

THE PROGRAMMING OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Technical Assistance Research Project

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

The Problems of Definition

Definitions of technical assistance have been of three general types: 1) simplistic and emotionally charged slogans; 2) attempts to provide an all-inclusive precision; and 3) manuals of operating agencies which are preoccupied with the "how to do it" approach. Prior to a more detailed consideration of the subject it would be instructive to examine a few previous definitional statements in the last two categories.

Roscoe Martin, in 1953, limited the definition of technical assistance to governmental recipients, but broadened the scope beyond the relations between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. He stated that "technical assistance may be said to occur when a unit or agency of government, of whatever kind or dimension, receives aid on a technical problem not available to it solely through its normal resources . . . the national, even the local, practice of technical assistance is as important in its way and to its clientele as the expanded international programs, if mayhap not so dramatic. Our preoccupation here is not with any particular variety of aid, but with technical assistance as a process affecting government, all government, great and small and wherever placed."¹

Jahangir Amuzegar in a recent study limits the term in another manner by referring to "foreign" technical assistance which, "strictly speaking, refers to any external effort in the form of advice, demonstration or performance which are 1) beyond the indigenous capabilities of the recipient itself, and 2) designed to improve certain specific techniques of planning, communication, control, or operations. Such an assistance may apply to the whole complex of an aid receiving society or it may be limited to a small segment of it. It may, on one extreme, cover long-term expert assistance at the highest level and for the whole structure of government planning. At

¹ Roscoe Martin, "Technical Assistance: The Problem of Implementation", Public Administration Review, Vol. XII, No. 4, pp. 258-66.

the other extreme it may simply consist of one-shot assistance for the rearrangement of the host country's national anthem or the design of its flag." ² It should be noted that in this definition, the question of government-to-government relationships is only implied and Amuzegar includes specific types of action -- advice, demonstration or performance. Martin subsequently argues that performance does not constitute technical assistance. ³ Both, however, agree on technical assistance as accomplishing something which is beyond the indigenous capabilities of the recipient itself. This notion has been brought into question by some others, however, who refer to indigenous capacity in terms of time span and state that technical assistance simply accelerates the achievement of what would have been accomplished over a longer period.

The International Institute of Administrative Sciences takes another view of the substance of technical assistance, but also enumerates in detail the forms which are used: ". . . technical assistance consists in the transmission of learning, knowledge, and techniques for material and human means in order to help the recipients to solve specific problems in a more suitable manner more in keeping with their needs. It is, consequently, an external contribution which assumes a very wide variety of forms: visits of experts and technicians; receiving fellowship holders; organizing courses, seminars, and internships; exchanging or disseminating information or documents; and supplying material and equipment and sometimes financial means." ⁴ Here the basis

² Jahangir Amuzegar, Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 30.

³ Roscoe C. and Mildred E. Martin, Technical Assistance in the Field: A Study in Administrative Relations. A staff report of the Technical Assistance Research Project of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, February, 1966.

⁴ Fernand Vrancken, Technical Assistance in Public Administration: Lessons of Experience and Possible Improvements, final version of the general report, XII International Congress of Administrative Sciences, (Brussels International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1963), p. 17.

for definition is drawn in part from anthropological concepts of diffusion and acculturation but substantively focuses on specific problems by implying a purposeful intent to promote certain types of diffusion or acculturation. It is also noteworthy that the wider range of activities include many which need not necessarily be government to government.

In its Manual Orders, the Agency for International Development (AID) takes a slightly different tack in defining technical assistance as "the process through which AID assists cooperating countries to develop human skills and attitudes and to create and support the institutions necessary for social, economic and political growth and development."⁵ In this case, technical assistance is recognized as a process rather than a task. It can only be carried out with countries which "cooperate," which in itself assumes a common set of objectives. The emphasis is on assisting the country to develop those human and institutional skills and attitudes which they need, regardless of their origin. The definition clearly implies that different countries have different needs for human and institutional development and allows for the selective diffusion of knowledge adapted to the particular circumstances of internal human and institutional growth.

Whether it is designed to impress the makers of organizational policy or to build a clear basis for discussion, the real question which is posed by the attempts at academic and institutional definition of technical assistance is whether we have a single substance or cluster of activities which are precisely definable. From the examination of the varied donor and recipient objectives, policies and ongoing activities, it would appear that the definitional problem is really one of broadly delineating the nature of technical assistance and leaving more precise definition to be separately dealt with in more definable clusters of subcategories. Possibly these would be similar to Morgenthau's subcategories on foreign aid, which are: humanitarian, subsistence, bribery, prestige, and economic development.⁶ Such categories can be defined. On the other hand, it is hard to lump together the U.N.

⁵ AID Manual, Order 1301.1, paragraph IIA.

⁶ Hans Morgenthau, "Preface to a Theory of Foreign Aid", Why Foreign Aid, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962).

operating and executive personnel program (OPEX), a foundation project promoting basic research, some bilateral projects with strong political motivation, and the activities of the Friends' Service Committee in villages in different countries.

It may be that a global definition of technical assistance which eliminates, at least in large measure, other types of activities is all that is necessary to understand the nature and function of the process and provide a basis for a more precise definition of subcategories. On this assumption the following general characteristics provide a definitional base.

Technical assistance is first of all purposive; it can be easily separated from classic diffusion and acculturation which has been occurring among cultures for thousands of years.

Technical assistance is cooperative; it can be clearly distinguished from economic imperialism or colonialism. With rare exception, either party participating in technical assistance is free to either withdraw or allow activities to languish until they are withdrawn.

Technical assistance involves an international transfer of knowledge and skill through individuals or agencies of a donor, and with a defined relationship to individuals, groups or organization of a recipient in the accomplishment of mutually agreed objectives.

It is not always necessary that the donor country be an advanced or modernized country and that the recipient be an underdeveloped country. The purposeful transfer of an important skill from North American to South American Indians has been usefully accomplished. An increasing number of developing countries are entering the column of donor nations by providing training, technical advice, capital and other services.

Aside from saying that technical assistance is international, purposeful, cooperative, and that it involves the transfer of knowledge which a recipient requests and a donor agrees to provide, the addition of any other qualifying adjectives tends to categorize the multivariate nature of technical assistance rather than define the whole.

A definition of programming is more difficult and has less precedent. The statement that it is how those in technical assistance decide what they are going to do is, generally speaking, a gross simplification of the problem.

In the first place, there is a need to separate the program process from the program office or officer, the program document or the variety of program submissions that are required by different agencies, and any other static visions that the word may conjure up. Programming is not just what the program officer does. There are, as a matter of fact, a great many technicians in the world who would prefer that the program process be accomplished, as it has been in the past, without a program officer. As will be discussed later, however, the program office may well be the focal point of a complicated decision-making process which can contribute to managerial, technical and administrative efficiency.

This report considers programming to be a process whose core is the organization for implementation. This is another simplification, but it can be useful if it is recognized as such. Programming as a process is concentrated, to a great degree, on aspects of technical assistance prior to implementation, but that is not its exclusive concern. While the budget aspect of programming is often overemphasized, there are other functions which may be equally important: evaluation or some other form of assessment, gathering of technical information, the devising of strategy, the design of project organization or a variety of other aspects of technical assistance. Programming is only concerned with implementation insofar as changes in objectives, organization and approach are necessary. The analysis of implementation, however, is a crucial input to programming determination.

Much of what is written in this report will be an attempt to define and develop dynamic concepts of programming as an administrative process. The emphasis will be on the administrative factors of programming, more specifically on the human and environmental inputs to decision making in the programming process.

In addition to those difficulties arising from the diverse nature of the process in practice and the many individual activities which it may involve, there are also some confusions which may arise from those extremely scarce bits of literature which have discussed the programming of technical assistance. Much of this literature has come from thoughtful practitioners and is therefore rooted in both practice and scholarship. Philip M. Glick, whose volume on administration

of technical assistance in Latin America is still an important work in spite of the fact that it is almost ten years old, ⁷ reviews the diverse instruments and relationships involved in the practice of programming. His theme is the exhortation -- "know thy tools."

Little has been done since Glick's volume to expand, examine and amplify his approach to both the instruments and the relationships of technical assistance programming though a great deal has happened in practice which would allow for important amplification on so useful a base. It is only possible to speculate that approximately at this time in the history of technical assistance the search for theories of development, social change and international relations overshadowed the need for more pragmatic analysis of the administrative process.

A U.N. official writes that programming is "a matching of available resources of the donor with the needs in the developing country, and the identification of priorities in the use of those resources" and that the U.N. concept of country programming is a process by which "the recipient countries themselves determine the scope and shape of the technical assistance provided to them by the nine international participating organizations. This principle is buttressed by three interrelated characteristics of the program: its single purpose, its voluntary nature, and its multilateral management." ⁸ This article was written prior to the development of the Special Fund, which operates in a very different manner, and will be described later in this report.

The question in any case is the degree to which it is possible to match needs and resources if one side is to determine the nature and the scope of the program. The U.N. approach, however, does provide some significant insights on programming as a means of incorporating recipient requirements.

In a somewhat different vein AID discusses the programming of all of its activities in terms of four basic steps: a) analysis of the country's needs and resources; b) an estimate of the assistance that may be forthcoming from external sources; c) consideration of the U.S.

⁷ Philip M. Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957).

⁸ Arthur Goldschmidt, "Programming and Development", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 323, May 1959, pp. 51-52.

objectives; and d) an assessment of the types of activities that can be effectively undertaken with U.S. assistance.⁹ Technical Assistance programming is, therefore, a part of this overall approach.

The problem with these definitions is that analysis, matching, assessment, etc. are only one aspect of the process in practice. A technical assistance program requires that donor and recipient agree on certain specific goals, whether expressed or implied, and that they further agree on individual activities which are in some way related to those goals. It should be remembered that in all countries the technical assistance program of a donor is only a part of the total technical assistance activities. All technical assistance is only a part of the total external influence on a country's development. In the same manner all external assistance is only a part of the total development program of the country. Technical Assistance may be as Chandrasekhar says, "Perhaps the most abiding contribution that the United States has made to India, other underdeveloped countries, and the world at large . . ." ¹⁰ Nevertheless, technical assistance cannot be programmed as though it were the controlling factor in the development process.

The notions that technical assistance can effect significant transformations in a relatively short time and that there is some neat, precise method for the selection of activities within a technical assistance program will be under attack throughout this report. It is not that students and scholars of technical assistance do not know that the problems they are dealing with are long-term and complex, but in their efforts to convince the skeptics who control the funds, they have been unduly influenced by some of their own propaganda -- or so the submissions and reports would indicate.

In spite of the complexity of the task, there is no need to abandon the search for ways to increase the rational inputs to the process. One of the assumptions of this paper is that a comparative description of how the programming process of different agencies is designed and how it functions will provide a basis for a more accurate design for

⁹ AID Manual, Order 1000.1, Paragraph IV.A.

¹⁰ S. Chandrasekhar, American Aid and India's Economic Development, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 188.

future activities. For example, in some agencies the programming process is often designed in headquarters without an understanding of the realities in the field. Conversely, the material submitted by the field to headquarters frequently is based on an incomplete understanding of how it must be used to obtain approval and funding of proposed activities. It is through a knowledge of these differences in design and function that new knowledge, such as that of development theory, can be incorporated into the programming process.

Programming is woven throughout the fabric of technical assistance. Therefore, it is necessary to make an informed but limited selection of those critical aspects which have emerged during the examination of the processes in many different agencies and different countries. The selection has been the result of combining observations, interviews, reports, studies and evaluations by others, and attempting a judicious seasoning from personal experience in programming. ¹¹

The approach is empirical in that it examines experience and pragmatic in that it is concerned only with the most significant elements of the process insofar as they can be determined. Since the report is an attempt to find a new approach in an area where little previous research has been done, the most important result of the report would be to generate the kind of criticism among informed students and practitioners of technical assistance which, hopefully, will lead to what Gross calls an action-theory marriage. ¹²

Within this context the definition of programming will be one of the purposes of the report rather than a starting point. Its nature will be elaborated through an examination of 1) some highlights of the development of the process; 2) the groups which participate in the process -- the recipient government, the donor field mission and the donor field headquarters; and 3) some critical stages of the process. From this comparative analysis of the processes of different agencies a series of elements will be abstracted and interrelated to create a tentative framework for the programming process. This framework will provide the structure for the conclusion of this report.

¹¹ In the bibliographical appendix there is a discussion of the reports, interviews and other inputs to the data base for this report.

¹² Bertram Gross, The Managing of Organizations, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), Chapter I.

Agriculture and Programming

Historically agriculture has been one of the major activities of technical assistance, a natural outgrowth of the fact that it is the basic occupation of most of the underdeveloped countries. For example, in fiscal year 1964 twice as many AID technical assistance personnel were explicitly working in the field of agriculture than in any other. ¹³

This report will use, as a major source of information, data regarding the development of agricultural projects by different agencies and their approach to rural development projects in different countries.

The programming process, however, is a generalized one, particularly in the context of an administrative analysis; therefore the administrative structure for a program of agriculture is to a large degree appropriate for other types of activities. If the administrative structure and procedures are appropriate, any type of technical knowledge will be incorporated so as to influence the decision-making process.

There are, to be sure, some very special considerations in the programming of agricultural technical assistance. Some of the most complex problems of culture, economics and community organization are involved in the formation of a strategy for action in the agricultural sector. One of the most valuable documents which has been prepared on agricultural development, Policies Promoting Agricultural Development, which, in describing the difference between industrial and agricultural development, says the following about agriculture:

"On the other hand, improving the efficiency of agricultural production depends on the decisions of millions of small producers. The tasks are not standardized, conditions vary from area to area and even between fields on the same farm, and account has to be taken of weather and the occurrence of diseases. Even the smallest farms usually diversify their production. The supply of inputs and marketing of products have to be organized to serve the many producers spread over the land, and requirements are usually seasonal. Provision of credit is also complicated by the need to serve many producers and by the seasonal character of income and production expenses. The poverty of most rural people increases the risk of experimenting with new practices. Lack of transport and communication makes it difficult to reach the dispersed millions of the farming population. Roads are few. The

¹³ AID, Operations Report, June 30, 1964.

multiplicity of languages impedes communication; cultural differences between educated elites and farmers hinder effective communication even when a common language exists." 14

Notwithstanding the awareness of the complexity of the problems, the conference participants were able to agree on some tentative organizational principles based on their experience and the examination of a number of cases. These principles --- the determination of bureaucratic feasibility, use of pilot projects, the development of farmer-bureaucracy communication, and the encouragement of local leadership --- are important considerations for technical assistance program decisions in the agricultural sector.

