



Local Organization, Participation and Development in the Yemen Arab Republic

FINAL REPORT

Yemen Research Program

John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis

RURAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE
YEMEN RESEARCH PROGRAM
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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SECTION I
ORIGIN OF PROJECT

Cornell Cooperative Agreement on Rural Development Participation

The Yemen Research Program was one of a number of activities undertaken by Cornell University's Rural Development Committee under its cooperative agreement with USAID's Office of Multi-Sectoral Development.¹ That Agreement ran from 1977 to 1982 and was known as the "Rural Development Participation Project." An overview of this project is presented at length here, for it defines the context in which the Yemen Research Program was undertaken.

Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, development specialists expressed increasing concern over lack of progress in altering the plight of the rural poor. This concern was based on the realization that one-quarter of the world's people still lived in conditions of insecurity and privation on incomes of less than \$100 in the rural areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The growing gap between rich and poor nations and regions of the world was mirrored by a similar divergence between the well-off and the impoverished peoples within most less developed countries. The pressing task of Development Decade II was to begin to reverse both trends. Towards this end, some new approaches were proposed, among them an effort to get greater participation in rural development activities by those who should benefit from them.

Because of accumulated experience suggesting that projects are likely to be more successful in the long run when local officials, organizations and people are involved in design, decision-making, implementation and evaluation activities, some governments and many international development agencies made decentralization, local organization involvement, and participation in the development process by the

1. The "Rural Development Participation Project" is funded under Cooperative Agreement (BMA-1/ta-8) between Cornell University and U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau of Science and Technology, Office of Multi-Sectoral Development (formerly Development Support Bureau, Office of Rural Development and Development Administration).

poor majority one of the central concerns of their official policies. One of the best known came to be called in the American aid community the "Congressional Mandate." This 1973 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of the United States specifically illustrated the focus on participation by noting: "Decisions concerning the activities to be carried out are (to be) made, preferably, by those benefited (for example, the poor), and if not, at least with effective consultation and substantial acceptance by those benefited." Similarly, several United Nations General Assembly declarations called for "the active participation of all elements of society, individually or through associations, in defining and achieving the common goals of development," urging UN projects to promote "the adoption of measures to ensure the effective participation of all elements of society in the preparation and execution of programmes of economic and social development." And, speaking for the World Bank, Robert McNamara noted that there is greater chance for rural development success if national governments and projects "provide for popular participation, local leadership, and decentralization of authority."

As a result of these kinds of mandates and directives, the United Nations, the World Bank, USAID, other donors and private voluntary organizations began to undertake studies concerned with decentralization and participation and to design rural development projects insuring more involvement by those communities affected. The problem was that little was known at this time about "rural development participation" or strategies for promoting it.

Of all the ways in which local involvement can be increased, the greatest uncertainties and confusions surround the participatory approach. Despite the rhetoric in the early 1970s, there was little agreement about participation or its theoretical or applied relationships to processes of development in different environmental or societal contexts. Beginning in 1976, Cornell gave extensive emphasis to analyzing rural development participation and its linkages to patterns of local government, organization and leadership. This effort led to several major studies which clarified the conceptual dimensions of

rural development participation and synthesized the basic literature in that area.²

Hence, by the time the cooperative agreement began in 1979, the task before Cornell researchers was to undertake more specialized studies on particular aspects of rural development participation and to undertake focused field studies and applied consulting activities that both served USAID missions and promoted increased understanding of local involvement and strategies for promoting it.³ The USAID Mission in the Yemen Arab Republic was one of those served by the Rural Development Participation Project. Other countries where USAID was assisted include: Botswana, the Cameroon, Liberia, Tanzania, Senegal-Gambia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Tunisia, Indonesia, Nepal, the Phillipines, Sri Lanka, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic and Jamaica.

2 The principal studies are: John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff, Rural Development Participation: Concepts and Measures for Project Design, Implementation and Evaluation (Ithaca: Cornell University, Center for International Studies, Rural Development Committee, Monograph Series No. 2, 1977); Norman T. Uphoff, John M. Cohen and Arthur Goldsmith, Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation: A State of the Art Paper (Ithaca: Cornell University, Center for International Studies, Rural Development Committee, Monograph Series No. 3, 1979).

3 Under its research Agreement with USAID, the project team attempted: to better conceptualize the notion of rural development participation; to develop indicators of its various dimensions and contexts; to reflect on the extent to which participation should be treated as either an end in its own right or a means to achieve other ends through mobilization of people and resources; to analyze the relationship between participation and the distribution of power and authority, both within a project setting and in the broader society; to understand the complex relationship between local government, governmental decentralization, and participation; to study the effects of participation on development benefits and spread effects; to develop strategies for appropriate intervention in order to engender or encourage participation in the development process; to analyze strategies for the kinds of interventions that are suitable or feasible, given societal or project constraints; to expand generally the understanding of causes and consequences of participation in development; and to apply this emerging knowledge base to real world problems through case studies and applied consulting activities.

In Yemen, Cornell researchers studied ways in which USAID could provide development support to little understood but dynamic local development associations. In other countries, Cornell assisted USAID missions addressing such objectives as: promoting the use of traditional water users organizations in irrigation canal or community water pump projects; promoting local identification of public works needs and involving local people in the decision, implementation and evaluation processes of such projects; promoting the participation of small-scale farmers in plant breeding research activities; or assisting local government reorganization efforts in developing policies that increase the possibilities for grassroots involvement by rural people.

Cornell's summary report on the Rural Development Participation Project presents a long list of activities carried out during the period of the cooperative agreement.⁴ It also sets forth an extraordinarily long list of publications that resulted from the research of Cornell team members in the countries listed above and elsewhere. We believe that the Yemen Research Program was an important part of this overall USAID funded activity and trust that the sections which follow will document that assertion.

Request of USAID Mission in Yemen For Assistance

Cornell's involvement in Yemen began with a request from James J. Dalton on May 23, 1977.⁵ Representing the Near East Bureau, he asked Collenjues in his unit to begin to explore possibilities for requesting Cornell's services for Yemen under the new Cooperative

4 Norman T. Uphoff, Summary Report of Rural Development Participation Project, 1977-1982 (Ithaca: Cornell University, Center for International Studies, Rural Development Committee, 1982).

5 James J. Dalton, "Expanded Program Cornell University," (Internal Memorandum to Alfred D. White AA/NE from Dalton NE/TECH/SP-RD, Washington, D.C., May 23, 1977).

Agreement on Bureau Development Participation. A month later, Cornell's John M. Cohen met in Washington with Yemen Mission Director Robert Huseman.

At this meeting Huseman told Cohen that his basic programming problem in the rural sector was lack of data.⁶ While interested in the assistance Cornell could provide on community action and participation strategies, the Director made it clear that he wished a research relationship which would generate a broad range of data on the rural sector and processes of change in it. Cornell stated its willingness to gather such data, in part because it wanted the opportunity to study LDAs and in part because it recognized that research on LDAs had to be set in context and little systematic data was available on rural Yemen. At the conclusion of these discussions, Huseman invited Cornell to send a team of interested specialists to Sana'a in the near future.

In June 1977, the Yemen Mission's Annual Budget Submission was discussed in Washington. Included in the ABS was a recommendation for:

"Local Resources for Development (FY 1979 - \$865,000; LOP - \$8,315,000) - using Fixed Amount Reimbursable (FAR) procedures, this project is designed to stimulate rural Yemeni investment in beneficial community action projects identified by the villages, and would for the most part utilize their own funds. Design assistance would be provided by local village organizations and, upon satisfactory completion of a project, A.I.D. would reimburse part of the costs."⁷

6 John M. Cohen, "Rural Participation Project: Yemen and Nepal, January 29, 1977" (Internal Memorandum to Norman Uphoff, Ithaca, June 30, 1977).

7 "Yemen Issues Paper: Yemen ABS Review, Thursday June 16, 1977, 2:00 P.M." (Internal USAID Memorandum), pp. 2-3.

Despite internal and external reservations about the proposed "Local Resources for Development Project,"⁸ a project design team began to prepare a Project Paper in early 1978, aiming at establishing a project approved for funding by early FY 1979.

In connection with the Yemen Mission's design efforts, Cohen and Lewis were invited to Sana'a to discuss possible Cornell involvement in the emerging project.⁹ During their March 1978 visit to discuss possible linkages between the Cornell participation project and USAID, they: (1) conducted a three day workshop on rural development issues in Yemen;¹⁰ (2) advised the Mission on a research strategy for studying the rural sector in a systematic and policy relevant way;¹¹ (3) discussed with USAID staff ways in which Cornell might play a role in

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- 8 For example see: James J. Dalton, "Review of Nicholson 'Concept Paper'," (Internal NE/TECH/SP-RD memorandum to Project Committee - Local Resources for Development, February 2, 1978); Robert Burrowes, "Report" (Consultant Letter to E. Glazer, Yemen Desk Officer/NE, February 1, 1978).
- 9 John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Egypt and Yemen as Possible Project Countries" (Trip Report to Cornell University and USAID, April 12, 1978).
- 10 Cohen and Lewis designed, prepared materials for and led the workshop on short notice for USAID and the National Institute for Public Administration (NIPA) and USAID. Held at NIPA, the three day workshop ran from March 25 to 27 and reached approximately 30 people, including senior members of the government and representatives of the donor community. Cornell consultant Manfred Wenner and USAID's Norman Nicholson also directed a session of the workshop.
- 11 Through discussions and a memorandum, Cohen and Lewis advised on: (1) consolidating available secondary data under a useful classification system; (2) developing a number of ideal profiles of the wide range of rural environments that characterize the country; (3) establishing a Mission Research Committee to encourage and direct an applied research program focused on rural Yemen; (4) formulating a set of research priorities that could guide applied research funding decisions; and (5) arranging procedures for them to assist Mission staff in reviewing research products produced by consultants. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Research Strategy of USAID/Yemen" (Memorandum Prepared for USAID Mission, Sana's, March 28, 1978).

assisting in the implementation of the forthcoming Local Resources for Development Project; and (4) joined major rural areas in order to obtain a better understanding of Yemen's development opportunities and constraints.

On returning to Ithaca, Cohen and Lewis recommended to the Program Committee for the Rural Development Participation Project that, if requested, Cornell agree to make Yemen one of the four countries the larger umbrella Cooperative Agreement required Cornell to serve on an intensive, long term basis. Discussions continued for the remainder of 1978, culminating in a December visit by Cohen and Lewis to Sana'a to work out formal arrangements and a research design for a Yemen Research Program. By then Cornell had agreed to make Yemen a major focus country and USAID/Washington had approved Project 045.

Over the next few months, Cohen and Lewis elaborated a research design, conducted a wide ranging search for field team researchers and undertook a detailed survey of existing secondary data sources on rural Yemen. Final approval for appointing two researchers and a short-term translator for the field was made by Cornell's Program Committee in April 1979. However, it was not until June that a formal agreement on the project was signed by the Government of Yemen and USAID. And, it was not until January 23, 1980 that a formal contract agreement was signed by Cornell University and USAID.

The contract and related amendments are presented in Annex I. The total amount obligated was \$370,050, of which \$107,000 came from the Cornell's larger cooperative agreement budget. Despite the delay in signing the contract, Cornell researchers were in the field by July 1979. For a review of Cornell activities from mid-1979 to the end of the Yemen Research Program see Section V of this Final Report.

SECTION II
RESEARCH CONTEXT

Overview of Yemen Arab Republic

The Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) is located at the southern corner of the Arabian peninsula. The different areas of the country vary greatly with regard to their ecological, agricultural, and societal characteristics, ranging from the dry but productive coastal lowlands of the Tihama, through the agriculturally rich waddis of foothills and fertile highlands surrounded by rugged mountain peaks, to the arid deserts of the interior of the peninsula.¹² For centuries this Islamic country was a nominal dependency of the Ottoman Empire.¹³ After gaining independence at the end of the First World War, it was ruled by an Iman who kept the country largely isolated from the West and closed to external economic forces and technological innovations. This absolutism ended in 1962 with a coup attempt that triggered a civil war. For the next several years, fighting between nationalistic republican army officers and royalists impeded development in both rural and urban areas. By 1969 the republicans gained the dominant position and the war ended. Attempted coups d'etat, assassinations of top political leaders, and tribal conflict, however, have continued to threaten national stability. Even today, the central government has only limited authority in the hinterland. The functions of local government are performed largely by the village sheikhs--traditionally independent men for whom tribal allegiances are often paramount to

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12. For a description of these ecological zones see: Richard F. Nyrop, et.al., Area Handbook for the Yemens (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 55-87; Richard Tutwiler, Muneera Salem Murdock and Michael M. Horowitz, Workshop on the Problems and Prospects for Development in the Yemen Arab Republic (Binghamton: Institute for Development Anthropology, Inc., Report No. 2, 1976), pp. 6-19.
13. On the political history of Yemen see: Harold Ingrams, The Yemen: Imans, Rulers and Revolutions (London: John Murray, 1963); Robert W. Stookey, Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); Manfred W. Wenner, Modern Yemen: 1918-1966 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).

national concerns.¹⁴ While the larger towns and southern and western parts of the country are more integrated with the national government, few government officials go into the remoter regions of the north without apprehension.

On the basis of data from the early 1970s, Yemen has some six million people and an area of 145,000 square kilometers.¹⁵ Nearly 90% of the population traditionally has earned its livelihood from agriculture or animal husbandry.¹⁶ The country has highland, waddi, coastal plain, and arid regions. Major crops of the highlands include sorghum, wheat, millet, barley, fruits, tomatoes, potatoes, and a variety of lentils. The seasonally heavy flowing rivers of the foothill waddis permit the cultivation of most cereals, sugar cane, and tropical fruits such as mangoes and bananas. Dates, tobacco, cotton, millet, and sorghum are widely grown on the hot Tihama plain along the coast. Most farmers also raise a few cows or other animals around their houses, but there are a few who pastoralists work their herds on the arid fringes of the cultivated areas.

Overall, some 90% of agricultural crop production is made up of cereals, with the northern parts of the country dominated by sorghum,

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14. Among the few reports on this local government system are: Manfred W. Wenner, "Local Government in (North) Yemen," (Paper presented for USAID/Yemen, May 1978); Steffen, et.al., Final Report, pp. I/39-56; Nyrop, et.al., The Yemens, pp. 218-20.
 15. The most reliable source of population data and demographic characteristics, indeed one of the most valuable studies yet done on Yemen, is: H. Steffen, et.al., Final Report of the Airphoto Interpretation Project of the Swiss Technical Co-operation Service, Berne (Zurich: Central Planning Organization, April 1978).
 16. The two major sources of general agricultural data are: A. Bartelink, Yemen Agricultural Handbook (Eschborn, 1974); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "Agricultural Sector Memorandum for Yemen Arab Republic," (Draft Memorandum, April 14, 1977). See also: Sheila Carapico and Richard Tutwiler, "Yemeni Agriculture and Economic Change: Case Studies of Two Highland Regions" (Paper presented for American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Sana'a, October 1980).

millet, and barley, and the south by sorghum and maize. A total of some 1.8 million hectares are thought to be in production. In 1972 agriculture accounted for 70% of gross national product, with coffee being the major export product, followed by cotton, salt, and hides. Despite this well-established agrarian base, by 1970, food production was lagging behind population growth. The problem has since been exacerbated by recurring periods of drought.

Most rural people live on small farms using traditional production techniques and working the soil either by hand or with oxen.¹⁷ Rural land ownership patterns vary from region to region, but the country does

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17. Among the few descriptions of rural and small town life in Yemen are: Thomas Gerholm, Market, Mosque and Mafraj: Social Inequality in a Yemeni Town (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 1977); S.Z. Moczarski, "Sample Socio-Economic Survey of Five Villages in Ibb Governorate" (Paper Prepared for FAO, Ta'iz, 1971); K. Al-Iryani, "un temoignage: scènes de vie dans un village yéménite," Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain, XV, 73 (1968): pp. 4-7; J. Chelhoud, "L'Organisation Sociale au Yemen," L'Ethnographie, LXIV (1970): pp. 61-86; Walter Dostal, "Socioeconomic Aspects of Tribal Democracy in Northeast Yemen," Sociologus, XXIV, 1 (1974): pp. 1-15; Herman A. Escher, Wirtschafts and Sozialgeographische Untersuchungen in der Wadi Mawr Region (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1976); Claudie Fayien, Yemen (Paris: Petite Planète, 1975); Ron Hart and Richard Tutwiler, "Survey of Socio-Economic Aspects of the Development Potential of Three Yemeni Sub-Districts" (Report Prepared for USAID Yemen, Community Development Associations, June, 1977); Cynthia Myntti, Women and Development in the Yemen Arab Republic (Rossdorf: German Agency for Technical Cooperation, 1979); Carla Makhoulouf, Changing Veils: Women and Modernization in North Yemen (London: Croon Helm, 1979); Peter Somerville-Lange, Tribes and Tribulations: a Journey in Republican Yemen (London: Hale, 1967); Sheila Carapico and Sharon Hart, "The Sexual Division of Labor and Prospects for Integrated Rural Development: Report on Women's Economic Activities in Nahweit, Tawila and Jihana Regions" (Report Prepared for USAID, Community Development Foundation, Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations, June, 1977); Robert Wilson, "Regular and Permanent Markets in the Sana'a Region," in Arabian Studies, V, edited by R.B. Serjeant and R.L. Bidwell (London: C. Hurt and Co., 1979), pp. 189-91; for a thorough review of related literature see footnotes in the general Cornell publications.

not seem to be plagued by the kinds of concentrated holdings that have made rural development difficult in countries.¹⁸ While irrigation has increased since the end of the civil war, it still covers only a minor proportion of the land; most farmers have to use dry farming practices. They have, however, developed a high degree of sophistication in the management of runoff rain water. On the terraced hillsides and in the waddis, it is efficiently channeled from field to field with minimal losses.

In 1972 industry accounted for only 3% of Yemen's gross domestic product, and it employed less than 1% of the labor force. Despite a 1969 law designed to attract foreign capital investment, the country still has only one textile mill, a small aluminum plant, and a cement factory--all established with foreign aid. The use of mechanical power is limited. The country has no known oil; deposits of other mineral resources are small and largely untapped.

In 1972 the country stood at the bottom of most lists for demographic, development and quality of life indicators.¹⁹ Per capita income was US\$80 per year, illiteracy rates ran more than 90%, and such pervasive diseases as tuberculosis and malaria, as well as chronic malnutrition, kept life expectancy at the low level of thirty-six years. Few public services reached the towns, much less the villages, and amenities such as portable water systems, health clinics, or schools were available only in a few of the larger towns. Sanitary public

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18. The percentage of tenants to owners is substantially higher in the southern highlands than in the northern mountains or the Tihama. The tenants' share of the crop has steadily increased with the rise of labor migration. No industrial survey has been done in Yemen, though a few land tenure studies exist: H. Deguin, Arabische Republik Jemen: Wirtschaftsgeographie eines Entwicklungslandes (Riyadh: n.p., 1976); Herman A. Escher, Wirtschafts und sozial geographische Untersuchungen in der Wadi Mawr Region (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1976).
19. The major sources of quality of life statistics are: Steffen, et.al., Final Report, passim; Central Planning Office, Statistical Year Book 1977-1978 (Sana'a: Statistics Department, 1979), and Prime Ministry Office, Housing Statistics in the Yemen Arab Republic (Sana'a: December 1976).

sewers were unknown in most towns and paved streets rare. Moreover, there was an acute shortage of trained manpower to staff clinics, schools, or public welfare organizations. Indeed, the government had few of the technical or middle-level managerial people so necessary for development.²⁰ And, in the agricultural sector, there was little agricultural research, no production credit programs, and few extension agents. Poor road and communication networks held back the development of efficient markets; storage systems were scarcely developed.

Despite this dismal description, the situation is changing, and Yemen has the potential for a productive and profitable rural sector. The country contains some of the most fertile land on the Arabian Peninsula and its people are hard working, energetic, and entrepreneurial. Moreover, the ruling military coalition has a political and economic philosophy centered on Islam, pragmatism, and free enterprise.

Rural Development and Local Development Associations

Yemen, like many of the world's poorer countries, is pursuing rural development as a strategy for addressing the problem of poverty.²¹ However, unlike many of these countries, Yemen presently has a significant opportunity to make substantial progress in this direction. To seize this opportunity, the country must pursue policies and programs that mobilize income already created, and use it to build a self-sustaining economic base for the nation.

20. In 1975 there were an estimated 31,315 government employees at all levels, most of whom were in the national capital of Sana'a, the principal port city of al-Hudeidah, or the regional towns of Ta'iz, Ibb or Hajja. The ministries of Interior, Municipalities and Finance accounted for half the total of government staff. Half the government staff, including most skilled administrators and technicians, are assigned to ministry headquarters. Central Planning Organization, 1975 Manpower Survey (Sana'a: Statistics Department, 1976), Table 5.

21. The government's strategy is described in: Prime Ministry Office, Summary of the First Five-Year Plan of the Yemen Arab Republic (Beirut: United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia and Central Planning Organization, 1977).

In the last few years, the country has experienced an unprecedented growth in opportunities for its labor force to work abroad, particularly in Saudi Arabia.²² As a result, some experts have estimated that up to 40 percent of the male Yemeni work force are seeking short or long term employment opportunities abroad. These workers are earning substantial incomes and sending much of the money back to Yemen. In 1978-79, the annual flow of remittances was approximately \$1.3 billion, an amount exceeding the entire GNP of the nation only four years earlier. Real per capita income doubled from about \$200 to \$400 (adjusted to 1975 prices). Since nearly every family sends a member to work in Saudi Arabia, the impact of remittance income has been broadly distributed across the population. Wealth does not appear to be concentrating in the hands of the elite.

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22. The patterns and effects of emigration are described in: Jon C. Swanson, Emigration and Economic Development: the Case of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979); J.S. Birks, C.A. Sinclair and J.A. Socknat, International Migration Project: Country Study, Yemen Arab Republic (Durham: International Migration Project, Department of Economics, University of Durham, September 1978); Donald H. McClelland, "Yemeni Worker Emigration and Remittances," (Report prepared for USAID, Sana'a, June 7, 1978); J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, "International Labor Migration in the Arab Middle East," Third World Quarterly, I,2 (1979), pp. 95; Christ Kutschera, "North Yemen: The Gilt Peels Off," The Middle East (February 1981), pp. 57-8. Lee Ann Ross, "Yemen Migration: Blessing and Dilemma" (Paper presented to USAID Seminar on Near East Labor Flows, Washington, D.C., 1977); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "Yemen Arab Republic: Effects of Migration of Rural Labor on Agricultural Development" (Agricultural Sector Memorandum, Report No. 2585-YAR, June 26, 1979, p. 14). This report notes 660,923 in 1979, Ibid., Table 11, p. 4: On the question of the number of Yemeni migrants see: J.S. Birks, C.A. Sinclair and J.A. Socknat, "Aspects of Labour Migration from North Yemen," Middle Eastern Studies, XVII, 1 (1981) p. 55. The complex remittance transfer pattern is described in: Lee Ann Ross, "An Informal Banking System: The Remittance Agents of Yemen" (Unpublished paper, USAID, Sana'a, 1980).

While Yemen has enjoyed a dramatic improvement in the levels of per capita income, the growth of the economy as a system of production has not kept pace.²³ This is a serious problem for the country. Recent economic data suggest that the growth in remittances may be slowing while inflation continues unabated. The data indicate that the number of migrants is stabilizing and that these workers are beginning to invest part of their earnings in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Still, barring unforeseen political disruptions, the country can expect the income from remittances to remain reasonably stable at current levels. The question is whether this flow of resources can be translated into economic growth before it begins to diminish, as eventually it must.

At present there is a tendency on the part of remittance earners to purchase land (more for reasons of security than for investment) and build houses, or to buy basic consumer goods and luxuries (such as television sets). To sustain a continuing improvement in the standard of living, Yemen must develop its economy. The country is heavily dependent on imports, particularly for food. Up until the late 1970s, Yemen enjoyed a strong positive balance of payments. But export earnings were equal to less than one percent of imports and gradually consumption expenditures have led to an increasing negative balance of payments position. In the past the deficit was covered by foreign exchange remittances. This however, is no longer possible. There is also a lack of recognized investment opportunities, both for individuals and cooperative associations. The bulk of the nation's financial resources are being held in the form of cash rather than

23. Tentative profiles of Yemen's little understood economy are: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Yemen Arab Republic: Development of a Traditional Economy, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Report No. 2057a-YAR, 1978); John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, Rural Development in the Yemen Arab Republic: Strategy Issues in a Capital-Surplus Labor-Short Economy (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development, Discussion Paper No. 52, 1979).

being put to work through the banking system. Yemen thus finds itself in the situation of seeking opportunities to harness existing liquidity for purposes of development rather than mobilizing development for purposes of generating investable resources.²⁴

Local development efforts in rural areas are critical to harnessing remittance resources. The central government is not organized to tax the broadly distributed remittances, nor does it have the capacity to manage major development activities in the scattered rural settlements where most of the population lives. The government is, however, supporting development in at least three different ways: building national infrastructure (e.g., trunk highway network, national electric grid); maintaining policies that encourage personal initiative for economic activities; and facilitating development initiatives by local organizations. Supporting the development efforts of local organizations has proven to be a critically important, but difficult task for relatively little is known about how they function or about their potential capacities.

Local Development Associations

Recent research in Third World countries suggests that rural development projects are more likely to be successful when initiated and managed by participatory local organizations.²⁵ This emerging

24. Economists to date have little advice for this situation. See generally, Anand G. Chandavarkar, "Use of Migrants' Remittances in Labor-Exporting Countries," Finance and Development (June 1980), pp. 36-9; and specifically, John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Capital-Surplus, Labor-Short Economies: Yemen as a Challenge to Rural Development Strategies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, LXI, 3 (1979), pp. 523-8.

25. Two of the major studies supporting this proposition are: Norman T. Upholff and Milton J. Esman, Local Organizations for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Rural Development Committee, 1974); Development Alternatives, Inc., Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects (Washington, D.C., Development Alternatives, May, 1975).

perspective confronts a substantial body of literature which pessimistically argues that local level organizations provide little effective opportunity for local participation in the allocation of resources or the distribution of decision power.²⁶ The resolution of this debate will have profound implications for development planning not only in Yemen, but also in other countries. Clarification of the issues necessitates detailed research on the relationship between local-level organizations, participatory strategies and rural development processes.²⁷

Research is particularly needed in regard to the potential for using traditional or indigenous organizations to engage in the promotion of what are often considered modern development tasks. To date, only a handful of case studies are available on the development activities of such organizations,²⁸ and most of these focus on farmers' cooperative

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26. The most influential of these is: Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 134-157. For an example of numerous pessimistic views of local level organizations see: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Rural Cooperatives as Agents of Change: A Research Report and a Debate (Geneva: Series on Rural Institutions and Planned Change No. 8, UNRISD, 1975).
27. A first step in this direction is found in: David D. Gow, et.al., Local Organizations and Rural Development: A Comparative Reappraisal, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1979).
28. The general literature on traditional organizations was recently summarized in Lenore Ralson, James Anderson and Elizabeth Colson, "Voluntary Efforts in Decentralized Management" (Paper prepared by the Project on Managing Decentralization, Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, February 1981). For summaries of development activities of such groups, see: Robert S. Saunders, "Traditional Cooperation, Indigenous Peasants' Groups and Rural Development: A Look at Possibilities and Experiences" (Review Paper prepared for the World Bank, Washington, D.C., August 25, 1977); Norman T. Uphoff, John M. Cohen and Arthur A. Goldsmith, Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation: A State-of-the-Art Paper (Ithaca: Cornell University Rural Development Committee, Monograph Series No. 3, 1979), pp. 33-38. Illustrative of development oriented traditional organizations is the gotong rojong association movement in Java: R.M. Koentjraningrat, Some Social-Anthropological Observations on the Gotong Rojong Practices in Two Villages of Central Java (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961).

societies. While a few observers conclude that traditional organizations can provide the basis for effective development,²⁹ most experts tend to dismiss their potential on the grounds that they are unlikely to be sympathetic to development processes and likely to be elite dominated, probably to the detriment of the poorer members of the community.³⁰

The case of Local Development Associations (LDAs) in the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) offers a number of important insights into the potential for indigenous organizations to promote progressive, participatory and equitable rural development objectives.³¹ The purpose

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29. For example: Hans Dieter Seibel and Andreas Massing, Traditional Organizations and Economic Development: Studies of Indigenous Cooperatives in Liberia (New York: Praeger, 1974); Wirsing Singh Mann, Sudan Cooperative Societies -- Present Structure and Traditional Origins (Forschungsinstitut der Friederich-Ebert-Stiftung Abteilung Entwicklungslander, 1977).
30. Guy Hunter and Janice Jiggins in their consideration of this question conclude that one had better start with new, introduced organizations rather than try to energize and adapt existing ones: "Farmer and Community Groups" (London: Overseas Development Institute, Agricultural Administration Unit, mimeo, 1977). Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith, Feasibility and Application, pp. 49-50 argue that the possibilities of engaging traditional organizations should be actively explored, making no assumptions in advance that they are incapable (or capable) of serving rural development project goals.
31. The limited fugitive literature on LDAs includes: James Wyche Green, "Local Initiatives in Yemen: Studies of Four Local Development Associations," (Paper prepared for USAID, Washington, D.C., October 1975); Peter G.L. Wass, "The Role of Local Development Associations and the Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations, Yemen Arab Republic," (Paper prepared for the Middle East Division, Ministry of Overseas Development, Amman, 1976); Richard Tutwiler, "Ta'Awon Mahweet: The Social History of a Local Development Association in Highland Yemen," (Paper presented to the Conference on Strategies of Local Development in the Middle East, University of Maryland, September 20-23, 1978); Sheila Carapico, "The Cooperative Framework for Local Development, in Hajjah and Hudeidah Governorates, Y.A.R.," (Paper prepared for USAID, Sana'a, January 1980); Barbara Samuels, "Local Development Associations in Yemen: An Accumulation of Official Documentation and Case Studies," (Paper prepared for USAID, Near East Bureau, Washington, D.C., 1979); Brinkley M. Messick, "Transactions in Ibb: Economy and Society in a Yemeni Highland Town," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1978).

of the Cornell research activity has been to document this interesting example of indigenous local organizations which are grounded in traditional society yet have achieved dramatic development results and become important, nationally recognized institutions.

