

CLASSIFICATION
PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) – PART I

Report Control
Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE RURAL SECTOR GRANT	2. PROJECT NUMBER 633-0077	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE USAID/Botswana
4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) <u>86-2</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION		
5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY <u>80</u> B. Final Obligation Expected FY <u>85</u> C. Final Input Delivery FY <u>88</u>	6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING A. Total \$ <u>17,302 million</u> B. U.S. \$ <u>9,349 million</u>	7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION From (month/yr.) <u>November 1983</u> To (month/yr.) <u>June 1986</u> Date of Evaluation Review <u>May 21, 1986</u>

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., algram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
1. The PACD be extended for two years. 2. All efforts should be made to insure that the existing RIO stations have adequate physical facilities and are properly staffed to allow for the most effective use of program funds before the next two RIO stations are opened. 3. Methods be explored with the Building Department which will speed up the process of utilization of funds allocated to the construction process since housing and training facilities are badly needed at present in the more remote stations. 4. The funding for the position of the Project/Communal Areas Coordinator in the MFDP be extended for a fourth full year. 5. The training component of the project funded under the TGSEF not be restricted by GOB ceilings to the point where it will jeopardize the success of the RIO program and the FAP. 6. The overall requirements for the posting of local candidates be reviewed to ensure progress toward prompt localizing of RIO posts particularly in the non-remote stations.	USAID GOB GOB USAID GOB GOB	All dates to be determined by Reference Group

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS

<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P	_____

10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT

A. Continue Project Without Change
 B. Change Project Design and/or
 Change Implementation Plan
 C. Discontinue Project

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)

David McCloud - REDSO/ESA
 William Faught - REDSO/ESA
 Robert Armstrong - REDSO/ESA

12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval

Signature: John P. Hummon
 Typed Name: John P. Hummon, Director
 Date: 2/3 / 1987

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| 7. | increased efforts be made by USAID/B, the appropriate GOB ministries, and the NDB to clarify the intended use of the PEDF, inform the local RIO cadre and insure the coordination of the activity; | USAID/GOB |
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To establish a successful rural development program in the more remote areas will be a very difficult task requiring a major committment of management time and financial support. To support this activity it is recommended that:

- | | | |
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| 8. | the USAID/B project manager make more regular field visits probably by air, to insure a better understanding of the substantive constraints and problems which are being encountered at the implementation level of the RIO sub-project; | USAID |
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| 9. | greater emphasis be given to overcoming marketing infrastructure and raw material supply constraints particularly in the remote areas; | GOB |
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| 10. | greater emphasis be given by the S/RIO at MCI and by the MFPD Communal Areas Coordinator to the leadership and management issues which will determine the long-term sustainability of the program. This will probably require the addition of two Industrial Officers as S/RIOs at Headquarters. | GOB |
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Productive Employment Development Fund

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| 1. | It is recommended that various options be explored for the increased utilization of the PEDF funds. | GOB/USAID |
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Horticultural Estates

- | | | |
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| 1. | It is recommended that collection and analysis of data on cost and returns on Phase II estates currently being undertaken by the MOA Agricultural Economist be extended to Phase I estates and continued as a part of the quarterly reporting systems. This information would not only strengthen the monitoring system, but also provide a basis for verifying if MOA attained its end of project objective of developing a successful model for commercial horticultural production based on small farmers as specified in the Log Frame. The feasibility | GOB |
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of supplementing the analyses of the estates with a comparative study of private horticultural crop producers should be explored.

2. It is recommended that collaboration of specialists on the farming systems project be sought in developing analyses of the combination of crops and rotations that would optimize the use of the limited water and labor which would provide guidelines for planning and managing each of the estates. USAID/GOB

3. It is recommended that Ramonaka estate personnel be required to decide on the type of draft power to be used and that such be secured within three months or that funds currently being held for this purpose be deobligated. GOB

4. It is recommended that the house scheduled for construction at Ramonaka for an Agricultural Demonstrator or Horticultural Advisor not be built. At present, Ramonaka and Mathubudukwane are being served by an Agricultural Demonstrator housed at Mathubudukwane. This appears to be a most reasonable and satisfactory arrangement and it is recommended that it be continued. GOB/USAID

5. It is recommended that a spare pump engine be provided for the Ramonaka/Mathubudukwane estates so that future breakdowns will not deprive the estates of essential irrigation water. USAID

6. It is recommended that efforts be initiated immediately to arrange for all members of the Selebi-Phikwe association and the assigned Agricultural Demonstrator to transfer their residence to the estate site. The present arrangement of living in Selebi-Phikwe, visiting the estates occasionally and hiring local labor to do most of the work on the estate is completely unsatisfactory, not in accordance with either the spirit or letter of the project agreement and will almost certainly doom the estate to failure. No further new capital investment should be made until arrangements for on-site residence of members are completed. GOB

7. It is recommended that the Horticultural Officer work with the Selebi-Phikwe Agricultural Demonstrator or other appropriate individuals to arrange for the timely supply of seed, fertilizer, pesticides and other essential inputs. GOB

8. It is recommended that work on the Chadibe estate not be initiated until a determination is made of the adequacy of the water supply to support the projected production without interruption and a soil survey is made as provided in the original proposal to determine if the soil is suitable for horticultural crop production and of sufficient depth to permit reforming the surface to facilitate irrigation and prevent erosion. It is recommended that the irrigation specialists of the Ministry of Agriculture be requested to undertake the assessment of the adequacy of the water supply and, if the current proposals are not feasible, develop alternative arrangements.

GOB/
USAID

9. It is recommended that the irrigation specialist of the Ministry of Agriculture also be requested to undertake a technical investigation of all of the estates as soon as possible to determine if there is any technically and economically feasible means of salvaging the irrigation potential of Manyana and Mankodi estates and of increasing the efficiency of water use and reducing the hazard of future failure of supplies at other estates.

GOB

District Institutional Development

1. It is recommended that greater attention be given to selecting appropriate degree programs, and that GOB be as clear and precise as possible in identifying, prioritizing and communicating the training needs of the three categories of participants (administration, development, and lands).

GOB/USAID/
CONTRACTOR

2. It is recommended that high priority be given to the training at the master's level of all 37 eligible District Officers by making use of whatever funds may be available within the Project.

USAID

3. It is recommended that the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) be extended to June 1990 to provide sufficient time for completion of all degree programs. This should allow enough time for all 37 eligible officers to complete master's programs, and allow the Ministry of Local Government and Lands to spread out the participants' departure dates so as to ease the burden of locating and placing on a temporary basis personnel to replace the absent officers.

USAID

4. It is recommended that the job performance of officers who have completed their degree work be closely monitored to judge in what areas their performance has improved and in what areas there should be some revision of current responsibilities to take into account their more advanced level of skills.

GOB

5. It is recommended that discussions between USAID and GOB about support for future District Administration training activities be based on the Picard report and revisions to that report, and in particular should consider providing District Commissioners with intensive short-term training in management so as to improve both their own work performance and their performance as supervisors of the master's level District Officers.

USAID/
GOB

Rural Development Unit Monitoring and Coordinating System

1. It is recommended that the RDU system for monitoring and coordinating Phase II activities be continued as presently organized, and that the position of CAC be extended for a further two years past the original contract expiration date of 25 January 1986.

USAID

2. It is also recommended that the RDU, through the CAC and his liaison with line ministries and other institutions, see that the following tasks are undertaken.

GOB

Horticultural Estates

a. A full analysis of the economic viability of the estates should be prepared and evaluated.

b. It should be assured that adequate and appropriate managerial and technical expertise is available to the estates' associations.

c. The issue of the residence of the association members and agricultural demonstrator at Selebi-Pikwe requires attention.

d. The issue of the Chadibe Estate development requires attention.

e. There should be a study by an irrigation specialist of all estates.

District Institutional Development

a. The upgrading where appropriate of job responsibilities of returned participants should be considered.

b. The specific GOB training needs should be communicated to the Academy for Educational Development (AED) to assist AED in identifying appropriate programs, and the credentials of proposed participants should be forwarded to AED promptly.

PEDF

a. RDU should coordinate the exploration of alternative uses for the PEDF.

Rural Industrial Officer Cadre

a. Greater attention is required to the development of policy regarding marketing, infrastructure and raw material supply constraints, especially in remote areas.

b. Greater leadership is also required to determine the effect the reorganization (merger of RIO, BEDU, and BAS) of the Department of Industry will have on the direction and overall goals of the RIO component.

Small Agricultural Projects

a. This study should be completed as soon as possible so as to be considered in conjunction with the RSG Project evaluation report.

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY

BOTSWANA RURAL SECTOR GRANT PROJECT EVALUATION

(Project # 633-0077)

May 1986

Gaborone, Botswana

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PREFACE

This mid-term evaluation of Phase II of the Botswana Rural Sector Grant has as its major purposes to review the progress of the various sub-projects, to analyze implementation bottlenecks and to recommend solutions. The evaluation was carried out from April 27 to May 20, 1986, by a three person team from the AID Regional Economic Development Services Organization for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA), based in Nairobi, Kenya. The team consisted of:

David E. McCloud, Project Development Officer and Team Leader

Robert E. Armstrong, Rural Industries Specialist

William Faught, Horticulturalist/Agriculturalist

The evaluation team reviewed previous evaluations and progress reports prepared by the Rural Development Unit (RDU) and the implementing ministries, held discussions with Government officials and other Project related individuals in Gaborone and in the districts, and visited numerous sub-project sites. The methodology used in the evaluation is described in the body of the Project Evaluation Summary. The substance of this report and its recommendations were reviewed by both AID and the Government of Botswana before being prepared in final report form.

The team wishes to thank everyone who assisted in the research for and preparation of this report, including Government of Botswana officials, officers of other organizations both governmental and non-governmental, individuals associated with the sub-project activities, and the staff of the Botswana USAID Mission.

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

General

It is recommended that the PACD be extended for two years, to June 1990, for reasons identified elsewhere in discussions about the RIO/PEDF and DID sub-projects.

Rural Industrial Officer / Productive Employment Development Fund

A. Rural Industrial Officer cadre

In support of the GOB fiscal policy discussed above and to permit the successful accomplishment of the stated goal and purpose of the Phase II of RSG it is recommended that:

1. the PACD be extended for two years;
2. all efforts should be made to insure that the existing RIO stations have adequate physical facilities and are properly staffed to allow for the most effective use of program funds before the next two RIO stations are opened;
3. methods be explored with the Building Department which will speed up the process of utilization of funds allocated to the construction process since housing and training facilities are badly needed at present in the more remote stations;
4. the funding for the position of the Project/Communal Areas Coordinator in the MFDP be extended for a fourth full year;
5. the training component of the project funded under the TGSF not be restricted by GOB ceilings to the point where it will jeopardize the success of the RIO program and the FAP;
6. the overall requirements for the posting of local candidates be reviewed to ensure progress toward prompt localizing of RIO posts particularly in the non-remote stations;
7. increased efforts be made by USAID/B, the appropriate GOB ministries, and the NDB to clarify the intended use of the PEDF, inform the local RIO cadre and insure the coordination of the activity;

To establish a successful rural development program in the more remote areas will be a very difficult task requiring a major commitment of management time and financial support. To support this activity it is recommended that:

8. the USAID/B project manager make more regular field visits probably by air, to insure a better understanding of the substantive constraints and problems which are being encountered at the implementation level of the RIO sub-project;
9. greater emphasis be given to overcoming marketing infrastructure and raw material supply constraints particularly in the remote areas;
- 10 .greater emphasis be given by the S/RIO at MCI and by the MFPD Communal Areas Coordinator to the leadership and management issues which will determine the long-term sustainability of the program. This will probably require the addition of two Industrial Officers as S/RIOs at Headquarters.

B. Productive Employment Development Fund

1. It is recommended that various options be explored for the increased utilization of the PEDF funds. Some suggested options are listed below. However, it should be noted that these have not been fully evaluated by the team, and that they represent only ideas. Discussions attended by all relevant parties, including the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, the National Development Bank, and USAID, should be held to consider these and other appropriate options which may be developed.

- a. To support the FAP training needs now being supplied from the Training and General Support Fund, a portion of the PEDF loan made to an entrepreneur could be for meeting training needs, and once the training has been successfully completed that portion could be forgiven. In essence the forgivable portion of the loan is a grant to the borrower to help fund his or her training needs.
- b. Training needs could also be supported by NDB establishing a separate training fund using PEDF monies for the purpose of administering forgivable loans to individual entrepreneurs who participate in training programs.

c. A third way in which training needs could be met with these funds is for NDB to make loans to other institutions, such as the Brigades, which are involved in training programs.

d. The loan terms could be softened for those eligible under the PEDF program, perhaps by lowering interest rates or providing for a repayment grace period. In this instance, however, one must be particularly careful about the economic viability of the project. Softening the loan terms may encourage the initiation of projects which in fact are not viable.

e. The tie to the FAP could be eliminated, thus freeing the money for use by a wider target group. NDB would then be able to use the funds for lending to a larger number of small scale businesses. In considering this option, however, one must also consider whether sufficient credit is already available to these potential borrowers.

f. The funds could be lent for economic feasibility studies when these are necessary prior to a loan being granted, or for the hiring of consultants to work with a new business.

g. The funds could be shifted to another appropriate institution which provides loans to small-scale entrepreneurs.

2. In line with the above options, it is also recommended that particular attention be given to the potential for using the PEDF funds to support training efforts (options one through three) which will raise the skill and management levels of small-scale entrepreneurs.

Horticultural Estates

1. It is recommended that collection and analysis of data on cost and returns on Phase II estates currently being undertaken by the MOA Agricultural Economist be extended to Phase I estates and continued as a part of the quarterly reporting systems. This information would not only strengthen the monitoring system, but also provide a basis for verifying if MOA attained its end of project objective of developing a successful model for commercial horticultural production based on small farmers as specified in the Log Frame. The feasibility of supplementing the analyses of the estates with a comparative study of private horticultural crop producers should be explored.

2. It is recommended that collaboration of specialists on the farming systems project be sought in developing analyses of the combination of crops and rotations that would optimize the use of the limited water and labor which would provide guidelines for planning and managing each of the estates.

3. It is recommended that Ramonaka estate personnel be required to decide on the type of draft power to be used and that such be secured within three months or that funds currently being held for this purpose be deobligated.

4. It is recommended that the house scheduled for construction at Ramonaka for an Agricultural Demonstrator or Horticultural Advisor not be built. At present, Ramonaka and Mathubudukwane are being served by an Agricultural Demonstrator housed at Mathubudukwane. This appears to be a most reasonable and satisfactory arrangement and it is recommended that it be continued.

5. It is recommended that a spare pump engine be provided for the Ramonaka/Mathubudukwane estates so that future breakdowns will not deprive the estates of essential irrigation water.

6. It is recommended that efforts be initiated immediately to arrange for all members of the Selebi-Phikwe association and the assigned Agricultural Demonstrator to transfer their residence to the estate site. The present arrangement of living in Selebi-Phikwe, visiting the estates occasionally and hiring local labor to do most of the work on the estate is completely unsatisfactory, not in accordance with either the spirit or letter of the project agreement and will almost certainly doom the estate to failure. No further new capital investment should be made until arrangements for on-site residence of members are completed.

7. It is recommended that the Horticultural Officer work with the Selebi-Phikwe Agricultural Demonstrator or other appropriate individuals to arrange for the timely supply of seed, fertilizer, pesticides and other essential inputs.

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9. It is recommended that the irrigation specialist of the Ministry of Agriculture also be requested to undertake a technical investigation of all of the estates as soon as possible to determine if there is any technically and economically feasible means of salvaging the irrigation potential of Manyana and Mankodi estates and of increasing the efficiency of water use and reducing the hazard of future failure of supplies at other estates.

District Institutional Development

1. It is recommended that greater attention be given to selecting appropriate degree programs, and that GOB be as clear and precise as possible in identifying, prioritizing and communicating the training needs of the three categories of participants (administration, development, and lands).

2. It is recommended that high priority be given to the training at the master's level of all 37 eligible District Officers by making use of whatever funds may be available within the Project.

3. It is recommended that the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) be extended to June 1990 to provide sufficient time for completion of all degree programs. This should allow enough time for all 37 eligible officers to complete master's programs, and allow the Ministry of Local Government and Lands to spread out the participants' departure dates so as to ease the burden of locating and placing on a temporary basis personnel to replace the absent officers.

4. It is recommended that the job performance of officers who have completed their degree work be closely monitored to judge in what areas their performance has improved and in what areas there should be some revision of current responsibilities to take into account their more advanced level of skills.

5. It is recommended that discussions between USAID and GOB about support for future District Administration training activities be based on the Picard report and revisions to that report, and in particular should consider providing District Commissioners with intensive short-term training in management so as to improve both their own work performance and their performance as supervisors of the master's level District Officers.

Rural Development Unit Monitoring and Coordinating System

1. It is recommended that the RDU system for monitoring and coordinating Phase II activities be continued as presently

organized, and that the position of CAC be extended for a further two years past the original contract expiration date of 25 January 1986.

2. It is also recommended that the RDU, through the CAC and his liaison with line ministries and other institutions, see that the following tasks are undertaken.

Horticultural Estates

a. A full analysis of the economic viability of the estates should be prepared and evaluated.

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c. The issue of the residence of the association members and agricultural demonstrator at Selebi-Pikwe requires attention.

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e. There should be a study by an irrigation specialist of all estates.

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a. The upgrading where appropriate of job responsibilities of returned participants should be considered.

b. The specific GOB training needs should be communicated to the Academy for Educational Development (AED) to assist AED in identifying appropriate programs, and the credentials of proposed participants should be forwarded to AED promptly.

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a. Greater attention is required to the development of policy regarding marketing, infrastructure and raw material supply constraints, especially in remote areas.

b. Greater leadership is also required to determine the effect the reorganization (merger of RIO, BEDU, and BAS) of the Department of Industry will have on the direction and overall goals of the RIO component.

Small Agricultural Projects

a. This study should be completed as soon as possible so as to be considered in conjunction with the RSG Project evaluation report.

