

Final Evaluation of the Ghana
Rural Reconstruction Movement, a Sub-Activity of the Accelerated
Rural Learning Project

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(Note: Annexes I-IV have
not been included with the
general distribution of the
evaluation report.)

1. Executive Summary

This project combines the "Small is Beautiful" and the "integrated rural development" approaches. Working with a limited budget toward which AID contributed \$233,000, the Ghanaian Rural Reconstruction Movement (GhRRM), a PVO, attempted to develop a farming population of about 4,000 in the Mampong Valley. A small (20-30) administrative and technical staff lived at a Center in the Valley and introduced agricultural, health, educational and community development activities to the farmers. From Accra, 40 miles away, a Board of Trustees, comprised of established professionals in various fields (business, academic, medical, law, etc.) guided and assessed the operations of the Center Staff in the Valley which became known as a "social laboratory."

AID began to support this project in 1976 after GhRRM had already demonstrated that it would help improve the farmers' livelihood through these two approaches. During the first two years of AID's support, GhRRM made substantial progress toward training farming families in basic techniques of crop and livestock production, cooperative formation, off-farm income generation, preventive and curative health, literacy and community organization. GhRRM's philosophy was for the staff to live and work with the farmers under their conditions, learn from them, and then introduce relevant and needed activities. With the exception of health from 1978 to 1980 the progress of these activities leveled off and in some cases declined. By the end of the project the situation had deteriorated in terms of staff performance and farmer responsiveness to program activities. One

can only conclude that GhRRM did not demonstrate its "capacity to conduct a self-help program of integrated rural development--- and to train leaders for expansion into other areas"* to the level it was expected to do so.

The most obvious reason for this is the shortage and relatively poor performance of the staff. High turnover rates, low morale, and limited technical qualifications prevented it from interacting with and guiding villagers in the ways that were planned. Inadequate staff salaries, conditions, logistical support and amenities are reported to account for this. At a deeper level, however, lies a serious managerial conflict between the Board of Trustees and field staff as to how GhRRM should operate. The Board believes that the field staff should operate under difficult conditions with a small budget and tight Board control over staff operations. The staff believes that GhRRM should operate under improved conditions with a larger budget and loose Board control over staff operations; this is to allow for field autonomy. Even deeper, lies an inchoate but real tension between a 1950's style community development approach whereby change agents live with villagers, elicit their "felt needs" and then to alter their behavior; and a more contemporary one whereby technically qualified agents live apart from villagers (physically or socially) but guide them through specific and planned technical inputs. Unless these problems are resolved at all three levels, it is difficult for GhRRM to act effectively again.

It is recommended, therefore, that GhRRM streamline its management to insure greater field effectiveness. Essentially this means that staff conditions be improved, that the Center be given greater managerial and financial autonomy, and that the Board function more

*Project Purpose

as an advisory and accounting body than as a directive one. It is further recommended that GhRRM rethink its development strategy so that it utilizes more qualified extension agents to work directly with farmers. Should these recommendations be implemented, it is hoped that GhRRM will resume its role as an effective and innovative development institution which works positive changes for rural farmers.

The methodology for gathering data for this evaluation included:

1. Review of relevant project documents and field reports;
2. Discussions about the project with USAID and GhRRM Board of Trustees;
3. Interviews with GhRRM staff members at the Center and with farmers in the villages;
4. Observation of the Center and farm conditions relevant to the activities of the project;
5. Administration of the questionnaire used for the 1977 GhRRM evaluation to a sample of 90 individuals in 7 villages.

Finally, a caveat. Considering Ghana today, an evaluation of any development project is not likely to be favorable. (This is especially the case when the project depends upon local material inputs). The deteriorating and chaotic economic conditions of the country in terms of severe problems in foreign exchange, high inflation rate, material and commodity distribution, marketing irregularities and general fiscal unpredictability all impinge directly even upon the smallest of development projects, such as this one. Indeed, one wonders if any project can succeed given these problems; what follows is a sincere effort to balance the internal problems of this project against the formidable, if not overpowering, external ones.

2. Project Background:

The main idea of this project is one of integrated rural development. Dr. J. Yen pioneered this development in his work among Chinese peasants between the two world wars. Yen believed that the rural poor majority anywhere could overcome the disruptive effects of modernization and the concomitant plights of poverty, disease, ignorance and alienation through "rural reconstruction."

