

**U.S. PUBLIC SAFETY ASSISTANCE
AN ASSESSMENT**

This report has been prepared for the U.S. Agency for International
Development under contract cds-3361 with the
Brookings Institution.

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ERNEST W. LEFEVER

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AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

This report seeks to assess the U. S. Public Safety program, which was begun in 1954 to help selected Third World governments strengthen their civil police services. Operating as a specialized technical assistance effort under AID and its predecessor agencies, Public Safety assistance in fiscal 1973 amounted to approximately one percent of the AID grant budget.

The future of the program is uncertain in view of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act adopted by the Congress in December 1973. These amendments stipulate that no AID funds be used to conduct police training or related activities in any foreign country. The practical effect of this limitation would be to phase out overseas Public Safety advisers by June 30, 1974, while the training of foreign police officers and specialists at AID's International Police Academy in Washington would continue. The amendments do not prevent AID from continuing to provide police advisers to countries that pay for these services.

In this report Public Safety assistance is discussed in the context of the larger AID effort, including U. S. programs designed to promote economic development, as well as of efforts to deal with the safety of U. S. personnel abroad, international terrorism, and the global traffic in illicit drugs. Various administrative options for providing police assistance are assessed.

The report does not deal with the large public safety program in the Republic of Vietnam, which was terminated under terms of the ceasefire agreement of January 27, 1973.

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The views expressed here are mine alone, and should not be ascribed to anyone I have consulted, to the Agency for International Development, or to the trustees, officers, or other staff members of the Brookings Institution.

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Chapter 1

ORIGIN, PURPOSE, STATUS

United States overseas aid, appropriately called the "new statecraft,"¹ has been a controversial instrument of foreign policy since the inception of the Marshall Plan in 1947. The transfer of U. S. resources to strengthen friendly states and influence their policies, especially those in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, has been the subject of increasing debate since the early 1960s.

Virtually all forms of U. S. assistance -- from the delivery of agricultural commodities and economic development grants to military aid and technical assistance of many kinds -- have been greeted with rising skepticism and outright opposition on the part of the Congress and the American people.

This controversy over aid is in part a reflection of a new and more complex relationship that has emerged between the United States and the weaker and poorer countries of the Third World, that "artfully ambiguous

1. See George Liska, The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy, (University of Chicago Press, 1960).

term"² that embraces most of the developing, static, or deteriorating states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, many of which have been and are receiving U. S. military aid, and 28 of which are linked to Washington in mutual security pacts.

The troubled relationship in turn is the product of several factors, including the withdrawal of European authority from Asia and Africa and the upsurge of nationalistic aspirations and ethnic self-consciousness throughout the Third World. This has led to increasing independence of action on the part of Latin American and other generally friendly governments and to criticism of certain U. S. policies, including some AID programs.

Changed patterns of behavior between the United States and the Soviet Union and between each of them and Western Europe, Japan, and China have also affected U. S. policy toward the Third World. These external factors combined with certain domestic pressures have bred a new and perhaps more relaxed definition of U. S. interests and responsibilities in these areas.

Among the Agency for International Development (AID) efforts caught up in the broader foreign assistance controversy is the small and little-known public safety program which, as of mid-1973, was providing technical assistance to the civil police in 18 Third World countries at a cost of \$7.4 million annually, approximately one percent of the total AID grant budget. At that time there were 114 professional police advisers abroad and more than 7,000 foreign police officers and technicians from 75 countries had received training in the United States.

2. Charles Wolf, Jr., United States Policy and the Third World, (Little, Brown, and Co., 1967), p. vii.

In important respects the public safety effort is a microcosm of the perplexities and prospects of United States commitments in an era when the President, the Congress, and the American people are seeking to relate U. S. resources and power to the countries of the Third World in ways that encourage their self development, limit U. S. involvement, and still serve the interests of each in peaceful diplomatic and economic cooperation. For this reason, an examination of the program should yield insights into the larger problems of U. S. policy toward the Third World.

The present study seeks to examine the public safety program as an instrument of policy in the light of changing U. S. objectives in the Third World. It addresses nine questions: 1) What were the original rationale and objectives of the program and are they still valid? 2) How is the program operated? 3) What is it doing? 4) What effects, intended or unintended, has the program had within the assisted countries? 5) What effects has it had on relations between the host government and the United States? 6) On balance, has the program served or damaged U. S. interests? 7) If it has served U. S. interests, has the cost been acceptable? 8) Should the program be continued or terminated? 9) If it should be continued, what should be the criteria for selecting recipient countries? What level of resources should be devoted to it, and what changes can be made to improve its effectiveness?

Sources Consulted

In the attempt to answer these questions the study has faced three difficult research problems: the nonexistence of any independent country

or regional case studies, the complete lack of any other kind of serious secondary analysis, and the inevitable problems of evaluating the impact of one element in situations of multiple causation where the important indicators are nonquantifiable. Further, the impact of newly introduced law enforcement measures are difficult to assess even in the United States, where much data is available. This problem is far more serious in less developed societies. These limitations should be borne in mind.

Gathering factual data about the objectives, organization, operations, and immediate effects of the program presented few serious difficulties. AID public safety documents were freely consulted -- presentations to Congress, field reports, country evaluations, internal memoranda, correspondence, and related documents from other government agencies. This material was clarified, tested, and supplemented by hundreds of interviews within AID and related agencies, both in Washington and in the field.

The problem of evaluating the secondary and longer-range effects of the program -- the extent to which it served or failed to serve larger U. S. objectives -- was more complicated because of the problems noted above and a failure to recognize that a program can be well managed without necessarily having the desired program or policy effects. There is also the problem of translating specific findings about the program (with the necessary allowance for imprecision in such findings) into policy conclusions, since the latter result from a calculus of empirical fact and political premise. These difficulties are compounded because of the dearth of informed, reliable, and disinterested observers of the program.

To mitigate these difficulties, I consulted individuals, with a

fairly wide range of views, in Washington and in 14 program countries (Jamaica, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Uruguay, Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, and the Philippines), though the persons interviewed were overwhelmingly U. S. or host government officials. A few non-official observers were also interviewed.

In each program country I had a dozen or more fairly long and wide-ranging interviews, always on a non-attribution basis. The U. S. officials typically included the ambassador, chief political officer, military mission chief, defense attaché, AID director, and most of the public safety advisers. I also interviewed recipient-government officials, particularly the commander of the national police, some of his chief officers, and officials from the interior ministry. I visited police facilities, including command and communication centers, general offices, training schools, and occasionally provincial headquarters. It was not feasible to interview members of terrorist or other illegal groups opposed to public safety assistance and to U. S. foreign policy generally. However, their views, which have been made known in various publications, are carefully noted and evaluated in the study, in part to offset any potential bias stemming from the necessarily heavy reliance on the views of U. S. and host government officials.

In Washington, congressional comment on the program, both critical and supportive, was considered. These views are summarized in this chapter.

This study does not purport to be an analysis of the full range of views about the public safety program. Rather it is a policy analysis of the program itself, which takes into account all available comment and criticism in the field and in Washington. As an inquiry into a worldwide program, except

that in Vietnam, and in the absence of detailed case studies, the attempt to relate the impact of the program to its objectives and to larger U. S. interests is necessarily based on partial evidence. The modest findings are largely qualitative and make no claim to scientific precision. All observations and conclusions invite further verification and research. Particularly valuable would be several intensive studies of the multiple effects of public safety assistance in certain selected countries.

The extensive public safety effort in the Republic of Vietnam, to which approximately half of the worldwide program resources have been devoted -- for the training of Vietnam police officers, for resident Office of Public Safety advisers, and for equipment -- is occasionally referred to in the present study, but has not been examined for three chief reasons: (1) This inquiry focuses on current country programs in the Third World that have much smaller advisory efforts and are justified on somewhat different ground than the Vietnam program. (2) The January 27, 1973, ceasefire agreement ended the public safety advisory program in Vietnam, though some training of Vietnamese police officers and specialists in the United States and some provision of equipment have continued. (3) Because the Vietnam program was large and complex and focused on unique problems related to the military conflict there, it could not have been effectively addressed in this study. To do justice to it, a separate analysis would be required, one that could assess in depth the many facets of the program by drawing upon the mass of detailed records, as well as the impressions of participants and observers while they are still fresh.

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Origin and Rationale

The public safety program was begun in 1954 by the Eisenhower administration to help selected Third World governments strengthen their civil police services, in part to assist them meet actual or threatened communist subversion or insurgency. It has been one small component in the larger U. S. effort, including military and economic aid, designed to shore up friendly states and maintain regional peace.

Sukarno's Indonesia was the first country to receive public safety assistance, starting in 1955. By the end of that year, the program included Iran, South Korea, and Cambodia at a total cost of \$1.8 million. Three years later 21 countries were receiving aid at a cost of \$14 million. By mid-1961 there were 38 recipients, though the cost had decreased to \$13.8 million a year.

The public safety program was launched and sustained, for at least a dozen years, by a strong White House interest reflected in several actions of the National Security Council (NSC). A 1954 NSC directive set guidelines for a comprehensive U. S. effort to enhance stability and stimulate development in selected Third World states through various forms of aid. It explicitly mentioned aid to civilian police as the "first line of defense" against subversion and insurgency. The State and Defense departments and other agencies were charged with implementing the new policy emphasis; the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) was given the responsibility for the public safety component. The new program was administered by a Civil Police Branch within ICA which continued to finance it until AID took

over in November 1962. The police program was not received enthusiastically

within ICA, was never given a line in the budget, and had to compete for funds along with other assistance programs.

During the seven ICA years, the program received almost no attention in the increasingly active and well publicized debates over foreign aid within the Administration and the Congress. This lack of attention reflected the very small resources devoted to public safety as well as a limited understanding of its functions on the part of those who were interested primarily in military aid or in economic assistance.

The incoming Kennedy administration in 1961 saw in Third World instability an even greater threat to U. S. interests than did its predecessor. A fortnight after Premier Khrushchev's January 6, 1961, speech pledging wholehearted and unreserved support for wars of "national liberation," President Kennedy said in his inaugural address that the United States "shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe" to "assure the survival and the success of liberty." A year later Mr. Kennedy said "our nation is commissioned by history to be either an observer of freedom's failure or the cause of its success."³ This approach was rooted in the widely expressed view, in and out of government, that a breach of the peace anywhere was a potential threat to the United States. The Kennedy administration emphasized U. S. conventional military capability, expanded the army's Special Forces, increased the size

3. State of the Union Message, January 11, 1962. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, Department of State, April 1966, p. 1.

and number of U. S. military advisory missions in the Third World, and gave new impetus to public safety assistance.

In August 1962 a definitive NSC policy statement on the public safety program was issued. It remained in force through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and was suspended by the Nixon administration in 1969. Based on a study prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee on Police Assistance headed by U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the statement said that U. S. police aid was essential, along with military and economic assistance, to the freedom and viability of Third World countries. Such aid, it said, should be coordinated with police assistance from other Western governments so as to deny police assistance from communist powers.

The 1962 directive, addressed to the secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, as well as to the Attorney General, the AID administrator, and other agency heads, called for a vigorous public safety effort in states facing an actual or potential danger of internal subversion or insurgency. This effort was to be administered by a professional staff within AID and was to have a sufficient degree of autonomy to operate efficiently. The NSC directive called for adequate funding to protect the program from being a "marginal competitor" for primarily economic development funds, and suggested giving the program a specific line in the AID budget. A standing Interagency Police Group was set up to guide the program and interpret it to the AID administrator. It met periodically for several years and then died out.

In response to the directive, an Office of Public Safety (OPS) was established within AID in November 1962. Byron Engle, who had been associated with police assistance from the beginning, became its director, a position he held until he retired on April 1, 1973. Before joining the government, Mr. Engle had been director of personnel and training in the Kansas City, Missouri, police department.⁴

The authority, scope, and functions of the newly constituted program were spelled out in an AID General Notice, November 30, 1962, and in an accompanying Memorandum for the Executive Staff from the Acting Administrator, Frank M. Coffin. The General Notice states: "Police assistance programs directly serve the high priority objective of internal security, and in addition thus serve to permit sustained economic development." The Coffin memorandum defines the considerable but ambiguous degree of autonomy of OPS called for in the General Notice:

The document creates a strong centralized Office of Public Safety which has powers greater than any other technical office or division in A.I.D., whose programs must be accorded priority treatment by the rest of the agency, and which has all the capabilities

4. The present OPS director is Lauren J. Goin, who has been with the program since 1955. He has served as a police adviser in Turkey, Indonesia, and Brazil. He has a Master of Criminology degree from the University of California at Berkeley and was director of the Pittsburgh and Allegheny County Crime Laboratory.

for independent action and judgment that are consistent with the status of that office as a component office within the Agency for International Development.⁵

In 1963 AID established an International Police Academy (IPA) in Washington, D. C. Addressing its first class of graduates in 1964, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, expressed the prevailing official view that law and order were essential to economic and political development:

This may be the generation of rising expectations, when millions are released from the chains of ignorance, poverty, and disease which have bound them for centuries. But it is also the age of the plastic bomb, of arson, sabotage, kidnappings, murder for political purpose; the age of hit-run terrorist activities coordinated on a global scale. People cannot achieve peace and security, even ensure their own personal safety, except under the rule of law.⁶

Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations increased the scope and resources of the program. It reached its high point in fiscal 1968 with an AID expenditure of \$55.1 million and with 458 advisers in 34 countries; more than half of these resources were committed to South Vietnam, Thailand, and

5. The AID General Notice and the accompanying memorandum are found in the Appendix.

6. Address at the International Police Academy, Washington, D. C., February 28, 1964.

Laos. Thereafter, funding declined sharply (though the size of the professional staff declined less sharply), along with the general reduction in U. S. military and economic aid. These reductions stemmed from growing disillusionment with the scale and efficacy of the continuing U. S. commitments to the Third World; a reassessment of the nature of U. S. interests in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and increasing congressional concern with domestic matters.

The Nixon Doctrine, with its emphasis on greater self-reliance on the part of the developing countries, was anticipated by the report of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, formed during the Johnson administration. Issued in May 1968, the report, "U. S. Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries," was endorsed by President Nixon in July 1969 and remains in effect. It qualified significantly the earlier view that international security was indivisible and that all local threats or conflicts were a potential danger to U. S. security. It reflected the changed perceptions in both government and academic circles about the nature of communist behavior and the diversity of rising nationalist pressures, pointing out that U. S. interest in the internal security of the various Third World states differed widely. It insisted on selectivity and asserted that U. S. "internal defense" support funds should be limited to those few countries in which (1) the United States has a significant national interest, (2) there is clear evidence that internal disorder or subversion threatens that interest, (3) there is an indigenous will to resist challenges to security and a desire, willingness, and capability to use U. S. assistance effectively, and (4) the resources and assistance needed to maintain internal security are not available from other Western governments.

President Nixon's stress on clearer and more limited security goals in the Third World was reflected in his statement that the prime objective of U. S. assistance is "to help other countries assume the responsibility for their own defense and thus help to reduce our presence abroad" and that continued assistance was essential to achieve these objectives "more quickly and more effectively."⁷ To reach these goals the President recommended, on the basis of the Peterson Report,⁸ that the three categories of U. S. foreign aid -- security assistance, development assistance, and humanitarian relief -- be treated as separate though compatible efforts, and that the various components of security assistance (military aid, military credit sales, grants of excess stocks, supporting economic assistance, and public safety aid) be combined in "one legislative act to assure that each is viewed as a part of a coherent overall program."⁹ The Congress has not implemented these recommendations.

Program Objectives

Public safety aid is calculated to enhance the efficiency, capability, and professional character of the civil police establishment so it can serve as a reliable instrument of constituted political authority. From the outset, the program has sought to assist the recipient state in maintaining law and

7. Foreign Assistance for the Seventies. President Nixon's Message to the Congress. AID (September 15, 1970), pp. 2 and 5.

8. U. S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970s: A New Approach. President's Task Force on International Development (March 4, 1970).

9. For a Generation of Peaceful Development. President Nixon's Message to Congress. AID (April 21, 1971), p. 8.

order "under humane, civil concepts" by developing within the civil police the capability for (1) regular police operations, (2) detecting and identifying criminal "individuals and organizations and neutralizing their activities," and (3) "controlling militant activities ranging from demonstrations, disorders, or riots through small-scale guerrilla operations."¹⁰ Consequently, OPS has provided training, advisory, and equipment assistance to improve the multiple functions of the recipient government's police establishment which is almost always state-wide in scope.

Program emphases have varied from place to place. In some cases the emphasis has been on helping the police deal with "ordinary crime;" in others the focus has been on crimes against the state. Both elements, however, have been present in all assisted countries. Indeed, the two are sometimes difficult to distinguish. In many Third World countries illegal attacks against constituted authority sometimes take the form of economically motivated crime, such as bank robberies, rural banditry, and smuggling. The program is necessarily concerned with the whole spectrum of crime, including its more dramatic manifestations -- violent riots, urban terrorism, kidnapping, and skyjacking. OPS, for example, had been active in combating the international traffic in narcotics more than a decade before President Nixon's June 17, 1971, message drawing attention to this problem, though the resources for this purpose were limited.

In 1964, AID administrator, David E. Bell, defined the objectives of OPS as:

10. U. S. Department of State, AID, Office of Public Safety, A.I.D. Assistance to Civil Security Forces, (July 12, 1967), pp. 1 and 2.

1) strengthening the capability of civil police and paramilitary forces to enforce the law and maintain public order with the minimum use of physical force, and to counter Communist-inspired or exploited subversion and insurgency; and 2) encouraging the development of responsible and humane police administration and judicial procedure to improve the effectiveness of civil police and paramilitary forces and enable them to become more closely integrated into the community.¹¹

In 1972, OPS director, Byron Engle, elaborated these objectives, emphasizing the relation of public safety to "internal reforms" and "economic, social, and political progress." The purpose, he testified, "is to develop the civil police institution" that can:

- 1) Be responsive to the needs of all people of the country for protection of life and property and, by embracing the public service concept, earn their respect and cooperation;
- 2) Employ modern practices in administration and management and use of resources in the humane enforcement of the nation's laws;
- 3) Provide an adequate measure of internal stability

11. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1965, Hearings before Senate Committee on Appropriations, 88 Cong. 2nd sess. (1964), p. 72.

needed to facilitate economic, social, and political progress;

4) Prevent the development of threats to internal order and cope with them effectively precluding the necessity for the use of military force later to deal with civil problems, and

5) Have sufficient institutional structural strength [within the civil police to undertake] internal reforms so that [the police] can keep pace with a changing society and political progress.¹²

Perceptions of Civil Police

The public safety effort has been shaped not only by the larger U. S. foreign policy debate and the changing perceptions of America's role in the Third World, but also by the persistent disagreement over the relative importance of security and development as U. S. objectives and the tendency of some policymakers to project partial images of police work from their limited American contacts to societies where the police, usually civil servants of the central government, play a quite different role.¹³

In Washington and among American officials overseas, the public

12. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1973, Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 92 Cong. 2nd sess. (1972), Pt. 2, pp. 790-91.

13. The role of the civil police in the Third World is discussed in Chapter 2.

safety effort has occasionally encountered suspicion, and even hostility, in part because of an inadequate understanding of how a national police service operates and in part because of the ambivalence toward police duties in any society. The policeman is required to restrain and protect; restraint is usually resented and protection is usually appreciated.¹⁴

This problem was noted in the 1970 Rockefeller Report on Latin America:

. . . there is not in the United States a full appreciation of the important role played by the police.

There is a tendency . . . to equate the police in other American republics with political action and repression, rather than with security.¹⁵

14. The problem of understanding foreign police forces is exacerbated by the unique situation in the United States where there are more than 45,000 different police jurisdictions, ranging in size and quality from a single, untrained and inept county sheriff to a well trained and highly professional municipal police department. In response to what they regard as an unfair stereotype and as unjustified criticism, American police have often developed a defensive posture, which has not helped the situation. A candid insight into the policeman's "working personality" is found in Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society, (Wiley, 1966), pp. 42-70.

15. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Quality of Life in the Americas, Report of a U. S. Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere, Agency for International Development, August 30, 1969, p. 51.

In some U. S. missions abroad, the lower social and official status accorded to public safety advisers by some AID and embassy officials has been manifest. In one Asian country some years ago the AID director invited all his program heads except the public safety chief to his residence for dinner. When he was asked why, he said, "I don't invite cops to my home in America, and I'm not about to do it here." This is an exception. Whatever their view of the police function and its importance, most American officials who associate with OPS advisers in the field appear to regard them as conscientious and hard working professionals.

Administrative Arrangements

Public safety assistance is a unique foreign policy instrument. It is set apart from all other aid programs because it is concerned with both development and security, with long-range institution building, and with current threats to law and order. Its interest in upgrading a vital civilian function of the recipient government is similar to that of other AID technical assistance programs, particularly those concerned with strengthening public administration. In those countries where it also focuses on the larger problems of internal security, it bears some resemblance to military assistance.

For these reasons there has been no wholly logical or congenial bureaucratic home for the public safety program, which has been characterized as an unwanted orphan. But it found a foster home, first in ICA and then in its successor, AID, where it has had an uneasy existence. Other means for administering the program have been suggested, but none has

been tried.¹⁶

The fundamental problem is the existence of a small effort devoted to improving the performance of civil police as a part of a larger AID effort devoted chiefly to development projects and programs whose results are measured, however imprecisely, in economic terms. OPS has thus been forced to justify itself primarily on development grounds, often economically defined, rather than in terms of its long-range impact on a necessary government function. The requirement to justify and assess police aid by program criteria designed to measure the effects of agricultural, road building, rural medicine, and population control projects has been time consuming and frustrating to both OPS and AID program officers. The problem is compounded by the fact that the long-range effects of any kind of assistance are difficult to determine with precision. Although it is relatively easy to learn how many birth control devices have been distributed through AID-sponsored clinics or how many police patrol cars have been provided through OPS, it is difficult to ascertain how the former have affected population growth and equally difficult to measure the effect of the latter on crime prevention and public order.

