Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) project, it was necessary to have in hand a verification of the crop assessment by the Food and Agriculture

¹ In accordance with a treaty concluded by member governments in August 1992, the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) became the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The latter name is used in throughout this report.

The multilateral agencies, which organized both their appeal and their response in collaboration with SADC, included only SADC member countries, not South Africa, in their donations. However, World Food Program and SADC country representatives worked closely with the Grain Operations Control Center in South Africa to manage grain imports through South African ports.

Organization (FAO) and of food and logistic needs by WFP. In the main, the FAO experts participating in the joint assessment of March and April 1992 accepted the crop estimates of the SADC-sponsored and FAO-assisted National Early Warning Units (NEWUs). WFP was particularly well placed to verify the need for logistical support that had been suggested by SADC, as it had country offices in the SADC region.

The first consolidated appeal coordinated by UNHHA was launched at a donor conference in Geneva on June 1-2, 1992. The appeal was seen as a blueprint for coordinating responses from all U.N. agencies involved in the drought emergency. It was not intended to encroach on the regular programs and resource mobilization mechanisms of each participating specialized agency. The appeal for the Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA) presented needs for food aid as estimated by FAO and WFP (about 80 percent of the total) as well as non-food aid projects presented by such specialized U.N. agencies as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF). The projects proposed were supported by pledges of funds and were to be implemented by the proposing agency.

UNHHA was responsible for determining whether or not a project should be included in the appeal, as well as tracking the response to the appeal and soliciting donor attention for further needs through reviews of progress in pledging and in actual contributions. Coordination of the actual work of U.N. agencies within a country was to be the responsibility of the U.N. Resident Representative. Accordingly, for the mid-term review of December 1992, UNHHA called upon the Resident Representatives of the southern Africa region to update country needs and the project proposals of the operating U.N. agencies. In several countries the Resident Representative also played a significant role in ensuring coordination among donors and between donors and host governments to help find solutions to implementation problems.

C. Multilateral Banks

The multilateral banks, as development agencies, do not have programs specifically directed to emergency relief. They do, however, support recovery programs.

The African Development Bank, in the context of the drought emergency in southern Africa, has financed a number of projects proposed by SADC and its member countries. These projects, on the whole, are drought-related but focus on recovery and institution-building. Examples include purchase of water pumps for irrigation to meet the needs of small-scale farmers in Angola, distribution of seeds and provision of draft power to farmers in Botswana, coordination of transport logistics of the three Mozambican railways, and creation of a drought-preparedness capacity in the SADC region.

The World Bank, which is a major promoter and supporter of macro-economic and sectoral structural reform programs, most often exerts a central influence on factors that affect the ability of a government to respond effectively to a drought emergency. For example, when a country has agreed, in the context of significant financial support from the Bank, to reduce its budget deficit, it might not be possible for that country to make needed commercial purchases of imported grains without exceeding the deficit limits upon which its agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is contingent. If the ability to import sufficient quantities of

grain to supply demand is restricted, this could quickly lead not only to spiraling price increases and general inflation, but also civil unrest.

As chair of periodic meetings of donors and country governments to review the economic situation and identify the requirements for external assistance, the World Bank is in a position to ensure that those reviews consider the potential effects of droughts or other disasters on the economy of the country.

D. Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)

Each of the ten member countries of the Southern Africa Development Community has taken responsibility for development and implementation of programs in one or more designated sectors of economic development. The two sectors most relevant to the response to the 1991/92 drought were Food Security, assigned to Zimbabwe, and Transport and Communications, assigned to Mozambique. Both units have received significant support from donors over the past ten years.

Key elements of SADC's food security sector are the Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU), which has been supported mainly through technical assistance financed by USAID, the European Community and bilateral European donors, and the National and Regional Early Warning Units, which are supported heavily by an FAO project. The regional units are located in Zimbabwe's Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development. The FSTAU took the lead within SADC in the alert to governments and to the international community and in establishing a role for SADC in the appeal to donors and the logistics of the response.

The Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC), a unit of the Mozambique government, had received massive support from multilateral and bilateral donors, in the form of technical expertise, capital goods and financing of the infrastructure of the ports and railways of the southern Africa region. The results of that support were evident in the ability of the system to import and deliver significantly larger quantities of grain than had ever been imported before. At Beira port, the just-completed doubling of the capacity to handle container cargo, and installation of bulk discharge equipment from Belgium had created an expanded capacity to handle grain imports. Improvements to the port of Maputo and the rail line up the Limpopo River to Zimbabwe, whose capacity had not been fully tested because of long-standing insecurity along the rail line, proved adequate for operation of traffic once political accords in Mozambique guaranteed the safety of the route. Similarly, Dar es Salaam port and the TAZARA line were able to carry traffic to the Zambian border and serve the road and lake corridor south into Malawi. The corridor from the port of Nacala in Mozambique to Malawi, the shortest route to Malawi but the most recent to receive donor attention because of poor security, was not sufficiently operational to handle more than a minimum of Malawi's needs.

At a special meeting in Lusaka in April 1992, the SADC ministers of transport and agriculture decided to:

- 1) establish a regional drought relief task force of representatives from transport and agriculture ministries and national drought relief organizations, to be chaired by Zimbabwe;

- 2) establish six transport corridor groups to manage the traffic from the ports serving the region to recipient country destinations;
- 3) set up a Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) in Harare to coordinate information on transport logistics;² and
- 4) call for a donor conference to seek assistance.

The ministers of the Task Force met periodically to make decisions on behalf of their governments to break bottlenecks and improve the handling of grain imports. Their commitment inspired officials at lower levels to cooperate across national lines to make the operation effective.

The corridor groups were modeled on the concept of transport corridor coordination embodied in the work of the Beira Corridor Authority and the Beira Corridor Group (BCG). The Authority, established by the Government of Mozambique, was charged with the development of the infrastructure to serve the transport trade from the port of Beira, Mozambique, to Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia. The BCG, a membership organization of firms involved in trade through the corridor, is dedicated to ensuring that the corridor will serve importers and exporters in the landlocked countries of the region in an efficient and economic manner.

Each corridor group was based on the port or ports offering access to the interior and was chaired by the respective port authority. Overall coordination of the entire operation of the corridors within the SADC region was the responsibility of SATCC. The role of each corridor group was to: maximize importation and delivery of food from port to designated distribution points while maintaining the unimpeded flow of existing cargos; identify and remove existing or potential operational and bureaucratic obstacles; identify procedures to increase corridor capacity; coordinate users of the corridor in the movement of cargos so that throughput and efficiency were maximized; liaise with other corridor groups to facilitate cross-corridor efficiency and maximize total regional food imports; and provide information to the donors, governments, operators and users of the corridor. The six designated corridor groups and their routes are listed in Annex E.

The Southern Corridor comprised four of South Africa's deep sea ports and two rail corridors to the north, one entering Zimbabwe directly and the other going through Botswana to serve that country as well as Zimbabwe and Zambia. Day-to-day operations were managed through the Grain Operations Control Center set up in Johannesburg for the purpose. Representatives of the SADC country railways of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe worked with staff of SPOORNET and PORTNET and representatives of the grain boards of South Africa and Zimbabwe at the Grain Operations Control Center.

SADC shared with WFP the direction of the operations of the LAC and joined the UNDHA in preparing for and sponsoring the June 1992 appeal to donors.

² Additional information on the logistical operation can be found in the reports on Zimbabwe and South Africa.

2. RECOGNITION OF NEED AND DESIGN OF A RESPONSE

A. Alerts from SADC Food Security Units

The Regional Early Warning System of SADC in Harare issues a *Food Security Bulletin* every two weeks, reporting agricultural and meteorological conditions in the SADC member countries based data from the countries' National Early Warning Systems and remote sensing data on cloud cover. This System, supported by FAO, was instrumental in bringing the severity of the problem to the attention of national governments and the donor community at an early stage.

By December 1991 the national early warning units had almost uniformly reported deficits in rainfall or unusual rainfall patterns. By the end of January 1992 the evidence of failure of the seasonal rains, after a promising start in some countries in October and November, led to the conclusion that the region was facing a drought of unprecedented severity.

B. Needs Assessment

i. FAO/WFP

It was not until March that multilateral organizations were energized. The nascent UNDHA began to estimate the degree of disaster and need for assistance in the southern Africa region. FAO and WFP launched joint food needs assessment missions in March and April 1992. The general conclusion of the overall mission, that "...the worst drought in decades had devastated crops throughout most of the region, placing the lives of millions of people in jeopardy," underscored the need for an urgent response.

Following consultation in the region, WFP concluded that there should be established in Harare, Zimbabwe, a regional Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) to coordinate information on ship movements and internal transport in order to help expedite food deliveries to the landlocked states of the region. To bring such an immense amount of food into 11 countries, six of them landlocked, through a total of six Indian Ocean ports whose logistical systems had been export-oriented, and over long overland rail and road routes, would involve some complex and daunting challenges and strains on the regional transport system. The need for such a mechanism was endorsed by the transport sector ministers of SADC at their meeting in April.

On the food side, following their early reports, both SADC and FAO continued to publish regular reports such as the regional *Food Security Bulletin* and *AgroMet Updates*, and the more comprehensive periodic reports of FAO, *Food Situation in Africa*, and *Food Crops and Shortages*.

ii. USAID/BHR

In late March 1992 BHR/OFDA sent two assessment teams to southern Africa to determine food and non-food needs in ten affected countries.³ The U.S. assessment teams--comprised of staff from BHR/FFP, BHR/OFDA, CDC, USDA, and the State Department--came a few weeks after the FAO-WFP assessment. The U.S. assessment focused on food aid and non-food aspects of the emergency, particularly water and health, assessed institutional and NGO roles and capabilities, and secured USDA involvement.

By the time the U.S. regional drought assessment mission arrived, the dimensions of the disaster were quite well known -- both from the preceding FAO-WFP assessment team and from national government early warning units. The U.S. assessment served to verify and confirm the earlier FAO-WFP findings, and generally accepted their quantitative calculations. The assessment went on to describe the status of donor and U.N. response planning and to offer comments and recommendations for U.S. participation.

The March-April 1992 assessment by BHR/OFDA had also included a review of the port and rail capacities of the region that emphasized the importance of close cooperation among SADC countries as well as with the port and rail operations of South Africa to ensure that needed quantities of food would be imported in a timely fashion. The assessment appended a report of a survey conducted by USAID's Regional Development Services Office (REDSO) in Nairobi which reported that the South African rail and port operators had already concluded that it would be useful for the SADC importers to establish and assign representatives to an operations center in Johannesburg.

C. U.N./SADC Appeal

The joint U.N. and SADC Appeal for DESA was presented at a conference in Geneva on June 1-2, 1992. Designed to present the minimum survival needs of the affected populations, the Appeal called for the provision of 1.6 million metric tons of targeted food aid, 2.5 million tons of program food aid, and \$173 million in non-food assistance to assure availability of water, health care and agricultural and livestock inputs. The Appeal included \$12.6 for technical staff and communications facilities for the coordination of the relief operation, as well as the purchase and leasing of transport and other equipment needed for the logistical task. Subsequent reassessment, made for a mid-term review of December 1992, recognized the gravity of the drought impact on health and water supply and raised the proportion of non-food aid solicited from the international donor community. The mid-term review's revised projections raised the amount for targeted food aid to 1.8 million metric tons, reduced the target for program food aid to 2.3 million metric tons (reflecting reductions for Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania) and increased the target for non-food aid to \$223 million.

The June 1992 Appeal meeting sensitized world opinion to the severity of the situation in southern Africa at a time when affairs in the former Yugoslavia, the newly independent states

³ The assessment teams visited Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe between March 24 and April 18, 1993.

of the former Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa were commanding world attention. It generated a significant initial response, mainly for food aid, for which pledges accounted for over 80 percent of the needs presented.

By June 1993 the operation of DESA was completed, except for continuing operations in Angola and Mozambique, as reports of crop harvests and improved food supply confirmed that cereal production would generally be adequate for the year's needs.