Since all technical assistance is a partial contribution to development projects, the criteria for successful technical assistance are not always the same as those for agricultural development. For example, the MIT Conference Report pointed out the need for concentration of effort within a limited geographical area due to the fact that the complex "innovation package" which will promote lasting changes is manageable only in a small area in most developing countries. The examination of both concentrated and diffused technical assistance did not show similar results. Concentrated programs tended to have an impact on program output but not necessarily a permanent one. Small diverse agricultural technical assistance projects were sometimes woefully inadequate but in other cases they were some of the most successful projects.

In fact, one of the most difficult problems of the study was the identification of success in technical assistance activities and the attempt to draw generalized lessons from them.

14 David Hapgood, Editor, Max F. Millikan, Conference Chairman, Report of a Conference on Productivity and Innovation in Agriculture in the Underdeveloped Countries. (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 1965).

In our study of individual projects there have been so many cases of apparent success and failure which on closer examination provide contradictory evidence that a strong case can be made for the fact that all projects succeed in some ways and fail in others.

Even when we assigned some arbitrary values to success --- continuity, diffusion, measurable physical progress, and some observed attitudinal changes --- no conclusive variables emerged. From the analysis of a large number of projects of different agencies, no individual or cluster of factors could be identified which were present in all of the more successful cases and absent in the less successful ones.

What has been done, therefore, is not dissimilar to the MIT Conference approach. The mass of project data, interviews, and observations have been used to describe the process as it occurs and to develop a framework for decision making more likely to lead to successful projects.

While the conclusions of the report will recommend practical actions on the basis of the framework, the recommendations must be accepted with the same circumspection with which the MIT Report surrounds its own prescriptions for bureaucratic innovation.

"We do not offer any organizational panaceas, any administrative technology to be transplanted whole from one society to another. It is useless to draw up the table of organization of an "ideal" extension or credit system, for no such bureaucratic shell would guarantee that the agent of change would perform in such a way as to achieve the goal we have stated: to make fruitful the farmer's encounter with bureaucracy.

In the past, claims have been advanced for particular forms of organization: cooperative credit and community development are examples. Our view is that -- entirely aside from the issue of the will to develop -- the variation in the factors involved is far too great to put forth any single technique as having general applicability or, for that matter, to reject a technique because it has failed in one situation. The priorities in the needs of agriculture vary from roads here to fertilizer there and to research in the third place; the variety of local cultures in which the innovations are to be introduced is almost infinite; different nations have different bureaucratic resources. If both problems and resources vary, it is normal that the best techniques for solving the problems should also vary." 15

CHAPTER II

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROGRAMMING PROCESS

Some insight on the nature of the programming process can be obtained from a brief look at its evolution. It is through the expanding activities and the mounting requirements that programming has become an explicit part of technical assistance. In its original form technical assistance was either a missionary activity, a by-product of private investment or the occasional loan of technical personnel from a developed country.¹ Some technical assistance emerged full blown through the shift from colonial status to independent nationhood, through efforts of the metropolitan country to maintain some degree of continuity. For the most part, however, government-to-government technical assistance has developed gradually from many unrelated activities which began in the 1930's.

The Expansion of Activities

Possibly one of the best ways to illustrate how the process has developed is through the use of a composite example drawn from the early experiences of technical assistance activities.

In the course of research an agricultural scientist finds a journal article by a scientist in a developed country dealing with a problem of importance in his underdeveloped country. He points out to his superior that the research involved could be more easily accomplished in their country and would be of benefit to all concerned. Following formal contacts between the two governments or only by the scientists involved, the foreign scientist is assigned to carry out the research

¹ For a review of some of these earlier activities see Edwin A. Bock, Fifty Years of Technical Assistance: Some Administrative Experience of U. S. Voluntary Agencies, (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1954). See also Philip Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 1-30.

project in the underdeveloped country. He finds little of the necessary equipment and few well trained laboratory assistants to support the activity. He convinces both his own and the host country agencies to supply the necessary equipment and to offer short-term scholarships to further train personnel in needed techniques.

As the scientist proceeds in his research project working with counterparts and training assistants, he is, in fact, promoting the adoption of new approaches to solving problems. The concern is not whether this is the most important thing that could be done in the country; it is agreed that the activity is "good" since if an answer to the problem can be found it will increase the country's agricultural potential.

The determination of priority, the decision as to what was to be done and the prediction of possible consequences are all implicit. The original agreement allowed two scientists to work together to resolve a common problem in the agricultural field.

The minister of agriculture may find that these new ideas and approaches portend important possibilities for development and may well add to his prestige as an innovator and modernizer. He is interested in increasing his ministry staff and improving the organization and operation of the ministry and sees an opportunity to do so through the use of a corps of foreign advisors in key fields. In this manner he will also have access to additional resources including equipment, foreign personnel and training abroad for promising agriculturalists at a minimum cost.

Through an interchange of opinions and ideas the minister and the advisor agree on what kind of technical assistance will be requested by the ministry of agriculture. The decision on what is important depends on the particular interests of the minister and the foreign advisor, their joint estimate of crucial agricultural needs and the likelihood of obtaining the assistance from the donor country.

Through communication with the donor agency, depending on the interest and availability of resources, an agreement is reached on the nature of the program and the people to be sent. As technical assistance increases to the ministry of agriculture, other ministers begin to request

this kind of advice for their own ministries and proceed to make similar arrangements to get technicians in their particular fields. At this point several things may happen.

The Prime Minister may become concerned with the amount of foreigners in the different ministries, he may find this a political liability with nationalistic political opponents, or he may find that both sizeable sums of money and high level technical talent are being drawn off into technical assistance activities which deprive him of funds for the general operation of government.

At the same time, if it is a governmental program, the ambassador of the donor country may become concerned that technical advisors are suggesting policies for the country which may conflict with other aspects of foreign policy, or which could create problems in the economic relations between the two countries. The ambassador urges his government to provide him authority to manage and coordinate all advisors in the country. He may make representations to the prime minister about the means in which the program is being conducted, pointing out that the embassy is the logical place through which any requests of this nature should be made.

The prime minister, who may be interested in obtaining capital funds or larger projects is quite receptive to proposals for a centralized approach to the problem of providing and receiving technical assistance, although he may not want technical assistance handled in the same manner as traditional diplomatic relations. The result of these concerns on both sides results in more direct and centralized relationships in the development of technical assistance activities. Either a chief of individual technical divisions was put in charge of all activities in his field, or in some cases a central director of all activities in the country was appointed. In addition, the ambassador to a greater or lesser degree becomes involved in the determinations of technical assistance, and the finance minister or some other high official recipient country also becomes involved in the general determination of what kind of technical assistance will be requested.

For the donor agency the new responsibilities of a central director involve gathering information as to the circumstances of each activity, its objective, what other support it is receiving from the government, and its future requirements in terms of funds and personnel. Thus an administrative structure is set up to provide adequate information and put it together in a meaningful way for both the field chief and headquarters. This is, in effect, the beginning of explicit activities of a programming type of technical assistance. It also results in the gradual imposition of an administrative structure which is required to deal with the increasing problems of administering technical assistance and maintaining relationships with the recipient government. The field chief, although in some cases he may be merely a coordinator of other agencies, becomes a focal point for information about activities in the country and a principal channel of communication with headquarters and recipient officials.

Programming, in terms of selection of activities on the basis of priorities or needs, is still to a great degree, implied and grows out of the interests of technicians, field chiefs, recipient country ministers, ambassadors and high level experts which visit the country.

Generally speaking, the basis for initiating new activities in these circumstances are through the individual requests from different recipient officials or from the expanding or amplifying of activities already in progress. Programming as such, involves the gathering of information, calculating of financial requirements, budgeting and other administrative aspects of technical assistance organization.

Some agencies in technical assistance still operate within this framework, with varying degrees of interest in developing more complex programming. In all cases, headquarters, if it is a separate agency, consolidates materials for each country to provide justification for funds and the backstopping support of the technical assistance arrangements in any given country.

The Development of an Administrative Structure

As requests expand, and the requirements of technical assistance begin to exceed the resources which the donor has available for it, field chiefs begin to make selective judgments as to which projects should be requested from headquarters offices. These arrangements may be influenced by the particular interests of the recipient country, the influence of different technical specialists, or the studied or intuitive judgments of the head of the field office.

At some point during the development of this selection process, headquarters (now an agency of the government rather than an office in a technical department) begins to develop broad policies which must be taken into account by field chiefs in the selection of projects. This is often as a result of the development of conscious objectives by the headquarters organization or the imposition of specific requirements by a legislative body, or the board which controls the funds to be used for technical assistance.

As these policies develop into a consistent pattern, headquarters becomes more involved in the determination of specific activities through requesting more detailed analysis from the field, or through the determination of areas in which the organization will provide technical assistance. Even though some agencies place considerable emphasis on country requests and field chiefs' recommendations, there is an implicit increase in the influence of headquarters. This may take the form of simply excluding certain sectors or geographic areas from acceptable projects in technical assistance. In other cases it may mean more elaborate approval processes or headquarters determinations of program emphasis.

Some of these requirements are the result from a need for obtaining domestic support for the program, others from the need for administrative efficiency. Headquarters may also begin to serve in a capacity of disseminating knowledge about activities in other countries so that field chiefs may have additional information on which to base decisions about specific activities.

In this situation the programming process becomes more than a reporting device. It is a means by which the experience of the individuals in headquarters and the field is brought to bear on decisions as to what activities should be initiated or how present activities should be modified. The interaction between donor technicians who are interested in the development of given kinds of projects and recipient officials who promote different activities within their government are now placed within a framework of organizational policies. These policies are influenced by technical considerations but reflect many other factors including foreign relations, economic conditions and overall policies of both donor and recipient. During this period there is an increase in administrative staff, the introduction of administrative controls and an increase in analysis of proposed activities. It is the beginning of the change from the simple loan of personnel to an organizational relationship involved in a technical assistance program.

The programming process is, even so, only to a very limited degree subject to the influence of a growing current of analysis in the field of development. There were, to be sure, efforts by technical groups to increase knowledge of soils, educational systems, health programs, etc. Policy makers and program personnel were at this time experimenting with a variety of administrative techniques and approaches designed to increase the influence, the effect and the multiplier of technical assistance activities in given countries or broad areas. With the more centrally directed activities, more diverse needs were also being met in new fields (i.e., civil aeronautics, public administration, transportation, etc.). As activities expanded into these many functional areas, the increase in funds for demonstration equipment, the contracting process, pilot and demonstration projects, joint operations and many other approaches to increase effectiveness were tried.

The Incorporation of Development Theory

The first stage of technical assistance was criticized by the administrators for its haphazard and isolated character. The second was

attacked by scholars who had begun to examine economic development, comparative administration and the impact of culture change.

"You can, after all, administer the wrong thing efficiently," they argued, often with convincing documentation. Nor was all the criticism from outsiders. There was a growing group of experienced practitioners who promoted a more analytical approach to both technical and program decisions in several different organizations.

While most programs tended to draw from the government bureaucracy, there was a significant sprinkling of career people with university and research oriented backgrounds. Many of the temporary consulting activities made use of university experts. The large economic and loan programs required considerable economic analysis, and economists involved in these programs have been an important influence on the development of the programming process in technical assistance.

The efforts of anthropologists, the usual managers of orientation for overseas personnel and language training, to promote social science research in the field began to have some effect. Foundations who had used the skills of academic personnel more extensively than either bilateral or multilateral programs began to broaden their analytical studies from the early emphasis on physical sciences.

The growing interest in the nature of underdevelopment and the increasing experience of the academic community brought about a questioning of many of the policies and approaches which had been cliches in the early days of technical assistance. In spite of its attractiveness to funding bodies and the public, the notion that we could simply show people the "right" way to do things and expect that they would absorb these methods was one of the first to fall. Anthropologists provided concrete examples of cultural barriers. Political scientists modified their traditional approach of comparative politics and government, which resulted in new insights into its complex nature in underdeveloped countries. Public administrators documented their evidence in the incongruity of modern development programs in antiquated

administrative systems. Sociologists, historians, and many others added to the growing current of literature which has been leading steadily toward a more comprehensive approach to development theory.

Economists from many countries served a crucial function in this process, not only because of the abundance of important contributions to research and to policy but because in the early stages they had effectively captured the entire movement under the term Economic Development. Fresh from applying modern concepts of economic analysis to the problems of World War II, U. S. economists, working with their European colleagues, provided the economic basis for major program determination during the Marshall Plan. This was the first attempt to base external economic aid on the analysis of national economic policies and conditions.

The success of the Marshall Plan, the expansion of its activities to the Far East, and its incorporation into a single U. S. foreign aid agency brought an important economic emphasis to program determination in U. S. assistance. The continuing role of economists in overseas activities and the volume of applicable research provided by economic scholars have maintained and extended this influence on the U. S. and other agency programs. However, with the incorporation of more detailed studies of economic behavior in underdeveloped countries and the work of other social scientists, a comprehensive approach to development theory has begun to emerge.

In the field of technical assistance this influence increased the understanding of the importance of systematic analysis and careful programming prior to the initiation of most activities. There can be no doubt that additional inputs of information can provide a better basis for program decisions. Similarly, a more comprehensive view of country development problems makes it possible to consider alternative actions in terms of their contribution to overall objectives. As has been pointed out previously, the widely varying circumstances of individual countries preclude a standard approach, whether to agricultural extension or university development. Therefore, the careful examination

of each country situation can provide the basis not only for decisions as to what should be done but also for information as to the means for accomplishing it.

On the other hand, the kinds of data which are needed in the formulation of a development program are either nonexistent or so unreliable as to be of very limited value in most of these countries. Frequently personalism, political interests, and administrative instability, combined with a lack of trained personnel, can destroy the best planned project. Given the lead time for approval and funding, in most projects a careful analysis at the time of the proposal may, therefore, be useless at the time of initiation. Even more serious is the assumption by headquarters that the data provided on underdeveloped countries are a meaningful base for program judgments. In practice it appears that there is as much danger in making activities fit preconceived development strategies as there was in the case of standard patterns of administration or technical preconception. While a comprehensive view is always useful for the purposes of analysis, justification by it may provide for misleading simplifications and raise unrealistic expectations in the planning of complex activities. Technical assistance activities just do not fit the tidy patterns in which they are sometimes conceived.

Whatever may be the problems of application, the concepts of development have added another component to the traditional reporting and budgeting role of the programming process in technical assistance. Insofar as agencies incorporate this role, programming attempts to provide a framework for the determination of the goals of a technical assistance activity within the confines of a development program. In this sense the programming process combines the political, economic and social data with technical and administrative factors in order to assist in decisions which will make the most effective use of the donor's resources in assisting a particular recipient development program.

Almost everyone agrees to the importance and potential of development theory as a means for country planning and external assistance

statistics gathered by DAC on current technical activities indicate that there are over one hundred thousand persons working in technical activities around the world. These, of course, include massive groups of teachers and other colonial servants who have been kept in former colonies by their metropolitan governments in an effort to assist the transition to independence. There are, in addition, a large number of small organizations with very small staffs in field headquarters which provide a few scholarships or support small programs.