With the assistance and guidance of outside change agents the farmers could address four main areas to uplift themselves: food production and off-farm activities, health, literacy and civic responsibility. The change agents should live and work with villagers, learn their basic problems and needs, and collaborate with villagers to implement them. When successfully done, other villagers would "catch on", and through outside assistance they would repeat the process to form the "rural reconstruction movement."

Currently Yen administers to affiliated Rural Reconstruction Movements in Asia and Africa from his headquarters in New York. The Ghana Rural Reconstruction Movement (GhRRM) is one of these and is non-profit, non-political and non-religious. The goal of GhRRM is to improve the welfare and living standards of the rural poor. GhRRM chose Mampong Valley, located 40 miles north of Accra as a "Social Laboratory" to try out Yen's ideas. GhRRM's strategy is to have a core staff live and work with the Valley farmers; both would plan and try out community oriented projects in the fields of livelihood, health, education and civic responsibility. By means of experimentation in the "social laboratory" area, GhRRM seeks to discover the means of simplifying technical knowledge needed by the rural population, of demonstrating its applicability to their daily

lives and of motivating those who acquire this knowledge to share it with others in order to maximize the program's outreach and spread effect.

GhRRM began work in the "social laboratory" area which comprises 25 square miles in the Mampong Valley. The population, numbering about 4,000, works mainly in the agricultural sector and lives in 30 small and dispersed villages. With a limited budget, GhRRM has initiated practical education programs utilizing Ghanaian volunteers, paid technical advisors and a few members of the National Service Corps. The basic program consists of the four integrated components developed by Yen: livelihood, health, literacy and civic responsibility. GhRRM established the Yensi Center (named after a local river, not Dr. Yen) as its base of operation in the Valley. This Center offers modest facilities for meetings, pilot demonstrations, and short courses and seminars for the Valley population.

To the visitor the Valley appears as a lush protected area in between the market centers of Mampong and Mamfe to the southeast, and Adawso and Koforidua to the northwest. "Protected" is an illusion because the main road connecting these centers runs right through the Valley and continuously exposes the inhabitants to political, economic and commercial influences from outside the Valley. Indeed the level of acculturation is quite high in the area, for European Missionaries brought Christianity and Western education here in the second half of the 19th Century; and an entrepreneurial African, Tetteh Quashie, brought cocoa for the first time to Ghana in 1879 and planted it in the Mampong area. Needless to say these innovations brought the area rapidly into the clutches of modernization.*

*This is important when considering the impact of this (or any) pro-

gram. Not only will development programs be more readily accepted in an acculturated area, but it is difficult to tell whether a program's success is due to the program itself or to the acculturative process which has preceded its acceptance.

The Yansi River (more a creek) and its tributaries drain the Valley as it winds down the comparatively gentle terrain. Two rainy seasons are separated by relatively dry periods that occur in August-September and December-March or April. The rainfall is not very regular in terms of number of rainy days and the inches of rain. Its bimodal pattern permits two rain-fed cropping seasons and the cultivation of many varieties of tree and foodcrops including cocoa, oil palm, maize, cassava, cocoyam and plantains.

Man's influence is quite evident in the area where there is little original semi-deciduous forest, except on the southern ridge 500 ft. above the Valley. Slash and burn cultivation has reduced this to secondary forest, or where the cultivation was intense, to elephant grass and stunted bush growth. The area is the domain of the Akwapim people. There are, however, migrants from other parts of the country, notably the Ewes. The Akuapems are the main landholders. The Ewes have only recently immigrated from the Volta region, and so many of these newcomers must rent land by share cropping from the Akuapems. However, some hard-working Ewes accumulate a crop surplus which they either exchange or use to pay cash to the Akuapem to gain the land outright. Despite the relatively dense population, it is possible for newcomers to seek opportunities to gain permanent residence.

The household is the main farming unit, and cultivates one or more small farms of less than one to two acres a season. Individual members (e.g. a wife) may cultivate their own plots as well. Farmers intercrop maize and cassava, often with cocoyams on the farms. They also cultivate small plots of vegetables (okra, pepper, tomatoes, garden eggs or onions) on the edge of the farm. (There are no groundnuts here). In addition, farmers have oil palm, plantain and citrus trees which are on the edge of a farm or near their village. In the village itself which ranges from a 5 to 50 households, farmers keep livestock, the most prevalent being chickens, goats and sheep.

