PD-AAG-578 511-0482

CLASSIFICATION

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) — PART I

Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE	2. PROJECT NUMBER	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE
Rural Education II	Loan 511-V-057 Grant 511-0482	USAID/Bolivia

4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) 11-3

☒ REGULAR EVALUATION ☐ SPECIAL EVALUATION

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING	7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY 1977	B. Final Obligation Expected FY 1982	C. Final Input Delivery FY 1982	A. Total $ 16,978,000 B. U.S. $ 11,729,000	From (month/yr.) 8/77 To (month/yr.) 11/80 Date of Evaluation Review 4/28

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
Equipment and Materials		
1. USAID/B & RE II Project Chief meet and agreed on the final list of purchases and method for purchasing.	Jean Meadowcroft	6/81
2. USAID/B contacts CONDER (the National Coordinating Office for Development of Rural Education Projects) requesting they take the mimeograph machines out of customs and deliver them to project sites.	Jean Meadowcroft	1/81
3* USAID sends a letter to insist CONDER arrange for the conversion of the army excess property pick up trucks and their delivery to the project sites.	Jean Meadowcroft	2/81
Construction		
4* USAID/B sends a letter to CONDER and RE II Project Chief requesting the project engineer and personnel to develop priorities and bidding plans for each of the six normal schools.	Lawrence Odle	5/81
Technical Assistance		
5. USAID/B resubmits a request for contracting full technical services as soon as political situation permits.	Jean Meadowcroft	When suspension lifted

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS

- ☐ Project Paper
- ☐ Financial Plan
- ☐ Logical Framework
- ☐ Project Agreement
- ☐ Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network
- ☐ PIO/T
- ☐ PIO/C
- ☐ PIO/P
- ☒ Other (Specify) TDD extension
- ☐ Other (Specify)

10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT

- A. ☐ Continue Project Without Change
- B. ☐ Change Project Design and/or ☒ Change Implementation Plan
- C. ☐ Discontinue Project

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)

Jean Meadowcroft (USAID Project Manager)
for Kevin Kelly (Chief of DR Office)
René Peña y Lillo (EE Engineer)
Jaime Vizcarra (Evaluation Team Coordinator)

12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval

Signature: Malcolm Butler

Typed Name: Malcolm H. Butler, Acting Director

Date: 5/5/81

AID 1330-15 (3-78)

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study.	B. Name of Officer Responsible for Action	C. Date Action to be Completed
Training		
6. USAID/B sends a letter to RE II Project Chief suggesting bilingual education specialists receive further on-site training in Puno, Perú.	Jean Meadowcroft	When suspension lifted.
7. USAID/B meets with RE II Project Chief, CONDER and the TA team to replan in-country training activities.	Jean Meadowcroft	When suspension lifted.
8. USAID meets with RE II Project Chief, and CONDER to discuss and set number of primary schools teachers to be served by mobile teams.	Jean Meadowcroft	When suspension lifted.
Personnel		
9.* USAID/B sends a letter to MEC urging a) provision of adequate salary and expenses to project personnel, b) assignment of qualified personnel to project.	Jean Meadowcroft	5/81
10. USAID/B meets with RE II Project Chief and CONDER to discuss the possibility of forming and training six additional mobile teams.	Jean Meadowcroft	When suspension lifted.
11. USAID/B sends a letter to CONDER requesting the description of roles and functions of the Coordinator and RE II Project Chief.	Jean Meadowcroft	5/81
12. USAID/B meets with RE II Project Chief, CONDER and TA team to discuss possible training for new administrators and technicians.	Jean Meadowcroft	When suspension lifted.
Overall		
13. USAID/B requests approval of TDD extension by AID/W	Kevin Kelly	When suspension lifted.
Subsequent Actions (11/80 - 4/81)		
3.* In April 81 CONDER communicated verbally to USAID/HR that the RE II team had been requested to submit plans and specifications for vehicle conversion and that CONDER would seek quotes for this work.		
4.* CONDER and RE II personnel are aware of this problem and are studying priorities which they will develop into a formal plan.		

A. List decision and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study	B. Name of Officer Responsible for Action	C. Date Actio to be Completed
9. In January, CONDER submitted budgets for increased salary and per diem to the Ministry of Finance which denied the increases, therefore, a letter will be sent to the Minister of Education. CONDER has been conscientious of the need to assign qualified personnel but needs support from the Ministers.		