Consequently, AID administrators in coping with threats to their major development programs are not likely to devote a great deal of energy or political capital to the defense of a tiny effort that seems only peripherally related to economic development. Equally significant, the program has been shaped by the decisions of middle-level officials whose views

16. Alternative administrative arrangements are discussed in Chapter 7.

toward public safety have ranged from friendly to critical. The critics sometimes assume that internal order is irrelevant to development or that police assistance gives AID a bad name and should be provided by a different U. S. agency. The attitude of a country AID director or program officer is often more important than that of the U. S. ambassador in determining the resources devoted to the police effort in a particular country.

To protect OPS from bureaucratic discrimination and neglect, as was noted above, President Kennedy gave the program an ambiguous degree of autonomy within AID. Its unique status was made specific in the areas of management, personnel recruitment, and access of the OPS director to the AID administrator.¹⁷ This autonomy, though it never extended to having a line in the AID budget, did offer some protection, at least until the beginning of President Nixon's first administration.

The autonomy itself has been a source of friction. AID administrators and program officers have often resented having to treat OPS differently from technical aid programs in education, population control, and agriculture. And the managers of these larger programs have questioned and challenged the special status accorded to OPS. These views were expressed in many interviews. One country AID director said: "We treat public safety like all other programs; it must fit into our development objectives. We do not tolerate independence." An official in Washington observed that

17. Direct access of OPS to the AID administrator is specified in Section C of the AID General Notice, November 30, 1962. See the appendix to this report.

AID program officers frequently refer to all traditional development efforts as "our programs" and to public safety as "that other program," a left-handed acknowledgement of the unique character and lingering autonomy of OPS.

While both sides have chafed under these uncongenial circumstances, OPS has survived within AID because of the acknowledged professional competence and bureaucratic skill of its first director, Byron Engle, and the general official view that there is a mutually reinforcing connection between internal security and development. This view is reflected in the statements of successive AID administrators that the program has made an important contribution to U. S. development goals in the Third World.

Role of Congress

The U. S. Congress has voted funds for the public safety program with almost no debate until 1970. Since then there has been increasing opposition, principally in the Senate. OPS has not, however, been the subject of a full and systematic congressional investigation, although occasionally, congressional inquiries into AID activities overseas have also looked into the public safety effort.¹⁸ There were two floor debates

18. See Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, a Staff Memorandum prepared for the Western Hemisphere Affairs subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 30, 1971.

in the history of OPS, in 1971 and 1972, and they were both brief.¹⁹ On May 3, 1972, the first OPS witness appeared before a congressional committee.²⁰ This was an indication of the increasingly controversial character of the program. The House has consistently supported the program. Its Committee on Appropriations in 1970 expressed concern for the "low priority assigned to the Office of Public Safety," insisted that "this program is very important to the stability" of the Third World governments, and urged the AID administrator to "review the past success of this program and accord it the high priority it deserves." It concluded that an upgrading of OPS was supported by Rockefeller Report recommendations that called for U. S. assistance to "strengthen the internal security forces of the various Latin American countries."²¹

19. The House debate on August 3, 1971, covered 5 columns in the Congressional Record, pp. H7729-30. The Senate debate on February 4, 1972, (9 columns) included J. W. Fulbright, William Proxmire, Hiram L. Fong, John O. Pastore, and John S. Cooper. Congressional Record: Senate, February 4, 1972, pp. S1213-16.

20. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1973, Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 92 Cong. 2nd sess. (1972), Pt. 2, pp. 789-826.

21. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill of 1970, House of Representatives Report No. 91-708, 91st Cong. 1st sess. (1969), p. 14. See also Quality of Life in the Americas, Agency for International Development, August 30, 1969, pp. 49-54.

In the fall of 1973, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended the termination of the entire OPS program while its counterpart in the House recommended that it be continued as usual. In December 1973, the Congress adopted compromise amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibited AID from conducting police training or related activities in any foreign country. This meant that present overseas OPS advisers will be withdrawn by approximately June 30, 1974. AID's International Police Academy was authorized to continue training foreign police officers and specialists.

Among the several factors leading to this decision are misgivings about the program expressed by several articulate members of Congress. These misgivings in turn are related to certain serious charges made against the public safety program. It is not always clear whether the congressional critics believe the specific charge in question (for example, that OPS advisers have taught torture techniques) or whether they object to the program because some people give credence to the charge. With these caveats in mind, the following six criticisms drawn from congressional sources appear to constitute the critics' case against public safety assistance.

1. It is inappropriate, if not arrogant, for the United States to assist Third World police forces when police in the United States cannot do a better job at home. The streets of Bangkok and Caracas are safer than the streets of Washington. Moreover, police methods used in the United States are not applicable to other countries and cultures.

2. Public safety aid carries the danger of intruding unnecessarily into the domestic affairs of other states. Close association with the civil

police involves us in internal matters and subjects us to the charge that we are covertly trying to control or manipulate the internal balance of forces. This is true particularly if the resident advisers become operationally involved. (Some critics claim that a few advisers have done so.)

3. The program carries the risk of supporting "reactionary and authoritarian" regimes that use repressive means to control political opposition and dissent. The police in these countries are often involved in such repressive measures and, by helping them, the United States becomes unnecessarily identified with unjust and undemocratic forces. (Some critics believe the United States has in some cases used public safety and other forms of aid to support repressive governments, while others say that the U. S. reputation for doing so is sufficient reason to oppose the program.)

4. Police assistance to any government, however democratic it may be, is unsound in principle because the police in any society tend to be repressive, anti-democratic, and in some cases brutal. Consequently U. S. association with police, even under the best of circumstances, unnecessarily tarnishes this country's image.

5. Public safety assistance makes little or no contribution to economic and political development. It cannot be justified as a development effort and has no place in AID. (Some of the critics who make this point suggest that such a program might be appropriate in another U. S. agency.)

6. The reputation of the United States has been hurt by charges that public safety advisers have approved, advocated, or taught torture techniques to civil police in some Latin American countries. (Again, some critics appear to regard the charges as documented facts.) The Senate critics of

OPS elaborated this point:

United States participation in the highly sensitive area of public safety and police training unavoidably invites criticism from persons who seek to identify the United States with every act of local police brutality or oppression in any country in which this program operates. It matters little whether the charges can be substantiated, they inevitably stigmatize the total United States foreign aid effort.²²

These six congressional criticisms, portions of which are subject to empirical verification, are related to criticism that has originated in several Latin American countries. The moderate critics in assisted countries make points similar to 2, 4, and 5 above, but they have not been nearly as articulate as the extreme critics who denounce U. S. public safety and military assistance, economic aid, trade policies, and private U. S. investment with equal fervor. These opposition voices have made four specific and overlapping charges against the program: (1) OPS advisers have been used as agents to gather intelligence to support U. S. imperialism, (2) within the assisted country they support reactionary forces against progressive forces, (3) the program is generally used to strengthen repressive regimes, and (4) advisers have approved, advocated, or taught torture techniques. These charges have been publicized in the film, State of

22. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Rept. 93-377, 93 Cong. 1st sess. (August 2, 1973), p. 17.

Siege, directed by Costa-Gavras and released in the United States in April 1973. This pro-Tupamaro and anti-AID film is presented as a documentary account of the public life and work of Dan A. Mitrione, an OPS adviser who was kidnapped and murdered by the Tupamaro terrorists in Uruguay in mid-1970. Similar charges are also found in books such as Teresa Hayter's Aid to Imperialism,²³ which offers a Marxist view of Western aid to the Third World. In developing the terms of reference for this study, all criticisms of the program have been taken into account and subjected to examination.

23. London: Penguin Books, 1971.

Chapter 2

CIVIL POLICE IN THE THIRD WORLD

The recent rash of overseas aircraft hijackings, kidnappings, murders, and less violent attacks on U. S. and other foreign personnel and property, which seem to be on the rise in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, point to the need for more effective civil law enforcement in the Third World. International terrorism is the most dramatic manifestation of criminal violence in these areas, but the more mundane forms of lawlessness and crime may in the long run have an even more corrosive effect on internal security and development. Many of these governments are singularly ill prepared to deal with the normal range of law and order problems, to say nothing of terrorism or insurgencies, because they lack trained, disciplined, and equipped police and other security forces to do the job.

The magnitude of the police problem in the Third World is indicated by the relatively high number of policemen killed in the line of duty, compared to the number killed in Western countries. The number of policemen killed per thousand policemen in 1971 in three of the most turbulent countries, compared to the figure for the United States, was as follows: Philippines,

5.5; Guatemala, 4.5; Honduras, 3.2; and the United States, 0.3. This means that if the United States had the same ratio as the Philippines, 2,288 policemen would have been killed in 1971, rather than the 125 who actually were.¹

Impact of Crime on Internal Development

In a dozen Third World countries, development efforts have sometimes been disrupted or postponed by banditry, smuggling, and political violence, which demand the attention of the authorities and divert scarce national resources. Guatemala, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Thailand, and Indonesia are examples. Foreign businessmen are reluctant to invest in a country whose capital city is assailed by violence. The peasant, still in the grip of ancient practices, is likely to respond to civil disorder or widespread crime by clinging even more tenaciously to his outmoded ways of sowing and reaping. He seeks to survive by keeping the lowest possible profile, hoping the disorder will go away. The disciplines of sheer survival leave him with less time and energy to tend his fields and care for his animals, let alone learn new and more efficient techniques. Some villagers react to turbulence by fleeing to the city, where many of them remain unemployed and live in slums that breed still further crime.

Widespread lawlessness also inhibits constructive and orderly political development. The perpetrators of political violence often engage

1. "Worldwide Police Casualty Study," AID, Office of Public Safety, May 30, 1972.

in crime to gain funds to further their cause. They sponsor the politics of subversion, riots, and civil insurrection. Useful political dialogue and orderly elections become difficult in a country that is seething with violent strikes, riots, bombings, kidnappings, or rampant corruption. Lawful dissent cannot readily play its constructive role in an atmosphere of violence and insecurity. Peaceful and competitive political activity is frustrated in a climate of fear.

Impact of Crime on Interstate Relations

Certain forms of crime, such as smuggling and tribal violence tend to spill over into neighboring countries and thus disturb interstate order. Tribal conflict may produce refugees who flee across a frontier and thus exacerbate tension between the two states. A shaky regime may try to distract attention from its internal problems by launching an adventure against a neighbor to redress an ancient grievance. Terrorists or smugglers who seek a privileged sanctuary across a border sometimes cause conflict between the two governments. In short, local internal violence may spread and upset the regional balance of forces to a point where the peace is broken. In severe cases, such as the civil war between East and West Pakistan, the great powers have seen their interests jeopardized by subsequent regional breaches of the peace. The U. S. interest in the internal security of Third World states is based on the fact that internal security--even at the lower level of the spectrum, which can be dealt with by police action--has a potentially adverse effect on interstate stability. This recognition of a connection between internal turbulence, internal development, and inter-

national security bears on the selection of recipients for public safety aid, a major policy issue discussed later in the study.

Contrasting Roles of the Police and Army

The role of the civil police in the Third World can perhaps be seen most clearly by differentiating it from that of the institution it is most frequently confused with, the army.

In this connection, it is important to distinguish between the regular civilian police who operate largely in the open, and the special police (variously called the intelligence, political intelligence, or political police) who operate covertly and focus largely on crimes against the state. Under some regimes, the political police sometimes engage in activities that violate the law. They may, for example, not only keep an eye on subversives, but obstruct legitimate opposition on orders from the regime. In some situations the regime politicizes elements of the regular police and directs them to engage in illegal activities. Generally, however, the important differences in character and functions between the regular police and the special police are maintained and are recognized by the regime, ordinary citizens, and opponents of the regime. Since the public safety program does not assist political police elements, the present discussion and the study as a whole are confined to the regular civilian police.

Most Third World countries, despite the great diversity in size, economic potential, and political influence among them, have common elements that distinguish them, at least in degree, from major industrial

states. The developing countries often have weak and unstable governments, strong ethnic and other centrifugal pressures, and a fragile fabric of national cohesion. Their security and political integrity tend to be threatened more from within than from without, though in some cases insurgency and subversion have external support or direction.

In law enforcement and the maintenance of internal security, all Third World regimes have relied both on the civil police and the army, though in different ways. Some governments have turned primarily to the military, particularly the army, to maintain internal security. Others have established paramilitary forces for this purpose. Some have combined the civil police and the army into a unified national guard. Others have placed this responsibility clearly in the hands of the civil police. In some countries the police have been subordinated to the military command, though the police function is separately structured and administered. Under most constitutions the army is assigned the traditional mission of external defense, but it is almost always given a larger role in internal security than it is in the United States and other more developed countries.

Because Third World police and military are relatively underdeveloped institutions and their roles and missions have often been ill defined or unconventional from the Western viewpoint, there has been a tendency to overlook the salient distinctions between them. These differences determine the unique impact of each on internal security, domestic politics, and economic development.

Generally, the army is more developed and modernized than the civil police. It is a "hard" institution in a "soft" society. The army tends to

have a near-monopoly on the legitimate instruments of physical coercion. It has the central command structure, the organization, and the muscle to get things done. As a community of command and obedience, equipped with modern communications gear, vehicles, and weapons, it can act relatively quickly and decisively. In contrast, the national police force is clearly a junior partner. The police, though usually under central government control, are less tightly organized, much more lightly equipped, more widely dispersed, and less accustomed to centralized and disciplined control.

The police and the military have different, complementary, and sometimes overlapping roles. The police are responsible for a wide range of law enforcement functions, including traffic control, protection of life and property, personal crime, narcotics control, kidnapping, skyjacking, and the first stages of insurgency. The military are responsible for external security and are called in to supplement or replace the police during major internal emergencies that threaten public order or endanger central authority. Nevertheless, in general the primary mission of the military is to defend the state against external enemies and largely by lethal means. The mission of the police is to enforce the law of the state, largely by non-lethal means. The army is concerned more with foreign foes and the police almost exclusively with fellow citizens.

Differences in how soldiers and policemen live and work also have a bearing on their outlook and role in society. Most soldiers and many army officers live apart from the population in barracks or in camps. Civil police of all ranks live among the people whose cooperation they need in

their daily work. The military are centrally controlled and have their separate system of justice. The police operate under central and local civilian authority and are subject to the jurisdiction of regular civilian courts, though in most countries minor police misbehavior is settled within the police establishment.

As a man who works among and with the people, a policeman upholds prevailing customs as well as the laws and regulations he is sworn to enforce. Though he sometimes feels psychologically cut off from his fellow citizens because of his role (e.g., he may symbolize an unpopular law, enforce an irksome regulation, or restrain people who regard themselves as law-abiding citizens), and though citizens may look upon him as a functionary who represents a distant and alien authority, a civil policeman remains much closer to the people than does a soldier and is often regarded as a protector of the citizen against those who would hurt him.

The soldier is more detached from society. The military tends to be a self-perpetuating subculture, but not necessarily a homogeneous culture or counter-culture. Because of their greater exposure to modern ideas -- more than one-hundred thousand Third World military officers have had some training in the United States -- these men, especially the younger generation, often have more progressive views on social and political questions than do police officers. Also, military officers, far more than police officers, have access to the top councils of government, whether civilian or military, because of their power and a long tradition of their acceptance in the leadership.

Relation to Political and Economic Development

The regular police and the military in Asia, Africa, and Latin America play dramatically different roles in internal politics. In most countries military officers have been politically active, while in virtually all countries the police have been politically passive. Civilian regimes of all stripes frequently appoint generals or colonels to fill key cabinet posts. This seldom happens to police officers. Military men have a considerable opportunity to exercise political influence, police do not. With their capacity to exercise coercive power and confer prestige, the top military commanders are active in the elite of every country. Their rank and position, often reinforced by family ties, ensure that political leaders will seek their favor and support.

Military leaders are potent actors in the political drama for still other reasons. They can play a role in reinforcing, upholding, influencing, or reshaping an existing regime and also in replacing it by direct intervention. Under constitutional regimes with a civilian administration, a military elite still may exercise political influence by arbitrating between competing factions, by siding with one faction against another, or by going into an informal partnership with a civilian faction. Few Third World regimes could survive without the active or passive blessing of the military.

Police officers, in contrast, have little power and limited prestige, hence little political influence. Normally they are not as well connected socially or by blood, and they do not usually enjoy the high status of military leaders. They do not have airplanes, tanks, and mortars. While the army has large forces that can be mobilized for security or political

purposes, the police usually work in small units that cannot easily be used to bring force to bear for political purposes or to check or defeat a political exercise of military force. They have neither the equipment nor the training to do so.

Police salaries, living conditions, status, and fringe benefits are almost always inferior to those of the military. Less deeply rooted in tradition, less prominently displayed in national parades, and usually less smartly dressed, the police service is not a promising base for politically ambitious men.

In short, police are more likely to be pawns and the military to be actors in the political drama. The regular police tend to be politically neutral -- to maintain the status quo by enforcing the law, whatever it is, however frequently changed, and by whatever means. The police are civil servants, along with judicial and other government personnel; and their chiefs, like other top-level civil servants, are subject to the political manipulation that often attends a scheduled or unscheduled change of regime. As civil servants, the majority of police continue working under successive regimes, whether "conservative," "reactionary," "progressive," or "revolutionary."

Their political neutrality may be compromised, however, when a regime -- whether of the right or left -- prohibits all significant political opposition and uses the regular police to enforce edicts to this end. This was the case under President Sukarno of Indonesia, who politicized the civilian police. The regular police were also politicized under President Diem in South Vietnam and for a brief period in Laos. In such situations, the police

become a political instrument of the regime, doing its bidding and frustrating the opposition, even by illegal means. When such a regime is overthrown, many top police officers are purged because of their close association with the old regime; the majority of the lower ranks usually continue and serve the new regime.

The most dramatic difference between the police and the military in the political sphere lies in their respective roles in unscheduled changes of government. There have been dozens of military coups in the Third World since 1970. There have been no police coups, though in several cases (e.g., Ghana and Nigeria) a few ranking police officers joined the military plotters. In every case the planning and execution of the coup were carried out by military men with military instruments, including the show or use of military personnel and weapons. The extent of military influence is shown by the fact that about 25 of the Third World countries have military governments and most of the remaining ones have regimes in which active or retired military officers hold high civilian positions.. The police, by contrast, simply lack the means to force or prevent either peaceful changes of government or military takeovers.

Although the police play a passive role in the ideological direction of internal politics they can play a constructive role in political development if they are encouraged or permitted to do so by the regime. It is precisely this passive posture that enables them to serve as an instrument of stability and continuity during periods of political turbulence and stress. As with other career officials and civil servants, they can be and usually are a bridge between regimes, thus making it possible for the

government to function during the periods of transition. In this way they can facilitate change by providing the stability that enables the successor regime to concentrate on the tasks at hand.

In their role as law enforcement agents, the police can also help to ensure normal political activity and elections under regimes that permit this degree of political competition. By maintaining order, they can diminish the hopes of extremists of the left or right that disorder and violence will serve their ends. By ensuring a reasonable level of public safety, they can encourage activities that are essential to genuine political competition and responsive government. Disciplined police, when supported by the regime, can protect the right of dissent within the law. In this sense, to quote Dr. John A. Hannah, AID administrator from 1969 to 1973, the police are "not only agents of order; they are also the agents of change" who help "shift dissatisfaction from the barricade to the ballot."²

Effective police work can also help to create conditions conducive to peaceful economic development for essentially the same reasons. As was noted earlier, productive economic activity requires a level of security that will enable investment, planning, and labor to achieve its ends without untoward interference or destructive interruptions. Internal security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for increased activity designed to meet the aspirations of the people. In this task, well-trained and disciplined police have played a significant role.

2. Speech, Washington, D. C., April 16, 1971.

Police-Military Trade-Off

Since most Third World military forces are sometimes assigned internal policing functions and some military forces are regularly assigned such functions, the contribution of the military to internal law enforcement invites a cost-benefit comparison with that of the civil police.

Basic to this analysis is the fact that the cost of a policeman is considerably less than that of a soldier, the difference depending largely on how heavily the army is equipped. Police also generally operate at less cost than the army, even when doing approximately the same police mission, primarily because their equipment is lighter and their overhead is less. Consequently, a policeman performs law enforcement and other internal security duties at substantially less cost than a soldier performing the same tasks; it is therefore generally less expensive to employ policemen to do police work.

But there are exceptions because peacetime armies always have "excess capacity." In time of peace underutilized soldiers are available to perform police functions at very little additional cost. This observation must be qualified by three factors: (1) It may be cheaper to reduce the size of the army than to transfer soldiers to police work, although it is often politically difficult -- or impossible -- to do so. (2) Soldiers lack the training, and usually the equipment, to do police work as well as policemen do it. (3) The political cost of using soldiers among their fellow-citizens is often greater than that of using civil police, especially during public demonstrations and other emergencies when the soldiers are

highly visible and their use tends to imply that the regime has lost a measure of civilian control.

In most circumstances, governments can buy better police work at less economic and political cost by investing more in the police services and less in the military services. The greater political influence of the army, however, sometimes makes it difficult to translate this conclusion into policy.

The same cost-benefit analysis has some relevance to public safety and military assistance because a significant portion of the latter is calculated to enhance internal security. According to a RAND study, "internal security served as the dominant rationale and objective" of MAP aid to Latin America during the 1960s.³ For this reason the potential for a marginal trade-off merits examination.⁴ From 1968 to 1972, U. S. public safety expenditures in all foreign countries other than Vietnam ranged from 6 to 2 percent of military aid expenditures. The following figures compare OPS and MAP grant expenditures worldwide, less Vietnam, for three fiscal years:

3. David F. Ronfeldt and Luigi R. Einaudi, Internal Security and Military Assistance to Latin America in the 1970s: A First Statement, a report prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs, RAND, Santa Monica, December 1971, p. v.

