

CLASSIFICATION
PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I

Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE AGRICULTURAL OFFICERS TRAINING PROJECT	2. PROJECT NUMBER 688-0207	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE MALI
4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY)		
<input type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION		

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY _____ B. Final Obligation Expected FY _____ C. Final Input Delivery FY _____	6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING A. Total \$ _____ B. U.S. \$ _____	7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION From (month/yr.) _____ To (month/yr.) _____ Date of Evaluation Review _____
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8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
(Cont'd) moniteurs training and utilizer needs to provide additional assurance of a viable project. The Mission is holding discussions with the IBRD and the GRM which may influence to a considerable degree the requests to be made in the revised PP.	M. Fleming	

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS <table style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T</td> <td>_____</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P</td> <td>_____</td> </tr> </table>	<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	_____	<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P	_____	10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT A. <input type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change B. <input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or <input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan C. <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____											
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	_____											
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____											
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P	_____											

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)	12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval Signature _____ Typed Name _____ Date _____
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PART II

P.E.S.

13. Summary

The purpose of the project is to assist the GRM in increasing its capacity to train and graduate each year up to 160 additional well trained and motivated polyvalent junior level agricultural extension agents (moniteurs) from its Centres d'Apprentissage Agricole (CAA's). Inputs to accomplish this were to be: the expansion of two schools (partly by renovation work and partly by new construction), commodities, vehicles, participant training and technical assistance. This was to be accomplished by the original project activity completion date; March 1980. The Pro. Ag. extended this date to May 1980.

That target was totally unrealistic. Nevertheless, there have been serious unanticipated delays in implementation and extremely large unexpected construction cost increases. It will take at least another 42 months to complete the project, perhaps 48 months. Project costs have about doubled to approximately \$10.5 million. Project technical assistance activities were brought to a halt in mid-October 1979 with the departure of the two-man technical assistance team and the cancellation of the contract with Near East Foundation. The basic concern of the GRM with the contract personnel was the lack of ability to communicate in French and the inability to perform the required Education Administration Training. A very deep concern of GRM developed because of an implied rejection of those aspects of training that have proven beneficial and should be incorporated into revised curriculum.

The bid submitted by SATOM and accepted by GRM for construction at the CAA Samé was for \$4.4 million. The ProAg estimated construction costs for Samé at \$854,000, for M'Pessoba at \$891,200. By adding these amounts to the contingency/inflation amount, a total of only \$2,911,300 was available. By incorporating all unearmarked funds in the project, the GRM was able to execute a contract for \$3,365,500 with SATOM on September 27, 1979. The provisions of the contract are such that the price for the remaining 20% of the contract holds only until February 2, 1980, after which SATOM could (and would) increase its prices. Adjusting for price level changes and currency fluctuations since January 1976 suggests a construction cost of about \$2.0 million, had the PP estimate been realistic. Costs were poorly estimated and the procedures imposed on Mission by AID/W caused a great loss of time and further inflation costs. It is possible that engineering standards used in the plans were higher than anticipated in the PP and higher than really necessary, as a result of requirement of designing to U.S. standards. Additionally, the contract was executed more than two years later than projected in the PP.

The time consuming process of getting Genie Rural to finish its plans and specs for Samé and then having them redone by Louis Berger with U.S. specs to attract U.S. firms was, in retrospect, not warranted. Attention is drawn to cable 76 State 296093 of 12/4/76 subject ECPR review of Ag Officers Training Project (688-0207) paragraph E. Mission was notified

of the required process after Genie Rural had completed plans and specs for Samé. New plans and specs were drawn up. This additional requirement caused delays of up to 2 years and increased costs of approximately \$2 million. (See cable - Annex 1) This wasteful process should be avoided in the future. There is just not enough interest by U.S. firms to get U.S. bidders for these small building jobs. Several U.S. firms have been contacted over the course of the last several years; most are not interested in jobs in remote sections of Africa of less than \$30 million unless the profit margin is so high that AID would be remiss to accept their bid. On occasion a U.S. contractor may be between jobs or have extra equipment nearby and be willing to take a small project. Even so, the source of much of the materials he would need in Mali would probably be Code 935 countries, and, in any case, AID should not count on the idle contractor for work.

The bid process for the M'Pessoba CAA has not started. Action needs to be taken to assure that maximum use is made of all existing facilities at M'Pessoba before constructing new facilities. This is being done by the mission staff, but it should be formalized to assure that the new construction bid package is scaled down as far as it can be for both specifications and total new construction. (See Engineering Section).

