PD-AAJ-988 ASN 570

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PP 2839 521PL02

1. PROJECT TITLE

Special Evaluation of Food Aid and Labor-Intensive Rural Development (FFW)

2. PROJECT NUMBER: NA

3. COUNTRY OR ASIA/W OFFICE: Haiti

Fiscal Year Serial No. (Assigned by AID/W): 521-79-11 (s)

☐ REGULAR EVALUATION ☒ SPECIAL EVALUATION

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES

A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY____ B. Final Obligation Expected FY____ C. Final Input Delivery FY____

6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING

A. Total $ _____

B. U.S. $ _____

7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION

From (mo. yr.) _____

To (mo. yr.) _____

Date of Evaluation Review _____

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)

B. Name of Officer Responsible for Action

C. Date Action Taken Completed

This PES summarizes the major findings and recommendations of a special study of food aid and labor-intensive rural development activities (Attachment A), and contains program guidance and proposed actions for review by USAID and participating voluntary agencies.

Attachment #1

"Food Aid and the Problem of Labor-Intensive Rural Development", G. Smucker, et al., 12/79.

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS

☐ Project Paper ☐ Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network ☐ Other (Specify)

☐ Financial Plan ☐ PIO/T

☐ Logical Framework ☐ PIO/C ☐ Other (Specify)

☐ Project Agreement ☐ PIO/P

10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT

A. ☐ Continue Project Without Change

B. ☐ Change Project Design and/or ☐ Change Implementation Plan

C. ☐ Discontinue Project

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)

12. Mission or AID/W Office Director

Signature: William G. Rhoads

Typed Name: William G. Rhoads, Acting

Date

AID 1330-15 (3-78)

I. Introduction

This evaluation (Attachment A) was undertaken July - September 1979 to identify problems and clarify issues commonly raised in the use of food aid, in labor-intensive approaches to rural works, and in community development.

The first part of the report deals with (1) the economics of food aid in Haiti from both a national perspective and peasant economic perspective; (2) problems of cash versus food payment for labor; (3) the use of food aid for "relief"versus"development"; and (4) the effects of food aid on grass roots community development. The second part of the report is a detailed discussion of four sites visited during the field study, including descriptions of the communities, agencies, projects and community organizations.

The draft report was reviewed by USAID and the Volags directly involved in the study on November 9. All participants in the review were given an opportunity to comment on the report and the substantive issues raised. A second in-house (USAID) review was held to establish a Mission position on issues and recommendations concerning administration and implementation of labor-intensive activities and to determine what actions could be taken to support recommended changes in FFW program implementation.

This PES provides a summary of the major findings of the study, a discussion of the conclusions of the joint review, and proposed guidelines for future program implementation which will be discussed further with the participating Volags.

II. Summary of Major Findings and Recommendations

Community councils were often established expressly to provide an institutional network for doing relief work in tandem with the PVOs. Regardless of how they function, community councils have the virtue of being dispersed throughout much of rural Haiti. As presently constituted, however, many are unlikely to serve as the institutional basis for authentic participatory rural development.

Food aid does not represent a long-term solution to the problems of Haiti's rural masses. At best it serves as a stopgap measure. To the degree that it fosters longer-term dependency, it should be curtailed. To the degree that it is available in the context of drought, famine and disaster relief, it can render a valuable service. In the context of rapidly rising food prices, it can potentially play a useful role in price stabilization. In the context of inadequate domestic food production, it should be used pointedly as an investment in agriculture and related economic endeavors.

Management of food aid poses certain problems. As a program factor, food commodities appear to be more readily available than technical support and administrative control. The PVOs in Haiti are cognizant of these problems and have taken steps to tighten food for work administration, as evidenced by the growing use of labor "contracts" rather than simple daily labor arrangements. On the basis of PVO experience and the problems observed in this evaluation, the following recommendations for program improvement were made by the evaluation team:

1) Food for work projects should be time limited. Ideally, relief oriented projects should take into account slack seasons for agricultural labor and seasonal variations in the price of grain.

2) Small work teams seem to lend themselves to greater efficiency and less opportunity for abuse than massive road projects and large scale food distribution.

3) Delays and irregular payments and disbursements of food seem to increase the opportunities for administrative corruption and worker vulnerability

to usurious loans.

4) Ideally, projects should be supported where workers have an intrinsic vested intefest in the asset being created, in addition to the employment opportunity.

5) "Contract" work patterns make good sense in light of agency goals of efficiency as well as traditional patterns of work. There is the potential for abuse, however, in paying out food commodities to highly paid, skilled workers and urban-based personnel temporarily assigned to rural-based projects. It appears that this practice is a way of supplementing agency budgets short of financial resources.

6) If peasant workers are involved in projects where they have a personal vested interest, it may make sense to use food commodities in the form of a cooked meal served at the workplace rather than wage rations. This assumes that the project is not set up primarily for relief-employment. On the other hand, if the project is truly a product of local initiative and worker interest, the provision of food aid may well constitute unnecessary outside intervention. The key point should be to respond flexibly to the situation which is only possible with adequate trained personnel working in the field assessing each project on a case-by-case basis.

7) Used as investment, food resources might best be combined with other inputs such as cash, materials and technical personnel. Funding agencies such as USAID should endeavor to make available the additional resources needed to back up food aid programming where PVOs have need. It would not be wise, however for PVO programs to expand beyond the PVOs capacity to manage such inputs, for the advantage of PVOs rests, at least in part, in their tangible presence in the field.

8) The relative prices of PL 480 commodities for sale on the Haitian market should be monitored along with other foodstuffs. Close attention should be paid to the possible detrimental effects of concessionary food imports, given changes in the market.

9) Further research in the area of food aid should examine with greater depth the market effects of imported commodities in relatively circumscribed areas of relief programming, such as La Gonave or the Northwest. Seasonal variations and the peculiarities of long-running food for work projects may reveal characteristics not observed in the present evaluation.

10) Further study and comparison might be made of programs oriented to self-sustaining economic ventures, such as the project in Kenscoff, and those oriented more to relief and services, such as the agency program in Terre Neuve.

11) Further inquiry might be made into the origins and history of the community council movement, the range and variation of existing councils, and alternatives relative to the formation of dynamic peasant collectivities.

12) Further inquiry might also be made into the peasant household as an economic unit, varying degrees of monetization and its effects on economic decision-making -- all with a view to using food resources and other inputs more effectively and in the essential interests of peasant farm units rather than the convenience of outside agencies.

13) As is evident in the case studies, there is a certain dilemma of doing food aid in Haiti. Because of the tendency toward dependency by the rural poor, outside aid tends almost by definition to work at cross purposes to goals of local initiative and self-sufficiency. At the same time there is a certain inescapable argument favoring the transfer of food surpluses to people confronted with food deficit. The resolution of this dilemma lies ultimately in the emergence of peasant institutions capable of accomodating such transfers in keeping with the economic interests of peasant smallholders.

III. USAID/Volag Review: Conclusions and Program Implications

The FFW evaluation pointed out, and there was general agreement among the various agencies administering Title II FFW activities, that food aid responds, at least in the short run, to the interests of peasant consumers at times of food shortage and high grain prices and also serves as an effective means of recruiting labor.

The use made of the food and the labor it purchases is, however, dependent upon the implementing agency's perception of the objective of the program, and the human and financial resources available to manage it.

The following discussion is an attempt to clarify the objectives of FFW activities and to propose implementation guidelines for future discussion. Part IV of this PES addresses the issue of additional resources for improving PL 480 Title II programs.

Program Objectives

PL 480 Title II guidelines make it clear that Title II commodities are to be considered a "development resource". Within the context of Food-for-Work the guidelines express concern for equitable income distribution and small farmer welfare. The goal of food-for-work projects as stated in the guidelines is "the achievement of needed agriculture/economic, and community improvements by providing commodities to support the labor of unemployed and underemployed local workers." Priority is to be given to projects which will contribute to an increased or improved food supply in areas where the supply is inadequate. Attention is supposed to be given to "who benefits" from completed projects as well as the number of persons employed. It is expected that people who are in a "low-income status" or who are otherwise "economically needy" are the principal group to engage in FFW activities. On food-for-work projects where the workers receive commodities as "compensation" for work performed, the following guidelines apply:

(1) Normally, commodities are not used to pay 100 percent of compensation if workers are employed full time over an extended period. Usually, 50 percent of the compensation in commodities is the maximum.

(2) the combination of cash and commodities is to represent a fair and reasonable compensation for tasks performed. The value of the commodity portion of the compensation is to be based on a fair price for each commodity distributed. The recipient government, the cooperating sponsor, and the Mission are to agree on the local value of each commodity.

(3) To reduce the likelihood of the worker selling or exchanging commodities received as compensation for work performed, the quantity of commodities issued to the account of each worker at any one time should not exceed the amount each worker alone, or the worker plus dependents, will consume during a 2-week distribution period.

On projects which emphasize the distribution of commodities as an "incentive" as distinct from "compensation" - for work performed, the commodities distributed as an incentive for each day of participation or performance should be at a rate which is considerably less than that which is distributed as compensation.

The distribution of commodities in exchange for work on either "compensation" or "incentive" type projects may be based on the food requirements of the worker alone or on the requirements of the worker plus dependents.

Implicit in the regulations for food distribution is the notion that the food is to be consumed by the recipient and/or family and not exchanged for other needs. This implies further that FFW commodities are intended primarily to alleviate a food deficit situation. FFW thus has a humanitarian and nutritional focus. The "method of getting the food to the recipient by using it as incentive or compensation for work is supposed to be designed in such a way as to maximize the developmental impact on the low-income, unemployed target group and on the condition which gave rise to the need (food deficit).

Matching this interpretation of the FFW guidelines against the actual practices and procedures for managing and implementing FFW activities in Haiti suggests that certain adjustments need to be made in the program in order to comply with the legislated intent.

The FFW evaluation shows that the Agencies administering FFW activities in Haiti view programs as meeting an overriding humanitarian need. Their primary objective is to provide food to needy people as economically as possible. [illegible]

is not inconsistent with PL 480 Title II guidelines, given the prevailing food deficit situation in Haiti. There are about 200,000 rural households in Haiti with an inadequate resource base to grow or purchase sufficient food to provide a minimally adequate diet. There is a still larger group of low income households, both rural and urban, which have only marginally adequate diets, which in times of stress - drought or natural disaster - must also be supplemented to maintain minimum nutritional levels. Emergency relief and long-range welfare type programs will therefore be needed for these target groups until such time as development programs begin to have an impact on food production, employment and income.

Community Councils have been relied upon as the major channel for emergency relief food distribution. In fact, councils were created solely for this purpose. One of the advantages in using community councils for relief activities is that they are widely dispersed throughout Haiti and a relatively small Volar administrative staff is able to distribute large amounts of food through them relatively quickly. However, these institutions, as presently utilized, have serious drawbacks as agencies for implementation of longer-range welfare or community development programs. The distribution of food aid through them tends to underwrite existing local hierarchies. Whoever controls the food aid in the community controls distribution of jobs and wages and is in a position of power. Also, the food-for-work "relief" focus of many councils tends to divert attention away from the serious business of grass roots peasant organization and economic alternatives.

Food aid administrators must determine, on the basis of field observations, whether an "emergency" situation exists or not. In times of emergency the primary objective is to deliver food as quickly as possible to prevent starvation and the community council network can contribute to achieving this objective. During non-emergency periods, however, development goals must be the primary focus. Indiscriminate use of community councils to distribute food during such periods without adequate management controls gives rise to practices which are inconsistent with development objectives and in many cases with PL 480 Title II regulations.

The following suggestions for improved program management are proposed as an agenda for further discussion among all interested parties involved in food aid programs in Haiti.

Suggested Guidelines for FFW Activities

1. The effective utilization of PL 480 Title II resources calls for joint development of plans and programs by the Voluntary Agencies, USAID and relevant GOH ministries and agencies. GOH recognition of this need led to the formation of DIFPAN which is currently working on a food/nutrition policy. Following the adoption of a policy, DIFPAN will begin to plan and design programs for the Third Five-year Plan (FY 82-86). USAID and the Voluntary Agencies should co-operate with DIFPAN and other involved GOH institutions in this programming exercise since the proposed programs in all likelihood will involve PL 480 support.

It is also recommended that the food and nutrition Technical Committee suggested by Joyce King be activated to routinely review both MCH and FFW programs. Technical issues which might be considered by the committee are (1) ways and means of improving and coordinating food and nutrition surveillance information, (2) appropriateness of ration levels and content, (3) criteria for FFW project selection, and (4) timing and scope for Title II evaluations.

2. Given the continuing high probability of recurring emergency, food stress situations in Haiti in the foreseeable future, a response mechanism must be maintained and strengthened. The Voluntary Agencies, working with community councils, have provided and continue to provide the basic infrastructure for emergency relief activities. FFW resources might be used to further strengthen logistical infrastructure essential for disaster preparedness.

3. An informal review of community councils currently active in food distribution should be undertaken by each Voluntary Agency to identify those which are adhering to sound management of food distribution activities.

The review should address such issues as:

(a) Level of community participation in community council deliberations/decisions.

(b) Adequacy of community council records.

(c) Recipient selection procedures.

(d) Project selection criteria.

Following the review Voluntary Agencies should select only those CC's which demonstrate an ability to manage or a willingness to improve operations to meet minimum standards. Voluntary Agencies should not distribute food to more Community Councils than can be closely monitored on a quarterly basis.

4. Inspectors should understand PL 480 Title II guidelines and should inform all Community Councils of the objectives of the program and the standards of operation. All irregularities should be investigated and appropriate action taken.

5. Ration Levels. The evaluation report indicates that as ration levels are increased, a larger portion tends to be sold for cash needs. In many cases, the pressure placed on the worker to pay kickbacks in return for being placed on the work list is also increased. If ration levels are high enough, the projects tend to attract non-local workers of higher economic status. These workers, as well as skilled laborers who are paid a large food wage comensurate with the market value of their labor, are very likely to sell portions of their food wages for cash. In cases where high wages are in order, only part of the wage should be paid with food. The remainder should be provided in cash or other non-food type of renumeration.

As a rule of thumb, small self-help projects initiated by local communities should utilize an "incentive" ration, i.e., smaller than the "compensation" ration.

In FFW projects which are conducted "coumbite style," with food rations going toward meals prepared for the workers at the project location, there is virtually no chance of food sales on the part of the worker. Study needs to be done to determine when coumbite-style projects are appropriate and to what extent they are acceptable to recipients. The question of whether supplemental take-home wages should also be offered and what form these wages should take also needs to be answered. Nevertheless, wet distribution should be encouraged where practicable.

In general, ration size should not exceed the equivalent value of the local agricultural wage. The value of the ration should be based on local market resale value of the commodities included. This information should be documented

either by project or by region and updated periodically.

6. Screening of recipient eligibility. The status of the workers should be monitored to ensure that they fall into the class of local farm laborers most in need of the food wages. In some specific test cases, information could be collected regarding the number and nutritional status of family members which the worker supports. Obviously, if several members of a single household participate in a food-for-work project, the amount of food they collectively receive will be greater than actual consumption within the household, and a portion will be sold. Also, if the general resources available to the household assure an adequate amount of food, the FFW commodities earned by the member or members participating in the project will have a greater chance of finding their way to market.

Information concerning availability of food-for-work should be made public sufficiently in advance of projects to provide an opportunity for all eligible recipients to apply. This should be the responsibility of the Community Council. If a Community Council officer receives payment for including a worker on a project, he should be removed or the project terminated.

7. Project management standards. In addition to the general guidelines provide by AID Hanbook 9, Chapter 8, Section 8F, the FFW management standards suggested by the study and subsequent reviews are:

a) Food-for-Work projects should be time limited. FFW guidelines require an estimate of number of man-days to complete a project. These estimates should be based on sound technical criteria and should not be exceeded by more than 10% without an evaluation and documented justification for extension of the activity. Whether or not an actual "work contract" is signed between the agency and the community council, specific goals of achievement should be agreed upon, documented and progress monitored.

b) FFW projects should be tailored to food deficit situations and should take into account slack seasons for agricultural labor and seasonal variations in the price of grain. (This, however, implies the existence of surveillance and logistical systems presently beyond the capability of the Volags. Until such a system is in place, limiting most projects to from

3 to 6 months and reducing FFW activities during peak, labor-absorbing seasons should adequately respond to this recommendation.)

c) "Relief" projects should be so identified in the statement of project objectives with justification for such designation, a time limit, and a review mechanism.

d) "Development" projects using FFW should have the following characteristics:

- workers should have an intrinsic vested interest in the project as an asset, in addition to the employment opportunity. This implies more rigorous technical review of community generated project proposals, evaluation of community council capabilities and past performance, and more careful screening of recipient eligibility, not only in terms of need, but also in terms of residence.
- work teams should be small enough to be effectively supervised. Quality of supervision should be up-graded.
- contract work patterns are permissible and encouraged so long as basic guidance with regard to distribution of commodities is adhered to, i.e., "the quantity of commodities issued to the account of each worker (including skilled labor) at any one time should not exceed the amount each worker alone, or the worker plus dependents, will consume during a two-week distribution period".
- project proposals should specify <u>all</u> resources needed to carry out the task efficiently, including cash, materials, tools and technical pers

8. <u>Frequent and prompt distribution of food</u>. Considering that, in general, food wages are quite low in relation to the recipients' food needs, it is probable that a high percentage of the cash proceeds from food sales by the workers are used, ironically, to pay for comparable amounts of food. For the most part, the cash generated is used to cover debts incurred by the worker in order to purchase food for his family on a day-to-day basis. If a worker is required to wait till the end of the month, or even longer when shipping delays

occur, to receive his food wages in one lump sum, he must provide for his daily food needs in some other manner. If he is truly a needy farmer with no other resources at his disposal, his one recourse is to arrange for credit which is applied against the food wages he is due at a later date. Such credit is often administered by the council president who is responsible for food distribution and who can deduct the amount owed directly from the worker's food wage. This practice is permissible only when the loan is made from a central fund, reimbursed to that fund and accounted for in the council books. If a council officer is making a personal profit from such loans he should be removed or the program terminated.

9. Additional resources should be provided to the Volags to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Food-for-Work as a resource for development. Technical and other inputs necessary for planning, implementing and evaluating labor-intensive rural works activities are presently inadequate. (See Section IV for discussion of additional resources.)

IV. Resources for Implementing Recommended Program Changes

As is usually the case, it is easier to identify problems and make remedial recommendations than it is to mobilize the necessary resources to carry them out. Volag programs using Food-for-Work are no exception.