D. World Bank Actions

As of early February 1992, the World Bank, like other donors and U.N. agencies, had not yet acted upon the rumblings of alerts to the drought in southern Africa. At a Consultative Group meeting in Paris to review economic structural reform in Zimbabwe, the question of the effect of the drought on the economy was not on the agenda, although the government there had already committed significant amounts of its foreign exchange reserves to contracts to import grains. Only when the U.S. delegation insisted was there even a rump session of donors to discuss the situation. By March 1992, however, following discussions at the World Bank by the USAID Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, the Bank did include the drought situation on the agenda for a Consultative Group meeting on Malawi.

Following the appeal by UNDHA and SADC, the World Bank provided substantial credits for drought recovery (including funds that were understood to be available for importation of grains) and, in coordination with IMF, selectively relaxed the target dates that had been agreed to for steps in structural reform programs. For Zimbabwe, adjustments in targets were approved, and a large credit made available in July; a further credit for food imports was approved in September. In Malawi, a credit for purchase of maize made earlier in the year was eventually used by the government in December 1992. For Zambia, a Bank credit financed rehabilitation of national railway tracks and equipment.

Frustration was a common experience for both the public and private sectors of countries receiving World Bank drought recovery credits. This frustration stemmed from the necessity to follow the entire procedural process in drafting specifications of imports, as well as the full competitive tendering process. Following normal World Bank tender procedures meant that, in some cases, drought relief food supplies arrived after the crisis had abated.

3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSE

A. Provision of Food

Never before has so much food been moved through so many ports in such a short time. Together, the ten SADC countries and South Africa had experienced a bigger crop failure than the Horn of Africa in the mid-1980s. Roughly five times more food (both donated food and commercial imports) than was shipped to the Horn during the 1984-85 famine was brought to the region during the 15 months from April 1992 to June 1993. Usually a net food exporter, the southern Africa region imported 11.6 million metric tons of food at an estimated food and

transport cost of \$4 billion. This volume, a six-fold increase above normal imports, was carried in addition to regular commercial flows.

Based on recognition by U.N. agencies and the donor community of its experience and capacity in handling food aid, the decision was taken at the June 1992 Appeal meeting that WFP would take the lead in food aid operations. The main sources of significant food aid for drought relief in the early period of the response, from May to September 1992, were the U.S. and WFP. WFP's early response was achieved by drawing on existing stocks held for emergencies and by advancing deliveries of food destined for refugees but not required until later.

Of the 5.9 million metric tons of food imported to the SADC region during the total relief operation from April 1, 1992 through April 1993, about 43 percent was purchased commercially by country governments, mainly Zimbabwe (whose commercial purchases accounted for some 77 percent of total food imports) and Botswana (which purchased 95 percent of its own needs). Other countries meeting over one-fifth of their needs through commercial imports were Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Zambia. Because most national governments, and the international donor community in general, were caught off guard by the severity of the drought, despite the early warnings of the SADC system, those commercial purchases were essential to cover the period until donor shipments could be mobilized and delivered.

It is common wisdom among food security analysts and government officials of the SADC region that four-to-five months are required for mobilization, shipment, unloading and inland delivery of donor-supplied food to a landlocked country. Such was the case, for example, for U.S. food aid, except for a quantity of 45,000 metric tons that was shipped before the region had mobilized its requests, and for re-deployment of food that could be spared from other, ongoing, in-country food programs. Under agreements concluded in May 1992, deliveries of food originating in the United States were made to inland depots as early as October 1992, as were a few European Community and European country deliveries.

Every 100,000 metric tons of grain requires, on average, three ships. From the time of reaching berth in port, that amount of grain would have to be unloaded, at the rate of 3,000 metric tons per day onto over 250 rail wagons, which would be hauled in some seven or more trains. If bagging was required, it would be possible, under the best conditions, to fill 55,000 bags per day. Rail transport, border crossings, and unloading at depots added additional time to the delivery of food supplies.

B. USAID/Washington Management

i. Food Allocations

When the magnitude of crop failure in the southern Africa region became apparent, one of BHR's first decisions was to freeze all non-emergency Title II & III food allocations. BHR initially concentrated on Titles II and III because they were the only programs within its jurisdiction. At one point, when U.S. NGOs were asked to assess how much Title II food already programmed could be diverted for use in Southern Africa, they became concerned that food not be diverted

from other emergencies. Ultimately, no food was taken from other emergency programs, nor was this contemplated by BHR.

USDA indicated during the early stages of planning the drought response that it was unlikely any 416(b) corn would be available to respond to the southern Africa emergency. However, after a trip to the region by a senior USDA official, Ms. Quayle and the Director of BHR/OFDA, USDA did make large quantities of 416(b) corn available. It is worth noting that at the same time the southern Africa drought was unfolding there were also indications that Russia was likely to experience dramatic grain shortages. In the end, 416(b) grain was by far the single largest source of U.S. grain used in the emergency response. The total value of 416(b) grain was \$396 million comprising 58 percent of the value of U.S. grain supplied.

By late March 1992 USDA was already processing two section 416(b) agreements for 60,000 metric tons of maize that was to be funneled through WFP to Mozambique and Malawi. By this time, USDA had also approved \$20 million of credit for Zimbabwe to purchase 204,000 metric tons of maize -- \$10 million was a concessional loan for purchase of Title I maize and \$10 million was commercial sales.

In addition, FFP prepositioned 45,000 metric tons of corn in the region. This corn was sent to Durban South Africa but its final destination was unknown at the time of shipment. Eventually, the 45,000 metric tons of food prepositioned in Durban was entirely sent to Malawi, and it arrived several months before any other emergency food. The decision to ship the corn was made before any of the countries had officially declared disasters. (See Malawi country report for a detailed description of use and impact of pre-positioned Title II corn.)

ii. Non-Food Allocations

The U.S. also provided \$112 million in non-food assistance, primarily in support of transportation and logistics coordination, agricultural rehabilitation, emergency water supplies, and emergency health activities. Non-food allocations included:

Assistance to Supply Emergency Water: USAID/Washington funding to address emergency water needs in southern Africa was effective in making water accessible to thousands of inhabitants who otherwise would not have had access to water. Recipients of USAID/Washington grants to address emergency water needs included UNICEF, Africare, the International Medical Corps, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision and the U.S. Peace Corps. The largest grants for emergency water activities were given to Africare by USAID/AFR and BHR/OFDA. These grants were used to rehabilitate existing water points in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe and to construct new wells, boreholes and dams in several southern provinces in Zimbabwe. In total, the Africare program rehabilitated 300 wells in Zimbabwe, 70 shallow wells and 200 boreholes in Zambia, and over 220 water points in Malawi.⁴ BHR/OFDA also supported emergency water rehabilitation activities in Namibia, Mozambique, Lesotho and South Africa. Rehabilitation of

⁴ For a detailed description of Africare's Emergency Water Relief Regional Project see OFDA-funded evaluation of January 1994 conducted by Basic Health Management (Mason and LeBlanc).

water systems was a particular priority because it was deemed necessary in order to prevent migration.

Famine Early Warning System: In Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi the USAID/AFR's FEWS project was used to bring in experts to help target food distributions through analysis of country data to identify areas most in need of assistance. In Zimbabwe, this assistance was used to help the Department of Social Welfare to assess that adequate quantities of food were reaching those most seriously affected by the drought. In Zambia, FEWS was helpful in enabling the USAID Mission to develop an overall relief strategy, to effectively coordinate its actions with other donors, and to facilitate the flow of information concerning the government's response program. Also, FEWS analysis helped to ensure that information developed to identify the vulnerability of different population groups was used by those directly involved in the design and implementation of food assistance activities. In Malawi, a vulnerability re-assessment conducted by the FEWS team reduced the number of persons determined to be eligible for free food assistance; however, food distribution rations were not altered as a result of revisions to the number of persons determined to be in need of assistance.

Supplemental Emergency Management Expertise: USAID/Washington funding was used to provide emergency management experts to several of its southern African missions. This assistance was important in augmenting existing mission expertise and was necessary to help USAID missions handle the increased management requirements generated by the drought response.

- In Malawi, BHR/OFDA funded a Drought Relief Specialist who made frequent trips into almost all districts to monitor food distributions. His observations and reporting enabled USAID to recognize where adjustments were required and then take corrective actions. Also in Malawi, BHR/OFDA provided support for logistics management and communications.
- In Zambia, BHR/OFDA funded two contractors to manage the drought response, one working at USAID/Lusaka, and the other at WFP/Lusaka.
- In South Africa, BHR/OFDA funds provided for the services of an individual experienced in water supply projects to coordinate activities with the Consultative Forum on Drought, an independent forum organized to coordinate relief activities among government agencies and dozens of NGOs.

SAFIRE Communications Network: The Southern Africa Food Information and Resource Exchange (SAFIRE) was designed, funded and installed under a \$300,000 USAID contract to provide a low-cost communications network for the principal organizations involved with the southern Africa drought relief effort. Organizations targeted to use the system included host governments, USAID missions, WFP field offices and various transportation and logistics sites. SAFIRE began after an April 1992 BHR/OFDA Drought Assessment determined a need for an electronic bulletin board service, or other computer-based information system, to coordinate regional transportation and food aid information. SAFIRE was designed to provide a low-cost easy to use communications system which would monitor food needs and imports; relate tonnage

and timing to port and corridor capacities; monitor shipments; and ensure that grain purchases, routing and berthing were systematically scheduled. SAFIRE used existing technology which enables personal computers and phone lines to be used to store and forward electronic data files.

SAFIRE's usage was limited mainly to WFP, whose field offices found the system to be a useful tool for communicating with WFP/Rome. Wider use of the system was inhibited by the existence of adequate communication systems, along with lack of time available for organizations to learn to use a new system in the midst of a crisis.

C. Management, Logistics and Transport

Although some countries of the region had established mechanisms for dealing with regularly recurring drought, others faced the crisis without the benefit of mechanisms for assessing needs, mobilizing resources and organizing distribution systems. In September 1992, the United Nations Disaster Management Training Program sponsored a regional Disaster Management Workshop in Harare, Zimbabwe. The workshop focused on data collection and analysis as tools to expedite efficiency in food relief and offered simulation exercises on how best to choose among alternative programs (food-for-work, cash-for-work or direct feeding). It was helpful to participating individuals, but because of its late timing, more helpful for future preparation than for the initial organization of a response.

The heavy investment in the transport sector, supported by almost a decade of donor assistance, was instrumental in establishing the capacity that enabled the regional transport system to move massive quantities of food imports. Road and rail infrastructure were in relatively good shape (with the exception of the Benguela railway from the Atlantic port of Lobito). The established informal working relationships among officials of the transport sector within the SADC context, as well as between the transfer agents, shippers and transport operators of SADC countries and those of South Africa, promoted unprecedented mutual coordination. Another factor contributing to the transport success was the sheer good luck that the rains that finally came in late 1992 did not seriously interrupt operations at the ports.

The Regional Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) was first established in April 1992 under the Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) in Harare. It evolved into a joint WFP/SADC operation in June with funding from USAID and other donors. The LAC played a key role in facilitating the smooth flow of food imports into the region with as little disruption as possible to the region's transport systems and regular commercial trade. From Harare the LAC provided information about donor commitments, dates and quantities of shipments, and dates due at southern African ports. Its representative at the Logistics Advisory Unit in Johannesburg kept the Grain Operations Control Center informed of expected arrivals at the South African ports of the Southern Corridor. The logistics coordination of WFP was supplemented by the work of donor-financed shipping and rail experts placed at major ports and internal transport interchanges.

The LAC did not have a mandate to control the timing or routing of shipments but served an essential role in providing information to donors, SADC governments, shipping agents, contractors and transport operators that enabled them to make decisions to ensure prompt delivery

of food. LAC's first monthly bulletin was published in May 1993, its last in June 1993. The reports included notices of important events in the region relevant to the drought response and tables summarizing the status of targeted food aid (with data from DESA in Geneva on food needs and pledges, and its own delivery and pipeline information) and of program food aid (based on its own data and that of the WFP Resources Division in Rome).

