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CONSULTANT REPORT OF NORTH - NORTHEAST
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM PREPARED FOR C O B A L AND U S A I D

by

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November 9, 1973

PROJECT APPRAISAL REPORT (PAR)

PAGE 1

1. PROJECT NO. 512-L-083	2. PAR FOR PERIOD: May 1973 TO Oct. 1973	3. COUNTRY Brazil	4. PAR SERIAL NO. 74-8
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5. PROJECT TITLE
512-26-150-308-1002
RE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING (Technical Assistance)

6. PROJECT DURATION: Began FY 73 Ends FY 76	7. DATE LATEST PROP -	8. DATE LATEST PIP -	9. DATE PRIOR PAR 7/18/73
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10. U.S. FUNDING	a. Cumulative Obligation Thru Prior FY: \$	b. Current FY Estimated Budget: \$	c. Estimated Budget to completion After Current FY: \$
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11. KEY ACTION AGENTS (Contractor, Participating Agency or Voluntary Agency)

a. NAME Personal Services Contracts	b. CONTRACT, PASA OR VOL. AG. NO. GOB Contract
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I. NEW ACTIONS PROPOSED AND REQUESTED AS A RESULT OF THIS EVALUATION

A. ACTION (X)			B. LIST OF ACTIONS	C. PROPOSED ACTION COMPLETION DATE
USAID	AID/W	HOST		
		X	COBAL should give a higher priority and more attention to the subject of planning both in general as related to its overall marketing program and in specific as related to this loan funded technical assistance program.	Completed
		X	Clearly define functions of U.S. and Spanish TA teams to avoid conflict of advice and duplication of work.	Completed
		X	Contract at least one and perhaps two more U.S. resident staff members.	Completed
		X	Improve pre-planning of short term consultant and follow-up activities for services already provided.	Completed
		X	Work to be carried out by U.S. team members should be better defined and more detailed to avoid involvement in tasks which should be carried out by Brazilians.	Ongoing
		X	Equipment needs should be further detailed; the approach to follow on equipment should be determined, and purchase procedures established.	Completed
		X	Improve administrative and logistic support and facilities provided to the program.	Completed
		X	Conduct evaluation of economic impact of wholesale markets.	6/30/75

D. REPLANNING REQUIRES

REVISED OR NEW: PROP PIP PRO AG PIO/T PIO/C P/O/P

DATE OF MISSION REVIEW: **March 1974**

PROJECT MANAGER: TYPED NAME, SIGNED INITIALS AND DATE: **William L. Rodgers, AEDD** *WR* **4/17/74**

MISSION DIRECTOR: TYPED NAME, SIGNED INITIALS AND DATE: **Horacio D. Lopez, AEDD** *HL* **4/17/74**

I. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL COMMENTS

In evaluating the impact of USAID technical assistance in support of COBAL, the Evaluation Team has interviewed key personnel in COBAL, COTEC, USAID and other agencies. Background information was obtained through a study of relevant documents and from a review of market data, operational reports and procedural statements. Finally, field interviews were held with market officials at Recife, Aracajú, and Salvador and with representatives of the private sector - including Wholesalers, retailers, and supermarket executives.

It should be noted that it is too early to evaluate the full impact of the technical assistance program. While loan approval was obtained in November, 1971, it was not until September, 1972, that the program became operational. For this reason, the analysis prepared by the Evaluation Team should be considered a progress report. The evaluation study, initiated by the Senior U.S. Advisor, is intended as an objective analysis of operating problems and needs and also as the basis for recommendations which will expedite successful completion of the project.

It is appropriate to preface this report with an expression of appreciation for the assistance of officials and staff personnel in all the organizations contacted. Their helpful guidance made possible the rapid collection of background data and contributed to the formulation of the Evaluation Team's conclusions and recommendations.

It is essential to recognize the many factors which affect the success of a technical assistance project. The impact of technical services, in this type of situation, is a function not only of the competence of the technical personnel but also of their ability to establish working rapport with their counterparts, their persuasiveness in introducing innovations, and their acceptance by those responsible for implementation. Ultimately, of course, technical services affect people, events and institutions - but not always in quantitative terms.

This project is also influenced by the number of organizations (at least ten) which exercise a degree of influence in shaping policy and/or implementation. In this regard, technical services and their impact are either facilitated or inhibited- depending upon the character of the organization and decision-making structure which implements recommended plans.

In sections II-IV there are the findings by the Evaluation Team according to the scope of work prepared by COBAL and USAID. In Section V there are the Team's recommendations. Section VI contains 4 exhibits concerning COBAL's structure and the Spanish technical assistance program.

II. PROGRAM GOALS

A. Pre-Loan Goals

The studies which preceded this project are impressive. The Michigan State analysis, the Montor report, the French proposal, and the loan proposal developed for USAID consideration all document the breadth and scope of need.

The Spanish proposal in 1972 gave further emphasis to the potential impact of technical assistance. In all of these reports, there was common concern as to the need for a more efficient food supply system in Brazil. There is no reason to believe that the social and economic goals stated in the pre-loan studies are not still valid. In fact, their validity has been tested with time. The economic growth of the region during loan years has stimulated demand for food products by consumers and reemphasized the need for facilitating the movement of food products from farmer to consumer. The purpose of the loan as stated in the Capital Assistance Paper is to provide financial and technical assistance to the GOB in creating an appropriately structured, viable and efficiently managed and operated agricultural marketing system to improve the marketing and distribution of food in the North and Northeast. The terms established for USAID loans L-083 and L-084 were reasonable in the light of the ultimate goals to be achieved.

1. CAP Rationale

The rationale contained in the Capital Assistance Paper (Section I-D) gives further documentation of project need and comments (Section IV) on certain potentially quantifiable benefits, including:

- Reduction in produce spoilage
- Reduction in costs due to decreased spoilage
- Reduction in unloading and loading time
- Reduction in costs and risks and increased competition
(brought about by economies of scale)
- Stimulation of farmer production and higher real prices for his products
- Economies in retail purchasing - due also to Economies of scale and the improvement of standard quality concepts
- Improved public health - through better hygiene, cleanliness and more stable supply
- Improved working conditions for market personnel
- Improved transport facilities and increased transport efficiencies
- Further economic benefits - as in the case of potential impact on increased employment in the construction of markets

The most succinct comment can be drawn directly from the Capital Assistance Paper in regard to market facilities is:

"There is no question that administrative and operational mistakes will be made as the new facilities come into operation, and such mistakes will reduce benefits and raise costs. Such mistakes are unavoidable and part of the learning process. However, considering the role of COBAL in the national program, any such mistakes will

be under close scrutiny and prompt actions are likely to be taken to correct them..... With regard to the distribution of savings, we believe consumer prices should fall in real terms, assuming a continuation of the existing trends in agricultural production, because of the increase in efficiency of the wholesale market. We also expect that this project will have important backward and forward linkage effects." (CAP, page 52)

2. Indicators

A review of the indicators contained in the Capital Assistance Paper suggests that these criteria are still valid. In addition, the logical framework analysis contained in the Second Revised Implementation Plan has a more detailed series of indicators, with proposed procedures for verification. In the latter case, the indicators appear basically sound. However, it is important to note that the COTEC staff should begin verification of these indicators as rapidly as possible. In addition, several additional indicators might well be considered to measure the economic impact on the farmer. For example, the Evaluation Team recommends study in more detail the seasonal, weekly and daily price variations which have resulted for the farmer under the expanded wholesale market system; the number of farmers who are finding increasing sales outlets via the wholesale markets, the patterns of price mark-up between the farmers, the middle-men, the wholesale buyer, the retail consumer, and the changes in labor productivity resulting from the new wholesale markets.

B. Planning

Several plans have been prepared for implementation of the wholesale market program in Brazil. A French plan for all of Brazil was developed in late 1971 and was subsequently accepted by USAID in April, 1972 as the operational plan required in the conditions precedent for the initial disbursement under the loan.

A national competition to provide assistance for the implantation of the national system of food supply centers (SINCA) was opened by COBAL to bidding in 1972. A Spanish group called MERCASA won this competition and provided COBAL with a technical assistance plan for the entire country. Consequently, the Spanish, rather than the French plan, has been COBAL's official implementation plan. This situation has created some confusion as to which plan provides the overall framework for the U.S. technical assistance group.

During the study conducted by the evaluation group it quickly became apparent that there was significant hazards in assuming that any detailed set of plans could be made. The U.S. advisory group has found itself in the unique position of having to establish a planning program in an environment which is not much plan oriented. In fact, despite the existence

of plans, COBAL-COTEC operating practices tend to assign planning to a secondary position, because of economic and political pressures to achieve quick results. As a consequence, the U.S. group has found it necessary to establish plans which are directed specifically toward prescribed goals but which are described in somewhat broader terms. The last version of these plans has just been completed and will be referred to throughout this report as the Revised Implementation Plan. In reviewing this plan, the Evaluation Team gave particular attention to four key areas: wholesale markets, interior assembly markets, market information services and grades and standards.

1. Wholesale Markets

At the present time, four markets, Recife, Fortaleza, Aracaju and Salvador are in operation, and three others, Maceio, Belém, Manaus, will be operating by March 1974. It is contemplated that a total of eleven markets will be built in the NO-NE. US technical assistance in this area originally contemplated having one full time wholesale market specialist and short-term consultants for training of wholesale market administrators and BEDE/COBAL personnel responsible for market operation and direct assistance in market operation and management. Activities to date have been the USDA consulting team, selection of CEASA training center in Recife, assistance in the evaluation of feasibility studies for proposed markets and establishment and maintenance of contact with the personnel at the CEASAS.

In regard to future activities the revised plan looks basically sound with its emphasis on training of market personnel. (This element is one of special interest for all the personnel interviewed in the field: there was a general feeling that training should be given a major priority in all aspects of the technical assistance program). The revised plan contains a budget of \$146,000 dollars for consultants, training and analysis in the 1972-75 period. Additional details are necessary to program activities according to indicated allocation of funds.

The recent addition of Mr. F.R. Todd as a wholesale market specialist is an important step toward strengthening much needed technical assistance in this field. The USDA team provided good background on the functions of a wholesale market specialist. The revised plan ought to reflect this background and possibly incorporate other functions that might be considered important. The Evaluation Team recommends for example a broadening of full-time marketing and marketing management services. Particular attention should be given to updating the procedures manual and to establishing a means of informing, systematically, all market management personnel of applicable innovations.

Another matter of concern is the reported unusually high overhead costs of the wholesale markets, which are assumed to reflect one-time

start-up needs. While in Salvador the CEASA officials are aware of these costs, and have plans to reduce them, technical assistance ought to be allocated to this problem, as it may occur in other markets.

The "federal supervisor" concept is an important one and is an excellent form of insuring on-site implementation of technical assistance. It is critically important to maintain close working rapport between the COTEC staff and the market management personnel.

The role of the middle-man in the market is an issue. Hopefully special emphasis can be given to insure the development of policies which will keep the middle-men's role in proper perspective. Recognizing his function, he should never be allowed to become the dominant factor in the operation of the market.

2. Interior Assembly Markets

The program for these markets (construction and technical assistance) demands a very high priority in view of its specialized function of product processing, better storage and loading facilities than currently exists in the interior towns, and since they are points of collecting and dissemination of market information. The revised implementation plan contains a good statement on the functions of an Assembly Market Advisor. However, technical assistance in this area is dependent upon a better definition of the concept of these markets and timing of their construction.

The original idea was to precede construction of interior markets by technical and economic studies indicating the best location, size, etc. However, reports from COTEC officials indicate the existence of an entirely new approach to the location of assembly markets. Under this approach, interior markets would be selected with a minimum of research. The chief criteria for their installations would be (1) the proximity to supply sources and (2) the availability of suitable buildings for use as market centers. The buildings would be rented, a manager selected and employed, and market operations started immediately. As now scheduled, a series of interior assembly markets would be in operation by March 1974.

This is a highly expedient approach which minimizes advance planning and emphasizes early impact before the change of government, which seems to be of high priority for COBAL.

Recognizing the political realities of the situation, and the fact that this approach would get the market into operation quickly, there are also dangers involved. An unwise site selection, an error in staffing, a breakdown in administrative procedure could do serious damage to the broad concept of interior assembly markets.

The Evaluation Team recommends that special attention be given to an orderly approach for implementing interior assembly markets, assigning either a staff specialist or a consultant to the immediate task of developing a plan for the construction and operation of these markets. This should include review of a recently completed study done for SUDENE on interior markets. The search for a full-time specialist should begin immediately.

3. Market Information Service

The market news service has excellent potential but several aspects of the operation of this service merits special attention. In the first place there is the need for minimizing conflict between several news services in the Northeast (i.e. SDMA of the Ministry of Agriculture and SIM of SUDENE). Second, as indicated by reports from the fields, it is essential to correlate the market information program with the grade and standards effort. Third, and perhaps more important, there is the question of finding the most practical means of getting the farmers to accept the service as reliable. Price quotations stated in general terms can be construed as misleading by the farmer, so it would be desirable to include in the information service a reference to the quantities demanded or supplied for specific items. When the market is flooded with a particular item, there is an obvious impact on prices. These factors, combined with the farmer's reported suspicion of market news reports, make it necessary that special attention be given to the very practical dimensions of the news service. How can the farmer best get the news service? From whom should it come? How can the farmer be protected against conflicting price information from a middle-man?

