

# DRIVING COORDINATION

## AN EVALUATION OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT'S OFFICE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

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# ABBREVIATIONS

AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CMM	Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID
COCOM	U.S. Combatant Command
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support Program
DCHA	Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FCI	Focus Country Initiative
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GEF	Guidance for the Employment of the Force
DCHA	Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, USAID
DLI	Development Leadership Initiative, USAID
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DODD 3000.05	Department of Defense Directive 3000.05
DOS	U.S. Department of State
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
JCOA	Joint Center for Operational Analysis
Mil-Rep	Military Representative
NSPD-44	National Security Presidential Directive 44
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid
OSD	U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SCRS	State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
TCAPF	Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## THE PROBLEM

There is too little coordination between the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD). There is currently no national foreign assistance strategy or clear guidance about which agency is the lead in providing or monitoring development assistance including in areas in conflict or crisis. Greater coordination would increase the U.S. Government's (USG) probability of successfully achieving its foreign policy goals in unstable environments, decrease unintended overlap of effort by different federal agencies, and preserve financial resources.

## OFFICE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

USAID's Office of Military Affairs (OMA) was created in 2005 to manage USAID's relationship with the Department of Defense and other interagency partners, assist USAID to raise its profile in the interagency process, and increase mutual understanding between those at USAID and DOD. OMA works primarily in three areas: training, planning and operations.

## EVALUATION RESULTS

This report reviews OMA's work over the past five years and presents strategies to improve its performance. The report evaluates OMA's progress in achieving four goals and finds that overall OMA has achieved the goals that were set for it by its leadership in 2005.

GOAL	RESULT
1) Improving USAID's relationship with DOD	Achieved
2) Raising USAID's profile in the interagency process	Achieved
3) Making efficient use of Department of Defense funds to meet development goals	Achieved in Part
4) Encouraging the use of more USAID resources to improve civilian-military coordination	Achieved with Others

The evaluation was conducted through review of materials produced by OMA, observation of OMA's training program, review of OMA's budget history, interviews with key experts and officials, and a review of interagency best practices. Methodological details can be found in Appendix A.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations in this report are designed to allow OMA to build on its successes, create a strategic plan of action for the short-term and the long-term, and to ensure that OMA uses its financial and human capital resources efficiently. The recommendations also take into account administrative and political feasibility, with the goal of ensuring that OMA can realistically accomplish the recommendations discussed herein.

Consistently, this report recommends the following:

RECOMMENDATIONS
1) Increase the number of staff exchanged with DOD
2) Create a robust "inreach" program at USAID
3) Institutionalize successful processes for engaging with DOD

USAID's Office of Military Affairs is at a crossroads. Former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios created OMA in April 2005 to facilitate and expand USAID's relationship with the Department of Defense and to ensure that it, to the extent possible, increased the effectiveness with which USAID and DOD worked together.

OMA has accomplished its initial goals, but remains a young office driven by individuals committed to making interagency relationships work. If it is able to develop a clear identity inside USAID, institutionalize its successful practices and transition to long-term thinking it will be poised to develop a reputation as a focal point of interagency collaboration in the USG.

# THE PROBLEM

There is too little coordination between the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD). There is currently no national foreign assistance strategy or clear guidance about which agency is the lead in providing or monitoring development assistance including in areas in conflict or crisis. Greater coordination would increase the U.S. Government's (USG) probability of successfully achieving its foreign policy goals in unstable environments, decrease unintended overlap of effort by different federal agencies, and preserve financial resources.

In the past, the lack of coordination between USAID and DOD has caused significant problems for USAID missions. The military has unintentionally harmed long-term USAID projects in developing countries because military planners and DOD personnel on the ground were not aware of USAID's presence. For example, DOD unintentionally crippled a USAID program to increase veterinary medicine skills in Ethiopia by vaccinating all livestock there.<sup>1</sup> This type of negative effect wastes USG financial and human capacity resources, and only serves to increase friction between those at USAID and DOD.

DOD has also suffered from a lack of development expertise. As DOD is more often faced with unconventional warfare situations including threats from non-state actors, terrorist networks and other complex security problems, it increasingly needs to engage with local populations and focus on activities outside its traditional war-fighting role. Without clear lines of communication with USAID, DOD has been unable to call on development experts to ensure that its efforts are as successful as possible.

USAID's Office of Military Affairs (OMA) is tasked with increasing coordination between USAID and DOD to avoid these types of inefficiencies. This report assesses OMA's progress in achieving four primary goals: (1) Improving USAID's relationship with DOD; (2) Raising USAID's profile in the interagency process; (3) Making efficient use of Department of Defense funds to meet development goals; and (4) Encouraging the use of more USAID resources to improve civilian-military coordination. It also makes strategic recommendations to ensure that OMA is able to build on past successes, institutionalize its successful practices and transition to long-term thinking so that it is able to develop a reputation as a focal point of interagency collaboration in the USG.

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<sup>1</sup> OMA training, 2010.

# THE POLICY CONTEXT

“The importance of deploying civilian expertise has been relearned—the hard way...”  
 -Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, November 27, 2007<sup>2</sup>

## USAID’S EVOLVING MISSION

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the principal U.S. agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, attempting to move out of poverty, and enacting democratic reform. President John F. Kennedy created USAID in 1961 to implement development assistance programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). While USAID is an independent federal agency that receives foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State, it is a tense relationship that has been characterized by changes in the level of USAID’s autonomy over time<sup>3</sup> and a struggle about which agency should be the lead provider of U.S. development assistance. Over the past several years, many foreign aid experts have called for USAID to have a cabinet-level leader as one method to clarify the roles between the Department of State (DOS) and USAID.<sup>4</sup>

USAID has traditionally focused on development in steady state environments by supporting economic growth, protecting global health, encouraging agricultural advances, and fostering democracy. The Agency operates in five regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Eurasia and the Middle East and currently operates in approximately 100 developing countries.<sup>5</sup> However, major global events have spurred USAID to expand its focus over time. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Congo, Rwanda and elsewhere during the 1990’s, USAID leadership created the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to ensure that the Agency was equipped to handle political responses. They also created the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) to provide technical assistance to countries emerging from conflict.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq rapidly increased USAID’s involvement in conflict situations and catalyzed the creation of OMA as a focal point for USAID-DOD communication and planning. Realizations by military and civilian leaders that increased coordination between DOD and the civilian agencies could help the U.S. achieve its foreign policy goals and resulting calls for a “whole of government approach” by President George W. Bush’s administration<sup>6</sup> have continued to increase the mandate for integration of civilian and military collaboration.<sup>7</sup> USAID has responded by providing the military with more development expertise in conflict and crisis situations.

## DOD’S INCREASING NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT EXPERTISE

<sup>2</sup> Ann Scott Tyson, “Gates Urges Increased Funding for Diplomacy, Secretary Calls for Use of ‘Soft Power’”, *Washington Post*, November 27, 2007, p. A02.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Carothers, *Revitalizing Democracy Assistance: The Challenge of USAID*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009 p. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Susan B. Epstein, *Foreign Aid Reform, National Strategy and the Quadrennial Review*, Congressional Research Service, April 10, 2010, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> USAID, *USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It*, January, 2006, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Walter Pincus, “Pentagon Recommends ‘Whole-of-Government’ National Security Plans,” *Washington Post*, February 2, 2009.

<sup>7</sup> Leaders at many agencies, in the White House and in Congress have realized that there is a need for greater coordination across the USG, including coordinated civilian-military responses. Several projects have emerged to promote increased planning, coordination and information across federal agencies. For example, in 2005 and 2006 Project Horizon brought together U.S. Government senior executives from global affairs agencies and the National Security Council staff to develop strategic interagency capabilities in which the USG should consider investing, to provide a scenario-planning toolset that can be used to support both internal agency planning and planning across agencies, and to provide a starting point for an institutionalized interagency planning process.