By defining technical assistance to include major activities at the government-to-government level it is estimated that there are about twenty thousand persons employed by organizations specifically engaged in attempting to influence the direction of change in underdeveloped countries.⁴

The existence of increasing numbers of donors in individual countries has had an important impact on how both donor and recipient approach program decisions and on the nature of the relationship between donors. These relationships may include direct cooperation, coordination, diffidence, competition and conflict.

Over the past several years, donor agencies, in particular, have been placing an increasing emphasis on the need for effective coordination of technical assistance activities among different agencies both in the field and at headquarters. This emphasis has been indicated by the various instructions to different field missions stressing coordination activity and encouraging the development of effective instruments of coordination at different levels. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has been created in part to promote exchange of information and actively encourage and support coordinating activities among different bilateral programs.

There has, in fact, been a significant increase in the exchange of information between different donors for the most part to avoid gross

⁴ For a concise discussion of the problem of determining the number of people involved in technical assistance see The Magnitude and Complexity of Technical Assistance, a staff paper on this project.

duplication of activities. In some countries a formal organization has been created to bring about more effective exchange of information and the relation of activities. This approach has met with a limited amount of success for many reasons, not the least of which is the reluctance of the recipient governments to formalize this process and the reluctance of donors to permit any direct intervention into their program decisions. This is in significant contrast to the relative effectiveness which has been achieved in the coordination of capital assistance.

The merger of the United Nations programs and what appears to be a trend toward strengthening the Resident Representative and the New York headquarters may provide new opportunities to develop coordination procedures within the U. N. and among other agencies. However, there are still formidable problems involved in the effective coordination of technical assistance. The problems and their implications are dealt with in more detail in Chapter IV.

Presently it is only important to note as a historical fact that existence of multiple donors, as well as multiple claimants, within the recipient government is a factor which has influenced and will continue to influence the nature of the organization of the programming process.

CHAPTER III

PROGRAMMING FROM DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS

The three major organizational elements, recipient, donor field mission, and donor headquarters have different roles and each influences the process in a particular way. Because of the external inputs from its environment and the internal influences on the development of specific objectives, each group has a special set of expectations derived from its framework for the consideration of programming.

The recipient views technical assistance programs within the context of its total development program.

The field mission views the problem in the context of its own total assistance program and the balance of relationships with the recipient and headquarters.

Donor headquarters sees programming not only in terms of a total country assistance program but also in terms of global organization objectives.

Within these broad contexts of consideration there are important problems which need to be resolved within each group. The recipient government must consider such factors as political relationships, development policies and the claims of different technical departments in its determination to request assistance. In order to define its position to headquarters and the recipient, the field mission leadership must resolve the views of the program, technical and administrative personnel. Headquarters leadership must integrate the views of similar groups in its organization concerned with agency policy, administrative organization, and technical support, as well as take into account a variety of external influences which impinge on its decisions.

In addition to the organization environment there are professional or other influences on individuals and groups. It is possible, for example, that recipient and donor field mission technicians can be more in agreement with each other than with either recipient headquarters or the donor agency field mission.

Nevertheless it is the objectives of these three groups, their policies and interrelationships, that create a technical assistance program both at the level of goal setting and at the level of project selection.

The recipient government could be divided into a central agency in charge of coordination or control, ministries in each sector and field personnel who perform the tasks of development. However, in the programming of technical assistance the problem is essentially the resolution of differing positions as represented by various organizational units. While there are many subordinate processes of resolution, the crucial one is between the recipient and the donor.

On the other hand, the donor agency is separated into field and headquarters because of the geographic distance and the separate role they play in dealing with the recipient. It is true that headquarters may overrule the field mission, but in most instances the field office takes a position, within policy limits, designed to meet the particular country circumstances. It is this difference and the peculiar characteristics of each country that require the development of individual country programs.

The headquarters has another position which is related to its own environment and the global objectives of the donor, and therefore requires separate consideration.

In order to understand the nature of the program process it is important to examine in somewhat more detail the roles, functions and relationships within each of these three groups as a means to understand their approach to program determinations.

The Recipient Country

In the spontaneous process described in Chapter II, technical assistance projects were developed largely through personal or professional relationships. Limited attention and support were required by the recipient government. There are no significant internal consequences of this kind of technical assistance. The donor often assumed that

once modern techniques were known they would spread spontaneously, creating significant changes in a given sector. Recipient agencies often assumed that if they added small inputs of human or monetary resources, technical assistance could significantly increase the scope and effectiveness of their programs. Even at this point, however, recommendations of technical advisors resulting from agricultural research raised the question, for example, of the need for a more effective and better staffed extension service. Such a decision means more personnel, higher salaries, training facilities with consequent increase in costs.

The Shift to Projects

As technical assistance began to shift from individual advisors or experts to projects with different kinds of objectives, the recipient government was required to provide substantial cash outlays and contributions in kind, in addition to utilizing the time of scarce administrative talent within the government.

Donor agencies began to expect careful preparation, detailed studies, backstopping facilities, and adequately trained personnel to work with their technicians in carrying out technical assistance projects.

What recipient governments thought would be extra resources to improve and increase their capacity to develop turned out to be a mixed blessing. Technical assistance had a way of eating into organizational budgets. If the donor provided technicians, equipment and funds, the recipient was expected to provide counterpart technicians, support personnel, physical facilities and travel expenses. If donors provided tractors for demonstration or pilot projects, the tractors required gasoline, mechanics, spare parts, access roads and experimental plots large enough to demonstrate their use. As the donors began to proliferate, recipient governments found it difficult to determine their future costs and were sometimes hard put to contribute their share to support the burgeoning projects.

Furthermore the character of external assistance was rapidly changing. What began as an uncomplicated arrangement for a few technical experts to assist the improvement of ongoing activities of the government has expanded into a broad program of loans, grants, capital projects, pre-investment studies, and the distribution of food grains.

Capital projects, whether grants or loans, not only can be important but they have a kind of charm. They involve large amounts of money. They attack large problems. They are evidence of the country's efforts to promote progress. In addition, technical and management problems for a capital project (a dam, steel mill, etc) are normally contracted to an experienced firm. Funds for these projects are also earmarked in large amounts and there is no need for returning to the legislature for a yearly request for funds.

Compared to capital projects the money provided by both donors and recipients for technical assistance is usually small.¹ It involves complicated long-term planning, financing and managing. It requires more attention at different levels of government than would seem warranted for the limited expenditure involved. This accounts, in part, for the limited attention which technical assistance may receive by recipients with large external assistance programs.

In the last few years, however, donor agencies dealing with capital projects have been more insistent on the need for appropriate indigenous skill to plan and manage capital projects, and in some cases have stipulated that recipients spend part of capital funds for technical assistance activities in support of the project. In other cases lending agencies have, themselves, begun to provide technical assistance in the preparation of large projects. This has been one factor in the gradual realization of the importance of human resources and the renewed interest in technical assistance activities by both recipients and donors. There are still, however, many

¹ Technical assistance has ranged between two and three hundred million out of a total economic aid program of between two and three billion in the U. S. program, for example.

capital minded recipient countries to whom technical assistance is considered a burden and even at times an unwarranted interference in internal affairs. A few recipients are convinced that all that is needed for effective development is the types of large inputs which are provided to European countries for the Marshall Plan.

With the proliferation of donors has come the problem of attempting to fulfill the different requirements that each expects prior to project approval. Furthermore, each donor has certain preconceptions as to strategy, certain general objectives and special capacities. Recipient governments, therefore, face the problem of how to use these external resources to a maximum effect. This is particularly difficult since each donor expects the recipient country to pay particular attention to its requirements, provide a major share of the funds and accept the responsibility for proper implementation.

Organization to receive Technical Assistance

With few exceptions, each donor expects to participate in: 1) selection of personnel for fellowships or training; 2) decisions about counterpart personnel; and 3) various other project determinations depending on the agency.² Further, each donor agency has a different a) approval process, b) budget cycle, c) accounting practice, and d) agreement procedure, which commit each side to certain specific actions.

In organizing to receive technical assistance, recipient officials state that they have basically two choices: 1) allowing project development by the individual departments with some coordination or guidelines from an interministerial committee; or 2) fashioning a central organization to coordinate or control requests to and relations with the many donor agencies.³ The first tends to provide duplication of effort and

² Frequently a competent local technician is sought by several donors. In the training field one candidate in one country was offered training by four different agencies concurrently.

³ The second is the most common. See John White, Analysis of Questionnaire Returns from United Nations Representatives on Technical Assistance Administration, a companion report on this project for an illuminating discussion of both approaches.

the second may provide an additional layer of bureaucracy in the decision making process.

With the increase in external assistance there has been a tendency for central agencies to assume the responsibility for dealing with all technical assistance activities. These agencies vary significantly in their relationship to the president or the source of power in the recipient government. Even when they are directly attached to the president's office and wield considerable power, they must use their authority with careful attention to the requirements of the donor agencies and the ministries. Frequently informal agreement between a ministry and the donor agency is a source of pressure on the central office for approval of projects which may vary from those considered of highest priority by the government.

In some countries with central coordinating organizations, cases were encountered in which projects considered to be of high priority by the ministry of agriculture were taken to the prime minister or the president for decisions; thus the process of going through some coordinating or planning body was short-circuited. At the same time a great deal of delay was involved in getting approval from the central planning agency on all other projects.

One of the factors which complicates relationships is that the donors have often predetermined strategies for country development which may not agree with the recipient's development plans. In the case of FAO, for example, regional field chiefs or technical personnel from Rome frequently make arrangements with departments of agriculture prior to consulting with either Resident Representatives or the central units for technical assistance. Since Resident Representatives usually have a close relationship with the personnel of the central unit, they may engage in informal reciprocal arrangements to prevent the approval of projects which either considers inappropriate. That is, the recipient country officials may ask that the Resident Representative try to dissuade FAO from submitting a given project, or the Resident Representative may ask

the coordinator to defer consideration on a project which has been proposed by FAO or some other specialized agency.

Under normal circumstances the bilateral field chief has greater control over the activities of technical divisions. There tends, therefore, to be less of a reciprocal relationship, although central bodies may ask field missions to assist them in preventing the short-circuiting mentioned above. The recipient may be put in a more difficult position if the bilateral donor, who also provides loans and capital, presses for a project of little interest to the central coordinating body. It must balance its overall relationships with the donor with its own role as a major influence in project approval.

With the growing sophistication of recipient and donor officials, arrangements for handling small projects which result from special interests on either side are dealt with on a reciprocal obligation basis. In this way the Prime Minister's pet project is accepted by the donor knowing that some project with the support of a strong interest group in the donor agency will also be accepted.

With donors who have very specific objectives the central body can play the role of intermediary more easily. Its knowledge of the requirements of a donor makes it possible to provide valuable assistance to a technical department in project preparation. In other cases where the program determinations are left to the recipient, the central body usually performs a major role in the determination either through an interdepartmental committee or direct determinations as to which projects will be selected.

An Example of Central Agency Problems

Possibly the range of problems which confront any central organization within the recipient government can be better illustrated with a hypothetical example drawn from a wide variety of cases:

The working day of a recipient official in charge of coordinating technical assistance in a central agency might begin with a morning meeting with the Resident Representative

of the United Nations and a division chief of a country ministry. The Resident Representative has a list of names of several experts under consideration for assignment to a new project. After reviewing the qualifications of each expert, they decide on those which will be submitted to the Planning Board Director and the Minister for approval. The Resident Representative then points out that the cash contribution on the new Special Fund survey has not yet been approved and requests action by the Planning Board on this matter. He also suggests a series of meetings to begin preliminary review of project proposals for the submission to the EPTA segment of the United Nations Development Program, which will be due in several months.

Later in the morning he meets with an official of the Ministry of Agriculture and the head of the dairy branch of FAO from Rome who is interested in developing a project in pasteurization of milk and wants an informal confirmation of the arrangements which have been agreed upon in the Ministry of Agriculture.

At a luncheon with the AID mission director and program officer, they remind him of a proposed project for the establishment of several farmer training centers, which was discussed more than a year ago. The project would provide an opportunity to channel knowledge of new techniques to owners of small farms and provide the technical backstopping for the extension service. The AID mission now has funds and since additional surveys have been completed, the government should now select the land, provide buildings, including additional space for the foreign advisors, personnel and budget additional funds for cost of local equipment, labor and materials. As soon as the government will commit itself to these actions, the mission director is prepared to negotiate a project agreement and start recruiting personnel.

After lunch the official meets with the country representative of UNESCO and the Deputy Minister of Education to discuss the use of savings made available by the late starting of some other UNESCO projects. The Deputy Minister points out that UNESCO is willing to provide assistance, a teacher training school, for rural primary teachers. While this project was not submitted in either category one or category two of the U. N. EPTA Projects, the new minister has classified it as a high priority activity. The Deputy Minister states that if this project is approved immediately it may be possible to get an expert from a nearby country who is finishing his work there.

The coordinator asks what arrangements have been made to provide the facilities for such a school and staff. He is told that the minister of education intends to use one of the present teacher training schools as a pilot center to begin training rural primary teachers who will be assigned to exclusively rural schools. On the question of the relation of this school to the other teacher training activities being carried out by another agency, both officials assure him that there is no duplication, since this school will be exclusively devoted to the training of teachers for rural areas.

The coordinator requests that the project proposal be sent from the minister of education to the director of the planning board and states that he will discuss the matter with the director as soon as possible.

At another meeting with the economic counselor of a foreign embassy he discusses a request for assistance in civil aviation which has been requested. The counselor says that he expects approval for the project in the near future, but that it would be extremely helpful if it were

possible to conclude the negotiations for landing rights for his country's airline. This would, of course, make it possible for the donor government to partially utilize these airline personnel to assist in the civil aeronautics project.

The only good news of the day comes in the form of a phone call from the Counselor of the British Embassy, stating that the request for training and technicians at the agricultural college has been received and that the Embassy will request London to begin recruiting on these technicians at once. Since there are no training facilities in the area, it will be possible to start selecting faculty members of the college for training in London for the following academic year.

As he leaves his office that afternoon he reflects that he has done nothing about the training course for development economists which is to be held at the U. N. regional commission, nor has he consulted with the foreign planning advisor attached to the commission with whom he was to prepare a request resulting from the Swedish Government's interest in a population control program.

After a cocktail party at a donor embassy and dinner at home, he returns to the office in order to prepare for an interministerial meeting at which he will have to present the budgetary requirements of technical assistance for the forthcoming year.

He is sure that the Prime Minister will be surprised at the additional funds that will be required to maintain the technical assistance projects, even though, insofar as possible, he will report only monetary costs that are required and leave all contributions in kind to the regular budgets of the respective departments.

