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CLASSIFICATION

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I

Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE North Cameroon Pilot Community Development Project			2. PROJECT NUMBER 631-0010	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE USAID/Yaounde
5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) 631-81-1	
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY <u>78</u>	B. Final Obligation Expected FY <u>79</u>	C. Final Input Delivery FY <u>81</u>	6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING A. Total \$ <u>784,400</u> B. U.S. \$ <u>351,000</u>	
			7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION From (month/yr.) <u>March 1978</u> To (month/yr.) <u>October 1980</u> Date of Evaluation Review <u>30 April, 1981</u>	
8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR				

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)

B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION

C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the project be terminated on June 30, 1981 as requested by CDF.
2. AID should more carefully review the technical and administrative feasibility of PVO proposals to better assure that projects funded by AID have realistic and obtainable objectives.
3. AID should stress to PVOs the importance of their including project beneficiaries in the project design and review process.

USAID & CDF

June 30, 1981

PDC/PVC

PDC/PVC

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS			10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	A. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change until June 30, 1981	
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T		B. <input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or	
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P		C. <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project	
11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)			12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval	
Rudolph Thomas, Project Manager, USAID; Kathy Radimer, IDI, USAID; Michel Ngoumeni, Provincial Chief of CD, Ministry of Agriculture.			Signature <u>Ronald D. Levin</u>	
			Typed Name <u>Ronald D. Levin</u> Director, USAID/Cameroon	
			Date <u>June 20, 1981</u>	

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART II

13. Summary: This evaluation covers the activities which have been carried out to date under a three-year, \$351,000 Operating Program Grant from AID to the Community Development Foundation (CDF) of Westport, Connecticut to implement a pilot community development program in North Cameroon. The purpose of the project is to create a model program in community-based integrated rural development which would be suitable for replication in other regions of Cameroon. The model program was to be developed from the experiences gained through the community development activities carried out in the target villages in Northern Cameroon.

The evaluation concludes that CDF will not achieve the goal and purpose of the project before June 30, 1981, the termination date for AID's assistance. Specifically, there are no clear indications that the Government of Cameroon will replicate the project on a national scale and CDF has not been able to establish an effective and self-reliant grass roots organization. It should be noted, however, that the features of the project which encourage integrated rural development and the use of a cluster of several villages as a target area for introducing Community Development (CD) have been accepted by the Government as part of their national CD strategy. Unfortunately, the government does not have enough resources to carry out these two programming features without outside help.

The project has been adversely affected by the poor design of the original grant, the lack of GURC involvement in the management and direction of the project, CDF's lack of an effective strategy for motivating and sustaining local initiative and CDF's support of activities which were too expensive and complex to be carried out by villagers without its assistance. As a result, the project got off to a slow start and the grant will most likely terminate without having fully achieved its goal and purposes.

An explanation of those key factors which have impeded the project's progress follows:

A. From the outset, the project was doomed to run into implementation difficulties. The grant was poorly planned because it did not provide sufficient time to accomplish all of its planned activities. The September 23, 1977 grant cover letter provides for a three year grant period - September 25, 1977 through September 30, 1980. Section VIII of the grant agreement provides an estimated budget which covers this period. This is not consistent, however, with Section VI, D, under sub-project expenditures which calls for CDF to submit a three year sector and implementation plan within 13 months of the effective date of the grant. This implies that the total implementation period would cover at least a 4 year and 1 month period. Given this discrepancy, it was destined that the project would run into difficulty. To deal with this issue, the grant was amended on August 31, 1979 to extend the termination date by 18 months to March 31, 1982. However, there were no additional funds provided and, as a result, the termination date was moved up to June 30, 1981. This allows only two years for the implementation of the sub-projects which were to be implemented by the villagers with CDF's assistance as opposed to the original three years implied in the grant.