## DRIVING COORDINATION

The Department of Defense has as its mission to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the United States. DOD's three major components are the Army, Navy and Air Force. DOD also contains the many other agencies tasked with securing the country's defense including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

DOD's strategic direction has changed over time, with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan catalyzing a more rapid embrace of integrated civilian-military operations and planning. Confronting complex and decentralized terrorist cells and non-state actors has changed the nature of DOD's strategy and operations. Where appropriate, it has substituted traditional war fighting for a response that necessitates more civilian expertise including building the capacity of emerging governments, building relationships with local populations, spurring economic growth and encouraging democratic governance.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap, a document designed to articulate military strategy, states that the current national security environment requires "unified statecraft"—that all government agencies integrate their efforts into a unified strategy.<sup>8</sup> In an effort to successfully integrate military and civilian planning, DOD has led the way toward integrated civilian and military responses to conflict, disasters and reconstruction by increasingly calling upon its civilian partners to provide development expertise in conflict and post-conflict environments. The sea change in thinking about the importance of civilian expertise in military endeavors, particularly with regard to development and stabilization, was reflected by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' call for a "dramatic increase" in funding for diplomacy in 2007.

## LEARNING FROM IRAQ

"Obviously, I joined the Army to become a tanker, to drive my tank into battle, but as you can see there are no tanks here. But this is the mission."

-U.S. Soldier in Iraq, 2010<sup>9</sup>

The conflict in Iraq has showcased the ways the military and civilian agencies must work together to effectively counter diffuse terrorist threats.<sup>10</sup> Officials involved in the planning and execution of the Iraq war were too slow in realizing that interagency collaboration was paramount to the war effort. The lack of coordination and consultation with civilian experts, including the USAID Administrator, caused major delays in implementing effective strategies, the loss of large sums of money, and some have argued that it severely damaged the image of the U.S. abroad.<sup>11</sup>

In a 2009 report on the status of interagency collaboration, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that, "since 2005 multiple U.S. agencies—including the State Department, USAID, and DOD—led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq's ministries to govern, without overarching direction from a lead entity to integrate their efforts."<sup>12</sup> This lack of an overarching strategy contributed to problems in interagency collaboration throughout the Iraq war experience. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), tasked with providing oversight of the U.S. effort in Iraq, also found a deep divide in civilian-military planning and execution of the Iraq war. The SIGIR report notes that one of the major

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<sup>8</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap*, May 2006, p.5.

<sup>9</sup> Tim Arango, "G.I.'s, New to Iraq, Hear the Election Explosions," *New York Times*, March 7, 2010.

<sup>10</sup> GAO, *Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing*, September 2009, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009.

<sup>12</sup> Government Accountability Office, "Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing." September 25, 2009. [www.gao.gov/new.items/d09904sp/pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09904sp/pdf)

themes of the war thus far has been “the poor integration of interagency efforts caused by weak unity of command and inconsistent unity of effort.”<sup>13</sup>

### LEGISLATION AND DIRECTIVES

In response to the frequently cited failure of interagency collaboration in Iraq, Afghanistan and other areas of conflict, President George W. Bush, the Congress, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued directives, legislation and policies designed to structure and incentivize that collaboration.

- The 2002 National Security Strategy, a document released by the Executive Branch to outline the country’s major national security priorities, established defense, diplomacy and development as the three pillars of U.S. foreign policy.<sup>14</sup> This was the first time DOD officially linked diplomacy and development to the success of U.S. national security. The 2006 National Security Strategy acknowledged that ungoverned, insecure and poverty-stricken areas are susceptible to the influence of terrorists. The Strategy therefore pledged that the United States will work to bolster threatened states, provide humanitarian relief, and build the capacity of developing governments.<sup>15</sup>
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England issued Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05) in November 2005, which states that stability operations should be given the same priority as combat operations. As such, it mandates that DOD must be able to conduct and support stability operations and that stability operations be explicitly addressed and integrated across DOD activities. DODD 3000.05 makes it clear that DOD may not be best suited to carry out reconstruction and stabilization, but that in the absence of civilian capacity it will step in to do so. Since the directive’s release, DOD has incorporated stabilization and reconstruction into its planning and doctrine.<sup>16</sup> DODD 3000.05 has led to a marked increase throughout the services in attempts to bring civilian partners into planning and operational situations that could benefit from a development or state-building perspective.
- President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44) in December 2005 to assign the State Department the lead in managing government-wide civilian preparation for contingency operations. NSPD 44 created within the State Department a Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (SCRS) responsible for coordinating and leading USG efforts at improving reconstruction and stabilization abroad.<sup>17</sup> SCRS focuses on “improving civilian response capability and leading interagency teams to initiate planning and response efforts” in crisis and post-conflict countries.<sup>18</sup>

### POTENTIAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

The end of the Cold War and the rise of modern terrorist groups have forced a change in the way the USG conducts its national security. It is making collaboration increasingly necessary and will continue to require the integration of activities directed at civilian populations in developing countries with combat activities. Several forthcoming documents could reshape the ways that USAID, State and DOD are organized and relate to each other.

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<sup>13</sup> Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009, p. viii.

<sup>14</sup> USAID, *Fragile States Policy*, January 2005 p.v.

<sup>15</sup> USAID, *Civilian Military Cooperation Policy*, July 2006 p.2.

<sup>16</sup> USAID, *Civilian Military Cooperation Policy*, July 2006 p.2.

<sup>17</sup> SIGIR *Hard Lessons* p. 339, USAID, *Civilian Military Cooperation Policy*, July 2006 p.2.

<sup>18</sup> USAID, *Fragile States Policy*, January 2005 p 2.

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- The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) could reorganize the Department of State and USAID in an effort to modernize and streamline their efforts to face complex challenges on foreign soil.<sup>19</sup> The first phase of the report was scheduled to be released in April 2010 and should be released in short order. The final report will be released in September 2010.
- In August 2009 President Barack Obama signed a Presidential Study Directive on U.S. Global Development Policy (PSD). The PSD authorized a U.S. government-wide review of global development Policy including the activities of agencies involved in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. An interagency committee made up of representatives from sixteen government departments and agencies is conducting the study and the committee's final report is expected in Spring 2010. According to Administration officials, the PSD process is coordinated with the QDDR.<sup>20</sup>
- The Congress may rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), which in 1961 reorganized existing U.S. foreign assistance programs, separated military and non-military foreign aid, and authorized the creation of USAID. If the House and Senate rewrite the FAA in the 111<sup>th</sup> or the 112<sup>th</sup> Congresses, it is likely that the offices responsible for coordinating civilian-military engagement would be reorganized or merged.

This report assumes the possibilities of OMA's merger with another office, placement in another part of USAID, or closure in the future. However, the recommendations take into account that any major structural changes to DOS and USAID will not occur for at least one year, and could not occur for the foreseeable future.



**Figure 1: Legislation and Directives Related to Civilian-Military Coordination**

<sup>19</sup> The QDDR will offer guidance on how the Department of State and USAID, “develop policies; how we allocate our resources; how we deploy our staff; and how we exercise our authorities.” <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125956.htm>>

<sup>20</sup> Susan B. Epstein, Foreign Aid Reform, National Strategy and the Quadrennial Review, Congressional Research Service, April 10, 2010, p. 12.

## THE CURRENT STATUS OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY COORDINATION

Currently there is too little civilian-military coordination. While USAID and DOD coordinate more now than before 2005 when OMA was created, efforts at coordination are largely ad hoc and there is much room for increased collaboration.

Current civilian-military planning is hampered by the fact that “senior decision makers within each agency, particularly within DOD are more comfortable with vertical planning” than conducting interagency planning because “it enables them to develop their plan fully before allowing other agencies to critique it.”<sup>21</sup> With very different planning processes, USAID and DOD are still learning how to integrate their planning activities. DOD has requested USAID input into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), two important planning documents. However, USAID has little input into DOD country plans.

