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In accordance with instructions contained referenced circular attached is a case history report of the project, National Agricultural Development--Research.

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DEVELOPMENT GRANT PROGRAM EVALUATION, AFGHANISTAN, PROJECT CASE HISTORY:
SUMMARYNational Agricultural Development--Research
30X-AD-21-AA-5

An agricultural research program to assist Afghanistan was established in 1953 with U.S. assistance which, despite many handicaps, has been able to: (1) Train outside Afghanistan eighteen Afghan technicians; (2) Level and drain land, and equip for mechanical and power farming, research stations at Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Bolog and Farja; (3) Establish and partially equip a model poultry station and a modern dairy farm; (4) Build a greenhouse and distribute from it annually an average of 100,000 plants to local farmers; (5) Introduce Hampshire Red roosters to a degree which has materially improved local poultry; (6) Demonstrated that sugar beets can produce 20 tons per acre of 21% sugar content; and that cotton production can be increased over 100% (three or more times local averages for both crops); (7) Established backyard nurseries and budded over 100,000 local fruit trees.

Afghan farmers had developed a self-sustained, subsistence farming based on wheat culture; but because of their isolation had had little exchange of crop or agricultural knowledge. The U.S. began assisting with a TC agreement signed in 1953. In 1954 a University of Wyoming contract was signed, and staffing began in 1955.

Objectives of the program were to: (1) Increase agricultural production; (2) improve quality of agricultural products; (3) find and introduce more efficient cropping methods; (4) Establish within the Ministry of Agriculture a research Department; (5) Develop a system of research stations; and (6) Develop adequate research personnel within Afghanistan.

To develop this program, the Wyoming contract has supplied a total of sixteen different technicians from 1955 to present, with an average of three technicians on hand each year. In FY '63 two contract technicians are in Afghanistan; and two direct-hire have been programmed but are not yet in Afghanistan. Twelve participants have received degree training in the United States; and six others have received special training in the United States or in third countries. An estimated \$200,000 in commodities have been supplied. The Afghan contribution has included \$,428,211 Af\$ (\$70,000) in U.S.-controlled local currency.

The program has been handicapped or slowed by a lack of suitable or trainable counterparts; as one direct result, the U.S.-supplied technicians have had to do a large part of the research work rather than train Afghans to do it. The Ministry of Agriculture assigned twelve junior-technicians to work with this program at its inception; but only three of these remain and those lost were not replaced. In the Holmand Valley, where a similar program was established, three senior technicians were assigned by IMA and these continue to function. As a result, the IMA research program has advanced more rapidly than that in the Ministry.

Neither the Ministry nor IMA has as yet established a research department to operate the functions of this activity, and technicians have had to work with personnel assigned to many different bureaus or sections. Afghan personnel at established research stations have not been continuous, and there has been a constant need to train replacements or to supervise station activities in the absence of responsible Afghan personnel. A program has not been submitted to the Ministry and is under consideration which should solve such problems.

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DEVELOPMENT GRANT PROGRAM EVALUATION, AFGHANISTAN, PROJECT CASE HISTORY:
 Project Title and Number: National Agricultural Development--Research
 306-AB-11-AA-5 (Formerly 306-1-12-AA and 306-12-002)

I. The Background Situation

a. Over the centuries, Afghanistan farmers had developed a self-sustained, subsistence agriculture. The country was relatively isolated with little or no exchange of crops or agricultural knowledge. This had resulted in an agriculture based upon a limited number of crops (primarily wheat) which was largely non-monetized. Export of ~~karakul was~~ the primary producer of foreign exchange.

After the end of War II, Afghanistan began a program of development which was accelerated with the construction in the Helmand Valley and the plains; for its first five year plan in 1954. This pointed out the need for an increased agricultural production and a diversification of crops with emphasis on export crops so as to raise the foreign exchange needed for the plan.

b. FAO had been operating in the country since 1950. AID (as FOA) had entered into a TC program agreement in 1953. Agricultural technicians from these two groups early recognized the archaic state of the country's agriculture and the need for the introduction of new species and strains of both crops and livestock. Further, the University of Wyoming had entered into a contract with AID (then FOA) in 1954 and started staffing the contract in 1955. This group also recognized the need for the simple testing and field trials of new crops and cropping methods for introduction to Afghan agriculture in order to greatly increase production.