What the central and local government cannot do, rural people and townsmen have shown they can organize themselves to do. In recent years a growing number of local or village level development associations has appeared throughout Yemen. To some extent they result from the decentralized propensity of Islam to allow grass roots community participation. More immediately, they result from popular demand for better infrastructure and social services, the inability of the central government to provide these, and the increased flow of financial resources from Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

As with many indigenous organizations, LDAs have roots in religious traditions of the community and ethnic and tribal loyalties. The foundations on which these organizations are based can be traced back to: Islam's communal routine and emphasis on the active participation of its followers in the activities of mosque and community; the religion's welfare associations and Muslim brotherhoods that maintain mosques and care for the poor; traditions of local rule generated by historical Yemen's fiercely independent tribal divisions; and well established practices of discontinuous local cooperative efforts to meet common community needs. Some communities claim to have had a "local development association" for generations and other communities acknowledge that they only recently organized themselves for community development purposes, largely as a result of having observed self-help successes in neighboring areas and having been influenced by government requests to form one. But most communities have a long history of Islamic mosque directors (ulema) commandeering people and resources for local projects, sheiks identifying local needs and taking responsibility to see that the community acts to resolve them, or groups of local people forming a transitory organization to carry out a specific project in the community's interest.

There was some effort to build on these traditions during the civil war when local religious groups organized community efforts to rehabilitate

war damaged villages and assisted families of men killed in fighting. Labor influences from Aden (South Yemen) stimulated the rise of early LDAs in southern towns, many of which were later suppressed for political activity. However, the LDA movement did not really begin until it was actively stimulated by the late president Ibrahim al Hamdi. Local communities rapidly responded to his leadership. Building on mosque, community and tribe, and realizing that development was unlikely to come from the center, leaders and local people organized themselves to bring roads, schools, clinics and water systems to their communities. Attracted by the achievements of the early LDAs, probably worried about the politicalization of a few of them and recognizing the utility of a national LDA organizational hierarchy for state building, national leadership moved quickly both to encourage the movement and control it.

Clearly aware of its development limitations, the central government increasingly relied on LDAs to improve the quality of rural life and to provide a basis for more productive agriculture.³² Its policy of "increasing community self-help and self-reliance, and strengthening local institutions and leadership"³³ began in 1963³⁴ when President al Hamdi issued Ordinance No. 11 which provided a rudimentary legal basis for local welfare associations which were springing up and Law No. 26 of 1963 which specified the form cooperatives were to be organized

32. "Report of the Yemen International Development Conference," (Sana'a, December 1, 1977), p. 61.

33. The Five Year Plan is frequently referred to as relying on LDAs to promote these activities. Certainly this was a major theme in conferences related to the Plan. Yet, it is hard to find specific references to LDAs in the Plan's seven-volume translation. Barbara Croken, Source Materials in Arabic on Rural Development and the Cooperative Movement in the Yemen Arab Republic (Ithaca: Yemen Research Project, Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1980), pp. 67-9.

34. The Yemen Government's account of LDA history is found in: Abdelwahab el Muayyad, Al Ta'Awon: Cooperative Movement in Yemen: Its Beginning and Development (Sana'a: Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations, n.d.) in Arabic with English summary.

into. The civil war made it particularly difficult for the government to stimulate and regulate the activities of these local welfare associations. Finally, in 1968, the government established a Department of Social Affairs, Youth and Labor in the Ministry of Local Administration, and charged it with promoting LDA involvement in agricultural, infrastructural and social development. This came at a time of growing need for coordination: a drought was stimulating local efforts to find new water sources; isolated communities were increasingly recognizing the need for feeder roads; and OPEC-generated remittances for these and other efforts were beginning to flow from overseas Yemeni workers.

In the early 1970s, as part of a national reconstruction effort, representatives of LDAs met with central government officials to explore the possibility of establishing a national self-help movement with an organization to mobilize and direct it. After a series of discussions in 1973, the Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations (CYDA) was formed.³⁵ A firm legal base for CYDA and the LDA movement was provided by Law No. 35 of 1975 which superceded earlier legislation. The new law laid out an organizational and administrative format for the movement, and committed financial resources to help support it. Today CYDA is under the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor and Youth. Under the motto, "War on Backwardness," it oversees projects, administers funds and coordinates various aid projects of donors. In addition, it seeks to provide technical support and funds where needed.

35. A meeting between rural LDA leaders and officials of the government took place on March 24, 1973. At the base of the meeting was the realization by LDAs of the disadvantages of dealing individually with the central government and the realization by the government that it needed control over the LDAs political directions and the use of their development potential. A second meeting in June was more broadly representative. It established a national forum for coordinating and promoting the LDA movement through a General Union. Finally, a national conference was held in November 1973 which led to the establishment of CYDA and agreement on a general program of action and organizational framework to achieve it. Green, "Local Initiatives in Yemen," p. 81; Abdelwahab el Muayyad, Al Ta'Awon, pp. 15-19; Carapico, "Cooperative Framework," pp. 6-7.

The reassignment of functions within the Ministry of Local Administration, the formation of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor and Youth, and the creation of CYDA hint at some interesting patterns of state building. The conversion of the semi-feudal system of the Imam into a modern government was clearly viewed by the Republicans as a difficult task. Hence, there is a relationship between the center's interest in the LDA movement, the penetration of the periphery and, possibly, the formation of a political party.

Known in Arabic as Ta'awon or local cooperatives for development, LDAs and communities within their jurisdiction build roads (frequently one way tracks for four wheel drive vehicles), construct village water systems, dig wells or cisterns, and build schools and clinics.³⁶ Some LDAs also function as local welfare systems, or provide activity centers for youth and literacy programs. Indeed, LDAs show some signs of providing more than a development or welfare function. There is evidence that some are independent arbiters of local conflict,³⁷ and that LDAs might become the basis for political organization of the countryside.³⁸ At present, however, LDAs are generally viewed as "a rare example of local development initiative"³⁹ and "the only institution in Yemen

36. CYDA regulations authorize a broad range of local level activities: construction of feeder roads, development of handicrafts, establishment of centers for aged, disabled, youth or mothers with children, promotion of adult education, provision of schools, teachers or educational materials, formulation of agricultural cooperatives, building of wells, dikes or other water systems, work with reforestation and construction of health clinics.

37. Tutwiler notes "...the mediation of conflict and the careful balancing of local and national pressures is one of the most critical and time-consuming of their (leaders of the Mahweet LDA) activities." "Ta'Awon Mahweet," p. 26. There is, however, some question as to whether the LDA itself plays a role in mediating conflicts. Traditionally, local tribal leaders were mediators; these people are likely to be LDA leaders.

38. It appears that some of the early LDAs, particularly in the Ta'iz area, were quite politicized, creating pressures for both their suppression and the need for the center to better control the direction of the movement.

39. IBID, Yemen Arab Republic, I, p. 84.

operating at the level of the mass of peasants in the countryside which holds the promise of assisting the poorest of the poor meet their basic needs."⁴⁰

LDAs are regarded as independent community associations and not official state entities.⁴¹ That is, LDAs are locally initiated and supported, but given governmental recognition and support by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor and Youth.

Figures on the number of LDAs are highly variable. In 1975 there were 65 certified LDAs and 80 reported by CYDA.⁴² Without distinguishing between certified and non-certified LDAs, CYDA reported 117 LDAs in 1976, 171 in 1978 and 187 in 1979.⁴³

Reliable data on LDA activities are hard to come by, for CYDA's information systems are still under development. Nevertheless, the magnitude of LDA activity is clearly illustrated in Table 1. Care should be taken in using this table, as activities are under-reported and expenditure reports tend to be inaccurate. The reason for the varying number of LDAs reporting is that highland LDAs have concentrated primarily on roads and, to a lesser extent, water systems. Lowland LDAs, blessed with dry weather access roads, have concentrated on schools, water distribution systems or electricity supply projects. Few LDAs have moved to such second generation tasks as supply cooperatives, adult education programs, or handicraft and rural industry enterprises. For the next few years,

40. Richard W. Gable, "Government and Administration in the Yemen Arab Republic," (Paper prepared for the Office of Rural and Administrative Development, USAID, January 1979), p. 86.

41. Carapico, "Cooperative Framework," p. 2.

42. Green, "Local Initiatives in Yemen," p. 8. See also Samuels, "Local Development Associations," p. 12. Apparently in the early years of the CYDA movement some LDAs resisted incorporation into the national movement. This is the probable distinction between certified and uncertified. When all LDAs were declared part of the CYDA organizational hierarchy the distinction was no longer meaningful.

43. Al Ta'Awon: Documents of the Second Round of the Elections and the Fourth General Congress (Sana'a: CYDA, n.d.) in Arabic with English summary, p. 23.

the emphasis will continue to be on roads, schools, water systems and clinic buildings, a priority list matching the country's Five Year Plan.

TABLE 1
LDA ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES:
1976/77 - 1977/78

Type Project	No. of LDAs Reporting	No. of Projects	Total Expenditure (Yr) (\$1 = Yr 4.5)
Roads	90	6,520km	389,375,000
Schools	88	347	64,831,000
Water	80	643	24,525,000
General*	47	143	25,029,000
Health	24	30	4,313,796
Total Expenditures			508,073,796

Source: Al'Taawar, January 22, 1979.

*Includes electricity projects, youth centers, and other miscellaneous projects.

LDAs vary considerably in their stage of development; some have existed for over a decade, others for only a few years. Their structures and functions also show substantial variation reflecting differences in local resources, politics, personalities and needs. Therefore generalization based on CYDA by-laws and rules, case studies and other reports is risky. Yet, an increasing number of international donors have shown an interest in providing financial and technical assistance to CYDA and selected LDAs. They want research so they can conceptualize, design and implement LDA related projects.

International Donors and Knowledge Base

The overview of the research context and LDAs just presented did not exist in 1976 when USAID began to design its "Local Resources for Development Project." That summary represents a brief consolidated statement of the work product of Cornell's Yemen Research Program, a work product which in part benefits from significant new research activities undertaken by other professionals and international agencies during the past few years.

Because so little was known about rural Yemen and the LDA movement when Project 045 was designed, it became necessary to learn from the program as it was implemented. In today's terminology, the project design was based more on a "process or learning model" than on a "blueprint model."⁴⁴ The strategy for doing this will be described shortly. For now it only needs to be noted that the purpose of Cornell's involvement in Yemen was to: (1) assist the Mission and the Project 045 contractor to better understand processes of rural development in Yemen and the patterns which characterized LDAs and their activities relative to those processes; and (2) contribute to the comparative study of rural development participation being undertaken by Cornell University's Rural Development Committee through a grant from USAID's Office of Rural Development and Development Administration.

Formidable Research Challenge

There are very good reasons why only limited field research has been done in rural Yemen. Effective field work requires researchers with solid Arabic skills, adequate knowledge about Yemeni social life and a willingness to live under difficult conditions for long periods of time.⁴⁵

44. David C. Korten, "Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach," Public Administration Review, XL, 5 (1980), pp. 480-503.

45. For example, health: in January 1981, after a protracted illness, Hebert had to be medical-evacuated to the United States for treatment. Or, for example, members of the Cornell research team had narrow misses on the hazardous roads and soft shoulders of mountain passes.

Moreover, obtaining the research permission, security clearance and travel permits needed to undertake field research is no easy matter. Beyond this, there is little conventional wisdom on how to undertake social science research in rural Yemen.⁴⁶ Researchers must learn about opportunities and constraints as they undertake their studies, hoping in the meantime that they make no fatal mistake.

All this and more was known when Cornell agreed to undertake the project and began to work out a research design and recruit field personnel. From the beginning it was recognized that doing the requested research constituted a formidable challenge. Fortunately the research co-directors were both optimists with non-Yemen specialists. Before they knew a great deal about Yemen they agreed to undertake an overly ambitious research effort. However, as will be submitted in later sections, the objectives of the research design were in general successfully completed. To a large extent this is because of the perseverance and dedication of members of Cornell's field team. It is also due to the advice and assistance which all members of the Cornell team received from professional researchers already working successfully in rural Yemen. In this regard, particular acknowledgement must be given to Sheila Carapico, Richard Tutwiler and Robert Burrowes. In addition, very helpful insights were gained from USAID's Lee Ann Ross, and Frank Pavich.

46. In fact, when the Yemen Research Program began, there were few available studies on rural Yemen. Gerholm's 1977 study had just been published and it provided some insights into community level field work, Market, Mosque and Mafraj, passim. Some insights were available in the 1978 Final Report of the Swiss project led by Steffin. But for the most part, it was necessary to search out and meet the new generation of Yemeni experts with field experience such as: Ron Hart, Jon Swanson, Richard Tutwiler, Sheila Carapico, Cynthia Myntti and Brinkley Messick.

SECTION III

YEMEN RESEARCH PROGRAM AND USAID's PROJECT 045USAID's "Local Resources for Development Project"

Preliminary design for the USAID Mission's "Local Resources for Development" Project (Project 045) began in 1976.⁴⁷ A formal agreement to execute the project was signed by the Yemen government and USAID in June of 1979, with activities beginning in March of 1980. The executing agency for the project is Chemonics, an American consulting firm.

The objective of the project was "to contribute to increased production, income and quality of life in rural Yemen" by providing "a coordinated program of technical and financial assistance, including research, to the existing local development system." Towards this end, the project was to provide training, technical assistance and a modest amount of matching grant financial support to 15-24 LDAs.

Initially designed to serve large parts of the country, the project began with a five year program centered in Hajja and Huderdah Governorates. The specific tasks to be executed by the contractor of this \$6.67 million project were: (1) train and assist local level association officials in project planning, financing, management, implementation and evaluation; (2) create technical capacities at the local level to carry out and maintain development activities in the fields of engineering, construction, agronomy, health, and human resource development; and (3) increase the organizational and technical capabilities of line ministries to support and supervise local development initiatives.

Under the project, the participating LDAs were to be divided into three groups. The first was to receive training, the second training

47. For a detailed description of the Project see: USAID, "Yemen Mission, Project Paper 045" (Mission Document Dated January 31, 1979); George R. Gardner, et.al., "Evaluation of an Integrated Rural Development Project: 'Local Resources for Development' Project 279-0045" (Paper Prepared for USAID, Sana'a, November, 1982).

and technical assistance, and the third training, technical assistance and matching-grant support. The objective was to develop the LDA's ability to plan, implement, manage and maintain local projects such as roads, water systems and agricultural infrastructure.

The program was designed to emphasize participation of the local population in development decision making and in organizing local resources for development activities. Training was to be provided both in technical aspects of project design/implementation and in the organization and management of local resources. Each participating LDA was to be required to prepare an annual work-plan outlining the goals and objectives for the activities of the year.

Research Component of "Local Resources for Development" Project

The design of Project 045 was based on USAID's explicit recognition that "it had limited knowledge of the socio-economic conditions in Yemen."⁴⁸ Hence, the project design sought to initiate the program on a pilot basis while at the same time learning about the task environment in which the project was implemented.

Two streams of information were to feed the "action research" part of the project. The first was from the work product of the Cornell Yemen Research Project, an activity partially funded by Project 045. The second was to flow from the operational work of the contractor undertaking the project.

Both streams of information were needed, for very little was known about the rural communities in the project area or about the LDAs which served them. Working cooperatively with USAID and Chemonics, Cornell produced a demanding Research Design.⁴⁹ Its success, however, depended on: (1) the cooperation and support of USAID and Chemonics;

48. USAID/Y, Project Paper 045, p. 25.

49. The full research design is set forth in: "Research Design" (Document Prepared by the Yemen Research Program, Project 270-0045 USAID/Y, Ithaca, July 12, 1979, revised March 26, 1980).

and (2) the approval and support of Yemen government officials, the national Confederation of Yemen Development Associations (CYDA) and host LDAs.

Cornell Research Program

Cornell's Yemen Research Program centered on the study of local organization, participation and development in rural Yemen. It was done in cooperation with the Government of Yemen, particularly CYDA, and USAID.

i. Research Objectives

The research was intended to generate policy relevant guidelines that could be used in future programs for helping local organizations design and implement rural development projects. The major thrust was to analyze and describe a set of carefully selected rural communities and their LDAs. The objective was to determine the relationships between successful local mobilization for development purposes and the resource environments and socio-economic characteristics of these communities.

In order to understand these relationships, it was necessary to gather background data on various communities' physical and ecological environments, social history, economic foundations, political structures, and socio-cultural patterns. It was also essential to observe the efforts of local organizations to promote either: (1) public welfare ends (such as potable water systems, better roads, or new primary health clinics); or (2) economic development ends (such as collective grain mills, canning schemes, or agricultural cooperatives). However, no mere generalized portrait of rural Yemen communities was sought. Rather, specific research attention was given to analyzing:

1. resource endowments as they relate to agricultural or off-farm development opportunities and constraints;
2. employment, income, and economic opportunity;
3. capital formation, investment, and availability of remittances;

4. land tenure, use, and productivity;
5. markets, prices, trade and distribution patterns of goods and services;
6. local organizations, Local Development Associations (LDAs), and rural local government; and,
7. informal patterns of local leadership.

A major assumption underlying the research design was that these seven specific foci were critical to explaining why some local organizations can mobilize community resources and utilize external aid for broad-base development ends, and why other local organizations in different environmental or socio-economic contexts cannot.

More generally, the Cornell effort sought to:

1. expand the knowledge base on rural Yemen in general and Hajja and Hodeidah Governorates in particular;
2. expand the knowledge base on patterns of rural change, giving particular attention to the identification of important structural or behavioral variables that either limit or facilitate that process;
3. describe the relationships between wealth, power and status, as well as their effects on participation in communities whose local organizations are undertaking development activities;
4. describe and analyze the processes by which local development activities are designed and implemented, giving particular attention to their effects on the local task environment; and
5. analyze how local organizations, such as LDAs, can serve as participatory vehicles for mobilizing local resources and promoting productive or service rural development activities in other projects.

ii. Central Research Issues

Two central issues were addressed by the research program. The first related to the potential for local Yemeni organizations to engage in rural development activities and the second was concerned with the task environment characteristics and socio-economic relationships that affected the potential for successful participatory local

local development projects. Specifically, these two research problems were:

1. What potential do local organizations in general, and Local Development Associations in particular, have for undertaking economic or income generating developmental activities, and how can the central government and foreign donors best serve and facilitate their development efforts?
2. What resource endowments or societal characteristics affect the ability of rural communities to generate development oriented local organizations, undertake different kinds of projects, or promote participatory, equitably shared development programs and projects?

The research was structured to address these problems using a general theoretical position and a set of related working hypotheses or operating assumptions. These provided the basis for the selection of local communities and their organizations to be studied, identification of data needs and formulation of survey instruments, methodological approaches and analytical techniques.

SECTION IV
RESEARCH DESIGN

Overview of Research Design

Cornell's researchers sought to gather as much data as possible without undertaking large scale surveys or engaging in quantitative multi-variable hypothesis testing. Rather Cornell operated more in the mode of standard, economic and social anthropological research, seeking to buttress qualitative analysis with the collection of standard data on such topics as markets, consumption, production, and employment. Small scale surveys and use of available statistical studies supported the quantitative effort. The qualitative approach was justified by the lack of information on rural Yemen in general and the project area in particular. In this research vacuum it was expected to be more useful to pursue the broad scope of this project rather the fine-grained, but much narrower product of highly empirical economic or sociological surveys. In this sense, the effort represented a methodological approach in "the context of discovery."

The research design thus provided a mutually reinforcing set of quantitative and qualitative methodologies. While such integrated approaches are described in the methodology literature as desirable, they are rarely attempted. The benefits of cross-checking baseline and cross-sectional data with detailed community field studies of political and economic anthropology inquiry was well suited to the study of a rural area of a country on which little information was available.

In the process of research, the anthropological effort sought both the views held by the local people on the research topics as well as the analytical observations of the researcher. Comparative analysis of both perspectives proved valuable.

The research design used the following methodological techniques:

1. participant observation
2. key informant interviews
3. cross-sectional surveys
4. case studies
5. professional informant interviews
6. secondary data collection.

Examples of the type of methods and their products are presented in Table 1.

Table 1
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

Type of Method	Examples of Product	Persons Responsible
1. Archival or Background Data Collection	Research in national and local government or donor archives for material on project area. Translations of documents, laws, regulations affecting rural development. Review of journals, newspapers, etc., containing data materials.	Cohen, Lewis, Swanson and Croken
2. Professional Informant Interviews	Discuss patterns and trends as well as general analytical issues with donor personnel and academic researchers knowledgeable about rural development and LDAs.	Cohen, Lewis, Swanson and Hebert
3. Baseline Survey	Baseline survey to yield information on the physical characteristics of the uzla, agricultural base, markets, and off-farm activities, level of development, development opportunities, and constraints on development.	Swanson and Hebert and field assistants
4. Cross-Sectional Surveys	Specific survey data on topics such as local resource base, land tenure, land use, production patterns, household management, labor and income, emigration, distribution of goods, etc.	Swanson and Hebert with field assistants
5. Detailed Community Field Studies	Extensive field notes on area and Project 045, with particular focus on variables identified in this research design.	Swanson and Hebert
6. Case Studies	Specific case studies which are instructive as to the society and economy of the area or the process by which LDAs operate (c.f., Gow studies for DAI's local organization project in Yemen).	Swanson and Hebert

Theoretical Perspectives

The research project was guided by the theoretical perspectives of human ecology and political economy. Briefly, human ecology focuses on the resource bases and ecological characteristics in which communities are situated. It studies how their factor endowments of land, labor, and capital, their cropping systems and agricultural productive patterns, their topography and infrastructure, and their other biological and physical characteristics affect local development potential and social organization. The political economy perspective focuses on the relationships between economic wealth, political power and social status, and how they relate to the social organization of the community and the processes and distributional effects of local development.

The ecological perspective was influential in setting the major criteria for selecting the communities to be studied. It led to the identification of ecological zones, land use, cropping patterns and agricultural productivity as important factors needing careful study. The political economy framework suggested a strong relationship between the possession of economic assets, the acquisition of political power and the attainment of social status. Since one of the major foci of this research was the capacity of local organizations to promote participatory, widely-spread development activities and benefits, the political economy perspective focused the research on land tenure patterns, and the household income. Another major focus was the determination of what development potential a community might have, how it might be tapped by local organizations and the effects of such activities on the community. Again, the political economy perspective suggested examination of such topics as employment, income, economic opportunity, capital formation, investment, remittances, farm productivity, risk-aversion, storage, credit, markets and prices.

Tiered Research Strategy

Cornell researchers followed standard archival methodologies for gathering data from published and fugitive materials. The gathering of original field data was done through a tiered research strategy which sought a systematic convergence of increasingly detailed information on rural communities and LDAs.

The tiered research strategy design was targeted on two significantly different ecologies: the dry lowland Tihama and the relatively well watered

highlands. Within each of the regions there are environmental sub-regions which provide opportunities to examine different socio-economic priorities and limitations. The first task, therefore, was to undertake a general assessment of the two areas under consideration. This assessment was to include both an analysis and examination of archival data and exploratory trips to Hajji and Hodeidah. The former was to be focused on providing a general socio-economic profile of the regions and the latter aimed at familiarizing researchers with the areas and identifying the communities which best reflected important intra-regional differences.

Once this basic evaluation was completed, a three-tiered research sampling strategy was designed. The first step was to choose approximately 25 uzlas for a baseline profile of general economic, social, and ecological characteristics. Uzlas selected were those which appeared to be most representative of as many different ecological and socio-economic types as was feasible.


When these surveys were completed, approximately seven which best reflected the general features or profiles of the 25 identified in the first survey were to be subjected to Cross-Sectional Studies. Again the emphasis was to be on social and economic variables.

Finally, two uzlas were to be selected from the seven Cross-Sectional Community Studies. Located in highland and lowland areas, these communities were to be subjected to detailed study utilizing traditional anthropological techniques. In addition to examining the decision-making process related to innovation and development, researchers were to pay particularly close attention to issues surrounding resource management and control, land tenure, emigration, crops and cropping strategies, and occupation. Local organizations, participatory patterns, and social class were to be key subjects in the analysis.

Figure 1 sets forth a diagram illustrating the tiered strategy.

Publications Linked to Research Methods and Stages

As of March 1983, all three stages of research were completed. Only the Cross-Sectional Survey was carried out differently and less fully than originally planned in the 1979 research design. But it was undertaken and successfully collected the basic kinds of data sought.



Archive Research

Regional Baseline Surveys

Cross-Sectional Surveys

Detailed Community Field Studies

Figure 1. Three-Tiered Research Sampling Strategy

A full list of the research product of the Yemen Research Program is presented in Section X. To conclude this section, Table 2 is offered to provide an overview of the relationships between the stages established for the research design and the publications they generated.

Table 2
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH STAGES, PRODUCTS AND PUBLICATIONS

Stage	Methodological Approach	Publications (See Section X)
1. Archival or Background Data Collection	Research in national and local government or donor archives for material on project area. Translations of documents, laws, regulations affecting rural development. Review of journals, newspapers, etc., containing data materials.	Cohen and Lewis (1979a); Cohen and Lewis (1979b); Cohen, Hebert, Lewis and Swanson (1981); Croken (1980); Cohen and Hebert (1983).
2. Baseline Survey	Baseline survey to yield information on the physical characteristics of the uzla, agricultural base, markets, and off-farm activities, level of development, development opportunities, and constraints on development.	Cohen, et al (1980a)
3. Cross-Sectional Surveys	Specific survey data on topics such as local resource base, land tenure, land use, production patterns, household management, labor and income, emigration, distribution of goods, etc.	Walker, Carapico, and Cohen (1983)
4. Detailed Community Field Studies	Extensive field notes on area and Project 045, with particular focus on variables identified in this research design.	Albert (1981a); Swanson (1981a); Hebert (1981b); Swanson (1981b); Swanson and Hebert (1981)
5. Case Studies	Specific case studies which are instructive as to the society and economy of the area or the process by which LDAs operate.	Wenner (1978); Ross (1981); Young et al. (1981); Cohen et al. (1981); Hebert (1983)

SECTION V
WORK PROGRAM

Research Design Time Frame

As noted elsewhere, both Project 045 and the Cornell Yemen Research Program were designed to be flexible, to be adjusted as more was learned about the task environment and the research context. Hence, the research design was based on an adaptive strategy that sought to preserve flexibility to modify the work plan as constraints were encountered and as more was learned about the research context. The purpose of this section is to: (1) document the research stages and time frame proposed in the original research design and the actual time frame which was followed; (2) review the major changes in that design.

i. Original Research Time Frame

The original time frame called for the project to pass through three phases between July 1979 and September 1981. Table 3 presents the original time frame and Figure 2 outlines the original planned project implementation schedule.

ii. Actual Research Time Frame

For a number of reasons given throughout this Final Report, but particularly for those set forth in Section VIII, it was necessary to make several revisions in the research design and several amendments to the contract between Cornell and USAID. Table 4 presents the actual time frame and Figure 3 outlines the actual project implementation schedule.

Amendments to Contractual Obligations


Alternations in the research design and the time frame were approved by USAID. The original Cornell-USAID contract and the authorized product and due date amendments made to that contract are set forth in Annex I.

Revised Design and Context of Discovery

Preliminary analysis of the Baseline Survey data was completed in mid-1980. It suggested two important variables for selecting the seven communities to be studied by Cross-Sectional Surveys. Figure 2 sets forth an ideal-type matrix of the kinds of agricultural production systems which guided selection of uzlas in this exercise. Of all the non-ecological production characteristics

Table 3
ORIGINAL TIME FRAME

Phase	Critical Date	Level of Activity	
		Intensive Focus	Ongoing Focus But Limited
I. Regional Baseline Studies			
Background Archive data collection, and the Baseline Profile Surveys	Selection/ Placement of Research Team: 7/79	7/79-4/80	5/80-7/80
II. Detailed Studies of Representative Uzlas			
1. Cross-sectional surveys	Selection of 045 LDAs: 11/79	5/80-11/80	12/80-6/81
2. Detailed Community Studies	Entry of 045 Contractor: 4/80	5/80-6/81	
III. Completion of Analysis and Final Reports		7/81-9/81	



10/1

Critical Events

- (1) - Obtain Permission for Baseline
- (2) - Obtain Vehicle
- (3) - Obtain Permission for Cross-Sectional Surveys and Detailed Community Field Studies
- (4) - Identification of Sites for Detailed Community Field Studies

Figure 2: Original Planned Project Implementation Schedule

Table 4
ACTUAL TIME FRAME

Phase	Critical Date	Level of Activity	
		Intensive Focus	Ongoing Focus But Limited
I. Regional Baseline Studies			
Background Archive data collection, and the Baseline Profile Surveys	Selection/ Placement of Research Team: 6/79 Swanson 1/80 Hebert	7/79-7/80	7/80-10/80
II. Detailed Studies of Representative Uzlas			
1. Cross-sectional surveys	Posponed: 3/80 11/80 12/81	6/82-3/83	2/80-5/82
2. Detailed Community Studies	Entry of 045 Contractor: 4/80		
III. Completion of Analysis and Final Reports		8/82-3/83	




Figure 3: Actual Project Implementation Schedule

* = Research Design Approved July 12, 1979

** = Revised Research Design Approved March 29, 1980

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS	Fair to Good Urban Access	Poor to Little Urban Access
HIGHLAND OAT (Commercial)		
HIGHLAND GRAIN		
MIDLAND GRAIN		
MIDLAND MIXED (Irrigated)		
LOWLAND GRAIN		
LOWLAND COMMERCIAL		
COASTAL FISHING		



= Expect few cases of this type



= Prior decision to exclude from study



= Uncertain but expect few cases of this type

Figure 2: Ideal-Type Matrix for Selecting Mix of Uzlas to be Studied

which further distinguished these uzlas, Cornell believed the most important related to their linkages to regional centers, Hajji or Hadeidah and the larger national economy. This was because: (1) access to regional and national markets is critical for the development of the local cash-crop economy; (2) linkages provide avenues for information and innovation to flow into local areas; (3) access to goods and services (hospitals, for example) in larger population centers can enhance the standard of living in rural areas; and (4) socio-economic integration through linkages can facilitate development of local specialization of production. Qat areas, for example, can concentrate on maximizing their production of this valuable crop if they are able to import their cattle fodder from other areas. Hence, a combination of urban-rural linkage characteristics as well as agricultural production system profiles were used to select the seven communities for study.

The uzlas selected were to be drawn from among the 25 covered in the regional Baseline Surveys. They were to be selected on the basis of: (1) expected cooperation as judged from the baseline experience; (2) degree to which they were characteristic of selected ecology/production units; and (3) extent to which they had interesting dynamics related to local organizations and development issues.