A number of funding mechanisms have been used to support Volag activities in Haiti and elsewhere. Some of these mechanism are:

- Outreach Grants
- Title I Counterpart Grants
- Special Development Grants
- Operational Program Grants (OPG)
- Title II (206) Sales Agreement

At the present time the most promising of these mechanisms in terms of additional availability and potential use for logistical support are Outreach Grants and for labor-intensive construction activities, the Special Development Fund and OPGs. Outreach grants have just been negotiated for Volag support through June 1982. These grants may be renegotiated if the need for additional resources can be juntified.

Title I counterpart, although made available in the past for vehicles and warehouse construction, is currently fully committed elsewhere.

The Special Development Fund, though limited in amount, is quick disbursing and relatively easy to administer. An annual fund of $75,000 is presently available for development activities up to approximately $5,000 in cost. This fund might be used much more widely for purchasing tools and other materials to improve the efficiency of small construction activities, in which Food-for-Work is a component.

OPG moneys are currently being held in a single fund at the Bureau level in AID/W. Grants are approved on a case-by-case, first-come-first-served basis. There appears to be no reason why a Volag could not develop a project which would directly enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of logistical operations and labor-intensive development activities. For example, an OPG might be used to finance training of warehouse personnel,

mechanics or supervisory personnel, to capitalize a revolving fund for the establishment, maintenance and replenishment of tool banks in local communities, or to train selected community level personnel in project development and management.

Title II (Section 206) provides for GOH sale of Title II commodities and use of the proceeds for support of Title II and/or agricultural programs. Should a 206 grant be contemplated, Voluntary Agency participation in the planning/programming process would be encouraged.

Other grants, both field-oriented and PVO headquarters-oriented, are described in Annex A.

ANNEX A

MEMORANDUM

NOV 14 1979

TO: AIDTO CIRCULAR - LIST P

FROM: PDC/PVC, Thomas H. Fox

SUBJECT: Grants Available from AID for Private and Voluntary Organizations (PVOs)

In response to Mission requests for information on grant categories for which PVOs are eligible, we have prepared this following summary:

1. Matching Grants - A matching grant is awarded to a PVO for that organization to carry out a clearly-conceived, evaluable, field-oriented program that takes place in a number of countries; is consistent with our legislative mandate, and supports a clearly defined, delineated program. Such a program may be as broad as the overall scope of the PVO's work or as specific as community-based health services or small enterprise development. The matching grant will normally allow a PVO to expand its program to new places and to initiate new projects. Awarded only to those relatively few PVOs with well-established development programs and with demonstrated, private fund raising ability, this grant carries with it less control or AID oversight than is the case with other grants to PVOs (since the eligible PVOs are the most established and therefore need less monitoring). The multi-year grant is matching in the sense that AID will pay no more than 50% of the cost of the program. It is also the newest category of grant, with only ten awarded to date. The Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation manages these matching grant relationships, although there is coordination with overseas Missions and the geographical bureaus. Current grantees (as of 10/1/79) include: YMCA, Lutheran World Relief, Institute for International Development, Technoserve, Medical Assistance Programs International, World Vision Relief Organization, Project Concern International, AITEC, Partnership for Productivity, and Save the Children Federation.

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2. Operational Program Grants (OPGs) - This program of grants, initiated in 1974, enables PVOs to carry out specific projects (new or ongoing) in individual countries (and occasionally regions). An OPG is a two-or-three year program, typically; and, like the matching grant program, it supports programs which are initiated and developed by the PVO (rather than by AID), and fully compatible with AID's legislative mandate. Normally, 25% of the cost of the project must come from non-AID sources. Typically, the AID program decisions and the monitoring of the grant relationship are carried out in the field through delegation of authority to Mission Directors. Some countries, mostly in Asia, administer a number of OPG-like programs under a structure called co-financing. Largely for administrative convenience, co-financing programs are essentially groupings of OPGs. Like the matching grant program, this program of OPGs encompasses the entire range of program areas contained in our legislative priorities. It and the matching grant program represent the most field-oriented of our grant relationships with PVOs and certainly exemplify the long-range relationship with PVOs which AID is trying to encourage. Note, however, that OPG grant relationships are usually managed somewhat more closely by AID than are matching grant programs. PVOs normally approach USAID field missions directly for OPG support. (We are currently doing a management review of the OPG program to see where policy adjustment seems appropriate.)

3. Development Program Grants (DPGs) - This program, also initiated in 1974, provides grants to PVOs who need strengthening of their ability to be effective development agencies. Covering matters like evaluation capability or program development, 39 grants were made, for a total of $26 million, from 1974 until the present. Now unavailable for any new applicants, the DPGs were an indispensable step in AID's assistance to PVOs to become effective development agencies in their own right.

The only PVOs whose DPGs have not yet terminated, but will during FY 80, are: the Salvation Army, American Institute for Free Labor Development, Accion Cultural Popular (in Colombia), the International Human Assistance Programs, the Heifer Project International IDEAS, International Educational Development, and the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction. Many of the earlier DPG recipients are now eligible for participation in the matching grant program.

4. Institutional Development Grants - To a very limited number of organizations which received DPGs, AID is making grants to complete the work started by the DPG where the performance under the DPG so justifies. In other words, although the PVO in question does not yet qualify (for either programmatic or financial reasons) for a matching grant, it is our judgment that the performance of the PVO under the DPG warrants further, though declining institutional support. We expect to make approximately twelve such grants from FY 78 through FY 81, and few if any thereafter. As in the case of the Development Program Grants, these institution-strengthening grants are being deliberately phased-out by AID, in favor of the more field-oriented matching grants and OPGs. Current grantees include: Town Affiliation Association of the U.S. (Sister Cities International), World Education, Inc., Agriculture Missions Foundation, International Eye Foundation, and Goodwill Industries of America.

5. Institutional Support Grants - There are a number of organizations, approximately twelve, which have been receiving ongoing support from AID for a considerable number of years, in some cases more than ten years. These organizations provide a unique development service overseas but, for one reason or another, are unable to raise enough money from the private sector to enable us to discontinue our broad support to the programs. Many of them, however, do have significant support from the private sector, though not enough to sustain their program at a level that we feel optimal.

Falling in this category would be the cooperative development organizations: (CLUSA, CUNA, Volunteer Development Corps, Agricultural Cooperative Development International, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association), Volunteers in Technical Assistance, International Voluntary Services, Meals for Millions. Overseas Education Fund, Opportunities Industrialization Centers International, and International Executive Service Corps.

There are also some Institutional Support Grants managed by Regional Bureaus; they currently include the labor institutes (AALC, AIFLD, AIFLI) NAPA, Africare, and the Asia Foundation.

6. Management Services Grants - A very small number of grants are awarded to PVOs which in turn provide management or program support services to other PVOs (clearinghouse, accounting assistance, evaluation, etc.). The PVO grantee has a particular competence that their colleague PVOs need. Our grant, therefore, enables the provision of that expertise at a very low cost basis to the other PVOs. This is and will remain a very limited category of grant. It now includes the Technical Assistance Information Clearing House (TAICH), the New TransCentury Foundation, and Planning Assistance, Inc., and CODEL (for training PVOs in environmental concern).

7. Consortium Grants - Also a limited category, AID makes a few grants to consortia of private and voluntary organizations. These grants enable a group of PVOs with similar interests to exchange information and program experiences and to collaborate in programs and thereby avoid duplication. Such grants also enable small amounts of grant monies to reach grass-roots projects (through the consortia or its members) that would ordinarily be impossible through the AID bilateral structure. Current grantees include: PACT, CODEL, Consortium for Community Self-Help, National Council for International Health, and Solidarios.

8. Other Grants - Particularly from the Development Support Bureau, but from some PPC offices as well, there are a number of grants to private and voluntary organizations to carry out particular technical programs in fields like family planning, health,

energy, and the like. Typically, these grants are considerably more tightly controlled and managed by AID than some of the other categories noted above. Like many of AID's grants to PVOs they tend to last for a three-year period; and they vary significantly in size. In addition, through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, grants are provided to PVOs to carry out disaster relief and rehabilitation activities; and PVOs are among the grantees under the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program.

9. Ocean Freight Reimbursement - This program, part of AID's subvention rather than grant program, reimburses PVOs for their costs in shipping equipment and commodities overseas in support of their relief and development program. Allocations are made based both on demand and on use. In FY 79 there were 33 PVO users of this program.

10. Excess U.S. Government Property - Through another subvention, excess U.S. Government property and equipment is made available to PVOs to support their program.

11. Food for Peace - Under PL 480, Title II, PVOs are a principal means by which Food for Peace commodities are distributed and used for development and humanitarian purposes. While AID is responsible for administering Title II programs, the commodities and freight costs are financed from the USDA budget. In addition, AID provides Title II outreach grants to PVOs to help them meet their logistical support costs. This program seeks to target Title II programs to reach target groups in the poorest LDCs. Only a handful of PVOs participate in the Food for Peace program.

Two final general points need to be made: All PVOs receiving grants from AID must be registered with PDC/PVC, formerly with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid; and, indirect costs are allowable in all program grants to PVOs.

Please contact this office or your Bureau's PVO Liaison Officer if you have any questions on this rundown.

Clearances:
DS/PO, MEgan (Phone)
ASIA/DP, M Snoddy (Draft)
LAC/DP, PMaguire (Draft)
NE/TECH, AGooch (Draft)
AFR/HA, SSiegel (Draft)
AFR/HA, DParker (Draft)
AA/PDC, CHRaullerson

cc: PPC/RB, KPoe (Draft)
AA/AFR, GButcher
AA/LAC, ECoy
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AA/ASIA, JSullivan

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ATTACHMENT #1 PES 521-79-11(S)
Special Eval. Food Aid and LIRD

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FOOD AID
and the problem of
LABOR INTENSIVE RURAL DEVELOPMENT

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INTRODUCTION

In keeping with the scope of work mandating this study, this report seeks to identify problems and clarify issues commonly raised in the use of food aid, labor-intensive approaches to public works and community development. An underlying premise of the study assumes that certain material resources are readily available to private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and USAID projects, in accord with the Congressional mandate. These resources include food for work through Title II of PL 480, cash resources and other forms of material aid.

The evaluation takes into account a number of commonly stated objectives for community works programs, objectives which vary in focus and methods of implementation according to the agency. These include the following:

A. Creation of employment.
B. Building low cost infrastructures of benefit to rural poor.
C. Redistribution of resources to the benefit of rural poor.
D. Providing incentive for voluntary labor, independent initiative at the grass roots level, and the community council movement.
E. Improving nutrition and providing relief to food deficit situations.

In August and September of 1979 the team of three researchers, an anthropologist, an economist and an engineer, visited four field sites for periods of approximately one week at each site. The time in the field was characterized primarily by group interviews with agency personnel, government employees, community council officers and project workers. The group also made it a point to visit local markets, checking prices, origins and range of produce available.

In addition, the anthropologist conducted personal interviews with project workers, agricultural wage laborers, local peasant farmers, community council members and a broad spectrum of buyers and sellers in the market places. (See Appendix I for further information on data and a sample of questions addressed to food workers.)

The interdisciplinary and group character of this investigation lends a certain interest to the undertaking. It also imposes a built-in limitation to the range and depth of anthropological reporting. The time frame imposes further limitations to securing and verifying data. Furthermore, the

evaluation is undertaken in the wake of conflicting agendas within the Mission and collaborating PVOs, and at a time of heated debate regarding the question of food aid. Such debate can only be healthy. In this light, the on-site visits upon which this report is based provide useful information pertinent to issues raised in using food for work.

This report is divided into two sections. The first is a summary-discussion of key issues emerging out of the site visits and the debate over the effects of food aid. The second section provides detailed discussion of the four sites, including descriptions of the communities, agencies, projects and community organizations.

The first section is divided into three parts. The first part deals with economics of food aid in Haiti from both a national perspective and peasant economic perspective. This discussion confronts the question of food aid as disincentive to agriculture, approaching the issue from the standpoint of peasants as producers as well as consumers, and in light of the availability of PL 480 commodities in the marketplace. The second part deals with problems of management, comparing the use of cash versus food payment, taking into account the prevailing market wages for agricultural labor in peasant communities. It also mentions briefly the issue of using food aid for "relief" versus "development". The third part discusses the issue of food aid in relation to grass roots community organizations in Haiti, especially the community council movement. Finally, there is a closing discussion of conclusions and recommendations.

Editor's Note: A preliminary draft of this report was reviewed in November 1979 by representatives of CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service/Service Chrétien d'Haiti, Harmonisation de l'Action des Communautés Haitiennes Organisées (HACHO), and the U.S. AID Mission. Any actual errors brought to the editor's attention have since been corrected. Final responsibility for this document, however, rests with the authors.

ECONOMICS OF FOOD AID AND THE QUESTION OF DISINCENTIVE

Peasants as producers. Beginning in the 1970s the value of imported food products has been growing fast in Haiti. The dollar amount doubled between 1970 and 1973 and more than doubled again between 1963 and 1976. By 1976, food imports accounted for 16 percent of domestic consumption (World Bank Report 1978, 10). Despite this growth in imported food, the pressure of growing demand was such that food prices were rising at more or less the same pace as the consumer price index for Port-au-Prince in 1977. During this period of rising commercial food imports, food aid was also going up at a substantial pace, especially in the case of cereal grains. As a result, commercial imports of cereals dropped from around 90% of total cereal imports in 1973 to around 84% in 1977 as can be seen in the following table

	Table I	Imports of Grains-Thousand of M/Tons			
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Commercial Imports/Grains	42.3	30.8	81.2	109	147
Food Aid/Grains	4.3	3.7	9.1	22.6	26.6
Total Cereal Imports	46.6	34.5	90.3	132	174
Commercial as % Total	90	89	89	82	84
	Source:	Unpublished WFP data			

The growing importation of grain reflects the structural inadequacy of Haitian agriculture, as presently constituted, to supply the domestic market. At the same time, grain prices on the world market have been generally lower than the domestic market since 1974. As a consequence it is feared that growing imports may have a disincentive impact on domestic food production. The argument is relevant to the question of food aid. From the standpoint of Haiti's national economy, several key points can be made regarding the possible disincentive effects of food aid, especially food for work.

1) Rising cereal imports on both a commercial and concessionary basis have not prevented rising, if erratic, prices for domestic cereals, as is evident in the following table:

Table II Yearly Index of Grain Prices - Port-au-Prince

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	Jan. 1978
Corn	100	93	134	102	141	91
Sorghum	100	101	118	-	95	70
Rice	100	94	125	118	130	93

Source: Table 12 - World Bank Report, 16.

In his study of the marketing system of Haitian agricultural products, Roe (1978) demonstrated that regional price differentials are largely explained by transportation costs. There is little reason to doubt that price trends in Port-au-Prince tend to reflect national ones since peasant farmers participate in the national market. It appears then that cereal imports may have only slightly moderated the general tendency toward higher food prices. (See Appendix II for actual average retail prices in Port-au-Prince for corn and rice between 1973 and 1979, and a comparison with world market prices.)

2) Commercial imports clearly supply the bulk of food imports. Furthermore, food for work programs have generally accounted for only a third of all aid, according to the WFP data. Preliminary data for 1977 - 1978 indicate that food for work programs jumped to 57 percent of total food aid, but this appears to be a temporary increase related to local drought conditions.

Turning to the American Title II program of PL 480, food for work accounted for only 26 percent of total food aid recipients in Fiscal Year 1978, equivalent to 37 percent of total aid in terms of dollar value (see Appendix III for data on PL 480 imports and the voluntary agencies). Between 1977 and 1980 the food for work program expanded and then contracted in keeping with local food deficits related to drought. Taking into account projections for 1981, the five year period since 1977 shows an overall increase of food for work amounting to about 6 percent. In short, not only is food aid relatively small compared to commercial imports, but food for work itself is far from the bulk of food aid imports. At the national level, any significant disincentive effect assigned to food for work would tend to exaggerate its impact on domestic production. At the local level, however, there may well be food for work impact on prices, especially in circumscribed areas of heavy relief programming.

3) In the face of fluctuating market prices for various crops, peasant farmers modify their cropping patterns. In spite of the rise in coffee prices on the world market, the relative price ratios for peasant farmers seem to be shifting away from the export cash crop in favor of foodstuffs, especially grain. Cotton, sugar cane and even coffee production may have been affected by the shift, with corn being a prime beneficiary (World Bank, 17; cf. Zuvekas 1978, 16 - 18).

There are limits to crop substitution. Many peasant households already have land, labor and capital resources strained to the breaking point, suffering an absolute food deficit with little grounds for maneuver in regards to increased food production. Another strategy is one of "belt tightening" --- reducing consumption in relation to limitations on household production.

Peasant households have cash needs as well as food needs. Even if increased quantities of food crops are grown, the increase is not necessarily available, as food, to the household producing it. Furthermore, increased food cropping tends toward increased erosion of scarce soil and water resources. Under the present economic regime, peasants facing food and income scarcity often seek employment as a means of supplementing the household economy. They also express interest in cheaper food prices as consumers. Food for work provides employment. It also makes grain available on the market, though somewhat indirectly.

<u>Peasants as Consumers</u>. Any discussion of food aid must take into account the availability of PL 480 in the marketplace. In the Haitian context, American definitions of what is corrupt do not explain this phenomenon, despite written strictures on every PL 480 container that the food is not to be sold or exchanged. The following points pertain:

1) The commodities are distributed as payment for work.
2) Peasant workers customarily consume a portion and sell a portion, depending on their needs, even as they are wont to do with their own grain crops.
3) Marketing intermediaries purchase these commodities for resale in the marketplace.
4) Peasants and townspeople purchase PL 480 items for their own consumption.

5) Theft and corruption account for some food in the market, but the bulk of it appears to be associated with legitimate distribution to workers.

6) It appears that commodities distributed to workers are sold in countr markets, and purchased by rural folk, rather than automatically being shipped to Port-au-Prince or other urban markets. At the same time, there is a national market for bulgar wheat, even as there is for domestic gr ns, and the effect of wheat on prices is worked through the national market network. In contrast to peasant workers, skilled workers who are paid in food tend to sell in greater volume and in urban as well as rural markets.

Although commodities may be distributed as "encouragement" for "relief" work from the viewpoint of the donors, they are considered wages by the recipients -- wages in the form of kind rather than cash. As a grain commodity, bulgar wheat is treated in much the same way as indigenous grain crops are treated.