All possible efforts are being made to reduce the costs of construction or scale back the specs at Samé. Changes should not hurt the effective use of the facility or cause contract problems with SATOM. The Mission Engineer is pursuing this possibility and is encouraging the GRM to negotiate acceptable change orders which will reduce costs.

The PP construction cost estimates did not take into account distance and risk. The Samé site is remote and any reasonable contractor would anticipate delays. The Mission Engineer is now considering distance and risk factors when costing new projects. (This project, despite considerable delays, is now in a position to move ahead. The Samé construction contract was executed on September 27, 1979. SATOM has 20 months from that date to complete the works. SATOM has almost completed mobilizing for the works.)

The Mission and the GRM wish to select another technical assistance contractor and will probably be in a position to begin action on this in February 1980. The Mission hopes to initiate some participant training activities even in advance of the arrival of the new TA contractor. The final design of the M'Pessoba facilities could be completed during the first six months of 1980 and let to bid in the fall.

This evaluation summary shows that the project has missed the original implementation schedule by an embarrassing margin. But that schedule was in itself faulty and unrealistic.

If the project is continued at about the same scope as before, AID funded activities will cost some \$10.5 million, not \$5.0 million. Obviously, costs estimates in the original PP were faulty. A few minor funding requirements not noted in the original PP may increase the cost to AID or the GRM by another \$500,000. In addition, the IBRD's \$1.5 million contribution to the project (unverified) will have to be increased by \$750,000 to cover overruns. Total costs to the GRM will probably rise from \$1.4 million to about \$2.1 million. It is hard to determine how much the GRM has contributed to the project. Unaudited accounts provided December 3, 1979 were passed on to the USAID project manager. The original PP does not provide detailed information on what was to be considered GRM operating cost and salary contributions. The \$2.1 million GRM contribution represents a narrow interpretation of the GRM's contributions to the project. The GRM operating costs of running the CAA's can also be considered as their contributions to the projects. The GRM's contributions in operating costs are now at \$750,000 a year and increasing.

Had the PP been realistic about the time it takes to complete project activities and realistic about the cost of such activities and if it had recognized a more comprehensive package would be required to achieve the purpose of the project, it might then have been set as a 4 or 4 1/2 year project with a total AID contribution in the range of \$7.0 to \$7.5 million.

The evaluation shows a project which has a basically sound concept and which will provide a needed commodity to Mali's efforts in the Ag sector. There has been rapid progress in the last few months on the same construction element and despite the project's extensive difficulties, the project concept still has the basic support of USAID, the GRM and the IBRD.

14. Evaluation Methodology:

The purpose of this evaluation was to include an outside opinion regarding the status of the project to date and to provide suggestions on how to proceed with a redesign.

The evaluators had no prior CAA evaluation reports at their disposal but did have access to all Mission files and the extensive work on the CAA program done by Tuskegee Institute earlier this year. This evaluation was done under severe time constraints and therefore is not as comprehensive as it could be. The Mission has been reevaluating this project in an informal sense for several months. This evaluation has uncovered little which was not already known by the project manager or within the Mission. Perhaps, though, this review of the situation will provide the Mission with some further insight. It is also helpful to have a summary of the situation in one paper. All evaluation work was done in Bamako at the USAID, at the DNFAR office or at the IBRD office.

15. External Factors:

The continual high inflation in Mali and the concurrent depreciation of the dollar caused part of the large cost increases. However, most of the expected cost overrun can be attributed to inadequate construction and technical assistance cost estimating in the original PP, delays in implementation, which with inflation, led to price increases. The performance by the Near East Foundation was totally inadequate. The \$189,000 spent on that contract produced nothing, and when the new TA contract is executed, will have to be spent all over again.

16. Inputs:

Inputs into the project have been completely off schedule. Perhaps 10% of the project inputs will have been accomplished by February 1980, the date when the project was to have been finished. The project has a Mission approved LOP extension to March 1981. The revised PP will request a further LOP extension.

The implementation schedule in the PP is totally invalid. Only a fully staffed mission working in a country totally familiar with AID procedures could have pulled it off and even then it would have been doubtful. This project has suffered more than most from the chronic boosterism in PP's which obscures the difficulties of implementation.

