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EVALUATION REPORT

JOINT THAI-USOM EVALUATION
OF THE
ACCELERATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

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MAY 1965

BANGKOK, THAILAND
May 30, 1965

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS COMMONLY USED

AMPHUR	- District - next level below changwad (province)
ARD	- Accelerated Rural Development
CCOP	- Committee for Coordination and Operational Planning - a Thai Committee
CD	- Community Development
CHANGWAD	- Province - first political sub-division of Thai Government
DTEC	- Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation
NAI AMPHUR	- Chief District Administrative Officer
ORA	- USOM Office of Rural Affairs
FALAD CHANGWAD ARD	- Deputy Governor, specially appointed for the ARD program
PRO AG	- Project Agreement
RTG	- Royal Thai Government
RD	- Rural Development
STAT	- Seabee Technical Assistance Team
TDY	- Temporary Duty
USIS	- United States Information Service
USOM/T or USOM	- United States Operations Mission to Thailand

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I. INTRODUCTION.

General.

The evaluation team wishes to stress its very real appreciation for the excellent cooperation and assistance rendered to it by all personnel related to the ARD program.

Where individuals have discussed matters in confidence, the Evaluation Team has sought to protect that trust, while at the same time using the information to make general observations and/or recommendations. Thus, it should be understood that each general observation and recommendation is backed up by one or more specific case observed.

One important conclusion of the Evaluation Program thus far, is that problems have arisen because of misunderstanding or lack of understanding among those involved in the ARD program. This has been due to a number of factors, including, but not limited to the following:

1. Language translation problems (there have been cases where translators have not correctly communicated concepts or intentions, and other times when they have translated more than was intended);
2. Very few roles, responsibilities, and limits of authority were adequately spelled out; and
3. Cultural differences; thus, differing value systems.

The Evaluation Team fully realizes that it, like those involved in the operation of the ARD program, may very well have misunderstood statements made to it in the field. However, without trying to reconcile differences that have appeared to us, we have sought to identify them in this report so that those which are correctly represented by us may be of benefit to others involved in the program, and so that those which may be incorrectly represented by us can be corrected by those who are in a position to do so.

Considering the very real complexities of this new type of program and the many pressures that existed in developing and launching it, we feel that the record of accomplishment during this first year has been outstanding in many respects, as indicated (on the following page). Those responsible for the development of the program thus far are to be commended. Further, we firmly believe that these accomplishments provide strong evidence of the active interest and support of the ARD program by both the Thai Government and USOM and have established a base from which the rural development program in Thailand can truly develop to the scope and effectiveness that is demanded because of the seriousness of conditions in Northeast and North rural Thailand.

Obviously some things could have been done better, more effectively, more efficiently and economically. Hindsight is usually better than foresight. And that, of course, is where the evaluation program comes in; to attempt to identify ways and means of improving the program by learning as much as we can from past experience as well as by considering new ideas, especially in the light of new knowledge and changed condition.

Positive Accomplishments Contributing in a Major Way to the Success of the ARD Program.

We believe it is important to point out at the beginning of this report several significant accomplishments which will have an important bearing on the future course and success of the ARD project, and which indicate the extent of the "tooling up" process necessary to support the complex ARD program.

1. The highest officials of the Royal Thai Government, specifically the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Director General of the Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior, the Director of Technical Service, Budget Bureau and others have a comprehensive knowledge of and actively support the objectives of the ARD project.

The Prime Minister of Thailand on February 9, 1965, addressed the heads of the Royal Thai Government Ministries likely to be involved in rural development. This speech demonstrated the Prime Minister's thorough understanding of and keen insight into the underlying problem of subversion and of the concepts and objectives of the ARD program to counter subversion. Likewise, the Deputy Prime Minister has demonstrated on many occasions his awareness of the problem and his support for the concept of Accelerated Rural Development. There is no question but that the highest Thai Government officials fully support the objectives of the Accelerated Rural Development Program.

2. The Prime Minister, recognizing the need for a Thai organization to coordinate the wide-ranging aspects of the ARD programs, requested the Cabinet to appoint a committee to be responsible for this coordination. The committee is known as the "Committee for Coordination and Operational Planning", and is composed of responsible officials of those Ministries of the Royal Thai Government who will be involved in Accelerated Rural Development. The Director and Deputy Director of the USOM Office of Rural Affairs are members of the committee. The Chairman of the committee is the Director General of the Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior - the Ministry primarily responsible for the ARD program. This committee is extremely active, meeting regularly each two weeks and holding many additional meetings. This is a working committee, assessing and solving operating problems.

3. The Committee for Coordination and Operational Planning, recognizing the need for an operating organization between it and the changwads (provinces), established the "Regional ARD Coordinating Committee" with headquarters in the City of Korat, Northeast Thailand. This committee is headed by a competent, highly respected Changwad Governor and more recently occupying an important position in the Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior. Competent assistants have been made available to the Chairman. This committee will operate the Regional Engineering Center at Korat (discussed elsewhere in this report), inspect ARD operations in the changwads, solve problems within its jurisdiction and refer problems outside its purview to its parent committee for solution.

4. The Governors of the six northeast changwads in which ARD is operating have been delegated complete responsibility for the ARD changwad construction program of rural roads and village projects. The Governors' knowledge of the ARD concepts and objectives, and the manner in which they have accepted this new responsibility, in addition to their established role, in the opinion of Thai participants in this evaluation, has been "remarkable". The public works capability provided to each Governor provides a way for the changwad officials, especially the Governors, Deputy Governors ARD, and Nai Amphurs (district officials) to be of service to villages and to identify the local government officials with these efforts. Many reports are now being received which indicate that villagers are meeting Governors and Deputy Governors through the ARD programs and identifying them with their welfare.

5. A Regional Engineering Center has been established at Korat, in the Northeast, to backstop the Changwad ARD operations in engineering, engineering design, soil testing, major overhaul of heavy equipment and spare parts service, as well as training of engineers, engineer aides, equipment operators and mechanics.

6. The American Ambassador gives the program his strong support.

7. The Director of USOM, the originator of the ARD project, is an enthusiastic and effective advocate.

8. An effective Office of Rural Affairs has been established in USOM with responsibility for planning and coordinating rural development programs (within USOM) and advising the Thai Government on rural development affairs.

9. A new USOM Division, Rural Roads and Village Projects, has been established in the Office of Rural Affairs with headquarters at Korat. USOM engineering advisors, employees of the Rural Roads and Village Projects Division, have been assigned to the changwads to assist with engineering and construction problems.

10. Two Navy Seabees, an equipment operator and a mechanic, have been assigned to each changwad to advise and assist in construction operations.

11. A USOM area advisor has been assigned to each changwad to advise and assist the Governor in all matters relating to rural development, except engineering.

12. A cooperative arrangement has been established between the Regional Engineering Center and the Korat Technical Institute to train the large numbers of Thai engineers, engineering aides, equipment operators and mechanics needed for the construction programs at the changwad level and for the Korat Engineering Center and Overhaul Shop. The Korat Technical Institute has been wisely chosen to carry the major load of the training. They provide all of the physical facilities and an increasing number of instructors. The services of the Vinnell Corporation, experienced in the training of all kinds of construction and mechanic personnel, have been

secured under contract to train repair shop machinists, mechanics, procurement and warehouse clerical personnel.

13. An active program of self-evaluation is beginning to emerge throughout the Office of Rural Affairs. Reports from the Governors, USOM area advisors and others in each changwad are increasingly more objective and penetrating in their analysis of current operations and in relating these operations to the basic objectives of the project. Consequently, assessment reports from the Office of Rural Affairs to the USOM Director and to AID Washington are frank, objective, and useful.

14. USIS, through its area offices in the Northeast and their mobile information team programs, have conducted an increasing number of these programs in the area of the ARD projects. An impressive number of important Thai Changwad and Amphur officials participate in these team visits to villages. They include the Changwad Governor, Deputy Governor for ARD, Amphur officers and the top changwad and Amphur officers representing Public Health, Education, Agriculture, Veterinarians, Rice, Fisheries, and Soil and Water Resources. The MIT technique provides an ideal tool for acquainting Government officials with villagers and to explain the ARD program to villagers.

15. The USOM Public Administration Project, "Local Government," although organizationally outside the USOM Office of Rural Affairs is contributing to the objectives of the ARD project by training local government officials, particularly, Nai Amphurs (heads of district offices) in improved local administration.

16. All changwads have received their construction equipment.

17. Personnel for the changwad engineering organization have been trained and are working.

18. The CCOP three-year plan for ARD road construction has been approved.

II. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ARD PROJECT, ITS OBJECTIVES AND PLAN FOR EVALUATION.

Background and Objectives.

The objectives of the ARD project are stated in the project agreements as follows:

1. Increasing income for rural people;
2. Strengthen ties between the Thai Government and the people; and
3. Strengthen local self-government. These objectives were planned to be attained by:

- a. Creating, training and equipping a changwad (province) public works (construction) capability able to plan, design and construct rural projects such as roads, water facilities, health and sanitation facilities, schools and other small rural projects which would be responsive to the needs and desires of the rural people under the leadership of the Changwad Governor;
- b. Coordinating the activities of other Thai Government rural development programs in the changwad, such as agriculture, health, education, community development, etc., so as to contribute to a program of accelerated rural development in the changwad.

Six separate project agreements were concluded on May 12, 1964, with the Governors of the six changwads of Northeast Thailand determined to be the most "security sensitive". A seventh project agreement was concluded with the Ministry of Municipal and Public Works to provide a strategically located engineering backstopping facility for the construction capability established in each changwad. A spread of construction equipment was supplied by USOM to each Changwad Governor to accomplish the construction projects. The project agreements specified the Thai and USOM organization and staffing planned for implementing the objectives of the project.

Without commenting in detail on the organizations established for this project, it is significant to point out that the Changwad Governors have direct control and supervision over the Changwad ARD Engineering and Construction facility, whereas they have only a coordinating authority over the other Thai Government representatives in his Changwad. Likewise, the USOM Office of Rural Affairs has control and supervision over agriculture, community development, rural roads and village project activities and equipment with coordinating authority only for other USOM activities such as health, education, public safety and public administration. The current status and effectiveness of these organizations are commented upon in the applicable sections of the report. Those readers of this report who may have a greater interest in the background objectives and organization of the ARD project are referred to the project agreements and to airgram number TOAID A-1113, dated December 18, 1964, titled, "Progress Report on the ARD-MDU Evaluation Program."

Evaluation Plan.

The ARD project concepts were new and the mechanisms employed to achieve its objectives relatively untried. Therefore, a provision was inserted in each project agreement providing for periodic joint Thai-USOM reviews of the success of the project in attaining its objectives with a special review of progress to be completed by May 15, 1965. The purpose of this report is to fulfill the May 15, 1965, requirement.

The evaluation of this project will be a continuing one. This report is concerned with the first year of operations which began, effectively in

January 1965, after the arrival of the heavy construction equipment. Accomplishment of construction projects, therefore, has been limited by this short period. The report can deal effectively with what can be referred to as the "tooling up" processes. Later reviews or evaluations will be concerned with the accomplishments of the broad project objectives. Attachment A is a flowchart presentation of the general objectives and scope of work of the Evaluation Program.

The total evaluation of the ARD project breaks down into two broad phases:

1. A survey of project operations to determine effectiveness, efficiency and compliance with the detailed provisions of the project agreement; and
2. Measuring the attainment of the three broad objectives of the project to increase income of rural people, to strengthen the ties between the Government and the rural people and to strengthen local self government. This special report is concerned primarily with the first phase of a review of project operations and the "tooling up" process. Additional surveys of phase one will be conducted at appropriate intervals in the future as necessary.

To measure success in attaining the three broad objectives of the project, phase two of the evaluation, two approaches to the problem have been selected. The first is a survey of economic conditions in the area of the ARD projects. These surveys will collect benchmark data on income, assets, health and sanitation, housing, land usage, education, water resources, etc. Initial data will be collected by July 31, 1965, and comparative data possibly one or more years later after project operations have had time to affect the conditions influencing the indices. Hopefully, this survey will indicate whether the economic and social status of the rural people have changed and whether or not such change can be attributed to the ARD program.

The second approach, to measure the effect of strengthening local government and of tying it more closely to the rural people, will be accomplished by "attitude surveys" of villagers in the area of the ARD projects conducted by experienced social scientists, anthropologists and social psychologists. The design of the techniques necessary to insure the collection of reliable data must await the availability of competent Thai and USOM personnel. It does not now appear possible for the initial data to be available before the end of calendar year 1965. Additional attitude surveys would be conducted at appropriate intervals in the future determined by project progress.

Limited Evaluations or Surveys Previously Conducted.

Governor Jin, Chairman of the Regional Coordinating Committee and members of his staff have made several extensive field inspection trips to the ARD changwads, construction sites and villages during the past

several months. He and his staff prepared and submitted to the Committee for Coordination and Operational Planning a constructive, analytical report of conditions as they found them, with sound recommendations for immediate and long-range improvement. This kind of constructive, self-analysis is extremely beneficial and should be encouraged at all levels of the ARD organization.

About the end of March 1965, after the evaluation teams had concluded a substantial part of their field interviews, discussions were held with the USOM Director and certain deficiencies observed were reported. The Director desired to begin corrective action on these at once and requested the preparation of a preliminary joint Thai-USOM statement of these deficiencies. The statement was prepared and distributed to the Chairman of the Thai Committee on Coordination and Operational Planning and to the USOM Director. A review at this date indicates that the following corrective actions have been initiated: (See Attachment B).

1. Inadequate Engineering Supervision. The Mission has detailed on TDY basis sufficient USOM engineers from the Korat Engineering Center to provide one USOM engineer for each changwad as recommended. USOM approved requests have been prepared and are in the process of being submitted to AID/Washington for approval to provide one full-time USOM engineer advisor for each ARD changwad. Eight graduate engineers from Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, have been recruited to strengthen the changwad engineering staffs and possibly to assist in training of engineers and engineer aides at Korat. The Thai Government has provided four engineers for those changwads most in need of assistance.

2. Coordination. Mr. Jamison Bell, USOM Office of Rural Affairs, is participating in a series of meetings with top representatives of the RTG Ministries of Interior, Agriculture, and National Development to develop a frame of reference for closer inter-ministerial coordination in the Accelerated Rural Development program. Coordination talks have been initiated between the Chairman of the Committee for Coordination and Operational Planning and the Directors General of Rice, Agriculture and Land Development.

3. Korat Engineering Center. Job descriptions have been written but not yet approved for the Chief of the Rural Roads and Village Projects Division and for the USOM Changwad Area Development Advisors and the Changwad Engineering Advisor.

4. Training Programs. Thai participation in teaching will be increased if the decision to utilize some or all of the eight graduate engineers recruited from the Chulalongkorn University is implemented. Negotiations are underway to detail qualified Thai technicians to teaching duties on a part-time basis.

5. Lack of Equipment for Village Projects. Separate equipment for constructing small village projects is included in equipment lists awaiting AID/Washington approval.

6. Maintenance of Completed Construction. Plans are being developed to accomplish road maintenance by employing Thai private contractors financed from counterpart funds.

III. CLARIFICATION OF THE BASIC OBJECTIVE OF THE ARD PROGRAM.

General.

There has been some confusion and disagreement as to (1) what ARD (Accelerated Rural Development) is and, (2) what the objective(s) of ARD is (are). Therefore, we have sought to clarify these two basic points. Actually the order should be reversed, and our treatment of these will be in that order:

First: What is the basic objective of this program referred to as the ARD program?

Second: What is ARD and how can we describe it?

Our position is that until these two points are clarified, it is impossible to determine how effective the ARD project is or is likely to be.

Basic Objective.

In his February 9, 1965 address, His Excellency Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, the Prime Minister (Attachment C) focused everyone's thinking on the seriousness of the subversion program and gave a crystal clear directive to all RTG Ministries, Departments, etc., to make, as their highest priority of operation, the coordination of rural development efforts so as to resist and eliminate subversion. We quote:

"Each and every government department and agency must be fully aware of the fact that rural development for resisting and suppressing subversion is the most important piece of its work, bearing on the security of the nation as a whole."

In this same speech the Prime Minister gave a brief, clear, but penetrating, analysis of both:

1. the problem of subversion in Thailand and,
2. the vital importance to the solution to that problem which is to be found in the coordination of the rural development effort of all RTG Ministries, Departments and officials.