4. The military assistance - public safety aid trade-off is discussed in Chapter 6, below.

COST OF OPS AND MAP WORLDWIDE (LESS VIETNAM)

(In millions of dollars)

<u>Year</u>	<u>OPS</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>OPS %</u>
Fiscal 1968	28.9	500	5.8
Fiscal 1970	13.8	350	4.0
Fiscal 1972	10.5	500	2.1

Latin America provides a useful comparison of OPS and MAP expenditures because virtually all countries receive both kinds of assistance. In calendar 1972, in 15 Western hemisphere countries receiving MAP and OPS aid, military assistance cost nine times as much as public safety aid. This difference was even more pronounced in training and hardware costs:

COST OF OPS AND MAP IN LATIN AMERICA: 1972

(In millions of dollars)

	<u>OPS</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>OPS %</u>
Total program cost	5.1	44.3	11.2
Total Training cost	1.2	19.7	6.6
Total materiel cost	0.7	15.7	4.5

Changing Attitudes Toward Professional Police

Within the last decade or so, according to U. S. public safety advisers, many Third World political leaders have begun to recognize the value to themselves and to their countries of professional police forces. Most of them are aware that their police are inadequately led, organized, and supported and are held in lower public esteem than are the military services.

They realize that, compared to modern Western police forces, their police are weak and unevenly deployed (e.g., concentrated in the capital to the neglect of the rural areas); that many police services follow outmoded practices; and that their recruitment standards are often low, the basis for promotion uncertain, and in-service training almost nonexistent.

There has also been a growing awareness that crime and lawlessness of all varieties are a serious threat to the tenure of the politicians, as well as to political viability and economic development. Political leaders, out of sheer self interest, if nothing more, are thus coming to realize that a more professional, nonpolitical police force can best serve their own interests. While a nonprofessional force is more likely to do the bidding of the regime, especially in the area of questionable political practices, it is also likely to be more inefficient and corrupt. Favoritism or corruption in a police force, in turn, reflects directly and unfavorably upon the regime that causes or condones these practices and thus gives aid and comfort to the opposition. In terms of simply staying in power, to say nothing of the larger consequences, many regimes have concluded that they are better served by professional than by politicized police. This is illustrated by the desire of the regimes of over 70 countries to expose their top police executives to professional training in, or visits to, the United States, Britain, France, and other countries.

There is also a growing recognition that the great bulk of violence and other criminal activity, however motivated, is essentially internal. Since it rarely involves an external threat, this is an additional reason why it can be dealt with more effectively, more economically, and with less

political cost, especially in the early stages, by police forces than by the military. A timely application of a professional police effort is the most efficient way to deter and deal with not only ordinary crime but also the earlier stages of larger threats to public order. The police have a key role to play in an incipient insurgency situation because they are usually the most sensitive contact between the government and its people, and are close to the focal point of unrest. Since they thus symbolize and project national authority, the police can also play a negative or positive role in political development. As one scholar has observed:

Because of their almost ubiquitous presence, the continual nature of their contact, and the crisis orientation of much of their work, the police probably are in a position to influence more people on a daily basis than either of the other institutions [the military and the tax collectors]. The potential of the police for increasing identification with the central government and for symbolizing its concern is enormous. An efficient, fair, generally honest police force may positively reinforce the more formal aspects of political socialization and encourage loyalty to the political authority. Conversely, an inefficient, discriminatory, corrupt force may prove highly dysfunctional to the process of nation building; it may curtail or reverse favorable patterns of identification

with the central government.⁵

For these reasons, many Third World leaders have moved in the past decade from relative neglect of the police toward actively improving the professional quality of the police services. They were virtually forced to do something because of increasing disruption and crime associated with urbanization. They have expressed their new concern in many cases by allocating more resources to their own police establishments and by requesting U. S. and other Western aid. Pressures for greater professionalism have also been generated within the police services and have sometimes contributed to demands for higher salaries.⁶

The implications of greater police professionalization within the Third World were sufficiently recognized in the U. S. foreign policy community to lead to the creation of the Office of Public Safety and to support of its continuing program of training, overseas advice, and equipment assistance. The value of police assistance was stressed in the Rockefeller report of 1969, which, after noting that no country in the Western hemisphere could "effectively protect its own internal security by itself," went on to say:

5. See Christian P. Potholm, "The Multiple Roles of the Police as Seen in the African Context," Journal of Developing Areas. (January 1969, pp. 139-58, especially pp. 142-43.

6. An unusual case occurred in early 1973 in Argentina, where thousands of policemen, representing some 40,000 men in 6 of the 23 provinces, demonstrated for pay raises. Washington Post, March 22, 1973/

. . . In view of the growing subversion. . . , mounting terrorism and violence against citizens, and the rapidly expanding population, it is essential that the training program which brings military and police personnel from other hemisphere nations to the United States . . . be continued and strengthened.

. . . The United States should respond to requests for assistance of the police . . . by providing them with the essential tools to do their job.⁷

Against this background, the report now turns to a description of the public safety effort (Chapter 3), an examination of its immediate impact on the assisted police services (Chapter 4), and an examination of its larger policy effects and implications (Chapters 5-7).

7. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Quality of Life in the Americas, Report of a U. S. Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere, Agency for International Development, August 30, 1969, pp. 51, 53, and 54.

Chapter 3

THE PROGRAM: SCOPE AND CHARACTER

Since its beginning in 1954, U. S. public safety assistance, which includes the provision of resident advisers, has been given to 47 Third World countries and to two members of NATO -- Greece and Turkey. The recipients have generally been chosen on the basis of criteria similar to the four developed by the Senior Interdepartmental Group in 1968.¹ These criteria emphasize the interest of the United States in the internal security of the assisted country, the capacity and willingness of the potential recipient to do its part, and the unavailability of police aid from other Western governments.

Since Britain and France have provided public safety aid to most of their former colonial areas, the United States has concentrated on Latin America and certain countries in Asia and Africa. In Asia, U. S. public safety assistance, like military and economic aid, has gone to the Philippines and Indonesia, as well as to countries where the U. S. government undertook

1. They are listed in Chapter 1, p. 12.

special security responsibilities: South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. In Africa the greater portion of public safety and military aid has gone to Ethiopia, Zaire, and Liberia.

The 19 countries receiving OPS assistance as of early 1973 are listed on page 47 along with the fiscal year the program began, the requested funds for fiscal 1973, and the number of advisers as of March 1973. For comparison, the number of other AID technicians in each country as of June 1972 is also indicated. The tabulation reveals that OPS in 1973 had 13.2 percent of the overseas AID-financed technicians, an increase of 3 percent over 1968 when there were in these same countries 1,215 AID specialists, of whom 124 were public safety advisers.

Generally, a country receiving police assistance also receives U. S. military and economic aid as well. The three forms of aid are provided for essentially the same reasons -- to strengthen a friendly government by improving its capacity to maintain security and develop economically, and to encourage the government to pursue external policies compatible with the maintenance of regional stability.

Of the 49 program countries (that is, those that have one or more resident OPS advisers), 30 no longer receive advisory or equipment services, though some of them still send police for training the United States. The countries are listed on page 48 along with the year the OPS program was terminated.

PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAMS BY COUNTRY: 1973

<u>Country</u>	<u>Starting Date</u>	<u>Allocated Funds</u>	<u>OPS Advisers</u>	<u>Other AID Advisers</u>
<u>Western Hemisphere</u>				
1. Bolivia	1956	\$184,000	2	23
2. Colombia	1963	360,000	5	28
3. Costa Rica	1963	127,000	3	11
4. Ecuador	1958	200,000	4	19
5. El Salvador	1957	52,000	1	10
6. Guatemala	1957	375,000	5	22
7. Honduras	1960	116,000	3	15
8. Jamaica	1967	85,000	1	4
9. Nicaragua	1971	91,000	3	12
10. Panama	1959	169,000	3	32
11. Uruguay	1962	210,000	3	6
12. Venezuela	1963	250,000	4	4
<u>Other Areas</u>				
13. Ghana	1971	108,000	2	19
14. Laos	1956	462,000	11	300
15. Liberia	1957	187,000	3	37
16. Philippines	1956	530,000	9	57
17. Saudi Arabia	1969	(a)	7 ^b	0
18. Thailand	1957	4,231,000	36	99
19. Zaire	1964	688,000	10	10
Total			108 ^b	708

(a) Saudi Arabia underwrites its complete public safety program.

PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAMS TERMINATED

Note: Each country is listed along with the termination date.

<u>Western Hemisphere</u>	<u>Africa</u>
1. Brazil 1972	15. Burundi 1967
2. Chile 1970	16. Central African Republic . 1966
3. Dominican Republic . . 1972	17. Chad 1968
4. Guyana 1971	18. Dahomey 1965
5. Peru 1970	19. Ethiopia 1969
	20. Ivory Coast 1969
<u>Asia</u>	21. Kenya 1969
6. Burma 1966	22. Libya 1963
7. Cambodia 1963	23. Malagasy Republic 1967
8. Indonesia 1964	24. Niger 1968
9. South Korea 1971	25. Rwanda 1968
10. Nepal 1966	26. Somalia 1970
11. Pakistan 1971	27. Tunisia 1972
12. South Vietnam 1973	28. Upper Volta 1966
<u>NATO</u>	<u>Middle East</u>
13. Greece 1962	29. Iran 1967
14. Turkey 1963	30. Jordan 1971

Programs in these countries were terminated for a variety of reasons. Some had achieved their specific objectives. In a few cases a program was not renewed because it was not achieving the expected gains. In other situations, the basic factor was political, usually a change of regime or a changed policy of the existing regime that made it difficult for the regular civil police to use professional advice and assistance. (The political aspects are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.)

Advisers, Training, and Equipment

The decision by AID and the Department of State to initiate an OPS program in a particular country is followed by a carefully negotiated project agreement between the United States and the government to be assisted, with each undertaking specific obligations. Typically AID agrees to provide one or more resident police advisers, training in the United States for a number of officers or specialists, and certain items of police equipment or training aids. The recipient government agrees to provide facilities for the resident advisers, to make proper use of any equipment received, and to undertake certain measures, including the provisions of necessary funds, to achieve the project's objectives.

Since each program is tailored to meet the particular needs of the assisted police service, the relative emphasis on resident advisers, training in the United States, and equipment provided varies from place to place. This flexibility among OPS services is illustrated by the expenditures for each component in Venezuela, Uruguay, and Jamaica in fiscal 1971:

	<u>Advisers</u>	<u>U. S. training</u>	<u>Equipment</u>
Venezuela	\$157,000	\$28,000	0
Uruguay	\$143,000	\$66,000	\$394,000
Jamaica	\$ 32,000	\$33,000	\$ 10,000

The worldwide balance among advisers, training, and equipment, excluding Vietnam and Thailand, where equipment costs were disproportionately high, and the trends since 1962 are indicated in the following table:

AID FUNDS FOR OPS BY FUNCTION: 1964-1972

(In Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Advisors</u>		<u>U. S. Training</u>		<u>Equipment</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Cost</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>%</u>	
1964	3,118	29.1	1,609	14.9	5,617	52.3	10,730*
1966	3,247	27.6	1,598	13.6	6,399	54.3	11,783
1968	3,706	25.1	1,410	9.6	9,023	61.2	14,747
1970	3,314	42.3	1,112	14.2	2,761	35.2	7,838
1972	2,715	46.9	1,245	21.5	1,537	26.5	5,795

*The totals are larger than the sum of the three components because certain overhead costs are included.

During the nine years (1964-72) spanned by the above statistics, the funds available for OPS declined by \$5 million, almost 50 percent. There was an even larger drop in the 1968-72 period. Over the entire eight-year period, there was a significant increase in the proportion of the total effort going into training and advisory services (from 44 percent in 1964 to 68.4 percent in 1972), though the dollar expenditures in these two categories remained almost constant. Concurrently, equipment expenditures dropped from 52.3 percent to 26.5 percent.

In the sections that follow, each of the three principal OPS functions is described and illustrated. The multiple effects of the public safety program as a whole are analyzed and evaluated in Chapters 4 and 5.

Services of Country Advisers

The distinguishing feature of an OPS program country is one or more resident advisers. Several non-program and former program countries receive assistance in the form of police training in the United States.

Nigeria, for example, has no OPS advisers, but sends about 12 police officers a year to the International Police Academy (IPA) and has received a \$3.4 million loan to help build a police staff college.

The majority of public safety advisers are professional police officers who have had an average of 14 years experience in the United States; the others have had equivalent training and experience as technical specialists or in the U. S. military establishment. Approximately 70 percent of the total OPS professional staff were hired for their police experience in such major fields as police training, management, criminalistics, identification, and traffic control. The other 30 percent were recruited because of their expertise in electronic communication, vehicle maintenance, or logistics, or because of specialized police-related skills acquired in military service.

Pursuing the dual objectives of encouraging professional attitudes and practices and developing supporting police institutions, U. S. advisers provide day-by-day counsel in virtually all areas of police work, focusing selectively according to the program agreement and changing circumstances. The categories covered are:

General Functions

Administration (organization, command structure, discipline)

Management at all levels (recruitment, testing, promotion)

Training (basic, academy, technical)

Logistics (vehicle maintenance, operations, records)

Weapons (training, control, maintenance)

Communications (command centers, operations, maintenance)

Investigation (procedures, techniques, legal constraints)

Criminalistics (identification of physical evidence)

Functions by Area

Municipal policing

Narcotics

Traffic

Airport police

Rural policing

Air operations

Border police

Marine police

Immigration and customs

The advisory function is an organic process, a reciprocal relationship between the OPS specialist and his counterpart in the police establishment--the person he works most closely with. The adviser communicates certain attitudes, encourages the teaching of certain skills, and transmits supporting equipment. The same objectives are sought in the U. S. training experience discussed below.

Communicating Attitudes

A large poster in the office of the OPS chief in Caracas, Venezuela, symbolized one of the most difficult and least tangible objectives of the program: helping foster a sense of public service within the assisted police forces. The poster, entitled "Faith and Confidence," shows a photograph of a policeman on the street, leaning down and listening intently to a three-year-old boy.² The adviser said he put it up in the hope that it would

2. Author interview, Caracas, June 29, 1972. The photograph, taken by Bill Bell of the Washington Daily News in 1957 in Washington, D. C., won a Pulitzer prize. The policeman, Maurice Cullinane, was made deputy police chief in Washington in 1970.

have a good influence on the Venezuelan officers who visited him.

The development of an attitude of public service and other attributes of a professional outlook is very difficult in cultures where government employment is often regarded more as a personal privilege than a social responsibility. (The barriers to professionalism in the Third World are discussed in Chapter 4.)

A professional may be defined as one who has a sense of vocation and pride in his calling and who acknowledges that good performance must be rooted in an accepted field of knowledge which is nourished by appropriate training and sustained by discipline, promotion on merit, and ethical behavior.

One of the most difficult aspects of professional conduct relates to humane and legal police behavior. In societies accustomed to the use of unnecessary force and to illegal means of apprehending citizens, gaining confessions, or subduing riots, the idea of a humane approach to law enforcement often seems impractical. When the adviser's views are sought on how to deal with such problems, he responds by suggesting that legal and humane procedures are not only more professional but more effective. He suggests that instruction on the legal rights of citizens and the legal constraints on police behavior be included in the local training program. He recommends concrete procedures for controlling demonstrations with minimum force -- emphasizing the importance of communication between the police and the demonstration leaders, respect for the rights of all citizens, including the demonstrators. He points out, for example, that non-toxic tear gas can be more effective than shooting into the crowd.

Films are shown, illustrating how trained police using bull horns, batons, transparent plastic shields, and tear gas can effectively control a crowd without the use of harsher measures.

Institution Building

The longer-term objective of introducing procedures, developing standards of recruitment and performance, and building institutions that have some chance of fostering professional attitudes and practices after the advisers leave is both important and difficult to achieve. There is a strong tendency in the Third World to be preoccupied with the present and to deal with the most vivid and pressing problems, especially in those countries confronted by insurgency or urban terrorism. The police understandably want immediate help, particularly vehicles and radios. In every country, nevertheless, the advisers have pressed for the building of lasting institutions, such as record facilities, training schools, command centers, and so on.

In-country Training

A major aim in all countries has been to develop and improve police academies and other training institutions. As a rule, one adviser is assigned full time to this task. He consults on the construction of facilities, curriculum development, and teaching techniques, and assists in providing textbooks, laboratory equipment, and other supplies. In some cases, OPS advisers are attached to the academy or training center to give day-by-day assistance. The basic objective is to develop ongoing institutions so that the assisted police forces can move toward self-sufficiency in training. The International Police Academy, discussed below, also seeks to achieve this same goal by training instructors to train others.

Preventive Maintenance

The immersion of the recipient police in current concerns is often expressed in their attitudes toward the use and maintenance of equipment, particularly vehicles, which are important status symbols in the Third World. There is often little or no tradition of preventive maintenance or simple repair procedures. As a result, vehicle engines burn out for lack of oil and expensive repairs are frequent. Advisers invest considerable effort in developing the discipline of routine checkups and maintenance.

Resident and Temporary Advisers

OPS advisers live and work much like other AID personnel abroad. Their normal tour of duty in one country is two years, and they frequently are assigned to a second foreign post. Many of them are rotated back to Washington for a stint at OPS headquarters or for duty at the International Police Academy.

In more than half of the program countries, OPS advisers have offices in the national police headquarters or at a police training facility in addition to their offices in the U. S. chancellery or AID building. Working next to their local counterparts provides an opportunity for frequent communication over a wide range of professional concerns and generally symbolizes a substantial degree of mutual confidence and rapport. At the same time it can lead to an unhealthy degree of dependence on the adviser or, in extreme cases, to the adviser becoming operational.

Public safety advisers in such strife torn countries such as Guatemala, or Uruguay have been exposed to at least as much physical risk as other American officials. In Montevideo, Dan A. Mitrione, the chief public safety

adviser was murdered by the Tupamaro terrorists. The U. S. ambassador there was also on their target list, and an AID agricultural adviser, Claude Fly, was abducted and after eight months was released.

In addition to assigning resident advisers abroad, OPS provides both program and non-program countries with special short-term advisory services. On request, specialists are sent for periods of ten days to three months to examine and evaluate any aspect of police work from airport security or riot control to a communications system or a training center. An OPS team may also undertake a general survey and prepare recommendations for strengthening the entire police establishment or portions of it, with or without U. S. assistance. Both kinds of temporary assignments may be underwritten by AID, or be paid for in full or in part by the requesting government.

Three recent cases of the provision of temporary advisory services illustrate this service. In 1972 an OPS specialist spent 10 days in Tunisia to help establish security procedures for a new international air terminal. This was underwritten by the AID mission in Tunisia. In that same year an OPS specialist headed a three-man team to evaluate the capabilities of the civil police in dealing with the narcotics traffic in six African and Middle Eastern countries. The bureaus of Customs and of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs were represented on the team. In September 1972, an OPS communications technician made a survey of the Caracas Metropolitan Police radio system, paid for by Caracas.

Training in the United States

By February 1973, some 6,900 Third World police officers and technicians had been trained in the United States by OPS at its International Police Academy (IPA) or elsewhere. The period spent here, usually about four months, should be seen as a total training experience, embracing IPA (or other) instruction, international travel, association with police from other countries, professional field visits, and an opportunity to see something of American life and institutions.

The training experience for all officers and technicians starts with a selection process in the assisted country that involves officials of both governments. Since a high premium is placed on U. S. training by national police administrators, there are usually more potential candidates than there are IPA or other openings. The requisite qualifications for selection include sufficient experience to benefit from the training (usually a minimum of three years as an officer), maturity and leadership qualities, a broad understanding of police problems in his own country, and a commitment to continue in police work after he returns -- in short, an "outstanding career potential," to use the words of an OPS memorandum. The selection of technical specialists, for example, radio technicians, is based largely on technical qualifications.

Though all of the officers ultimately selected may not have all of these qualities, the competitive process, which also includes thorough English language tests for some and political acceptability by both governments for all, has produced a competent group of trainees, according to the testimony of officials of the United States and the assisted governments, confirmed by spotty

observation by the author. A few mistakes have been made, however, A dramatic case is that of a talented police officer from Uruguay who turned out to be a Tupamaro terrorist.³ He handed over an account of his U. S. training experience, which was subsequently distorted and used as propaganda against the public safety program.

International Police Academy

The IPA, operated by AID in Washington, D. C., and housed in the fortress-like structure that was formerly a streetcar barn, has been the chief instrument of the training program. It has graduated 4,661 men from 75 countries. IPA seeks to translate and adapt what it considers the best and most advanced doctrine and methods of law enforcement to the diverse needs of the Third World. Supplementing the IPA, the public safety program has provided specialized police courses at universities, institutes, and the FBI, and has made provision for observing the operations of selected metropolitan and state police departments.

Founded in 1963, the IPA followed two earlier efforts to train foreign police here. From 1955 to 1962, the International Association of the Chiefs of Police arranged for limited training, under contract to the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), but this was judged to be inadequate because it consisted largely of superficial observation tours to various police facilities. The second precursor was the Inter-American Police Academy, founded in 1962 in the Panama Canal Zone as a regional center for Latin America. In its nearly two years of existence, the Canal Zone

3. Author interviews with U. S. officials in Montevideo and Washington.

academy graduated 725 trainees. In 1964 it was merged with the IPA, which continues to have a strong Latin American representation.

The IPA conducts two main courses, a 17-week General Course for middle-range police officers and a 14-week Senior Course for Executives of the rank of lieutenant colonel and above. The General Course consists of 12 to 16 classes a year with a maximum of 40 trainees in each, taught in Spanish, English, or French. From 1964 to mid-1972, 3,746 men were graduated from it, the majority being from Latin America.

The Senior Course, given once in Spanish and once in English each year, is designed for police officials who have policy or planning responsibilities or who occupy major command positions at the national, provincial, or municipal level. The typical class numbers about 30 officers. Since 1964, there have been 335 graduates. The total graduates by country and region are listed on the following page.