In view of the master plan being prepared by Cobal's staff for the regional and national market information system, the revised implementation plan for expansion and improvements of the market news is presented on a very tentative basis, as far as training and equipment is concerned. Nevertheless, the NE market information plan should be reasonably far ahead of the national plan since considerable technical expertise has already been provided under the loan by Messrs. Hook and Wise. The recommendations made by those experts most certainly provide a sound basis for an implementation plan which should be adaptable to the national plan with small modifications. Thus, a revised program for training and equipment might be presented with activities scheduled to begin earlier than currently contemplated.

4. Grades and Standards

An effective grades and standards program, in addition of being essential to the market news service, is a vital link in the entire

food distribution system - from the farmer to the wholesaler to the retailer.

While the Revised Plan suggests a generally orderly approach to this subject, additional attention should be given to a comprehensive plan that will rapidly consolidate all existing data and produce realistic guidelines for the various markets. There are reportedly several plans in progress now: what is being done toward their coordination? It is also recommended that further attention be given to the importance of packaging standards - as a subject of parallel importance to grading. There are wide variations in the type, size, shape and cost of packaging materials being traded in the markets visited. Because weights and measures and packaging methods also vary extensively, interregional trade of commodities is impaired. The subject justifies additional study. The Revised Plan properly gives particular attention to training personnel in grades and standards. If any comment is justified, it would be that this budget item could be increased.

Finally, the US Advisory Group might wish to give consideration to the employment of a full-time specialist in grades and standards. Recognizing the apparent difficulties in securing such personnel, it would be wise to reevaluate the merits of a full-time specialist against the proposed plan for use of consultants.

III. BRAZILIAN PROGRAM STRUCTURE

A. COBAL's Role in Program

As a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Ministry of Agriculture, COBAL is a unique experiment. Formed in 1962, it is a highly-diversified operation with activities in wholesaling, retailing, food product transportation, and the storage of certain strategic food commodities. Annual sales are reported to approximate \$ 100 million.

COBAL was designed as a vehicle through which the food products system could be improved without undue competition with the private sector. In this sense, it parallels certain American entities - similar in some respects to TVA and its role in developing hydroelectric power resources.

The Brazilian Government has shown both initiative and a capacity for innovation in many areas. COBAL has served a useful purpose and it is likely that it will continue to do so.

1. Operations

Operationally, Dr. Rubens José de Castro Albuquerque establishes all COBAL operating policy within the general guidelines set by the Ministry of

Agriculture. (See Exhibit 1). As President, he makes all major decisions within the framework of established policy. As a chief advisor, Dr. Roberto Pinheiro Nunes serves a staff role, directing the work of COTEC. Dr. Nunes is expected to initiate the necessary research and technical assistance activities which will contribute to the broad goals of COBAL. He also responds to specific project assignments made by the President (See Exhibit 2).

2. Relation With Other Agencies

COBAL relates to a number of other agencies of the Brazilian Government. It is obviously sensitive to the policies of its parent, the Ministry of Agriculture; its activities are also affected by the policies and programs of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning and Coordination, the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE), and GEMAB itself (the inter-ministerial group overseeing wholesale markets). There are still further affiliations with SUDENE, SUDAM, and such organizations as the National Confederation of Commerce. The effect of these varied relationships is to place COBAL in a pivotal role as the implementing agent which must, through its programs, reconcile potentially conflicting points of view.

There is still another dimension of COBAL's relationships, one which relates to those with the individual markets (CEASAs). In these situations, COBAL typically takes a 30% position in the debt funding required for construction of the wholesale market. However, it exercises the dominant influence in market management and in suggesting operating policies. Further, the federal supervisor assigned to each market is a COBAL employee whose job involves implementation of COBAL's procedures on the site. Significantly, the federal supervisors are paid from USAID loan funds.

B. COBAL's Personnel Structure

The Evaluation Team has had occasion to interview the great majority of Brazilian staff members involved in the COTEC operation and several personnel from other activities within COBAL. Numerically, the staff group appears capable of handling the work load with no difficulty. Qualitatively, and in terms of background preparedness, all of the COTEC Brazilian staff members have university degree except for one individual who serves as a technical assistant. From information available, all of the group appear well-qualified in academic training, less-qualified in terms of actual experience in their assigned areas. Dr. Nunes, the U.S. Advisory staff and Dr. Goyanna have done an outstanding job in providing on-the-job instruction in technical areas. From the standpoint of attitude, the groups appear to work well together. As their job experience broadens and their competence increases, salary limitation in COBAL will make it difficult

to avoid losing some of them to other agencies. It should be noted that their general absence of experience prior to employment by COTEC is not uncommon; all reports indicate a severe shortage of Brazilians experienced in the technical services provided by COTEC. USAID should also be prepared to adjust to personnel changes which result from the expiration of U.S. staff centers as they occur at various future dates.

C: COBAL's Participation in the Loan Funded Constructions Program

The principal entities involved in the implementation of the Loan funded construction program are BNDE, FINEP, COBAL (COTEC-DECEN), GEMAB and the ultimate borrower, the CEASA. The program implementation involves the approval of the feasibility study which supports the loan application made by CEASA and the engineering and construction of the market. Once CEASA is incorporated a request is made to FINEP for the feasibility study. COTEC, through Dr. Gabriel Andrade, a BA economist, helps in securing approval for this request and provides guidance to CEASA, and the consulting firm in charge of the study, regarding its technical and economic aspects. In this stage, which may include on-site inspection, other COBAL's technicians cooperate as needed. After the study is completed COTEC reviews it and writes a preliminary report recommending the project's approval by GEMAB. This review, done mainly by Dr. Gabriel Andrade, usually takes not more than a month and is made easier because of the follow up of the preparation of the feasibility study. The preliminary report is reviewed by GEMAB's Executive Secretary and technical advisor, by COTEC's chief, Dr. Nunes, and by BNDE and SUDENE technicians. The final report is forwarded to GEMAB's council, signed by all these technicians. Approval by GEMAB is usually a smooth voting process in view of the agreement previously reached at the technical, and to a considerable extent at the political level, among GEMAB's members - regarding the project under consideration. Final loan approval is made by BNDE's board of directors.

After the construction loan is approved, COBAL supervises the construction of the market through DECEN, which is responsible for opening up public bids for the engineering and architectural projects. BNDE engineers participate in this supervision.

