

CLASSIFICATION
PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I


Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE Casamance Regional Development			2. PROJECT NUMBER 685-0205	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE USAID/Senegal
4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION	
6. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY <u>78</u> B. Final Obligation Expected FY <u>84</u> C. Final Input Delivery FY <u>86</u>			7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION From (month/yr.) <u>1980</u> To (month/yr.) <u>1982</u> Date of Evaluation Review <u>July, 1983</u>	
8. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING A. Total <u>\$34.5 mill</u> B. U.S. <u>\$23.7 mill</u>				

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
1) Take steps to change SOMIVAC's judicial status to a Societe Nationale, thereby assuring it more autonomy;	USAID/ SOMIVAC	6/85
2) Limit SOMIVAC's "review" role over PIDAC's activities;	USAID/ D.G. of SOMIVAC	9/84
3) SOMIVAC and PIDAC to institute MBO;	" "	7/84
4) Establish a personnel evaluation system and related system of performance incentives;	" "	6/85
5) Improve evaluation process and effectiveness of PIDAC extension agents;	DEEP	3/85
6) Reinstate literacy training for the presidents and secretaries of the producer groups;	Literacy section of PIDAC & SOMIVAC's Bureau de Formation	7/84
7) USAID to provide technical assistance to the section of Promotion Feminin at PIDAC;	USAID	As required
8) PIDAC should accelerate establishment of the seed farm and strengthen the production of seed on contract by producer groups;	PIDAC	3/85
9) Improve collaboration between SOMIVAC and PIDAC with respect to applied research.	ISRA, USAID, PIDAC/SOMIVAC	7/84

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS <input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper <input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan <input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T <input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework <input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement <input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P	10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT A. <input type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change B. <input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan C. <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project
---	--

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles) Robert MacAlister; Project Mgr., USAID Bacary D. Coly; Director General, SOMIVAC Jacques Faye; Director of Dept. Systems Madieke Niang; Director of ISRA, Djibelor	12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval Signature:  Typed Name: <u>S.J. Littlefield, DIR</u> Date: <u>April 5, 1984</u>
--	---

13. Summary

The Casamance Regional Development Project (685-0205) has faced continual delays and obstacles since it began in 1978. In 1983, two years before its scheduled completion, SOMIVAC's evaluation data indicates the project is having a questionable impact on agricultural production. By the end of the first five-year phase, the project should have induced an increase in cereals production by 11,000 tons. The actual figures show an increase of between 3500 and 4000 tons of cereals per year. The failure to achieve greater production results from administrative and management problems, as well as a rate of rainfall well below the projected rate and until recently a lack of access to fertilizers.

It should be noted, however, that several other aspects of the project are firmly underway. For example, the farming systems research and research concerning the commercialization of cereals in the Lower Casamance; a system of collecting agricultural production data for SOMIVAC; long-range training of seventeen Senegalese associated with ISRA-SOMIVAC, a women's component as well as the training of counterparts by project-supported technicians; construction of anti-salt dam, crop protection extension, seed multiplication, a credit program, a well-digging program and the construction of offices and laboratories..

14. Evaluation Methodology

The Evaluation Team consisted of an agronomist, a training specialist, an economist, two sociologists, an anthropologist, an agro-economist and a civil engineer.

The terms of reference were as follows:

1. To evaluate the current agriculture production systems in PIDAC's 14 intervention zones and to compare agricultural production figures for 1980, 1981 and 1982. Comparisons were to be established on the productivity of production units that benefited from extension services (encadrees) and those which did not.

2. To evaluate PIDAC's agricultural extension efforts. This assessment was to include an evaluation of techniques currently recommended by PIDAC agents, notably in the areas of crop protection and the willingness of the farmers to adopt these techniques. An evaluation of PIDAC's work with seed multiplication was also to be part of the scope of work.

3. To study the village organizations in the 14 PIDAC intervention zones and design recommendations for future activities to be undertaken by village organizations. This segment of the evaluation was to comprise an assessment of the relationship between PIDAC agents and Producers' groups.