I. SUMMARY

The purpose of this project is to provide the rural population of Botswana with increased access to productive employment opportunities. To accomplish this, Phase II of the Rural Sector Grant (RSG) is funding the following:

- 1) Rural Industrial Officers' Cadre/Productive Employment Development Fund;
- 2) Horticultural Estates;
- 3) Agricultural Small Projects.

In recognition that trained administrative personnel at the district level will affect the outcome of rural productive initiatives, the RSG is also supporting:

- 4) District Institutional Development.

Finally, in order to provide for the administrative coordination of the sub-projects, to be responsive to special concerns that may arise during implementation, and to monitor the Project through periodic evaluations, the Project is providing support for:

- 5) Special Technical Assistance.

By supporting the Rural Industrial Officers' cadre (RIO) and the Productive Employment Development Fund (PEDF), the RSG is meant to assist in overcoming training gaps, the lack of information, and the limited investment capital. It is also to directly stimulate employment creation. Overall, for the RIO sub-project, good progress has been made to date as measured against goal and purpose "End of Project Status", and by variable indicators for inputs and outputs. The RIO cadre are in place and functioning at a highly efficient level, despite existing constraints at some posts. All RIOs interviewed were highly professional in their approach to the problems they faced. The present Senior RIO in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Communal Areas Coordinator (project coordinator for the RSG) in the Rural Development Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning are performing the tasks assigned to them in their job descriptions related to the RIO sub-project in a more than satisfactory manner. Major problems encountered include reduced funds allocated by GOB for training and support activities, lack of adequate support facilities (such as housing) at some posts, and the difficulties related to establishing a successful rural development program in the more remote areas of the country.

Utilization of the PEDF has been much lower than expected. Since 1984, when the first loan was made, up to the end of 1985, only 6% of the fund has been lent out to rural entrepreneurs. Job creation through the PEDF is running at about half the rate expected. Various factors are playing

roles in low Fund utilization. Potential borrowers often can not afford the loan repayment terms. That borrowers must also be recipients of a Financial Assistance Policy grant substantially reduces the pool of potential borrowers. The Fund may have been overbudgeted given that there are relatively few opportunities for business start-ups which meet the PEDF conditions, and there is no general shortage of credit in Botswana. Some redesign of this sub-project component is necessary.

The development of the Phase II horticultural estates continues to run far behind the schedules laid down in the Project Paper. The lag in utilization of funds which characterized Phase I are recurring in Phase II. The problem of inadequate supplies of irrigation water that continues to limit production to very low levels on some of the Phase I estates has been avoided in establishing the two new Phase II estates. However, problems due to friction among members and failure to cooperate and to poor technical and managerial leadership that restricted progress in Phase I are reoccurring on one of the Phase II estates. The targeted employment levels are being maintained on Phase I and one of the Phase II estates, but information has not been developed to determine income effects or long-term economic viability.

An evaluation of the Agricultural Small Projects is the responsibility of separate consultant, and was not included in the team's scope of work.

The District Institutional Development sub-project is designed to help overcome constraints related to the need to increase District Officers' capacity to plan and administer rural development programs. Good progress is being made in selecting District Officers for master's level training and placing those selected in degree programs in the United States. The academic performance of participants generally has been good. Participants are not returning to Botswana as scheduled since the Project underestimated the amount of time required for degree program completion. This change has necessitated a change in the budget to accommodate the increased costs associated with longer training programs. In addition, without an extension in the PACD, only 29 of the 37 eligible officers will participate in the sub-project. Generally the graduate programs selected are appropriate, but some fine-tuning may be required in specific instances. An more full evaluation of purpose and goal achievement must await the time when participants who have completed their degrees have been back at their posts for six months to one year.

The Special Technical Assistance component of the RSG Phase II comprises primarily of one post, that of Communal Areas Coordinator (CAC), located in the Rural Development Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. The RDU has overall responsibility for monitoring and coordinating the

RSG activities on the part of the GOB. The CAC is a USAID-funded position whose responsibilities include, among others, monitoring, coordinating, troubleshooting and liaising functions with respect to RSG activities. The evaluation team found that in general the RDU system for monitoring and coordinating Phase II activities is working well. Also, the CAC is doing a good job of working with line ministries and institutions in monitoring RSG activity implementation and dealing with project-related issues as they arise on behalf of the RDU. There are some important outstanding implementation issues which require the attention of the RDU, and these are discussed later in this report, and in Annex D.

II. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

This mid-term evaluation of Phase II of the Botswana Rural Sector Grant has as its major purposes to review the progress of the various sub-projects, to analyze implementation bottlenecks and recommend solutions. Individual team members also were given specific evaluation responsibilities as identified in the scope of work prepared and agreed to by USAID/Botswana and GOB. An evaluation of the Agricultural Small Projects sub-project was not included in the teams' scope of work, but rather was contracted to a separate consultant.

The team consisted of an AID Project Development Officer, an agriculturalist with expertise in rural industry development, and an agricultural economist with expertise in horticulture. In performing the evaluation, team members reviewed Project related documents and records, interviewed GOB officials and other individuals involved in Project activities, visited Project sites located throughout the country, and analyzed the data collected. A list of ministries and other organizations contacted appears as an annex attached to this report. In preparing the final report, the Project Evaluation Summary (PES) format was used in conjunction with the scope of work presented to the team prior to the evaluation. One slight modification to the standard PES format has been adopted, and that is grouping Project inputs, outputs, and management under "Implementation Issues," and Project purpose and goal under "Project Impact." This approach was used in the previous RSG evaluation report, and is appropriate here as well. Separate annexes which cover each of the major Project components have been prepared and attached to this report.

III. EXTERNAL FACTORS

Major changes in the project setting include a devaluation, a drought, and the imposition of GOB budget ceilings on individual ministries. Since the time when the Project was designed, the Pula (Botswana currency) has fallen in value by 60% as compared to the U.S. dollar. Because the

Project input amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars, the Pula equivalents over time have increased significantly. In addition, overall inflation (including both local and foreign components) was projected to be 10% p.a., but has proven to be much lower, averaging 7% p.a. The effect of these two factors has been that the budgets of some Project activities have surplus funds.

A second general change in the project setting has been the imposition of budget ceilings by the GOB on individual ministries. A ministry ordinarily can not exceed its budget ceiling regardless of the source of funds, and the ceiling does not seem to be strongly influenced by availability of specific aid funding. As a result, Project funds may be available but go unused because a ministry has had to allocate its permitted resources elsewhere. This system is prudent national budgeting practice in that it helps control recurrent costs associated with capital expenditures, but in terms of Project activities it has resulted in slower implementation.

A factor impacting most severely on the horticultural estates sub-project has been the drought starting in 1981-82 and continuing to the present. Two of the four Phase I estates suffered complete or near complete crop failure each season since 1982-83, and a third estate has suffered serious reductions in at least one season. In this instance, the assumption in the Project design of constant rainfall was incorrect.

A major assumption of both Phase I and Phase II is that rural unemployment and under-employment is sufficiently significant to require substantial inputs in the form of the Rural Sector Grant. This assumption continues to be valid. The current National Development Plan (1985-91) projects that by 1990/91, 51.8% of the labor force will be without employment or self-employment opportunities.

IV. ACHIEVEMENT OF OUTPUT TARGETS - IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

A. Inputs

The achievement of output targets is in part a function of project inputs. Inputs are expressed in terms of both financial flows as well as the provision of goods and services. The original RSG Phase II Project budget was in the amount of \$5.569 million. Disbursements have not been as large as anticipated, and overall Project expenditure now is expected to be less than budgeted. Allotments totaling \$4.042 million have been made, but no additional allotments are planned. Of the \$4.042 million, it is intended to deobligate about \$0.8 million. Thus, total Phase II Life of Project expenditure is estimated to be about \$3.21 million, or about \$2.3 million less than budgeted. Causes for reduced expenditures are the

external factors discussed above, e.g. devaluation, lower inflation, and GOB budget ceilings, as well as a lower level of activity in some sub-projects.

With regard to the Rural Industrial Officer sub-project, an examination of the planned inputs required indicates that quantities were more than adequate and quality was quite acceptable. Problems are arising as a result of the timing of input expenditures which are now being delayed by the imposition of GOB budget ceilings. Additional expenditures may be warranted in the area of training and general support (which has been directly affected by the budget ceiling), but these should require no new Project funds. The amount of funding set aside for the establishment of the PEDF now appears to be in excess of the amounts that will be needed. This is in part due to the devaluation, and in part to the way the sub-project is structured and administered.

Several factors have contributed to the relatively low utilization of available funds for the horticultural estates. The sub-project appears to have been moderately over-budgeted in the beginning, but this condition was worsened by the rapid rate of devaluation of the Pula. Beyond these factors, however, the failure to vigorously promote and encourage the development of the estates was a contributing factor.

The District Institutional Development sub-project is one of the few areas where financial inputs have been increased. This was done because the service being purchased, training time in the form of master's level degree programs, is requiring more time than originally anticipated. The cause of the problem is with the Project design rather than implementation, i.e. too little time was budgeted from the start. Additional expenditure, perhaps funded from savings within the Project budget, may be required to fund the training of some of the eight eligible District Officers who currently are not included in the sub-project.

If the recommendation for a further one year extension (to a total of four years) of the contract of the Communal Areas Coordinator is accepted, additional expenditure would be required.

B. Outputs

1. RIO/PEDF - Projected output targets included the following: 3,960 new jobs through the PEDF; 528 new jobs through the TGSF; 11,000 rural producers provided with RIO extension services; 11 RIO posts localized; 45 Batswana receive short-term training; construction of 20 houses and 7 offices for RIOs; purchase of 4 vehicles and other equipment; and 10 feasibility studies/surveys undertaken.

Actual progress is indicated by the following: in a total of 1098 new and/or expanded small scale businesses, 101 new jobs have been created by support to the PEDF, 1020 through training under TGSF, and 1401 through the FAP (1982 to date); 3057 entrepreneurs have been assisted through extension services; 4 district and 4 headquarter RIOS have been trained and localized; 5 houses and 1 office have been completed, and 8 houses are under construction; 3 vehicles and other equipment have been purchased; and baseline data reports/feasibility studies have been completed at all RIO stations. In addition, 2 new RIO stations have been established. In the above assessment, jobs created through the FAP are included because RIOS often spend at least 50% of their time processing FAP applications and assisting FAP entrepreneurs.

As can be seen, satisfactory progress has been made against the stated output targets from April 1984 through March 1986. One significant exception is the number of jobs created through the PEDF. This Fund has been extremely underutilized, and it has been recommended that a more innovative approach to its use be adopted. The continuation of the general high level of progress with regard to meeting the RIO output targets will be constrained in the future due to GOB budget ceilings and the reduced level of funding in the revised Project budget.

2. Horticultural estates - The Project calls for the establishment of 3 horticultural estates offering employment to 40 persons. To date, 2 new estates have been established with a total membership of 20 families. Establishment of the third estate is far behind schedule, and whether it will in fact be established is in doubt. On one of the two established estates, at Selebi-Phikwe, only one of the six members has moved to the estate and is working his plots. The remainder continue living in Selebi-Phikwe and hire local labor to do a major part of the work on their plots. The Project also states that the estates should be commercially viable. In this regard, it must be noted that no information has yet been developed from either Phase I or Phase II to indicate whether or not the estate concept is economically viable.

3. District Institutional Development - The projected output was 37 Batswana receiving 40 person years of long-term training. Without any change to the PACD, it is now expected that 29 District Officers will receive a total of about 44 person years of training. The reduction in the number of participants is due to the longer than expected training time per participant and the resulting higher cost per participant. As explained in Annex C, to achieve the original purpose of training 37 eligible District Officers the PACD would have to be extended. Whether additional funds would be required is not clear. There may be sufficient funds in the overall line item,

but reallocation among individual participants' line items would be necessary.

C. Project Management

The team's scope of work included a request for "an assessment of the RDU system for monitoring and coordinating Phase II Project activities." There are three line ministries plus one parastatal involved directly in RSG activities. In addition, there are numerous other ministries involved indirectly. Project activities are scattered throughout the country. This multi-faceted project structure necessitates a good amount of monitoring and coordination. Annex D attached to this report presents a brief description of the RDU system, an assessment of its performance, and recommendations regarding its continuation and tasks to be undertaken.

In sum, the evaluation team found that generally the RDU and more specifically the Communal Areas Coordinator have been doing well in working with line ministries and other institutions in monitoring RSG activity implementation and in dealing with project-related issues as they arise. A revised management information system has been initiated which keeps the RDU and USAID informed of progress and problems with respect to the implementation of project activities and the achievement of project objectives. The system seems to be working well, although lapses have been apparent during the evaluation team's study. The team has noted that previous Project reports have raised as an issue a lack of agreement between AID and the RDU on the specific responsibilities of the CAC with respect to the management of RSG. It is the team's impression that the CAC is performing in accordance with his agreed-to scope of work, and it has been recommended that his contract be extended for a fourth year.

Instead of entering into a discussion about interpretations of and revisions to the CAC's scope of work, the team has chosen what it feels is perhaps a more direct route to resolving this issue, and has identified specific outstanding tasks which are significant to the success of the Project and which should be undertaken by various ministries involved. It is the responsibility of the RDU, through the CAC as liaison person, to see that these tasks are fulfilled. These are listed in Annex D.

Project management by the Botswana USAID Mission has attended carefully to details of Project administration. In some instances there should be closer contact with the field activities. Particularly in the case of the RIO sub-project, which has a variety of activities spread throughout the country, the USAID project manager should make more regular field visits, probably by air, to insure a better understanding of the substantive constraints and problems which are being encountered at the implementation level of the RIO sub-project.

V. PROJECT PURPOSE AND LONG-TERM GOAL - PROJECT IMPACT

A. Introduction

The goal of Phase II of the Rural Sector Grant remains the same as that of the original project, that is "to stimulate rural development and a more equitable distribution of income in Botswana." The two End of Project Status (EOPS) conditions listed in the Project Paper are that the number of jobs in the rural sector will have increased by 50%, and that the GOB revenue from domestic mining industry will be used to stimulate rural development. The purpose of Phase II is to provide the rural population with increased access to productive employment opportunities. The relevant EOPS conditions are the following:

1. the capacity of Government to assist small non-farm enterprises will be increased through the expansion of the RIO cadre;
2. greater numbers of small-scale entrepreneurs will have access to financial assistance to initiate new or expanded productive activities in the rural areas;
3. baseline information will be obtained on the potential for new rural productive activities and the availability of markets;
4. the Ministry of Agriculture will have developed a successful model for commercial horticultural production based upon organized groups of small farmers;
5. and the capability of district level institutions to promote and support productive activities will be strengthened by upgrading the caliber of senior officers through training.

The relationship among the various sub-projects and the overall Project purpose and goal, along with progress toward the End of Project Status conditions, is discussed below for the three sub-projects RIO/PEDF, Horticultural Estates, and District Institutional Development.

B. RIO/PEDF

This sub-project supports Project purpose and goal achievement by assisting in overcoming training gaps, lack of information, and limited investment capital. Satisfactory progress has been made to date against all three relevant EOPS conditions (numbers 1 - 3 above). First, the number of RIO cadre and stations has been increased, thereby enabling the GOB to better assist small rural entrepreneurs. Second, as a result of the sub-project, a greater number of small rural entrepreneurs have access to financial assistance and have

started or expanded rural businesses. Third, baseline data reports have been completed at all RIO stations and indicate the potential market demand for a variety of goods and services which could be produced in the rural areas. There has been a shortfall with regard to progress toward attaining the EOPS condition associated with the PEDF. Because of the loan repayment terms and the relatively few potential applicants, PEDF utilization has been extremely low, and has led to the creation of only 3% of the projected number of jobs. However, the RIO cadre have been intensely involved in the promotion and implementation of the FAP, and much of the success of this program is attributable to RIO action. One important external factor which will continue to affect purpose achievement is the imposition of GOB expenditure budget ceilings. When imposed on RIO activities, these ceilings will result in reduced activities in terms of training and support services provided to existing and potential entrepreneurs.

C. Horticultural Estates

Project purpose and goal are supported by this sub-project through the establishment of several operational horticultural estates to provide employment, increase income to members of the estate associations, and partially meet the consumption requirements of urban markets with domestic production. The specific EOPS condition is the fourth listed above, "the Ministry of Agriculture will have developed a successful model for commercial horticultural production based upon organized groups of small farmers." There is no assurance that this EOPS condition can be attained. The time schedules were unrealistic, selection of several sites was ill-advised, the design and installation of irrigation systems have been faulty, and technical guidance has been inadequate. Whether sufficient progress could be made within the time remaining before the termination of project to achieve the end of project objectives cannot be assured. Further, unless steps are taken to assemble information relative to the economic performance of estates, it will not be known at the end of project whether the horticultural estate concept is viable. As discussed earlier, the continuing drought has had a significant negative effect on the performance of the estates, and the reoccurrence of droughts must be taken into account when the viability of the estate concept is considered.

D. District Institutional Development

The DID sub-project is intended to increase the District Officers' capacity to plan and administer rural development programs, particularly those aimed at job creation and increasing rural incomes, and to provide District Officers with advanced training to improve their management, economics and planning skills. The EOPS condition associated with this sub-project is the fifth listed above, "The capability of

district level institutions to promote and support productive activities will be strengthened by upgrading the caliber of senior officers through training." The training is well underway, and given the academic performance of those in training the caliber of the officers is being upgraded. To what extent the capability of the District Administration is being strengthened as intended can not yet be properly evaluated since only four returned participants are at post, and these have been back in country only one to four months. However, based on interviews with the individuals and a review of their academic performance and course content, it appears that their job performance in the relevant areas will be improved as a result of their training. If only 29 of the 37 eligible District Officers are included as participants, then purpose achievement will be reduced accordingly, as measured against what it would be if all officers were trained.

