

*Pacification*  
*Priority Area Summary*


*Việt Nam*  
*Cộng Hòa*



**JAMES P. GRANT**

# **PACIFICATION PRIORITY AREA SUMMARY**

**PREPARED BY  
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS  
AND  
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT  
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND,  
VIETNAM**



*BEST AVAILABLE COPY*



DEPUTY FOR CORDS TO COMUSMACV

TO: JIM GRANT

1. With the additional pacification management tools we have developed, we are confident that we can refine the priority province concept (which we will still retain) to zero in on priority villages within 99 important districts. This booklet gives you an idea of where we intend to deploy new pacification resources in 1969 and where we intend to focus our main effort.
2. GVN planners like the idea and we are in the process of selling it up the line.
3. This is just one example of the fine work Clay McManaway and his planners are doing. Clay can explain others to you.
4. Pacification is becoming bigger business out here. Expect you will be feeling more of the change soon.

  
R. W. Komer

Attachment  
Booklet

DATE: 26 SEP 1968

## INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this booklet is to present the pacification priority areas with related statistical summaries and the National Pacification Policy for 1969.

2. Pacification priority areas were developed utilizing past experience and the new data systems which are now available at this headquarters. Priority areas were established based on four criteria:

Population Density

Vital Lines of Communication

Strategic Government Centers

Areas of Economic Importance

Priority areas were developed to focus management attention at the province, CTZ, and national levels; to determine pacification resource requirements; and to prepare a balanced resource allocation plan for 1969 in light of resource availability. Enclosed are maps of each CTZ which display the pacification priority areas in two degrees of importance. The red areas are of utmost importance to pacification. The blue areas are considered more important than the uncolored area but less important than the red areas. The objective of selecting priority areas is to utilize and allocate pacification resources in areas for maximum benefit. It is not intended that previously allocated resources should be subject to a major redistribution or that only those red areas would receive new resources.

It should be noted that since all provinces have pacification resources, they also have a priority pacification area. Once this priority area is "pacified," necessary resources should remain in the priority area, and the pacification effort should be expanded as remaining resources permit.

The pacification priority areas indicated on the enclosed CTZ maps have been reviewed and approved by US and GVN Province, CTZ and National Officials.

Adjacent to each CTZ map is a summary of significant statistics. The security status was obtained from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). "Relatively Secure" includes that population in a HES security category A, B or C hamlet. "Contested or VC Controlled" includes that population in a HES security category D, E or V hamlet.

3. Also enclosed in this booklet is a paper called "THOUGHTS ON PACIFICATION" which is a Pacification Policy Summary. In brief, this paper explains the eight priority pacification programs and outlines policy for shifting the emphasis of these pacification programs. Four changes in pacification emphasis are outlined:


- a. Greater geographical and functional concentration of the pacification effort. (Priority areas and eight priority programs).
- b. Redirect pacification efforts from the hamlet to the village level.
- c. Establish permanent central government presence in the village.


d. Require participation of all technical ministries.

4. The enclosed maps, statistics, and narratives were prepared with the hope that they would be self-explanatory, however, any additional information required or desired will be provided upon request. The concept, priorities, etc. presented in this booklet are subject to revision, therefore, comments and recommendations which would permit further improvement thereof are solicited.

1 CTZ

# I CORPS

-  FIRST PRIORITY
-  SECOND PRIORITY



## I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. The pacification priority areas in I CTZ include the heavily populated coastal lowlands, major lines of communication and the areas of economic importance in each Province. The priority areas also encompass the autonomous city of Da Nang, the religious city of Hue and all the Province capitals.