The more frequent shipping bulletin issued by LAC contained up-to-date, detailed information on all drought-related shipments (commodities, volume, nominated port, arrival and discharge dates, etc.). On the basis of this information, purchasers of shipments were able to decide, for example, whether a ship should be diverted to an alternative port, if the shipper's instructions so allowed. The port of Beira in Mozambique, being the closest to landlocked Zimbabwe and least costly for Zambia and Malawi, was often overloaded. Moreover, the Mozambican government imposed a number of transport taxes and border levies that raised the price of transport to the interior. Thus, the LAC information enabled importers to consider trade-offs between timing and costs and to consider alternatives between demurrage charges at an overloaded port or transfer of a ship to another port.

The WFP director of the LAC also handled grants from donors, including the U.S., Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, UK, Luxembourg, and the African Development Bank to eliminate bottlenecks to transport in SADC countries. It was able to buy, lease, or borrow equipment, including South African locomotives and rail wagons; install communication and signalling systems; repair rail wagons and tracks; buy stacking machines, weighing scales, tarpaulins, radios and fax machines; and repair and maintain roads and bridges. Bagging machines were provided to handle bulk grain, either at the port or at the depot for which it was destined (all grain for Zambia and Malawi and 30 percent of grain for Zimbabwe that entered through South Africa had to be bagged before it was unloaded at a depot). These interventions were extremely helpful in the international and inland transport and inland distribution aspects of the tasks. Moreover, systematic improvements made will contribute to the continued viability of the transport systems to finance equipment needed to break transportation bottlenecks.

Adequate funds were available, from USAID and others, for the operational interventions. However, constraints in the procurement process slowed the acquisition of equipment that was not available for local purchase. At the outset, insufficient delegation of authority from WFP headquarters in Rome to the LAC created serious delays; the second WFP director of the Center was able, later, to gain expanded procurement authority. Other problems encountered included inability to record or agree on specifications for needed equipment, delays in customs clearance, and donor insistence on procedures that were not understood by potential users.

The concept of the corridor group proved effective. The groups brought together transport operators, transport service users and government and parastatal officials to consider problems and propose solutions. The newly established corridor groups varied, but each could have been more effective had government representation consistently been at a senior level, and able to make immediate decisions. Nonetheless, there was a high degree of cooperation and exchange of information among the participants, which may continue well beyond the crisis.

Experts were assigned under the USAID-supported Transit Traffic Facilitation Project of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to review both road and rail systems and suggest improvements in transport efficiency. Procedural changes were made following the recommendations of two studies by transport experts, one on the effect of border procedures on movement of goods by road, the other on interchange arrangements of railways with the ports, at borders and at off-loading points. Decisions on recommendations made by the experts were taken at high-level meetings of the regional Transport and Logistics Committee following technical meetings on road problems in August 1992, and on rail problems in November 1992. In the meantime, operating personnel had made adjustments on their own. If lighting was available, for example, a border post would be kept open as long as that of a counterpart post in the adjacent country.

For movements by road, where the principal obstacles to efficient movement were bureaucratic in nature, some progress was made; for example, opening hours on both sides of a border were synchronized, or inspection procedures were speeded up. Neither outside advisers nor negotiations by officials of their neighbors dissuaded the Mozambicans from imposing a number of road and border fees, however. The major problems for the railways were operational, and concerned mainly the utilization of wagons. Following the principle introduced by the experts, that a reduction in turnaround time of as little as five percent would greatly reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of the drought relief effort, some railway managers were persuaded to permit wagons to return empty—an unprecedented move.

The railways, which had benefited from large infusions of donor-financed equipment and technical expertise, were beginning to heed donor pressures for improvements in efficiency. During the drought they streamlined systems: introducing efficiencies from organization of unit trains, each pulling all wagons to a single destination; allowing locomotives to pull trains across the border to an off-loading point rather than handing off to the other country's locomotives at the border; and achieving savings through faster turnaround of rail wagons.

4. SPECIAL ISSUES

A. Numbers of Needs Assessments

Reviewers of the response to the drought in the SADC countries commonly are critical of the duplication of needs assessments that occurred during the period March-April 1992, at a time when local citizens were well aware that there had been no crop from late 1991 plantings, even if all of their governments had not as yet declared a drought disaster. Some of those same governments, notably Zambia and Zimbabwe, had already entered into contracts to purchase grain imports.

SADC's own assessment of the response to the drought suggests that aid recipient governments had been conditioned to inflate or exaggerate their requirements, with the result that donors were automatically impelled to question national statistics and to field their own assessment teams. The instance of the 1991/92 drought in southern Africa was an exception. The estimates of

import requirements based on meteorological and production data first produced by the SADC Early Warning System were credible and were not basically disputed by subsequent assessments.

The main issue for SADC concerns duplicative reviews of the situation by FAO staff from headquarters in Rome who were not nearly as knowledgeable about the local situation as their own FAO colleagues who were actually working as advisers in the National Early Warning Units. The work of the visiting teams generally confirmed the estimates of the SADC Early Warning Units.

B. Timeliness of the SADC Appeal

From the point of view of the United Nations humanitarian and development agencies as a group, it is necessary to have in hand an assessment by FAO before an appeal for response to a drought can be organized. As the staff of UNHCR told the evaluation team, a report from an agency of the U.N. "family" lends credibility to the presentation of needs. The appeal for the Drought Emergency in Southern Africa was not scheduled until after the final report of the FAO/WFP assessment mission had been completed, in mid-April.

Questions have been raised as to why the U.N. waited until early June to launch the appeal. In retrospect, however, considering the slowness of governments to declare disaster, as well as UNHCR's infancy and its desire to include SADC as a partner in the appeal, it might not have been realistic to have expected a donor appeal to be mounted before the first of June 1992.

C. Emergency vs. Development Needs

The non-food aid elements of the SADC appeal were less than half fulfilled, according to the final report of DESA. The inclusion or exclusion of various of those elements was controversial, however. Some analysts found a good proportion of the projects listed by WHO, UNICEF, FAO, ILO and UNDP to be development-oriented rather than emergency efforts. The country staffs of those agencies argued differently. And country governments were frustrated by the non-fulfillment of what had been presented to them as aid pledges.

WHO and UNICEF were the most active of the U.N. specialized agencies in supplementary feeding programs and in non-food aid projects. The projects that were funded by the emergency response were concentrated on matters that could affect the ability of people to survive the drought, such as water supply and immunization, and projects that could assist toward recovery of personal and economic well-being, such as provision of seeds.

D. Tracking and Reporting

As the calculations underlying U.N. appeals for special purposes are based on the commodities and project funds that will be handled by U.N. agencies, so the reports of the relative success of an appeal are based on verification that such quantities of commodities or funds have been offered by donors. Thus, the outcome of the DESA appeal was reported to have been very successful in terms of targeted food aid (at 82 percent) and program food aid (at 89 percent), but less successful in terms of its non-food aid components.

In addition to the specific amounts reported against the appeal, sizable quantities of assistance were also provided to the region through various multilateral, bilateral and NGO channels. A report of the commitments from the African Development Bank can be found in the closing report of the LAC. No summary report of credits from the World Bank for economic support, drought recovery, or food aid is available. Yet, if UNDHA had reported those credits, the report might have skewed the picture, because for one reason or another the Bank-financed food imports and many items of equipment did not arrive in the region until after the crisis was over.

The periodic *Situation Reports* on DESA published by UNDHA covered contributions received, by agency and program and by recipient country, in direct response to the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal through SADC and U.N. channels. They included a summary of contributions from governments as well as international NGOs, showing the country and organizational destination of each separate donation. But the reports do not capture other contributions of nonprofit NGO agencies, either international or local, and none of those of the for-profit private sector of the various countries. Actually, the NGOs themselves had difficulty keeping track of the origins of commodities they handled or operating funds they received, as to whether they were from a government directly or through WFP, or from a country-based NGO headquarters through WFP, or directly from the NGO headquarters to the local NGO. Thus, since NGOs played a significant role in providing non-food aid, not all of which went through U.N. channels, the official reporting will continue to under-report the response in non-food aid.

SADC's July 1993 assessment of the response to the drought, which is based on data gathered by the LAC, attempts to give a full picture of actual deliveries as against the needs and pledges recorded by UNDHA. Yet SADC found a number of anomalies in the reporting by donors and recipient agencies that detract from the usefulness of the data for comparative purposes.

Nevertheless, the success of the official response, together with the actions of the public and private sectors in the affected countries, is clear. Mass food deprivation was avoided, and rural residents were generally able to remain in their home areas and to acquire the seeds and power required for planting when the next rains came. The import program as a whole was so successful that food aid arriving after the beginning of harvests, in April and May 1993, became excessive to the needs of the region for the 1993/94 crop year.

E. SADC and Recipient Country Role in Allocation of Aid

Although the U.N./SADC appeal was based on a country-by-country analysis, and presented the needs on a country basis, the response to the appeal was not allocated in the same proportions. Parts of SADC leadership, and certain SADC member countries, would have liked to have seen a system through which the allocation of actual aid donations reflected the proportions indicated in the appeal. Others would have attempted to distribute the contributions in accordance with some definition of equity among SADC member countries. UNDHA understands the issue that arises when donors do not respond equally to cases of need, but as a U.N. agency is not capable of managing the destinations of the donor contributions. Nor does UNDHA want to become involved in decisions that could be partially based on political factors within a region such as that of SADC.

Donors, as a matter of course, make their own decisions as to the destinations of their aid. Therefore, the response to an appeal almost inevitably supports some countries more heavily than others. Food aid passed through WFP is more likely to be allocated in accordance with WFP's analysis of current and relative shortfalls. But non-food aid is frequently negotiated directly between a donor and the implementing U.N. specialized agency.

5. THE FUTURE

After the end of operations under joint SADC/WFP direction, the LAC reverted to the SADC FSTAU. An advisor financed by the African Development Bank will help expand the capacity of the unit to cover logistical information and data on international and regional grain price structures and will also advise on policies to establish strategic grain reserves.

The proven usefulness of the Grain Operations Control Center was so momentous, the gains from the experience of direct interface among railway representatives so valuable, and the opportunity to serve intra-regional trade on an expanded basis so significant, that SPOORNET decided to keep the Control Center open, under the direction of a senior official, to manage all regional trade using South Africa's ports and railways.

The now-renamed Operations Management Center is designed to unite the operations of the railways of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland and South Africa in order to develop and maintain a client-oriented service that is competitive with road service in the region. It has already established the first regularly scheduled train service between South Africa and Botswana and Zimbabwe in order to assure potential users of predictable service. The transit procedures and interchanges of trains at the border with Zimbabwe, which used to take place at two locations, 12 kilometers apart, have now been unified at Beitbridge, on the Zimbabwe side of the border. The computerized tracking system and telephone conference mechanism set up during the drought have been continued and will be expanded to include the Swazi and Mozambican railways. National Railways of Zimbabwe have expanded their control functions in a Management Operations Center at their headquarters in Bulawayo, and Tanzania has begun investigating the possibility of a similar move.

It is likely that the experience of coordination of the massive drought relief effort will have helped establish a positive working attitude toward South African capabilities and willingness to act as an economic partner in the region. Such a change will help foster increased trade relations as the process of political change within South Africa continues, and the climate of regional politics outside the country changes as well.

UNDHA sees the need to put disaster planning into the regular planning portfolio, in the context of development prospects and economic reform. The operation of the response to the drought in southern Africa exemplifies the desire of UNDHA to manage emergencies in full coordination with locally capable institutions and in the context of local self-help. In this instance, SADC was the first to broadcast the alert, was a partner in the appeal process and in logistics coordination, and was heavily involved in the mobilization of inter-country task forces and operations. In keeping with the U.N. philosophy of support to regional organizations, UNDHA provided staff

expertise to the SADC FSTAU and offered to bring a SADC representative to Geneva to help organize the donor response. Unfortunately, the SADC representative was not nominated and assigned until March 1993. UNDHA believes, nevertheless, that the investment in direct involvement of a SADC representative will lead to continuity in future working relationships.