E. Summary of Project Impact

The RIO component of the Project is mostly responsible for progress toward purpose and goal achievement. Without understanding better the viability of the horticultural estates, their long-term impact on employment creation and income generation remains unknown. The PEDF, as it now stands, will do little to stimulate rural development, either in terms of jobs or income. The DID sub-project is likely to have an important effect on the effective development and implementation of rural development policy, and should contribute greatly to providing the rural population with increased access to productive employment opportunities, but verification of this must await the passage of time as the returned District Officers exhibit their improved job performance and application of their upgraded skills.

As discussed in the section on "Output," there has been significant progress toward achieving the goal of increasing the number of jobs in the rural sector by 50% over the life of the project, and this progress is directly attributable to purpose achievement. However, it is probably the case that the easy part is now over, and the creation of additional jobs will become even more difficult over the next couple years. A contributing factor to this difficulty will be the continuing imposition by the GOB of budget ceilings on expenditures, both capital and recurrent. In any case, GOB is attempting to stimulate rural development through its expenditures, and perhaps one of the best examples of this is the Financial Assistance Policy. Whether the revenue used to support these expenditures comes from the domestic mining industry is not possible to determine, but it is likely that a good portion of it does come from that source since mining contributes a substantial sum to the GDP of the country. One other contributory project to achieving this Project's goal is the Botswana Workforce Skills and Training Project, which continues

to provide various kinds of training to a number of Botswana citizens.

VI. BENEFICIARIES

The direct beneficiaries of the RIO/PEDF sub-project are private entrepreneurs with small scale businesses. To date, an estimated 3057 entrepreneurs have been assisted through training, skills development, and support services, 1098 new and/or expanded small scale businesses have been created, and 2531 new "spin-off" jobs have been created. In particular, females and business owners located in the western part of the country have benefited. The evaluation indicates that the intended target groups are benefiting from the sub-project. For the Horticultural Estates sub-project, the direct beneficiaries include about 40 families who are members of associations formed during Phase I, and about 20 families in associations formed during Phase II. These are poor rural people who generally had been unemployed and many are female heads of households. There have been no significant indirect or secondary beneficiaries associated with this sub-project. The direct beneficiaries of the DID sub-project are the District Officers who are receiving the master's level training. Six of the current 29 participants are women. Indirect beneficiaries are all those resident in the various districts who will benefit by the improved District Administration management resulting from the training received by the participants.

The intended nature of the benefits received was to increase small-farm, labor intensive agricultural productivity, to promote greater equality in income, and to reduce rates of unemployment and underemployment. Of these, achievement of only the first is in doubt given the lack of information on the viability of the horticultural estates.

VII. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

There have been only two unplanned effects. First, the large amount of time required of the RIO cadre to assist FAP applicants in researching their projects, completing their applications, and evaluating the applications as a member of the Production Development Committee was wholly unanticipated. This activity often consumes about 50% of a RIO's time. Such work benefits those who receive the FAP grants, but it reduces the amount of time the RIO can spend on his or her other tasks. Second, one of the five returned participants in the DID sub-project has left the District Administration to enter the banking profession. Although unplanned, this may not have been unanticipated in that highly trained professionals are always in demand. The effect of this on the DID sub-project is to reduce the number of officers who have received master's level training. As a precautionary step GOB should assess the

compatibility of the D.O.'s current job responsibilities with their upgraded skills.

VIII. LESSONS LEARNED

Three lessons learned have been identified. First, the Project illustrates the dangers inherent in designing and attempting to implement a project without appropriate technical expertise. In particular, the agriculturalist on the design team should have been more careful regarding the work related to the horticultural estates. This may have avoided many of the design faults and implementation problems which have been encountered. Second, any project component which deals with training should include careful scrutiny of the course programs to be included and the preparation of the participants. This has become apparent with regard to problems encountered during implementation of the DID sub-project.

Third, on a more positive note, the DID sub-project has led to identification of one follow-on activity, meeting the training needs of District Commissioners who do not have university degrees. This activity would both improve the job performance of the District Commissioners, and prepare them to make better use of the upgraded skills acquired by their subordinates, the District Officers who have received their master's degrees.

IX. SPECIAL COMMENTS

An evaluation had been planned for 1985 but did not take place. A number of the problems covered herein would have been evident at that time. Thus, had that evaluation taken place, some of the current bottlenecks and implementation problems could have been resolved or avoided earlier. Further, the decision to deobligate funds from the Project preceded this 1986 evaluation. The evaluation team could have made a greater contribution to the success of the Project if instead this evaluation had preceded the decision to deobligate.

The impact of the GOB imposition of expenditure budget ceilings, which are affecting this Project, may have serious implications for ongoing and future USAID programs in terms of the expenditure level an individual ministry can maintain on any one project.

Annexes attached to this report include the following:

- A - Rural Industrial Officer/Productive
Employment Development Fund Sub-Project Evaluation
Report (12 pages)

- B - Horticultural Estates Sub-project Evaluation Report (13 pages)
- C - District Institutional Development Sub-project Evaluation Report (11 pages)
- D - Assessment of Rural Development System for Monitoring and Coordinating RSG Phase II Activities (3 pages)
- E - Evaluation Team's Scope of Work and Schedule (4 pages)
- F - List of Ministries and other Organizations Contacted (1 page)
- G - Explanation of Abbreviations Used (1 page)

ANNEX A

RURAL INDUSTRIAL OFFICER CADRE AND PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT
DEVELOPMENT FUND SUB-PROJECTS

BOTSWANA RURAL SECTOR GRANT PROJECT EVALUATION

(Project # 633-0077)

May 1986

Gaborone, Botswana

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I. SUMMARY

Overall, good progress has been made to date as measured against goal and purpose EOPS and by variable indicators for inputs and outputs. The Rio cadre are in place and functioning at a highly efficient level, particularly in light of the existing constraints at some posts; they are collecting data, identifying training needs, seeing that courses are offered, and assisting small rural producers with the task of obtaining FAP grants. All RIO cadre interviewed were highly professional in their approach to the problems they faced, and, quite simply, were doing an outstanding job of carrying out the Rural Industrial Program of the GOB. The present S/RIO in the MCI and the Communal Areas Coordinator in the RDU of MFDP are performing the tasks assigned to them in their job descriptions related to the RIO program in a more than satisfactory manner.

Three exceptions to the above general conclusion are noted: first, the great majority of RIO posts are still held by expatriate specialists; second, funds available under the PEDF have not been utilized to the extent anticipated in the design of the RSG Phase II; and third, the TGSF allocations to the RIO stations have been reduced by the GOB.

II. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The RIO/PEDF sub-project was evaluated using the specific Scope of Work (SOW) outlined in the terms of reference supplied by AID/Botswana (AID/B) and approved by the Government of Botswana (GOB). Where appropriate the standard Project Evaluation Summary (PES) format was used to insure compliance with USAID requirements. Specific questions and issues raised in the AID/B SOW not usually covered in the PES are addressed under Special Comments in the evaluation. The RIO evaluation was the specific responsibility of R.E.Armstrong while D.E.McCloud was responsible for the specific attachment dealing with the PEDF.

III. EXTERNAL FACTORS

The Project Paper (PP) states that, "The GOB supports the role of the private sector in expanding employment, stimulating economic growth, and thereby, improving the distribution of income. Particular encouragement is given to the development of rural small-scale productive activities. There are however, general constraints to increased rural production. These include: training gaps in technical and management skills, underdeveloped markets, limited investment capital, and a lack of information on the opportunities and types of assistance available for small-scale producers."

"In response to these problems, the GOB has enacted measures which support and facilitate small-scale business activity. Two of

these measures are the Rural Industrial Officers' Cadre, which is the principal GOB institution used to assist small rural enterprises, and the Productive Employment Development Fund, the funding channel for the Financial Assistance Policy. The Rural Sector Grant, by supporting these two activities, will assist in overcoming training gaps, the lack of information, and the limited investment capital. It will also directly stimulate employment creation."

Implicit in the assumptions column of the logframe is a time frame equal to the life of the project amendment. The GOB financial policy is one that tries to balance government expenditure against long-term revenue. To do this the GOB has instituted a policy of controlled growth requiring the use of budget ceilings. This approach is sound and should be supported through donor program design. If this policy of the GOB, therefore, prohibits the dispersement of AID funding in the time frame originally indicated in the amended project, careful consideration should be given to extending the time frame for dispersement especially as it relates to capital expenditures requiring increases in recurrent cost budgets.

The GOB budget ceilings have had an effect on the amounts of TGSF available to the RIOs to use in the training of individuals applying for and receiving approval of FAP grants. The GOB ceiling has also had an effect on the dispersment of the funding for the construction of RIO housing and offices.

IV. PROJECT INPUTS

A major element of the RSG project is the continued operation, expansion and localization of the Rural Industrial Officer's Cadre. Inputs that are required are: (a) technical assistance; (b) short-term staff training; (c) financial support of the Productive Employment Development Fund; (d) financial support of the Training and General Support Fund; and (e) logistics. A detailed scheduling of events is included in Annex E of the PP amendment.

An examination of the planned inputs required for the RIO/PEDF sub-project indicates that quantities were more than adequate and quality was quite acceptable. Problems are arising as a result of the timing of input expenditures which are now being delayed by GOB ceilings as discussed under "External Factors".

The amount of funding set aside for the establishment of the PEDF now appears to be in excess of the amounts that will be needed. This is a result of two factors. First, there was a decision to utilize the funds as loans rather than grants as originally intended in the design of the amendment. The second factor is a management and communication problem. Interviews with the RIO cadre indicated that only one RIO had ever heard of the PEDF and none of them knew that it had any relationship to the RIO program or the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP).

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The only assumption made in the logframe concerning inputs is "AID/W approves the project and supplies the funds." There is no stated assumption that AID/B is committed to "staying the course" for a reasonable period of time to allow the project to achieve its goal and purpose. AID/W approved the project at a level of \$5.5 million and has made the funds available; the evaluator feels that it is essential that AID/B permit sufficient time and levels of funding for the project to realize a successful conclusion.

V. PROJECT OUTPUTS

The Output Targets are defined in the PP as follows:

1. 11,000 entrepreneurs assisted through training, skills development and support services;
2. 2,112 new and/or expanded small-scale businesses created;
3. 4,488 new "spin-off" jobs created;
 - a. 3,960 by support to the FAP through the PEDF,
 - b. 528 through training under TGSEF;
4. 11 District and 2 Hqs. RIO trained and localized;
5. 4 new RIO stations established;
6. Logistical support to RIO cadre improved; 20 houses and 7 offices constructed for Rural Industrial Officers and their assistants. 4 vehicles and supplementary equipment for 15 offices will be purchased.

The records of the MCI indicate that satisfactory progress has been made against the stated output targets as indicated below for the period April 1984 through March 1986.

1. 3057 entrepreneurs assisted through training, skills development and support services;
2. 1098 new and/or expanded small-scale businesses created; (454 under FAP, 610 from TGSEF, 25 from PEDF)
3. 2522 new "spin-off" jobs created;
 - a. 101 by support to the PEDF,
 - b. 1020 through training under TGSEF;
 - c. 1401 through the FAP (from 1982 to date);
4. Four District and Four Hqs. RIO trained and localized;

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5. Two new RIO stations established;
6. Logistical support to RIO cadre improved; 5 houses and 1 office constructed (eight houses are under construction) for Rural Industrial Officers and their assistants. 3 vehicles and supplementary equipment for 12 offices have been purchased.

It is stated that "GOB is committed to improving the support to the RIO." However, the priority level of the RIO activity within GOB must be questioned given the management decision by the GOB to place ceilings on expenditures and by AID/B to deobligate. The continuation of the high level of progress to date against EOPS conditions is going to be constrained in the future due to these decisions.

For additional observations on outputs please see the "Special Comments" section.

VI. PURPOSE

The purpose varies slightly from Phase I in that it is no longer experimental, but is "to provide the rural population with increased access to productive employment opportunities." To accomplish this purpose the RSG will fund a number of sub-projects including the RIO Cadre/PEDF program reviewed in this annex.

Three EOPS conditions will have to be met if the purpose of the project is to be fully achieved; satisfactory progress has been made to date against all three EOPS conditions. First, the number of RIO cadre and stations has been increased thereby enabling the GOB to better assist small rural entrepreneurs. Second, as a result of the program, a greater number of small rural entrepreneurs have access to financial assistance and have started or expanded rural businesses. An examination of district PDC and NDB records indicate an increase in the number of FAP applications and the number of micro small-scale entrepreneurs aided under the TGSF program. Third, baseline data reports have been completed at all RIO stations and indicate the potential market demand for a variety of goods and services which could be produced in the rural areas. MCI headquarters has received and reviewed the baseline data reports from the district RIO cadre and discussions with RIO cadre indicate they plan to undertake additional surveys to determine the market potential for new products and services for local consumption and for products which might have export markets.

As was the case for "Outputs", a Purpose assumption must now be questioned; "GOB (and USAID/B by inference) continues to provide more personnel and resources for expanding employment opportunities." The accomplishment of all three EOPS conditions are affected by this assumption. The allocations of TGSF are being treated as capital expenditures and the allocations to the

RIO stations are being reduced. The GOB is finding it difficult to attract local RIO for posting to remote areas due to the lack of housing. These constraints will affect the successful future expansion of the RIO program and the FAP.

VII. GOAL/SUBGOAL

The Goal of Phase II remains the same as the original project; "to stimulate rural development and a more equitable distribution of income in Botswana". Progress has been made to date against specific indicators for overall project goal achievement and can be attributed to purpose achievement for the sub-project goal. As indicated in the description of the goal of the sub-project the RSG supports the GOB policy of increasing rural production by helping the GOB overcome the above stated constraints to increased rural production. This is accomplished through support to the RIO cadre, especially through the TGSF and indirectly to the FAP through the PEDF.

Records of MCI and the NDB indicate that between 1/7/84 and 31/12/85 101 jobs have been created as a result of PEDF loans to FAP grant recipients. The FAP is facilitated by the work of the RIO cadre and supported by training funds from the TGSF.

In addition to FAP work, the RIO cadre is responsible for the administration of the TGSF program which has to date created or upgraded over 500 additional jobs in such skills areas as sewing, carpentry and crafts and has strengthened entrepreneurial skills with courses in bookkeeping and accounting. The funds available under the TGSF program are also essential to the success of the FAP grant program as many of the FAP grants approved by the PDC and DDC are conditional based on upgraded skill levels requiring additional training which is funded by the TGSF program.

Field interviews with eight out of twelve RIO and their clients as well as the examination of RIO and MCI records indicate that without the work of the RIO cadre the FAP grant program would not have achieved the success it has in creating new jobs in the rural industrial sector. Progress toward goal/subgoal achievement has therefore been a direct result of the RIO support to the implementation of the FAP grant program and the training funded by the TGSF and conducted under the supervision of the RIO cadre. Future progress may well be limited by a number of causal linkages between external factors, outputs and purpose as they are influenced by management decisions on the part of both the GOB and AID/B.

VIII. BENEFICIARIES

This sub-project will operate throughout rural Botswana. The beneficiaries will be private entrepreneurs with small-scale businesses. In particular, females and business owners located in the western part of the country will be favored under the

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Productive Employment Development Fund. The A/RIO and RIO counterparts will benefit from training funded under the RSG.

The evaluation indicates that the intended target groups are benefiting from the program. The program activities have been successfully directed to rural small scale entrepreneurs. Training courses have been conducted for 3057 participants, it is estimated that 1130 new or upgraded jobs have been created and 635 new and/or expanded small scale businesses have been created as a direct result of the RIO/PEDF sub-project.

IX. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

The principal unplanned effect has been the amount of time required of the RIO cadre in connection with FAP and other general administrative work which restricts the amount of rural industrial development project work they can do.

X. LESSONS LEARNED

Not pertinent at this time.

XI. SPECIAL COMMENTS

The RIO Cadre evaluator and the PEDF evaluator were asked to address a number of specific questions which are covered in this section and the section on the PEDF activities.

A. Implementation Bottlenecks and Monitoring and Coordinating of Phase II.

An assessment of the RDU system for monitoring and coordinating the phase II RIO/PEDF sub-project indicates that the present S/RIO in the MCI and the Communal Areas Coordinator in the RDU of MFDP are performing the tasks assigned to them in their job descriptions in a more than satisfactory manner. The RIOs in the field posts spoke highly of the work being done by the present S/RIOs and the Communal Areas Coordinator in MFDP.

The one area where the monitoring and coordination is not functioning properly is in connection with the PEDF which is discussed under "Outputs" and under Section XI herein.

In general both the RDU and AID/B staff is spending a great deal of time on the detailed monitoring of Inputs which limits the management time available for other substantive issues which will have to be addressed in the future if the program is going to be sustainable over the long-term. These issues include RIO program direction and leadership which must come from the the S/RIO cadre and in the more remote areas the amount of infrastructure necessary to develop markets and reliable and accessible raw material sources for successful rural industrialization.

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The principle bottleneck specific to the future of the RIO/PEDF sub-project is going to be the GOB imposed budget ceilings. This issue is discussed and recommendations are made elsewhere in the report.

B. The Training and General Support Fund.

The most successful part of the RIO sub-project seems to be the activities carried out under the TGSF. The absorptive capacity of the fund should continue to increase as staffing levels in the RIO stations increase. The TGSF is used for training courses, FAP related skills upgrading and for such things as surveys, data collection, market promotion and development activities. All the RIOs expressed concern that the funding levels were being cut.

C. The PEDF and the RIO Cadre:

The relationship of the PEDF to the RIO program is in reality non-existent. Of the eight RIOs interviewed only one knew of the existence of the PEDF and none had any knowledge of the relationship of the PEDF to the RIO program or the FAP. This is covered in more detail in the following section.

XII. ASSESSMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT FUND

A. Discussion

Under the original Phase II Project Paper the Productive Employment Development Fund (PEDF) was intended to provide financial support to the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) program. As such it was a grant, not loan program. One recommendation which resulted from the ECPR was that AID funds to the PEDF be used to provide resources to rural entrepreneurs on a loan basis only. In accordance with this recommendation, an addendum to the Project Paper modified the originally proposed grant approach. However, the ECPR also stated, "In the event that AID and the GOB are unable to reach agreement on the provision of credit under the PEDF, other viable alternatives for the use of these funds are the following: support to the NDB lending operation for small scale business; support to another appropriate institution for the provision of loans to small scale entrepreneurs."