Confusion about chain of command in the field is another severe impediment to successful interagency collaboration. Some within the military have argued that “lack of unity of effort is perhaps the most significant impediment to operational-level interagency action today” and that unity of command is necessary to bring about such unity of effort.<sup>22</sup> Without clear chain of command, the vision of interagency cooperation and integration that exists at the policy level does not translate to the operational level. General Peter Pace described the problem in 2004: “The problem comes after [the President of the United States] makes the decision. The various parts of the government take their various pieces and go back to work on them. No one below the president has control over the totality of the process. And if there are disagreements among the various players, it has to go back to the president for resolution.”<sup>23</sup>

Important cultural differences also exist between USAID and DOD that hamper efforts at coordination. USAID’s primary mission is to help lift people out of poverty, provide access to basic services, and ensure health. It follows that the Agency’s staff tend to be oriented toward long-term projects and relationship building. On the other hand, DOD is based on a hierarchical model designed to quickly use force to protect and defend. Its staff therefore tends to be oriented toward short-term efforts designed to take immediate effect.

As in any situation in which different organizational cultures exist, stereotypes have taken root. Specific stereotypes are that USAID is informal, has slow but creative planning processes, and coordinates carefully while DOD is formal, fast but often repetitive, and acts unilaterally. More general stereotypes are that USAID personnel are incapable of quick action and very liberal while DOD personnel are conservative and overly aggressive. In order for OMA to successfully target its efforts, it is important that it frankly addresses the cultural differences between USAID and DOD as well as stereotypes that have become pervasive.

## FUNDING FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AGENCIES: THE TENSION BETWEEN GOALS AND CAPACITY

Cultural and organizational differences between USAID and DOD are informed by the very different budgets of the two agencies. As of 2006 the ratio of military spending to spending on diplomatic and foreign aid programs was 12:1<sup>24</sup> As of FY2010, that ratio had climbed to 13:1 despite increases in the budgets of

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<sup>21</sup> Bogdanos, Matthew F., “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 37 p. 15.

<sup>22</sup> Coffey, Major Ross, “Revisiting CORDS, The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq,” *Military Review* March-April 2006, p. 24.

<sup>23</sup> Garamone, Jim, “Agencies Must Coordinate to Win War on Terror,” *American Forces Information Service*, September 15, 2004. <[http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/n09152004\\_2004091514.htm](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/n09152004_2004091514.htm)>

<sup>24</sup> Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” December 15, 2006, p. 4.

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the civilian agencies. The Fiscal Year 2010 Congressional appropriation for DOD is \$663.7 billion<sup>25</sup> while the FY10 Congressional appropriation for both Department of State and USAID is \$51.7 billion.<sup>26</sup>

After many years of reduced funding, the Congress has increased appropriations to USAID for personnel and operations over the last several years. In FY2008 USAID received \$930 million, in FY2009 the amount was increased to \$1.6 billion and \$1.7 billion in FY10.<sup>27</sup> A large bump in USAID's funding is due to the Development Leadership Initiative (DLI), which was created in 2008 to increase the number of USAID foreign service officers by 300 per year for three years. USAID received \$12.2 million for the DLI in FY08, \$72 million in FY09, \$306.6 million in FY10 and has requested \$354.8 million for the program in FY11.<sup>28</sup>



**Figure 2: DOS and DOD Budgets, FY2006-FY2010, in billions [Office of Management and Budget]**

As they have increasingly called on their civilian partners to engage in key conflict and post-conflict situations, many in the Department of Defense have become aware of the large difference in capacity of the agencies. DOD currently has approximately 2.4 million employees and in FY10 has a budget of \$663.7 billion. USAID, on the other hand, has approximately 2,200 direct-hire employees<sup>29</sup> and in FY10 has a budget of \$1.7 billion.

The enormous scale of this difference was illustrated during an OMA training course for new Foreign Service Officers at USAID.<sup>30</sup> A Military Representative presented a slide describing the Foreign Area Officer program, a military program to produce officers with detailed regional expertise. Those in the room realized

<sup>25</sup> "Summary: FY10 Defense Appropriations," House Committee on Appropriations, December 15, 2009.

<sup>26</sup> "Summary: FY10 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations," House Committee on Appropriations, December 8, 2010.

<sup>27</sup> Office of Management and Budget, *A New Era of Responsibility, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget*, p. 54.

<sup>28</sup> Office of Management and Budget, *A New Era of Responsibility, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget*, p. 88.


<sup>29</sup> This figure includes USAID direct hires as of 2008 but omits the many contractors employed by USAID. USAID permanent employees administer more than \$8 billion in aid, including hiring large U.S. firms who use contractors to carry out many USAID projects in the field. USAID has been criticized for relying too heavily on Personal Service Contractors (PSC) and Foreign Service Limited appointments (FSL) and the FY10 and FY11 budgets have attempted to reduce the Agency's use of these types of contractors. For more on USAID staffing and contractors see *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing a Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness*, American Academy of Diplomacy, October 2008.

<sup>30</sup> OMA DLI Training 2010.

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that what is considered by the Army to be a very small program to assist senior military leaders make culturally-informed and appropriate decisions has more personnel than all USAID Foreign Service Officers combined.

Beyond the problem of budgets and human resources, expecting civilian agencies to immediately engage in security, stabilization and reconstruction operations ignores that both USAID and State have traditionally operated in steady state environments while DOD is focused on contingency response.<sup>31</sup>



**Figure 3: Traditional Organizational Orientations of DOS, USAID and DOD**

While USAID is becoming more focused on contingency response and DOD is taking on more work in the steady state environment, the historical orientations of the agencies has two important implications. First, the majority of USAID and DOS personnel are already deployed to posts around the world and are therefore unable to deploy rapidly to engage in crisis response. Second, USAID and DOS have different views of the scope of their work than does DOD. USAID and DOS have tended to focus on long-term programs and relationship building to meet complex and often loosely defined goals. DOD, on the other hand, focuses on short-term actions to meet clearly defined objectives. In short, civilian agencies are now routinely and frequently called upon by DOD to participate in actions outside what, until recently, have been their basic missions.<sup>32</sup> OMA is tasked with doing everything possible to bridge this gap between USAID and DOD.

## OMA'S ROLE AS A COORDINATOR

OMA was created in 2005 to manage USAID's relationship with DOD and other interagency partners, assist USAID to raise its profile in the interagency process, and increase mutual understanding between those at USAID and DOD. Andrew Natsios, USAID Administrator from 2001 to 2006, was a proponent of having a focal point within USAID for engagement with the military. As a twenty-three year veteran of the U.S. Army Reserves, including service in the Gulf War, Natsios was familiar with military planning and

<sup>31</sup> Szayna, Thomas S., Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett II, Brooke Steans Lawson, Terrence K. Kelly, Zachary Haldeman, *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations*, RAND, 2009, p xviii. Under the Guidance of the Employment of the Force, USAID and DOS are not focused solely on the steady state, an indicator of the agencies' move away from their traditional roles as actors in stable environments.

<sup>32</sup> Szayna et al argue that, "civilian agencies are asked to participate in a process that is outside of their basic mission." Given the increasing emphasis on integrating civilian-military operations and planning over the past several years, I argue that the mission of civilian agencies has evolved to include more rapid-response activity.

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operations and the benefits that could be realized by including development experts in military planning. He brought Tom Baltazar, another veteran, on board as OMA's first director and John Champagne, a former member of the Special Forces and Senior USAID Foreign Service Office, served as an advisor to the office. As OMA's director, Baltazar aggressively worked to increase OMA's funding. The office has grown rapidly and today has 32 employees.

OMA works primarily in three areas: training, planning and operations. It is a lean office, with 28 of its 32 staff members concentrated in Operations, Training and Plans and only three administrative staff. It operates at a fast pace with personnel working independently and in small teams to respond to DOD requests for USAID action, coordinate with DOD counterparts and counterparts in other agencies, target the most effective recipients of their efforts, and strategize about the best ways to continue to facilitate cooperation between USAID and DOD. Many staff travel often to communicate directly with DOD, to attend military training exercises, to conduct trainings or to coordinate efforts in crisis situations as they emerge. Because each non-administrative staff member has a large potential pool of people to communicate with in the COCOMs and throughout DOD, they have developed many of their own best practices to create impact without a large amount of financial or human resources from which to draw upon.