The AID project manager did not arrive at post until almost seventeen months after the Pro Ag was executed. His presence should almost have been a prerequisite to the beginning of this project.

The PP suggested that Personal Services Contracts (PSC's) would be executed with individuals who would provide TA for the project one month after the Pro Ag was signed. In reality a technical assistance contract was executed with Near East Foundation (NEF) approximately twenty-two months after the Pro Ag was signed, which was a more realistic date for TA contract execution of the Pro Ag. The PP placed more emphasis on capital improvement than technical assistance when in reality it should have been the opposite.

The construction work at Samé and M'Pessoba was to start six months after Pro Ag execution (The PP actually says 8/30/77 based on Pro Ag execution 3/1/77). The Samé contract was executed twenty-nine months after the signing of the Pro Ag and the M'Pessoba contract execution date is likely to be 41 months after the agreement was signed, at the earliest.

A more realistic timing would have been to expect construction to start at one site about a year after the grant and at the other site about eighteen months after the grant provided Genie Rural was reasonably qualified to prepare final plans and assist with the selection of a contractor. The optimistic analysis of Genie Rural's design and contract award/contract supervision capacity in the PP unfortunately was wrong. Genie Rural evidently looked good on paper but of late has been overburdened with work and has been unable to meet deadlines. AID experience with similar organizations throughout Africa consistently shows that their work is fair at best and generally is woefully behind schedule. Moreover, Genie Rural's designers often have a tendency to

overdesign. If donor money is being used they are not given a prime objective of cutting costs.

The mission engineer is working very closely with Genie Rural to make sure the plans for the M'Pessoba school are lean and are prepared without too much further delay. His experience with the bidding for the Samé work should be of value to keep costs down for M'Pessoba.

(See Engineering Analysis).

The evaluation team suggests that the Title XII contracting procedures be used to employ a new TA team. After the Title XII procedures are followed, AID would contract directly with the university to perform the work. This approach would help attract the most capable institution. The firms who requested proposals under the first technical assistance RFP are mainly body shops. They often provide shoddy back-up services and cannot really guarantee the quality of their personnel. The Mission and the GRM would reserve the right to co-select the institution and accept or reject any proposed technician. The evaluation team urges that USAID and GRM officials select the contractor on the basis of direct interviews and name select the actual technicians. The TA will succeed or fail primarily on the basis of the quality of the individual technicians.

A body shop which can guarantee good technicians could turn out to be a good contractor. Nevertheless, this type of project should be implemented with more lasting results by a Title XII institution familiar with extension programs in developing countries. Stronger performance and reporting requirements must also be built into the contract.

The coordinator of inputs, AID's and those contributed by the GRM and IBRD, was not carefully controlled at the beginning of the project. Since the arrival of the AID project manager considerable AID effort has gone into input coordination. The Mission now has a reasonably good input tracking system in place. The Mission should update the input tracking information monthly and assure financial records correspond with physical inspections. Major slippages in input goals should be reported by memo to Mission management and to the GRM.

It is recommended that a tripartite letter of understanding be executed among the IBRD, USAID and GRM covering, inter alia, coordination, cost and timing of inputs, project responsibilities and the need for joint evaluations. At the least, there should be a letter of understanding between AID and the IBRD. The latter may be easier to accomplish.

There is no evidence that GRM had held or reported on its annual program reviews; these were supposed to have been an annual event (see pg. 32 of PP). Much more effort must be made to put in process, evaluation and feed back mechanisms.

17. Outputs:

There have been no completed project outputs worth mentioning, save the completion of some minor amounts of participant training.

AID funding in the \$11 million range, GRM funding of about \$2 million and IBRD funding of some \$2.3 million will be needed to complete the outputs originally contemplated.

The Mission, as it tried to salvage the foundering project, came to see that the project itself could not achieve what it set out to do without significant quality improvements by placing more emphasis on technical assistance. The GRM has likewise seen the greater need for quality improvements in the curricula, staff and students and will be an active partner in this effort.

The revised project, with its greater emphasis on curricula, teaching methods, and student and professional career motivation should provide more efficient service to the small farmer and should have an "output quality" which would not have been achieved under the original project. The previous section discusses the type of inputs needed to upgrade output quality. (Also see Sections 19-20).