NDB is administering PEDF in the following fashion. Loans drawn from PEDF monies can be made only to FAP grant holders whose projects qualify under the FAP criteria for small-scale projects. Currently small-scale means total investment in fixed assets does not exceed P 20,000. Successful FAP applicants complete a NDB loan application which is evaluated and approved or rejected by a NDB loan committee. Ordinarily one member of that committee is also a member of the Production Development Committee (PDC) where the FAP applications are originally considered, and thus has prior knowledge of projects eligible for PEDF loans.

Loan applications are evaluated on a commercial basis. An application for a project considered to be not viable economically is likely to be rejected. Up to most recently the interest rate charged for these loans has been 16% or 17%, no different from the rate charged for similar loans which are non-PEDF funded. NDB's interest rate structure is being revised, and rates may fall to the 10% - 11% range. Six percentage points of the rate charged goes to cover NDB's operating costs. Its rates, at 16% - 20%, are slightly above commercial rates offered by private banks, but most likely NDB takes on riskier and more small-scale projects which involve higher administrative costs.

Disbursement of loan funds is based on the submission to the bank of a pro forma invoice. Funds are disbursed only to goods and services suppliers, not to the individual borrower.

Three aspects of NDB administration of PEDF should be highlighted. First, administration of the Fund is on a commercial basis. Within the bank, the Fund is referred to as the "USAID line of credit," and its use is not distinguished from the use of any other line of credit except that it is tied to FAP grant holders outside of urban areas. Also, RIOs have mentioned that at least some NDB branches require PEDF loan applicants to provide on their own account 15% of the project's total investment. In most cases this means that the loan can be used for only 5% - 15% of total investment.

Second, the loan application process can take at least six to eight months.

Third, NDB does not appear to actively promote the use of the PEDF either directly to RIOs or through the PDC or DDC. Only one of eight RIOs interviewed by the evaluation team had even heard of the PEDF. This is not surprising since to NDB the scheme is not one which requires special promotion and is handled simply as a regular line of credit.

B. Fund Utilization

The original Phase II Project budget included \$525,000 for the PEDF. Of this, \$165,866 was disbursed in 1984 to GOB, which has transferred that amount to NDB. The transfer of funds to NDB is in grant form, but NDB then lends at their going rate of interest to individual borrowers. Since this program began in 1984 to the end of 1985, NDB has lent only about \$28,000 of the PEDF funds, or roughly 6% of the original budget line item. These funds have gone to 25 businesses, and have supported the creation of 101 new jobs. Because of the slow rate of PEDF utilization, no additional funds have been disbursed to GOB.

A question which may be asked is, has the way in which the PEDF been structured and administered reduced its utilization? The Fund's structure as a loan program tied to FAP, and its administration by the NDB as a line of credit to be drawn down in

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accordance with ordinary commercial practices, has put constraints on its overall utilization. The NDB estimates that three to four times the number of loans could be processed under the auspices of the PEDF if the tie to FAP were eliminated. It claims that all FAP grant recipients eligible for a PEDF loan receive that loan. On the other hand, many potential borrowers from the target group of small-scale rural entrepreneurs can not afford the loan conditions and repayment terms set by the bank. In addition, the lag time from loan application to approval is so long that potential borrowers are discouraged from the start.

It should be noted that frequently RIOs specifically discourage entrepreneurs from even applying for loans. The rationale for this is twofold: first, interest rates are considered to be too high; and second, if the project fails after a short period of time, loan repayments are difficult to make. Potential borrowers are instead encouraged to raise their own contribution, or to provide their contribution in kind.

Other reasons for lower Fund utilization than expected include the following. The demand for loan funds may be low because there are few opportunities for opening new enterprises. In this sense, the original target amount may have been overly ambitious. Also, the time required for the loan application process may be too long.

Though only indirectly related to PEDF utilization, another important factor to consider is that credit per se does not appear to be a problem in Botswana. The current National Development Plan reports, "During NDP5, total credit to the nonfinancial sectors of the economy more than tripled...It represented a real growth of credit of over 11% per year, matching the rapid growth of total GDP and more than twice the growth rate of the non-mining sector." Thus, rather than the availability of credit, what may be a problem is the ability of borrowers to meet the terms set by NDB. These terms include interest rates, loan application approval conditions, and repayment time.

XIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. RIO Related Recommendations

In support of the GOB Fiscal Policy discussed above and to permit the successful accomplishment of the stated goal and purpose of the RSG II it is recommended that:

1. the PACD be extended for two years;
2. all efforts should be made to insure that the existing RIO stations have adequate physical facilities and are properly staffed to allow for the most effective use of program funds before the next two RIO stations are opened;

3. methods be explored with the Building Department which will speed up the process of utilization of funds allocated to the construction process since housing and training facilities are badly needed at present in the more remote stations;
4. the funding for the position of the Project/Communal Areas Coordinator in the MFDP be extended for a fourth full year;
5. the training component of the project funded under the TGSE not be restricted by GOB ceilings to the point where it will jeopardize the success of the RIO program and the FAP;
6. the overall requirements for the posting of local candidates be reviewed to ensure progress toward prompt localizing of RIO posts particularly in the non-remote stations;
7. increased efforts be made by USAID/B, the appropriate GOB ministries, and the NDB to clarify the intended use of the PEDF, inform the local RIO cadre and insure the coordination of the activity;

To establish a successful rural development program in the more remote areas will be a very difficult task requiring a major commitment of management time and financial support. To support this activity it is recommended that:

8. the USAID/B project manager make more regular field visits probably by air, to insure a better understanding of the substantive constraints and problems which are being encountered at the implementation level of the RIO sub-project;
9. greater emphasis be given to overcoming marketing infrastructure and raw material supply constraints particularly in the remote areas;
10. greater emphasis be given by the S/RIO at MCI and by the MFDP Communal Areas Coordinator to the leadership and management issues which will determine the long-term sustainability of the program. This will probably require the addition of two Industrial Officers as S/RIOs at Headquarters.

B. PEDF Related Recommendations

It is recommended that various options be explored for the increased utilization of the PEDF funds. Some suggested options are listed below. However, it should be noted that these have not been fully evaluated by the team, and that they represent only ideas. Discussions attended by all relevant parties, including the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Ministry of

Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, the National Development Bank, and USAID, should be held to consider these and other appropriate options which may be developed.

1. To support the FAP training needs now being supplied from the Training and General Support Fund, a portion of the PEDF loan made to an entrepreneur could be for meeting training needs, and once the training has been successfully completed that portion could be forgiven. In essence the forgivable portion of the loan is a grant to the borrower to help fund his or her training needs.
2. Training needs could also be supported by NDB establishing a separate training fund using PEDF monies for the purpose of administering forgivable loans to individual entrepreneurs who participate in training programs.
3. A third way in which training needs could be met with these funds is for NDB to make loans to other institutions, such as the Brigades, which are involved in training programs.
4. The loan terms could be softened for those eligible under the PEDF program, perhaps by lowering interest rates or providing for a repayment grace period. In this instance, however, one must be particularly careful about the economic viability of the project. Softening the loan terms may encourage the initiation of projects which in fact are not viable.
5. The tie to the FAP could be eliminated, thus freeing the money for use by a wider target group. NDB would then be able to use the funds for lending to a larger number of small scale businesses. In considering this option, however, one must also consider whether sufficient credit is already available to these potential borrowers.
6. The funds could be lent for economic feasibility studies when these are necessary prior to a loan being granted, or for the hiring of consultants to work with a new business.
7. The funds could be shifted to another appropriate institution which provides loans to small-scale entrepreneurs.

In line with the above options, it is also recommended that particular attention be given to the potential for using the PEDF funds to support training efforts (options one through three) which will raise the skill and management levels of small-scale entrepreneurs.

ANNEX B

HORTICULTURAL ESTATES SUB-PROJECT

BOTSWANA RURAL SECTOR GRANT PROJECT EVALUATION

(Project # 633-0077)

May 1986

Gaborone, Botswana

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I. SUMMARY

The development of the Phase II estates continues to run far behind the schedules laid down when the extension of the Horticultural Estates sub-project was planned. The lag in utilization of funds which characterized Phase I are recurring in Phase II. The problem of inadequate supplies of irrigation water that continues to limit production to very low levels on some of the Phase I estates has been avoided in establishing the two new Phase II estates. However, problems due to friction among members and failure to cooperate and to poor technical and managerial leadership that restricted progress in Phase I are re-occurring on one of the Phase II estates. The targeted employment levels are being maintained on Phase I and one of the Phase II estates, but information has not been developed to determine income effects or long-term economic viability.

II. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The purposes of the evaluation of the Horticulture Estates sub-project are:

A. Review progress of Ramonaka and Selebi-Phikwe Estates and make a preliminary assessment of Chadibe Estate,

B. Analyze implementation bottlenecks and recommend solutions, and

C. Assess drought effects on estates and suggest means of alleviating avoidable problems or alternative plans.

The evaluation was done by the Agricultural Economist on the evaluation team with the cooperation and assistance of the GOB/MOA Horticultural Officer, the Research Horticulturist and Estate Horticultural Advisors and Agricultural Demonstrators. Project documents, including previous evaluation and status reports, and available financial and production data were reviewed. Visits were made to both Phase I and Phase II estates since financing of Phase I estates has not been terminated; at least one Phase I and one Phase II estate share management personnel; and since knowledge of the current status of the Phase I estates is relevant to an assessment of the viability of the Horticultural Estate concept.

III. EXTERNAL FACTORS

The factor impacting most severely on the Horticultural Estates sub-project was the drought starting in 1981-82 and continuing to the present time. In spite of drought being a common occurrence in Botswana, the present drought being the second five-year period of continuous drought since 1961-62, the

possibility of such an occurrence apparently was ignored in planning Phase II. The goal of Phase II was specified as being the same as Phase I, but the purpose varied in that emphasis was no longer placed on developing new strategies and would not be experimental. Apparently, it was incorrectly assumed that the horticultural estates were viable and would not be affected by rainfall. Yet, two of the four Phase I estates suffered complete or near complete crop failure each season since 1982-83. A third estate has suffered serious reductions in at least one season. The 1984 evaluation of Phase Phase I concluded that the Horticultural Estates concept had not been fully tested and that there was considerable evidence that such organizations were not sustainable.

A second external factor impacting on all of the sub-projects has been the marked devaluation of the Botswanan currency which substantially exceeded the internal rate of inflation. As a result, fewer dollars have been required to cover local costs and the problem of over-budgeting of some sub-projects was intensified.

A third factor that may have had some impact on the development of the Horticultural Estates sub-project was the policy of the government to limit overall and some individual items of expenditures regardless of whether internally or externally funded. This policy may have delayed some capital expenditures on the project. However, it appears that these delays would probably have occurred in any event.

IV. PROJECT INPUTS

In Phase I, RSG funds were to be provided if needed to cover costs of housing for Horticultural Advisors and Agricultural Demonstrators; net houses for producing seedlings, and vehicles for transporting produce to market. Fencing, draft power and an irrigation system were to be provided where such facilities did not exist. Improvements in some irrigation systems were to be provided as well as operating costs to get the estates into production. Funds to support a research horticulturist and economist at the research station were also included. The GOB was to provide Horticultural Advisors (generally volunteers), Agricultural Demonstrators and a Horticultural Officer and assistants to manage and supervise estate activities. Land would be allotted from communal sources and estate members would clear and prepare sites for production.

Most of the prescribed inputs for Phase I appear to have been provided although considerably later than indicated in the original schedule. Two new estates, Mogobane and Mathubudukwane, have been established. Two existing organizations, Manyana and Mankodi, were brought into the sub-project in 1982. Current status of RSG funds made available for Phase I of the sub-project is as follows:

	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Original Budget	\$293,275	100
Earmarked	311,943	106
Disbursed to GOB	222,412	76
Proposed Deobligation	60,000	20
Unliquidated (AID)	29,531	10
Spent by GOB*	197,190	67
Unliquidated (GOB)*	25,222	9

*Estimated dollar equivalents

Between the beginning of the third quarter of 1981 and the end of the fourth quarter of 1985, an amount equal to 67% of the originally budgeted amount has been disbursed to and spent by GOB agencies. GOB has expended 89% of the funds made available to it. An amount equal to 19% of the original budget remains unliquidated at the end of four and one-half years--10% held by USAID and 9% by the GOB.

Under Phase II, RSG funds were budgeted to provide support for site development, tools and equipment, draft power, housing and supplies to establish three new Horticultural Estates. GOB commitments were similar to those under Phase I. Two of the three estates, Ramonaka and Selebi-Phikwe, have been established and production initiated even though additional development remains to be done. No work has been done physically on establishing the third estate at Chadibe although an allotment of land for this purpose has been approved. Current status of RSG funds for Phase II is as follows:

	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Original Budget	\$222,000	100
Earmarked	181,800	82
Disbursed to GOB	27,511	12
Proposed Deobligation	70,000	32
Unliquidated (AID)	84,289	38
Spent by GOB*	33,085	15
Unliquidated (GOB)*	- 5,574**	- 3

*Estimated dollar equivalents.

**Expenditures by GOB exceed receipts of RSG funds.

The first disbursements and expenditures of Phase II funds were made in the third quarter of 1984. Eighteen months later, an amount equal to only 12% of the original budget had been disbursed to the GOB. The GOB, using some of its own funds, had expended an amount equal to 15% of the original RSG budget. Since only 82% of the budgeted amount has been earmarked, the proposed deobligation of an amount equal to 32% percent of the original budget will reduce the total available for expenditure on the sub-project to 50% of the budget originally proposed or \$111,000. With a project assistance termination date of September 30, 1988, or 21 months from the date of last reported expenditures, it is questionable if even this limited fund will be spent.

Varying numbers of Horticultural Advisors and Agricultural Demonstrators have been provided by the GOB at different times, but one advisor and one demonstrator for each project, as specified in the project agreement, has never been achieved. Currently, there is one Agricultural Demonstrator with two assistants, but no Horticultural Advisor, to support the work at both Mathubudukwane and Ramonaka Estates. One Horticultural Advisor and one Agricultural Demonstrator are available to support the work on the three estates of Mogobane, Manyona, and Mankodi. One Agricultural Demonstrator is available to work with the members at Selebi-Phikwe. None are available to work with prospective members at Chadibe in organizing the association or initiating implementation of an estate activity. Thus, instead of 14 Horticultural Advisors and Agricultural Demonstrators to work with members of seven estates as envisioned in original plans, there are one Horticultural Advisor and three Agricultural Demonstrators to work with six existing estates plus one in the earliest stage of development.

A total of \$515,275 was originally budgeted under Phases I and II for development of the Horticultural Estates. Of this amount 29% was either not committed or is proposed for deobligation. Of the remaining 71% available, only 45% had been expended by the end of 1985 and the remaining 26% was still unliquidated. Several factors have contributed to this relatively low level of utilization of available funds. The sub-project appears to have been moderately over-budgeted in the beginning, but this condition was worsened by the rapid rate of devaluation of the Botswana Pula relative to the internal rate of inflation. Beyond these factors, however, the failure to vigorously promote and encourage the development of the projects was a contributing factor.

V. Project Outputs

The quantitative outputs targeted for Phase I were achieved although well behind original schedules. Four, as opposed to three originally planned estates were established. The first, aside from shortage of irrigation water during the early seasons after organization, continues to operate effectively. This estate has had technical advisors and managerial direction since early in its organization. It is reported to have operated without serious problems developing among its members and at relatively high levels of production. The two cooperative organizations subsumed in the sub-project during its second year have suffered from severe shortages of irrigation water and have had only limited or no production each season since 1982-83. One of these has also had serious organizational problems with only three of the original members still a part of the organization. The number of members has been restored, but current limited production prospects may seriously impair future motivation of the group.

In contrast, the second of these two associations has experienced equally bad or worse production and returns, but still retains its original ten members who reportedly are determined to continue their joint effort. The fourth and last estate to be established appears to have a dependable source of irrigation water, soils moderately well suited to horticultural production and to be favorably located relative to market outlets. Technical problems in production during the first few seasons restricted production below hoped for levels and expenses considerably exceeded levels which members reportedly had been led to expect. Members were very dissatisfied and two-thirds left the association within the first two years. However, a new management team has been installed, several new members have been recruited and production prospects are favorable.

In summary, it might be noted that organization of two of the Phase I associations--Manyana and Mathubudukwane--reportedly had been initiated and promoted by individuals outside of the group who became members. These two associations are the ones that experienced and continue to experience serious organizational problems. These groups appear to have been less motivated than those that came together because of their common interest and without outside initiatives. It might also be noted that the quality of leadership of the Horticultural Advisors or Agricultural Demonstrators is reflected in the progress or lack of progress in developing the estates. In no case, however, does there appear to be appreciable progress in creating the managerial capability among the members to continue successful operation of the estates if the advisors and demonstrators are removed. Finally, it must be noted that no information has yet been developed from Phase I to indicate whether or not the estate concept is economically viable.

Development of Phase II, like Phase I, has experienced many delays. However, two new estates have been established and are now in production. The allotment of land for the third estate has been approved. The nature and rate of development has varied markedly among the estates so each will be reviewed separately.

Ramonaka

Ramonaka is the most advanced and most promising of the estates. Some delays were encountered in site preparation and getting the reservoir installed and the irrigation system in operation. The estate has 3.65 hectares fenced and available for cultivation. Most of the tract is light, sandy soil suitable for any horticultural crop, but a limited area is composed of heavy black soil, the use of which will be more restricted. A tractor was hired to plow the tract prior to preparing the plots for planting by the members using hand tools. Draft power has not been purchased. The lack of draft power may delay replantings and complicate establishing an

effective rotation. In order to avoid the stoppage of work and loss of a crop, such as occurred on the nearby Mathubudukwane estate due to failure of the pump engine, a standby engine should be provided.

