


PD-AAI-399

633-0069
6330069001801

①

UNITED STATES
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

THE
INSPECTOR
GENERAL



Regional Inspector General for Audit
NAIROBI

AUDIT OF THE SOUTHERN
AFRICA MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Audit Report No.
3-633-81-06

Dated
March 31, 1981

AUDIT OF THE SOUTHERN
AFRICA MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i - iv
BACKGROUND	1
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland	1 - 2
General Manpower Constraints	2
Project Development	3
AUDIT FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	4
Contract AID/afr-C-1569	4
Funding	5
Documentation of Expenditures	6
Combined Field Support	7
Operational Expert (OPEX) Personnel	8
Recruitment Criteria	9
Demonstrated Need	10
Employment Agreement	11
Evaluation	12
Non-SAMDP Recruitment	13
Participant Training	14
SAAST, SAMDP Integration	14
Third-Country Training	16
Participant Selection	17
English Proficiency	19
Predeparture Orientation	20
Follow-up Activities	22
EXHIBIT A - Acronyms Used in Report	
EXHIBIT B - List of Recommendations	
Report Recipients	

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The pervasive and limiting constraint to further development by the countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) is in the area of skilled manpower. This lack of skilled manpower both slows the rate and breadth of development and is a major drain on foreign exchange because of the need to employ expatriates. The extraordinary presence of expatriate or non-African personnel distinguishes this area from other regions in Africa.

The Southern Africa Manpower Development Project (SAMDP) was designed to reduce this critical manpower constraint in the BLS countries. SAMDP placed operational expert (OPEX) personnel in selected positions within the local government structure while counterpart replacements were being trained. It also provided on-the-job training to nationals currently employed in the specified areas. Under contract to AID, Trans Century Corporation recruited and administratively supported the OPEX personnel, while the Phelps-Stokes Fund handled the counterparts' participant training program.

Initially planned as a regional project, SAMDP was later divided into three projects for separate implementation by the BLS USAIDs. The Southern Africa Academic and Skills Training Project, which emphasized general graduate education in the U.S. and Africa, became integrated into and funded under SAMDP in 1980.

Purpose and Scope

Our review of SAMDP covered FY 1978 to November 7, 1980. In addition to OPEXers recruited by Trans Century to work in SAMDP, we also examined OPEXers recruited by Trans Century's predecessor (Institute for International Education) and contractors recruited by Trans Century to work on non-SAMDP projects. The purpose of our examination was to:

- Determine the status and effectiveness of management.
- Verify compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
- Identify and report on any significant problem areas.

We reviewed official AID files and held discussions with USAID personnel in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. (This work under AID contract by Trans Century was also extended to Malawi after the contract was executed. We did not include this effort in the scope of this review, however.) At each USAID we reviewed management procedures and controls, records and reports. In addition, we interviewed numerous OPEX personnel and host-country and other donor agency officials.

Responses to the Findings

Our findings were discussed with the responsible USAID officials as they were being developed. Our final findings were formally transmitted to USAIDs in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in separate exit conferences held on November 7, 12, and 17, 1980, respectively. A draft report was also provided to each USAID. Comments from these officials have been considered and incorporated into this report where considered applicable.

Despite use of a single contract to provide SAMDP support, SAMDP remains three separate projects in three different countries. Each of the BLS USAIDs has attempted to tailor the project to best assist its respective host government's development. This custom tailoring has consequently introduced a certain amount of variation in individual project implementation. We believe, however, that the BLS countries and the SAMDP projects remain sufficiently similar to warrant their inclusion in a single, consolidated audit report.

Discussions with USAID officials, as well as the documentation they provided, greatly facilitated the review. Many of the issues addressed in this report were known by these officials before audit.

Major Conclusions

SAMDP seems an effective method of temporarily meeting certain critical manpower shortages in the BLS countries, although at no small cost. It provides short term expatriate personnel to meet the scarcity of trained manpower identified as the major constraint to development in the Southern African countries. Long term results will depend more on the strengthening of the basic BLS educational systems than the continued provision of OPEXers.

Basic problems encountered in SAMDP's implementation include: use of the OPEX contractual mechanism, change from a requirements to cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, and the treatment of the BLS countries as a single entity for operational purposes. In our opinion, project success has been further hindered by the limited spread effects resulting from the lack of sufficiently qualified counterpart personnel.

More significant findings of the SAMDP audit follow:

AID/Washington requested contract funding from each of the USAIDs based on a contract to be negotiated in Washington. Upon learning the actual amount of the contract, the USAIDs did not adjust their original funding levels. Each USAID has overfunded the contract by \$129,786 (pages 4-6).

Most of the home office support costs under the contract concern activities conducted in Washington, away from USAID scrutiny. Trans Century had only occasionally provided enough expense documentation for the USAIDs to understand or control its home office expenses, and then, at the USAIDs request. Trans Century plans to provide more information in the future (pages 6-7).

Despite varying numbers of contractors and participant trainees, each USAID pays an equal share of home office expenses. A Trans Century Field Representative, stationed in Botswana, does not provide equal service to all the USAIDs (pages 7-8).

Contractors have been recruited and placed in operation without meeting all the necessary criteria for their employment. Many contractors are working without adequate counterpart personnel either on the job or in training (pages 8-11).

Contractors have been recruited to work for the host-country government without always obtaining an employment agreement with that government. In addition, the terms and conditions of the Trans Century employment agreement place its legal validity and consequent enforceability in considerable doubt (pages 11-12).

The concerned countries are confronted with critical manpower shortages. In our opinion, there is considerable doubt about the long-term effects of this project on those shortages which needs to be promptly evaluated (pages 12-13).

The USAIDs are using the Trans Century contract as a general recruitment device for more projects than it was intended. This use is not only legally questionable but likely to result in higher project costs in the future (pages 13-14).

The USAIDs have combined a limited funded general manpower training project with a project with more generous funding and stringent criteria. This has produced a large, general manpower training project. This development seems to conflict with AID's Congressional Mandate and emphasis on basic education (pages 14-16).

The use of Phelps-Stokes was intended to assist in the placement of many participants in third world (primarily African) training institutions. Despite continued promises, Phelps-Stokes has yet to place a single participant in one of the aforementioned training institutions (pages 16-17).

Deficient educational infrastructures in the BLS countries produced a very limited number of candidates qualified for further training. The competition among several donor agencies for participant training candidates has led to the lowering of qualifications of those actually selected. The USAIDs need to maintain stringent candidate selection criteria to make the best use of available training funds (pages 17-19).