Regarding the movement of funds during construction, BNDE makes a full money tranche to COBAL, at the beginning of the process for its participation in the investment, but provides money to the CEASA on a reimbursement basis, which usually is done with some delay, thus forcing COBAL to fund CEASA's participation out of its own resources.

At the present time COBAL's capacity to make decisions at the pre-construction stage concerning such factors as market location, size,

architecture, operation, management, etc., depends on the work done at COTEC which is complemented by the work performed by technicians in BNDE, GEMAB and SUDENE, in the process of reviewing the feasibility study for the construction of a particular market. After construction DECEM, in COBAL, plays the principal role and BNDE technicians, especially engineers, do interfere in the implementation of the construction program. The capability of these institutions to implement the loan program was considered satisfactory at the time of the USAID loan intensive review. At the present time the evaluation team, as far as the evaluation could be carried within its time limit, has found no elements to substantiate a different opinion. All the people involved have a college degree in Brazil and several have post-graduate courses, or a Master's degree, and seem familiar with the problems involved in their particular areas. It should perhaps be considered, however, that final operational results depend on other factors, such as work-load of technicians involved in the process, within and outside COBAL, and political influence from within and outside COBAL, including decision on how to interpret norms and regulations or how to overcome certain difficulties as a few examples might help to clarify the argument. In the case, for instance, of the Maceió market, the decision as to location, according to COTEC people interviewed, was greatly influenced by the refusal of the Governor of the State of Alagoas to consider alternative sites from the State's own lands, in order to make up the State's share in the investment. Another instance is the existence of supermarket as a dependence in the wholesale market. There appears to be no technical-economic evaluation of the supermarket component of the wholesale market, and much less of its operation on a preferential basis by COBAL. The decision to have COBAL exploiting these markets, at least in the case of the Aracajú market, visited by the Evaluation Team, does not appear to be commercially or economically sound. One further example refers to the GOB-USAID agreement that a decision to build a particular market would be based on the ascertainment that the investment is technically, financially and economically sound. One way of objectively verifying the economic soundness of the investment is to quantify benefits and costs which can be summarized into a benefit-cost ratio or an internal rate of return. While the calculation of such a rate is recommended in the BNDE-USAID approved Operational Plan for Loan 003, the documents that the Team had the chance to examine do not show such a rate. According to COTEC personnel, benefits are difficult to be quantified and unquantifiable benefits are more important. This interpretation, while overcoming the difficulties presented by data shortage in Brazil, certainly introduces considerable uncertainty as to whether a particular wholesale market represents a good allocation of resources from the society's stand point. This is especially true given the fact that by and large the markets built so far operate under a deficit and must be subsidized in one way or another.

In regard to the relationships of COBAL with BNDE and participating states, the Evaluation Team feels that coordination and communication among these entities, especially between COBAL-BNDE, can be improved. This point however could not be explored at greater length by the team, in view of the impossibility of contacting the concerned people during the evaluation period.

IV. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

A. The Organization of Technical Assistance

1. U.S. Team and Other Advisory Groups

The U.S. technical assistance input has been implemented through the resident general coordinator and two technical staff, one of whom has just recently arrived in Brazil. This has been complemented by the services of short-term consultants in several different areas during the past year. According to the first annual report, loan activities in November 1971 to November 1972 period were concentrated in the following areas: Market Facilities Evaluation; Planning and Budgeting; Staffing Needs; Market Information Activities and Plans; Evaluation of Consulting Resources; Training Activities and Plans; Monitoring of Loan L-063; and Logistics and Administration.

Since November 1972, particular attention has been given to broad and varied forms of technical assistance in wholesale market planning and to improvement of the market news service. Work is in progress on refinement of the grades and standards systems and consideration is being given to assembly market potentials.

During this period COBAL contracted the Spanish technical assistance program for planning and operation of wholesale markets in Brazil. (Total program cost is 2.2 million dollars, 80% of which is financed through a seven-year loan from the Spanish government with a two-year grace period.) As a result of the lack of integration of the original COBAL operational plan as accepted by USAID (The French plan) with the MERCASA program a rather loosely defined situation developed in COBAL in regard to the role of the two groups.

The Spanish program of work is extremely broad. (See Exhibit 3.) While these services are intended to cover all of Brazil, much of the current team activities have been directed specifically toward North and Northeast Brazil.

There is, without question, an overlapping of functions between the U.S. and Spanish (MERCASA) technical assistance teams. This situation, as it now exists, has the potential for serious internal problems arising from an inherent danger for conflicting advice and duplication of work activities.

Dr. Nunes, as chief of COTEC, can find himself as a mediator between two groups independently pursuing a project and independently arriving at different conclusions. Informal communication between the Senior U.S. advisor and the Senior Spanish advisor is complicated because of the absence of continuity in leadership for the latter group. They have no permanent counterpart like Fleming; rather it rotates every three to four months. The net effect is one in which planning and implementation of U.S. efforts cannot always be done quickly and effectively.

The most obvious approach to blending the efforts of both groups should lie in a team approach combining specialists from both teams into functional working units, which may not be feasible in the current situation. The consolidation of the two teams would demand very stringent management control and, in all probability, would result in a kind of forced relationship.

According to comments from the Chief of COTEC, the Spanish team fills a more research-oriented role while the U.S. group is more nearly an operating staff function. In the latter case, the Senior U.S. Advisor tends to assume more responsibility for liaison, administration and implementation. As project research and technical service plans are developed, they are reviewed informally by representatives of the two teams. Dr. Nunes, who participates in the final discussion, must reconcile any conflicting points of view. (See Exhibit 2.) It is in this capacity that Dr. Nunes becomes the real key to the success of the technical assistance effort. It is necessary that he exercise a very strong administrative leadership to insure that research findings and technical services are quickly implemented.

2. U.S. Staffing

In identifying and fulfilling the needs for American technicians, the basic guidelines were established in the capital assistance paper and the loan agreement. However, these original documents provided a degree of flexibility in the exact staffing pattern.

a) Long-term technicians need was identified by the Senior U.S. Advisor, working with COTEC and COBAL executives. The decision initially was to maximize the use of loan funds by securing a limited number of permanent staff, selecting only those specialists who could provide leadership and training for the Brazilian personnel to be employed.

While the earlier USDA report recommended a series of seven full-time specialists, implementation of this plan would have required a commitment of approximately 70% of the loan funds for U.S. personnel services. In addition, COBAL could not make available counterpart staff for the proposed resident personnel. Until recently, Professor Fleming and Dr. Weiss were the only resident advisors. The recent addition of Mr. Todd as wholesale market specialists fills a critically needed gap in the staff.