During the course of the evening at the office he receives an urgent phone call from the director of an agricultural research station in the countryside, stating that insect damage to crops this year is so serious that there is immediate need for a senior entomologist with experience in tropical insects to assist them in determining the means of controlling it. The director points out that he requested an entomologist some weeks ago and has heard nothing. The coordinator makes a note and says that he will talk to the Israeli Ambassador, who has discussed the possibility of starting a program and might be willing to act expeditiously on this matter.

Like most of that small band of overworked officials who handle the management of the development programs in undeveloped countries, he leaves the office late at night, possibly wondering how he will handle the volume of activities scheduled for tomorrow, how he may be able to get some additional staff, and whether he will be named undersecretary if the prime minister's plans to change the planning commission to a ministry are realized.

No simple recording of the activities of one recipient official can indicate all the types of problems with which a central coordinating body must deal, but the above examples of specific problems may help to clarify some of the more generalized discussions in this section. Of course there is a wide variety of other relationships with individual ministries and interest groups within the recipient government which occupy the time of the central body involved in coordinating technical assistance.

Some insights on the internal relationships within the recipient government were gathered from planning advisors and recipient officials but not enough data are available for reliable generalization.

Recipient countries have become concerned with the amount of their limited development funds and scarce administrative talent that they must

expend in order to organize for receiving technical assistance from the different available sources. Each of the donors seeks assurance that the recipient will provide its share of resources for the projects in which it is participating. This is usually done through some kind of written understanding which commits the recipient government to a particular share of the expenses involved. These commitments for technical assistance are long term in implication, if not explicitly so. While not large, they are an expanding part of recipient expenditures and there are no grace periods until they need to be met. Recipient support of these projects may also have some influence on its obtaining large loans and grants for capital projects as well.

The Project Selling Problem

Another problem for recipients is project promotion by donors. One group of recipient officials stated that normal requests for approval for projects which are internally developed can be handled through the already established formal and informal procedures which are in effect. Donor agency promotion, however, is a more difficult problem, since it involves not only the balancing of different interests within the government, but the relationships with an individual donor or possibly between different donors.

Another group of officials stated, however, that they welcomed project selling by donors provided they had the opportunity to review a proposed activity. They stated that in most cases a donor will never refuse to honor a recipient request but pursues a variety of stratagems requiring multiple revisions, reconsiderations, surveys, establishing of committees, etc., in order to delay the project or bring it into line with the conceptions of the donor. On the other hand, when the donor agency suggests a project, if it is found to be broadly within the recipient's needs, there is relative assurance that the donor agency has enough interest to act expeditiously on the project. Therefore, when agreement can be

reached as a result of donor initiative, the burden is placed on the donor to follow through.

In another not uncommon case a recipient official with experience in the U. N. made a practice of informing himself on the particular procedures, budget cycles and predilections of different donor agencies in order to determine their interest in the particular activities which he wished to initiate in his ministry. By continuing official and social contact with different donor personnel, he was able to obtain important support from donor agencies prior to his submission of the project to central agency.

In another case, through the knowledge of particular interest of donor agencies, one official was able to maintain continuing donor inputs to a given project, even though the recipient funds for that activity had been reduced by 50%.

Other interviews confirmed that those recipient officials who understood the workings of the donor agency were more able to obtain support for projects even though they were not as high priority as some other activities. Recipients also use their country's ambassador in Washington, New York or London to generate support at headquarters and grease the tracks for approval of projects in which they have a particular interest.

Another internal factor in the development of extensive projects in one ministry is that it provides some political prestige to that minister and brings him to the attention of higher officials through the arrangements for negotiations, and the relationships which he has with a foreign donor. The significance of this fact is not lost on ambitious recipient officials. Most central agencies are aware of this, but the continuing pressure from both donors and the internal forces within the recipient government to increase the number of technical assistance projects create a situation which they are usually unable to control even if they are so inclined.

Some Recipient Approaches to Agreement

In technical assistance, as in other external aid, the internal

problems and the presence of multiple donors has been an important influence in promoting the increase of government development planning. Recipients are learning what donors have known for some time - if you do not have a defined program, you must take what donors are willing to support. The transition to a more rational approach, however, is not an easy one. Aside from the special interests of the internal bureaucracy and the almost always impending economic crisis, there are important political relationships with major donor nations which must be considered.

Because of these problems countries have to use a number of devices to obtain support for the types of activities which they have decided are important to development. These techniques may vary from country to country, but they are used to a greater or lesser degree depending on the firmness of the country's development program, the economic circumstances, and the nature of donor preconceptions about the program or project.

Some of the techniques are: 1) recipients agree to projects which are tied to loans or provide the greatest amount of foreign exchange with the minimum amount of restriction; 2) recipients commit themselves to projects encouraged by donor agencies in one area, in order to release funds which may be used in another development project which is more desired by the recipient government, but less likely to obtain technical assistance; 3) recipients often request several agencies to consider the same project to determine the one that will provide the best conditions or the one that is interested enough to take immediate action for approval and implementation; 4) recipients will attempt to set project proposals into the reality of their political and bureaucratic environment. They may use as a base an equal division of activities between ministerial claimants and donor agencies. Thus, all ministries get some of the assistance available but the more influential ministries tend to get additional projects. In the same manner, the good projects which offer promise are divided as equally as possible among the different donor agencies except that those donors with additional influence or a large capital program which the country needs, get additional or better projects.

The use of these and other techniques reflects the conscious efforts of the central leadership of the recipient government to formulate a technical assistance program which will contribute most to their own concept of what is important for country development. They are fully aware of the wide range of activities which could be useful and the importance of a careful selection of interrelated activities which will have positive influences on country development. They are also conscious of the often parochial view of the technical departments and that donor agencies may have objectives which vary from those of the country. The maintenance of a careful balance in internal and external relationships in the face of the maze of donor requirements, the special interests of internal groups, and the need for the impact of the total development program is a realistic, rather than cynical, approach to obtaining agreement on a technical assistance program in the context of the country's development objectives.

This amounts to a complicated and tenuous tightrope which the central agency has to walk. The problem is further complicated by the fact that national plans are often not operative documents for the selection of projects. There is also a lack of trained personnel for project preparation or for building a support base on which activities consonant with the plan will be undertaken.

The central coordinating body must, therefore, attempt to relate the logical determinations of what should be done to the political and administrative factors of both the country environment and its understanding of the donor's policies.

There is general agreement that the provision of technical assistance to planning bodies or coordinating offices is one of the means by which additional support can be obtained for rational approaches to planning. These advisors are often furnished by foundations, private firms, or the United Nations. They can be useful for detailed planning, communication with the donors, and, through an understanding of the internal problems of program development, support an integrated development emphasis. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.

Donor Field Mission

Donor field missions vary greatly in their composition, in the delegated authority from headquarters, in their relationships with the recipient organizations, and in the way they resolve the internal problems which impinge on the programming process. In spite of these differences, certain central and identifiable characteristics have been grouped together because of their influence on the field mission view of the program process.

Dualism:

The field office is an operating arm of the donor agency, whose headquarters provides the policy components on which the programs are developed. At the same time, it is the source of the information gathering, analysis and proposals which provide the raw material for policy and strategy for the individual country. It also develops and negotiates final specific agreement on specific projects.

The field mission often finds itself in the position of explaining and defending headquarters policy to the recipient governments and then justifying the resulting program of the recipient to headquarters. This particularly true when there are differences in policy or approach between donor and recipient.

The field mission, as a part of the donor agency, is responsible for the appropriate adaptation of policies to the country situation. It is close enough to the dynamics of the country environment to have a better understanding than headquarters of the objectives of the recipient country in its multi-faceted activities. That the field mission is often in between two fires is partially evidenced by the recipient officials' statements that donor field people do not present their requirements to the headquarters organization in a persuasive manner. On the other hand, a common headquarters concern is that field personnel are becoming over-identified with the country problems in such a way as to twist policies and strategy developed by headquarters into distorted adaptations in order to meet what it considers to be the country situation.

During the period when technical assistance was very limited in nature, a country request was the basis of action, and the field mission was essentially concerned with the availability of funds, personnel, and administrative support. Some technical assistance programs still depend essentially on country requests, with very few limitations imposed by the donor.

As the volume of requests increased and activities were combined in programs, donors became more selective in their choice of activities. This selectivity gradually came to be based on criteria which each donor developed for its own program in each country. The criteria were sometimes derived from a specific strategy for country development, a global policy with regard to an area or a specific field, or possibly some practical criteria such as the availability of personnel and funds. Since this strategy is frequently different from the recipient's approach, the field mission finds the formula for resolving these differences.

Field agencies with extensive authority to agree on projects are often able to minimize these difficulties through their capacity to obtain support for whatever compromises result. Agreement is also facilitated when a specific focus can be defined by the field and approved by headquarters for each country. The field office can then obtain agreement on any project within these limits with the assurance of headquarters support. The problem can be almost eliminated when a donor agency restricts its activities to one specific group of subject matter fields. However, with the changing nature of the requirements for technical assistance and the interdependence of different activities in the development process, the problem of maintaining narrowly focused activities has become a difficult one.

Effective communication between field and headquarters in order to arrive at an agreed approach to the wide variety of country situations is a problem in all but the smallest and most tightly knit organizations. The headquarters views the country program in terms of global objectives

and the set of policies which have been developed through the complicated action of the headquarters environment. The field mission is faced with the individual problems which arise from the country environment and its relationships with the recipient government in the determination of an approach to the technical assistance program.

It is, of course, true that technical and program personnel in the field sometimes lose perspective because of their intimate involvement in country problems. It is also true that headquarters often expects adherence to policies because of the difficulties in formulating them within the headquarters environment. Under these circumstances it is not difficult to understand why there are frequently varying degrees of disagreement between headquarters and field offices. ⁴

At the same time, unfettered by the political and administrative problems of the recipient government, the field office tends to look at technical assistance activities in terms of their objective values within a development program.

There is no intention here of overstating the problem between field and headquarters. There are relationships between persons in the same technical field which cut across field headquarters differences. There are varying degrees of delegation of authority which allow field flexibility in different agencies, and there is a whole pattern of informal communications by which many of these differences are resolved.

The nature of the environment in which the field mission cooperates with the recipient government and the nature of the environment from which the field mission receives its guidance are, nevertheless, different enough to create a situation in which the field mission must find a common ground of resolution for these two different influences. The programming process must, therefore, recognize the dualistic problem of the field mission.

⁴ Because of the nature of the skills required and the differences in the two environments there is a strong tendency for people who adapt well to one or the other to become a professional "field man" or "headquarters man." Data gathered on AID personnel, for example, showed that of the headquarters personnel directly involved with field guidance and support, only one half had served in underdeveloped countries and only one third in the area with which they were dealing. Another sample of agricultural personnel in the field with over ten years' experience showed that 80% had not had headquarters experience.

Action Orientation

Operations has been the exclusive concern of the field mission during most of its history. Budgets and personnel problems were handled by specialists at headquarters or the mission. As technical assistance became a more complex activity with policy and program guidelines, technicians were required to spend more time on analysis, reporting and other activities referred to as "paper work." In spite of agreement by most field people that the nature of technical assistance today requires them to deal with program and administrative problems, they argue that its volume seriously reduces their effectiveness in their "real" job - operations. On examination the nature of the field activity in technical assistance and the environment in which technicians work provide useful insights into their emphasis on operations.

First, most technicians bring with them the Western values of efficiency and accomplishment. Achievement motivation is a common component of the attitudes of field personnel and provides a satisfaction from involvement in concrete activities as well as a measure by which they can judge their effectiveness within the context of the organization.

Second, field personnel are directly involved and cannot avoid facing the nature of the problem and the difficulties which need to be resolved. This is quite different from sitting in a headquarters office thousands of miles away where the problem is described on paper.

Third, field personnel must face their counterparts and officials of the recipient country on a continuing basis and a lack of operational accomplishment decreases their impact in urging increased local activity. It also affects the image of the organization and the individual to the people with whom he must cooperate continuously. It is one thing to be surrounded by the abject poverty of an underdeveloped country to which a gradual defense can be developed, and quite another to be unable to take the necessary action of those specific activities with which one is charged. Field people view the frustrations of the country situation as unavoidable but seriously question the additional

problem of a complicated programming system.

Fourth, the Action Orientation is intensified by the short time which field people have to work on a given technical assistance activity. It may be one year in the EPTA program, two to four years in AID, or longer in the Special Fund and in some foundations. They are therefore anxious to begin work and mobilize local resources to demonstrate progress both for the reputation and their personal satisfaction.

Fifth, there are a variety of outside pressures for accomplishment. In many agencies there is pressure for expenditure of funds prior to the end of a fiscal year. There is also the knowledge that judgements of the effectiveness of the mission will be based on concrete accomplishments within a predetermined time period.

Finally, this operational orientation is further intensified by the pattern of previous activities in technical assistance which have been concerned more with specific accomplishments than with their integration into a total pattern of activity. Technical people are, by the nature of their jobs, responsible for fairly narrow aspects of the program and are concerned with progress in that segment as a means for professional satisfaction and organizational advancement.

Programming as a central means of determining priorities and courses of action threatens both past practices and the roles of those who implement the program.

At another level in the field mission, similar forces work on program officers, field chiefs and other administrators. These forces are manifested in the view that each country is unique, and that program operations can be determined only through the intimate knowledge of the complicated country environment. Field personnel often criticize the approval process and the restrictions placed on the rapid implementation of activities. Each field mission views its needs as priorities and argues that the effectiveness of a role is based on the timeliness of activity initiation.

In AID, where the growth of headquarters' influence on the program and the centralization of program development within the mission

has been most apparent, the conflict between the action orientation of technical staffs and the planning orientation of the program personnel has resulted in some important problems of resolution within the mission.

The shift in the programming function within the field mission from budgeting administrative support and reporting to analysis, strategy and program development has, in some cases, made the program officer a powerful figure.

In AID, mission directors faced with a variety of problems in administration and implementation often rely heavily on the judgment of the program officer in overall program determination. His influence is further reinforced by his role as the principal interpreter of the shifting program guidelines from Washington.

Program officers tend to see technical personnel as protagonists galloping into the mission astride their favorite project, rather than analysts attempting to determine what should be done in their particular field. Technicians, on the other hand, find program officers to be arbitrary and narrowly committed to a set of economic or policy guidelines without the understanding of the operational problems in the countryside.⁵ Most of these conflicts are resolved in a mission review, when all program materials are discussed by technical and program people, together with the mission director.

Many of the AID mission directors interviewed found these differences in approach to be useful and complimentary rather than conflicting unless they created serious personnel problems within the mission. Most field program officers expressed an awareness with the complicated problems involved in program development and recognized a need to work with technicians.

