

UNITED STATES
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

THE
INSPECTOR
GENERAL

ARUSHA PLANNING AND VILLAGE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (NO. 621-0143)
NEEDS INCREASED MANAGEMENT ATTENTION

AUDIT REPORT NO. 3-621-82-22
AUGUST 20, 1982



Regional Inspector General for Audit
NAIROBI

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The Arusha Planning and Village Development Project (No. 621-0143) began in August 1978. Project expenditures of \$14.6 million are planned to be made by the March 31, 1983 project assistance completion date.

The Arusha Planning and Village Development Project specifically focused on the Arusha Region of Tanzania. It was designed to strengthen the capability of the Arusha Region and three of its six rural districts (Arumeru, Mbulu and Hanang) to plan and implement development activities at the regional district level.

Purpose and Scope of Audit

This initial review included an examination of project documents, discussions with project officials, and field trips to selected project sites to determine whether (a) controls over AID provided resources were adequate, (b) the Government of Tanzania (TanGov) was using these resources effectively and efficiently, (c) applicable laws and AID regulations were being followed, (d) the project was meeting its objectives, and (e) contractors were satisfactorily performing their responsibilities. We also focused on how well USAID/Tanzania was monitoring the project.

Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Our review of the Arusha Planning and Village Development Project found that improvement was needed in the following areas:

- Some project objectives were behind schedule and, in our opinion, will not be accomplished during the life of the project (pages 2 to 4).
- Procurement delays affected the accomplishment of some project objectives, and a commodity receiving and inventory system was not developed in a timely manner. Also insufficient contractor oversight contributed in the failure to file an insurance claim for commodities not received (pages 4 to 6).
- Controls over vehicle useage and fuel consumption needed to be tightened (pages 6 to 8).
- The maintenance of newly rehabilitated roads was inadequate (pages 8 and 9).

- An imprest fund was not working as planned (pages 9 and 10).

USAID/Tanzania needed to determine if the host government contributions requirement to the project had been satisfied (page 10 and 11).

- An antagonistic relationship had developed between the contractor (DAI) and USAID because of a severe communications problem (pages 11 and 12).

This report contains seven recommendations to correct the deficiencies noted in the above areas.

At the conclusion of our audit our findings were discussed with USAID/Tanzania officials, and a draft report was provided to them. Their official comments were reviewed and, as considered appropriate, have been incorporated into our final report.

BACKGROUND

Introduction

The Arusha Planning and Village Development Project (No. 621-0143) began in August 1978. Project expenditures of \$14.6 million are planned to be made by the project assistance completion date of March 31, 1983. As of March 31, 1982, expenditures totaled about \$12.8 million.

The Arusha Planning and Village Development Project specifically focused on the Arusha Region of Tanzania. It was designed to strengthen the capability of the Arusha Region and three of its six rural districts (Arumeru, Mbulu and Hanang) to plan and implement development activities at the local district and regional level. Included in this effort was village level development and the preparation of the Arusha Region Integrated Rural Development Plan. Implementation concentrated on direct production activities in the Agricultural sector, construction and/or rehabilitation of secondary feeder roads, improvement or construction of village water and irrigation systems, and developing technologies appropriate for local conditions.

A follow-on project is presently being designed which will provide for the maintenance of roads, the further development of rural industries, the development of the region's energy resources, and the strengthening of the institutional structure for implementation. AID funding for the follow-on project is estimated to be between \$7 and \$8 million.

Tanzania is considered one of the 25 poorest countries in the world. The United Nations classifies Tanzania as a "relatively least developed country." The main thrust of AID's development strategy in Tanzania has been to assist in the development of the country's agricultural delivery system and of economic infrastructure in support of the agricultural sector. AID's overall development efforts are in close agreement with the Tanzanian Government's Country Development Plan.

Purpose and Scope

The audit was requested by USAID/Tanzania because the Director was concerned that the contractor's method of operating might be in conflict with Agency procedures. Another concern was the project's slow progress to date.

