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THAILAND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(AID Loan 493-T-017)

4930240

STATUS REPORT - JULY, 1979

This report is an attempt to review the past history of the Seed Project (both successes and failures), to outline the current status, to discuss problems and propose possible solutions, and to suggest some future actions. It was initially prepared for use in an internal USAID review of the Seed Project and subsequently expanded. The report was finalized following the USAID review.

I. BACKGROUND

The Seed Project has suffered more than its share of problems, delays, bureaucratic hang-ups, etc. And, it has not lived up to the goals proposed in the Project Paper. This is largely because of unrealistic planning. The goals of the Project were set forth assuming (or so it would seem) that full staff would be available for each segment of the Project as needed. However, at the time the Loan Agreement was signed there was not even, officially, a Seed Division. The Project, in reality, did not have a home. Because there was not a Seed Division, no personnel allocations could be made from the Civil Service Commission nor could permanent personnel assignments be made.

For some time the Seed Project was run, on the Thai side, by one person - the current Seed Division Director. In time personnel from other Divisions of DOAE were assigned to work, on a temporary basis, on Seed Project activities. Many of them have remained.

Establishment of a Seed Division was not a condition precedent to disbursement as it probably should have been. For many reasons, mostly internal-political factors in both the MOAC and other RTG Agencies and the Thai bureaucratic process, the Seed Division was not officially established by the Cabinet until late 1977. Only at this time could the Project actually start to function.

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During this same period, USAID was in a phase-out status and primarily concerned with completing Project Papers and entering into Loan Agreements for projects yet to be obligated. The "official" USAID attitude was that the RTG had reached the point that it was capable of implementing projects including all necessary procurement actions. USAID's role would be mainly an approval process. For some parts of the RTG, e.g., DTEC, USAID's attitudes might have been partly valid; but not for the great majority of agencies. Present implementation problems in most projects, especially those involving outside procurement actions, substantiate USAID's error.

What USAID was doing, in the case of the Seed Project, was expecting the impossible. DOAE, and more particularly the Seed Division, was facing a task, in terms of procurement, which makes up a major part of the Loan, that they had no idea how to deal with. USAID Project Officers were only slightly more skilled. The MOAC does not have a central procurement office, at least not for the type involved in this Project. That leaves each Department, in reality each Division, on its own. Lessons learned have little carry over. This is exemplified by the fact that the Special Projects Division of DOAE now is going through the same process and learning the same lessons.

Also to be taken into account is the fact that the Seed Project was one of the first Loans to be implemented. Neither USAID nor the MOAC had any idea what they were facing. In the past clearances were easily obtained. It was USAID money. Now it was RTG money and subject to all the RTG bureaucratic processes. Few people knew what they were. As an example, DOAE officially advised USAID that it would be ready to sign the contract with MSU almost immediately upon conclusion of negotiations. However, when it reached the Office of the Under-Secretary for approval, he insisted it be approved by Department of Public Prosecution. Public Prosecution will only review contracts in the Thai language. DOAE spent considerable time and expense on translation. Then came the problem of clauses in the Loan Agreement which USAID requires but which are contrary to Thai regulations. The list could go on and on. The Chief of the Seed Division spent literally days for a period of more than six months moving contract approval along. This obviously took time away from other activities. Equipment procurement approvals are almost as time consuming.

As a final note, the MSU Senior Seed Specialist advised shortly after his arrival, and later in an official report, that had the personnel and procurement actions envisioned in the PP taken place as planned the Seed Project goals were obtainable, in a developing country - over a period of ten to twelve years.

II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND CURRENT STATUS

During the past several months the Project Officer and Assistant Project Officer for the Seed Project have visited all of the Seed Processing Centers at least once and have observed seed multiplication and seed buying activities in areas both adjacent to and far from the Centers. In all cases Seed Project activities were discussed with Seed Division personnel, other Extension officers and participating farmers. Observations made and results of discussions will be contained in subsequent sections of this report.

During the same time period the Seed Project has undergone an exhaustive audit by AAG/EA. USAID has just received a copy of the final draft and the report itself should be issued by the end of July. This report will also address some of the points and recommendations contained in the audit report.

After a review of the 1978 Evaluation Report, AID/W has raised several questions and made requests for information (STATE 145353). An interim response (BANGKOK 21277) was sent advising that this report was to be prepared and would be addressing many of the points raised. Those which would not be addressed were answered in the interim reply.