Clearances:

DPE:JVizcarra
DPE:RLeón de Vivero
DPE:HRHandler

13. SUMMARY:

The Rural Education II project was initiated on August 30, 1977. Its purpose was to improve the capability of rural teachers through teacher training programs, curriculum development, teaching material development, the improvement of teacher training facilities, and the consolidation of training programs and teacher training institutions.

Funding for this project has been suspended by AID since the July 1980 coup. As a result the project is considerably behind schedule. The original schedule was too optimistic for first year achievement; in addition the implementation of the project has been seriously affected by a very unstable political period which began shortly after the project agreement was signed. Unfortunately, just at the time technical assistance was ready to arrive and the project was "taking off", the July 17, 1980 coup occurred and Washington's subsequent course of action included delaying this activity on project specific grounds.

Notwithstanding this fact, the project has made significant progress in its principal component of teacher training, as well as in the delivery of equipment and books. The Bolivian project technicians remain eager to work and have continued as many of the activities as possible, given the present political situation and funding limitations. Assuming a normalization of U.S. - Bolivian relations and the correction of project deficiencies by the Government of Bolivia (GOB), the project would have to be extended beyond its TDD on August 30, 1982 in order to offset the time lost.

A major problem remaining in accomplishing the project purpose is the shortage of funds for construction due to inflation and required improvement in design specifications. To alleviate this problem, the construction at each teacher training institution can be reduced, although at the expense of not achieving the full project purpose.

In brief, progress has been uneven and has been affected by events external to the project. Nevertheless, the project purpose can be achieved and a significant contribution be made toward the sector goal if AID funding is restored to the project, the GOB provides sufficient financial and administrative support, and the Bolivian situation stabilizes.

14. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY:

This is the first evaluation since the project's inception in August 1977 and covers the period through November 1980. In accordance with the project paper, an independent evaluation was to be carried out by consultants in February 1979. This has been postponed to date due to resistance by the Ministry or Education and Culture (MEC) to finance it with loan funds.

In lieu of the outside evaluation denoted above, the first regular evaluation was planned initially for June 1980 which had to be postponed until October 1980 due to the situation created by the coup. The primary purposes

of the present Mission evaluation were: 1) to establish whether adequate resources are being made available by the GOB and USAID/B in support of the project; 2) to determine if an adequate number of personnel are being trained to implement subsequent project activities; 3) to examine if the necessary steps have been taken to develop new curricula and teaching materials; and 4) to identify problem areas and recommend corrective actions for the future implementation of the project. This evaluation was designed in accordance with the project paper evaluation plan and took place at a time when the project had had the opportunity to achieve partial progress towards its objectives. The evaluation team consisted of the following USAID members: Jean H. Meadowcroft, project manager; Kevin Kelly, Development Resources Officer; René Peña y Lillo, an engineer from the Engineering and Energy Division; and Jaime Vizcarra, the team coordinator, an evaluation economist of the Development Planning and Evaluation Office. Additional inputs were received from Dr. Claude Boyd, former long term logistics education advisor. Special contributors outside of USAID included: Lic. Oscar Daza of the National Coordination Office for Rural Education (CONDER); Prof. Emma Alegría de Ruilova, the previous Bolivian project chief; Prof. Néstor Jurado, current Bolivian project chief; and Prof. José Triveño R., evaluation technician.

The evaluation process included a review of the most important project documentation (e.g. project paper, reports and documents); an extensive on-site evaluation allowing for the participation and discussion with normal school teachers and mobile teams; and the review of the findings and the preparation of the PES.

15. EXTERNAL FACTORS:

The unstable socio-political situation has impacted negatively on the project by contributing to: 1) the lack of understanding, knowledge and support for the project by high level authorities (e.g. MEC and the National Chief of Rural Normal Schools), who were frequently changed; 2) excessive bureaucratic procedures and delays in MEC and other GOB Ministries; 3) personnel changes by the National Confederation of Rural Teachers and the present government; and 4) the significant increase of equipment and construction costs rendering the original budget inadequate.

Regarding the validity of the main assumptions in the project's logical frame, the requirements of 12 years of schooling to enter the rural normal schools has had the effect of lowering the quantity of rural normal school students because few campesino children have access to secondary schooling. The quality of rural normal school students is also deficient in view that the better qualified students enter the more competitive urban normal school system.