BACKGROUND

Botswana

The Republic of Botswana is about the size of Texas (568,580 square kilometers (Sq.Km.)) and has a population of nearly 785,000 people. A flat and sparsely populated land, it is dominated geographically by the Kalahari Desert. The traditional people of the land (the Batswana) were cattle-raisers, who lived in self-sufficient communities under chiefs. Settling on the edges of the country, the Batswana had no center of population or major city until approximately ten years ago when Gabarone, the capital, was established. In the 1960's, under the influence of Christian missionaries, the people requested British protection and the land became the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Independence was not gained until 1966.

While Botswana is basically an agricultural country, newly discovered mineral resources and large diamond mines have provided new resources for economic development. The primary language in Botswana is Setswana and education is compulsory through Grade 7. Although many of the schools are administered by church missions, government or government-aided schools are growing in number. The central government pays teachers' salaries and is responsible for setting and administering the syllabuses. The government spends nearly 23% of its total budget on education.

Lesotho

Somewhat larger than Maryland (30,333 sq. km.), the kingdom of Lesotho is a stark, mountainous country completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa (RSA). Lesotho has a population of more than 1.2 million, with up to 200,000 Basutho (about 40% of the adult male population) working in the RSA. Known as Basutoland under the British, Lesotho became an independent member of the British Commonwealth in 1966. The Basutho people were, and still are, primarily herders. With less than 13% of its land arable, there is relatively little agricultural production in the country. The primary language is Sesotho and much of the population live in small family units far distant from their neighbors.

The diffuse population has made it difficult to establish centrally located schools. Much of the formal education system is still run by church missions, even though the State has been involved in education since the 1920s. Being among the world's 30 least developed countries, Lesotho lacks the resources to make education compulsory. The government spends almost 22% of its total budget on education.

Swaziland

About the size of Hawaii (17,363 sq.km.), the Kingdom of Swaziland is the second smallest country in Africa. It has a population of close to 575,000 of which approximately 15,000 work in the neighboring RSA. This multi-regional country is very fertile and displays all type of geographic formations from mountains to plains. It obtained independence in 1968. Of all the former British South African Colonies, Swaziland has the richest renewable resources, which provide substantial income from exports.

The traditionally oriented Swazis live in small independent family units. Primarily agriculturists, they speak SeSwati and are ruled by the world's longest reigning monarch. While there is no compulsory education in Swaziland, the government is working to achieve universal primary education by 1985. The government spends approximately 18% of the total budget on education.

General Manpower Constraints

There are vocational, agricultural and teacher training schools at the secondary or higher education levels in each of the three countries -- Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS). However in each case they are not preparing a sufficient number of students to meet the manpower needs of the country. Similarly although each country has an institution of higher learning, the universities are very small and do not have the facilities or staff to educate enough students.

The BLS countries are years behind other developing countries in their availability of trained manpower. One of the prime characteristics of the BLS countries is their tradition of dependence on expatriate personnel.

Until 1948, the British had anticipated that the BLS countries would eventually be incorporated into the RSA and did not provide extensive training opportunities for BLS nationals.^{1/} The BLS countries thus were among the very last British protectorates to gain independence and they had few trained leaders ready to immediately assume the responsibilities of self-government. (At independence, only 35 Botswana had even a B.A. degree).

High drop-out rates throughout elementary and secondary school have impeded the BLS countries' efforts to meet growing needs for trained manpower. In addition, the educational curriculum has been criticized as irrelevant

^{1/} The formal adoption of apartheid by the RSA in 1948 politically eliminated any chance for the RSA to incorporate within its boundaries the BLS countries.

to the demands of the labor market. The resultant accelerating unemployment of unskilled workers has been only partially alleviated by temporary employment in the RSA.

The obvious and all-pervasive nature of the Southern African manpower problem cuts across all sectors of economic activity and is the chief obstacle to the development process in every area stressed by the Congressional Mandate, AID policy and USAID programs in the BLS countries.

Project Development

The Southern African Development Personnel and Training Project (SADPT) was designed in response to a request for assistance in manpower development jointly made by the BLS governments. The project focused on the necessary link between the provision of U.S. advisory assistance and the training of local national replacements to provide long-term benefits. Begun in fiscal year (FY) 1973, the project was phased-out in FY 1978.

A mid-project evaluation of SADPT in 1976 indicated that the project had made an appreciable difference in the capacity and quality of operations in the organizational units where operational expert (OPEX) advisors were functioning. It appeared to be accomplishing more in training personnel and upgrading organizational capability than most other donor-assisted programs.

The Southern Africa Manpower Development Project (SAMDP) was developed in FY 1978 to strengthen and continue the development processes begun under SADPT. It was intended to accelerate localization of key positions in BLS governments by providing practical in-country training and advanced overseas course work for counterparts -- offering the services of OPEX personnel to manage the immediate public sector needs while nationals were being trained as replacements as well as to provide on-the-job training.

The Southern Africa Academic Skills Training project (SAAST) was designed to finance graduate, undergraduate and specialized non-degree training in the U.S. and Africa for nationals of the BLS countries and Zambia. Emphasizing graduate training, SAAST meant to provide a broad upgrading of government manpower reserves. In 1980 the functions of SAAST were integrated into and became funded under SAMDP.

Southern Africa^{2/} is the only region in AID currently using the OPEX employment mechanism. These OPEX personnel are recruited and given administrative support by Trans Century Corporation under AID contract Afr-c-1569.

^{2/} In addition to the BLS countries, Malawi recruited and employed one OPEX personnel under a SAMDP amendment.

Created by the former Deputy Director of the Peace Corps in 1967, Trans Century is a Washington, D.C. based consulting firm servicing a social science research and international development clientele. Its initial focus was on efficient operation of social action programs, job training for the disadvantaged, adult remedial education, and community and youth development projects.

A major source used in Trans Century's recruitment efforts was a job opportunities bulletin. This bulletin listed employment possibilities with any organization seeking qualified professionals for international service. (The service was provided free -- under a separate grant from AID -- to private and voluntary organizations currently active in third world development.)

Trans Century subcontracted to the Phelps-Stokes Fund its responsibilities under SAMDP to provide long- and short-term participant training in the U.S. or in African countries at post-secondary institutions.