The scope of the audit was to determine whether: (a) the Tanzanian Government (TanGov) was effectively and efficiently using AID provided resources, (b) applicable laws and AID regulations were

being complied with, (c) the project was meeting its goals and objectives as stated in project documentation, (d) AID funds were properly expended, (e) the contractor, Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), was performing satisfactorily and operating within the provisions of the contract, (f) USAID/Tanzania was providing adequate supervision to the project, and (g) the intent of Congress was being followed.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Project Was Not Meeting Some Of Its Stated Goals

The accomplishment of some project objectives was behind schedule, and not all targets will be reached by the end of the project.

The goal of the Arusha Planning and Village Development Project was to improve the production, income, and well-being of rural people in the three relatively better endowed agricultural districts of the Arusha region. The purpose of the project was to strengthen the capabilities of the Arusha region to identify, implement, and evaluate development activities within the framework of the policies and priorities of the TanGov. A second purpose was to provide the micro data that will assist in the preparation of the Arusha Integrated Rural Development Plan.

The project agreement established objectives in four project components. Those objectives and progress made toward their accomplishment are discussed in the following paragraphs:

1. Planning, Implementation and Evaluation

One project objective was to strengthen planning, implementation, and evaluation capabilities at the regional, district, and village levels, including preparation of the Arusha Region Integrated Rural Development Plan.

We reviewed selected planning documentation, analyses, and statistical data, and concluded that this objective had been accomplished. Project officials from the TanGov, DAI, and USAID/Tanzania were satisfied with the project's planning accomplishments. A mid-project evaluation made in June 1981 by a REDSO/EA, USAID, DAI team said this was a remarkable achievement because "the long-term development priorities and strategies produced through the process truly reflect Tanzanian officials' decisions and attitudes, and that the planning exercise has focused on policy issues which formerly were only vaguely articulated."

2. Improving Agricultural Production

This project objective was to identify and develop crop and livestock technological innovations for the project area, and develop a technical training program for government agricultural and livestock officers as well as villagers.

The project has accomplished a broad range of training activities. For example, numerous regional and district workshops and seminars on planning, data analysis and development planning, and communications skills were held. Also five persons are expected to receive graduate degrees by September 1982 in regional planning from Cornell University.

The project changed its approach from one of learning what the constraints were to agricultural production to one of concentration on an expanded extension system and conservation program. The conservation program focused on nursery and reforestation activities, which stress resource conservation to provide a base for growth. Largely because of external factors, this objective was not accomplished as planned.

3. Identifying and Promoting Other Economic Activities

This objective was to support the development of a center aimed at the promotion of appropriate technology and local level enterprise which was to focus on the development, production, and introduction of improved agricultural implements and agricultural processing equipment, as well as the promotion of village enterprise.

The Appropriate Technology Center was not developed because it was determined to be a duplication of an existing facility. In its place the project developed an Agricultural Implement Center which became operational in June 1982. It was delayed coming on line for several months because of the late arrival of equipment.

At the local level, 57 economic activity projects had been initiated--including a brickmaking facility, ox-cart and ox-plough production groups, and several nursery/reforestation projects. We found that 20 of the 57 projects were completed and three were terminated.

4. Improving the Social and Economic Infrastructure Directly Related to Productive Activities

This objective was to rehabilitate approximately 276 miles of secondary roads and 200 miles of feeder roads, develop water systems in approximately 52 villages, and rehabilitate approximately 2,800 acres of small scale village irrigation systems.

As of July 1982, this component was significantly behind schedule and, in our opinion, will not achieve the planned output. We found that:.

- 209 miles of secondary roads were rehabilitated.
- No feeder roads were rehabilitated.
- 30 water systems in 13 villages had been developed.
- No irrigation systems had been rehabilitated.

Project personnel estimated that by the end of the project 276 miles of secondary roads will be rehabilitated; no feeder roads will be completed; perhaps another 20-30 village water systems will be developed; and none of the 2,800 acres of small scale village irrigation systems will be rehabilitated.

The major effort and achievement to date focused on planning activities. There had been programs developed to increase production. The impact of better plans and planning capabilities on the production, income, and well-being of rural people are not measurable in the near term. It can be said that because of increased extension agent activities, the availability of farm implements, and better irrigation that production and rural income will both increase.