The Seed Project is a highly complex undertaking involving many different activities, some of which are very sophisticated. Each of these, as well as some elements, e.g., staffing, which affect all Project components, are discussed below.

A. Foundation Seed Program

The Foundation Seed Program is one of the less problematic Project components. The primary problem has been one of coordination between DOAE and DA in terms of both ordering and taking delivery of seed on time. The situation has improved as the Project implementers have gained experience. In the past lack of adequate storage space was one reason for DOAE not taking delivery of foundation seed as scheduled. Completion of the Seed Processing

Centers which provide storage facilities and increased numbers of Seed Division personnel, especially Field Supervisors, to locate and train Contract Farmers and to distribute the foundation seed have alleviated much of the problem and it will continue to improve.

Reading the 1978 Evaluation Report would lead one to conclude that most, if not all, of the problems of the Foundation Seed Program are caused by the DOAE. Such is not the case. At times, foundation seed delivered by the DA has been of inferior and occasionally unacceptable quality. This situation is also being remedied as Project implementation progresses.

One problem which persists is that DOAE prefers to obtain corn and sorghum foundation seed from the National Corn and Sorghum Research Center as opposed to the DA as specified in the PP. DOAE reasons for this action are to some extent valid, but the corn and sorghum seed production unit of the DA regards the practice as discriminatory. This question will have to be resolved.

B. Seed Multiplication Program

During the earlier implementation stages of the Project, the Seed Multiplication Program suffered from two very serious problems. These were lack of personnel and inability to pay farmers "on-the-spot", as envisioned in the PP, for multiplied seed. The situation in both cases is now much better, but there is still room for improvement.

For reasons outlined in the Background Section (Part I) and discussed further in the section dealing with personnel (Part II.H), the Seed Multiplication Program was initiated without adequate staff on the rolls of the Seed Division. This was even more true in the field. In an attempt to overcome this inadequacy, the Seed Division relied on the already overloaded Provincial Extension Agents to locate Contract Farmers to multiply the seed, contract with them, deliver foundation seed to them, and supervise the seed multiplication. Considering other responsibilities of the Provincial Extension Staffs, one must conclude that even with the problems in the early days of seed multiplication, progress was made.

As is the case with the Foundation Seed Program, the seed multiplication segment of the Seed Multiplication Program has overcome many of its earlier problems through the

assignment of additional staff. Seed Division personnel, working out of the Seed Centers or stationed in major outlying multiplication areas serviced by the Centers, have alleviated and in some cases overcome many problems. Field visits indicate that the Field Inspectors have, for the most part, located increasing numbers and have established good working relations with "their" Contract Farmers. Their records as to the number of farmers involved and number of rai planted are very complete. One problem that remains is that these records do not make their way to the Seed Division in Bangkok in a timely manner.

RTG regulations are such that it is literally impossible to make immediate payments to Contract Farmers for the multiplied seed. This aspect of Thai regulations was evidently not investigated during Project design since the PP, as stated above, envisions immediate payment. When the first advance of funds for the Working Capital Account was made to DOAE, the Department deposited it in an account and was prepared to follow the PP outlined procedures. DOAE was then advised by the Ministry of Finance that the funds must be deposited in the Ministry and could only be disbursed after procedures had been established. As a result, during the first year, Contract Farmers waited for an inordinate amount of time for payment for the multiplied seed. Time and experience has, to some extent, overcome this problem also. Contract Farmers interviewed during field visits seem, for the most part, satisfied with the current delay of about two weeks for payment. They understand the situation and are, partly because of the premium price received for their seed, willing to wait. In many cases farmers have grouped together to "support" one another until payment is made. There are, however, still cases of farmers, because of a need for ready cash, selling multiplied seed directly to merchants even though they would receive a premium price selling it to the Seed Division.

Interviews with Contract Farmers currently participating in the Seed Multiplication Program indicate a desire on their part to remain with the Project and word that many neighbors would also like to join.

The most successful multiplication activities have occurred when a forward-looking village Farmer Leader has become interested in the Project and has encouraged his colleagues to take part. A good Farmer Leader reduces the time demand of the Field Inspectors allowing them to service more farmers.