Most IPA training is paid for by AID, though some countries contribute a part or all of the expense. Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, Mexico, and Zambia pay the total costs for their own students, and other countries are moving in this direction. Expenses include international travel (often paid for by the program country), domestic travel, student per diem, textbooks, and incidentals. In 1971 the cost per trainee, minus the cost of international travel, was \$2,071 for the General Course and \$2,977 for the Senior Course, the latter carrying a larger per diem and involving more U. S. travel. If AID support costs, rent, and all other overhead expenses were included, the real cost per student of the two courses would be \$4,274 and

IPA GRADUATES BY REGION AND COUNTRY: 1964-1972General Course

<u>Africa</u>		<u>East Asia</u>		<u>Western Hemisphere</u>		<u>Near East and South Asia</u>	
Liberia	72	Vietnam	208	Brazil	437	Iran	79
Zaire	67	Thailand	173	Venezuela	405	Saudi Arabia	32
Somalia	60	Philippines	96	Colombia	302	Jordan	19
Tunisia	29	Indonesia	49	Guatemala	273	Greece	18
Zambia	25	Laos	48	Dom. Rep.	148	UAR	17
Ghana	20	Korea	25	Costa Rica	116	Iraq	11
Nigeria	18	Malaysia	16	El Salvador	113		
				Panama	104		
*Other	149	Other	6	Other	560	Other	51
(22)	—	(1)	—	(14)	—	(6)	—
Total	440	Total	621	Total	2,458	Total	227

Senior Course

<u>Africa</u>		<u>East Asia</u>		<u>Western Hemisphere</u>		<u>Near East and South Asia</u>	
Somalia	16	Thailand	40	Chile	15	Pakistan	21
Ethiopia	11	Vietnam	34	Colombia	13	UAR	11
Liberia	10	Philippines	23	Brazil	13		
*Other	32	Other	27	Other	42	Other	27
(7)	—	(7)	—	(13)	—	(4)	—
Total	69	Total	124	Total	83	Total	59

*The number of countries included in "Other" is shown in parentheses.

\$5,180.⁴

IPA Curriculum

The IPA curriculum has three components: 1) police management and organization (administration, leadership, fiscal control, logistics, public relations, etc.), 2) police operations (traffic control, patrol, criminal investigation, crime prevention, etc.), and 3) internal security (including the nature of more serious challenges to public order, such as riots and urban terrorism, and how to deal with them). The general and senior courses have essentially the same curriculum, the latter being pitched at a higher level.

General Course students have 4 weeks of specialized training after completing the regular curriculum. IPA offers specialized work in riot control, traffic management, airline security, kidnapping, VIF protection (including foreign dignitaries), identification of explosive devices, and narcotics control, the last five being recent additions. Among the courses contracted out are ones on immigration and customs provided by the U. S. Border Patrol Academy and police patrol operations and criminal investigation provided by International Police Services of Washington, D. C., a commercial firm. Both the regular and the special offerings have been revised over the years in response to changing needs expressed by the trainees.

4. "OPS Training Division Costs for FY 71," Memorandum from Thomas M. Finn, OPS Training Division to Byron Engle, OPS Director, November 1, 1971.

IPA employs a variety of educational devices, the most novel being a gaming or simulation exercise played out in a specially designed command room with a map of the capital city of a hypothetical country, San Martin, that resembles a small Third World republic. Each trainee plays a police role in coping with various public safety problems, such as a bank robbery, an earthquake, or an emergency precipitated by the visit of a foreign dignitary which certain dissident groups seek to disrupt. Most of the trainees regard these exercises as the high point in their formal training and insist that they have learned much they can apply at home.

Classroom instruction in both the general and senior courses is also supplemented by films, workshops, field trips, informal discussion among students from different countries, and between students and U. S. police counselors. Each trainee is required to submit a research paper which normally deals with a major police problem in his own country. The top six papers are selected for presentation by the author for class discussion. Each class hears a dozen or more guest lecturers from U. S. Government agencies and other specialists. IPA graduation speakers have included Under Secretaries of State U. Alexis Johnson and W. Averell Harriman, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, AID Administrator John A. Hannah, Ambassador George C. McGhee, General Maxwell D. Taylor, and Senators Joseph M. Montoya and Gale W. McGee.

Each session includes an eight-day, five-state trip of 1,500 miles, with visits to police departments and other elements in the administration or criminal justice, such as courts and probation and parole offices. Each class visits Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to be briefed on, among other topics,

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military-police relations. Factories, farms, and major tourist attractions are on the itinerary. There are two evenings of local citizen hospitality, usually in private homes. The trainees also spend a week at AID's International Center in Washington, D. C. which provides lectures, discussions, and local field trips designed to give them an elementary exposure to American customs and to the economic, educational, and governmental problems and accomplishments of the United States. The Center also arranges for each trainee to have two dinners with an American family. All together, most trainees have an opportunity to spend six evenings in private homes.

Professional Approach of the IPA

The director of the IPA is John Lindquist, who has a doctor of criminology degree from the University of California at Berkeley. His professional teaching staff is composed of public safety advisers on rotation to Washington. As of March 1972, there were 18 instructors, 9 with bachelor degrees and 7 with graduate degrees, with an average of 19.3 years of police or security experience and 6 years of full-time teaching. The overseas advisory experience is an asset but, because of rotation, the teaching staff lacks continuity.

Despite the necessity for teaching in three languages, the short-term classes, and the wide range of cultural and academic background among its students, the IPA had developed by early 1973 a level of professional instruction that enabled its students to transfer credits to colleges and universities in the Washington area.

The IPA seeks to create an atmosphere in which the merits of the rule of law, orderly change, respect for human rights, government by consent

and professional and humane law enforcement are affirmed. These values are implicit in the entire curriculum, but are made explicit in two hours of instruction in each course devoted to "professional police ethics." The primary document for this instruction is a training aid published by the International Association of the Chiefs of Police, including its "Canons of Police Ethics" and its "Law Enforcement Code of Ethics." Each student is given this leaflet in English, Spanish, or French.

Developed in 1956, the "Code of Police Ethics," together with the eleven supporting canons, set forth basic normative concepts of professional police service. It calls upon the police officer to discharge "his duties as a public trust and recognize his responsibility as a public servant," and to honor the laws of his country, perform his duties without favoritism, and refrain from "employing unnecessary force or violence" or "accepting gratuities." The code calls for a level of police behavior that is seldom attained. Nevertheless, the IPA staff believes that discussing these high standards has an educational effect, not only on the students but also on training centers in their own countries. A recent Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (1969-1973), Charles A. Meyer, said that the professional standards set by the IPA have provided a good example for the Latin American police academies.⁵

The IPA is the only center devoted exclusively to training police officers and specialists from the Third World. Both Britain and France

5. Author interview, Washington, D. C., April 5, 1973.

train police officers from their former colonial areas, but they are instructed along with Britons and Frenchmen. Most of the material in British and French classes is related to local laws, needs, and customs and has limited application elsewhere. The IPA is tailored specifically to the circumstances of less developed countries, and it provides officers from police services that are at approximately the same stage of development an opportunity to learn from one another.

Other Western countries, such as Germany and Italy, have provided a small amount of training for Third World policemen. Virtually no policemen from non-aligned countries have been sent to the Soviet Union for such training. The few exceptions include Ghana, Guinea, and Indonesia when their regimes had close ties with Moscow. In these three cases, the experience turned sour, largely for political reasons. The same is true of Zambian police trainees who were sent to Peking.

Most Third World governments prefer to receive external public safety training and police assistance from one primary source, though a number accept help from several countries. Brazil is an example. The United States has trained more than 450 Brazilian police officers; about 20 have been trained in Western Europe.

Other Public Safety Training

In addition to IPA, the program has provided two other major training opportunities. The first, called Police Executive Training, is a VIP tour designed to meet the needs of top-level police officials who have specialized interests or who lack the time for the 14-week Senior Course. Designed in part to confer prestige on the visiting officers, Executive Training consists of

visits to various law enforcement agencies in the United States, usually in groups of two or three officers from one country, escorted by a public safety adviser. It always includes a visit to the IPA to acquaint the administrators with the experience that some of their junior officers have had there. It also includes an extended field trip to various American police facilities to observe modern law enforcement practices. This program costs an average of \$2,088 per officer, not counting overhead. From 1963 to 1972, some 653 police administrators from 61 Third World countries have had this tour.

POLICE EXECUTIVE TRAINEES: 1963-1972

<u>Africa</u>		<u>East Asia</u>		<u>Western Hemisphere</u>		<u>Near East and South Asia</u>	
Zaire	17	Thailand	114	Brazil	65	Iran	50
Tunisia	16	Vietnam	30	Venezuela	32	UAR	27
Ethiopia	12	Malaysia	12	Peru	20	Saudi Arabia	25
		Philippines	9				
*Other	45	Other	18	Other	123	Other	38
(17)	—	(7)	—	(17)	—	(8)	—
Total	90	Total	183	Total	240	Total	140

*The number of countries included in "Other" is shown in parentheses.

The second program, Technical Specialist Training, is designed to upgrade the proficiency of police technicians by providing courses not offered at IPA, such as ones in Questioned Document Examination, Traffic Management, Police Records Management, Advanced Police Telecommunications Management, Maritime Law Enforcement, Firearms Identification, Penology and Corrections, and Automotive Repair taught at various university and schools. From 1963 to 1972, there were 1,552 participants in this program.

TECHNICAL SPECIALIST TRAINEES: 1963-1972

<u>Africa</u>		<u>East Asia</u>		<u>Western Hemisphere</u>		<u>Near East and South Asia</u>	
Tunisia	59	Thailand	170	Chile	87	JAR	42
Zaire	38	Vietnam	84	Colombia	68	Pakistan	41
Somalia	34	Indonesia	74	Guatemala	56	Jordan	32
Tanzania	28	Philippines	46	Venezuela	54	Iran	31
*Other (22)	181 —	Other (6)	21 —	Other (18)	351 —	Other (8)	55 —
Total	340	Total	395	Total	616	Total	201

*The number of countries included in "Other" is shown in parentheses.

Of the 6,600 trainees in all categories, 54 percent have come from the Western Hemisphere, 21 percent from East Asia (including Vietnam), 15 percent from Africa, and 10 percent from the Near East and South Asia.

Provision of Police Equipment

OPS operates on the general AID assumption that there is a mutually reinforcing relation between training and advice, on the one hand, and equipment, on the other. The disciplines of good driving or the proper use of firearms are of little value apart from the availability of vehicles and guns, and vice versa.

The four major categories of equipment provided by OPS are telecommunications, transportation, weapons, (light arms and ammunition), and general (textbooks, training aids, criminal investigation equipment, and so on), the bulk of which consists of communication and transportation items. The dollar commitment by category and region for fiscal 1972 is shown on the

AID-OPS EQUIPMENT BY CATEGORY: 1972

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Dollar Value</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Telecommunications	2,703,700	37.5
Transportation	2,122,400	29.4
Weapons	1,616,300	22.4
General	770,600	10.7
	Total	7,213,000
		100.0

AID-OPS EQUIPMENT BY REGION: 1972

<u>Region</u>	<u>Dollar Value</u>	<u>Percent</u>
East Asia (other than Vietnam)	4,322,400	60.0
Vietnam	2,336,800	32.4*
Western Hemisphere	375,900	5.2
Africa	155,100	2.1
Near East and South Asia	22,800	0.3
	Total	7,213,000
		100.0

*In addition, the Department of Defense provided \$8.6 million in equipment and supplies in fiscal 1972.

Vietnam and East Asia are included in both of the above tables to make the statistics comparable and to indicate the high percentage (94.4) of AID-OPS funds devoted to this war-related area. The point is even more evident when the Defense Department contribution of \$8.6 million to the Vietnam effort is taken into account. In fiscal 1972 only 7.6 percent of these equipment funds were allocated to the Western Hemisphere and Africa, and none to the Near East and South Asia; the 0.3 percent shown on the chart represent later expenditures from fiscal 1970 funds.

Development of Special Equipment

OPS does more than advise on appropriate police equipment and process orders for equipment and supplies. Through its technical staff, it has been able to adapt existing radio equipment and to design new items that meet the cost, use, and maintenance requirements of Third World countries.

A prime example is the development of a two-way VHF/FM radio system that is easy to maintain and relatively inexpensive. The larger radio (VHF/FM-5) can be adapted to a back pack, motorcycle, car, or fixed station, and uses either flashlight cells, car batteries, or ordinary house current. The small walkie-talkie unit (VHF-FM-1) operates on flashlight cells. Developed in 1965, this equipment has been manufactured by several U. S. firms since 1967. As of early 1973, more than 21,800 of the larger units and 21,500 of the smaller units have been sent to some 30 different countries at a cost of \$14,037,607 to AID, a saving of \$10,874,389 over the cost of the commercial counterpart. In addition, one manufacturer sold more than 10,000 units of both kinds of radio (with spare parts and accessories) at a cost of approximately \$7 million to Italy, Argentina, Iran, Ghana, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, Uruguay, Honduras, and other countries.

Variety, Delivery, and Constraints

The breadth of OPS procurement is illustrated by the wide distribution in Latin America and Asia of an instruction booklet (translated into Spanish and French) for a narcotics test kit and the airlifting of several pedigreed German shepherd dogs, obtained gratis from the U. S. Army, to Guyana to upgrade the K-9 element in the national police force.

OPS has developed the capacity to process emergency orders with

dispatch. On December 19, 1971, for example, Saudi Arabia requested 18 major items of telecommunications equipment for installation in Mecca prior to the official commencement of the Moslem pilgrimage on January 26, 1972. The entire shipment was delivered on January 23 and installed on time. This facilitated the police protection of the 1,042,000 pilgrims, including 479,000 non-Saudis, who came to Mecca that year. In 1972, OPS helped the Caracas police to purchase 30 Harley Davidson motorcycles in the United States at a saving of \$19,419.54 compared to the Caracas price.

Because of practical, political, and humane considerations, several items of police equipment and supplies are not provided by OPS or are provided only under certain restrictions. On the totally prohibited list, in addition to automatic rifles, are electronic police batons designed to control crowds with an electric shock and "sickening gas" that causes nausea and diarrhea. Though electronic recording equipment can legally be provided if the requesting agency certifies in writing that such devices "will not be used for audio-surveillance," as a matter of policy such equipment is not given. Ordinary tape recorders are furnished for training schools only. Small recorders that can easily be concealed are prohibited altogether.

Commercial Sales

One by-product of OPS has been continuing commercial sales of police equipment and supplies by the United States to developing countries. In the interests of efficiency and standardization, many countries prefer to continue buying U. S. items previously received as grant aid. A 19-country survey (not including Vietnam) made by OPS in January 1973, found that U. S.

sales of police equipment attributable largely to the program, totaled \$32,470,915. The regional breakdown is as follows:

Western Hemisphere (12 countries)	\$18,723,667
Africa (Ghana, Liberia, Zaire)	6,996,219
Near East and South Asia (Saudi Arabia)	234,112
East Asia (Laos, Thailand, Philippines)	<u>6,515,917</u>
Total	\$32,470,915

The Hardware-Software Ratio

The hardware-software (software embraces training and advisory services) ratio for the public safety effort is dramatically different from that of the Military Assistance Program, which in recent years has spent from 4 to 7 percent of its budget for training, and the remaining 93 to 96 percent largely for hardware.⁷ (Much of the overhead for MAP training and advisory costs, including all salaries of U. S. military personnel, is borne by the three services, so the training-hardware ratio noted above is a fairly close approximation of reality.) The public safety ratio is quite the reverse. As of 1972, training and advisory services received 68.4 percent of the funds, and hardware 26.5 percent.⁸ The great hardware differential between OPS and MAP is a reflection of the respective roles of the civil police and the military, the latter requiring much heavier and more expensive weapons and supporting equipment.

7. Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales, Defense Security Assistance Agency: Washington, April 1972, p. 5.

8. See the table on page 50 of this chapter.

The percentage of total OPS funds spent for equipment has declined from 61.2 percent in 1968 to 26.5 percent in 1972. Concurrently, the portion devoted to training and advisory services has risen from 34.7 percent to 68.4 percent. This shift of emphasis from hardware to the person-to-person advisory and training services accompanied the steep decline in total OPS funds and reflects the increasing emphasis on encouraging self-sufficiency and institution-building, as well as the greater capacity of certain Third World countries to buy equipment.

Chapter 4

IMPACT ON POLICE SERVICES

The public safety program, which accounts for about one percent of the total grant AID budget, is also a very small effort in the assisted countries of the Third World. On May 1, 1972, for example, there were 113 public safety advisers in 23 countries (excluding Vietnam), which have a total of 683,200 civil policemen -- one U. S. specialist for every 6,045 policemen.

This thin presence suggests the magnitude of the task faced by the Office of Public Safety (OPS) in its effort to upgrade the quality and performance of the police. The problem is exacerbated by the meager resources of the recipient governments, the underdeveloped condition of many of the police establishments, the formidable challenges to law and order they face, and the cultural barriers to modernization, which are discussed below. Under these circumstances, has the public safety effort had any impact at all on the police services in these countries? Is it only a token program, to be judged primarily by its impact on U. S.-host government relations, or has it had some discernible effects upon the character and performance of the police services? If it has had such effects, what have they been?

Limitations on the Impact

There are severe limits to the internal influence in a country of any external program, especially one as small as OPS, which has increased by only about two percent the total resources available to the assisted governments for civil law enforcement. The impact of that two percent -- addressed, to be sure, to the more innovative elements and focused at critical points -- on the 98 percent of indigenous resources must necessarily be small, though the multiplier effect implicit in instructing the instructors and administrators should not be overlooked.

The psychological and cultural barriers to upgrading Third World police services are difficult to overcome. Traditional societies, whether in Asia, Africa, or Latin America, are characterized by many deeply-rooted attitudes, customs, habits, and thought forms that militate against those aspects of modernization that depend upon the rational allocation of resources and disciplined decision-making. The traditional attitude toward authority is an example. Authority and respect in the common life tend to be defined by family ties, and at the top authority flows from the person symbolizing tribal or dynastic legitimacy. Hence, respect for a tribal chief or other traditional authorities tends to come naturally, but respect and willingness to carry out the orders of one's immediate superiors on the job, if they lack traditional status, often does not. Linked to this problem is the extreme reluctance on the part of anyone at any level of authority in any bureaucracy to accept responsibility or to make decisions. For both of these reasons trivial decisions frequently have to be made at the top.

Person-to-person relations, especially when a person of status is involved, are characterized by a kind of formal politeness that eschews criticism, stimulates agreement, and encourages flattery. This mode of communication erects serious barriers to the open discussion of unpleasant problems, and objective evaluations of personal or organizational performance are difficult to achieve. Hence, advancement is often more dependent upon family and other connections than on demonstrated merit. Personal relations calculated to achieve immediate objectives have a greater claim on one's attention than do rationally defined roles designed to achieve more distant and less personal goals. This helps to explain why the widespread practice of granting special, extra-legal favors for material reward not only is not frowned upon, but is regarded as an obligation of a civil servant or politician to his family and friends.

Traditional societies by definition tend to be static and to resist innovation. They are slow to recognize the potential value of new ideas and techniques. Until they are awakened by external intrusion, these societies have a limited vision of what changes are desirable or possible, and they tend to be resigned and to accept the status quo. The work ethic is one of the most underdeveloped attributes of the underdeveloped world. Little premium is placed on disciplined work habits, punctuality, or sense of pride in what one does at someone else's bidding.

While these obstacles to the development of responsible institutions are not absent in Western societies, they are far more widespread and deeply ingrained in traditional cultures. They impede modernization efforts, especially the development of such hierarchical and impersonal organizations

as the army and the civil police, in which the habit of command and obedience is vital to their central purpose. Third World military establishments are usually more modernized than the police because they have been the recipients of more Western training, advice, and hardware than have the police.

With this background, specific problems plague most Third World police services. Some of these problems were listed in a 1964 OPS report on a Latin American police force: "Frequent changes in key internal security officials, poor administrative resources, excessive military orientation of top police administrators, overlapping jurisdiction plus inter-agency friction, low morale and high turnover of police personnel, and an inadequate operating budget."

This terse list, which remains a reasonably accurate picture of the problems facing many Third World police forces, includes one element that deserves brief elaboration. "Excessive military orientation of top police administrators" is a euphemism for the practice in a number of countries of appointing army colonels and generals to police command positions. While some of the military officers have improved civil police operations by introducing stricter command procedures and greater discipline, others have attempted to make the civilian police behave like the military, with unfortunate results. Even in the best cases, according to the testimony of an experienced OPS adviser, career army officers have to be "civilianized" before they can become effective leaders of civilian public safety agencies.

In its effort to build more modern police services fashioned largely on Western concepts of organization and management and characterized by rational resource allocation, accountable decision-making, and promotion

by merit, OPS has sought to overcome, or at least mitigate, these cultural-psychological obstacles. The extent to which it has succeeded has depended on the size, character, and duration of a particular country program and, more fundamentally, on the capacity of the assisted institution to absorb and use new ideas, processes, and techniques.

Rarely can external aid radically redirect or reform the habits and ways of thinking deeply rooted in an alien culture, at least in the short run, though changes related to the acceptance of simple technology can be made more readily than those calling for modification in personal attitudes. A traditional society accepts a modern radio network more easily than disciplined work habits.

Trainee Utilization; Indicator of Impact

One of the most objective indicators of the impact of OPS is the use that is made of police officers and specialists trained in the United States when they return. Of equal or greater importance is what the trainee has learned and his capacity or opportunity to apply it in his police service. These are less tangible elements, however, and more difficult to measure, though some attempt will be made to do so.

By any measure, public safety trainee utilization has been high, and for the same reason that utilization of military personnel trained by the United States has been high. In each case the trainee is a professional who is expected to return to his respective service for ten or more years. The military obligation is usually more legally binding, but the expectation of continued service is high in both cases. The training of police and

military personnel is more like that of the training career of civil servants than of individual professionals who have no explicit obligation to their government.