### 2. Population Summary:

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| Total Population in I CTZ  | 3, 236, 000 |
| Population in First Priority Areas<br>(32% of CTZ total population)  | 1, 042, 200 |
| Population in Second Priority Areas<br>(42% of CTZ total population) | 1, 362, 200 |

### 3. Population Security Status:

#### a. Relatively Secure Population

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| CTZ Total  | 1, 733, 000 |
| First Priority Areas<br>(43% of CTZ relatively secure population)  | 749, 800    |
| Second Priority Areas<br>(33% of CTZ relatively secure population) | 573, 000    |

#### b. Contested or VC Controlled Population

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| CTZ Total  | 1, 503, 000 |
| First Priority Areas<br>(19% of CTZ contested or VC population)  | 292, 400    |
| Second Priority Areas<br>(53% of CTZ contested or VC population) | 788, 600    |


713 II

SOUTH VIETNAM

# II CORPS



- FIRST PRIORITY
- SECOND PRIORITY



0 25 50 75 Miles  
 0 25 50 75 Kilometers

DAO PHU QUI

## II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. The pacification priority areas of II CTZ include the large cities along the coast and the significant population centers and agricultural areas near the coast. These areas include most of Route 1 and the national railroad. In the Highlands, priority areas, although not following a discernable pattern, include the major population centers of each Province as well as the areas of economic importance.

### 2. Population Summary:

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| Total Population in II CTZ   | 2,895,000 |
| Population in First Priority Areas<br>(53% of CTZ total population)  | 1,543,900 |
| Population in Second Priority Areas<br>(31% of CTZ total population) | 888,100   |

### 3. Population Security Status:

#### a. Relatively Secure Population

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| CTZ Total  | 2,082,000 |
| First Priority Areas<br>(40% of CTZ relatively secure population)  | 823,500   |
| Second Priority Areas<br>(39% of CTZ relatively secure population) | 830,500   |

#### b. Contested or VC Controlled Population


|   |         |
|---|---------|
| CTZ Total   | 813,000 |
| First Priority Areas<br>(89% of CTZ contested or VC population) | 720,400 |
| Second Priority Areas<br>(7% of CTZ contested or VC population) | 57,600  |

III CTZ

SOUTH VIETNAM

# III CORPS AND CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE

-  FIRST PRIORITY
-  SECOND PRIORITY



### III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. The pacification priority areas in III CTZ include: the Capitol City of Saigon which is not only densely populated but is the economic hub for South Vietnam; the highly populated areas contiguous to Saigon and along the major LOCs emanating from Saigon; and the Province Capitals and areas of economic importance.

2. Population Summary:

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| Total Population in III CTZ   | 5,411,000 |
| Population in First Priority Areas<br>(83% of CTZ total population) | 4,489,500 |
| Population in Second Priority Areas<br>(6% of CTZ total population) | 347,500   |

3. Population Security Status:

a. Relatively Secure Population

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| CTZ Total   | 4,424,000 |
| First Priority Areas<br>(83% of CTZ relatively secure population) | 3,667,900 |
| Second Priority Areas<br>(6% of CTZ relatively secure population) | 288,100   |

b. Contested or VC Controlled Population


|   |         |
|---|---------|
| CTZ Total   | 986,000 |
| First Priority Areas<br>(83% of CTZ contested or VC population) | 821,600 |
| Second Priority Areas<br>(6% of CTZ contested or VC population) | 59,400  |

IV CTZ

SOUTH VIETNAM

# IV CORPUS

 **First Priority**  
 **Second Priority**



## IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. In IV CTZ, the pacification priority areas include the rich agricultural areas of the Delta with its densely populated areas along the vital LOCs (Routes 4, 5A, 6A, 7A and 24; and Cho Gao Canal. The priority areas also include the Province capitals and major District capitals, airfields and key economic facilities of IV CTZ.