While small holding farming predominates in the Valley there are numerous other activities. Three hundred individuals work as laborers and in skilled jobs on the nearby government owned Oil Palm Estate located in the Valley. This impressive 5,000-acre complex not only provides additional income for farming families whose members work there, but occasionally provides mechanized assistance to the Yensi Center in terms of cutting and hauling wood or transport of goods. For a sample of 89 villagers surveyed for this study, the following activities supplement or even substitute crop farming:

<u>Men(60%)</u>		<u>Women (40)</u>
Distiller	State Farm	"Market lady"
	Laborer	
Poultry breeder	Watchman	Cassava baker/seller
	Driver	Cassava meal processor
Wood carver	Hotelier	Seamstress
Blacksmith	Mechanic	Traditional midwife
		Primary school teacher

Needless to say the more highly paid salaried positions demand more education. In the survey, most/respondents reported they were illiterate; those who were educated had primary schooling, and a few had secondary schooling. Contrary to expectations, half of those with secondary schooling were farming.

3. Project Description:

The purpose of this project is to (1) test the capacity of GhRRM to conduct a self-help program of integrated rural development involving skills, motivational and leadership training; and (2) to create a capacity to train leaders for expansion of such activities to other geographic areas.

To achieve this purpose AID assisted GhRRM with the following inputs: salaries for 34 staff positions, the construction of seven buildings, and the contribution of teaching office facilities and a jeep wagoner for a total cost of \$233,000. The outputs were training courses and extension work in four basic areas of the project: crop production and related off-farm activities, health, literacy and civic responsibility.

The implementation of the project was to be done by the Yensi Center with a core staff of the Director, Administrative Support staff, and technical supervisors and extension officers in each of the four areas. The crucial link to the farmer were the 10 "propagators", or general community development workers trained in the basics of the four areas and whose jobs were to organize the community for extension activities, assist the technical officer when he conducted them, and to follow up these activities during his absence. The propagators were to train promising farmers or "village scholars" in the basics of literacy, and they in turn were to assist the propagator in the follow up

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extension activities. Thus, there is a cascading linkage from the Center staff to the propagator, to the village scholar, and to the farmer; and a chain is only as strong, as we shall see, as its weakest link.

According to project documents, the basic training of the propagators, village scholars and farmers took place mostly during the period 1976 to 1978. There is very little mention of training during the period 1979 to 1980, as the emphasis here is upon extension activities with farmers. Given the shortage and turnover of staff, one cannot but wonder whether the quality of training was adequate. See Table I and II regarding staffing and construction implementation.

Table 1 - Staff

<u>Component</u>	<u>1976 Budget</u>	<u>1980 EOPS</u>
<u>Administration</u>	Center Director	In place
	Center Technical Officer (CTO)	Left, 1978
<u>Health</u>	Secretary	Assumed CTO position
	Security Assistant	In place
	10 Propagators	9 in place (not original ones; turnover estimated at 2-3 per position for life of project)
	3 Drivers	2 drivers in place.
	Obstetrician/gynecologist	Visits Center periodically
	Specialist-Herbal medicine	Visited Center once
	Public Health Specialist	Left April 1977
	2 Community Health Nurses:	In place (MCH funded, n GHRM funded as was budgeted for)
	2 Specialists	2 nurses aides.
	Cooperative Officer	1 (left 1979)
<u>Livelihood</u>		In place, leaving Oct. 1980
	Livestock Officer	In place
	Crop Production Officer	In place
	Rural Industries	In place (since Nov. 1977)
	Technical Officer	Never had one
	Technical Assistant	Never had one
	Vocational Artist	Left March 1977

Table 1 - Staff (Continuation)

Education/Civic

Responsibility	Education Specialist	Never had one (work by Center/Director)
	Technical Officer	Left late 1976

One clear example of no training having taken place is that the second Education Technical Officer finally came onboard in November 1979. The carpentry, blacksmith and vocational arts shops are still not completed; See Table 2.

Table 2 - Buildings:

1976 Budget

Multi-purpose shop

Carpentry shop

Blacksmith shop

Vocational Arts Shop

2 Dormitories

Staff Quarters

1980 EOPS

Completed

Construction almost
completed.