It is the opinion of the Project Officer and the MSU Senior Seed Specialist that the time is not far distant when it will be possible to be increasingly selective in identifying Contract Farmers and still be able to multiply as much seed as can be processed and distributed under the proposed mechanisms. This will result in even higher quality seed and in less personnel demand.

Throughout the PP runs the implicit theme that Contract Farmers are the elite and therefore wealthy farmers. Observations during a recent field visit to the Northeast prove this is not necessarily the case. Many peanut farmers were interviewed who are definitely at the lower if not the lowest end of the income scale. But, they are very good farmers. The premium price paid by the Project for multiplied seed varied, depending on quality, from B8 to B10 per Kilo. (The regular price paid by seed merchants was about B8 or lower per Kilo). Almost all farmers had received B10 per Kilo. In the Khon Kaen and Kalasin area this added income was especially important. Many villages had lost their entire rice crop in last year's floods. The income from the sale of the seed was extremely important.

C. Seed Processing Program

The Seed Processing component of the Project consists of three elements - construction of three new Seed Processing Centers located at Korat, Lampang, and Chai Nat, equipment procurement to expand an earlier AID financed Seed Center at Phitsanulok and to equip the Centers at Korat, Lampang, and Chai Nat, and the processing of the seed purchased from Contract Farmers participating in the Seed Multiplication Program.

Construction of the three new Seed Centers has always been behind schedule. This cannot, however, be considered as a Project deterrent as the seed processing equipment procurement was also delayed. Construction at the Korat Seed Center, which is now operational, was completed well in advance of equipment deliveries. Much of the equipment for the Lampang and Chai Nat plants has arrived at the Bangkok Port. One shipment has been cleared and delivered. By the time these initial shipments of equipment are cleared through customs and are ready for delivery, the Chai Nat Center will have secure storage available. Secure storage is already available at Lampang. Construction at both Centers is expected to be completed in late September. Unless something very unusual happens, this will be well in advance of arrival and clearance of all the equipment.

Construction delays were the result of two primary factors. One was the lengthy bureaucratic clearance process for blueprints which includes the Department of Public Works - a process not taken into account in Project design or realized by Project implementers. The second was failure on the part of the BOB to allocate sufficient funds, even though they were requested/budgeted, as scheduled. This as an official of any government realizes is a common procedure and difficult to question unless one knows all factors contributing to such a decision.

Procurement of the seed processing equipment, especially that equipment destined for Phitsanulok and Korat, also experienced lengthy delays. The primary factor was complete inexperience on the part of the Seed Division in such an undertaking. At a late date, in order to expedite the process, USAID became involved. Particular problem areas included RTG procurement regulations previously not considered (which had to be taken into account along with USAID's often cumbersome requirements and in some instances there were conflicts between the two), difficulty in working out suitable financing arrangements, and the RTG clearance process for the IFB. Happily the first two of these provided lessons which contributed to a "streamlined" issuance of subsequent IFB's and will do so for future ones. The clearance process is known, if not shortened, but every little bit helps.

A remaining problem connected with procurement is customs clearance. All RTG procurements must be cleared by ETO, a state enterprise notorious even in Thai circles for its inefficiency. Speed up of customs clearance is, for all practical purposes, under means available to the Seed Division, almost an impossibility.

Until recently all seed processing was done at the Phitsanulok Center. Seed is now also being processed at Korat. The actual processing has not and does not at this time present any serious problem. The problem, which is very serious, is the disposal of the normal waste materials that result from seed processing. A mechanism does not currently exist to dispose of these waste materials or outdated seed. Timely disposal would allow these items to be sold as grain, fish food, etc. Instead they must be stored. In addition to taking up valuable warehouse space the waste materials become insect-infested, rendering them valueless, and creating potential for insect infestation of seed awaiting processing or distribution.

The regulations to allow disposal of the waste materials must be issued by the Ministry of Finance. DOAE long ago requested that proper procedures be established. More recently USAID wrote the Minister of Finance to support the DOAE request. As of this date no definite response has been received by DOAE. However, USAID has been advised by Finance officials concerned with the Seed Project that the Department that issues the regulations had been strongly urged to do so. More recently the Director of the Seed Division was told, by his contact in Finance, that the necessary documents were ready for the signature of the previous Minister but not signed before the change in government and that they would probably be available soon. Assuming that the regulations are issued in the near future, it will require a careful reading to determine if they really do solve the problem. Any relief at all will be welcome, but the total problem must be resolved.