### 2. Population Summary:

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| Total Population in IV CTZ   | 5, 879, 000 |
| Population in First Priority Areas<br>(51% of CTZ total population)  | 2, 969, 200 |
| Population in Second Priority Areas<br>(12% of CTZ total population) | 705, 800    |

### 3. Population Security Status:

#### a. Relatively Secure Population

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| CTZ Total  | 2, 989, 000 |
| First Priority Areas<br>(58% of CTZ relatively secure population)  | 1, 734, 700 |
| Second Priority Areas<br>(12% of CTZ relatively secure population) | 371, 300    |

#### b. Contested or VC Controlled Population

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| CTZ Total  | 2, 889, 000 |
| First Priority Areas<br>(43% of CTZ contested or VC population)  | 1, 234, 500 |
| Second Priority Areas<br>(11% of CTZ contested or VC population) | 334, 500    |

**National Summary**

## NATIONAL SUMMARY

Inadequate pacification resources (in particular territorial security forces and management talent) and the urgency of securing and organizing the major portion of the population, dictate the need for focusing available assets in designated priority areas to achieve greater pacification momentum and to establish a more permanent GVN presence.

The 1968 pacification program has been largely concentrated in areas within 26 priority provinces chosen according to population, size, and location, although there is a pacification effort in every province. For 1969, the plan is to achieve even greater focus of pacification resources and management attention by refining further the precise villages and groups of villages of particular importance by virtue of population density and proximity to main lines of communication, government centers and economic assets. This has been accomplished through the use of improved data processing techniques. Areas so defined in the priority provinces (reduced to 25 for 1969) will be assigned first priority in the allocation of new pacification resources. Major redeployment of existing resources is not contemplated. Other areas of importance but less so than the first priority areas are identified as second priority.

Approximately 58 percent of the total population of South Vietnam is within

the areas of first priority to pacification. Some 19 percent of the population is within areas identified as a second priority for pacification. Further, 13 percent of the population now under GVN control according to the HES are outside both first and second priority areas. If the GVN could extend its control to include all the population in the priority areas while retaining its control of the population now under its control outside these areas, it could claim control of 90 percent of the population of South Vietnam.

The importance of concentrating pacification resources becomes apparent when it is realized that currently available resources are inadequate to satisfy the "first priority area" requirements.

NOTE: The specific priorities presented in this booklet are subject to revision, therefore, comments and recommendations which would permit further improvement thereof are solicited.

Thoughts on Pacification

## THOUGHTS ON PACIFICATION

### I. GENERAL

1. Summary. We must achieve greater pacification momentum.

Achieving greater momentum will depend largely on increased concentration of still inadequate resources on priority activities and in priority areas. However, successful concentration of widely varied resources and the many forces available will require improved pacification management. Pacification must also be recognized as much more than just Revolutionary Development (RD). Unless the other essential elements of pacification -- PHUNG HOANG, territorial security, Chieu Hoi, police refugees, etc. -- are fully coordinated, real pacification success cannot be achieved.

2. Need for centralized direction of pacification. Though the President and Prime Minister have stated repeatedly that pacification is a national policy, pacification is still not nationally managed. In fact, the GVN does not have a National Pacification Program; it has many separate pacification-related programs. Most of these programs are under different national level managers and are largely uncoordinated, much less unified in the sense of being aimed at the same specific objectives. This lack of coordination hampers the ability of national and lower-level managers to direct pacification efficiently. Therefore, pacification

must be given centralized national level management. It is recommended that a Deputy Prime Minister for Pacification be assigned. He should serve concurrently as Secretary General of a revitalized Central Revolutionary Development Council (CRDC), which meets at least twice monthly with the President or Prime Minister as chairman.

3. Inadequate resources. Although resources committed to pacification have increased over the past several years, they are still limited and constrained by lack of manpower. We must therefore concentrate pacification resources on the most important geographic areas and programs. We must, in addition, utilize existing resources more effectively and efficiently. A sensible list of priorities is essential.