The Evaluation Team basically agrees with the objective of maximizing use of loan funds but it does appear that the U.S. resident staff may have been cut too close. At least one and perhaps two more resident staff members will be required. The additional resident staff will ease the large technical workload of a program whose completion date has been reduced from five to two-and-a-half years. (The addition of Mr. Guilherme Schuetz, a member of the Brazilian team, has clearly helped in meeting administrative and planning responsibilities of the U.S. group.)

b) Short-term technicians need has been established by the Senior U.S. Advisor and his Assistant with the objective of securing the qualified personnel who could supplement the basic capabilities of the

resident staff. In addition, it was felt that short-term specialists provide, at reasonable cost, the degree of flexibility which seemed essential to this program. In support of consultant usage, it can be argued that this is a quick source of expertise and can be secured with relative ease. By contrast, permanent staff personnel are not only difficult to find but also expensive in terms of salary and support costs. On the other hand, the use of consultants eliminates the kind of professional leadership continuity so important to this type of project. Recognizing the merits of both arguments, the Evaluation Team strongly supports the employment of full-time personnel in the fields of interior assembly markets and grades and standards.

The selection of consultants to date appears to have been quite good although the actual use of consultant time was less than what was budgeted for 1973. Mr. Hooks and Mr. Wise both made significant input into the technical assistance program. At present, tentative consulting engagements are contemplated for 1974, in the following areas:

<u>Consulting Specialty</u>	<u>Man-Months</u>
Packaging	2
Grades and Standards	2
Organization and Policy	2
Market Extension Planning	4
Handling and Equipment	1
Market News	2
Marketing Specialist	3
	<u>16</u>

The use of large amounts of consultant time on any contract requires a great deal of pre-planning and follow-up activities to assure that the consultant's time and the resources are fully utilized. Without appropriate follow-up activity there exists a real danger that the consultant report will be filed and no implementation activity is made. The revised plan should reflect these implementation and follow-up activities for past consultants.

Procurement of consultants has been more difficult in this contract because of a lack of a specific institutional tie in the U.S. which normally provides the resident technician with a great deal of back-stopping support. Consequently, the resident technicians have had to do all the recruiting of consultants which has required travel to the U.S.

3. The Impact of U.S. Technical Assistance

a) As defined in the Capital Assistance Paper, and restated in the First Annual Report, the loan program "shall consist of assisting the Borrower in financing the technical assistance, training and equipment needs necessary to increase the operating efficiency of the marketing system being constructed in the North and the Northeast areas of Brazil." According to the loan agreement appendix, the technical assistance mission was further detailed with emphasis on improvement of the market news service, the development of produce classification grades and standards, and special technical expertise and training in wholesale market operations, retail

food marketing and rural-urban marketing integration. In addition, a specific implementation plan was to be developed. This plan would have a rather high degree of flexibility which is implicit in these general guidelines and more specifically stated in regard to cost:

"The above (referring to the cost summary) cost estimates and manpower needs have been determined on the basis of Mission and GOB analysis; however, during the course of implementing this project adjustments may be required to meet changing GOB policies and priorities. Said adjustments and changes in funding for technical assistance program items will be made on the basis of joint USAID and GOB analysis and determination of best use of loan funds." (CAP p. 44.)

b) In this light, the technical assistance effort has been directed toward a series of activities:

- 1) General administrative guidance and program planning - essential to the orderly development of the U.S. effort.
- 2) The function of liaison, filled by Professor Fleming, in obtaining concurrence of proposed operational plans from the various agencies involved. While this can be classified as one aspect of administration, the function is of particular importance in this operating environment. Ineffective liaison would result in a complete program breakdown.
- 3) The coordination and scheduling of consultants, including the USDA group, Mr. Hooks and Mr. Weiss.
- 4) General training and leadership for the Brazilian staff, most of whom had minimum practical experience in the technical fields of COTEC operation.
- 5) Development of the series of training programs for Brazilians in the U.S. - of benefit not only in terms of the knowledge acquired but also for the impact or greater rapport with Brazilian officials.
- 6) Development of the basic plan for an internal management information system, including a variety of administrative reports.
- 7) Installation of the federal supervisor concept, allowing for much more effective line coordination between COTEC and the individual markets.
- 8) Development of specific market management guidelines, including plans for market tariff policies.
- 9) Design of survey procedures to obtain data for developing grades and standards criteria.
- 10) Development of the plans for the loan-funded grades and standards training program (the first of its kind in Latin America) involving individuals who will be directly concerned with implementing the grades and standards procedures.

11) Assistance in developing background data on the market news service system, including preparation of the information flow analysis.

12) Participation in planning for inter-agency coordination of the market news service.

In summary, technical assistance efforts have been directed on a variety of fronts in accordance with the expected outputs identified in the loan agreement. The Evaluation Team finds no absence of energy or technical competence on the part of resident staff personnel.

However, it may be worthwhile to call attention to the fact that little effort has been directed toward technical assistance in retail marketing or the rural marketing program. The retail market assistance has apparently been given a low priority within USAID and COBAL and therefore no activities have been planned in this area. The rural assembly market program however has a high priority and considerable future activity must be devoted to this areas as has been contemplated in the revised plan. Also, in regard to equipment there has been less progress than could have been expected. As mentioned later in this report, this reflects in part a lack of definition on equipment needs by GOB. The U.S. team should strengthen efforts to get this definition.

c) Working relationships between U.S. personnel and their counterparts and other groups appear to be from good to excellent. Undoubtedly this is an important element in a TA program, and it has been recognized as such by Brazilian personnel. However, in regard to definition of tasks, the situation is not as clear as it should be. This in large part results from the existence of the two advisory groups and the approach followed by Dr. Nunes, which is to maximize usefulness of the technical assistance inputs through the simultaneous utilization of the two advisory groups, under his personal leadership. In addition, intended or not the U.S. group, especially Mr. Fleming, has been involved in much administrative and liaison work, including reconciling GOB and COBAL strategy with the necessary controls established by USAID - not a particularly easy task. The Revised Implementation Plan should contain a detailed definition of tasks for each member of the U.S. team. In view of the dubiousness characterized above, U.S. advisors might find themselves involved in activities that might be done by Brazilians. The almost full-time participation of U.S. advisors in this evaluation may be illustrative, although in more technical tasks the U.S. - Brazilian duplication of work may be minor, as there are relatively few Brazilians available for the positions involved. The resident U.S. group is providing on-the-job training for some Brazilians and, as indicated in the Revised Implementation Plan, will be gradually replaced by Brazilian personnel in this task.