The project team collected village specific data and planned to demonstrate the effects of the project in certain areas, such as how many trees had been planted or how many water systems were developed. However, project officials did not have a mechanism in place to determine how the project impacted on the well being of the rural poor.

We estimate that \$5.3 million will be spent primarily on planning and evaluation by the end of the project. We cannot judge whether this is a prudent investment. However, we suggest that any future planning aid for Tanzania be carefully considered by AID experts because of the TanGov's known strained financial position. This could have an adverse affect on their ability to support completed AID projects once United States funding ends.

Reasons why some planned objectives will not be accomplished are detailed in the following sections of the report.

Procurement Problems Adversely Affected Project Progress

The project was hampered by procurement problems which adversely affected the accomplishment of some project objectives.

One such weakness was that USAID/Tanzania did not ensure that DAI had established a commodity receiving system or an inventory procedure until well after the commodities began to arrive. The

failure to establish a proper commodity receiving system was the primary reason that an undetermined number of warehouse parts had not been identified as short-received. Therefore neither USAID nor DAI determined the quantities actually received and no claim was filed. USAID's response to our finding was:

"...We have now received a list of the missing warehouse parts which cost Dols.1,680.85. These parts were not replaced because slight changes in the buildings design resulted in an excess of side panels which were remanufactured to replace the missing roof cap. The claim is time barred..."

Although the claim may be time barred, we feel the contractor should be held liable because an adequate control system was not established.

Another illustration is: several pieces of machine tools needed for the appropriate Technology Center procured from excess property were extremely slow in arriving in Tanzania. While this is not unusual, it delayed the project from moving forward as planned.

Finally, the project provided funds to procure 120 motorcycles which were to be sold to TanGov extension workers to assist them in their work. The sales campaign was delayed for approximately two years because the motorcycles were not received until November 1981. The activity was finally implemented in March 1982.

We found that the motorcycles were being used in the field by TanGov employees; however, we also found that the TanGov had not submitted a plan to USAID as to how the proceeds from the motorcycle sales were to be used in the development of the Arusha Region as required by Section 5.3 of the Project Agreement.

In responding to this section of our draft report the Mission said:

"...USAID did not establish the inventory system but insisted that DAI and the Region do so; the system was established and subsequently reviewed in February 1982 and revisions suggested at that time have been implemented. The supply management advisor has already been making necessary reviews of the system and will continue..."

Conclusion and Recommendations

DAI has now established an inventory control system which is functioning satisfactorily. In our draft report we stated that it would be prudent if USAID/Tanzania periodically reviewed the system and refined it as necessary and, accordingly, made a recommendation to that effect. But, we believe that USAID/Tanzania's subsequent actions has obviated the need for a recommendation, accordingly, we have withdrawn it.

We believe that DAI was negligent in its management of AID-financed commodities because it failed to determine what commodities were missing, and then take the appropriate action to either notify the supplier if they were short-shipped or file an insurance claim if they were lost in transit. Thus, we believe that SER/CM should recover from DAI the cost of the parts.

Recommendation No. 1

SER/CM recover from DAI the amount of \$1,680.85 for the missing warehouse parts.

Recommendation No. 2

USAID/Tanzania ensure that the TanGov develops and implements an acceptable plan for the use of the proceeds generated from the motorcycle sales program.

Controls Over Vehicle And Fuel Usage Needed To Be Improved

Controls over vehicle usage and fuel need to be tightened. As of September 1981, the project had purchased about \$950,000 of vehicles and trucks, and about \$750,000 of fuel, oil, and lubricants.

DAI had installed a vehicle maintenance log system to monitor and control vehicle use and maintenance costs, including fuel. We found that this system was not working because an estimated 50 percent of the log entries were meaningless due to broken vehicle speedometers. Also, vehicle operators failed to prepare trip logs.

Further, we found an unaccounted for difference of 23,929 litres of fuel costing approximately \$17,000. This was the difference between meter readings and stick measurements.

We believe that USAID/Tanzania failed to detect this situation because of inadequate project management and monitoring. DAI contractor personnel advised us that direct hire project personnel visited project sites only about once per year; but senior USAID/Tanzania officers told us that managers visited project sites more often. We could find no documentation that USAID's Arusha-based project personnel ever made project site visits.