Since its founding in 1911 when the Phelps-Stokes Fund became the first foundation in the U.S. with a charter commitment to African education, the organization has stressed the importance of African-American cultural exchange and cooperation. Phelps-Stokes has a group of some 67 U.S. universities which form its constituency in higher education. It also operates: a Southern African Refugee Scholarship Program (under separate AID funding), an African-American Professors Exchange (Department of State funded), and an African Student Aid Fund. A non-profit organization, Phelps-Stokes accepts and actively seeks tax deductible gifts from individual, corporate and foundation donors.

AUDIT FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Contract AID/afr-C-1569

Contract AID/afr-C-1569 (hereinafter SAMDP contract) was designed to supply expatriate personnel to the BLS countries to fill manpower needs within the governments, while at the same time providing long and short term training for nationals of the participating countries to eventually replace the expatriate personnel. Drawn up in AID/Washington after a lengthy period of negotiation, the contract is due to expire August 31, 1981, two years after execution.

The total cost of the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is \$2,010,641. Although the USAID/Botswana Mission Director is the Contracting Officer, each USAID has separate financial and implementation responsibilities. The USAID/Botswana Mission Director can amend the contract (without approval from

the other USAIDs) and approved and forward data on all personnel recruited for OPEX positions and candidates nominated for participant training opportunities outside the BLS countries.

The contractor selected to recruit and provide administrative support to OPEX personnel in the BLS countries was Trans Century Corporation. Trans Century subcontracted to Phelps-Stokes its responsibilities to identify and provide long and short term participant training opportunities for selected BLS candidates at post-secondary institutions in the U.S. or in African countries.

Funding

The SAMDP contract was written and negotiated in AID/Washington with little specific input provided by USAIDs in the BLS countries. The USAIDs had wanted a contractual mechanism whereby selected technical experts could be recruited and placed in certain host country institutions without the necessity of providing the full range of support normally associated with AID contractor personnel who work on specific projects.

The USAIDs had previously operated under an area-wide OPEX recruitment system with Near East Foundation, and then the Institute for International Education (IIE). These were requirements contracts under which a specific fee was charged a USAID for each OPEXer recruited.

Several months after the expiration of the recruitment contract with IIE,^{3/} AID signed a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with Trans Century for \$2,010,641. In contrast to the pay-as-you-go method for actual recruitment under a requirements-type contract, the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract mandated initial funding of the core contract (the amount used for home office and common-support expenses) based on a prospective level of eventual OPEX recruitment.

Without having had an opportunity to review the contract with Trans Century --- or even having been advised that the OPEX recruitment method had changed from a requirements to a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis -- the BLS Missions were requested by AID/Washington to earmark \$800,000 each in a Project Implementation Order/Technical Services (PIO/T) to fund the contract. Despite considerable protests and some initial confusion, each Mission did eventually earmark the requested \$800,000.

When the respective USAIDs finally received a copy of the SAMDP contract and learned that the actual contract cost was \$2,010,641, no action was taken to reduce the amount of funding. This, despite the fact that each Mission had overfunded its portion of the SAMDP contract by \$129,786.

^{3/} The interval between the IIE and Trans Century contracts caused the BLS Missions considerable difficulties. Promised recruits were unable to be fully paid and further OPEX recruitment ceased.

We believe that this excess funding represents both a poor use of AID monies and an improper financial control device. The SAMDP contract funding needs to be reduced to permit a reallocation of funds to other priority areas.

Recommendation No. 1

USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, each reduce the amount of funding for the SAMDP contract by \$129,786.

In response to our draft report, not all the BLS USAIDs agree with this recommendation, noting that increased contract costs may later require the use of this excess funding. It was our view, however, that such cost increases should be met if and when they arise, and that adequate financial controls counseled the recommended course of action. USAID/Lesotho, however, acceded to our position in this regard; thus, we have annotated our records to show this recommendation as closed as it pertains to USAID/Lesotho.

Documentation of Expenditures

Under the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract entered into between AID and Trans Century, Trans Century submits periodic vouchers to receive reimbursements of funds expended under SAMDP. Trans Century submitted monthly vouchers to each of the USAIDs in the BLS countries for reimbursement of salary and fringe benefit payments (including medical expenses, dependent education and travel allowances) made to the various OPEXers.^{4/}

Trans Century also submitted monthly vouchers to USAID/Botswana for home office expenses incurred by both Trans Century and Phelps-Stokes in administering SAMDP (core contract). The amounts for reimbursement were listed in a very summary fashion, including headings for: home office salaries, home office fringe (sic), allowances and other direct costs. The reimbursement requested for the Phelps-Stokes subcontract did not even provide this cursory breakdown -- only a lump sum amount was mentioned.

No explanations or detailed break-down were presented for the various expenditures. Nor was USAID/Botswana or the Trans Century Field Representative able to explain what activities were covered by the listings.

Billings for OPEXers were listed in separate vouchers to the various USAIDs where the OPEXers worked and were indirectly supervised by the respective

^{4/} Although the OPEXers are paid and indirectly supervised by both AID and Trans Century, Trans Century maintains that the OPEXers are independent contractors and not their employees -- even in cases in which OPEXers have no employment contract with, and are not paid by, the host country government.

AID Missions. This allowed sufficient oversight and scrutiny for the USAIDs to administratively approve the vouchers for OPEX salary reimbursements.

The vouchers for the core costs submitted to USAID/Botswana covered expenses incurred largely for work done in Washington, D.C. USAID/Botswana had almost no way of knowing the actual hours worked or home office expenses incurred in Washington, D.C. The amounts of these vouchers were at times in excess of \$160,000 per month and varied from month to month by as much as \$90,000.

This lack of documentation prevented not only the examination and approval of authorized expenditures but any analysis of the rate of contract spending. (There is some evidence to suggest that the funds provided for the contract may be exhausted before the end of the contract period.)

We believe the information provided to USAID/Botswana in vouchers covering Trans Century's and Phelps-Stokes' home office expenses is inadequate for AID management control purposes. The information available is considered insufficient to allow USAID/Botswana to administratively approve the vouchers in question. However, in a visit paid to the Trans Century Washington, D.C. office by a member of our audit staff, we also learned that Trans Century's books and records are regularly audited by USG auditors as regards indirect cost rates, which were provisionally approved by AID based on the results of these regular reviews.

Trans Century has done business with AID for some time, nor is this its only or even largest AID contract in force at the moment. Thus, any question that might arise as to the propriety of charges vouchered by Trans Century (and none have arisen to date nor are they implied in this report) would center on the direct costs incurred under this contract. As the contract is soon due to expire, the issue of adequate documentation must now be considered moot, and better left to the results of post-audit. Trans Century has also formally advised us that it intends to provide more information with its vouchers in the future.