B. Training Program

In reviewing the training program, the rationale is obvious. There is simply an absence of qualified personnel in the fields contemplated under technical assistance program. It should be noted that personnel in each of the markets visited commented on the importance of continuing the training program.

Training policy however is not well defined for COTEC personnel especially in view of the two advisory groups. Since most of the personnel being trained work in the temporary divisions of COTEC, attention should be given to make training underway really relevant for these people's future assignments.

By and large, the Evaluation Team would support short-term training in the U.S., but it should be planned for only a few key personnel, as such training is largely observational in nature. Academic training in the U.S. would seem justified only in rare cases, whereas increased training in Brazil is strongly recommended by the Team, as this is the area of greatest potential impact. This training has already offered a first course in grades and standards (just completed) and participants interviewed commented enthusiastically on its value. A similar course, but for lower level technicians, has just started and further programs will be designed to meet specific needs.

The trainee selection criteria appears to be sound. Basically, individuals are chosen according to their position and to their capacity to implement the new skills acquired. A special effort is being made to include extension agents - one of the pivotal groups in the whole food production system.

C. Equipment Program

In considering the equipment program, the Evaluation Team frankly finds it difficult to get a clear picture of what will ultimately be committed. Clearly, the rationale for equipment expenditures exists: the wholesale markets, the market news service, and the proposed assembly market will all require special types of equipment. Such items could range from radio units to additional telex systems to materials handling devices. The Revised Implementation Plan describes probable needs; but should be more specific. This will involve a decision by GOB on the approach to follow on equipment (type of equipment, origin, destination). A definition in regard to this is of absolute necessity to get the equipment program started. It is also suggested that USAID officials, Professor Fleming and Dr. Nunes meet at an early date to clarify the types of equipment which could be funded under USAID procedures.

From another standpoint, no specific equipment purchase procedures have been established. The U.S. group should make plans now to solicit suggestions and recommendations from each potential user (wholesale markets and others) as to the kinds of equipment which they feel will be required.

The most likely type of equipment which would be useful for market news would be radio units. It is particularly flexible, especially for the interior assembly markets.

As a matter of interest, the capacity to communicate between markets is more than just an ability to deliver standard price and volume information. It also makes possible the creation of new business relationships between individual dealers. In a recent situation, a Salvador buyer used the telex unit to order a shipment of bananas from a dealer in Fortaleza.

D. General Comments - Revised Implementation Plan

In addition to the references made in the preceding pages, the following general observations can be made about the implementation plan:

1. The plan, to the greatest extent possible, should have more detail in correlating proposed work schedules with projected expenditures. The need for flexibility is recognized but it does not preclude specificity and detail at the planning level. Any needed changes can be made on the basis of periodic reassessment of program implementation. The plan should also correlate inputs with needs, so as to provide a clear rationale for the various program components.
2. The plan document should separate program report from planning per se. In regard to the former, in addition to the history of activities an appraisal of consultant's work and recommendations seems appropriate so as to indicate which of those have been or are the most appropriate to be implemented in view of program priorities, resources available and limitation factors. Regarding planning, the presentation of the rationale for the various program components and activities would greatly improve the consistency of the plan document. This rationale would include items such as purpose, alternatives considered, inputs selected.

The section on Market Facilities should be expanded to include discussion on technical assistance to wholesale markets, rural and retail markets and assembly markets.

3. A detailed schedule of disbursements seems to be required by USAID as a matter of official policy. Recognizing the difficulties involved in developing such a schedule, which probably would be subject to change in the near future, some form of understanding must be reached between USAID and COTEC on this issue.

4. On the basis of 1972-1973 commitments and projections, approximately \$770,114. is available for the balance of the project period. If the total project budget is executed as now scheduled, the percentage allocation of funds would appear as follows:

	<u>\$</u>	<u>\$</u>	<u>\$</u>
Personnel Services			
U.S. Salaries	16.0		
Brazilian Salaries	18.6	34.6	
Consultants	12.4	12.4	47.0
Training			21.0
Equipment			21.8
Analysis			3.0
Miscellaneous Administration			
Bank Charges	.35		
Housing	4.40		
Int'l Travel	.85		
Moving-Storage	1.35		
Education	.25	7.2	7.2
			<u>100.0</u>

10

These funds will be disbursed in a relatively brief period. Extreme care should be exercised in the administration of these funds, especially in regard to equipment. It is appropriate to note that the general distribution of funds appears reasonable in the light of project goals. Expenditures for Brazilian salaries moves sharply upward from 1974 on and U.S. salaries decline on a compensating basis.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

In the judgement of the Evaluation Team, the basic goals outlined for the U.S. Technical Assistance effort can be achieved, within the projected time framework, but not without recognition of certain operational considerations:

1. While USAID rightly requires an observance of standard administrative policies and procedures governing the use of loan funds, the COTEC-COBAL operating environment is one of strategic flexibility.
2. The U.S. Advisory Group is in the untenable position of reconciling USAID requirements with COBAL strategy.
3. If these points of view are to be resolved, USAID program management personnel are going to have to be brought more frequently into planning discussions. Through whatever means, the respective parties must communicate more effectively. If this is not done, the U.S. Advisory Group will continue to remain in the middle, in the awkward position of an intermediary between COBAL and USAID and finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy either party.

In the light of all the factors affecting the operation of this program, the Evaluation Team submits the following recommendations:

A. Organization

1. While the internal working relationships between COTEC management, the Spanish team and the U.S. group are cordial, the present structure lends itself to serious potential problems as discussed in more detail on page 11.

The Evaluation Team recommends a redefinition of roles. Functional charts should be made for each activity and detailed job descriptions developed. In addition, consideration should be given to the feasibility of re-aligning Spanish and U.S. efforts. This would help to eliminate the overlapping functions. For example, one approach would be to give to the U.S.-Brazilian effort more of a field service role which emphasizes direct personalized and continuing contact with the markets. Organizationally, the Brazilian staff would become generalists, with one or more staff men assigned to each market. Conceivably, these roles could be filled by reassigning the federal supervisors to COTEC-Brasilia. It would be their responsibility to serve as the direct link between the market and COTEC on all types of activities. The "Field Service Specialist" is at once a general technician, an expeditor, and a liaison man between the field and headquarters. The benefits of this approach are these:

- a) This approach could provide for a sharp distinction between the roles of the two groups, eliminating the current duplication of effort.

b) The division of work in this form strengthens Dr. Nunes' capacity to maintain complete information on all field operations. Each Field Services Specialist would be required to be completely informed on all operations, problems and needs in his assigned area.

c) Administratively, the work of the Field Services Group could be much more easily directed by Dr. Nunes. Each of the Field Services representatives becomes a channel for fast technical services action.

d) There is the important benefit (essential to effective technical assistance) of giving each of the field operations a personal link to headquarters through their own Field Services Specialist. In turn, the COTEC Representative should be encouraged to feel a strong sense of responsibility for his assigned market. He should provide the personal link in what might otherwise become a bureaucratic procedure.

e) For the Field Services staff, this approach forces fast learning of a variety of activities. This kind of team approach is also easily assisted by a small group of generalists (such as the U.S. Advisory Group).

f) In their role as Field Services representatives, each staff member can work effectively with consultants and transmit COTEC-approved consultant recommendations quickly to the field operations.

g) For USAID, there would be clear evidence of the practical use of loan funds for implementation activities - the real goal of all technical assistance.