In any household peasant economy, grains such as corn and millet are produced for consumption and also for sale - a means of raising scarce cash for other consumer needs. The period of greatest sale is at the time of harvest, a time when the price is also lowest. When the domestic supply of grain is exhausted, the household either substitutes other household food crops for its own consumption, such as tubers, or else purchases grain on the open market. At this point the purchase price is invariably higher than the harvest sale price. It is highest of all during the planting season when supply is limited and demand is up for seed grain as well as consumption in the form of food. In short, prices fluctuate considerably within the annual cycle of the seasons. As a corollary, peasant farmers are both producers and consumers of foodstuffs.

Poorer peasant farmers, perhaps the majority, are unable to store grain from one season to another for their own consumption, let alone for speculative purposes and commerce. At the same time, when the harvest is good, there is household grain storage, as evidenced in granaries such as the kolombyé of the Plateau Central or the roof and tree storage characteristic of corn growing regions. Even when a household can afford some grain storage, it is more often than not an inadequate seasonal supply, at best permitting the household to

profit from rising prices for a time as the season progresses - if there is a surplus remaining above consumption needs.

In the end, whether peasants are in fact net producers or net consumers is an open question and varies with the household and the locality. There is considerable variation, for example, in the degree of monetization of any household's economy. Some peasant households depend far more on subsistence cropping than others. The area around Furcy and Obleron, for example, appears to be highly monetized and less oriented to subsistence than other areas such as La Gonave or Terre Neuve. All peasant households participate in the money economy;however, the level of participation varies with the season, the class characteristics of individual households, and the economic character of different regions

In this context, small peasant producers and peasant-workers demonstrate a market interest, as consumers, in the market availability of bulgar wheat and oil, especially in a situation of grain scarcity, seasonal variation in supply, and high food prices.

The availability of bulgar wheat in the market follows certain patterns:

1) It is generally available. All markets visited in this evaluation had bulgar wheat for sale, even in Fond des Negres where the road project was using cash payment rather than food for work. PL 480 oil, CSM and cornmeal were also on the market but in less volume than wheat.

2) The presence of PL 480 commodities in local markets is strongly linked to local food distribution in food for work projects. This factor would surely be modified during the school year when portions of school lunch allocations are marketed (Aside from outright corruption, bulgar is sometimes sold to cover other costs of operating a school canteen.) Market supplies observed in this evaluation could generally be traced to specific project sources.

3) Market intermediaries effectively provide wheat supplies to markets more distant, in accord with local demand. Larger country markets may have wheat available from Port-au-Prince, as in the case of the Fond des Nègres market. Commercial wheat merchants have reportedly imported large quantities of PL 480 wheat into La Gonave and the

Nord-Ouest during times of grain deficit. In other words, given a supply that exceeds local demand, wheat enters the pipeline of the national market along side other grains such as corn, millet and rice. The presence of a national market is suggested in the relative prices of wheat and other grains in widely dispersed market places during the same time frame (see table below). The seasonal price variation of wheat appears to vary from 20 gourdes to 38 gourdes per 50 pound bag of wheat. Currently, wheat retails at the equivalent of around 8

Table III. Grain Prices in Various Haitian Markets, in gourdes

	Fond des Nègres		Kenscoff		La Gonave		Terre Neuve
	Bidouz 8-6-79	F des N 8-7-79	8-14-79	9-15-79	Ti Palmist 8-21-79	Palma -22-79	9-7-79
Corn	3.00	2.75	2.50-3.00	3.50	3.00-3.50	3.00	3.00-4.20
Bulgar wheat	4.50	4.00	4.00-5.00	5.00	3.50-4.00	3.50	4.50
Millet	3.50	4.00	5.00	5.50	3.00-4.00	4.00	3.00
Rice	----	7.50 13.00	8.00	8.50 12.00	9.00-12.50	9.00	7.20- 9.60

dollars per bag, wholesaling at 6 or 7 dollars per bag. Pricing suggests that wheat is not being sold at a discount nor is it undercutting local grains. It consistently sells at less than the cost of rice, but it is not generally perceived as being a substitute for rice.

4) The price of wheat clearly varies with supply and demand. Large distributions bring lower prices in their wake, smaller distributions bring higher prices. The price rises as time elapses following distribution, and according to the season.

5) The price appears to be affected by the relative prices of other grains. Some informants report that a good corn harvest brings down the cost of wheat. Likewise, it is conceivable that large scale dumping of wheat could affect the price of corn, although relative volumes of grain, in the market places observed, clearly favored indigenous grains.

6) Another factor in pricing is the question of palatability. There is clearly less consumer demand for PL 480 cornmeal, CSM (Corn-soya-milk), and WSB (wheat-soya blend) than wheat and oil. The cornmeal and CSM allegedly cause diarrhea and are less satisfying to Haitians in terms

of taste and texture. Both CSM and cornmeal are sold at lower prices than indigenous grains. Foreign cornmeal reportedly sold at about 3/5s the price of local cornmeal in Fond des Nègres during the food for work road project. WSB is given out at the rate of 2 bags for 1 bag of wheat in the Kenscoff project, indicating the relative values in terms of local demand. CSM is sometimes cooked as a porridge or used in place of flour for soup dumplings. Some people do not like wheat, but it appears to be generally acceptable if cooked in a fashion similar to traditional ways of cooking millet or rice. It does not have a high status value in contrast to other foreign food imports -- especially processed and canned items. Traditional millet eaters on La Gonave prefer millet to wheat, unless the price of wheat is advantageous at times of grain scarcity. Rice is generally considered the luxury grain and it is the highest priced of all grains regularly available in the market.

MANAGEMENT

If food aid responds, at least in the short run, to the interest of peasant consumers at a time of food shortage and high grain prices, it also serves as an effective means of recruiting labor. The use of that labor is another question, posing certain problems related to doing "relief" versus doing "development".

Labor intensive work: cash versus food. The issue of labor recruitment raises a number of points:

1) Payment in either cash or kind is acceptable to peasant workers. The primary consideration as regards mode of payment is the value of the wage. Traditional patterns of peasant agriculture incorporate non-cash forms of payment as well as cash. Payment in food commodities is not, in and of itself, either demeaning or without precedent. All other things being equal, however, there is a preference for cash since it is already in the convenient form of common currency. The notion that food payment is "demeaning" seems to be an urban idea not expressed by peasant workers.

2) Peasant workers generally consider food for work a straight wage rather than "incentive" or "encouragement". In no case in this evaluation were food payments less in value than local wages for agricultural labor, as is evident in the following table:

Table IV. Prevailing wages for agricultural labor, cash equivalence of food for work at local market rates, half-day unit, in gourdes.

	Agricultural Wage Labor	Food for Work Equivalence
Fond des Nègres	2.00	(cash payment - 3.25)
Kenscoff - Furcy	3.00	3.35
La Gonave	2.00	2.80
Terre Neuve	2.00	4.00

As is evident, food for work wages converted to cash work out to be higher than the prevailing agricultural wage. Furthermore all food for work projects shown in the table use the principle of worker rotation. All are underway during the slack season for agricultural wage labor.

3) Both cash and food payments shown above lend themselves to the possibility for "corruption" given the difference between the going rate and the agency ration or wage. That is, it is economically feasible to pay a fee in order to get the job, as indeed has been reported in the case of both Fond des Nègres (cash) and La Gonave (food ration).

4) Food appears to be more readily available than money, personnel or other inputs administered in the PVO programs.

5) Problems of delayed payment are common to both cash and food payment, affecting morale and work efficiency. In both cases workers may go into debt pending payments due.

6) Food for work appears to be somewhat more democratically administered than the cash paid work project observed: Workers are rotated, workers are local; whereas, in Fond des Nègres the workers are primarily from areas not served by the road at its present stage of construction, nor are they rotated, yet they are paid a high wage. The degree of corruption appears to be greater with money than with food, given the higher salaries and administration by strangers.

7) Both food and cash projects may lend themselves to building a job patronage system for supervisor or community council president. Councils sometimes employ people outside of council membership. Workers may well have no vested interest in the work project apart from employment.

8) Project workers are generally peasant farmers with their own gardens. Most have some land. A large number do agricultural wage labor in addition to their own peasant farming. None of those observed depend primarily on the work projects for their livelihood except in the case of cash payments in Fond des Nègres where wages are high enough to attract strangers to the area. The economic class of the cash laborers is also generally higher than other projects except for the Kenscoff road project which pays a high food ration. It appears that jobs at higher wages tend to be less available to poor members of the community than less lucrative employment.

9) Actual food rations vary considerably as do length of workdays among the PVO work projects. The usual food for work day is 4 hours, 5 days a week, but the Kenscoff road project works 6-day weeks and 8-hour workdays. CRS generally gives about 5 lbs. of food as compared to 3 lbs. used by other agencies for a half day's work. The "contract" system, setting work goals for payment rather than simple man-days, commonly has the effect of boosting the daily pay rate, equivalent in Terre Neuve to the legal minimum wage (8 gourdes), a rate even higher than the cash wage paid in Fond des Nègres (6.50 g.). See Appendix IV for a set of standards used by HACHO and CARE to set up work contracts for food wages, transforming the man-day unit into a projected amount of work to be accomplished. All agencies are presently using some form of contract arrangement for some project.

10) CARE, HACHO and CRS also make food available at the going market rates for skilled labor- a much higher daily payment than road workers. In some cases the contract system is also used for skilled workers, e.g., masons.

11) Since the Haitian market price for bulgar is known, one can compare it with the landed cost of the same bag to the American tax payer, and this in turn can be used to compare the relative cost of doing a job by using food for work versus cash for work. In May 1979, the estimated price of SFB to the U.S. Government was $.1017 per pound in a Gulf Port (New Orleans). This is equivalent to a price of $5.085 per 50 pound bag. Assuming that freight, insurance, loading and storage amount to 25% of this price, it would mean that the cost in Haiti would be $6.35. Thus if bulgar is being sold at 7 or 8 dollars per bag in the Haitian market, the US government is getting more for its money than it paid. The reverse happens when bulgar is sold as low as 4 dollars per bag. It is not clear how much of the wheat is sold at the higher price though the prevailing price for wheat during this evaluation ranged from about 6 dollars on La Gonave, a high distribution area, to 8.50 dollars retailed in Kenscoff, with 7.00 dollars being the most common wholesale price encountered. In terms of cost, it obviously would be cheaper to use cash when the price drops.

Internal transportation and storage costs are not included in the figure above. These costs are often borne by community councils. If the cost of transportation between Gonaives and Terre Neuve is included, for example, the cost per bag in Terre Neuve comes up to 7 dollars, the going market rate.

Using this data allows cost comparison with food versus cash payment on road construction, for example, in Terre Neuve or Fond des Nègres. Both cases assume that a 60 man crew works 20 days per month. At the rate of 1.30 dollars a day used by the PPC project, the cost of 1,200 man/days comes to $1,560 in cash. Using CARE's daily ration for a 4-hour day (3 lbs. of SFB, .23 lbs of oil), the total dollar cost of food payment comes to $647.50 for 1,200 man/days, or $1,295 for double rations (8 hour day), about 16 percent cheaper than the cost in cash wages. The comparison for road work in Fond des Nègres assumes the same productivity, an assumption that is not unreasonable in light of this team's site visit to that road. If the legal minimum wage of 1.60 dollars/day were used in this calculation, the cash alternative would be that much more expensive.

Based on a rough evaluation of road work observed in several sites, the 1,200 man/days should be worth about 400 meters of rudimantary road. Using CARE's scale for contracting (Appendix IV), the same food for work should be worth 43,632 square meters of reforestation, 500 cubic meters of masonry, 1,200 cubic meters of excavation, or 400 cubic meters of building materials transported a distance of 10 kilometers.

Relief versus development. Administration of food aid via work projects and community councils commonly seems to be caught in a bind between doing "relief" or "development" -- or attempting to do both. The tendency is for performance criteria to differ according to which goal is paramount. A key factor seems to be the relatively greater availability of food in comparison to other program inputs.

A strict orientation to development suggests the use of specialized workers, adequate tools, worker training, close management, and the creation of structures with a direct economic impact. In contrast to criteria of efficiency and economy, relief goals are more oriented to distributing large amounts of food in an orderly fashion, greater emphasis on the magnitude of employment than the nature of the work, less emphasis on technical proficiency

and generally less emphasis on the nature of the asset being created. A problem in the relief goal is the duration of projects. For example, food was given for road construction in Fond des Nègres during a 4 year period resulting in about 6 kilometers of rudimentary road. With many false starts, crews worked for a time and then left for a new road trace. Local community councils clearly had no incentive to get the job done quickly. On La Gonave there are some 300 kilometers of roads built on an island with 7 church and agency vehicles. In Terre Neuve, councils have repeatedly worked on the same road and the area is still not served by commercial transportation.

The relief focus tends to take community councils for granted as satisfactory grass roots channels for food distribution without due regard for the particularities of their relationships to community. On the other hand, it is clear that there are few alternatives in terms of existing institutional structures in rural Haiti, particularly for doing relief. The other structure readily available is of course the market network which becomes incorporated into the relief structure in any case, as it presently stands.

In a sense, relief is cheaper to administer than development efforts geared to expanding production. As long as community councils are the primary channels for relief-work projects, a smaller agency administration is able to distribute larger amounts of food. On the other hand, food aid as presently constituted is politically conservative, tending to underwrite existing hierarchies. Whoever controls distribution of jobs and wages is in a position of power via patronage and unequal access to goods. More important, the food for work focus of many councils tends to divert attention away from the serious business of grass roots peasant organization and economic alternatives. Generally, councils exert relatively little pressure on the government apparatus for increased public services, incremental reforms or major re-alignment of basic institutions.

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COMMUNITY COUNCILS AND FOOD AID

From the standpoint of the general character of rural Haitian society, the community council movement is subject to unusual stresses and strains. Councils are not of course indigenous organizations in the sense that they arise "naturally" out of the peasant milieu. They are alien by definition, for not only do community councils not traditionally exist in rural Haiti, but the very notion of "community" does not and has apparently never existed for a variety of historical reasons.

Relationships of local solidarity revolve less around the abstraction of "community" than highly personal ties and obligations, kinship and patron-client relationships more characteristic of rural Haiti. In other words, factions exist where communities do not. Hence, community councils are subject to factionalism, splits and charges of inequity. Having said this, there are local community councils which apparently function smoothly and in the interest of their members. Such small groups may well be representative of a "faction" in a local area rather than a "community". In some cases, larger groups maintain group discipline and provision of services to members under the auspices of strong authoritarian leadership. Such groups are based less on democratic participation as equals than personal loyalties and client relations to a strong leader. Neither variation is based on the common identity of its members in "community".

A number of work arrangements are used by community councils, not all of which involve food for work. These include the following:

--voluntary labor ("bay konkou") with no expectation of pay.

--cash wages.

--food wages.

--"encouragement": This pattern more closely resembles a traditional work party, or koumbit, where people are fed on the spot while engaged in a group work project. The difference from a koumbit rests in the fact that the work party doesn't depend on the largesse of an individual host but rather is a group endeavor underwritten by the group.

In the context of these work patterns, the following points seem to pertain:

1) Food for work is generally used as a form of wage payment-in-kind at a rate somewhat higher than the prevailing agricultural wage but usually, though not always, less than the legal minimum wage. Food aid is less often used as a true "encouragement".

2) Food for work is commonly a point of conflict at the level of community council, a problem having to do with job patronage and special access to scarce resources. There is a problem of distribution. This problem is not inherent to food for work. It is a potential problem wherever goods or jobs are distributed by formally organized community movements in rural Haiti. The problem characteristically arises whenever council leaders have special resources at their disposition, whether the origin of these resources is from within (e.g., dues) or without (e.g., food for work, or jobs).

3) Councils are often formed with a view to qualifying for food aid through work projects. (The same allegation has been made in relation to certain rural schools created with a view to qualifying for school lunch programs through Title II programming) Councils whose identity is linked to food aid tend to disappear when food aid is withdrawn.

4) More often than not, workers appear to have less vested interest in the asset created by a work project than the wages distributed for work. It is not uncommon to find councils employing food workers beyond the number of members belonging to the council. The possibility of food for work projects, and employment, is sometimes used to attract members in order to raise a larger treasury through increased dues, dues derived ultimately from food wages.

5) Food aid projects appear to be most effective when workers have a personal vested interest in the asset created. Water projects undertaken on La Gonave with the benefit of food aid led to other water projects undertaken voluntarily and without the hope of food aid.

6) Council leaders have a number of vested interests in holding office including prestige, special access to the council treasury, special access to food both as a base for job patronage and in terms of wage distribution, special access to agricultural labor for personal use--the perquisites of office.

7) Access to food for work constitutes a source of power by definition. Corruption in the field is most likely at the level of animateurs, project foremen (agency employees) and community council presidents.

8) "Contract" approaches to food for work are a feasible solution to problems of efficiency and control, but they are only as effective as their administration and technical support.

9) Councils cover the cost of food aid transportation through cash dues payment on the part of workers, sale of a portion of the food, or by payment in food itself.

10) Food for work is commonly used as a lever for raising scarce cash for the council treasury. This is also the case where cash for work approaches have been used with community councils, as in La Vallee and Dubreuil. In both cases, the opportunity is inherent in work payment at above-market wages.

11) The most common organizational model for community councils seems to be hierarchical, authoritarian and dominated by a person or central committee.

12) It appears that the majority of councils receiving food for work are in effect agents for outside agencies. Some fall apart when food aid is withdrawn. Some are subject to "elections officielles" and the control of town politicians and factions. Field animateurs recognize the need for relief work but are generally skeptical of the use of food aid as an incentive to local initiative and truly voluntary labor. Animateurs' estimates range from 10 to 25 percent of councils which function satisfactorily in terms of genuine local initiative. The animateurs indicate that councils further removed from town politicians, exterior forms of aid, and agencies are more likely to function along the lines of voluntary labor for projects of vested interest to members.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the long run it is important to recognize the limitations built into the community council movement. At the present time councils provide an institutional network for doing relief in tandem with the PVOs. The only other institution for channeling relief, at present, seems to be the market network which offers its own series of constraints. Regardless of how they function, community councils have the virtue of being dispersed throughout much of rural Haiti. As presently constituted, however, they are unlikely to serve as the institutional basis for authentic rural development.

Like community councils, food aid does not represent a long term solution to Haiti's rural masses. At best it serves as a stopgap measure. To the degree that it fosters longer term dependency, it should be curtailed. To the degree that it is available in the context of drought, famine and disaster relief, it can render a valuable service. In the context of rapidly rising food prices, it can potentially play a useful role in price stabilization. In the context of inadequate domestic food production, it should be used pointedly as an invest ment in agriculture and related economic endeavors. From the standpoint of the interests of most Haitian peasants "food first" strategies can only make good sense.