In this analysis, the Prime Minister also clearly differentiated between:

- a. What is the most important part of all rural development - "The spirit of working really for the benefit of local

people in the areas and for the building and restoring of their faith and confidence in the Government;" and

- b. What part of the new program for the coordination of all rural development would need to be launched first in order to facilitate, and in many remote rural areas to open up the door for the flow of rural development efforts from all RTG Ministries, Departments, etc., namely, the construction of access roads. We quote: "According to the plan for accelerated rural development, access roads to remote rural villages and districts will be built first . . ."

The Prime Minister is very clear in stating that the basic objective for the total RTG coordinated rural development program is "to resist and suppress subversion."

This raises two questions: (1) What is subversion? and (2) How can rural development be used to counter it?

Subversion is the result of a subverter concentrating his attention on a group of people, gaining their confidence and respect, while at the same time carefully and cunningly using any current condition or action to discredit the Government and to cause the people to lose faith and confidence in their Government. Thus, the people are conditioned to believe that the subverter and his cause can be trusted to look after their best interests.

The only way to defeat subversion is to counter it in a positive and sustained way in the areas where it seeks to operate. And this is why rural development, as the Prime Minister envisions it, with a strong emphasis on contact and work with and for rural people in " . . . the spirit of working really for the benefit of local people . . ." is one of the best means of both (1) eliminating grievances (real or imagined) of villagers with respect to the Government, and at the same time (2) demonstrating to the villagers in practical and meaningful terms: (a) that there is a Thai Government and that it is good; (b) that the Thai Government is interested in them, and furthermore (c) that the Thai Government can and will do something about helping them and protecting them from threats against property and life by banditry and subverters.

Although the ARD project agreements do not mention counter-subversion as such, the fact that the program was confined to the security sensitive areas of the country definitely implies that its efforts were to assist in the RTG total rural development effort which has been oriented to counter-subversion by the Prime Minister. The evaluation team believes ARD's part in this total RTG Rural Development Program needs to be emphasized to all concerned so that it is not looked upon as purely an economic development project. In the light of the present situation that exists in the security sensitive areas, it seems clear to us that the basic reason for seeking "to raise the income of the people" . . . "to strengthen relationships between the RTG and the villagers" . . . and "to strengthen local self

government" was, and is, to use the words of the Prime Minister, to "resist and eliminate subversion."

Definition of ARD.

Again, the Prime Minister's speech is one of the clearest statements that we have seen on this subject. It is clear that ARD is not a new, improved rural development project which, if it were would make it somewhat a competitor of other established rural development-related projects (for example, Community Development, Agricultural Extension, Education, etc.) Rather ARD is a new concept of programming all RTG rural development efforts in a coordinated, concentrated manner in critical areas where the RTG has determined that such a coordinated attack can and will be effective in resisting and eliminating subversion.

The emphasis as well as the essence of ARD is on achieving the most effective coordination possible of all RTG rural development efforts. It is true that in FY 1965 ARD introduced a new rural development "tool", namely a changwad-level public works capability to build access rural roads in order to open up remote rural areas to RTG rural development efforts. But it is important to remember that the objective of this new "tool" is to promote rural development. The rural road all by itself represents very little real rural development. However, the road can be a vital means to opening the door to a flow of an unlimited number of rural development efforts.

IV. SUMMARY.

It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the ARD project in terms of its prescribed objectives. However, during the first year of the ARD program there have been significant accomplishments made on organizing and equipping working units and launching the project. This is due to the unusual attention and support given by everyone connected with the project from changwad to Ministerial level. In our Introduction we have referred to these accomplishments. Improvement in the problem areas, noted below, will direct this interest and support toward a more effective program.

A. Emphasis on Coordination and Village Projects.

During the first year of the ARD project, various organizational units have been established, including the changwad public works units, and the Regional Center. Major effort has so far been concentrated in the rural road-building program. Now that this program has been established, the emphasis should be expanded to include planning and operation in support of the overall coordinated rural development program. For example, the changwad-level public works units must become more responsive to supporting the development of other rural development efforts. Clearly

several types of public works activity and support will be required in addition to all-weather rural roads. These include, but are not limited to, access roads which meet villagers' needs and wishes or which open up remote areas for the in-flow of the several RTG Ministry-Department rural development projects, village development projects requiring various types of construction services, and of course, maintenance of construction that has been previously undertaken.

Because of the heavy demand that will exist for some time for the changwad level public works units, as presently constituted, to concentrate on road construction and relatively heavy embankment work, we have recommended that the changwad public works units be expanded to include a smaller construction unit which would be used exclusively for village development projects.

There are reports of several rural development projects in existence or planned in the changwads where the ARD program is to operate. We commend these efforts and recommend that a much greater effort be made by all RTG Ministries and Departments to produce the overall coordinated rural development program that is envisioned by the project agreements in the ARD development areas.

B. The Need for Planning.

We believe the most effective way for the ARD Governors to achieve coordination of all RTG rural development inputs into an ARD development area is through a complete, overall plan for rural development in the area. This Master Plan for Rural Development should include Implementation Plans for general coordination of all rural development projects, as well as detailed Implementation Plans for each project.

During the first year of the ARD project in which some officials, both U. S. and Thai, were getting established in their new assignments, it was difficult for them to anticipate problems and pitfalls in the operation and to lay out detailed plans for implementation for each project. Had such plans been available, they would have been of great assistance in launching the project and probably would have saved a considerable amount of delay and confusion. As a first step toward better planning, we recommend early action to jointly develop job descriptions and to define roles and responsibilities for the several positions that have been established and to make a further analysis of the ARD project to determine: (1) the various functions that will be required by the project; (2) the type and quantity of positions needed to accomplish these functions, followed by (3) the type and quantity of administrative and supervisory personnel that will be needed.

As the ARD program of overall coordinated rural development begins to take shape this year, and as the ARD public works project expands its construction services in support of the full ARD program, we recommend that additional personnel be detailed as may be necessary to insure that the various planning functions are fully covered during the next important months of expansion of the program.

We believe that progress reports can be of great assistance in planning and coordination and therefore recommend that greater effort be made to develop and submit them regularly.

C. Strengthening of Supervision.

Supervision is needed for all levels of the changwad public works units and should be strengthened with respect to engineering, construction programming, and for the proper operation and maintenance of the construction equipment.

It is our recommendation that a senior engineering construction advisor be assigned to each changwad construction unit and that the roles of the Seabee Advisors be clarified so as to utilize them in supervisory roles with respect to the operation and maintenance of the construction equipment.

It is our observation that before supervision can be achieved, it will be necessary for the management of the ARD program to carefully and completely develop job descriptions for all of the positions involved, including supervisors and senior advisors. Further, it will be necessary to establish procedures, guidelines and rules for operation, together with appropriate disciplinary and penalty actions if and when anyone fails to follow them. After this determination of job descriptions and establishment of procedures for operation, it will be possible to determine both the number and type of supervisors that are needed.

D. Training Problems.

The main responsibility of the Regional Engineering Center in Korat is to provide engineering services and equipment backstopping to the ARD changwads. These production functions are extremely important to the success of the whole ARD program. Training, however, has taken a great deal of the time of the engineering advisors in preparing training materials and in teaching. Insofar as possible, training functions should be delegated to established RTG training institutions utilizing Thai instructors. However, the Regional Engineering Center is responsible for determining, much more precisely than it has to date the type and qualifications of individuals needed for the various production functions. The Center and the training institutions will need to coordinate planning for the various training requirements (pre-service, in-service and refresher training programs.)

It is difficult at this time to judge the effectiveness of the training programs conducted last year because the changwad public works units encountered many problems in getting established: there were no job descriptions, supervision was not really adequate and, of course, the construction season was very short due to the late arrival of equipment.

A special review of the ARD training program has been requested of the ARD Evaluation Group by the CCOP and will probably be its next order of business.

E. Regional Support Services.

The Regional Center is to furnish support services in engineering, training and equipment maintenance to the changwad construction units. During its initial year of operation, the Center was called upon to prepare or approve road and bridge designs and inspect field operations in the six ARD changwads, substitute for ARD changwad Engineering Advisors, and furnish instructors for training courses. All of these requirements came during the period when staffing and organization at the Center was incomplete and simply was too much for it to perform everything adequately. The Center has been understaffed in design capability (the three Thai design engineers required by the Pro Ag are urgently required), the soil testing equipment was unavailable, roles and responsibilities were undefined, and the Center lacked the necessary clerical and administrative assistance to handle its administrative functions.

We have recommended that the training and production functions of the Center be separated to allow the Center to devote full time to its engineering and equipment maintenance responsibilities. When the ARD Regional Coordinator moves his staff to Korat, a capable administrative assistant or manager should be provided to relieve the technical staff of this load which they have been carrying.

F. The Problem of Communication.

Because the emphasis of the ARD project is on people, and especially rural people, the problem of communicating effectively assumes great importance. Thus, we recommend (1) that a sufficient number of capable interpreters be employed to assist American advisors, (2) training courses be expanded to include instruction on human relations, and (3) that an effective Rural Public Relations program be developed utilizing both Thai and U. S. capabilities.

G. Problems Related to Equipment.

Construction equipment arrived in the changwads between mid-December and mid-March 1965. A two to three month delay occurred between the arrival of the equipment in Bangkok and its delivery to the construction sites. The dump trucks have not yet arrived. We recommend that equipment be ordered to arrive at the start of the construction season.

Construction equipment for operator and mechanic training courses has not been available in the quantities needed. Such equipment is essential for training programs.

Sources of supply need to be developed and ordering procedures established to improve the availability of spare parts. Further, we recommend that Preventive Maintenance and Safety Programs for the operation and maintenance of equipment and vehicles be developed and instituted immediately.

V. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. General.

We wish to restate our overall praise for the many fine accomplishments of this first year of operation of the ARD program. There have been "growing pains," as in the launching of any major program, especially one as complex as this. Also, because of its very high priority, the ARD program often has been subjected to many pressures to faster action than was reasonable under new, difficult, and often frustrating circumstances.

A general observation that we should like to make as a result of our field interviews and discussions in Bangkok is that it is unwise to equate economic development and security development. Whereas almost anyone would be quite happy to have an increase in his income, this would not necessarily fortify him against subversion.

There is no doubt that rural development, and especially the construction of rural roads into remote areas, will eventually produce some increased income and some rise in the standard of living of the people in the vicinity.

However, there is no assurance that such increased income and/or raised standard of living will counteract subversion.

Although the evaluation program to date has been unable to carry out any extensive attitudinal sampling in the ARD area, there were a number of cases where we did have a good opportunity to talk with villagers and to explain to them how the ARD road that was to be built in their vicinity would provide various means for assisting them to increase their income and to improve their standard of living. One common response to this from the villagers was "what good will it do to help me increase my income if the Kamois (bandits) continue to come in and rob us? Actually if they know we are making more money, they will be more inclined to rob us."

Thus, we feel that whereas the objective of helping village people to increase their income is good in itself, it is inadequate unless there are other actions taken by the Thai Government to insure an overall improved situation in the rural areas. Practically everywhere we visited

in remote village areas, some reference was made to the need for more effective police protection, both with respect to quality and quantity.

Another general observation is that in a very real sense the basic ARD and CD concepts are parallel.

The basic concept of CD is to work at the village level to stimulate the villagers to action to do some village improvement project which they want to get done; and, where necessary, the CD worker will assist the villagers to get that project done by means of some small assistance from Amphur or Changwad-level representatives of the various RTG Ministries and Departments.

The basic concept of ARD is to work at the changwad level with the Governor, his staff and representatives of the various RTG Ministries and Departments to stimulate a coordinated concentration of all types of rural development that is feasible in a given critical area.

Not only is there this basic relationship between CD and ARD but, in addition, CD is the established RTG program to work at the grass roots, village level, and this is absolutely essential to all rural development. Thus, CD work is a vital, basic element to the new overall coordinated rural development program, which is ARD and its capabilities should be more fully utilized.

In the following sections of the report we provide a more detailed discussion of our observations and recommendations. We have grouped these under three major sections: (B) Functions; (c) Organizational Units; and (D) Equipment and Related Items.

B. Functions.

1. Development of Communications.

The ARD program is bringing RTG officials into close contact with remote rural people, and providing them a rare opportunity to understand and to be understood by them. The problem that needs to be carefully analyzed is how to be sure that there is good and complete mutual understanding.

Throughout this first phase of the evaluation program, we have observed repeated instances where there was or had been a breakdown in communications. The following are some of the points that seem to relate directly to the problem of communication.

Because of the nature of the ARD program and the high priority and urgency that is given to it, complete and accurate communication of ideas and instructions is particularly important to the success of the program. The recognition of the problem of communication and the fact that we do not always communicate clearly and fully is one of the first steps toward improved communication. Communication must be a two-way proposition to be effective; by providing a two-way give and take

with regard to any discussion or even instruction, there is a much better chance for determining whether or not the topic is fully and correctly understood. The definition of terms and expressions invariably improves communication and operations. One of the basic essentials to communication is that there be adequate time to communicate and to be sure that there is correct understanding. Another problem is that so often there is a different sense of value given to a term or concept (the value of time is one example). In the complex ARD program which combines people from many different organizational and professional backgrounds, often there are new and unfamiliar concepts. A mere definition is inadequate. What is needed is a patient and full explanation of the new concept. Finally, effort should be made to test and to determine whether the idea or instruction was completely and accurately communicated.

In view of the fact that ARD is a Thai program that will remain in Thailand, we believe that the main burden with regard to communication is on the USOM technicians to be sure that the technical assistance contribution of ideas is correctly and completely converted into Thai.

Many of these same problems of communication exist between Bangkok officials and villagers; for example, time, sense of values, new concepts and, of course, in some cases even language differences. The burden for the solution of communication problems rests on the RTG officials with respect to their relations with villagers.

Translator Problems.

We have been impressed by the very important role that the translator has been asked to assume in this ARD program. Actually he is a key individual in resolving or possibly complicating the problems that have been mentioned above. Assuming that he is sincere and conscientious about his work, he will translate what he thinks is necessary from what he understands was stated. Thus, he must be skilled not only in Thai and English translation, but also he must be very familiar with the concepts and terminology that is being used. In one or two instances we observed where a USOM technician carefully worked out ahead of time the material that he proposed to use in a discussion and made it available to his translator. The translator spent time reviewing the material and prepared questions he used in discussing the material with the USOM technician. Then, and only then, would the translator and the USOM technician feel that they were prepared to hold the discussion the following day.

In a very real way, the translator controls the flow of thought in both directions. We strongly recommend that greater investment of time and money be made in the selection and use of translators.

The Need for a Public Relations Program.

Public relations is an extremely important element of the overall rural development program. Much benefit from rural development efforts could be multiplied if in each changwad there was a coordinated effort to pass the word along regarding the accomplishments of the various rural development efforts. One of the vital parts of rural development is to

demonstrate to rural people the fact that their government is interested in them and is able to do something to help them in a meaningful way. Obviously, rural development cannot benefit everyone at one time. However, with a vital public relations effort operating in the changwad, it should be possible to give to many people a convincing picture of what the government is doing for others now and plans to do for them in due course.

Just as communications is a very difficult problem in rural development work, so is public relations, for the simple reason that essentially public relations is a task of effectively communicating one's message to another group.

There are experts in this field of public relations who should be asked to review the problem as it pertains to the ARD program. We understand that the RTG Public Relations Department has been asked to assist. We do not know the extent of their efforts to develop an effective public relations program for the ARD program. However, we would make this general recommendation that it is important to be sure that an adequate public relations program is launched. By adequate we mean not only quantity contact or circulation of information, but especially there should be quality of communication.

We have commented in another section on the important contributions which have and can continue to be made. USIS should be utilized fully in ARD public relations programs.

There has been some thought given to expanding the training program at Korat to include a course in human relations. We endorse this idea and suggest it be given not only to the regular trainee classes but to as many others, both Thai and American, as possible.

2. Planning.

Planning Is Essential If Coordination Is to be Achieved.

This is an obvious observation, but so often planning is pushed aside because of the rush and pressure of the moment.

Again, on the topic of planning the Prime Minister was very specific:

"I would like to emphasize here also that acceleration of development of the remote areas that belong to us calls for definite and complete plan of operations . . . the work in each accelerated development area has to be carefully planned in order to meet appropriately specific needs of its inhabitants. Besides, it must be executed according to the planned time schedule and in conjunction with other plans of operations, making for speedy and real completion of development work in all fields."

It is clear that in order to achieve a coordination of all RTG rural development inputs into a certain area (and we shall assume that the area

is a changwad, because the ARD program has been set up on the basis of individual changwads), there must be a complete, overall plan for rural development in the area. We shall use the term Master Plan for Rural Development when referring to this concept of a complete plan for rural development for a changwad.