Tom Baltazar was Director of OMA from 2005 to 2009. Elena Brineman has been appointed Director, but is slated to retire next year. She has not had a Deputy Director on hand to assist with charting a course for the office.



**Figure 4:** OMA Staff by Functional Area [OMA]

# EVALUATION

## GOAL I: IMPROVING USAID'S RELATIONSHIP WITH DOD

OMA has been very effective at improving USAID's relationship with DOD. The primary methods that OMA has used to reach out to DOD have addressed both perceived differences between the two offices and the lack of channels for communication between the two agencies on areas of common activity.

### TRAINING PROGRAM

One important avenue for improving USAID's relationship with DOD are the many types of trainings OMA conducts, detailed in the table below. OMA conducts training with its own staff, jointly with DOD and as part of interagency teams. Training is part of OMA's core functions—it breaks down barriers with DOD and other agencies, helps educate partners about USAID's mission and OMA's role as a coordinator, and creates cultural ambassadors able to interface between agencies.

TYPE OF TRAINING	PERSONNEL TRAINED	NUMBER TRAINED
1 Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF)	USAID, DOD	1,650
2 Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)	USAID, DOD, other agencies	640
3 Development Leadership Initiative (DLI)	USAID	15
4 USAID I01, OMA I01, and DOD I01 Briefs	USAID, DOD, other agencies	1,000

OMA has trained 1,650 DOD and USAID personnel on the use of the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) with the majority of the training sessions given to military personnel. TCAPF is a simple diagnostic tool that helps field personnel identify and develop activities to mitigate the sources of instability as identified by the local population's perspective.

OMA, as part of an interagency team that includes DOD and DOS, conducts three-week training courses for those scheduled to become members of Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRT training course is provided every nine months at Camp Atterbury to members of future Provincial Reconstruction Teams and is provided in conjunction with members of the Army's 189<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade. OMA does not regularly tally the total number of personnel who have undergone the PRT training course but estimates that as of 2009, 640 personnel were trained for PRTs. Of the 640, approximately 600 were DOD personnel and approximately 40 were personnel from other agencies. This training both promotes efficient collaboration by civilian and military personnel in PRTs by educating them about avenues for cooperation, and embodies the interagency efficiency that OMA seeks to encourage. OMA staff work with an interagency team to prepare training materials for a course taught by military personnel, producing material informed by both civilian and military staff.

A third type of training conducted by OMA is for new USAID Foreign Service Officers hired through the Development Leadership Initiative (DLI). The course, which was first held in February 2010, is principally for DLI participants who have been posted to countries with conflict, post-conflict or crisis situations<sup>33</sup> but also trains some other new hires. OMA has now trained fifteen DLI participants.

<sup>33</sup> OMA trains DLIs with Backstop 76 distinction, Crisis Stabilization and Governance.

## DRIVING COORDINATION

OMA's training team and others on the OMA staff also provide briefs to military and other interagency audiences on USAID 101, OMA 101, and DOD 101. The office does not currently compile a running total of the number of individuals given these training sessions<sup>34</sup> but estimate that the total is approximately 1,000.<sup>35</sup> These trainings explain each agency or office's mission, basic functions and areas of operation.

OMA is aware of the cultural differences between USAID and DOD and has adopted trainings designed to bridge the cultural gaps. For example, the "USAID 101" course takes pains to ensure that participants learn that USAID missions are "deliberately not too visible" and that USAID personnel working in developing countries often work through local personnel to ensure that projects are sustainable. As OMA continues its training efforts it is likely to continue to increase collaboration between USAID and DOD. However, it is important to note that because USAID and DOD have different primary missions, they will always have different cultures, and that is appropriate. OMA seeks to increase understanding between DOD and USAID, not to make USAID into a defense agency with development expertise.

### STAFF EXCHANGES WITH DOD

A second vital element in OMA's push to ensure that those at USAID and DOD are familiar with each other's cultures, develop personal relationships, and communicate more often about potential joint efforts are staff exchanges. OMA has built robust professional relationships with the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) by placing senior USAID staff in five geographic COCOMs, the Special Operations Command and the Joint Staff as Senior Development Advisers. DOD has provided corresponding Military Representatives (MilReps) to USAID to provide day-to-day coordination with the regional and sectoral bureaus. OMA currently houses six MilReps and eight USAID staff members serve as Senior Development Advisers at the COCOMs, the Special Operations Command and the J-5 Directorate in the Pentagon.

The staff exchange program has accomplished two important tasks. First, the staff exchanges have provided a key avenue for increased communication between USAID regional bureaus and the COCOMs. This communication has led to more coordinated planning, awareness on the part of DOD of ongoing USAID projects in countries in which DOD operates, and many efforts to engage cooperatively. These efforts have reduced the number of occasions in which it was possible for DOD to adversely affect a USAID project unintentionally because it did not know it existed, and have increased the financial and operational efficiency of the USG by pairing DOD's financial and staff resources with USAID's technical and development expertise.

Second, the staff-sharing program has broken down interpersonal barriers to cooperation. Those in DOD and USAID have commented that they have found commonalities in their shared interest in getting things done—they are both satisfied when they create tangible changes. Inside USAID, having uniformed military personnel at meetings, in shared space, and engaged in USAID work has helped eliminate the idea many in USAID have had that their work is often in opposition to that of the military.

### PLANNING AND COORDINATION

A third important element in OMA's effort to build relationships with DOD is OMA's robust engagement in DOD planning and coordination efforts. OMA staff have engaged in as many DOD planning meetings, roundtables and exercises as is feasible for the office. OMA staff has coordinated USAID input for the Guidance for the Development of the Force (GEF) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), both extremely important documents that guide DOD planning for the two and four years, respectively.

OMA staff has also coordinate USAID's participation in several military training exercises. One example is Austere Challenge 09, a joint exercise held by the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to increase

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<sup>34</sup> OMA staff email, March 18, 2010.

<sup>35</sup> OMA staff estimate.

## DRIVING COORDINATION

EUCOM's ability to respond to a complex threat. One of Austere Challenge 09's training objectives was to achieve integration of joint civilian and military planning processes. OMA's coordination of USAID's participation in such military training exercises educates civilian and military personnel on the development-defense nexus and increases the likelihood that military and civilian agencies will be able to respond effectively in crisis situations. It also increases DOD's awareness of OMA as a focal point for communication with USAID.

OMA has begun an effort to coordinate USAID country plans with DOD planning, a decision that is likely to produce even more gains in coordination and effective use of financial and human capital resources. This process has the potential to greatly improve DOD and USAID awareness of efforts in the countries in which both USAID and DOD have a presence.

### GOAL 2: RAISING USAID'S PROFILE IN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS

OMA has been successful in raising USAID's profile in the interagency process, This is especially pronounced with DOD. Ensuring that military personnel have a more accurate understanding of USAID's mission and capacity is an important condition for fruitful collaboration between the two agencies.

Before the invasion of Iraq, many in DOD mistakenly viewed USAID as either inactive in affairs that pertained to them, or much larger than the organization really was. In 2002, as the White House planned for the invasion of Iraq, many involved in the planning process viewed USAID as a minor player. Simultaneously, the National Security Council incorrectly assumed that USAID's disaster response teams could handle humanitarian crises, rebuild Iraq's infrastructure and assist the country's transition to democracy.<sup>36</sup> Either view led to frustration on the part of those in the military. If they viewed USAID as a minor player, those at DOD were surprised that the Agency argued that it should be included in the war effort. If they viewed USAID as having much larger capacity than it did, those at DOD were frustrated that the agency could not rapidly deploy its experts to areas of conflict.

OMA's efforts have provided many in DOD with a more accurate perception of USAID's mission, the types of development projects it is engaged in, and the many countries in which it has a presence. This education has led many in DOD to respect the work of USAID's mission teams which are staffed with experts in health, agriculture, finance, and democratic governance and who have an in-depth understanding of the countries and cultures in which they work.