Cornell researchers were not able to undertake these Cross-Sectional Studies as planned. This was the result of overambitious research objectives, the cumulative effects of delays in carrying out prior research steps, the difficulties of obtaining authorization to undertake the studies from the central and local government officials, and lack of support for the exercise from USAID and field officers of the contractor executing the project to which the Cornell effort was attached. These constraints will be discussed in Section VIII of this report.

In brief, these constraints delayed completion of the Baseline Survey until the summer of 1980. By then there was only a year left on the contract for field work, and it was clear that there would not be time to do the Cross-Sectional Surveys and the detailed village studies as originally planned. Hence, it was decided to revise the research design.

The revised research design attempted to compress the schedule by choosing the two long term village study sites through special analysis of the baseline data, having the researchers begin their work in residence in

these sites and then having them make brief trips out to the Cross-Sectional Survey areas to collect data there. This strategy was seen as having the advantage of giving a full year of residential observation in the Phase III study sites, while at the same time allowing the team to recover from the slippage in time of the baseline completion by finishing Phase II simultaneously with the Phase III work.

For reasons also described in Section VIII, it was not possible to carry out the Phase II Cross-Sectional Surveys at the same time that the Phase III village studies were being undertaken. As a result, the research design was revised for the third time.

Under this final revision, it was arranged with the USAID Mission that a new two person field team would go to Yemen in late 1981 to collect the Phase II data. When additional constraints made this effort impossible, Cornell decided to send a single researcher to Yemen in the Summer of 1982. This effort was carried out successfully, although with some compromises in the original survey design.⁵⁰

Among the reasons for Cornell's efforts to carry out Phase II and for the revisions they required on the research design were: (1) Cornell's commitment to deliver as much of the data promised by the research design as possible; (2) Cornell's recognition of the importance of testing whether social surveys could be conducted and what problems might emerge; (3) Cornell's existing contacts with CYDA and knowledge about how to undertake such a research effort without the support of USAID or the principal contractor; and, most importantly, (4) Cornell's access to a knowledgeable, Arabic speaking and field experienced political scientist (Shelia Carapico) comfortable with survey approaches and willing to return to Yemen to experiment in their administration.

⁵⁰These are fully reported in: S. Tjip Walker, Sheila Carapico and John M. Cohen, Emerging Rural Patterns in the Yemen Arab Republic: Results of a 21 Community Study (Ithaca: Cornell University, Yemen Research Program, March 1983).

Summary of Research Activities⁵¹

Cornell's first field researcher and Team Leader, Jon C. Swanson, arrived in Sana'a in July 1979. Shortly after that, the team's translator of Arabic source materials, Barbara Croken, arrived. Some progress had been made on archival work and setting up the Baseline Survey logistics when Cohen and Lewis visited Sana'a in July 1979 to ensure the field team was in place and moving on schedule.

During this visit, Cohen, Lewis and Swanson revised and finalized the Research Design. However, most of their work centered on procedural matters. In particular, they: (1) interviewed and appointed Mary Hebert as the other principal field investigator; (2) established financial arrangements and accounting procedures for all Yemen field expenditures; (3) made initial contacts with senior officers of CYDA, largely to introduce the research activity and obtain CYDA support of it; (4) began the long battle to obtain the vehicle needed to allow field surveys to be effectively and efficiently carried out; and (5) worked with the Mission to ensure that appropriate government letters, security clearances and travel permits were issued as soon as possible.

The vehicle problem merits particular attention here. Preliminary field work indicated that all American four wheel vehicles were too large for the single track roads the LDAs were busy carving into their hillsides. Cornell's strong request for the purchase of a small, inexpensive Suzuki or Toyota jeep conflicted with formal USAID regulations requiring the purchase of American made goods. Obtaining a waiver to purchase the project's Japanese vehicle was to take until February 1980. This delay in getting field transport was one of the major factors that delayed progress in the research program and required several amendments to product due dates in the Cornell-USAID/Yemen research contract.

⁵¹ Among the documents in Cornell and USAID/Yemen files on which this summary is based are: (1) Jon C. Swanson, "Report of the Cornell Research Team, July-October 1979;" (2) John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Yemen Trip Report: July 6-14, 1979;" (3) John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Report on Nairobi Meeting: January 20-30, 1980;" (4) John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Report on Trip to Yemen: March 15-April 1;" (5) David B. Lewis, "Report on Trip to Yemen: June 18-20, 1980;" (6) John M. Cohen, "Report on Trip to Yemen: July 4-18, 1980;" and (7) John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Report on Field Trip to Yemen: January 21 to February 2, 1981."

Between July and October, Lewis worked on setting up financial transfers and procedures for he and Cohen to administer the project. USAID assumed no field responsibility for Cornell activities other than to ensure that the project's procedural and financial actions complied with USAID regulations and the terms of the Cornell-USAID/Yemen contract. Once the vehicle waiver was obtained and financial systems were in place, most Mission activity centered on reporting mechanisms and product delivery dates. In Sana'a, Croken made steady progress indentifying Arabic source materials on rural Yemen and LDAs while Swanson continued to lay the groundwork for the upcoming Baseline Surveys.

Throughout October of 1979, Lewis and Swanson worked to draft, field test and revise the Baseline Survey instrument. Swanson also spent considerable time during the last half of 1979 building relationships with CYDA, obtaining contracts with local officials in Hajja, completing a paper on the consequences of Yemeni migration, and training a research assistant.

Printed sets of the Baseline Survey instrument arrived in Sana'a in November and Swanson began implementing them immediately, aiming to have 15 completed before the end of December. However, lack of a project vehicle, Idd holidays and loss of his research assistant slowed him down considerably. Typically, the instruments took eight hours to administer and travel time in and out of a selected community took three days. By the end of the year it was clear that the Baseline Surveys would take longer to complete than had originally been expected.

Importantly, field notes indicate that the Baseline Survey instrument was well received in Yemen, both USAID and Swanson feeling comfortable with it and confident about it. This is in contrast with the Cross-Sectional Survey instrument, the background of which is summarized elsewhere in this report.

During late 1979 Yemen experienced a period of political transition. State Department restrictions on travel to Yemen made it impossible for Cohen and Lewis to return to Sana'a until March 1980. In the interim period, they reviewed the first nine Baseline Surveys, completed the negotiation and execution of the Cornell-USAID/Yemen contract, continued to gather and analyze project related secondary data, secured finally the vehicle waiver approval from USAID/Washington and began design work for the Cross-Sectional Survey instrument.

Field progress slowed further in early 1980 because Swanson, who had returned to the United States for Christmas, was also affected by the State Department travel ban. He did not return until February. During his absence, Hebert, who had joined the project in January, was unable to begin to administer surveys in her assigned areas of the country. The result was additional slippages in the research time schedule.

Swanson, Hebert, Cohen and Lewis reviewed field work progress, project administration and the timetable for research products with USAID staff in March 1980. At this time 21 Baseline Surveys had been completed, some under difficult circumstances in remote areas. On the basis of this progress and with the recognition that delays encountered were beyond the control of Cornell, USAID agreed to amend the project contract to adjust the survey strategy and schedule.

Considerable time was spent during these Suna'a meetings developing a strategy to: (1) complete the Baselines as soon as possible; (2) redesign the Cross-Sectional Surveys; and (3) select field sites for long term village study. Since the debate about the appropriateness of the Cross-Sectional Survey is discussed elsewhere in this Final Report (Sections V and VIII), it need only be noted here that a decision was reached to have Swanson and Hebert move into their long-term residential field sites as soon as possible, postponing the Cross-Sectionals until late 1980 or early 1981.

Research authorization was particularly difficult to get at this time. In the absence of progress in the implementation of Project 045, CYDA and the Jajja and Hodeidah LDAs were not supportative of further research. It was clear at that time that until a contractor was in the field implementing the project, Cornell was going to have a difficult time getting permission to work in the field. Given this situation, USAID officers were reluctant to press CYDA and the LDAs for research letters needed by Swanson and Hebert. As a result, progress in the Yemen Research Program was further delayed.

By late March, however, CYDA had been informed that the 045 contractor was selected and would be in the field shortly. Lewis had already held briefing sessions for the firm, Chemonics, Inc., in Ithaca and these established optimism that the 045 Project would soon be underway. The task for Swanson and Hebert at this time was to leverage the selection announcement and appearance of Chemonic start up staff into stronger CYDA support for the now hostage Cornell research program.

During the March sessions, Swanson gave a presentation of tentative Baseline Survey findings to the Mission's Research Committee. This seminar was attended by key Mission officials, as well as invited participants from other donor agencies and CYDA. Swanson's report was later distributed as one of the publications in the Working Note.

Swanson, Cohen and Lewis also prepared a report for the Mission and Chemonics to assist them in selecting 045 activity sites. This paper was based on the classification matrix developed through the analysis of the Baseline Survey results. It discussed the characteristics of the development situation in each category of the matrix and suggested how the allocation of implementation resources might be related to them.

Also during this visit, Cohen and Lewis provided the Mission with advice on how to develop a training program for CYDA officials and a strategy for forging linkages with short-term training institutions in the United States. Lewis agreed to provide liaison support to the Mission as it and Chemonics moved to implement this training aspect of the 045 contract.

Between March and July, Chemonics began to establish a field presence. During this period Swanson and Hebert gave background information and advice to the new Chemonics Chief of Party, Martin Kumorek. Meanwhile, they continued efforts to obtain authorization letters and complete the last of the Baseline Surveys.

In June, Chemonics sponsored a seminar in Sana'a to review the 045 project and plan a strategy for its implementation. Both Swanson and Hebert participated in the seminar. Two key decisions were made at the meetings which ran contrary to assumptions which underpinned Cornell's research design: (1) the choice of sites for project activity were to be made as LDAs began to generate project proposals rather than by pre-selection; and (2) financial resources of the project would be reserved for projects of province-wide significance, risk ventures of high potential and activities by extremely poor communities.⁵² These decisions were made without the input of Cornell team members.

⁵² See: Martin Kumorek, "Local Resources for Development Project 045: Annual Work Plan July 1980-June 1981" (Work plan prepared for USAID and Chemonics, Inc., n.d.); and his "Operating Principle During the Implementation of the Project," (Internal Memorandum, Chemonics, Inc., June 1980).

Lewis visited Sana'a in mid-June, enroute from a consulting assignment in Tanzania. During this visit he: (1) worked with Swanson and Hebert to begin procedures for selecting long term field sites (Phase III of the Research Design); (2) assisted in the design of a "wind shield survey" for gathering general community data for Chemonics activities; (3) negotiated with USAID, Chemonics and CYDA to gain support for more rapid processing of security clearance documents; and (4) laid the groundwork for writing the Baseline Survey Report in the coming month. Security clearance problems were Cornell's major worry at this time, for they were delaying the beginning of Swanson and Hebert's year long village studies.

Cohen spent the first two weeks of July in Sana'a analyzing the Baseline Survey data and drafting the two volume report that presented Cornell's findings. Working intensively with Swanson and Hebert, he was able to complete the report by the product deadline date. Also during this visit Cohen: (1) worked with Croken to finalize her lengthy Working Note on "Source Materials in Arabic on Rural Development and the Cooperative Movement in the Yemen Arab Republic;" (2) obtained USAID approval for Cornell's decision to place Swanson in the village of Bani 'Awwam, Hajja Governorate, and Hebert in the community of Maghlaf, Hodeidah Governorate; (3) assisted Swanson and Hebert in their struggle to obtain support for the issuance of twin security clearance papers; (4) negotiated with USAID for further contract amendments reflecting delays on research progress and setting new dates for product deliveries; (5) discussed coordination issues with USAID and Chemonics staff; (6) developed a strategy for Swanson and Hebert to complete several more Baseline Surveys in the Tihama; and (7) set up procedures for Lewis to add those surveys into the study and further revise and edit the July draft into a final product.

Based on a rich set of data generated by the survey instruments and an exhaustive review of existing literature on Hajja and Hudeidah Governorate, the report expanded the state of knowledge about rural development and local organizations in the two governates. It also provided programmatic insights into 045 activities of immediate concern to CYDA, USAID and Chemonics. Whether these insights were used by these organizations cannot be determined. Unfortunately Cornell researchers never received any evaluation or comments on the study from the Mission or the contractor (see Section VIII of this Final Report). A long Arabic summary of the Baseline Survey report was also prepared and presented to CYDA. No comments from the government were ever received.

Issues of site selection and security clearance were resolved by October and Swanson and Hebert spent the rest of the year working in Bani 'Awwam and Maghlaf. At the same time Lewis continued to struggle with the problem of mounting the Cross-Sectional Surveys and to oversee the administration of the Project. He also made arrangements for CYDA officials to tour Cornell University and worked with them and Chemonics to explore ways to use micro-processors to organize data on rural areas and LDA activities for CYDA. Technical assistance in this regard was provided by Professor Frank W. Young of Cornell's Department of Rural Sociology.

When the Cross-Sectional Survey phase was postponed in March 1980, Cornell and USAID tentatively agreed that they would be carried out at the same time the community field studies were being done. However, in October, at USAID's strong recommendation, this strategy was abandoned. The understanding that emerged from discussions with USAID during this period was that the surveys would be postponed until the Beni 'Awwam and Maghlaf case studies were completed.

Cohen and Lewis made their final field trip to Yemen in January 1981. Their main objectives were to: (1) review research progress at the two village research sites; (2) update the research design and finalize the program for the remainder of the Cornell activity; and (3) participate with Cornell researchers, CYDA officials, Hodeidah LDA officers and Chemonics field staff in a three-day workshop focused on the 045 Project. Together with Swanson, they spent most of their time reviewing the progress of the Beni 'Awwam and Maghlaf studies and preparing an outline for the drafting of two preliminary field reports on each site and a final major report on the findings of this phase of the research effort. In addition, they revised the research design with USAID approval, arranged for the necessary contract amendments and took care of general administrative obligations. They did not visit Hebert's field site because she had been evacuated to Boston for treatment of an illness which had been gradually debilitating her for months and for which she could not get diagnosis or treatment in Sana'a. Time was spent, however, in Bani 'Awwam with Swanson and his research assistant. Throughout the three day conference in Hodeidah, Cohen, Lewis and Swanson were able to hold useful coordination discussions with Chemonics, CYDA and USAID representatives. In particular, Cornell's research team provided

suggestions about how to increase the effectiveness of the 045 Project and discussed ways in which Chemonics staff might develop an information system for CYDA.

Despite continuing security authorization problems, plans were developed to keep Cornell researchers in the field until August 1981, at which time they were to return to Ithaca to draft a major report covering the findings of their field studies on Beni 'Awwam and Maghlaf. At this time Cornell planned on carrying out the Cross-Sectional Surveys in the fall of 1982. After discussing these plans with USAID officials, it was agreed that the contract product dates would be amended again, with Cornell being given a no-cost extension to complete the objectives of the initial research design.⁵³ Finally, discussion was held with Chemonics on ways to transfer research responsibilities now that the Yemen Research Program was drawing to a close. Ultimately this transition was facilitated by the fact that Swanson joined the Chemonics staff when his contract with Cornell ended. He is currently in Sana'a serving as social science adviser to the 045 Project.

Swanson and Hebert completed two interim field reports each over the next five months. The first focussed on socio-economic conditions in their respective communities and the second on local organizations. Both were rapidly typed and distributed in the Working Note series. On the Ithaca side of the project, Lewis continued to work out a research design for the administration of the Cross-Sectional Surveys in late 1981. The instruments were redesigned for the fourth time and two experienced Yemen researchers, Richard Tutweiler and Sheila Carapilo, were contracted to implement them. Finally, Lewis and Cornell's Young worked during this period to help Chemonics operationalize a microprocessor based information system for the CYDA headquarters.

Throughout the month of August 1981 Lewis, Swanson and Hebert worked on drafting case studies for Bani 'Awwam and Maghlaf. Cohen joined this activity for two weeks in late July and early August. While in Ithaca, he and Lewis finalized the new research design for the Cross-Sectional Surveys and sent it on to USAID/Yemen.

⁵³ See: David B. Lewis and John M. Cohen, "Revision of Research Design" (Internal Memorandum Prepared for Frank Pavich, USAID, Sana'a, January 30, 1981).

The writing of the case studies took longer than had been expected. A rough draft was forwarded to Sana'a in September and a final document was published in the Yemen Research Program series toward the end of the year.

As discussed in Sections V and VIII, Cohen and Lewis were unable to obtain Mission permission to carry out planned Cross-Sectional Surveys in the Summer of 1981 and in late 1981. Believing that the gathering of Cross-Sectional Survey data was essential to the integrity of the overall research design of its Yemen Research Program, Cornell independently funded the administration of those instruments by Sheila Carapico in the Summer of 1982.

Over the remaining contract period Cornell completed three additional studies. First, Cohen worked with Harvard graduate student S. Tjip Walker to analyze the Cross-Sectional data and write a lengthy major report on emerging rural patterns. Second, Cohen and Hebert consolidated all the published and fugitive literature reviewed by Cornell researchers over the contract period into the most complete bibliography yet published on rural Yemen. Third, Hebert, reflecting on her field work while writing her doctoral dissertation, prepared a final Working Note on participation and LDAs.

SECTION VI
STRATEGY FOR COMMUNICATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS

Philosophy of Sharing Results as Widely as Possible

The requisite number of copies of all trip reports, project related reports and research generated publications were sent to both the Yemen Desk Officer in USAID's Near East Bureau and to the Mission in Sana'a. From the beginning, however, Cornell sought to achieve a broader distribution of the work products of the Yemen Research Program.

Early on it was decided to share the research product as widely as possible with the larger academic and donor community. This was done through making new institutional affiliations, developing an attractive publications series and announcing the availability of the work product in various forums. This was done with the full support of the Mission, for the rural development officer who oversaw the project was well aware how little information was available in Western universities on rural Yemen.

High costs made it impossible to consider having all the publications translated into Arabic. However, in order to alert Arab speakers to the research findings, nearly all publications by the Yemen Research Program contain an Arabic summary. And in the case of the data generated by the Baseline Report, a special and lengthy publication was prepared entirely in Arabic.

Use of Multiple Communication Vehicles

i. Conventional Research Reports to Clients

At least 10 copies of all publications listed in Section X were sent via USAID pouch or hand carried to the Mission in Sana'a. More copies of particular reports were delivered on request. For example, at the request of the Rural Development Officer, 24 copies of the two volume baseline report were delivered to Sana'a. In addition, five copies of each publication were sent to Washington, D.C. for use by the Yemen Desk Officer in the Near East Bureau. And, when requested, additional sets of materials were sent to various USAID officers, consultants and consulting firms. These were used to provide background materials for activities related to other programs and projects in Yemen.

Copies were also sent to Chemonics for the use of their Washington and Sana'a based staff. Copies of all reports were sent also to the Confederation CYDA through both USAID and Chemonics channels.

ii. Institutional Linkages

With the approval of the Mission, Cornell University joined the newly formed American Institute for Yemeni Studies. Throughout the research project Cornell activities were reported in the AIYS and copies of all the publications listed in Section X were forwarded to the libraries of member universities. Beyond this, copies of the project activities were reported in the widely circulated Rural Development Participation Review⁵⁴ published by Cornell University and listed in research publications of the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell.

iii. Working Note Series

Early on it was decided to report all major research results through a distinctive set of Working Notes. Fifteen Working Notes were published in this series and they are listed in Section X. The initial purpose of the Working Note Series was to allow research generated information to become immediately available to the program's clients and to professional colleagues actively studying or working in rural Yemen. As a result, many of these papers contain preliminary and tentative conclusions. The three general reports published by the project consolidated these notes and expanded them.

iv. Major Publications

The Yemen Research Program published three major studies during the project period. These were bound with the same cover that marks this Final Report and the entire set of Working Notes. These two sets of reports constitute the entire work product of the Yemen Research Program and have been distributed to university libraries and to individual professionals as such.

v. Availability of Reports for Future Requests

Original copies of all Working Notes and major reports are on file with the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell. As requests come in, these are photocopied and sent on an actual cost basis to the person

⁵⁴David B. Lewis, "Local Development Associations in the Yemen Arab Republic," Rural Development Participation Review, I, 2 (1980), pp. 1-3.

asking for them. Recently, the Cornell research team published a major research journal article that cites all the working notes and major reports.⁵⁵ That article will generate future demand and the system established will allow Cornell to respond to it now that the project has ended.

vi. Professional Publications

The research product has at this time resulted in two journal articles. Data gathered during the research exercise is being used in two doctoral dissertations, one by Hebert and the other by Carapico. In addition, all members of the research team plan on writing individually and jointly various papers and articles in the coming year. Hence, the research enterprise has and will generate publishable papers which expand the body of literature on rural Yemen and the LDA movement.

vii. Seminars and Other Public Presentations

Throughout the period of the Cornell-USAID/Yemen contract, Cornell team members have participated in seminars and other public presentations. Examples of these include:

1. "Training Seminar on Rural Development" for USAID, CYDA and Related Programs, Sana'a, March 1978.
2. "Seminar on Rural Development Issues on the Yemen Arab Republic," for USAID/Washington, Washington, D.C., February 1979.
3. "Seminar on Preliminary Baseline Results," for USAID, Sana'a, March 1980.
4. "Local Development Associations in the Yemen Arab Republic," Paper Presented to Annual Rural Sociology Conference, Ithaca, August 1980."
5. "Briefings on working in Rural Yemen" for Cornell personnel undertaking AID-funded Soils Classification study for Yemen (Van Wambeke and Hardy Project), August 1980.

A number of other briefings and seminars were participated in by the Cornell research team. These included sessions with the 045 contractor shortly after the project agreement was signed, sessions held by the contractor in Yemen, such as the January 1981 workshop in Hodeidah, and sessions held with the World Bank during their analysis of a possible program to assist LDAs. Rather than list all these meetings here, it is only noted that throughout the project period, members of the Yemen research program eagerly participated in all workshops and seminars to which they were invited, both in Yemen and abroad.

⁵⁵ John M. Cohen, Mary Hebert, David B. Lewis and Jon C. Swanson, "Development from Below: Local Development Associations in the Yemen Arab Republic," World Development, IX, 11/12 (1981), pp. 1039-1061.

SECTION VII
RESEARCH STAFF

Responsibility for Project

The project was co-directed by John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis. They administered and guided it from Ithaca. However, they made a large number of trips to Yemen and spent a total of six months in Sana'a and the field.

Cornell Research Team

Cohen is a rural sociologist. He began the project as a member of Cornell's Rural Sociology Department and finished the project after moving to the Harvard Institute for International Development. Lewis was a faculty member of Cornell's Department of City and Regional Planning for the entire contract period.

While Cohen and Lewis spent considerable time in Yemen directing the project and gathering research materials, the major field personnel of the project were Jon C. Swanson and Mary Hebert. Swanson was Field Team Leader from July 1979 to September 1981 and Hebert served as research associate between January 1980 and September 1981. Both are anthropologists.

Three other Yemen experts worked at various times with the project. Manford Wenner, a Political Scientist at Northern Illinois University, served as a consultant in March 1978. He helped the team to identify background information and his paper helped lay a foundation for consolidating information on local government patterns. A Harvard graduate student in History and Arabist, Barbara Croken, worked with the Cornell team from July 1979 to March 1980. She assisted in evaluating Arabic sources of information on rural Yemen and LDAs, producing in the process a helpful Working Note on source materials in Arabic. In addition, Frank W. Young of Cornell's Rural Sociology Department assisted CYDA by helping develop a strategy for using microprocessors to organize data on rural areas and LDA activities, a strategy later implemented by Chemonics with the assistance of Croken. Finally, Sheila Carapico, a Political Scientist at Wilkes Barre College, carried out cross-sectional surveys for the Yemen Research Program in the summer of 1982. She also played an important, albeit informal, role in advising project team members on research strategies and in reviewing and

commenting on drafts of research generated papers. S. Tjip Walker, a graduate student at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, played an important analytical role on processing the data gathered by Canapico.

As the publication list in Section X will show, the major field work activities were carried out by Swanson and Hebert. Despite very difficult field conditions they managed to complete most of the ambitious research design described earlier. The project co-directors were responsible for mining the literature. As the working note on bibliography suggests, there proved to be quite a large body of published and fugitive information. Based on analysis and data drawn from that exercise, Cohen and Lewis joined with the core field team members to produce the publications which flowed from the overall research activity.

SECTION VIII

CONSTRAINTSOverambitious Research Design and Delays

The overall design of this research project was quite ambitious. At the time it was conceived, the USAID Mission had a complex agenda to be achieved, and the data needed were vast in scope. Cornell, in its willingness to be supportive of the effort, sought to build into the research design the capacity to get all the information requested. This resulted in a tight schedule for field work with only a minimal slippage allowance for contingencies. Delaying factors and other impediments, however, began to be encountered even before the research team was in the field. Creative compensation for delays became common element in the field work.

The final signing of the contract was delayed by procedural entropy within the USAID system. As a result, Cornell was 5 months into research activities when the research contract was finally signed. USAID procedures required Cornell to obtain permission to purchase a non-American jeep, procedures which led to a seven-month delay in the acquisition of a vehicle for transporting the researchers from site to site. The field team worked steadily during this period, but their efficiency was impaired by the lack of transport.

The lack of transport resulted in another type of problem. The researchers found it necessary to use busses, taxis, and a wide range of informal means of getting from one place to another. In one case, the truck on which one of the field team members was riding was stopped by police for a cargo inspection. Internal security is a matter of serious concern to the Government of Yemen, and the officers would not believe that a legitimate researcher working on a USAID project would be hitch-hiking on a country truck rather than having her own vehicle. All field work had to be suspended for several weeks while security authorities reviewed the entire project in detail before granting permission to continue. The USAID Mission took the position that the problem was basically Cornell's, and chose not to make a serious effort to intercede with the Government to expedite the review process.

By early 1980 Cornell field researchers were familiar with USAID and Yemen bureaucracies. This allowed them to facilitate project activities on the Sana'a end. In the mean time, the project's Ithaca based co-directors gained similar knowledge about USAID/Washington procedures and developed the contacts needed to facilitate project activities on their end of the administrative chain. Hence, as a result of experience accumulated in 1979 and early 1980, delays became less frequent.

This does not mean, however, that less time was spent dealing with administrative red tape. Project co-directors and the field team leader spent an inordinate amount of time dealing with contract revisions, time extensions and other administrative matters which resulted from the delays encountered in the early implementation period of the contract. Field personnel also lost time frequently due to sudden, unplanned requests from USAID for particular services.

Security Clearances

The government of the Yemen Arab Republic is not anxious to allow researchers unrestricted travel permission. From its perspective, residence in virtually any single place is preferable to unmonitored movement. This position is due to the uncertainties faced by the government in a number of rural areas and to rules of security and research authorization that are administered at central and local levels of the government. The government is also worried about the images which a travelling researcher might gain if he or she is allowed unrestricted travel in the country. In this regard, officials are particularly sensitive to unmonitored movement combined with systematic research on socio-political topics.

Obtaining research authorization papers and permission to travel into particular areas took a great deal of time. In fact, Cornell lost three months of field work as both team members sat in Sana'a trying to obtain the necessary letters. The USAID Mission staff felt it was not their role to assist in Cornell's efforts to obtain these papers. Mission officers responsible for the project were unwilling to directly request the government to issue the appropriate documents. Because of political issues surrounding the signing of the O45 Project and the Yemen feeling that the project did not provide

enough direct financial assistance to LDAs, the Mission was reluctant to press CYDA for research clearance, for to CYDA the research component was linked to progress on 045 activities.⁵⁶ Moreover, both USAID and CYDA insisted on obtaining permission through formal diplomatic channels. Letters which could have been hand-carried through the system by Cornell field researchers had to be sent through the mail, resulting in further delay. Perhaps most importantly, neither USAID nor Chemonics ever emphasized to CYDA that research was an important part of the 045 enterprise.⁵⁷ As a result, Cornell team members had to fight for months for the privilege of doing the job they were hired to do. The effects of security delays are described elsewhere in this Final Report (Section V).

Mission and 045 Contractor Support for Cross-Sectional Surveys

The original research design called for a three phase data collection strategy. The first phase was a general Baseline Survey of some 25 uzlas, and was intended to capture the important dimensions of variation within the study area. This was to be followed by a more detailed Cross-Sectional Survey of six to eight carefully selected sites, each representing an important characteristic type of community. On the basis of this survey, the team was then to pick two sites (one for each researcher) for a one-year participant observer study of the agricultural crop cycle. As the delaying influences began to mount, the completion date for the Baseline Survey was forced into the time frame planned for the Cross-Sectional Survey. The time

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From the beginning, CYDA felt that Project 045 provided too much support for foreign technical assistance experts and not enough financial assistance to LDA projects. CYDA undoubtedly felt that the money could be better spent on LDA activities, a view that was hard to change at a time when there were no 045 activities. See the mid-term review of Project 045 cited in footnote 47. Some CYDA officials also held the view that any questions the implementors had could be answered by them in Sama'a or by the majalis al-Tousiqs.

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A good example of this occurred in August 1980. When Swanson and Hebert visited the Coordinators Council in Hodeidah they discovered Chemonics and CYDA staff had just presented their work plan to the Council without mention of the Cornell research component and the need to obtain permission for the year long community field studies.

available for this second phase of data collection was inexorably compressed by the slipping baseline completion date and the unmoveable character of the village participant observer studies. The starting date of this third phase was fixed by the need to have the researchers in the villages for one full year, and the completion date for this year could not slip beyond the end of the contract.

By the time the baseline work was completed in the summer of 1980 there was only a year left on the contract for field work, and it was clear that there would not be time to do the Cross Sectional Surveys and the detailed village studies as originally planned. It was decided to compress the schedule by choosing the two long term village study sites through special analysis of the baseline data, having the researchers begin their work in residence in these sites, and then having them make brief trips out to the cross-sectional survey areas to collect data there. This strategy had the advantage of giving a full year of residential observation in the Phase III study sites, while at the same time allowing the team to recover from the slippage of the baseline completion by finishing Phase II simultaneously with the Phase III work.

The field team was willing to attempt this dual-track data collection strategy, but they were understandably concerned about the work load. Moreover, as anthropologists they put greater weight on the village studies than on the surveys. When time constraints began to make it look like a choice of doing both studies badly or one sufficiently, they opted for the village studies.