Management of food aid poses certain problems. As a program factor, food commodities appear to be more readily available than technical support and administrative control. The PVOs in Haiti are cognizant of these problems and have taken steps to tighten food for work administration, as evidenced in the growing use of labor "contracts" rather than simple daily labor arrangements. On the basis of PVO experience and the problems observed in this evaluation, the following guidlines seem to be pertinent:

1) Food for work projects should be time limited. Relief-oriented project should take into account slack seasons for agricultural labor and seasonal variations in the price of grain.

2) Small work teams seem to lend themselves to greater efficiency and less opportunity for abuse than massive road projects and large scale food distribution.

3) Delays and irregular payments seem to increase the opportunities for administrative corruption and worker vulnerability to usurious loans.

4) Ideally, projects should be supported where workers have an intrinsic vested interest in the project as asset, aside from the employment opportunity.

5) "Contract" work patterns make good sense in light of agency goals of efficiency as well as traditional patterns of work. There is the potential for abuse, however, in paying out food commodities to highly paid skilled workers and urban-based personnel temporarily assigned to rural-based projects. It appears that this practice is a way of supplementing agency budgets short of financial resources.

6) If peasant workers are involved in projects where they have a personal vested interest, it may make sense to use food commodities in the form of a cooked meal served at the workplace rather than wage rations. This assumes that the project is not set up primarily for relief-employment. On the other hand, if the project is truly a product of local initiative and worker interest, the provision of food aid may well constitute unnecessary outside intervention. The key point should be to respond flexibly to the situation which is only possible with adequate personnel doing field animation.

7) Used as investment; food resources might best be combined with other inputs such as cash, materials and technical personnel. Funding agencies such as USAID could well make available the additional resources needed to back up food aid programming where PVOs have need. It would not be wise, however, for PVO programs to expand beyond their capacity to absorb such inputs, for the advantage of PVOs rests, at least in part, in their manageable and tangible presence in the field.

8) If food for work continues to be sold on the Haitian market, the relative prices of PL 480 commodities might well be monitored along with other foodstuffs. Close attention should be paid to the possible detrimental effects of concessionary food imports, given changes in the market.

9) Further research in the area of food aid might well examine with greater depth the market effects of imported commodities in relatively circumscribed areas of relief programming, such as La Gonave or the Nord-Ouest. Seasonal variations and the peculiarities of long running food for work projects may reveal characteristics not observed in the present evaluation.

10) Further study and comparison might be made of programs oriented to self-sustaining economic ventures, such as the project in Kenscoff, and those oriented more to relief and services, such as the agency program in Terre Neuve

11) Further inquiry might be made into the origins and history of the community council movement, the range and variation of existing councils, and alternatives relative to the formation of dynamic peasant collectivities.

12) Further inquiry might also be made into the peasant household as an economic unit, varying degrees of monetization and its effects on economic decision-making--all with a view to using food resources and other inputs more effectively and in the essential interests of peasant farm units rather than the convenience of outside agencies.

13) As is evident in the case studies which follow, there is a certain dilemma to doing food aid in Haiti. Outside aid tends almost by definition to work at cross purposes to goals of local initiative and self-sufficiency. At the same time there is a certain inescapable argument favoring the transfer of food surpluses to people confronted with food deficit. The resolution of this dissonance ultimately lies in the emergence of peasant institutions politically capable of accomodating such transfers in keeping with the economic interests of peasant smallholders.

SECTION B. FOUR CASE STUDIES

Fond des Negres

Kenscoff

La Gonave

Terre Neuve

FOND DES NEGRES - AUGUST 1979

Feeder road. This site was chosen primarily with a view to examining a labor-intensive road project based on cash payment of daily wages. Secondly, the road provides an unusual opportunity to contrast earlier construction efforts using food for work via community councils, and current labor gangs paid in cash and without affiliation to local organizations.

The Virgile-l'Asile feeder road is one of the Damian-PPC coffee penetration roads funded through USAID and linked to national efforts to expand coffee production. The road project is subject to minimal supervision by the director of the DARNDR Coffee Center located in the region, on the main road south. Another Coffee Center exists in Changieux, beyond l'Asile. The 17 kilomenter feeder road is linked at Fond des Nègres to the main national road to Cayes, and at the other end to the Vieux Bourg d'Aquin-l'Asile road which feeds into the Route du Sud at Vieux Bourg, as well as into the l'Asile-Changieux-Cavaillon area in the other direction. In effect, the road opens up vehicle access to a highland plateau in the interior of the southern peninsula -- an area never before served by vehicle roads.

Markets. A lively network of country markets exists in the area, a pattern closely observed by anthropologist Sidney Mintz in the late 1950s. The "town" of Fond des Nègres, located just off the Route du Sud, is in fact a section rurale where a settlement has built up around a very important regional market, effectively linking local peasant producers, internal country markets and the larger urban markets of Port-au-Prince. In terms of distance, the peasant farmers in this area are much closer to Les Cayes, the southern metropole; but in terms of movement and markets, as both producers and consumers, the people of the area are much more closely tied to Port-au-Prince. As a result of the road, two country markets -- the Marché Bidoux in Moinasson, and the Marché Birel in Bouzi -- are accessible by vehicle to Fond des Nègres and the main thoroughfare to Port-au-Prince. In addition, the road potentially facilitates traffic to and from the l'Asile market at the other end of the road.

In visits to the local markets, it was determined that locally grown grains and foodstuffs of various kinds were available. In addition, grains

from other regional towns were present, including Miragoane, l'Asile, Vieux Bourg, Petite Goave and Cavaillon. A large amount of produce and spices came from Port-au-Prince markets. PL 480 type bulgar wheat was present, purchased in Vieux Bourg (neighboring town) and Port-au-Prince. It was later determined that wheat was being distributed in a school construction program in Vieux Bourg, accounting for the local availability of wheat. The wheat purchased in Port-au-Prince for re-sale locally suggests the presence of local consumer demand for the commodity in the context of a national market network. At the time of this August visit wheat was more expensive than cornmeal, about the same price as millet, and considerably cheaper than the cheapest rice. In contrast to the large Fond des Nègres market, very little wheat was available in the country market of Bidouz, and none from Port-au-Prince sources.

Emigration. One striking feature of the area is evidence of considerable out-migration to French Caribbean possessions. Earlier generations of workers from this area went to Cuba. The scale of migration is unclear, but migration to French Guiana and St. Martin has reportedly been increasing since the mid-1960s. It is reported that moneylenders in the area readily finance such migration at rates of 100 percent interest, at a cost of around twelve hundred dollars per migrant to French Guiana.

In recent years the Virgile-l'Asile road shows clear evidence of return migration and cash remittances. Between Virgile and Moinsson a number of houses have been erected with construction styles and color patterns not traditional to the area and not readily apparent in neighborhoods more distant from the new roadway. In short, there is evidence of an active and inflating land market in the area linked, among other factors, to the existence of the new road and cash remittances from abroad.

Agriculture. Some coffee is grown in the area, but the plateau region is not traditionally a major coffee producing area. Existing coffee production suffered severe losses after the 1963 hurricane. Fond des Nègres has three major coffee buyers -- one cooperative, and two private speculators who reportedly sell to an exporter in Petite Goave. The plateau area is devoted far less to coffee than to grain as primary cash crops.

Corn (3½ month variety) and millet (5 month) are characteristically intercropped with millet being of primary importance. Several varieties of beans are commonly grown in conjunction with corn and millet. Some rice and taro are produced in wetland zones. The mountains surrounding the flatland plateau produce yams, sweet potatoes and a variety of bean crops as well as grains.

The area is notably rich in fruit bearing trees, including plantains, oranges, grapefruit, and avocados. There appear to be considerable stands of hard and soft woods. In terms of outward appearances, the region presents an image of considerable agricultural potential, relatively high average rainfall and an unusual degree of forest cover in comparison with many other regions of Haiti. There is good evidence that opening the road has tended to decrease the forest cover, a problem tied to the commerce in wood and charcoal. On the other hand, the road has tended to open up the marketing of fruit, a bulky and perishable type of produce less easily marketed by animal transport than by truck.

There appears to be a very active market for agricultural wage labor in the form of eskouad, labor gangs generally varying from 5 to 15 people. Women are hired for certain tasks at nearly half the price of men. It appears that the cost of labor has nearly doubled since 1974. In discussing this issue, local farmers relate the rapid rise in labor costs to the sky-rocketing prices of grain during the same time period. They also mention increased labor demand based on cash remittances and agricultural investment on the part of local migrants to French Guyana. Labor demand seems to be particularly high in the fertile lower reaches of the plateau. Many agricultural workers come down from the mountains to work in the lower flatlands. As these laborers pass by on the path, it is said that they are going to Guyana, in this case a metaphor for local wage labor taking the workers far afield.

Jurisdictions and fragmentation. The apparent geographical unity of the area surrounding the road -- a plateau surrounded by mountains -- is not reflected in the government jurisdictions administering the area. Fond des Nègres itself is a section rurale of the commune of Miragoane. Various sections of the road are administered by other sections rurales of Miragoane

as well as the communes of Aquin, l'Asile and Anse à Veau. The people living in the latter jurisdiction are so far removed from the town that they may well choose to misrepresent the actual location of their domicile in order to avoid the arduous trip for such official matters as registering the birth of a child. Such administrative fragmentation tends to further exaggerate the natural diversity of interests represented by people in the mountains versus people in the lowlands, dispersed settlement versus town and village, and the changing direction of traffic along the road in accord with geography and market networks.

Road and project history. The upper end of the road is more oriented to the commune of l'Asile, while the middle and lower reaches are oriented to the little country town of Bouzi (seat of parish, resident priest) closer to Fond des Nègres. Community council road projects and the support of local vehicle owners reflect these interests. The Damien road crews currently working on the road are located in the direction of Morne Okeau and the commune of l'Asile. At present they do no road maintenance in the middle and lower reaches.

The latter portions of the road divided into three sections, by consensus, for the purposes of maintenance - the primary goal of maintenance being simply to keep the road open to traffic. Two maintenance sections are the responsibility of the Comité Communautaire of Bouzi: the area closest to this small town, and the beginning of the road at Virgile, close to Fond des Nègres. The middle section, Montauban, is maintained by a trucker who lives along the road and provides commercial transport in and out of the area. This trucker occasionally hires laborers at prevailing local wages for agricultural labor to work on the road.

While an important artery for pedestrian traffic and beasts of burden, the road has been made accessible to motor vehicles only in recent times. Early efforts to make the road passable by jeep seem to be tied to initiatives by the parish priests of Bouzi and l'Asile, support from Protestant clergy and laity, and the formation of several community councils. The priest of Bouzi expressed interest in opening up the Bouzi market to vehicles and in gaining access to the parish church and rectory by jeep. The trucker from Montauban has long been established in the area and helped

in road construction at an early date

The bulk or road work between 1974 and 1978 was organized through community councils with the benefit of food for work. For around 8 months, from September 1977 to May 1978, the project was supported by both food for work and the PPC coffee project. When this was discovered by an SCH inspector, food for work support was cut off.

The construction of a 5 meter road was started in 1974 through two distinct local initiatives. The first one was the initiative of the priest from the locality of Bouzi who helped to form a community council.

At the other end, in Moinsson, a local community council was already active, having built a school by initially raising a total of $65 from local people. The money was used to buy ½ of a carreau and more funds were raised to finance the construction of the building, including the hiring of skilled labor. The school has recently been turned over to the l'Asile authorities and title to the land has been transferred to the state. A permanent teacher is assigned to the school.

The community council of Moinsson also wanted a road to the main highway and it started to work in April 1974 when it was put in touch with SCH through the services of the priest in l'Asile. There existed a "Comité de Relèvement" whose purpose was to supervise community councils of the area. After the first contacts were made, the Moinsson road project came under SCH supervision.

It appears that the Moinsson council was dominated by a Protestant family of landed peasants, holding as much as 8 carreaux or more. One family member, a Protestant minister, and other close relatives made up the council leadership in Moinsson. The family has long maintained extensive contacts with the outside world through sons in Montreal, New York,

St. Martin and Port-au-Prince.

The presence of food for work and outside agencies resulted in the loss of control over the council by the dominant founding family. The engineer from SCH ultimately shifted food distribution responsibility from the council president to another member with special ties to SCH and its representative. This new contact person was a VSN member closely connected to authorities in l'Asile. Shortly thereafter he was named as the new council president in an "election officielle" presided over by the l'Asile authorities.

The road project continued under the direction of the new president. The SCH inspector noted that there was a shortage of food in the local warehouse at the time the food for work project was terminated. At the time of the recent site visit the Moinsson council was inactive, seemingly unable to sustain itself as an independent entity after the cut-off of food aid.

In the year following the establishment of Moinsson as a food for work project, another council formed nearby at Bidous with a view to working on the road. It too began to receive food for work from SCH. The evidence suggests that this new council formed itself in the hope of receiving food payment for road work. The founding president is a member of the VSN and has a son in the Palace Guard. The SCH inspector indicated that this council president seemed to maintain an active work detail on the road, but that he had an excessive amount of food still in his warehouse at the time the project was closedly by SCH.

Between 1974 and 1976, the parish priest of Bouzi played a part in supervising SCH food for work given to the community council of Bouzi. The project had a divisive effect on the community because of a fight over who would control the food distribution. Council leadership, dominated by the local VSN commander, exerted pressure to have the food depot transfered out of the priest's quarters. Later, members of a mountain community outside of Bouzi withdrew from membership in the Bouzi council due to "differences of interest" from the town members and local officials directing the council.

The Bouzi council has long maintained a strong interest in road work, even when food payment was not available. Some workers reportedly donated work days to the project in the hope of eventually getting food aid. The VSN commander called out members under his command for volunteer work on the road. As a Protestant lay leader, he also called on church members to help. A close associate of the Bouzi president purchased a jeep for commercial use when the road was passable.

At the time of the site visit, the council of Bouzi and its former affiliate, the council of Dabon in the mountains, were both active. The Bouzi council maintains an active role in road maintenance and is still dominated by the official leadership of the little town. There is ongoing work on the local marketplace.

The Dabon council does not work on the road. It maintains close ties to the priest and contributes labor to a parish school being built. Otherwise it works in its own mountain zone, doing agricultural work and building erosion control structures.

<u>Management - food vs. cash for work.</u> Although the road has gone from a community based undertaking to a project supervised at the national level, there does not appear to be any change in the management. At best it is very loose, at worst it is meaningless. The PPC engineer in charge spends one day a month on site visits. Given a very slow work pace, this could

be sufficient, but all the decisions appear to be left to the foreman who has had some experience and is respected not only by the crews but also in the communities around the project. The road obviously cannot sustain any meaningful level of traffic density without quickly deteriorating, as happened with the sections that were first built under food auspices. Even if this is meant to be a local road, it seems that far better care should be given to the project. As of now, it is plagued by morale problems since workers have not been paid for the past three months. There is also a lack of adequate tools, and continuing corruption problems.

The problem with the PPC project is that it appears to be top heavy. The project is burdened with supervisory personnel whose presence have no bearing on workers' performance. The selection of one supervisor appears to have been due to family connections with the agronomist; the nature of his working role is ambiguous. Furthermore, the cash-paid labor has attracted outsiders, whereas food workers were local, hired through the councils.

Currently, road workers are willing to pay to get a job. This has a straight-forward economic rationale since the wage of $1.20 per day is clearly above the "shadow wage" or opportunity cost of local agricultural labor— 4r gourdes for a comparable day's work. Thus it is rational for the worker to pay part of the difference between the road wage and the prevailing "shadow wage" as a bribe, thereby gaining access to cash earnings. The wider the gap between the minimum legal wage and the opportunity cost of labor, the greater the incentive for bribery. This one suspects is also the case for private contractors who pay the minimum industrial wage of $1.60 a day. (Incidentally this appears to be the situation for the firm MOK that works on the L'Asile-Vieux Bourg road within the feeder road construction program)

Furthermore, workers report borrowing money, on occasion, from supervisory personnel, a pattern known as "achté mois" (buying the month). These supervisory people advance a portion of one month's salary to the workers at the rate of 20 to 30 percent interest. It appears that some regional super-

visors have refrained from paying salaries over a certain period with the purpose of lending workers their own salaries at interest. The worst offender in these practices has now been transfered out of the area, but there is some suspicion that he maintains contact with one of the team leaders.

As far as management efficiencies are concerned, the situation appears to have hardly changed since the project went from food to cash payments. The priest in Bouzi claims to have not seen the CWS engineer in charge of the project in 1974-1975. The priest was himself closely involved in the technical planning of the project during its first year of its existence. On the Moisson side, periodic visits were made but not with appropriate frequency since the road abruptly changed directions in more than one place after considerable labor investment in poorly traced routes. To the extent that the objective was to build a road quickly, a lot of time and resources were wasted. No general training was provided to the workers then, and none is provided at present. Only the skills that people already know are apparently used.

The work is performed by a group of 60 workers split into 3 teams of 20. It is stated that attempts are made to rotate the number of workers involved, but in fact this is not done although there is a slow turnover of some workers. Efficiency considerations point in the direction of sticking with one group, but equity considerations dictate a rotation of the beneficiaries. Worker skills appear to be less important in hiring than personal ties, patterns of authority (e.g., VSN) and proximity to the supervisory staff.

The work pace is very slow and seems to have increased only slightly with the change in project status: Some 15 kilometers have been built over more than four years, and the PPC engineer claims to have built 9 of them in 22 months. This would indicate a quickened pace. On the other hand, work was being done at both ends of the road under the food regime, whereas PPC efforts are devoted exclusively to the one end. The other end of the road is minimally maintained through the voluntary efforts of the Bouzi

council and one trucker. The older sections of the road seem to be rapidly deteriorating under the ravages of expanding truck traffic and certain spots have no solid road base at all.

The engineer on this evaluation team observes that team leaders in the PPC road gangs have a useful knowledge of such techniques as rock breaking, dry wall terraces, and leveling. The general level of local technical supervision seems slightly improved over the earlier period of construction. A total of 1.6 miles of roadway have been built during the 4 month period preceding this site visit, which works out to about 640 meters per month for 60 workers, or about a half meter per day per worker—a rate much slower than that claimed overall by the PPC engineer, and perhaps closer to the rate of past efforts with food for work.