⁵ See American Institute for Research, "The Program Officer - Appendix B" and "The Division Chief - Appendix D", a study of some key USAID jobs (unpublished June 1964). The discussion of internal relationships is detailed and illuminating. It points up shortcomings of both groups, i.e., lack of field visits and the technicians' concern with operations.

Other bilateral and foundation donors react to field action orientation in a variety of different ways. Due to the limited size of many of their operations and the resultant flexibility, it is frequently possible to expedite approval. In other cases short term consultants can provide the necessary services for project development. The Middle East Development Division of the British Program assists in project planning and implementation. While neither AID nor the U. N. has the degree of flexibility of the Foundations, they have expanded the use of consultants significantly in the past few years.

In the U. N. the institutionalized power of the specialized agencies and their functional orientation have created a situation where there is relatively little central field office mediation between experts and headquarters.

Further, it has been pointed out that about 30% of the EPTA activities are never initiated and that these funds remain in the hands of the specialized agencies to be allocated to project activities with the minimal attention to either the resident representative or New York headquarters.⁶ While specialized agencies also compete for Special Fund projects, the process of approval requires more attention by the resident representative and headquarters than is true in EPTA. With the creation of the U. N. Development Program it is reasonable to believe that the EPTA process will be modified in the direction of greater influence of the resident representatives and headquarters offices.

Program Consolidation

Program consolidation is not, strictly speaking, a unique characteristic of the field mission, as both headquarters and the recipient governments consolidate programs in different ways and at different levels. It is at the field level, however, that headquarters policies, recipient requests and field mission judgments are combined into a country program in most agencies. This initial combination is frequently done without reference to the other countries in the area

⁶ See Karl Mathiasen, New Dimensions for Technical Assistance: The UN in Africa, Chapter II, pre-publication draft.

and to a greater or lesser degree is isolated from the detailed headquarters influence (for reasons of distance, if no other).

The degree of program consolidation in the field and the means by which it is accomplished provide important clues to the programming approach of the donor agency.

In some cases the resolution by the field of the major inputs to the program (i.e., headquarters policy, recipient request, and internal analysis) are the determining factors in the country program of the donor agency. In others, they are subject to modification and review by headquarters agencies. In still others either headquarters or the recipient officially decide on the nature and content of the program.

The U. S. program (excluding the Marshall Plan) began to appoint field chiefs in charge of more than one subject matter field in the late 1940's, and a central program planning process was not fully consolidated until the mid 1950's.⁷ Country program consolidation at the field level presently involves an analysis of the country situation, the development of goal plans, and the grouping of capital and technical assistance activities under each goal.

In various U. N. activities program consolidation in the field varies greatly but has been significantly influenced by the changing role of the resident representative. With the beginning of the country programming system in which the target amounts were provided to individual countries, the resident representative began to assume greater responsibilities for constructing the program and thus influencing its content.

⁷ The direct consolidation of different technical divisions into one mission was most apparent in the Institution of Inter-American Affairs. See Philip M. Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.) See also his discussion of the incorporation of responsibilities for technical activities by FOA in 1953, which was at that time a sweeping incorporation of both program and technical responsibilities.

In the biennial program process of the EPTA, the Resident Representative not only is formally responsible for the consolidation of the program but has an increasing influence with the body in the recipient government which makes program decisions. His prestige and continuity at the post also reinforces his capacity to control program consolidation in the EPTA submission.

As Director of the Special Fund in the country he has more direct responsibilities for program formulation and submission. Even though Special Fund projects are submitted at irregular intervals, the Resident Representative takes an active part in their development and submission. He may also submit a separate statement with his own comments on any Special Fund project directly to the Managing Director.

The Resident Representative's participation in the consolidation of the regular programs of the specialized agencies varies greatly. He plays a major role in program consolidation for those agencies which have designated him as their representative in the country. On the other hand, in some other agencies, notably WHO and FAO, he may exercise very little influence. Cases have been observed in which the Resident Representative uses the biennial EPTA submission as a basis for the review and incorporation of all other U. N. activities in the country.

With few exceptions all technical assistance agencies are moving toward greater central leadership and support in the field, and consequently the role of field leadership in program consolidation has increased. This is particularly noticeable in the trend toward the integration of individual projects into sectoral or total country programs. These programs are then justified in terms of a particular development strategy or some agreed common program goals.

Insofar as programs are consolidated at the sectoral level, technical considerations still predominate, but as programs become more integrated, a field mission's view of the process tends to be oriented more to long-range development strategy and less to technical objectives.

Program consolidation is more a function which influences the field approach to the program process, while dualism and action orientation

are each a complex of attitudes which have developed from the changing administrative structure of technical assistance activities. Taken together, however, these factors are basic to the understanding of the approach of field offices to goal development, program determination, and project selection.

Donor Headquarters

Headquarters, as a third major organizational participant in program development, brings another set of perspectives to the process. Its views are determined by: 1) the requirement to develop global policies applicable to a wide variety of field situations and acceptable to the contending forces at headquarters; 2) the need to defend the program to enabling bodies in order to obtain continuing grants of authority and other resources for effective planning and execution; 3) the responsibility to provide guidance and supporting assistance to the field in program and project development; and 4) the necessity to maintain relationships with other agencies which assist, cooperate, or compete with the agency objectives.

The degree of autonomy of the headquarters organization, its position in the hierarchy of broader organizational structure, its independence from external influences, and the size of the internal bureaucracy are some of the major variables which influence the manner in which headquarters performs its function. While the field faces the problems inherent in the country situation, headquarters must contend with an equally, if not more, complex variety of internal and external influences from the donor environment. It must synthesize the field inputs to policy and its program requirements with the varied inputs from these different elements in the headquarters environment into policies and actions which are acceptable at home and feasible abroad.

The more complex the headquarters environment, the more the field objectives are subject to modification to assure adequate support at the headquarters level. Large headquarters offices are always pursuing the ideal formula which will be attractive to supporting groups and broadly applicable to field program development.

While both the recipient and the field mission see their problem as unique, the requirements of a global view of the program inclines headquarters to see them as a variation of an established pattern. There are, of course, elements in the headquarters environment whose views are conditioned by concern with special country situations or by particular sectors of activity. However, the level at which ultimate program determination takes place in headquarters tends to place the emphasis on total organization objectives which transcend the individual country goals.

The way in which headquarters personnel approaches the programming process is molded, as are those of the other participants, by the functions they perform and the environment with which they deal. In order to increase the understanding of it, it will be useful to examine in more detail the four roles stated above.

Policy Formulation

In the past 20 years, public administration theory has left classic notions of policy and administration in tatters. Decision-making theory, systems analysis and functionalism in the process of adding to modern public administration theory have demonstrated that policy and administration are in constant interaction.⁸ Nowhere is this notion more apparent than in the far-flung international operations of a technical assistance agency. Contending parties at headquarters, the policies of recipient governments, the perception of the reality of the country environment by donor field personnel are continually fraying policy around the edges and pressing for changes at the core.

The notion that headquarters should deal with policy and the field with operations is one of those bits of conventional wisdom used in technical assistance organizations by both the field and headquarters

⁸ Some of the most provocative recent works in this area are Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, (New York: The Free Press, 1965) and Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964). However, some of the early attacks on classic public administration concepts are still valuable sources; for example, Chap. II of Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947) and Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State, (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948).

which tends to obscure the degree that policy and operations are intermixed throughout the donor agency.

If policy is defined in practical terms as the broad goals, objectives and values to which all units of the organization are expected to relate, then headquarters is simply a focal point for the resolution of different policy inputs and the organization-wide dissemination of agreed guides to or approach in particular circumstances.⁹ Headquarters operates on the assumption that all persons facing a particular problem in the field will make approximately similar decisions because of the role of policy in the decision-making process. When decisions are made which vary from the established policy terms, headquarters must concern itself with the following possibilities: 1) that the decision itself was incorrect; 2) that this was an exceptional case which required deviation from policy and 3) that it is indicative of changing circumstances which require the re-formulation of present policy. A less frequent question brought up at headquarters revolves around whether policy formulations are too narrow in scope or are not applicable to the variables found in the diverse environments in which technical assistance operates.

Much of what is called policy formulation is usually a re-formulation through small, specific changes resulting from experience or broad new initiatives introduced at the top of the hierarchy. Headquarters personnel finds the field's desire to interpret policy to country needs and its emphasis on decentralization to be contradictory positions. Only when policy is specific, relatively stable, and widely understood, they argue, can any decentralization take place. Program determinations in particular must be closely in accord with policy if they are to obtain the support within the headquarters environment which is needed for approval.

⁹ This definition is derived from Roscoe C. and Mildred Martin, Technical Assistance in the Field: A Study in Administrative Relations - A report on this project which deals in more detail with field-headquarters relations.

Aside from the inherent logic of policy stability for a large organization, headquarters is influenced in its view by the difficulty involved in formulating and modifying policy within its own environment. As the inputs increase from different sources the problem may become one of finding a compromise between contending forces with the established goals as a limiting factor rather than a controlling one. This is to say that there is considerable variation from the ideal that inputs to policy should be measured in terms of their optimum contribution to the goals. The greater the number and the more independent the influence of the elements which contribute to policy, the more it is necessary to find a compromise among contending forces and then determine if the resulting policy is in accord with the overall goals. If it is, the policy is adopted. If not, the process of finding a compromise between contending groups must be repeated until a policy which is approximately in consonance with the goals can be developed.

While the policy problem is a complex one which goes well beyond the scope of this paper, there appears to be a relationship between the volume and independence of inputs to policy formulation and the manner in which headquarters deals with both policy and program determination. A brief inquiry into the policy formulation process of several different technical assistance agencies will serve to indicate the significant points.

Foundations tend to have a less complicated policy formulation problem. They are relatively independent of other agencies in the headquarters environment, their goals do not have to be incorporated into national policy,¹⁰ or with other coordinate groups at the headquarters level.¹¹ Their policy is the product of fairly stable, long-range goals, limited inputs from the field mission, and the internal bureaucracy,

¹⁰ See Annual Report of the Ford Foundation, 1963, for an explicit statement of the Foundation's position as one which does not conflict nor run counter to U. S. policy, but neither is it subject to, or directly influenced by that policy.

¹¹ This refers to policy formation and not operational coordination. Ford and Rockefeller, for example, do have policies which result from an agreement between the two foundations not to engage in specific activities which are of particular emphasis or interest by the other.

and a few individuals or groups who are requested to provide technical or policy studies for assistance in the formulation or modification of policy. These factors and the existence of a relatively small bureaucracy with close ties to the field, provide a policy-making process which does not often involve the resolution of widely varying and essentially independent elements. The Board of Trustees or other enabling body in foundations is also relatively independent of outside influences and integrates the top leadership of the executive arm of the organization. These factors all combine to create a policy formulation process which is a synthesis of relatively homogeneous elements from headquarters and field.

The U. N. has a somewhat more complicated process of policy development. Broad goal setting is done by the Economic and Social Council which consists of both net recipients and net donors.¹² Some of the policy problems of relationships between the U. N. and recipient governments are resolved, or avoided, because the Council consists of representatives of both groups. A subsidiary body of this Council is, in effect, both a goal setting body and an arbiter in the policy process. There are, however, important policy inputs from the Specialized Agencies. Particularly in the EPTA program these agencies function as both external organizations with independent capacities and interests, and as internal participants in the policy formation process. While there is very little other independent, external influence, the volume of internal inputs to policy formulation in the United Nations programs is large. In addition to the field offices, the specialized agencies, and the internal bureaucracy, there are groups within the economic and social council and the general assembly which seek to introduce or alter policy in some way. One of the problems of U. N. policy formulation has been the incorporation,

¹² Since all members of the U. N. (and some who are not) pledge funds to the U. N. technical assistance programs, the most reasonable classification is between those whose pledges are greater than their receipts in technical assistance services and those whose receipts are greater. For a clarification of the net donor concept see John Lindeman, Magnitude and Complexity of Technical Assistance - a report on this project.

where possible, and otherwise the resolution of the variety of often conflicting inputs from internal elements.

The U. S. program is one of the largest and the most complex of the bilateral programs. It illustrates in greater or lesser measure most of the policy problems of bilateral agencies. Technical assistance policy must conform to national goals, foreign policy, and other objectives resulting from capital and supporting activities of the AID agency. There are a great many external inputs to policy formulation over and above the field of the internal bureaucracies.

The Congress, which sets fundamental goals and reviews them yearly, is subject to the direct influence of many groups whose efforts to influence policy are dictated by special interests. With the exception of times when the executive presents an especially imaginative or crucial security problem, the Congress tends to act negatively, restricting, rather than setting, broad objectives in their legislation.¹⁴ Control agencies, such as the Budget Bureau and the Department of State, are concerned with national and foreign policies and consider technical assistance to be one of the many instruments which contribute to it.¹⁵ Lateral agencies and other external groups not only directly influence policy formulation within the agency but they have the additional leverage of direct access to the Congress. Some external agencies must be incorporated into the implementation process and therefore have an influence on policy formulation.

Coordinate groups, while they cannot directly intervene in policy formulation policy, have programs of their own which must be taken into account to prevent duplication and possible conflicts in the field.

Even the inputs to policy from the field environment occur in several different ways. Among these are: 1) the direct interaction

¹⁴ See Frank Coffin, Witness for AID, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), for a more detailed review of Congressional procedures and suggestions for improvement.

¹⁵ See the section entitled "Relationships with other Agencies" for additional treatment of control, lateral and coordinate agencies, pp.71-75.

between field mission and headquarters to resolve problems which raise policy questions; 2) the policy problems that arise from the field activities of lateral agencies which are introduced into the process by their headquarters office; and 3) the recipient inputs that enter either through the field mission or directly at the headquarters level through its diplomatic representation to the donor country.

In such a complex environment the weight of any given input depends upon the degree to which it can garner support from the other elements contributing to the process. The field is the least informed element of the interplay between different groups. It is therefore easy to understand why the field becomes impatient with the process of formulating policy.

Headquarters, in examining modifications in given policies, or even exceptions in special cases, find that they have ramifications beyond the individual case. Their view is that policy modification is complex and should be attempted only in the most critical cases. Field personnel, on the other hand, want frequent modifications which will pave the way for the kind of action they deem necessary. This reluctance is also a source of conflict between field and headquarters. Any field actions which might serve to decrease the effectiveness of policy or precipitate its modification are, in the view of headquarters, their legitimate concern. The rationale for headquarters' involvement in so much operational detail in AID is essentially that of insuring conformity to policy guidelines. The availability of extensive technical resources or information for the field is used as justification, but in interviews headquarters personnel stressed the insurance of conformity to agreed policy as the major reason for involvement in operational detail.