D. Seed Distribution and Marketing

This is the weakest part of the Project. However, this weakness has not been proven to or accepted by the RTG because, up to now, all seed produced has been distributed in one way or another. To date, a portion of the seed has been distributed through direct sales at the Phitsanulok plant. A much smaller amount has been purchased and resold by the MOF. Only a small portion of this seed has reached the small farmer. The greatest amounts of seed have been distributed through DOAE demonstration activities or purchased by the government for direct distribution to farmers. Each year, because floods and drought, government agencies have literally emptied the seed warehouses. Seed distributed in this manner does reach the small farmer.

Seed produced initially by the Korat Center will probably be able to be distributed under the same haphazard system. The "crunch" will come when both the Lampang and Chai Nat Centers are in operation. A workable distribution and marketing system must be established! The first step is for the RTG to realize that there is a problem.

According to the PP, seed and inoculum were to be distributed by the MOF through distribution centers established throughout the country. This has not happened and it is doubtful if it ever will. The MOF is a new and weak organization. It does not have seed storage facilities. As a state enterprise, the MOF is expected to pay its own way and as a result does not have the necessary budget to do what must be initially done to undertake the marketing of

the Project seed. Project design did not take into account all factors. Originally the MCF was expected to play a much larger role, but even before implementation began responsibility for the Working Capital Account was moved to the Seed Division and the plan for MCF to eventually operate the Seed Centers was scrapped.

At this stage, considering the past and anticipated future performance of the MCF, an alternative marketing system must be developed.

DOAE is now of the opinion that it will have to market the seed and proposes to do so through its Provincial Extension Agents. While this system will be an improvement over what currently exists, it will not solve the problem primarily because of lack of personnel.

E. Inoculum Component

While not plagued by lack of personnel, this Project component has suffered implementation delays for other reasons. Construction of the inoculum production plant was delayed because of budget restrictions placed by the BOB. As is the case with the construction of the Seed Centers, this has not been a hinderance because no equipment has been purchased under the Loan. Plant construction should be completed by October.

The original assumption was that expertise existed in the DA to write the equipment specifications as well as prepare the IFB. (The specifications for the seed processing equipment had been prepared by outside experts prior to Loan signing). Neither proved to be true. USAID took little action. After considerable time, the DA requested USAID to provide someone to write the equipment specifications. This was done utilizing Loan proceeds. Later DA requested USAID to undertake the equipment procurement on its behalf. IFB's issued by AID, were opened last November. Because the IFB's called for a "turn Key" operation in the case of the inoculum production equipment and "all-or-none" in the case of the laboratory equipment, bids were high. In addition, few bids were received...to few for USAID to be able to make a determination if the price quotations were reasonable. The IFB was cancelled.

As of now DA is making some revisions to the equipment specifications in an attempt to reduce costs. USAID has prepared the IFB using the same format as for the seed processing equipment. Procurement will be on an individual item

basis. The IFB should be ready for RIG clearance in the near future. However, because of the type of equipment involved (much of it having to be specially manufactured), the equipment cannot be expected to arrive in less than 450 days after the issuance of the IFB.

The equipment is expected to be installed by DA engineers under the supervision of DA inoculum production personnel, the MSU advisors and a consultant to be provided under the DA portion of consultant time included in the MSU contract.

The inoculum produced by the DA was, as was the case with the multiplied/processed seed, to be marketed by the MOF. It has not happened. DCAE has and will continue to distribute inoculum with foundation seed. The DA plans to make inoculum available at its various research facilities scattered throughout the country.

Discussions with farmers indicate that they are very much aware of inoculum and its beneficial results.

F. Working Capital Account (WCA)

One of the original intents of the WCA was to provide a source of funding to be used for purchasing multiplied seed from Contract Farmers with payment being made immediately upon purchase. It has not worked that way. Procedures were not worked out in advance with the Ministry of Finance. And, it is not really feasible within the Thai system.