B. A second problem was CDF's failure to include time in the project design to start-up the project and to obtain local approval of the sub-project activities to be implemented by the villagers. There was no time included in the grant for CDF to recruit personnel and to get them installed in Cameroon. This made the three-year grant period even more unrealistic. What actually happened, was that the project director, Richard Embry, arrived in Cameroon in March 1978, six months after the grant was signed and the implementation of the discreet sub-project activities started in November 1979, more than two years after the signing of the grant. During this period, the implementation of the villagers' self-help projects was delayed for five months, June through October 1979, because local authorities insisted that they review and approve the village self-help projects before implementation. The original design of the project should have provided time for these two activities.

C. A third problem was the insufficient level of administrative funds provided. The budget estimate for administrative costs was \$142,000. Since this budget was based on a three-year period, it is understandable that the figure would be insufficient for what probably should have been a five-year project. Sufficient administrative funds should have been provided to allow the project to go through a reasonable start-up period, select villages, organize the village development committees, develop plans for sub-project activities and carry out three years of sub-project implementation. Unfortunately, the grant neither provided for a specific time frame for each of these activities nor an appropriate budget.

D. The fourth problem concerns the \$209,000 which was budgetted for sub-project activities. This amount proved to be too much for CDF to spend in the villages during a three-year period because it exceeded their absorptive capacity. This factor put pressure on CDF to support relatively large infrastructure projects, i.e., wells and school construction. As discussed in Section 18 of this evaluation, large, complex and expensive projects are not conducive to the creation of an independent, self-reliant and motivated group of villagers because these types of activities are beyond the villagers' capacity to implement without large doses of outside help.

E. The fifth problem was the absence of a Cameroonian counterpart from the Department of Community Development assigned to work with CDF in the Kar-Hay sub-division. This is necessary to replicate the project and make a smooth transfer of the program to the Department of Community Development.

F. The sixth and last factor was the over-ambitious nature of the projects which CDF supported. We were left with the distinct impression that CDF devoted too much time to the planning and implementation of its large projects and not enough time to community development work and the training of the villagers. This was perhaps the main reason for the villagers' lack of motivation and for CDF taking the lead in project implementation.

In summary, there have been a number of mistakes in the design and implementation of the project. In retrospect, most could be corrected if the project were redesigned and extended with additional funding. However, with the problems to date and the limited resources of the Department of Community Development there is no strong evidence that a revised project will succeed in producing a model CD program that is replicable on a national scale. The Department of Community Development can, of course, incorporate some elements of the project into its national program but it would be in need of constant foreign assistance

in order to carry out a national program which uses resources as intensively as CDF has under this project.

14. Evaluation Methodology. The guidelines for preparing the Project Evaluation Summary (PES) constitute the basic line of investigation used in this paper.

The evaluation team of three persons was composed of two USAID/Yaounde officers; Mr. Rudolph Thomas, Project Manager and Miss Kathy Radimer, an International Development Intern and an official of the Department of Community Development; Mr. Michel Ngoumeni, Provincial Chief of Service for Community Development in the North. Other individuals who worked closely with the team were: Mr. ALBAKKA Guidikaya, Mayo-Danay Division Chief for Community Development; Mr. Richard Embry, CDF Project Director; Mrs. Susan BIBI MESSI ESSAMA, Acting Field Director for CDF in Cameroon; and Jon Werz, a Netherlands volunteer assigned to the project. This was a sizable group of individuals who were knowledgeable about the project and interested in its outcome. Mr. Thomas was the team leader and principal investigator. The background information and evidence supporting the conclusions of this evaluation were obtained by the following methods:

1. Visits to the five pilot villages in the Kar-Hay sub-division: Bougaye, Zouaye, Going, Saoringwa, and Sirlawe.
2. Interviews and discussions with village development committees and sub-committee members in each pilot village.
3. On-site inspection of village projects.
4. Meetings with political and administrative authorities:

The Prefect of the Mayo-Danay division, the Sub-Prefect of the Kar-Hay sub-division and the Deputy of the Kar-Hay sub-division, representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Health and officials of the Department of Community Development.

5. Interviews with members of the CDF staff in Kar-Hay.
6. Review of the project grant agreement, CDF's bi-annual reports and its management-implementation plans.