This concept strengthens the capacity for effective evaluation of field operations. It would be reasonable to have a small central research staff working on special projects. But the emphasis would clearly be of Field Services - and clearly away from any activity which did not have a direct bearing on actual operations. (See exhibit 4.)

2. Dr. Nunes holds the key role in terms of both research and implementation. There are extraordinary demands on his time. His management responsibilities are also complicated by political forces which are a natural part of this environment. The Evaluation Team recommends that Dr. Nunes give serious consideration to enlarging his senior staff as a means of reducing his own administrative workload.

3. The working environment can be considered as a factor in organizational effectiveness, and it would be difficult to find worse working conditions than those that now exist. Offices are crowded; the noise level is high; there are no quiet conference facilities. Staff productivity should increase sharply in more suitable quarters, far in excess of the cost of these facilities. While plans are in progress to move to better quarters, the move should take place as soon as possible.

4. The Evaluation Team also recommends that the future staffing plan include at least one full-time bilingual secretary. The U.S.-Brazilian group now operates with an absolute minimum of clerical staff support.

B. Coordination

1. As noted in the introduction to this section, USAID has remained somewhat remote from much of this program. This is a desirable posture normally, but some greater degree of involvement seems desirable now for two reasons: first, USAID/COBAL would become more sensitive to all the factors affecting actual project implementation; with COBAL requesting and USAID providing more direct help in fulfilling loan control requirements. Secondly, the Evaluation Team strongly recommends that Dr. Nunes assume a greater degree of responsibility for coordination with USAID.

2. There is reportedly a breakdown in coordination between INDE and COBAL in administration of L-083. The Evaluation Team also understands that INDE could be better informed on technical assistance services. It is recommended that the INDE designate one senior staff member to meet regularly with the COTEC counterpart to exchange information and maintain open lines of communication on technical assistance matters.

3. It is essential to muster support for the technical assistance effort from all agencies whose interests are even remotely related. There is a particular need to coordinate market development efforts with extension agency activities. It is recommended that Dr. Nunes and the Senior U.S. Advisor give particular attention to establishing stronger lines of communication with the agricultural extension agency. Some significant steps have already been taken by including extension agents in the loan-funded training programs. This kind of involvement should be continued.

C. General Operations

1. Caution should be exercised in scheduling training abroad for members of the Brazilian staff. While the need for training is apparent, plans should be made for their replacement and for their effective utilization upon completion of training.

2. Plans should also be developed to off-set the effect of the change of government (in March, 1974) on the loan-funded program. If key personnel changes take place in COBAL-COTEC, there could be a serious impact on program development.

3. The U.S. Advisory Group should begin documenting now the effect of technical assistance - following the basic indicator outlined in the Revised Implementation plan.

4. Evaluation of economic impact of wholesale markets as anticipated in the Revised plan should be given high priority by COBAL. Plan should indicate timing of this evaluation, staff requirements and funding.

5. More attention should be given to strengthening COTEC's staff capabilities in feasibility and cost-benefit analysis.

6. In an earlier section of the report, the Evaluation Team noted the relative merits of consultants versus resident staff. The ultimate objective in this situation should be the rapid development of in-house capabilities from among Brazilian staff members. Until that time, it seems essential that resident specialists in interior assembly markets be secured as quickly as possible and that further consideration be given to a resident professional in the field of grades and standards.

7. The hazy areas surrounding equipment planning must be resolved as soon as possible. USAID program officials should be kept informed of all progress in finalizing equipment expenditures.

8. We have noted earlier the importance of fast but orderly action in such priority fields as the market news service, training, and assembly markets. Under all circumstances, it is important that an element of central administrative control be exercised where possible. This kind of standard policy application will be of special importance in operation of the interior assembly markets. Toward this end, consideration should be given to having the individual CEASA markets manage the assembly markets in their own states. It would be helpful from both an administrative and a marketing standpoint for each CEASA to exercise this degree of control in their respective market systems. The CEASA should have responsibility for the training of assembly market personnel, under the general guidance of COTEC.

9. Special priority should be given to broadening the training program. It would be appropriate to consider adding an additional Brazilian staff member to assist in training planning and coordination, and also to develop any further refinements in general personnel policies.


10. While not now a part of the technical assistance commitment, the Brazilian Government is concerned, and the Evaluation Team concurs, that the U.S. Advisory Group take steps to stimulate interest in broader programs of rural credit as a follow-up to this program. At present, there are only limited types of credit for the small farmer. The demand for more credit will increase with completion of the assembly market system.


11. It is essential that the role of the middle-man in the total market system be followed with special care. In some markets, the middle-man emerges as the dominant force, potentially capable of victimizing the farmer and thereby negating some of the important benefits intended under this program. Assembly market management should be particularly concerned with this potential problem.

In summary - the highest priorities which warrant attention are:

- Clarification of the Organization Structure
- Redefinition of the U.S.-Brazilian Team Effort
- More effective Communication and Coordination with USAID and COB Agencies
- Particular Attention to Training, Development of Grades and Standards, and Implementation of the Interior Assembly Market System.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF CORAL





PLANO DE TRABALHO

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

I - COORDENAÇÃO GERAL

1. - Estabelecimento de um Programa de Prioridades (IV.1.)
2. - Coordenação do programa geral e dos planos parciais (IV.2.)
3. - Verificação periódica das tarefas e resultados com GEMAB - Cobal. (IV. 3.)
5. - Revisão e readaptação periódica do programa geral e dos planos parciais. (IV.4.)

II - DETERMINAÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DO PROGRAMA

1. - Magnitudes econômicas de Base (nacional) (I.1.)
2. - Estrutura de partida (I.2.)
3. - Política Nacional de Abastecimento (I.3.)
4. - Organismo que intervém na elaboração e programação do Programa (I.4.)
5. - Meios disponíveis (I.5.)
6. - Estudos básicos comparativos entre a situação atual e anterior (Metodologia) (II.5.)