The eight priority pacification programs which must be emphasized are:

a. Territorial security -- the first essential stage of pacification. Territorial security forces must be improved and deployed for maximum benefit.

b. The attack against the VC infrastructure. This effort must be rapidly expanded as the enemy effort intensifies. PHUNG HOANG shows promise and has great potential. It should be better coordinated with other elements of pacification and given close attention by the CRDC.

c. Stronger local government -- is an essential. Hamlet and village administrations do not function effectively, if at all. There must be greater involvement of the people. Self-defense and self-help are programs

which should increase this involvement.

d. Self-defense -- must be stepped up. An aggressive, comprehensive program is needed to cover both urban and rural areas. In the cities self-defense can be best handled by the Interior Ministry; in the countryside the RD Ministry should be responsible under the policy direction of the Interior Ministry.

e. RD and self-help are closely related methods of getting people involved. Both programs should be integrated closely. Self-help should be greatly expanded. PF platoons, cross-trained as RD teams, should be widely used to extend into more areas.

f. Economic revival, particularly in the Delta. This was one of the most promising programs during 1967. Although regressed by TET, the rural economy is recovering. Further revival of the economy in the countryside and growth of prosperity are important to pacification. They are mainly functions of improved territorial and LOC security, intelligent economic policy such as removal of restrictions, and successful execution of the TN-8 rice and fertilizer programs.

g. Resettlement and care of refugees needs greater attention. The percentage of SVN population in refugee status has continued to climb to almost 10 percent. This problem is of national importance. A more promising place in society must be provided for refugees. Resettlement must be stressed.

h. National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi programs need improvement. The opportunities presented by the current situation require an aggressive rejuvenation of these important, possibly vital, programs.

## II. PACIFICATION GUIDELINES

1. Strengthen pacification management. The CRDC has a structure extending through province level and including all the important elements of pacification. It should be strengthened through more active use. Though the President or Prime Minister chairs the CRDC, the Secretary General should be a Deputy Prime Minister who will handle operational problems and coordinate execution of CRDC policy decisions. He should be assisted by a small but high-level coordinating staff. Because MORD is seriously over-extended now, the CRDC Secretary General should not be from MORD. The members of the staff should be the second-ranking official of each of the CRDC member Ministries. Beginning immediately, the CRDC itself should meet bi-weekly with the PM as chairman. The CRDC should report to the President after each meeting. The Coordinating Staff should meet twice a week. The Coordinating Staff should be provided adequate personnel and facilities.

If thought necessary to insure that the CRDC does not become unwieldy, the Prime Minister, the MOI, Chief, JGS and MORD could form an Executive Committee to take up policy questions inappropriate for the full CRDC or which the full body referred it for solution.

This National CRDC concept should be repeated at corps and province level. For example, the Province Chief should chair the Province RDC

made up of the chiefs of appropriate technical services, the Deputy Sector Commander and the Deputy for Administration. It should have a small coordinating staff headed by a representative of the Province Chief's office of higher rank than the number two's of the members of the RDC.

Drawing again on the Recovery experience wherein US involvement in day-to-day deliberations enabled US support to be more effective than ever before, there should be high-level US representation on the CRDC, coordinating staff, and at corps and province level. The US already has a single manager for its support to pacification and the tie-in would insure close coordination of US support.

The strengthened CRDC should issue systematic directives to provide operational guidance, notifications of policy changes and tasking orders to its member ministries (and other elements of the government if necessary) as well as to corps and province. They should be signed by the PM or the President. These directives would integrate the policy and operational guidance for all the different elements of pacification to include RF and PF, PHUNG HOANG, Local Government, Self-Defense, Chieu Hoi, Refugees, Psywar, and RD.

A systematic planning process and reporting schedule is essential.

The CRDC should require that province and corps pacification plans be prepared on a fixed schedule and reviewed at the next higher echelon.

The province plan is basic. It should incorporate all elements involved, especially RF and PF. Annual plans are not sufficient. Province plans must be kept up to date as changes occur or are required. A standard format must be followed such as the overlay scheme described in the Combined Campaign Plan, AB-143. Slightly modified to incorporate recent changes in hamlet nomenclature and the shift to the village concept, the AB-143 format would provide a basic plan with overlays as annexes. A single monthly overlay showing changes would keep Corps and Saigon informed and serve as the key report of progress in each province. While province is the responsible agency for the annual plan and monthly reporting, districts would be required to maintain an up-to-date status of the pacification plan within the district and provide feeder data to province. Follow-up inspections should be carried out frequently to insure that provinces are either on schedule or problems have been reported with recommended solutions.