The understanding that many OMA staff have of the military has also led to an increased respect for USAID as a whole. Some at DOD have stereotyped those at USAID as liberal and anti-military.<sup>37</sup> The fact that OMA personnel have an understanding of the practices and culture of the portion of DOD with which they work has served to ameliorate that stereotype. Additionally, that OMA houses uniformed military personnel has visibly demonstrated to many in the services and at the Pentagon that USAID is comfortable, to a certain degree, working hand-in-hand with the military.

### GOAL 3: MAKING EFFICIENT USE OF DOD FUNDS TO MEET DEVELOPMENT GOALS

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<sup>36</sup> Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009, p. 18.

<sup>37</sup> Interviews with DOD and USAID personnel.

## DRIVING COORDINATION

OMA has been successful in part in making efficient use of DOD funds to meet development goals, largely by improving the outcomes of projects carried out with DOD funding. However, evaluating OMA's effect on the flow of funds from DOD to USAID is necessarily limited because of the lack of available financial information. OMA itself does not have exact figures for the amount of DOD transfers to USAID. Despite placing a request for information on DOD transfers to USAID, OMA has yet to receive the information from USAID's Financial Management office. The problem is also informed by the fact that in light of its total budget, these funds are a very small amount of DOD's budget. DOD therefore does not focus on tracking each account. Knowing the precise amount of each type of funding that is directed to USAID projects would help OMA more successfully target its efforts to assist USAID country teams tap into funds earmarked for reconstruction and stabilization.

Evaluating the outcomes of projects carried out via DOD funding is inherently difficult. First, many projects carried out by USAID and DOD with CERP, I207 and OHDACA funding are done so in conflict, post-conflict or crisis situations. Such projects tend to be focused on outcomes such as capacity building and improving democratic governance, which are not fully captured by quantitative measures. However, based on the experiences of those interviewed for this evaluation, overall progress has been made in coordinating and executing USAID-DOD projects in the field since OMA's creation in 2005. Those interviewed reported that since OMA was established, a greater portion of projects carried out in conflict and crisis settings have been done so with cooperation between DOD and USAID. In particular, interviewees note that an increase in the portion of projects in which USAID mission teams were able to work with the military to expand projects planned or operated on a small scale by USAID staff. They also report a greater portion of projects funded by DOD have had a long-term impact, largely due to the advice of USAID's development experts about how DOD could best target its resources.

Progress in the coordination and execution of USAID-DOD projects can be attributed at least in part to several OMA efforts. First, OMA's work to educate those at USAID and DOD, especially targeting training to those entering conflict and crisis situations, has improved the understanding each type of personnel has of the other agency. It has also increased awareness of the ways they can work together. Before such trainings, it was often unclear to those at USAID that they could reach out to their military partners for funding, and it was often unclear to those in the military how to engage with civilians who are outside of their chain of command and who often have different skill sets.

Second, USAID has been able to influence the outcomes of projects funded with Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), I207 and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding.<sup>38</sup> Congress appropriates CERP, I207 and OHDACA funds for reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The use of such funds to support or expand ongoing USAID projects is often an extremely efficient use of USG funds because it eliminates replication of efforts by multiple agencies, enhances the effects and reach of current USAID projects, and provides the military with uses of funds informed by country experts. Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 authorizes DOD to transfer up to \$100 million per fiscal year to DOS for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries. DOD transferred \$10 million in FY2006, \$99.7 million in FY2007, and \$100 million in FY2008. I207 funds have supported projects in 18 countries.<sup>39</sup> Of the \$99.7 million in I207 funding allocated in FY09, USAID was able to funnel approximately 80 percent of that funding to USAID projects.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> OMA staff email to author, March 29, 2010.

<sup>39</sup> Nina M. Serafino, *Department of Defense "Section 1207" Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns*, Congressional Research Service, February 4, 2010, p.2.

<sup>40</sup> OMA staff email to author, March 29, 2010.

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TYPE OF DOD FUNDING	USE	OMA ACTIVITY
1 Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP)	Funds to be used at the discretion of commanders in the field	Provide development input to project formulation
2 I207	Up to \$100 million per fiscal year to support reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries	Provide civilian-military perspective for I207 proposals
3 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA)	Funds to provide humanitarian aid, avert crises, promote regional stability and conflict recovery	Provide development input for project formulation

Third, in 2008 OMA and DOD created the Focus Country Initiative (FCI) to better coordinate development, defense, and diplomacy in countries where USAID missions currently operate, to highlight the ways USAID missions can benefit from interacting with their DOD counterparts, and to demonstrate the ways USAID missions can tap into DOD funds for security and stabilization. OMA also used success stories of military-civilian coordination by FCI countries to motivate other USAID missions to reach out to their DOD counterparts.

Albania was selected as one of the first five FCI countries and is descriptive of FCIs effects. The effort provided both the USAID mission team and the U.S. military forces working in Albania with ideas about how to work together, and how to use resources to enhance the effectiveness of the other institutions' resources. In Albania, that discussion led to the use of DOD humanitarian assistance resources to provide telemedicine and remote diagnostic technology, making a long-term USAID effort to increase Albania's health care capacity more effective.<sup>41</sup>

## GOAL 4: ENCOURAGING THE USE OF MORE USAID RESOURCES TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN-MILITARY COORDINATION

USAID is currently spending more on civilian-military coordination and programs than it did when OMA was created in 2005. However, the increase in spending on civilian-military coordination is due in a large part to increased Congressional appropriations for such programs. It is likely that OMA only tangentially affected the increase in funding for USAID civilian-military efforts and that wider acknowledgement of the increased importance of the role in development in reducing conflict and mitigating disaster has driven the funding increase.

Given the large demands placed on USAID to provide development expertise to military partners, the Agency allocated few resources to coordinating with the military before 2005. In order to ensure that development goals were taken into account in military planning and operations, former Administrator Andrew Natsios, OMA Director Tom Baltazar and those involved in the creation of OMA believed that an increase spending on personnel and programs designed to liaise with DOD was necessary.

Increases in general USAID funds have been directly tied to the Agency's role in security and stabilization. The FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations states with regard to increased USAID funds that, "It is both right and smart for the U.S. to renew its leadership in the promotion of opportunity and security around the world. In addition to increased accountability and transparency, as well as innovation, efforts to modernize U.S. foreign assistance will pay significant returns in global security and

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<sup>41</sup> Interview with USAID personnel.

## DRIVING COORDINATION

prosperity.”<sup>42</sup> USAID’s increases in budget are being justified as expenditures that will produce gains in security—recognition of the necessity of integrated civilian-military operations given non-traditional combat and conflict situations.

The FY10 USAID budget provides \$2.45 billion in program funding for the Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) Bureau, which houses OMA and several other offices that are designed for conflict assistance and stabilization situations. This is an increase of over \$268 million from FY09. Additionally, the FY10 USAID budget includes several funds specifically designated for crisis response. A Stabilization Bridge Fund of \$40 million is designed to “provide immediate infusions into critical transition and stabilization programs and lessen the need for long-term deployments of military forces or peacekeepers” and a Rapid Response Fund of \$76 million is designed to be used to “respond quickly to unforeseen opportunities to address divisive issues and reconcile competing interests in new and fragile democracies.”<sup>43</sup> While DCHA’s increasing budget over the past three fiscal years is likely the product of Congress and the White House’s favorable attitude toward linking development, diplomacy and defense, legislative staff are aware of OMA’s success as a coordinator with DOD. That reputation is likely a part of the reason for increased funds for USAID programs that focus on security and stabilization.

REQUEST BY ACCOUNT & FISCAL YEAR (\$ in thousands)	FY08 TOTAL	FY09 TOTAL	FY10 TOTAL
TOTAL	565,985	2,185,150	2,454,000
Democracy Fund	-	37,000	-
Development Assistance	83,335	132,750	139,500
Economic Support Fund	39,395	44,000	-
Global Health and Child Survivor – USAID	13,044	13,000	13,000
International Disaster Assistance	669,739	750,000	880,000
Public Law 480 (Food Aid)	-284,164	1,158,400	1,295,500
Transition Initiatives	44,636	50,000	126,000

Through the strategic work of its relatively small staff and an increasing interest in funding DOD-USAID collaboration by Congress, OMA has achieved the goals that were set for it by its leadership in 2005: (1) Improving USAID’s relationship with DOD; (2) Raising USAID’s profile in the interagency process; (3) Making efficient use of DOD funds to meet development goals; and (4) Encouraging the use of more USAID resources to improve civilian-military coordination.