At the same time, however, we would suggest to USAID/Botswana, as the cognizant contracting office, that, in the event this contract is renewed or extended, the present contractor level of effort be made the subject of detailed review. However, we do not feel that there is adequate cause to make a formal recommendation on this matter at this time.

Combined Field Support

In December 1979 Trans Century stationed a Field Representative in Gaborone, Botswana to assist in the provision of services required under the SAMDP contract. Although intended under the SAMDP contract to select or design in-country programs, the Field Representative devotes the majority of his

efforts to providing administrative support to the OPEXers already employed in the BLS countries. He also provides a direct communications link to the home office of Trans Century and Phelps-Stokes in Washington, D.C. (To assist him in Lesotho, one person has been hired on a part-time basis to meet arriving OPEXers, ensure that living arrangements have been provided and conduct a basic in-country orientation briefing.)

Although the Field Representative spends the vast majority of his time in Botswana, he does occasionally travel to both Lesotho and Swaziland (about two weeks to each country every quarter). He meets with the respective USAIDs and attempts to resolve any outstanding problems affecting either OPEXers or participant trainees.

The BLS Missions all pay an equal (one-third) share of the costs of the SAMDP contract. They do not feel, however, that they all receive an equal amount of support under the contract. For various reasons, USAID/Botswana has a larger number of OPEXers and participant trainees in country than either USAID/Lesotho or USAID/Swaziland and this would appear to justify stationing the Field Representative here. For the USAID Missions communication and information is more rapidly received through direct communication with Trans Century's headquarters in Washington, D.C.

Most of the administrative and procedural difficulties that plagued operational inception of the SAMDP contract have now been resolved. Part-time personnel seem to adequately meet temporary needs of arriving OPEXers.

Recommendation No. 2

USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, (a) carefully examine the need for the continued presence overseas of a Trans Century Field Representative, and (b) develop a more equitable allocation of support costs under the SAMDP contract.

While one of the USAIDs has noted its agreement with part (b) of the recommendation, another advised us that this point will be specifically addressed in a forthcoming evaluation of this project. We therefore anticipate an early response to this recommendation.

Operational Expert (OPEX) Personnel

OPEX personnel are employees of the host government but receive additional salary (topping-up) and support from the sponsoring donor. Recruited in

conjunction with the host country and the sponsoring donor, OPEXers receive a percentage of their salary from the host country and are considered to be direct hire employees of the host government. Their assignment is only temporary (generally less than four years), since local counterparts are to be trained during that period -- both on the job and at selected institutions -- for one specific purpose of replacing OPEXers or their function. (Several counterparts may be trained to replace one OPEXer.)

The BLS countries are the main countries where AID is using the OPEX contractual mechanism. Under a model basic OPEX contract, AID can respond to government requests for a specific type of expertise within a relatively short time period.

OPEXers in SAMDP are employed in a variety of positions in the BLS countries including: Director of the Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining; Manpower Planner; Financial Controller; and Commissioner of Lands.

Recruitment Criteria

Trans Century is responsible for OPEX recruitment under SAMDP. The usual process begins when the host country submits a specific request for a technical expert. If approved by the Mission, the host government request along with desired qualifications and other descriptive material is sent to Trans Century for recruitment.

Trans Century generally ranks and nominates four candidates for each such request. The nomination and candidate qualification sheets are sent to the USAID which presents it to the host country for decision. Trans Century then attempts to recruit the selected candidate.

In most instances the candidates nominated and eventually selected (which have sometimes been the host country's second or third choice) appeared to be well-qualified for their assignments. Competency questions that arose generally concerned those instances where candidates were specifically identified and recruited by the USAID, and Trans Century merely signed a contract with them.

Occasionally the USAIDs have specifically identified and recruited candidates already working in the host country. Among these candidates were several former U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers, who continued their employment within the host country at a much higher OPEX salary for doing jobs very similar to their Peace Corps functions, and several technicians whose funding from other donors had ceased. While the propriety of paying these individuals a much larger salary as 'experts' for doing jobs similar to ones they performed as volunteers, may be questionable, the BLS Missions feel that the USAIDs have obtained a good deal of job and host country experience at relatively economical prices.

Demonstrated Need

OPEX personnel were to be provided only after both the host country and AID were satisfied that precise criteria for meeting development needs were met. SAMDP's five standards in this regard were that the proposed OPEX training and position be:

- Clearly within AID's development mandate and the host country's development priorities.
- Strategically placed in a key development-oriented institution so as to play significant roles in improving its performance.
- Precisely defined as to purpose and duration.
- Consonant with an established host government position.
- Associated with available, qualified counterparts prepared to participate.

Our review showed that these standards have not always been satisfied. OPEXers have been assigned jobs as: accountants, chemists, ophthalmologists, procurement managers and computer technicians. While not precisely within AID's mandate, these positions have been used by the USAIDs to strengthen the implementation or monitoring responsibilities of certain host government institutions that play a predominant role in various other AID projects. The USAIDs have been hampered in this effort by changing responsibilities of some host government organizations where OPEXers were earlier placed.

Many OPEXers have been placed in positions with very ill-defined job descriptions. They have frequently drafted their own scope of work or job description and attached it to their contract. (Some OPEXers had formal job descriptions which they had never seen.) Most had two-year contracts with an option to renew for an additional two years.

OPEXers are not always placed in established positions. This prevents them from receiving any host country salary or counterpart personnel to train. The OPEXers who receive all of their salary from AID (through Trans Century) become a practically cost-free addition to host government personnel rolls. Because they are not replaced at the end of their assignment by host country personnel, there exists a lack of continuity in the expertise they provided the host country.

The most glaring deficiency in the OPEX process has been the lack of available qualified counterparts prepared to participate under the SAMDP project. Counterparts sent to the U.S. for long-term training (up to five years in some cases) frequently do not even meet the OPEXers whose job they will later assume. Local personnel intended for on-the-job training frequently have such limited expertise as to negate the full training value of the OPEXer.

An early concern of SAMDP was the lack of spread effects inherent in the project. The USAIDs attempted to increase the project's spread effects with increased counterpart staffing and on-the-job training. The increased USAID counterpart staffing requirements in certain areas have caused occasionally bitter exchanges with other donors who believe that USAID requirements have dominated the few available counterparts in the BLS countries.