Construction almost
completed.

Construction almost
completed.

Construction not yet begun

Refurbished farm houses in
place (mud walls plastered,
porch roof installed, etc.

Buildings rented from
Mampong landlords).

Equipment

Typewriter

6 Tilley lamps

4 Cupboards

Tape Recorder

Camera/films

Drugs

Vehicles

Jeep

In place

In place

In place

Personal gift from USAID
Director

At GhRRM headquarters

2/3 paid by MOH

Inoperative

Blue pickup (inoperative)

White Pickup (operative
when not raining).

Perhaps the most significant indictment of the training is that given by the Center Director himself to the Board in his six-month report, July -- December 1978:

"Regarding the future of GhRRM there is, however, fear that the calibre of staff at present engaged by the Movement, cannot offer the training needed to equip learners for any expansion work. There is need, therefore, to raise standards through recruitment of competent and capable personnel and also through staffing programs. Until and unless that has been done, no training programme can efficiently be undertaken by the quality of staff at present employed by the Movement."

Table 3 indicates that the only aspects of the project is that of health.

Table 3 - Major Output/Targets:

<u>Output/Targets</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980 EOPS</u>
Full staff hired, trained and functioning (34)	28	23
Volunteer propagators and literacy training functioning (100 farmer cooperators/year)	227	-*
Health worker program functioning (minimum of 6 village clinics)	6	8
Construction work on multi-purpose hall, vocational workshop, dormitories and staff quarters completed.	1	1

* Biannual evaluation reports indicate no quantitative information about the farmer cooperator program. Out of 90 farmers sampled in the 8 field surveys, however, only 8 reported the existence of a literacy program in their village; and of the 8 only 4 reported that they attended the class. This testifies to the lack of any education specialist in the program noted in Table 1.

Table 4 - Conditions which will exist when purpose is achieved:

<u>Conditions</u>	<u>Indicators 1978</u>	<u>Indicators 1980</u>
1. Mampong Valley Social Laboratory (MVSL) inhabitants beginning to enjoy benefits of program with significant employment income, cooperative community action, etc.	1.1 56% of target population has realized increased crop output and 20% attribute this to GHRM effort.	1.1 67% of target population has realized increased crop output and 14% attribute this to GHRM effort.
	1.2 6% increase per annum per capita rate in livestock production with project.	1.2 40% of target population reported increase in livestock production with 28% of this attributing it to GHRM.
	1.3 13 cooperative established and operating with membership of 1,600.	1.3 15 cooperatives established and operating with membership of 1,800.
	1.4 7 health centers introduced by GHRM.	1.4 Health Centers introduced by GHRM.

Table 4 (Continuation)

2. Project established and widely accepted as base for and model of facility for training villagers and leadership cadres for community self-help rural development.

2.1 Farmer scholars increased from 3 in 1974/75 to 227 in 1978, this represents 28% of projected target of 800 (excluding unestimated multiplier effect).
 2.1 No record of farmer scholars in 6 monthly reports. With no literacy training taken place, assume that their number has decreased.

2.2 Youth organization with 57 members being trained in rural industry activities.
 2.2 No mention made of Youth Organization with exception of one club of 13 members.

2.3 37% of population obtain information on innovations from the GHRM compared with an average of 12% by other extension institutions.
 2.3 Only 10-15 respondents answered questions. Of that half say they got information from GHRM.

3. GHRM has established capacity for replicating MVB-type rural self-help voluntary action programs.

3.1 Assistance initiated in Keoga District; two propagators trained for Central Region and considering requests for assistance by some Ghanaian institutions.
 3.1 No mention of propagators specifically assigned outside of Valley. Those who resign seek

4. Project Analysis

Aside from the deteriorating economic conditions of Ghana, three reasons appear to lay behind the declining effectiveness of the program: (a) Management Conflict, (b) Technical Incompetence, and (c) The Ambiguous Role of the Propagator.

(a). Management Conflict:

Two members of the Research Committee, Drs. Brown and Gyasi have systematically identified, adequately articulated, and comprehensively confronted, in terms of providing actionable alternatives, the management problems of the project (Annex I). They argued that the Center staff receives inadequate salaries, housing, support and amenities; hence there is a regular turnover of staff or vacancies which are not filled, both of which account for the Center's relative ineffectiveness. In addition, the Center Director complained that on numerous occasions he writes proposals to the Board to initiate activities at the Center, but inevitably, the Board trims these drastically or turns them down altogether because of a "shortage of funds." Also, the Director complains that he has no financial authority to spend project funds as he sees fits (within limits); and that it is the Executive-Secretary who decides how they shall be spent.