Obtaining and Allocating Resources

While policy evolves gradually and continuously, the need for specific amounts of funds at specific times imposes other requirements on the programming process. Obtaining resources includes both budgeting and justification of specific activities. Headquarters offices must meet these requirements of the funding body and set the schedules for

field submission. The funding of technical assistance is more difficult since there may be changes in fund requirements which cannot be anticipated. In addition, the recipient country funding process is frequently out of phase with that of the donor, creating important timing problems.¹⁶

Another problem, especially for bilateral programs, is the relationship between the area and country focus in developing a program and the functional basis for support. Except in cases of crisis (e.g., famine, earthquake, etc.) the means of building support for a program are through functional departments (agriculture, public health, etc.). A recipient country rarely has a clientele in the donor country, but many groups support agricultural extension, cooperatives, malaria control, etc., as important aspects of the development program. AID, for example, may emphasize the importance of relationships with a given country but it must also seek support from the functional departments. Fads in technical assistance are partially due to the pressures of functional groups in promoting given types of programs with the funding body (savings and loan banks, labor, etc.).

The headquarters role includes the development of a programming system which will provide the kinds of predictions, the depth of analysis, and the adequacy of reporting needed to convince the funding body that it has a valid basis for allocation.

The problem of obtaining the needed amount of funds is influenced by two critical factors, among many others: 1) the competition for funds and 2) the nature of the budget process.

¹⁶ This is particularly true in the yearly funding of bilateral programs. AID funds for a given fiscal year (starting July 1) may be allocated to the field mission any time between the following October and January. Eighty per cent of the funds must be committed by April 30 and the rest by June 30. The country budget cycle is usually different and categories are fixed before the AID mission knows its allocation. There are, therefore, those few months between allocation and the deadline for commitment in which the field mission must obtain agreement on the details of the project and the recipient share of the funds. The problem is somewhat mitigated by the growing sophistication of donor and recipient officials about each other's budget system, but it is a trying period for both sides every year.

1) The nature and extent of the competition for funds - In the case of foundations where the single purpose of the resources of the organization is the financing of technical assistance, the competition is among the projects themselves or country programs. One of the reasons why the foundations' funding decisions are relatively rapid and concentrated on substantive problems is the limited amount of competition for funds based on any other criteria.

In the United Nations, funds are pledged by governments after the submission of program documents. In the EPTA program there is some competition among both countries and Participating Agencies in setting of target figures and in fund allocation. Since there is considerable reprogramming by the Participating Agencies, there has been a good deal of competition between functional departments and countries during that process. The Special Fund is essentially concerned with the quality of projects, their development in the field, and their review at headquarters, but a certain amount of attention must be given to the problem of geographic and institutional distribution.

The bilateral programs illustrate a case of competition for funds on a much broader scale. Technical assistance funds must compete within bilateral agencies for an appropriate share of total funds which are allocated to capital, technical assistance and other purposes. In the preparation of a national budget, foreign assistance funds compete with other national agency requests.

The fact that technical assistance services may not appear to provide as direct and tangible benefits to the national interest and the population at large, as some other services, puts them at some disadvantage. The extent of the problems depends upon the sophistication of both the policy making bodies and the interest groups. After the national budget has been prepared, there is also competition for funds in the legislative bodies which have the final say on the determination of the amounts of funds which will be allocated to foreign assistance agencies.

AID Technical Assistance divisions at headquarters must devote a great deal of attention to obtaining support and developing tools for

justification, to meet competitive pressures on fund availability. This includes the agency level, the Bureau of the Budget, the Congress, and the problems of suballocation based on the capacity of the field to initiate projects.

In some other bilateral programs the funding process is mitigated by the commitment to former colonial dependencies or the support of colonial administrators to assist new governments in maintaining government operations. However, the Jenneney Report to the French Government provides an example of the growing concern on the part of national governments about their technical assistance programs as their colonial obligations are reduced.¹⁷

With the formation of the Ministry of Overseas Development in Britain changes are beginning to be introduced into the program, but it is not yet clear whether the British technical assistance program will face greater difficulty in obtaining funds from the Parliament as colonial commitments diminish and the nature of the program evolves.¹⁸

2) The nature of the budget process -- While budgeting is a specialized process which is carried on throughout a technical assistance agency, it is the headquarters' responsibility to consolidate field budgets and justify them to control and enabling bodies. In the complicated programs of technical assistance, field offices are concerned with flexibility of budget categories and headquarters is concerned with effective control expenditures. The headquarters approach to decentralized control of funds depends on the volume of funds involved and the existence of control mechanisms in the field. Control and enabling bodies are concerned that funds be used in strict accordance with legal and administrative grants of authority.

¹⁷ A report to the President of France by the Jenneney Commission in 1963 also in an abridged translation entitled The Jenneney Report published by The Overseas Development Institute, London, 1964.

¹⁸ For recommendations on the British Program, see British AID, Technical Assistance, The Overseas Development Institute, London, 1964.

Private organizations have more of an opportunity for a flexible approach to budget categories than in most public agencies. It is noteworthy, however, that once funds have been approved, either by program or project, they are in almost all cases allocated to field or operating offices for disbursement. There are, however, varying degrees of flexibility to expend the funds and different durations of fund availability.

The integrated nature of the leadership and enabling bodies of most foundations provide a basis for project-by-project approval of funds with relatively long-term authorization (2, 3, or 5 years) and with considerable flexibility to meet changing conditions after the initiation of activities. Other foundations have regular meetings of Boards of Trustees in which they authorize an illustrative program, delegating headquarters leadership to make final determinations or approve individual projects which have been presented.

In cases where foundations approve a total country program they tend to provide considerable flexibility to both headquarters and field offices in the final detailed determinations of project organization. In the Ford Foundation, for example, there is a yearly submission from the field and funds are earmarked for a planned program of grants. The fund authorizing body meets every six months but in urgent cases they may give immediate consideration to a project. Frequently the President of the Foundation can authorize at least the initial steps in the implementation of any activity. Furthermore, the regional division of Ford Foundation headquarters is allowed to carry over funds from the previous year's authorization and may continue to allot them to projects. The headquarters view is that while funds which are not used by a particular field mission cannot be held over, there is an understanding by field personnel of the flexibility with which the Foundation can act. Field personnel, however, state that there is a definite pressure to expend all funds earmarked during the fiscal period. This in part reduces the flexibility which the Foundation provides its field people, since the successful negotiation of planned projects involves the capacity to wait until appropriate actions are taken by the recipient government to insure effective support for the activity.

The United Nations programs have a variety of different budget systems. Each of the Specialized Agencies which has a regular program has a specific set of budget procedures, varying from highly decentralized (WHO) to relatively centralized (UNESCO). Until the merger they also participated in the budget process of the EPTA as members of the TAB.

The Budget processes of the voluntary programs of the U. N. are significantly influenced by the fact that the funds are pledged by member and other governments at yearly pledging sessions. However, because of the size and the nature of their operations the Special Fund and EPTA approached the allocation of funds in quite different ways. As of this writing there have been relatively few changes since the merger of the two programs.

The Governing Council of the Special Fund earmarks monies for those projects which are submitted to it by the Managing Director at its semi-annual meetings. These funds are earmarked for the life of the project, which may be as long as five years. They constitute the basis for the detailed budget which is contained in the Plan of Operations negotiated by the Special Fund, the Executing Agency, and the recipient government subsequent to Council approval. Financial flexibility is achieved by the amendment of the Plan of Operations and no further recourse to the Governing Council is necessary as long as no additional funds are needed.

The Special Fund budget system allows for considerable flexibility in dealing with the total funds available to it. The long-term authorization and flexibility of the Plan of Operations minimizes the problem of complicated justification for readjustment but vests heavy responsibility in the Special Fund and Executing Agency staff. The problems of the Special Fund have been more those of obtaining the required technical competence for detailed preparation of the Plan of Operations and implementation of the project than providing sufficient funds. There have also been problems involved with the capacity of recipients to fulfill the responsibilities which they undertake in Special Fund projects, including 15% cash contributions to be administered by the Executing Agency and local currencies for personnel and other types of support necessary for the project.

The UN EPTA program, with much smaller and more diverse projects, had a somewhat more complex system of funding procedures.¹⁹ In the early period EPTA funds were divided among Participating Agencies according to a formula. In 1954, the EPTA shifted to a country programming system in which target figures for each country limit the amount of funds available for first priority projects (Category I). Other projects may be submitted, but they will not be funded unless additional funds above the target figure are available (Category II). After the country program has been agreed upon by an organization in the country and submitted to New York through the Resident Representative, country programs are checked and consolidated by the programming staff of the Technical Assistance Board (TAB). The TAB reviews and approves the program and submits its program to the Technical Assistance Committee which approves the budget and authorizes the allocation of funds in accordance with their activities in the different country programs.²⁰ From this point on they are responsible for the detailed arrangements and funding of the individual projects. As will be pointed out later in a discussion of the EPTA program, flexibility in funding is obtained through the capacity of the participating agencies to shift funds in agreement with the recipient government with little or no prior recourse to either resident representatives or headquarters of the EPTA program.

In 1962 the EPTA program shifted to a biennial submission and authorization for activities, though funding is provided yearly through the pledging sessions referred to above. Projects can be submitted for two-year periods (short term) or for a four-year period (long term). A number of problems with the two-year program have emerged and there are differences of opinion within the U. N. as to its effectiveness.²¹

¹⁹ While the special fund and the EPTA program have been merged in the United Nations Development Program, the study was conducted prior to the merger.

²⁰ For more detailed comments on these factors see The Organization of the United Nations Technical Assistance: A staff paper on this project, pp. 16-28. For a concise statement of the development of the EPTA program see also Gerard J. Mangone (Ed.) U. N. Administration of Economics and Social Programs, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), particularly pp. 166-185.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 28-30.

The budget process of technical assistance in the AID program is a part of the total program submission and as such receives a limited amount of attention at top levels, in the AID/Washington and the Bureau of the Budget. The Congress, however, particularly in the committee hearings of the House of Representatives, sometimes asks for detailed information on individual projects. Because of this Congressional attention to detail, and the need by parts of the headquarters office to have advanced information on personnel, specific funding requirements and commodity components, the Activity Description in the AID program book is prepared in great detail and includes the categories and amounts of all proposed expenditures throughout the life of the project. This material, prepared in the field more than a year prior to the proposed implementation of the project, is reviewed in the Regional Bureaus, and if important policy questions are raised, may receive more attention through an Administrator's review. Bureau presentations are then combined to make an Agency presentation to the Bureau of the Budget, and subsequently a total presentation, including the budget, for the Congress is hammered out. The Congressional consideration of the budget, including all of the related justifications, is a long, involved, and time-consuming yearly exercise.²² Important blocks of time of senior headquarters officials are taken up in the preparation and presentation of material to the Congress. At the beginning of the subsequent fiscal year, and usually prior to Congressional appropriation of the Foreign Aid funds, an operational year budget (OYB) is submitted by the field, requesting funds for the year's activities. This document forms the basis for allocation of supplemental funds until Congressional action has been completed. It is also a device for shifting program requirements in view of changed country circumstances at a time somewhat closer to the initiation of the project.

Shortly after the submission of an OYB, the following year's program submission, including a budget, is required. This means that

²² The overall Congressional role, while beyond the purview of this paper, will be discussed briefly in Chapter IV under the section "Project Review."

expenditures for a fiscal year already begun must be predicted prior to a knowledge of the nature of Congressional approval.

Headquarters is, therefore, dealing with three different sets of figures on technical assistance activities at any one time -- the budget for the next fiscal year (called the budget year), the budget in the process of approval by the Congress (operational year) and the operational year budget submitted by the field.

Once the operational year funds are approved, they are allocated to the Regional Bureau, then to the respective field missions. Some flexibility is achieved by providing the field with authority to shift a certain percentage of funds among approved projects. However, the problem of readjusting funds between projects and countries as a consequence of changing circumstances and of unforeseen critical problems continues to occupy the attention of headquarters throughout the fiscal year.

In particular, the requirement for committing 80% of the funds by April 30 requires extensive reporting and involves a certain amount of re-programming in order to make sure that those countries and activities which can effectively use the funds obtain them.

The attempts by AID headquarters to achieve the relative stability of the budget process of the programs of the old-line agencies is frustrated on the one hand by the continually changing circumstances in the field, which require flexibility, and on the other hand by what would seem to be an exaggerated notion of detailed accountability on the part of some of the control agencies, particularly Congressional committees.

The above examples give an indication of a few of the problems which headquarters faces in obtaining funds for the program. The effect of competition and inputs to the budget processes are crucial factors in the headquarters role and approach in the programming process. The greater the complexity of the budget process, the shorter the term of approval and the keener the competition for funds, the more the headquarters office must devote its attention to the problem of assuring a

continuing flow of funds at the appropriate rate.

The problem of justifying funds to the control and enabling bodies, as well as those of timing and competition, have an important influence on the way the headquarters views the funding problem and the program process as a whole. Since headquarters is ultimately responsible for widely dispersed field expenditures, they are understandably concerned with control procedures and accountability. Furthermore, adequate justification from the field is the basis for convincing the funding body of the validity of budget determinations. It is, therefore, not difficult to explain why headquarters views procedures for funding flexibility in terms of its effect on both justification and accountability.

Field Guidance and Support:

Another major role of headquarters, from which its view of the program process is derived, is the organization and the content of the relationships with field offices. The overall problem of field headquarters relationships is covered in another report on this project.²³ Within the confines of the present concern for the program process, the Martin statement of the special character of field headquarters relations in technical assistance is equally applicable to the present analysis:

" For one thing, the larger technical assistance programs . . . are worldwide, or at the least transnational, in scope. This immediately produces problems (turning most obviously on difficulties in communication, diversity in needs to be served, and variety in cultures and conditions encountered) scarcely to be compared with those found in individual nations. For another, the technical assistance process by definition brings advanced countries into relation with underdeveloped ones, with important consequences for the concept of a fixed and uniform policy and a predetermined way of administering it. For yet another, the recipients of

²³ Technical Assistance in the Field: A Study of Administrative Relations, Roscoe C. and Mildred E. Martin. See also Robert Iversen, Personnel for Technical Assistance.

technical assistance are sovereign nations capable of deciding for themselves what form foreign aid shall take and (within limits) how it shall be administered within their borders. Such features as these set technical assistance apart; they combine to provide an environment in which the lessons drawn from national or subnational experience have only limited applicability." ²⁴

It is in the program process, ranging all the way from the development of goals to the transfer of projects, that these difficulties in communication and differences in viewpoint are most significant.

In a sense, headquarters and field stand almost back to back, one facing the complexities of the country situation and the other facing the problems of the headquarters environment. The headquarters view is conditioned by the difficulty in formulating policy, obtaining funds and maintaining inter-organizational relationships, as well as by its inherent global view of activities. In the headquarters view, the more reports, analyses and data available, the easier it will be to resolve internal problems and withstand the probing from enabling bodies and competing elements outside the organization.