The 14 members of the association have worked together without friction and cooperated in carrying out agreed upon production plans effectively. The management staff consists of an Agricultural Demonstrator and two assistants. A Horticultural Advisor is not available, but technical assistance has been provided by MOA staff in solving some technical problems that have arisen. A storage facility has been provided which makes it possible to maintain reserve supplies so that all operations can be performed in a timely manner. A net house has been used effectively to produce seedlings for transfer to field plots, insuring better stands and improved yields.

Limited quantities of produce are sold to people who come to the estate to buy or to shops or individuals in nearby villages. However, most of the produce is sold to SEGA in Gaborone. Deliveries are made twice a week in the vehicle which serves both Ramonaka and Mathubudukwane. Some difficulty reportedly developed in moving the total quantity of produce from both estates during peak production period. Some adjustment in delivery schedules to ease this problem should be possible without resorting to the purchase of a second or of a larger more expensive vehicle.

Selebi-Phikwe

The establishment of Selebi-Phikwe has run about one year behind schedule. Some delay was experienced in obtaining an acceptable site. The location finally approved is on the Matloutse River which carries waste water from mines in the vicinity of Selebi-Phikwe so the supply of irrigation water seems reasonably assured. Tests of samples of the water being used for irrigation do not indicate levels of salts or other elements likely to be injurious to horticultural crops. Unfortunately, the site is over 20 kilometers from Selebi-Phikwe where the produce must be marketed. Roads should be passable throughout the year with the possible exception of a few days during the peak of the rainy season. However, transportation costs will be high.

Unusually heavy growth of brush and trees on the site delayed the clearing and site development. This situation was complicated by the fact that all members of the association lived in Selebi-Phikwe and had to commute each day to the estate during the clearing process. In addition to the work done by the six member families, local labor was hired to assist in the clearing process. There is a total of 15 hectares in the site, of which 11 have been cleared, 4.5 fenced and 2.5 placed in cultivation. The four hectares of uncleared

land are scheduled to be used as site for houses for members or other buildings required for the estate.

A pump and sprinkler irrigation system has been installed which is adequate for the 2.5 hectares currently being cultivated. Additional pipe and perhaps the originally planned reservoir will be required if the cultivated area is expanded. A question has been raised as to whether additional water can be pumped from the same location where water is now being obtained or whether a new pump at a different location will be required. The soil and supply of water appear suitable to permit expansion, but this question of location for pumping should be answered before proceeding with any expansion of the cultivated area.

Construction of housing for the Agricultural Demonstrator or of the net house has not been started, nor has the reservoir called for in the original proposal been installed. Draft animals have not been obtained nor the mule paddock fenced.

The association is composed of the six original families, several of which are single parent households. Additional members are being sought, but the group has decided that new members would have to contribute 200 Pula as compensation for the work of clearing the tract. Thus far only one of the six members has moved to the estate and is working his plots. The remainder continue living in Selebi-Phikwe and hire local labor to do a major part of the work on their plots. Group participation and cooperation has been poor.

The association has had difficulty in obtaining fertilizer, seeds and pesticides in a timely manner. Delays in spraying to control pests has reduced yields in some instances. Seed sown directly to the field have often failed to produce good stands. Poor cultural practices have also reduced yields in some instances, particularly of tomatoes.

The first harvest started in October, 1985. The types of vegetables sold and gross receipts are shown below.

Cabbages	P1,435
Tomatoes	P1,330
Maize	P 991
Spinach	P 471
Carrots	P 208
Onions	P 85
TOTAL	<u>P4,520</u>

Sales by individual members, deductions for inputs and payments to members are indicated below.

<u>Member</u>	<u>Sales</u>	<u>Deductions</u>	<u>Payments</u>
1	P 642	P 165	P 477
2	P 755	P 139	P 616
3	P1,097	P 244	P 853
4	P 778	P 170	P 608
5	P 625	P 149	P 476
6	P 623	P 122	P 501
TOTAL	<u>P4,520</u>	<u>P 989</u>	<u>P3,531</u>

It should be noted that the deductions are not any reflection of total expenses. For example, transportation costs for the last quarter of 1985 reported to AID totaling P2,870 were not included nor were any depreciation charges. The deductions made by the association were made to cover at least part of the cost of inputs and will be held to purchase inputs for the next crop.

Chadibe

The allotment of land, scheduled to be accomplished in April 1984, was completed in April 1986. The general area proposed for location of the estate has been determined, although the specific site has not been designated. The area is on a moderate slope with an uneven, stony surface. It is expected that the site will have between six and seven hectares and it is proposed that two hectares be used for producing horticultural crops and the remainder planted with fruit trees. On or adjacent to the expected site for the estate are two small free flowing springs, plus two boreholes used to supply the nearby village. The flow from the springs appears to be quite limited even at this season. The stream carrying water from the springs is currently being absorbed into the soil and disappears within about 300 yards of the spring. It is questionable if this limited flow, even if maintained throughout the year, would irrigate more than a fraction of the proposed estate area. It is possible that the supply from the springs could be supplemented by water from new boreholes. However, this action would increase both the beginning capital cost and the continuing operating costs. In any event, before initiating work on developing the site, the adequacy of the potential water supply should be carefully assessed and, if it appears necessary to supplement the springs with boreholes, costs should be re-calculated.

The soil survey specified in the project document should also be completed prior to the initiation of site development. Considerable re-shaping of the surface will be necessary to facilitate irrigation and prevent erosion. In light of this requirement, depth of soil becomes particularly pertinent.

The analyses that have been made of potential markets in the area and the projected costs and returns cannot be quantitatively tested. However, the estimates used in making the analyses

appear reasonable if it is assumed that an uninterrupted adequate flow of irrigation is attained and that effective managerial leadership is provided. Past experience on the other estates clearly indicates that attainment of those assumed conditions cannot be assured.

VI. PURPOSE

The purpose of the project, of which Horticultural Estates is a sub-project, is to provide the rural population with increased access to productive employment opportunities. The purpose of the sub-project is to establish several operational Horticultural Estates, increase the income of members of the estate associations and partially meet consumption requirements of urban markets. At the end of the project it was expected that the Ministry of Agriculture would have developed a successful model for commercial horticultural production based upon organized groups of small farmers and that Horticultural Estates would be established and commercially viable. There is no assurance that end of project conditions can be attained.

The time schedules set for attaining the physical establishment of the estates, achieving the behavioral changes required in the adoption of a complex and demanding new technology and establishing new forms of organized behavior essential for successful planning and managing common interests and resources were unrealistic. Selection of several sites for establishing production enterprises based on irrigation was ill-advised from the standpoint of assuring dependable adequate supplies of water. The design and installation of irrigation systems appears to have been faulty in some instances and may require corrective action. Technical guidance provided members was inadequate in several instances. Vigerous and coordinated action by all sponsors of sub-projects could make very substantial progress in correcting the conditions noted above. Whether sufficient progress could be made within the time remaining before the termination of project to achieve the end of project objectives cannot be assured. Further, unless steps are taken very quickly to assemble information relative to the economic performance of estates, it will not be known at the end of project whether the Horticultural Estate concept is viable.

VII. GOAL

The long-term goal is to stimulate rural development and a more equitable distribution of income in Botswana. A subgoal appears to have been, that following demonstration of the viability and success of the model for commercial horticultural production based on small farmers, the establishment of a number of horticultural associations great enough to have a significant impact on employment and on filling domestic demands for horticultural products would occur. Substantial

secondary benefits would likely occur as input and commodity marketing organizations and processing plants were established that would also have contributed to attainment of the national goal. Currently six estates have been established, but there is not yet any basis for concluding that they are commercially successful.

VIII. BENEFICIARIES

Direct beneficiaries include some 40 families who are members of associations formed during Phase I, plus 20 families in associations formed during Phase II. These are poor rural people who were generally unemployed and many are female heads of households. There have been no significant indirect or secondary beneficiaries.

IX. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

No unplanned effects have been identified.

X. LESSONS LEARNED

The project illustrates the dangers inherent in designing and attempting to implement a project without appropriate technical expertise. An agriculturalist should have been aware that recurrent and extended droughts were almost certain to occur in a country with the historical rainfall pattern of Botswana and that irrigation water--from either surface or ground sources--would be affected immediately or in the relative short run. An agriculturalist should also have advised the economist against basing the economic analysis on the completely unrealistic assumption of constant yields over a 10-year period. Irrigation specialists could have foreseen the probable failures of irrigation sources and systems on several of the estates and have proposed alternatives that would have avoided or at least minimized the probability of failure. Low yields or crop failures experienced intermittently on several estates could have been avoided with better direction as to the most effective agricultural practices.

XI. SPECIAL COMMENTS

Not pertinent at this time.

XII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made with respect to the Horticultural Estates sub-project:

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1) It is recommended that collection and analysis of data on cost and returns on Phase II estates currently being undertaken by the MOA Agricultural Economist be extended to Phase I estates and continued as a part of the quarterly reporting systems. This information would not only strengthen the monitoring system, but also provide a basis for verifying if MOA attained its end of project objective of developing a successful model for commercial horticultural production based on small farmers as specified in the Log Frame. The feasibility of supplementing the analyses of the estates with a comparative study of private horticultural crop producers should be explored.

2) It is recommended that collaboration of specialists on the farming systems project be sought in developing analyses of the combination of crops and rotations that would optimize the use of the limited water and labor which would provide guidelines for planning and managing each of the estates.

3) It is recommended that Ramonaka estate personnel be required to decide on the type of draft power to be used and that such be secured within three months or that funds currently being held for this purpose be deobligated.

4) It is recommended that the house scheduled for construction at Ramonaka for an Agricultural Demonstrator or Horticultural Advisor not be built. At present, Ramonaka and Mathubudukwane are being served by an Agricultural Demonstrator housed at Mathubudukwane. This appears to be a most reasonable and satisfactory arrangement and it is recommended that it be continued.

5) It is recommended that a spare pump engine be provided for the Ramonaka/Mathubudukwane estates so that future breakdowns will not deprive the estates of essential irrigation water.

6) It is recommended that efforts be initiated immediately to arrange for all members of the Selebi-Phikwe association and the assigned Agricultural Demonstrator to transfer their residence to the estate site. The present arrangement of living in Selebi-Phikwe, visiting the estates occasionally and hiring local labor to do most of the work on the estate is completely unsatisfactory, not in accordance with either the spirit or letter of the project agreement and will almost certainly doom the estate to failure. No further new capital investment should be made until arrangements for on-site residence of members are completed.

7) It is recommended that the Horticultural Officer work with the Selebi-Phikwe Agricultural Demonstrator or other appropriate individuals to arrange for the timely supply of seed, fertilizer, pesticides and other essential inputs.

8) It is recommended that work on the Chadibe estate not be initiated until a determination is made of the adequacy of the water supply to support the projected production without interruption and a soil survey is made as provided in the original proposal to determine if the soil is suitable for horticultural crop production and of sufficient depth to permit reforming the surface to facilitate irrigation and prevent erosion. It is recommended that the irrigation specialists of the Ministry of Agriculture be requested to undertake the assessment of the adequacy of the water supply and, if the current proposals are not feasible, develop alternative arrangements.

9) It is recommended that the irrigation specialist of the Ministry of Agriculture also be requested to undertake a technical investigation of all of the estates as soon as possible to determine if there is any technically and economically feasible means of salvaging the irrigation potential of Manyana and Mankgodi estates and of increasing the efficiency of water use and reducing the hazard of future failure of supplies at other estates.

ANNEX C

DISTRICT INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SUB-PROJECT

BOTSWANA RURAL SECTOR GRANT PROJECT EVALUATION

(Project # 633-0077)

May 1986

Gaborone, Botswana

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I. SUMMARY

The District Institutional Development (DID) sub-project directly supports other project components which are dependent upon the effective administration of decentralized government services. The District Administration structure has major GOB responsibilities for planning and implementing development programs at the district level. Over the last few years, the GOB has significantly moved toward localizing District Officer positions, upgrading district office and logistical facilities, and providing incentives to attract qualified personnel for District Administration.

The purpose of this sub-project is to help overcome key constraints which remain to the overall improvement of management within the District Administration system. These constraints concern the need to increase the District Officers' capacity to plan and administer rural development programs, particularly those aimed at job creation and increasing rural incomes, and to provide District Officers with advanced training to improve their management, economics, and planning skills. To accomplish this purpose, the sub-project was designed to provide 37 District Officers with a total of 40 person years of training at the master's degree level.

Good progress is being made in selecting District Officers for master's level training and placing those selected in degree programs in the United States. The academic performance of participants generally has been good, and their average cumulative grade point average to date is 3.2, where 3.0 equals a "B" and 4.0 equals an "A". In 1984 and 1985, the implementation schedule for sending participants to the U.S. to begin graduate studies was followed as closely as possible. In 1986, the schedule may be accelerated due to the need to see that all students complete their studies by 1988. Participants are not returning to Botswana as scheduled since the Project underestimated the amount of time required for degree program completion. It is now expected that an individual's program duration will average 18 months rather than 12 months, so participants will return about six months later than originally expected. This change has also necessitated a change in the budget to accommodate the increased costs associated with longer training programs.

The evaluation team's recommendations deal with three aspects of this sub-project. First, in some cases greater care is necessary in identifying the specific training needs of the participants, and in turn identifying appropriate programs. Second, an attempt should be made to include all 37 eligible District Officers in the sub-project. Third, job responsibilities of returned participants should be suited to their upgraded level of skills.

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II. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Relevant documents and reports were reviewed to gain an understanding of the sub-project activities and progress to date. Interviews were conducted with Ministry of Local Government and Lands officials at headquarters, District Officers who have completed their master's degree programs and one who is scheduled to begin his training, other District Administration officials, and officers of the Academy for Educational Development. The content of some master's degree programs was reviewed.

Progress toward output and purpose achievement was judged on the basis of the flow of sub-project participants, their academic performance, their own impressions of the respective degree programs, and course content of those programs and their relevance to District Officer job responsibilities. Job performance of returned participants could not be evaluated since those who have returned have been at their posts for only one to four months. The final report on the District Institutional Development sub-project has been prepared in the PES format

III. EXTERNAL FACTORS

The problem of rural unemployment and under-employment which prompted the initiation of Phase I of the Project in 1980 continues today, and is expected to continue into the near future. The current National Development Plan (1985-91) projects that by 1990/91, 51.8% of the labor force will be without employment or self-employment opportunities. The GOB, through its Financial Assistance Policy and other programs, is making a concentrated effort to diversify its economy by providing technical assistance and financial incentives for the development of small industries, particularly in rural areas. The rural Sector Grant is designed to be a contribution to these efforts. Given the continuing employment problem, the idea behind the RSG is still very much valid.

IV. PROJECT INPUTS

The AID contribution to this activity was budgeted in the amount of \$820,000. This was calculated on the basis of 40 person years of long-term graduate degree training in the United States for 37 participants, and represents an average cost of \$20,400 per person year. When it was found that each participant will require on average 18 months of training rather than 12 months, this budget item was revised upward by \$332,800, to \$1,152,800. In theory this new amount would fund 37 participants for an average of 18 months each at a cost of \$20,400 per person year. However, in practice, only 29 District Officers may be participants unless there are changes to the PACD and perhaps to this sub-project budget.

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A problem arises in that the line item for each participant is calculated on the basis of 24 months training. This is prudent budgeting procedure, but the result is that only 29 District Officers currently are expected to be included as participants because given the 24 month period used for the budget this is the maximum number which can be accommodated within the total budgeted amount. In the following section we discuss a recommendation whereby all 37 eligible District Officers would be included in this sub-project. If this recommendation is accepted, and the average training program is longer than 18 months in duration, the budget for this sub-project will require additional funds which should be available from savings elsewhere in the Project budget.

V. PROJECT OUTPUTS

The Project's original expected output was 37 District Officers trained to the master's degree level. This represented the number of District Officers who would be eligible for training over the life of the Project. According to the implementation schedule, seven participants were to be trained during 1984/85, nine during 1985/86, ten during 1986/87, and eleven during 1987/88. All participants were expected to return to Botswana by August 1988. It was thought that a total of 40 person years would be required to complete this training program.

To date, 16 participants have been sent to the U.S. to do master's level programs, and 13 are scheduled to go this year. Five of the 16 participants have returned with their degrees, and all but one continues to work in the District Administration. Current plans are to train 29 of the 37 eligible District Officers. The original schedule was based on the assumption that training would require one year only. Since it is requiring two years, implementation is slower than expected.

The estimate of 40 person years for 37 participants has been found to be inaccurate. Each participant now is expected to require on average 18 months of training. As explained in the section above, the sub-project's budget was revised upward based on 37 participants for an average training period of 18 months at a cost of \$20,400 per person year, but individual participant line items are calculated on the basis of a training period of 24 months. As a result, the projected output is 29 District Officers trained at the master's degree level. AID budget procedures permit the reallocation of funds from one participant's line item to another only after nine months have elapsed from the time of degree program completion. If the PACD remains unchanged, it is unlikely that any additional District Officers, over the 29, will be able to participate, even if funds remain in the budget, because there will be insufficient time for them to complete a degree program.

As participants return, savings may be available from individual line items and could be reallocated to help fund additional participants. Also, there may be savings available from other line items which are underspent. It is recommended that high priority be given to the training at the master's level of all 37 eligible District Officers by making use of whatever funds may be available within the Project. As a corollary to this recommendation, it is recommended that the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) be extended to 16 June 1990, to provide sufficient time for the completion of all degree programs, for unspent funds to become available, and for the Ministry of Local Government and Lands to locate and place temporary replacements for District Officers who are participants (see discussion under Special Comments).

The team believes that including all 37 eligible District Officers as participants is justified on at least three grounds. First, the purpose from the start has been that all 37 eligible officers would be included. Second, it appears that there will be sufficient funds in the Project to achieve this purpose. Third, overseas training of this type has proved historically to be an efficient and productive use of USAID funds, and thus deserves support in particular when it is already included as a Project component. We understand that funds may be available under the BWAST Project for District Officer training, but believe that it is logical to use the current project for this purpose since District Officer training is precisely one of the Project components.