One very positive achievement in the field of planning in the ARD program has been the development by the CCOP and the Governors of the six ARD changwads of the three-year plan for Rural Road Construction, which indicates general location and chronological priority sequencing of road routes. This plan was reviewed and approved by the CCOP last month.

Though such a plan is very essential for the ARD program, it is not the type of Master Plan needed. What is needed is an overall plan that will combine all rural development efforts that are to be concentrated in any one changwad during any one year (the Thai fiscal year might be a good definition in view of the fact that not only are new funds released then by the RTG, but also that is about the beginning of the construction season). Such a Master Plan should include several Implementation Plans for general coordination of all rural development projects, as well as rather detailed Implementation Plans for each rural development project. Unfortunately, no such Implementation Plan was developed for the Rural Road Construction Project of the ARD program. As will be explained later in this report, such an Implementation Plan would have been of great assistance in launching the project and probably would have saved a considerable amount of confusion, delay and wastage.

As we discussed this concept of the Prime Minister with senior RTG officials there has evolved what would seem to be a very practical technique for developing a Master Plan for Rural Development as well as a very practical means of implementing it. This is outlined in section A, 3 of this report.

As indicated elsewhere, the most common and serious problem has been that a thorough analysis was not made to determine: (1) the various functions that should be performed; (2) the type and quantity of positions needed to accomplish those functions, followed by (3) adequate job descriptions which would define the roles, responsibilities, and authority of the various individuals employed.

This has particularly plagued the field operations where delays and misunderstandings have been very frequent, which has been very annoying, to say the least, and often very costly.

Within the last few weeks, a determined effort has been made by those responsible for the ARD program to draw up job descriptions for the various positions that have been established. No doubt this will greatly improve the operation of the entire program. However, we consider that this will be only a partial corrective treatment. As indicated elsewhere, we believe that a thorough review of the entire project needs to be made to determine:

- (1) All present and probable functions that will be required;

(2) What existing organizational units can most feasibly perform these functions, and establish new organizational units only as can be justified; and finally,

(3) The resources that will be required in the form of personnel, facilities, commodities and financing.

In view of the fact that so much of the ARD program has been built on existing Thai Government organizational units, we would envision that there should be little problem in making such operational changes as might be desirable following the analysis recommended above. Obviously, several recommended changes in procedures and operations will be possible to improve the effectiveness and economy of the operation. One of the major areas that we will be looking at in the future is that of practical ways and means of achieving greater coordination of the various organizational units that are vital to the overall ARD program.

Planning for the Expanded ARD Program.

In expanding ARD into additional provinces, great care should be taken to avoid the pitfalls which have beset ARD in the first six changwads during its first construction season. It is not sufficient to say that next year's program will automatically be better because we have had one year of experience. Nothing will be better unless time is taken to plan carefully and make sure that effective methods and tools are being used to achieve our goals. Whereas it is usually wise to keep a fairly tight limit on the number of personnel that are assigned to a new program until it is clearly determined that additional personnel are needed, it is usually unwise to try to economize on manpower for the planning stages, especially of a new program. ARD is still quite a new program, especially with regard to its major responsibility of coordinating an overall rural development program. Again, it is expected that the program will be expanded both into new changwads as well as with the new capability to construct village development projects. Thus, we recommend that additional personnel be detailed as may be necessary to insure that the planning functions for ARD are fully covered during these next important months of expansion of the program. This might be achieved either by part-time or short-term assignment of qualified personnel stationed in Bangkok (Department of Municipal and Public Works, and other RTG Departments; other personnel in USOM, the SEATO Graduate Engineering School, etc.), or by bringing in TDY personnel from other AID Missions or from Washington. This would have helped to avoid a great deal of confusion and wastage due to the fact that no one really sat down and thoroughly thought through as to the implications of various aspects and functions of the program.

Planning and Coordination of Operations.

We were told by one of the Governor's that in May 1964 when he and the other Governors signed the ARD project they were advised that the ARD construction equipment would arrive about October 1964. Accordingly, they made plans to start operations about that time.

In late September 1964 the Regional Engineering Center in Korat sent the young men who had been trained as "engineers", surveyors, draftsmen, equipment operators and construction mechanics for assignment to the several changwads. The earth-moving equipment and vehicles did not arrive in Thailand until mid-November to December 1964. It took approximately two months to get the equipment from Bangkok to the changwads, so that the changwads did not receive any of the earth-moving equipment or vehicles until January and February 1965.

Naturally the Governors were disappointed that the equipment arrived so late. However, what bothered them most was that they felt that they were not adequately informed of the fact that the equipment was going to be at least two months late so that they could have made plans accordingly. (Officials in Bangkok most certainly were in possession of information concerning the arrival dates of the ships with the ARD construction equipment, namely, mid-November to December. This information should have given the basis for estimating that the equipment could not possibly reach the changwads until late November or early December.)

Planning Recommendation.

We recommend that the 1965 and subsequent years' project agreements include or require the early preparation of a changwad annual work plan or master plan incorporating (1) the planned length of the main road project to be completed, (2) number and length of village access roads to be started and completed, (3) other village impact projects to be constructed by the changwad engineering organization, (4) coordinated rural development projects to be undertaken by RTG Ministries such as agriculture, health, education, community development, etc. The plan should be approved by the Changwad Governors, RTG Ministries involved, the USOM Office of Rural Affairs, the Regional ARD Coordinator and the Committee for Coordination and Operational Planning.

The suggestion in Section V, A, 3, Practical Procedure for the Coordination of ARD, contains also the elements of an annual changwad work plan.

Changwad Progress Reports.

The ARD Pro Ags, dated May 12, 1964, required that Quarterly Progress Reports were to be prepared by the Changwad Governors. Accordingly the first Quarterly Progress Report, jointly designed by Thai and USOM ARD officials, covering the period from the signing of the Pro Ag through the first full quarter (September 30, 1964) should have been prepared and submitted by October 31, 1964. This was not done by any of the six changwads. ARD officials later decided to shift from a quarterly to a tri-annual schedule.

According to the revised schedule, the first tri-annual Progress Reports, covering the period "October 1, 1964 - December 31, 1964, was to have been submitted by January 20, 1965," and the second report was due on

March 20, 1965. However, the changwads have thus far submitted only the first progress report, which was received in late April.

After the submission of the First Quarterly Changwad Reports, it was determined by ARD officials that a revised form was needed. The reason given for the required revision was that the original reports were "lacking in detail."

The Progress Reports, in both the original and revised form, although serving as a comprehensive financial and statistical data report, were not completely adequate to provide ARD officials with all the required information for management purposes.

There should be early agreement upon the contents of progress reports and instructions should be issued to insure their timely submission. We believe that progress reports can be of very great value in planning and coordinating activities, and their value is enhanced because they will be prepared by Thai officials. USOM advisors should however, contribute the observations and recommendations to the Governors for inclusion in the report. Further, expenditure information from these reports should be extremely useful in projecting costs of the program.

Regional Engineering Center Progress Reports.

Separate progress reports were designed for the Regional Engineering Center. No reports have been received from the center. The same comments and recommendations made on the Changwad Progress Reports apply to the Regional Engineering Center.

3. Promotion and Coordination of Rural Development Projects.

General.

As indicated in earlier sections of this report, the main activity under the ARD program during this last year has been essentially to "tool up" for a rural development program. This has involved setting up the organizational units listed under Section B of this outline, together with the training, equipping and first field work of the rural roads construction units. Many people have felt that far too much time was devoted to the establishment of the rural roads construction units. However, they may not realize how extensive and complicated an operation the unit is.

There now seems to be a much clearer and increasingly widespread understanding of the nature of the ARD program, namely, that it is to involve all RTG rural development efforts. With the provision of the permanent engineer construction advisors, one to each ARD changwad, the Governors and the Palad Changwads ARD's should be able to give much more of their attention to promotion and development of an overall rural development program in their respective changwads.

Coordination is a Two-Way Proposition.

The following incident is reported to indicate the lack of appreciation of coordinated effort.

During the period when there was such great difficulty getting soil samples tested and results returned to the changwads, one Governor requested permission to use the services of the Highway Department's representative in that area (a very senior man) to get soil samples tested for him. The Governor's plan was to ask the Changwad Engineering Advisor to take the sample to Bangkok, where the Highway Department representative would have had arrangements made for the soil sampling work to be done. The Governor's proposal was refused and he was told that he must submit soil samples only to the Korat Regional Engineering Center even though there had been a considerable delay already, and there was further delay on the part of the Regional Engineering Center in processing the soil samples.

Whereas we did not attempt to check this out, this report, given directly to us by the Governor, was repeated in general by two other Governors. For a project that has as its major operational function to "coordinate planning and implementation of several rural development related projects", it is highly inconsistent to flatly turn down offers of cooperation and coordination by those very Ministries and Departments with whom the ARD program is designed to coordinate, assuming they are technically competent.

Coordination of Rural Development Programs.

As indicated above, the function of coordination, although not well defined in the project agreement, is a most important element of the ARD program. The emphasis of the program should be on coordination rather than acceleration for the simple reason that unless there is a coordinated effort to develop a broad series of rural development projects within the area, it will be of little value to try to speed up one rural development function; for example, that of building rural roads. We have recommended a modification in the programming of the rural roads construction units. This is basically in order to promote coordination of rural development inputs from a great many of the Thai Government Ministries and Departments.

The project agreement calls for an overall plan for coordination of rural development. We have reviewed this requirement (and the suggestions made by the Prime Minister) very carefully, discussed this matter with officials at all levels within the Government, and have developed the following procedure which we believe clarifies what is meant by coordination and will be effective in implementing an overall program of rural development. Certainly some such device or plan will be necessary to secure the coordinated action of other RTG Ministries. At the time of our field visits, there was little evidence of any real effective effort to develop a plan to enlist the capabilities of other RTG Ministries in the ARD program. Some Governors were holding meetings with the changwad representatives of the RTG Ministries in their changwad and discussing their possible contributions. We recognize the preoccupation of everyone

with the construction unit and with the development of organizations during the first year of operation, but we believe it is not now too early to concentrate on developing a complete plan of rural development as outlined in the project agreement.

Practical Procedure for the Coordination of ARD.

- (1) Select a Changwad ARD Development Area for the Year (in each changwad where there is ARD).
 - (a) Development area is defined as the area surrounding the rural road which is to be constructed during the year:
 1. Selection of the rural road route to be made by RTG on the basis of national interest priorities.
 - (b) Development area should include several villages which are in the general proximity of the rural road project.
 - (c) Development area also should include land with reasonable potential for agricultural development.
- (2) Make a Survey of the Development Area to Determine Developmental Projects which are Feasible to Complete Within the Year.
 - (a) Three categories of developmental projects:
 1. Mainly (initially) to assist the RTG in performing its responsibilities to the rural areas.
 2. Projects which meet villager felt needs.
 3. Projects mainly for economic and social benefit to the development area.

Note: 2, a, 1 and 2, a, 2 will be immediate impact type projects, while 2, a, 3 will be slower impact type projects.
 - (b) Scope of Developmental Projects:

Surveys undertaken by RTG Ministry-Department representatives will seek to identify at least one feasible project to be undertaken by every RTG Ministry-Department which has responsibility for various socio-economic development in rural Thailand.

Note: These individual developmental projects need not be large; nor should the whole changwad development area be blanketed with developmental projects. However, concentrated within each of the ARD changwad development areas should be at least one practical and beneficial developmental project for each RTG Ministry-Department (as indicated above). These

would demonstrate in a concrete, tangible manner the RTG's concern for its rural people-citizens, and the RTG's ability to help them achieve rural development.

(3) Secure Agreement from Each RTG Ministry-Department to:

- (a) Complete its piece of the total development plan (as determined from the survey, item "2" above) within the year, and
- (b) Develop and submit copies of its plan for implementation to the coordinator of the ARD changwad development program, namely the Governor.

(4) This, then, results in a Master Plan for Rural Development for ARD - of the Changwad Development Area.

- (5) Each RTG Ministry-Department will be responsible for the development of its own developmental project, and its Changwad Representative will be responsible to its parent organization, in the normal way.

(6) The Project Coordinator (the Governor) will:

- (a) Make periodic surveys of the progress of all developmental projects and prepare progress reports on project implementation.
- (b) These reports will be submitted to all concerned.
- (c) The Master Plan for Rural Development will enable the ARD Regional Director to monitor ARD and should suggest ways in which various individual developmental projects can be made more effective or more efficient.

- (7) These reports (item "6" above) plus special surveys (benchmark, etc.) will be used to periodically evaluate the progress, effectiveness, and efficiency of the several developmental projects and the Master Development Plan.

4. Construction Services for Rural Development.

The Concept of "Felt Need" and its Relationship to Changwad-Level Public Works Capability.

The sociological term "felt need" is espoused by many but seems to be limited to "villager" felt need as far as rural development is concerned. The hypothesis of rural development, as stated in the ARD Pro Ag specifies that operational functions A and B are to be responsive to villager "desires" and "needs". However, the Pro Ag is incomplete in that it mentions only villager "felt needs." Some people have overlooked the equally important element that the project must be a Thai project - and that it must project a good Thai Government image. To accomplish this will require designing the program to meet the RTG "felt need" with regard to rural development. The RTG "felt need" with regard to rural

development is to be able to discharge its responsibilities to its rural citizens in the remote, security sensitive areas. In this regard it seems evident that the rural road route construction element of the program is a huge success; that is, as far as meeting the RTG "felt need" with respect to rural development.

It may be helpful at this point to review a bit of the background on the development of the changwad level public works capability. As indicated above, the hypothesis of rural development as stated in the ARD Pro Ag is that operational functions A and B are to be responsive to villager desires and needs. When this philosophy was first proposed, back in 1963, it was consistent with the package of construction equipment then planned for the six changwads, namely a unit of equipment slightly larger than the usual STAT equipment package, which would truly have been very suitable to perform all manner of village development projects that were responsive to villager felt needs. Accordingly, the USOM engineering division in the Office of Rural Affairs was titled, "Village Projects Development Division."

However, several major changes occurred in November 1963, when it was decided: (1) to expand the ARD equipment package by about 400%; (2) to design that equipment package specifically to be able to construct a significant amount of embankment (e.g. some 50 to 60 kilometers of all-weather rural road per year); and, (3) to change the name of the USOM division to "Rural Roads and Village Projects Development Division." Not only did the equipment package change drastically; the operational philosophy also changed drastically in the minds of the RTG officials involved in the ARD project. To them the whole program was now elevated to a much higher plateau. Before, the RTG using the ARD equipment would only have been able to do a few village development projects here or there where there already was an access road into the village. Now, with the revised equipment package, the RTG would be able to open up new remote rural areas in the sensitive parts of the Northeast which would, in turn, allow various Thai Government services to flow into the area. The ability to build these rural roads and access routes met a major Thai Government "felt need" in enabling the RTG to fulfill its responsibilities to its rural citizens.

However, when the changes occurred, as described above, there was no corresponding change made in the philosophy or operational policy of the ARD project. What should have been done was to expand the philosophy and operational policy in the same way as the equipment package, namely that: (1) village projects should be responsive to villager "felt needs"; whereas, (2) rural roads projects should be responsive to the RTG "felt needs."

Misunderstanding developed when, as the construction program began, the RTG selected rural roads projects, which obviously best met the RTG "felt need" at the time, whereas some people, clinging to the original philosophic concept of the ARD public works capability merely meeting villager "felt needs", were disappointed when all the projects selected were rural roads.

The above background information, together with our field observations, is the basis for our recommendation that a small construction package be provided to build village projects that will fulfill villager "felt needs." We feel very strongly that in some way small equipment packages should: (1) be made available for village development projects, (2) be responsive to villager "felt needs" - what the villagers want, and (3) be used exclusively for village development projects.

Engineering Construction Leadership.

ARD is a major engineering complex. As such it must have mature engineering know-how experience at the Chief Engineer position. This has not been provided. Such mature engineering know-how must be of such a competence level that the Governor and Palad Changwad ARD will recognize and respect it and release to it the engineering decision-making role which they often have assumed. (They assumed this role because of: (1) lack of role definition, and (2) the void that existed at the Chief Engineer position of a mature person capable of making construction engineering decisions.)