UNDHA expects to follow the training workshop of September 1992 with additional workshops and to offer help in preparedness and country-oriented planning of multi-sectoral approaches to disaster management that will include coverage of environmental issues, land resource utilization and drought mitigation strategies.

SADC sponsored a regional workshop on drought management in Harare in September 1993, at which country representatives reviewed their situations in terms of lessons learned and policy and management implications. A series of national workshops was to begin in Namibia in November 1993.

The World Bank and the British ODA are sponsoring a study of the impact of drought on economic growth. The study should help alert donor agencies to issues to be aware of in planning economic reform for drought-prone countries.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The formation of a USAID/Washington Drought Task Force was an effective mechanism for identifying and tracking key actions, sharing information with key players in and outside of USAID, and tracking international food and non-food pledges.

High-level political attention was important to secure large commitments of U.S. surplus food for use in southern Africa. Marilyn Quayle, the U.S. Special Assistant to the United Nation's Decade of Disaster Preparedness Committee, and wife of the Vice President, made a trip to southern Africa to assess the situation, during which she determined that southern Africa should have high priority for the allocation of corn held by USDA. Her strong interest in the needs of the region was apparently influential in the U.S. decision to allocate such large volumes of food assistance.

The World Bank played a useful role in assisting affected countries to respond to the drought by relaxing target dates for structural reform actions and by making credit available so countries could commercially import needed grain. However, adherence to standard procurement procedures meant that the process could not always be executed swiftly enough to be effective. USAID played a useful role by putting a discussion of the drought's economic effects on the World Bank's agenda.

The confidence underlying the decision to use WFP as the main body responsible for delivering relief food shipments to southern Africa was fully justified. WFP competently kept track of pledges and the movement of food commodities donated for free distribution (the so-called targeted food aid), organized the coordination of information on donor shipments and transport logistics from the LAC in Harare and its branch Logistics

Advisory Unit in Johannesburg, and managed the funds provided by the United States and other donors to help break logistical bottlenecks.

The estimates of food import requirements based on meteorological and production data first produced by the SADC Early Warning System were credible and were not significantly disputed by subsequent assessment teams. The work of the outside assessment teams basically confirmed the estimates produced by the SADC Early Warning Units and were probably necessary to lend credibility to international appeals for food assistance, particularly given the large volumes requested.

The proven usefulness of the Grain Operations Control Center was so significant, the gains from the experience of direct interface among railway representatives so valuable, and the opportunity to serve intra-regional trade on an expanded basis so important, that SPOORNET decided to keep the Control Center open, under the direction of a senior official, to manage all regional trade using South Africa's ports and railways. It is likely that the experience of coordination of the massive drought relief effort will have helped establish a positive working attitude toward South African capabilities and willingness to act as an economic partner in the region. Such a change may help foster increased economic cooperation as the process of political change within South Africa continues.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

When managing a major relief response, USAID should form a Task Force to identify and track key actions, share information with key players in and outside of USAID, and track international food and non-food pledges.

It is useful, and perhaps necessary, for U.S. disaster interventions to have high-level political visibility in order to ensure inter-departmental cooperation, access necessary resources and to resolve differences.

USAID should coordinate as closely as possible:

- with local organizations, international NGOs, and multilateral agencies when responding to an emergency;
- in assessment missions, which should be designed to coordinate in timing and methodology with the assessments of all other organizations similarly involved; and
- in preparedness training programs, which may be adequately conceived and carried out by organizations such as the U.N. or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

As soon as USAID becomes aware that a country is suffering from a disaster, it should confer with World Bank officials, at a high level, to ensure that they are aware of the

situation and will take steps to see that disaster-related factors are taken into consideration in the context of support for structural reform. Countries facing extraordinary food deficits should be encouraged to commercially purchase grain imports as quickly as possible even if this results in relaxing national resource allocation strictures.

USAID should take the initiative to organize discussion among bilateral and multilateral donors of the steps that are possible to simplify and curtail procedural requirements in disaster situations.

USAID should offer support, if needed, to the SADC effort to expand baseline data on nutritional status and household incomes as a basis for analysis of the household aspects of national and regional food security.

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ANNEX C

Evaluation Methodology

ANNEX C: Evaluation Methodology

Information contained in this synthesis report was based on the findings, conclusions and recommendations of nine discrete country evaluation reports (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) plus Annex B which explains the role of USAID/Washington and select multilateral agencies, including the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the World Bank and the World Food Program (WFP).

The MSI evaluation team undertook the following activities in carrying out the southern Africa drought relief evaluation.

Reviewed the existing body of literature concerning lessons from previous U.S. Government responses to food shortages in Africa as well as numerous documents dealing with the effectiveness of drought relief efforts in response to the 1991/92 drought in southern Africa. An illustrative bibliography is presented as Annex G. For a more detailed list of documents reviewed consult annexes of country reports and the report on the role of USAID/Washington and multilateral institutions.

Conducted field research in the following countries:

- Botswana - November 1-3, 1993
- Lesotho - November 4-11, 1993
- Malawi - October 18-29, 1993
- Mozambique - October 25 - November 12, 1993
- Namibia - October 18-31, 1993
- South Africa - October 26 - November 5, 1993
- Switzerland (Geneva, UNDHA) - October 10, 1993
- Zambia - October 4-15, 1993
- Zimbabwe - October 12-25, 1993

Over 400 persons were interviewed in ten countries. These included persons from the following organizations: USAID field missions and Washington offices; USDA; UNDHA in New York and Geneva; numerous U.S. and international NGOs; and WFP. For a complete list of persons interviewed consult annexes of country reports.

Draft country reports were submitted to USAID/BHR and the respective USAID missions for review and comments. The synthesis report was circulated among USAID/AFR, BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP before finalization.

This evaluation was conducted by an 11-person team from MSI. Evaluation team members and roles are presented below.

David Callihan, Chief of Party

Allison Butler Herrick (Team Leader - Zimbabwe and South Africa)
Richard Greene (Zimbabwe and South Africa)

John Eriksen (Team Leader - Botswana, Lesotho, and Namibia)
Ira Amstader (Botswana, Lesotho, and Namibia)

Adam Koons (Team Leader - Malawi and Zambia)
Ruth Berger (Malawi and Zambia)

Stahis Panagides (Team Leader - Mozambique)
Katherine Lawder (Mozambique)

Julia Nenon, Technical Support

Conrad Meub, Statistical Research and Analysis

ANNEX D

**Southern Africa Drought Emergency,
U.S. Government Assistance, Statistical Tables (as of March 31, 1993)**

SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EMERGENCY (SADE)

U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE

As of March 31, 1993

Compiled by USAID

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**SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EMERGENCY
U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
As of March 31, 1993**

Summary of USG Assistance by Source & Fiscal Year	1
Detail of USG Assistance by Source & Fiscal Year	
A.I.D./Bureau for Africa	2
State Department/Bureau for Refugee Programs	3
A.I.D./Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance	4
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Namibia	18
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Zambia	20
Zimbabwe	21

SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EMERGENCY
U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
By Source & Fiscal Year
As of March 31, 1993

	<u>FY-92</u>	<u>FY-93</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
I. A.I.D.	\$239,010,099	\$111,984,995	\$350,995,094
A. Food Aid			
of which:			
- PL 480 Title II	\$ 62,198,100	\$ 46,900,000	\$109,098,100
- PL 480 Title III	\$ 82,210,000	\$ 39,000,000	\$121,210,000
- C.I.P. (DFA & ESF)	\$ 13,000,000		\$ 13,000,000
- OFDA: (AA Fund)	\$ 25,000		\$ 25,000
Sub-total	\$157,433,100	\$ 85,900,000	\$243,333,100
B. Non-Food Aid			
OFDA	\$ 33,254,999	\$ 6,104,995	\$ 39,359,994
Bureau for Africa	\$ 48,322,000	\$ 19,980,000	\$ 68,302,000
Sub-total	\$ 81,576,999	\$ 26,084,995	\$107,661,994
II. USDA	\$328,546,100	\$112,387,300	\$440,933,400
A. Food Aid			
of which:			
- PL 480 Title I	\$ 40,000,000	\$ 5,000,000	\$ 45,000,000
- Section 416(b)	\$288,546,100	\$107,387,300	\$395,933,400
III. State/Refugee Programs	\$ 14,557,332	\$ 105,364	\$ 14,662,696
A. Food Aid			
- Cash Contribution to WFP	\$ 10,000,000	0	\$ 10,000,000
B. Non-Food Aid	\$ 4,557,332	\$ 105,364	\$ 4,662,696
TOTAL USG	<u>\$582,113,531</u>	<u>\$224,477,659</u>	<u>\$806,591,190</u>

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**SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EMERGENCY
DETAIL OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE BY SOURCE AND TYPE OF ACTIVITY**

**A.I.D. BUREAU FOR AFRICA
As of March 31, 1993
(All FY-1992 unless noted)**

DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA (DFA)

REGIONAL

SARP Drought Emergency Relief & Recovery Project	\$35,000,000 *
(FY-92: \$15,020,000)	
(FY-93: \$19,980,000) *	
SARP Regional Transport Project	\$ 5,500,000
(portion in support of drought assistance)	
SARP ICRISAT sorghum & millet seed	\$ 1,150,000
(portion in support of drought assistance)	
Extension of FEWS project to southern Africa	\$ 2,900,000
Africare Regional Water Project	\$ 2,600,000
Peace Corps Drought Emergency Project	\$ 802,000
Sub-Total	\$47,952,000

* FY-93 portion is estimated

MALAWI

SCF/UK for water project	\$ 1,150,000
Government's Drought Response Coordination Unit	\$ 50,000
(through SHARED project)	
Sub-Total	\$ 1,200,000

MOZAMBIQUE

PVO Support Project	\$11,900,000
Primary Health Care Project	\$ 7,000,000
Sub-Total	\$18,900,000

ZAMBIA

Maize Markets NPA	\$12,000,000
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ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe self-help water projects	\$ 250,000
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TOTAL DFA: \$80,302,000

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS (ESF)

ZAMBIA

Maize Markets NPA	\$ 1,000,000
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TOTAL ESF: \$ 1,000,000

GRAND TOTAL \$81,302,000

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**SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EMERGENCY
DETAIL OF U.S.GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE BY SOURCE AND TYPE OF ACTIVITY**

STATE/BUREAU FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS

**As of March 31, 1993
(All FY 1992 unless noted)**

FOOD AID

REGIONAL

World Food Program - food purchases **\$10,000,000**

NON-FOOD AID

REGIONAL

UNHCR for water and other non-food **\$ 2,000,000**
assistance programs

UNV for 10 food aid monitors **\$ 300,000**

Sub-Total **\$ 2,300,000**

MALAWI

IRC for health project **\$ 78,810**

MSF/France for health project **\$ 170,422**

(FY-92: \$ 65,058)

(FY-93: \$105,364)

Sub-Total **\$ 249,232**

MOZAMBIQUE

ICRC for emergency appeal **\$ 2,000,000**

SOUTH AFRICA

MSF/France for water/sanitation project **\$ 113,464**

GRAND TOTAL **\$14,662,696**

**SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EMERGENCY
 DETAIL OF U.S.GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE BY SOURCE AND TYPE OF ACTIVITY**

**A.I.D. OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE
 As of March 31, 1993**

REGIONAL - (All FY 1992)

World Food Program logistical assistance	\$2,500,000
Food monitoring project	1,000,000
A.I.D. Assessment Team	105,500
Relief Coordinator SADE Task Force	35,911
Telecommunications Assessment Team support	17,085
American Red Cross for International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	190,230
Africare Regional Water Project	1,502,959
Peace Corps PASA for emergency response to the region	167,000

REGIONAL TOTAL **\$5,518,685**

LESOTHO - (All FY 1992)

Ambassador's Authority Fund food transport/distribution	25,000
UNICEF for immunization and health program***	150,000
American Red Cross for emergency project in Lesotho**	105,000