18. Project Purpose:

The project purpose was not stated with precision in the PP. To quote from the log frame, "to increase the capacity of the GRM to provide up to 160 well-trained polyvalent junior level agricultural technicians by February 1980". It seems this should have read, the project purpose is to assist the GRM in increasing its capacity to train and graduate each year up to 160 additional well-trained and motivated polyvalent junior level agricultural technicians (moniteurs) and to provide periodic retraining for the moniteur cadre. This latter thought should be explored during the redesign process. Moniteurs are relatively isolated in their jobs and need periodic in-service training.

19. Well-prepared Moniteurs:

The ultimate objective of this project is to turn out qualified and motivated male and female moniteurs who will be of real value to the farmers. Whether or not this is accomplished depends not only upon the quality and motivation of the moniteurs and the quality and appropriateness of their pre-service and in-service training but also in the way moniteurs are allowed to perform their jobs. The moniteurs are primarily hired by Operations. The Operation's main objective may be to push for the production of a certain crop or perhaps two different crops. This may not be perceived by farmers to be in their best interests. Then, although the moniteurs may be proficient at promoting that particular crop (providing inputs, providing a marketing channel, etc.) their value will be limited as farmers will not have as much trust in their advice. The same purpose might have been met by the old contract hire encadreur almost as well. This situation could prove to be very expensive to the country and would certainly not be helpful to the farmers. It thus becomes very important to find ways of modifying not only how moniteurs work with the farmers but also modify how the Operations perceive the moniteurs. This will take a long range reeducation effort and close Operation-CAA coordination. This project may only be a start in this process but it could influence the direction the GRM takes.

20. Beneficiaries:

It is too early to tell if the project will have any beneficial impact on Malian small farmers. The Tuskegee study of Malian farmer responses to the work of moniteurs showed that most farmers interviewed had positive attitudes about moniteurs and the moniteur system. Moniteurs were accepted or rejected as individuals. Often Moniteurs who were perceived by farmers as trying to do a reasonable job but who had only limited skills and limited understanding of the local farming system were accepted by farmers because they provided inputs or marketing channels. In these situations, other basic agricultural information, and knowledge was generally obtained by farmers from their own experience, from other farmers or from Radio Mali. The survey did show that open-minded farmers will respond to good moniteurs who have current and useful information.

Unfortunately, the Tuskegee team turned up only a small percentage of moniteurs who had adequate knowledge, who were learning on the job and who also had the energy and diplomacy to achieve a truly effective relationship with the farmers. Moniteurs perceived as providing poor information are soon ignored. Farmers have too much at risk to speculate with poorly informed moniteurs. This problem is interrelated with that noted in paragraph 19.

The ultimate goal of this project has to be fully vetted. It is a compatible mix of goals to help the Operations achieve their production goals and to enable the small farmers of Mali to increase their agricultural production and improve their quality of living. The GRM's

policies in the agricultural sector are parallel to these goals.

The focus of the redesigned project must be on the training and retraining of moniteurs who are sensitive and responsible to the needs of the farmers but who are output oriented. This is not an easy row to hoe. Full intra-ministerial coordination is required. A formal committee consisting of heads of the Operations and the head of DNFAR and chaired by a minister or vice minister which meets at least quarterly may be the way for the role of the moniteur to be discussed throughout the ministry. CAA staff and CAA teachers must be intimately involved in restructuring the curriculum. Special seminars for high officials might be necessary. Last, but not least, DNFAR must listen to the opinions of the farmers they are serving. Such surveys should be periodic.

21. Unplanned Effects:

The project has had no unplanned effects to our knowledge.

22. ENGINEERING EVALUATION

A. Country Contracting, Construction: A review of the contracting procedures, for construction of the facilities at Samé leaves much to be desired. What has happened is partly a result of poor implementation planning in the PP Phase - presumably, as is often the case, the PP did not properly consider implementation. Perhaps the drafters of the PP were not aware of AID contracting procedures and/or time requirements for each step of the procedures. However, the time and money spent trying to attract a U.S. contractor appears in retrospect to have been a severe mistake.

A continual problem associated with AID's contracting procedures occurs where the dollar cost of construction seems to be sufficient for U.S. construction companies to show interest. (The size of the project is attractive to small U.S. firms interested in expansion, but the cost and risk associated in establishing an overseas office can consume all anticipated profits for a one time construction venture.) But under the surface many problems exist. Often, as potential bidders get to the point of submitting bids, they back out. First there are so many unknowns associated with overseas work that many smaller firms at first attracted to the potential for business decide at the end not to bid. AID obviously cannot promise other work to anyone and the banker for many construction firms will also advise against new ventures where risks are high and profit margins questionable. (A similar size project might be worthwhile in the contractor's normal sphere of operations.) Perhaps many firms showing interest in AID's small overseas jobs are doing so to satisfy curiosity or wish to expand

overseas. In any case, too many firms back out. This puts AID in a difficult spot when it tries to follow its procurement source origin requirements.