To continue to increase coordination between USAID and DOD, and thereby increase the USG’s probability of successfully achieving its foreign policy goals in unstable environments, decrease unintended overlap of effort by different federal agencies, and preserve financial resources, OMA must transition to long-term thinking. The recommendations that follow are designed to assist OMA make that transition.

<sup>42</sup> *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2010, p. 4.*


<sup>43</sup> *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2010, p. xvi.*

# RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations are designed to allow OMA to build on its successes, create a strategic plan of action for the short-term and the long-term, and to ensure that OMA is efficiently using its financial and human capital resources. The recommendations are not mutually exclusive—they can be implemented together or separately.

## RECOMMENDATION I BROADEN STAFF EXCHANGES WITH DOD

OMA should broaden its DOD staff-sharing program. These staff sharing agreements with DOD have been repeatedly hailed by those in DOD, USAID, DOS, and by lawmakers as essential to the development of interagency coordination. In the exchanges, seasoned USAID staff are sent to five of the six geographic Combatant Commands (COCOMs) to serve as Senior Development Advisors. Personnel from each COCOM are also sent to USAID where they sit in OMA and serve as liaisons between the relevant geographic bureau at USAID and the COCOM.



**Figure 5:** Timeline of Steps to Execute Recommendation 1: Broaden Staff Exchanges with DOD

### SHORT-TERM IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

- (1) Cost: Additional Staff are expensive and expanding the program would increase OMA's budget requirements.
- (2) Staff Placement: New staff could either be located elsewhere in DOD, in the Pentagon for example, or additional staff could be sent to the COCOMs. The decision about where to send staff should attempt to place them wherever they can have maximum impact in areas that are not currently covered by OMA staff.

### LONG-TERM IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

- (1) Capacity Restraints: It is extremely likely that if OMA expands the number of USAID staff exchanged with DOD staff, the number of requests for USAID participation in military planning and coordination will increase. OMA should clarify what its priorities are—for example, including more services in its communication network, finding out more quickly about high-level DOD planning—

and develop improved procedures to decline DOD requests when they do not align with OMA’s goals.

## RECOMMENDATION 2 BEGIN A ROBUST “INREACH” EFFORT

OMA should begin an intensive period in which it aims more of its efforts internally at USAID personnel and leadership. This inreach should include increasing training of USAID staff on DOD basics and OMA’s function, engaging the Administrator’s office on the issue of civilian-military integration, and making an active effort to ensure that USAID personnel in Washington and at missions understand OMA’s goals and scope. This effort would go a long way toward reducing fears that OMA would like to dramatically increase its budget, acts without considering its effect on the regional bureaus, and would clarify the way OMA tries to assist country teams achieve the goals they have established.



**Figure 6:** Timeline of Steps to Execute Recommendation 2: Begin a Robust “Inreach” Effort

### SHORT-TERM IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS


- (1) Targeting: OMA should consider how it can most usefully target USAID decision makers, more senior Foreign Service Officers who believe that association with the military could lead to a failure to encourage sustainable development, and those who are unsure of OMA’s mission.
- (2) Relationship with Administrator Rajiv Shah: OMA should work with the Administrator’s Office to ensure that the Administrator designates a point of contact for OMA.
- (3) OMA should determine where to target an internal training program. One approach would be to train all FSOs while they are stationed in Washington, D.C. This would be an ongoing effort that would proceed until all FSOs and DLIs had been trained.

### LONG-TERM IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

- (1) Ensuring evaluation of inreach procedures: OMA must evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to inform USAID personnel of its mission and to inform them about the opportunities available to work with the military. This could take the form of evaluations before and after training sessions, or annual surveys of USAID staff to assess their view of the military, knowledge of ways to engage with their DOD counterparts and understanding of OMA’s role. Those efforts deemed to be ineffective should be pared down or halted.
- (2) Ensuring Continuity: OMA will have new leadership in the coming year. To ensure any gains are maintained, the office’s current Director should work with the new Director and Deputy to ensure that working relationships with key USAID decision makers remain intact despite the changes in OMA leadership.

### RECOMMENDATION 3 INSTITUTIONALIZE SUCCESSES

OMA should do everything possible to ensure that its successful practices are institutionalized. This will require a new approach that moves staff from an organizational start-up phase to long-term thinking and planning. This recommendation aims to provide OMA with a more permanent place at USAID, eliminate current bottlenecks to civilian-military interaction engendered by USAID regulations that do not harmonize with OMA procedures, and ensure that OMA’s successes are not based solely on personality.



**Figure 7: Timeline of Steps to Execute Recommendation 3: Institutionalize Successes**

First, USAID leadership should appoint a Director for the Office to take over after the office’s current Director, Elena Brineman, retires next year. USAID should also make it a priority to resume the search for a Deputy Director to ensure the office’s leadership is fully staffed and is able to work as a team. Director Brineman has shepherded OMA through the period of transition after Tom Baltazar’s departure and initiated important planning processes designed to help OMA become more effective. However, the knowledge that she will retire next year is one factor that has kept OMA from transitioning to long-term thinking. Sustained leadership will allow OMA to increase its planning for the long-term and determine the office’s strategic priorities. Without sustained leadership, it is unlikely that OMA will be able to undertake the kinds of efforts described in this report.

Second, OMA should refine existing position descriptions for each staff member to ensure that include they specific methods through which they communicate with DOD, their efforts to advance OMA’s strategic interests, and any additional smart practices. Because each non-administrative OMA staff member has such a large potential pool of people to communicate with in the COCOMS and throughout DOD, they have developed many of their own best practices to create impact without a large amount of financial or human resources from which to draw upon. However, many of the practices that they have developed are unknown to other OMA staff. Creating position descriptions that include effective innovations would capture this knowledge to ensure it is not lost if staff leave the office. The collection of the information would also facilitate sharing of effective methods between OMA staff.

Third, OMA should work with USAID bureaucracy to ensure that the procedures it relies on regularly, including staff exchanges and developing military point-persons for communication sharing, can be accomplished more easily. Currently, OMA must invest a large amount of staff time for routine tasks such as placing a USAID Foreign Service Officer at a COCOM. Remedying this type of problem will entail the use of staff time in the present but will incur great savings of staff time in the long run. Additionally, standardizing procedures for engaging with the military across USAID would ensure that the current largely

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personality-driven engagement with DOD continues despite staff turnover at OMA and DOD due to routine changes in assignments and changes in leadership.

Finally, an important component of ensuring that OMA is able to function effectively in the long-term is developing methods to regularly evaluate how well the office is meeting its goals. As a first step in this process, OMA leadership should designate its priorities and determine outcomes that would reflect successful steps toward those priorities. Using a logic model could assist the office think through the component parts of each goal, and the outcomes that would indicate success. For example, if one of OMA's top priorities is to reduce the amount of overlap between USAID and DOD efforts in developing countries, one component part of this goal would be to improve coordination with DOD. One indicator of success in achieving the component would be an increase in communication between MilReps and USAID missions in steady state environments. This type of planning that moves from high-level goals to components to specific indicators would provide OMA with a way to gauge its progress over the course of each year.

Director Brineman has begun the important process of developing indicators to measure success. Several potential indicators are included in the table below.