15. External Factors. Since the March 1978 arrival of the project director, Richard Embry, in Cameroon, there have been several external factors which have delayed project implementation. These are:

- A. The rains caused two wells which were planned for FY-80 to cave-in. The wells have been rescheduled for the FY-81 program.
- B. Completion of eight classrooms for four primary schools was delayed from June 1980 to January 1981 because of the lack of transportation caused by water damage to the CDF truck and a shortage of water.
- C. CDF has not yet been able to start its livestock pond maintenance program because the digging tool requested from CENEEMA was too large.

D. The reforestation/soil enrichment project has not materialized because of the unavailability of trees from Chad due to the Chadian civil war.

16. Inputs: The most serious input problem has been the lack of transportation. This has particularly hurt the construction of wells and primary school classrooms, where the transportation of gravel and sand was essential. The CDF project truck arrived late in the construction season and has a small carrying capacity. The services of the CDF truck were lost for an extended period when the motor was soaked with water during the rainy season. Truck rental has not been an acceptable alternative because it is unreliable and expensive. The lack of transportation caused more than a six month delay in completion of classroom construction. CDF is urging the local population and the Commune Rurale, which is controlled by the Sub-Prefect, to find a solution to the transportation problem.

Project implementation has also been impeded by poor planning and design. Examples are:

A. The late start of the implementation of sub-project activities planned for the period of July 1, 1979 through June 30, 1980. These activities were delayed until November 12, 1979, the date the Mayo-Danay division administrative authorities approved CDF's 1980 management implementation plan.

B. There is almost a one year delay between the time eight wells were initially dug (April/May 1980) and the time they will be completed. This is due to the unavailability of the Genie Rural well digging-machine to finish the digging. It is hoped that Genie Rural will be able to dig the wells by the spring of 1981.

C. The rain, which lasted from late June to early October, hindered well and school construction by making the roads impassable.

The factors, which have impeded project implementation could have been anticipated during project design.

17. Outputs: The first three outputs listed below were specified on page 3 of grant No.AID/afr-G-1375 with the remaining outputs specified in the SCF/CDF Management/Implementation Plan for the period of July 1, 1979. The latter identified those sub-projects which were to be jointly executed by the villages and CDF. Funds for these activities were provided for in the grant. The specific sub-projects were not identified because it was understood that this could be done only after the Village Development Committees had been formed and their development priorities established. The listing below shows those outputs which were realized through the first year of execution of the sub-projects identified in CDF's Management/Implementation Plan.

Outputs through June 30, 1980

<u>Planned</u>	<u>Realized</u>
A. <u>General Outputs</u>	
1. Establishment of Village Development Committees (VDC) in each of nine villages	All 9 villages have VDCs

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|---|--|
| 2. Leadership training for VDC members | Training was provided to each VDC |
| 3. Preparation of a development plan for the villages | The plan was prepared for July 1, 1979 - June 30, 1981 |

B Water Resources

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|--|---|
| 1. Creation of a water resources sub-committee in each village | All villages have a water resources sub-committee. |
| 2. Construction of 10 wells | 8 wells were dug and cemented but are not yet functioning |
| 3. Provide technical training for 5 well diggers | 8 well diggers were trained |
| 4. Construction of cisterns for water storage | Two cisterns were constructed |
| 5. Deepening of artificial watering ponds | No artificial watering ponds were dug because the digging implement ordered from CENEEMA was not functional |

C. Agriculture/Forestry/Livestock

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Create an agricultural sub-committee in all villages | All villages have an agricultural sub-committee |
| 2. Organize a blacksmith training program | The blacksmith training was not offered by IUCW |
| 3. Plant 50 shade trees in each village | Done |
| 4. Initiate a reforestation/soil enrichment project | This has not been done because the trees requested from Chad were not available. |

D. Formal and Non-Formal Education Sector

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Establish primary schools in the Saoringwa and Sirlawe villages | Done |
| 2. Construct at least one classroom in each village | Construction of two classrooms in each village has been started |

3. Survey the non-formal education sector in the five villages Not done

E. Health and Nutrition Sector

1. Establish a health/nutrition sub-committee in each village All villages have a health/nutrition sub-committee
2. Provide health training for two SCF/CDF field coordinators, Done
3. Train village health agents and 10 birth attendants Trained 8 village health agents and 6 birth attendants
4. Plan an MCH program Started
5. Begin plans for health posts Medical supplies for the health post have been purchased and the personnel have been trained. The villages are now awaiting approval of the health post by the Ministry of Public Health.