2. Concentrate pacification efforts. Inadequate resources (in particular territorial security forces and management talent) and the urgency of securing and organizing the great bulk of the rural population, dictate concentrating pacification efforts in geographic priority areas and toward the achievement of a few top priority objectives. Geographic priority areas have been identified following President Thieu's four criteria: high population density, traversed by important LOCs, contain vital government centers, and have significant economic importance. These

priority areas should receive close management attention and first cut at new territorial security and other resources.

3. Shift focus to village. Primary pacification emphasis in the past was on hamlets -- an emphasis which tended to ignore and actually weaken the village organization. Today the low level of GVN activity in hamlets which have undergone pacification in previous years is partly the result of lack of interest and capability of villages to continue pacification efforts. Recent GVN policies have increased authority and resources of village governments. More than 1,120 villages have elected administrations. To further strengthen village government and to give pacification lasting qualities, villages should become the focal point for local pacification activities.

4. Develop permanent GVN presence. As indicated before, pacification used to be a transitory phenomenon. While GVN resources were being devoted to a hamlet, pacification tended to flourish. Territorial security usually improved as RF and PF, and sometimes ARVN, were stationed in the hamlet. But when the RD team departed and the security forces were thinned out, many hamlets regressed to their original condition. Hence, to improve and strengthen pacification, it is necessary to retain a strong GVN presence semi-permanently, if possible. Thus the concept of permanent deployment of RF and PF at hamlet and village in accordance with needs dictated by the security situation, and the permanent deployment

of RD teams to villages begun in 1968 should continue in 1969. The attached general planning criteria for RF and PF and RD teams should be adopted as guidelines.

The PF and the RD teams should be under the operational control of the village chief.

An additional refinement to the village deployment of the RD teams should be made. Prior to beginning the 1969 program, each RD cadre should be surveyed to determine his home, location where he desires to settle permanently, experience (both prior experience and experience as an RD cadre), and occupational preference.

Prior to beginning the 1969 program, an RD cadre seminar should be held in each province to insure complete understanding of the pacification program, reorganize the teams based on information received in the survey, and assign teams to specific villages permanently.

5. Reduce responsibilities of MORD. As a matter of necessity, MORD has taken on many responsibilities of other ministries over the years. It is now seriously over-extended, and the other ministries are not interested in or pulling their weight in pacification. With a greatly strengthened CRDC, it should be possible to reverse the process and transfer back to the regular ministries many of their normal activities now performed by MORD. If MORD restricted its efforts to RD teams, self-help and self-defense -- all essential priority programs, it could

make these programs much more effective than they are now. This would mean that MORC would have one functional area since RD teams, self-defense and self-help should be an integrated effort in any village. Many, perhaps most, of the activities now carried out under the RD program would continue. They would not be programmed as activities at the national level but would be done, as desired by the people, through self-help.

### III. EIGHT PRIORITY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

1. Upgrade territorial security. Current territorial security forces are inadequate in number and quality. However, manpower constraints and lead time considerations make substantial expansion beyond end-FY 69 force levels less attractive, more difficult and less timely than improving quality of existing forces. Better deployment and employment of RF companies and PF platoons is the quickest way to get results. Leadership is the key to better employment. Because end-FY 69 RF and PF force levels are still inadequate, some ARVN battalions probably must be retained on territorial security missions and utilized more effectively than in the past.

JGS/MACV already have a 15-point RF and PF improvement program. This program must continue to receive top priority and must be updated periodically. The CRDC should get periodic reports or briefings on the status of the RF and PF improvement program. Follow-up inspections and actions are essential. By becoming involved, the CRDC can insure that other programs -- PHUNG HOANG, RD Cadre, self-defense, etc. -- contribute actively to improving territorial security.

2. Step up the attack on the VC infrastructure (VCI). The PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX framework exists. Almost 200 DIOCC's are operational. More than 1,000 VCI have been neutralized each month for the past four months. However, the number of VCI is 80-90,000; it is still strong;

and the enemy appears to be shifting to an increased political effort. Hence, PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX must be made more effective.