16. INPUTS:

16.1. Equipment and Materials

Ideally the planning for purchase of equipment would have been coordinated with the construction elements so that certain equipment

(e.g. library checkout counters, blackboards) could have been built in instead of being purchased separately. This was not possible, due to the delay in the signing of the A & E contract, as well as subsequent delays in the development of construction plans. Consequently, the purchase plan for equipment and materials was based on a detailed study of needs and priorities for each of the rural normal schools, carried out by the long term education logistic advisor. The purchase of books was also based on this study. An initial list of all remaining purchases of equipment has been prepared by project technicians.

Considerable pressure has been applied by the GOB to procure goods locally to assure prompt delivery. A review of the GOB request by USAID showed that it would be advantageous and cost-effective to purchase a limited number of items locally. To this effect, USAID demonstrated flexibility within AID procurement regulations in making certain purchases (i.e. 22 typewriters, 7 calculators, 15 motorbikes, 49 bookcases, and 1 mimeograph machine) which facilitated the work of the Higher Institute of Education in Tarija (ISE/T), the six rural normal schools, and the mobile team. The use of local procurement procedures also allowed for the purchase of 14,000 volumes of general and specialized educational books for ISE/T and the six rural normal schools.

A factor causing delays in the delivery of some goods was the well intentioned belief of some GOB authorities that students and teachers should pay for transportation costs so that they would value the goods received. Since these people had little money and needed to raise funds, the delivery of goods was delayed for several months until transportation cost could be paid. To correct this problem, in September 1980, the new project coordinator began to use loan funds, as is appropriate, to deliver the rest of the goods.

Although the GOB and USAID both recognize the cost advantages in purchasing goods through a large international IFB, this loan has experienced long delays in the awarding of contracts. Further, CONDER had great difficulties in the liberation of goods from customs (e.g. 13 pick-up trucks and 1,000 cots, purchased from excess property and delivered in June 1979, were not liberated from customs until July 1980).

A specific problem ensued with the pick-up truck procurement. USAID urged the GOB to purchase low-cost excess property U.S. Army pick-up trucks for conversion to 7 vans and 6 stake-bed trucks. Although the trucks were purchased and finally released from customs in July 1980, the situation following the July coup has not allowed the Mission to approve the necessary loan funds to convert the trucks. As the GOB does not want civilian using U.S. Army trucks, they have not been delivered to the project sites.

Recommendations: 1) USAID and GOB counterparts should come to an agreement on the items still to be purchased and the methods for purchasing; 2) the project should make purchases locally when appropriate; 3) USAID must continue to pressure the National Coordination Office to assure

prompt release of project goods from customs; and 4) the USAID and GOB should arrange for the conversion and delivery of the trucks to the project sites, as soon as possible.

16.2. Construction

A year's delay was encountered in awarding, negotiating, and approving the contract for A & E services (May 1979 vs. project paper date of April 1978). Part of the delay was due to conflicts among local competing firms. In addition, the MEC project enginner, who was to review their work, was not hired until May 1980, because of lack of timely decision by MEC. Fortunately, the MEC engineer is very able and reviewed the plans thoroughly and rapidly. The construction plans were submitted by A & E consultant to MEC and AID in final by December 1980, but cannot be bid on at present due to the delayed status of the project (see Section 13). Further, because of severe inflation and changes in original specifications in order to improve the durability and maintenace of new buildings, the current cost estimated is 60% above the funds originally budgeted. The following table shows projected against actual construction costs:

	Original Financial Plan	New Estimated Costs
New Construction	US$ 6,756,192	US$ 10,661,029
Remodeling	209,140	771,852
Engineering Services	675,619	674,945
Total	US$ 7,640,951	US$ 12,107,826
Rounded	US$ 7,641,000	
AID Loan	US$ 5,067,000	
GOB Contribution	US$ 2,574,000	
Total	US$ 7,641,000	

Alternative solutions to this problem are that the GOB increase its contribution; that only three of the six rural normal schools be built; or that the budgeted funds be distributed among the six schools according to construction and repair priorities. The first alternative is unfeasible given the financial state of the GOB. The second alternative would cause a great deal of tension with the 'abandoned' schools and would not serve the project purpose of creating good educational facilities distributed throughout Bolivia. The third alternative has a technically sound basis in that construction and repair priorities for each school can be set in relation to their importance as related to the improvement of teacher training vis-a-vis the improvement of teacher facilities and the contribution to the project purpose and goal.

Recommendations: 1) Priorities should be set for construction and repairs at each rural normal school in accordance with the original financial plan; and 2) construction should be let to bid as soon as possible.