We believe that SAMDP will have only minimal spread effects unless the criteria for OPEX recruitment and placement are more stringently met. The difficulty of meeting the OPEX recruitment criteria and the pressing need for OPEX personnel in the BLS countries seem to have coalesced to produce less than optimal OPEX utilization.

Recommendation No. 3

USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, develop more precise and complete criteria for the recruitment and provision of future OPEX personnel.

Employment Agreement

Each OPEXer has an agreement with Trans Century to provide salary supplements and administrative support. The contractor received a salary supplement based on a certain negotiated amount^{5/} from which the host country payment has been subtracted. He/she also received various other allowances and administrative support benefits.

The agreement for topping up salary and administrative support states that it is not effective until the employment agreement (with the host country) has been executed. The agreement also contains many provisions which are left to the sole and unreviewable discretion of Trans Century including: reimbursement to the contractor for travel to and from the U.S. for him and his dependents, payment of salary in certain situations and assignment of the agreement itself. In addition, Trans Century removes itself from liability for any injury to person or property that may result from any cause whatsoever.

^{5/} The amount is based primarily on the contractor's last salary to which is added an overseas incentive of 10% and a payment in lieu of retirement benefits of 7%. In certain cases when the contractor is reluctant to accept the salary determined by the above formula or has no base salary previously earned, Trans Century conducts a pay comparability study which attempts to determine the salary level that the particular individual doing the assigned job would command in the U.S. To this salary is added the 10% and 7% additional benefits.

Most OPEXers had not signed employment agreements with the host country until some time after the agreement had been signed with Trans Century. In some cases several months elapsed without a signed employment agreement -- in Swaziland no employment agreement had yet been signed because of delays encountered in finalizing the general contract form. Although the situation in Botswana and Lesotho was not as serious as in Swaziland, in all three countries we found instances of a lack of individual employment agreements.

Several amendments have been signed to the contract which allegedly affect earlier signed agreements. When OPEXers in Botswana were given general salary increases by the Government of Botswana, an amendment to the contract was signed which attempted to reduce OPEX salaries by the amount of the increase.

We are concerned that the Trans Century employment agreement might be viewed as so over-reaching or unconscionable as to be declared without effect should it ever be legally tested. We are also concerned about the number of contractors with no defined employment status and the validity of amendments signed after an employment agreement. We are aware of several instances where the legality of the employment agreements may need to be judicially determined.

Recommendation No. 4

USAID/Botswana, USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, ensure that employment agreements are signed immediately between the host country and OPEXers currently in-country, and that a system is devised to require all OPEXers to sign such an agreement within 30 days after arrival in-country.

Recommendation No. 5

RLA/REDSO/EA determine the validity of the Trans Century employment agreement and the effect of subsequent amendments on specific agreements and redraft the contract and amendments into a single, integrated document.

Evaluation

SAMDIP was designed to assist the BLS governments in alleviating the constraints to development imposed by the extreme shortage of trained manpower in the public sector. It was not meant to substitute for, or even compare to, a manpower training project in the AID sense of the term. Strengthening

the capacity and capability of an in-country training institution or organization would necessarily be required to make a more sizeable self-sustaining impact.

The numbers of contract technicians provided by the various USAIDs is inherently inadequate to meet the tremendous shortage of trained manpower in the BLS countries. Although their numbers are decreasing, there are generally more expatriate personnel (and their numbers remain large) employed in the BLS countries (although their numbers vary considerably in each case) than at the time of independence. (In response to our draft report, USAID/Botswana stated that at least part of the increase in expatriate personnel was due to the rapid growth of the economy in these countries.) SAMDP cannot even hope to localize the large number of expatriate positions, much less meet the existing but unfilled needs for more personnel.

One of the SAMDP end-of-project indicators to be achieved at the end of the five year project (as listed in the Project Paper) is the maintenance of a high level operational efficiency of host country offices with OPEX staff while counterparts are being trained to assume or resume responsibilities. Similarly, a listed output indicator is a sustained or improved level of operational efficiency in government departments in which OPEX technicians serve. Apparently, the project design team intended SAMDP-supplied OPEXers to continue to function after the project had ended.

We believe that the critical manpower shortages facing the BLS countries are only temporarily met by the provision of short term OPEX technicians. This is illustrated in the short term goals and expectations reflected in the project design. We feel that greater stress and attention need to be placed on strengthening host-country institutions, particularly at the more basic educational levels. We understand this issue will be addressed in a forthcoming evaluation of this project. Consequently, we are making no recommendation on this matter.

Non-SAMDP Recruitment

The BLS countries are the main countries where AID is currently using the OPEX contractual mechanism. It may be an appropriate device to meet special situations of manpower shortages in several professional disciplines at the same time.

The OPEX contract signed with Trans Century seems to encompass obligations only under SAMDP. The contract contains specific levels of recruitment, support and training which are to be provided under the project.

The BLS USAIDs have been recruiting technicians for projects other than SAMDP under the OPEX contract, however. (In fact, all of the Trans Century OPEXers in Swaziland at the time of our audit worked on a project rather than SAMDP.) The USAIDs used this method of obtaining technical services because the types of skills required are not known to exist at any one

institution, full institutional back-stopping is not required, and use of the established recruitment mechanism would obviate the need for a new contract and greatly facilitate project implementation.

Trans Century itself has voiced no objection to recruiting other technicians through the SAMDP contract. It has even given oral approval for an unspecified amount of additional recruitments. Informal approval for this form of contract utilization has also been received from AID/Washington.

This closed recruitment process seems to eliminate many of the safeguards installed through an open, competitive bidding system. While currently a faster and less expensive form of obtaining additional contract technicians, the continued recruitment of personnel outside the scope of the original SAMDP contract may later lead to increased costs and other difficulties.

It is not clear that the continued recruitment of non-SAMDP personnel through the SAMDP contract is in the best interests of either AID or the BLS Missions. To continue the process based on informal and oral understandings seems to us to be inappropriate.

Recommendation No. 6

USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, consult with RLA/REDSO/EA to determine whether the Trans Century contract should be amended to permit recruitment of non-SAMDP personnel.

Participant Training

AID Handbook 10 states that one of the goals of the participant training program is to enhance the capacities of the developing countries to manage their own development programs. Although indigenous training institutions are encouraged, AID USDH officer involvement is needed in three functions: selection, predeparture orientation and follow-up activities.

The participant training function in each of the three BLS Missions is managed by a Human Resources Development Officer (HRDO) and an Assistant Training Officer. The HRDOs are direct hire Americans and the Assistant Training Officers are host country nationals.