To weed out firms which were just fishing, AID could require all correspondence from firms for bidding and or pre-qualification information to be both in French and in English. Perhaps AID could eliminate firms from future bidding if they had a history of backing out of bidding at the last minute. AID has to be realistic about source origin requirements in construction activities or it will continue to suffer from similar delays and embarrassments.

All RFPs and IFBs must note that any contractor will be required to negotiate a contract with the host country in French. Also, the contract will be with the host country not USAID. If the contractor is not willing to communicate in French before the bidding, he would be disqualified. (Knowledge of French and the French building and construction procedures is a minimum for work in Francophone Africa.) Communication in French is a necessity for successful completion of any construction project in Mali. The inclusion of such a requirement will save Mali and the U.S. the many thousands of dollars and the considerable time to translate French construction documents into English. The intent of allowing for American firms to participate will have been met , but proper restrictions and warnings will disqualify and/or discourage non-qualified firms. This problem needs to be addressed on a wider scale throughout Africa.

B. Construction Costs: The Mission review of bids and acceptance of the SATOM bid and the subsequent GRM award have established the

construction cost at Samé. As with all construction there are unknown elements that affect cost and a contingency fund is usually maintained for this purpose. It is recommended that an additional contingency of 5% be provided to cover the unexpected (poor foundation conditions, cement price escalation, etc.) at commencement of construction. This can be reduced to a 2% contingency at 50% completion if so desired. A 5% contingency would add about \$20,000 to the total cost of the project.

C. Implementation: A hard look should be made of the implementation plan and evaluation and feedback mechanisms should be included as an integral part of the implementation plan. If a change in direction or emphasis is necessary to bolster a lagging activity the need for new resources or transfer of resources can then be readily identified and acted upon. This will help reduce delays in implementation.

Implementation and evaluation planning must be done with counterpart participation. AID and the host country should understand each other's working constraints if implementation is to be effective.

The procedures which the CAA project manager and the AID engineer have been using to follow the project appear to go a long way towards this end. While they cannot make up for the early slippage in this project, they should be of help in keeping on top of things in the future. The systems used, particularly the project manager's wall chart of project actions, need constant updating and major slippages should be reported to mission management.

To this end the Mission engineer has reviewed the implementation plan for the MPessoba construction and remodeling work. The mission has proposed that Genie Rurale engage an architect to prepare architectural plans and specifications to the standard used for

construction at Samé. The work at M'Pessoba is to be divided into increments that can be easily contracted by local firms. (This should reduce cost and expedite construction.) The supervision of construction can be done by Genie Rural . This plan will relieve Genie Rural of responsibility for preparation of contract documents. The design staff of Genie Rural is over-committed and their work of this type is behind schedule. If Genie Rural hires the architect soon it could keep to ^a reasonably tight design schedule for M'Pessoba. Perhaps a final decision on this cannot be made until after AID and the IBRD think through which of them will finance M'Pessoba construction. The IBRD might want to proceed differently and contract for the entire works.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations represent a mix of design and evaluation considerations which may be useful if this project is to be redesigned.

1. AID should provide additional funds to complete the project. The Mission should be satisfied with the level of funding to be provided by the GRM and the IBRD before submitting a revised PP.

2. AID should consider extending the project to o/a September 1983 perhaps longer. Rushing now to finish construction and to get a TA team in place may prove counter-productive. A reasonable estimate for the TA team arrival is September 1980. The project requires a minimum of three years of technical assistance, perhaps more.

3. Additional funding \$5.6 million is recommended. Preliminary discussions with IBRD indicate a potential agreement regarding coordination of technical assistance and construction at M'Pessoba that may have a bearing on costs. The present amount of IBRD funds available for technical assistance amounts to only \$211,000 for a GRM/IBRD approved request for 10 man years of technical assistance. The advisability and availability of the five positions involved is under discussion.