OPS conducted a survey of some 3,300 International Police Academy (IPA) graduates from 62 countries for the 1963-71 period. Though personnel records were not complete in some of the countries, the tabulation, indicating less than one percent "no information," showed that 80.7 percent of the IPA graduates remained in the police force. The other 19.3 percent were lost through regular retirement (2.4 percent), death (1.6 percent), and dismissal or resignation (15.3 percent). Half the graduates who remained in the police service received promotions during the period; the other half presumably were employed at the same rank. The table on page 79 gives the retention and promotion record of IPA graduates. Approximately 60 percent of the 1,315 promotions were to operational posts in provinces and major cities; 40 percent of the promotions were to management or policy positions at the national level. It should be added, however, that the selection process is designed to reach men on the way up, so in many cases the promotion would have come even if the man in question had not had U. S. training.

The degree of responsibility carried by IPA trainees is also a measure of utilization, whether or not they were promoted after their U. S. tour. As of early 1972 there were 13 IPA graduates who were in director general positions (or the equivalent) in Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Somalia, Liberia, Costa Rica, Panama, British Honduras, Colombia, and Pakistan; nine had been promoted to the post after graduation.

RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF IPA GRADUATES: 1963-1971

Region	Total Graduates	Lost		Retained		% of Retained Promoted	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Western Hemisphere	2,155	571	26.5	1,584	68.9	876	55.3
Africa	377	32	8.5	345	91.5	145	42.0
Near East South Asia	246	21	8.5	225	91.5	116	51.6
East Asia	377	14	3.7	363	96.3	170	46.8
Vietnam	182	5	2.7	177	97.3	8	4.5
Totals	3,337	643	19.3	2,694	80.7	1,315	50.7

Another test of the impact of the IPA alumni is the everyday use of graduates in the many middle-range training, managerial, and maintenance positions that enable a Third World police force to function. Visits to command centers, training schools, radio workshops, and vehicle facilities in program countries indicate that many of the men in key posts were IPA graduates or had other kinds of U. S. training.

The testimony from interviewed trainees and their superiors, suggests that a substantial majority of the men have profited professionally from the U. S. experience. It also suggests that their capacity to absorb the impressions and ideas and to make use of selected elements of their training varies widely with their own ability and the circumstances they

confront. Some trainees reported that a portion of the material at the IPA was too advanced or otherwise not applicable, but that the general professional emphasis plus specific techniques and approaches were both relevant and of practical use.

There are exceptions to the generally good record of trainee utilization. Professional jealousy, poor management and personnel practices, and nepotism have sometimes prevented the full use of new skills. So has occasional political interference in the civil police establishment. A certain amount of shifting in top police positions is to be expected with any change of government. But when large numbers of trained officers are dismissed or assigned to lesser posts for political purposes, much of the investment in U. S. training is lost. In rare cases of this sort, the integrity of the police force has been severely damaged. In one Central American country, a considerable number of IPA graduates were dismissed or resigned when a new regime came to power. Some of these men found positions in other law enforcement agencies; other later rejoined the national police; and a few joined terrorist groups. Such cases have been rare.

Professional Skills and Efficiency.

In assessing the effects of the OPS program on police services, several constraints should be borne in mind. In the first place, it is difficult to measure the degree of professionalization and the changes in performance of any police service anywhere because of multiple factors at work. This is true of the best municipal police forces in the United

States about which there is an abundance of data. If the crime rate drops, for example, in a particular area of Washington, D. C., is it because of brighter street lights, tighter security measures among property owners, more patrol cars, more foot patrolmen, or the migration of crime-prone persons to other areas? If the traffic police in Bangkok gradually become more efficient, this could be attributed to U. S. training, a new traffic commissioner, new uniforms, higher pay, or a combination of all four.

Crime and police records in many Third World countries leave much to be desired. In the absence of formal data, one must rely on the view of informed observers. While the quality of their testimony varies, their judgements on the quality of police work in any given capital city tend to be remarkable similar. In this study, as was noted in Chapter 1, the evaluation of the OPS program depends largely on interviews with a relatively few observers with varying degrees of knowledge about the program and of the local situation. Further, these observers were largely U. S. and local officials, though it bears repeating that the Americans differed significantly on whether or not AID should be involved in public safety assistance. The interviews were supplemented by personal, though necessarily superficial observation and by critically reviewing OPS program and country evaluation reports.

It should also be noted that some effects of the OPS program are more measurable than others. It is relatively easy to count the number of radio patrol cars in operation or to calculate the average time it takes the police to reach the scene of a crime or an accident. It is more difficult to assess the impact of the program on the attitudes of policemen, or its ef-

difficult is the evaluation of the net impact of the effort on crime and lawlessness throughout the country, primarily because of the many factors involved. Still more problematical is the impact of the program on the climate for internal political and economic development and other U. S. policy objectives. (These larger effects are discussed in Chapter 5.)

For all these reasons, both the specific and more general findings that follow in this and the subsequent chapters are imprecise. Obviously, some conclusions are more solidly based than others, but all of them, whether firm or tentative, require further study and examination.

Technical and Operational Efficiency

Most proponents and critics of public safety aid agree that in every assisted country the police have become more technically proficient as a result of the program, the extent depending on circumstances. It could hardly be otherwise with the influx of even small quantities of new police equipment and supporting training. Mobility and radio communication, for example, have improved. This fact was often more apparent to lawbreakers than to the law-abiding public. The Tupamaro guerrillas in Uruguay and similar groups elsewhere have criticized the public safety program in part because they believed it was assisting the civil police to do a more effective job against them.

The capacity of key officers and technicians to perform one or more major functions with greater dispatch, precision, or economy has been enhanced in some degree by training, advice, and the provision of supporting equipment. The improvement has ranged from slight to substantial and has varied from country to country and from function to function within a

country. A few police forces are now using computers and sophisticated control centers, while others are still attempting to eliminate illiterate patrolmen from their ranks. Of the 104 interview respondents who assessed the general effect on efficiency in their country of current residence, 72 said there was significant improvement, 31 said some improvement, and 1 said no improvement.

All informed observers report a marked improvement in police radio communication as a result of the OPS effort, though the pre-program level was often very low and even the more advanced countries have a long way to go. Several typical examples follow. In Laos a radio system was established with 13 primary circuits linking the national police headquarters in Vientiane with provisional police centers. In Venezuela a unified communications center was built to facilitate coordination among the various police agencies. A radio network covering all 19 departments was set up in Uruguay, and in Guatemala a new centralized radio dispatch center for the capital city was constructed. The new radio net linking Kinshasa to all key points in the interior of Zaire is perhaps the most reliable communication system available to the central government. The same is true of the police radio net in the Philippines.

The improvement has not been as great in vehicle mobility because jeeps, sedans, and motorcycles are much more expensive to acquire and maintain than radios. A radio receiver lasts a long time, but a car is easily wrecked and wears out more quickly. Nevertheless, the strong OPS effort on training mechanics, building repair facilities, and on the procedures of preventive maintenance have yielded some results. Modern vehicle

repair and service facilities have been established in many countries, staffed at the top by OPS-trained men, who have learned everything from how to order spare parts in advance to preventive maintenance. They are often pointed out as models of efficiency to be emulated by other government or private agencies.

Improved efficiency has also been extended to other police functions. Notable in the technical area is developing responsibility in the use of firearms, including the construction of safe practice ranges, the storing and maintenance of arms, and the recycling of target practice ammunition. In a number of countries great strides have been made in identification and record-keeping facilities and in some the Henry system of fingerprinting used by the FBI has been introduced or its application improved. Several crime detection laboratories have been established; others have been upgraded by modern procedures and equipment.

OPS instruction in identifying explosive devices has been put to good use in several Latin American countries. A police technician from Guatemala, for example, wrote OPS: "On Saturday, February 3, 1973, the Israeli Embassy received a suspicious letter, and I was assigned the investigation. Thank the Good Lord and the material I learned from you, I was able to deactivate the device -- a letter bomb."

The larger effects of the habits and procedures developed to sustain modern and more efficient technical operations depend on circumstances. In most places they tend to have a positive spillover influence, which benefits the police service as a whole. In Ghana, for example, the vehicle facility (which also included tailor and carpenter shops) and the radio workshop

were a source of pride and morale for the national police and they reinforced professional attitudes generally. On the other side, there are sometimes negative circumstances -- such as poorly written laws, corruption, political interference, or plain apathy -- which either limit the positive impact of greater technical efficiency or turn it to illegal ends.

Equipment Utilization

There is little doubt that the provision of police equipment has produced an incentive toward its proper utilization and thus toward more efficient performance. It is understood on both sides that the strong desire for hardware also gives the adviser a degree of leverage. If equipment is not properly used or if associated advice is ignored, the adviser can delay the delivery of additional items until the situation is corrected. But the acceptance of OPS advice is not necessarily contingent on the flow of radios, cars, and textbooks. Among the countries that receive no grant aid, but have asked for OPS advisers, are Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Ghana, and Costa Rica. In other countries, such as El Salvador, Jamaica, Honduras, Colombia, and Liberia, the equipment grants are so small that they carry little leverage.

In all grant equipment programs there is a danger that unnecessary or otherwise inappropriate items will be delivered. The appetite for overly sophisticated items is sometimes generated during the U. S. training tour; there is an understandable tendency to request police sedans when jeeps or bicycles will do. Requests for new hardware are sometimes received when existing items are not fully used. When requests for unnecessary equipment are made, the advisers recommend more prudent alternatives. One effective

and frequently used device to reduce requests is insistence that provision of any equipment be contingent on the availability of trained men to use it.

The advisory-negotiating process on equipment requests is illustrated by two recent examples. In 1972, when Liberia requested 300 M-16 rifles for its civil police, OPS informed the government that it had a worldwide policy of not giving or selling automatic rifles; the matter was dropped. In 1971, when the Nigerian police said they needed new radio equipment to improve their system, they were told that an OPS study indicated the improvement could be achieved if present equipment were properly utilized; the government accepted the advice and sent an officer to a U. S. communications management course.

OPS personnel also give advice about police equipment already on hand. In one Latin American country, for example, they advised the metropolitan police against using a chemical riot-control product, Riotrol, 400 pounds of which had been bought from a private firm. Riotrol is a dry substance to be spread on the streets during a riot. When made wet by fire hoses it was supposed to become slippery and incapacitate the rioters. OPS pointed out that because of possible injury to infirm persons, problems in neutralizing its effects, and general inflexibility in its use, the product should be destroyed and that proved methods of crowd control be employed. The police accepted the advice.

The need for resident advisers to promote effective use of equipment is illustrated by another case. In the early 1960s, a U. S. political decision was made to demonstrate American interest in several new African

states by aiding their internal security forces. A conspicuous, but small, shipment of sedans, jeeps, and radios was sent to these governments, "dumped" according to one U. S. official, without supporting advice or training. As a result, much of the hardware was wasted through nonuse or misuse, though later some of it was salvaged when OPS arranged for the U. S. Seabees to repair what they could.

It should be emphasized that the serious problems of equipment repair and maintenance are beyond the capacity of OPS advisers to solve. Their influence is limited and their stay is temporary. There is no assurance that the disciplines of maintenance will continue after a program is terminated, though the chances for this have been enhanced.

Training and Administrative Practices

Training, recruitment, and promotion standards, the heart of a professional police service, have been clarified and strengthened through IPA instruction and in-country advice and assistance. Several dozen indigenous police academies and other training centers have been started with U. S. help, and more than a hundred others have been assisted by IPA training, advice, and material aid. These centers have graduated several hundred thousand police officers. In the fiscal year 1971 alone, approximately 81,500 policemen were trained in their own OPS-assisted schools.

Virtually all Latin American police training schools, national and provincial, have received U. S. aid. In the Philippines OPS helped develop 10 regional police academies and in Thailand, OPS assisted in creating 5 counterinsurgency schools, 5 basic recruit schools, and 4 other specialized

force had any basic training. On request, OPS instructed Guatemalan training cadres in the IPA and in 15 months a 3-week basic course had been given to 2,500 Guatemalan police officers in their own country. While the net effect of these activities has been greater self-sufficiency in police training, the professional impact and lasting effects vary widely with circumstances.

Some progress has been made in the development of uniform recruitment and promotion standards. This has been slow and difficult; in some places, recruits have been barely literate, and promotion, especially at the higher levels, has often been based on personal or political connections. Testing procedures have been improved, merit systems adopted, and promotion panels established. Zaire, for example, has introduced competitive examinations to provide upward mobility.

A major problem in most places has been the relatively low pay and fringe benefits of civil police compared to those offered in the civilian labor market, or even in the military. Efforts to upgrade the stature of the police in this fundamental way have had only spotty success. There has been somewhat greater progress in advancing more visible signs of professionalism, such as cleaner and more orderly offices, stricter uniform regulations, better maintained vehicles, and greater courtesy in dealing with the public.

In all assisted police services there appears to have been some improvement in the general administration, structure, and command, resulting in more efficient performance. This is most marked in countries such as Laos, South Vietnam, and Zaire, where a virtually new police structure has

been built on the ashes of a system discredited by its association with a former regime. Improved managerial efficiency has also been noted in several countries with more mature and stable police services, especially in facilitating coordination between the police in the capital and those in the provinces and between the regular civil police and the constabulary or other specialized police. These efforts at coordination and cooperation have been supported by the development of a unified communications system in some cases and by the building of a compatible system in others.

Professional Attitudes and Conduct

There is often a wide gulf between the acquisition of technical skills and professional administrative arrangements, on the one hand, and their full utilization, on the other. Professional behavior depends upon a sense of responsibility and follow-through, a work ethic, and other attitudes in which, as noted earlier, the more traditional societies are frequently deficient. This fact has limited the impact of public safety aid, as it has of other forms of U. S. foreign assistance. Nevertheless, according to the testimony of those interviewed, the public safety effort, particularly IPA training, has had a positive effect on developing the disciplines essential to more professional performance. Of the 57 respondents in the field who were asked to assess the impact on "professional attitudes and behavior," 23 said there was significant improvement, 32 said some improvement, and 2 said no improvement.

This general appraisal was supported by many specific examples of improved attitudes, manners, and behavior on the part of the police, which

were cited in the field investigation. Several commanding officers were said to have developed a greater sense of professionalism. This was expressed in a greater awareness that the police service should be above partisan politics, that the police could survive professionally only if they avoided too close a political attachment to the regime in power, and that a professional outlook enabled commanders to deal more effectively with the ever-present problem of corruption. In confronting the last named problem, several police administrators have pressed for better police salaries to mitigate the temptation to accept material rewards in exchange for special favors.

While curbing corruption is not an explicit objective of OPS for obvious reasons of sensitivity, many advisers report modest results in this area. Examples from two countries with relatively large OPS programs illustrate this, as well as the limits of U. S. advice.

In Zaire, where 11 out of the top 14 police administrators are IPA graduates, an anti-corruption effort was launched in 1972. Officers with poor records were selected out or given a chance to resign and others who had risen "too rapidly" were demoted. In early 1973, the effort was directed toward the traffic police in Kinshasa. After three warnings, several hundred thought to be corrupt or incompetent were taken to the bush where they were ordered to build a village in eight days. In addition to working eight hours a day in the hot sun, the disciplined police were given regular lectures about the merits of honesty.

In Thailand, where professional performance was said to have measurably improved, a police general complained that in spite of U. S. advice, police

authorities could not bring themselves to dismiss the "small percentage" of the men who clearly fell below minimum standards because "we knew they had families to support."

The efforts of OPS advisers to encourage the habits, processes, and mechanisms of internal inspection and monitoring of police performance have met with mixed results. Several Latin American countries have adopted inspection procedures, including devices for taking corrective measures to weed out incompetent and corrupt officers. In the Philippines, OPS helped to develop guidelines for an Inspection and Audit Division within the Police Commission, and in Laos it assisted in the development of a viable Inspector General office. In Africa, OPS efforts to establish or strengthen the existing inspection effort have yielded limited results because, according to the OPS regional chief, the inspection process is "susceptible to political whim" both within and beyond the police establishment. Nevertheless he added, there has been small but steady progress in "the improved quality of police performance," but the police are not immune from political manipulation.¹

A greater appreciation of public service and an attitude of respect toward the population was said to characterize some police officers with U. S. training, though it was noted in several places that this has been slow in moving down through the ranks. In this area, as in others, conspicuous improvement tends to be made in the capital city, where the U. S. advisers reside and where the political rewards for good performance are

1. Internal OPS memorandum, March 2, 1973.

greater than in the countryside. Examples often cited were improved bearing, courtesy in contact with the public, especially among traffic police in the capital. A high Thai official said, "Many of our trainees have seen the helpfulness of your police and have returned with a spirit of public service."²

A related point was frequently made about police responsiveness in countries where OPS had been instrumental in establishing a visible mobile patrol in the capital. One U. S. ambassador said, "For the first time you can get a policeman to come to your home if you are in trouble. For the first time you see policemen helping little old ladies across the street. And for the first time, there is really popular support for the police." He added that not all policemen behaved in this way and that the service still had a long way to go, especially in the provinces. Several of the more advanced police services have established complaint desks to enhance their availability to the public.

A significant change in the attitude toward and use of firearms in most assisted countries is reported, especially as they relate to the control of demonstrations and disturbances. Much of the change is attributed to OPS advice and assistance. Ten years ago, said an OPS official in Washington, the general approach was "fixed bayonets" in confronting a hostile crowd or riot. This has given way in most places to the use of non-lethal tear gas, with firearms being used only in extreme cases. This point was made repeatedly in field interviews in several countries, including Jamaica,

2. Author interview, Bangkok, October 6, 1972.

Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, and Vietnam, where demonstrations and riots in recent years were controlled more effectively and with less injury and loss of life than previously, due in part to OPS taught skills and OPS equipment.

Professional behavior in the apprehension, detention, and interrogation of suspects and convicted offenders is also said to have improved, but the change has not been as pronounced as it has in the control of riots. In this area, ancient practices die hard. As Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (1962-1964), Edwin M. Martin, put it: the program could not "have been expected to change dramatically police-suspect attitudes or traditional ways of getting evidence by brutality. These are commonly deeply embedded in a social system."³ He indicated, however, that the program in some countries may have helped to "provide alternative, more efficient ways of getting evidence and thus reduce somewhat the temptation to use more clumsy methods." Although police behavior toward suspects is seldom open to public view, most OPS advisers believe the assisted police have placed increasing reliance on tangible evidence and less on brutality, though this varies from place to place. As one adviser put it, more of them now realize that "a chip of paint or a fingerprint is a more reliable piece of evidence than a worthless confession beaten out of a suspect."

Taking into account the limits of verifiable data noted earlier, this study has found no evidence that any U. S. adviser approved or advocated police torture or brutality, much less taught torture techniques.

3. Letter from Edwin M. Martin to author, April 17, 1973.

Further, it is difficult to think of any U. S. objective that could be served by any deliberate connection of any kind with police brutality or misbehavior. Some police in some assisted countries have doubtless resorted to torture and other brutal methods during arrests or interrogation. Another Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Covey T. Oliver, (1967-1968), observed that "no inheritors of the Iberian-Roman tradition seem to need [instruction in torture] from representatives of other cultures" and added that OPS advisers had never taught police to be brutal but, on the contrary, had some positive effect on preventing "much cruel treatment."⁴

In a related matter, Mr. Oliver, speaking of his ambassadorship in Colombia, said he was impressed by the development of "humane but effective" riot control techniques by the OPS-assisted Colombia police, which stood in great contrast with the "cobble-stone hurling students and the outrageous fiasco of the military in attempting to capture one man in a Bogota ghetto. . . . In the latter case, the military actually fired an anticraft cannon point-blank at a house, killed and wounded five or six people, and. . . could not get through its own gas barrage to attempt to arrest the suspect. Eventually, one policeman did."⁵

Self-sufficiency vs. Dependency

A serious danger in any aid effort is that it may foster within the assisted institution attitudes and habits of dependency on external resources

4. Letter from Covey T. Oliver to author, March 26, 1973.

5. Ibid.

and personnel. The evidence accumulated in this study indicates that OPS has made a determined effort to avoid this pitfall and that significant indications of self-reliance can be seen. This result can be attributed to the very small size of the program and the deliberate effort of OPS to engender the disciplines essential to carrying on after U. S. aid ends.

Most advisers have become aware of the perils of becoming too closely or deeply involved in local police operations and have taken measures to avoid it. One danger is political identification (discussed in Chapter 5) and the other is the fostering of unhealthy dependence. It is sometimes difficult to avoid the pitfalls of closeness because many assisted police officers want their U. S. advisers to tell them what to do. This attitude springs variously from a sense of inadequacy, confidence in the advice, and a belief that a close working relationship may make it easier to acquire additional material assistance.

One OPS chief candidly said that good advisers naturally would "love to be operational" but that they understood the importance of letting their counterparts develop greater self-reliance. "The tips of their fingers itch," he added, "when they have to be passive" in an interesting situation, especially when the local officials are inactive or bungling. Nevertheless, he said, "weaning is the daily task of all advisers."

The effort to disassociate the advisory effort from operations is sometimes expressed in symbolic gestures. In one Latin American country, for example, the adviser's office in the remodeled police headquarters had a new sign on the door that gave the impression that he was a member of the admin-

he moved in. In several countries, offices for advisers are no longer provided in police buildings and in others where this practice still prevails the advisers deliberately spend little time in these offices, working instead in their own embassy or AID offices.

Dependency and self-sufficiency cannot, of course, be objectively defined. Recipients differ in their expectations, demands, and needs. Two countries in approximately the same objective situation in law enforcement capability and resources may differ widely in their goals and expectations, the one with higher goals, therefore, being more psychologically dependent on external aid. The donor must impose his own policy criteria for defining sufficiency to avoid falling victim to the recipient's definition of what he needs or wants. In U. S. policy terms, as Charles Wolf, Jr., of the RAND Corporation points out, it is better for the donor to promote "higher effort on the part of the recipient countries toward achieving specified, rather than increased, goals."⁶

In the face of these complicating factors, most observers consulted detect a significant movement toward greater self-help and self-assurance among the assisted police establishments, again varying widely from more dependent countries like Liberia to virtually self-sufficient places like Venezuela. The indications of less dependence are evident in the increase in quantity and quality of indigenous training, in growing professionalism,

6. Charles Wolf, Jr., "Security Assistance: Point and Counterpoints," Remarks presented at the Conference on Security Assistance held by the Department of State in Washington, D. C., on November 17, 1972, p. 1.

and in increasing purchases of police equipment.