SAAST, SAMDP Integration

Africa ranks far below other continents in the number of students per inhabitant and in the ratio of students in the 20-24 age group. The lack of skilled manpower has been identified in the BLS countries as a critical bottleneck to continued development. Two projects were specifically

designed to meet the critical need for trained manpower in Southern Africa -- the Southern Africa Academic Skills Training project (SAAST), and the Southern Africa Manpower Development project (SAMDP).

SAAST was designed to finance graduate, undergraduate and specialized non-degree training in the U.S. and Africa for nationals of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia to assist these countries in meeting their development related managerial and technically skilled manpower needs. Participation in U.S. undergraduate training was not encouraged -- the major sub-activity of the project was intended to be primarily graduate programs in the U.S. and Africa.

SAMDP was designed to accelerate localization of key positions in Southern African governments by providing practical in-country training and advanced overseas course work, and providing the services of OPEX personnel to manage the immediate public sector needs while most country nationals were being trained, as well as providing on-the-job training. SAAST and SAMDP were designed to be complementary, in that SAAST provided a broader upgrading of government manpower resources, while SAMDP addressed specific jobs to be supported with training and a "stand-in."

The BLS Missions received only limited project funding for SAAST compared to the much larger SAMDP amounts. Because the critical manpower training needs still existed in the BLS countries, SAAST activities were integrated into and funded under SAMDP.

The SAAST preference for general graduate training and the SAMDP utilization of undergraduate training for specifically designated counterparts have combined to produce a general manpower training project in the BLS countries. Activities funded under SAMDP now include undergraduate training in: chemistry, biology, library science, pharmacy, aviation management and telecommunications, among others. None of these participants was designated as counterpart replacements for OPEX personnel.

Although we are not making any recommendations, we are concerned about the nature of the general manpower training project that has evolved in the BLS countries. We are not only unconvinced of the long-term benefits and spread effects resulting from general undergraduate training in the U.S., but had thought AID, and the Africa Bureau, intended to increase its concentration on primary education and on strengthening local educational institutions with a close focus to the poorest of the poor.

The utility of this general manpower training project and its goal congruence with AID's emphasis on basic education seem particularly apt subjects for the forthcoming evaluation of this project.

In response, one of the USAIDs advised us that its overall program did in fact concentrate on basic education needs, but that it nevertheless valued the SAMDP resource even more highly than these projects. Another USAID advised us that targeting and focusing SAMDP resources to become integral parts of on-going AID projects was a primary objective in its country development strategy. At the same time, the USAID noted the difficulty it experienced in achieving adequate targeting because of the scarcity of qualified local nationals for training.

Third-Country Training

Third-country training is AID-sponsored training in a country other than the participant's home country, the U.S. or Puerto Rico. A basic aim of third-country training is to broaden the training base of developing countries by encouraging host third countries and their training institutions to finance and manage their own training programs, especially in the fields in which they have achieved technical competence.

The costs of training in the U.S. have proven to be much higher than those in Africa. While total training costs in the U.S. are rapidly approaching \$20,000 a year, the American University in Cairo (with New York State accreditation and American faculty) costs less than \$7,000. Similarly, a full year at a university costs approximately \$6,000 in Tanzania and about \$3,400 in Botswana.

Under a subcontract with Trans Century, Phelps-Stokes is required to provide all long and short term participant training for SAMDP in the U.S. or in African countries at post-secondary institutions. One of the reasons for awarding the SAMDP contract to Trans Century was the good experience and contacts of its subcontractor (Phelps-Stokes) in participant training programs with African institutions.

Despite its contractual commitment, Phelps-Stokes has not assisted in the placement of BLS participants in African institutions. The BLS students currently undergoing training in third-country institutions were placed as a result of efforts expended by the HRDOs and respective host-country governments.

It has become increasingly difficult to place students in African institutions because most countries in Africa are hard pressed to accommodate their own national needs, much less satisfy the needs of others. Nevertheless, sufficient benefits (including more appropriate training, less cultural disorientation and reduced costs) accrue to make continued placements of BLS participants in African institutions a worthwhile effort.

We believe that Phelps-Stokes has not made an adequate effort to either place or assist the HRDOs in placing BLS participants in African institutions. A minimum initial effort should be the preparation of a directory of African

institutions including certain specific, salient characteristics. We note that Trans Century and Phelps-Stokes have made exploratory trips under SAMDP funding to various African institutions for which no information or trip reports have been presented to the BLS Missions.

Recommendation No. 7

USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with the Human Resource Development Officers assigned to the BLS USAIDs, consult with representatives of the Phelps-Stokes Foundation regarding specific objectives to be attained in placing candidates from the BLS countries in third country training institutions in Africa.

In response to our draft recommendation, one of the USAIDs advised us of its strong support. We also received considerable comment from the Phelps-Stokes Foundation, although it was not clear to us to what extent these comments were concurred in by the BLS USAIDs. In summary, the Phelps-Stokes comments alleged that certain exploratory missions has been undertaken to make third country placements, largely at its own expense. However, no record of the results of these trips was on file with the BLS USAIDs. Phelps-Stokes went on to state that further funding would be necessary to identify and carry out large-scale third country placements. It would appear from the nature of the Phelps-Stokes comments that it viewed the first year or so under the SAMDP effort as a gearing up exercise, and that it is now prepared to attempt more ambitious placements in African third countries. We would note at this point, however, that the Phelps-Stokes subcontractual arrangement was entered into because it supposedly had established contacts with such third country training institutions in Africa, not so these could be developed under SAMDP funding. We have consequently retained the above recommendation on this matter albeit in somewhat modified form.

Participant Selection

Among the factors used to develop a training request, consideration is given to the qualifications of the participant, particularly his educational background, work experience, English competence and professional standing within the community.

Because of the critical manpower shortages in the BLS countries, there is a lack of sufficiently qualified candidates for academic studies.

All three BLS countries had increasing difficulties in identifying suitable participants for training. This is due, in part, to the quality of education in the BLS countries, and the limited number of students able to pass

entrance requirements at U.S. educational institutions, and in some cases, at African training centers.

In Lesotho in 1980, over 390 students were sent abroad by more than 25 separate donors to over 30 different countries. In Botswana, over 280 students from the public service were sent abroad to more than ten countries in 1980 alone. The small pool of qualified candidates and the increasing number of donor training opportunities has led, in many instances, to a lessening of the qualifications of those candidates sent abroad for training. Notwithstanding this trend, AID participants in the BLS training programs have included such prominent officials as the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Education for both Lesotho and Botswana, the Director of Agriculture and the Permanent Secretary of Local Government and Lands in Botswana.