4. Covenants in the amendment might include: "GRM will establish and convene on a regular basis an intraministerial committee of the users of CAA's (operations) and DNFAR". The Mission should consider how this committee should function and what powers it should have. It might also add a covenant: "The directors and department heads of the CAA's will

meet with DNFAR/DAEPT officials at least annually and report on problems and progress over the past year". A summary written report should be issued. (Perhaps this should be just made part of the PP, see pg. 32 of present PP).

5. The new TA contract should be with a Title XII institution (BIFAD), or a highly competent private sector firm, not a "body shop". PSC's could be considered in exceptional circumstances. The final selection of contractor and actual technicians must be agreed to in writing by GRM, if it is impossible to execute a Host Country contract. The contract should be administered to the extent possible by GRM and the contractor has to answer first to GRM. All Technicians must have R-3/S-3 French capabilities.

6. The Mission Engineer must determine if or when G.R. will finish the plans and specs for M'Pessoba. If a problem exists, the Mission should insist on an A&E firm handling the work or putting an A&E person on G.R.'s staff without delay (see engineering section).

7. The Mission should explore the possibility of an (open) negotiated contract for M'Pessoba using a list of prequalified contractors to open negotiations.

8. Tuskegee should continue to concentrate on user (Operations) requirements to be incorporated into curriculum revisions. The Tuskegee work could be very valuable to a good technical assistance team which can add reasonable adjustments in the curricula of the CAA's.

9. Curricula reform is critical. The TA team must, however, build from what is in place. Any other approach would imply too much criticism of the CAA's and perhaps ruin the contractor's relationships.

10. An action plan including perhaps an AID-IBRD Letter of Understanding; agreement to meet among AID/GRM/IBRD and understandings on who is to finance what should be made part of design process or be incorporated into the revised PP.

The following items are not referred to in text, however, they should be considered as additional points of reference:

1. All sources of information about long and short term participant training should be contacted without delay. Some courses/seminars should begin even before the arrival of the technical assistance team.
2. The project should allow for a reasonable time overlap between returning participants and contractor personnel.
3. The contractor team might consider sending an advance man to handle logistics. The Mission might wish to add this requirement to the contract.

AMEMBASSY BAMAKO

ACTION: AID
INFO: AMB DCY CHRQW

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

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1045

R 840403Z DEC 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUTABD/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 3962
INFO RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 3466
BT
UNCLAS STATE 296293

AIDAC

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: ECPR REVIEW OF AG OFFICERS TRAINING PROJECT
(683-0207)

1. ECPR REVIEW OF SUBJECT PROJECT WAS HELD NOV 24, 1976.
FINDINGS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE PROJECT SHOULD BE APPROVED FOR FY 1977 FUNDING
(FY 77 LEVEL IS DOLS 1.2 MILLION) SUBJECT TO THE RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND ACTIONS DETAILED BELOW.

B. SIZE AND COST OF PROJECT: THE COM CONTRIBUTION
COVENANT PROPOSED IN THE PP (P. 32 "D") SHOULD BE
STRENGTHENED TO CONFIRM NOT ONLY THE COM COMMITMENT TO
PROVIDE NECESSARY RESOURCES FOR PROJECT EXECUTION, BUT
ALSO THE TIMING AND APPROPRIATE PLACEMENT OF PROGRAM
GRADUATES.

C. SALARIES OF TRAINING CENTER STAFF: THE ECPR CONCLUDED
THAT CONDITION PRECEDENT (AS OPPOSED TO THE COVENANT PRO-
POSED IN THE PP) TO DISBURSEMENT BE THE ENACTMENT OF AN
APPROPRIATE LEGAL FRAMEWORK, TO BECOME EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO
THE OPENING OF THE FIRST AI - FINANCED CENTER, GRANTING
FULL STATUTORY RECOGNITION FOR THE TRAINING CENTERS (CATER)

AS INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROFESSIONAL AGRICULTURAL
TRAINING IN MALI AND WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR THE INTRODUCTION
OF THE NECESSARY SALARY OR ALLOWANCES INCREASES, CAREER
STATUS AND OTHER BENEFITS IN ORDER TO EQUALIZE TEACHING
STAFF COMPENSATION AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT WITH
THOSE OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION AND WITH
"OPERATIONS",

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D. SOCIAL SOUNDNESS: THE PROJECT AGREEMENT IS TO INCLUDE A COVENANT WHICH WILL SPECIFICALLY REQUIRE THAT A SPECIAL ELEMENT OF THE CURRICULUM FOR THE TRAINING OF MONITORS BE DEVOTED TO OVERCOMING THE PROBLEM OF THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MALIAN PEASANT FARMER AND THE MORE EDUCATED AGRICULTURAL TECHNICIAN.

E. PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION: RE CONSTRUCTION, A NOTICE SHOULD FIRST BE PUBLISHED IN THE COMMERCE BUSINESS DAILY REQUESTING EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF U.S. FIRMS. IF THERE IS NO RESPONSE, THEN BIDS WOULD BE SOLICITED FROM AND LIMITED TO MALIAN FIRMS. IF STILL NO RESPONSIVE BIDS ARE FORTHCOMING, THEN A WAIVER COULD BE SOUGHT FOR CODE 935 PROCUREMENT. RE VEHICLES, CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, FURNISHINGS, ETC., SEPARATE CODE 935 OR CODE 941 WAIVER REQUESTS, AS APPROPRIATE, MUST BE PREPARED TO ACCOMPANY DOCUMENTATION FOR PROJECT AUTHORIZATION. RELATIVE TO CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT IT MAY BE INAPPROPRIATE TO IMPORT FROM U.S. CERTAIN COMMODITIES SUCH AS CEMENT WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE AS IMPORTS FROM NEIGHBORING CODE 941 COUNTRIES (AND THEREFORE NOT "LOCAL" AS DEFINED IN HANDBOOK 19). THE CDD SHOULD INDICATE IN A WAIVER REQUEST SUCH MATERIALS FOR WHICH CODE 941 WAIVERS WOULD BE REQUIRED, AND DOLLAR AMOUNTS. PLEASE ADVISE.

F. PARTICIPANT TRAINING: THE ECPR ACCEPTED THE PROJECT COMMITTEE FINDING THAT THE TRAINING ELEMENT OF THE PROJECT SHOULD BE INCREASED (ON THE ORDER OF DOLS 22,000). REQUEST CDD FORWARD SPECIFIC DETAILS FOR REVISION OF APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS AND BUDGET OF THE PR.

G. COM COUNTERPART CONTRIBUTIONS: THE ECPR ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR A WAIVER TO THE 25 PERCENT REQUIREMENT. AID/W WILL PREPARE BASED ON CDD RATIONALE.

H. ENVIRONMENT: THERE APPEARS TO BE NO PROBLEM, AND A NEGATIVE DETERMINATION HAS BEEN PREPARED. THE TRAINING PROGRAM SHOULD EMPHASIZE ENVIRONMENTALLY NEUTRAL OR BENEFICIAL FARM TECHNOLOGY PACKAGES TO BE PASSED ON TO

FARMERS BY THE CAA GRADUATES.

2. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS AND COVENANTS NOT COVERED BY

ECPR REVIEW BUT WHICH WILL BE INCLUDED IN AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED CDO CLEARS:

- A. AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO DISBURSEMENT FOR CONSTRUCTION SERVICES AND EQUIPMENT, THE COM SHALL FURNISH IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE SATISFACTORY TO AID AN EXECUTED CONTRACT(S) FOR CONSTRUCTION SERVICE WITH A FIRM(S) ACCEPTABLE TO AID AND DETAILED PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE CAA'S TO BE CONSTRUCTED/RENOVATED UNDER THE PROJECT.
 - B. A COVENANT WILL ASSURE THAT SPECIAL TRAINING COMPONENT FOR WOMEN WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE CAA.
 - C. A COVENANT SHOULD COMMIT THE COM, WITH ASSISTANCE FROM GRANT FINANCED TECHNICIANS, TO THE NECESSARY REORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE CAA PROGRAM AS WELL AS TO ON-THE-JOB TRAINING (P. 19 OF THE PP) IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR APPROPRIATE DAEPD AND CAA STAFF.
 - D. A COVENANT WILL PROVIDE THAT CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION OF THE CAA'S SHALL BE SUPERVISED BY GENIE RURAL.
 - E. A COVENANT SHOULD COMMIT THE COM TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF QUALIFIED INSTRUCTORS FOR THE CAA'S TO ASSURE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT.
3. AID/W IS PREPARING ACTION MEMO AND PROJECT AUTHORIZATION REQUEST BUT REQUIRES CDO INPUT ON PARTICIPANT TRAINING AND PROCUREMENT ISSUES OUTLINED (I E AND F ABOVE) IN ORDER TO PROCEED. KISSINGER

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