The President's 1 July decree provides the necessary direction to the effort of increasing the attack on the VCI. The new PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) provides the necessary details. With modest increases, sufficient assets would be available -- if used aggressively and in a coordinated manner -- to double or treble the results now being obtained. Neutralization of VCI at three times the present rate could thwart the enemy's shift to a more political phase and significantly weaken his ability to continue the fight. Thus, under general direction of the CRDC and specific policies of the National PHUNG HOANG Committee, it is essential that the attack against the VCI be greatly accelerated.

3. Develop stronger local government. Many uncoordinated and largely ineffective programs now exist for strengthening local government. Moreover, since TET the number of functioning hamlet administrations has declined 20-30 percent. Village administrations have generally failed to improve, and in many cases have regressed. Continued enemy pressure through his terror campaign is hampering the ability and willingness of local GVN officials to carry out their duties, which are the essential link between the people and their government.

The CRDC must assume responsibility for integrating, coordinating and providing policy guidance to the various efforts aimed at strengthening

local government. One way to accomplish this is through a simple action program (modeled on the 15-point RF/PF improvement program) to bring about early improvements in training, protecting and supporting local officials. The most important action should be the issue of directives and policies that increase the resources available to local administrations and the authority of local officials to use them in accordance with desires of the local populace. Special programs which emphasize on-the-job training for local officials through use of mobile training teams are also important.

4. Expand self-defense. Self-defense has been a program without adequate national backing and direction. RD cadre teams have trained countless Revolutionary Development People's Groups in the rural areas. Few have received arms. For the most part, support and interest ceased when the RD team moved to a new hamlet. After TET, self-defense flourished in the cities, especially among civil servants. Again support and interest quickly waned.

A National Committee has recently been formed. The Interior Minister has been assigned definite responsibilities to organize self-defense in both rural and urban areas. A decree has been issued. August was designated "Self-Defense Month." A realistic program has started. Its momentum needs to be built and sustained. Most important, provisions of the decree emphasizing arming the people must be vigorously satisfied.

5. Emphasize RD and self-help. The self-help program was originally designed as a tool for organizing the people. This purpose has been obscured by anxiety of province chiefs and RD leaders to build things for the record. Desires of the people are not always considered. Much of the work, even if within the capabilities of the local populace, has been done through contracts. Results, in the sense of involvement of the people, have been inadequate.

A good way to improve self-help and RD is to tie the two together under the control of the village chief, who is the representative of the people. Not only will the people become more involved but the local administration will be strengthened. Therefore, an RD team should work for the village chief and stay semi-permanently in the village. Working together, the village administration and the RD team can develop an interest in the people to help themselves. Using funds and materials furnished by the GVN to supplement locally available materials and voluntary labor, some of the needs of the people can be quickly satisfied. Implemented in this manner, self-help will fulfill its purpose of developing a more organized local population which will defend itself against outside attempts to interfere with security and growing prosperity.

To carry out a greatly expanded self-help program, more security and more trained organizers are needed than are provided by 800 RD cadre teams. The only readily available source is the 4,500 PF platoons primarily deployed in hamlets and villages. Thus the present government

program to cross-train 1,000 PF platoons as RD teams by end-1968 must be implemented. Expansion in 1969 of the number of RD-trained PF platoons to 2,000 or more is essential in order to push pacification out to more of the rural population.

6. Revive the rural economy. Growth of prosperity along with improved security are the most powerful attractions of pacification. Although substantial improvement of the rural economy -- higher paddy price to the farmer, increased vegetable production, etc. -- occurred in 1967, it was set back by the TET offensive. New programs to expand use of TN-8 rice, increase hog and poultry production, and speed up introduction of water pumps and small land tillers were delayed. However, the rural economy is now slowly recovering.