The question of whether a dual-track data collection strategy could or would be followed came to a head in October 1980 when the Cornell Rural Development Participation Project monitor from USAID/Washington traveled to Yemen to familiarize himself with the field work. The team was scheduled to pre-test the Cross-Sectional Survey instruments, and, since it was his first trip to Yemen, it was decided that the USAID representative should accompany them. At this time the instruments were too long and cumbersome for immediate use, and the objective of the pre-test was to assess the effectiveness of each question so that the instruments could be pruned down to tight, crisp, efficient units. Unfortunately the pre-test was a grueling experience under difficult conditions, and the USAID representative concluded that it was not

possible to do the Phase II work in combination with Phase III. He discussed the matter with the field team and the USAID Mission in Sana'a before contacting the research directors. By the time he informed them of his conclusion, it was too late to reverse the chain of events he had initiated, and the Cross-Sectional Survey was aborted.⁵⁸

As the work proceeded, it became increasingly clear that the Cross-Sectional data were needed to link the broad spectrum baseline data with the fine grain detail data collected in long term residential sites. The research directors made several attempts to work with the USAID Mission in Sana'a to reestablish the Phase II survey, but to no avail. There was always one reason or another why it could not, or should not be done. By the summer of 1981, the field team had finished the Phase III work (participant observation long term village studies), and returned to Cornell to write the report.

Finally it was arranged with the Mission that a new two person field team would go to Yemen in late 1981 to collect the missing Phase II data. At the last minute (within a week of departure) after the contract was signed, visas arranged and tickets purchased, the Mission withdrew permission for the work to be done. Recent elections and reservations by one of the 045 contractor's resident staff in the study area were cited as reasons.⁵⁹ The Mission suggested the work be rescheduled for a later date. When Cornell arranged to send a researcher in the summer of 1982, the Mission indicated

⁵⁸ See: John W. Harbeson, "Trip Report - Yemen Arab Republic, October 2-13, 1980" (Internal Memorandum to USAID/Yemen Mission Director and Director DS/RAD/Washington, October 12, 1980); Diane Ponasik, "Re-Thinking of Research Design" (Internal Memorandum to 045 Cornell Research File, Sana'a, October 15, 1980); John W. Harbeson, "DS/RAD-Cornell Rural Development and Participation Project -- Activity Under Local Resources for Development Project (279-0045)" (Cable to USAID/Y ref Sana'a 7124, November 17, 1980).

⁵⁹ See: Diane S. Ponasik "Letter to David B. Lewis Explaining the January Postponement" (Sana'a, January 6, 1982).

tentative approval, but then finally cabled that it would not allow any research funds to be used for field work in Yemen.⁶⁰ At this point Cornell decided that it was unlikely that the Mission would ever grant approval, and that the only responsible thing to do was to send the researcher independently using University resources. This it did.

The Cross-Sectional Survey work was difficult. Without official support and in a very limited time period, the researcher had to arrange everything from transport to government approval. This was not an efficient approach, but it did produce results. And it did field test the questionnaires to Cornell's satisfaction. The data was gathered and the research design completed.

Data generated by this summer 1982 Cross-Sectional Survey exercise was analyzed and published as a major research report by the Yemen Research Program.⁶¹ We believe that this report illustrates that the proposed surveys could have been carried out as planned, that they were not overly long, that they would have generated data useful to the 045 Project and that they increased our understanding about opportunities and constraints surrounding efforts to gather survey data in rural Yemen.

⁶⁰USAID/Y, concluding the instruments were still too long and arguing that the Mission was now interested in other kinds of data than that agreed to in the Research Design, requested DS/RAD discuss a different survey strategy with Cornell. See the following unclassified cables: USAID/Y, "Cable No. 02507" (Cable, April 24, 1982). After discussion with Cornell, DS/RAD in Washington cabled NE/TECH's recommendation that the Cross-Sectional Survey's proceed as planned in order to preserve the integrity of the Research Design. USAID/W, "Cable No. 120771: (Cable, May 4, 1982). Rejecting the recommendations in this cable, the Yemen Mission refused to authorize the survey, arguing that it would not produce useful, reliable data. USAID/Y, "Cable 2989" (Cable, May 12, 1982).

⁶¹Walker, Carapico and Cohen, Emerging Rural Patterns in the Yemen Arab Republic, Passim.

Interaction Between Cornell, USAID Mission and 045 Contractor

The presence of Cornell in Yemen would not have occurred without the interest and support of USAID's Frank Pavich and Norman Nicholson. Throughout his tenure on the Yemen Mission staff, Pavich tried particularly hard to assist Cornell in its efforts to carry out its contractual obligations. In particular, he was helpful with logistics and on contract amendment efforts. However, he alone could not obtain Mission support for research authorization, or secure the vehicle waiver from USAID/Washington. Nor was it his responsibility to provide social science evaluation of the Cornell research product.

Throughout the project, Cornell researchers tried to be responsive to requests from the USAID Mission and the 045 contractor. Indeed, as Section III shows, one of the major objectives of the Yemen Research Program was to provide applied, project related analysis.

Relationships between the Cornell field team, Mission staff and Chemonics employees remained cordial throughout the project. These led to informal discussions on an irregular basis. It is assumed that such discussions contributed to the Mission's understanding of rural Yemen and LDAs and the contractor's efforts to successfully implement Project 045. There is, however, no way to evaluate the utility of the information and analysis passed on through these kinds of exchanges. A few informal seminars on rural development were held in the Mission. Cornell field team members participated in these and gave presentations related to the research findings of the project. However, no formal or informal evaluation of Cornell research work emerged from these workshops. The Cornell research team, including the co-directors, participated in a Chemonics directed workshop in Hodeidah in January 1981. There Cornell's presentation on research directions and findings were received without comment by Mission staff, Chemonics employees and CYDA officials.

Cornell was eager for criticism and suggestions and would have willingly tried to respond. However, aside from early discussion about the Research Design and issues related to the administration of the Cross-Sectional Surveys, no written or verbal comments were ever received from USAID or 045 personnel on the contents of any of the numerous publications generated by the research team. Indeed, the only written evaluation received during the

entire contract period occurred as part of a Mission cable response to a USAID/DSB mid-term review of the larger Cornell Rural Development Participation Project. Washington's questions and Sana'a's reply are set forth in Table 5.

To be sure, discussions were held with Mission staff by co-directors during all field visits. However, these centered largely on procedural matters regarding project implementation dates, USAID rules on vehicle purchase, and so on. This lack of critical, professional evaluation of the emerging work product made it difficult for the co-directors to know whether the research was useful to the Mission or the contractor⁶² and clearly constituted a constraint on the production of a more applied product for USAID.

⁶²The recent mid-term evaluation of Project 045 made no mention of the Cornell research component, aside from comments on compliance with contract delivery dates. See footnote 47.

TABLE 5
USAID YEMEN MISSION RESPONSES TO
USAID/DSB MID-TERM REVIEW OF CORNELL PARTICIPATION PROJECT

Question	Cable Reply
<u>I. Team Personnel</u>	
A. Qualified?	"well qualified"
B. Performance?	"done very well" under very difficult conditions
C. Working Relationships?	"very good"
D. Timely Delivery	"best they could" under difficult conditions
<u>II. Project Performance</u>	
A. Better understanding of rural poor	"much better picture/profile of the socio-econ conditions in the project area"
B. Better understanding of participation	"now have a fairly good picture"
C. More participation	"if education of local people re development problems helps them deal with them, research will have lasting effect. Difficult process, long."
D. Increased host country commitment	"host country commitment is strong"
E. Increased benefits to beneficiaries	"too early to tell"
F. Changes in country policy/programs	"Indirectly yes, Five Year Plan, Ministry Plans, etc."
G. Durability	"no across board interest in research but d.a. aspect of project will continue."
H. Most/Least Useful	"very useful" security clearance problems delay team too much
<u>III. Project Results</u>	
A. Results Disseminated	"yes, finished reports. Discussion of findings"
B. Translated into Local Language	"yes"
C. Use of SOAPS	
1) by missions	"all reports & papers have been distributed w/i missions and are on file in ref. center"
2) by country	"distrib to GOY"
<u>IV. Additional Comments</u>	
	None

Source: Mid-Term Review, Cornell University Rural Development Participation Project.

SECTION IX
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND SHORTCOMINGS

Major Accomplishments

i. Consolidation of Existing Knowledge

The Yemen Arab Republic is one of the least researched countries in the developing world. Still, a fair amount of material was available on the country when Cornell's Yemen Research Program began in 1979. However, it was not consolidated into any systematic statement on the processes of development in the country or the LDA movement.

Most of this material was in the form of unpublished research papers, consultant reports, international development agency memorandums and Yemen government documents. The few bibliographies on Yemen did not include most of these materials, and the few books which touched on modern Yemen were largely insensitive to development processes at the local level. This made it difficult for the Cornell research project to get started and made the design of Project 045 a risky venture.

One of the first things Cornell researchers did was to search out all of the material it could find on rural Yemen and the LDAs. In addition, efforts were made to find all publications which described the social and economic context in which development efforts were being made. These were linked together into a paper which consolidated all this material into a coherent background statement on rural development and LDAs.⁶³

Cornell also made extensive efforts to locate Arabic source materials on rural development and LDAs. The Working Note published on those findings offers assistance to researchers interested in knowing what kinds of development related topics are discussed in Arabic language newspapers and journals, the content of Arabic language publications of CYDA and the location of archives in Yemen which are likely to contain useful Arabic materials on local level development.⁶⁴

⁶³ John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, Rural Development in the Yemen Arab Republic: Strategy Issues in a Capital Surplus Labor Short Economy (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development, Development Discussion Paper No. 52, February 1979). This 98 page paper was later reissued as Working Paper No. 6 (see Section X).

⁶⁴ Barbara Croken, "Source Materials in Arabic on Rural Development and the Co-operative Movement in the Yemen Arab Republic," Working Note No. 5, October 1980.

All of the reports issued by the Yemen Research Program build on this effort, for efforts were made to relate new data and analysis to the existing literature. This was done largely through extensive footnotes. The purpose of this format was to continually build on the consolidation and restatement effort that began the project. A good example of how this was done is exhibited in the footnotes to the article set forth in Annex II of this report.

Throughout the contract period, Cornell researchers made every effort to identify new reports or studies overlooked in the initial consolidation effort. In one of the final Working Notes all known published and unpublished materials were consolidated into a select bibliography.⁶⁵ To Cornell's knowledge, this is the first bibliography ever published on rural Yemen and one of the most complete bibliographies available on development in Yemen.

ii. Generation of New Knowledge

A great deal of new knowledge about rural Yemen was generated during the period Cornell worked in the country. This research was largely funded by international agencies and a number of bilateral donor missions. It was undertaken by donor staffs, consulting firms, university programs and individual researchers. The USAID Mission in Yemen played a major role in supporting the emergence of this new body of literature. Some of its best success in this area came from funding highly focused studies by young, experienced Yemen experts who were doing doctoral dissertations and needed part time consultancies to help fund their stay in the country.

It is submitted that the major reports and Working Notes issued by the Cornell research team contain a great deal of new data and analysis that in total contributed to the expansion of knowledge about rural Yemen and the LDA movement that has marked the last five years. In this regard, reference should be made to Sections X and XI of this Final Report.

⁶⁵ John M. Cohen and Mary Hebert, "Rural Development in Yemen: A Select Bibliography," Working Note No. 14, February 1983.

iii. Contribution to Research Base for USAID Project on Rural Development Participation

As noted in Section I, the Yemen Research Program was one of a number of activities undertaken by Cornell University's Rural Development Committee under its Cooperative Agreement with USAID's Office of Multi-Sectoral Development. Focused on "Rural Development Participation," that project sought to learn more about local level organizations and ways to increase their role in development processes. The research publications of the Yemen Research Program contributed a good deal of comparative data and analysis to the larger Cornell project. This will be reflected in the project's final publication which is currently being drafted by Professors Milton J. Esman and Norman T. Uphoff of Cornell. USAID has found the Cornell Cooperative Agreement to have been one of the most effective of the many which it entered into with various Universities. It is submitted that the Yemen program contributed to that success.

iv. Broadly Distributed Research Findings to Preserve Data Base for Future Research on Rural Yemen

Many of the materials cited in Cornell's publications are available only in Sana'a. Indeed, there is a notable lack of materials on rural Yemen in most of the major research libraries of the West. Hence, it is important that Cornell has been able to broadly distribute its research findings and to have placed full sets of the publications listed in Section X in these libraries (see Section XI for a list of libraries). At a minimum, the extensive and complete footnotes in those publications will alert researchers to a literature they might not learn about through other means. More importantly, the body of data and analysis in these publications provides a good overview of the rural area and should be useful in helping future researchers and development professionals get started on work related to Yemen's rural sector.

The Cornell strategy for communication of research results was described in Section VI. So scarce is available data on rural Yemen, and so likely is it that reports will disappear over time, that it is recommended that the Mission ask other research contractors to consider the type of approach taken by Cornell to preserve its research findings.

v. Contributed to Knowledge About How to Undertake Research on Rural Yemen

Despite its modest size, the Cornell Research Program is one of the largest research efforts yet undertaken in rural Yemen. As noted elsewhere in this Section, it was also overly ambitious. The size of the research program and its objectives created conditions in which it was possible to learn a good deal about doing development oriented research in rural Yemen.

Much was learned during this exercise that will be useful to the design of future research undertakings of a similar nature. To a large extent, the lessons are incorporated in the trip reports and Cornell-USAID Yemen Mission memorandums cited in footnotes to this Final Report. Statements on the research experience are also incorporated in most of the Cornell publications. Hence, future development specialists should be able to draw on the Cornell experience to increase their probability of designing successful research projects.

vi. Formulation of a Useful Research Strategy

The tiered research strategy followed by Cornell is presented in Section IV of this Final Report. This approach is well suited to obtaining increasingly fine-grained detail on rural regions of the country. Despite problems with the Cross-Sectional Surveys described elsewhere in this report, it is submitted that the tiered strategy is both attractive and feasible. Moreover, the detailed classifications of data listed in the Research Design should be a useful contribution to future efforts to study other rural areas of the country.⁶⁶

⁶⁶"Research Design" (Document Prepared by the Yemen Research Program, Project 270-0045, USAID/Y, Ithaca, July 12, 1979, revised March 26, 1980). This document is in the files of USAID/Y, USAID/Washington and Cornell's Rural Development Committee.

vii. Demonstration that Social Survey Instruments can be Implemented in Rural Yemen

The issues surrounding the Cross-Sectional Surveys have been discussed in several sections of this report. In the sub-section which follows, it is noted that one of the project's shortcomings was the failure to carry out the Cross-Sectional Surveys as planned. Still, it is submitted that the report on the Cross-Sectional Survey data establishes: (1) that it is possible to administer open ended survey instruments in rural Yemen; and (2) that such a research methodology can generate useful, valid information.⁶⁷ The paper based on those surveys also contains a review of the lessons learned during the process of designing and administering the instruments. This should provide helpful information for future researchers considering the use of such instruments in rural Yemen.

viii. Provided Information Source for USAID's Washington Staff, Potential Contractors for Mission Projects and Other International Donors

Throughout the research period, Cornell received requests from various USAID offices in Washington for publications generated by the project. Most of these have been used to provide background information for universities and consulting firms doing research on rural Yemen. In addition, requests have been received from various donors and private voluntary organizations. The World Bank, in particular, has drawn on the research product. Indeed, Cornell's Swanson and Lewis presented Cornell research findings and publications to the World Bank in a Washington held workshop on rural Yemen. Because future request are anticipated, the originals of all project publications are being held by Lewis at Cornell for reproduction and distribution as requested.

ix. Organization of Mission Archives on Rural Development Research

In 1977 the USAID Mission had no central archive that organized available materials on rural Yemen. Reports, papers, articles and government documents were scattered. Some important comments were protected in bottom drawers of staff officers. At the same time, the Mission was experiencing

⁶⁷ Walker, Carapico and Cohen, Emerging Rural Patterns in the Yemen Arab Republic, Passim.

a steady flow of Washington based USAID specialists and consultants. They used up inordinate amounts of staff time seeking information sources. Unfortunately they often took documents with them to photocopy, forgetting to ever return them.

Recognizing this problem early on, the Mission asked Cornell to design an archive system which would classify documents in a useful way, make them available to permanent and temporary USAID staff, local researchers and consultants, and ensure that the Mission lost no further reference materials. By early 1981, Cornell's recommendations had been fully implemented and for the first time the Mission had a useful and attractive archival office which both protected and made available the published and fugitive literature on Yemen.

x. Contributed to Professional Development of Rural Yemen Experts

There are few experts on rural Yemen who can be drawn upon for consulting assignments. Most are young researchers doing Ph.D. dissertations. Seized as targets of opportunity by donors and consulting firms, they have tended to mix their academic research with short term applied consulting exercises. Cornell's Yemen Research program directly or indirectly worked with several of the more promising of these people. While they were experts on Yemen and Arab speakers, nearly all of them had no direct consulting experience. Long and short term work with the project helped train them in the applied approach to research work that consulting demands. Even those with some prior consulting experience benefited from working under the rigorous demands and contract deadlines the Cornell Research Design generated.

Two researchers who worked for Cornell are using data gathered for the project in their Ph.D. dissertations. The field team leader has moved into an applied position on the staff of the O45 contractor. Most interestingly, the historian-cum-Arabist who did initial archive work for the project has moved into the development of microprocessor-based information systems for CYDA.

The co-directors did have a comparative perspective and experience base which allowed them to assist young researchers to produce better theses and papers. Over the past six years they reviewed and critiqued a number of research studies, consulting reports and dissertation drafts. These exercises also contributed to skill development.

Finally, all those associated with the Cornell research team will continue to be available to do consulting work on Yemen. Hence, they are part of a small but important group of experts needed by the international community as it seeks to assist the Yemen government's efforts to promote the country's development. Cornell's research project contributed to the professional development of this pool of expert resources.

Important Shortcomings

i. Overly Ambitious Research Design ...

There is no question that the Research Design which Cornell attempted to implement was overly ambitious. As noted in Section VIII, at the time it was conceived the USAID Mission had a complex agenda to be achieved and Cornell's Cohen and Lewis were eager to be of service to that Mission. From hindsight, it is clear that gathering the kinds of data outlined in the Research Design was a very difficult task. Still, it is submitted that Cornell researchers substantially accomplished all of the objectives which were set in the early optimistic days of 1979.

Some of the reasons for the ambitious research design were:

(1) the co-directors were not totally familiar with Yemen and underestimated the difficulties of field research and the probabilities of government and USAID generated delays; (2) the Mission was in transition and USAID personnel who helped design Project 045 and reviewed the Cornell Research Design were also not experts on Yemen field conditions; (3) little was known about rural Yemen and the LDAs, but recent research funded by USAID suggested that it was possible to gather the kinds of data sought by the Research Design; (4) Cornell was overly confident about being able to recruit an agricultural economist who could pursue particular kinds of data required by the Research Design; and (5) Cornell did not realize how resistant CYDA and the LDAs would be to research when it was unconnected to concrete project activity nor did Cornell anticipate how out of phase with the 045 contractor its field work would be. Several of these reasons are important enough to require specific treatment below.

ii. Co-Directors of Project Not Resident in Country

Given the problems and delays encountered throughout the research period, it would have been extremely useful if at least one of the project co-directors had been resident in the country and actively involved in the field research. Since it was never possible for either co-director to do this, the matter was not considered in the design stage. But it seems clear that the presence of a university professor in Sana'a might have helped generate the support needed from CYDA and the LDAs and could possibly have helped break the procedural and security blockages that plagued the project throughout its history. Hence, it seems useful to identify this constraint so that future research projects can benefit from the observation.

iii. Inability to Locate and Recruit an Agricultural Economist for the Yemen Field Team

The Mission director in 1978 was quite insistent that the Cornell research team include an agricultural economist. He took this position because he wanted to be sure the project would be able to gather particular kinds of data and to increase the likelihood that useful quantitative data would result from the research effort. Cornell agreed with this view and planned to have one team member be an anthropologist and the other an agricultural economist. Thus, it was this perspective that led the Research Design to promise to gather particular kinds of data.

Cornell overestimated the probability of recruiting an Arab speaking agricultural economist who would live in the difficult field conditions that the project demanded. Extensive recruiting efforts were made in the United States, Europe and the Middle East. The two promising candidates identified decided not to consider joining the team, largely because of field conditions in rural Yemen. In the end, only anthropologists were available, and one was recruited as the second team member from among them.

Cornell believes that both anthropologists performed well in the field. However, it must be acknowledged that anthropologists are in general neither inclined to gather the kind of data that an agricultural economist would be most interested in nor attracted to use the methodological approaches that agricultural economists are trained to prefer. As a result, it proved difficult to obtain particular kinds of data and the overall

research product lacks a strong empirical or statistical base.

iv. Inability to Convince CYDA and LDAs in Hajja and Hodeidah Governorates of the Importance and Utility of Research Activities

Members of the Cornell research team were never able to convince CYDA or important LDA officials in Hajja and Hodeidah Governorates that the research being gathered was important to both them and the 045 contractor. To some extent this is because the entire 045 Project, including the Cornell research component, was designed with little input from CYDA or the host LDAs in the project area. It is ironic that this was the case, for both the 045 Project and the Cornell program were based on the New Directions mandate to increase the participation of local people in the projects that affect their lives and communities.

Politics are the major reason why there was no Yemen participation in Cornell's Research Design. The process of approval for Project 045 was going very slowly when Cornell entered the scene. As a result, the Mission was reluctant to have Cornell's co-directors discuss a research program with CYDA or the government. As explained elsewhere in this report, to some extent this was because the Yemenis were well aware that the project was largely foreign technical assistance. What they wanted was more direct grant money in the project. Since this was not to be, USAID wisely decided that it was not appropriate to discuss a research component with the government, for it was obvious that this would raise the issue of the percentage of grant money in the project.

It is unfortunate that this was the case, for Cornell could have delivered a presentation to CYDA and LDA officials that would have explained the purpose of the research and its ultimate utility to the LDA movement. Had CYDA and involved LDAs been brought in early, it is entirely possible that they would have given the research team the support needed to obtain security clearances and conduct research interviews. Indeed, this lack of Yemeni participation in the research exercise and the failure of Cornell to explain fully the potential value of the research product was one of the major shortcomings of the project.

v. Qualitative Nature of Data

A great deal of data on a number of Yemen communities are displayed in the annexes of the Baseline and Cross-Sectional Survey reports. It would have been misleading, however, to have placed that data on computer tapes and done statistical analysis with it. Both reports explain why this is the case and it is not necessary to repeat that explanation here.

It was expected that the village level studies would be qualitative, for they were to use methodologies favored by anthropologists. However, as noted above, Cornell had hoped to have one of the researchers be an agricultural economist. When this proved impossible, it became difficult to revise the research design in ways that could facilitate the ability of the project's anthropologists to gather quantitative data. As a result, most of the findings generated by the project are qualitative.

It is not clear that this should be considered a shortcoming. Rural Yemen is so diverse, the processes of change so complex and rapidly shifting, and the problems of security and authorization so great, that it might not have been possible to gather statistically significant data in any case. Further, so little was known about rural Yemen when the project began, that obtaining a qualitative overview was probably a precondition to any hypothesis testing. Today an adequate portrait of rural Yemen exists. It is for the next generation of research to move towards hypotheses and more statistical analysis.

vi. Compromise Approach to Cross-Sectional Surveys

The situation surrounding the postponement and modification of the planned Cross-Sectional Surveys is described in Sections V and VIII of this report. There is no need to repeat the facts here. All that needs to be noted is that Cornell views its compromised approach toward administering the planned Cross-Sectional Surveys as a major shortcoming of the project. Had the original research design been implemented as planned, these instruments could have generated additional data needed to better understand rural development processes and LDAs in Yemen.

vii. Research Phases Out of Synchronism with 045 Contractor Activities

Because of delays in the signing of the 045 Project and the time frame in the Cornell Research Design, the research and implementation activities of Cornell and the implementation activities of Chemonics were never in phase. For example, just at the time when the contractor was about to move into the two governorates to get projects started, Cornell researchers were settled into their long term village studies. This kind of phasing made it difficult for Cornell to respond to the applied research needs of Chemonics. This was an important shortcoming. On the other hand, the Baseline Surveys produced by Cornell were available for the contractor to use when it began the project and should have assisted its staff in gaining a detailed understanding about the kinds of communities likely to be encountered in the two governorates. No evaluation is available to determine whether this was indeed the case.

viii. Lack of On-Going Substantive Suggestions and Criticisms from USAID Mission

Unfortunately, most of the time spent with USAID officials was concentrated on procedural and reporting matters. Why this was the case is outlined in Section VIII. To be sure, some suggestions and criticism were received in informal ways, particularly by the field researchers. But the fact remains that the co-directors never actively sought, and the Mission staff never actively provided, suggestions and criticism that would have improved the emerging research product. From the perspective of hindsight, it is clear that the research product would have been improved had such reviews occurred. Hence, we would recommend that future research efforts be very conscious of this failed interchange and try to establish formal ways to ensure that it occurs.

ix. Inability to Overcome USAID and Yemen Government Generated Delays

All members of the Cornell research team made extraordinary efforts to overcome the delays created by USAID and Yemen government rules and procedures. Large amounts of energy that could have been expended on research efforts was used up in the struggle to obtain the clearances and permissions needed to carry out the project. Perhaps as much energy was spent in Ithaca and Washington as in Sana'a. Clearly, future research efforts in rural Yemen

need to more realistically anticipate the kinds of delays likely to emerge and design their research timetables and strategies accordingly.

SECTION X
WORK PROJECT

Major Reports

1. John M. Cohen, Mary Hebert, David B. Lewsi and C. Swanson, Rural Development and Local Organization in Hajja and Hodeidah: Regional Baseline Study Report, 2 vols. (Ithaca: Cornell University, Yemen Research Program, July 31, 1980). 350 pp.
2. Arabic summary of the Baseline Study Report (item a, above). 55 pp.
3. Jon C. Swanson and Mary Hebert, Rural Society and Participatory Development: Case Studies of Two Villages in the Yemen Arab Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University, Yemen Research Program, September 1981). 281 pp.
4. S. Tjip Walker, Sheila Carapico, and John M. Cohen, Emerging Rural Patterns in the Yemen Arab Republic: Results of a 21 Community Study (Ithaca: Cornell University, Yemen Research Program, March 1983). 170 pp.

Working Notes

1. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Capital-Surplus, Labor-Short Economies: Yemen as a challenge to Development Strategies," Working Note No. 1, January 1980, 6 pp.
2. David B. Lewis, "Local Development Associations in the Yemen Arab Republic," Working Note No. 2, January 1980, 3 pp.
3. Jon C. Swanson and David B. Lewis, "Preliminary Baseline Report," Working Note No. 3, February 1980, 17 pp.
4. Cornell Research Team, "Selection of 045 Project Sites: Guidelines from Regional Baseline Study, Working Note No. 4, March 1980, 16 pp.
5. Barbara Croken, "Source Materials in Arabic on Rural Development and the Cooperative Movement in the Yemen Arab Republic," Working Note No. 5, October 1980, 119 pp.
6. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Review of Literature and Analysis of Rural Development Issues in the Yemen Arab Republic," Working Note No. 6, February 1981, 98 pp.
7. John M. Cohen, Mary Hebert, David B. Lewis and Jon C. Swanson, "Traditional Organizations and Development: Yemen's Local Development Associations," Working Note No. 7, February 1981, 42 pp.

8. Mary Hebert, "Preliminary Field Report: Socio-Economic Conditions and Development - Maglaf, Hodeidah Governorate," Working Note No. 8, March 1981, 32 pp.
9. John C. Swanson, "Preliminary Field Report: Socio-Economic Conditions and Development - Bani 'Awwam, Hajja Governorate," Working Note No. 9, March 1981, 44 pp.
10. Mary Hebert, "Interim Field Report: Local Organization and Development - Maghlaf, Hodeidah Governorate," Working Note No. 10, June 1981, 31 pp.
11. Jon C. Swanson, "Interim Field Report: Local Government and Development - Bani 'Awwam, Hajja Province," Working Note No. 11, June 1981, 26 pp.
12. Lee Ann Ross, "An Informal Banking System: The Remittance Agents of Yemen," Working Note No. 12, November 1981, 16 pp.
13. Frank W. Young, Mary Hebert and Jon C. Swanson, "The Ecological Context of Local Development in Yemen," Working Note No. 13, November 1981, 7 p.
14. John M. Cohen and Mary Hebert, "Rural Development in Yemen: A Select Bibliography," Working Note No. 14, February 1983, 33 pp.
15. Mary Hebert, "Community Structure and Participation: Yemen's Local Development Associations," Working Note No. 15, March 1983, 30 pp.

Professional Publications

1. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Capital Surplus Labor Short Economies: Yemen as a Challenge to Rural Development Strategies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, LXI, 3 (1979): 523-8.
2. John M. Cohen, Mary Hebert, David B. Lewis and Jon C. Swanson, "Development from Below: Local Development Associations in the Yemen Arab Republic," World Development, IX, 11/12 (1981): 1039-61.
3. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Rural Development in the Yemen Arab Republic," (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development, Development Discussion Paper No. 52, February 1979).

Workshop Publications

Throughout the contract period, Cornell researchers gave a number of formal papers to workshops in Sana'a, Washington, D.C., and Ithaca. For example, in March 1977, Cornell organized, prepared and directed a three day workshop in Sana'a on "rural development" and co-sponsored with NE/TECH a

full day workshop in Washington, D.C. in February 1979. Informal presentations were given at various times at all three locations for both USAID and other donors. Major workshop publications include:

1. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Discussion Outline for Workshop on Rural Development in Yemen" (Paper Prepared for National Institute for Public Administration and USAID, Sana'a, March 25-27, 1978). 17 pp.
2. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Rural Development Issues in the Yemen Arab Republic" (Discussion Paper for USAID/RDA and NE/TEC Workshop on Yemen, Washington, D.C., February 21, 1979). 47 pp.
3. Jon C. Swanson, "Preliminary Results of Baseline Studies in the Governorates of Hajja and Hodeidah" (Presentation to Research Committee Meeting, USAID/Yemen, Sana'a, March 25, 1980). Later published as Working Note 3, 17 pp.
4. John M. Cohen, Mary Hebert, David B. Lewis and Jon C. Swanson, "Traditional Organizations and Development: Yemen's Local Development Associations" (Paper Presented to Annual Rural Sociology Association Convention, Ithaca, August 1980).
5. Jon C. Swanson, "Review of Baseline Survey and Overview of Cornell Yemen Research Program" (Summary Paper and Oral Presentation at Chemonics - USAID/Y Second Semi-Annual Conference on Local Resources for Development Project, Hodeidah, January 28, 1980).