18. Purpose. This project has four basic purposes:

A. To improve the economic well being of 10,000 low-income people living in the Kar-Hay sub-division of the North Province.

B. To help them create an effective grass roots infrastructure and decision-making process for determining priority community activities and to assist in their implementation.

C. To create a model program in community-based, integrated rural development suitable for replication in other regions of Cameroon.

D. To work closely with the Government of Cameroon in order to bring about the application of the model community-based integrated rural development program within Government institutions by the end of the project.

Progress toward the achievement of these purposes has not been significant due largely to the fact that at the time of the evaluation the project had only one year to implement the villagers' sub-projects. During this short time, many activities have started, e.g., wells and classrooms, but few have been completed. Thus, there is no clear evidence of improvement in the economic well-being of the target population. There are clear signs of progress in the creation of village development committees, the second project purpose. The VDCs have established officers and created sub-committees to deal with problems in the areas of agriculture, health, and nutrition, water resources and education. VDC members hold regular meetings to discuss their CDF projects and to reinforce the member's understanding of their responsibilities.

It cannot be said, however, that these VDCs represent an effective grass roots infrastructure and decision-making process. Our interviews revealed that CDF is the motivating force which led to project actions. In fact, some VDC members said that the VDCs were created at CDF's request, which was apparently presented as a prerequisite for CDF's assistance. There was no evidence that the VDCs dealt with village problems which did not use CDF funding exclusively. Also, four of the five VDCs interviewed said that if CDF were to leave they would be lost and would not know where to seek assistance. It is clear that the VDCs are highly dependent upon CDF for initiative and motivation, as well as for funding.

The major cause of CDF's failure to make the villagers self reliant is the type of projects chosen for implementation. Most were too expensive, complex, and large to be done by the villagers. These kinds of projects, e.g., wells, create a natural dependency on CDF to take charge.

The projects prepared by CDF required that equipment and commodities be regularly obtained from Maroua and transported 120 kilometers to Doukoula. It is, also, questionable whether the many project ideas presented in CDF's FY-80 and FY-81 management implementation plans were actually conceived by the villagers themselves. For example, it is unlikely that they could have organized themselves to participate in an IUCW blacksmith training program in another region and arranged a 70,000 CFA loan from FONADER for the newly trained blacksmiths. Nor could the villagers have come up with the idea of requesting the Centre d'Etudes et d'Experimentation du Machinisme Agricole (CENEEMA) in Maroua to create a 140,000 CFA digging implement to make artificial water catchment ponds. These kinds of projects used up valuable CDF staff time, but provided little problem solving, decision-making experience for the villagers. CDF's biggest mistake was that it did most of the planning and executing, leaving itself little time for real community development work, i.e., motivating the villagers to take initiative. Thus, CDF did not develop a model program suitable for replication, which was a major purpose of its project in North Cameroon.

CDF also has expended a disproportionately large amount of money and the time of a staff of 8 CDF workers to introduce the concept of community development to only five villages. The Government of Cameroon is not financially able to reproduce this kind of resource intensive program.

CDF has collaborated closely with Cameroon's Department of Community Development (DCD) but does not yet have a Cameroonian official assigned to the project. Given the remoteness of the Doukoula project site, DCD has not participated substantially in the project. CDF is now trying to correct this and has requested that DCD assign a Cameroonian to work in Doukoula with CDF project director Richard Embry.