4. To evaluate PIDAC's functional literacy efforts especially in management and accountancy training for Producer's Groups.

5. To evaluate PIDAC's special credit component.

6. To evaluate PIDAC's Women in Development Unit's work.

7. To evaluate the applied research activities of ISRA/Djilbélor and the applicability of research for SOMIVAC and PIDAC. Compare the application of the recommendations of the last evaluation for on-going research and activities.

8. To review the current evaluation and monitoring system of SOMIVAC. This will also include an analysis of guidelines implemented for collecting data on production and marketing.

9. Assess DEEP's capacity for planning and designing projects.

10. Evaluate the project's efforts in long and short term training, for continuing education and by utilizing people already trained as agents upon their return.

11. Assess the validity of the studies financed by the project (i.e. HARZA, NCNW, Timberlake, Diallo). Evaluate the efficiency of the regional unit of R & D, in order to avoid duplication of research efforts.

12. Evaluate the efficiency of the technical assistance given to SOMIVAC, PIDAC and ISRA/Djibélor, including counterpart training.

13. To evaluate the maintenance of SOMIVAC, PIDAC and ISRA/Djibélor equipment financed by USAID.

15. External Factors

There are several factors impeding the progress of the project, most of which are inherent in the Senegalese government's policies and administrative procedures. First, because SOMIVAC's judicial status does not grant it the authority to carry out most procurement activities, slow and burdensome administrative procedures are required to supply inputs whose value exceeds 8.000.000 CFAF. The amount of time it takes to procure materials seriously impedes project implementation.

The second obstacle the project faces is the unreliability of financial contributions on the part of the GOS. It is hoped that this problem will be resolved with the expected amelioration of Senegal's terms of trade.

A third restriction results from the GOS licensing requirements for private sector cereals trade. A loosening of these stipulations could raise prices and stimulate the adoption of improved technology.

Another deterring factor stems from the fact that farmers are shifting from rice production to dryland cereal production due to chronic lower rainfall. The original objective of exporting 20,000 tons of rice by 1990 is unrealistic.

As concerns the women's component, relatively slow progress has been made because approval of activities is required by those in charge: men who demonstrate a lack of interest in this component. However, project management continues to encourage greater activity.

16. - 17. Inputs, Outputs

The lack of necessary operating inputs and timely material support for important project activities was cited as one of the major reasons for the lack of progress in project implementation and impact. This results mostly from the cumbersome administrative procedures within SOMIVAC .

Outputs are presented below in tabular form.

	! Unrealized Outputs	! Realized Outputs
Ag Research	! Diffusion of new varieties of rice and other food grains not possible until second phase of Project. ! ! Links b/w ISRA and PIDAC still weak but should be strengthened by increased cooperation and communication between ISRA and PIDAC. ! ! ! !	! Project identification and testing of 5 new varieties of rice and other food grains by ISRA likely to be realized. ! ! By all accounts, farming systems research is a success: teams aimed at making programs responsive to needs of the majority of farmers in the Lower Casamance; ISRA collaborating with project in farm visits, designing surveys and interpreting results on farm trials.
Ag. Extension	! Only 500 tons of the proposed 5000 tons of fertilizers were delivered in 1983. ! ! Credit program expected to distribute 300 million CFAF in medium term credit to 2000 farmers but only 126 millions CFAF were delivered to 1500 farmers. ! ! PIDAC seed production program must be greatly strengthened if farmers are to produce the 50 tons/year of improved rice and maize seeds. ! !	! Actual number of households working with PIDAC agents in 1982/83 was an approximate 1 5000, far from the projected 10,000. ! ! "Encadrés" farmers appear to use twice as much fertilizer as "non-encadrés" farmers. ! ! Use of flat plowing for rain-fed rice is high - 65% for "encadrés"; 35% for "non-encadrés". ! ! Early planting results in increased yields of: ! - 45% for aquatic rice,