Internal Memorandum and Reports

A number of internal memorandums for USAID and the 045 contractor were written throughout the life of the project. These ranged from advisory memorandums and research designs to project status reports and trip reports. Examples of important memorandums and reports are:

1. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Organizing Rural Development Information Systems" (Memorandum Prepared for USAID Mission, Sana'a, March 1978).
2. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Research Strategy of USAID/Yemen" (Memorandum Prepared for USAID Mission, Sana'a, March 28, 1978).
3. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Socio-Economic Profile, Local Resources for Development, AID Project 045, Yemen Arab Republic" (Review Memorandum for USAID/Y, Ithaca, December 7, 1978).
4. John M. Cohen, Mary Hebert, David B. Lewis and Jon C. Swanson, "Research Design (Revised), Design Report Prepared for USAID Mission, Sana'a, May 1980.
5. Manfred Wenner, "Local Government in (North) Yemen," Memorandum Prepared for USAID Mission, Sana'a, May 1978.

SECTION XI
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

Publication Series as Attachment

Data and analysis generated by Cornell's Yemen Research Program are largely contained in the four major reports and 15 Working Notes issued over the course of the project. Full citations for these studies are provided in Section X of this Final Report.

The major reports and Working Notes comprise a total of nearly 1,400 pages. So detailed are these studies and so wide ranging is their analysis that it would be difficult and inappropriate to summarize them here. Rather, they are incorporated by reference into this Final Report.

Such incorporation is possible because all these reports and studies have been published in the same distinctive format as this one. The strategy for distributing these is described in Section VII.

Still, to provide an overview of the research product, the Cornell research team's recent overview article on LDAs is set forth in Annex II. While it does not explicitly summarize the fine grained data produced by field team members in Hajja and Hodeidah, it is in part guided by generalizations drawn from that field research. No such overview existed when Cornell began its relationship with the Yemen Mission in 1978. Hence, we believe this article provides a useful summary of the kinds of data and analysis generated by the project and reported in the larger corpus of research publications.

Location of Publication Series

At the same time as this Final Report was submitted, a full set of the four major reports and 15 Working Notes was sent to research libraries in the following institutions:

1. Central Planning Office, Sana'a
2. Confederation of Yemen Development Associations, Sana'a
3. Sana'a University, Sana'a
4. USAID/Yemen Mission, Sana'a
5. USAID/Washington, Near East Bureau and Office of Multisectoral Development, Washington, D.C.
6. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
7. University of Chicago
8. University of California at Los Angeles

9. University of Pennsylvania
10. University of North Carolina
11. University of Texas
12. University of Edinburgh
13. University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies
14. British Museum Library, London

These sets are in addition to copies of individual papers which were forwarded to the Yemen Government and USAID over the length of the contract period. It is hoped that this final distribution of sets to research libraries and government archives will ensure that the work product of the Yemen Research Program will survive and be available to future development professionals seeking to improve the lives of rural people in the Yemen Arab Republic.

ANNEX I

MAJOR CORNELL-USAID CONTRACT AGREEMENTS

1. Principle Contract, January 23, 1980
2. April 19, 1980 Amendment Memorandum
3. June 26, 1980 Amendment Letter
4. July 9, 1980 Amendment Letter
5. April 30, 1982 Amendment Letter

COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT UNDER THE
 BASIC MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
 FOR EXPANDED PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC
 ANALYSIS FOR AGRICULTURAL AND
 RURAL SECTOR PLANNING

COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT
 NO. AID/ta-CA-4
 BASIC MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
 NO. AID/ta-BMA-8
 PROJECT NO. 279-0045


NEGOTIATED PURSUANT TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED, AND
 EXECUTIVE ORDER 11223

<p>AUTHORIZED ORDERING ACTIVITY</p> <p>Agency for International Development Office of Contract Management Washington, D. C. 20523</p> <p>Cognizant AID Scientific/Technical Office</p> <p>AID/DS/RAD and USAID/YEMEN</p>	<p>COOPERATOR (NAME AND ADDRESS)</p> <p>Cornell University</p> <hr/> <p>Name</p> <p>P.O. Box DH, 123 Day Hall</p> <hr/> <p>Street Address</p> <p>Ithaca New York 14853</p> <hr/> <p>City State Zip Coc</p> <hr/> <p>MAIL VOUCHERS (original and 4 copies) TO:</p> <p>Agency for International Development Office of Financial Management (See Para. Washington, D. C. 20523 No. 1)</p>
<p>EFFECTIVE DATE: See Paragraph E</p>	
<p>EXPIRATION DATE: See Paragraph E</p>	

ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA

Amount Obligated:	\$249,400
Appropriation No.:	72-1191021
Allotment No.:	943-50-279-69-03
PIO/T NO.:	279-045-3-90058

The United States of America, hereinafter called the Government, represented by the Agreement Officer executing this Cooperative Agreement, and the Cooperator agree as follows: (1) That the parties shall perform their respective responsibilities as set forth in this Cooperative Agreement; (2) That this Cooperative Agreement is issued pursuant to the terms of Basic Memorandum of Agreement No. AID/ta-BMA-8 and (3) That the entire agreement between the parties hereto consists of: (a) This Cooperative Agreement, consisting of 5 pages, including the Cover Page, the Schedule and Additional Provisions (if any); and (b) Basic Memorandum of Agreement No. AID/ta-BMA-8, including Attachment B to same.

<p>NAME OF COOPERATOR</p> <p>CORNELL UNIVERSITY</p>	<p>UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT</p>
<p>BY (Signature of Authorized Individual)</p> 	<p>BY (Signature of Agreement Officer)</p> 
<p>TYPED OR PRINTED NAME</p> <p>Thomas R. Rogers, Director</p>	<p>TYPED OR PRINTED NAME</p> <p>M.D. V.C. Peretti /s/ Morton Daryin</p>
<p>TITLE</p> <p>Office of Sponsored Programs</p>	<p>TITLE</p> <p>AGREEMENT OFFICER <i>Set up</i></p>
<p>DATE</p> <p>December 20, 1979</p>	<p>DATE</p> <p>JAN. 23 1980 <i>U20-83</i></p>

cc: J. Killian
 n. uphoff

x c: P. Lewis
 P. O. Kewala
 B. K. - SPA

Cooperative Agreement Schedule

A. Title of Work Effort

Local Resources for Development (Project No. 279-0045) - See attachment 1 entitled "Scope of Work")

B. Project Managers(1) AID Project Managers

Mr. John Harbeson DS/RAD/AID/W
and
Mr. Frank Pavich, USAID/Yemen

(2) Cooperator's Project Manager

Dr. Porus Olpadwala
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 14853

C. Location of Work

Cooperator's Home Institution, Ithaca, New York
SANA and other areas/regions within Yemen Arab Republic

D. Scope of Work and Services to be Provided

See Attachment (1)

E. Duration

The effective date of this agreement is the date of signature by the Agreement Officer and its expiration date is September 30, 1981.

The term of this Agreement may be extended provided the underlying Basic Memorandum of Agreement AID/ta-BMA-8 is still in effect.

F. Total Estimated Cost, Obligated Amount and Cost Sharing

1. The total estimated cost of this Agreement is \$370,050 of which \$357,225 represents AID's share of the cost and \$12,825 represents the Cooperator's share of the costs. (See paragraph F.2 below for Breakdown of cooperator's share) AID's share consists of \$249,400 obligated hereunder and \$107,825 to be drawn from funds previously obligated in CA-1. The Cooperator may not draw funds from CA-1 to support this Agreement (CA-4) in excess of the amount of \$107,825 without the prior written approval of the Agreement Officer. Expenditure of the funds obligated by this Agreement (CA-4) in the amount of \$249,400 is subject to the provision of the clause

entitled "Limitation of Cost" attached hereto and made a part hereof.

2. Cost Sharing: The Cooperator agrees it will provide the following items without cost to AID for the effort undertaken pursuant to this Agreement:

Data Processing	\$2000
Administration (Managerial on campus)	8300
Administration (Clerical on campus)	<u>2525</u>
Total	\$12,825

G. Pre-Agreement Costs

The allowable cost of performance of this Cooperative Agreement shall include all costs which have been incurred by the Cooperator in anticipation of this Cooperative Agreement on and after July 1, 1979, but prior to the date hereof, and which if incurred after the date of this Cooperative Agreement, would have been considered as items of allowable cost under this Agreement; provided, however that such anticipatory costs shall not exceed \$30,000 unless such amount is subsequently increased in writing by the Agreement Officer.

H. Budget

The budget for the work to be performed hereunder for the period specified herein is shown in the Table I entitled "Budget" attached hereto. This budget represents the total estimated cost for the total effort. AID's share of this cost does not reflect its in-house contribution of personnel and facilities, the details of which are set forth in Paragraph K below.

The Cooperator may not exceed the amount obligated hereunder of \$249,400 but may make line item adjustments without restriction.

I. Method of Payment

Disbursements of funds hereunder shall be made in accordance with the provisions of clause No. 7A entitled "Federal Reserve Letter of Credit" which clause is set forth in the Standard Provisions, Attachment B to the underlying Basic Memorandum of Agreement AID/ta-BMA-8.

J. Establishment of Predetermined Indirect Cost Rates

Pursuant to the provisions of the clause of the Standard Provisions of this Agreement entitled "Negotiated Overhead Rates - Predetermined", a rate or rates shall be established for each of the Cooperator's accounting periods during the term of the Agreement. The rate for the initial period shall be as set forth below:

<u>72%</u> Rate On-Campus	<u>Direct Salaries & Wages</u> Base	<u>Until Amended</u> Period ...
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<u>17%</u> Rate Off-Campus	<u>Direct Salaries & Wages</u> Base	<u>Until Amended</u> Period
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2. Allowability of indirect costs and acceptability of cost allocation methods shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Federal Management Circular (FMC) 73-8, "Cost Principles for Education-Institutions" in effect as of the date of this Agreement.

K. Responsibilities

1. The Cooperator agrees to:

a. Designate the two (2) researchers and others listed below to conduct the cooperative work.

<u>(1) Cooperator's Project Personnel</u>	<u>Level of Effort</u>
Researcher I - Jon Swanson	24 PM
Researcher II - Mary Hebert	21 PM
Dr. John M. Cohen Project Director (1)*	
Dr. David D. Lewis Project Director (2)*	
Dr. Norman Uphoff - Participation Project Director*	
Other	
Total	45 PM

*The level of effort and costs therefore of these individuals is being drawn from Cooperative Agreement AID/ta-CA-1, thus not reflected in this Cooperative Agreement AID/ta-CA-4.

(2) The individuals named hereinabove are considered to be key personnel. If any of these become unavailable for the work to be carried out under this agreement, the Cooperator shall nominate suitable replacements subject to the review and approval of USAID/Y and the Agreement Officer.

b. Assign other professionals and clerical personnel as needed in planning and conducting the cooperative work.

c. Provide necessary office space, office equipment and supplies for all personnel assigned to the cooperative work at the Cooperating Institution.

d. In addition to the above, absorb \$12,825 of the total estimated cost stated in Paragraph F above.

2. A.I.D. agrees to:

- a. Assign the A.I.D. technical representatives stationed in USAID/Yemen and AID/W as shown below.

<u>AID Activity Personnel</u>	<u>Level of Effort</u>
Mr. John Harbeson	3 PM
Mr. Frank R. Pavich	3 PM
Miss Diane Ponasik	3 PM
Secretary/clerical	<u>2 PM</u>
Total	11 PM

- b. Pay travel and per diem expenses of the above personnel.
- c. Assist in defraying the total cost of the cooperative work by reimbursing the Cooperator in an amount not to exceed \$357,225 of the Cooperator's total cost for the period specified in Paragraph E. hereof.

L. Administrative Relationships1. Relationships and Responsibilities

The (YARG) Yemen Arab Republic Government will be represented by the Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations (CYDA). The Cooperator's scope of work will be approved by USAID/Y and coordinated with CYDA and other concerned parties through the annual work plans.

2. Cooperating Country Liaison Officials

CYDA and regional (Coordinating Councils) and local (Local Development Associations) counterpart agencies.

3. Aid Liaison Officials:

Rural Development Office and Behavioral Science Advisor, USAID/Yemen.

M. Logistics Support In -Country

1. To the extent items of logistics support such as those described below are not provided by the Host Country and/or participating institution at no cost to the Cooperator, the Cooperator is responsible for providing them, as appropriate, for the two (2) researchers assigned in country on a long term basis and for those other key personnel who will be making periodic on site visits to the project. These items of logistics support which are considered items of allowable cost shall include but not to be limited to: Office space and equipment, housing, utilities, and furniture, household equipment (such as stoves, refrigerator etc.)

transportation to and from country and while in country, official motorized vehicles, travel arrangements, tickets and importation of personal effects.

2. Use of pouch, mail room and commissary will be provided as permitted by AID regulations in effect at the time of execution of this agreement.

N. Travel Provisions

Prior to making any visits to the Cooperating Country, the Cooperator will review his plans with USAID/Yemen and/or DS/RAD/AID/W. He will request and receive country clearance and USAID Mission concurrence as required and will make his own appointments and logistics arrangements. Upon completion of all international travel, a copy of the trip report will be provided to the cognizant AID and USAID Project Managers.

O. Subordinate Agreement

In the conduct of the work to be carried out hereunder, the Cooperator is authorized to enter into a subordinate agreement with Harvard University. It is to be noted that AID's consent to the placement of this subordinate agreement in no way relieves the Cooperator from final responsibility for all of the work to be performed.

A copy of the fully executed subordinate agreement shall be provided to the Agreement Officer whose name appears on the cover page of this Cooperative Agreement.

P. Alterations to Standard Provisions (Att. B., Sept 1977 Edition) AID-ta-BMA 8

1. For purposes of this Cooperative Agreement AID/ta-CA-4, the Clause No. 6 entitled "Limitation of Funds" is superseded and replaced by the attached clause entitled "Limitation of Costs" (Jan 74).

2. Title to vehicle(s) purchased by the Cooperator with AID funds provided hereunder shall vest in the U.S. Government and the provision of Standard Provision 12B of Attachment B to BMA-8 shall apply. All other property purchased hereunder shall be governed by standard Provision 12A of BMA-8.

SCOPE OF WORK: Summary

Cooperator will undertake a socio-economic survey and in-depth study of selected uzlas (sub-districts) of Hajja and Hodeida Governorates in conjunction with Project 279-0045, Local Resources for Development. The research is intended to contribute to project implementation by providing information that will assist USAID in identifying areas with potential and/or resources for economic development; by providing general baseline data which can be used in evaluating subsequent project impact; and by identifying possible social or economic blockages in local participation which can then be taken into consideration in project implementation.

DETAILED SCOPE OF WORK

The main services to be performed are the following:

1. During their first six months in Yemen, researchers will conduct an initial baseline study on the selected uzlas of Hajja and Hodeida. Macro data to be gathered and analysed will include (to the extent reasonably available), but not be limited to, basic economic statistics on the governorates, population statistics, social services available, migration patterns, formal and non-formal training facilities available, ethnic groupings, ecological resources, main forms of livelihood, urban-rural distribution and interaction, political configurations, and nutrition and health information.
2. During the final 18 months, the researchers will conduct in-depth studies in individual uzlas in the governorates of Hajja and Hodeida. These studies will yield the following analyses.
 - a) baseline data on specific uzlas chosen from the project area (these data will be similar to those listed under 1 above).
 - b) description of the project areas with particular emphasis on rural labor and income, land tenure, and local organizations and participation.
 - c) analysis of rural development issues in the project area with specific concern for the relationship to rural labor, income distribution, and tenure patterns and community participation in local organizations.

(Note: The details of the research will be finalized during the team's first month in Sanaa, as it must be worked out jointly with the researchers, CYDA, and USAID.)

METHODOLOGY

The research design will utilize the following methodological techniques:

- 1) participant observation
- 2) key informants
- 3) micro-study surveys
- 4) case studies
- 5) secondary data collection

REPORTS

All reports shall be submitted in 12 copies, in English: 4 to USAID, 4 to Cooperator's project manager, and 4 to O45 contractor. At the discretion of USAID, selected reports shall be translated by USAID into Arabic and submitted to CYDA.

Deadlines for reports shall be as follows:

1. July 31, 1979, or one month after arrival in Yemen (whichever comes last), the researchers, in cooperation with Cooperator's advisors, USAID and CYDA, will submit a detailed research design outlining the types of information to be gathered under the two main headings listed in 2b and c above, methodology of research and implementation plan with estimated time frame and other useful progress indicators. These progress indicators will be reviewed and subject to approval by USAID.
2. April 30, 1980, or six months after arrival in Yemen (whichever comes last) researchers shall submit analyses of macro baseline data for Hajja and Hodeida governorates (as detailed in Scope of Work (1) above).
3. September 30, 1980, or nine months after arrival in Yemen (whichever comes last) researchers shall submit micro-baseline data on target area uzlas in the governorates of Hajja and Hodeida (as detailed in Scope of Work (2) above). This report will be tentative as, provided for in item 2 of the Plan of Work, many of the issues detailed in item 2 will take a full 18 months to explore and analyze.
4. December 31, 1980, or 15 months after arrival in Yemen (whichever comes last) researchers shall submit preliminary findings and analyses on labor use, income, labor tenure and local participation as detailed in final work plan to be finalized during first month of work in Yemen.
5. September 30, 1981, or 25 months after arrival in Yemen, (whichever comes last) researchers shall submit final reports and analysis on labor use, income, land tenure and local participation as they relate to further project design (as specified in final work plan to be finalized during first month of work in Yemen).

If the research effort encounters unanticipated problems the contractor may request AID to extend one or more of these deadlines, such extensions to be approved by the grants officer with the concurrence approval from both the USAID project managers in Sanaa and Washington.

6. Other reports as requested by USAID and mutually agreed upon.

June 1979

	<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>CA-1</u>	<u>CA-4</u>
1. Salaries	\$ 27,150	\$ 93,750
2. Allowances	23,310	79,364
3. Sub-contract with Harvard University (services of J.M. Cohen)	23,353	2,725
4. International Travel	17,226	
5. Per Diem en Route	2,100	
6. Per Diem in Yemen	1,090	18,203
7. Shipment and Settlement		8,400
8. Transportation		17,275
9. Communications	750	750
10. Research assistants/ materials	<u>9,200</u>	<u>20,500</u>
Totals before inflationary offset	\$ 104,179	\$ 240,967
Inflationary offset - second year-7%	<u>3,646</u>	<u>8,433</u>
Total	\$ 107,825	\$249,400

Cooperator's Cost Sharing:

Data Processing \$2000

Administration
(Managerial \$8300
-on Campus)Administration 2525
(Clerical-
on Campus) _____

\$12,825

GRAND TOTAL \$370,050

6. LIMITATION OF COST (Jan 74)

(a) It is estimated that the total cost to the Government for the performance of this Agreement, exclusive of any fee, will not exceed the estimated cost set forth in the Schedule, and the Cooperator agrees to use his best efforts to perform the work specified in the Schedule and all obligations under this Agreement within such estimated cost. If, at any time, the Cooperator has reason to believe that the costs which he expects to incur in the performance of this Agreement in the next succeeding 60 days, when added to all costs previously incurred, will exceed 75 percent of the estimated cost then set forth in the Schedule, or if, at any time, the Cooperator has reason to believe that the total cost to the Government for the performance of this Agreement, exclusive of any fee, will be greater or substantially less than the estimated cost hereof, the Cooperator shall notify the Agreement Officer in writing to that effect, giving the revised estimate of such total cost for the performance of this Agreement.

(b) Except as required by other provisions of this Agreement specifically citing and stated to be an exception from this clause, the Government shall not be obligated to reimburse the Cooperator for costs incurred in excess of the estimated cost set forth in the Schedule, and the Cooperator shall not be obligated to continue performance under the Agreement (including actions under the Termination clause) or otherwise to incur costs in excess of the estimated cost set forth in the Schedule, unless and until the Agreement Officer shall have notified the Cooperator in writing that such estimated cost has been increased and shall have specified in such notice a revised estimated cost which shall thereupon constitute the estimated cost of performance of this Agreement. No notice, communication or representation in any other form or from any person other than the Agreement Officer shall affect the estimated cost of this Agreement. In the absence of the specified notice, the Government shall not be obligated to reimburse the Cooperator for any costs in excess of the estimated cost set forth in the Schedule, whether those excess costs were incurred during the course of the Agreement or as a result of termination. When and to the extent that the estimated cost set forth in the Schedule has been increased, any costs incurred by the Cooperator in excess of the estimated cost prior to such increase shall be allowable to the same extent as if such costs had been incurred after the increase; unless the Agreement Officer issues a termination or other notice and directs that the increase is solely for the purpose of covering termination or other specified expenses.

(c) In the event that this Agreement is terminated or the estimated cost not increased, the Government and the Cooperator shall negotiate an equitable distribution of all property produced or purchased under the Agreement based upon the share of costs incurred by each.

United States A.I.D. Mission to the Yemen Arab Republic
c/o American Embassy, Sana'a, Yemen

الوكالة الأمريكية للتنمية الدولية
السفارة الأمريكية، صنعاء، اليمن

Contract Amendment

April 19, 1980

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Franklin H. Moulton
Office of Contract Management (SER/CM)
Rm 729 SA-14
Agency for International Development

THRU: Chester S. Bell, Jr.
Acting Director
USAID/Sana'a

FROM: Frank R. Pavich
Acting Chief, Office of Rural and Capital
Development

Subject: Project No. 279-0045 USAID/Y, Cooperative Agree-
ment No. AID/ta-CA-4, Basic Memorandum of Agree-
ment No. AID/ta-BMA-3

In late January 1980, AID and Cornell University signed a cooperative agreement to undertake field research on local level development in Yemen. Cornell began field work in July 1979, despite the fact that a cooperative agreement was not signed until early 1980. We have just concluded a project progress review as part of the March 1980 visit of the project co-directors, John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis.

The Cornell activity is proceeding well and ahead of the rest of the project. The process for selecting the prime contractor has taken longer than planned.

Nevertheless, we think it appropriate to make one amendment to the cooperative agreement. This relates to product delivery dates. Cornell has contracted to submit a Final Baseline Report on April 30, 1980, a Final Cross Sectorial Survey Report on September 30, 1980, and a Final Project Report on September 30, 1981. The Mission and Cornell both agree that the dates for submissions be set back. There are several reasons for this: (1) State Department restrictions on travel to Yemen prevented the

the planned visits of the research directors, Cohen and Lewis, during the first two months of 1980; for this reason they came in March rather than January; (2) delay in signing the USAID/Y Cornell CA and difficulties in obtaining a vehicle waiver slowed down the survey of villages in remote areas since researchers had no transport; (they continued surveys without transport but the process took far longer; (3) the length of time the exchange of mail drafts between Cornell directors and Yemen researchers took was underestimated; and (4) the Government of Yemen is delaying the researchers' permission to continue work in the field until the 0045 project implementation begins in the field. Hence, the pressure for reports of use to the contractor has also been relieved for a few months. For these reasons we suggest and support the following amendments:

<u>Product</u>	<u>Present Contract Date</u>	<u>Proposed Amended Date</u>
1. Detailed Research Design	July 31, 1979	January 15, 1980
2. Regional Baseline Report (macro baseline data)	April 30, 1980	July 31, 1980
3. Cross Sectorial Survey Report (micro baseline data)	September 30, 1980	February 28, 1981
4. Preliminary Community Field Study Report (case study)	December 31, 1980	February 28, 1981
5. Final Project Report (no change)	September 30, 1981	September 30, 1981

Note: In order for Project 0045 to make use of research findings prior to scheduled report completion dates, Cornell has agreed to provide a series of Executive Summaries with preliminary findings to USYD. The following are target dates for the summaries in each report category:

1. Regional Baseline Report - April 30, 1980
2. Cross Sectorial Survey Report - October 31, 1980
3. Preliminary Community Field study Report-December 31, 1980
4. Final Project Report - July 31, 1981.

Best Available Document

Again, we view this as a minor, justified amendment and find the Cornell Research team producing the expected quality of work on a schedule suitable to the Mission's needs. Hence, we would appreciate your negotiating these amendments.

cc: David B. Lewis
Cornell University ✓

ORCD:FPavich:rh

Clearance:

BSA:DPonasik (in draft)
CONT:RBurford _____
A/DD:JBean _____
PRCG:HJohnson _____

JUN. 26 1980

Mr. Don K. Enichen
Asst. Director
Office of Sponsored Programs
123 Day Hall
Cornell University
P.O. Box DH
Ithaca, New York 14853

Subject: Amendment No. 1 to the
Cooperative Agreement
AID/ta-CA-4 under
Basic Memorandum of
Agreement No. AID/ta-
BMA-8

Dear Mr. Enichen:

Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Section 7 and 6 of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977 and in furtherance of the public purpose stated in the Basic Memorandum of Agreement AID/ta-BMA-8, the Agency for International Development desires to amend the subject Cooperative Agreement AID/ta-CA-4 as follows:

A. Within the Scope of Work of the Schedule, under the heading entitled "REPORTS", make changes as follows:

1. Paragraph 1, delete the date "July 31, 1979" and insert in lieu thereof the date "January 15, 1980";
2. Paragraph 2, delete the date "April 30, 1980" and insert in lieu thereof the date "July 31, 1980";
3. Paragraph 3, delete the date "September 30, 1980" and insert in lieu thereof the date "February 28, 1981";
4. Paragraph 4, delete the date "December 31, 1980" and insert in lieu thereof the date "February 28, 1980."

B. Within the Scope of Work of the Schedule, under the heading entitled "REPORTS," add a new paragraph as follows:

"In order for Project 0045 to make use of research findings prior to scheduled report completion dates,

1981 ?

Page 2 - Mr. Don K. Enichen

the Cooperator shall provide a series of Executive Summaries with preliminary findings to USAID.


Target dates for the summaries in each report category shall be as follows:

1. Regional Baseline Report - April 30, 1980
2. Cross Sectorial Survey Report - October 31, 1980
3. Preliminary Community Field Study Report - December 31, 1980
4. Final Project Report - July 31, 1981." ✓

Except as expressly herein amended, the subject Cooperative Agreement continues in full force and effect in accordance with its terms.

If you are in agreement with this amendment, please sign the original and all copies in the space provided below and return the original and six (6) copies to this office. You may retain two (2) copies for your files.

Sincerely yours,



Morton Darvin
Contracting Officer
Agriculture/Nutrition Branch
Central Operations Division
Office of Contract Management

ACCEPTED

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

BY: _____

TITLE: _____

DATE: _____

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON D C 20523

102

JUL 9 - 1981

Mr. Don K. Enichen
Assistant Director
Office of Sponsored Programs
123 Day Hall
Cornell University
P.O. Box DH
Ithaca, New York 14853

Subject: Amendment No. 1 to the
Cooperative Agreement
No. AID/ta-CA-4 under
Basic Memorandum of
Agreement No. AID/ta-
BMA-8

Dear Mr. Enichen:

Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Sections 6 and 7 of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, and in furtherance of the public purpose stated in the Basic Memorandum of Agreement No. AID/ta-BMA-8, the Agency for International Development desires to amend the subject Cooperative Agreement as follows:

- A. Within the Schedule, Paragraph E. entitled "Duration," delete the date "September 30, 1981" and substitute in lieu thereof the date "March 31, 1982."
- B. Within the Scope of Work of the Schedule, under the heading entitled "DETAILED SCOPE OF WORK," paragraph 2., add a new subparagraph as follows:

"d) Field work may be terminated at any time after September 30, 1981, on mutual agreement of USAID and Cornell, should serious delays or other problems indicate this plan no longer feasible. If it becomes advisable to terminate data collection, Cornell will not be held responsible for research products beyond those which can be prepared with data collected up to that point."

Page - 2 - Mr. Don K. Enichen

C. Within the Scope of Work of the Schedule, under the heading entitled "REPORTS," make changes as follows:

1. Paragraph 1, delete the date "July 31, 1979" and insert in lieu thereof the date "January 15, 1980;"
2. Paragraph 2, delete the date "April 30, 1980" and insert in lieu thereof the date "July 31, 1980;"
3. Delete Paragraph 3 in its entirety and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

"3. March 30, 1981. Cornell shall submit to USAID/Sanaa a set of working notes, one for each site, describing the physical ecology, social history of the uzla and principal villages, development potential and constraints, political economy of the uzla, and LDA experience. Within one month of this submission, research team will give oral presentation to USAID/Sanaa."

done
per 5/12/81
letter from
Dimec
to Jim C

4. Delete Paragraph 4 in its entirety and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

"4. June 30, 1981. Cornell shall submit to USAID a second set of working notes covering development issues including structure of local government and LDA organization, procedures for project selection, design and implementation, project financing, local decision making, development opportunities and constraints, and local development needs."

done

5. Paragraph 5. delete the words "to be finalized during first month of work in Yemen." ← >

6. Add a new Paragraph 6 as follows:

"6. September 30, 1981. Researchers shall submit design for data collection and analysis system."

nothing on
who does it

↳ approval?

7. Add a new Paragraph 7 as follows:

"7. January 31, 1982. Researchers shall submit a report on pilot implementation of the data collection and analysis system."

8. Add a new Paragraph 8 as follows:

"8. March 31, 1982. Researchers shall submit final report summarizing project activities."

(and seminar)

Page - 3 - Mr. Don K. Enichen

Except as expressly herein amended, the subject Cooperative Agreement continues in full force and effect in accordance with its terms.

If you are in agreement with this amendment, please sign the original and all copies in the space provided and return the original and six (6) copies to this office. You may retain two (2) copies for your files.

Sincerely yours,



Morton Darwin
Agreement Officer
Agriculture/Nutrition Branch
Central Operations Division
Office of Contract Management

ACCEPTED:

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

BY: _____

TITLE: _____

DATE: _____

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON D C 20523

105
JEF

APR. 30 1982

Mr. Don K. Enichen
Assistant Director
Office of Sponsored Programs
Cornell University
123 Day Hall, P.O. Box DH
Ithaca, New York 14853

Subject: Amendment No. 4 to Cooperative
Agreement No. AID/ta-CA-4
under Basic Memorandum of
Agreement No. AID/ta-BMA-8

Dear Mr. Enichen:

Pursuant to the authority contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Sections 6 and 7 of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, and in furtherance of the public purpose stated in the Basic Memorandum of Agreement No. AID/ta-BMA-8, the Agency for International Development does hereby amend the subject Cooperative Agreement, as previously amended, to extend its term for one year at no additional cost.