The project agreement between USOM/A and the RGA Ministry of Agriculture of June 28, 1954 provided for research assistance to the Ministry. This assistance was provided through the University of Wyoming Contract.

Within the above framework, University of Wyoming recruited a team research leader and three research specialists and placed them in the field early in 1955.

c. FAO was involved in the early planning of the project. The Special Fund of the UN received and turned down a research project due to its overlapping nature with this program. The RGA Ministry of Agriculture is closely associated with the project through the furnishing of the land, local costs and limited technical assistance. FAO in recent years has had research technicians assigned to the Ministry of Agric. in the fields of karakul, wool, and cotton. The two technicians working in karakul and wool are provided by the USSR under a special agreement with FAO.

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II. Objectives

1. Short range objectives were listed as follows:

- a. To increase agricultural production of Afghanistan.
- b. To improve the quality of the products so that they will command a higher price in both the domestic and foreign market. (in the case of fruits, nuts and vegetables, the quality is often of greater importance than the yield).
- c. To find more efficient production methods.
- d. To test crop varieties of known high yielding species for adaptation and introduction to Afghanistan.

2. Long Range objectives were listed as:

- a. To establish a Department of Research as one of the branches of the Ministry of Agriculture, with a functioning administrative organization having responsibility for all research activities of the Ministry of Agriculture.
- b. To develop a system of agricultural research stations including a central station in the vicinity of Kabul and substations in the principal agricultural and livestock centers of the country.
- c. To build up adequate research personnel by on-the-job training, by sending promising students abroad for research training and by schooling within the country whenever suitable facilities become available.
- d. To initiate a program of agricultural research suited to the needs of the country and designed to build up a sound body of knowledge of the soils; the adaptation of crops and varieties to the various areas, the proper methods of culture, pest and disease control and soil management; the adaptation of breeds of livestock and poultry to Afghan conditions; the value of native foods and the management and proper care of livestock and poultry under Afghan conditions.

III. Resources Committed.

- a. Beginning in 1955 and through to the present time, the University of Wyoming has staffed the project with American technicians as shown below.

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IV. Factors Accelerating or Inhibiting Progress.

a. On host country side

1. Major difficulties encountered:

Lack of suitable and trainable counterparts within the Ministry of Agriculture program would be the number one difficulty. Assignment of cast off people from other departments and the erosion of these to the army, other jobs, etc. over the period resulted in the contract technicians actually doing the field work, planning the programs, etc., with the resultant lack of interest by top Ministry officials.

Nearly complete lack of understanding on the part of policy making Ministry officials as to what was required in a research program resulted in non-assignment of facilities, lack of budget, scatteration of responsibility and authority, all hampering progress.

The Ministry of Agriculture has never set up a department of research, hence funding is from other technical divisions or wholly from USAID funds in the contract.

Lack of stations with assigned lands or loss of lands after they were developed to other uses was hampering.

Lack of irrigation water, floods, etc. largely delayed useable results.

Difficulty in local procurement due to RCA procurement procedures meant idle tractors during critical times or late planting, etc.

2. Factors accelerating progress:

In the Helmand Valley where senior technicians on the Afghan side were assigned to head the crop and livestock portions of the program, steady progress and useable results have been accomplished.

Sufficient funds in a separate research budget in the IV allowed for the development and operation of two good research stations.

Use of PL 480 funds in station development give promise for more fruitful future programs.

b. On U.S. Side

1. Specific devices or tactics facilitating progress:

a. Use of contractor to procure commodities needed for the project allowed for relatively satisfactory procurement and delivery of needed commodities.

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b. Officing of research team within the Ministry of Agriculture gave a somewhat better relationship with the Ministry in the early years.

c. Use of PL 480 funds for construction of local facilities, especially in the Helmand Valley provided for a more adequate program.

d. Assistance to project by USSR in HV on technical drainage and irrigation problems strengthened the program.

e. Field trials and demonstrations by American extension technicians enlarged the station program.

f. Distribution of chicks and hothouse transplants of early vegetables and improved varieties gave the Ministry one of its few contacts with local farmers.

2. How might performance have been improved.

a. Insistence by contract personnel and USAID that the Ministry and IVA carry out the actual operations of the program.

b. Joint planning and agreement on the type of research program to be carried out between USAID, Contractor and RGA would have resulted in a much stronger program.

c. Better understanding and cooperation between Direct Hire and contract technicians through close cooperation of heads of contract team and AID officials could have done much to give a useful, coordinated program.

d. A clearer understanding between contractor and USAID and RGA as to reporting procedure and insistence on the publication of useable results would have resulted in greater value of the program.