Internal training institutions have increased in number and quality as the result of OPS, but there will be a continued need for external training for advanced officers, especially in management and administration and for specialists in new problems such as terrorism and narcotics control.

The improvement in professional attitudes, behavior, and procedures, while slight in some places, makes the recipient police services less dependent on U. S. advisers. For this reason, as well as AID budget limitations, the total number of advisers, and usually the number per country, has declined since 1968, which in turn has forced their counterparts to rely on their own resources.

Increased purchases of police equipment by countries that formerly received grant aid is perhaps the most tangible indicator of growing self-reliance. Two limits to self-sufficiency should be noted in passing. First, no Third World police service, however well off its government may be financially, is ever fully satisfied with the amount of equipment available to it. Second, and more important, the countries that need equipment most probably can afford it least. The first limitation is more subjective and the second is rooted in objective facts.

Law Enforcement and Internal Security

The cause-effect connection between the OPS effort and its impact becomes more tenuous when one moves from technical skills to procedures, attitudes, behavior, and finally to the effects of improved performance of the police on law enforcement and internal security. The state of law and

order in any society is the product of many factors -- only one of which is the quality, deployment, and efficiency of the civil police. In the 15 countries visited, knowledgeable observers said that the net effect of the OPS effort was better law enforcement and internal security, though in several places the impact was said to be small in view of the magnitude of the problem, a relatively weak central government, and a legacy of ill-trained and sometimes corrupt police.

The size of the OPS program was an important factor in improving general law enforcement. Observers reported significant improvement in countries with four or more advisers (notably Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Thailand, Laos, and Zaire). The improvement was less marked in countries with a lower level of aid. Whether the gains were small or substantial, the contribution of OPS could not be quantified because enhanced internal security was usually the product of several factors -- police reorganization, a fresh political determination to deal with lawlessness, or assistance from the military (as in Uruguay in 1971-1972), as well as OPS efforts. It is only fair to say, however, that OPS advisers were frequently credited with stimulating local initiatives.

The situation generally improved in the capital cities more than in the countryside, primarily because of the greater effort there, including the introduction of modern radio equipment and vehicles. Manila, where the crime rate has been high (Manila has 11 percent of the population of the Philippines but 54 percent of all reported crime), was an exception because OPS has not been permitted to operate there, in part because of local political circumstances.

Turning to special police problems, OPS has assisted a number of Latin American countries -- notably Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, and Uruguay -- to deal with rural insurgency or urban terrorism. Venezuela in the 1960s provided the most dramatic example of OPS assistance to help combat a wave of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere. In 1961 a Venezuelan terrorist group calling itself the Castroite Armed Forces of National Liberation was determined to pull down the government of President Romulo Betancourt.⁷ They vowed publicly to "kill a policeman a day" and by 1964 they had murdered more than 200. The terrorists used the Central University in Caracas as a sanctuary because no police or military men were permitted on its premises. (The university was denied its sanctuary status by government action in December 1966.) Their most deadly tactic was to swoop out of the university gate in their high-speed sports cars and gun down policemen. To finance their campaign, which also included dynamiting bridges, oil pipelines, and radio stations and burning warehouses, these heavily armed men carried out daytime bank robberies. One of their immediate objects was to force President Betancourt to call out the army, an act they assumed would destroy him politically. The country was terrorized and the frail fabric of social order was gravely endangered.

In early 1962, Betancourt, determined that the civil police could

⁷. For a detailed analysis, see A Study of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency Operations and Technology in Venezuela, 1960-1964, Georgetown Research Project, Atlantic Research Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia, c. 1965 especially pp. 72-76, 91-92, and 125-39

restore law and order without the army, asked the resident OPS advisers for additional aid. Three Spanish-speaking police officers from the United States were recruited by OPS. Emergency plans were drafted by the Caracas police with the aid of the new advisers.

The Venezuelan police soon began to win their share of the shoot-outs and to earn public support. When terrorists gunned down the foreign minister's brother, more than 20 people dialed the new emergency police number (the number 80 had been installed to replace five different six-digit police numbers then in use) with descriptions of the murderers and the license number of the escape car; the 4 killers were found. President Betancourt and his civil police, with OPS advice and equipment purchased in the United States, were able to restore order without calling in the army. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon has said that OPS assistance "played an important positive role in getting that vicious form of subversion under control, thus subduing a major threat to the stability of Venezuelan democracy and the prospects for orderly and peaceful development."⁸

Countering rural insurgency has been an OPS objective not only in Latin America, but also in Thailand and the Philippines. In general, however, the Latin American police have been more effective against rural insurgency than those in Southeast Asia and in the Philippines, where the

8. Letter from Lincoln Gordon to author, March 10, 1973. This conclusion is also endorsed by former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Robert F. Woodward, in a letter to the author, March 24, 1973.

revolutionary forces have been larger and better armed.

In Korea, where the problem has been infiltration of North Korean agents, the specialized OPS training for South Korean police during the early 1960s designed to enable them to cope with this problem has been reasonably effective.

Thailand has had the largest public safety effort next to Vietnam. Most of its police vehicles and other equipment have been provided by the United States, and as of early 1973 there were some 30 police advisers in the country, 12 of them serving in the provinces. The program has had the dual function of supporting the civil police in counterinsurgency efforts and of building police institutions for the broad range of law enforcement activities. Though the two functions overlap, approximately 85 percent of the effort has gone into counterinsurgency broadly defined.

There has been some debate on the respective roles of the Thai military and civil police in counterinsurgency and on which services should be armed with what weapons. As matters turned out, the civil police were given the major role because the Thai military were oriented toward conventional external attacks and also were constrained from operating close to the border. Because of this substantial police role in counterinsurgency, the OPS program in Thailand extends the institution-building function to those police elements engaged against the insurgents.

As in most guerrilla situations, it is difficult to assess the performance of the Thai civil police and even more difficult to evaluate the contribution of OPS assistance. As of late 1972, when insurgency was on the rise, most knowledgeable observers believed that the total counter-insurgency

effort was "starting to move," but this reflected a mix of internal effort and of three U. S. aid programs -- public safety, military, and rural development assistance -- whose respective efforts were difficult to assess.

There was little disagreement, however, on the positive effect of the OPS effort on other police functions in Thailand. A veteran U. S. observer said the program had significantly improved the performance of the police in general law enforcement, especially in Bangkok. Marked gains were cited by respondents in the capability of the police to deal with smuggling and the narcotics traffic, though they acknowledged that these problems were far from being under effective control.

In sum, it is clear that public safety assistance has had a positive effect on improving the capabilities of Third World police forces. The improvement has been greater where hardware is involved than it has in changing deeply-held habits and attitudes. In all countries indigenous factors remain the principal forces in shaping the quality of the civil police establishment.

The conclusion that OPS has helped upgrade assisted police does not in itself answer the larger question of whether the program has served U. S. interests at an acceptable cost. This question is examined in the chapters that follow.

Chapter 5

LARGER EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

The public safety effort, like all other U. S. programs abroad, has intended and unintended effects that go beyond its more immediate and specific objectives of improving Third World police services. Every program has some bearing, however slight or indirect, on broader U. S. objectives in Asia, Africa, and Latin America -- to reinforce interstate stability, to encourage peaceful economic and political development, and generally to strengthen diplomatic and economic relations with the countries involved.

Again, like other programs, public safety aid has had problems, limitations, and collateral effects that have had an impact for good or ill on the pursuit of U. S. interests and the reputation of the United States. These larger and less direct effects were assessed in this study by consulting the same range of sources described earlier.

The problems of evaluating the direct effects of the program on the police services and the secondary effects on internal security (dealt with in Chapter 4) become even more difficult in assessing the impact on the climate for development, the reputation of the United States, and U. S.

relations with the assisted governments generally. The paucity of hard data and the ever-present factor of multiple causation add up to a tenuous cause-effect connection. A substantial element of personal judgement is involved in attempting to draw reasonable conclusions from limited personal observation and from the necessarily limited range of facts and opinions cited in the study.

Climate for Economic and Political Development

The impact on the prospects for economic development of more effective law enforcement and improved internal security as a result of OPS assistance cannot be measured precisely for several reasons, including the varying relationship between security and productivity in different societies. In a number of program countries the greater security resulting from the neutralization of rural insurgents (as in Guatemala) or the curbing of urban terrorists (as in Caracas and Montevideo) has created conditions for undertaking agricultural reform, for resuming normal economic activity, or for attracting more foreign investment. Provincial banditry, bank robberies, kidnappings, and other serious crimes -- whether the motive is political or economic -- have demoralized the population and bred insecurity, which in turn depressed economic activity.

According to the testimony of five Assistant Secretaries of State for Inter-American Affairs who have served since 1960, the public safety effort in Latin America has contributed marginally to economic and social development by enhancing internal security. Referring to "administrative modernization in all fields -- from tax collection through agricultural

extension," Lincoln Gordon concluded that the "modest and low-cost public safety assistance program made a positive contribution to . . . economic and social development," especially in "view of the headlong pace of urbanization."¹ In separate letters, Assistant Secretaries Robert F. Woodward, Thomas C. Mann, Covey Oliver, and Charles A. Meyer supported Ambassador Gordon's conclusion, but all four noted that an enhanced sense of security was only one factor and that it alone obviously could not insure economic productivity or social advances.²

The minimal role of civic action programs should be noted in passing. Third World civil police have not been as active in this area as the military, but a number of community projects in several countries have been undertaken at the suggestion of OPS advisers and with OPS material support. In Zaire, for example, the police have made a beginning with baby clinics and other community projects. In Thailand, the police have started elementary schools and medical clinics where they never existed before.

OPS-assisted police have also made a contribution during natural or man-made catastrophes. Three examples in 1972 illustrate this point. The

1. Letter from Lincoln Gordon to author, March 10, 1973. See also Frederick C. Terzo, Urbanization in the Developing Countries: The Response of International Assistance. New York: International Urbanization Survey, Ford Foundation, 1973.

2. Letters from Robert F. Woodward, March 24, 1973; Thomas C. Mann, March 29, 1973; Covey T. Oliver, March 26, 1973; and Charles Meyer, April 5, 1973, to the author.

Zaire coast guard police helped ease the plight of refugees fleeing from the bloody tribal strife in neighboring Burundi. During and after disastrous floods in the Philippines, the OPS-built radio net was heavily used by the government. In relief and reconstruction following the earthquake in Nicaragua, IPA trained policemen and OPS-provided equipment helped to restore order and communication. As Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer put it, "The public safety program has taught us the use of central planning, communication, mobility, not solely as a counterforce to urban terrorism, but as a public service. . . during flood, fire, and earthquake."³

If it is difficult to assess the effect of improved order and security on economic activity, it is even more difficult to ascertain the impact on political development, because the latter is the product of a web of dynamic and static forces, only one of which is relative tranquillity -- which, in turn, has different political implications in different circumstances. Effective law enforcement tends to reinforce the regime in power, regardless of its character; depending on that character, this may facilitate or impede healthy political development.⁴ In some cases, the police are used to suppress normal political activity. In other cases, effective law enforcement helps to facilitate peaceful political competition by ensuring that debate, organization of opposition parties, and scheduled elections can proceed without obstruction. The range of permitted political activity

3. Letter from Charles Meyer to author, April 5, 1973.

4. The political role of civil police is discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 34-37.

varied in the 15 countries visited for this study. In some countries, opposition groups were allowed to organize and publish and competitive elections were held; in others only one party was permitted and other political activity was sharply limited.

In the politically less restricted countries, it was the judgement of U. S. officials that the net effect of public safety assistance was to encourage peaceful development and change. This view was specifically expressed in Jamaica, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, and Uruguay. In more restricted military-government countries such as Ghana, Zaire, and Thailand, the U. S. officials consulted said that increased security had a marginal effect in encouraging some peaceful and orderly adjustment and change by providing a climate of greater stability and curtailing civil violence. In neither situation did the facts suggest that significant political change stemmed from the OPS program. At most, greater security increases the chance for orderly development; it cannot ensure such development.

In all countries, as noted earlier, OPS assistance, like U. S. aid, generally has -- and was seen to have -- the immediate effect of strengthening the existing regime, though in some situations U. S. assistance was said to have a moderating effect. At the same time, it was pointed out that Third World regimes change frequently and that something can be said for helping to improve administrative agencies -- including the civil police -- which serve successive regimes having varying political complexions.

This element of risk in all aid -- that it may be misused -- was applied to the OPS program by former Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin, who noted

that the purpose of OPS was not "to change the political orientations" of recipient regimes. Hence, he said, it was wrong to criticize OPS assistance for helping create "more efficient police forces" that occasionally may be misused.⁵ The real issue here is the problem of selecting the government to receive aid, which is discussed in Chapter 6.

Relations with the Assisted Government

The initiation of any U. S. aid program to a given country is a political decision that reflects, and subsequently influences, the relationship between the two governments. The participants and observers consulted reported that in virtually every country, the public safety program has strengthened ties of understanding and cooperation between the donor and recipient. Of the 54 interviewees who responded to this question, 51 said that the program strengthened significantly the channels of communication between the two governments, and the remaining 3 said the improvement was marginal.

This evaluation was supported in every active program country by repeated assertions that OPS advisers had a close and unusually candid relation with their counterparts. Local police administrators with some exceptions praised the hard work and long hours of OPS personnel. There were, of course, occasional problems. In a Latin American country, one adviser was accused of being more interested in studying the local culture than in helping the police.

5. Letter from Edwin M. Martin to author, April 17, 1973.

Many U. S. embassy comments tied the access that OPS advisers had achieved to their unusual degree of rapport with their counterparts. This reflects the deep sense of kinship that police officers have for one another. During his ambassadorship in Brazil, 1961-1966, Lincoln Gordon said that the public safety chief had a "friendly and modest approach [that] was very effective in establishing good rapport with his Brazilian counterparts."⁶ When he was ambassador in Colombia, 1964-1966, Covey T. Oliver said that the OPS advisers were "especially good, both as teachers of modern police science and as non-ego-damaging communicators."⁷ Similar comments were heard in the field.

This close rapport was apparent in a dozen of the countries visited. Frequent face-to-face and telephone contacts occurred between advisers and local police officers during the working day and into the night. The police seemed to be sharing with their advisers many of their current problems and concerns on all facets of law enforcement.

There was a lively awareness among advisers and other U. S. officials of the two chief political perils of too close an identification with the local police service and its top administrators. The first danger was that local police misbehavior would tarnish the U. S. image and the second was that the advisers might become improperly involved in internal political affairs. In reply to persistent questioning in the field, the respondents were unable to name a single instance of an OPS adviser being accused of improper political activities by the host government. Some opposition spokesmen, however, insisted that any U. S.

6. Letter from Lincoln Gordon to author, March 10, 1973.

7. Letter from Covey T. Oliver to author, March 26, 1973.

assistance to the regime they seek to replace was improper interference in domestic matters, i.e., the United States was siding with the regime against its opponents.

Speaking of his six years of association with Brazil as ambassador and assistant secretary, Lincoln Gordon said:

I cannot recall during that period (1961-1967) any complaint on political grounds, despite the severe political instability experienced in Brazil in 1961-1964 and the great variety of political parties represented in the State governments and the national Congress.⁸

During the first three years of Ambassador Gordon's service in Brazil, the government was run by President Joao Goulart whose administration was characterized by "runaway inflation, economic stagnation, and political moves to the far left."⁹ Public safety assistance was provided during the Goulart regime as well as during its more conservative successor. Assistant Secretary Meyer, referring to Latin America as a whole during the 1969-1972 period, characterized the OPS program as "non-political and technical."¹⁰

Even though an adviser may remain properly aloof from internal politics, he may become so identified professionally with the police he is assisting that he loses his perspective as a U. S. official. One such case was found. The adviser in question came to feel so close to the local police

8. Letter from Lincoln Gordon to author, March 10, 1973.

9. Brazil: Background Notes, Department of State, May 1971, p. 2.

10. Letter from Charles Meyer to author, April 5, 1973.

officials after more than four years in the country that he seemed more comfortable with them than his fellow-Americans and failed to inform the embassy fully of his activities. When this became apparent, he was assigned to Washington.

Image and Reputation of the United States

The reputation of a government is the product of many factors, including the level, character, and sources of criticism directed against it and the extent to which such criticism is given credence, especially among persons in influential positions. As a superpower, the United States has been the target of hostile words and deeds, both from governments and from opposition groups. No element of the official U. S. presence abroad is immune. All public criticism of a U. S. foreign policy pronouncement, action, or program, or of the policy approach in a particular country or region, exacts a political cost, which may vary from slight to heavy, from temporary to prolonged.

Within the wide and continuing spectrum of criticism of U. S. policy in the Third World, including expressions of official displeasure, the public safety program has not been singled out as frequently as have larger and more visible programs, such as the Peace Corps,¹¹ the U. S. Information Agency, or Military Assistance, which often appear to be more useful targets.

11. According to Peace Corps director, Donald K. Hess, the governments of 15 countries have "asked it to leave or have unceremoniously ejected it." New York Times, July 10, 1973.

In Venezuela, for example, a U. S. official with ten years' experience in the country said that the only specific criticism of OPS he could recall was made in 1964 during a dramatic kidnapping episode when "our profile was not quite as low as it subsequently has been." The criticism, he said, came from the extreme left, which usually directs its attacks against the more visible Venezuelan military forces, accusing them of being dominated by the Yankees. The political cost of public safety aid, he added, has been near zero.

Of the 74 officials interviewed (35 embassy, 12 AID, and 27 OPS) in 15 program countries, 66 said that the public safety program carried no political cost for the United States and did not damage its reputation. Of the remaining 8, half said the political cost was insignificant and the other 4 said that there was a significant cost. There was no variation in this general assessment among OPS, AID, and embassy personnel.

This conclusion is corroborated by a USIA official, who said that the OPS program in Latin America has never been "significant enough to be picked up in our thrice-weekly world media reaction roundup,"¹² even at the time of the Mitrione kidnapping and murder in 1970. Another USIA official recalls that Latin American press comments on the Mitrione affair was on balance strongly anti-Tupamaro, not anti-OPS or anti-American. The relatively small amount of criticism directed against the program is the result of two basic facts:

The public safety program is almost invisible. It is "lower than a snake's belly," to quote an adviser in a South American country. Very

12. Letter from Margita E. White, Assistant Director for Public Information, USIA, September 20, 1973, in response to author's request.

few persons in the Third World have known anything about it in spite of the headline stories and radio broadcasts generated by the dramatic Mitrione affair in Uruguay.¹³

This low profile to date in assisted countries is the result of the small size and unique character of the program, the discreet behavior of the advisers, and the disposition of both the U. S. and recipient governments not to seek publicity. Most countries have fewer than five OPS specialists. They are not as visible as U. S. military advisers, who are usually more numerous and sometimes wear uniforms. The product of OPS is not as tangible as an AID-supported road or dam or as dramatic as the arrival of 10,000 tons of wheat. In some countries there are a small number of OPS-provided police patrol cars, but they tend to blend in with other American vehicles on the streets of the capital city. OPS is not as intrusive or visible as a team of Peace Corps volunteers whose modernizing presence in a small town challenges ancient ways. It is not as controversial as AID-backed population

13. Awareness and criticism of the public safety program may increase to the extent that the Costa-Gavras film, State of Siege, is circulated in Latin America. As of October 1, 1973, the U.S.I.A. had information that the film has played only in Argentina. The five newspaper reviews in Buenos Aires focused on the film's general "anti-Yankee imperialism" theme and did not deal with police assistance. The film is not likely to be shown in all Latin countries, because some governments will ban it. Those relatively few Latin Americans who do see it will probably have their prior prejudices reinforced. The movie was made primarily for Western European and U. S.

control programs or land reform efforts because it contradicts few traditional beliefs or interests.

OPS makes no effort to publicize its activities. It issues no press releases in Washington or abroad. In some countries, advisers attend police graduation exercises or other ceremonies. Occasionally there is a story in the local newspaper about the opening of a new police academy or the return of IPA graduates which mentions the program, but this is rare.

A South American country provided an example of an unusual proposal by a public safety adviser that was vetoed by his chief because of potential political misunderstanding. The adviser, among his other duties, had helped the capital police to develop a professional motorcycle patrol unit. Proud of this achievement, he suggested that the unit demonstrate its skills in a public exercise on the U. S. embassy grounds. He was informed that his enthusiasm had overtaken his discretion.

One modest exception to the low-profile approach suggests that publicity may have positive advantages for the program. In 1971 the U. S. embassy in Nicaragua, in response to ill-informed press criticism of OPS, invited the critics to a meeting with the advisers, who discussed their work in the country and distributed documents on the program's objectives. Since this disclosure, little has been heard from these critics.

The major charges against the program have not been taken seriously by the assisted governments or important elements of public opinion. The three principal charges against OPS which usually originate with extreme critics of U. S. foreign policy are: 1) public safety advisers are used as agents to gather intelligence or manipulate internal political forces,

2) advisers have encouraged or approved the use of torture or other inhumane methods, and 3) advisers and equipment have been used to strengthen the police forces of repressive regimes. The first two criticisms are subject to a considerable degree of empirical verification, but the third criticism includes a large measure of subjective judgement.