	Unrealized Outputs	Realized Outputs
Ag. Extension (cont'd)	<p>Use of insecticides and pesticides is at low rate of 5% of farmers familiar with them. Used only on a portion of a farmer's field.</p> <p>Frequency of weeding and thinning is low and of equal occurrence b/w two groups.</p> <p>Same for use of flat plowing for aquatic rice and maize.</p>	<p>- 20-30% for rainfed rice, - 25% for maize, - 15% for peanuts.</p>
Literacy and Training	<p>Project can expect to field only 24 out of 36 agents and to enroll 2400 rather than 3000 villagers.</p> <p>A level of 10% literacy in 50 villages more realistic than the projected 40% literacy in 100 villages.</p>	<p>Training methods used by extension agents are theoretically valid; difficulties arise with application: too much theory and not enough practice. In need of rigorous training, careful extension program and continued monitoring.</p>
WID	<p>Poor progress due to following reasons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -lack of interest and perception on the part of men in charge -WID component is under the wrong department in PIDAC -WID team is still not recognized by SOMIVAC's Conseil d'Administration; WID team should have clearly stated terms of reference. -Inadequate WID funding. -Poor training of WID Unit Director. 	
Project Management & Coordination	<p>Due to the lack of experienced managers and senior researchers, DEEP has been unable to fulfill its role adequately. It is, however, better at data collection than at project development and planning.</p>	<p>Preparation of Master Plan is on target and it should be possible to complete the final design of the three projects as anticipated.</p> <p>SOMIVAC expertise for project planning is still weak but</p>

	Unrealized Outputs	Realized Outputs
Project Management & Coordination (cont'd)	<p>! Slow progress in project implementation and impacts is due to the following:</p> <p>! 1. the legal statutes under which SOMIVAC operates.</p> <p>! 2. weak planning and lack of work plans and monitoring systems to improve project performance.</p> <p>! 3. Absence of incentives for good work and effective sanctions against low productivity and negligence by project employers.</p>	<p>! will be strengthened through the current Director General.</p> <p>! By the end of Phase I in 1985, USAID should be able to rely on SOMIVAC for expertise in project planning and coordination assuming it strengthens its management and reinforces DEEP.</p>

18 & 19. Purposes, Goals and Subgoals

The primary purpose of this project is to overcome labor, technology, resource, marketing, institutional and weather constraints on agriculture production, with particular emphasis on rice production. The project focused on the Bignona, Ziguinchor and Oussouye departments of the Casamance Region. The project also attempts to raise the quality of life of the rural population in the project area by increasing incomes and by providing health education services and literacy training to the local farmers.

20. Beneficiaries

Twenty percent of the households in the specified area had significant contact with PIDAC in 1982-83. Another 20% witnessed a PIDAC demonstration of technology, while 60% had no contact at all with a PIDAC agent. A DEEP study shows that some households saw an agent 4-5 times per year, whereas the Project Paper envisioned a more intensive and regular contact. However, these households demonstrated a substantially higher adoption rate for improved seed for all crops and a higher adoption rate for flat plowing for rainfed rice. Benefits are minimal for flat plowing other crops and for weeding and thinning. Data suggests that farmers working with PIDAC agents are twice as likely to use chemical fertilizers but somewhat less likely to use manure. In general, though, impact on agricultural practices and on adoption of new technologies must be improved by ensuring that PIDAC extension agents operate more effectively.

21. Unplanned Effects

None.

22. Lessons Learned

The future of this project, as is the case with many other projects, is threatened by recurrent costs. The Government of Senegal is not a dependable source of operating cost support and it is doubtful that ISRA will be effective in obtaining the inputs it needs to continue exploring technological packages and cultural practices once donor support ceases. Also, without the public sector supply of materials adult literacy programs will die once transferred to the villagers themselves.

The Mission, on the other hand, feels that given projected future increase in agricultural production and a stronger national financial condition, the GOS will in time be able to handle the recurrent costs of the project.