Workers on the road state a preference for cash payment over the old food payment system. When examined carefully, the preference for cash seems to have less to do with the nature of payment than the level of payment, for the cash wage is in fact much higher than the old food payment. On the other hand, some of those interviewed expressed a "hope" that the evaluation of this project might result in the resumption of food for work in addition to the present cash for work, suggesting the availability of an ongoing labor pool in the area.

<u>The road workers.</u> Under the food for work program, hiring was handled by the local councils and work gangs were rotated. The workers were invariably local residents.

Under the current program, most workers are not from the local area, and several have moved into the area from a considerable distance in order to get work, coming from as far away as Cote de Fer and Fond des Blancs. The dominant pattern of worker residence is tied to the residence of the supervisory staff, and none of the supervisors (3 team chiefs, 1 supervisor, 1 foreman) are from the upper end of the road where the crews are working.

Some of the outsiders on the road crew are linked to one of the team chiefs from Côte de Fer who was hired by an earlier foreman. The other members of the supervisory staff are from Virgile and Fond des Negres, about 15 kilometers or more from the work site.

Over half of the workers present have been interviewed (28 out of 50 present) in the course of the site visit. About half of those interviewed are young men, most of them dependent on their parents, turning over their salaries to their families. Around two-thirds of the mature men with families own land although only a third have purchased land. Half of the sample are agricultural wage laborers in the Duverger-Bouzi Plateau area, but virtually all workers maintain their own personal gardens as well, even when employed on the road project. Perhaps a third of the crew are members of relatively well to do peasant families though none of them are large landowners (large holdings in this area appear to run from 10 to 15 carreaux). There are several landless workers who depend on rented and sharecropped land for their own gardens.

In short, the workers represent a distinctly varied background in terms of peasant class, and are not exclusively made up of the poorest members of the community though the latter are represented. Young men from families of relatively well to do peasant farmers are present on the team, e.g., some of the young men present do not normally do agricultural wage labor but are sent to work on the road because of the good wages. In terms of both physical appearance and evidence of economic success in peasant farming, the workers constitute a potentially hardworking and able bodied work force.

Lack of regular payment of wages seems to be a serious factor in working morale. Workers customarily spend money on food and drink in the course of the working day. At the time of the site visit, the level of consumption has decreased and a number of workers reported various types of indebtedness incurred in the expectation of future payment of wages in arrears.

Since working on the road project, the workers have ceased to do agricultural wage labor though they still do some work in their own gardens. They clearly supplement their own garden labor with purchase of other labor gangs from money earned on the road. Beyond debt service and purchase of agricultural wage labor, workers report investments in animals (classic form of peasant savings) and commerce. With sufficient savings available, road workers hope to purchase additional farm land. Some mention the option of investing their savings in migration to French Guyana in search of wage labor.

Effects of the road. Given the unusual circumstance of a new road in an area where no vehicle road existed before, an opportunity is presented for understanding some of the social and economic impacts of road construction. The following points seem to pertain:

1) The road is heavily trafficked.
2) New vehicles have been purchased in the area.
3) There is a marked rise in the sale of firewood and charcoal.
4) Land values are clearly on the rise.
5) New houses have been built along the road. In contrast to other homes in the area, they have a distinctly urban character.
6) Priests and pastors have readier access to the area, reflected in church and school building programs.
7) Agricultural extension is somewhat more active in the region.
8) There is some commercial bus and truck service to internal markets, and an apparent rise in the marketing of fruits.

The roadway is heavily used by pedestrians and beasts of burden. It is the main artery to the southern highway and the Fond des Nègres market. It also is important in terms of local traffic within the plateau. Scores of agricultural workers may be observed walking to work during the morning hours. Mountain peasant farmers ride past on horseback en route to distant lowland gardens.

The road is also used by vehicles. Three area residents have purchased vehicles including a truck, a bus and a jeep. The resident priest of Bouzi has brought in a jeep. A close associate of the community council president of Bouzi uses his jeep for commercial passenger transport. A bus owner from Bidouz serves the country market, and the trucker of Montauban makes two round-trips to Port-au-Prince each week. Before the new national road south was re-built, he made three trips weekly from Fond des Negres, but competition and traffic have increased. In the mean time the new feeder road was built, and he provides trucking service from within the plateau instead of Fond des Negres proper.

Since construction of the new national road and the even newer feeder road, transportation costs have gone down in real terms for passengers and produce from the plateau area. This has taken the form of better quality service for the same price. More comfortable buses are replacing the old trucks, providing a better ride to Port-au-Prince. This pushes the old truckers to look for business farther away from the main road. Thus, while the fare from Fond des Negres to Port-au-Prince is 5 gourdes per person and 1.50 gourdes per bag of agricultural produce, the fare from Montauban to Port-au-Prince--a few kilometers away from the main road--is exactly the same. In order to maintain the pratik with his clients, chiefly market ladies, the old trucker gives a free ride from Montauban to Fond des Negres.

The opening of the road has also led to a dramatic expansion of the trade in fuelwood. Good charcoal has long been freighted out of the Fond des Negres market by the truckload. Firewood, however, is being hauled out of the feeder road on an unprecedented scale. Prior to the opening of the road there was no market for firewood.

Large amounts of wood are being sold by peasants at about 3 dollars per cubic meter. Long stacks of wood are visible all along the new roadway. Truckers from outside the area come and purchase the wood for re-sale in Leogane and Port-au-Prince (clairin mills, vetiver plants, bakeries, dry

cleaning plants) at about 3 times the purchase price. The trucker has loading charges, transport costs and taxes to pay.

Since there is a ready market for it, the wood is being cut on a large scale, thereby destroying potential tree cover required for growing coffee at this altitude. Ironically, the opening of this coffee penetration road may have the effect of working at cross purposes to the goal of stimulating coffee production. In any case further destruction of the forest cover tends to further aggravate problems of soil and water conservation. Finally, the truck interests involved in the wood trade seriously contribute to the deterioration of the rudimentary road without participating in its maintenance.

Another possible impact of the road on the area is the rapidly inflating price of land. The exact magnitude of this phenomenon is difficult to determine because land prices are going up as a result of the interaction of three elements: opening of the roads, increased demand generated by cash remittances and return migration from abroad, general inflation. Furthermore, land prices vary according to topography, fertility, forest cover, humidity, etc. Yet, on the basis of prices paid for plots of various size among farmers of the area, it would appear that land has generally more than doubled in price since 1973, and land costs along the roadway may well have increased by an estimated 220 percent. There is clear evidence that roadside house-and-garden plots are in demand, especially by return migrant and their relatives. A small number of road workers report owning land along the road, thereby benefitting from the rise in land values. The inflationary character of land prices generally complicates the aspirations of most peasant householders who seek to augment their land base by purchase.

KENSCOFF - AUGUST 1979

This report concerns the Afe Neg Combite (ANC), an organization receiving food for work from both Catholic Relief Services and CARE. It directs a large program in the commune of Kenscoff. ANC was recognized by the authorities in December of 1978. It is an association grouping together peasants of the Kenscoff area with a view to promoting the economic, social, cultural and agricultural development of the following rural communities: Nouvelle Touraine, Furcy, Fermathe, Codey, Robin, Grande Savanne, and Dumisseau. All of these communities are part of the Kenscoff parish and generally fall within the commune.

The relationship between this association and the Catholic Church is very intimate. This reflects the fact that Pere Cicaut Jean, the priest of Kenscoff, has had a decisive influence on the founding of the association and is still its main driving force. A priori it might be difficult to identify the association as a non-religious, secular organization, not only because of the tremendous weight of Father Cicaut but also because of other factors such as the following: In various places, such as Codey, Nouvelle Touraine, Kenscoff or even Dumisseau, the physical structures built by ANC - dispensaries, schools, community rooms - are physically close to churches or are built on church land. Secondly, three of the top 7 men in the association are deacons: the President, the Vice-President, the Treasurer. The Secretary of the association is a former Brother and the local leader for Codey is also a Deacon. This fact is downplayed by the priest and ANC leadership. They take pains to explain that the first counselor is a Protestant, that houngans and people practicing vaudou are welcome members of the association. It is the clear expectation that the links with the church will decrease as the association matures. It is also fair to say that ANC is not operating along the traditional lines of church sponsored groups. The relationships described above are the result of certain constraints faced by the priest in trying to do development in Kenscoff.

It is helpful to understand who Pere Cicaut is in order to grasp the nature of his impact on ANC and its general orientation. Son of a wealthy family from the North, the priest is a graduate of the Faculte d'Ethnology where he developed a taste for socio-cultural analysis. He was the director of Secours Catholique, and as a result of that experience developed a strong aversion for community actions oriented solely to relief services. Similarly, his experiences with community councils led him to be skeptical of their viability for development. He concluded that the only way to achieve local community development was to build an economic base which could provide the basis for delivering social services. Thus any meaningful degree of autonomous development must be done with that ultimate goal in mind.

Pere Cicaut strikes one as a forceful, dynamic and ambitious personality. He has a certain charisma and exerts powerful leadership, not only within ANC but also within the larger community. His political flair and sense of publicity have helped him to neutralize certain difficulties with the powerful local VSN chieftain. This was not only a sizeable achievement but also an essential precondition for any community action in the area. Finally Pere Cicaut seems to have a very good business sense although his self confidence may lead him to become over-extended.

Community and economy. Afe Neg Coumbite operates within the borders of the Kenscoff commune, an area of singular problems and possibilities. Its physical proximity to Port-au-Prince makes it part of a broader metropolitan area. Some people live there and work in the city. Others use it as a vacation spot. Members of the middle and upper classes of Port-au-Prince have acquired land and houses in the area. The capital city also provides a ready market for perishable cash crops such as fruits and vegetables.

The close proximity to Port-au-Prince has certain drawbacks, including the strong impact of migration, heavy land purchase by urban dwellers and

burgeoning inflation. Peasant landowners have been vulnerable to the demand for land purchase, often selling at relatively cheap prices given the continuing and rapid inflation of land values. The strong demand for goods and services on the part of vacationing urban families has driven prices up and pulled farmers of the land into personal services, especially during summer months.

Aside from fruits and vegetables, Kenscoff also produces corn, beans, coffee and flowers. (During the site visit a flower dealer from Montreal was exploring the possibility of exporting flowers to Canada.) In the areas of Robin, Grande Savanne, Fermathe and Godey, the land is heavily deforested and subject to severe soil erosion. The land is intensively cultivated, with vegetables assuming great importance as a cash crop.

The pattern of vegetable cultivation tends to diminish with greater distance from Kenscoff, especially in the areas beyond Furcy. The cultivation of vegetable crops has only recently been introduced to Nouvelle Touraine, some 3½ hours walk from Obleron, beyond Furcy. Traditional crops here include corn, congo peas, red beans, peanuts, sweet potatoes, cane, manioc and coffee. This area is heavily forested especially in comparison to communities closer to Kenscoff. Houses in Nouvelle Touraine are commonly built of hand sawed planks; sawyers are much in evidence. There is little commerce in wood planks, however, outside of local demand, presumably due to the problem of transport and lack of vehicular road.

In contrast, areas closer to Kenscoff are subject to deforestation for reasons of demand for wood planks as well as intensive cultivation of expensive land. There does not appear to be a significant commerce in firewood or charcoal in the immediate area of Kenscoff.

There is evidence of considerable inequality in the distribution of land. Some holdings range up to 20 or 30 carreaux while other household plots are so small that land is left fallow only after it is exhausted.

One indication of land shortage among certain classes of peasantry is the shortage of thatch for roofing. Thatch is available only when land is left in fallow. Areas near Kenscoff have few hatched houses even among poorer people. This seems to reflect both intensive land cultivation and a high degree of monetization of the peasant household economy. The prevalence of tin roofs here does not necessarily imply adequate levels of wealth, unlike other rural communities where tin roofs may be a clearer indicator of greater wealth.

In contrast to Kenscoff, Nouvelle Touraine is much less monetized. It has fewer tin roofs and relatively little agricultural wage labor, depending more heavily on exchange and festive labor. By comparison, the relatively high degree of monetization of the Kenscoff-Furcy area is suggested by the following characteristics: very high cost of agricultural wage labor, very high cost of garden land, high degree of deforested land brought under cultivation, limited fallow, willingness to invest labor in 3 specialized forms of earthern terracing, cash cropping with high capital requirements (potatoes, cabbage, onions, etc.). On the other hand, it should not be assumed that consumption patterns are wholely monetized; workers in Obleron report seasonal patterns of cash food purchase, highest being in the lean months of May-June which also happen to be a peak labor season for wage labor.

On market day the Kenscoff market was observed to have locally grown produce available but hardly any local grain. Local beans were readily purchased as well as local fruits, vegetables and tubers, suggesting food surpluses in the area. Considerable quantities of locally distributed PL 480 wheat and cornmeal were also in evidence. The usual complement of Haitian grain imported from other markets was present including rice, millet and corn purchased in Port-au-Prince for re-sale in Kenscoff. Cornmeal was notably cheaper than any of the other grains including wheat which was selling a little cheaper than millet. (On another visit to the market one month later the prices of all grains, including wheat, had risen by about

$.10 per marmit.) The largest quantities of produce available were vegetables, including a large supply of potatoes. Vegetables appear to be the dominant cash crop sold in the market, at least at this point in time, a pattern which sets the Kenscoff market apart from other Haitian markets.

Work projects. Afe Neg Coumbite directly involves 210 peasant families in the Kenscoff commune, but it also has a much wider influence in the area. Its aim is to develop a local economic base articulated around the two main economic activities of the area: 1) production of fruits, vegetables, flowers, beans, peanuts, grain and coffee; 2) the marketing of these products. So far ANC efforts have mainly been on the marketing side, and on the related activity of transport. The goal is to develop a local economic base, using the benefits from economic activities to provide low cost or free social services. Given this outlook, the question of road building takes on a special significance. The emphasis is on quick construction of an asset geared to extending the ANC transport network. Therefore, the objective of employment creation in doing the task is made secondary to the need to complete the task as quickly as possible. The Codey road project illustrates the point.

The 7 kms linking Codey to Kenscoff were built in 17 days by using a bulldozer D-4, specialized labor and materials such as cement, rocks, wire etc. The reported cost was around $24,000, or about $3,460 per kilometer.

Once the road was built under an engineer's supervision and using capital intensive methods, a local team of 14 people was formed to insure the ordinary maintenance of the road. The team is remunerated with food for work (CARE). Aside from the team linked to a specific place, there is another "flying team" of repair workers.

As soon as the road was completed, ANC sent in small trucks to provide transport services in the area. It formerly cost between 5 and 8 gourdes

to have a bag of produce transported from Godey to the main Kenscoff road. Now ANC charges only 2 gourdes to transport it to the Port-au-Prince market. Competition has started to move in but ANC protects its market by offering other services: emergency transport of sick people, free use of the organization's portable two-way radio network. Since ANC trucks are equipped with two-way radios, market ladies in downtown Port-au-Prince at Croix des Bossales can call Godey, Dumisseau, Kenscoff or Obleron to send messages of a personal or commercial nature. Similarly, the dispensary in Godey can call for a truck to pick up emergency cases in the community. Thus, the road is made valuable by the social and economic services it provides to the community, and incentive is created for its proper maintenance. The large investment in the bulldozer is defrayed by renting it out at $100 per day plus the cost of gasoline, supplies and the operator's salary.

Aside from the Godey road, 18 kms were built between Dumisseau and Kenscoff using the same techniques. Similarly, a 70 kilometer road to Seguin via Nouvelle Touraine is now being built, supported by CARE and CRS food. To meet its schedule of completing the road by July 1980, a D6 bulldozer has just been acquired by ANC. For all these roads, the general scheme applies: The road is not an end in and of itself; it must have an economic purpose. If the road to Seguin is completed and built to accomodate two-way traffic, the impact on Kenscoff could well be significant with Kenscoff potentially rivaling Jacmel as a coffee marketing center. Furthermore, the position of Kenscoff as an overall marketing center could be enhanced.

The economic activities of ANC include the operation of a fleet of 18 to 20 vehicles, Peugeots for passenger transports, small and big trucks for commodity transport to Port-au-Prince and Petion-Ville markets. The vehicles are rented to individual drivers according to the prevailing market rates. They provide subsidized services: While the commercial cost of transporting school children to Petion-Ville is $30 per month per child, ANC provides the same service at $5 per month. Furthermore another bus is being purchased to serve children living on the main road below Kenscoff

who are unable to find places in the morning rush hour.

ANC owns heavy equipment including a D-4 and a D-6 tractor, a steam hammer, a back loader and two 1,000-gallon portable water tanks. These are used for ANC's own projects but they are available for leasing to third parties.

ANC operates a number of community gardens: 5 in Furcy, 2 in Robin, one in Nouvelle-Touraine. They produce fruits, vegetables and flowers. Half of the net proceeds go to the people who have worked on these gardens and half goes to the central fund of the association. The way of acquiring these lands is unclear: some are or will be purchased, others are leased and still others are simply borrowed from their owners.. Modern cultivation practices are introduced and use is made of fertilizer and pesticides. The project is intended to be a net money-earner for ANC as well as being a series of demonstration gardens.

ANC operates community stores through its women's auxiliary, Heguesse Han Development. Only 3 stores are in operation now, but the expectation is to have one in each of the eight main communities. These stores sell consumer goods and agricultural supplies at reduced prices. For instance, a bag of fertilizer, generally sold at 60 gourdes, is sold at 48 gourdes by ANC which still makes a profit on it. These stores will also be incorporated as a grain cooperative, buying at harvest time, storing and reselling later when prices are higher. For perishable goods such as fruits and vegetables, the stores are ultimately intended to operate as marketing agents, rationalizing the selling unit and trying to establish a minimum price. In addition to these community stores, ANC operates a bar, bakery, beauty shop and cinema in Kenscoff.

Turning now to the non-commercial operations, ANC strategy is to provide certain services to each satellite community. These include a school, dispensary, community room, electricity and water. Furthermore, low cost

housing is being built. In Dumisseau half of a projected 12 unit complex has been completed. These social services are provided in the hope that they will stimulate village settlement of rural areas and the creation of a sense of community. Medical technicians and teachers are given housing. Street lighting is installed in each community.

In the provision of social services, there is an awareness of what is economically relevant. Education and training programs are pursued with a view to future needs in the community for skilled labor. A boarding house is maintained in Kenscoff for the benefit of poor rural families who cannot afford to pay commercial pension for children to attend school in town. Vocational training programs are operated in Fermathe for boys, and in Kenscoff for girls. The hope is to provide needed skills to the community along with economic incentives against out-migration.