The facts do not support the first two charges. Like all other AID programs, OPS does not have an intelligence mission. OPS advisers have not been accused by the assisted governments of interfering in internal political affairs. They have not taught, advised, or approved torture or other inhumane and illegal means. As noted earlier, the police in some countries do sometimes employ these methods, but U. S. and other observers have reported that neither AID nor the U. S. government is generally held accountable for these deplorable practices. A number of Latin Americans interviewed said that it was ridiculous to blame the United States for inhumane police practices that are rooted in centuries of tradition. This would have as much logic as blaming an AID agricultural expert because some farmers, ignoring U. S. advice, still planted according to the sign of the moon. But a number of politically motivated opposition spokesmen, unconstrained by either fact or logic, have blamed police misbehavior on the Yankees to score points in the emotional atmosphere of rising nationalism. Seen in this light, public safety aid is more a victim than a cause of anti-Americanism.

The charge that OPS supports "repressive regimes" is more difficult to analyze because of widely differing subjective views on what constitutes such a regime. One man's repressive regime is another man's viable government.

Through the years Washington has provided security and development assistance to a broad spectrum of governments, from left-wing socialist to right-wing military governments, whether or not it approved the regimes in question. At the same time, aid has been terminated, suspended, and held up on a number of occasions when the State Department concluded that the behavior of the regime or other internal political circumstances would nullify the objectives of the assistance. In Korea, Laos, and Indonesia, public safety aid was terminated when the regime prevented its police service from operating as a reasonably nonpartisan and professional instrument of law enforcement. In Venezuela, Bolivia, and Laos, requests for public safety assistance were turned down when these countries were in the grip of what Washington regarded as a repressive regime.

The Eisenhower administration, for example, refused police aid to Perez Jimenez, the anti-communist dictator of Venezuela, but Washington gave such aid to his more democratic successor, Romulo Betancourt. The situation was not considered as drastic in Brazil where OPS assistance was provided both to the leftist regime of Goulart as well as to its military successor until 1972. With this wide variety of assisted countries, honest observers may disagree on the point at which a particular regime fails to meet a minimum political test for receiving U. S. aid.

The principal charges against public safety aid tend to be discounted by the assisted governments and the majority of moderate leaders because the allegations are not convincing. The primary sources of criticism are often suspect. The attacks usually originate in far-left publications which denounce various U. S. foreign policies and program with little discrim-

ination.¹⁴ Many Latin American readers familiar with such propaganda have long since learned to discredit what is said about local conditions of which they have some direct knowledge. Also, they tend to view with suspicion other allegations about matters more distant. These anti-American papers and books, of course, have their loyal readers -- an audience which shrinks and swells with changes in external circumstances and internal frustrations.

This does not mean that criticism of, or reservations about, OPS in Latin America are confined wholly to extremist elements. There are moderate leaders who have serious questions about the program, or, more precisely, about some of the regimes that receive it. Among the moderates, it is difficult to find any who believe the gross torture charges or who think OPS is an espionage agency. Also, few of them appear to oppose police assistance on principle. What they object to is assisting a regime they strongly oppose, especially if that regime directs its civil police to interfere improperly in the political arena. Some opposition leaders will candidly admit that if they were in power they would welcome discreetly given public safety aid from Washington.

14. See for example, La Intervencion Militar Yanky en Colombia, by Rosa Gómez Lleras and Juan Valdés, Colombia, Frente Social, 1972. This book, according to U. S. officials, was produced by Soviet agents, and appeared in several Latin American countries. Intended for intellectuals, the book includes official U. S. documents (AID-OPS memoranda, etc.)

There is a widespread suspicion of U. S. motives and policies in Latin America, and we can expect politicians to exploit this situation in ways that they believe will appeal to their followers. They will seize upon issues and programs that are thought to have the maximum impact. Thus far, OPS has been fairly low on the target list, but the situation could change.

Other U. S. Interests

In addition to pursuing its basic objective of strengthening the civil police, the OPS effort has become involved in three other specific and growing U. S. interests abroad in recent years: 1) the physical safety of overseas Americans, 2) curbing international terrorism, and 3) the worldwide campaign against illicit narcotics traffic. OPS involvement in these three areas came about as much by accident as by design.

1. Embassy Security: In all program countries where U. S. officials or facilities have been the targets of terrorists (such as Brazil, Uruguay, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, and Thailand), OPS advisers have been active in planning security measures to counter these dangers. The OPS chief has usually served on the ambassador's security committee, along with other embassy personnel and the State Department security officer, if there was one in the country. In many places there was no such officer, and an OPS adviser in effect performed his functions.¹⁵ Advisers have

15. In 1960 there were approximately 35 State Department security officers assigned to Third World countries, including 15 in Latin America. By mid-1973, as a result of rising threats to Americans, these numbers increased to 65 and 20 respectively.

helped devise ways and means to protect U. S. personnel at work, in their homes, and when travelling to and from their offices. They have provided technical knowledge and have been a constant source of current information generated by their daily contacts with the local police. On several occasions, OPS advisers were the first to learn of a plot to kill or kidnap Americans or mount an attack against a U. S. building, though the information was quickly corroborated from other sources. Several ambassadors reported that such timely information enabled them to take the necessary precautions.

A U. S. ambassador in a large Third World country said that he profited frequently from such information and attributed its flow to the "total access" of OPS advisers to local police. During a 48-hour author visit to that country, examples of useful information resulting from this access were evident: The OPS chief received the first word of a disturbance outside the U. S. ambassador's residence, and he also received early information about plastic bomb envelopes received by the Israeli embassy. He gave the impression of being a major link between the U. S. embassy and the government on security matters, even though there was a State Department security officer stationed there. In Uruguay, a U. S. military officer said that American personnel could not have been protected without the information provided almost daily by the OPS advisers. A high official in the State Department Security Office said that OPS advisers "have been extremely helpful to us, especially in countries where we have no security officer."¹⁶ These security-related tasks have earned considerable respect for the OPS operation.

2. Terrorism: Another recent area of U. S. concern has been international terrorism, particularly the hijacking of passenger airlines. OPS has long emphasized airport safety; Jamaica and Tunisia, for example, have received special assistance in this area. But curtailing terrorism involves a wide spectrum of police skills. The investigation, record-keeping, mobility and other capabilities that can help prevent or deter hijacking may not be dramatic, but they are essential. In the early 1960s, IPA-trained police in Ecuador aborted a terrorist plot to hijack a passenger flight from Quito to Guayaquil shortly before it was to take off, largely because of special skills learned in the United States. The plot to take over the plane to force the release of five leftist terrorists from prison was foiled.

3. International Narcotics Traffic: In his June 17, 1971, message to the Congress, President Nixon announced a comprehensive anti-narcotics effort, including expanded efforts to control illicit drugs at their overseas sources and transit points. The State Department bears the primary responsibility for carrying out the overseas program, but in the enforcement area it has drawn upon the Drug Enforcement Administration (formerly the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) of the Justice Department, the Bureau of Customs, and OPS.

As early as 1964, OPS began working on narcotics law enforcement in Iran. It has cooperated with U. S. agencies and Interpol both in Washington and the field, providing specialists in narcotics detection and control. In October 1971, OPS organized a 7-day narcotics seminar in Washington for its chief advisers from 24 countries and representatives from other U. S. agencies.

In 1964 the International Police Academy added specialized narcotics training to its curriculum, and special courses were arranged for police officers from countries seeking to upgrade their competence in this area. Drug identification kits have been sent to police training centers in the Third World and the resident advisers have provided textbooks and other literature.

Some U. S. ambassadors have selected the OPS chief as the narcotics coordinator under the President's directive. In other countries, OPS advisers participate in narcotics action groups. In mid-1973 there were 10 OPS advisers in 6 countries working as full-time narcotics specialists, compared to about 125 representatives of the Drug Enforcement Administration in Third World countries. One of the chief tasks of OPS personnel is to maintain contact with the local police. This coordination with local law enforcement authorities and other U. S. agencies has yielded some good results in Thailand, Laos, Colombia, and Jamaica. In Jamaica, for example, the OPS adviser in February 1973 provided information that enabled U. S. Customs agents in Miami to arrest two American narcotics dealers with 1,345 pounds of marijuana in their possession. In Colombia, the OPS-assisted police in 1972 seized 567 pounds of cocaine, compared to 130 pounds in 1971.¹⁷

The involvement of OPS in the three specific security functions abroad and the occasional assistance to other U. S. agencies should be seen as a by-product of a program that was set up primarily to assist other governments. At the same time, this collateral contribution to U. S. objectives should be acknowledged. In particular, it should be noted that the protection of

U. S. citizens abroad requires local police support and that such support is likely to be more effective in countries where public safety advisers have already established lines of communication and cooperation.

Country and Latin American Regional Programs

The assessment of OPS should also take into account several general appraisals of country and regional programs. In the field survey 82 respondents in program countries were asked: "Given the assets and liabilities of the public safety program in this country as you have observed it, should it be continued or terminated? If continued, should it be at the present level of effort, a decreased level, or an increased level?" Over 90 percent of the 82 respondents opted for a continued program, 53 at the present and 22 at a higher level. There were slight differences among American officials, host government officials, and the small number of nongovernment respondents.

Generally the U. S. ambassadors said the program was valuable and served U. S. objectives. One ambassador in a Latin American country said that he arrived determined to abolish the OPS program and AID generally, but after observing OPS for a short time he concluded that it was "important and had done a good job" and should be continued at least until fiscal 1974 and then reappraised. A U. S. ambassador in an African country said that OPS was one of the most useful U. S. aid programs. In Thailand, the ambassador said that public safety aid was, along with military assistance and rural development, one of the three most useful aid programs. Other U. S. political officers made similar appraisals.

Although some AID officials indicated that they were lukewarm toward

OPS, all those interviewed said that the program should continue. In Laos, where there is military conflict and insurgency, an AID administrator said: "I would be willing to sacrifice some development projects, such as agricultural research, in favor of public safety because the latter deals with the survival of the country."

Evaluating the program in Latin America as a whole, the region where public safety aid has generated some controversy, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Lincoln Gordon, said it has "made a positive contribution" to "economic and social development" and to "improved inter-American relations."¹⁸ Charles A. Meyer, who served in the same regional post from 1969 to 1973, made substantially the same general appraisal. It has been "a great program" for Latin America, he said; and added that on its merits it should be continued.¹⁹

18. Letter from Lincoln Gordon to author, March 10, 1973.

19. Author interview, Washington, D. C., February 15, 1973.

Chapter 6

POLICY FINDINGS

Any responsible judgement on whether or not to continue the public safety program and, if so, in what form and at what level, must take into account the facts about its effects in the assisted countries, insofar as they can be ascertained, and must relate these facts to current U. S. foreign policy objectives in the Third World. This raises three policy questions: the adequacy of the present rationale for the effort; the different perceptions of U. S. interests in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and the problem of cost, economic and political.

The administration's rationale for public safety assistance has changed little over the years: The United States, it is maintained, has an interest in upgrading the civil police in selected friendly states because this helps to contribute to a climate of internal order and security conducive to development and to regional peace. What has changed is the administration's perception of threats to U. S. interests, especially in areas more remote from the arena of great power confrontation and collaboration. In the 1950s and 1960s, most policymakers now hold, we became too broadly

involved and too thinly spread because there was a tendency to regard any local breach of the peace as a threat to world peace, to see each untoward political development as a gain for forces inimical to us, and to expect too much from the new fledgling states.

The Vietnam war and other developments forced a reappraisal of U. S. interests and objectives which has led to a consensus in the Executive Branch, disputed by some members of Congress, that the United States has a range of interests within the Third World, though the area as a whole is considerably less important than Europe and Japan. U. S. interests vary from country to country and situation to situation, and the American response to the problems and possibilities of these areas should vary accordingly.

Problem of Selecting Recipient Governments

The Four Criteria

The four criteria for selecting major security aid recipients articulated by the Senior Interdepartmental Group in May 1968, noted in Chapter 1, challenged the fading concept that international security was indivisible and anticipated the policy consensus indicated above. Endorsed by the incoming Nixon administration in 1969, the four guidelines characterized appropriate aid recipients as countries in which 1) the United States had a significant interest, 2) there was clear evidence that internal disorder or lawlessness threatened that interest, 3) there was a clear need for U. S. assistance, and 4) there was an indigenous will to resist challenges to security and a desire, willingness, and capacity to use such assistance effectively.

Though such criteria were present from the start of U. S. aid, they were perhaps more rigorously consulted in making aid and other policy decisions after 1969. In any event, the change of behavior has been evident. In 1960, for example, Washington became deeply involved in security assistance, albeit through the United Nations, to deal with a relatively small conflict in the Congo; while in the late 1960s it did not become involved in the much larger and more serious civil war in Nigeria. In 1954, the U. S. government took direct measures to prevent Guatemala from being taken over by a left-wing regime and in 1965 it sent 5,500 Marines to the Dominican Republic, but in 1970 it took no action when an avowed Marxist took over peacefully in Chile. It is not surprising that since 1968 the volume of U. S. military and police aid, and for that matter economic development assistance, has declined along with the number of recipient states.

Proponents of the new consensus agree that the past tendency toward indiscriminate involvement may now be superseded by the danger of indiscriminate withdrawal from U. S. security responsibilities. The maintenance of interstate stability, it is argued, often requires more than normal diplomatic relations and mutually beneficial trade, particularly when dealing with the richer, more powerful, or strategically located states of the Third World, such as Brazil, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Thailand. For twenty years various kinds of U. S. assistance have, in spite of many mistakes and a few conspicuous failures, helped to strengthen economic and security ties to the benefit of both sides, and in the great majority of cases at relatively low financial and political cost and with little

risk of military involvement to the United States.

Two Exceptions

There are two situations where the four criteria are not wholly applicable. Governments that provide facility rights -- bases, overflights, or landing rights, etc. -- may receive public safety aid even if they do not meet all the criteria. So may countries where Washington deems it of value to have a token program in order to maintain channels of communication with an important segment in the government. Token public safety efforts for this purpose alone can yield modest benefits in improved communication. The distinction between a token program and a serious substantive program must be understood on both sides if excessive expectations and false criteria for judging them are to be avoided.

The foreign policy value of the representational function of the public safety effort, substantial or token, should not be exaggerated. Contact between OPS advisers and local police have served immediate and specific interests in protecting U. S. citizens abroad and in curbing the narcotics traffic. On larger issues, however, such as support of or opposition to the U. S. negotiating position on the Panama Canal, governments will be inclined to take their positions on the basis of factors more substantial than the good communication generated by U. S. aid.

Political Orientation of Recipients

Adherents of the consensus also hold that the foreign policy orientation of Third World states has a more significant bearing on international stability than does the character of their internal political or economic systems

As noted above, successive U. S. administrations have provided security and development aid to many kinds of governments and have frequently continued it when the character of the government was significantly altered by scheduled or unscheduled changes of regime. Hence, many military and civilian, left leaning and right leaning, governments have received and continue to receive U. S. assistance. There have been, however, two kinds of regimes that for political reasons have been barred from receiving active and substantial U. S. assistance, though they may receive humanitarian aid: 1) those that pursued a foreign policy seriously inimical to U. S. interests and objectives, such as Castro's Cuba, Sukarno's Indonesia in 1964, Nasser's Egypt, Iraq, and Guinea; and 2) those that became so repressive, weak, or corrupt that the minimal objectives of U. S. aid could not be achieved. At different times, Haiti, Batista's Cuba, Paraguay, and Laos fell in this second category.

This view of Third World realities and U. S. obligations is challenged by various critics, including some members of Congress, who hold that the entire Third World, or most of it, is of limited security interest to the United States and that little or no security aid is justified. These critics often favor some kinds of grant development assistance, but oppose military and police aid. Others focus on the internal character of the regime in question, and oppose all U. S. aid, or all security aid, to regimes they deem repressive or reactionary.¹

1. Congressional criticism of OPS aid is summarized in Chapter 1, pp. 21-25.

This criticism raises the crucial question of country selection in its most troublesome form. It is virtually impossible to resolve the difference between one who emphasizes the foreign policy test for a recipient and one who emphasizes some kind of internal political test. According to the former, the present regime in Brazil has pursued responsible policies toward its neighbors and has honored its international commitments; therefore, Brazil is an acceptable candidate for military and police assistance. But some critics insist that the present regime in Brazil has been "repressive" or "reactionary" and thus should not receive such aid. In response to this pointed attack and to ease criticism against the program as a whole, AID in 1972 ended the public safety program in Brazil. While this difference cannot be bridged, it might properly be asked whether an entire program can be faulted because the U. S. decision to provide such aid to several controversial regimes was regarded as unwise by some key members of the policymaking community. Is the instrument inherently faulty or was it sometimes inappropriately applied?

Policy Assessment: Benefits vs. Costs

The final judgement on the utility of the public safety program as an instrument of foreign policy involves three questions: Has the effort served stated U. S. objectives? Are the stated objectives relevant to genuine U. S. interests in the Third World? If agreed objectives have been served, has the cost been acceptable?

This assessment is based on the dual assumption that the United States has an interest in the maintenance of interstate peace in the Third World and that stated U. S. objectives are relevant to this interest.

In other words, the policy consensus noted above is an adequate basis for evaluating the performance and effects of the program. Those who dissent from this view in significant particulars will probably come to different policy conclusions, even if they accept as reasonable the major findings of Chapters 4 and 5. The opposition of most U. S. critics focuses not on the program's performance, but rather on the objectives assigned to it.

These findings indicate that in virtually every assisted country the civil police have become more efficient and professional as a result of the program, but the extent has varied from slight to significant according to circumstances. This improvement has resulted in more effective law enforcement, though again the degree varies from country to country and from function to function within a country. The improvement in order and security resulting from better police performance, however small, has been one factor in creating a climate that has encouraged peaceful economic development and political activity.

The study also concludes that the program as a whole has been well received by the assisted governments and that relations between OPS advisers and host-government officials have been good. As a by-product, the program has been able to assist the U. S. government in protecting U. S. officials and facilities abroad and in the worldwide narcotics effort. The policy utility of OPS, however, should be judged primarily by its own program objectives, and not by its collateral contribution to other U. S. goals, though this contribution should be given some weight, especially in marginal situations. In sum, according to the evidence available from the sources consulted, the program has served well its modest objectives and larger U. S. interests.

But what about the economic and political costs, especially the latter? In dollar terms, the program has always been a tiny fraction of the AID budget. The request for fiscal 1974 is \$7.4 million, or approximately one percent of total AID grant funds requested (\$749.9 million). Though the amount is very small, it can properly be asked whether \$7.4 million could be better spent to serve U. S. interests abroad. This basic policy question is not addressed in this study, which does not compare OPS with other foreign policy programs, except for a brief mention of military assistance below.

The real cost question relates to the positive and negative political consequences of the program, which are difficult to assess. As noted in Chapter 5, criticism of OPS in the assisted countries has been quite small compared to that of other larger and more visible U. S. efforts. The principal charges against OPS in these countries -- that its advisers have interfered improperly in internal affairs and have encouraged police brutality and torture -- have not been sustained by evidence. These charges are not accepted by policymakers and are taken seriously by only a small percentage of the attentive public who are predisposed to be critical of the United States on other grounds. Hence, the charges have not created a serious political issue. No recipient government has requested the termination of an agreed program. By their continued acceptance of aid, these governments have demonstrated their judgement that the benefits have exceeded the costs. At the same time, since some extreme groups continue to attack the program and some moderate spokesmen are suspicious of it, political criticism could increase to the point where it would exact a political cost from the recipient regime.

unfavorably on the United States, which seeks to avoid embarrassing friendly governments. Closely related to this reflected cost is the direct cost, alleged by U. S. critics, of being too closely identified with repressive regimes. There is little doubt that the image of the United States has been tarnished by OPS assistance to several regimes that have restricted peaceful political activity, especially in the eyes of the regime's opponents and their sympathizers abroad, but also in the eyes of those who believe in the right of peaceful dissent.

But all forms of U. S. aid -- humanitarian, economic, or security -- confer status on the recipient regime and thus tend to identify the United States with it, especially in the view of opponents. Police work is sensitive, however, and the police are often the principal point of contact between a regime and its people. Consequently, aiding the police of a grossly repressive or corrupt regime could reflect more unfavorably upon the United States than providing the same regime with financial credit or with Peace Corps volunteers. Nevertheless, the basic question here appears to be the nature of the regime, not the kind of aid, because determined critics of a given regime (e.g., Greece or Brazil) want all U. S. aid ended to that regime. It is also a matter of degree, and this is where subjective judgments play a key role. When is a regime repressive and beyond the pale, and how many such regimes have actually received public safety assistance?

Public Safety-Military Assistance Trade-Off

The cost question can also be addressed by asking whether the benefits of police assistance could be achieved more efficiently or with less political

liability by an alternative program. The only plausible potential trade-off is between OPS and military assistance because both are designed to enhance internal security in the Third World, although in most countries MAP also seeks to upgrade the military's capacity for external defense.²

Internal police functions can be performed more economically by civil police than by the military, and police assistance involves the provision of less costly hardware than does military aid; hence aid to civil police probably buys more of this type of internal security per dollar than does military assistance for the same purpose.³ By thus meeting civil police needs effectively, the police can prevent more situations from deteriorating to the point where larger uses of force, including military force, are required.

There is also a political aspect to the trade-off question that is rooted in the contrasting roles of the police and the army in Third World countries noted in Chapter 2. The police play a dramatically different role from the military in internal politics -- the former being largely passive and neutral, while the latter are more active and often the decisive factor in political crises. By maintaining public order, the police

2. See Chapter 2, pp. 38-40.

3. The potential trade-off between public safety assistance and military aid is put forward here primarily as a fruitful line of inquiry which deserves further study supported by quantitative data. This could be done in a statistical, cost-accounting study of the relative utility

sometimes make possible peaceful and orderly elections. The military frequently intervene directly in the political process and sometimes take over the government to prevent or postpone an election. Without going into the deeper question of the variety of military coups involved and their diverse impact on political development, it is clear that these differing political roles of the military and the civil police are a significant factor in any cost-benefit analysis of the two kinds of security assistance, however difficult it may be to assess.