The concept that recent graduates of technical schools (vocational schools), with only six months of an "engineering indoctrination" course, could assume the major, senior roles of engineering operation and planning at the changwad level has been demonstrated to have been rather naive. They are not qualified for several reasons: (1) lacks adequate engineering training; (2) lacks sufficient experience in engineering and construction; (3) lacks leadership and supervisory experience; and (4) lacks maturity-age. He simply cannot assume the major, senior role in the Changwad ARD public works program. However, you just can't fire the young "Chief Engineer" and you most certainly cannot expect the Governor and Palad Changwad ARD to relinquish their assumed positions of responsibility for engineering decisions and operations in the face of the vacuum that exists in the key leadership position.

The solution simply is to add to the changwad staff a mature, experienced engineering person capable of making sound engineering decisions with respect to engineering construction plans and operations. If, as seems to be the case, there are no such Thai engineers, we must for the immediate future provide USOM engineers. However, such a solution is only a temporary one.

A long-range plan must be developed whereby the ARD changwad will have a permanent Thai engineering capability with the required level of construction and engineering competence.

Therefore, we recommended in our Statement of Preliminary Findings and repeat again here the recommendation that each ARD changwad public works unit have assigned to it a senior, experienced engineering construction advisor.

The Problem of Right-of-Way.

As has been observed in the press and over the radio, the problem of right-of-way has been used as a tool of present subversion propaganda effort. Aside from this objectionable publicity, it seems obvious that there needs to be a careful study made of the problem of securing right-of-way.

There is no single solution. There are many of which the following are only a few:

(1) It may be that those involved will be satisfied with an exchange of right-of-way of the old road route for the right-of-way of the new road route provided that the right-of-way of the old road route is properly cultivated or prepared for whatever use the owner wishes to make of the land.

(2) Agreement might be reached by a provision of land somewhere else in the vicinity in exchange for the right-of-way.

(3) The exchange for some property improvement.

(4) Cash settlement.

(5) Some individuals involved might be willing to contribute land either as a straightforward donation (which might be recognized by the Thai Government), or because they can clearly see that they will be benefitted by the road increase and land value, etc.

Regardless of the solution, it is important that there is real agreement reached between each and every person whose land is involved in road realignment or any other construction project.

Project Selection.

In a later section dealing with our recommendations for modification of the rural road program, we indicate that with regard to selection of rural roads routes, this selection should be that of the Thai Government. The three-year Master Plan for Rural Road Construction, recently approved by the CCOP, identifies where the main rural road routes are located and the sequence in which they will be developed. As the ARD program becomes more responsive to the overall objectives of promoting the coordination of rural development (as suggested in the sections on Modification of the Rural Road Program and Coordination of Rural Development Programs) and as the rural road construction units take on construction of access roads branching off from the main road, construction of small dams, and other rural development projects, it will be desirable for villagers to participate in the selection of those projects. The Palad Changwad ARD and the Nai Amphurs should have the main responsibility of seeing to it that there is villager involvement in those rural development projects which are located on or in the proximity of their village. There is little participation by villagers in the selection process to date.

In fact as indicated elsewhere, there is little firm planning at all for village projects.

Village Development Projects.

It is our understanding that projects fall into two categories: those constructed with ARD equipment, and those of a non-public works nature carried out by other agencies in their own fields of special interest as part of a broad rural development program. With the emphasis on ARD road projects, a large part of the energy and attention of changwad officials and USOM advisors has been occupied with the problems of carrying out the road projects, and little attention has been given to either of these two kinds of village projects. The presence of public works equipment has caused ARD to be seen as a project concerned primarily with construction. We have heard governors speak of their sub-projects which they proposed to carry out under ARD. In one case they were all roads. In another case they were small road and pond-building projects which would be carried out with village labor. However, the main criterion is that village projects represent villager "felt needs". From our observations it seems that priority rural development projects in the minds of villagers are: (1) improved police protection; (2) domestic water supplies; and (3) curative medical provision.

The Evaluation Team wishes to acknowledge that during its field investigations it saw and learned about many village improvement, rural development projects in operation or being developed by or under the sponsorship of various RTG Ministries and Departments. Some of these were very interesting and clearly illustrate the sort of rural development tool which the RTG wants to develop further. We wish to clarify that the mission of the Evaluation Team at this time was not to enumerate all of nor to evaluate these other rural development efforts, but rather to explore whether: (1) the new concept of coordinated rural development was understood, and in practical terms how that concept could be implemented; and (2) the new rural development tool for constructing rural roads was being developed satisfactorily.

As indicated elsewhere it is our observation that the rural road construction equipment unit will be very heavily committed if it is to meet the construction schedule of the three-year Master Plan for Construction of Rural Roads in the six ARD changwads. We agree that a sufficient amount of roadway route must be opened up to provide access for the flow of RTG rural development efforts by all of the RTG Ministries and Departments which will be joining in the overall coordinated rural development program concentrated in critical areas selected by the RTG.

Actually, it is our belief that the amount of roadway prescribed in the three-year plan will be inadequate, and have recommended that the rural roads units concentrate in the first instance at the beginning of a construction season to open up a larger access roadway network, with access roads branching off from the main road routes, in order to provide the basis of a broader distribution of rural development throughout the

area. There has been a great deal of interest by the senior changwad officials to provide such a broad access roadway network in the "trouble spots" within their respective changwads. Thus, we envision that the rural road construction units will be fully committed in order to put in the roadway network envisioned by the Governors.

The rural road construction units most certainly can make some contributions in village development work along and in the immediate vicinity of the roadway being constructed. Such contributions cannot be counted upon, and more importantly, won't be able to meet the need or really be responsive to the requests and wishes of the villagers. Thus, we have recommended that in some way a construction equipment unit be designed and made available exclusively for village development projects. Such a unit of equipment would be used to perform whatever construction work the particular village wants it to do for them in the period of time that it was assigned to assist them. Obviously this calls for careful planning on the part of the changwad public works organization and the Nai Amphurs of the districts involved to arrange an appropriate schedule arrangement for deployment of the village development construction equipment unit. The Regional Engineering Center is supposed to develop Standards of Construction and an Engineering Handbook. Both of these documents should, of course, cover standard designs and information on the whole range of village development projects so as to facilitate the work of the changwad public works engineering units in the survey and design (as may be necessary) of village development projects, and likewise to provide guidance and facilitate the construction of the village project by the Village Development Construction Unit.

The Evaluation Team will be looking forward to a review of the work and results of the village projects currently being undertaken by the Community Development Department using the small package of equipment which they have only recently put into operation. We feel that it will take some time yet to determine precisely the type of equipment which will really prove to be most effective and economical in promoting village development projects. The problem of recruiting and retaining qualified equipment operators and mechanics for the village development projects equipment should be provided for in the 1965 project agreements.

It has been our observation that when thinking about projects which they wanted, village people do not think "big." Their horizons are quite limited. Their aspirations are also quite limited, but they are very realistic.

Several people have suggested that the expression "sub-project" be dropped in favor of the expression "village project" or "village development project."

The expression "sub-project" suggests to some that such a project is inferior to or of less importance than other projects. And no one likes to be associated with inferior projects.

We recommended in our Preliminary Statement of Findings that a special package of equipment be made available to accomplish village projects. This recommendation was accepted and the equipment is in process of procurement.

The Need for Access Roads.

Several Governors have very good reasons for wanting to deploy some of the road building equipment to push through access roads. In the cases which were discussed with us by the Governors the reasons given were either for security, counter-subversion, or political reasons, or in one case a combination of political and economic. In every instance the Governor's decision was met with opposition and the argument that such was not allowable in accordance with the terms of the Project Agreement.

It is our strong recommendation that such portions of the Project Agreement as touch on this matter of the Governors' prerogatives with regard to the use of the ARD road construction equipment be more clearly spelled out.

We further recommend that serious consideration should be given to launching a more efficient and more aggressive access road program to open up channels for communication to and from strategic rural areas even though use of these access roads will be limited pretty much to the dry seasons and even though much of such access roads will be washed away during the rainy season.

The Korat Engineering Center, in collaboration with the Highway Department, and using the consultant services of other in-country engineering and construction service (including the Seabees) should develop some general guidelines and design criteria for access roads where the factors of: (1) speed of construction; (2) durability; and (3) investment for later improvement as an all-weather rural road are properly balanced for achieving maximum accessibility into remote rural areas.

Construction During the First Season.

In view of the many problems encountered during the first season, none of the ARD changwads have been able to complete anywhere near the amount of rural road construction that was planned. Some have seemed to do better than others. However, the real test as to the effectiveness of the construction operation must wait until after the rainy season.

Maintenance of Construction.

We believe that it will be extremely important for this function to be adequately provided for. At the moment the construction of roads is the most visible evidence of Thai Government involvement in the ARD program. Thus, it is important to insure that the roads are adequately maintained for several reasons: (1) economic - in order to protect the

investment in constructing the road; (2) security - in maintaining all-weather access along the road that has been constructed; and (3) political - to maintain a good Thai image (to the extent that USOM is understood to be participating in the project, this will, of course, mean maintaining a good image of USOM).

The problem of road maintenance will become a serious one at the beginning of the rainy season May - June, 1965. It should therefore be the subject of a special joint study group immediately, including the Highway Department, leading to recommendations on the extent of maintenance responsibilities, necessary organization and manpower, re-occurring expenditure, equipment needs, etc.

As of the time our field inspections were made there were no plans at the changwad level, the regional level or in Bangkok for providing maintenance of work constructed by the ARD road construction units. We strongly recommend that this matter be given immediate consideration, if it has not yet been taken care of.

Modification of Rural Road Construction Program.

We question the wisdom of all the ARD rural road equipment being used to build only all-weather roads. To meet other factors involved in rural development, we believe access roads, even though they are usable only in dry weather, will be good enough to open up remote rural areas and provide access for the flow in of great variety of rural development effort.

The reasons for this suggestion are as follows:

(1) The access road network can be completed much more extensively and in less time.

(2) There would be much less need for time-consuming survey work for the simple reason that access roads could in most instances very well follow existing cart trails.

(3) There would be much less demand for a relatively complicated engineering design work.

(4) This type of construction would involve relatively small amount of soil sample testing in view of the fact there would be much less compaction of embankment.

In the light of the above, and representing what we have found to be the thinking of a good many people involved in or interested in the ARD, we wish to make the following proposal for the modification of the rural road construction program, in order to make it more effective in the support and promotion of the overall coordinated rural development program.

We find that building rural roads, even of the relatively simple design agreed to this last year (a five to six meter wide all-weather

roadway, laterite surfaced) is not only very expensive and time-consuming, but it will not provide the amount of access roadway that must be opened up to enable an effective rural development program to be established.

Therefore, we strongly recommend a modification of the rural roads program so that it may more effectively support the overall rural development program, and make a significant impact in the attack on subversion in rural Thailand. Simply, this would mean that the rural roads construction teams would be programmed as follows during a construction season:

(1) Push through access roads into the changwad area where it has been determined by the RTG that there will be a concentration of rural development. This will include the main rural road route (that is, those included in the three-year Master Plan for Rural Road Routes), plus access roads branching off from the main road to connect with villages, other roads, etc., as seems feasible to support the Master Rural Development Plan (explained elsewhere in this report). These access roads should follow the established cart tracks. Later, as time and resources permit, if a portion of the access road is improved to all-weather status, then the problem of realignment can be considered. Such access roads can be constructed quickly and relatively inexpensively, even though they may include some simple drainage structures (for example, where the road route crosses a low spot or stream). We believe that access roads can very adequately serve the needs of the rural development program.

(2) Obviously these roads would not provide all-weather access. However, if some extra attention was paid to improvement of the particularly bad spots, it should be possible to make the road route somewhat accessible during the monsoon. Some of these improvements might actually serve a dual purpose, as was the case with a couple of projects undertaken by the STAT in Ubol and Kuchinarai. That is, if the access road route crosses a stream or marsh, consideration should be given to constructing an embankment over that section which would not only provide access during the monsoon, but which also could serve as a dam to store water. Such an assignment would require careful engineering planning and supervision and coordination with the people in the vicinity. However, such dual-purpose projects would make valuable contributions to the proposed overall Master Plan for Rural Development.

(3) In addition to improvement of sections of the access road routes, the rural road construction teams could be deployed to construct other projects that would involve fairly large earth-moving operations; for example, building dams, digging out pond area, clearing land, etc.

(4) Access roads, as suggested above, would, of course, require maintenance during the dry season and major attention following the monsoon. However, it should be quite simple to provide for such maintenance from the relatively large amount of equipment that is now programmed for the rural roads construction teams.

(5) As time permitted and resources were available in accordance with priority requirements of the proposed Master Plan for Rural Development for the services of the rural road construction unit, then the rural road construction unit could be deployed to improve sections of rural roadways up to the all-weather standard already agreed upon.

(6) One other suggestion that we would like to make for the consideration of those responsible for the planning and programming of the rural road construction teams has to do with deployment of the team members during the monsoon period when it is either impossible or unwise to operate the heavy construction equipment. In addition to refresher course would suggest that at least some of the team members be deployed on other rural development projects. As the Master Plan for Rural Development is drawn up, it would seem that there are many places where these young men could be of real service, because of their skills. As might be feasible, they could be assigned on TDY with various other RTG Ministry-Department rural development projects. The young men could make a valuable contribution and it would be very beneficial for them to secure first-hand experience and appreciation of the nature, plans, problems and potentialities of other rural development efforts.

One other positive result of this modified use of the rural road construction units would be to encourage the Highway Department to participate in the Master Plan for Rural Development by joining in the improvement of certain sections of the access road network that might be opened up in any one season. Whereas the Highway Department might feel that it was so committed that it could not take on the construction of a major section of all-weather road, it might very well be able to help improve sections of access road routes, especially those that are in the proximity of other work that they have going.

In view of the above, it is our recommendation that the project agreement be amended as necessary to provide clear procedures to be followed in the use of ARD construction equipment and personnel in the construction of various types of village development projects, as well as the construction of all-weather rural roads. Further, we recommend that the Regional Engineering Center expedite early completion of the preparation of Standards for Construction and the preparation of the Engineering Handbook to adequately cover the planning and construction of this range of project.

5. Training Programs (Technical).

The evaluation program effort thus far has not been able to make a review in depth of training. That will be done later since it is a major project in itself.

Relationships Between Production and Training Functions.

It is the recommendation of the evaluation team that possible, the ARD changwad construction units and the regional center

should concentrate on production elements of rural development and rely on various Thai Government training institutions and facilities to provide what training is necessary for personnel to staff the various rural development projects. We appreciate the problem encountered during this first year when it seemed necessary to utilize engineering and technical personnel assigned to the Regional Engineering Center and Overhaul Shop to also serve as instructors in various technical courses. However well this may or may not have worked out, it clearly is not a good management arrangement.

Somewhat of the same pattern is being programmed for this second year. We strongly recommend that the training functions be clearly separated from the production functions at the Regional Center. Whereas it may be necessary again to utilize personnel from the Regional Center to serve as instructors in the technical courses, their services in that capacity should be clearly that of temporary assignment to the training institution or facility and they should be responsible to the administrators of the particular training courses.

Though it is our general recommendation that as soon as possible the two functions of training and production should be separated, this does not in any way suggest that those responsible for the production program of rural development can turn over the whole matter to the training institution or group. It still is very much the responsibility of production people to clearly determine the types and qualifications of individuals that they will need.

The Need for an Analysis of Personnel Requirements.

It would appear that many of the problems, confusion, and delay encountered in the training programs during this first year (and the proper placement of those trained in appropriate field positions) were due in large measure to failure to adequately analyze the personnel requirements involved in this program. The following would seem to be the basic steps that should be taken leading up to the proper placement of personnel:

(1) Make a thorough job description of each job for which personnel will be required; (this will involve identifying various functions and levels of responsibility of the job);

(2) Determine the qualifications and experience requirements for a person filling the job;

(3) Carefully determine the qualifications and experience levels of the prospective employees; and

(4) Establish a requirement for training and experience necessary to bridge the gap between items "2" and "3" above. Qualifications for employment for ARD will require a combination of training and field experience. It is usually desirable to provide the basic training in an institutional situation, followed by a field assignment where practical

in-service training can be provided. The latter obviously requires assignment of either instructional personnel or supervisory personnel who can assure that the practical field in-service training experience meets its prescribed objectives. In this connection, it was interesting to learn from the Seabee advisors of their very general comparison of Thai equipment operators and mechanics trained at Korat and those trained by the STAT. It was their feeling that whereas the young men trained by STAT were able to operate equipment in the field somewhat better than the Korat trainees at the beginning of the construction season, it was now their opinion that probably the Korat trainees would eventually surpass those trained by the STAT for the simple reason that the Korat trainees had secured a better understanding of the fundamentals. It was, of course, much easier to provide this at the Korat training center than at the rather remote construction sites where the STAT training was conducted.