Road workers and the community. By way of understanding who the food workers are in ANC, and how they are hired, the workers on the Seguin road building project were interviewed on two separate occasions. Hiring seems to be based on the following characteristics:

1) Workers are not hired by virtue of ANC membership nor are they hired through the auspices of local community councils. The members of the Seguin road crew are hired from people local to the area who ask the ANC president for jobs. As the road progresses in the direction of Nouvelle Touraine, patronage shifts from the ANC President, and workers from Furcy, to the ANC treasurer and workers from Nouvelle Touraine.

2) Workers are rotated weekly. Only rarely is there a carry-over of the same workers from one week to another, though some workers are able to get work again some weeks or months later.

3) In contrast to the road workers, the team leader is not rotated. He is maintained on an ongoing basis for the duration of the project, providing the carry-through necessary for consistent management of rotating

workers. The team leader is, however, paid at the same rate as the regular road workers. He does manual labor along with supervision. The team leader on the Furcy-Seguin road derives the additional advantage of being readily available to the ANC for skilled labor jobs in construction as he is an experienced mason as well as farmer.

4) The workday is a full 8-hour day rather than the 4-hour days more common in food for work projects. Furthermore, the crew works a 6-day week rather than the 5-day week or even fewer days common to such projects.

5) The pay ration is a large one in comparison to other food for work projects: First of all it is based on a longer working day; secondly, the CRS basic ration is 5 pounds of grain plus oil for a 4-hour day, whereas the other PVOs in Haiti give 3 pounds plus oil.

The weekly pay in this particular case amounts to a full bag of wheat plus a quantity of oil. Converted to its cash value at going market rates, this ration amounts to a daily wage at least equivalent to the PPC road wage and in excess of the going market wage for agricultural labor in the area. In other words the pay scale is competitive with prevailing wages rather than constituting an "incentive" or "encouragement" to voluntary community work. It is in fact wage labor. This attracts many applicants, most of whom have nothing to do with ANC either as members or as knowledgable supporters. Hiring has more to do with access to ANC leaders through personal ties or local residence than with active participation in the programs of ANC.

Who the workers are in the road crew varies from week to week as well as within each weekly group, yet all workers interviewed are land owners in the area. Four members of the crew of 10 are from one konn (organized group of agricultural laborers). This konn had requested the opportunity to work on the road project since March, and came to work as a group during the August slack time for agricultural wage labor. Virtually all members of the work crew customarily work for others as agricultural wage laborers at least part of the time.

It is clear that Obleron-Furcy is an area of labor-intensive cash cropping with a high level of demand for agricultural wage labor. The peak labor season is April-May-June, and the August-September period is a major off-season when labor demands are at a low ebb. A number of the road workers are accustomed to working for wages on the land of the ANC president or other officers in the organization. Comments elicited from these workers suggest that they are not familiar with all the activities of ANC nor do they participate in decision-making. In general, they seem to have little to do with ANC, although they are appreciative of the employment and the new road.

These workers are generally mature family heads with an average land base putting them into a class of "middle peasants" -- neither the most well - to - do of farmers nor the poorest. The intensive labor requirements of their farm units cause them to hand together to work in association, travay asosye, exchanging labor among themselves while working as a group, and selling their labor to other farmers. The nature of vegetable cropping and related terracing makes heavy labor demands in order to be successful, and even middle peasants find it advantageous to work in asosye to meet their labor requirements. The ANC road provides jobs to such worker-peasants at wages higher than the going market rate, although the local wages for agricultural labor are the highest of all sites visited. In this way the ronn provides a ready source of labor for ANC projects.

It has already been noted that the leadership of ANC is predominantly, though not exclusively, Catholic. It is also clear that the leadership tends to be inter-related by kinship. Finally, a number of the ANC leaders are from well-to-do peasant farm families of the area who have taken a special interest in the Catholic Church. These men are respected community leaders even outside their affiliation with ANC, and apparently constitute what the priest identifies as the "natural leaders" of these rural areas, in contra-distinction to the ambitions of community council leadership.

The affiliation with ANC and the church tends to further expand the role of these traditional patrons with their expanding client relationships. It also puts them at odds with other community leaders, especially those in politics or linked to competing institutions such as community councils. The leaders pointedly address themselves to the goals of ANC, directed at serving the powerless and those least well off in the community. This reportedly elicits criticism from other landed peasants in the area.

ANC has come into sharp conflict on more than one occasion with members of the VSN (although there are also VSN members who are active in ANC leadership). One such recent conflict involved a direct challenge to ANC's newly acquired hegemony over the market-transport business in an area just opened to vehicle traffic. ANC was able to gain immediate support from community residents sympathetic to its cause, and people came out in bands, making noise, playing vaccines and generally demonstrating against the attempts of a competing trucker owner and VSN member to remove ANC trucks from the road.

There have also been conflicts with local community councils. On the other hand, some community councils have contributed voluntary labor to ANC projects. The community council of Oranger was observed planting trees along the Furcy-Seguin road with great fanfare and without any promise of food for work. It appears that ANC has asked councils to contribute to ANC projects although they haven't provided services specifically to the councils: Some cooperate and others do not. In Nouvelle Touraine a local community council maintains its own program of mutual aid, building houses, operating a communal garden and administering a burial fund. The local ANC leader asked the council to contribute labor to the building of a school (CARE food project) near the Catholic chapel, and 35 members donated a day's labor, carrying blocks and sand, stating that they hoped to send their children to school there and thus were willing to contribute labor. In short, where they have a perceived vested interest, councils donate labor to ANC projects, thereby providing another source of labor recruitment to the ANC.

Management. The projects are centrally conceived by ANC leadership. It almost seems as though everything flows from the mind of Pere Cicaut. Lip service is paid to decentralization and local initiative but the facts seem otherwise. This is not perhaps a fatal criticism given the social context--old patterns of authority, paternalism and apathy among the traditional leadership of the area. Obviously the priest has chosen to establish his credibility by "getting things done" rather than basing his efforts on local initiatives of any kind. Community councils were bypassed for a number of reasons, including the fact that some were tied to local authorities and effectively hindering ANC development. The federation of community councils in the commune was not favorably inclined toward ANC.

Central management allows ANC to pursue long term objectives unencumbered by collective decision-making or grass-roots organization. Resources available for one project may by shifted to another, or even to another community, as the need or opportunity arises. For example, Pere Cicaut uses the principle of leverage in the management of assets. If ANC receives a gift in cash to purchase materials for a community room, the money is used for that purpose, but in addition it is used as the basis for purchasing other goods on credit. In this fashion the priest appears to have contracted a debt estimated at around $300,000. Most of the debt is linked to the acquisition of heavy equipment and trucks.

In a similar vein, varied resources are used together in implementing projects e.g., food, cash gifts in kind, skilled labor and voluntary work. It is thus difficult to isolate the impact of a single input or a single donor on any particular project. ANC receives assistance from numerous sources including Adaveniat, CIDA, Aquanu, Action de Careme des Catholiques Suisses, Caritas, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Misereor, Development et Paix, and COHAND. Furthermore ANC has received a number of gifts from the government and presently gets support amounting to about $6,000 per month.

Food aid is used in non-orthodox ways. It is not always distributed according to the usual norms. First of all, it is rarely used alone on a project; rather, it is used in tandem with other resources and sources of labor. Secondly, food workers may work 8-hour days, 6 days a week, rather than the usual 4-hour

workday for 5 day a week or less. Those working long days get double rations. Thirdly, skilled labor (carpenters, masons) is used in ANC projects and is sometimes paid in food, e.g., the going wage for a job is converted into its food equivalent by using the prevailing market price for wheat. Finally, workers sometimes turn over their potential rations to ANC in exchange for equivalent services such as swift completion of the road to Godey. In effect, food designated for the project is converted into other inputs required to construct the road. In short, the program uses food resources in unusual and creative ways, apparently free of corruption, while taking due advantage of the market value of PL 480 food.

One of the problems with de-emphasizing the use of food workers and labor intensive approaches is of course the employment question. Swift results may run counter to maximum employment in the construction of a project. It is evident that poor people from the Kenscoff area migrate to Port-au-Prince in search of wage labor. Landless people from Nouvelle Touraine, for example, may be found working as porters in the Croix des Bossales market of Port-au-Prince. On the other hand, ANC clearly approaches the use of food for work as a time-limited resource best devoted to investment in projects creating alternative forms of longer term employment.

There are however certain problems. The need for quick results in order to establish credibility has given rise to technical defects in some projects. For instance, the slope of certain sections of the Dumisseau road is unacceptable by usual engineering standards. Pouring concrete in problem areas, as is proposed, may not solve the problem. Similarly the use of plastic pipes in water projects may not be optimal under the circumstances. Already water pressure is causing leaks and general maintenance problems. The use of cement blocks (CARE donation) in Dumisseau could well have been modified to save on cement consumption but speed was of critical importance, as the priest and local leader made clear. As ANC grows, the need for more adequate engineering grows more acute. It is feared that time and resources will be wasted if proper technical supervision is not used in the ambitious road project between Furcy and Seguin. The need for technical advice has been recognized in relation to managing the fleet of transport vehicles, but less so in order project areas.

As a final point, it is clear that Father Cicaut is more than successful in motivating people. For instance, the dispensary and school of Nouvelle Touraine are being built with materials carried on people's heads for over 30 kms. in rough terrain. Similarly the people working closely with the priest appear to hold him in highest respect. He commands attention from city people spending their summers in Kenscoff, some of whom have contributed support. Despite all this, one fears that the ground over which ANC is built is very shaky as so much depends on one man. A high priority should be the strengthening of ANC as an institution, depending less on the top-down strategy and more on the grass roots. At this time it is not at all clear what would happen to the organization in the absence of Father Cicaut. Some potential aid from abroad has been denied on these very grounds.

A second danger to be avoided is financial over-extension. Implicitly, Father Cicaut seems to believe that if there were a crisis he could rely on his personal credit and family backing to pull himself out. Even if this is true, it is a dangerous ground for future institutional growth. A successor to Father Cicaut might well not have the same charisma and business acumen.

A third problem is the issue of agriculture, erosion control and reforestation. Up to now this has received a relatively low priority in comparison to commerce and transport. ANC has been unable to secure effective support from DAMDR, and hasn't moved ahead on its own.

LA GONAVE - AUGUST 1979

The island of La Gonave was chosen as a visitation site in the hope of assessing long term use of food for work in a relatively circumscribed area with projects and community councils related to the Service Chretien d'Haiti (Church World Service affiliate). The SCH maintains around 75 employees on the island and operates a variety of programs including development of water resources, soil conservation, reforestation, road building, literacy training, grain storage, nutrition education, and a vocational school.

Insular development. La Gonave's unique character is dominated by its status as an offshore island located about 25 miles from Port-au-Prince at its southernmost tip. It is about 32 miles long and 12 miles across at its widest point, comprising a land area of around 320 square miles. A series of small coastal villages provide ports of passage for traffic to and from the mainland; however, the bulk of the population is located in the more fertile highlands of the interior.

The island is part of the departement de l'ouest dominated by Port-au-Prince; the depute for La Gonave is from Arcahaie. Administratively the island constitutes one commune centered in the village of Anse a Galette. A second commune centered at Pointe a Raquette has recently been established by law but with no magistral appointment as yet. The land is almost wholly state-owned.

Many of Gonave's estimated 65,000 residents are reportedly descendants of relatively recent immigrants to the island, coming from the coastal towns ringing the bay within the last generation or two, in search of access to land. There is at present a conspicuous out-migration to the mainland and, in some measure, to other parts of the Caribbean, including Guadeloupe and St. Martin. A significant number of Gonavians reportedly enlisted in the recent embauchage of cane cutters sent to the Dominican Republic.

Some 15 to 18 evangelical Protestant missions operate on the island, sometimes at odds with each other. The Wesleyan Mission operates the sole hospital serving the island. A consortium of 20 Protestant & Catholic missions and agencies have banded together in concerted effort to make potable water available to the island's residents. This effort is underwritten by USAID grant of $500,000.

Land tenure on La Gonave presents certain obstacles to development, as well as certain potentialities. While the island has long had a reputation for having land available to outsiders for peasant farming, it in fact does not have any unclaimed land at present. All land is rented from the state, at least theoretically, with the exception of the two small communities of Mare Sucrin & Grande Source where ownership was ceded in 5 hectare plots to a number of peasant farmers during the post-occupation period.

The state land is rented by peasant smallholders in the form of cessions which may be bought and sold. Each cession requires annual payment of rent to the state at the rate of about G.12.50 per hectare. In addition, the sale of cessions is taxed, though most of these cessions are apparently neither surveyed nor generally verified by state official. It appears to be common practice, especially among larger landholders, to pay for one hectare while actually farming an area of two or more hectares, thereby avoiding the annual payments due the Bureau de Contributions.

It appears that the vast majority of residents are smallholders. There are, however, both local and absentee landholders of considerable scale. According to the Bureau of Contributions, one landed family was discovered to have occupied a total land area in excess of 200 carreaux when this land was surveyed some years ago at the behest of the government. The tax office reports significant numbers of farmers making annual payment on stated holdings of 10 to 20 hectares. Wealthy families and tourist interests from Port-au-Prince maintain cessions on La Gonave, including undeveloped beach

areas on the southern coast of the island. It appears that holdings on the island may be less equitably distributed than comparable mountainous areas of the mainland. At the same time, more peasant farmers seem to "own" cessions, relative to their mainland counterparts. They also seem to purchase land cessions at an earlier age, rather than depending on inherited parcels or rented and sharecropped land from other peasant farmers.

The market in land cessions reflects the general inflationary trend observed on the mainland. There is some suggestion that SCH road projects may be contributing to the rise in land values along the roadways, in tandem with purchase of cessions from overseas remittances. On the other hand, the market value of cessions is markedly less than the mainland market for land owned and titled. It is evident that peasants holding cessions are in a more precarious position vis-a-vis the question of land security than are their counterparts who hold outright title to land. For example, the history of off-shore island tenure in Haiti suggests that smallholding tenants of the state are more subject to enclosure and eviction. In general, the issue of land security should not be underestimated in assessing the problem of risk and development potential from the standpoint of smallholders, particularly as regards their willingness to invest in quality improvements, reforestation, soil conservation, etc. The complications and potentially volatile character of the problem are reflected in the existence of a "rent strike" among renters of state land on La Gonave since 1977. In discussing this apparently spontaneous trend, the tax office makes reference to radio broadcasts reporting on land tenure problems of Ile à Vache. At present the state has apparently established no policy of enforcement in response to this trend.

The problem of insecure holdings and state lands offers certain potentials in relation to development — potentials embedded in the nature of the prevailing mode of land tenure. It would be possible, for example, to establish secure holdings in a land reform program geared to outright ownership

of land units of minimum size for productive peasant forming. Such a fundamental reform of offshore land tenure could potentially maximize basic agricultural extension, reforestation and farm planning services oriented to the benefit of smallholders. As the situation stands at present, however, the activities of such agencies as SCH and DARNDR are severely hampered at the outsight, due to the problems and peculiarities of offshore tenure: lack of cadestral survey, insecurity of rented holding from the state and unequal distribution of the land.

Agriculture. La Gonave is generally considered to be a food deficit area. It is an area with special transportation problems and costs in relation to food imports as well as the export of goods and produce. Most important, it has had recurring problems of severe drought, most recently the harvests of 1977 and 1979. The periods of greatest food shortage and highest prices for grains in the market are called "sézon grangou" or hunger seasons. The limitations on production imposed by climate and fertility are reflected in the physical structure of garden plots. Unlike certain mountainous areas in northern Haiti, the garden plots of La.Gonave are less often enclosed by fencing as a protection against the encroachments of grazing animals. Gardens on La Gonave are generally not expected to produce more than one major harvest per year, and are therefore not "worth" undue expenditure of scarce resources on fencing. When not in grain production such gardens are often used as grazing plots for livestock.

The special character of the drought factor and food imports from the mainland exerts unusual pressures on church and development agencies to "do relief". SCH personnel suggest that some of the pressures to mount large food for work programs come from the numerous missionary groups and Protestant churches.

According to highland farmers, the most important crops are millet, corn, congo peas, peanuts, manioc and sweet potatoes. Significantly, there has been in recent years a severe shortage of sweet potatoes, a staple in the subsistence base of peasant agriculture. During periods of drought the sweet potatoes haven't produced and livestock has been permitted to graze on the stems. Consequently there is a current shortage of sweet potato shoots for planting.

When there are surpluses available, cereals, tobacco and sisal are exported to the mainland. At the time of the August site visit there was visible export of livestock, firewood by the boatload, wood charcoal, and some watermelons. In the arid coastal areas, considerable charcoal pits were in evidence and on a scale not observed at any other site in this evaluation.

Markets. There are a series of 4 major market places situated in the highland interior of the island at strategic intervals, notably at Ti Palmist, Palma, Nan Cafe and Dent Grient. Coastal village markets are of relatively minor importance except perhaps for Anse a Galette where a market of some size occurs on Sundays in connection with boat traffic from the mainland. Generally, the coastal villages serve as ports of exit and entry for highland markets.

In areas more isolated from the major markets some interest is expressed in establishing new market places. One such community was recently given official permission to do so but this market does not operate on the scale of the others. There is of course common incidence of local retailing at crossroads and along heavily trafficked pathways.

The major markets of Ti Palmist & Palma were observed by the evaluation team. There was virtually no local grain available for purchase, except for bulgar wheat from local work projects. The only other grains available were imported from the mainland, purchased in St. Marc, Miragoane and Port-

au-Prince for re-sale at Marche Ti Palmist; and at Leogane, Petit Goave, Montrouis, and Port-au-Prince for re-sale at Marche Palma.

Prices for the mainland grain sold on La Gonave tended to be higher than the prices at mainland field sites, presumably reflecting increased transportation costs, including rental of beasts of burden on La Gonave, boat passage, and mainland road transportation.

Little local food of any kind was available in these markets except for some fruit and root crops. This tends to lend considerable weight to the suggestion that La Gonave is overall a food deficit area, although the availability of local food certainly varies from season to season and year to year.

Food for work and community. Food for work has been used in the La Gonave program of SCH during the last ten years. Community projects and work programs are channelled through 85 community councils and 4 cooperatives located in three animation districts. At present SCH also maintains a food for work program through the Eglise Methodiste, centered in Source à Philippe. The Methodist church works with about 35 community councils in the administration of food for work projects.