- A. Within the Schedule, Paragraph E. entitled, "Duration," delete the date, "March 31, 1982" and substitute in lieu thereof the date, "March 31, 1983."
- B. Within the Scope of Work of the Schedule, under the heading entitled, "REPORTS," subparagraph 8, delete the date, "March 31, 1982" and substitute in lieu thereof the date, "March 31, 1983."

Except as expressly herein amended, the subject Cooperative Agreement continues in full force and effect in accordance with its terms.

Mr. Don K. Enichen
Cornell University
AID/ta-CA-4 - Amend. No. 1


If you are in agreement with this amendment, please sign the original and all copies in the space provided below and return the original and six (6) copies to this office.

Sincerely yours,


Morton Darvin
Agreement Officer
Agriculture/Nutrition Branch
Central Operations Division
Office of Contract Management

ACCEPTED:

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

BY: 
Thomas R. Rogers

TITLE: Director

DATE: 5-19-82

ANNEX II

JOURNAL ARTICLE ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT
AND LDAs IN YEMEN BY CORNELL
RESEARCH COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Development from Below: Local Development Associations in the Yemen Arab Republic*

JOHN M. COHEN,
Harvard Institute for International Development

and

MARY HÉBERT, DAVID B. LEWIS and JON C. SWANSON
Cornell University

Summary. – The Local Development Associations (LDAs) of the Yemen Arab Republic illustrate how indigenous organizations led by local élites can promote participatory, widely beneficial rural development. LDAs reflect a tradition of community based self-help efforts. Today Yemen's six million people, from urban dwellers to those living in remote mountain areas, are served by nearly 200 LDAs. These associations are active in undertaking tasks the central government is not organized to perform. Supported primarily by their immediate constituencies and led by local notables, they build roads, schools, village water systems, and clinics. Over the past decade they have achieved dramatic development results and become important, nationally recognized institutions. This article documents the LDA movement. This example of successful local organization is particularly important because development experts often dismiss the potential of such movements on the ground that they are likely to be élite-dominated, probably to the detriment of the poorer members of the community. In describing the LDA movement, this article also consolidates for the first time the few published, frequently unavailable papers on Yemen's complex little-studied rural sector.

1. LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Recent research in Third World countries suggests that rural development projects are more likely to be successful when initiated and managed by participatory local organizations.¹ This emerging perspective confronts a substantial body of literature which pessimistically argues that local-level organizations provide little effective opportunity for local participation in the allocation of resources or the distribution of decision power.² The resolution of this debate will have profound implications for development planning. Clarification of the issues, however, will necessitate detailed research on the relationship between local-level organizations, participatory strategies and rural development processes.³

Research is particularly needed in regard to the potential for traditional or indigenous groups to engage in the promotion of what are often considered modern development tasks. To date, only a handful of case studies are available on the development activities of such groups,⁴ and most of these focus on farmers'

cooperative societies. While a few observers conclude that traditional organizations can provide the basis for effective development,⁵ most experts tend to dismiss their potential on the grounds that they are unlikely to be sympathetic to development processes and likely to be élite-dominated, probably to the detriment of the poorer members of the community.⁶

The case of Local Development Associations (LDAs) in the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) offers a number of important insights into the potential for indigenous organizations to achieve dramatic development results and become important, nationally recognized institutions.

* Research supporting this article was funded under a cooperative agreement between Cornell University's Rural Development Committee and the Office of Rural Development and Development Administration of the United States Agency for International Development and by the USAID/Yemen Mission. The authors are particularly indebted to Sheila Carapico and Lee Ann Ross for criticism of earlier drafts and valuable insights into the Yemeni case.

2. RURAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN YEMEN

Yemen, like many of the world's poorer countries, is pursuing rural development as a strategy for addressing the problem of poverty. However, unlike many countries, Yemen has a significant opportunity to make substantial progress in this direction. To seize this opportunity, the country must pursue policies and programmes that mobilize recently increased income and direct it toward building a self-sustaining economic base for the nation. In the last few years, the country has experienced an unprecedented growth in opportunities for its labour force to work abroad, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. As a result, some experts have estimated that up to 40% of the Yemeni work force are seeking short- or long-term employment abroad.⁷ These workers are earning substantial sums and sending much of the money back to Yemen. In 1978-1979, the annual flow of remittances was approximately \$1.3 billion, an amount exceeding the entire GNP of the nation only four years earlier. Real *per capita* income doubled from about \$200 to \$400 (adjusted to 1975 prices).⁸ Since the majority of families send a member to work in Saudi Arabia, the impact of remittance income has been broadly distributed across the population. Wealth does not appear to be concentrating in the hands of the landed élite.⁹

While Yemen has enjoyed a dramatic improvement in the levels of *per capita* income, the growth of the economy as a system of production has not kept pace.¹⁰ This is a serious problem for the country. Recent economic data suggest that the growth in remittances may be slowing while inflation continues unabated. The data indicate that the number of migrants is stabilizing and that these workers are beginning to invest part of their earnings in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.¹¹ Still, barring unforeseen political disruptions, the country can expect the income from remittances to remain reasonably stable at current levels. The question is whether this flow of resources can be translated into economic growth before it begins to diminish, as eventually it must.

At present there is a tendency on the part of remittance earners to purchase land (more for reasons of security than for investment) and build houses, or to buy basic consumer goods and luxuries (such as television sets). To sustain a continuing improvement in the standard of living, Yemen must develop its economy. The country is heavily dependent on imports - particularly for food. While at the moment it is

enjoying a strong positive balance of payments, export earnings are equal to less than one per cent of import costs. The remainder is being covered by the foreign exchange remittances. Imports help relieve inflationary pressures, but there is still a shortage of basic goods and services. There is also a lack of recognized investment opportunities. The bulk of the nation's financial resources are being held in the form of cash rather than being put to work through the banking system. Yemen thus finds itself in the situation of seeking opportunities to harness existing liquidity for purposes of development rather than mobilizing development for purposes of generating investible resources.¹²

Aside from its labour, Yemen's major resource is its agricultural potential.¹³ While the country has no proven oil reserves, it does have much of the arable land on the Arabian Peninsula and a long tradition of producing food and fibre. Yemen includes diverse ecological zones ranging from the dry coastal lowlands of the Tihama, through wadis (river zones) and midlands to terraced mountain sides of the highlands.¹⁴ Seventy-five per cent of the country's six million people are located in rural areas.¹⁵ They live in numerous small towns, villages, and hamlets largely isolated from one another by the rugged terrain. Of the estimated 19,500,000 hectares that make up Yemen's area, only 1.5 million are thought to be cultivated regularly, with perhaps an additional 500,000 hectares farmed when there is an exceptionally good rain fall (once every four or five years). The major food crops of the highlands are sorghum and millet, with smaller amounts of wheat, barley, fruits, tomatoes, potatoes and a variety of lentils. *Qat*, a crop extremely important to the country's economy and society, is almost exclusively produced in highland areas.¹⁶ The seasonal rivers of the wadis permit cultivation of most cereals, maize, sugar cane, and tropical fruits such as mangoes and bananas. Millet, sorghum, sesame, cotton, tobacco and dates are widely grown on the hot Tihama plain. Farmers throughout the country complement their agricultural activities with small-scale livestock production. Also, there are pastoralists who have substantial herds that they work on the arid fringes of the cultivated lands.

There has been little modernization in the agricultural sector.¹⁷ Most rural people continue to use traditional production techniques, working the soil either by hand or with livestock. Food, coffee and cotton production have declined as a result of large-scale labour immigration, increasing labour costs and shifts

in production to *qat* crops in highland areas. Rural land ownership patterns involve high tenancy rates, but the country does not seem plagued by the exploitation that typically accompanies land concentration.¹⁸ While irrigation has increased since the end of the civil war in 1969, the scale is still small compared to the area under dry farming practices. The management of run-off rainwater, however, has been developed to a high degree of sophistication; on the terraced hillsides the water is channelled efficiently from field to field with minimal loss. In recent years, some remittance earnings have been invested in tractors and irrigation equipment. The amount, however, has been so small as to have had only a marginal affect on the country's agrarian base.

Living conditions in rural areas and small towns place Yemen at the bottom of most lists for demographic, development or social indicators.¹⁹ Illiteracy rates in the rural areas approach 90%, and health threats such as tuberculosis, malaria and intestinal infections keep life expectancy at the low level of about 36 years. Few public services reach the villages where most of the population lives. Amenities such as potable water systems and health clinics are not commonly available in rural areas.

3. DECENTRALIZATION AND LIMITED GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY

A major key to developing Yemen's agricultural potential rests in the conversion of the country's remittance earnings into the infrastructure and capital investment needed for development. This is no easy task, for the country does not enjoy a history of development-oriented administration. The government has not had the capacity to plan and implement programmes and projects aimed at creating a progressive rural structure.²⁰ The local development associations examined in this article are to a large extent a response to this incapacity.

For centuries Yemen was a nominal dependency of the Ottoman Empire.²¹ After gaining independence at the end of the First World War, it was ruled by a religious leader (Imam) who kept the country virtually isolated from the West and closed to external economic forces and technological innovations. (The Imam imported technical innovations for his personal use, but they were rarely seen beyond the palace walls.) This isolation ended with a coup in 1962. The coup, however, was only partially successful for it resulted in a civil war between nationalistic republican army officers

and royalists. The conflict dragged on for several years stifling development effort in rural and urban areas. By 1969, the republicans gained the dominant position and the war ended.

As a result of Yemen's political isolation and administrative problems following the civil war, the central government still lacks the capacity to extend effective administration into the rural hamlets, villages, and small towns.²² Indeed, in some areas, the central government's authority is seriously limited by strong local tradition.

Local government in Yemen is, by the standards of most developing countries, both decentralized and independent.²³ The country is divided into: 11 governorates, or *muhafazahs*; 185 districts, or *nahiyahs* (generally centred on towns);²⁴ and approximately 1700 subdistricts, or *uzlas* (set of villages whose majority population tend to belong to one tribal group). Below the *uzlas* are an estimated 15,500 villages (*qaryahs*) and 50,000 hamlets (*mahalls*).²⁵

The governorate is headed by a *muhafiz* appointed by the Prime Minister, usually for a three to four year term. The law and order, tax and development ministries are expected to maintain field offices in the governorate capitals. Lack of personnel, however, has not allowed for much more than rudimentary representations, particularly for the development-oriented ministries. The *nahiyah* is the lowest level of government representation. It is administered by a general director or *mudir al am al nahiyah* who is appointed by the *muhafiz* and charged with settling local disputes, overseeing tax collection and coordinating the activities of ministerial field agents and LDAs seeking to promote the district's development. The *nahiyah* officialdom is appointed from the governorate capital and generally includes a religious judge (*hakim al shari'a*) who advises the *mudir* in the application of Islamic law; a military-police officer (*qaid al mantiqa*) and several policemen (*askari*) who aid in enforcing the *mudir's* decisions, guard him, and arrest violators of the law; a tax overseer (*mudir al mali*) who directs local tax collection at the *uzla* or *qaryah* levels by *sheikhs* and *'aqils*; and a *mudir al waqaf* who works for the Ministry of Justice and administers income from lands held in religious foundation (*waqaf*). If there are schools in the *nahiyah*, a local man is likely to be appointed to oversee teachers in coordination with an official in the governorate capital. In larger *nahiyahs* there may be an education officer (*mudir al ta'lim*) and director of supply (*mudir al tamwin*), a registrar of motor vehicles (*mudir al marur*) and a director

of municipalities (*mudar al bala diyya*). The *mudir* and several of these officials are likely to be from other parts of the country, and some may be ex-army officers.

At present the government is seeking to avoid the mistakes of an earlier reform based on the Egyptian system of local government which had no role for tribal leaders or organizations. Under the new system, the subdistrict or *uzla* is the lowest officially recognized administrative unit, and is headed by a *sheikh*.²⁶ These traditional leaders hold their position through ascription and usually have significant wealth in comparison to the rest of their community. It is not uncommon for a *sheikh* to be the major landowner in his area. *Sheikhs* are charged with representing the interests of their community to the government and the outside world in general. In addition, these traditional leaders settle disputes between individuals, families or villages on the basis of customary law (*'urf*), maintain order (using *askari* to deal with malfactors, if necessary), grant security to travellers, offer hospitality to visitors, and determine how much each family must pay in *zakar* taxes. Of late their influence has been expanded by their roles in the new LDAs, but threatened by increasing numbers of young returned migrants who question traditional authority.

Sheikhs are intended to be under the authority of the *mudir*, but their support is essential to his successful administration of the *nahiyah*. The *sheikhs* have substantial but not absolute authority over people in that area. They must use their leadership influence to win local support for their decisions and policies, largely through fairness in action and use of personal wealth and prestige to bring benefits to their communities. The dominant *sheikh* in an area can be replaced by another, and there are cases where development-oriented *sheikhs* have eased out older conservative ones.²⁷ It is not unusual for a *sheikh* to sponsor and personally fund construction of a school or a water system.²⁸ Hence, they are important to the understanding of the LDA movement, for they are often elected to key LDA positions and tend to dominate LDA activities.

Yemeni rural communities are typically divided into kinship groups, tribal units and a complex social hierarchy differentiated by occupation and Islamic sect.²⁹ Some groups have their own leaders or head men (*'aqils*) who settle internal disputes and act as liaison between the group and the rest of the community. There is also a tendency for particular groups to produce community leaders (e.g. the *saada* who claim descent from the Prophet).

Still, most observers see community structure as too complex to allow for the emergence of strong interest groups based on economic or social identities.

This brief description of Yemen's administrative system disguises the extensive variability in patterns of local government and central government field activities. It is clear, however, that the central government concentrates primarily on law, order and tax collection functions and the task of administering the governorate capital municipalities. Its capacity to go beyond these functions is limited to building a few major roads, maintaining communications links between governorate capitals and the centre, constructing and occasionally staffing health and educational facilities in the larger towns, and facilitating some rural development projects. These activities often involve the help of donor resources and management.³⁰

4. DEVELOPMENT FROM BELOW IN RURAL YEMEN

(a) *Rise of the Local Development Association (LDA) movement*

What the central and local government cannot do, rural towns people have shown they can organize themselves to do. In recent years a growing number of local or village level development associations have appeared throughout Yemen.³² To some extent they reflect the propensity of Islam to allow grass roots community involvement. More immediately, they result from popular demand for better infrastructure and social services, the inability of the central government to provide these, and the increased flow of financial resources from Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

As with many indigenous organizations, LDAs have roots in cultural traditions and ethnic and tribal loyalties. They reflect Islam's communal routine and emphasis on the active participation of its followers in the activities of mosque and community; the religion's welfare associations that maintain mosques and care for the poor; traditions of local rule generated by historical Yemen's fiercely independent tribal divisions; and well-established practices of discontinuous local cooperative efforts to meet common community needs. Some communities claim to have had a 'local development association' for generations. Others acknowledge that they only recently organized themselves for community development purposes, largely as a

result of having observed self-help successes in neighbouring areas and having been influenced by government requests to form an LDA.³³ But most communities have a long history of local notables organizing people and resources for local projects, *sheikhs* identifying local needs and taking responsibility to see that the community acts to resolve them, or groups of local people forming a transitory organization to carry out a specific project in the community's interest.

There was some effort to build on these traditions during the civil war when local religious groups organized community efforts to rehabilitate damaged villages and assisted families of men killed in fighting. Labour influences from Aden (South Yemen) stimulated the rise of early LDAs in southern towns. However, the LDA movement did not gather momentum until it was actively stimulated by the late president Ibrahim al Hamdi. Local communities rapidly responded to his leadership. Realizing that development was unlikely to come from the centre, leaders and local people organized themselves to bring roads, schools, clinics and water systems to their communities. Attracted by the achievements of the early LDAs, and recognizing the utility of a national LDA organization hierarchy for state building, Yemen's leadership moved quickly both to encourage the movement and control it.

Clearly aware of its development limitations, the central government increasingly relied on LDAs to improve the quality of rural life and to provide a basis for more productive agriculture.³⁴ Its policy of 'increasing community self-help and self-reliance, and strengthening local institutions and leadership'³⁵ began in 1963³⁶ when the Republican government issued Ordinance No. 11 which provided a rudimentary legal basis for local welfare associations which were springing up and Law No. 26 of 1963 which specified the organizational structures for cooperatives. The civil war made it particularly difficult for the government to stimulate and regulate the activities of these local welfare associations. Finally, in 1968, the government established a Department of Social Affairs, Youth and Labour in the Ministry of Local Administration, and charged it with promoting LDA involvement in agricultural, infrastructural and social development. This came at a time of growing need for coordination: a drought was stimulating local efforts to find new water sources; isolated communities were increasingly recognizing the need for access roads; and remittance resources were beginning to flow from overseas Yemeni workers.

In the early 1970s, as part of a national reconstruction effort, representatives of LDAs met with central government officials to explore the possibility of establishing a national self-help movement with an organization to mobilize and direct it. After a series of discussions in 1973, the Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations (CYDA) was formed.³⁷ A firm legal base for CYDA and the LDA movement was provided by Law No. 35 of 1975 which superceded earlier legislation. The new law laid out an organizational and administrative format for the movement, and committed financial resources to help support it. Today CYDA is under the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Youth. With the motto, 'War on Backwardness', it oversees projects, administers funds and coordinates various aid projects of foreign donors. In addition, it seeks to provide technical support and funds where needed.

The reassignment of functions within the Ministry of Local Administration, the formation of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Youth, and the creation of CYDA hint at some interesting patterns of state building. The conversion of the semi-feudal system of the Imam into a modern government was clearly viewed by the republicans as a difficult task. Hence, there is a relationship between the centre's interest in the LDA movement and the penetration of the periphery. Too little is yet known on this aspect of LDA history to allow further analysis.

Identified in Arabic as *Ta'awon* or local cooperatives for development, LDAs build roads (usually one-way tracks for four-wheel drive vehicles), construct village water systems, dig wells or cisterns, and build schools and clinics.³⁸ Some LDAs also function as local welfare systems, or provide activity centres for youth and literacy programmes. Indeed, LDAs show some signs of providing more than a development or welfare function. There is evidence that some are independent arbiters of local conflict,³⁹ and that LDAs might become the basis for political organization of the countryside.⁴⁰ At present, however, LDAs are generally viewed as 'a rare example of local development initiative'⁴¹ and 'the only institution in Yemen operating at the level of the mass of peasants in the countryside which holds the promise of assisting the poorest of the poor meet their basic needs'.⁴²

LDAs are regarded as independent community associations and not official state entities.⁴³ That is, LDAs are locally initiated and supported, but given governmental recog-

Table 1. LDA activities and expenditures: 1976/77-1977/78

Type project	No. of LDAs reporting	No. of projects	Total expenditure (YR) (\$1 = YR 4.5)
Roads	90	6520 km	389,375,000
Schools	88	347	64,831,000
Water	80	643	24,525,000
General*	47	143	25,029,000
Health	24	30	4,313,796
Total expenditure			508,073,796

Source: *Al-Taawar* (22 January 1979).

* Includes electricity projects, youth centres, and other miscellaneous projects.

dition and support by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Youth.

Figures on the number of LDAs are highly variable. In 1975 there were 65 certified LDAs and 80 reported by CYDA.⁴⁴ Without distinguishing between certified and non-certified LDAs, CYDA reported 177 LDAs in 1976, 171 in 1978⁴⁵ and 187 in 1979.⁴⁶

Definitive data on LDA activities are hard to come by for CYDA's information systems are still under development. Nevertheless, the magnitude of LDA activity is clearly illustrated in Table 1. Care should be taken in using this table, as activities are underreported and expenditure reports may not be accurate. The reason for the varying number of LDAs reporting is that highland LDAs have concentrated primarily on roads and, to a lesser extent, water systems. Lowland LDAs, blessed with dry weather access roads, have concentrated on schools, water distribution systems or electricity supply projects. Few LDAs have moved to such second generation tasks as supply cooperatives, adult education programmes, or handicraft and rural industry enterprises. For the next few years, the emphasis will continue to be on roads, schools, water systems and clinic buildings, a priority list matching the country's Five-Year-Plan.

LDAs vary considerably in their stage of development; some have existed for over a decade, others for only a few years. Their structures and functions also show substantial variation reflecting differences in local resources, politics, personalities and needs. Therefore generalization based on CYDA by-laws and rules, case studies and other reports is risky. Still it is essential to describe the evolving pattern of LDA organization, administration and activities because of its importance to the emerging policy-oriented literature of local organizations, participation and development.

(b) Organization of the LDA hierarchy

There are four levels of administration in the LDA movement: (1) village or *uzla* Development Cooperative Committees; (2) district or *nahiya* LDAs; (3) governorate or *muhafazah* Coordinating Councils; and (4) the national Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations (CYDA). The LDA organizational hierarchy parallels the structure of the local government system.

In the early days of the movement there were some *qada* boards. This resulted from the formation of LDAs covering more than one *nahiyah*, a practice which ended with the issuance of laws clarifying LDA jurisdiction and structure, and abolishing the *qada* level LDA organizations. Some LDAs still cover several *nahiyahs*, but this is an increasingly rare situation.

Local village or *uzla* committees began to be encouraged by CYDA in the mid-1970s. These committees are intended to provide an organization for village level activities and to deal with demands that locally collected taxes be used to finance local projects. There are regulations covering the committees' basic activities and duties; however, only a few organizations have been formed and little is known about them. Typically, these villages are mobilized into activities by LDA representatives and government officers during walking tours of the district. The villages then begin projects and the LDAs attempt to support them by working with the local *sheikh* and other notables. Villages sometimes move ahead with projects without LDA approval and with little or no support from LDA resources. The *uzlas* elect representatives to the *nahiyah*-level LDA General Assembly. However, given the limited participation in the LDA General Assembly, as described shortly, village committees may

offer substantial opportunities for increasing broad local participation.

The election process for the *nahiyah* General Assembly is still incompletely understood, in part because it is still evolving and in part because it varies considerably from one area to another, a reflection of Yemen's social diversity. It is generally reported, however, that inhabitants gather at *uzla* centres and elect (for three-year terms) one representative for every 300 to 800 people.⁴⁷ Voting is done by show of hands. The first elections were held in 1975 and aimed at promoting a uniform election at the same time for all LDAs. The most recent election lasted 70 days, from 15 November 1978 to 24 January 1979. It was supervised by centrally appointed officials, with final tabulations for each LDA General Assembly made in Sana'a by election supervisors.⁴⁸

Based on average *nahiyah* population figures for the country, it is tentatively estimated that a typical General Assembly has 40 to 50 members. Each assembly is required to meet at least once a year. Its members elect, by show of hands, an administrative council, also called the administrative board, or Local Development Board (LDB), made up of 5 to 7 members.⁴⁹ This election of the LDB is the primary function of the LDA General Assembly. Once the task is completed, it tends to lapse into inactivity.

The board members select a president (*ra'is*), general secretary (*mudir al am*), and treasurer (*amin al sanduq*). It is common for the most influential *sheikh* in the area to be chosen president. Lesser *sheikhs* or notables often serve in the other offices. There are traditional and functional reasons for sheikhs to hold LDA positions. While their wealth and power may vary, they are men whose authority rests on social trust. As such they must influence community members to accept or support their decisions on LDA activities. This is largely done by 'knowing' ahead of time what the needs and views of the community are, so that disagreements tend to be on specific points rather than general issues. Disagreements have been minimal because most LDAs are focused on building the basic infrastructure desired by most member of the community. Delegations may protest to the LDA leadership about the route of a new road or other aspects of its construction, but not over whether the road is needed. It will be the second generation projects and maintenance costs of the initial ones that test the harmony between LDA officers and local people.

Active, broad-based popular participation is thus limited to the election of LDA members.

Selection of LDB members and their internal appointment of officers is done by a successively smaller number of local people. While the members of the LDB tend to be the expected *sheikhs* and notables, this is clearly a situation where local communities are involved in selecting representatives who are to some extent accountable to them. The election process has occurred twice on a national scale. There have been additional elections in some areas where there was dissatisfaction with the performance of the early LDA officers.⁵⁰ General Assembly representatives tend not to be replaced in such elections, for they rarely meet and are not paid for their services. It is the LDB officers (who frequently receive salary payments reported at approximately YR1000 per month) who change from time to time, either because of resignation or because of community dissatisfaction.

No systematic election data are yet available to researchers. Observations by those in contact with LDAs suggest that a fairly large number of LDB officers have been removed or voted out of office over the past five years.⁵¹ Motivations of candidates destined for LDB office range from a sense of personal duty as established community leaders to a desire to extend their contacts beyond their *nahiyah*. Some clearly see advantages for personal aggrandisement and advancement, but few seek the position for financial gain. In many LDAs, the officers have a thankless job that is frustrating, tiresome and time-consuming. Frequently they must put up with unrealistic requests from local people who do not give support willingly and with red tape from CYDA and central government officials who do not produce the resources supposedly available. Hence, resignation after one term is not unusual. On the other hand, poorly established financial and accounting procedures and the lack of public understanding of budgets for delay or cost overrun prone projects lead to accusations of official misconduct or incompetence. Community gossip and grumbling about such accusations is a major reason for the apparently high turnover of LDA officers. Another reason for the change of officers during the second election cycle was a desire by communities to be represented by residents. Apparently in the first election leaders who lived in provincial capitals or Sana'a were elected on the assumption they were better placed to bring development to local areas. A final reason for electing new officers was that some communities had high expectations for results which LDA officers could not deliver.

LDBs are supposed to meet at least once per month; their members serve three-year terms. Day-to-day affairs of the LDA are administered by the president or the general secretary. LDB responsibilities include identifying local project needs, drawing up plans to submit to the governorate Coordinating Council, and supervising actual project implementation. Typically, the president or head conducts board business, listens to petitions from the community, oversees the identification and selection of project contractors and supervises actual project implementation. The financial officer is supposed to prepare project budgets, control the funds raised and keep financial records on the LDA's revenues and expenditures. Increasingly, LDAs keep their funds in the new Cooperative Banks. LDB members with specific technical experience may oversee the undertaking of a particular project. Not all members are active; some go abroad to work and others lose interest.

LDB presidents make up the membership of the governorate level Coordinating Council (CC) or *majlis al-tansiq*. Again, each CC elects a general secretary, deputy secretary and finance director. The governor is the honorary president or head of the CC, but everyday business of the CC is carried out by the elected officers and their staff.⁵² The CCs are charged with a number of functions related to supervising the financial and technical activities of the LDAs and promoting the expansion of the LDA movement in their governorates.⁵³ In essence, the CC serves as an intermediary between LDAs in their area and CYDA in the national capital. Such intermediary activities centre on providing in-house training and obtaining technical assistance and line ministry or foreign donor funding for LDA projects.

The major tension between the levels of organization is generated by the CC's and CYDA's perceptions of excessive LDA demands and impatience, and the LDA's feelings that desired and supposedly available financial, material and technical assistance is delayed by red tape, limited or simply not provided by the CCs. Communities and their LDB officers recognize that they rarely get any service (such as agricultural extension advice or medical help during the outbreak of disease) from the government. They feel they have a right to government support and see CYDA and the CCs as new organizations whose task it is to obtain government resources. But in general they are disillusioned by the limited ability of CYDA or their CCs to provide resources and by what they perceive as unforgivable delays which occur when resources finally do flow. In the face of such

problems, some LDAs will proceed with their own projects, complaining of how the CC and CYDA do not do their job or fulfil their responsibility. In such situations they are likely to circumvent the CCs and CYDA by using personal ties with powerful central government bureaucrats to obtain resources and needed support⁵⁴ or by making their own arrangements with private companies and governmental bodies.⁵⁵ On the other hand, CYDA and the CCs see LDAs as so impatient for development that they rush ahead rather than wait for technical assistance and funding support. The CCs argue they are overworked, understaffed and caught between the excessive demands of the LDAs and the bureaucratic slowness of CYDA. CYDA recognizes its problems and is attempting to improve its administrative and support systems. Further work is needed, however, in institutionalizing channels and procedures of assistance, improving the quantity and quality of material and technical resources available and speeding up the processes which move resources down to rural communities.

The CC receives its funds from three sources: (1) allocation of CYDA's tax and fee revenues; (2) grants from CYDA's technical and administrative allocations from the government; and (3) local donations and gifts (provided they do not bias the CC in favour of the donor or his LDA).⁵⁶ The CC budget must be prepared according to CYDA guidelines. New budgets and final accounts of the previous year's financial activities must be approved by CYDA.⁵⁷

The secretary-general of the CC acts as the representative of the council and the supervisor of its activities. Council decisions are based on majority vote and require a majority of members to reach a binding decision. CCs can and do form special committees to oversee particular projects or development sectors. Such subcommittees select their own chairmen. Secretaries are elected by the CC to keep minutes and forward copies to CYDA. Each council is authorized to set up its own internal regulations. Members are eligible for monthly allowances, often determined by the number of meetings they attend. It appears that the presidents and the secretaries general of the country's CCs make up the General Assembly of CYDA.⁵⁸

At the national level, CYDA is headed by an honorary chairman — the President of the Republic, a secretary general,⁵⁹ and an assistant secretary general. These last two officials are elected and guided by members of the Administrative Board.⁶⁰ The Board is composed of 11 members from the CYDA General Assembly

who are elected by secret ballot for two-year terms by the General Assembly. The most recent election was held in Sana'a, 22-25 February 1979.⁶¹ Seventy persons ran for the 11 seats. Elected members are joined on the Board by key deputy ministers from the government and by heads of several government organizations. There are a total of 11 non-elected members.⁶² The purpose of this combined membership is to promote better links between the development ministries and CYDA.

The CYDA Board is required to meet at least once a month. It is responsible for implementing resolutions of the General Assembly and promoting: (1) the coordination of local development projects with those of the central government; (2) the ability of local associations to plan, organize, finance and implement projects; (3) the overall success of the CYDA movement; and (4) the attraction and coordination of donor funding for some of its activities. The Board is divided into four committees: Financial Affairs, Foreign Relations, Cooperatives and Planning.⁶³

These Board committees oversee nearly parallel departments of CYDA and such functional activities as information⁶⁴ and training.⁶⁵ Earlier problems have stimulated efforts to improve the organization of CYDA and its services to CCs and LDAs.⁶⁶ The administrative Board formed in 1979 has commissioned an analysis of problems and issues in the cooperative movement. The results are to be used in formulating a Five-Year Cooperative Plan to reorganize CYDA's administrative units and develop improved reporting and budgeting systems. One major goal will be to help insure the formulation of realistic development plans at all levels.