16.3. Technical Assistance

The contracting of technical assistance took nearly two years longer than planned (May 1980 vs. project paper date of June 1978). While the original date may have been optimistic, the fact that an influential former MEC official only wanted Bolivian firms to compete, contrary to AID regulations, nearly caused the contracting process to fail. In this regard, he created a series of legalistically based issues as a means of assuring that the contract be awarded to a local firm. These issues related to 1) the approval of the RFP, 2) the award of the contract, and 3) the approval procedures for the Ministers of Education and Finance. The contract was finally approved due to the efforts of the second MEC project director and USAID/B, as well as the support of the Rural Teachers Confederation.

The July 1980 coup took place shortly after the signing of the contract and prevented the arrival of the contracted personnel. Despite the fact that, from July through the time of the evaluation in November, the Chief of Party/ Administration Advisor did his best to support the project from the U.S., and the Teacher Training Advisor, who was already in place, expanded his duties to other areas as needed, the lack of contracted technical assistance, hampered teacher training efforts and severely affected the implementation of the curriculum, teaching materials, and administration improvement components. Also, the approved AID/W guidance regarding project implementation following the July 1980 coup, necessitated the termination in September 1980 of the education logistics advisor, a PSC who had served the project since April 1978. During the period of his contract he was effectively able to expand his services to meet the needs of the project in teacher training, curriculum development, and evaluation.

In sum, of 236 person/months of long term technical assistance only 29 (12.3%) had been provided through the end of the evaluation period. The project has been negatively affected by the delay in delivery of full technical services as described above.

Recommendation: Full technical services should be restored to the project as soon as possible.

16.4. Training

16.4.1. Overseas Training

The original training plan called for sending two groups of participants to study for 9 months each, one in 1978 and the second in 1979. This plan underestimated the time needed to identify and contract appropriate universities, and to select the participants. Nonetheless, the time lost in 1978 was regained by sending one large group of participants in 1979. The extra time taken to arrange training resulted in a somewhat longer course

(ten months) with a reasonable cost per participant at two Colombian universities (Del Valle in Cali and Javeriana in Bogota), which provided especially designed highly intensive programs. The results of this high quality training are seen in educators who show positive changes of attitude and behaviour (e.g. teamwork, openness to new ideas, application of research). In the area of bilingual education training results were less than optimal because Colombia offered more theoretical than practical oriented experiences. In addition, the project funded two months of supervisory observational visits for project administrators, and one and a half months training for two project technicians in evaluation. The director for ISE/T was trained in the United States at the master degree level in administration and supervision, through the LASPAU program.

Recommendation: The participants in bilingual education should receive further training in on-site programs, possibly in Puno, Peru.

16.4.2. In-Country Training

The first in-country training program was originally planned for 1978, prior to the time the overseas training would have been completed -- an unrealistic schedule for obtaining optimal training outputs. In view of the late return of the participants from Colombia, the first 8 months course for new rural normal instructors began at ISE/T in April 1980. The course only covered 75% of the pre-established content due to the lack of available technical assistance, inexperienced instructors and political interruption related to the July coup. Some participants and instructors felt that the course covered too many areas in the time allowed for the course.

The six mobile teams trained in Colombia: 1) carried out workshops for rural primary school teachers in the five primary school systems in the area of each of the normal schools; 2) supervised the teaching practices of final year students; and 3) assisted the rural normal school staff to improve planning and teaching practices. The subsequent changes in the rural normal school staffs, since the July coup, have temporarily reduced the effectiveness of the mobile teams (e.g. one normal school director's refusal to cooperate with the mobile team; some mobile team members leaving their positions). Other serious problems facing the mobile teams have been: 1) the lack of transportation (other than motorbikes) for the reasons described in Section 16.1. above; 2) delays of per diem and travel expenses payments by the GOB; and 3) delays in the training of six additional mobile teams originally planned for 1979.

Recommendations: 1) the MEC should plan and initiate new training as soon as possible; 2) the MEC convert the trucks and provide them to mobile teams; 3) the MEC project manager should ensure smoother relations among project personnel; 4) the GOB should provide per diem, travel and adequate salaries to attract and retain qualified personnel, and 5) USAID/B and MEC should explore the possibility of forming and training six more mobile teams.