In view of the expansion program for public work operations (going into new changwads and providing equipment for village projects) it is apparent that a long-range study needs to be made of the probable personnel requirements and a determination of best ways and means for providing them when needed.

Assignment of Permanent Field Positions.

Another problem was experienced in field operations which should have been anticipated and eliminated before the training programs were completed and men assigned to the changwads. Governors and other were quite critical of the fact that assignment of senior positions among "engineers," equipment operators, mechanics, etc., was made by the Chief of the Rural Roads and Village Projects Division in Korat. The changwad officials felt that in view of the fact that these were field operation positions, determination of the senior positions should have been deferred until after the recently trained young men had been able to prove who was most qualified for said senior positions. Also, it was observed that had such decision been deferred and left up to the ARD changwad organization, there would have been more control over the trainees during their first real experience in the field.

Thus, we strongly recommend, beginning immediately, the policy be that the trainees not be assigned permanent positions on the changwad staff at the conclusion of their training programs in Korat, nor that they be assigned senior positions, as was done this last year. Instead, the training institutions responsible for the training together with the Regional Engineering Center should submit to the changwads their recommendations regarding their assignments which information the Governor and his staff can use to make temporary work assignments for the first year of field construction, and which they can further use in the assigning of permanent positions at such time as is mutually agreed upon by CCOP and the Governors.

Assignment of Personnel to Own Localities.

Several recommendations have been made to employ mechanics and equipment operators and truck drivers who reside in the locale in which they will be assigned. The feeling was expressed that this would result in more of a "community spirit", plus the fact that village people would look upon such a project as being one in which, in fact, they were participating. We suggest that ARD officials give consideration to implementing this recommendation.

6. Supervision of the Changwad Public Works Facility.

Many reasons may be cited, and a few illustrations or examples will be given to establish the fact that supervision is a vital and constantly needed element of the ARD changwad level public works facility. Experience with the performance of this facility leaves no question in anyone's mind that improved supervision is imperative.

Basic Requirement for Establishing Supervision.

What needs to be emphasized is the fact that before any effective supervision can be assured, the management of the program must develop job descriptions for all positions involved and then establish procedures, guidelines and rules for operation which clearly determine and establish appropriate disciplinary and penalty actions that will be taken if and when anyone fails to follow the agreed upon and prescribed procedures, guidelines and rules. This job has not been done, but the time must be found to do it.

Supervision, or the lack of it, has been mentioned as one of the most serious problems plaguing the launching of the rural road construction units. Part of the problem, we feel, was that there was an inadequate determination of the complexity of the various jobs that the trainees would be filling when they were assigned to the ARD changwads. As indicated, the training programs were extremely limited in time and more importantly, did not provide an opportunity for the development of supervision or leadership.

At one point, it was suggested by ARD officials that a solution to the problem of supervision would be to raise the salary, say of the chief engineer, and provide benefits and provisions in order to give him "prestige and recognition" with his staff. We fail to find any support for this solution. Whereas an increased salary and provision of various benefits no doubt would be appreciated by the recipient, there is no reason to think that this would produce respect or recognition. Respect and confidence will only come as a result of demonstrated professional ability and experience. Maturity and age, of course, is another important factor. However, these qualities (proven ability, experience and maturity) require time to develop.

The Position of the Chief Engineer.

The position of Chief Engineer is most acute because this position is the most vital one in the changwad-level public works unit. Without commenting on any of the specific trainees who are assigned to the position of chief engineer, it is clear that the qualifications for such a position are far higher than any of these young men could possibly hope to reach in the near future. The basic fault was not with the trainees or necessarily with the training they received. They apparently did quite well in their training programs (we are told) and again, undoubtedly they took on their assignment as chief engineers with great expectation. These young men represent potentially important individuals for the rural development program. Unfortunately they were asked to do a job for which they were not adequately trained or experienced. Given proper supervision and field guidance, there is no doubt but that many of these young men in time would develop into good civil engineers capable of handling such important positions.

Providing Engineering Construction Leadership and Supervision.

It is for this reason that we have suggested that a senior engineering construction advisor be assigned to each ARD changwad as a counterpart to the young man serving as Chief Engineer. We believe that such a relationship could prove to be very beneficial for the young men in question and it, of course, would provide the engineering construction expertise that is vitally needed on a continuing basis in the changwad. (The above remarks apply equally to the position of Construction Engineer.)

Even as there needs to be supervision or backstopping for the changwad Chief Engineer, so there needs to be supervision or backstopping for all of the other positions. We believe that when the Regional Engineering Center, Korat, is fully staffed they can in fact provide the necessary engineering backstopping for the design "engineers" on the changwad-level public works team. Obviously, the senior construction advisor would be an additional backstop to the design engineers. However, he should be primarily a construction man rather than a design man.

Utilization of the Seabees.

We believe that the two Seabees assigned to each ARD Changwad can be very effective as counterparts to the Chief Construction Equipment Operator and the Chief Mechanic to provide supervision to the equipment operators and mechanics.

During a good portion of this last year the two Seabee Advisors in each changwad were not effectively utilized. They were brought to Thailand as advisors, but neither they, the Thais, nor the Americans from USOM seemed to have a clear understanding of exactly what role the Seabees were to play. They were assigned to their jobs without any clearly defined job descriptions. They still do not have written job descriptions. Eventually they were told that they were not to direct

the activities of the Thai equipment operators and mechanics, but only to "advise". In most cases this resulted in a situation where the Seabees, in a sense, stood back on the sidelines waiting for someone to come and ask them for advice. The result, of course, was that rarely did anyone come to them for "advice". Thus, they felt that there was little or nothing for them to do and this, at times, gave the impression that they were not doing a proper job. By the same token, some Seabees felt, on a number of occasions, that sound advice which they offered was ignored, with the result that they became reluctant to go out of their way to offer more.

The problems encountered by the Seabees were further complicated by the inability of the Seabees and the Thais to communicate with each other except through an interpreter whose ability to translate may well be open to serious question.

In a few cases where we had an opportunity to explore this problem, we found that when the Governor or Palad Changwad ARD took the initiative to use the Seabee officers in an effective manner and apparently re-defined the term advisor to be supervisor, a helpful and productive relationship developed.

It must be remembered that the Seabees and the Thais have worked together for only a very short time, and we believe that some of the difficulties will iron themselves out once each side gains the respect and confidence of the other.

To bring this about more quickly a complete description of the Seabees' duties should be prepared and circulated to all concerned - Americans and Thais. Consideration should be given to the possibility of language training for the Seabees before they come to Thailand. We also recommend that USOM give consideration to bringing the Seabees to Thailand on the same basis as USOM direct hire personnel; that is, a two year tour of duty at post with family. We found from our discussion that this would be very appealing to some Seabees, particularly senior non-commissioned officers. And it is the senior officers who, in our opinion, do the best job. First, they are older and more mature, and as a result immediately command more respect from the Thais than do younger men. Further, they have more experience in supervising and dealing with people and, probably, a greater knowledge of their work.

Development of Supervisory Personnel from the Public Works Units.

Further training should be provided for the changwad engineering and construction staff. This may include some actual class instruction work within the weekly production schedule (this was done by several of the Seabees). In any event the first year, at least, of service with the field construction unit should be looked upon as an extension of training and preparation for the job. Some of the young men trained and assigned to field jobs will progress more rapidly than others. If given some practical assistance and attention in developing supervisory skills, they

should be available for supervisory assignments in the not too distant future. In either case, this involves providing qualified personnel who will be able to conduct such field in-service courses and/or provide necessary in-service training in supervision and leadership skills.

Examples of the Need for Supervision.

We believe that it is quite apparent to all involved in the ARD program that supervision of the field operation is essential. However, one field observation will be cited to indicate the extent of supervision that is needed. Although we do not represent this first example to be typical of all construction operations, there are many elements of it which were found to occur at the other ARD construction sites.

After observing one construction site where an embankment was being constructed, it was obvious that there was no plan for a properly balanced deployment of the various pieces of construction equipment. The fill was being distributed unevenly and not being properly graded. Thus, swells and bumpy areas were observed throughout the entire stretch of the operation. There was not nearly enough water or compaction being applied. There were no toe stakes. And, upon checking the construction plans and making a simple measurement, it was obvious that the construction was starting from a base that was not nearly wide enough (the result, of course, would have been that when the embankment was brought up to grade, the width of the road bed would have been within the neighborhood of two meters).

We asked why the embankment was being started at this width, and were told that a few days before, when a senior visiting group from Bangkok had reviewed the construction along another section of the road, they had severely criticized the Chief Engineer for building that portion of the road too wide. Therefore, to avoid such criticism again, he was going to build the road narrower here. This indicated a serious lack of understanding of what the visitors had criticized, as well as of the basic engineering concepts involved.

It became apparent that part of the reason for using every piece of available equipment on the one particular section of embankment was the great pressure from the Governor to build the road as quickly as possible. One obvious corrective action was to reduce the amount of fill that was being placed in order that it might be properly graded and that a balanced water and compaction treatment might be achieved. We learned that only a few days earlier the USOM Engineering Advisor had directed the Chief Engineer to discontinue using three dump trucks to place fill. At first the Chief Engineer explained that the reason he did not follow this directive was that he felt his primary obligation was to follow the Governor's directive to build the road as quickly as possible. Later it became apparent that this was not the real reason. It developed that the real reason for this action was he had been directed to keep the dump trucks in operation on the project. The dump trucks had been made available as a result of a contract providing payment of a rather large fee for each haul of fill carried by each dump truck regardless of the distance

of the haul. Consequently, the more trips the dump trucks made, the larger the amount of money earned by the contractor. It was further observed over a period of time that these dump trucks were used for very short hauls, some even in the neighborhood of 50 to 60 feet. Such a procedure, of course, is extremely inefficient and costly compared to the accepted construction practice of using scrapers for short hauls.

After observing for some time the above mentioned construction operation, we suggested that the Chief Engineer, the Construction Engineer, and the Seabee Construction Equipment Advisor consider an experiment in programming construction equipment for more effective use on this specific job. They agreed eagerly and actively entered into a discussion of what would constitute an improved operation. The Chief Engineer and the Construction Engineer immediately contacted their key men and gave them instructions and then returned to join the Evaluation Team in other discussions and inspection of other aspects of the field operation.

Some four hours later we all returned to the original construction site and were amazed at the transformation. The whole operation had been revolutionized into a well-balanced flow of all aspects of the operation. A survey had been completed and toe stakes properly located; the swells and the fill had been leveled out and graded to proper width; the dump trucks had been sidelined back at the construction camp; scrapers, graders, water trucks and compaction equipment were all working in a smooth, well-balanced operation (which looked almost professional). Needless to say, the reorganized operation was building the embankment faster, as well as properly. It was obvious that the Thai Chief Engineer and the Construction Engineer were extremely pleased in what had happened. We cite this as a convincing argument that the young men who have been trained and assigned to the ARD changwads can do a first-rate job if provided good professional advice when it is needed and, of course, in a way that inspires them to feel they are a vital part of the operation.

When we re-visited the same changwad about a week later, we learned that the Palad Changwad had ordered the Chief Engineer to use the dump trucks continually, against the better judgment of the Chief Engineer.

We draw the following conclusions from this case:

- (1) The trainees who have been placed in the ARD road construction units do need qualified professional supervision to enable them to develop experience and confidence to operate individually and collectively in the field.
- (2) This supervision is needed on a full-time basis.
- (3) There must be clear assignments of responsibility for construction operations.

Another example of the need for supervision involves the trainee surveyors. There have been several instances where they have taken off on

their own to lay out a straight line route for the road from point A to point B, and the bulldozers have followed right after them crashing out the service track without anyone having first discussed with the villagers in the area that will be affected, the Government's plan to build the road, and, since it would run through their property, to determine whether they would have any strong preferences as to where the road should go. In some of these cases reported to us by changwad officials, the Governors had felt that the road should follow the already established road route where the Nai Amphur had already talked to the villagers and settled the right-of-way problems.

Probably the young men were acting on orders given to them or maybe they just went ahead on their own. However, in either case it seems clear that supervision was lacking. It is elementary that someone should be responsible for seeing that the necessary clearances have been secured before construction begins.

Several other instances were observed which clearly indicate the need for supervision:

Various pieces of construction equipment have been used for personal and non-official business.

There have been numerous instances of equipment being driven at excessive speeds, operated or maintained in improper ways, and used or operated contrary to instructions. The results vary from little damage to serious damage.

As indicated elsewhere, operating procedures, safety measures and disciplinary procedures are needed. Some workers are lazy or indifferent with regard to their work assignments; some seem to have the attitude, "you can't fire me." Apparently the Governor can fire his employees on due cause. However, it was recognized that dismissal of personnel was an extremely sensitive matter, which could spark increasingly serious personnel problems. It would appear that emphasis should be placed on rewarding outstanding work and supervisory qualities, while keeping a proper balance with respect to the handling of disciplinary problems and "misunderstandings."

In conclusion, we observed that some confusion exists as to how supervision can be secured. The following two statements indicate that there are those who feel that an organization chart is adequate to define job responsibilities which if followed, would produce the desired supervision:

1. "It is also possible that some supervisory field personnel do not fully understand their responsibilities and their authority to implement them. We are requesting the Regional Center to prepare a modification of the organization chart for the Governors' construction staff showing this so that all concerned may be aware of their duties."

2. "A complete lack of supervision and discipline exist in the job, primarily due to a complete disregard of the organization chart as set up."

We respectfully submit that helpful as organization charts may be, they are inadequate by themselves to produce the supervision that is needed for this program, especially under the present conditions of staffing.

It is our strong recommendation that the management of the ARD program (at this point, specifically those responsible for the Changwad ARD Rural Road Construction Units) carefully and completely develop job descriptions for all positions involved, including supervisors and senior advisors, and then establish procedures, guidelines and rules for operation together with appropriate disciplinary and penalty actions that will be taken if and when anyone fails to follow the agreed upon and prescribed procedures, guidelines and rules. Whatever actions are taken should be uniform in all of the ARD changwads.

C. Organizational Units.

1. General Organizational Structure.

The organizations prescribed in the project agreements to carry out the ARD programs have all been established and, with minor exceptions, are staffed with the specified number of administrators and technicians. Although the changwad project agreements have been signed by the Ministry of Interior (Governors of the changwads), implementation of the objectives of the project require the cooperation of several other Ministries of the Thai Government. For this reason and others, supplementary organizations have been established to assist in accomplishing this cooperation. A "Committee for Coordination and Operational Planning" (CCOP) was established by authority of the Thai Cabinet to coordinate the contributions of these other agencies involved in rural development activities. This committee is primarily concerned with planning and policy. Membership of the committee and its effectiveness are commented upon in the Introduction of this report.

A working committee has been established under the CCOP to assist in carrying out its policies and the plans and procedures prescribed by the project agreements. The membership and functions of this committee are also commented upon in the Introduction.

A Regional Engineering Center has been established in Korat in Northeast Thailand to provide engineering services, training and major repair services to the changwad construction organization. Observations and recommendations on the performance of the organization are contained in Section B of this report on Organizational Units.

The Changwad Governors are the project directors. A Deputy Governor ARD has been assigned in each changwad to be responsible for all ARD

activities. Each changwad has established a public works organization under the supervision of the Deputy Governor ARD to plan and execute construction projects. The changwad public works organization consists of graduates from Thai Technical Institutes (vocational schools) who have been given the titles of "engineers" of various kinds, draftsmen, surveyors, equipment operators and mechanics. All of these vocational school graduates have been given from four to six months additional training by the ARD training program in Korat. Comments on this organization are given in Section V, B, 2.

USOM/Thailand was reorganized to establish an Office of Rural Affairs with responsibility for the ARD program and related rural development activities.

The total organizational structure in our opinion provides an adequate framework to implement the ARD project. During the first year of tooling up, all organizations have been concentrating their efforts on securing equipment, training, and gearing up to launch the major projects of road construction. To achieve the full project objective they now must focus on the problem of enlarging the scope of their planning to include other rural development projects. Cooperation of several Thai Government Ministries will be necessary in this effort. Further comments and suggestions on enlarging the scope of activities are contained throughout this report.

2. The Changwad Organization for Rural Development.

General.

The establishment of the Changwad ARD public works units, the assignment of Deputy Governors for ARD, and the very active part they have played this year under the able direction of the Governors has been an outstanding and encouraging achievement, and all of those involved in the program are to be congratulated for their accomplishments.