19. Goal. The goal of this project is to contribute to the development of the rural sector in Cameroon by helping to bring about the adoption of a nation-wide community-based integrated rural development program. Satisfactory progress toward this goal has not been made for the reasons given in section 18 of this evaluation. At this point, there is little reason to believe that the North Cameroon Pilot Community Development Project will contribute substantially to the development of a nation-wide community development program,

20. Beneficiaries. The project beneficiaries are the 21,000 inhabitants who live in the nine pilot villages. This differs from the figure of 10,000 shown in the original grant agreement and in section 19 of this report. The target population was increased by 11,000, when, following CDF's first year of sub-project implementation, it added four new villages to the original five. At present, the primary beneficiaries are those who have received training. This includes 8 well diggers, 8 village health agents, 6 birth attendants and an undetermined number of village leaders. However, when all project activities are completed, the entire village populations will benefit. This will be particularly true in the case of the 17 wells which will ease the acute water shortage in the project villages.

21. Lessons Learned.

A. In the design of AID projects in general and PVO projects in particular, more thought should be given to start-up time. This should be included in the grant, since the project begins when the agreement is signed. A protracted start-up time can have serious implications for the accuracy of the original cost estimate and the amount of overhead and administrative funds required. This was certainly the case in this project.

B. All AID grants, project agreements, contracts and PIOs should be reviewed carefully to verify their consistency, accuracy and completeness. Close scrutiny would eliminate design and implementation problems before they have a chance to adversely affect the outcome of the project. AID should give special emphasis to the review of the technical and administrative feasibility of PVO proposals. In retrospect the Agency approved a project proposal which was not well thought out.

C. Community development activities should emphasize the involvement of local people rather than the completion of large, complex and expensive activities which require substantial outside assistance. The activities should be appropriate to the villager's financial means, level of community knowledge, sophistication and leadership capacities. This would improve the relevancy of the CD activities and reinforce the problem-solving process which is so important to the success of community development projects.

D. In projects where the government is expected to take over when the project is completed, there should be host country counterparts assigned to the project throughout its life.

E. PVO projects should be evaluated yearly and monitored regularly by AID. Closer monitoring of this project could have lead to the early identification and correction of some of its problems.

F. In March 1980, USAID learned that CDF's estimate of Project disbursements through March 31, 1980 were \$208,014 and that 82% of these funds were programmed for administrative expenditures. With two years left in the project, this situation left no remaining funds to cover administrative cost and a substantially smaller amount to support the self-help sub-projects than was planned in the Grant. USAID advised CDF that it would not make any further payment until CDF reduced its administrative cost to better reflect the original administrative/project cost ratio of 4/6 which is shown in the Grant. As it turned out, the situation was not as serious as it seemed at first. A close review of CDF's

memorandum

DATE: August 21, 1981

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Raymond F. Rifenburg, PDESUBJECT: North Cameroon Pilot Community Development Project Evaluation Summary (PES)
(631-0010).

TO: Mr. Henry Miles, AFR/DP

Attached please find the revised page 9 for the subject PES. After additional discussions between USAID/Cameroon and the Community Development Foundation it was agreed to drop from the PES Section 22 in its entirety. Please assure that copies of the PES on file in AID/Washington have the old page 9 removed and the new page 9 inserted in its place.

Attachment, a/s



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

expenditures revealed that \$30,000 of the administrative funds were actually used to support project activities. In addition to this adjustment, CDF added \$80,000 of its own money to cover administrative cost. The revised estimate of the administrative/project cost ratio for the life of the project is 42/58. This is much more acceptable. The confusion over the amount of project funds used for administrative cost could have been avoided if CDF's vouchers were submitted regularly for actual expenditures and the pattern and nature of the expenditures followed more closely by the USAID/Yaounde project manager. The CDF voucher which raised the administrative cost problem covered a six-month period. A better interval for voucher submission would be either bi-monthly or quarterly.

G. The final lesson learned to be mentioned is that the project beneficiaries and local officials must participate in the project design. Distrust and resistance was encountered from local officials because they viewed the project as an intrusion of foreign concepts.