16.5. Personnel

The GOB/MEC was to assign sufficient personnel to the project and provide them with salary, per diem, and travel expenses. At the time of this evaluation, fewer than the required positions had been created and fewer persons had been trained. Of the 20 instructors planned for ISE/T only 14 were provided and trained. The first MEC project chief was unwilling to create any of these positions even though at one time he stated that 13 of the positions had been created and filled. It took the second MEC project chief from October 1979 to March 1980 to create the positions and assure the salary schedule. As a result, some of the new ISE/T staff left the project. In addition, the delay in the training to be provided by ISE/T has impacted negatively on existing personnel.

The major problem presently facing the project is the loss of some of the personnel previously trained in Colombia. It is estimated that 21 (34.4% of the 61 persons have left the project (although they remain within MEC) due to low salaries and lack of per diem and travel expenses. Of these 21, 9 have more influential MEC positions and are actively helping the project. The existing six mobile teams have been supporting project activities out of their own pockets and the other teams have not been formed.

Another problem has been the conflict between MEC project chiefs and coordinators. Although project administration was to be supported by the National Coordinator for Rural Education, the centralization of the position has distanced the relationships, oftentimes holding up programs. Until July 1980, the project chief had to circumvent the Coordinator, dealing directly with the other MEC officers and the Minister, in order to continue with certain implementation activities called for by the project.

Recommendations: 1) the MEC should set up an adequate salary schedule for project personnel; 2) the MEC should establish a timely payment system for salaries, per diem and travel expenses; 3) the MEC should attempt to reincorporate trained personnel and/or qualified replacements into the project; and 4) the roles and functions of the Coordinator and the project chief should be clarified.

17. OUTPUTS:

Actual progress against projected output targets was analyzed in the six areas of the logical framework.

17.1. Facilities Improvement

The architectural and engineering firms have performed very well after the lengthy process in the approval of their contract (see Section 16.2.). Final construction plans have been designed and submitted to USAID/B for approval. However, even after they are approved and let to bid in the near future, the date of completion of construction will be some 15 months behind the project paper schedule (see Annex I - Schedule of Engineering Events).

Motorbikes, office equipment, cots and books have been delivered to ISE/T and the six rural normal schools. Plans have been initiated for purchasing remaining equipment.

Recommendations: 1) Should full project funding be reinitiated, USAID/B must request extension of the TDD from AID/W based on a revised construction schedule.

17.2. Training

Teachers and other personnel were trained as follows:

	Cumulative Target thru 11/1980	Achieved by 11/1980
a) National Administrators	3	4
b) ISE/T Professors and Administrators		
(1) Overseas training	22	14
(2) Instructors taught through visiting professors program	90	
c) Rural Normal School Teachers and Administrators		
(1) Overseas training	24	18
(2) In-country training	182	146
d) Rural School Trainers		
(1) Overseas training	30	30
(2) In-country training at ISE/T	30	-
e) Rural Shool Teachers		
(1) Summer in-service training at rural normal schools	300	-
(2) In-service training by teams of trainers at Nucleos	12,500	900 (estimated)

Although the original teacher training plan was not followed in exact detail, outputs have been consistent with overall targets. In two areas of the overseas training, fewer persons than planned were trained. As explained in Section 16.5 the first MEC project chief was opposed to creating more positions for ISE/T, resulting in a loss of 8 positions. In the case of the rural normal schools, USAID and MEC project officials agreed that training the two department chiefs for each institution was sufficient.

The impact of the training has been reduced since trained personnel have been lost to the project (see Section 16.5). This has diminished the possibility of achieving adequate outputs of new teachers at the rural normal school level. The mobile teams are reaching far fewer rural school teachers

than planned, although they have worked more intensively with the remote primary school systems (one central school and about ten smaller schools) reachable by poor primary/secondary roads, or foot trails. Thus, it is improbable that all the schools in each department will be reached. Also, the mobile teams are of the opinion that the original plan of reaching each school only once or twice a year does not provide sufficient training to teachers to make a significant improvement of classroom teaching. Finally, summer courses and the visiting professor program, though planned for 1981, could not be done due to the limitation of project funding following the July 1980 coup.

Recommendations: 1) As per Section 16.4 and 16.5, MEC should attempt to reincorporate as many trained personnel as possible and/or seek the best possible replacements; and 2) USAID/B and MEC project personnel should study the number of teachers that reasonably can be reached by the mobile teams and agree on a revised target.

17.3. Curriculum Development

The largest activity under this component was the national workshop including all 20 rural normal schools in Cochabamba in 1979. Preliminary basic recommendations for curriculum reform were made at the workshop. Also in 1980, in depth scientific research on curriculum development was begun in rural normal schools. The data has been collected but needs to be processed. These two efforts form a solid base for the reform of curriculum (plans and programs).