This is not to say that there have been no problems or difficulties. There have been many, and most of these have been discussed in various sections of this report. The establishment of the changwad level public works unit with its engineering office, maintenance and warehouse facility and the operation of the construction unit (also establishment of a construction camp), has consumed most of the time and attention of the Governors, Palad Changwads ARD, and the USOM advisors. Thus, there was little real effort made to mount the coordinated overall rural development program in the changwads which is the major work assignment under the ARD project agreement. However, most of the factors that were responsible for this have been or will soon be resolved. The bulk of the equipment and commodities for the public works units has arrived, and it is anticipated that each changwad will have its own Engineering Advisor by the time the next construction season arrives, and that also the Regional Engineering Center will be fully staffed and able to provide the necessary backstopping for engineering design review and approvals, soil sample testing and spare parts and major overhaul services.

Planning for the Overall Coordinated Rural Development Program.

Thus, it is felt that the changwads must begin now in earnest to plan for promoting and supporting the coordinated, overall rural development program envisioned by the Prime Minister and described in the project agreement.

We have commented elsewhere on the need for a changwad Master Plan for coordinating this overall rural development program, for the need of Implementation Plans (drawn up in detail) for the several rural development projects (especially the rural road construction unit), and for the need of job descriptions and adequate supervisory personnel and procedures. In all of these items which yet need to be developed and/or established, the Governor and his staff will need to be fully involved. This suggests that at an early date a determination must be made as to whether the Governor has sufficient manpower of the types and quantity that he will need to perform the planning and development work that will be required. It is true that a great deal depends on the CCOP and the various RTG Ministries and Departments and the Regional Engineering Center in promoting the overall coordinated rural development program in the several changwads. This in turn indicates the great need that there is for careful coordinated planning and assigning of roles and responsibilities.

The following are some general observations and a few recommendations regarding staffing, facilities and finances in the changwad in support of the ARD program. The topic of equipment and related items is dealt with in section V, C, below.

Deputy Governor, ARD.

A Thai position of Palad Changwad ARD (Deputy Governor, ARD) has been unofficially established in each of the six changwads and all positions have been filled. The Palad Changwad ARD is directly responsible to the Governor for the ARD program in the changwad. Approval of the Civil Service Commission and the Cabinet is necessary to establish this position formally, give it legal status, and thereby provide the incumbent with the authority he needs in keeping with traditional Thai administrative custom to perform his duties effectively. Until this position has been so "legalized" the incumbents and others in the Thai administrative hierarchy feel that the duties of the position cannot be effectively carried out by the Deputy Governors, ARD. Also certain desirable candidates may be reluctant to accept the position, because of its unofficial status and because the families of the temporary incumbents cannot join them. ARD officials are aware of the problem and are attempting to solve it, recognizing that the necessary approval for a position of this level is customarily slow.

We observed that in some changwads, depending upon the Governor's view of the problem, and the relationship between the Governor and his Deputy for ARD, the Deputy Governor ARD was operating effectively.

USOM Advisors - Roles and Responsibilities.

At about every juncture of the ARD program, we have found that roles and responsibilities are not defined, nor were there job descriptions available as of last month when we conducted our field observations.

We found that there was general understanding as to what the Engineering Advisors were supposed to do and in general their work was appreciated because it was clear that they were making contributions to the construction program. In every changwad the Governors commented that the arrangement whereby one Engineering Advisor rotated between two and sometimes three changwads was completely inadequate. The only real solution seemed to be to have a senior construction engineer advisor available to each changwad full time.

We found that generally there was confusion as to the role and responsibilities of the USOM Area Rural Development Advisor. This is understandable in view of the lack of clarity that has existed as to the real meaning of ARD. As indicated above, in the minds of too many people, ARD has been limited to the road construction element of the overall rural development program. With the inordinate amount of attention being given to the establishment of the changwad rural roads construction units and the pressure to make a good showing in the matter of construction of roads, (in spite of the late arrival of the equipment, delays, etc.) it is not surprising that the work of developing village development projects was given a secondary priority. Thus, the work and potential contribution of the Area Rural Development Advisor was not effectively used.

Again, if there had been mature, competent engineering construction leadership available all the time to the Governor and the Palad Changwad ARD, this would have taken the pressure off of them to fill that engineering construction leadership vacuum, and would have released the Governor, Palad Changwad ARD, and others to concentrate on the overall rural development program in the changwad. Had this happened, we feel sure that the Area Rural Development Advisor would have been better utilized.

Had there been available at each changwad the required engineering construction leadership, the construction operations could have been programmed so as to (1) accomplish more construction as well as (2) be able to program the construction equipment in such a manner as to do some village development projects along the route or in the immediate vicinity of the main rural road that was being constructed.

What is needed is an experienced mature engineering construction advisor. The emphasis is on experience in planning and directing operations of a public works construction spread rather than on engineering design. Engineering design is the role of the Regional Engineering Center.

We found some misunderstanding of one phase of work undertaken by one of the Area Rural Development Advisors, namely, his sampling of villager attitudes about the ARD project, personnel, etc. It would seem that this

was an illustration of the rule of human behavior: "It is not so much what you do, but the way you do it, that really counts." Our observation on this point, when the criticism was raised by a Governor, was that the matter of sampling villager attitude is certainly very important. However, since this involves, of necessity, the determination of villager attitudes toward government officials, it would seem desirable to have the villager attitude sampling studies involve personnel on the Thai side whom the officials could feel were objective and unbiased in their views. Further, we pointed out that as part of the evaluation program, a series of field benchmark surveys will be made including a carefully designed attitudinal study, which we feel will be very valuable in determining, in a scientific and professional manner, villager attitude toward many important issues related to the ARD project. We believe that until such professional studies are undertaken, efforts to determine villager attitude toward the program should be limited to observations and the recording of voluntary opinions.

There has been some confusion and misunderstanding with regard to the roles of and relationships between the position of the Area Rural Development Advisors and the Area (now Changwad) Engineering Advisors. This must be straightened out immediately. We believe that this can and must be done in terms of the clarification of:

1. The basic objective of ARD, and
2. The true nature of ARD, as the new concept of programming all RTG rural development efforts in a coordinated, concentrated manner in critical areas selected by the RTG. We believe that it is in respect to this clarification of what ARD is that the position of Area Rural Development Advisor takes on its true significance.

Facilities.

In all six changwads we found that the physical construction of the maintenance shops had been completed by, at the latest, the end of December 1964. None of the shops, however, could be considered truly operational in that they all lacked electricity, running water (although three had dug outside surface wells), work benches, a completed tool room and two did not have a grease rack. Changwad officials assured us that these shortcomings would be corrected in the "relatively near future". Lack of these facilities did not, however, appear to have been a major hindrance to the progress of the project. In five of the changwads all equipment received was new and/or used only a short time, and routine operating maintenance and any repairs necessary have been performed at the construction sites. Even Ubol, which received a good portion of older excess equipment, (some of which has required quite a bit of shop repair) has not been greatly handicapped by the lack of a fully operational maintenance shop. Nevertheless we believe that these shops should be made fully operational as soon as possible so as to be ready for any eventuality. Also, we understand that when construction is halted during the rainy season, it is intended to bring all equipment to the shops for

a thorough check prior to the start of the next construction season. At that time it would certainly be preferable, though probably not essential, to have the shops fully operational.

Financing: The ARD Changwads and the Regional Center - Korat.

The ARD program is one which involves a large allocation of both Thai Government and U. S. resources. In the beginning, because of the purchase of many pieces of construction equipment, the cost of this program to the U. S. Government greatly exceeds that of the Thai Government. However, in subsequent years the U. S. involvement drops sharply, whereas the cost to the Thai Government increases to a very high level, drops slightly, and finally levels off at a considerably higher cost than that of the U. S. Government. The attached chart (see Attachment D) excludes any provision for the replacement of equipment and relates to only the initial six changwads in the ARD program. If, as is presently contemplated, the ARD program is expanded to include more changwads there will be proportionately increased costs, but the relationship between U. S. and Thai Government contributions should remain approximately the same. Furthermore, the Thai Government must give consideration to a situation, perhaps five years from now, when it may be necessary to purchase replacements for worn out equipment. This would cause an additional cost to the Thai Government of approximately that amount originally contributed by USOM.

Therefore, we believe that for wise long range rural development planning it is desirable to have a general idea of the projected investments that will be required to sustain the ARD construction program over the coming years.

After approval by the Bureau of the Budget, RTG regional center funds are released by the Ministry of Finance to the Department of Municipal and Public Works who, in turn, upon application, allocate the funds to the Regional Center. Changwad funds are released by the Ministry of Finance directly to the individual changwad governors. Through April 30 of RTG fiscal year 1965 (the RTG fiscal year runs from October 1 through September 30), the regional center has been allotted a total of $\text{฿ } 5,722,000$. (No additional funds are expected to be requested during the remainder of fiscal year 1965. Not included in the $\text{฿ } 5,722,000$ is an additional $\text{฿ } 3,000,000$ which, on May 6, 1965, the Deputy Prime Minister requested the Bureau of the Budget to make available for the purchase of spare parts.) Of this amount $\text{฿ } 3,196,000$ has been expended for such things as salaries, materials, construction of the engineering office and the overhaul shop, temporary wages, etc. No financial problems were evident at the Regional Center. At the time of our visits to the changwads, we found that all had been allotted in excess of $\text{฿ } 1,000,000$ and had expended something less than the amount received for similar items. As far as we were able to determine, no difficulties have been encountered in securing releases and allocations of funds.

Both the regional center and the changwads are maintaining separate sets of accounting records for all funds received. We understand that

the National Audit Council is responsible for the audit of these funds, and it is anticipated that they will perform their first audit sometime after the close of fiscal year 1965. Upon request, the National Audit Council will probably agree to furnish USOM with copies of their audit reports.

The RTG has recently approved an additional ฿ 100,000 for each of thirty-seven sensitive amphurs (districts) in the ARD changwads for small village projects. We understand that these projects will be developed on the amphur and local level. In addition, the RTG has made a provision of 43 million baht to be distributed to various ministries for accelerated development in sensitive areas. No serious financial problems were apparent in the changwads.

The 1964 regional center project agreement provides ฿ 335,000 of project counterpart funds for training allowance for STAT trainees and operational supplies and equipment. As of May 12, 1965, none of these funds have been expended, and, since provision for the training of STAT trainees is funded under other project agreements, it appears unlikely that these counterpart funds will be spent. Under the circumstances, we recommend that ARD officials review this budget item and if not needed so inform the USOM Office of Finance so that the funds may be deobligated and made available for further programming.

3. The Regional Organization for Rural Development.

General.

The major role of the Regional Center, Korat, is to provide engineering services and equipment maintenance backstopping to the ARD changwads. With the establishment of the Office of the Regional ARD Director, Nai Jin Rakgarndee, at Korat in the near future, the center will probably perform additional functions in promoting the overall coordinated rural development program as identified in the Project Agreements.

With the monumental tasks of establishing the Regional Engineering Center and the Regional Repair Shop it is not surprising that the changwads have received inadequate support in equipment, spare parts, engineering design and advice, soils testing, and training. Korat's role is so crucial to the entire ARD road construction operation, that these inadequacies are intolerable.

Korat is understaffed, and this is particularly serious considering all of the additional duties assigned to it during the first year of operation. This can and must be changed. Americans are teaching engineering courses at the Korat Technical Institute in English using interpreters who are not technically qualified to interpret such courses. This can and should be changed. American instructors of operators and mechanics courses state that equipment for training is woefully inadequate from the point of view of quality and quantity, and this is confirmed by the Director of the Korat Institute. It is clear that some of the problems which the operators and mechanics are having in the changwads

were caused at least partly by this equipment shortage. This can and must be changed. The Korat Center should provide engineering handbooks and other teaching aides in Thai for the trainees and the ARD changwad public works units.

Relationship to Training Programs.

There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the responsibilities and authority of the Korat Center and the Korat Technical Institute, and the individuals within both. Greater communication and mutual support between the Center and the Institute should be encouraged. As suggested under the section of this report on Training, we recommend that the functions of training personnel for the ARD program be separated out from the production functions of the Regional Center.

Need for Job Descriptions.

It is our opinion that the management of the Regional Center, Korat, was responsible for drafting clear and complete job descriptions on all technical positions related to the Korat and changwad ARD engineering and public works program, and that these job descriptions should have been developed well in advance of the appointment of individuals to said positions. Repeatedly during the spring of this year the Chief of the Rural Roads and Village Projects Development Division told us that he was working on the job descriptions and "would have them ready in a few days." Drafts of job descriptions on some of the more senior positions were made available in April, and were discussed at subsequent CCOP meetings. From those discussions it was obvious that there were several differences of opinion between Thai and USOM ARD officials, even at this late date. It is indeed regrettable that the various roles and responsibilities, together with appropriate and necessary authority, were not discussed and developed jointly last summer before the program really got started and operations began without this guidance.

Designation of a Director for the Center.

For some time there has been confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of the Senior Thai Engineer at the Regional Center and the Chief of the USOM Rural Roads and Village Project Development Division. Some were of the opinion that they were Co-Directors of the Regional Engineering Center. However, as recently as April 9, 1965, we were told by the USOM advisor that the Senior Thai Engineer was the Chief Engineer (but not director) of the Regional Engineering Center. Memorandum No. S.R. 0503/306, submitted January 25, 1965, by the Secretariat of the Cabinet, states: ". . . the Cabinet's approval to appoint Nai Pote Kanthamala, Director of Regional Engineering Center, Nakornrajsima, as member of Accelerated Rural Development Operation and Coordination Committee (Jin Committee)" Needless to say, it is important that the roles and responsibilities of these two key positions be clearly defined and clearly communicated to them and those involved with the center as soon as possible. We feel that failure to

do this is directly responsible for a great deal of confusion relating to the work of the Regional Center and its relations with the six ARD changwad organizations and operations. Likewise, when Governor Jin, Regional ARD Director, and his staff move to Korat, it will be even more important to clarify roles and responsibilities and to advise all ARD officials. The designation of a Director for the Center should not be postponed any longer. The Director's office must be located at the Center.

Functions of the ARD Regional Center.

It was the view of the USOM Division Chief in Korat that the Regional Engineering Center consisted of the following two divisions to provide the indicated functions:

1. Engineering Division.
 - a. Soil Lab services
 - b. Preparation of standards for construction
 - c. Preparation of engineering handbook
 - d. Printing of construction prints
 - e. Provide engineering consultant services to ARD changwads
 - f. Training functions

2. Maintenance and Overhaul Division.
 - a. Maintenance and overhaul services
 - b. Spare parts backup.

Much of the difficulty that was experienced in the matter of soil sampling services was due to the fact that the shipment of soil lab equipment was tied up for such a long time in the U. S. shipping strike. In the face of this difficulty, the Regional Engineering Center approached several operational units who had soil lab facilities in an attempt to process the many, many soil samples that were being sent in from the ARD changwads. Obviously using this make-shift arrangement service was slow. This is understandable. The one thing that apparently made the situation so annoying to most of the ARD changwads was that the administrative machinery at the Regional Center was not able to keep up with the requests for service and to adequately respond to communications from the changwads (by letter, telegram, telephone and/or side band radio).

As might be expected the two functions, preparation of Standards for Construction and preparation of Engineering Handbook, suffered by the heavy demand for more pressing matters. Mr. Moratz could not give us a very clear picture on the progress of work on the Standards of Construction. He stated that two of the twenty sections that have been planned for the Engineering Handbook were now available.

As indicated elsewhere in the report, there was an inordinate demand on the senior engineers at the Regional Center to rush up to the various

ARD changwads to inspect and usually make recommendations for corrective action on the ARD road construction projects. This contributed to the delays experienced by many changwads in getting their engineering designs reviewed and approved and other regular functions of the Korat Center.

With the exception of three Thai design engineers and one Thai geologist for the Korat Regional Office, we found that all positions, both Thai and American, required by the project agreements have been filled. However, one USOM advisory engineering position was not filled until mid-March 1965. As a substitute for the geologist an additional hydrologist has been employed.

Lack of the design engineers at Korat has directly contributed to delay in the review and approval of changwad engineering plans and placed a heavy workload on the other engineering staff. No candidates are in sight to fill these three design positions. These vacant positions should be filled as quickly as possible.

In the section on Training in this report, we have recommended that the functions of production for ARD and the training of personnel for the production functions of ARD be separated, and that where possible the training functions be undertaken by some established training institution.