INDICATOR	POTENTIAL BENEFITS	POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES
1 Financial metrics for CERP, I207, OHDACA funds and overall DOD transfers to USAID by Fiscal Year	Access to information about DOD transfers to USAID would allow OMA to assess the impact it is having on financial resources and better target its efforts to funds that are not being adequately used for development purposes, as they were designated.	Financial data will not reflect changes in Congress' attitudes toward stability and reconstruction funding, which have a large impact on overall funding levels.
2 Annual or biannual survey data of USAID personnel's attitudes toward civilian-military cooperation and knowledge of methods to cooperate with the military. A sample survey is included in Appendix E.	Surveys would allow OMA to compare how attitudes toward civilian-military cooperation vary by bureau, geographic region, seniority, or exposure to OMA training and to capture trends over time. Surveys would also assist OMA in targeting its efforts to the USAID staff least knowledgeable about DOD, OMA and how cooperation might be fruitful.	The survey would have to be given to a large enough sample of USAID personnel to be significant. Creating and implementing the survey could be time-intensive in the first year.
3 Annual or biannual survey data of OMA's key points of contact in DOD, DOS and other agencies.	Surveys of key OMA points of contact would allow OMA to assess how partners view the office and how to more effectively target its efforts.	Surveys could be biased toward the positive if points of contact do not perceive them as completely anonymous.
4 Input into theater campaign plans, measured either by number of campaign plans that have had USAID input or by number of non-military leads in IMOs in each campaign plan	Measuring input into theater campaign plans would allow OMA to assess its efforts to inject development goals and expertise into military planning. <sup>44</sup>	Measuring influence in planning is difficult because it is subjective. However, capturing effectiveness with a high degree of noise is preferred to not assessing effectiveness at all.

<sup>44</sup> If the number of non-DOD IMOs in campaign plans is selected as an indicator of progress, it should be used for a limited period. After DOD assigns IMOs to civilians in large enough quantities to provide them with sufficient input, having additional civilian IMOs could hurt the overall efficiency of the planning process, and recording civilian IMOs as measures of progress at that point would be counterproductive.

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5 Number of joint exercises USAID participates in per year	Tallying the number of joint exercises OMA coordinates for USAID would provide an indication of how well OMA is doing at ensuring USAID and DOD personnel know how to work together in crisis situations.	Counting the number of joint exercises that USAID takes part in will not express the quality of participation or readiness of USAID to cooperate with DOD in crisis situations.
6 Continued public expression by USAID Administrator Shah, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton of support of civilian-military coordination	Tracking public statements made by DOD, DOS and USAID leadership would provide an indication of how well OMA's efforts, in conjunction with those of other offices involved in civilian-military coordination, are being transmitted to leadership.	Public statements may not translate into tangible policy changes, but would provide an indication of leaderships' attitudes toward civilian-military integration.

If OMA does not have the capacity to develop and monitor indicators of its progress, one less time-intensive alternative is to use the Office of Management and Budget's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) tool as a way to institutionalize the use of annual evaluations. Several other USAID offices, including the Office of Transition Initiatives, use PART as a way to annually track the progress of their programs. While PART is not an ideal evaluative tool because it is not tailored to OMA's goals, it would provide the office with the ability to track their progress from year to year.

OMA may also want to consider advocating for implementing incentives for collaboration at USAID. While this alternative would require significant buy-in from USAID leadership as well as bureaucratic changes, if USAID included cooperation with the military in conflict or crisis situations as a goal in personnel evaluations, it is likely that collaboration would greatly increase. If this change were instituted, OMA would also have the ability to track where increases in collaboration were occurring, both by bureau and geographically, on an annual basis.

### SHORT-TERM IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

- (1) Procedures Point Person: A member of the OMA staff should be designated a point-person for the procedural standardization efforts. This person should work with the appropriate financial management, human resources, and leadership staff to include OMA procedures in USAID protocol.
- (2) Targeting: In order not to mire one or more OMA staff persons in unmanageable bureaucratic wrangling, OMA should focus its efforts on standardizing the procedures most commonly used by OMA, the procedures that currently take large amounts of staff time to accomplish, and those that are considered to be of the highest strategic value.
- (3) Additional Administrative Staff: OMA has a small group of very competent administrative staff. The office would be well served to increase its administrative personnel to ensure that there is enough staff support as the office grows and undergoes increased evaluative processes.
- (4) Staff Morale: OMA is an office staffed with people devoted to ensuring that USAID's work is done to its fullest potential in conflict, crisis and disaster zones. The fast-paced environment is not conducive to tackling bureaucratic tasks that may yield slow returns. OMA leadership should motivate staff by clearly and repeatedly drawing a line between efforts to standardize OMA procedures and gains in future efficiency.

### LONG-TERM IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

- (1) Ensuring Continuity: OMA will have new leadership in the coming year. To ensure any gains are maintained, the office's current Director should work with the new Director and Deputy to ensure that progress toward more accurately capturing OMA's affect on finances, operations, planning and training continues despite the changes in OMA leadership.

# CONCLUSION

The United States is facing a very different set of challenges on foreign soil than it has in the past. Dedicated individuals working on the ground have seen the increasing connections between development, national security and diplomacy and have responded by doing everything possible to adapt. Commanders used to executing thirty-six hour contingency plans are working with USAID missions to build relationships with local populations in areas of low economic growth and high terrorist activity. USAID Mission Directors who normally engage in complex multi-year public health projects are reaching out to the Combatant Commands to coordinate efforts in unstable areas and reduce programmatic overlap. Others throughout the USG are taking their own initiative to respond to the increasingly interrelated challenges they face.

Crises like the one that followed Haiti's massive earthquake in January 2010 demonstrate the importance of this type of strong collaboration between USAID, DOD and other government agencies. The United States' immediate multifaceted response to the earthquake included action by the U.S. military to secure Haiti's major cities, maintain Haitian airspace, and provide food and water as well as the dispatch of Department of Health and Human Services medical teams. The USG has now allocated over \$1 billion for Haiti to fund action by a host of U.S. government agencies providing security assistance, search and rescue, medical supplies, shelter, food assistance, economic recovery assistance, and infrastructure construction in the earthquake's aftermath. The multi-agency coordinating team for Haiti, working around the clock, has drawn expertise, logistical support, manpower and funds from an array of agencies. This type of coordination is possible because staff and leadership at USAID, DOD and other agencies had strong working relationships and experience coordinating their efforts before they were called on to provide relief to Haiti.

Support of USAID's Office of Military Affairs is a part of the broader response by USG leaders to the urgent need for collaboration across agencies to meet complex challenges like the ones posed in Haiti. This report finds that OMA, despite its small size, has been largely effective in meeting its goals. However, there are important opportunities for collaboration between USAID and DOD that remain untapped. If OMA is able to build on its successful practices, motivate others inside USAID, and plan for the long-term, it will be able to spur greater civilian-military collaboration and provide an illustrative example for others in the USG striving for greater interagency cooperation.

# APPENDIX A

## INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY

Interviews were conducted between February 17, 2010 and April 15, 2010. All interviewees were provided the same background information on the evaluation and were then asked the same four questions to gauge their view of the status of the interagency process generally and OMA's role. Additional questions were asked as appropriate for each interviewee's experiences and views. Interviewees were selected based on their work with OMA over the past six years, experience leading or establishing the office from 2005-2006, and participation in different aspects of interagency dialogue and cooperation.

## INTERVIEWEES

Over the course of the evaluation, twenty-three people were interviewed using the methodology described above. Those interviewed include leadership and personnel from USAID, DOD, DOS, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), National Defense University (NDU), the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), the Congress and Booz Allen Hamilton. Additional conversations conducted in a less formal manner and via email inform the report and are cited throughout.

## KEY QUESTIONS

- (1) What do you think of the status of the interagency process right now and how has it changed since 2005 when OMA was created?
- (2) Where do you think the biggest push for improvement in interagency integration comes from? (e.g. a particular agency, outside the government, those in theater)
- (3) Do you think OMA has been successful in raising the profile of USAID in the interagency process?
- (4) Are you familiar with any particular instances where OMA could have done something more efficiently or more effectively?