The CYDA General Assembly, sometimes called the conference or congress, meets annually. At these meetings it elects Administrative Board members when necessary and passes a variety of resolutions confirming the Board's policy decisions and actions. Analysis of such decisions suggest two trends: (1) growing interest in making CYDA more professionally managed and accountable (perhaps reflecting the frustrations and delays experienced by LDAs in dealing with CYDA); and (2) increased willingness to call on central development ministries for funds and operational or maintenance assistance.⁶⁷ Another important function of such meetings is to stimulate the flow of information and spread of policy decisions from the central government to the governorate levels of administration, and presumably from there to district and local levels.

(c) Financing LDA activities

Once an LDA approves a project, its officers move to raise local contributions and to tap tax and fee generated funds. Local contribution shares of project costs appear to be collected in several ways: (1) the LDA president can set a *per capita* levy on the population; (2) the *sheikh* can set an amount per household based on financial capability; or (3) the *sheikh* can charge each male the sum he daily spends for *qat*.⁶⁸ Additional research should turn up a wider range of fund raising approaches.⁶⁹ Typically, the collection of local contributions is handled by the *sheikhs* or *aqils*. In general, such contributions are genuinely voluntary, though examples of coercion or even imprisonment for failure to contribute can be found.⁷⁰

While local contributions of money, labour and property are critical to the undertaking of projects, LDAs also seek to tap local tax sources as well as CYDA and central government funds. Description of these sources is not easy for the general taxation and local financing system in Yemen is still little understood by outsiders, in part because of the lack of research on the topic, and in part because of variability in Yemen's decentralized system.⁷¹ In general, local LDA funds are drawn from a combination of *zakat* taxes and other locally based taxes and fees.⁷² CYDA funds are generated by a combination of import duties, taxes and fees.⁷³ CYDA's revenue sources and the mechanisms for collecting them are not yet clearly established, for the country is still evolving a coherent policy for financing the LDA movement.⁷⁴

*Zakat*⁷⁵ is said to be the main source of LDA funding, an assertion needing testing. Large projects, for example, tend to have only a small component of *zakat* funding, and some projects, regardless of size, have no LDA contribution. Clearly it is important to distinguish between LDA funding and project funding. At present, the LDA *zakat* is based on *nahiyah* collection. The amount of *zakat* generated by a *nahiyah* depends on its resource endowments, agricultural productivity, crops, position on transport routes, urbanization, and other factors. Obviously, Yemen's ecological and production variability results in very different levels of *zakat* revenue throughout the country. Areas with irrigation or high value crops will have more funds for development and areas hit by drought will have less. Typically, the higher the *zakat*, the lower the level of individual contributions to development projects. The government reports an increase in *zakat* revenues from YR7.2 million in 1970/81 to YR32.8 million

in 1976/77.⁷⁶ This increase should mean more finances for LDA activities and may be the result of local awareness that a large percentage of the tax is now returned to the area.

CYDA and the LDAs receive funding from American, Dutch, German and Russian foreign aid programmes, from the ILO and UNEP, and from voluntary organizations such as Concern and Oxfam. Aid has taken the form of training programmes, provision of technical experts and direct financial and material contribution to project construction. This aid is channeled through line ministry activities to CYDA, or directly to LDAs.

CYDA and the central government have negotiated a cost-sharing formula for LDA projects.⁷⁷ In the construction of schools, for example, local self-help, LDA, and the central government each shoulder one-third of the total cost. For water and health projects, the local people and LDAs each contribute one-quarter of the costs while the central government contributes one-half. Roads of less than 20 km are paid for entirely by self-help funds and LDA contributions. The central government pays one-quarter of the costs of a road 20–30 km long and three-quarters of the costs of roads longer than 30 km. There is some evidence that local communities and LDAs bear a heavier percentage of costs than the formula requires, for projects often cost more than anticipated and the central government does not always contribute as expected.

One newly emerging central finance source is the National Cooperative Bank for Development.⁷⁸ Until recently, most development projects undertaken by the LDAs were on a pay-as-you-go basis. The establishment of the Bank in early 1979 began to alter this process. It is charged with assisting the cooperative movement in Yemen and promoting the social and economic welfare of the country. Towards these ends it is provided with YR100 million declared capital and authorized to: (1) grant loans to and finance projects undertaken by cooperative associations; (2) accept deposits on current account from cooperative bodies; (3) borrow funds from the government or from central, local or foreign banks; and (4) render all other services normally provided by cooperative banks to cooperative associations. Its primary activity is intended to be the provision of loans for development activities on the basis of project feasibility and repayment probability. Emphasis is to be given to income generating projects.⁷⁹

Most communities do not begin an activity until they have collected their local shares and

feel reasonably confident that the allocation of LDA, CYDA and central government funds will be forthcoming. Because of funding uncertainty, some types of projects are financed and constructed in sequential stages.⁸⁰ For example, local resources will be used to build a school up to the windows. The LDA inspects this first third of the construction effort and then agrees to cover the next third with a CYDA allotment. When the building is up to the roof, the government then finances the rest of the construction. On completion, the community petitions the Ministry of Education for equipment, books and teachers.

Some projects can generate revenue. For example, a water system can be run on a user fee basis with the income returned to the LDA to offset operating and maintenance costs, and to finance other projects. Instances have been observed where electricity projects are run for profit, but this may lead to conflict with the Yemen General Electrification Corporation which is instituting a new, centrally-controlled nationwide rural electrification programme.

Most LDAs cannot keep up with local initiatives, particularly in providing the funds called for by the official contribution formula. When locally raised funds are not matched by expected LDA and central contributions, there can be damaging effects on community interest. If a community must suspend or abandon work on a project, or complete the effort on its own, it tends to become disillusioned with the LDA, CYDA and the government.

(d) *Planning and central control*

Most LDA project proposals originate at the village level. However, not all local projects are LDA linked. CYDA acknowledges that a typical LDA '... lacks the capacity to pursue every project and comprehend all the popular undertakings ... due to its limited membership in some districts ... [and] ... the inability of the members to follow up all the requests in villages and rural areas ...'.⁸¹ Projects outside LDA involvement are simply part of the larger tradition of local cooperative effort which helped give birth to the more formal LDA movement. Such projects are generated by loosely organized groups formed around mosque or *mafraj* discussions. The leader who emerges to push the group's objectives is typically a *sheikh* or local notable, but it is increasingly possible for him to be a returned migrant who has new ideas for his village drawn from his observations in Saudi Arabia, or a private investor who sees

potential profit in a project (such as a road or rural electrification). The emerging pattern of development, however, is that LDAs are gaining influence over, if not control of, most local self-help activities. The problem associated with this trend is that LDAs lack the capacity to design or implement the increasing number of projects under their jurisdiction.

Many LDA projects are poorly planned and managed. LDAs have trouble obtaining technical advice on design work and their officers lack the administrative and budgetary skills to effectively supervise project implementation or to manage financial resources.⁵² Hence, little attention is given to technical aspects of design, cost-benefit considerations, budget calculations, ecological impacts, maintenance programmes or future recurrent costs. For example, roads are carved on hillsides with little concern for grades or drainage culverts. Agricultural terraces below roads are destroyed by debris from construction and erosion from uncontrolled runoff. Budget overruns are common and generate suspicion of the fiscal integrity of LDB officers as local people are asked to donate additional funds and communities are faced with unanticipated maintenance expenses. Unless the causes of such problems can be corrected the presently positive attitudes of rural people may sour.

CYDA has yet to systematically respond to the need to provide LDAs with project planning systems, project management training or technical and financial advice through extension services. Programmes are being developed in Sana'a for such services, and international donors are interested in funding them. At the moment, however, LDAs are largely on their own. The two major initiatives taken to date are the generation of LDA three-year plans and the establishment of an accounting system for LDAs.

In 1976 the LDAs were asked to draw up three-year plans for approval by CYDA. While some argue that it is not appropriate for CYDA to set national priorities,⁵³ these plans were modified, aggregated and incorporated into the national Five-Year Development Plan for 1976-1981. Government priorities for LDAs, as expressed in the Plan are: (1) construction of rural roads; (2) construction and staffing of village schools; (3) development or repair of village water systems; and (4) provision of preventive health care services.⁵⁴ Table 2 presents a breakdown of proposed LDA Plan investments.

The priorities of the Five-Year Plan seem to be well matched to the infrastructure and social

service needs of most rural communities. At the local level, however, little attention is given to planning as a comprehensive process. While LDA plans often include a number of different activities, projects tend to be highly specific and unintegrated.⁵⁵ It appears that most project proposals originate at the village level, affected quite obviously by the interplay of local politics. Selection of projects and their integration into a local plan is done by the LDB and ratified at the annual General Assembly if indeed one is held.⁵⁶ This too is affected by still little understood governmental and tribal forces. LDA annual plans are approved by the CC and CYDA's central staff, and then incorporated into CYDA's national plan, a document intended to coordinate central technical and financial support for local projects. Specific project approvals may involve the oversight of particular ministries.⁵⁷ Once a plan or project is approved by CYDA, funds are released from the Cooperative Bank to the LDA's account.⁵⁸ Such funds, however, cover only part of the project's costs.

Since 1977/78 CYDA has attempted to introduce a Unified Accounting System (UAS) which links the established formula for cost-sharing with both the LDA plan and specific details on anticipated incomes and expenditures.⁵⁹ The UAS was introduced because LDAs were following very different accounting approaches, some of which were too unsystematic to be audited. At the same time, CYDA has improved the capacity of its financial department to follow up and control LDA receipts and expenditures. It appears, however, that many LDAs do not have officers with requisite skill to utilize the UAS. As a result, some LDAs are either late or fail to present accounts.

As CYDA undertakes to improve plan preparation, project management and financial responsibility of LDAs, it risks damaging the

Table 2. *Planned LDA development expenditures: 1976-1981*

Expenditure	Per cent	YR (1000) (\$1 = YR 4.5)
Access roads	42.0	615
Schools	18.3	268
Water supply	7.1	103
Public health	4.0	58
Other	6.4	94
Unidentified	22.2	325
Total	100.0	1463

Source: World Bank, *Yemen Arab Republic*, p. 84.

LDA movement. A central question is the degree to which imposed regulations and controls will affect the spirit and viability of the local forces of autonomy and self-reliance. An additional question is whether increased CYDA institutionalization of the LDA movement plus central funding for local projects will increase the dependence of LDAs on the centre and limit their ability to raise funds for their locally identified needs.

(e) *Agricultural Cooperative Societies*

Increasingly, agricultural related activities are being undertaken by a new CYDA-sponsored local level organization, the Agricultural Cooperative Society (ACS). The most fully studied ACSs are in Hudeidah Governorate at Al-Lawiah and Taiz Governorate at Ajshoub.⁹⁰ In two years Al-Lawiah's ACS initiated a share capital enterprise that supplies agricultural inputs to the community, established a gas station, bought a bulldozer which it rents for land reclamation, and began a successful programme for marketing okra in Saudi Arabia. Aside from commercial ventures such as operating a lime mill, renting the bulldozer and running profit-making fertilizer distribution centres, Ajshoub's ACS has undertaken LDA-type infrastructure projects, such as access roads and school building construction. It is essential to review these new local organizations for they present a likely direction for the LDA movement once basic infrastructure needs of communities are met.

Procedures for establishing ACSs and regulations covering their activities are not formalized, as they have been for LDAs. Some ACSs cover more than one *nahiyah* and other *nahiyahs* have more than one ACS. Formation rules appear flexible.⁹¹ An ACS needs only 20 members before applying to CYDA for recognition. A committee of founders is selected from among dues-paying shareholding members and charged with recording members' names and their shares or dues payments, drafting by-laws stating the ACS's objectives and operating rules, and obtaining the approval of the shareholders. When this is achieved, the shareholders dissolve the founders' committee and elect an administrative board of five to seven members who direct the ACS toward its goals.

There is variability in the format, objectives and operating rules of ACSs' organization and by-laws. They seem, however, to share a common objective of obtaining scale economies in purchasing and marketing activities. While

ACSs are directed toward promoting rural development by stimulating agricultural productivity and marketing in their areas, they are primarily aimed at generating profit. Specifically, they are motivated toward repayment of initial loans, generation of capital for new ventures or equipment, maintenance of existing equipment and repayment of initial subscriptions, as well as raising share profits for members. While only members share the profits, non-members are allowed to participate in some undertakings. Membership is voluntary and based on dues payment or share purchase. Usually there is a minimum and maximum number of shares which can be held by any one person. Dues or shares are modestly priced, so most ACSs need to seek loans from the Agricultural Credit Bank, for which they are required to prepare integrated plans. On the basis of what is presently known, a typical plan would establish an infrastructure base for the ACS's activities, a strategy for initial operations and an estimated revenue schedule linked to loan repayment.⁹²

The potential of ACSs is threatened, however, by the difficulties of marketing in Yemen. It may be that despite the well-advertised okra success of Al-Lawiah, ACSs face a difficult future until Yemen's national import policies are rationalized and internal storage, processing and marketing facilities are improved.⁹³ In addition, the ACSs face the same administrative difficulties as the LDAs – indeed, greater difficulties because of the large amount of capital and equipment generally associated with them, the complexities of marketing activities, the large-scale purchasing contracts they frequently enter into, and the need to maintain cooperative store supplies, and transport and construction equipment.

Seventeen ACSs were represented at a September 1979 conference; more than twice as many may exist today.⁹⁴ Limited observations of these organizations suggest they have the capacity to move local communities beyond the typical infrastructural concerns of LDAs into profitable, locally identified activities generating economic growth. They also suggest that participation in ACSs is narrowed to more progressive farmers, landowners and merchants. *Sheikhs* and more wealthy notables are likely to lead and administer them and immediate benefits of income-generating activities are largely confined to those who can afford to buy significant numbers of shares. The rural poor may own a few shares or otherwise benefit from their activities in a limited way, but the ACSs' primary goal is to generate a profit for

their members. As such, they are more like private corporations than public service cooperatives. Still, they represent a locally generated effort for development and are likely to influence the future direction of LDA activities.

5. INDIGENOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The literature on traditional or indigenous rural organizations has largely focused on classifying them by such functions as: (1) insuring members against personal tragedy (e.g. funeral societies); (2) assisting less well-off members through redistributive practices; (3) providing reciprocal labour exchange to break resource bottlenecks; (4) generating rotating capital or savings funds; (5) pooling productive assets to better utilize land or water resources; or (6) mobilizing local people to provide funds, labour or skills for building community facilities. Cutting across this classification are studies based on considerations of age and origin. One taxonomy includes: (1) long established and locally developed organizations such as Bolivia's *sindicatos*; (2) recently established and locally developed organizations such as *subak* water user organizations in Bali, Indonesia; (3) long established but imported organizations such as Mexico's *ejidos*; and (4) recently established and imported organizations such as the *ujamaa* cooperatives in Tanzania.⁹⁵

A useful typology can be formed using these two classification schemes. Yet, so little research has been done on indigenous organizations that many of the cells would have few cases assigned to them. There is a lack of sufficient data to allow the systematic and comparative generation of propositions linking types of indigenous organizations to rural development participation strategies.

On the basis of present evidence, LDAs are recently established Yemeni evolved organizations built on traditional patterns of community self-help with some stimulation from the government. They are primarily focused on the provision of public infrastructure, in part through the mobilization of local resources. While more research on their historical roots needs to be done, it seems that the LDA movement, if not each individual LDA, springs from indigenous roots. This fact is important, for the success of the movement provides support for those who suggest the utility of building participatory strategies on established traditional practices, where conditions for such attempts are favourable. This view is well summed up by Roger Darling who notes:

Indigenous human factors are the primary determinants of development. All development activity starts with human factors and builds from that foundation. Development is achieved through indigenous processes guided by indigenous organization, fueled by indigenous capacities working to fulfil goals that represent indigenous values . . . performing but a limited role, external resources contribute to development only where they reinforce indigenous human factors.⁹⁶

In an overview of indigenous organizations, Robert S. Saunders argues that they are likely to have more success and local participation if: (1) the proposed benefits are seen as valuable and direct; (2) the skills and time demanded are not too great; (3) past experience with self-help activities has not been negative (as with colonial *corvée* labour); (4) the population in the area is socially cohesive; (5) there has been a traditional basis for cooperative action; (6) membership is small enough for face-to-face contact among members; (7) kinship organization can be involved in forming the groups; (8) project components are tailored to local conditions; (9) local leadership can be given significant responsibilities and also held accountable to the group; (10) domination by more powerful members can be restricted; and (11) organization and policies are not simply imposed from above.⁹⁷ The LDA movement largely confirms these observations and expands them.

It expands them in ways that suggest that the accepted wisdom on the development potential of indigenous organizations may be simplistic or biased. To some extent this may be because the literature counselling against building development efforts on such groups is based largely on analysis of problems with farmers' organizations⁹⁸ and undertaken by academics who are not predisposed to advocate techniques of intervention which might modify or improve the development potential of traditional organizations.⁹⁹ In the face of traditional élites and land inequality, their tendency is to argue for revolution or massive structural reform as a precondition for effective local level organizations that promote participatory development and equity. While there is much to this argument there is also a need not to let it become a shibboleth that forecloses consideration of indigenous organizations where they are grounded in communities with inequalities and led by local notables. In this regard, the LDA movement provides an interesting case study which challenges the majority view of indigenous organizations and offers anomalies to the propositions on which that view is based. As, such, the Yemeni case argues for more subtle understanding of the potential for traditional groups

rather than posing a direct challenge to the majority view.

Among the most interesting qualifications raised by the LDA experience are: (1) areas which have received few government resources or services are likely to provide a good environment for the emergence of development-oriented traditional organizations; (2) remote areas are particularly likely to generate development-oriented traditional organizations; (3) traditional organizations are more likely to be successful in promoting development efforts if: (a) their objectives are supported by the national centre, and (b) they are allowed to evolve their strategies of operation with sufficient flexibility to carry out their activities in ways harmonious with local societal patterns; (4) communities marked by inequities in land tenure and entrenched élites are more likely to give rise to generally participatory indigenous organizations promoting widely shared development benefits where: (a) there is broad-based community access to financial resources (in Yemen's case remittances), and (b) local people contribute a substantial share of the resources needed to promote development efforts; and (5) traditional leaders with strong authority can become enthused by development ideals and promote widely beneficial development activities through processes allowing some degree of community participation. In short, the Yemen case suggests that debates over the capacity of local organizations in general and indigenous organizations in particular to promote development, as well as issues of functions, scale of operation, procedures, hierarchy, linkages, participation, leadership, accountability and equity, may have little operational meaning outside the specific contexts in which such organizations are operating.

More specifically, the LDA movement offers evidence that the size of indigenous organizations need not necessarily be small. Saunders suggests a need for face-to-face contact, a view supported by others.¹⁰⁰ Yet, it has long been recognized that small groups have serious economic and technical limitations.¹⁰¹ The LDA model provides one strategy for enabling local community organizations to use a national structure to achieve sufficient scale for rural people to undertake large projects as well as tap central and donor support (financial and technical) for those projects. In this regard, the LDA movement illustrates that it is possible to build a set of hierarchical structures on the foundation of indigenous organizations. This is important because some analysts argue that multi-tiered organizations linking local-level ac-

tivities to the centre are essential for sustained, significant long-term development.¹⁰²

On the surface the Yemeni case supports the critical view that indigenous organizations are dominated by more prosperous and privileged members of the community. However, closer inspection suggests that they do act in the interests of the community as a whole. Present evidence indicates that while local élites are elected to serve on LDA Boards and Coordinating Councils they are constrained by strong norms that press them to select and implement projects that promote the public good. Most LDA Board decisions tend to reflect the public will, for Yemeni society includes intriguing institutional mechanisms which promote participatory interchanges between leaders and community members. Such interaction occurs through discussions at socially important, semi-formal *qat* sessions,¹⁰³ in the mosque where there is no organized maintenance of social hierarchy, during open market transactions, and in the course of involvement in tribal associations.

The literature on traditional associations contains a useful distinction between associations based on some common trait of members, and followings constructed out of vertical bonds between followers and a common leader in a patron-client relationship.¹⁰⁴ To the extent that local élites base their power on associations, they tend to be accountable to their membership; in this situation power for the élite is likely to benefit members. The opposite holds true for followings where leaders, often starting out with resource advantages of wealth, status and authority, build up a group that multiplies their personal power. Given the research vacuum in rural Yemen, it is not possible to characterize the LDAs definitely, but it appears that men with wealth, family or tribal status and moral authority tend to emerge as leaders, that patron-client relationships are important, but that paradoxically, the organizations they guide tend to operate more like associations than followings.

Beyond this, factionalism is surprisingly low and projects generally operate to the benefit of most inhabitants. Indeed, the rise in the LDA movement can in part be attributed to efforts by communities to promote local development outside the central ministerial and local government administrative systems.¹⁰⁵ Finally, contributions to LDA projects generally flow from a sense of commitment to the community rather than from coercion or legal sanction.¹⁰⁶

Hence, the present patterns of development pursued by LDAs have not been particularly susceptible to élite domination, although

there is some indication that LDAs are town oriented¹⁰⁷ and some kinds of projects, such as electric systems or roads, bring greater benefits to the economically well off. The lack of elite domination may be because LDAs are still at an early stage of evolution, and that the roads, water systems, schools, and clinics they have emphasized are priorities for élites as well as the rural poor. It may also be partially explained by the fact that the ratio of economic distance between the upper and lower 20% groups is less than six to one.¹⁰⁸ Still, it will not be until LDAs turn to second generation projects that the vulnerability of LDA activities to capture of benefits by élites will be tested.

It is submitted that local participation is broad though still not as comprehensive as it might be.¹⁰⁹ Certainly, the formal procedures described earlier suggest a good deal of participatory opportunity. On the other hand, the expected leaders do emerge; the LDA General Assembly tends to act as an electoral college for the Board, becoming moribund at the completion of the exercise. Alternatively, leaders do promote what they understand to be the consensus of the community. And while the election results of 1978–1979 have not yet been fully analysed, knowledgeable observers believe there was a substantial turnover in elected LDA members. Perhaps an expansion of local village or *uzla* committees will provide both opportunities for broader participation and more pressure for direct participation of local people in the upper levels of the LDA hierarchy.

At a more comparative level, the Yemeni case suggests that indigenous organization cannot be judged by conventional Western concepts of democracy. Social trust in the expected leaders and norms favouring the promoting of the public interest may be more important than legislation promoting competition for leadership through elections, provisions for majority rule in decisions and formal mechanisms for holding leaders accountable to members. Viewed in this perspective, the LDA movement appears reasonably participatory.

In a recent study of 41 diverse local organizations in seven countries, the four Yemeni organizations studied ranked at the top in terms of their overall impact on their communities' development.¹¹⁰ This study supports the argument made here that the LDA movement provides a convincing demonstration that successful development efforts can be built on the foundations of indigenous organizations grounded in conservative societies and led by traditional élites. What is not clear is whether

this might be a largely Middle Eastern or Asian situation. Certainly the literature critical of building on traditional organizations is drawn largely from Latin America and Africa, while the favourable literature tends to come from Asia.

At the moment, however, administrative problems and technical incapacity are far more salient issues in the analysis of LDA leadership patterns than questions of élite domination or skewed benefits. In the last several years LDAs have raised a significant amount of money. The roads, schools, health centres and water systems they have built are highly visible. Equally visible are inefficiency and wastage of implementation resources. This is seen in poorly constructed buildings and erosion on inadequately designed roads. It is also apparent in poorly maintained, costly equipment; in overly expensive water systems where smaller, more efficient pumps could have been used; and in schools and clinics without supplies or staff. Such mismanagement and waste result from the lack of technical experience to design projects, purchase equipment, use proper construction techniques, and maintain equipment and structures. It also results from rudimentary management practices that lead to inaccurate accounts, misplaced assets and a failure to plan for recurrent expenses. Clearly, development from below can be quite wasteful and costly.

Such problems suggest the importance of local–central partnerships that promote both national interests and decentralized opportunities.¹¹¹ Development technocrats are tempted to conclude that CYDA, the development ministries and international donors can do much to improve the administrative and technical capacity of the LDAs. However, the government and CYDA are plagued with the lack of professional and technical manpower, high staff turnover, and a lack of established administrative and financial procedures. These problems are found in many developing countries, but they are particularly constraining in Yemen. Moreover, it is not easy for donors to play a meaningful role in helping these indigenous organizations; efforts to transfer resources and build programmes are hampered by general ignorance of CYDA, the LDAs and their task environments. Even CYDA officials do not fully understand the perspectives, needs and limitations of these local organizations. Given the diversity that marks the LDA movement and the lack of research on LDAs, it is likely that CYDA and donor efforts to modernize these indigenous organizations will meet only limited success.

Significantly, it is likely that the LDAs will face severe recurrent expenditure costs to maintain what they have constructed and to staff and equip their new schools and clinics. The resolution of this problem may well require the central government to increase its fiscal income and strengthen its administrative capacity to support the results of LDA activity.¹¹² In this

regard, a final and critically important question must be raised: how will increased institutionalization of the LDA movement, and increased donor willingness to make financial and technical assistance available to it,¹¹³ affect the spirit and viability of indigenous forces of autonomy and self-reliance?

NOTES

1. Two of the major studies supporting this proposition are: Norman T. Uphoff and Milton J. Esman, *Local Organizations for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Rural Development Committee, 1974); Development Alternatives, Inc., *Strategies for Small Farmer Development: An Empirical Study of Rural Development Projects* (Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., May 1975).

2. The most influential of these is: Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 134–157. For an example of numerous pessimistic views of local level organizations see: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, *Rural Cooperatives as Agents of Change: A Research Report and a Debate* (Geneva: Series on Rural Institutions and Planned Change No. 8, UNRISD, 1975).

3. A first step in this direction is found in: David D. Gow et al., *Local Organizations and Rural Development: A Comparative Reappraisal*, 2 vols (Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc., 1979).

4. The general literature on traditional organizations was recently summarized in Lenore Ralson, James Anderson and Elizabeth Colson, 'Voluntary Efforts in Decentralized Management' (Paper prepared by the Project on Managing Decentralization, Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, February 1981). For summaries of development activities of such groups, see: Robert S. Saunders, 'Traditional Cooperation, Indigenous Peasants' Groups and Rural Development: A Look at Possibilities and Experiences' (Review Paper prepared for the World Bank, Washington, D.C., 25 August 1977); Norman T. Uphoff, John M. Cohen and Arthur A. Goldsmith, *Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation: A State-of-the-Art Paper* (Ithaca: Cornell University Rural Development Committee, Monograph Series No. 3, 1979), pp. 33–38. Illustrative of development-oriented traditional organizations is the *gotong rojong* association movement in Java: R. M. Koentjaningrat, *Some Social-Anthropological Observations on the Gotong Rojong Practices in Two Villages of Central Java* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961).

5. For example: Hans Dieter Seibel and Andreas

Massing, *Traditional Organizations and Economic Development: Studies of Indigenous Cooperatives in Liberia* (New York: Praeger, 1974); Wirsing Singh Mann, *Sudan Cooperative Societies – Present Structure and Traditional Origins* (Forschungsinstitut der Friederich-Ebert-Stiftung Abteilung Entwicklungslander, 1977).

6. Guy Hunter and Janice Jiggins in their consideration of this question conclude that one had better start with new, introduced organizations rather than try to energize and adapt existing ones: 'Farmer and Community Groups' (London: Overseas Development Institute, Agricultural Administration Unit, mimeo, 1977). Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith, *op. cit.* (1979), pp. 49–50, argue that the possibilities of engaging traditional organizations should be actively explored, making no assumptions in advance that they are incapable (or capable) of serving rural development project goals.

7. The patterns and effects of emigration are described in: Jon C. Swanson, *Emigration and Economic Development: The Case of the Yemen Arab Republic* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979); J. S. Birks, C. A. Sinclair and J. A. Socknat, *International Migration Project: Country Study, Yemen Arab Republic* (Durham: International Migration Project, Department of Economics, University of Durham, September 1978); Lee Ann Ross, 'Yemen Migration: Blessing and Dilemma' (Paper presented to USAID Seminar on Near East Labor Flows, Washington, D.C., 1977). On the question of the number of Yemeni migrants see: J. S. Birks, C. A. Sinclair and J. A. Socknat, 'Aspects of labour migration from North Yemen', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (1981), p. 55.

8. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 'Yemen Arab Republic: Effects of Migration of Rural Labor on Agricultural Development' (Agricultural Sector Memorandum, Report No. 2585-YAR, 26 June 1979), p. 14. This report notes an increase of Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia from 334,042 in 1975 to 560,923 in 1979, *ibid.*, Table 11, p. 4.

9. The complex remittance transfer pattern is described in: Lee Ann Ross, 'An Informal Banking System: The Remittance Agents of Yemen' (Unpublished paper, Sana'a: USAID, 1980).