17.4. Teaching Material Development

Little has been accomplished in this component. Although a plan for systematic production of instructional materials at ISE/T and the rural normal schools was begun, it has not yet been approved or implemented due to lack of technical assistance and delays in purchases of the equipment (e.g. material reproduction, audio visual equipment).

17.5. Administrative Improvement

The director and two departmental chiefs for each of the six rural normal schools, and the sub-director for ISE/T were trained in Colombia in 1979. As explained above (see Section 17.2) sub-directors were not trained for the rural normal school due to the small size of the institutions. A few of the participants were not able to take up their positions for the 1980 school year due to pressures by the Rural Teachers Confederation. Then, after the July coup the GOB replaced all but one of the directors, and the sub director for ISE/T. The director for ISE/T, trained at the masters degree level in the U.S., was not able to regain his post. Also the departmental heads left for better pay or less rural locations. Thus, this component has lost nearly all of its trained personnel base. No other activity toward administrative improvement than the training was done due to lack of technical assistance.

Recommendations: MEC should attempt to reincorporate these persons and/or make use of the technical assistance team to provide in-service training to the new administrators.

17.6. Consolidation

This component contemplates a construction of six larger, more efficient rural normal schools in lieu of the 10 deficient local normal schools. The progress in consolidation up to November has been minimal. Early in the project it became apparent that local groups would not permit the closure of a local normal school, nor did any of the GOB administrations have the power to enforce this plan. Therefore, it was decided to try to draw more students to the six project schools, emphasizing the improved academic opportunities and facilities, thus reducing the other schools by attrition. However, the current GOB has publicly stated its plans to reduce the number of normal schools along the lines called for in the project.

18. PURPOSE:

The main purpose of this project is:

> "to improve the professional capability of rural teachers to meet the educational needs of their students."

To accomplish the latter the project delineated six additional sub-purposes in the following areas:

18.1. Consolidation

> "To increase the efficiency of Bolivia's rural normal school system."

EOPS Verifiable Indicators

> "a) The consolidation of the ten existing rural normal schools serving the seven departments included in the project area into six larger, more efficient units."

No progress has been made at this time, although the current GOB has indicated plans to convert some rural normal schools into technical schools. Thus, it is likely to be achieved by the TDD.

18.2. Teacher Training

> "Teacher training is the focus of the project and its activities will aim at 1) ISE/T professors, 2) rural normal school teachers, 3) rural school trainers and 4) rural school teachers."

EOPS Verifiable Indicators

> "a) All ISE/T professors trained abroad."

All ISE/T professors have already been trained abroad as indicated previously in the output section. However, six of the 13 have left the project since the July 1980 coup. If they are reincorporated or replaced with qualified persons, EOPS will be achieved.

"b) All teachers at the six rural normal schools included in the project trained at ISE/T".

The first course for rural normal school instructors at ISE/T is well underway (June 1980 - January 1981). EOPS is very likely to be achieved.

"c) An ongoing summer in-service training program for rural school teachers in the seven departments included in the project."

The first summer in-service training program for rural school instructors was planned for November 1980, and now is planned for November 1981, should loan funding be re-initiated. MEC is very interested in achieving this EOPS.

"d) A team of trainers visiting every nucleo in the seven departments included in the project to carry out in-service training every 6 to 18 months."

Teams of trainers in the four departments visited by the evaluation team (Tarija, Santa Cruz, Sucre and Oruro) are carrying out in-service training in fewer nucleos on a more intensive schedule than originally planned. Due to rough terrain and wide dispersion of schools the EOPS cannot be attained and the number of schools should be reduced.

"e) The reduction of new unqualified teachers (interinos) entering Bolivia's rural school system to 150 per year."

The reduction of unqualified teachers target cannot be assessed at the moment since it is a long term process due to: 1) the time required to produce a rural normal school graduate (3 to 4 years), and 2) the long period of preparation needed for the project to improve and reform the normal rural schools. Nevertheless, a data gathering system has been established by the project which will provide information each year on the number of qualified and unqualified teachers entering the system. Thus the number of unqualified teachers can be monitored over the years.

18.3. Curriculum Development

"The curriculum development efforts of this project will be confined to the ISE/T and rural normal school levels. They will take into account curriculum developments at all levels under the A.I.D. Education Management and Rural Education I Loans and the proposed World Bank Warisata Loan."