If the number of participants is limited to 29, a PACD extension to at least 1989 is justified to enable GOB to reduce the number of officers absent from post during the coming year. One covenant in the amended Grant Agreement stipulates that GOB provide replacements for District Officers who are in the U.S. on training programs. GOB has experienced difficulty replacing District Officers on a temporary basis, and it is unreasonable to expect them to do so on a more accelerated basis.

Extension of the PACD at least will spread out the demand for replacements. However, a decision on this should be made quickly since preparations have begun to send the officers abroad later this year.

VI. Purpose

The purpose of this sub-project is to meet the training requirements of the senior cadre of District Administration staff by tailoring an intensified graduate level program for the District Officers in the three fields of Administration, Development and Lands. The sub-project is to provide District Officers with advanced training both to improve their management, economics, and planning skills, and, more

specifically, to increase the officers' capacity to plan and administer rural development programs, particularly those aimed at job creation and increasing rural incomes.

Further explanation of the scopes of work for the District Officers is provided in a report titled, "District Administration Training in Botswana," prepared by Louis A. Picard in association with the Ministry of Local Government and Lands. This report was prepared in accordance with a condition precedent requirement that prior to disbursement of AID funds for training of District Officers the GOB submit to AID a training plan and exploration of alternative training programs.

Should the sub-project include training only for the 29, then purpose achievement would be reduced accordingly. Of course, 80% of the eligible officers will have been trained, and significant improvement in planning and administration should be expected. However, job performance of the remaining 20% who will not receive training could be affected negatively.

Those who have returned have been back in Botswana only one to four months. Those four who continue to work in District Administration have been interviewed as part of this evaluation. Since they have been back only a short while, the extent to which their job performance will be improved as a result of their training can not be determined. It should be noted that the Ministry of Local Government and Lands intends to conduct an evaluation of performance after each participant has been back on the job for six months.

All participants interviewed expressed general satisfaction with their degree programs. All believe that their job performance should improve now that they have received advanced training. However, they also noted that the actual nature of their respective jobs was not expected to change. There may be some cause for concern in this regard. The nature of work expected of officers who do not hold master's degrees should be different from that expected of those who have completed their programs. The job performance of officers who have completed their degree work should be closely monitored to judge in what areas their performance has improved and in what areas there should be some revision of current responsibilities to take into account their more advanced level of skills. GOB is correct to expect that the performance of returned participants with respect to their current job responsibilities should improve, but it should also be cognizant of the potential need to adjust job responsibility along with the upgrading of skills.

A related issue is that sub-project purpose achievement will result in a cadre of highly trained District Officers being supervised by a more senior level of officers who in many cases have received much less formal training. All the participants interviewed are aware of this situation and of the potential for conflict. The Ministry should strive to maintain a favorable working relationship between the participants and

their supervisors. USAID may assist in this regard by providing funds for intensive management training courses for District Commissioners who have no university degree. This subject is discussed further under the section, "Special Comments."

Important to the achievement of the sub-project's purpose is the relevance of the subjects studied to the work of the participant District Officers. The Picard report identified the following emphases within each course of study:

- 1) District Officer (Administration) - M.A. in Public Administration/Local Administration and Development Management;
- 2) District Officer (Development) - M.A. in Development Economics and Planning, including project planning, planning appraisal and project management;
- 3) District Officer (Land) - M.S. in Land Resources/Land Use Planning/Physical Geography.

Since returned participants have been on the job only a short while, an evaluation of course relevance based on job performance is not possible. However, the following observations are relevant. First, development officers are expected to do development economics, but do not necessarily have adequate preparation to enter most of the economics courses offered at the universities being chosen. At least one participant was advised against doing the economics program due to lack of preparation, and another has had to revise his course schedule due to difficulties with a quantitative course. It may be that the respective course of study the development students do in the end is more relevant to their work, but in any case it should be understood that to expect those who do not have an economics background to do much economics at the graduate level in the universities chosen is unrealistic. If such courses are necessary, two options are available. Students could take remedial courses in economics and mathematics prior to enrollment in the graduate program, or universities could be chosen which emphasize an institutional approach, rather than a quantitative approach to economics.

A second observation relates to the "Lands" students. Some land use planning subjects relevant to Botswana's needs may not be covered in a particular university's curriculum, such as range management. It may be more appropriate for participants to attend universities which do offer these courses.

Both of the above observations indicate that closer attention should be given to the university program selection process. However, improvements to this process should involve GOB, AED and USAID, because the process includes the identification, prioritization and communication of training needs by GOB to AED, as well as the selection of university programs by AED.

VII. GOAL/SUB-GOAL

The goal of this sub-project is to strengthen the institutional framework for promoting rural employment and income generation. Interviews with the returned participants in the training program suggest that the officers have learned skills which will improve their job performance, and, in turn, improve the implementation of GOB development policy, one aspect of which is the promotion of rural employment and income generation. However, actual progress toward goal achievement can not be properly evaluated until the participants have been on the job for some time. As mentioned above, the Ministry of Local Government and Lands will conduct evaluations of individual participants' performance once sufficient time has passed to provide the necessary data.

VIII. BENEFICIARIES

The direct beneficiaries of this sub-project are the District Officers who are receiving the master's level training. It should be noted that six of the current 29 participants are women. Indirect beneficiaries are all those resident in the various districts who will benefit by the improved planning management resulting from the training received by the participants.

IX. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

The only unplanned, although probably anticipated, effect has been that one participant, soon after returning from successfully completing his master's program, left the District Administration to take a job elsewhere. His reasons for leaving apparently were both personal and professional.

X. LESSONS LEARNED

That some relevant subjects are not covered in the graduate programs selected, and that some students are not adequately prepared to do courses in which they are to enroll, indicates that with this kind of activity great care must be given to university program selection. AED is performing well in general, but there needs to be some fine-tuning with regard both to the identification of training needs, and to program selection. Both of these sub-project components are critical to achieving the overall purpose and goal.

With regard to follow-on activities, the evaluation team's scope of work requested discussion about "a mechanism and timeframe which would guide the Ministry and USAID in discussions concerning support for (District Administration training) needs beyond Phase II of the Rural Sector Grant." As

a starting point, the Ministry and USAID should jointly review the 1984 report titled, "District Administration Training in Botswana," and any revisions which have been made to this training plan since the report was first published. One revision is particularly relevant, and could form the basis of more in-depth discussions. This concerns the training needs of District Commissioners.

In a short report titled, "Training of District Administration Personnel Since 1984," distributed at the RSG Reference Group meeting held on 29 April 1986, the Ministry of Local Government and Lands discusses, among other topics, the training needs of District Commissioners who are without university degrees. This report states, "Most existing formal regional training programmes that would suit these experienced District Officers spell out that trainees should have diploma or university training in order to be admitted to the courses. This target group is also comparatively small which makes any specially designed formal training programme that would suit their needs quite expensive as the officers hold important posts and cannot be released all at the same time. It is also questionable if these officers will be prepared to subject themselves to an in-country training programme or would benefit from such a programme as they have acquired considerable skills through their practical work." The report concludes, "(This group) would benefit from intensive management courses either within the region or in the U.S."

One strong argument in favor of training District Commissioners is that it would support USAID's current activity of training District Officers. One potential problem with the District Institutional Development sub-project is that officers trained to the master's level often will be supervised by District Commissioners who do not have university degrees, nor have a good understanding of what new skills the officers have learned. Through intensive management courses, District Commissioners could be introduced to various aspects of the master's level training courses which their District Officers have completed. In this way, they would be better prepared to make use of the upgraded skills those officers have acquired.

Discussions regarding this kind of training project could start immediately. Funding could be through a separate project, or could be handled through the phase II of BWAST. Such training would be directly relevant to employment generation in rural areas since District Commissioners are in key positions in terms of the development and implementation of government policy in the individual districts.

XI. SPECIAL COMMENTS OR REMARKS

To satisfy a condition precedent (CP) GOB submitted to USAID the training report by Louis Picard, titled "District



Administration Training in Botswana," referred to in an above section. Once received and accepted by USAID as satisfying the CP, the report was the subject of no further communication between USAID and GOB. Since the report included a training schedule for the District Officer cadre being sent to the U.S., this lack of communication created some confusion. For some time GOB assumed that USAID accepted the report's training schedule, which provided that participants would be sent for training up to 1989. The Project Paper clearly states that the final group of participants would leave for training in 1987, and USAID has informed the team that they sent out notices at different intervals which dealt with the training implementation schedule. But apparently this discrepancy in dates was not discussed until almost a year after the Picard report's acceptance. In any case, there has been confusion in this regard. It should be noted that since the CP states that the report is to be "in form and substance satisfactory to AID," it is incumbent on USAID to identify areas where the report is not satisfactory. Otherwise, it is not illogical for GOB to assume that the substance of the report has been accepted.

Regarding the training of the eight eligible District Officers who are excluded from the group now slotted for training, it has been suggested by USAID that these eight can be included as participants in the BWAST project. USAID has communication from GOB in support of this position. However, others who have been interviewed in and out of GOB do not share the opinion of USAID for two reasons. First, the emphasis under BWAST is direct employment generation, not institutional development, and thus the training of District Officers would be a low priority. Second, at least six ministries, plus the private sector, will be competing for BWAST funds. A third consideration is that recommended in this report is that these same funds (from BWAST) perhaps be used for the training of District Commissioners, and it is less likely that the BWAST project would support both the remaining District Officers and the District Commissioners. In sum, dependence on BWAST for training District Officers seems to be unnecessary when a project currently exists which includes that activity as one of its components.

XII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Good progress is being made in selecting District Officers for master's level training and placing those selected in degree programs in the United States. Also, the academic performance of participants generally has been average to above average. The original Project assumptions about duration of degree programs was incorrect, and programs are lasting an average of about 18 months rather than 12 months. Thus, participants are not returning as scheduled, and there may be fewer total number of participants than expected, and costs will be higher.

A

The following recommendations are made.

1) It is recommended that greater attention be given to selecting appropriate degree programs, and that GOB be as clear and precise as possible in identifying, prioritizing and communicating the training needs of the three categories of participants (administration, development, and lands).

2) It is recommended that high priority be given to the training at the master's level of all 37 eligible District Officers by making use of whatever funds may be available within the Project.

3) It is recommended that the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) be extended to June 1990 to provide sufficient time for completion of all degree programs. This should allow enough time for all 37 eligible officers to complete master's programs, and allow the Ministry of Local Government and Lands to spread out the participants' departure dates so as to ease the burden of locating and placing on a temporary basis personnel to replace the absent officers.

4) It is recommended that the job performance of officers who have completed their degree work be closely monitored to judge in what areas their performance has improved and in what areas there should be some revision of current responsibilities to take into account their more advanced level of skills.

5) It is recommended that discussions between USAID and GOB about support for future District Administration training activities be based on the Picard report and revisions to that report, and in particular should consider providing District Commissioners with intensive short-term training in management so as to improve both their own work performance and their performance as supervisors of the master's level District Officers.

ANNEX D

ASSESSMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM FOR MONITORING AND
COORDINATING RSG PHASE II ACTIVITIES

BOTSWANA RURAL SECTOR GRANT PROJECT EVALUATION

(Project # 633-0077)

May 1986

Gaborone, Botswana

Discussion

The Rural Development Unit (RDU) of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning has overall responsibility for monitoring and coordinating the Rural Sector Grant (RSG) Phase II activities on the part of the Government of Botswana. A committee has been established, the Rural Sector Grant Reference Group, to assist the RDU in performing this function. This committee is chaired by the Coordinator of Rural Development in the RDU, and includes as members all line ministries and other government institutions, such as the National Development Bank, which are involved in RSG activities, as well as USAID. In addition, the Communal Areas Coordinator (CAC) in the RDU is a USAID-funded position whose responsibilities include, among others, monitoring, coordinating, troubleshooting and liaising functions with respect to RSG activities. The CAC also is the Secretary to the RSG Reference Group.

The Reference Group's primary function is to monitor and coordinate RSG activities in an environment where all involved ministries and institutions can work together to assess progress of project activities and to resolve issues as they arise. The committee does not have executive powers of its own, but rather is a forum where discussion can take place and recommendations be made which are then referred to the respective ministries and institutions. The Group meets on a quarterly basis and receives reports on the various activities included in the RSG.

The evaluation team found that in general the RDU system for monitoring and coordinating Phase II activities is working well. Reports are submitted on a regular basis to the Group, and discussion centers on how issues raised in the reports can be resolved. A revised management information system has been initiated which keeps the RDU and AID informed of progress and problems with respect to the implementation of project

activities and the achievement of project objectives. This system seems to be working well, although lapses have been apparent during the evaluation team's study. The Chairwoman has noted that at times individual reports are received too late for adequate study prior to Group meetings, and we concur with her that Group members should strive to submit reports in a timely fashion so that they receive the necessary attention. The Communal Areas Coordinator is doing a good job of working with line ministries and institutions in monitoring RSG activity implementation and in dealing with project-related issues as they arise on behalf of the Rural Development Unit, the Reference Group and the line ministries and GOB institutions.

The team notes that the previous Phase I evaluation report and the 1984 audit report raised as an issue a lack of agreement between AID and the RDU on the specific responsibilities of the CAC with respect to the management of the RSG. It is our finding that within his scope of work the CAC is performing well, and that his contract should be extended, as requested by the Directorate of Personnel, for a further two years from its original expiration date of 25 January 1986. This extension is justified on the grounds that critical implementation issues will continue to arise over the following two years, and that there will be a significant change of USAID mission management within a couple of months, including the departure of the mission director and deputy director and of the RSG project manager.

Instead of entering into a discussion about interpretations of and revisions to the CAC's scope of work, the team has chosen what it feels is perhaps a more direct route to resolving this issue and had identified specific outstanding tasks which are significant to the success of the Project and which should be undertaken by the various ministries involved. It is the responsibility of the RDU, through the CAC as liaison person, to see that these tasks are fulfilled. These are listed below.

Recommendations

It is recommended that the RDU system for monitoring and coordinating Phase II activities be continued as presently organized, and that the position of CAC be extended for a further two years past the original contract expiration date of 25 January 1986.

It is also recommended that the RDU, through the CAC and his liaison with line ministries and other institutions, see that the following tasks are undertaken.

1. Horticultural Estates

a. A full analysis of the economic viability of the estates should be prepared and evaluated.

b. It should be assured that adequate and appropriate managerial and technical expertise is available to the estates' associations.

c. The issue of the residence of the association members and agricultural demonstrator at Selebi-Pikwe requires attention.

d. The issue of the Chadibe Estate development requires attention.

e. There should be a study by an irrigation specialist of all estates.

2. District Institutional Development

a. The upgrading where appropriate of job responsibilities of returned participants should be considered.

b. The specific GOB training needs should be communicated to the Academy for Educational Development (AED) to assist AED in identifying appropriate programs, and the credentials of proposed participants should be forwarded to AED promptly.

3. PEDF

a. RDU should coordinate the exploration of alternative uses for the PEDF.

4. Rural Industrial Officer Cadre

a. Greater attention is required to the development of policy regarding marketing, infrastructure and raw material supply constraints, especially in remote areas.

b. Greater leadership is also required to determine the effect the reorganization (merger of RIO, BEDU, and BAS) of the Department of Industry will have on the direction and overall goals of the RIO component.

5. AE10 Evaluation

a. This study should be completed as soon as possible so as to be considered in conjunction with the RSG Project evaluation report.

ANNEX E

SCOPE OF WORK AND SCHEDULE
BOTSWANA RURAL SECTOR GRANT PROJECT EVALUATION
(Project 633-0077)
May, 1986
Gaborone, Botswana

I. Team Leader/Project Development Officer

A. Reviews progress reports submitted by GOB ministries to Ministry of Finance and Development Planning on all sub-projects implemented under the Rural Sector Grant.

B. In conjunction with appropriate team members, Rural Development Unit (RDU) staff and planning officers in the concerned ministries, analyzes implementation bottlenecks and recommends solutions. Included in this analysis will be an assessment of the RDU system for monitoring and coordinating Phase II activities.

C. In conjunction with appropriate team members, RDU staff and planning officers in the concerned ministries, provides sub-projects status reports which include:

1. Description of activities, (completed, in progress, cancelled, etc.);
2. Achievement/shortfalls;
3. General financial status; and
4. Future monitoring requirements.

D. Provides an overview of phase II of RSG performance in relation to the stated goals, purpose, inputs and outputs of the project.

E. In conjunction with the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, district officials and returned participants, provides an assessment of district administration training. In addition to reviewing the progress of the program to date, the assessment should suggest a mechanism and timeframe which would guide the ministry and USAID in discussions concerning support for those needs beyond phase II of the Rural Sector Grant.

F. In conjunction with National Development Bank officials and Rural Industries Specialist, provides an assessment of the Productive Employment Development Fund (PEDF).

II. Horticulturalist/Agriculturalist

A. Reviews progress of Ramonaka and Selebi-Phikwe Horticultural Estates.

B. Provides a preliminary assessment of the Chadibe Estate.

C. Works with team leader, Rural Development Unit and Ministry of Agriculture for activity 1.B as described under team leader.

D. In light of on-going drought and its attendant effects on the horticultural estate, suggests technical inputs to alleviate avoidable problems and suggest alternative plans.

E. Coupled with several site visits, incorporates findings of AE10 Evaluation into conclusions on the agricultural component of the RSG Evaluation.

III. Rural Industries Specialist

A. Reviews progress of sub-projects in the Rural Industrial Officer component (CI 08).

B. Works with team leader, Rural Development Unit and Ministry of Commerce and Industry for activity 1.B as described under team leader.

C. Reviews the performance and absorptive capacity of the RIO training and general support fund and provides recommendations for improving this activity.

D. Provides a detailed sub-project status to the level of sub-activities for CI 08 and provides a preliminary review of future needs of the program and requirements for supporting these needs.