Chapter 7

PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusion that the public safety program has served its modest objectives at an acceptable financial and political cost suggests that such a program should be continued as an instrument for advancing U. S. development and security interests in the Third World as long as the costs are outweighed by benefits. It also suggests that recipient countries should be selected with rigorous attention to the four criteria discussed earlier. These derivative conclusions raise four subordinate questions: Should the essential character or emphasis of the program be changed? What are the best administrative arrangements for operating it? What measures can be taken to increase its effectiveness? And what level of resources should be allocated to public safety assistance?

The answers to these questions are based on the appraisal of the program made in Chapter 6, on the assumption that the United States will continue to have a special interest in the internal security of selected Third World states, and on the forecast that the problems of law enforcement in the developing world are likely to increase in severity and complexity in the next decade.

Basic Character of the Program

OPS has emphasized general law enforcement in all assisted countries, with a special focus on counterinsurgency only in Vietnam and Thailand. It has usually been a broad multi-purpose program calculated to improve the prospects for internal order and security by upgrading the civil police. The major effort has gone into building police institutions that would have some chance of carrying on after external aid is terminated.

To channel limited resources efficiently or to serve more pressing law enforcement needs, any future program could theoretically be limited to one or two specific problems, any one of which could emphasize current operations or long-range institution-building. Among these problems are: counterinsurgency, training, security in the capital city, rural law enforcement, terrorism, the narcotics traffic, and telecommunications.

This study recommends that any public safety program should continue to be a multi-purpose effort that is flexible enough to respond to changing needs in countries of special interest to the United States. The effort should clearly focus on upgrading the professionalism and efficiency of the police and police institutions. If this results, as it has in the past, in collateral benefits, such as the protection of Americans overseas or the curbing of the international narcotics traffic, it should be regarded as a welcome dividend, not as an occasion for restructuring the program. Other U. S. agencies should continue to have primary responsibility for the safety of embassy personnel and other efforts designed to serve direct U. S. objectives abroad.

Alternative Administrative Arrangements

In December 1973 the Congress adopted amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act that prohibit AID from conducting police training and related activities in foreign countries, but authorize AID to continue training foreign police officers and specialists at AID's International Police Academy in Washington and to send police advisers and equipment to governments that pay for them. The Conference Report, however, said the intent of the amendment is to prohibit grant public safety activities in foreign countries, other than in the area of narcotics, by any U. S. government agency. With these new congressional constraints in mind, several government and nongovernment administrative alternatives for providing public safety aid are briefly discussed and assessed.

1. Interpol: The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), with headquarters in Paris and composed of 114 member governments, is designed primarily to facilitate the exchange of intelligence on nonpolitical criminals. The heart of the organization is a compatible telecommunications system. Though its secretariat occasionally has conducted seminars for ranking police officers of member countries, Interpol is not staffed or otherwise qualified to provide public safety aid. Nor could it become so qualified without drastically changing its basic character, a change that would be resisted by the great majority of its members.

In the highly unlikely event that Interpol decided to enter the police assistance field, it would face formidable obstacles, which are inherent in

its international composition. Police assistance is politically sensitive, and the recipient must have confidence that the donor will not exploit the relation by interfering in internal affairs, or by any other action contrary to the interests of the recipient. This requires a bilateral relationship between governments that share a measure of mutual interests and confidence, although it does not prevent a recipient from accepting aid from several compatible donors.

2. The U. N. Economic and Social Council: The United Nations Economic and Social Council passed a resolution on June 7, 1971, stating that it would entertain requests for aid in crime prevention when "it can be shown that crime is a serious matter, possibly affecting [adversely] the economic and social growth of a country." Subsequently, a modest U. N. training center was set up in Geneva to fight the illicit narcotics traffic. The Economic and Social Council can be regarded as a source for limited financing of police aid to Third World states, but it could hardly become an agency for administering a training and advisory program; its multi-national character would raise the same problems that would confront Interpol. The U. N. nationality quota system for manning its efforts would add further complications. The problems of a multi-state organization operating in internal security were amply demonstrated by the U. N. Force in the Congo in the years 1960-64.¹

3. International Association of Chiefs of Police: The IACP is a professional organization of some 9,000 members who are local, state, and

1. See Ernest W. Lefever, "The Limits of U. N. Intervention in the Third World," The Review of Politics (Vol. 30, No. 1), January 1963, pp. 3-18.

national police administrators. Its membership and orientation are almost entirely American, though it has about 600 members from 65 other countries. With headquarters near Washington, its small staff conducts studies under contract with U. S. police jurisdictions and is active in national legislation affecting law enforcement. Though before 1962 IACP did organize some orientation tours in the United States for Third World police officers on behalf of ICA and AID, it is not equipped to provide professional training or overseas advisory services. It would have to alter its charter and its financing fundamentally to enter the assistance field; it is unlikely to do so, but if it did, it would have to build a specialized, language-proficient, professional staff from the ground up.

4. A private non-profit corporation: A new private, non-profit corporation could be established in the United States for the explicit purpose of operating a program similar to that of the Office of Public Safety (OPS), which would include an academy and overseas advisers. Theoretically it could take over the existing personnel and facilities of OPS and thus benefit from its experience and reputation and could receive funds from the U. S. government and other sources if they were available. Securing nongovernmental financial support, however, would pose a serious problem.

In terms of quality, policy control, and reputation, these four suggested options leave much to be desired when compared to a viable U. S. government program. Only a government program would be responsive to U. S. policy guidance, would have the necessary financial support, and would be acceptable to most of the Third World governments that seek police aid.

If assistance is continued as a U. S. government program, there are five options for providing it.

1. Continue public safety assistance as an AID operation: The present administrative arrangement has the obvious advantage of continuity, with all that this implies in terms of the momentum of a working relationship. But maintaining this arrangement would continue the problems inherent in the existence of a security-oriented program in a development-oriented agency. It would also continue the present ambiguity over the degree of OPS autonomy within AID: OPS, unlike the Food for Peace and population programs, has had no line in the AID budget; as a result, it has not had an assured budget, even after the AID appropriation has been voted by the Congress. Its programs have had to be approved by country AID directors and regional program officers who control the allocation of funds. On the other hand, OPS has had greater autonomy in management and in selecting its professional staff than have other technical assistance efforts, and because of its special character, OPS has always had direct access to the AID administrator, without which it probably could not have survived.²

2. Continue under AID, but with greater autonomy: This arrangement would be a modification of the previous option, providing OPS with autonomy approximating that of a regional bureau within AID. OPS would either be provided for in the AID budget, or would have an assured budget after the appropriation was voted by the Congress; OPS could then manage its own budget and coordinate its activities with AID country directors

2. See the Appendix, "Amendment to AID General Notice," paragraph C.

and regional program officers without needing their approval. Thus, OPS would be able to develop its own program.

3. Administer public safety as a part of the military aid program:

This option would enable OPS to exploit the formidable logistical and administrative resources of the U. S. Defense Department. There would be some danger, however, that the comparatively small public safety effort would be swallowed up by the much larger military aid program. Furthermore, while in most Third World countries there is some overlap in function between the military and the police, this does not obliterate the difference in basic orientation between the two, and these differences would undoubtedly cause frictions and misunderstandings in Washington and in the field. This problem was noted by a State Department adviser at the U. S. Army Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, who pointed out that "the security problems often caused by urbanization highlight the complex and close relationship between the police and the military. There is a huge gap in U. S. Army doctrine on this score."³

4. Establish a bureau for public safety aid within the State Department: This alternative was recommended in the President's security assistance bill submitted to Congress in April 1971. OPS would report to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance. It would thus enjoy sufficient autonomy to present and defend its own budget and develop its program, always operating under the policy guidelines of the State Department.

3. Raymond J. Barrett, "Urbanization in the Developing Countries,"

And like other semi-independent operations, it would be vulnerable to hostile pressures.

5. Administer public safety aid through the Justice Department:

In terms of program substance and professional identification, a logical administrative home for civil police aid would be the U. S. Department of Justice. Many cabinet departments currently provide technical advisers or attachés in their field for Third World countries and arrange for leaders from these countries to receive specialized training in the United States. New legislation would probably be needed to authorize the Justice Department to provide grant aid abroad.

Under a newly created foreign services section within the Department of Justice, police assistance could be provided much as it is at present, with any number of adaptations. This arrangement would provide the program with a professionally congenial administrative home, but it would pose certain problems. Public safety would have to fight for its share of resources within a department that would necessarily emphasize domestic programs. There would also be image problems because, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Justice Department gathers U. S. domestic intelligence. Further, there would probably be some confusion abroad between F.B.I. agents and police advisers serving in a given country, a confusion which to a small extent already exists in countries where both are assigned. At the same time, the role and mission of various U. S. officials are often deliberately confused, and there is little that can be done about it.

There is no totally satisfactory administrative arrangement for

police assistance because of the inherent complexity and conflict that exist in any bureaucracy, and because of the unpredictable character of U. S. policymaking and the persistent ambiguity in the U. S. policy toward the Third World. No structural answer can substitute for two basic essentials of any viable government operation -- supporters in the Congress and a clientele that wants its services. Which option would enable the program to operate most effectively under the policy control of the State Department, yet with sufficient autonomy for it to develop and manage its program along professional law enforcement lines?

The operation of OPS within the Defense Department (Option 3) appears both infeasible and undesirable, for the reasons noted above.

The creation of a new State Department bureau (Option 4) would meet the essential budget and management requirements, though a small semi-independent operation might have difficulty in developing, presenting, and defending its own program. It does not, however, appear to be feasible. The State Department traditionally has not engaged in aid operations, other than in the area of educational and cultural exchange. Furthermore, this is the only option that has been presented to the Congress, and it has not been acted on.

With renewed support from the Congress, the present arrangement of providing public safety assistance through AID would seem to be the most effective alternative, especially if the program had an assured budget and somewhat greater operational autonomy (Option 2). A renewed concern by Congress could possibly be stimulated by an authoritative statement of interest on the part of the administration similar to the National Security

Council statements that attended its creation. But since the program has been limited by Congress, in part because of the absence of such a statement, it is not likely that the full program will be revived in the near future. Under these circumstances, the Justice Department alternative (Option 5) has considerable merit in addition to the logic of professional compatibility and a conducive administrative environment. It deserves most careful study.

Improving Effectiveness

Judged by administrative standards, OPS has been an efficient and high-morale operation. This study has found no waste or corruption, though there have been occasional complaints by OPS officials and others about the mediocre performance of certain advisers, particularly in Vietnam, where recruitment was rapid. The present study has found five areas, however, where improvements are needed in any program of comparable scope: personnel development, training in the United States, adviser utilization, program follow-up, and liaison with military assistance. These improvements could be initiated or furthered under present budget constraints, but they could be accelerated if additional funds were available.

1. Personnel development: Generally, OPS has recruited high-quality professionals, but it has not provided adequate in-service training and career development opportunities. One problem has been a shortage in authorized positions for the agreed program, which has resulted in a large amount of volunteer overtime in Washington and the field. In Washington during calendar 1972, for example, overtime of the 60-man staff amounted

to 26,426 hours, including more than one-third of a man-year for the director. This heavy workload has contributed to fatigue and illness. In fiscal 1972, five men had to undergo heart operations. The program should be more adequately staffed to permit a lighter workload. More opportunities should be provided for in-service training, including one-year sabbaticals and participation in two-year intergovernmental programs in which staff members advance their careers by serving in their special fields at the state or local level.

There should be greater opportunity for orienting new overseas advisers, including serious preparation for those requiring exotic languages, such as Arabic and Thai. OPS advisers have typically spent about three months in orientation, including a period at the Foreign Service Institute and two weeks at the International Police Academy, but any overseas adviser would profit from more extensive instruction, such as that given to MAP advisers at the Fort Bragg Center for Military Assistance.

During their Washington tour OPS advisers have typically taken a two-week refresher course at the IPA and often served as a counselor for one of the IPA classes. This has given them a practical exposure to comparative police administration and practice. Some advisers would profit from further advanced professional education at American universities in specialized areas of police work, including management and budgeting. The two-week adviser course should be lengthened and enriched to include a serious study of comparative police systems.

2. Participant Training: Though the training of Third World police officers in the United States is one of the most widely commended elements

of the program, the professional quality of the IPA should be improved. Current efforts to gain further accreditation from colleges and universities for IPA courses should be encouraged. Accreditation would enable participants to transfer credits for academic work to other institutions in the United States or in their own countries, and would thus encourage further professional training here and abroad. The IPA faculty should be strengthened by providing support for language study and graduate work in police administration. Foreign students should be selected with even greater attention to their professional potential.

The IPA should continue to revise the curriculum to keep abreast of emerging trends and needs. In 1972 specialized courses on VIP protection and police-community relations were added, and in 1973 a new course on the control of criminal violence was initiated. Further emphasis should be given to police management, budget control, and narcotics.

A genuine research and development unit should be added to the IPA, designed to prepare new curriculum materials for the IPA as well as for the training institutions of the assisted countries. There would be considerable value in translating into usable form the material in the several thousand research papers prepared by IPA participants. There is also a large volume of teaching aids that need translation, particularly into French.

3. Adviser Utilization: While there has been little complaint about the efficiency of country advisers, every effort should be made to improve their effectiveness, especially in view of their declining numbers. It has generally been the practice for each OPS specialist to work primarily

with one counterpart, the host government official whose status and function best qualified him to advance program objectives in an agreed area. This one-to-one relation has made sense, particularly in countries with several advisers, but it unnecessarily limits contacts. There has already been a trend away from this more restricted advisory concept toward multiple counterparts for each adviser, even in countries with several U. S. police specialists. This study recommends that public safety advisers be assigned to several officers or offices of the assisted civil police to broaden their contacts and enhance the potential impact of the program.

4. Program Follow-up: With the increasing emphasis on developing self-sufficiency in assisted police services, the program should be given the authority and resources to do a more effective follow-up after a country program has been terminated. The periodic evaluations of current programs by a team including a State Department or a non-OPS AID official have paid off in both efficiency and economy. It is simple prudence to check on how well a recently assisted police service is caring for and utilizing the communications and other equipment provided. It is professionally important to ascertain how well the institutions in which AID has invested are doing a year or two after the last adviser has left.

The follow-up program could start with an end-of-mission report addressed to the host government. Thereafter, brief but well-conducted post-termination surveys could be scheduled at appropriate intervals to encourage the police services to maintain their standards. Such visits would provide an opportunity to identify problems that might be dealt with by special short-term police advisory missions. In very unusual

cases, changed circumstances might suggest the desirability of renewing a program after a lapse of several years. In any event, the post-termination visits would demonstrate continued U. S. interest.

5. Relation to U. S. Military Assistance: Any public safety program would benefit from closer cooperation with the U. S. military assistance effort in Washington and the field. OPS has partially recognized this need and has taken students in all IPA classes to the Military Assistance Center and other elements at Fort Bragg. There has been sporadic cooperation in program countries between military and public safety advisers. But there should be greater policy consultation and coordination in Washington between these two partners of security assistance.

In addition, there needs to be a serious cost-benefit study of the respective contributions of police and military assistance to the internal security of assisted countries. This would throw light on the administration of both programs and help in the rational allocation of resources between them.

Level of Effort

Since 1968, OPS has had to cut back substantially its worldwide program; its funds have declined more rapidly than have grant AID funds generally. No attempt is made here to recommend a specific dollar level for U. S. public safety assistance, but some of the policy implications of three alternative levels of effort are briefly indicated.

1. The present level: In fiscal year 1973, the public safety budget was \$15 million, about half of which was allocated for Vietnam,

The fiscal 1974 budget request for \$7.4 million (which amounts to less than one percent of the grant AID development budget and about one percent of the grant MAP budget for the same year) does not include Vietnam but maintains a viable and well-rounded program -- IPA training in the United States, a moderate overseas advisory effort (2 to 4 advisers in each of 18 countries), and the provision of a small amount of police equipment for the most needy countries.

2. A substantially increased level: A public safety budget increased by 50 percent, or even by only 25 percent, would enable the program to respond to additional government requests that meet the four foreign policy criteria discussed above. With additional funds, most of the above study recommendations for improving effectiveness could be implemented, including more graduate training and language study for advisers, better program follow-up, and more short-term assignments abroad to meet specific problems. The quality of IPA instruction could be improved and there would be resources to meet a few additional requests for equipment assistance.

3. A substantially reduced level: A 50 percent, or even 25 percent budget decrease, would force a serious limitation in the present multi-purpose public safety program. In fact, the recent congressional limitation represents such a substantial cut. Further, the Congress has determined that the cutback should be made in the work overseas, leaving the IPA intact. If a full public safety program is revived under AID, the Justice Department, or any other auspices, it should be recognized that it would be severely hampered by a substantial reduction in the funds from those available for fiscal 1973. Perhaps the most serious consequences

of the congressional cutback is the erosion it will force in the uniquely trained public safety staff. If this expertise, accumulated over almost 20 years, were permitted to disintegrate, and a new need should arise for substantial public safety aid abroad, it would take years to restore the present level of competence and effectiveness.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Note: The most definitive statement of the responsibilities and authority of the Office of Public Safety within AID for the 1960s is found in an AID General Notice, November 30, 1962, and in an accompanying memorandum from the Acting Administrator, Frank M. Coffin. These two brief documents are reproduced in full below.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Washington 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE STAFF

SUBJECT: Measures to Strengthen A.I.D.'s Police Assistance Program

The A.I.D. General Notice of November 30, 1962, amends the functional statement of A.I.D.'s Office of Public Safety. It vests the Office of Public Safety with primary responsibility and authority for public safety programs and gives that office a series of powers and responsibilities which will enable it to act rapidly, vigorously, and effectively on its own initiative.

The document creates a strong centralized Office of Public Safety which has powers greater than any other technical office or division in A.I.D., whose programs must be accorded priority treatment by the rest of the agency, and which has all the capabilities for independent action and judgement that are consistent with the status of that office as a component office within the Agency for International Development. The now centralized Office of Public

All public safety specialists in AID/W have been transferred to the Office of Public Safety. Efficiency reports of all public safety personnel in the field are to be subject to review by O/PS. Assignment and reassignment actions for such personnel shall be initiated by O/PS, as will activities in recruitment and training.

Responsibility for initiating public safety programs to be funded by all four Regions has been accorded O/PS. O/PS has been empowered to issue public safety guidelines to the field, to participate in all Washington program reviews, and to evaluate the public safety aspects of country programs.

O/PS has been made responsible for participant training in the field of public safety. In addition, that office has been given broad authorities to determine the nature of equipment to be procured for public safety programs and to initiate and review such procurement actions.

When issues arise between O/PS and another office or bureau which cannot be resolved by the appropriate assistant administrator, they are submitted directly to the Administrator.

/signed/
Frank M. Coffin
Acting Administrator

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

AID General Notice
November 30, 1962

SUBJECT: Office of Public Safety - Amendment to AID General Notice dated November 1, 1962

Police assistance programs directly serve the high priority objective of internal security, and in addition thus serve to permit sustained economic development. It is established policy that AID accord increased emphasis and vigorous leadership to police assistance programs in appropriate less developed countries.

To discharge this responsibility of the Administrator with maximum speed, flexibility and effectiveness, and to give proper consideration to the key aspects of public safety programming and administration, it is necessary to strengthen the centralized Office of Public Safety (O/PS), to vest it with primary responsibility and authority for police assistance programs, and to give it line as well as staff responsibilities. That office must receive the full cooperation of other AID offices and bureaus.

The following amends pro tanto the functions of the Office of Public Safety:

A. Program Formulation

1. The Office of Public Safety is responsible for initiating the development of professionally and technically sound and adequate Public Safety programs. O/PS, through normal Regional channels, issues yearly program guidelines, conducts the AID/W technical review of Public Safety programs, and is represented at Regional and Agency-wide reviews of country programs.

2. The Regional Bureaus are responsible for advising the Administrator and the Office of Public Safety on the consistency of Public Safety programs with the total AID program in individual countries, for incorporating adequate Public Safety programs in their annual program budget presentations, and for funding approved programs.

B. Implementation

1. Contracts and Service Agreements

a. The Office of Public Safety is responsible for providing AID/W technical services incident to executing and administering contracts and service agreements, including review and approval of PIO/T's, participation in contractor selection and negotiation; processing of contractor personnel, etc.

b. The Contract Service Division, A/PS, is responsible for providing contractual services to O/PS. The Office of Public Safety is responsible for effecting necessary country coordination and clearance through the Regional Bureaus.

2. Personnel. All AID/W Public Safety personnel, including those concerned with participant training as well as secretarial staff and files, are assigned to the Office of Public Safety. At least one officer shall be assigned to each Regional Bureau by the Office of Public Safety to serve as the action officer and also as staff advisor on Public Safety matters.

The Office of Public Safety is responsible for recruiting and maintaining a pool and ready reserve of professionally competent Public Safety personnel. It is responsible for initiating actions of assignment and re-assignment of Public Safety personnel. The Office of Personnel Administration (A/PA) is responsible for providing personnel services to the Office of Public Safety.

The Office of Public Safety is responsible for assuring that U. S. Public Safety personnel, whether in Washington or abroad, are technically and professionally competent and are adequately trained. That office in addition to present practice, is to review the efficiency reports of Public Safety officers in the field.

3. Equipment. The Office of Public Safety is responsible, in coordination with the AID Regional Bureau concerned, for the specifics of the equipment content of programs. The Office of Public Safety is responsible for the initiation and review of procurement of equipment in implementation of approved programs. That office shall also develop procedures for expediting the furnishing of equipment. The Office of Material Resources will support these actions on a priority basis.

4. Training. The Office of Public Safety is responsible for the selection and training of foreign participants in the U. S. or elsewhere, in coordination with the Regional Bureaus and other elements of AID concerned.

5. Evaluation. The Office of Public Safety is responsible for continuous evaluation of the Public Safety aspects of country programs and their implementation, operating in close collaboration with the Regional Bureaus concerned.

C. General. When issues arise which cannot be resolved through consultation between the Director of the Office of Public Safety and the appropriate Assistant Administrator, they are to be promptly submitted to the Administrator.

DISTRIBUTION: AID List H, Position 8
AID List B-1, Position 8

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