EOPS Verifiable Indicators

"a) Existence of an operation process for the continual development of the ISE/T curriculum, taking into account experience in using the curriculum and developments in the curricula of the rural normal schools and rural schools."

A national seminar and survey have been carried out. Project technicians have begun the long term planning process for development of curriculum. Achievement is probable

> "b) Existence of an operational process for continual development of the curriculum at the six rural normal schools included in the project, taking into account experience in using the curricula and development in the curricula of ISE/T and the rural schools."

As indicated in Section 17.3, although the basic study and design towards curriculum development have been carried out, further progress is pending the provision of technical assistance in this area. Achievement is probable.

18.4. Teaching Material Development

> "Teaching materials preparation, reproduction and dissemination will be limited primarily to materials needed to support project curriculum development activities."

EOPS Verifiable Indicators:

> "a) Existence of an operation system of teaching materials preparation in support of the continuous curriculum development process at the ISE/T and rural normal school levels."

Limited progress has been made towards teaching material development as indicated earlier in Section 17.4. Further development is pending the arrival of a long term teaching material development advisor to work at ISE/T. Once the advisor is on board the likelihood of achievement is good.

> "b) Existence of an operational system for reproduction and dissemination of rural normal school and rural school curriculum materials as they become available to teachers who need them in the seven departments included in the project."

Limited progress has been made on this EOPS indicator due to lack of reproduction equipment at ISE/T and the six rural normal schools. With the arrival of technical assistance and purchase of remaining equipment, probability for achievement is good."

18.5. Facilities Improvement

> "The project will upgrade the facilities at both ISE/T and the six normal schools included in the project."

EOPS Verifiable Indicators

"a) The completion of repair work on serviceable existing facilities and construction of new facilities at the six rural normal schools included in the project, as well as the availability of needed equipment at ISE/T and the six rural normal schools included in the project."

Approval of the final construction plan is expected to be completed during the first quarter of 1981. These documents can be let to bid as soon as the limitation on the use of project funds is lifted. Equipment and large amount of materials have already been purchased and delivered to ISE/T and the six rural normal schools. It remains for CONDER to deliver the reproduction equipment and the trucks for the mobile teams. With the extension of the TDD by at least 15 months, this EOPS can be accomplished.

18.6 Administrative Improvement

"The project will invest significant resources in administrative improvement at the national ISE/T and rural normal school levels."

EOPS Verifiable Indicators

"Improved administration of the rural normal school system at the national level."

Little progress has been made in this area due to lack of technical assistance. The EOPS can be achieved if technical assistance is made available and the TDD is extended.

"b) Improve administration at ISE/T."

The progress made in this area through training has been lost due to personnel attrition. It will require a concerted effort by USAID/B, MEC and the technical assistance to recover lost time, and direct efforts toward improved administration.

"c) Improved administration of the six rural normal schools included in the project."

Same as b).

The evaluation team believes that EOPS conditions represent an adequate description of what will exist at the end of the project (provided the TDD is extended for at least 15 months). Political instability directly or indirectly has diminished the effect of outputs on project purpose because it caused major delays and personnel changes, resulting in reduc-

tion of purchase and construction potential by inflation, loss of trained personnel to the project, untimely arrival of technical assistance, and lost opportunities to hold training courses. Nevertheless, with an extension of the TDD, the project can recover much of the lost ground and still achieve its purpose.

19. GOAL/SUB-GOAL:

> "The project's education sector goal is to establish a more efficient and equitable public education system institutionally and substantively responsive to the needs of rural Bolivia."

EOPS Verifiable Indicators:

> "a) increase percentage of school age children between the ages of 6 and 14 in the rural areas enrolled in school by 5% by 1982."
>
> "b) increase percentage of pupils entering basic cycle (first five grades) in rural areas who completed cycle from 15% in 1975 to 20% in 1981."
>
> "c) decrease percentage of rural population who are illiterate by 2% by 1982."

The evaluation team found that some progress is being made in the above EOPS indicators. The team also concluded that these indicators involve increases in quantities but that the project itself is more involved with the quality aspects of schooling. Furthermore, regarding EOPS b), increases in enrollment have as much to do with demand for schooling by rural parents for their children as with the quality of schooling itself. More appropriate indicators should have also included increases in student learning. Finally, the evaluation team believes that this project will contribute directly to the improvement of both the quality of the teachers and the teaching. In the long run these will contribute indirectly to the quantity and quality of student learning, as well as to increase in enrollment, school completion and general literacy. This project may also indirectly contribute to increasing the demand for schooling through its provision of better quality and more attractive schooling.