We were advised that someone will be assigned full time at the Regional Engineering Center to represent the USOM Equipment Division in a manner similar to that where the Chief of the Rural Roads and Village Projects Development Division represents the USOM Rural Roads and Village Projects Development Division. Had a representative of the Equipment Division been assigned to the Center earlier to work full time on processing changwad requests for backup on spare parts, no doubt the Center could have provided much more effective service to the changwads. Though the Regional Center did not have an adequate supply of spare parts on hand, the plan has been for the Regional Center to collect all changwad requests for spare parts and coordinate their procurement from whatever sources are best at the time. Since no one was assigned this job, it would have been wise for the Regional Center to inform the changwads that the Regional Overhaul and Warehouse was not yet set up and operating and that Korat would not be able to process their requests for spare parts. Of course, the Regional Center was able to process some of the requests, but with a very limited staff it was not possible to keep up with the requests for service or to adequately respond to communications. The changwads therefore began devising their own methods of securing spare parts, which has been time-consuming and somewhat ineffective.

Some officials have felt that the Regional Engineering Center has imposed upon the Area Engineering Advisors too restricted an area of work responsibility. This we could not determine. However, it would seem quite likely that some might reach that conclusion in view of the fact that no job descriptions were developed and the Engineering Advisors were so frequently being directed by the Chief of the Rural Roads and Village Projects Development Division to drop what they were doing and rush over to another changwad to attend to some problem there.

Administration.

It would be beneficial if multiple information copies were made and distributed to all involved or interested in the particular topic discussed in the communication.

It was observed that there was no cross check on incoming mail. We learned that all incoming communications written in Thai are routed to the Senior Thai Engineer, unless clearly addressed to someone else, and that all incoming communications written in English are routed to the USOM Division Chief unless clearly addressed to someone else. There was no system for insuring that either official saw everything which was pertinent to him. Furthermore, there was no system for controlling incoming communications written in English (i.e., indicate routing, action, and disposition of business requiring action or distribution).

There is evidence of serious laxity in administrative functions. The Regional Center with its three major and distinct functions of (1) Engineering Services, (2) Equipment Overhaul and Spare Parts Logistics, and (3) Promotion and Inspection of the overall coordinated rural development program in all ARD changwads, will require a supporting administrative organization. There are administrative employees there now, but we recommend that a centralized administrative unit be established to serve the entire Center, under the supervision of an experienced official to be responsible for the usual administrative functions of personnel, procurement, accounting, payroll, communications and records, etc.

In our continuing evaluation of the ARD program, we will make further reviews of the administrative and managerial operations of the Regional Engineering Center at Korat.

Facilities.

Construction of the Regional Engineering Center was begun sometime in November 1964 and was completed in March 1965, including electricity and water. Total cost was approximately \$ 1,400,000 and the building appears to be adequate to house and provide sufficient work space for all personnel, including USOM advisors.

Construction on the overhaul shop which was supposed to be completed by January 1, 1965, did not begin until March 1965, because of a delay in drawing up plans. It is now estimated that the shop will not be fully operational until July 1, 1965. During the interim, training and repair of equipment is being conducted in temporarily constructed tent shelters.

At the present time, the Vinnel contract group is preparing an initial list of consumables that will be needed for the operation of the shop. This list will be ready by approximately June 1, and all needed items will be purchased from RTG funds. A plan is also being developed to insure a continuous supply of consumables and parts required for operation of the shop.

D. Equipment and Related Items.

1. General.

It has come to our attention that no professional forecasts have been made of the estimated cost to the RTG of operating the large fleet of ARD heavy construction equipment over a period of years. We believe ARD and particularly RTG officials should be fully aware of the total potential high cost of operating and maintaining the ARD equipment for the life of the project. A brief review of compiled information of U. S. experience on this subject shows that the average annual expense, as a percentage of acquisition cost, for such items as bulldozers, graders, scrapers and dump trucks will run 25 per cent for depreciation (i.e., these units may need to be replaced within four or five years) and 15 per cent for major repairs. In addition, there must be considered the cost of such items as fuel, minor repairs, operators and mechanics salaries, insurance, etc. When we consider the value of equipment presently in the country (approximately \$2.5 million) and are contemplating ordering another 3.5 million dollars worth, the annual cost of operation becomes a formidable figure. Also equipment will wear out and must be replaced, therefore, we believe now, at the beginning of the ARD program, consideration should be given to equipment replacement, which presumably will be financed by the RTG. An estimated projected cost analysis over a period of perhaps five years on the operation of all ARD construction equipment should be useful for planning and budgetary purposes.

2. Equipment for the Korat Regional Engineering Center Overhaul Shop.

We found that a considerable quantity of U. S. Government excess equipment, ordered under PIO/C 40282, has been received and delivered to the Regional Overhaul Shop. The Vinnel contract group has set up an adequate system of accounting for all shop equipment. Three DW 952 welders and two tractor trucks with spare wheel and tires were received in "poor" condition and it may be impossible to restore them to proper operating condition. We recommend that ARD officials investigate the condition of these pieces of equipment and, if deemed necessary, secure replacements and dispose of items which cannot be made serviceable. This recommendation should be extended to any other such equipment in the ARD program, wherever located.

Further, we found that the following items of equipment were received in Thailand on the dates indicated but have not yet been turned over to the Regional Shop; one polishing machine, 10-14-64; one buffer, 10-14-64; one hanger, 9-9-64; one lot shop maintenance and repair equipment, 12-2-64; two D-7 tractors, 1-3-65; one air compressor, DY-0191-6-65, 11-11-64; one fork lift truck, 1-12-65; two battery chargers, 11-28-64; and one 3/8 yard dragline bucket, (K36), 12-12-64. We recommend that these pieces of equipment be located and turned over to the Regional Shop immediately. At times it may be necessary to lend some of the Regional Shop equipment, on hand and to be received, to other organizations in Thailand. However,

we believe the equipment should first be turned over to the Regional Shop so that proper location records can be prepared. Also, this will give the Regional Shop the opportunity to determine the condition of the equipment and provide the receiving organization with record cards to be maintained on preventative maintenance.

3. Training Equipment - Korat.

Varying amounts of equipment have been made available to the Korat Regional Center for training equipment operators and mechanics. Much of this equipment has had to be borrowed from various sources since the equipment intended for Korat has not yet arrived. Rather wide difference of opinion exist within the Office of Rural Affairs as to whether or not sufficient equipment has been available for an adequate training program. Most of the training equipment has been U. S. Government excess with the usual attendant problem of "down-time". The short training period of about six months would seem to dictate the necessity for providing adequate training equipment during this entire period and to err on the side of providing too much rather than too little.

Since this question primarily affects the efficiency of the training program which, of course, will later reflect in construction operations, the matter can be resolved if the recommendation under the Training Section of this report is accepted to conduct a separate intensive review of the ARD training policy and procedures. It is pertinent to point out, however, that the USOM advisors participating in the training of equipment operators at Korat firmly state that sufficient training equipment has not been available.

4. Equipment for Changwads Nongkhai, Sakol Nakorn, Udorn, Nakorn Panom and Loey.

All heavy construction and related equipment for these changwads was purchased new, and, with the exception of five dump trucks and two 3/4 ton pick-up trucks for each changwad, has been received and, for the most part is being used. The reason for the delay in the delivery of the pick-up and dump trucks will be treated in another part of this report. Lack of these trucks, particularly the dump trucks, has handicapped road construction in each of the changwads. Sufficient hauling units have not been available to allow filling to proceed as rapidly as desired. In two changwads, dump trucks have been rented locally, but this has proven to be expensive, and, at best, only a stop-gap measure. We understand that the trucks in question will be delivered to the changwads sometime in May 1965, but this delivery date will allow only about one month of use before the rainy season begins, at which time work on the roads will be halted. We were informed that some, if not all, of the dump trucks can be used during the rainy season to maintain completed portions of the roads.

Equipment not being used is confined to that type which is not yet needed on the job, such as cement mixers and roto tillers.

ARD's Seabee advisors in each of the changwads expressed satisfaction with the equipment provided, with the unanimous exception of the lowboy trailers. The lowboy trailers are of the "drop center" type which leave a clearance of about only eight inches between the bottom of the trailer and the road, which is not suitable for conditions in Northeast Thailand. The Seabees have requested that we replace these trailers as soon as possible with what they referred to as a "drive on, drive off" lowboy. This type of lowboy has a road clearance of approximately three feet, and can be used on all roads in Thailand. We understand specifications for new trailers being ordered will correct this deficiency.

All Seabee equipment operators requested that we provide each changwad with one or possibly two additional sheep's foot rollers. The one roller which they have now is not sufficient to maintain pace with other equipment on compaction work. Several of the Seabees also suggested that, in the future, we give consideration to purchasing six-cylinder flat bed trucks rather than the eight-cylinder trucks now in use. According to the Seabees, the six-cylinder trucks are cheaper to purchase, more economical to operate, easier to maintain, but have sufficient power to do their required job. One of the Seabees suggested the use of diesel engines on trucks rather than gasoline as an economy measure. We were also informed that the two roto tillers provided each changwad are not necessary on a road construction job, and that, unless we expect to use them on other projects, we should not buy more in the future.

Our review of procurement documents disclosed that the authorization for the purchase of equipment for the five changwads, PIO/C 40181, was issued on April 20, 1964. Invitations to bid were dated April 27, 1964; bids were accepted through 12:00 noon of May 28, 1964, and contracts were signed with suppliers between mid-June and mid-July. All things considered, this schedule appears to be quite reasonable. (A contract for thirty dump trucks and ten 3/4 ton pick-up trucks was, for various reasons, subsequently cancelled and reissued to a second supplier in December 1964. It is expected that these trucks will reach the changwads sometime in May 1965).

Delivery of the equipment in Bangkok ranged from early October to mid-December, but delivery to the changwads was delayed two to three months, late December to mid-March. We believe that this time lag is too long; thirty days from arrival in Bangkok should be sufficient to secure delivery to the changwads. For the future, therefore, we recommend that the USOM Logistics Division, in cooperation with DTEC, monitor all incoming shipments to expedite delivery to the changwads.

Several of the Seabee advisors informed us that some of the moving parts on graders and scrapers were frozen at the time they were received in the changwads and required considerable work before they could be used. This situation apparently was due to improper lubrication at the time the machinery was packed for shipping. Proper monitoring by USOM and DTEC with the aid of a local manufacturer's representative could prevent this from happening again in the future.

5. Equipment - UBOL.

From an equipment standpoint, Changwad Ubol is unique from the other five changwads in the ARD program in that all equipment provided Ubol was transferred from the Community Development project and for the most part consisted of U. S. Government excess property. At the time of our review in late February, seven pieces of excess equipment of twenty-nine on hand were scheduled for repair. An eighth piece, a water trailer which was received in an unserviceable condition, was scheduled to be scrapped. ARD's Seabee advisors informed us that, since the time of their arrival in late December, almost every piece of excess equipment has had to undergo at least minor repairs to keep it in running condition. This difficulty was compounded by the fact that at the time of equipment transfer from Community Development to ARD no arrangements were made to also transfer the applicable spare parts. As a result, unnecessary time has been spent in attempting to locate parts in Ubol, Korat, and Bangkok, which, because of the age of the machinery, are not readily available. This situation has resulted in some delay in the construction of the Ban Amnat road.

Records were scanty and we could not with any certainty determine how much construction time was lost due to equipment failure.

6. Spare Parts - KORAT.

To provide an inventory of high mortality spare part items, the Deputy Prime Minister, General Prapas, on May 6, 1965, requested the Thai Bureau of the Budget to allocate \$ 3,000,000 to the Korat Regional Center. (We understand that the original request made to General Prapas was for \$ 12,000,000.) When purchased, these parts will be for use by the Regional Center, and also will be available to fill orders for parts received from the individual ARD changwads. The Vinnel contract group has been requested to prepare a list of spare parts which should be purchased, and also establish procedures for the changwads to follow when ordering needed parts. It is estimated that the list and the procedures will be ready by approximately June 1, 1965. As the Regional Center has only begun operations, spare part usage figures are not available and consequently the initial list at least will be taken from individual manufacturers' "prescribed load lists" for various pieces of equipment. As experience is gained, however, usage figures will be used to determine subsequent ordering requirements. Compilation of meaningful figures will most likely take at least one year and possibly longer.

Until such time as the initial order of parts, now being prepared, is received and subsequently in cases where needed parts are not carried in stock, the Regional Center will provide the changwads with "logistic support" in securing parts. If available in Bangkok, spare parts can be obtained and delivered to the changwads within approximately one week. If procurement is to be from the U. S., delivery to Bangkok can be expected to take a minimum of two months, exclusive of time for customs clearance and shipment to the changwad. Under the circumstances, we recommend that Bangkok suppliers be canvassed to determine what anticipated spare part items

are not available, and orders for stocks placed by dealers with a U. S. supplier(s) as soon as possible.

Establishment of this system should resolve the uncertainties, discussed below, now encountered by the ARD changwads in placing orders for spare parts. As soon as available the procedures for ordering spare parts should be sent to ARD changwads. Further, it seems advisable to notify the changwads immediately that all orders for spare parts are to be made through the Korat Regional Office, and that detailed instructions will be forthcoming in the near future.

7. Spare Parts - Korat and Changwads Nongkhai, Udorn, Nakorn Panom, Sakol Nakorn and Loey.

In Korat and five of the changwads we found that a considerable quantity of spare parts had been received, inventoried and placed on specially constructed shelves in a locked parts room. The spare parts control system used by the storekeepers is one devised by the Vinnel contract group and, while simple, appears to be completely adequate. In general, we found the method for controlling the receipt, physical safe-guarding and issuance of spare parts to be quite satisfactory.

Funds have been provided in each of the changwad budgets for the subsequent order of replacement spare parts or to purchase needed parts not included in the original order. However, no one seems to be clear as to how these orders will be placed, i.e., through the Ministry of Interior in Bangkok, the Korat Regional Office or by the Palad Changwad directly with the supplier or suppliers' representative(s) in either the U. S. or Bangkok. The general understanding seems to be that such orders will be placed through Korat, but at the moment Korat is not in a position to fill the orders. One Seabee advisor, with the permission of the Changwad Governor, was planning to come to Bangkok to discuss a method of ordering parts on a credit basis through two local manufacturers' representatives. Since all the equipment purchased for these changwads was new and used for only a very short time, lack of a source for purchasing replacement spare parts has caused very little delay in the construction of the changwad roads. However, we do believe that as time goes on the need for additional spare parts will become greater and it is necessary to now establish a system through which these parts can be ordered if undue down-time on equipment is to be avoided.

8. Spare Parts - UBOL.

When the various pieces of construction and related equipment were transferred on November 6, 1964, from the Community Development project to ARD, no arrangements were made to also transfer the applicable spare parts. As a result the Seabee advisors and members of the Governor's staff have had to buy parts locally, or by special trip to Bangkok. We visited the Community Development warehouse in Ubol and found many boxes of spare parts, opened and unopened, some of which we believe should have been transferred with the equipment to ARD. Further, Community Development

officials have refused to allow ARD personnel to inventory the parts even though the Seabee and Thai mechanics offered to do this to determine what they could use. The local Community Development office was apparently authorized to transfer only equipment to ARD, and until such time as an authorization is received from Bangkok to transfer spare parts they will remain in the custody of the Community Development Department.

A small quantity of spare parts had been received by ARD for two new DC six tractors and a new front end loader, but no parts had been received for two new dump trucks. It may well be that the parts for this equipment are in the Community Development warehouse. Also, ARD officials informed us that they have never been given a listing of the spare parts for new equipment which they are supposed to receive. Therefore, it is impossible for them to determine what parts they are missing for the front end loader and tractors.

The Office of Rural Affairs, in conjunction with the Community Development Department, should immediately have an inventory taken of spare parts on hand in the Community Development warehouse in Ubol and make arrangements to transfer those required for the ARD operation to the changwad maintenance center. The situation is such that considerable down-time on equipment may be incurred if this is not done in the very near future. Complete lists of equipment and spare parts to be received should always be furnished to consignees.

9. Tools - Korat and all Changwads.

Sets of master mechanic tools for the repair of heavy equipment have not yet been received. We recommend that the procurement of required tools be coordinated to coincide with the arrival in country of the construction equipment.

10. Preventive Maintenance - KORAT.

The Vinnel contract group at Korat is developing a systematic written procedure for preventive maintenance of equipment. This system will include, among other things, an individual history card for each piece of equipment which will show when and what type of maintenance should be done, repairs performed, parts used, labor expended, etc., and is expected to be completed by approximately June 1. We recommend that this procedure, when completed and approved, be prescribed for use on all ARD shop and construction equipment.