Unfortunately, most candidates have had much lower qualifications. Many had "C" or "D" averages for the last courses of instruction within their home-country. (BLS Mission Officials believe the poor academic records result from the strict grading systems employed in the BLS countries and do not appropriately reflect candidate qualifications. They also note that nearly all SAMDP participants have turned in satisfactory performances in the U.S. academic system.) Several students enrolled at the Universities in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland left to attend undergraduate training in the U.S. Candidates have also been sent to the U.S. who had been previously trained outside their home country; but only occasionally was their prior training in the U.S.

We believe that candidate selection needs to be strengthened in the BLS countries. Prior work experience, previous scholastic achievement and the use of standardized admission tests -- such as the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), Graduate Management Aptitude Test (GMAT) and the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) -- which are required by most U.S. universities (and Phelps-Stokes) should be utilized. We believe that too frequently the best available candidates for participant training are not sufficiently qualified to warrant an expenditure of AID funds in their behalf. In such cases, a more appropriate use of training funds might be to strengthen local institutions until a suitable candidate is found.

Recommendation No. 8

USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, (a) formalize and transmit to their respective host governments a set of minimum criteria that will be applied in selecting candidates for long-term participant training, and (b) ensure that predetermined numbers of candidates are not sent for training within specified periods to merely fill a quota.

In response to our draft recommendation, all three USAIDs assured us that they did in fact possess minimum standards for selecting long-term participants for training abroad. However, our review disclosed that such criteria had not been formalized or made known to the respective host governments. Consequently, we have retained our recommendation on this matter in modified form.

English Proficiency

All participants proposed for AID-sponsored training in countries where training programs are conducted in English must demonstrate an English language proficiency to meet program prerequisites. Exceptions permitted to testing participants English language competence are few.

All participants programmed for academic training are supposed to take the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL). Many U.S. educational institutions retest participants after their arrival. If participants do not meet institutional requirements, they are subject to intensive language training which lengthens their training programs and adds to costs.

In reviewing participant training files in the BLS Missions, very few test scores for the TOEFL were found. In general, the TOEFL was waived on the basis that the language of the participant's home country was English. Another difficulty was that the TOEFL was usually administered only once a year which prevented attendance by many participants. TOEFL scores that were found varied between 450 and 547 -- the required minimum score for most U.S. universities is 550.

Because English is not the first or "native" language in any of the BLS countries, it is important that the TOEFL not be waived for any BLS participants. In addition, many U.S. universities (and Phelps-Stokes) require the TOEFL of all foreign students despite use of English as the home-country's medium of instruction.

We believe the TOEFL should be required of all BLS participants prior to their departure for the U.S. Early TOEFL results can be used both as additional participant selection criteria and as identification of remedial language training needs. Where scheduling constraints intervene, the practice TOEFL can be administered as a suitable alternative.

Recommendation No. 9

USAID/Botswana, USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, require all candidates for U.S. training to take the TOEFL prior to departure. Where scheduling constraints intervene, a practice TOEFL could be administered as a suitable alternative.

In response to our draft recommendation we received strong support from two of the USAIDs and from Phelps-Stokes Foundation. Trans Century advanced the notion that these tests be given in Washington, D.C. after the candidates' arrival. In our view, administration of the tests in the BLS countries is eminently more desirable because it would preclude the expenses of travel to the USA if the candidates scored low. Once they have arrived, of course, the tendency would be to disregard a low score on the basis of costs already incurred. We have therefore retained our recommendation.

Predeparture Orientation

All AID-sponsored participants receive predeparture orientation. There is a high correlation between effective predeparture preparation and successful training, including utilization. The orientation program is important not only for its informational content, but also for its value in reducing anxiety and the building of understanding and confidence.

Orientation by returned participants, social gatherings among USAID personnel and departing participants, and making available selected written materials all constitute suggested implementation procedures for a successful predeparture orientation.

For a variety of reasons^{6/} -- including the small numbers of participants departing, short notice of departure dates and the lack of specific information materials -- the BLS Missions have been conducting very informal predeparture orientations. These usually consist of short talks with Assistant Training Officers and HRDOs, handouts of very brief information materials, and directions to the United States International Communications Agency's (USICA) library where further reading materials are available.

These informal and somewhat cursory orientations have been almost routinely criticized by returned participants.^{7/} Participants have asked for more extensive predeparture orientations -- including the use of returned participants -- through formal programs in order to better inform themselves and build in the experiences of others.

^{6/} In Swaziland, the Government forbids direct contact between participants scheduled for training and the sponsoring donor. Contacts are required to be through the Department of Establishments and Training only.

^{7/} In response to our draft report, USAID/Swaziland stated that there were no returned long-term SAMDP participants in Swaziland at the time of this audit. Our comment (insofar as Swaziland is concerned) pertains to other AID sponsored returned participants.

Although Phelps-Stokes conducts an orientation program for participants upon their arrival in the U.S., a need still exists for predeparture orientation. This is particularly true for information about courses and institutions where students have recently been placed. These universities (most of which form part of Phelps-Stokes special education constituency) include Benjamin Franklin University, Coppin State College, Park College, Livestone College and Alfred University. Very little information was available about these institutions to either HRDOs, host country officials or participants. There has even been a feeling among certain Botswana officials that the U.S. is holding out and not prepared for Botswana to attend the "better" institutions.

The drastic need for manpower training in the BLS countries and the increasing acceptance of formal U.S. participant training almost mandates a larger number of individuals in the participant training programs. This is especially true in Botswana where a recent agreement was reached by the USAID and GOB, under which the Botswana government pays a major portion of training costs for an additional number of students in U.S. universities. (This innovative program is not only an effective use of limited AID resources but also an indication of the good relations between Botswana officials and the USAID Mission, especially the USAID/Botswana HRDO. Although, as pointed out earlier, this type of training does not meet AID's "basic human needs" criteria, the GOB's shouldering a major share of the costs does indicate the strong felt need and desire which we believe would be imprudent to deny.)

Although the circumstances surrounding the individual or group of participants and the BLS Mission and cooperating country situations dictate the breadth and scope of orientation programs, we feel that more extensive predeparture orientations need to be conducted in the BLS countries. Lack of staffing is an inadequate justification for the continuing neglect of this USAID responsibility.