In the long term the bulk of food for work projects has been oriented to road construction, road maintenance, and the problem of potable water. The present system of roads on the island did not exist prior to the SCH road building program. At present it amounts to about 100 kilometers of jeep roads. There is no commercial vehicular traffic of any kind. Beasts of burden constitute the most significant transportation resource on the island outside of pedestrian traffic. Vehicles using the Gonavian road system are primarily those of SCH and Protestant pastors, including seven jeeps and two tractors. There are a number of privately owned motorcycles. The considerable inter-island movement of people and goods is assured by a fleet of sailboats, some of them motorized.

According to the July food for work report, the program is still dominated by road work, amounting to over 60 percent of the food allotment. Water projects and the construction of four grain storage silos account for roughly another fourth of the food workers. The remainder of the program is devoted to reforestation, wharf construction and payment of literacy teachers, in order of relative importance.

SCH is generally maintaining its food for work program on La Gonave at a level in excess of 2,000 workers, plus another 700 workers under direct supervision of the Methodist Church. Agency personnel suggest that the primary impulse in maintaining this level of programing is for relief purposes in the context of a chronic food deficit region. The program seems to be caught in something of a bind between the "relief" aspect and the question of "development" - the latter efforts directed toward providing certain social services, building economic infrastructures and fostering community organization. The food for work projects administered directly by the Eglise Methodiste appear to be even more oriented to the relief impulse.

Inquiries to agency personnel indicate that roadwork constitutes a convenient method for readily assembling large numbers of workers and distributing considerable quantities of food. The emphasis on roadwork was inaugurated early in the agency history on the island and was virtually institutionalized.

Regarding the actual utility of the road system, the roads are said to allow greater agency movement in providing services, greater access to the hinterlands by priest and pastors, and safer passage for beasts of burden. It is said that two merchants on the southern coast of the island have expressed an interest in providing commercial jeep traffic between the two coasts and key market places. The present condition of the roads raises the question of viability of such an enterprise, especially given the higher cost of maintenance for reasons of both the road conditions

and the import costs of mechanics, parts and fuel. There is clearly a great deal of movement within the island, but less between the coasts than between coastal ports and highland markets. Anse a Galette, for example, is less accessible to Pointe a Raquette, on the opposite side of the island, than it is to Montrouis. Likewise, Pointe a Raquette has more frequent correspondence with Miragoane, or even Port-au-Prince, than it does with Anse a Galette.

Management. The food for work programs are channelled primarily through community councils. The workers are chosen by the councils themselves, usually by the president of the council. Rotation of workers is the pattern except for certain more specialized workers, such as skilled road makers or road tracers, who are paid at the usual rate but have longer term access to work. The work projects chosen are closely tied to the animateurs, to the point that collaborating councils seem to be agents of SCH projects and the supervising animateurs rather than autonomous community organizations.

The relief aspect of food for work on La Gonave has generally had the effect of fostering long term work projects which drag on and are somehow never completed. Roads, for example, include false starts or traces which are later determined to be inadequate and recharted along other paths, effectively extending the work project. This type of problem has led to the adoption of certain new work policies based only indirectly on the prescribed man-day ration for payment. Rather, a fixed "contract" or estimate of work to be accomplished is stated in advance, and the worker is paid when the work is complete. In this case, the work contract is established by SCH personnel, and payment is made through the community council.

To illustrate, the establishment of tree nurseries is remunerated according to the number of trees planted in any individual nursery, e.g., 300 benzoline trees are worth a 20-day ration of food, with cash equivalence (based on the local market rates for bulgar) amounting to about $.04

per tree. The transplantation of the trees onto the land is further remunerated according to the contract formula, e.g., 500 trees are worth a 20-day ration, 1500 trees are worth two such rations. In this way individual farmers are encouraged to do reforestation on their own land.

The building of grain silos, a major construction effort in cement blocks and concrete floors, is based in part on food payment for work contracted. An estimated one-third of the cost of a $15,000 building is paid through food for work. This includes the provision of 3 stout wooden poles about 10 feet long in exchange for 2 marmit of bulgar wheat for a cash equivalence, at local market rates, of about $.50 per pole. Three "boxes" of construction sand are provided in exchange for one bag of bulgar and one gallon of oil. Two 50-gallon drums of water are provided in exchange for one bag of bulgar and one gallon of oil, amounting to a cash equivalence of about $.10 per gallon.

The contract system of adjusting man-day rates of payment is apparently an improvement over the older method in terms of getting work done. It is not used, however in the bulk of food for work projects - road construction and maintenance - where efficiency is traditionally at its lowest ebb. Over the years the personnel serving in La Conave projects have been increased in an attempt to provide technical support to specific projects as well as the animation of community councils. Ironically, however, councils closely tied to food for work projects and SCH supervision are often subject to factionalism and charges of corruption.

No agency involved in the distribution of resources in Haitian peasant communities can avoid the spector of factionalism and charges of inequity, for the context is one of scarce resources and competing factions. Solidarity does not generally exist at the level of "community" for communities do not exist in these settings; rather, "factions" do exist as the customary expression of social relations in peasant settings.

It was not unexpected, then, to hear numerous charges of special interest in the distribution of food on La Gonave. Some workers reported withdrawing membership from a community council because of inequity. A market lady said she didn't engage in wheat commerce because she lacked access since she wasn't a president's wife. A former worker indicated he didn't receive correct payment for number of days worked. The sister of a council president made the counter charge that workers attempt to be counted as present on days when they are not in fact working. It is taken for granted by most workers interviewed that food for work constitutes a form of patronage for council presidents. It is said, "Met byin se wa" (He who owns the goods is king).

Charges against the administering agency have less to do with allegations of dishonesty than lack of control over local supervision of food distribution. Secondly, it is evident that payments are irregular, e.g., workers may labor for two months and then get paid for one month. Some payments may be 2 months or more in arrears. There is some evidence that animateurs may take advantage of their position, accepting certain favors in exchange for council access to food for work.

Agency management of food is quite tightly controlled, as far as transport and warehousing are concerned, up to the point of transfer to community councils for their distributions. Some loss is reported in warehousing and in transit through "holes" in bags, e.g., regular stacks of bags may not be of equal height although each stack has the same number of bags. Cases of large scale theft are quickly detected through a system of manifests covering every movement. A recent loss of some $4,500 worth of food was sustained during night time transportation from wharf to warehouse. The theft was discovered in the morning when proper lighting permitted thorough accounting. The theft was followed by the arrest of the key person implicated, with arrangements made for redress.

There is some evidence of inefficiency in the nature of administrative

relationships between Port-au-Prince and La Gonave offices. Bureaucratic procedures are instituted in Port-au-Prince for the purpose of monitoring the work, tending to decrease management perogatives at the local level of administration. Furthermore, there are Port-au-Prince decisions made outside of consultation with the island level of administration, resulting, in one case, in the doubling of food rations to a large road construction project without the knowledge of the local SCH administrator.

Community councils and grass roots interests. One of the special contributions of SCH animation revolves around the question of elections. It is no longer a standard procedure on La Gonave for councils to elect officers to indefinite terms of office. SCH-imposed pressures for election have resulted in electoral campaigns and council reforms, including due consideration of the problem of equity in food for work projects. Incumbent presidents have been re-elected on the basis of campaign promises and have been pressured to make good on those pledges. Notably the pressures for electoral reform emerge most strongly from outside the communities, i.e., the agency rather than the members. Once imposed, however, the demand for elections finds popular support from the membership. It remains an open question as to whether or not periodic elections, or even the very existence of the councils, would be ongoing and institutionalized in the absence of SCH resources and animation. It seems that most councils are in fact client organizations of SCH, especially those most actively benefiting from the agency.

The origin of the Picmi II community council illustrates in concrete terms some of the dynamics of council formation. It speaks to the issue of voluntary work, local initiative and council autonomy.

Following the famine period of 1976-1977, farmers from the Picmi area went to SCH to ask for aid. As a result they organized in the form of a council under the leadership of an older and respected farmer in the neighborhood. They asked for help and chose to dig out a water source

with the promise of food payments. Later they received food for road work. In short, they formed a council in response to crop failure and in the hope of food payment for work.

Current road workers interviewed in Picmi are council members from the immediate area. Most are land cession owners. The president controls somewhat more land than other members but all are smallholders with 3 hectares or less, and over half of those interviewed are agriculturalwage laborers. In addition to managing their own farming units, they generally are members of a poor-to-modest class of peasant farmers. The council members consider the council to be a client organization of SCH.

Speaking in more general terms, what examples can be cited of voluntary work projects undertaken by local councils - independent of food for work and SCH directions? Agency personnel cite the following, and most are visibly in evidence: construction of park areas, organization of community fetes, construction of football fields of teams and leagues, and dry wall terracing. Following the introduction of tree nurseries and vegetables previously unknown to the island, some local people have voluntarily adopted these items. Water projects are perhaps the most common voluntary projects involving organized groups of people. Dry wall terraces are also built in humid ravines, with plantains planted behind them, in areas where neither were traditionally done. These projects appear to have been undertaken in the wake of similar projects done with food for work, but in this case, without the hope of receiving it. There are also road projects undertaken without the promise of food payments, but nevertheless, with the "hope" of food payments - once having established a willingness to work "voluntarily". Finally, the council of Bois Brule has organized work projects of particular interest to its members in which money is voluntarily collected and spent for food cooked and eaten on the spot. This food is "encouragement" and sustenance, not payment, more along the lines of coumbit than wage labor.

On the other hand, some of the major SCH projects attempt to respond to basic economic problems with economic solutions, but with a limited prognosis as to an independent and self-sustaining future, e.g., the silo grain storage project. SCH provides the silo structure through technical and material aid, and local labor paid by food for work. It is in the process of forming cooperatives for silo ownership and direction. In the short run, the possibility of self-sustaining silo cooperatives is without doubt contingent on outside (SCH) management, accounting and investment. While potentially self-sustaining in terms of economics, the silo program may well not be self-sustaining, in the long run, in terms of independent local management.

Some thought has been given to the possibility of incorporating food for work as only one option for payment in relation to a proposed system of stores retailing a variety of merchandise. That is, council members might be able to establish "credit" at these stores on the basis of participation in community work projects. They might then have a choice of taking "payment" in either food for work or other commodities such as tools, fertilizer, seed grains, etc. Such a program would speak to the consumer needs of peasant farmers in new forms, needs already institutionalized in the sale of food for work on the open market under the present mode of distribution.

The consumer/marketing dimension to food for work should not be taken lightly, according to the evidence from La Gonave. All farmers and workers interviewed expressed a decided interest in the market availability of bulgar wheat, especially in the context of grain scarcity, hunger seasons and expensive grains imported from the mainland. No one expressed an interest in the possible price depressing effects of wheat sales on local grains. People seemed to feel that the prices of local grains responded more to basic supply and demand, and seasonal variation, than to the relative price of wheat. Furthermore people consistently expressed the consumer's interest, as opposed to the producer's interest, in the price of either local millet or the wheat - hoping for cheap prices. Household produced

millet is both consumed and sold at harvest time. (As a corollary it is evident that wheat is both consumed and sold at the time of its "harvest" or distribution.) Finally, when the household supply is exhausted for either purpose, the household tends to become a market consumer of millet. It remains to be determined whether Gonavian peasants are net producers or net consumers of millet. Verification is outside the scope of this evaluation.

Consumer interest in wheat on the market is strongly reflected in the outcry over some wheat buyer in Pointe a Raquette who sought to purchase wheat in quantity from local recipients of food for work in order to export it to the mainland. Public outcry against such commerce at a time of grain shortage on the island treated the venture as a "scandal" - exercising social pressure on the merchants outside the normal channels of the market. As a corollary, PL 480 wheat has been imported to the island through commercial channels when the price was favorable for local marketing (reportedly purchased from wheat merchants on the Rue des Cesars near the market in Port-au-Prince).

Consumer opinion among La Gonave peasants suggests that feeling sometimes runs high against grain speculators. In one discussion it was suggested that "the people" reserve the right to storm the warehouses of local speculators holding grains for higher prices if the usual market sources of grain are inadequate at times of hunger.

During the site visit, the team observed considerable quantities of wheat in the market at Ti Palmiste, most of it apparently derived from the large-scale road project at Pointe a Raquette. The close relationship between work projects, food distribution and market availability seems apparent. A later survey of grains available in the Palma market, further removed from the Pointe a Raquette road project, showed very little wheat available for sale. Upon inquiry it became clear that this region of the island had not received any recent distributions of food.

Finally, it is evident that consumer demands for wheat may be satisfied even when the grain is available on the market through outright corruption. For example, wheat was available in large quantities on La Gonave, and at especially reasonable prices, in the days immediately following the large theft from SCH stocks being offloaded and transported at night from wharf to warehouse.

TERRE NEUVE - SEPTEMBER 1979

HACHO and CARE maintain programs and operate food for work projects in this highland valley zone surrounded by mountains in Haiti's northwest region. HACHO personnel suggested the Terre Neuve road project as a visitation site for evaluating food for work. CARE also uses food for work in nearby water projects, capping springs for potable water. Food distributed in these road and water projects is from PL 480 commodities imported by CARE.

HACHO maintains an office in Terre Neuve including a program coordinator, accountant and project supervisors. The program includes the services of a dispensary and nutrition center. HACHO is without doubt the largest institutional presence in town whether public or private, commercial or benevolent. Community projects are administered through the auspices of local community councils.

Geography. Terre Neuve is located about 14 kilometers from the SEDREN copper mine, which closed its operation in 1972. The town has close ties to the regional metropole, Gonaives, about 30 kilometers away.

Terre Neuve is located in a wider region generally known for its chronic droughts, but this local area is not in fact characterized by unusual aridity. Furthermore, it has a significant forest cover interspersed with the intercropping so characteristic of mountain peasant agriculture. The area is richly endowed with fruit trees, especially mangos and avocados.

The town is not served by any commercial trucks or buses. All traffic out of the area is on foot or beast of burden with the exception of HACHO and CARE vehicles and an occasional private jeep. Commercial vehicles are available at Meme, the site of the old SEDREN mine, for connections to Gonaives. Pack animals are readily available for travel to Meme, costing about 5 gourdes for a mule or horse, and from 2.50 to 3.00 gourdes for a donkey. Lack of vehicle access and the high cost of transportation effectively limit the potential commerce in fruit. Some mangos and avocados are exported out of the area, but at a level far

below the potential trade. At present it does not pay to export mangos in any volume given the relatively low value-to-weight ratio of this bulky commodity. Consequently, mangos and avocados are unusually cheap during the harvest season.

There is jeep access to Anse Rouge via Sources Chaudes. The parish priest lives in Sources Chaudes, midway between Anse Rouge and Terre Neuve, and travels by jeep via the connecting jeep road. There are also two roads connecting Terre Neuve with a community half-way to SEDREN. The upper road was originally built by SEDREN (1968) and passes through a low populated area at a high altitude. The lower road is more recent (1974), shorter, relatively more populated and generally better suited to foot travel as evidenced in its popular use by the people of Terre Neuve.

Agriculture. Terre Neuve is the seat of a commune with the usual complement of government functionaries. It also hosts an important country market. Otherwise it has few commercial activities outside of peasant farming. There are two corn grinders in town, some skilled craftsmen and two or three small stores doing a low level of business. In sum, peasant agriculture is the dominant preoccupation even of townspeople.

This has not always been the case. Prior to the 1954 hurricane there were also coffee and cotton speculators in town, perhaps 4 or 5 large ones, selling to the old Rheinhold export firm in Gonaives. At present, some 25 years later, there are none. Local coffee buyers lost all incentive to ply their trade in the 1950s, following the drop in production, the drop in world market price, and the increased cost of licensing.

There is some coffee but little cotton presently grown in the area. Coffee is available in the market for local consumption. A few planters sell larger quantities to the speculators in Gonaives.

The most important crops in the area are corn and beans, including both the red bean and the congo pea. Plantains are an important crop, and farmers report

a significant quantity of land devoted to millet, manioc, sweet potato and fruit trees.

Marketing. Terre Neuve has important market days twice per week. There is a lively commerce with other country markets in the region, especially La Source, Port à Piment, Anse Rouge, Gros Morne, and the Plaine de Gonaives. Market ladies from La Source bring corn and millet to sell, and purchase fruit for re-sale in La Source and Anse Rouge, using donkeys for transport. Millet is available from the Gonaives Plain, Bassin and Port a Piment. Corn is available from and Anse Rouge, rice from Gros Morne and the Artibonite. While Terre Neuve is isolated by lack of commercial vehicle transport, it is clearly not isolated from regional market networks and the effect of the national grain market on local prices.

Locally grown produce is also present in the market, especially corn and beans, suggesting that there is at least seasonal availability of food surpluses. PL 480 wheat and oil are marketed in accord with the patterns of local distribution for work projects. (Wheat readily available during the week-end market was sold out after a day or two and was no longer available at the large market several days later.) Wheat sells at a conspicuously higher price than corn or millet, but appreciably less than rice. There is good evidence that the price of bulgar wheat is strongly affected by the supply. When a large food payment is made, wheat sells at about 5 dollars per bag. When there is a smaller distribution, it may sell for 6 dollars per bag (the current wholesale price). In either case, the price goes up after two or three days following distribution and has been known to sell as high as 35 to 38 gourdes, and as low as 20 gourdes per bag. One wheat merchant says that the price of bulgar tends to drop during the local corn harvest. PL 480 oil is also available from local market ladies: It is purchased at prices ranging from 16 to 20 gourdes and is currently retailed at the equivalent of 25 gourdes per gallon.

Road project. The current maintenance project began in July on the road originally built by HACHO to allow easier access to Terre Neuve. The local HACHO representative thinks of the present work project as primarily a relief operation in an

area affected by drought during the early part of 1979. This perception appears to be shared by the CARE representative for the area. On the other hand, the regional HACHO office in Gonaives views the project in terms of the maintenance objective -- repairing a deteriorated road in order to maintain access. It is possible to admit both objectives, of course, but in practice the performance criteria are different.

In the case of a relief operation, the objective is to get food out as quickly as possible to a threatened population. The actual work performed is of secondary importance -- a means of fulfilling the primary goal of helping vulnerable groups. In the event, however, that the main goal is to improve the quality of an economic asset, the level of technical performance is primary.

There appears to have been a breakdown in communications between the different levels of HACHO as to the exact objective to be pursued. The regional office authorized food outlays for repair of 7 kilometers of roads. The local field coordinator in Terre Neuve, however, authorized work for 14 kilometers. Consistent with his perception of the need for relief, he also doubled the number of people working on each 100 meter of road. Instead of having 10 persons on a section, he assigned 20 so as to touch the maximum number of people.