Essentially the Center is asking for more managerial and financial autonomy. Behind this, however, appear to be two different philosophies regarding the Center's operations. The GhRRM Board, especially the Executive-Secretary, believes that the staff should live and work under the same difficult conditions of the farmers. Other wise, it cannot remain faithful to the core strategy of the project whereby it learns about the farmers in order to help them to help themselves; and, it is the Board not the Center, which should

control day-to-day operations of the Center. The Center staff, especially the Director, shares this to some extent, but it is asking for greater logistic support, improved conditions of service and living conditions, and most important, the transfer of decision-making power regarding the Center's operations from the Board to the Center. Unless this conflict is worked out, the Center's operations will continue to falter.

(b). Technical Incompetence:

Aside from the Director there is no question that the staff generally lacks competence. Not only have the specialist positions been vacant since 1976, but the technical officer positions have not been filled continuously. If GhRRM is not willing to offer salaries and amenities to attract good talent for these positions, then it should try to get personnel seconded to the project by the Government or arrange for the Ministries of Agriculture, Social Welfare and Health to have the appropriate extension agents visit the Center regularly. They could be most helpful in building up the technical training at the Center; in advising how the demonstration plots can be improved; and in tightening up the extension linkage between the Center and the farmer. GhRRM cannot expect training, demonstration and extension activities to be effective unless each of the four components has permanent and qualified staff. The continued lack of this will only diminish the credibility of the Center, and hence its effectiveness in getting the farmers to adopt new practices.

(c). Propagators:

The role of propagators appears to be increasingly ambiguous and ineffective. The propagators or "Center Ambassadors" in villages, as Mr. Appiah calls them, are to organize participation in each of the program components, assist the technical officers when

they conduct demonstration and extension activities in the village, and follow up these activities in terms of training, advice and data gathering. The villagers choose the propagators from their own ranks; they are trained periodically over an 18-month period at the Center in how to implement the farm components; and then they return to live/work in the village as full-time propagators at a salary of ₵170-210* a month. Given the way the extension network is currently organized, they are the crucial linkage between the Center and the farmer. There appears to be conflicting expectations regarding the propagators, and this seems to affect their performance. Villagers choose the propagators to be trained more for technical than organizational reasons and expect the propagators to provide them with solid technical advice. GhRRM, on the other hand, trains them for organizational purposes even though they get a technical dosage for each component; it is the technical officer who is expected to give the technical advice.

Who gets chosen by villagers and confirmed by the staff? 18-25 year old bachelor or recently married men, most of whom have a Form IV education. Their objective is "up and out", for with their educational level and a GhRRM training, they know they are marketable elsewhere in Government, the State Plantations, or on private farm businesses, all for a higher salary than what they get as a propagator. This would explain why so many have left and why those who remain do not appear motivated in their job.

If GhRRM decides to continue recruiting propagators it should consider recruiting individuals who are firmly anchored in their villages. A more experienced and less educated farmer who remains in the Valley

A *Official rate ₵2.75=\$1.00

can perform as well if not better than a younger and more educated male. Rather than serving in a full-time capacity, he could do it part-time for \$100.00 a month so that he could still farm. He is less likely to leave the village and more likely to be responsive to advice and criticisms from technical officers and farmers.

5. Project Impact

The analysis of the impact of GhRRM program at the Mampong Valley Social Laboratory (MVSL) was based on interviews with the present and former staff, some members of the Board of Trustees, some farmers, and on-the-spot observations. In all, 89 farmers were interviewed in 8 of the 25 villages forming the Social Laboratory. The villagers who are predominantly farmers were interviewed with a questionnaire which was used in the 1977 evaluation of the GhRRM programs. The 1977 questionnaire was re-used with the hope of achieving consistency and comparability in the results of data analysis.

A stratified sample of villages was selected initially to include villages that the field staff at the Center ranked as most to least cooperative in the operation of GhRRM. Periodic rains hampered travel to all villages, and so some of the selected villages were abandoned and others were chosen for study on the basis of accessibility. The villages that were finally studied included 5 that were classified as the most cooperative, 2 that were classified as less cooperative, and 1 that recently joined the GhRRM program.