We believe trip reports are an important management control procedure as stated in Appendix E of the Project Officer's Handbook. Appendix E states:

"For efficient management and continuity, it is equally important that such visits be recorded in written reports prepared by the responsible Project Officer. These reports

serve a number of purposes. They provide a succinct commentary for AID management on the status of the contract or grant, and become an integral part of the official contract or grant files of the Agency. Properly completed, they constitute an invaluable "follow up" monitoring tool by identifying problems and the actions required to resolve them."

USAID/Tanzania officials agreed that controls over vehicle usage and petroleum needed to be tightened. They stated that as of June 30, 1982, the management of project fuel reverted to the control of the TanGov in Arusha.

The Mission in their response to the draft report also said:

"...The differences of opinion between DAI and the Arusha Office, coupled with a lack of communication between DAI, USAID/Arusha and our Dar office were among the reasons for reorganizing the Arusha office and assigning project management responsibility to Dar. This problem was recognized and solved by the Mission. Aside from the difference of opinion between the Mission and DAI over site visits, the current project manager has made site visits 6 times since January 1982 and has scheduled other site visits this month; this averages one group of site visits a month and is considered to provide adequate project oversight. Problem areas, if discovered, are the subject of appropriate memoranda. The Mission sees no benefit to be derived by requiring trip reports for routine visits..."

Conclusion and Recommendations

Control over the use of project fuel and vehicles needed to be tightened. We believe that USAID/Tanzania should, as a matter of course, periodically review the newly implemented fuel control procedures. Further, the USAID/Tanzania should instill in the contractor the importance of the trip logs.

USAID/Tanzania needs to develop a procedure that requires project technicians to complete a trip report after each site visit. This would verify how often managers make inspections of project activities. While we believe that USAID/Tanzania is now making an adequate number of site visits, in our opinion each site visit should be documented as stated in Appendix E of the Project Officers' Handbook.

Recommendation No. 3

USAID/Tanzania ensure that (a) vehicle trip and maintenance logs are properly maintained, and (b) inventory controls the TanGov has implemented over fuel paid for from project funds are adequate.

Recommendation No. 4

USAID/Tanzania establish a procedure that requires project personnel to prepare a trip report after each site visit and file it in the project's official records.

The Roads Component - A Program In Need Of Attention

The quality of road rehabilitation was questionable, and road maintenance had been inadequate since this phase of the project began in December 1979. USAID/Tanzania estimated that at the end of the project, 276 miles of road will have been rehabilitated at a cost of about \$4.2 million. The project agreement provided that the necessary maintenance capabilities would be established at village and district levels. It wasn't.

We found that there had been inadequate road maintenance work on the rehabilitated roads. We observed that serious water damage to recently rehabilitated roads have not been repaired. A roads engineer told us that without maintenance the roads would deteriorate within one year to the extent that major rehabilitation would be necessary. The road advisors also told us that they did not think that the TanGov had the resources to properly maintain the roads. A USAID/Tanzania staff member echoed the road advisor when he told us that road maintenance had been extensively discussed with TanGov officials, but these discussions produced only limited results.

REDSO/EA engineers inspected the roads during the mid-project evaluation. This inspection found minor faults, such as excessive camber in places, and bridges and culverts not in place. USAID/Tanzania intends to request another REDSO/EA inspection during the end of project evaluation scheduled for January 1983.

We discussed overall quality of the road rehabilitation program, as well as the the camber and culvert problems with a project roads engineer. He told us that the excessive road camber was caused by the lack of water which was needed for compaction after rehabilitation. Thus compaction was accomplished by traffic rather than by water and rolling. The use of water for compaction is considered to be more desirable. He also acknowledged the culvert problem. He said that about 400 culverts were needed but only 80 had been installed. The engineers went on to say that the delay in installing the culverts was caused by the late arrival of culvert forms.

USAID/Tanzania officials agreed that proper maintenance of roads was critical if they were to remain usable. They pointed out that this was a major problem in most of Africa. Further USAID/Tanzania stated in their comments to the draft audit report:

"...the Mission has already used its maximum influence to obtain road maintenance and, at present the TanGov is not in a position to increase its maintenance efforts. Recognizing this, the Mission plans to include maintenance funds in the follow-on project."