E. Reviews relationship of PEDF sub-component with RIO cadre activity.

F. Time permitting, provides helpful comments and suggestions to the team leader on the assessment of the PEDF.

IV. USAID and GOB Representatives

A. Arrange meetings and provide access to documents.

B. Available to answer project related questions.

PHASE II RURAL SECTOR GRANT EVALUATION - SCHEDULE

		MON	TUES	WED	THURS	FRI	SAT	SUN
WEEK I	RIO	28 1 TEAM ARRIVES;	29 10:30 RSG	30 SOUTHERN	1 TSHABONG	2 RIO POST VISIT	3	4
	TEAM LEADER	MEETINGS WITH USAID AND RDU	REFERENCE GROUP MEETING	GABORONE	TSHABONG	RIO POST VISIT		
	AGRIC		AFTERNOON MEETINGS	ESTATES VISIT	ESTATE VISIT	ESTATE VISIT		
	OTHER		WITH TEAM AND MINISTRIES					
WEEK II	RIO	5 MAUN	6 GOMARE	7 SEROWE FTOWN PALAPYE	8	9 KASANE	10	11
	TEAM LEADER	MAUN	GOMARE	SEROWE FTOWN PALAPYE	PUBLIC HOLIDAY	KASANE		
	AGRIC	GABORONE	CHADIBE	SELEBI-THIKWE		KASANE		
	OTHER	ELLISON MAUN	ELLISON GOMARE					
WEEK III	RIO	12 WRITE	13 WRITE	14 GROUP MEETING		15 REVISE	16 DEPART	17
	TEAM LEADER	"	"	2:00 pm RSG REFERENCE	REVISE	REVISE REVISE	REVISE	REVISE
	AGRIC	"	"	GROUP MEETING	REVISE	DEPART		
	OTHER							
WEEK IV	TEAM LEADER	19 REVISE	20 DEPART	21	22	23	24	25

ANNEX F

LIST OF MINISTRIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED

Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

Ministry of Commerce and Industry

Ministry of Local Government and Lands

Ministry of Agriculture

Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs

National Development Bank

Agricultural Technology Improvement Project personnel

Lutheran World Federation

Southern and Eastern Growers Association

Academy for Educational Development

Notes:

1. Within each Ministry, various departments were contacted.
2. Field visits were made to RIO stations, district offices, and horticultural estates throughout the country.

ANNEX G

EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS

AED	Academy for Educational Development
CAC	Communal Areas Coordinator
DID	District Institutional Development
DO	District Officer
EOPS	End of Project Status
FAP	Financial Assistance Policy
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOB	Government of Botswana
MCI	Ministry of Commerce and Industry
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MLGL	Ministry of Local Government and Lands
NDB	National Development Bank
P	Pula
PACD	Project Assistance Completion Date
PEDF	Productive Employment Development Fund
PES	Project Evaluation Summary (Standard AID project evaluation format)
RDU	Rural Development Unit
REDSO/ESA	Regional Economic Development Services Organization for East and Southern Africa
RSG	Rural Sector Grant
S/RIO	Senior Rural Industrial Officer
TGSF	Training and General Support Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/B	Botswana USAID Mission



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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The AE10 component of the evaluation was evaluated by a local consultant, therefore it does not follow the PES format.

However, it should be viewed as a supplement to the overall mid-term evaluation.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Beverley Reed
Executive Secretary

AE 10 AGRICULTURE SMALL PROJECTS PROGRAMME

MID TERM EVALUATION

APRIL 1986

BY M SIBANDA

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The call for me to take up the AE10 Agriculture Small Projects Programme Mid Term Evaluation, did not come as a surprise but as a challenge for me to contribute in the rural and Agricultural development of my country.

I would like to express my deep and sincere appreciation to the following people:-

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Deputy Director Agriculture Field Services,

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Ken Ellison, C.A.N Ministry of Finance and Development Planning who put at my disposal all the necessary files and reading material.

My thanks also go to the Sociological Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture who prepared a comprehensive set of question guide lines for the Evaluation.

Last but not the least my thanks and appreciation go to USAID who provided the funds for the Rural Sector Grant and made the support funding available for the Evaluation exercise.

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SHORT BACKGROUND TO THE AE10 AGRICULTURE

Small projects programme

The AE10 Small projects programme provides grants to community groups to improve or establish village infrastructure and productive activities related to agriculture.

These projects include small dams, woodlots, horticulture projects, poultry projects, fishing groups, the erection of drift fences to isolate crops from animal damage and construction of storage and marketing facilities for crops and agricultural inputs.

The programme began with a maximum contribution to groups of P5000.00 under NDP V. This has now been increased to P15,000.00 under NDP VI.

In this programme groups or communities have to demonstrate a commitment by making a counterpart contribution in cash or kind of at least ten percent (10%) of the total cost of the project.

The programme is implemented with the Assistance of Agricultural Demonstrators (ADs) who are responsible, with the groups, for the organisation and implementation of each project.

PREFACE

The need for a Supporting System that Really Supports

It is widely known that a farmer's ability to increase his output depends not only on natural factors; the structure of his farm and resources allocated to it; his attitudes toward himself and his techniques and quality of the instruction he receives; and the internal organisation of the rural community but depends also on a broad net work of factors - external to the farm itself = both within and beyond the rural areas, that must be organized into a system of assistance to the farmer in his efforts to increase production.

Planners and Policy makers here are of great importance in establishing principles, that can guide, direct and through their authority can organize systems adapting various elements to the needs of the farmer in a manner that will spur him to increase production.

The sytem of services that directly supports production and helps to improve the farmers living conditions is composed of a large number of varying elements - such as services of supply, marketing, credit facilities, public services - such as instruction in education, health as well as physical infrastructure, including roads and warehouses etc, etc.

In the light of this; Coordination from Ministries, their departments and or other organizations is a vital core for development.

Every Ministry, department and organisations should coordinate, comprehend, be progressive, interlinked and indeed be sychronized in spirit and effort to have development possible.

EVALUATION TRIP AND EVALUATION METHOD USED

The evaluation exercise took a wide route and covered many areas and peoples of different backgrounds, constraints, priorities and outlook in life.

The trip covered six (6) Agricultural Regions and their agricultural extension districts. ie Western region, Maun/Ngamiland region, Francistown, Central, Gaborone, and Southern regions.

Terms of Reference were used as Yard Stick and that all evaluation questions and assessment measures were taken from them. These were very wide and comprehensive and have influenced the write up of this report.

However, mention of outside forces deterrent to development or decisive to; has been noted in this report.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Determine the economic impact of the programme on rural population; assess the extent to which the programme has created jobs or increased income for disadvantages groups of farmers and determine the degree of input from target groups in deciding on particular projects.
2. Specifically and critically examine the uses of drift fences with a view to determining how much drift fences have been effective in reducing crop damage by livestock and further examine the effects of drift fences on creating more rationale grazing and ploughing patterns.
3. Examine whether or not other projects that have been sponsored under AE10, e.g. woodlots, vegetable gardens, poultry raising, fisheries, etc have been directly related to diversifying and increasing agricultural production. Make a close examination of the existing group projects and identify aspects needing improvements. Assess the efforts made by groups or farmers to maintain and sustain these projects over medium to long term and on the basis of this suggest if AE10 projects are likely to remain operational in the future.
4. Determine whether farmers are conversant with the procedure for applying for funds and whether farmers regard this procedure as operating in their best interests and convenience. If not, what improvements can be made?
5. Determine the most successful project and/or kinds of projects and examine the factors owing to their success, i.e. good management, good AD leadership, group's determination, etc.
6. Determine reasons for the delays, if any, in applications from the extension areas through agricultural Districts up to the final approval in Ministry headquarters. Suggest ways to improve this application process.
7. Determine the Agricultural Extension support and advice to AE10 groups and projects, progress on the implementation/execution of most AE10 projects and the general problems encountered by farmers/groups and ways to solve these.

GENERAL OVERVIEW

The AE10 Agricultural Small Projects Programme is on the whole a very popular and welcome programme throughout the country.

The programme has indeed met its objectives and has served many, whose projects have been diligently and objectively planned to serve an identified problem in the group or community.

Job Creation

Projects such as Fishing, Poultry and Vegetable growing have provided a steady employment for the group participants and their families.

The success of these projects is however determined by a number of variables such as the drought and lack of water in the case of Fishermen in the Ngamiland area. Lack of fuel to run their fishing boats, shortage of salt for the drying of fish and in many instances shortage of repair materials for their boats, nets etc, etc.

The most successful part about the Fishermen is that they all understand their trade and technologies that can keep them going without the daily Nursing by the Fisheries Extension Officer.

However continued support by the Food Resources Unit is vital as it is the biggest single purchaser of their dried fish, for distribution to Clinics and Health centres in the country.

Vegetable Gardens

Group vegetable growing has not yet been a success in many projects throughout the country.

Many projects are not operational throughout the year because of lack of irrigation water. The persistent drought for the past five (5) years has indeed cut down production in most of the vegetable projects.

This natural phenomenon however is not the only one to blame all the failures to. A good number of failures arise from poor project development and appraisal, poor and unreliable group formation, lack of group constitution, lack of group work plans, plenty of group friction, lack of horticultural technology, dedication, hard work and cooperation with their Agricultural Extension personnel for advise in vegetable production.

Poultry Projects

The Serowe and Mahalapye poultry projects were the most, steadily productive, successful and most impressive units in the programme.

The Serowe - Boiteko Agricultural Management Association (AMA) group is composed of nine (9) women and one (1) man. This group of ten people is running a very successful egg laying poultry unit in conjunction with a very productive vegetable garden.

This group is very well composed, cooperated and has drawn out a very useful constitution and work plans to be followed and obeyed by members of the group.

The success of this group or project stands out of the fact that, apart from them having registered as an association with the Ministry of Agriculture, they have with them a qualified Agricultural Technician seconded to them by the Foundation for Education in Gaborone. This man's salary is paid partly by the Foundation and partly by the Boiteko group.

The Technician is hired as a coordinator of the project responsible for agricultural technical advice, recording, bookkeeping and financial management. Work organisation, sales and general administration is all entirely on the group participants.

This group meets regularly, keeps records of their meetings and Executive Committee members attend: upgrading courses arranged by CAMA of the Ministry of Agriculture.



The Cripple and Blind poultry project in Mahalapye is another occupational activity doing very well indeed. It has now fifteen (15) participants operating on daily bases.

The participants tend the birds; they feed, water, collect eggs, clean them, pack and deliver them to the market in Mahalapye village for sale.

The centre is looked after and coordinated by a Mr M Mathuba who is himself a Vice President of the Botswana Association for the Blind and Cripple who has been the spear head for this Mahalapye project.

He has volunteered in the building and construction of the Chicken house and the residential house in the centre. Participants' spirit and cooperation was very high and lots of appreciation for the programme was voiced by the participants who still looked forward for further financial help.

Drift Fences

In many instances these have changed name from place to place, depending on the land terrain and cattle pressure.

Drift fences have had to be called 'Group fences' in Shorobe, 'Land fences' in Etsha, and 'Encloser fences' in Kweneng and other Southern districts. However what ever name is used, it still simple means "Lands fences" for the protection of crops from animal damage.

This project is very popular throughout the country and carries the highest single activity over other projects and participants numbers.

The success of this activity lies in the spontaneous realization by many crop farmers that crop damage by cattle and other animals added to poor harvest in addition to that caused by low rainfall.

Farmers, their groups and communities all identified this problem and have formed themselves in working groups, collected money and drawn out working constitutions to make sure work goes on as scheduled.

Most of these successful groupings have been initiated by AMAO or GDO Extension Officers from the Ministry of Agriculture. This group of Extension workers is highly motivated and knowledgeable in group dynamics and group stimulation.

These officers have undertaken to stimulate appropriate group action in the following ways:-

1. Help in organizing people, farmers into well understanding groups with clear cut roles, objectives, intentions, identity and cooperativeness.
2. Where possible furnish special materials or organise for the relevant items needed for the project or projects.
3. Provide or organise Technical and Managerial Assistance to the people or their groups.
4. Arrange for financial assistance for farmer groups or projects through the appropriate agencies.

Examples of good Extension efficiency were found in Etsha, Shorobe, Tutume, Bobonong, Palapye, Serowe, Kweneng and the Southern districts.

Most projects here were found complete or about to be complete and participants in high spirits of enthusiasm and cooperation. All work was carried out cooperatively by all members of groups as they shared their work equally between men and women.

When erecting drift fences men are usually found cutting and loading poles to the fence site, clearing fence lines and straining fence wires. Whilst women are normally found digging holes for fence posts, planting fence posts or removing tree brush (branches and small bush) away from the fence line.

Group leaders or chairmen of groups are unanimously respected and followed by group members as per their written constitutions and guide lines.

In Shorobe, when I enquired on how they managed to have their work go on as smoothly as it did, I was told that "Constitutions" were made and drawn out in such a way that all loopholes were removed and made it impossible for members to dodge call up for work and that if anyone did dodge he/she was liable for punishment and made to pay a fee or fine which would be used to hire a person in his or her place.

Another advantage to these successful groups was that, their societies were unison in nature, background, tribe and objectivity.

These attitudes, thoughts and emotional reactions are and were not enjoyed by other groups or communities in other districts throughout the country.

OTHER PROJECTS

Projects in Ghanzi/East Hanahai, Gomare, Nokaneng, Northeast, Pilikwe and Mahalapye need a lot of help and department of agriculture's close examination and correction.

These projects have suffered from lack of project appraisal, project planning, project development and coordination of participants and or other supporting development agencies in the areas.

The drift fence and woodlot plantation in East Hanahai Basarwa settlement are all near completion.

The drift fence now stretches for fifteen (15) kilometres and will be pulled further another five (5) kilometres to twenty (20) as was originally planned for.

The objectives of this drift fence was to protect the Basarwa cattle from the commercial Trek-route cattle to BMC Lobatse. Over the years it was found that a lot of cattle were lost and taken away by the Trek-route stock to Lobatse.

The woodlot was planned and is now being planted into eucalyptus trees at the settlement for what the objectives are said to be, for the creation of employment for the Basarwa people. Both these projects in East Hanahai were initiated by the district council with little or no coordination or consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture.

Project participants too, have not been involved in project planning or consultation of any kind.

They have never been involved in any work on the projects or commitment of some kind to show their participation, save for eight (8) men who took up paid employment to clear the woodlot land before fencing it off.

The future of both these projects is certainly in doubt, because the so called participants have not been motivated towards these activities. They are foreigners to their own projects as these have been imposed on them without explanation.

Though it is hopefully anticipated that these people will settle down permanently and fore go their traditional way of life - of seasonal going to the bush for hunting and gathering.

Vegetable Projects

The Khurakhura Sewing Circle Vegetable Garden is one project whose future is in realy doubt. The Sewing Circle group of women has a long and unactive history with its projects.

Before this group took up a vegetable garden as a project it had earlier on taken up Sewing as a development project in Ghanzi.

The group had raised money from another donor to purchase eight (8) sewing machines which would help them start up a cloth production unit in Ghanzi village. Each of thse women was provided with a sewing machine, which they still keep and own as individualsnot as a group.

Working together as a group failed as they did not have guide lines or constitution to help them in cooperative business or outlook. Immediately after the failure of the Sewing exercise in 1983 the group started requesting for a vegetable garden project. The intentions and objectives of which were to raise money to subsidise the sewing project. However, again due to lack of unity and continued lack of cooperation the vegetable project has again been grounded before take off.

On close analysis it was obvious that this group was made up of unfaithful persons who needed to acquire individual wealth in the name of, and in disguise of being called a group to acquire Government funding.

The garden is never used or worked up on. Only a four foot fence was erected sometime ago and piped water reticulated into the garden. Poles and fencing materials to raise the perimetre fence to six or eight feet is lying idle and rotting away in the sun and rain.

There were also signs of broken down fertilizer bags which had already been wasted and lost.

Surprisingly, there was a beaten path to and from the water tap which was used conveniently by one of the group leaders and her family.

Nokaneng/Gomare

Division of interests, tribalism and party politics rivalry is so immense in this area that development projects are hampered and fail to achieve their targeted schedules.

Drift fence projects cited for these areas are lagging behind their scheduled time tables because lots of conflicts have arisen between cattle owners and none cattle owners. Generally, the bulk of arable farmers are not cattle ranchers and have a dire need to protect their lands and crops from cattle damage. However, the dominant powerful cattle owners think and feel the fencing of lands areas is going to curtail and restrict their cattle movements.

This conflict of interest has been made worse by the growing political rivalry ravaging the area, making it impossible for cattle farmers and arable farmers to come to a consolatory agreement. The situation is so volatile that Extension Agricultural workers are made helpless and cannot help in any way but watch. However, the situation continues dragging down, misallocation of resources.

North East

Incidencies of conflict, bickering among group members on projects and sinister vetures of tribalism coupled with Party Politic rivalry are enormous in the district, that most projects tend to be stagnant and suffer from inertia.

The Moroka Sorghum Hammer Mill is not functioning because some people feel they have been cheated on the running of it and general administration of it.

The history of the Hammer Mill has it that it was requested and purchased for the Moroka Village VDC. However when the mill arrived at the village in 1979 they were questions asked as to:-

- (1) Who was going to run it
- (2) Who was going to be responsible for its general administration.
- (3) Who was going to be responsible for its repairs, service and collection of daily takings.

The answer was simple then, though it was not unanimously agreed by everybody. The few individuals who did not agree at the time, have over the years been manipulating the situation with all vigour including tribalism and politics to win their end.

As a result of these unholy manoeuvres the committee which was chosen to run the Mill affairs does not meet any more and things are at a stand still.

Reports from Zwenshambe and Sechele state of a combination of factors similar to those prevalent in Moroka and district at large.

Pressurers on projects of this kind are indeed a hinderence to progress and lead to a waste and misallocation of resources as they are normally extremely difficult to change or persuaded to, by Extension workers who are by their employment code exonerated from such dealings.

Pilikwe Youth Development Association Sorghum Mill

The Pilikwe Sorghum Mill project faces a lot of development problems.

First it is not clear how the Association was formed and how it was registered. There is no information as to whether it was registered with the Ministry of Agriculture (CAMA) or Ministry of Education (BRIDEC) or not at all.

The Association lacks viability as a Board responsible for the development of the Sorghum Mill project.