Further revival of the economy is essential to pacification progress. Rice and protein production must be increased and farmer income should be improved. Farm-to-market roads must be made secure and kept in good repair. Low-interest rural credit should be expanded. Labor-saving devices (water pumps, land tillers, and motors) must be made readily and widely available. Economic restrictions -- licenses, permits, taxes, checkpoints, etc. -- must be lifted to foster a free flow of goods and produce. To coordinate the extensive efforts required, the CRDC should have a sub-committee on Economic Revival that would meet regularly and report to the CRDC. The sub-committee should concern itself with

such matters as LOC security and repair, overall economic policies affecting rural areas, and the cessation of economic restrictions.

7. Upgrade refugee care and step up resettlement. More than one million refugees are living in temporary camps or with friends and relatives. More refugees are being created as intense military actions continue. At this time, few refugees, except those people made homeless during the TET and mini-TET offensives, are being resettled. Hence there is no reduction in the burden on the government to care for refugees. Moreover, this care is barely sufficient because of inadequately staffed province refugee services and too few mobile refugee teams. Mobilization is cutting into the existing, overtaxed organization.

It is imperative that a large-scale resettlement program begin during the next six months. The new, forward-thinking programs initiated by the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Refugees to manufacture and distribute 100,000 prefabricated houses by end-1969 should be started immediately. Greater emphasis should be given to returning refugees to their own villages as soon as security permits. Meanwhile, every effort should be made to provide adequate care to all temporary refugees and see that they get all assistance promised by the GVN. To do these major tasks requires the full support of many ministries and the RVNAF; the MHWR cannot do it alone. Hence, refugee matters should be coordinated

by a strengthened CRDC.

8. Revive national reconciliation and Chieu Hoi. For the first six months of 1968, the returnee rate was only one-third of the rate during the same period in 1967. Although there was a marked increase in July, the Chieu Hoi program is running far behind its potential. This is partly the result of lack of interest except by the Chieu Hoi Ministry and less than adequate handling of returnees. However, the basic concept and program are sound. There are signs that the Chieu Hoi program is reviving -- July returnee rate was 75 percent higher than June, quality of returnees is two to three times greater than in 1967. Three high-level VC have defected in recent months, and the utilization of Hoi Chanh has greatly improved.

More must be done to exploit the opportunities which exist. Enemy morale is flagging. Military pressure on the enemy is increasing. Enemy commanders are being forced to accept heavy casualties for scant political gains. Use of Hoi Chanh as Armed Propaganda Teams and as Kit Carson Scouts has proved to be highly productive in encouraging additional defections. Good treatment and adequate facilities are known to attract more Hoi Chanh. Hence, through better execution of existing programs, greater interest and attention by GVN leaders, and more support and better cooperation from other ministries, it should be possible in the last half of 1968 to more than double the number of returnees

who rallied in the first half of the year. This should be the minimum goal. To achieve it, a special campaign of the same intensity as the annual TET campaign should be launched now and continue throughout 1969.

## PLANNING CRITERIA FOR DEPLOYMENT OF RF, PF, AND RD TEAMS

1. The following planning criteria are guides to determining the number of RF Companies, PF Platoons, and RD Teams required in a pacification priority area.

- a. One PF squad per secured hamlet.
- b. One PF platoon per secured village.
- c. One RF company per 8 km of critical LOC (in those instances where hamlets adjacent to the LOC were not secured).
- d. One mobile RF company per district as a reaction force.
- e. Two mobile RF companies per province as a reaction force.
- f. Two RF companies per airfield (in most cases requirements computed for adjacent LOCs and district/province towns will satisfy airfield security).
- g. One RD team per population of 5,500.

2. When determining the number of RF companies, PF platoons and RD teams required, the following must be considered:

- a. Disposition of US/FW and ARVN forces and location of bases and other installations in the proximity of pacification areas which may contribute to security and reaction capabilities.
- b. Whether the pacification area being worked can be rapidly supported by indirect fire support weapons.
- c. Possible relocation of territorial security units and/or grouping of RD teams and territorial security units within a priority area to strengthen the security environment.