The significance of organizational size is of crucial importance in the relationships between field and headquarters in the formulation of a technical assistance program. Smaller organizations appear to have a greater degree of informal as well as formal communication between headquarters and field, hence an easier resolution of differing views. The larger and more far-flung the field operations, the more difficult it is to attend to the special problems of each one.

In AID, for example, both field and headquarters, given the complex environment in which each operates, face a series of pragmatic problems which must be solved by skillful administrative tactics to capitalize on opportunities. On the other hand there is a formal process by which programs are presented to enabling bodies as a logically developed, carefully planned and efficiently administered activity. This is the programming fairyland in which boxes must be filled with internally consistent figures and justifications developed which will satisfy

²⁴ ibid., pp. 170-171.

the particular requirements of the enabling body and the policies presently in force. Headquarters, therefore, deals with the field on the program at two different levels; one in the day-to-day reality of shifting circumstances and continuing critical problems; and the other in the polished presentation of goals, objectives and activities. The capacity of both field and headquarters leadership to move back and forth through this looking glass from reality to unreality is the key to successful operations in a large agency with complex inputs to its determinations.

In order to mitigate these problems most organizations devise a variety of techniques, both formal and informal, within the structure of the programming process.

In formal administrative arrangements there are usually attempts to refine policy guidelines to fit given areas or country situations. Reporting devices are developed to assist in the formulation of more realistic policy and provide a better basis for justification in decision making. The volume of reports, which the field considers to be an excessive burden, sometimes are inspired by parochial special interests of enabling bodies or other groups within or outside the agency. Often, however, they are developed in the belief that the additional information will effectively relate headquarters decisions to field problems. Furthermore, headquarters provides a less involved judgment about project proposals and has a much larger pool of expert resources on which to base judgments about the technical aspects of an activity. ²⁵

²⁵ One of the functions of headquarters is to provide a "memory resource", that is, to reply to the field pointing out that X project has been tried in 5 different countries and an analysis of these projects indicates that the mission should consider certain problems and anticipate certain possibilities, etc. The observation by members of the Project indicated that this is rarely done. On the other hand, a number of important questions about the projects are raised by headquarters and a good deal of intuitive advice by experienced practitioners is provided either from the headquarters or by groups participating in project development in the field.

Headquarters designs its field requirements to provide material which it knows will be required by the different groups whose support or acquiescence is necessary for program determination. Given the kind of information it needs, it is quite possible that headquarters can, at an early stage, assist in laying the groundwork for the approval of field projects.

In the informal sphere there are many techniques which soften the rigidities of any programming system and assist in the resolution of differing viewpoints. A few examples will give some insight into the types of techniques which are utilized.

The God-father system - The existence of informal channels which provide additional information and support for the views of the field in the headquarters environment or vice versa are not unique to technical assistance. Experienced practitioners have contacts in the headquarters (or in the field) who are professional colleagues, have common field experience, or simply have worked together at other times. Such persons provide effective support in the other environment, since they are acquainted with the internal intricacies of the decision-making process. An agricultural technician in the field, faced with delays or special circumstances, will communicate with some friend to ask him to determine what has happened with a particular problem, expedite some decision, or assist in some other way.

Similarly, a project developed by a particular individual who is known to important headquarters officials will be approved with little review because of his reputation as an effective technician or administrator.

Prior to departure for a new post experienced field officials spend some time locating friends or cultivating people in the headquarters offices on whom they can expect to depend for expediting routine paper work and for obtaining special consideration on particularly urgent actions.

In both headquarters and the field the decision to take action on a given request or make given decisions will depend on the individual who initiated the request, as well as the content. The volume of paper work that flows into field offices in large programs requires the

establishment of certain priorities of action. There are, of course, certain substantive matters that require attention, but other documents are given priority according to the importance of the originator. Direct communications from the Managing Director, Administrator, or other top officials usually gets priority attention, as do the requests of Congressmen in the AID program. Documents from offices with which there are direct and continuing relationships are next in importance, followed by requests for action by operating departments, and finally staff and auxiliary departments.

The reaction of experienced people in both headquarters and the field to a decision in AID to eliminate the names of drafting and authorizing officers on airgrams to and from the field was spontaneous and immediate. The change did not last long; it would have disrupted crucial information on the position, status, and role of the initiators of communications.

New personnel, particularly those assigned to the field, complain bitterly of the volume of paper work and the unresponsiveness of headquarters in dealing with special problems. As they become more experienced, they develop both godfathers in headquarters and a knowledgeable approach to incoming paper.

Of course, the godfather system in particular has to be used with considerable care, since a reputation for always using informal communications can be self-defeating as well as seriously hampering regular channels of communication. Most experienced personnel, on both sides, however, tend to use the device within a framework of reciprocal obligation that limits the frequency with which special services can be requested.

The interviews held with experienced persons in different agencies revealed an intuitive skill in utilizing formal and informal channels to accomplish desired objectives. The extreme case was one in which one senior official stated that he would regret any change in the present system of field-headquarters relationships since he was able

to run his program effectively through the carefully developed juxtaposition of formal and informal relationships with the headquarters.

Rotation and Visits - For most administrators, there are few better ways to improve field-headquarters relationships than through rotation and interchanging visits.²⁶ Ideally, interchangeability should be a standard practice, but headquarters has few places for a plant pathologist nor is he likely to relish the assignment in a headquarters bureaucracy. Similarly, there are many competent people at headquarters who would not accept, nor would they fit into, a field position. Nevertheless, the tendency, which is in varying stages of emergence in different technical assistance agencies, to develop an optimal rotation of personnel, is a healthy one.²⁷

The problem of effectiveness of individuals with field experience in headquarters and headquarters experience in the field has been a difficult one and our interviews and observations have not provided any definitive answers.²⁸ It would logically appear that the field person in headquarters could provide a viewpoint which would influence headquarters decisions to take into account field problems. However, the headquarters environment seems to require, or at least to rapidly inculcate, its particular view. The person who takes a field view, if he is in headquarters, is considered suspect, in contrast to a field officer who visits headquarters and propounds the field view. A similar

²⁶ A thorough treatment of the rotation problems, see Robert Iversen's paper, Personnel for Technical Assistance, op. cit.

²⁷ With MO 418.3 of May 14, 1965, there has been probably some increase in rotation in AID. The Foundations seem to have a somewhat better record on rotation, but their permanent staffs are relatively small and in such a situation communications tend to be considerably better. In FAO the movement seems to be heavily from the field to headquarters in Rome. Interviews indicate that the reasons are mainly pay, security and living conditions.

²⁸ At high levels field oriented personnel do have an important influence on headquarters decisions. This discussion refers to middle and lower levels.

situation obtains in the field regarding persons with the headquarters orientation. It appears that a headquarters official with field experience and vice versa must exercise a great deal of shrewdness and tact in presenting his views and that his capacity to influence decisions depends more on this skill than on the simple fact of experience in the other environment.

Since both the field and headquarters environments require extremely complex manoeuvring to obtain desired results, it is clear that the more experience in one environment, the more likely an individual is to be effective. It therefore follows that frequent visits between headquarters and field officials may provide a more effective interaction between field and headquarters than limited rotation. With the increasing ease of travel anywhere in the world, it is not difficult for headquarters, field and recipient personnel to meet together in the operating environment and work out particularly difficult problems of program development. While comptrollers regard the cost as excessive, it may involve the solution of problems which can lead to a much greater waste through incomplete planning or agreement on given activities.

One private firm engaged in technical assistance sends some of its key officials from headquarters to the field for several months at a time as an active participant in program administration. Several foundations have policies which allow for the frequent exchange of visits between headquarters and field personnel. The Latin American Bureau of AID has sent teams to work with the field mission in program development and request that mission directors participate in country program reviews in Washington.³⁰

In all of these cases, interviews with both field and headquarters personnel reinforce the view that this interchange makes a significant contribution to improved programming.

³⁰ An unusual and effective approach was tried by one Mission Director who arranged for the headquarters desk officer to be acting field director during his vacation. The results from everybody's point of view were quite satisfactory.

The headquarters approach to field guidance and support is, therefore, as much influenced by the pattern of communication with the field mission as by the substantive allocations of authority between field and headquarters.³¹ When communications are poor, the tendency for both field and headquarters to assume parochial positions is great. It is for this reason that informal communications are consciously developed to supplement the formal channels. Another factor in the problem is the tendency by headquarters to view guidance as the means of setting down patterns of operation which are to be adhered to, and support as providing specific needs (personnel, equipment, etc.) as they are requested. On the other hand, the field tends to consider guidance to be broad, general limits within which it can design a program, and support to be the capacity to get the country program approved and take an active part in providing all the necessary inputs for rapid implementation.

The complex interaction within headquarters, from which policies and other aspects of field guidance are developed, produces general statements of policy and other types of guidance which must be adapted to the individual country situation. This requires that field missions understand the implications of the guidance, as well as its explicit requirements. Similarly, field needs for support come from the complex environment of individual countries and must be dealt with through an understanding of these circumstances.

Only insofar as a combination of both formal and informal patterns of communication provides an understanding of the problems of the environments of both field and headquarters can the headquarters approach to the problems of guidance and support be carried out in a realistic manner.

Relationships with other agencies

In previous parts of this section relationships with different agencies at the headquarters level have been briefly discussed in terms of their effect on particular functions. These and the wide variety of

³¹ See Roscoe and Mildred Martin, op. cit., for an excellent discussion of the problems of centralization and decentralization.

other contacts with the broad range of organizations for a variety of different purposes influence the headquarters approach to programming. The linkages with these agencies may involve control, support, information, influence, cooperation, competition, coordination, or any given combination of these. An important determinant of these relationships is the independence of these other agencies in both policy and operations and the degree of influence which they are able to exert on control and enabling bodies of the technical assistance agency.

As an example of the variety of different types of relationships which can exist between agencies, AID and the Department of Agriculture have both widely diverging and many common objectives. Each attempts to influence the promotion of specific national policies. In this effort they may combine efforts, compromise to present a common position, or compete at a higher level for the support of their position. Both agencies exchange information, both compete for control over personnel and agricultural activities in foreign countries, and cooperate on the implementation of agricultural projects. Both agencies coordinate their activities through contact between Agricultural Attaches and AID missions in the field and through a myriad of inter-agency relationships in Washington.

While different in many ways, relationships between U.N. Headquarters and specialized agencies are another example of the significance of inter-agency relationships. FAO, for example, seeks to influence policy, provides technical information and review, implements projects, coordinates its own activities with the new U.N. Development Program, and seeks control of all agricultural activities. The difference in the role of the specialized agencies in EPTA and the Special Fund prior to the merger was an example of the way in which such relationships influence the programming process.³²

Since the specialized agencies participated in the development of EPTA projects, provided technical review and also functioned within

³² A more detailed explanation of the relationships in both programs is contained in another staff report of this project entitled The Organization of U.N. Technical Assistance.

the policy-making structure of the Technical Assistance Board, the EPTA program reflected the functional emphasis of these organizations. Even after a geographic pattern had been established, there was no significant change in the percentage of funds which was eventually allocated to participating agencies.³³ Because of their detailed involvement in project development, review and implementation, relationships between EPTA and the Specialized Agencies were critical.

In the Special Fund, on the other hand, the specialized agencies were considered major instruments of execution, though they frequently assisted in project development. Since projects were larger and required more review at headquarters, the emphasis was not only technical but also focused on administrative support and development factors. Relationships with the specialized agencies were primarily confined to the details of implementation and preliminary assistance in project preparation.

Some foundations provide a special example of the influence of other agencies in relation to programming system, due particularly to their independence of outside organizations in policy formation aspects.

The Ford Foundation, for example, depends heavily on contract arrangements for project development and implementation. It may also request individuals or organizations to provide analysis or proposals which contribute to policy development. Only in the case of policy development, (i.e., a strategy for public administration) do consultants report to the headquarters organization. Consultants on project development are responsible to the field representative in the individual country who may reject or accept their recommendations based on his judgment of their significance and applicability. This approach limits the inputs from external groups to those parts of the Foundation directly involved with an activity and tends to prevent the kind of multiple pressures that many outside agencies are able to apply in an international or bilateral program. Interviews with Foundation personnel indicate a substantial agreement on the program development process as having a focus

³³ Ibid., pp. 24 and 31.

in the field office with headquarters review directly concerned with major policy aspects and the capacity to provide adequate support.

The headquarters role in U. S. technical assistance programs is influenced by other agencies in such a wide variety of ways that it is necessary to roughly divide them into categories even though one agency may have several different types of relationships of varying intensity.

First, there are organizations who exercise a given measure of control over the agency. These range from the Congress and the Budget Bureau, which exercise basic control of policies and activities, to organizations which only indirectly influence policy or operations such as the Civil Service Commission. While all of these groups exercise influence or control at different levels, they also provide support functions.

As in all national agencies, AID headquarters must assign priorities to inputs of each of these elements and attempt to convince each of them of the correctness of AID's policies and positions. With a very small direct clientele the problem of combining diverse interests of different control and support groups into an acceptable set of policies is a complex one. This means that in the process of program development the agency headquarters must measure its activities not only in terms of field statements of needs and requirements, and general agency policy, but also in terms of the priorities it attaches to the many different groups which have an influence on its policy and operations.

A second set of relationships is with lateral agencies who provide technical resources and advice. These groups may also contribute to policy or implementation, particularly in development of sectoral policies related to program development. Cabinet departments (Agriculture, Interior, etc.) play a role in the determination of the nature and scope of the activities in its sector. It is a source of technical knowledge, research, and personnel. Each department defends the importance of its own particular field and competes with other lateral groups. The AID headquarters must also incorporate and weigh such factors in considering the field, program and project proposals.

A third group of relationships involves other donor agencies who conduct similar programs of technical assistance in the same countries. While most coordination relationships have their focus in the field, the knowledge of policies of other organizations and the nature and scope of their activities on a multi-country scale are useful information in the determination of program emphasis and project development.³⁴ It is only necessary to note here the fact that these relationships have some, if only limited, influence on headquarters actions.

These categories are applicable to the British program and other bilateral agencies and to a varying degree to all technical assistance headquarters. Some relationships require elaborate and time-consuming machinery and others are handled informally, but all of them influence the headquarters approach to the programming process. They provide support, judgment, knowledge and information, but they also add to the number of inputs to policy, funding, and program approval decisions.

As in many other instances it is not always possible to isolate the effect of inter-agency relations from the other inputs to the individual functions of policy formulation, obtaining funds, etc. However, there is some evidence from the material gathered on the project which indicates that external inputs are important and useful, but the greater the number and the more independent these inputs are, the more complex is the problem of program determination.

It should be clear from attempting to abstract out the major roles and functions of headquarters that its approach to the programming process is based on a great deal more than the objective analysis of field proposals. In a very real sense headquarters is a focal point of a balancing act of no mean proportions. The global consequences of its decision about one country are significant for all others and for all of the internal and external contributors to the roles of functions which headquarters must perform. Given the pressures from different sources

³⁴ Coordination is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV: Programming After Approval.

which must be resolved, it is not difficult to understand why there is a tendency for headquarters to overemphasize its problems as being the only truly important ones.