# APPENDIX B

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REQUEST	FY08 ACTUAL	FY08 SUPPLEMENTS	FY08 TOTAL	FY09 ESTIMATE	FY09 BRIDGE SUPPLEMENTAL	FY09 RECOVERY ACT	FY09 SUPPLEMENTAL	FY09 TOTAL	FY10 TOTAL
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS	36,399,897	6,514,108	42,914,005	37,892,884	4,074,500	382,000	7,148,144	49,497,528	53,872,901
FOREIGN OPERATIONS	23,996,268	3,773,500	27,769,768	24,772,359	2,644,800	38,000	4,511,000	31,966,159	34,847,665
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT	775,636	154,500	930,136	916,359	94,000	38,000	201,100	1,249,459	1,650,300
USAID Operating Expenses (OE)	650,657	150,500	801,157	808,584	93,000	-	152,600	1,054,184	1,338,800
Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI)	-	-	-	30,000	-	-	-	30,000	-
USAID Capital Investment Fund (CIF)	87,287	-	87,287	35,775	-	38,000	48,500	122,275	185,000
USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses	37,692	4,000	41,692	42,000	1,000	-	-	43,000	46,500

# APPENDIX C

## PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN: A CASE STUDY OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY COLLABORATION

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are groups of 50-100 military and civilian personnel that assist local and regional governments in areas of conflict. They may contain personnel from DOD, DOS, USAID, USDA and other agencies with expertise required for specific regions or missions.<sup>45</sup> PRTs have been in use in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002.<sup>46</sup> PRTs were developed by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in Afghanistan to address the need for civilian personnel involved in building the capacity of local government amid an insecure environment.<sup>47</sup> Khalilzad brought PRTs to the Iraq mission in 2005 to assist Iraq's provincial governments increase capacity and build stability. PRTs were an attempt to create a CORDS-like program<sup>48</sup> that integrated military and civilian personnel to more effectively tackle the growing insurgency outside Kabul.

PRTs have faced several problems that can be traced to a lack of integration of civilian and military organizations. First, appropriating resources for PRTs is complex and ad hoc with each agency involved using its own processes for funding. The result is that, "PRTs choose projects based on convenience rather than the actual needs of the local populations. The agency most able to secure funding for a project can dictate the projects to be undertaken."<sup>49</sup> This leads to frustrations on all sides about the efficacy of the teams.

Second, PRTs lack clear chain of command. When PRTs were first put into use in Iraq, the Department of State was put in charge of the program. However, DOD was assigned responsibility for security, logistical support, and force protection for all PRT members, including civilians and USAID was given the lead on reconstruction.<sup>50</sup> The lack of clarity about who was in charge of what—exacerbated by the fact that State Department officials do not have a place in DOD chain of command—caused immediate conflict. The result has been what the GAO calls "disjointed and incoherent" procedures<sup>51</sup>—that hampers the effectiveness of PRTs.

Third, PRTs lack a clear mission. The most explicit mission given to PRTs in Afghanistan is that they have three objectives: to extend the Afghan central government's authority, improve security, and promote reconstruction.<sup>52</sup> However, without more clearly stated objectives PRTs are forced to act in an uncoordinated manner. The result has been that the level of a given PRT's civilian-military integration has been largely driven by personalities. When PRT commanders have decided to work with civilian members of a

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<sup>45</sup> PRTs in Afghanistan usually consist of a small number of U.S. civilians, generally a DOS representative, a USAID representative, and a representative from USDA as well as an Afghan representative from the Ministry of Interior. However, not all PRTs have a full civilian complement. On the military side, PRTs generally contain a commander, two civil affairs teams of four members each, operational and administrative staff and soldiers for force protection.

<sup>46</sup> Lawner, Daniel, Brandon Kaster, Natalie Mathews, "Recipes for Failure and Keys to Success in Interagency Cooperation: Two Case Studies," *Defense Concepts* Vol 4 Edition 4, p. 22.

<sup>47</sup> SIGIR, *Hard Lessons*, p. 241.

<sup>48</sup> The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support (CORDS) Program was created for use by the USG during the Vietnam War.

<sup>49</sup> Lawner, Daniel, Brandon Kaster, Natalie Mathews, "Recipes for Failure and Keys to Success in Interagency Cooperation: Two Case Studies," *Defense Concepts* Vol 4 Edition 4, p 24.

<sup>50</sup> Joint Center for Operational Analysis, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan—an Interagency Assessment." April 26, 2006, p.9.; SIGIR *Hard Lessons*, p. 241.

<sup>51</sup> Government Accountability Office, "Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing." September 25, 2009.

Lawner, Daniel, Brandon Kaster, Natalie Mathews, "Recipes for Failure and Keys to Success in Interagency Cooperation: Two Case Studies," *Defense Concepts* Vol 4 Edition 4, p. 25.

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given PRT it can develop “as a team with a common vision and a sense of aligned purpose.”<sup>53</sup> However, the opposite case is also true, and when PRT commanders opt not to engage civilian team-members a PRT can become fragmented.

Additionally, the lack of qualified civilians to fill PRT roles is limiting PRT effectiveness. When DOS or USAID do not have qualified personnel for PRTs, DOD steps in to fill those positions with their staff. This has led to PRTs that lack the required skills or expertise to function effectively and it exacerbates chain of command problems.<sup>54</sup>

The problems that hamper PRTs in Afghanistan persist despite reports from numerous agencies detailing the failures of the PRT program and recommendations issued by the Joint Center For Operational Analysis (JCOA) in 2006 to develop clear guidance for PRTs including “the mission, roles, responsibilities and authorities” of each participating agency represented in the PRT.<sup>55</sup> The 2006 JCOA report also suggests that the civilian agencies remedy the staffing problem faced by PRTs by creating incentives for participation by civilian staff and improve PRTs’ access to funds. Problems that continue to keep many PRTs from functioning to their full capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq are illustrative of the issues that keep interagency actors from engaging efficiently and effectively in a diverse array of operational settings.

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<sup>53</sup> Joint Center for Operational Analysis, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan—an Interagency Assessment.” April 26, 2006, p.10.

<sup>54</sup> Lawner, Daniel, Brandon Kaster, Natalie Mathews, “Recipes for Failure and Keys to Success in Interagency Cooperation: Two Case Studies,” *Defense Concepts* Vol 4 Edition 4, p. 25.

<sup>55</sup> Joint Center for Operational Analysis, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan—an Interagency Assessment.” April 26, 2006, p 5.

# APPENDIX D

## SAMPLE SURVEY OF USAID STAFF

This survey is designed to provide feedback that will allow OMA to assess how well it is targeting its efforts at USAID staff. The survey will provide information about how USAID staff view DOD, how USAID staff view OMA, and how capable they feel coordinating with DOD.

Keeping the survey short and administering it online are likely to improve response rates. A pilot survey of a small number of USAID staff will ensure the questions are clear to respondents and that the survey captures the information necessary to provide OMA with substantive feedback about its efforts.


## SURVEY TEXT

Please take the time to answer the questions in this brief online survey, including any additional comments you have. The survey is designed to assist USAID target its coordination with the military to make the best use of our resources. All survey responses are completely confidential.

- (1) On a scale from 1-5, how would you rank USAID and DOD's coordination in areas of conflict and crisis?  
1=not at all coordinated, 2=poorly coordinated, 3=coordinated in some areas but not others, 4=somewhat strongly coordinated, 5=very strongly coordinated
- (2) On a scale from 1-5 do you believe USAID and DOD should make an effort to coordinate more?  
1=strongly oppose increased coordination, 2=oppose increased coordination, 3=neutral, 4=support increased coordination, 5=strongly support increased coordination
- (3) On a scale from 1-5, how do you think OMA is doing in its role as a coordinator between USAID and DOD?  
1=very poorly, 2=poorly, 3=neutral, 4=well, 5=very well
- (4) If you wanted to coordinate your work at USAID, where applicable, with the Department of Defense, who would you contact?
- (5) Have you ever interacted with a member of the military in the course of your work at USAID headquarters or at mission?
- (6) Please describe OMA's mission.
- (7) Have you attended a training hosted by OMA?  
Yes  
No
- (8) In which bureau do you work?
- (9) How many years have you been employed by USAID?


# APPENDIX E

## USAID AND OMA ORGANIZATION



OMA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

**DRAFT**  
As of: 1 February 2010



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