11. Preventive Maintenance - All Changwads.

At the time of our visits we found that none of the six changwads had established a systematic routine for preventive maintenance of equipment. Maintenance was being carried out, under the direction of the Seabee advisors, on a catch-as-catch-can basis and with practically no records maintained. At the changwad level, the need for a preventive maintenance system is recognized and apparently some thought has been

given to establishing one. In two changwads we found that Seabee advisors had actually drawn up cards for each piece of equipment showing when and what type of maintenance should be done, repairs performed, parts used, labor expended, etc.

During our visits to the changwads, no equipment was reported damaged, at least severely, because of lack of maintenance. However, reports of serious violations of equipment care and maintenance rules, as well as misuse of equipment, have been reported since by ARD officials. Under the circumstances, we recommend that ORA and RTG officials give whatever assistance is necessary to install and enforce compliance with the preventive maintenance procedures being developed by the Vinnel contract group at Korat.

12. Safety Program - Korat and All Changwads.

On our visits to the six changwads we saw no evidence of any type of safety program for equipment operators or mechanics. Some of the advisors have given thought to establishing some sort of program, but because of the language barrier, inability to secure training aids and posters and pre-occupation with operating problems, nothing has been done.

E. Conclusion.

In conclusion we would like to make two brief points. First, we emphasize that it is at least a year too early to evaluate effectively the program in achieving the project objectives. We have been able to evaluate the "tooling up" process.


Secondly, we wish to make it clear that the Evaluation Team has no monopoly on reviewing the various aspects of the project. Many officials, both Thai and American, are making reviews continually and corrective actions are being taken. Some of the more important recommendations of this report were contained in our preliminary statement of March 29, 1965, and are being incorporated in Fiscal Year 1965 Project Implementation documents.

Boonserm Weesakul
DR. BOONSERM WEESAKUL
RTG Coordinator


R. J. Lippolt
R.J. LIPPOLT
USOM Coordinator

MODEL OF THE EVALUATION PROGRAM:

GENERAL OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF WORK OF THE EVALUATION PROGRAM



(1)



Identify possible other goals and objectives (and policies for achieving same) which might be added to or exchanged for those currently in the Pro-Ag. based on:

- a. findings of "felt needs";
- b. success or failure to achieve certain organizational, procedural, operational, work objectives;
- c. changed conditions (from what existed, or was thought to exist at the time the Pro-Ag was written).

March 29, 1965

Mr. Chamnan Yuvapurna, Chairman CCOP

Mr. Tracy S. Park, Director, USOM

Subject: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Recommendations -
ARD Evaluation

It would perhaps be useful to bring to the attention of the RTG and the Office of Rural Affairs those weaknesses of the ARD program which so far have been disclosed by the joint evaluation team. The teams evaluating compliance with the Project Agreements (project implementation) have substantially completed their work in five changwads (Ubol, Udorn, Nongkai, Sakol Nakorn and Loei) and, to a lesser extent, the Regional Engineering Center at Korat.

The evaluation so far has not indicated failures in basic concept or implementation serious enough to result in a recommendation not to continue or even expand the ARD program. There are, however, certain weaknesses which should be pointed out at this time and which should be corrected in the current and in any expanded ARD program. The complete report of the ARD-MDU Evaluation by the joint RTG-USOM evaluation team will be forthcoming shortly. Without dwelling on the substantial positive achievements of the ARD program thus far, there are listed below some weaknesses which are apparent at this time and which should be corrected:

1. Inadequate Engineering Supervision

In all changwads there is inadequate engineering and construction management capability at the changwad level to insure sound construction practices on the number one project (roads). The Thai changwad engineers are inexperienced in construction and do not enjoy the full confidence of the Governors and Deputy Governors (ARD), who therefore tend to assume engineering responsibilities themselves. The changwad USOM engineering advisors are spread too thin to give adequate engineering supervision on the projects and on-the-job training to the Thai changwad engineers and their staffs. There seems to be, in some cases, a lack of communication between the two-man Scabee teams and the Thai changwad engineering staffs.

To correct these weaknesses, it is recommended that one U. S. engineering advisor be immediately recruited for each changwad to serve as counterpart to the Thai Chief Engineer. This will provide the necessary daily on-the-job training for the Thai changwad engineering staff. Several Governors have indicated that they would greatly appreciate the continued presence of an experienced engineering advisor.

2. Coordination

The aspect of coordinating and integrating the related projects of health, agriculture, water supply and education at the changwad level as contemplated in the Project Agreement is receiving little or no attention. This is (1) because of the strong emphasis on road building and (2) confusion in the concept of coordination. It is recommended that a statement be prepared setting forth concepts of coordination and suggested methods of accomplishment for discussion with the interested Thai and USOM officials with the objective of producing a mutually approved procedure for accomplishing the coordination envisioned in the Project Agreement.

3. Korat Engineering Center

The Korat Engineering Center is not giving the intended backstopping on engineering design, soil testing and spare parts procurement. Many complaints from the changwad engineering staffs attest to the inability of Korat to fulfill its intended functions. Requests for information about overdue equipment delivery, approval of plans submitted, requests for bridge designs, have often gone unanswered, causing changwad officials to become increasingly doubtful of Korat's competence and responsibility. The evaluation of the Korat Engineering Center has not been fully completed, but it appears that the Thai Design Engineering staff specified in the project agreement has not been completely provided and the soil-testing equipment for the soil-testing laboratory has not been received. The Thai Chief Engineer seems also to be under-utilized and is involved in administrative type duties which might be performed by an office manager. Pending completion of the evaluation of Korat, it is recommended that the Thai Design Engineering staff be fully staffed, job descriptions be drawn up on all ARD field positions, and administrative functions be improved so that the Center can provide more rapid and effective response to communications from the changwads, whether by letter, telegram or radio.

4. Training Programs

Training programs are inadequate as to extent and effectiveness. Effectiveness of the training programs would be increased greatly if more competent Thai instructors were made available.

5. Lack of Equipment for Village Projects

Because of the make-up of the construction equipment package provided each changwad and its intensive use on the number one road projects, little equipment is available for small impact projects at the village level. We believe that special consideration of the problem will be necessary to insure the availability of such equipment as is or will be required for these small projects. Improved engineering supervision as recommended in item "1" above, may free some existing equipment for small projects.

6. Maintenance of Completed Construction

Little or no planning is evident for maintenance of road construction. The equipment suggested for the small village projects (item 5 above) could possibly serve the dual role of providing the necessary maintenance equipment.

(Signed) _____
DR. BOONSERM WEESKUL, RTG Coordinator
ARD-MDU Evaluation

(Signed) _____
R. J. LIPPOLT, USOM, Coordinator
ARD MDU Evaluation

Rough Translation

Speech

Given by His Excellency Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn,
The Prime Minister

on

"The Need for an Acceleration of Rural Development in
Areas Threatened by Infiltrations"

February 9, 1965

"Santi Mitri" Building, Government House.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

On the occasion of our gathering here to-day for the purpose of orientation on accelerated rural development, it gives me great pleasure to have the opportunity of speaking to you about why we have to speed up the development of remote rural areas where infiltrations from the opposite side are known to exist, undermining the institutions, security and well-being of our beloved nation.

The accelerated rural development program is not regular program of economic and social development as has been implemented by the Government in the normal course of events up to the present time. It is a program in which the speed of action and the amount of resources used would most effectively produce physical and mental impact on the life of rural people within minimum time. Such a program is needed, because we are facing a situation in which the national security is at stake. It is not the responsibility of one particular department or another, but it is the joint responsibility of all of us, and for that matter, of all the Thai people to preserve integrity and freedom of the Thai nation. All government departments and agencies must join hands, working together in the most unprecedented manner of cooperation and coordination to ensure prompt and effective action as dictated by circumstances.

For the benefit of senior officials attending this orientation session here today, let me give my words about certain conditions and developments in the remote areas of our beloved country. The conditions and developments that I shall be talking about have made it imperative for us to plan and program for an effective acceleration of rural development in certain areas above and beyond what would be the case under the normal course of action. These areas cover border Amphurs of Chiangrai, Nan, Uttaradit, Loei, Nongkhai, Udonthani, Sakol Nakorn, Nakorn Panom and Ubolrajadhani.

At present, if we take a look at what are happening in our neighbouring countries, we shall find that almost every country is facing the problem of instigation and incitement, designed to bring national disintegration, fighting and killing among people of the same nation. What invariably happened when trouble arose as the result of instigation was that people of the same national family found themselves fighting and killing one another in an unending warfare, while the instigators looked on, losing not a single drop of blood. All has been designed and engineered to serve the interest of outsiders who are immoral and unscrupulous, yet capable of fooling and deceiving poor and gullible people. Our own country might experience similar danger, if no precautions were taken in good time. If we would

just look over the border, it should be evident to us that this great danger has made its appearance. It is the sort of danger that cannot be easily removed, once permitted to take root. Our country could easily be thrown into such an undesirable state of affairs, if no protective and remedial measures were promptly taken to rectify the situation in certain areas of the country. To stress the point, the danger I am talking about is analogous to a lethal disease which is being endemic in Southeast Asia. As the matter of fact it is the disease that has spread all from outside. We could protect ourselves against this danger by building up our economic, social and other strengths as we do against a disease by vaccination.

Some of us here are well acquainted with the present conditions of the remote areas on the North and Northeastern borders of our country. To be sure, these areas are poor, undeveloped and far removed from civilization of all kinds. However, there live a large number of our country men.

Economically, it can be rightly said that the remote areas on the North and Northeastern borders of Thailand are ones of the poorest and most undeveloped parts of the World. A large number of the people there live at a bare minimum level of subsistence, tilling small plots of infertile land and collecting forest products. No matter how hard they try to give themselves better income, this seems intolerably difficult to achieve. The opportunity of increasing their income is extremely limited, and at places, virtually non-existent. This is partly due to the fact that in those area the poor happen to be living among the poor. Worse still, a large number of these poverty stricken people have no means of communication with the world outside, even within the country. Being poor and enduring much suffering, the Thai people who are thus neglected could be most susceptible to instigating and misleading words of outsiders, hence psychological instability and, conceivably, severance of goodwill and allegiance towards the Government of their own country.

As regards social conditions, the problems would arise as a result of economic inadequacy and problems. It is because the government authorities neglect the people or are unable to reach them that they have to do without proper medical care and attention when sick. They are left entirely on their own struggling helplessly against natural hazards; only those who have access to urban community can benefit from medical facilities the Government has provided. Again, security against bandits and robbers is still wanting in many places in the absence of any means of communication; the people have to make personal effort in defending themselves and their property, or accept as normal whatever state of insecurity they endure. Moreover, a large number of children of these unfortunate people do not have the education that they should be entitled to as Thai citizens. It is, therefore, not surprising to find people, both old and young, who are deep in ignorance and lack the mentality for good citizenship. In the absence of due influence on the part of the Thai national institutions among these people, it is inconceivable to make them feel proud of and loyal to their own country. I am sure my fellow government officials appreciate how easily under those circumstances, seditious instigation could be made effective.

Even if at the present time subversive infiltrations in the remote areas have been discreet, it is difficult for the Government to keep an effective trace of all developments fully. They are often present in those places which are weak and do not come under close observation of the government authorities. As the matter of fact we have long known that the subversive activities that have been going on within our territory, especially in the Northeast, and that these have been increasing in intensity as experienced by our neighbouring countries. In spite of the

assiduous and continuous effort of the Government in suppressing these subversions and infiltrations, they could not be altogether extricated nor put out of action completely. This is because they originated from outside and, therefore, tend to grow stronger, especially when the subversive elements have had their stronghold built in the neighbouring territories.

My fellow government officials may have known that the methods used for seditious instigation are diverse. For instance, the Thais are seduced to go abroad for training and indoctrination and then return home to spread the germs of their evil design, especially in the weak and remote areas that have been neglected by the government authorities. Apart from the said reduction, various acts of violence are staged to frighten and threaten those people who refuse to cooperate. Weapons and arms are also stocked up for the fighting and killing among the instigated Thai who have lost trust and confidence in one another. Along with all these underground activities are propaganda, inculcating in the mind of the people hatred against the Government and governing systems of the country in which they live on one hand, and sympathy and liking for those systems in which outsiders would have a directing role to play.

The state of affairs I have briefly related should help convince my fellow officials from Government central agencies of the necessity on the part of Government to take positive action in all directions to prevent and meet this great danger.

I would like to emphasize here also that acceleration of development of the remote areas that belong to us calls for definite and complete plan of operations, coordination of efforts of all concerned, and the spirit of working really for the benefit of local people in the areas and for the building and restoring of their faith and confidence in the Government. The accelerated rural development program was initiated and drawn up by the previous Government, and, upon assumption of leadership of the present Government, I found it necessary to expedite its implementation. I wanted to show to the people that the Government was not neglecting the work that had been earlier planned. On the contrary, it was actually pouring financial and manpower resources into this very important work to achieve speedily all what it is intended with real efficiency. I requested the Cabinet to appoint a committee for the purpose of managing this program, known as "the Committee of Rural Development Coordination and Planning" or, in abbreviation "C.R.D.C.P.". The Committee was appointed and charged with the following duties:

1. Propose the area to be declared as "accelerated development area" for the purpose of preventing and resisting infiltrations.
2. Lay down the principle and approach that will govern rural development activities in the "accelerated development area".
3. Work out detailed operational plans of various development activities with the help of government departments and agencies concerned.
4. Coordinate the operational plans of rural development with the assistance programs of friendly countries.
5. Review the programs of work and report it to higher authorities.

It can be said, therefore, that the accelerated rural development efforts in the areas specified are those which must be coordinated with the regular programs

of national development that have been drawn up by the respective regional development committees and the National Economic Development Board. This could be achieved by treating development efforts under the National Development Plan as fundamental and national in importance, whereas those under the Accelerated Rural Development Program are specifically directed towards the development of only those areas which are threatened by infiltrations or susceptible to subversive instigation. Reaching the people in the shortest possible time is the most essential factor determining the development work in these areas. We must reach the people, body and mind before the subversive instigators get hold of them. The work in each accelerated development areas has to be carefully planned in order to meet appropriately specific needs of its inhabitants. Besides, it must be executed according to the planned time schedule and in conjunction with other plans of operation, making for speedy and real completion of development work in all fields.

I believe, to really reach the people, one must have a good knowledge of their psychology and their real needs. In planning, maximum advantage should, therefore, be taken of initiatives and participation of rural people. When the plan is being implemented, cooperation and willingness of the local people have to be also fully reckoned with. We must hold on to the principle that whatever we do, we do in response to the demand of the people and for the people. Only if we are true to this principle, we can then succeed in winning the heart of the people through our development efforts.

In carrying out the work under the accelerated rural development program, we have to use a great deal of money and manpower. When an area is chosen, pioneering work will be carried out by the mobile development unit of the Central Agency of National Safety (MDU) that has already achieved success in a number of places. However, the groundwork has to be supplemented and reinforced by further operations of a more complete and permanent character. Accelerated rural development efforts of various government departments and agencies must be such planned and programmed as to increase steadily job opportunity and income of the people. According to the plan for accelerated rural development, access roads to remote rural villages and districts will be first built, using machinery and techniques made available, and personnel trained by the United States Government as assistance to Thailand through USOM. Road construction has begun in a number of places and I do hope the cooperation between Thailand and principal friendly nations like the United States will continue in mutual sympathy and in full recognition of a common goal.


Furthermore, coordination and cooperation among government departments and agencies, both at central and provincial levels, are most essential for successful completion of work in the accelerated development areas within good time, bearing in mind the circumstances that have prompted us to action. Each and every government department and agency must be fully aware of the fact that rural development for resisting and suppressing subversion is the most important piece of its work, bearing on the security of the national as a whole. It is another type of war we are waging against subversions directed and supported by outside power. We must not therefore, think in terms of their department's business and not our department's responsibility. I earnestly ask you and your departments to bring physical and mental power to bear jointly and fully on this work.

Finally, I would like all of you who have gathered here to realize the situation facing our country at the present time. With this realization coupling with the administrative responsibility you partly share, you would take greater interest in building and strengthening through mutual cooperation, the bulwark protecting our country against misfortunes, hence preservation of lasting security and well being of our people.

OBLIGATION OF FUNDS FOR THE SIX ARD CHANGWADS

=====
 (Excludes a provision for replacement of equipment)

U.S.
Dollar Baht
 (in Thousands)



	<u>RTG</u>	<u>US</u>
	(Dollar Equivalent, Thousand)	
CY 1964	900	2,440
CY 1965	1,920	830
CY 1966	1,710	580

(AD/F: December 11, 1964)