Initially a budget of 840 bags of bulgar was allocated to the project. This was to be paid at the rate of 20 bags for 100 meters of work which works out to only 4 kilometers of road work. Some sections were considered easier in which case 20 bags could cover for 200 meters. Even so the initial budget was clearly short of the amount needed to pay workers for 7 kilometers of repair. In the end, 135 work contracts were given out for a total cost of 2,203 bags of food. As a result, the project exceeded its budget by a considerable amount and so payment was not forthcoming, effectively stopping work on the project some days prior to the site visit.

Another issue is the use of tools. Road workers currently use their own tools which are inadequate for the requirements of effective road work. The

major community group providing workers to the road has requested tools from a HACHO tool-bank program selling at reduced rates.

Information gathered concerning the longer history of this road suggests that it has been plagued with problems ever since the first period of construction. The agency engineer responsible for the road initially chose to build it through an area called Ka-Soleil, in 1973. This attempt proved to be impractical and work was stopped after 9 months of effort including the use of a bulldozer. In 1974, it was decided to work on a popular foot path first opened in 1957 by a local judge. The president of the Terre Neuve community council was appointed HACHO's foreman in charge of the project. He gave contracts for each 150 meters of road, with a team of 5 workers receiving payment of 25 bags of wheat for each section. Adjustment was made for differing labor requirements for different sections. The basic rate of payment worked out to about 8 and 1/3 pounds per meter.

In comparison, the current maintenance project calls for 20 bags of wheat and 10 gallons of oil to be paid for 100 meters of work. This converts to about 10 pounds of grain per meter plus oil. Thus the cost of repairing the road appears to be higher, at present, than the cost of construction some 5 years ago.

Another feature of the road project is maintenance work on two parallel roads. While in fact there is no commercial traffic to Terre Neuve, there are two roads to the town from a point 7 kilometers distant. The SEDREN mining company originally built a fairly good road about 4.8 miles long in 1968, but the road was geared more to SEDREN's needs rather than those of local people. People are reluctant to use this road as it passes close to a steep cliff and is subject to rock falls.

The newer HACHO road is much preferred since it is over a mile shorter and less steep. The SEDREN road also does not go through other rural communities, thereby reducing its social and economic value. Nevertheless it is still an

alternative route and continues to be used by HACHO trucks to bring supplies to Terre Neuve. Consequently, work efforts appear to be oriented in the direction of giving employment while maintaining both roads open to HACHO vehicles. It seems that current road efforts are not geared primarily to opening the lower road to the full complement of traffic, including commercial trucks & buses.

Management and community organization. Building a road of this nature is fraught with difficulties under the best of circumstances, let alone the particular complications of both community politics and an agency administration at odds with itself. Aside from an apparent confusion of objectives, there are technical problems. Engineer supervision of the road project is almost non-existent. The regional supervisor is generally unavailable due to an overburdened work load. Only one of two foremen on the payroll for this road project is in fact present, and a third road supervisor is present with no clearly defined function or technical skills. Supervision of the road project is at one and the same time top-heavy with administration and inadequately managed.

One sign of the absence of effective control lies in the attitude and behavior of the HACHO representative in Terre Neuve. He appears to be in general disagreement with HACHO policy and personally frustrated with his pay scale. He is skeptical of food for work, on the one hand, while pushing its use for relief. As a means of dissociating himself from a program fraught with complications, he takes a hands-off attitude toward food distribution and work supervision, thereby leaving food for work in the hands of a road foreman, accountant and council leaders. He purposely limits himself to an animateur's role--encouraging community councils to do work regardless of food availability. In fact, road work is generally not done outside of food aid though one group in town has periodically done so. The road foreman is only temporarily assigned to the project. Furthermore, he is not a regular HACHO employee and his salary is paid in food, calculated on the minimum cash value of the food on the open market. In short, management is not only inefficient but openly lends itself to the opportunity for abuse.

These problems are compounded by the fact that no less than 8 community councils are involved in the road project. The situation is highly polarized with both latent and open antagonism among various groups. HACHO's field personnel are unavoidably drawn into the factionalism. The polarization has explicit political overtones since different community leaders have backed competing politicians; furthermore, the groups vary according to class status, especially those associated with townspeople.

The Conseil Communautaire de Terre Neuve is evidently an "official" council: The president is also the town magistrate, attaining the two posts simultaneously about 4 years ago; the treasurer is the local juge de paix, as well as the treasurer of another town grouping known as the Club des Jeunes; the first counselor is the local president of COMAJEC, the second counselor is the secretary of COMAJEC. The council was formed in 1971, composed primarily of town residents. Its leaders are town notables who have never personally worked on the road project although the council has received food for work contracts from HACHO. Since the advent of its current administration, the council has lost many of its members who are described by council leaders as unwilling to work under the magistrate's leadership. There have been some pressures to hold elections but no elections have been called. The council is manifestly upset that HACHO appointed an outsider as foreman for the road project, preferring a former council president for the position. The HACHO animateur perceives the council to be generally ineffective, undemocratic and unrepresentative.

Closely associated with the prominent members of the community council is the Club des Jeunes, a town organization which does not appear to be associated primarily with young people, despite its name. This "club" has raised money as a contribution to the construction of the town marketplace though it has not worked on the project directly. It has also not been a receipient of food for work.

In overt competition with the Conseil Communautaire de Terre Neuve is a more recent organization known as the Union des Ouvriers Agricoles. The Union was formed in 1976 during the year following the accession to power of the new

community council leadership. The very name of this organization dissociates it from the community council. It was founded with the encouragement of a HACHO agronomist in reaction to the ineffectiveness of the older council. The initial period of Union formation involved intervention of government authorities and threats of prison.

The president of the Union des Ouvriers Agricoles is also an officer of CONAJEC as well as being the local Commandant of the VSN (the president has long been a member of the VSN but was named commander only a year ago). He is a landed peasant farmer and town resident, operating the largest of several small stores in town. The Union has an active membership of 265 members, most of whom are rural peasant farmers. About 10 percent are also members of the VSN.

The Union is a tightly disciplined group. Potential members are required to work with the organization for a probationary period of 6 months before being accepted into membership. Member obligations include voluntary weekly donation of one day's work to a Union work project, a monthly dues payment of 1 gourde, and presence at weekly meetings. Fines are levied for unexcused absence from Union activities or dues payment in arrears. Three unexcused absences lead to expulsion. Dues and fines in arrears are surtaxed at the rate of 10 percent interest.

In return for their active participation, Union members derive the following benefits: a grant of $40 cash in case of a death in the family, free agricultural labor in case of illness or unusual hardship (this comes from the Union's weekly workday), the right to borrow money at no interest (1,000 gourdes were reportedly lent to members during the month of August), the right to bring personal disputes to be judged in front of the Union leadership (disputes primarily involve debt payment and grazing violations), access to employment in food for work projects based on alphabetic ordering of the membership lists and the principle of worker rotation.

When the Union gets food for work contracts, members generally work a 5-day week from early morning to late afternoon. A week's pay rate for this schedule amounts to 1 bag of wheat and a half gallon of oil. The Union president and other officers participate along with common members in both the voluntary and paid labor projects. If a member working for food is unable to come due to illness, he is customarily paid for the sick days as well as the days he reported to work.

The availability of food for work plays an unusual role in Union finances. The president and his wife both engage in commerce and have capital available for purchase of PL 480 commodities for re-sale. Consequently, food workers with dues or fines in arrears are able to pay off union debts by selling portions of their food allotment to the president, thereby raining scarce cash. This also has the effect of channelling a ready supply of commodities to the president. There is a certain entrepreneurial advantage to the president in the structure of the situation, an advantage not considered "corrupt" but nevertheless recognized as privilege. The president is subject to criticism from members as well as jealous competitors -- whether for commercial or political reasons; yet the membership repeatedly refuses to call for elections when the question is posed. Meanwhile, members receive a tangible return on their investment in the organization, a factor tending to downplay disaffection from the ranks.

In addition to the Conseil Communautaire de Terre Neuve, the Club des Jeunes, and the Union des Ouvriers Agricoles, there is a fourth community organization known as the "Groupe d'Entretien Volontaire pour les travaux des Routes d'Haiti, Terre Neuve". The founder of this group is a member of another political faction strongly opposing that associated with the Union president and also out of grace with the current magistrate. This landed peasant had supported an unsuccessful candidate for *député* some years ago, and also benefited from a minor patronage job in an earlier magistrate's office. The Groupe d'Entretien was apparently founded with a view to establishing a political base, and as is implied in the title, to do road work in the hope of food payments. It was originally a split-off from the Conseil Communautaire of Terre Neuve. The Groupe claims a membership of some 350 rural farmers but is currently in disarray, and neither meets or works

on any projects. The founder is bitter about not being recognized by the HACHO animateur or the Federation de Conseils Communautaires, and is clearly interested in being approved for food for work payments without which his organization effectively doesn't exist.

Aside from the community organizations associated with the town, there are a number of councils in the surrounding rural areas. Some do food for work on the road, but the bulk of road workers appear to be affiliated with the Union des Ouvriers Agricoles. The HACHO animateur reports working with councils more distant from the town on the basis of genuinely voluntary labor, without hope of food payment, including water projects, soil conservation structures and a rustic dam.

CARE is administering potable water projects in the area, including the use of food for work, material support and technical supervision. Food for work is paid on the basis of its cash value on the open market in order to purchase specialized labor at the going market wage. Masons, for example, are paid a quantity of food equivalent to 4 dollars per day on the basis of wheat valued at 4 dollars per bag and oil at 3 dollars per gallon. Local masons prefer payment in food rather than cash, which is not surprising since the current market value of the food is higher than the market equivalent calculated by CARE. One of the CARE engineers temporarily assigned to the water projects reports that transport of sand and rocks is being paid in food at the rate equivalent of 8 gourdes a day, the minimum legal wage. Another engineer with overall responsibility for the Noel water project reports a budget of $2,000 cash for pipes, cement and plumbing, and a food budget of 70 bags of wheat and 35 gallons of oil. Using CARE's calculation of cash equivalence, the PL 480 component amounts to $385 or about 12 percent of the budget. At the time of this site visit, however, the wholesale market value of the food component in this project actually amounted to about $560, or a cash value some one and a half times that figured by CARE. In any case, the use of food in this manner is geared less to incentive for voluntary labor by community council members, or creation of relief employment, than to creating the structure quickly and with the proper complement of skilled

labor.

Project workers. At the time of this site visit 90 workers were observed on the Terre Neuve road project--two thirds of them from the Union des Ouvriers Agricoles. The remaining workers were associated with the community council of Rocher, a rural zone outside of Terre Neuve.

Fourteen members of the Union were interviewed at the work site. Almost all of them live in rural areas surrounding the town of Terre Neuve and walk from 5 to 8 kilometers to arrive at the work project. All are peasant farmers and all except one of those interviewed do agriculture wage labor for other farmers. A number of workers migrate seasonally in search of wage labor, especially to the rice growing areas of the Artibonite (weeding, harvest) and to the Anse Rouge-Port à Piment-Bonal coastal port area, loading boats during the months of March and October.

Almost all of the interviewees are mature men with several dependents, but only a small minority have managed to purchase land. Half are virtually landless, slightly less than half farm inherited land, none farm land units in excess of 1½ carreaux. The vast majority depend on rented land--the most common form of rent being the fem requiring an annual payment in cash. In short, these Union members are worker-peasants constituting a distinctly land-poor class of smallholders. The summer and early fall time period is a slack season for agricultural wage labor, giving the current road project considerable justification from the standpoint of creating employment.

Local wages for agricultural work are about 3 gourdes for a 6-hour work day. The most common form of wage labor is the bout zeb--a contract arrangement where the work is divided into 2 gourde portions, e.g., one farmer near Terre Neuve recently spent 14 gourdes for 5 workers working bout zeb during a 5 hour work day. Individual wage labor arrangements appear to be more common than paid labor gangs, although both mazinga societies and anonyé wage labor groupings are present in the area.

The food for work ration generally paid works out to about the same rate of pay as the prevailing wage for agricultural labor. Some workers express a certain preference for working bout zeb rather than food for work -- strictly on the grounds that food payments involve delays of varying lengths of time whereas bout zeb are customarily paid the same day the work is accomplished. Consequently some road workers report borrowing money at interest in order to meet pressing cash needs while awaiting food payment, paying 20 percent interest for a 2 week loan.

There is good reason to believe that the agricultural potential of these peasant workers is severely restrained by capital scarcity. This pushes them to seek wage labor to meet basic food consumption needs during times of scarcity. Beyond consumption requirements, the desire to accumulate scarce cash for investment in agriculture is a motivation commonly expressed for working on the road project. Capital availability is a key factor in both cropping patterns and the sheer amount of land under cultivation in any given household, whether for land purchase, land rentals, or the larger capital requirements of cash cropping. In short, the primary interest on the part of the road workers is availability of employment, not the benefits of the road itself. Secondarily, some workers mention the increased marketing potential for local fruits with the opening up of the road to commercial traffic.

Foot trails effectively incorporate the area into the national grain market. One could conjecture however, that Terre Neuve might be subject to a temporary enclave effect in the event of a bumper crop of corn, for example, with a transportation system (donkey) too small in volume and too expensive to haul it out of the area. In such a case, a commercially viable road could affect the production and marketing of grain as well as the more bulky and perishable fruit harvest. On the basis of other sites visited, it is also possible to conjecture that a commercially viable road might spark rapidly increased levels of deforestation due to urban demand for wood fuels.

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APPENDIX I

Further notes on gathering data. In addition to examining projects in light of their stated objectives, projects were observed with a view to gathering data pertinent to the following issues of special interest to the AID Mission:

1) The question of relative efficiency in doing labor-intensive work with food aid and/or cash payment.

2) Material aid and the issue of incentive and disincentive to agricultural production.

3) The question of management: general administration: labor recruitment, training & supervision: control and distribution of resources.

4) The community council movement: material resources as incentive or disincentive to community organization; relations of community councils to agencies and residents; distribution of project benefits in terms of work generated and assets created.

Information was gathered primarily by observation and wide-ranging interviews with local residents, workers, council members, agency and government personnel. Interviews allowed for open ended responses to questions and ample opportunity for follow-up queries. Interviews were taken in the language most comfortable to those being interviewed, usually Haitian Creole, sometimes French and occasionally English

By way of illustration, the following questions were used in interviewing some 60 project workers receiving food for work (these queries were addressed in idiomatic Creole, and were used in the report as a basis for discussing social and geographic origins of workers, their relations to project benefits and to sponsoring community councils): Where were you born? Where do you presently live? How long have you been working on this project? Who gave you the work assignment? Are you a community council member? Are you the head of a family? How many children do you have? Do you work as a wage laborer outside of this work project? Have you purchased land? Do you work inherited land? shapecropped land? Assessment of size of land unit. Age assessment.

APPENDIX II

AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES FOR GRAIN
PORT-AU-PRINCE MARKET
CENTS PER POUNDS

Year	Actual Reported Retail Price	Hypothetical Import Price: (World Market Price Plus 3.5 ¢/Lb. For Transport, Handling and Retail Mark-up.)
	CORN	
	Domestic	U.S. Yellow #2
1973	9.0	7.9
1974	8.2	9.5
1975	11.2	8.9
1976	8.9	8.6
1977	N.A. **	7.8
1978	7.7	8.1
1979	9.7	8.7
	RICE	
	Ti Fidele	Thai White 5% Brok.
1973	18.9	17.7
1974	18.5	29.3
1975	22.9	20.0
1976	21.6	15.0
1977	N.A. **	15.8
1978	20.0	20.1
1979*	22.3	17.9

* 8 Months

** Drought Year - Prices were high

APPENDIX III

Table A. PL 480 Budget of Title II Foods during Fiscal Year 1980 in Haiti, by PVO.

Agency	Dollar Value	% by $	Metric Tons	% by volume
CARE	3,428,120	52	12,272	51
CRS	1,425,489	21	5,184	22
CWS	913,945	14	3,256	14
SAWS	880,841	13	3,078	13
Total	6,648,395	100	23,790	100

Table B. PL 480 Budget of Food for Work in Haiti during Fiscal Year 1980. Percent by Agency of Title II.

Food for Work Program	% of Title II	Percent by PVO Program			
		CARE	CRS	CWS	SAWS
90,000 Recipients	19	19	21	16	20
7,084 Metric Tons	30	29	41	28	29
1,796,432 Dollar Value	26	25	37	26	29

Table C. PL 480 Budget of Food for Work in Haiti, Percent Change in Numbers of Recipients between 1977 and 1981.

Fiscal Year	Number of Recipients	Percent Change from Previous Year
1977	83,750	----
1978	91,250	Up 9%
1979	94,500	Up 3%
1980	90,000	Down 5%
1981	89,000	Down 1%

Source: USAID/Haiti Food for Peace Office

CARE - Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CRS - Catholic Relief Services
CWS - Church World Service
SAWS - Seventh Day Adventist World Service
PVO - Private Voluntary Organization

APPENDIX IV

GUIDE DE BAREMES POUR "FOOD FOR WORK"

(Fondation CARE)

TYPES DE TRAVAUX	VALEUR
AGRICULTURE	
Pour les canaux d'irrigation ou de drainag	: Homme/jour = 1m^3
Pour les constructions de mur sec (conservation de sol)	: Homme/jour = 1.5 m^3
Pour le labourage de terre a la houe.	: Homme/jour = 1.5 m^3
Pour la protection de sols par sillons	: Homme/jour - 1 m^3
Pour le reboisement	: Homme/jour = 36.36 m^2
CONSTRUCTION	
Pour les construction de mur maconne (Ecoles, Hopital, etc...)	: Homme/jour = 0.5 m^3
Pour creuser la fondation d'un edifice (faire les fouilles)	: Homme/jour = 1 m^3
Pour tranporter les materiaux de construction: moins d'un Km	: Homme/jour = 0.5 m^3
1 - 10 Kms	: Homme/jour = 0.4 m^3
Plus que 10 Kms	: Homme/jour = 0.3 m^3
Pour transporter l'eau pour construction	: Homme/jour = ½ baril/jour
ROUTES	
Pour le deblai d'une site	: Homme/jour = 1 m^3
Pour le deboisement (longueur X largeur)	: Homme/jour = 6 m^2
Pour l'empierrement de route (remblai)	: Homme/jour = 1.5 m^3
Pour le terrassement de route ou d'une cour	: Homme/jour = 1.5 m^3
Pour le revetement en sable our gravier	: Homme/jour = 1.5 m^3