V. Accomplishments:

1. Provided funds for the education to a BS degree in US \$ for 12 Afghan students in the various Agricultural sciences. Provided further funds for the securing of MS degrees for 2 Afghan officials who presently head up the IVA research program in Agronomy and Livestock.

While only four (4) of the above are presently connected with the program, others are indirectly connected through teaching positions and affiliated positions in the Government.

2. Prepared the land through levelling, drainage, etc. for research stations in Kabul (2), Jalalabad, Kandahar, Helon and Marja.

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VI. Appraisal by Reporting Technical Division

- a. This project has both fallen far short of its goals as originally set and exceeded original goals in many respects. One of the basic weaknesses of the project was that original goals were overly ambitious and beyond the capacity of the Host Government to carry out with the resources in people, land and funds available. The ambitious goals and plans resulted in American technicians actually carrying on the work. This has allowed for the accomplishment of a large volume of species testing in spite of the many difficulties. On the other hand, it retarded the necessary institutionalization within the PDA of a competent research organization. It further prevented the proper study and evaluation of data so that results could be published and put into widespread use.

The determination to accomplish something in spite of the difficulties is praiseworthy. It has, however, caused a draining away from the project by the PDA Ministry of Agriculture and a non-acceptance of results which could be of great value to the increased production of agriculture in the country. Had the program been paced to the capacity of the Host Country to carry out, results would have been fewer but more widely adopted as is demonstrated in the Holmand Valley where leadership was limited but definitely Afghan.

- b. The significance of the work accomplished to date is remarkable when projected against the future of Afghan Agriculture. The demonstration on cotton shows that cotton production can be increased from three to seven times the average yield on the same acreage. This is significant when it is realized that import of textiles from neighboring countries is one of the larger drains on foreign exchange. The demonstration that beet production can be tripled with only a minimum of fertilizer and good cultural practices indicates that by increasing both yield and sugar content, the present acreage in beets could appreciably close the gap between consumption and production of sugar.

The findings in rust resistant wheat assures more uniform yields in this basic crop. Improved varieties of vegetables and fruits will allow for larger exports to provide funds needed for the country development plans. The above are only a few of the many examples that could be pointed up.

- c. In respect to future activities, findings from this evaluation harden our determination to build this and future progress in agriculture only to the level that they can be supported and operated by the PDA. The evaluation points out the necessity of joint planning with the host government and the necessity of involving Ministry officials in the activity to insure its acceptance and usefulness.

The evaluation does not point out that the contractor should be condemned. The contractor in this case has done a better than average job in staffing and back-stopping the activity. It does point up one of the major problems in operating with both contract and direct hire technical assistance, i.e., the difficulty of overcoming split authority and responsibility and the normal human tendency to

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develop antagonism between the two groups which results in a lesser net accomplishment.

The evaluation further points out that Mission direction of the contract should have been tighter to the point of insisting that joint contractor, USA, & Mission planning took place and that useable results were collated and published.

Project analysis highlights also a long suspected theory that developing nations only reluctantly accept research results they have not been intimately associated in developing. This means that much of the work will have to be repeated, at least on a sampling basis, by Afghans before results are put into practice.

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VIII. Director's Comment

The successes of this agricultural research project are the establishment of going research farms, the testing of many varieties, and the adoption of some of the results, including budding of fruit trees.

The short-comings of the project are the lack of adequate participation by Afghan personnel, the lack of many published bulletins on findings, and the lack of coordination with the Afghan extension service.

These short-comings undoubtedly reflect a failure of the USAID to provide close supervision of the contract team, to insist on coordination, and to assure wholehearted Afghan participation. Part of this failure can be traced to the use of contract personnel, who are controlled indirectly through a contract team chief. Partly, the difficulty reflects a tacit policy decision not to struggle with the RSI Ministry, but to do the best possible at the time with the hope that their enthusiasms would grow with their understanding.

Recently, the USAID has decided to shift from contract to direct-hire at the end of Calendar 1968. It has also decided that the size of the direct-hire staff will be smaller than the contract staff and will be directly related to the number of Afghans assigned.

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