LESOTHO TOTAL **\$280,000**

MALAWI

FY 1992

Emergency relief coordinator	144,177
Ambassador's Authority Fund to monitor food movement	25,000
International Rescue Committee for food distribution and monitoring, water supply, health and nutrition in the Ntcheu District	357,706
UNICEF program***	400,000
American Red Cross for food monitors in the Nsanje and Chikwawa Districts**	169,000
Christian Reformed World Relief Committee for food distribution in the Lilongwe District	330,450
Save the Children Federation/US for food distribution in the Mangochi District	394,952
Church World Services (Blantyre Synod) for food distribution in the Mwanza District	120,868
Adventist Development & Relief Agency for food distribution in the Machinga District	315,409
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture for production and distribution of cassava and sweet potato seedlings	497,772
Malawi Sub-Total FY 1992	\$2,755,334

FY 1993

Ambassador's Authority Fund for water projects	25,000
Malawi Sub-Total FY 1993	\$ 25,000

MALAWI TOTAL **\$2,780,334**

NAMIBIA

FY 1992

Emergency relief coordinator	28,150
Ambassador's Authority Fund for water projects	25,000
International Medical Corps drilling of 20 boreholes	431,832
UNICEF for immunization and health programs***	700,000
American Red Cross for vitamin A food distribution**	51,350
Namibia Sub-Total FY 1992	\$1,236,332

FY 1993

IMC drilling of 20 additional boreholes	277,739
Peace Corps for purchase of computer equipment	3,000
Namibia Sub-Total FY 1993	\$ 280,739

NAMIBIA TOTAL

\$1,517,071

SOUTH AFRICA

FY 1992

Medecins Sans Frontier rehabilitation of water points	117,000
Rural Advice Center rehabilitation of water points	104,000
Water expert	18,000
International Executive Service Corps water experts	200,000
Sanitation, water, and drought coordinator	100,000
South Africa Sub-Total FY 1992	\$539,000*

FY 1993

Medecins Sans Frontier rehabilitation of water points	120,000
South Africa Sub-Total FY 1993	\$ 120,000

SOUTH AFRICA TOTAL

\$659,000*

* All of the water projects are being implemented in the "Homelands"

SWAZILAND

FY 1992

Ambassador's Authority Fund for purchase of emergency food relief	25,000
UNICEF for supplementary feeding and health programs***	50,000
American Red Cross for food distribution**	100,000
Swaziland Sub-Total FY 1992	\$175,000

FY 1993

Grant to World Food Program for agricultural inputs (maize seeds)	1,866,090
Swaziland Sub-Total FY 1993	\$1,866,090

SWAZILAND TOTAL

\$2,041,090

ZAMBIA

FY 1992

UN Food monitoring coordinator	57,772
UNICEF for supplementary feeding and health programs***	250,000
American Red Cross for food distribution**	275,550
USAID maize storage	170,300
Emergency relief coordinator	189,000
World Food Program food-for-work program	485,000
Zambia Sub-Total FY 1992	\$1,427,622

FY 1993

Extension of maize storage and fumigation	53,500
Zambia Sub-Total FY 1993	\$ 53,500

ZAMBIA TOTAL

\$1,481,122

ZIMBABWE

FY 1992

Ambassador's Authority Fund for water projects	25,000
Private voluntary organization coordinator	15,000
UNICEF for supplementary feeding, water projects, health and immunization projects***	950,000
American Red Cross seeds and food distribution**	144,000
Save the Children Federation/US Supplementary Feeding Program	313,803
Zimbabwe Sub-Total FY 1992	\$1,447,803

FY 1993

Ambassador's Authority Fund for water projects	25,000
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) seeds and water project	834,905
Zimbabwe Sub-Total FY 1993	\$ 859,905

ZIMBABWE TOTAL

\$2,307,708

ANGOLA - ALL FY 1992

Emergency relief coordinator	115,148
Air Charter for A.I.D. Assessment Team	3,100
International Medical Corps immunization program	2,467,527
Africare Health/Nutrition Program in Kuanza Sul	140,481
Africare displaced persons in Waku Kungo	279,657
CARE food distribution in southeastern	2,807,375
CARE food distribution in southwestern	109,554
UNICEF Special Relief Program for Angola (SRPA II), General Appeal	1,000,000
World Food Program SRPA II, General Appeal	1,000,000
UN Development Program SRPA II, General Appeal	500,000
World Food Program SRPA II, air support	744,000
International Committee of the Red Cross purchase of trucks for food distribution	901,000
Catholic Relief Services food distribution in Benguela	1,104,998
Africare seeds, tools for displaced person in Bie	275,369

ANGOLA TOTAL

\$11,448,209

MOZAMBIQUE

FY 1992

World Vision Relief and Development airlift to seven villages in Zambezi and Tete Provinces	1,771,000
World Vision Relief and Development Zambezia Emergency Relief project	264,251
American Red Cross water, health and immunization projects**	321,300
UN World Food Program logistics in moving US supplementary food	2,600,000
Food for the Hungry International emergency airlift	797,000
International Committee of the Red Cross emergency program for affected population	2,000,000
World Relief food distribution	698,463
Mozambique Sub-Total FY 1992	\$8,452,014

FY 1993

Air Serv International air support	146,233
WVRD commodities program	98,400
WVRD airlift to seven villages	1,916,158
AICF supplemental feeding project	206,388
CRS food distribution and security project	532,582
Mozambique Sub-Total FY 1993	\$2,899,761

MOZAMBIQUE TOTAL

\$11,351,775

TOTAL SADE ASSISTANCE FOR FY 1992/1993

\$39,384,994

** Please note that funds provided for the American Red Cross were targeted for projects dealing with water, seeds, tools, health, nutrition and food distribution and were reviewed on a country by country basis.

*** Funds provided for UNICEF were for the areas of water, health, nutrition, sanitation and immunization and were reviewed on a country by country basis.

**Southern Africa Drought Emergency
Listing of Affected Countries/
FY 1992 USG Response**

<u>Country</u>	<u>Metric Tons</u>		<u>Estimated Dollars</u>	
	<u>Funding Source</u>	<u>Approved To Date</u>	<u>Funding Source</u>	<u>Approved To Date</u>
<u>Angola</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	33,984	Title II	\$18,283,100
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416	20,000	Section 416	\$8,725,000
	Subtotal	<u>53,984</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$27,008,100</u>
<u>Botswana</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	4,368	Title II	\$1,354,300
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416		Section 416	
	Subtotal	<u>4,368</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$1,354,300</u>
<u>Lesotho</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	8,114	Title II	\$3,864,000
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416	5,000	Section 416	\$1,590,000
	Subtotal	<u>13,114</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$5,454,000</u>
<u>Malawi</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	45,000	Title II	\$17,055,000
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416	238,000	Section 416	\$96,224,000
	Subtotal	<u>283,000</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$113,279,000</u>
<u>Mozambique</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	42,579	Title II	\$14,781,700
	Title III	246,039	Title III	\$49,210,000
	Section 416	200,000	Section 416	\$72,200,000
	Subtotal	<u>488,618</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$136,191,700</u>
<u>Namibia</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II		Title II	
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416	10,000	Section 416	\$2,580,000
	Subtotal	<u>10,000</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$2,580,000</u>

**Southern Africa Drought Emergency
Listing of Affected Countries/
FY 1992 USG Response**

Country	Metric Tons		Estimated Dollars	
	Funding Source	Approved To Date	Funding Source	Approved To Date
<u>Swaziland</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II		Title II	
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416	10,500	Section 416	\$3,108,100
	Subtotal	<u>10,500</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$3,108,100</u>
<u>Zambia</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	20,000	Title II	\$6,860,000
	Title III	200,772	Title III	\$33,000,000
	Section 416	110,000	Section 416	\$37,080,000
	Subtotal	<u>330,772</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$76,940,000</u>
<u>Zimbabwe</u>	Title I	330,339	Title I	\$40,000,000
	Title II		Title II	
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416	203,000	Section 416	\$67,039,000
	Subtotal	<u>533,339</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$107,039,000</u>
<u>WFP Regional Supplemental</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II		Title II	
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416		Section 416	
	Subtotal	<u>0</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$0</u>
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	Title I	330,339	Title I	\$40,000,000
	Title II	154,045	Title II	\$62,198,100
	Title III	446,811	Title III	\$82,210,000
	Section 416	796,500	Section 416	\$288,546,100
		<u>1,727,695</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$472,954,200</u>

Note: Dates are estimated, and are regularly updated with the most current information.

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**Southern Africa Drought Emergency Report
Listing of Affected Countries/
FY 1993 USG Response**

	Metric Tons		Estimated Dollars	
<u>Country</u>	<u>Funding Source</u>	<u>Approved To Date</u>	<u>Funding Source</u>	<u>Approved To Date</u>
<u>Angola</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	8,529	Title II	\$5,127,400
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416		Section 416	
	Subtotal	<u>8,529</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$5,127,400</u>
<u>Botswana</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II		Title II	
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416		Section 416	
	Subtotal	<u>0</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$0</u>
<u>Lesotho</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	10,121	Title II	\$3,775,100
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416		Section 416	
	Subtotal	<u>10,121</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$3,775,100</u>
<u>Malawi</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	1,500	Title II	\$1,488,800
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416	148,500	Section 416	\$59,496,800
	Subtotal	<u>150,000</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$60,985,600</u>
<u>Mozambique</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	75,586	Title II	\$26,510,500
	Title III	206,000	Title III	\$39,000,000
	Section 416	109,000	Section 416	\$34,460,500
	Subtotal	<u>390,586</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$99,971,000</u>
<u>Namibia</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II		Title II	
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416		Section 416	
	Subtotal	<u>0</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$0</u>

**Southern Africa Drought Emergency Report
Listing of Affected Countries/
FY 1993 USG Response**

<u>Country</u>	<u>Metric Tons</u>		<u>Estimated Dollars</u>	
	<u>Funding Source</u>	<u>Approved To Date</u>	<u>Funding Source</u>	<u>Approved To Date</u>
<u>Swaziland</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	3,805	Title II	\$1,919,400
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416	10,000	Section 416	\$2,590,000
	Subtotal	<u>13,805</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$4,509,400</u>
<u>Zambia</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II		Title II	
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416		Section 416	
	Subtotal	<u>0</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$0</u>
<u>Zimbabwe</u>	Title I	52,600	Title I	\$5,000,000
	Title II	5,000	Title II	\$1,965,000
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416		Section 416	
	Subtotal	<u>57,600</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$6,965,000</u>
<u>WFP Regional Unallocated</u>	Title I		Title I	
	Title II	10,970	Title II	\$6,113,800
	Title III		Title III	
	Section 416	40,000	Section 416	\$10,840,000
	Subtotal	<u>50,970</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$16,953,800</u>
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	Title I	52,600	Title I	\$5,000,000
	Title II	115,511	Title II	\$46,900,000
	Title III	206,000	Title III	\$39,000,000
	Section 416	307,500	Section 416	\$107,387,300
		<u>681,611</u>	Subtotal	<u>\$198,287,300</u>

Note: Dates are estimated, and are regularly updated with the most current information.

SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION

COUNTRY	AFFECTED POPULATION	FOOD			NON-FOOD		TOTAL
		FAO/WFP FOOD NEEDED ESTIMATE MT	US CONTRIBUTIONS MT		UN ESTIMATED NON-FOOD AID NBBDS \$	US CONTRIBUTION \$	TOTAL US CONTRIBUTION \$
ANGOLA	1,400,000	74,831	62,513	32,135,500	26,031,000	11,448,209	43,583,709
BOTSWANA	100,000	16,700	4,368	1,354,300	3,246,994	0	1,354,300
LESOTHO	170,000	60,702	23,235	9,229,100	5,042,278	280,000	9,509,100
MALAWI	5,700,000	N/A	433,000	174,264,600	31,325,890	4,229,566	178,494,166
MOZAMBIQUE (a)	3,150,000	1,353,881	879,204	236,162,700	43,621,000	32,251,775	268,414,475
NAMIBIA	250,000	37,850	10,000	2,580,000	13,887,227	1,517,071	4,097,071
SOUTH AFRICA (b)	n/a	n/a	-	-	n/a	772,464	772,464
SWAZILAND	250,000	46,475	24,420	7,642,500	6,565,015	2,016,090	9,658,590
ZAMBIA	1,700,000	N/A	372,487	89,940,000	41,923,872	1,481,122	91,421,122
ZIMBABWE	4,600,000	N/A	590,939	114,004,000	25,422,727	2,557,708	116,561,708
REGIONAL							
Allocated:							
Drought - Affected (c)						53,470,685	53,470,685
Refugees (d)			13,213	10,000,000		2,300,000	12,300,000
Unallocated			50,970	16,953,800			16,953,800
Sub - Total Regional			64,183	26,953,800		55,770,685	82,724,485
GRAND TOTAL	17,320,000	N/A	2,464,349	694,266,500	197,066,003	112,324,690	806,591,190

SUMMARY OF FOOD AID BY FISCAL YEAR:
 FY-92: 1,762,736 MT \$465,879,200
 FY-93: 661,811 MT \$166,267,300
 TOTAL 2,424,547 MT \$632,146,500

SUMMARY OF NON-FOOD AID BY FISCAL YEAR
 FY-92: \$ 66,134,331
 FY-93: \$ 26,180,359
 TOTAL \$112,324,690

SUMMARY OF REGIONAL NON-FOOD AID BY SOURCE:
 Total OFDA: \$ 5,516,885
 Total DFA: \$47,952,000
 Total State/FP: \$ 2,300,000
 TOTAL: \$55,770,885

- a) From State/RP: \$2,000,000 to ICRC for emergency relief activities
 b) From OFDA: \$237,000 to MSF/France, \$104,000 to the Rural Advice Center for well and borehole drilling and rehabilitation, \$218,000 for water experts, \$100,000 for support personnel
 From State/RP: \$113,464 to MSF/France for water & sanitation activities
 c) From OFDA: \$105,500 for regional assessment, \$35,911 for support personnel, \$2,500,000 to WFP for food aid logistics, \$1,000,000 for food monitoring, \$190,230 to American Red Cross for IFRC regional delegates, \$1,502,959 to Africare for regional water project, \$167,000 to Peace Corps for food monitoring & water activities, \$17,085 for telecommunications assessment team support
 From DFA: \$40,500,000 (est) to USAID/SARP for regional transport, relief & recovery, \$1,150,000 to ICRISAT for seeds, \$2,900,000 to FEWS (Famine Early Warning System); \$802,000 to Peace Corps for water activities, \$2,600,000 to Africare for regional water project
 d) From State/Bureau for Refugee Programs: \$10,000,000 to WFP for food purchases; \$2,000,000 to UNHCR for non-food aid activities; \$300,000 to UNV for food aid monitors

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Country Table - Southern Africa Drought					
ANGOLA					
Date: March 31, 1983					
Total Population: 8,668,000					
Affected Population: 1,400,000					
	REVISED NEEDS PER UNSADC - FEB 83		USG CONTRIBUTION		
	MT	\$	MT	\$	
I. FOOD AID					
TOTAL IMPORT REQUIREMENT	323,265				
LESS COMMERCIAL IMPORTS:	180,000				
TOTAL FOOD AID REQUIREMENT:	163,265				
OF WHICH					
PROGRAMME FOOD AID	8,000				
TARGETED FOOD AID	154,265				
	(74,831)	63,568,000	FY-82	53,984	27,008,100
			FY-83	8,529	5,127,400
Sub-Total Food	74,831	63,568,000	62,513	32,135,500	
II. NON-FOOD AID					
AGRICULTURE		6,092,000			
LOGISTICS		7,657,000			
HEALTH & NUTRITION (b)		4,865,000		2,467,527	
WATER (c)		3,115,000		420,138	
DISPLACED/RETURNEES (d)		4,282,000		275,369	
OTHER (e)				4,822,827	
Sub-Total Non-Food		26,031,000		8,065,061	
III. OTHER DROUGHT-RELATED ASSISTANCE					
UN SPECIAL RELIEF PROGRAM (f)				3,244,000	
OTHER (g)				118,248	
Sub-Total Drought-Related				3,362,248	
Sub-Total Non-Food & Drought Related				11,448,209	
GRAND TOTAL		89,599,000	62,513	43,583,709	

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SUMMARY OF NON-FOOD & DROUGHT RELATED

Total OFDA: \$11,448,209 (FY-82)
TOTAL: \$11,448,209

- a) Of the 154,265 MT needed, approximately 79,434 MT was already available from WFP resources, (including some of the USG contribution), leaving a balance of 74,831 MT needed for an estimated value of \$63,568,000.
 - b) From OFDA: \$2,467,627 to IMC for immunization programs
 - c) From OFDA: \$420,138 to Africare for water projects
 - d) From OFDA: \$275,369 to Africare for seeds, tools, etc. for displaced persons
 - e) From OFDA: \$2,916,929 to CARE for foodseed distribution in SE and SW Angola; \$1,104,998 to CRS for food distribution and water activities; \$601,000 to ICPC for truck purchases
 - f) UN Special Relief Program: From OFDA - \$1 million for UNICEF, \$1.74 million for WFP, \$500,000 for UNDP
- NOTE: According to the UN-SADCC appeal, funds requested under the section for Angola have already been requested of the international community under SRPA II. Since the response to the appeal has been inadequate, the UN-SADCC appeal has incorporated the unmet portions of SRPA II.
- g) From OFDA: \$118,248 for other support activities

Country Table - Southern Africa Drought

BOTSWANA

Date: March 31, 1993
 Total Population: 1,292,281
 Affected Population: 100,000

	REVISED NEEDS UN/SADC - FEB 93		USG CONTRIBUTION	
	MT	\$	MT	\$
I. FOOD AID				
TOTAL IMPORT REQUIREMENT	241,700			
LESS COMMERCIAL IMPORTS:	<u>225,000</u>			
TOTAL FOOD AID REQUIREMENT:	16,700			
OF WHICH:				
PROGRAMME FOOD AID	11,700			
TARGETED FOOD AID	<u>5,000</u>	3,106,000	FY-92 4,368	<u>1,354,300</u>
Sub-Total Food	16,700	3,106,000	4,368	1,354,300
II. NON-FOOD				
AGRICULTURE		413,000		
HEALTH & SANITATION		602,994		
LOGISTICS		1,900,000		
PUBLIC WORKS		<u>331,000</u>		
Sub-Total Non-Food		3,246,994		
III. OTHER DROUGHT-RELATED ASSISTANCE				
N/A				
Sub-Total Drought-Related				
Sub-Total Non-Food & Drought Related				
GRAND TOTAL		6,352,994	4,368	1,354,300

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Country Table - Southern Africa Drought					
LESOTHO					
Date: March 31, 1993					
Total Population: 1,801,000					
Affected Population: 170,000					
	REVISED NEEDS		USG CONTRIBUTION		
	UN/SADC - FEB 93		MT		\$
	MT	\$		MT	\$
I. FOOD AID					
TOTAL IMPORT REQUIREMENT	299,702				
LESS COMMERCIAL IMPORTS:	222,000				
TOTAL FOOD AID REQUIREMENT:	77,702				
OF WHICH:					
PROGRAMME FOOD AID	45,000				
TARGETED FOOD AID	15,702	8,033,820	FY-92 13,114		5,454,000
			FY-93 10,121		3,775,100
Sub-Total Food	60,702	8,033,820	23,235		9,229,100
II. NON-FOOD AID					
AGRICULTURE		900,000			
LOGISTICS		356,430			
HEALTH & NUTRITION		130,000			
VULNERABLE GROUPS		2,202,262			
WATER		1,453,586			
OTHER (a)		0			280,000
Sub-Total Non-Food		5,042,278			280,000
III. OTHER DROUGHT-RELATED ASSISTANCE					
N/A					
Sub-Total Drought-Related					
Sub-Total Non-Food & Drought Related					280,000
GRAND TOTAL		11,076,098	23,235		9,509,100

SUMMARY OF NON-FOOD & DROUGHT RELATED

Total OFDA: \$280,000 (FY-92)

TOTAL: \$280,000

a) From OFDA: \$105,000 to American Red Cross for Int'l Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) appeal to SADE for emergency relief activities; \$150,000 to UNICEF for water, nutritional surveillance and other emergency programs; \$25,000 for Ambassador's Authority (AA) fund

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Country Table - Southern Africa Drought		FOOD NEEDS = N/A (REQUIRES CLARIFICATION)		USG CONTRIBUTION	
		NON-FOOD NEEDS - PER UN/SADC	\$	MT	\$
MALAWI					
Date: March 31, 1993					
Total Population:		9,605,342			
Affected Population:		5,700,000			
I. FOOD AID					
TOTAL IMPORT REQUIREMENT LESS COMMERCIAL IMPORTS:					
TOTAL FOOD AID REQUIREMENT OF WHICH:					
PROGRAMME FOOD AID					
TARGETED FOOD AID					
Sub-Total Targeted				FY-92 163,000	64,763,000
				FY-93 61,500	25,527,795
				224,500	90,290,795
FOR REFUGEES					
Sub-Total Refugees				FY-92 120,000	48,516,000
				FY-93 88,500	35,457,805
				208,500	83,973,805
Sub-Total Food				433,000	174,264,600
II. NON-FOOD AID					
LOGISTICS			2,230,178		
AGRICULTURE (a)			2,470,000		497,772
HEALTH (b)			3,180,000		357,706
WATER/SANITATION (c)			8,110,799		1,175,000
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT			385,000		
REFUGEES (d)			14,949,913		249,232
OTHER (e)			0		1,755,679
Sub-Total Non-Food			31,325,890		4,035,389
III. OTHER DROUGHT-RELATED ASSISTANCE					
OTHER (f)					194,177
Sub-Total Drought-Related					194,177
Sub-Total Non-Food & Drought Related					4,229,566
GRAND TOTAL			N/A	433,000	178,494,166



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SUMMARY OF NON-FOOD & DROUGHT RELATED	
OFDA:	\$2,780,334 (FY-92: \$2,755,334) (FY-93: \$ 25,000)
DFA:	\$1,150,000 (FY-92)
AA Self-Help:	\$ 50,000 (FY-92)
State/RP:	\$ 249,232 (FY-92: \$143,868) (FY-93: \$105,364)
TOTAL	\$4,229,566

- a) From OFDA: \$497,772 to ITTA for famine mitigation activities (drought resistant crops)
- b) From OFDA: \$357,706 to IRC (Also includes assistance for water activities and food distribution)
- c) From Ambassador's Self-Help Fund: \$50,000; from reprogrammed DFA: \$1,100,000 to SCF/UK
- d) From State/RP: \$170,422 to MSF/France for supplementary feeding, \$78,810 to IRC for drought related expansion
- e) From OFDA: \$400,000 to UNICEF and \$169,000 to ARC for IFRC, \$25,000 thru Ambassador's Authority (AA) Fund to WFP for food monitoring program; \$330,450 to CRWRC, \$394,952 to SCF/US, \$120,000 to CWS, \$315,409 to ADRA, all for food distribution
- f) From reprogrammed DFA: \$50,000 grant thru SHARED project to GOM Drought Response Coordination Unit (DRCU); from OFDA: \$144,177 for support personnel

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Country Table - Southern Africa Drought					
MOZAMBIQUE					
Date: March 31, 1993					
Total Population: 15,814,000					
Affected Population: 3,150,000					
	REVISED NEEDS UN/SADC - FEB 93		USG CONTRIBUTION		
	MT	\$	MT	\$	
I. FOOD AID					
TOTAL IMPORT REQUIREMENT	1,424,881				
LESS COMMERCIAL IMPORTS:	71,000				
TOTAL FOOD AID REQUIREMENT	1,353,881				
OF WHICH:					
PROGRAMME FOOD AID	881,000		FY-92	248,039	49,210,000
			FY-93	206,000	39,000,000
Sub-Total Programme				452,039	88,210,000
TARGETED FOOD AID	497,881	204,808,320	FY-92	242,579	88,981,700
			FY-93	184,588	90,971,000
Sub-Total Targeted				427,165	147,952,700
Sub-Total Food	1,358,881	204,808,320		879,204	236,162,700
II. NON-FOOD AID					
AGRICULTURE/LIVESTOCK		33,385,000			
HEALTH (a)		771,000			7,000,000
WATER		6,884,000			
RELIEF & SURVIVAL ITEMS		509,000			
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT		2,112,000			
OTHER (b)		-			13,351,775
Sub-Total Non-Food		43,621,000			20,351,775
III. OTHER DROUGHT-RELATED ASSISTANCE					
OTHER (c)					11,900,000
Sub-Total Drought-Related					11,900,000
Sub-Total Non-Food & Drought Related					32,251,775
GRAND TOTAL		248,527,320		879,204	268,414,475