It lacks consultation with other Agencies in the village and outside. The Association lacks Technical, Social, Economic and general know how on project development. The Association does not have a Project Memoranda or Work plan.

On further investigation during the Evaluation exercise it came to light that the Sorghum Mill idea for Pilikwe Village came from someone outside the village who cannot be available now to help the Association sort itself out. The idea was taken up haphazardly without much thought and basic planning.

Association members did not agree on many issues which led to some of them altering the Original Mill Shed building plans. The alterations led to shortages of building materials which has now lead to delays in the Mill Shed construction, completion and installation of the Sorghum Mill.

All this delay and flastration has further split the relationships among Association members.

Information received from the Village Head man and the resident Agricultural Demonstrator (DA) were that the Association members were not cooperative and did not seek for advice either with them or the local Village Development Committee.

The Committee member representative met, gave excuses on the delay as being the result of the Mill Shed alterations and the delay in the Ministry of Agriculture releasing carry-over funds for the purchase of the additional needed building materials.

He however, assured me that, now that the building materials had arrived the project would be completed and Commissioned without any more delay.

Kgetsi Ya Tsie, Rakhudu and Itekeng Vegetable Garden Groups

The three (3) Horticultural groups are situated along the Mahalapye river Southeast of Mahalapye town. They are all in Thokole Agricultural Extension area.

Their chances for the future is bright, only, if they could follow the Agricultural Extension information, guide lines and recommendations as well as the basic principles of agricultural development.

Kgetsi Ya Tsie is the oldest of all vegetable groups. All mistakes it did and continues to do are blindly followed by all other groups without consideration. Following Kgetsi Ya Tsie's operations - all groups have chosen five (5) people to form a vegetable group. Horticultural land or garden is divided up into 5 equal blocks. Block for each farmer/operator.

Each farmer/operator or block has its own reservoir to store their water for irrigation. Each block of land is re-divided up into smaller plots or beds for each farmer's convenience to grow whatever crop he may deem fit.

Sales and marketing is not arranged or coordinated, everyone does what he likes when he feels like. Each member has a day put aside for him to use the engine and pump to water his block. There is no systematic cropping or rotation in all horticultural projects. No systematic pest control measures are being followed. etc., etc.

8/1

Though the involvement of these people in agriculture is highly appreciated and encouraged it is however, fundamental that their approach to agriculture should change to a more scientific light, to assure them a more lucrative occupation.

It is recommended here that they must be encouraged to leave and forego their impulsive way to horticultural activities; Reorganize themselves as a group or groups, with proper constitutions and work plans. Have proper land layouts and big enough water reservoirs to keep enough water at all times to be available to any one member when needed. Make arrangements for engines to be serviced and have proper maintenance. To acquire from Horticultural Officer the ways of combating insect pests. Be helped to formulate a marketing system beneficial to all of them.

Encourage the groups to organize themselves to follow the procedures taken by the Serowe Boiteko A.M.A. group, Tshukudu A.M.A. in Francistown, and S.E.G.A. A.M.A. group in Gaborone. This will help improve their marketing problems, economize in the use of transport, handling, facilitate the assessment of quantities and qualities of supplies and determination of prices. Further more this cooperation and unity will improve their general administration and prepare them for the forthcoming Marketing infrastructures proposed for construction in the Central district.



COMMENTS ON PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

It is frequent that Extension workers, Communities or other rural organisations need to start up a project or projects for the improvement of local living conditions in the area.

In deciding on projects we must always remember that projects are meant for men and must meet the needs of people. Many projects have been rejected, misused or under utilized because full consideration was not given to some human, social or environmental factors.

Considerations on social, economic, political, technical and administration should be looked into earlier on at the planning stage to avoid a repulse later on in the project.

Project planning must always be guided by the following considerations:-

- (a) Is the project really in the interest of the people for whom it is proposed? Will the benefits and costs be equitably distributed?
- (b) Is the project acceptable to the people for whom it is proposed? Will they be willing to supply the necessary inputs - money, labour, materials, time etc. to achieve it?
- (c) Does the project adequately prepare the people for its consequences? Is public education or training included in its implementation?
- (d) Is the project best located in terms of physical environment conditions?
- (e) Have similar projects been tried before? If so, what success did they have or why were they not successful? How can past failures be avoided?

NOTE

Pressures on projects should be guided against and be avoided at all times. It is usual that projects are conceived and implemented with enormous waste and misallocation of resources because of very strong pressures that are extremely difficult to change. Many people tend to regard "their project" as the key to personal advancement; this is particularly true where planning is administratively separated from action.

Misguided political interests also deter projects and project development in many spheres - and result in Project Stagnation alongside an impatience for results for haste, even where projects require long periods for proper preparation and implementation.

SPECIAL NOTE

My observations in all agricultural regions and districts was that many people were interested in a number of technologies, items and the want to learn new ideas but suffered from a group constraints.

Like:

1. Lack of knowledge where to go to learn
2. Lack of information through Extension Agencies i.e. Agric. Extension GDO's AMAO, ADCO's, Adult Education, Health and Nutrition etc.
3. Lack of Coordination and Cooperation by Extension Agencies

A general lack of dialogue was apparant in all societies I met and this questions the effectiveness of Extension Agencies as vehicles of transporting and transmitting development technologies. Development as we know it, is lived by people where they are, where they live, where they learn, work, love and play. The primary community, whether geographical or organizational, is the immediate space open to most people. It is the village, the neighbourhood, the town, the factory, the office, the school, the Union, the church, sports club, the association - whatever its purpose - that personal and Societal development first and best interact. Development, even in its most subjective dimension does not happen in a vacuum. Human beings, like the societies they form, are at the same time conditioned and free. They are conditioned by history and culture, by biological rhythms and access the resources, by the level of social productivity and institutional environment. They become free in the process of learning to understand and transform nature - in an ecologically prudent way - and Society itself, a process in which personal and societal development interact. Participating in this societal process is a source of fulfilment.

Developmental problems can thus, be defined in an objective way. That the Society, its economy and Policy ought to be organized in such a manner as to maximize, for the individual and whole, the opportunities for self-fulfilment.

Developing gives an account of, and suggests the removal of husks of ignorance - that is overcoming domination, unfolding and liberating ones self. Development is the unfolding of peoples's individual and social imagination in defining goals, inventing means and ways to approach them, learning to identify and satisfy society legitimate needs. Development as defined means liberation of human beings and societies, happens, or better, is lived by people where they are. There is development when people and their Communities, whatever the space and time span to their efforts when they start to assert their autonomy, self-reliance and self-confidence. When they set out and carry out projects.

This stage can only be reached when Development Agencies all do their work objectively with a integrated approach to rural development as a binding ideal and yard stick.

The need for integration, Coordination and Cooperation arises from the fact that development problems on the ground are not the same. They have many aspects, and for reasons of what were, originally, administrative convenience and efficiency, these aspects were allocated as task areas to different Specilist planning and executive agencies. It is for this reason that as soon as there is a measure of Specialization of development agencies, there is a need for integration, coordination and cooperation of those Specialist Agencies.

CONCLUSIONS

Information and record keeping on AE10 projects was very scanty and scattered in most of the Agricultural regions and district offices. Most of the Agricultural demonstrators and their District Agricultural Officers did not even know how many projects their districts or regions had, both new and old. There was simply no effort to keep a proper file order or system to keep the AE10 records on their own, the best they did was to bundle some AE10 application duplicates with those of other projects such as AG15, LG17 etc, etc. There was no information on how much was spent on projects or how much was in balance. Everything was said to be with Agricultural Headquarters Gaborone.

Projects did not have regular visits from AD's or Extension Staff. Many Demonstrators used excuses that, they were either new in the districts from transfare, did not have time to visit because they were busy with other projects such as ALDEP, ARAP or they had just come from Quaille birds or Locusts. There seemed to be very little contact or appreciation with projects and their participants except when projects are being initiated or when people are being encouraged to form themselves into groups.

Many groups or Farmers groups still need a lot of teaching and support from the Agricultural Extension Staff in matters ranging from Group behaviour, Group responsibility, Committee responsibilities in meetings, minute keeping, as well as financial management and record keeping etc, etc.

Delays in applications were in most cases due to irregular visits by DA's to needy areas, after which delays in hearing of the farmers applications by the Village Development Committees VDCs, at their meetings which are held once every month followed by a further hearing by the District Development Committees DDC's which are held once in three months. There are at times, some applications that miss hearing by both the VDC and DDC at their first meetings which then delays the project application for a further six months before it finally reaches Ministry Headquarters or budget allocation.

In all complete projects, where the Farmers' or Group's Participants' Spirit was high and dynamic was due to, or, was a result of a good and able DA or some Extension Staff i.e. AMAO or GDO who took it up on himself to stimulate the people and give them the necessary guide lines.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Cooperativeness, is a Science that needs a constant building upon and continued education on the part of farmer, is vital. Experience of Groups or Cooperatives in many countries suggests that the primary requirement for economic success is sufficient social cohesion and uniformity among members. Without it there cannot be the mutual confidence necessary for the subscription or saving of enough capital, for equal and democratic control of management, for risk-taking and for the weathering of financial and other difficulties.
- B. In economic success, the desire of individual members for the services provided by the group, cooperative, association or syndicate must be sufficiently intense, uniformly felt and continuous - for the benefit of farmers and their groups; It is recommended here that a bigger number of AMAO, GDO Cadre of Extension officers and their junior officers be trained and be posted to all Regions and Agricultural Extension districts.
- C. That AMAO and GDO's be responsible for group initiation, formulation, registration, participant - stimulation etc, etc.
- D. That AMAO and GDO officers in all regions have adequate logistic and support materials to cover the regions regularly to acquaint themselves with their junior officers' and farmers' needs when they arise.
- E. It is recommended that the work of ordinary and general AD be left to that of a Specialist Technician, certainly not that of a group initiator - for most of them lack the quality and proper experience.

- F. Botswana has up to now, created a large number of Farmers Committees, Groups or Associations which are allowed to die away or breakup in dissolutionment for lack of continued instruction on various issues, some of them pertaining their group and administration. The Extension Cadre of AMAO and GDO's be charged with activities of group stimulation based on the following principles:-
1. Help in organizing or initiation of groups
 2. Furnish special materials
 3. Provide technical and managerial assistance
 4. Provide or organize financial assistance
- G. Teaching materials be provided in the form of Projectors, appropriate films and slides to be shown to groups and associations throughout the region or regions. These films and slides will incite farmers to think more or give them desire to improve on their own projects or activities.
- H. GDO's and AMAO Officers be responsible for project recording, catalogueing and proper filing and be responsible for progress and quarterly reports to Ministry Headquarters.
- I. That proper and meaningful Project Group Constitutions, workplans and Project development plans and schedules be made available to the Ministry of Agriculture before any money or funding is released to the group. This will safe guard and eliminate the present waste and misallocation of resources.
- J. That measures be drawn and made available to RAO's and DAO's, to withdraw and move materials or tools from the unactive groups to the more active ones whose funds have not been forwarded due to financial year allocations.

AE10 DISTRICT PROJECT AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

DISTRICT: LOBATSE.....

AGRIC. REGION: SOUTHERN.....

PROJECT TYPE	NUMBER OF TYPE	AVERAGE SIZE	GROUP SIZE	FINANCE		BALANCE	%
				COMMITTED	SPENT		
D/FENCES	27		1450	56172.00	55966.28	205.72	46.5
VEG. GARDN	12		339	18706.00	9313.84	9392.16	20.6
POULTRY	5		98	3405.00	3405.00		8.6
WOODLOTS	1		1900	6000.00	2355.54	3644.46	1.7
FISHERIES							
CATTLE GRDS	3			6000.00	6000.00		5.1
WATER PRJS							
SS D. GRPS	8		39	3501.00	3501.00		13.7
DAM FENCES	1			640.00	640.00		1.7
STORAGES	1		26	275.00	274.00		1.7
HAMMER M. CITRUS OCHARD COLLECTION CENTRE PLANTER PROJECTS							
TOTALS	58		3852	94699	81456.66	13242.34	

AE10 DISTRICT PROJECT AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

DISTRICT:.. KWENENG, RAMOTSWA,..
KGATLENG & TLOKWENG

AGRIC. REGION: GABORONE.....

PROJECT TYPE	NUMBER OF TYPE	AVERAGE SIZE	GROUP SIZE	FINANCE			%
				COMMITTED	SPENT	BALANCE	
D/FENCES	36		3499	159991.00	152724.66	7266.34	62.0
VEG. GARDN	10		500	15987.00	15472.00	515.00	17.2
POULTRY	3		33	14061.00	14061.00		5.1
WOODLOTS	1		385	3500.00	3500.00		1.7
FISHERIES							
CATTLE GRDS	3		205	10360.00	10360.00		5.1
WATER PRJS							
SS D. GRPS							
DAM FENCES	4		212	4583.00	3500.63	1082.37	6.8
STORAGES	1		4709.00	4709.00	4709.00		1.7
HAMMER M. CITRUS OCHARD COLLECTION CENTRE PLANTER PROJECTS							
TOTALS	58		4834	213191.00	204327.29	8863.71	

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AE10 DISTRICT PROJECT AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

DISTRICT:.....SEROWE.....

AGRIC. REGION: ..CENTRAL.....

PROJECT TYPE	NUMBER OF TYPE	AVERAGE SIZE	GROUP SIZE	FINANCE			%
				COMMITTED	SPENT	BALANCE	
D/FENCES	40		5537	130222.00	112868.95	17353.05	67.7
VEG. GARDN	10		225	23798.00	22417.17	1380.83	16.9
POULTRY	3		91	17220.00	9780.00	7440.00	5.0
WOODLOTS	3		5010	5835.00	5343.00	492.00	5.0
FISHERIES							
CATTLE GRDS	1		200	6271.00	6271.00		1.6
WATER PRJS							
SS D. GRPS							
DAM FENCES							
STORAGES							
HAMMER M.	1		95	7000.00	6928.68	71.32	1.6
CITRUS OCHARD							
COLLECTION CENTRE							
PLANTER PROJECTS	1		50	2400.00	2400.00		1.6
TOTALS	59		11208	192746.00	166008.80	26737.20	

AE10 DISTRICT PROJECT AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

DISTRICT:..NORTH.EAST/TUTUME...

AGRIC. REGION: .FRANCISTOWN.

PROJECT TYPE	NUMBER OF TYPE	AVERAGE SIZE	GROUP SIZE	FINANCE		BALANCE	%
				COMMITTED	SPENT		
D/FENCES	10		1439	45514.00	38277.00	7237.00	55.5
VEG. GARDN	4			9866.00	9866.00		22.2
POULTRY							
WOODLOTS							
FISHERIES							
CATTLE GRDS							
WATER PRJS	1		147	4424.00	4268.71	155.29	5.5
SS D. GRPS	1			80.00	80.00		5.5
DAM FENCES							
STORAGES							
HAMMER M. CITRUS OCHARD	2			4100.00	4100.00		11.1
COLLECTION CENTRE PLANTER PROJECTS							
TOTALS	18			63984.00	56591.71	7392.29	

AE10 DISTRICT PROJECT AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

DISTRICT:.....NGAMILAND.....

AGRIC. REGION: MAUN.....

PROJECT TYPE	NUMBER OF TYPE	AVERAGE SIZE	GROUP SIZE	FINANCE			%
				COMMITTED	SPENT	BALANCE	
D/FENCES	30		1284	65552.81	64514.81	1038.00	55.5
VEG. GARDN	12		233	10636.00	10572.22	63.78	22.2
POULTRY	1		4	1738.00	1738.00		1.8
WOODLOTS							
FISHERIES	10		111	29975.97	29975.97		18.5
CATTLE GRDS							
WATER PRJS							
SS D. GRPS							
DAM FENCES							
STORAGES							
HAMMER M. CITRUS OCHARD COLLECTION CENTRE PLANTER PROJECTS	1			2280.00	2280.00		1.8
TOTALS	54		1632	110182.78	109081.00	1101.78	

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AE10 DISTRICT PROJECT AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

DISTRICT:.....K GALAGADI.....

AGRIC. REGION: .WESTERN.....

PROJECT TYPE	NUMBER OF TYPE	AVERAGE SIZE	GROUP SIZE	FINANCE		BALANCE	%
				COMMITTED	SPENT		
D/FENCES	2	20KM	350	6130.00	3230.00	2900.00	22.2
VEG. GARDN	6		400	7233.00	5369.00	1864.00	66.6
POULTRY							
WOODLOTS	1		250	8623.00	3251.43	5371.57	11.1
FISHERIES							
CATTLE GRDS							
WATER PRJS							
SS D. GRPS							
DAM FENCES							
STORAGES							
HAMMER M. CITRUS OCHARD COLLECTION CENTRE PLANTER PROJECTS							
TOTALS	9	20	1000	21,986.00	11,850.43	10,135.57	

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AE 10 PROJECT ANALYSIS SUMMARY

REGIONS

FINANCING

	SOUTHERN	GABORONE	CENTRAL	F'TOWN	MAUN	WESTERN	TOTALS
Phase I Total Committed	38851.00	114306.00	76235.00	19555.00	60581.00	5362.00	
Phase I Total Spent	38851.00	113688.00	73243.25	19555.00	60581.00	4562.00	
Phase I Balance	NIL	618.00	2991.75	NIL	NIL	800.00	
Phase II Total Committed	55848.00	98885.00	109511.00	44429.00	49602.00	18624.00	
PHASE II Total Spent	42605.66	90639.29	92686.90	37992.24	48449.00	8488.00	
Phase II Balance	13242.34	8245.71	16824.10	6436.76	1153.00	10136.00	
TOTAL COMMITTED	P 691 789.00						
TOTAL SPENT		631341.34					
BALANCE		60447.66					

PROJECT ANALYSIS

Total Projects	There are two hundred and fifty six (256) projects throughout the country.
Average Cost	Average cost per project is P2466.17 ^t
Av. Group Size	118 persons per project unit
Av. Approval Time	One year
Av. Implementatn Time	Twelve months to Eighteen months
Av. Completion Time	Three to Five years.

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