20. BENEFICIARIES:

There are three distinct beneficiary groups in the project:

1) the direct beneficiaries - approximately 20 ISE/T professors, 200 rural normal school teachers, 5,000 rural normal school students and 8,000 to 9,000 rural school teachers; 2) the intermediate beneficiaries - about 275,000 rural school students in all Bolivia, and 3) the ultimate beneficiaries - approximately two million rural people.

To date the project has benefitted the first group of professors, administrators and teachers from ISE/T and the six rural normal schools as already discussed in Sections 16 , 17 , and 18. Benefits to groups 2) and 3), above, are expected to occur in the long run as more teachers receive training and the quality of teacher preparation is upgraded.

21. UNPLANNED EFFECTS:

The evaluation team believes that because of the more intensive and longer training abroad offered to participants, these persons will have a longer lasting impact and a larger multiplier effect in rural education than originally conceived. Specifically, the participants are proving to be better thinkers, more practical and more interested in research and application of new ideas than expected.

22. LESSONS LEARNED:

1) The flexibility shown by USAID/B in allowing the purchase of some equipment locally (e.g. typewriters, calculators, motorbikes, books) has been very advantageous in time and has enhanced the CONDER's image (i.e. power groups endorsed the project after realizing USAID/B's responsiveness to their concerns) Because of the flexibility shown by USAID/B an atmosphere of mutual cooperation was created with the counterpart during the period preceeding the July 1980 coup.

2) The project was overdesigned in terms of the host country capability requirements for project implementation. The evaluation team suggests that projects either try to do less in the same amount of time or do the same targeted outputs over a longer period. In cases where there is less developed local administrative capacity, projects should be designed to allow greater USAID/B participation and control over commodity procurement and contracting. In least developed sectoral areas, USAID should carry out these actions directly and include host country administrators to give them experience in such matters.

3) The project design did not contemplate the reaction of local groups to the proposed consolidation plan nor the GOB power required to enforce the plan. In order to implement similar efforts in future projects, local groups and government authorities should be consulted in the design and implementation phases of the project.

4) The use of third country training contemplated in the project design proved to be effective. Specifically, the training was transferable to Bolivia since the third country was similar although more developed; the language similarity eliminated communication problems at the universities and between participants with third country experts, institutions, and libraries; and the proximity of the training site specifically reduced the cost per participant.

5) The training carried out by mobile teams for rural teachers at their rural school sites proved to be useful and much appreciated by the teachers. Nevertheless, the project design should have taken into account: 1) the ability of the GOB to create new positions and provide adequate support, and 2) the accessibility of the territory to be covered.

SCHEDULE OF ENGINEERING EVENTS

(Loan Paper Data versus Actual Events)

a)	October, 1977	- Request for Prequalification Data for design engineer contract issued	October 1977 - Requests for prequalifications and proposal process (a and d) were combined as it is usual Bolivian procedure, accepted by AID
b)	November 1977	- Prequalification Data received for design engineer contract	
c)	December 1977	- Design engineering firms prequalified.	
d)	February 1978	- Design engineer contract proposals received.	February 1978 - March and April 1978 there was no activity on evaluation of proposals. Decision was reached in July 1978 to award contract to Prudencio-Claros and CNWC Architects. Negotiations began.
e)	April 1978	- Design Engineering contract awarded and signed.	Supreme Decree for awarding issued in October 1978. Contract signing process began. May 1979 - Design engineer contract signed.
f)	October 1978	- Preliminary construction plans received and approved.	March 1980.
		(1) Request for prequalification data received for construction contract(s)	Not done - Expected for January, 1981
g)	November 1978	- Prequalification Data received for construction contract(s)	Not done - Expected for January, 1981
h)	December 1978	- Final construction plans received and approved - Construction firms prequalified.	Expected for December 1980.
i)	February 1979	- Construction contract proposals received.	Expected for March 1981.

SCHEDULE OF ENGINEERING EVENTS

j)	April 1979 -	Construction contract awarded and signed.	Expected for April 1981.
k)	July 1982 -	Construction completed.	Expected for October, 1983, which means that construction would extend 15 months beyond the T.D.D.
l)	August 1982 -	Local contractor engineer and architect complete services.	
m)	November 1982-	Terminal disbursement date.	