The Thai system limits the amount of expenditure authorized to each level of administration within the government service. The amount involved in purchasing seed is such that relatively high authorization is necessary and in turn requires approvals made up of several steps. Delay results. The system also requires up to three committees to inspect goods to be purchased - including the multiplied seed - approve the purchase, make the purchase, and pay for the goods. Only through special Cabinet level approval, granting of which is doubtful, could the Project Manager be authorized to make special expenditures. Even if he were, because a government official is responsible throughout his career for any irregularities in payments he authorized regardless of length of time or present position or whether or not he was aware of the irregularity, the Project Manager would have to establish his own procedures. If they are thorough enough to provide adequate protection, the new procedures would not be apt to be much of an improvement over existing ones.

Consequently, the WCA must be viewed as a means of financing operating costs of the Project, which it does, without a marked increase in the rapidity of purchase or expenditure. As mentioned previously the time required to make payments to the farmers has decreased considerably from the delays experienced in the first seed purchasing.

In addition to the purchase of multiplied seed from Contract Farmers, the WCA finances purchases of foundation seed, inoculum, and supplies (bags, tags, etc.). Reflows into the account result from sale of foundation seed and inoculum to contract farmers and sale of processed seed.

One problem, which has been partly alleviated since Seed Division personnel have assumed responsibility for Project field activities, is that proceeds from sales of foundation seed and inoculum made by Provincial Extension Agents have not been returned to the WCA. Instead they have been put into general DCAE accounts. The same problem will probably emerge if the Provincial Extension Agents become responsible for seed sales. The Audit Council of Thailand is in the final stages of an audit of all Seed Division activities. Audit findings, recommendations, and resulting follow-up actions are expected to help solve this problem.

G. Participant Training

Participant training under the Project is funded by a \$200,000 grant. Funds are to be committed by April 30, 1980, and are available for expenditure on an accrued basis through April 30, 1981.

Original plans called for short-term training (U.S. and third-country) for 18 participants and Master's degree training for six participants. Training was to be spread over the life of the Project. To date one short-term participant has completed training related to inoculum production and two participants are presently at Mississippi State attending a special course in seed production.

Delays in training are the result of two factors. Participants could not be nominated until they were in authorized Seed Division positions. This was not possible until after the Seed Division was officially established, positions allocated and filled. The second factor is lack of English language capabilities. Even graduates of U.S. universities are having to study for six months in order to pass the required English tests.

Participants have now been nominated for all but one of the training slots. DTEC has recommended retaining this slot to provide funding to meet increased training costs of other participants. Those participants needing to do so are in English training.

USAID has received a letter from DOAE requesting that the funding period be extended late 1982, to cover the Master's training. (Following the USAID Project review the process to extend the funding period was initiated.)

H. RTG Project Personnel

As indicated throughout this report, the personnel situation has improved greatly. Assuming that staff allocations for the Seed Centers in Lamphang and Chai Nat are made at levels equivalent to those already authorized for Phitsanulok and Korat, the personnel situation in the Bangkok Headquarters will be the most critical.

The table on the following page indicates the DOAE estimated requirements, positions approved and current staffing for the Bangkok Seed Division and the Seed Centers. As a side note, the MSU Senior Seed Specialist estimates that the Seed Centers could operate effectively with 80% of the estimated staff requirements assuming adequate numbers of field inspectors.

I. Seed Committees

A Seed Executive and a Seed Implementation Committee have been formed to provide administrative guidance and to make policy decisions. Unfortunately they have not been very effective. Meetings are not held on a regular basis and most Committee members are not well versed in Project activities. This is understandable considering their diverse backgrounds and other responsibilities. Project progress is impeded because Committee members do not understand and, in some cases, are not interested in Project problems.

J. Private Sector Relationships

One of the stated goals of the Seed Project is involvement of the private sector in making seed available to farmers. At this point there is a great deal of interest within the private sector and one Thai company is well on the way to entering the seed business. Processing equipment

DOAE Seed Division Staffing as of July, 1979

Organization	Total Staff Requirements			Positions Already Approved by CSC and BOB			Positions Already Filled		
	Civil Servant	Permanent Hire	Temporary Hire	Civil Servant	Permanent Hire	Temporary Hire	Civil Servant	Permanent Hire	Temporary Hire
1. Seed Division Bangkok	71	14	16	18	12	16	9	12	16
2. Seed Center 1 Phitsanulok	48	25	10	27	25	10	25	25	10
3. Seed Center 2 Korat	48	25	10	27	21	10	27	21	10
4. Seed Center 3 Lampang	48	25	10	12	15	5	10	15	5
5. Seed Center 4 Chai Nat	48	25	10	12	15	5	11	15	5