A team of 9 people, including one University student, administered the questionnaire in the villages after a brief but comprehensive training of about 3 hours; the brevity of the training did not appear affect their performance of administering the questionnaire.

An opinion shared by all those interviewed, namely, farmers or villagers, past and present staff of the Center, and members of GhRRM Board of Trustees, is that both the operation of the program and its impact have declined dramatically in the last two years. It was observed that some projects for demonstration and education at the Center have been abandoned; for example, the rabbitery and the plots for the cultivation of crops. Construction of various buildings at the Center has been halted for a considerable period of time and the only completed building at the Center is the multi-purpose shop.

Casual observations and results of the questionnaire of some of the villages and farms in the MVSL attest to the declining effectiveness of the Center. Few farmers plant crops in rows, use chemical and other forms of fertilizers, improved seed and planting materials, apply seed dressing and spray their farms against insects and diseases in the field. In some instances where crops production has increased over the past few years, farmers have attributed this to plentiful rains, better weeding practices and hard work rather than to specific physical inputs from the Center. Better weeding practices, however, could be attributed to farmer education mounted by GhRRM.

There also appears to be a general decline in livestock production from the level anticipated by GhRRM. Those livestock producers who continue to show increase in their operations claim to have

achieved these through their own efforts in acquiring the necessary inputs, not to specific assistance from the Center.

An area in the livelihood program where GhRRM has achieved a great success in the last two years is participation in co-operative organizations. Although GhRRM deserves some credit, cooperative development has been aided considerably by the deteriorating economic conditions of the country and the mode of distributing inputs and consumer goods by the Government. In the face of acute shortages of inputs and consumer goods in the country, Ghanaians have been advised to form or join cooperatives for effective distribution of all scarce goods and services at controlled prices.

For all practical purposes the literacy education component of the GhRRM program is inoperative although a few propagators are reported to be conducting literacy classes on a weekly basis.

The civic responsibility component is operating to an appreciable extent but it appears that GhRRM does not deserve all the credit; communal activities, a major part of the civic responsibility, have been carried out in African villages for centuries.

One aspect of GhRRM program that is operating effectively is the health component. Two trained nurses and their assistants visit regularly the 8 "clinics" located at strategic villages to serve the MVSL area. They dispense basic drugs, treat minor maladies, make referrals for major cases, instruct women on the basics of child care, and demonstrate to villagers essential preventive and environmental health practices. A major reason for the effectiveness of the health component is the relative autonomy which the nurses share as trained, salaried and supported (in terms

of drugs) as personnel of the Ministry of Health.

As in the previous evaluation survey of 1977, the ranking of the perceived impact of four components of GhRRM's program by the villagers (mainly farmers) in the MVSL area are:

1. Health
2. Livelihood
3. Education
4. Civic responsibility

There is an apparent discrepancy between the farmer's ranking of education as having greater impact than civic responsibility, and the reality of their being no operative education component. The discrepancy is resolved, however, when the meaning of "education" is examined: GhRRM/AID personnel use it to refer to the literacy component; the farmers use it to refer to information given in all components (livelihood, health, etc.) Under this broader context, it is clear that education does have some impact.

6. Conclusions:

From the available data, GhRRM had the capacity to implement its program of integrated rural development from 1974 till the second half of 1977. Since then, the evidence points to a declining effectiveness and efficiency of the project. The causes of the dramatic turn in the performance of the project are complex and derived from both external and internal factors. The main external factor is the deteriorating condition of the country's economy and a high rate of inflation resulting from acute shortages of essential goods and services.

It must be admitted that the chaotic economic conditions of the country threaten any development project, and, in this case, certainly have contributed to the relatively low performance of this project. Nevertheless, GhRRM suffers from some problems that are internal in their origin.

The borrowed concept of GhRRM - going to the people, living with them, learning from them and assisting them to improve their economic, social and political welfare - appears to have run into operational difficulties. The field staff employed to implement the concept does not seem to appreciate living with the target population in the difficult environmental conditions. There has been no compromise on this issue between the Board of Trustees, representing the "concept defenders", and the field staff, representing the "concept implementers." This conflict largely accounts for the high turnover of the field staff. It is necessary for GhRRM to re-think its strategy of implementing an integrated rural development program by duplicating Dr. Yen's approach.