Conclusion and Recommendation

The roads were not adequately maintained and, unless the situation is corrected, they will become unusable. Thus, scarce assistance funds will have been wasted. The maintenance that is accomplished is all labor intensive. While this is better than no maintenance at all, it will not begin to protect the asset. In our view new road projects should not go forward unless maintenance funding is available.

Recommendation No. 5

USAID/Tanzania ensure that funds are provided for road maintenance, or the rehabilitation and building of additional roads should be terminated.

An Imprest Fund Was Not Working As Planned

The AID funded imprest account was regularly insufficient to meet monthly operating expenses. Suppliers were slow to deliver project commodities because they were not being paid in a timely manner. The occasional non-availability of project commodities adversely impacted on the accomplishment of road project objectives.

The roads complement required approximately TShs. 130,000 (about \$16,250) 1/ per month to meet recurring costs. There were ten instances from May 1980 to November 1981 when the account balance was insufficient to meet costs. The average account balance during these instances was TShs. 9,854, or 92 percent less than the required amount. The primary reasons for these problems were paperwork delays and the high demand on the account when commodities were received.

USAID/Tanzania advanced the TanGov funds to cover three months of expenditures. The TanGov then advanced these funds to three districts. At the end of each month the districts were to submit reimbursement requests supported by expenditure documentation. The procedure worked well except for one district which would not submit the necessary documentation for reimbursement. This depleted the imprest account.

1/ US\$1 = TShs. 8

Conclusion And Recommendation

Insufficient imprest funds adversely impacted on project progress. A reimbursement procedure had been established and would have been workable had all three districts followed it. It is incumbent upon USAID/Tanzania to ensure that the TanGov understands the importance of timely imprest fund reimbursements. Accordingly, USAID/Tanzania should make certain the TanGov brings the one district in line so that the system functions as designed.

Recommendation No. 6

USAID/Tanzania ensure that the TanGov enforces established reimbursement procedures for the district projects so that funds are provided in a timely manner.

TanGov Financial Support For The Project Needed To Be Tabularized And A Value Assigned For The Assistance-In-Kind

USAID/Tanzania did not know the value of the TanGov's contribution to the project. In fact our review indicates the contribution will not be met because a major TanGov input to the project was to provide labor and equipment for rehabilitation of 200 miles of feeder roads. This is being dropped because the TanGov, according to USAID officials, does not have the resources to begin the rehabilitation.

The Project agreement required the TanGov to contribute approximately \$8.4 million to the project over its four-year life. This is the amount necessary to meet the 25 percent cost sharing requirement contained in Section 110(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The contribution was to consist of staff salaries, housing and office space for Arusha based technicians, equipment for roads and water system construction, construction and self-help labor, parastatal developmental support, and miscellaneous recurrent costs.

DAI officials told us that the TanGov provided housing and office space for Arusha based technicians as agreed. However, we found that neither USAID/Tanzania nor DAI nor the regional TanGov offices had an accounting of TanGov contributions to the project, and did not know if the contribution requirement had been satisfied.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Lack of certain inputs to the project indicates the TanGov may not meet its contribution to the project as required by the Foreign Assistance Act. It has not been determined whether the contribution has been met.

Recommendation No. 7

USAID/Tanzania (a) determine the amount of the TanGov contribution to the project to ascertain if the requirements of the project agreement and Section 110(a) of the FAA, as amended, have been met, and (b) take appropriate corrective action if necessary.

Poor Communications Between USAID/Tanzania And DAI Adversely Affected Contractor Performance

Subsidiary project issues diverted attention from the project's objectives and strained the relationship between USAID/Tanzania and the DAI contract team.

During the course of the project several instances occurred in which USAID/Tanzania questioned whether DAI was in compliance with AID regulations. One reason this audit was requested by USAID/Tanzania was because the contractor had reportedly used some questionable practices in shipping project commodities and personal effects. These instances, individually, did not impact on the progress of the project; however, in total they were of sufficient magnitude that USAID/Tanzania began to seriously question DAI's creditability. The situation culminated in January 1982 when USAID/Tanzania stated in a cable to AID/Washington:

"As DAI has proven reluctant to follow mission directives, it would appear that reconsideration should be given to delegating administration of this contract to the field, specifically REDSO/EA...."