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- NOTES:
1. Positions for civil servants are approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and positions for permanent hire and temporary hire employees are approved by Bureau of the Budget (BOB). Temporary hires are approved by BOB for positions pending approval by CSC. Permanent hire and temporary hire employees do not enjoy civil servant benefits.
 2. Permanent hires are mainly positions for laborers, janitors, drivers, carpenters, and watchmen.
 3. Filling positions approved by CSC for Bangkok begins in 1980.
 4. Temporary hires for Bangkok are approved by BOB to work in positions pending approval by CSC.
 5. The CSC has withheld approvals of positions for Centers 3 and 4 because they are still under construction.
 6. Request for new positions will be submitted to CSC in late July, 1979.

is on its way and a processing plant is being constructed. Seed Project personnel assisted with the equipment specifications and building plans. Staff will be trained at the Project Seed Centers. Like in the Seed Project, the firm will contract with farmers in the vicinity of the processing center to produce the seed. The farmers will be provided with seed, credit, etc. by the firm.

Five other companies, some multinational, are seriously considering and are currently investigating prospects for involvement in the seed business.

III. GENERAL COMMENTS

The Seed Project has been plagued by problems. But, this is not just the fault of the RTG. AID shares the responsibility. RTG failure to supply personnel, budget and other resources, etc. as scheduled, has been well documented. AID lack of attention to the Project has not, except for mentioned in the MSU Senior Seed Specialist's annual report and more recently by the AAG/EA.

The PP, prepared by AID, imposed an impossible implementation schedule considering RTG capabilities in several areas and the AID attitude of minimal participation.

Also not documented, with the exception of some mention in the MSU advisor's reports, are Project successes. Both Evaluation Reports and the AAG/EA Audit do not mention them. Failure to do so in the 1978 Evaluation Report was called to the attention of the rest of the team by Dr. Lloyd Frederick but the team members finalizing the Report decided not to include a "success" section. It will be included as a part of the 1979 In-House Evaluation. The past year has shown tremendous improvement. Things are moving!

The quality and dedication of most of the Seed Division staff is very high. Long hard work has produced results.

Activities in the field have gone very well considering what there has been to work with. The problems have been and will continue to be bureaucratic and mostly at the national level. The Project will be able to produce and process the seed. The rest is up to the bureaucracy.

The importance of seed in any agricultural development activities is high enough to justify extension of the current Project in order to provide all Project inputs.

IV. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN^{1/}

1. Extend the TDD for up to one year to cover not only the MSU contract, which is scheduled to terminate March 21, 1981, but also the inoculum production equipment yet to be ordered. The current TDD is December 11, 1980. Final payments for the inoculum equipment cannot be expected to be made before early 1981. Final payments for some seed processing equipment may also extend beyond the TDD. (Between the time of the initial draft of this report and the USAID review, USAID received an official request to extend the Project for one year.)

2. Extend the funding period for the training grant to cover Master's degree candidates who will begin training this year and in August or September, 1980. If they do not begin this year funds should be switched to short-term training - both U.S. and Third Country.

3. Discussions and resolutions of current problems, especially marketing, between RTG and USAID officials above the implementation level.

4. Continue increased USAID participation in the Project.

5. Complete the IFB for the inoculum production equipment.

6. Work with the Seed Division to establish a system whereby information on numbers of farmers participating and number of rai planted is available at the Bangkok level as well as in the field.

7. Make a determination as to how the Project should be restructured or revised (as recommended by both AID/W and AAG/EA) and complete the necessary documentation.

V. DECISIONS MADE DURING USAID REVIEW

1. USAID and DOAE should jointly review the current progress of the Project and consider necessary revisions to the Project design and implementation plan, particularly with regard to the most important recommendations of the 1978 Project Evaluation. (This has been proposed to DOAE and USAID has received indication of interest.)

1/ As of June 29, 1979 - the date of the initial draft.

2. Extend the TDD to April 11, 1981 to cover the MSU contract. The decision to extend to the requested December 11, 1981 will depend on the outcome of the Project review.

3. Extend the funding period for the training grant to cover the M.S. candidates who are scheduled to depart in August or September, 1980 with the understanding that they will depart at that time.