This is not to say that the concept be abandoned, for there is much that is useful and developmentally sound in it. Nor are all aspects of the GhRRM approach declining in effectiveness. The Health component is a smashing success, and the cooperative enrolments have increased dramatically since 1974. However, reasons for their success lie beyond the GhRRM project: the Health component is semi-autonomous with MOH supplying nurses and drugs; and the shortages of materials and commodities throughout the country are so acute that collective action through cooperatives seems the best way to get them. This points all the more to the need for a re-thinking of

the GhRRM concept and approach, and to bring them more in line with the economic and social realities of the country today.

The propagators who contact and educate the target population are in an ambiguous role. The villagers apparently expect them to play the role of technical advisers; GhRRM expects them to play the role of organization agents; and the propagators expect to use their extension training to better their careers elsewhere. Thus, they neither act in the ways villagers and GhRRM expect them to, nor do they feel a strong loyalty to remain in the village to lead villagers in their development efforts.

The target population may be seeing the Center as collapsing as a result of abandoned projects and long delays in completing buildings at the Center. If this observation is correct, it is likely to affect adversely the performance of GhRRM in reaching and advising the target population. The Center will have lost whatever credibility it has gained over the years.

Finally, a note on the Research Committee which has not been discussed in the Report, but which was responsible for gathering data for the baseline study, and mid and final evaluations. The role of the Research Committee seems to be too removed and too theoretical for the operation of the program. Once evaluations are over, much of the data collected and analyzed are of little relevance for the implementation of the program. From now on, there is a need for research to be more in line with the pressing problems facing the program, such, as, crop production, market incentives, and cooperative organization.

7. Recommendations

1. The strategy of implementing Dr. Yen's concept of development at the rural level should be reviewed to make it more operational.
2. GhRRM should be restructured along four bureaucratic lines, namely:
 - i). Board of Trustees whose role would be to advise and offer guidelines for field operations. The Board should not interfere with day-to-day management of the program.
 - ii). Field Management Committee to be headed by the Center Director who would plan and execute day-to-day field activities of the program. The Field Management Committee should have reasonable financial and managerial autonomy from the Board of Trustees.
 - iii). Financial Committee which should include the Center Director to approve the use of funds.
 - iv). Logistic Support Committee that would plan and see to the acquisition needs of the program.
3. To be able to attract and keep qualified personnel for effective implementation of the program, the salary structure and other service conditions of GhRRM field employees should be reviewed.
4. GhRRM should seek to utilize the assistance of Government employees performing identical functions in the Laboratory area or nearby, such as Ministry of Agriculture Extension staff, Department of Social Welfare personnel, field staff of the Ministry of Youth Labor and Cooperatives, etc.
5. The research component of the program should address itself more to finding solutions to problems in the implementation of the program.

6. Replacement of the two-wheeled-drive vehicle with a four-wheeled drive one.

7. That the GhRRM disbursement process be reviewed. This is especially important for purchase of local materials and contracting services.

SCOPE OF WORK FOR
End of Project Evaluation of Ghana Rural Reconstruction
Movement

(2p.) 1. Executive Summary

A short, concise statement of major findings of the evaluation and the methodology used.

(5p.) 2. Project Background

A brief but comprehensive statement that discusses the project idea, how it got started as a project in Ghana, the historical and socio-cultural context of Mampong Valley, and a description of the beneficiaries (the 3,000 Ewe and Akwapim farmers). The last can be an abbreviated summary of:

- geographical area, farming and settlement patterns
- similarities/differences between two groups
- Akwapim-Ewe relations.
- current political-economic context of Ghana.
(possibly backed up with annex)

(5p.) 3. Project Description

Project purpose, outputs, and inputs. Also description of main project components and implementation arrangements to manipulate to input-output linkage in the context of each component.

Thrust of evaluations to date as well as current status of project toward the realization of the out-put to purpose linkage.

(5p.) 4. Project Analysis

Identifies problems through observation and interviews at project site as well as through review of documents. The analysis goes beyond obvious shortcomings (lack of drugs) and identifies problems which flow from faulty design and/or implementation. For example, what appears to be behind the resignation of one of the "propagators" who are vital to the project? Competing interests, unattractive incentives, role conflicts?