SUMMARY OF NON-FOOD & DROUGHT RELATED

Total OFDA: \$11,361,776 (FY-92: \$8,462,014)
(FY-93: \$2,899,761)

Total DFA: \$18,900,000 (FY-92)

Total State/RP: \$2,000,000 (FY-92)

TOTAL: \$32,251,775

a) From DFA: \$7,000,000 for Mozambique's Primary Health Care Project

b) From OFDA: \$3,987,158 to World Vision for emergency airlifts to inaccessible areas, \$284,251 for airlifts to Zambezia, \$88,400 for commodities program, \$2,800,000 to WFP for food aid logistical support, \$2,000,000 to ICRC for Emergency Action Plan, \$797,000 to FHI for emergency airlifts, \$698,463 to WRI for food distribution, \$321,300 to American Red Cross for IFRC emergency relief activities, \$206,388 to AICF for supplementary feeding, \$532,562 to CRS for food distribution and security, \$148,233 to AirServ for air support

From State/RP: \$2,000,000 to ICRC for emergency relief activities.

c) From new and reprogrammed DFA: \$11,900,000 for PVO support project

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Country Table - Southern Africa Drought					
NAMIBIA					
Date: March 31, 1993					
Total Population: 1,520,000					
Affected Population: 250,000					
	REVISED NEEDS PER UN/SADC - FEB 93		USG CONTRIBUTION		
	MT	\$	MT	\$	
I. FOOD AID					
TOTAL IMPORT REQUIREMENT	102,850				
LESS COMMERCIAL IMPORTS:	65,000				
TOTAL FOOD AID REQUIREMENT	37,850				
OF WHICH:					
PROGRAMME FOOD AID	20,000				
TARGETED FOOD AID	17,850	6,925,000	FY-92	10,000	2,580,000
Sub-Total Food	37,850	8,925,000		10,000	2,580,000
II. NON-FOOD AID					
AGRICULTURE		785,000			
HEALTH & NUTRITION		2,919,227			
WATER (a)		8,000,000			734,571
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT		1,208,000			
VULNERABLE GROUPS		975,000			
OTHER (b)		0			751,350
Sub-Total Non-Food		13,887,227			1,485,921
III. OTHER DROUGHT-RELATED ASSISTANCE					
OTHER (c)					31,150
Sub-Total Drought-Related					31,150
Sub-Total Non-Food & Drought Related	(e)				1,517,071
GRAND TOTAL		20,812,227		10,000	4,097,071

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e) SUMMARY OF NON-FOOD & DROUGHT RELATED
 Total OFDA: \$1,517,071 (FY-92: \$1,236,332)
 (FY-93: \$ 280,739)
TOTAL: \$1,517,071

- a) From OFDA: \$25,000 thru AA Fund to GON for water bladders and \$709,571 to IMC for water drilling
- b) From OFDA: \$51,350 to ARC for IFRC; \$700,000 to UNICEF
- c) From OFDA: \$28,150 for support personnel, \$3,000 to Peace Corps for computer equipment

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

Country Table -- Southern African Drought					
SWAZILAND					
Date: March 31, 1993					
Total Population: 882,891					
Affected Population: 250,000					
	REVISED NEEDS UN/SADC - NOV 92		USG CONTRIBUTION		
	MT	\$	MT	\$	
I. FOOD AID					
TOTAL IMPORT REQUIREMENT	134,475				
LESS COMMERCIAL IMPORTS:	<u>69,000</u>				
TOTAL FOOD AID REQUIREMENT:	65,475				
OF WHICH:					
PROGRAMME FOOD AID					
TARGETED FOOD AID (a)	<u>46,475</u>	<u>14,297,000</u>	FY-92	10,615	3,133,100
			FY-93	13,805	4,509,400
Sub-Total Food	46,475	14,297,000		24,420	7,642,500
II. NON-FOOD AID					
AGRICULTURE (b)		4,452,565			1,866,090
HEALTH & NUTRITION		691,750			
WATER		1,170,700			
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT		250,000			
OTHER (c)		0			150,000
Sub-Total Non-Food		6,565,015			2,016,090
III. OTHER DROUGHT-RELATED ASSISTANCE					
N/A					
Sub-Total Drought-Related					
Sub-Total Non-Food & Drought Related					2,016,090
GRAND TOTAL		20,862,015		24,420	9,658,590

SUMMARY OF NON-FOOD & DROUGHT RELATED
 Total OFDA: \$2,016,090 (FY-92: \$150,000; FY-93: \$1,866,090)
 TOTAL: \$2,016,090

- a) From OFDA: \$25,000 thru AA Fund for purchase of 115 MT of maize
- b) From OFDA: \$1,866,090 to WFP for agricultural inputs
- c) From OFDA: \$100,000 to American Red Cross for IFRC; \$50,000 to UNICEF

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

Country Table - Southern Africa Drought			
ZAMBIA			
Date: March 31, 1983			
Total Population:		8,745,284	
Affected Population:		1,700,000	
		FOOD NEEDS = N/A (REQUIRES CLARIFICATION)	
NON-FOOD NEEDS - PER UN/SADC		USG CONTRIBUTION	
		MT	\$
I FOOD AID			
TOTAL IMPORT REQUIREMENT LESS COMMERCIAL IMPORTS:			
TOTAL FOOD AID REQUIREMENT OF WHICH:			
PROGRAMME FOOD AID		FY-92	300,772
C.I.P. (a)		FY-92	41,715
			66,500,000
			13,000,000
			342,487
			79,500,000
TARGETED FOOD AID			
		FY-92	30,000
			10,440,000
Sub-Total Food		372,487	89,940,000
II NON-FOOD AID			
LOGISTICS	16,968,712		
AGRICULTURE/LIVESTOCK	214,000		
HEALTH & NUTRITION	1,722,000		
WATER	21,000,000		
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT	2,019,160		
OTHER (b)	0		1,010,550
Sub-Total Non-Food		41,923,872	1,010,550
III OTHER DROUGHT-RELATED ASSISTANCE			
OTHER (c)			470,572
Sub-Total Drought-Related			470,572
Sub-Total Non-Food & Drought Related			1,481,122
GRAND TOTAL		41,923,872	372,487 91,421,122

SUMMARY OF NON-FOOD & DROUGHT RELATED
 Total OFDA: \$1,481,122 (FY-92: \$1,427,822; FY-93: \$53,600)
 TOTAL: \$1,481,122

- a) From DFA: \$12,000,000 and from ESF: \$1,000,000, both for Zambia CIP purchase of maize
 b) From OFDA: \$278,650 for American Red Cross for IFRC; \$250,000 to UNICEF, \$486,000 to WFP for food-for-work program
 c) From OFDA: \$248,772 for support personnel, \$223,800 for maize storage

Country Table - Southern Africa Drought

ZIMBABWE

Date: March 31, 1993

Total Population: 10,720,000

Affected Population: 4,600,000

		FOOD NEEDS = N/A (REQUIRES CLARIFICATION)		USG CONTRIBUTION	
		NON-FOOD NEEDS - PER UN/SADC \$		MT	\$
I. FOOD AID					
TOTAL IMPORT REQUIREMENT LESS COMMERCIAL IMPORTS:					
TOTAL FOOD AID REQUIREMENT OF WHICH:					
PROGRAMME FOOD AID				FY-92	330,339 40,000,000
				FY-93	52,600 5,000,000
Sub-Total Programme					382,939 45,000,000
TARGETED FOOD AID				FY-92	193,000 63,749,000
				FY-93	5,000 1,965,000
Sub-Total Targeted					198,000 65,714,000
FOR REFUGEES				FY-92	10,000 3,290,000
Sub-Total Food					590,939 114,004,000
II. NON-FOOD AID					
AGRICULTURE	7,710,000				
HEALTH & NUTRITION	5,500,569				
WATER (a)	5,491,158				275,000
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT	443,000				
DISPLACED (Multisectoral)	6,278,000				
OTHER (b)	0				2,267,708
Sub-Total Non-Food	25,422,727				2,542,708
III. OTHER DROUGHT-RELATED ASSISTANCE					
OTHER (c)					15,000
Sub-Total Drought-Related					15,000
Sub-Total Non-Food & Drought Related					2,557,708
GRAND TOTAL	25,422,727				590,939 116,561,708

SUMMARY OF NON-FOOD & DROUGHT RELATED

Total OFDA: \$2,307,708 (FY-92: \$1,447,803; FY-93: \$859,905)

Total DFA: \$ 250,000

TOTAL: \$2,557,708

a) From OFDA: \$25,000 to AA Fund for water projects; from reprogrammed DFA, \$250,000 for water activities


b) From OFDA: \$144,000 to American Red Cross to IFRC; \$950,000 to UNICEF; \$313,803 to SCF/US for supplementary feeding program; \$25,000 to AA Fund for emergency relief activities. \$834,905 to CRS for seeds and water project

c) From OFDA: \$15,000 for support personnel

AID Southern Africa Drought Task Force

ANNEX E

Map of Food Aid Corridors




INFORMATION PAPER

BEIRA CORRIDOR GROUP


REPRINTED MAY 1992 NO:2

RAILWAYS AND PORTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA




- OPERATING RAILWAY LINES
- RAILWAYS UNDER REHABILITATION
- NON OPERATIONAL RAILWAYS


BEIRA CORRIDOR



NACALA CORRIDOR



TETE CORRIDOR



LIMPOPO CORRIDOR



TRANSPORT CORRIDORS

THE BEIRA CORRIDOR

The systems which constitute the Beira Corridor are the road, rail, pipeline and electricity powerlines. The tarmac road runs for 298 kms from the Zimbabwe Border at Machipanda to the City and Port of Beira on the Mozambican Coast, where the Port is undergoing a complete rehabilitation. The pipeline runs parallel with the road.

The railway is a single line Southern African gauge which traverses the provinces of Manica and Sofala for the 317 kms between Mutare and Beira. The railway line was refurbished between 1985 and 1988.

The powerlines run from the Chicamba Real Dam to Beira in close proximity to the road. The Pungwe and Buzi rivers flood seasonally which influences the agriculture in the hinterland and the depth of the Pungwe estuary. The heavy siltation results in a requirement for maintenance dredging to the Macuti Channel which permits accesses to Beira Port in the Pungwe estuary.

NACALA CORRIDOR

The Corridor is presently served by a railway for the 615 kms from Entre Lagos in Niassa Province to the deep water port of Nacala in Nampula Province. The railway is undergoing a full rehabilitation which should be complete within three years. A branch line runs from Cuamba to Lichinga

There is a tarmac road between Nacala and Nampula in regular use with convoy escorts and there are plans to upgrade the existing road from Nampula to Cuamba in the future.

The Port of Nacala has been recently refurbished with a container handling system complementing the existing general cargo facilities and an excellent working surface for the port equipments.

THE TETE CORRIDOR


The Tete Corridor is a tarred 262 km road crossing the Tete Province from Nyamapanda on the Zimbabwean Border to the Mozambican Border at Zobue. The road has been comprehensively resheeted between Nyamapanda and the City of Tete, where it crosses the Zambezi river over the Tete Bridge.

The road between Tete and Zobue has not been maintained with a good surface and all transit traffic is escorted as convoys.

THE LIMPOPO CORRIDOR

The Limpopo Corridor is a 534 kms rail link from Chicualacuala to Maputo City and Port. This rail link is still undergoing rehabilitation but it is in current use for commercial transit traffic. The resumption of commercial traffic through the provinces of Gaza and Maputo by rail recommenced in 1991.