Subsequently, the president of DAI visited USAID officials in Dar es Salaam and the contract team in Arusha to see if a working relationship between the two parties could be reestablished. The chief-of-party was replaced and USAID/Tanzania now believes that a rapprochement will follow.

A compendium of the individual issues were:

- DAI intermingled household effects, consumables, and project commodities in containers, and air shipped them as accompanied baggage to the project site. USAID/Tanzania questioned this practice as being in violation of AID regulations.
- DAI purchased four motorcycles in April 1981 and had them imported to Tanzania. USAID/Tanzania determined this was an improper importation and implied that the motorcycles were sold for profit by DAI. Further, USAID/Tanzania was "disturbed that these motorcycles were sold by DAI after DAI was directed by the Mission not to do so."

With the assistance of USAID/Tanzania personnel in Arusha, DAI improperly imported a video tape recorder and monitor. Both USAID/Tanzania and DAI personnel certified that this video equipment was for project use while knowing that it was intended for the personal use of DAI's employees.

USAID/Tanzania officials agreed that there was a severe communications problem among DAI and AID personnel in Dar es Salaam and Arusha. They acknowledged that USAID/Tanzania was partially at fault in this situation by not doing a better job of monitoring Arusha activities and discussing the issues. USAID/Tanzania management was confident that with the recent Arusha office reorganization and subsequent meetings with senior DAI officials, the communication problem had been solved.

Conclusion

The poor communications between all parties impacted adversely on the project. Working relationships between DAI and USAID personnel in Dar es Salaam deteriorated to the point that they became antagonists. USAID/Tanzania senior managers told us that communications improved with the assignment of a Dar es Salaam based direct hire project officer. Further, with the designation of a new chief-of-party, we believe that the communications problem has been addressed. Therefore, we are not including a recommendation.

However, we found minor violations of AID regulations, and have questions regarding reimbursement of certain costs. The major questions pertained to:

- If the cost to airship commodities as accompanied baggage is cheaper than sea shipment.
- If DAI personnel pay for personal shipping charges.
- If project money was involved in the purchase of video equipment or shotgun shells.
- The disposition of the motorcycle sales proceeds.

A review of DAI's financial records in Washington, D.C. is needed to resolve these issues. By separate memorandum, we have requested our RIG/A/Washington office to schedule an audit of DAI's home office.

List Of Report Recommendations

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SER/CM recover from DAI the amount of \$1,680.85 for the missing warehouse parts.	
<u>Recommendation No. 2</u>	6
USAID/Tanzania ensure that the TanGov develops and implements an acceptable plan for the use of the proceeds generated from the motorcycle sales program.	
<u>Recommendation No. 3</u>	7
USAID/Tanzania ensure that (a) vehicle trip and maintenance logs are properly maintained, and (b) inventory controls the TanGov has implemented over fuel paid for from project funds are adequate.	
<u>Recommendation No. 4</u>	8
USAID/Tanzania establish a procedure that requires project personnel to prepare a trip report after each site visit and file it in the project's official records.	
<u>Recommendation No. 5</u>	9
USAID/Tanzania ensure that funds are provided for road maintenance, or the rehabilitation and building of additional roads should be terminated.	

Recommendation No. 6

10

USAID/Tanzania ensure that the TanGov enforces established reimbursement procedures for the district projects so that funds are provided in a timely manner.

Recommendation No. 7

11

USAID/Tanzania (a) determine the amount of the TanGov contribution to the project to ascertain if the requirements of the project and Section 110(a) of the FAA, as amended, have been met, and (b) take appropriate corrective action if necessary.

APPENDIX B

List Of Report Recipients

	<u>No. of Copies</u>
<u>Field Offices:</u>	
USAID/Tanzania	5
REDSO/EA	2
<u>AID/washington:</u>	
Deputy Administrator	1
AA/AFR	5
LEG	1
GC	1
IG	1
SER/CM	2
FM/ASD	2
AFR/EA	2
PPC/E	1
ST/DIU	4