(5p.) 5. Project Impact

This is the "guts" of the Report and attempts to answer the basic question "Did the project achieve its purpose?" In this case the purposes are: For GhRRM to conduct a selfhelp program in integrated rural development; and to train leaders for expansion of such activities to other geographic areas.

Unlike most AID evaluations this one may be able to answer the most important question "Did the project achieve its goal?" In this case the goal is to increase the income, productivity and welfare of the target beneficiaries. This is because the project was well designed, appears to have been implemented well, is small and easily managed, and most important has a sophisticated evaluation process developed by GhRRM.

(5p.) 6. Project Conclusions

What does all the above mean? From reading the Ghana Rural Reconstruction Movement publication "An Experiment in Integrated Rural Development", I would venture two already:

- 1) That the "social amenity" strategy is equally, if not more, important to the "increased agricultural production" strategy (see p.38) to a small-scale and well controlled project.
- 2) That we have a clearer understanding of what is meant by "integrated rural development, which, if the impact is really there, would be more along the line of Myrdal's "cumulative circular causation" than of the holistic fashion as reviewed in the publication (pp.19-32)

(1p.) 7. Recommendations

Based upon all the above, what do we do?

Should the project be replicated, expanded, changed or discontinued?

A note on the AID Logframe:

	<u>Narrative</u>	<u>Indicators</u>	<u>Verification</u>	<u>Assumptions</u>
Goal:	To increase income productivity and welfare of targeted beneficiaries.	Levels of productivity, incomes show increase.	Ag census data epidemiologic data GhRRM data.	Basic public RD policy continues; Ghana has economic growth.
Purpose:	To test GhRRM conducting of self-help IRD. To train leaders.	<u>EOPs:</u> Beneficiaries enjoying benefits. Yensi Center established as base. M VSL concepts work	Evaluation Reports, GhRRM's visits, Request by non-GhRRM for training	Villagers support the project. GhRRM supports project.
Outputs:	For villagers 16 training courses in 4 components. For trainers special courses in 4 areas. Yensi infrastructure in place.	<u>X</u> number of farmers attending number of courses for <u>z</u> number of yrs. Same with trainees; Staff there	Project inputs, site visits, GhRRM records, evaluations.	GhRRM well-organized and managed.
Inputs:	Staff salaries, equip. & teaching aids, vehicle purchase/maint. constructed facilities, drugs & supplies, other costs.	<u>X</u> number of staff, facilities, vehicles, etc. in place for <u>y</u> number of years.	GhRRM records, USAID records, observation.	GhRRM has trained personnel. GOG cooperates.

Unclassified
CLASSIFICATION

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I

Report Symbol U-4

1. PROJECT TITLE ACCELERATED RURAL LEARNING Sub-Activity: Ghana Rural Reconstruction Movement			2. PROJECT NUMBER 698-0387.3	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE AFR/RA 2
5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) 698-81-05	
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY <u>76</u>	B. Final Obligation Expected FY <u>79</u>	C. Final Input Delivery FY <u>80</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION	
6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING			7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION	
A. Total \$ <u>288,000</u>			From (month/yr.) <u>July 1976</u>	
B. U.S. \$ <u>233,000</u>			To (month/yr.) <u>Sept. 1980</u>	
			Date of Evaluation Review	

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR		
A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
<p>A final evaluation of this sub-activity was conducted in September 1980. The evaluation report is attached and constitutes the narrative section of the PES.</p> <p>The sub-activity was terminated, as planned, on September 30, 1980. No further actions are required.</p>		

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS			10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) <u>N/A</u>	A. <input type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change	
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T		B. <input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or	
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P		C. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Terminated project	

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)		12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval	
Jeannette B. Carson, Project Officer, AFR/RA Oleen Hess, Agri. Devel. Officer, USAID/Ghana J. M. Seymour, Acting Chief, AFR/DR/EHR		Signature: <u>[Signature]</u> Typed Name: <u>AFR/RA</u> Donald F. Miller, Director Date: <u>4/22/81</u>	

ACCELERATED RURAL LEARNING, 698-0387

Sub-Activity: Ghana Rural Reconstruction Movement, 698-0387.3

Project Evaluation Summary - Part II: Key to Evaluation Report

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