10. Tentative profiles of Yemen's little understood

- economy are: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Yemen Arab Republic: Development of a Traditional Economy*, 2 vols (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Report No. 2057a-YAR, 1978); John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, *Rural Development in the Yemen Arab Republic: Strategy Issues in a Capital Surplus Labor Short Economy* (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development, Discussion Paper No. 52, 1979).
11. Donald H. McClelland, 'Yemeni Worker Emigration and Remittances' (Report prepared for USAID, Sana'a, 7 June 1978); J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, 'International labor migration in the Arab Middle East', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1979), pp. 95; Christ Kutschera, 'North Yemen: the gilt peels off', *The Middle East* (February 1981), pp. 57-58.
12. Economists to date have little advice for this situation. See generally, Anand G. Chandavarkar, 'Use of migrants' remittances in labor-exporting countries', *Finance and Development* (June 1980), pp. 36-39; and specifically, John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, 'Capital-surplus, labor-short economies: Yemen as a challenge to rural development strategies', *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, Vol. LXI, No. 3 (1979), pp. 523-528. Also see, Jon C. Swanson, 'Some consequences of emigration for rural economic development in the Yemen Arab Republic', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, pp. 34-43.
13. The two major sources of general agricultural data are: A. Bartelink, *Yemen Agricultural Handbook* (Eschborn, 1974); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 'Agricultural Sector Memorandum for Yemen Arab Republic' (Draft Memorandum, 14 April 1977). See also: Sheila Carapico and Richard Tutwiler, 'Yemeni Agriculture and Economic Change: Case Studies of Two Highland Regions' (Paper presented to the American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Sana'a, October 1980).
14. For a description of these ecological zones see: Richard F. Nyrop *et al.*, *Area Handbook for the Yemens* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977); pp. 55-87; Richard Tutwiler, Muneera Salem Murdock and Michael M. Horowitz, *Workshop on the Problems and Prospects for Development in the Yemen Arab Republic* (Binghamton: Institute for Development Anthropology, Inc., Report No. 2, 1976), pp. 6-19.
15. The most comprehensive source of population data and demographic characteristics, indeed one of the most valuable studies yet done on Yemen, is: H. Steffen *et al.*, *Final Report of the Airphoto Interpretation Project of the Swiss Technical Co-operation Service*, Berne (Zurich: Central Planning Organization, April 1978). The results of the 1981 census should be available soon.
16. *Qat* (*Catha edulis*) is a plant whose leaves are chewed to induce a sense of euphoria and alertness to the chewer. With growing *per capita* income, people can now afford to import more food, and use land to grow *qat*. W. Lagman and T. S. Danowski, 'Use of *kat* (*Catha edulis*) in Yemen: social and medical observations', *Annals of Internal Medicine*, Vol. LXXXV, No. 2 (1976), pp. 246-249. The importance of *qat* in social life is well illustrated in Thomas Gerholm, *Market, Mosque and Mafraj: Social Inequality in a Yemini Town* (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 1977), pp. 176-185.
17. The government's strategy is described in: Prime Ministry Office, *Summary of the First Five-Year Plan of the Yemen Arab Republic* (Beirut: United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia and Central Planning Organization, 1977).
18. The percentage of tenants to owners is substantially higher in the Southern Highlands than in the northern mountains or the Tihama. The tenants' share of the crop has steadily increased with the rise of labour migration. No industrial survey has been done in Yemen, though a few land tenure studies exist: H. Deguin, *Arabische Republik Jemen: Wirtschaftsgeographie eines Entwicklungs Landes* (Riyadh: n.p., 1976); Herman A. Escher, *Wirtschafts und Sozial Geographische Untersuchungen in der Wadi Mawr Region* (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1976).
19. Among the few descriptions of rural and small town life in Yemen are: Gerholm, *op. cit.* (1977); S. Z. Moczarski, 'Sample Socio-Economic Survey of Five Villages in Ibb Governorate' (Paper prepared for FAO, Ta'iz, 1971); *Rural Development and Local Organizations in Hajjah and Hudeidah (Yemen Arab Republic)* 2 vols (Ithaca: Cornell University, Rural Development Committee, July 1980); Cynthia Mynetti, *Women and Development in Yemen Arab Republic* (Rosdorf: German Agency for Technical Cooperation, 1977). Two basic data sources are: Central Planning Office, *Statistical Year Book 1977-1978* (Sana'a: Statistics Department, 1979); and Prime Ministry Office, *Housing Statistics in the Yemen Arab Republic* (Sana'a: December 1976).
20. Arthur T. Mosher, *Creating a Progressive Rural Structure: To Serve a Modern Agriculture* (New York: Agricultural Development Council, 1966); John Friedman, 'A spatial framework for rural development: problems of organization and implementation', *Economie Appliquee*, Vol. XXVIII, Nos 2-3 (1975), pp. 519-543.
21. On the political history of Yemen see: Harold Ingrams, *The Yemen: Imams, Rulers and Revolutions* (London: John Murray, 1963); Robert W. Stookey, *Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); Manfred W. Wenner, *Modern Yemen: 1918-1966* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).
22. This critical constraint is little discussed in Yemen's limited literature: Mohammed Anam Ghaleb, 'Government Organization as a Barrier to Economic

Development in Yemen' (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Texas); IBRD, *op. cit.* (1978), Vol. 1, pp. 39-51.

23. Among the few reports on this local government system are: Manfred W. Wenner, 'Local Government in (North) Yemen' (Paper presented to USAID/Yemen, May 1978); Steffen *et al.*, *op. cit.* (1978), pp. 1/39-56; Nyrop *et al.*, *op. cit.* (1977), pp. 218-220.

24. Until 1976 the *qada* level stood between the *muhafazah* and the *nahiyah*. It was officially dissolved in order to reduce the number of administrative levels. *Qadas* continue to operate in some areas, usually when their boundaries match tribal regions. In 1975 there were 40 of these subprovince units.

25. Symptomatic of Yemen's difficult development agenda and illustrative of their rugged isolation is the ratio of central places to villages in Yemen. There it is estimated at 631 villages to 1 centre compared to 301:1 in Syria, 204:1 in Iraq and 4:1 in Israel.

26. In general the term can refer to the head of an *uzla*, a large-scale landowner, the patriarch of a respected family, or the leader of a tribe or tribal confederation. For a useful description of tribe and *sheikh* see: Gerholm, *op. cit.* (1977), pp. 105-119.

27. For a description of this occurring in Mahweet *Nahiyah* see: Gow *et al.*, *op. cit.* (1979), II, pp. 97-105. This occurs in societies undergoing rapid change: James C. Scott and Benedict J. Kerkuliet, 'How traditional rural patrons lose legitimacy', *Cultures et Developpement*, Vol. V, No. 3 (1978), pp. 501-540.

28. The role of traditional leaders as catalysts of development is not uncommon in the Middle East: Jane Fair Bestor, 'Peasants in the modern Middle East', *Peasant Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 2 (1978), pp. 124-141.

29. The hierarchy has at the top aristocrats and landowners (*sayyids* and *mansabs*), warriors, owners and tenant farmers (*qabayl*), merchants and artisans (*ba'ya*) and performers of despised tasks (*akhdam*). The major religious division is between *zaydis* (*shi'ite*) and *shaf'i* (*sunni*). For details on complexities of these divisions see: Nyrop, *op. cit.* (1977), pp. 55-87; Gerholm, *op. cit.* (1977), *passim*.

30. In 1975 there were an estimated 31,315 government employees at all levels, most of whom were in the national capital of Sana'a, the principal port city of al-Hudeidah, or the regional towns of Ta'iz, Ibb or Hajja. The Ministries of Interior, Municipalities and Finance accounted for half the total of government staff. Half the government staff, including most skilled administrators and technicians, are assigned to ministry headquarters. Central Planning Organization, 1975 *Manpower Survey* (Sana'a: Statistics Department, 1976). Table 5.

31. The analysis in this section is tentative, the result

of secrecy and distrust of research within CYDA, the limited amount of fieldwork carried out to date (see note 32) and the fact that Arabic sources are frequently contradictory on specific points. For a summary of Arabic sources consulted in drafting this section see: Barbara Croken, *Source Materials in Arabic on Rural Development and the Cooperative Movement in the Yemen Arab Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell University, Rural Development Committee Series on Local Organization, Participation and Development in the Yemen Arab Republic, Working Note No. 5, 1980).

32. The limited fugitive literature on LDAs includes: James Wyche Green, 'Local Initiatives in Yemen: Studies of Four Local Development Associations', (Paper prepared for USAID, Washington, D.C., October 1975); Peter G. L. Wass, 'The Role of Local Development Associations and the Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations, Yemen Arab Republic' (Paper prepared for the Middle East Division, Ministry of Overseas Development, Amman, 1976); Richard Tutwiler, 'Ta'Awon Mahweet: The Social History of a Local Development Association in Highland Yemen' (Paper presented to the Conference on Strategies of Local Development in the Middle East, University of Maryland, 20-23 September 1978); Sheila Carapico, 'The Cooperative Framework for Local Development, in Hajjah and Hudeidah Governorates, Y.A.R.' (Paper prepared for USAID, Sana'a, January 1980); Barbara Samuels, 'Local Development Associations in Yemen: An Accumulation of Official Documentation and Case Studies' (Paper prepared for USAID, Near East Bureau, Washington, D.C., 1979); Brinkley M. Messick, 'Transactions in Ibb: Economy and Society in a Yemeni Highland Town' (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1978).

33. For example, Zebid LDA claims to have had an 'LDA' for generations, Durayhimi LDA argues that it has had what is essentially an LDA since 1958 and Maghlaif LDA was only recently formed. All three LDAs are in Hudeidah Governorate. Mahweet's LDA was largely established at the request of the central government.

34. 'Report of the Yemen International Development Conference' (Sana'a: 1 December 1977), p. 61.

35. The Five-Year Plan is frequently referred to as relying on LDAs to promote these activities. Certainly this was a major theme in conferences related to the Plan. Yet, it is hard to find specific references to LDAs in the Plan's seven-volume translation. Croken, *op. cit.* (1980), pp. 67-69.

36. The Yemen Government's account of LDA history is found in: Abdelwahab el Muayyad, *Al Ta'Awon: Cooperative Movement in Yemen: Its Beginning and Development* (Sana'a: Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations, n.d.), in Arabic with English summary.

37. A meeting between rural LDA leaders and officials of the government took place on 24 March 1973. At the base of the meeting was the realization by LDAs of the disadvantages of dealing individually with the central government and the realization by the government that it needed control over the LDAs political directions and the use of their development potential. A second meeting in June was more broadly representative. It established a national forum for coordinating and promoting the LDA movement through a General Union. Finally, a national conference was held in November 1973 which led to the establishment of CYDA and agreement on a general programme of action and an organizational framework to achieve it. Green, *op. cit.* (1975), p. 81; Abdelwahab el Muayyad, *op. cit.* (n.d.), pp. 15-19; Carapico, *op. cit.* (1980), pp. 6-7.

38. CYDA regulations authorize a broad range of local level activities: construction of feeder roads, development of handicrafts, establishment of centres for aged, disabled, youth or mothers with children, promotion of adult education, provision of schools, teachers or educational materials, formulation of agricultural cooperatives, building of wells, dikes or other water systems, work with reforestation and construction of health clinics.

39. Tutwiler notes that '... the mediation of conflict and the careful balancing of local and national pressures is one of the most critical and time-consuming of their (leaders of the Mahweet LDA) activities', *op. cit.* (1978), p. 26. There is, however, some question as to whether the LDA itself plays a role in mediating conflicts. Traditionally, local tribal leaders were mediators; these people are likely to be LDA leaders.

40. It appears that some of the early LDAs, particularly in the Ta'iz area, were quite politicized, creating pressures for both their suppression and the need for the centre to better control the direction of the movement.

41. IBRD, *op. cit.* (1978), Vol. I, p. 84.

42. Richard W. Gable, 'Government and Administration in the Yemen Arab Republic' (Paper prepared for the Office of Rural and Administrative Development, USAID, January 1979), p. 86.

43. Carapico, *op. cit.* (1980), p. 2.

44. Green, *op. cit.* (1975), p. 8. See also Samuels, *op. cit.* (1979), p. 12. Apparently in the early years of the CYDA movement some LDAs resisted incorporation into the national movement. This is probably the distinction between certified and uncertified. When all LDAs were declared part of the CYDA organizational hierarchy the distinction was no longer meaningful.

45. *Al Ta'Awon: Documents of the Second Round of the Elections and the Fourth General Congress* (Sana'a: CYDA, n.d.), in Arabic with English summary, p. 23.

46. Azhari Mohammed Babikir, trans. 'Confederation of Yemen Development Associations: Yemen Arab Republic' (Paper prepared for CYDA, 4 September 1979), p. 2.

47. One study reports that communities with less than 300 residents have one representative, 300-600 have two, and more than 600 three, giving each community at least one but not more than three representatives. This appears to be the *de jure* rule in the legislation. Other studies find 700 to 800 residents elect one representative, with one additional representative for every additional 500 to 800 people in the community. Obviously this disagreement results from local variability, the patterns of which have not yet been studied, and failure to distinguish between people or men as the determinant.

48. A Supreme Committee of 25 was organized to supervise these elections by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Youth. It appointed 400 election supervisors who were trained on election procedures in a late November four-day training seminar.

49. Selection of LDB members is supposed to be supervised by three persons representing CYDA, the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Youth and the Office of the Governor. Smaller numbers than 5 to 7 may be selected in communities where two or three respected individuals are considered sufficient to undertake planned tasks. Carapico, *op. cit.* (1980), p. 2.

50. For example, in Hudeidah's Qanawis LDA, the CC stepped in and held new elections when sitting officers were viewed as inactive. In Durayhimi LDA the same CC appointed new officers when the existing ones were paralysed by internal disputes. The extent of such extralegal interventions is not known.

51. For example, a 1979 World Bank team that visited LDAs just after the second election reports that 68% of the LDA General Assemblies' and 42% of the LDB's members were re-elected. (Personal communication, Tom Hexner, team member.)

52. The Hajjah Governorate CC staff, for example, has a technical engineer, office director, records secretary, typist, external and internal affairs officer, information officer, finance and accounts officer and an LDA affairs officer. CCs have operating budgets for office and transport expenses.

53. These include: (1) supervising financial and technical work of the LDAs; (2) providing advice to LDAs on request; (3) advising CYDA on the best allocation of funds for LDA projects as well as for projects which LDAs cannot undertake (the CC draws up plans for these and submits them to CYDA); (4) helping LDAs deal with government ministries and other organizations; (5) coordinating with LDAs both general and cooperative projects and sharing the cost of these projects with the LDAs concerned; (6) passing LDA plans

on to CYDA with comments by CC staff; (7) submitting comments and suggestions to CYDA on development activities by LDAs within their governorate; (8) reviewing, auditing and forwarding on to CYDA the final yearly accounts of LDAs; (9) obtaining training fellowships for CC or LDA staff; (10) overseeing voluntary local labour and helping to secure public participation in development activities; (11) using publications, seminars and lectures to spread cooperative ideals and ideas in the governorate; (12) mediating disputes among cooperative movement staff; (13) receiving visitors coming to review CC or LDA activities; (14) helping to establish or revive LDAs or LDBs; (15) collecting funds in *nahiyahs* that do not have LDAs and using them to bring activities to the area; (16) passing CYDA information on to LDAs in the governorate; (17) facilitating the generation of financial contributions in each LDA; (18) encouraging LDAs to fulfil their various commitments toward CYDA and other official organizations; and (19) executing all projects and laws imposed by CYDA plus overseeing the application of cooperative laws and rules in LDA activities. Based on Ahmed Said Al Agbari, trans., 'Basic Regulations for Establishment of Coordinating Councils in the Governorate' (Sana'a: CYDA, n.d.), pp. 1-3.

54. For example, Tutwiler, *op. cit.* (1978), p. 7, reports that Ta'Awon Mahweet LDA had used CYDA and the governor to rent bulldozers directly from the Ministry of Public Works in Sana'a. Green reports that Khamer LDA went directly to CYDA and the Ministry of Agriculture to obtain 5000 trees for a reforestation project, *op. cit.* (1975), p. 49.

55. For example, Green, *op. cit.* (1975), pp. 30, 49, 60, 80, reports that: Bany Hoshaysh obtained its engineers and technical experts by paying central government and employees overtime; Khamer LDA rented a bulldozer and compressor from a Yemeni contractor when CYDA and the CC could not provide them; and Aires LDA bought its own heavy equipment when the Highway Authority could not provide it.

56. Al Agbari, *op. cit.* (n.d.), p. 3.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 5. Interestingly, these rules advise CCs to avoid connecting themselves with projects requiring recurrent funding.

58. Sheila Carapico, 'A Preliminary Socio-Economic Profile of Hydeidah and Hajjah Governorates, Y.A.R.' (Paper prepared for USAID/Yemen, Sana'a, May 1979), p. 68. Green, *op. cit.* (1975), p. 77, reports that a few years earlier, the General Assembly was made up of two nominated or elected (?) persons from each LDA. Gable, *op. cit.* (1979), p. 80, reports that it is made up of the presidents of all LDAs in the country.

59. Green, *op. cit.* (1975), p. 77, states that this official is the Minister of Social Affairs, Labour and Youth. Gable, *op. cit.* (1979), reports that he is elected by the General Assembly: in fact, he is appointed and then confirmed by 'election'.

60. Babikir, *op. cit.* (1979), p. 1.

61. The 1976 annual meeting was the first to hold representative elections for the Administrative Board, '... thereby legitimating its authority to establish policy for the local cooperatives', Carapico, p. 7.

62. These include: Ministries of Instruction and Education, Public Works, Finance (Receipts Sector), Culture and Information, Transport and Communications, Agriculture, Municipalities, and the CPO, Chief of Social Affairs Authority, General Secretary of Yemeni Nationals Abroad, Chief of Electricity Corporation. Babikir, *op. cit.* (1979), p. 1.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

64. Information activities are particularly interesting. The Department of Culture and Information is producing a weekly 8-page cooperative newspaper with a press run of 3000 copies (up from 4 pages and 1000 copies), a magazine called *Elgad* on the cooperative movement, a series of weekly broadcasting programmes and 30-minute weekly TV programmes on cooperative activities, a number of books, studies, and reports on CYDA activities, conferences, rules and procedures, and a number of seminars on cooperative ideology. *Al Ta'Awon: Documents*, pp. 30-31.

65. CYDA reports holding a number of training courses averaging 200 participants. As of 1979 it had sent 699 Yemenis connected with the LDA movement abroad for training. It plans to establish a cooperative institute to promote administrative and technical training. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

66. Carapico, *op. cit.* (1979), pp. 72-73.

67. Green, *op. cit.* (1975), p. 79; *Al Ta'Awon: Documents*, pp. 4-12.

68. Green notes: '... villages have devised a variety of schemes for sharing equitably in village projects according to the norms of their respective subcultures'. *Op. cit.* (1975), p. 2. In Aires LDA alone he found four different systems for funding well projects: (1) family contributions based on individual assessment of its crops and livestock production; (2) family contributions based on land holdings and the number of animals owned; (3) family contributions of YR25 (except for the very poor); and (4) the *agil* (tribal leader) divided all the men into 5 groups 'according to the family' and each group accepted the responsibility for working on the well one day a week. *Ibid.*, p. 36. Migrants in Saudi Arabia also contribute to project expenses. Usually money is sent to the family which pays an increased share of the levy. Sometimes, however, contributions are sent directly to the LDA specifically for the use in certain projects.

69. For example, the interesting system of communal labour is described by Tutwiler. Under the '*juwaysh*' system: (1) LDA representatives estimate the required labour; (2) LDA administrative leaders and local leaders decide how many man-days of labour are needed and divide this number by the number of adult

men in the community to determine each man's contribution (individuals not present, unwilling or physically unable to contribute their own labour are required to provide an alternative); (3) community leaders (an LDA member, *sheikh*, or *amin*) coordinate local labour contributions; and (4) the governor supervises the overall effort. *Op. cit.* (1978), p. 7.

70. Tutwiler reports that by law LDAs may not use coercive force in their activities, *ibid.*, p. 26. But Green reports that the *nahiyah* director can order an individual to do his proper share, *op. cit.* (1975), p. 66; for example the Khamer LDB asked the director to intercede when farmers would not sell their land for its projects, asking him to use his authority to take the land by force. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

71. In 1966 the government began to develop a modern tax system. The present system was established in 1972. Revenue is under the Ministry of Finance in general and its Customs, Fiscal, Government Property and *Wajibat* Departments in particular. All departments suffer from poorly trained staff and lack of coordination in collection efforts. No detailed study of taxation is known to exist. For a recent attempt based on field inquiry see Gable, *op. cit.* (1979), pp. 46-61. It is thought that two-thirds of government revenue is derived from indirect taxation on foreign trade and customs with considerable revenue lost to inefficient staff and undocumented imports. Direct taxation comes largely from the *zakat*, one of the five pillars of Islam (creed, daily prayer, fasting and pilgrimage). The historical system of feudal tax farming is described by Carapico, *op. cit.* (1980), pp. 3-4. On tax farming practices and use of in kind *zakat* see Gerholm, *op. cit.* (1977), pp. 40, 70, 92.

72. Local LDA sources include: 75% of *zakat*; 25% of municipal income; poll tax of 1YR per person from LDA elections; local transport tax of 1YR (may be confined only to LDAs with major cities); emigration tax of 5YR; taxes on such expenditures as cinema and bus tickets; and fees for rental of LDA equipment. Major cities develop special sources, for example, al-Hudeidah's LDA receives income from port, airport and customs duties. Additional sources include local contributions, financial institution loans, and donor grants and loans.

73. CYDA sources include: 2% share of customs duties [perhaps 2% tax on value of imports and 5% of customs duties - Carapico, *op. cit.* (1979), p. 74]; 10% share of national grain and vegetable taxes; LDA membership fees (400YR for Governorate; 150YR for *Qada* and 75YR for *Nahiyah*); funds from central government budget; donor grants and loans; and financial institution loans.

74. For example, CYDA documents vary on whether 75% of all an area's *zakat* (see note 75) or only 75% of the agricultural *zakat* go to the LDA. It is also unclear whether 75% of the *nahiyah's* *zakat* that is legally allocated to the LDA is removed from the total amount,

and the rest sent on to the government, or whether the entire amount is sent to the government and 75% returned to the LDA. Although such patterns may vary between districts, the distinction is important because of evidence that some LDAs have problems getting access to their funds.

75. There are at least four types of *zakat*, each with a standard rate structure but subject to variable collection and local political negotiations. The *zakat* runs on honesty and self-reporting. It appears to be 10% of production on rain-fed land and 5% on irrigated land. It is paid in cash or kind, before the division of crop between tenant and landowner. The other *zakats* are livestock, patron (tax on gold or silver held more than one year - 2.5% of value), wealth (tax on 2.5% of capital assets of merchants and traders), and head or poll (YR2.5 per person payable at the end of Ramadan). For problems in transferring *zakat* to the government see Carapico, *op. cit.* (1980), p. 12.

76. IBRD, *op. cit.* (1980), Vol. II, p. 83. These figures include only agricultural, livestock, wealth and poll *zakat* figures. Patron or honest *zakat* may or may not be included with wealth *zakat*.

77. Carapico, *op. cit.* (1980), p. 15; Gable, *op. cit.* (1979), pp. 83-86; Samuels, *op. cit.* (1979), p. 21.

78. Created by Law No. 30 of 1979. An English translation is printed in *Al Ta'awon: Documents*, pp. 47-58.

79. This would include purchase of rental equipment for construction or drilling; commercial electrification and water supply; light industry or handicraft enterprises; or hotels. Carapico reports some private sector opposition to LDA activity in such investment areas. *Op. cit.* (1980), p. 27.

80. Samuels, *op. cit.* (1979), p. 3.

81. Carapico, citing her translated Yemeni source, *op. cit.* (1980), p. 16.

82. One observer notes: '... local demands to the LDBs and the LDBs demands to the central government far surpass the technical and financial capacity of those organs to respond. CYDA itself, the CCs, and particularly the local boards and the agricultural coops are all painfully short of office and technical staff and even ordinary labour. This causes not only poor planning and maintenance, but forced reliance on the over-priced private sector for transport, construction contracts, equipment rental, and the like. Skilled people are all the harder to attract because private sector wages are two to three times higher than what the government or the cooperatives pay.' *Ibid.*, p. 26.

83. Wenner finds it unlikely that 'CYDA will take the initiative in recommending, promoting, or implementing one set of projects over another'. *Op. cit.* (1978), p. 3. Alternatively, Gable, *op. cit.* (1979), p. 81, submits that 'CYDA reviews projects according to policies and priorities it has established. For

example, a second school, or second well cannot be built in a given locality if it already has one.'

84. United Nations Commission for Western Area, 'Summary of the First Five-Year Plan of the Yemen Arab Republic' (Draft Summary, UNCWA, Beirut, November 1977).

85. Tutwiler, *op. cit.* (1978), p. 8, comments, '... general LDA activities are not designed for integrated rural development programmes. LDAs operate to complete specific projects one at a time ...'.

86. Green, *op. cit.* (1975), pp. 25, 55, 64, notes that the Aires LDA has a planning committee which meets with 'middle villages' (*moklaf* or tribal grouping) to determine project priorities; Khamer LDA responds to village requests by sending a planning committee to get their priority project started; Bany Hoshysh LDA does not send a committee, but relies on requests from the villages in determining the LDA development programme.

87. Gable reports the following approval process: (1) LDA decides it wants a school; (2) CYDA, the governorate and the Ministry of Education are notified; (3) CYDA reviews, the project according to its policies and priorities while other parties review plans and resources; (4) CYDA authorizes project to proceed or refers it to Committee for Economic Development and it may seek donor support; (5) Ministry may send a technician to assist or oversee implementation; and (6) bids for contractors may be permitted or CYDA may do the project itself. *Op. cit.* (1979), pp. 17, 81-82.

88. While officially each LDA should have a development plan issued by its CC, projects tend to be reviewed individually by the CC and CYDA for central government funding. Carapico argues that the CC and CYDA cannot be required to submit plans or budgets or exercise control over the use of non-central financial sources. *Op. cit.* (1980), p. 15. Some LDAs use local funds to rebuild or repair mosques in their districts. These are not usually put before the CC or CYDA for approval, but undertaken as needed and approved by the LDA and when needed funds are obtained locally. More information is needed on how funds are held in the Bank, what procedures regulate LDA access to accounts, and how finances are audited; e.g. does the CC or CYDA authorize access?

89. *Ibid.*, p. 15. *Al Ta'Awon: Documents*, p. 25.

90. For a description of Al-Lawiah and Ajshoub ACSs see: Gow *et al.*, *op. cit.* (1979), Vol. II, pp. 85-96, 111-122.

91. The following description drawn from Carapico, *op. cit.* (1980), pp. 22-25.

92. For example, 'Among these are a fuel station to supply agricultural heavy machinery, often including tankers to transport fuel and sometimes involving con-

struction of a service road or roads; a plow or other heavy equipment, which may be used for cooperative sponsored experiments and rented to members or other farmers often at lower rates than are charged by the private sector; and some form of distribution system for fertilizers, pesticides, new seed varieties, and other special inputs such as water pumps, grapevine supports, or whatever is needed most to improve local production.' *Ibid.*, p. 24.

93. These problems are outlined in Cohen and Lewis, *op. cit.* (1979), pp. 523-528. See also: James Morton, 'Agricultural Marketing in the Yemen Arab Republic with Special Reference to the Montane Plains and Wadi Rima' (Paper prepared for Land Resources Development Centre, England, 1979).

94. For recommendations of the conference see: *Al Ta'Awon: Documents*, pp. 14-20.

95. Saunders, *op. cit.* (1977), p. 2.

96. Roger Darling, 'A return to valid development principles', *International Development Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (1977), p. 28.

97. Saunders, *op. cit.* (1977), pp. 20-32.

98. For example, Peter Worsley (ed.), *Two Blades of Grass: Rural Cooperatives in Agricultural Modernization* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971); Carl Widstrand (ed.), *Cooperatives and Rural Development in East Africa* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1970).

99. See the distinction between traditional, progressive and technical viewpoints on using local organizations for development in: Gow *et al.*, *op. cit.* (1979), Vol. I, pp. 16-19.

100. For example, Judith Tendler, *Intercountry Evaluation of Small Farmers Organizations* (Washington: USAID, Program Evaluation Series, November 1976), argues that indigenous associations are likely to succeed when they are small and unconnected to other groups. She was studying, however, small farmers' groups, though the principle tends to be widely applied.

101. This is discussed by J. M. Texier, 'The promotion of cooperatives in traditional rural society'; and Goran Hyden, 'Cooperatives as a means of farmer grouping in East Africa: expectations and actual performance', in Guy Hunter *et al.*, *Policy and Practice in Rural Development* (London: Croom Helm, 1976), pp. 215-232.

102. Inayatullah, *Cooperatives and Development in Asia: A Study of Fourteen Rural Communities of Iran, Pakistan and Ceylon* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1972); Uphoff and Esman, *op. cit.* (1974), *passim*; Texier, *op. cit.* (1976), pp. 215-222.

103. *Qar* (see note 16) sessions occur on many afternoons. During the chewing of *qar* there is considerable opportunity for discussion of local issues by a wide range of community members. See Gerholm's description, *op. cit.* (1977), pp. 176-185.
104. Carl H. Lande, 'Networks and groups in South-east Asia: some observations on the group theory of politics', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXVIII, No. 1 (1973), pp. 103-127, especially pp. 122-126.
105. This helps to explain the confusion surrounding *zakar* collection. The LDAs were given their vague mandate to collect *zakar* as part of a 'corrective movement' (*tashih*) aimed against government inability to collect or use the tax effectively.
106. Two qualifications: (1) *zakar* payments are not graduated according to wealth and *zakar* is paid by sharecroppers; (2) there are cases where *sheikhs* have jailed local people for refusing to contribute to a project. Neither of these conditions, however, overrides the conclusion.
107. Few LDA projects relate to agricultural activities. Gerholm, for example, argues that the Manakha LDA is dominated by an alliance of tribal and commercial élites, is the tool of the men at the top, and allocates no money to activities outside the town. *Op. cit.* (1977), pp. 99, 190.
108. Uphoff and Esman found that societies with ratios greater than this tended to be dominated by élite capture of benefits, *op. cit.* (1974), pp. 63-67.
109. The potential for participation is described in: John M. Cohen and Norman T. Uphoff, 'Participation's place in rural development: seeking clarity through specificity', *World Development*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (1980), pp. 213-235, and Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith, *op. cit.* (1979), *passim*.
110. Gow *et al.*, *op. cit.* (1979), Vol. I, pp. 70-74. The countries studied were Upper Volta, Cameroon, Yemen, Guatemala, Peru, the Philippines, and Jamaica.
111. A recent essay on the importance of such strategies, particularly on the need to view central and local interests as non-zero-sum interactions, is: David B. Leonard and Dale R. Marshall, *Decentralization and Linkages in Rural Development: The Partnership of Central and Local Organizations in Assisting the Poor* (Berkeley: University of California Project on Managing Decentralization, February 1981).
112. The inability of the Government of Kenya to provide solid recurrent expenses support to Harambee self-help efforts raises serious questions about whether the Yemen Government can do so for LDAs, particularly because of the Kenyan Government's superior financial and administrative capacity. See Frank Holmquist, 'Implementing rural development projects', in G. Hyden, R. Jackson and J. Okumu (eds), *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 201-229.
113. For example, a new rural development programme is being initiated in the governorates of Hudeidah and Hajjah (coastal plain and adjoining mountain area). It is being funded by USAID (Project 045) and is designed to strengthen the capabilities of the LDAs. It covers 53 or 54 LDAs providing a mix of training, technical assistance and a modest amount of financial assistance. The objective is to develop the LDA's abilities to plan, implement, manage and maintain local projects such as roads, water systems, and agricultural infrastructure.