There is a tarred road from Maputo to the river bridge at Barragem across the Limpopo River. From Barragem there is a dirt road to the Zimbabwe Border.



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ANNEX F

1991/92 Southern Africa Drought - Chronology of Selected Key Events

ANNEX F: 1991/92 Southern Africa Drought - Chronology of Selected Key Events

- 8/91 Report to the annual summit meeting of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) by the regional Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) that the last harvest had been relatively thin, and some 2,500,000 metric tons of food would have to be imported before April 1992.
- 11/91 Zimbabwe: National Early Warning Unit (NEWU) alert of pending drought. Stocks of grain in Zimbabwe dangerously low; risk that they would be inadequate for the annual January-February period of consumption preceding first harvest period; prediction of failure of the harvest due to lack of late year rains.
- 12/91 Recognition by the SADC Regional Early Warning Unit, based on remote sensing data on cloud cover and vegetative cover that the entire region was dry; countries would not be able to import from their neighbors as in past dry periods.
- Swaziland: First evidence that a unprecedented drought was looming, rains had stopped.
- South Africa: First reports that a drought might affect grain production.
- 1/92 Malawi: First indications of failing rains and drying crops.
- Early warnings alerted South Africa to the regional extent of the drought.
- Swaziland: Establishment of Disaster Drought Committee by Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.
- Namibia: Rains fail in many areas after a "normal" rainy season through December 1991.
- 2/92 Zimbabwe: In the face of certain failure of rains, government appeals to donors for emergency maize shipments.
- Zimbabwe: Emergency Declaration by U.S. Ambassador
- South Africa: Declaration of drought disaster by U.S. Ambassador
- 3/92 Malawi: President Banda declares drought emergency and puts grain import needs at 800,000 metric tons.
- South Africa: First meeting of donors called by USAID to discuss a coordinated response to the drought.

3/92

Zimbabwe: USAID authorizes commitment of \$1,160,000 of funds from the Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program of ICRISAT to locate a suitable site and grow seeds of sorghum and pearl millet that could be used by farmers in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and Malawi in the next planting season.

Zimbabwe: Presidential declaration of a National Disaster and establishment of drought relief Task Force to coordinate and monitor the drought relief and recovery program and mobilize resources.

Zimbabwe: Arrival and prompt distribution of commercial orders of late 1991; cessation of food riots in urban areas.

Beginning of operations by U.N. staff of what was to become the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment missions to 10 countries; confirmation that drought had severely affected crops throughout the region (except in Angola, where food shortages mainly were due to insecurity); conclusion that a major relief effort was needed to avert massive famine.

Logistics assessment by WFP in cooperation with SADC's National and Regional Early Warning Systems, and decision to establish a regional Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) in Harare to coordinate information on ship movements, ports, etc.

BHR/OFDA drought assessment team arrives in southern Africa (approximately two weeks after WFP/FAO team).

4/92

Establishment of the Grain Operations Control Center in Johannesburg to manage movement of grain through the southern corridor.

Decisions by meeting of SADC ministers of transport and of agriculture to: 1) establish a regional drought relief task force of representatives from transport and agriculture ministries and national drought relief organizations, to be chaired by Zimbabwe; 2) establish six transport corridor groups, each based on the port offering access to the interior, and chaired by the respective port authority, the whole to be chaired by the Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC); 3) establish a Logistics Advisory Center in Harare to coordinate information on transport logistics; and 4) call for a donor conference to seek assistance.

5/92

USAID pre-positioned 45,000 metric tons Title II maize arrives in Durban and consigned to Malawi.

USDA credit guarantee for Zimbabwe's purchase of 177,000 metric tons of maize under section 102 of the GSM program.

Zimbabwe: Arrival of FEWS (Famine Early Warning System project) staff to help Department of Social Welfare analyze district and household level data as a basis for identification of the most vulnerable groups in order to inform decisions on food targeting.

National Drought Relief Program is launched by the President of Namibia, His Excellency Dr. Sam Nujoma. Initial projections of government expenditures for drought relief was Rand 171 million (\$ 59,454,000).

Namibia: The National Drought Task Force (NDRTF) is constituted and charged with the responsibility to run the relief operation.

Swaziland: National declaration of drought by Prime Minister.

Swaziland: Establishment of National Disaster Task Force, under coordination of Ministry of Home Affairs.

Swaziland: USAID proposal for a U.S. contribution of 20,000 metric tons of maize under PL480 Title II through WFP's International Emergency Food Reserve.

Lesotho: The Ministry of Finance approaches the African Development Bank for support in dealing with drought emergency. Bank reacts positively but disbursement of funds takes over a year.

The Lesotho Council of NGOs is given a mandate by its membership to coordinate NGO response to drought.

6/92 The military government in Lesotho announces a State of Emergency.

Lesotho: United States Ambassador declares a disaster and gives \$25,000 to the Lesotho Red Cross.

6/92 Namibia: Water volume in the country's major surface catchment dams stands at only 26 percent of full capacity, compared with 42.2 percent in June 1991. Emergency Groundwater Supply Unit (EGSU) is created under Deputy Permanent Secretary of the MAWRD. The largest ever borehole drilling program is started with issuance of ten drilling contracts and five rehabilitation contracts, to run concurrently. In addition, borehole drilling is started by the Department itself and by the International Medical Corps, with the eventual assistance of drought relief Peace Corps Volunteers.

USAID grant to WFP for support of the operations of the LAC and its branch office in Johannesburg, and for equipment and expertise to break bottlenecks in delivery of relief commodities.

Pledging conference, Geneva, reviewed requirements for Targeted Food Aid (to be distributed free), Program Food Aid (for commercial imports) and Non-Food Aid; yielded pledges of 50% of free distribution target and 36% of program food aid target for Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA).

WFP Area Director in Harare designated by U.N. Under Secretary General as United Nations Regional Coordinator for Logistics and Food Transport, responsible for providing information on and coordinating all food aid movements and related logistics in the region and for the WFP management role in the joint SADC/WFP Regional LAC.

Joint approval by WFP and FAO of initial allocation of 711,824 metric tons for a period of 12 months from WFP's International Emergency Food Reserve for targeted free distribution to an estimated 7.8 million drought affected persons in 9/10 countries (later revised to 733,350 metric tons).

USAID pre-positioned maize begins to arrive in Malawi.

7/92 Malawi: ADMARC orders 50,000 metric tons commercial maize.

Malawi: Red Cross is first NGO to assist in food distributions. Other NGOs soon follow.

South Africa: Beginning of activity by the Water Supply Task Force of the Consultative Forum on Drought; first arrival of volunteer water engineers from abroad.

Per WFP estimate, 77% of target food aid to the region pledged, and 35% of program food aid.

7/92 Relaxation by IMF and World Bank of targets for trade liberalization and deficit reduction in Zimbabwe under structural adjustment program, in recognition of costs of drought in foreign exchange costs, demands on public expenditure, stress on parastatal budgets and rise in unemployment.

Namibia: The first 842 metric tons of food is distributed to 67,400 beneficiaries.

Lesotho: Government promises to establish a National Drought Relief Budget for the Drought Relief Implementation Group (DRIG) but does not act.

8/92 Lesotho: Registration of beneficiaries under the Vulnerable Household Feeding Program begins. Registration is completed in December.

BHR/OFDA grant to Africare for emergency water supplies for drought-stricken countries of southern Africa: Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia.

Zimbabwe: Grain Marketing Board offer of incentive price to maize producers for 1992/93 season (up from Z\$580 to Z\$900) and removal of subsidy in price to the four approved grain millers.

Malawi: Government begins issuing monthly district distribution plans according to registration.

Namibia: All but 9,000 metric tons of national cereal import needs of 116,400 metric tons are met by food aid pledges and commercial imports. Local millers have brought 73,200 metric tons of wheat and maize into the country.

9/92 Lesotho: Ministry of Finance approaches the World Bank for support in dealing with drought emergency. Bank reacts positively.

Lesotho: DRIG becomes operational.

Zimbabwe: World Bank credit of US\$35 million for purchase of maize.

Swaziland: Government request for assistance in supplying inputs to small scale maize and cotton farmers for the coming planting season.

Namibia: Agreement between the government and the Council of Churches of Namibia is signed to establish the Food Management and Logistics Unit to cooperate in the management of the transportation, handling, storage and distribution of food aid as directed by the Secretariat of the NDTF.

10/92 Namibia: On average and prior to this month, food rations were distributed to 176,000 beneficiaries per month. In October, the number of people assisted had risen to 220,000 persons and was expected to remain at that level through May 1993.

Arrival at USAID/South Africa of BHR/OFDA-funded drought disaster relief coordinator.

Mozambique: Peace Accord signed.

Zimbabwe: First arrival at port of U.S. maize under PL480 Title I, and delivery to Zimbabwe.

USAID/AFR grant to AFRICARE for recovery program to develop water resources in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe: USAID agreement with government on the use of local currency generations to support drought relief distribution and provide fertilizer for "crop packs" delivered to farmers for the planting season.

First arrival in Zimbabwe of PL480 Title I maize; for distribution, maize from government stocks was added (to be reimbursed from the Section 416(b) donation that had not yet arrived).

Malawi: EC 10,500 metric tons maize diverted from Zambia to Malawi to cover diminishing emergency stocks.

Malawi: U.S. pledges an additional 60,000 metric tons of Title II maize, increasing total pledge to 223,000 metric tons.

11/92 Swaziland: Arrival in Durban of 10,500 metric tons of maize from the U.S.

Zimbabwe: BHR/OFDA grant to Catholic Relief Services for seed distribution and water and sanitation.

Malawi: Transport Logistics Unit begins operations.

Lesotho: NGOs receive GOL funding to implement the Vulnerable Household Feeding Program.

12/92 Lesotho: A decision taken by DRIG, endorsed by the GOL, to re-register vulnerable households in Lesotho because of irregularities with the first registration effort. Re-registration takes two months.

Malawi: Government uses World Bank loan to order 100,000 metric tons of maize.

Malawi: Seasonal rains begin, disrupt food distributions.

1/93 Arrival in Zimbabwe of Section 416(b) maize and sorghum; most maize and sorghum under this program were distributed within Zimbabwe by April 1993.

Malawi: commercial maize shortages cause riots at distribution centers.

2/93 Malawi: Government early crop estimates indicate bumper harvest.

Namibia: Government initiates subsidized plowing and planting support programs in the northern areas of Namibia. Millet seed supplied by USAID through the Southern Africa Regional Program (SARP) is distributed.

3/93 Zimbabwe: De-control of consumer prices of bread and grains.

Malawi: USG reduces pledge by 33,000 metric tons in light of delivery timing and anticipated harvest.

- 4/93 Zimbabwe: Termination of the drought as a "National Disaster." Disbandment of Drought Relief Task Force. Reversion of Role of coordinating disasters to Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development.
- Malawi: Government commercial stocks become available in rural depots.
- Malawi: WFP last food allocation.
- 5/93 Malawi: Last distribution of U.S. maize to districts.
- Malawi: NGOs cease relief operations.
- 6/93 Namibia: As of the first of the month, Department of Water Affairs has completed laying 272 kilometers of new water pipelines. At a cost of Rand 3 million, 31 water tankers have covered a total distance of 1 million kilometers delivering water to schools, clinics and some of the most disadvantaged communities in the rural areas. Water bladders supplied by the U.S. are used in this effort.
- 6/93 Final report by UNDHA and SADC and official end of DESA appeal.
- Zimbabwe: Elimination of subsidy to millers designated to purchase GMB grains.
- 7/93 Zimbabwe: Decontrol of maize sales to millers and prices to consumers and confirmation of removal of controls on other commodities.
- 8/93 Namibia: The government declares the 1992/1993 drought relief program over.
- 11/93 Namibia: The government issues its final report on the 1992/1993 drought relief program under the title "Drought, Once Again -- An Institutional Memory Compilation on the 1991-1993 Drought Emergency in Namibia and Details of the Drought Relief Programme." This report contains a National Needs Assessment for 1993/1994.

ANNEX G

Illustrative Bibliography

ANNEX G: Illustrative Bibliography

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