III - TAREFAS ESPECIAIS

1. - Magnitudes econômicas de base (regional) (III.2.)
2. - Análise da Estrutura Comercial das áreas de influência. (III.3.)
3. - Análise dos contrastes entre os projetos e o dimensionamento das Centrais. (III.4.)
4. - Ajustes dos projetos e do dimensionamento de cada Central, às necessidades reais de área de influência (III.5.)
5. - Determinação de material e equipamentos de operação (III.6.)
6. - Elaboração de um programa de Inversões (III.9.)
7. - Análise de equilíbrio econômico financeiro de cada Central. (III.11 e 12.)
8. - Esboço e fixação de normas para controles técnicos, de funcionamento e gestão. (II.11.)

9. - Esboço e fixação de normas de proteção. (II.7.)
10. - Esboço e fixação de normas para a transferência do usuário. (II.8.)
11. - Esboço e fixação de normas para o estabelecimento de tarifas. (II.6.)

IV - TAREFAS ESPECÍFICAS DO PROGRAMA

1. - JURIDICAS

- a. Forma e constituição das Sociedades de Gestão. (II.1.)
- b. Esboço e fixação das normas jurídicas gerais. (II.2.)
- c. Redação dos Estatutos da Sociedade. (III.8.)
- d. Normas para implantação dos perímetros de cada Central (III.14.)

2. - TÉCNICO-OPERACIONAIS

- a.1. Determinação da área de influência de cada Central (III.1.)
- a.2. Determinação do perímetro de cada Central (III.14.)
- b. Operação de transferência dos comerciantes. (III.15.)
- c. Cálculo de tarifas aplicáveis. (III.13.)
- d. Promoção e formas de técnicas de comercialização. (III.23.)
- e. Promoção da Central para atrair novos usuários. (III.24.)
- f. Controles de Gestão, técnico e funcionamento. (III.17. e 18.)
- g. Regulamento de funcionamento interno. (III.16.)

3. - ADMINISTRATIVO E FINANCEIRO

- a. Estabelecer um grupo nacional de contabilidade e controle financeiro, de acordo com os procedimentos oficiais de contabilidade, orçamento e auditoria. (II.3.)
- b. Desenhar um sistema de controle contábil e financeiro nacional. (II.4.)
- c. Adotar um sistema de controle contábil e financeiro para as Centrais. (III.10.)
- d. Implementar o sistema de controle contábil e financeiro em cada Central. (II.9. e II.11.)
- e. Acompanhamento e revisão do sistema de controle contábil e financeiro. (II.11. e III.13.)
- f. Melhorar o funcionamento administrativo, operacional e eficiência nas Centrais de Abastecimento. (II.10. e III.17.)
- g. Desenvolver organogramas funcionais, descritivos, responsabilidades, hierarquia de pessoal e o inter-relacionamento funcional com os usuários. (III.7. e III.21.)

V - INFORMAÇÃO DE MERCADO (II.12. III.19. e III.20.)


VI - CLASSIFICAÇÃO E PADRONIZAÇÃO (II.13.)

VII - TREINAMENTO

1 - Treinamento de pessoal de direção (II.14.)

2 - Treinamento de pessoal específico da Central (III.22.)

ESQUEMA DE INTERELACOES DE TAREFAS





CRONOGRAMA DE TRABALHO ADAPTADO À PROPOSTA DA COBAC

T A P E S A S		P E R I O D O S											
		J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
1)-I	1) Estabelecimento de um Programa de Prioridades												
	2) Coordenação do programa geral e dos planos gerais												
	3) Verificação periódica das metas e resultados com SEMAS-COBAC												
	4) Revisão e reatualização periódica do programa geral e dos planos gerais												
2)-II	1) Magnitude econômica da base (nacional)												
	2) Estrutura do partido												
	3) Política Nacional de Abastecimento												
	4) Opções para intervenção de planejamento e programação do programa												
	5) Metas de planejamento												
	6) Estudos sobre a operação e controle da produção atual e anterior (fotocópia)												
3)-IV	1a) Forma e características das atividades do partido												
	1b) Análise e plano de normas jurídicas gerais												
	1c) Análise dos estatutos da Sociedade												
4)-III IV	1) Magnitude econômica da base nacional												
	2a) Análise da estrutura econômica das áreas de influência 2b) Determinação da taxa de inflação de cada Central												
5)-III	3) Análise dos contratos entre os produtores e o dimensionamento das Centrais												
	4) Análise dos produtores e do dimensionamento de cada Central, as necessidades reais de área de influência												
	5) Determinação de critérios e equipamentos de operação												
	6) Elaboração de um programa de intervenções												
6)-IV	3a) Elaborar um grupo nacional de contabilidade e controle financeiro, de acordo com os procedimentos oficiais de contabilidade, orçamento e auditoria												
	3b) Desenvolver um sistema de controle contábil e financeiro nacional												
	3c) Adotar um sistema de controle contábil e financeiro para as Centrais												
	3d) Implementar o sistema de controle contábil e financeiro em cada Central												

15

CRONOGRAMA DE TRABALHO ADAPTADO À PROPOSTA DA CCEAD

TAREFAS		PERÍODO					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
7)-III	1) Análise de requisitos necessários para a elaboração de cada Central	J	A	S	O	U	D
IV	2a) Elaboração de projeto de cada Central						
8)-III	3) Elaboração e fixação de normas de prestação						
IV	4a) Normas para implantação de prestação de cada Central						
9)-III	10) Elaboração e fixação de normas para a implementação de unidades						
IV	2b) Operação de unidades de cada Central						
10)-III	11) Elaboração e fixação de normas para o estabelecimento de tarifas						
IV	2c) Cálculo de tarifas aplicáveis						
III	8) Elaboração e fixação de normas p/ controles técnicos de funcionamento e gestão						
11)-IV	2f) Controles de gestão, técnicos e funcionamento						
	3a) Acompanhamento e melhoria do sistema de controle contábil e financeiro						
	3f) Melhorar o funcionamento administrativo, operacional e financeiro nas Centrais de Abastecimento						
12)-IV	3g) Regulamentos de funcionamento interno						
	3g) Desenvolver cronogramas funcionais, descritivos, responsabilidades, hierarquia de pessoal e a inter-relacionar com funcional em os municípios						
13)-IV	4a) Promoção e formas de abertura de comercialização						
	4a) Promoção de Central para atrair novos usuários						
14)-V	7) Informação de Mercado						
15)-VI	7) Identificação e Padronização						
16)-VII	11) Treinamento de pessoal de gestão						
	2) Treinamento de pessoal operativos da Central						

RECOMMENDED ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
FOR ADVISORY GROUPS