Recommendation No. 10

USAID/Botswana, USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, ensure that plans are finalized to have responsible AID officials conduct more extensive predeparture orientations than have been undertaken in the past, during which specific information about planned training institutions and goals would be made available.

In advising us of its support for the above recommendation, one USAID noted that effective predeparture orientations are contingent upon the receipt of adequate information about the training institutions from Phelps-Stokes before the scheduled orientation. Consequently, we think the following recommendation is appropriate:

Recommendation No. 11

USAID/Botswana request that Phelps-Stokes prepare written predeparture orientation materials for participants which would include specific information on the institutions selected for placement.

In response to our draft recommendation, Trans Century and Phelps-Stokes noted that short-notice of candidate selections and other constraints had prevented all but summary information from being transmitted by telex to the BLS countries. We were further advised that a new and more extensive briefing format has been devised for implementation during the remainder of the SAMDP exercise. Receipt of copies of such briefing papers from each of the BLS USAIDs as they pertain to specific long-term participants under SAMDP, would provide a basis to close this recommendation.

Follow-up Activities

Follow-up activities are a form of continuing education designed to further the technical and non-technical objectives of all AID-sponsored training. USAID Missions are required to maintain personal or written contact with returned participants for at least three years and to make formal presentations of Certificates of Achievement.

USAID Missions are encouraged to undertake or assist in arrangement of conferences, workshops and seminars, publication of newsletters, use of former participants to orient new participants, and supplementary training through correspondence courses among others.

Although the BLS Missions did make formal presentations of Certificates of Achievement, few other forms of participant follow-up were conducted. Contact, if maintained at all, was usually on an informal basis and infrequent in nature.

Participant evaluations conducted by USAID Missions in Swaziland and Botswana noted the desire of former participants to involve themselves in various follow-up activities, ranging from assistance in predeparture orientations of new participants to informal gatherings.

We believe the lack of follow-up activities weakens the effectiveness of the participant training programs. This is particularly true in the BLS countries where the critical need for trained manpower has meant the rapid rise in position and influence of many returned participants. The lack of staffing and pressing development matters does not eliminate the need for a strong participant follow-up program.

Recommendation No. 12

USAID/Botswana, USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, plan to conduct a more extensive range of follow-up activities for returned participants.

In response to our draft recommendation, we received a strong endorsement from one USAID and the following from Trans Century:

"This is an important recommendation and one in which (our) Field Coordinator. . . can perhaps be instrumental. As more and more participants are formally designated counterparts of OPEXers operating in the BLS countries, it will be important to build a network of communication between the OPEXer and his counterpart. Other kinds of follow-up and evaluation of effectiveness of earlier training decisions are equally important."

EXHIBIT A

ACRONYMS USED IN REPORT

AID	- Agency for International Development
BLS	- Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
FY	- Fiscal Year
GMAT	- Graduate Management Aptitude Test
GRE	- Groundwater Record Examination
HRDO	- Human Resource Development Officer
IIE	- Institute for International Education
OPEX	- Operational Expert
Phelps-Stokes	- The Phelps-Stokes Foundation
PIO/P	- Project Implementation Order/Participant
PIO/T	- Project Implementation Order/Technical Services
RSA	- Republic of South Africa
SAAST	- Southern Africa Academic Skills Training
SADPT	- Southern Africa Development and Personnel Training
SAMDP	- Southern Africa Manpower Development Project
SAT	- Scholastic Aptitude Test
Sq.Km.	- Square Kilometers
TOEFL	- Test of English as a Foreign Language
Trans Century	- The New Trans Century Corporation
USAID/Botswana	- United States Agency for International Development Mission to Botswana
USICA	- United States International Communications Agency

List of Recommendations

	<u>Page No.</u>
<u>RECOMMENDATION NO. 1</u>	6
USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, each reduce the amount of funding for the SAMDP contract by \$129,786.	
<u>RECOMMENDATION NO. 2</u>	8
USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, (a) carefully examine the need for the continued presence overseas of a Trans Century Field Representative, and (b) develop a more equitable allocation of support costs under the SAMDP contract.	
<u>RECOMMENDATION NO. 3</u>	11
USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, develop more precise and complete criteria for the recruitment and provision of future OPEX personnel.	
<u>RECOMMENDATION NO. 4</u>	12
USAID/Botswana, USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, ensure that employment agreements are signed immediately between the host country and OPEXers currently in-country, and that a system is devised to require all OPEXers to sign such an agreement within 30 days after arrival in-country.	
<u>RECOMMENDATION NO. 5</u>	12
RLA/REDSO/EA determine the validity of the Trans Century employment agreement and the effect of subsequent amendments on specific agreements and redraft the contract and amendments into a single, integrated document.	

(List of Recommendations) Contd.

- RECOMMENDATION NO. 6 14
- USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, consult with RLA/REDSO/EA to determine whether the Trans Century contract should be amended to permit recruitment of non-SAMDP personnel.
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 7 17
- USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with the Human Resource Development Officers assigned to the BLS USAIDs, consult with representatives of the Phelps-Stokes Foundation regarding specific objectives to be attained in placing candidates from the BLS countries in third country training institutions in Africa.
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 8 18
- USAID/Botswana, in conjunction with USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, (a) formalize and transmit to their respective host governments a set of minimum criteria that will be applied in selecting candidates for long-term participant training, and (b) ensure that predetermined numbers of candidates are not sent for training within specified periods to merely fill a quota.
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 9 19
- USAID/Botswana, USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, require all candidates for U.S. training to take the TOEFL prior to departure. Where scheduling constraints intervene, a practice TOEFL could be administered as a suitable alternative.
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 10 21
- USAID/Botswana, USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, ensure that plans are finalized to have responsible AID officials conduct more extensive predeparture orientations than have been undertaken in the past, during which specific information about planned training institutions and goals would be made available.

(List of Recommendations) Contd.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 11

22

USAID/Botswana request that Phelps-Stokes prepare written predeparture orientation materials for participants which would include specific information on the institutions selected for placement.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 12

23

USAID/Botswana, USAID/Lesotho and USAID/Swaziland, plan to conduct a more extensive range of follow-up activities for returned participants.

Report Recipients

Field Offices:

USAID/Botswana	3
USAID/Lesotho	3
USAID/Swaziland	3
REDSO/EA	3

AID/Washington:

Deputy Administrator	1
AA/AFR	5
AA/LEG	1
AA/SER	1
IG	1
GC	1
FM	1
IDCA/LPA	1
AFR/SA	2
SER/CM	1
DS/DIU	4