Some concluding comments:

It is, of course, no revelation to find that participants in the programming process view that process from the vantage point of the particular environment with which they have to deal and the particular roles and functions which they must perform. What is somewhat unusual is the great differences in the environments in which the three groups operate and at the same time that they are expected to reach agreement on common activities, organization and approaches to development. Even the field mission of the donor agency faces such a different set of problems in performing its roles, than does its own headquarters, that we find the existence of a dualistic attitude regarding their relations with the recipient agency and headquarters.

Both the donor and recipient are independent entities engaging in voluntary cooperation. This means that differences in view cannot be resolved by some higher authority but must be approached as a bargaining problem. It is not, however, the typical bargaining of international relations since it is, in effect, a means of active participation with the recipient country in its affairs in a different manner than has ever been done before. The effective resolution of these different views is necessarily complex, but with cross cultural, bureaucratic, political and economic objectives intermixed, it is often extremely difficult. A shaky consensus is often a triumph. Much of the skill of personnel dealing with these problems is the capacity to understand the problems of the other environment. In many cases, a knowledge of what is needed for development, organizational roles and policies provides only the vaguest of guidelines for the complex and changing circumstances of the environment.

It is not necessary to overstate the limitations and rigidities or to oversimplify on the basis of limited observations of a variety of

situations by treating them as typical. There are, fortunately, within all three groups experienced individuals who are able to understand the views of other groups through either logic or experience. It is these persons who find the means of informal communication which effectively avoid many of the difficulties created by the different approach of each group. It is often these informal channels of communication that make possible the effective resolution of inter-group difficulties.

Keeping in mind, then, the different approaches of each participant in the process, it is now possible to look at the stages of programming and better understand the way in which each one contributes to program decisions.

CHAPTER IV

THE STAGES OF THE PROCESS

The Flexible Framework

In addition to understanding the attitudes which influence the process it is important to determine the points at which these attitudes will directly impinge on program determination. By breaking down the process into its critical stages it will be possible to obtain more insight into the influence of attitudes and organizational structure on the key problems and conflicts and how they are resolved by different agencies. In addition, an examination of the means by which different agencies deal with given problems at these crucial points can shed light on the advantages of particular techniques which may assist all agencies to make the process more meaningful.

To some extent, the problem of dividing the process into stages is arbitrary and static. Development of programs and projects is a patchwork of creative imagination, effective use of available personnel, the application of experience from other situations, inductive analysis and deductive testing.

In their relationships the three major participants in the process, the donor, field, and headquarters offices, facilitate and limit each other's actions. Because of their interdependence, non-performance by any one group may nullify action by all the others. Each group has its means of applying pressure, extracting concessions, and facilitating agreement. The fact that one or both of the parties may be a sovereign state emphasizes the capacity of each to prevent any action at all.

Even within a single agency, insofar as it is possible to look beyond the formal procedures, the means by which programs and projects are conceived, developed and approved is so varied as to leave any arbitrary set of stages in general disarray. Because of the need for justification and effective communication between groups, projects and

sometimes whole programs are presented as though they had been developed through a series of logical steps. It amounts to a kind of reconstruction of the process after the fact to justify program determinations already completed. This does not in any way mean that the original determinations were not achieved through careful analysis and consideration of the important factors. It is, in fact, a rearrangement of considerations in order to achieve desired results in whatever environment it will be acted upon. In most agencies there are times when the exigencies of political or other external factors cut across normal patterns of decision-making so that the fulfillment of the requirements of different stages becomes a perfunctory means to achieve a largely predetermined result.

However, the logical steps which are formally postulated by most agencies in program development provide a useful framework within which it is possible to examine the activities of an individual agency and to compare it with others. Steps may be implicit or explicit, they may vary in the order in which they occur, but for the most part the following steps take place at one point or another in a broadly conceived set of decisions which form the structure programming process: 1) common goal determination; 2) project development; 3) project review and approval; and 4) programming after approval. It should be noted that this is a continuous process and that the knowledge obtained from evaluation and coordination is fed back into the modification of common goals and project operations. Therefore, the process is a circulative one in the sense that the results of decisions are, or should be, constantly influencing both the decision-making process of the total program and its individual projects.

Common Goal Determination

Technical assistance goals are often hard to uncover among the welter of statements of policy, the different objectives of individual projects, and the actions of the different parties involved. It is clear from interviews and observations that the objectives of both the recipient and the donor are political, economic, humanitarian, technical, and bureaucratic. The process of getting agreement on cooperation between a recipient country and a donor normally involves all of them. In many cases some or all of the objectives may be implicit or only partially stated.

Country agreements, characterized by flowing rhetoric about the common pursuit of development and prosperity, soon get down to the detail of cost sharing, privileges and responsibilities of each party, and the means by which projects will be agreed upon. While some agencies have no need for broad agreements on overall programs, because they have limited interests, each must concern itself with the personnel and administrative arrangements necessary to the operation of a program. It is unfortunate that there seems to be much more concern regarding privileges and administrative detail than the development of a common understanding of country and donor objectives.¹ In spite of the limited specificity about overall objectives which are the basis for common action, and the misunderstanding among donors and recipients alike of each other's purposes, it is possible to separate out some important influences in the formulation of general agreements between donor and recipient.

Some Political Factors

Political factors are of greater consequence in bilateral programs although the tendency for them to be controlling only exists in a few cases. The withdrawal of a program by a bilateral donor for political reasons is always a reluctant act because of the emphasis on the non-political nature of technical assistance activities and further, because it is a useful source of contact with the recipient government. The common technique is to limit the size of a program or to restrict any new action until political or economic questions have been resolved.

However, the withdrawal of a number of programs by the U. S. and U. K. for political reasons is indicative of the significance that political considerations may have in critical circumstances. Other indicators also point up political considerations. More than 90% of the British program is concentrated in the Commonwealth countries,² and

¹ Donor agencies must be concerned about certain privileges to attract expert personnel, but at a conference of donors and recipients in an African country import privileges, administrative arrangements and other details regarding different classes of experts occupied a disproportionate share of the attention of the high-level officials at the meeting.

² British Aid for Technical Assistance, London, The Overseas Development Institute. Chapter IV describes very clearly the request procedures, terms and priorities and gives considerable insight into both policy and procedures in the British program.

the French program is largely operating in ex-colonial countries. As is reasonable to expect, the Israeli program has as one of its many purposes, the development of political and economic relationships to counteract Arab antagonism.³

Different kinds of political factors influence multilateral and foundation technical assistance programs. The fact that all recipients are also donor policy makers in the U. N. is a significant political factor. The actions of recipient governments may not only influence single country situations but may, in these circumstances, influence overall policy of the technical assistance body. The U. N. therefore must have an appropriate geographic distribution of its activities in order to satisfy political as well as country needs. There was, for example, considerable criticism of the Special Funds' early emphasis on Africa.

The national rivalries and the multi-nationality of the staff in U. N. programs, as well as political pressures in the general Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the policy-making bodies of the Specialized Agencies all contribute to some important political considerations within the U. N. program.

While not strictly a political aspect, it is natural for agencies to like to work with countries which are highly cooperative. Foundations can be more selective about the countries and situations in which they will undertake activities. They are also less subject to the identification with particular national policies. Once a program has been initiated, however, foundations must find political and administrative means to maintain continuity and influence in the changing recipient country circumstances. There are many ways in which foundations approach this problem. The stature or continuity of the field chief, the use of prominent consultants, and the negotiation of projects which may lead to large future expenditures are only a few of the means employed.

³ For a review of policy and operations of the Israeli program see Mordechai E. Krenin, Israel and Africa, (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

The relationships between the recipient and all donors, particularly with major donors, in the context of international competition can influence technical assistance programs of all agencies, both public and private.

Recipients also bring a fairly sophisticated sense of political factors to the development of common goals. They must relate technical assistance programs to their overall relations with donors, including finding a way to maintain a balance between western and communist bloc countries, large and small groups and capital and technical assistance activities. They must weigh the political consequences of getting support from different donors, and the interest in terms of their own foreign policy objectives. Both the instability of the internal politics in recipient countries and the shifting political conditions in the international scene are often unarticulated but important considerations in the agreement to cooperate in a technical assistance program. New governments can contribute significantly to their legitimacy and prestige, both internally and internationally, through arrangements for aid relationships with donor countries.

Some Economic Factors

In the economic sphere, development of common goals for technical assistance is considered in relation to the much larger development program in most countries. In some cases agreements on goals for technical assistance are limited to the support of these larger programs. In recent years, the realization that technical assistance may be a device for providing the preconditions for capital projects, increasing their effectiveness, and assuring their continuity has led to the incorporation of technical assistance with such projects.⁴

Bilateral donors are interested in the economic factors in development and the stability of the country as well as in their own commerce and trade relationships. They also tend to bring strong

⁴ For example, the World Bank has placed two teams in Africa to assist in countries in analyzing and presenting projects. This is in response to the lack of good projects from the area and the need for technical assistance in project preparation.

preconceptions about the type of economic policies recipients should adopt to achieve given development goals.

Recipients are also concerned with the degree to which technical assistance programs will substitute for foreign exchange expenditures and with such added physical and human resources as may be useful in maintaining the pace of a development program. In addition to the usual objectives of maintaining economic independence, recipients may have a variety of objectives of differing importance such as diversification of agriculture, increase of exports, and the promotion of industry.

Some Aspects of Other Objectives

In spite of the existence of a wide variety of political and economic motives, there is an underlying and significant element of humanitarian spirit which donors bring to the consideration of the development of common goals. The U. N. and foundations tend to express this spirit openly and directly. Bilateral programs tend to emphasize the long-range benefit to their own national interest because of problems of support at home.⁵ Recipients, too, have mixed motives. Their role is not always a happy one, yet it has important prestige values and indicates that a government is making serious efforts to improve the conditions of the people. A good deal of the feeling of urgency, the impatience and the desire for early results is due to the belief by individuals on both sides of the technical assistance relationship that what they are doing is an important and pioneering venture in both development and in international relations.

The importance of technical considerations in goal setting is limited except insofar as technical agencies impinge on the policy making aspect of most technical assistance agencies. The cultural barriers between a donor and recipient agricultural technician are minimal when it comes to the question of developing new approaches to agricultural development in the country. As one program officer put it: "The agricultural

⁵ The Scandinavian countries are an exception to this and tend to emphasize the humanitarian aspect of their policy. See Robert E. Asher, "How to Succeed in Foreign Aid Without Really Trying," Public Policy, Vol. 13, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964.)

problems of this country are so varied and vast that it would be difficult for our own technicians and those of the recipient country not to continually find ways in which we could expand and enlarge our activities in this sector." While this comment is more relevant to the discussion of project development which will be covered in a later section of this chapter, it does, in fact, influence the donor and the recipient approach to agreement on common objectives. The greater the influence of the technical divisions, the greater appears to be the propensity of an organization to expand its technical assistance activities.

As in all instances where two relatively independent entities are involved in arriving at agreement, basic bargaining factors also have an important influence on the process. When recipient countries are particularly interested in receiving technical assistance in one particular field or as a part of the program which will include large capital inputs, they will frequently agree to objectives for a technical assistance program which may not be in line with their overall capacities or basic objectives. Similarly, when donor agencies are interested in political and bureaucratic objectives, they may agree to objectives which are not completely within the global objectives of the agency.

Since the variety of objectives tend to result in an equal variety of projects, the emergence of national planning has been an increasingly important factor in the development of program goals.

National Planning and Technical Assistance:

At the present time, national and sectoral planning influence the focus of technical assistance, the continuing agreement on common objectives, project determination and sometimes project implementation.

In earlier periods, technical assistance was not considered to be of enough significance to affect overall national development goals, even when they were not formulated into a plan. In addition, for the U. S., the socialist origins and heavy emphasis on the role of government implicit in the planning process were a source of conflict with enabling and supporting bodies. As experience with planning process increased,

the problem of selecting how donor resources were to be used became important. At this point the donors increased their emphasis on both national and sectoral planning in recipient countries. The concept of development as an integrated process suggests the need for some central body to analyze basic problems and recommend policies based on an examination of alternative strategies.

At present few will question the concept of national planning as a factor in programming decisions and its influence on the reorientation of some technical assistance programs. There is an increasing attempt to relate technical assistance activities directly to planning goals and in some cases the approval of technical assistance rests with the planning authority.

This process has created a series of important complications for the development of objectives and for individual projects. National planning, which should provide an objective basis for agreement between donor and recipient, has been mainly based on traditional economic analysis which is of more value to capital and financial programs than to technical assistance. Furthermore, the goals in technical assistance include a number of political and technical factors which vary over time with the changes in leadership. Sometimes the planning has been done by those groups who most resist the needed changes. In addition, the lack of accurate data and experienced planners in developing countries has limited planning's role as a basic reference tool for technical assistance programs.

Planning bodies often restrict their concern to the level of broad goal determination and major external inputs. The planning board's demands for ultimate control without getting involved in technical assistance program determination can be a problem for technical assistance. Subsequent agreement on project activities and implementation may rest with an agency which has not been completely involved in the project development. Similarly, later project development activities with the individual ministries may be frustrated by the lack of participation of the planning board. Often the planning board's difficulties with line agencies add conflicts to the already complicated relationships with the

donor. This may mean that the technical assistance mission has to become an intermediary between two different groups within the recipient government. In such situations the existence of a planning board, which was supposed to simplify donor recipient relations, in fact complicates the work of technical assistance missions.

However, the most common problem of planning bodies in developing countries, has been the lack of interest or capacity to facilitate implementation of planned projects. There is a growing literature documenting the concern of governments with plans rather than planning and the inability of planning bodies to influence overall governmental support or deal with the realities of plan implementation.⁶

Technical Assistance to National Planning Agencies:

Given the problems in building an effective planning body for the formulation and review of development activities, donor agencies have provided assistance in the creation, operation and institutionalization of planning organizations. Several agencies consider assistance on such projects as a fundamental contribution to the capacity of the country to formulate its own development policies.

Planning advisors are either high level or specialized experts and as such have distinct advantages for both donor and recipient. They are able to advise and influence not only the planning process but also the improvement of administration in related agencies at a fairly high level. These are prestigious projects for the donor and provide highly valuable human resources for the recipient.

In this type of technical assistance the donor has more difficult

⁶ For a short pointed analysis of the nature of the problem and the need for changes in approach see Bertram Gross, editor, "Activating National Plans," Action Under Planning, (New York: McGraw-Hill, in press). See also another similar review by Albert Waterston, "What do We Know About Planning?", International Development Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, December 1965.

For an example of the effective use of power and the promotion of coordinated planning, see John Friedman, Venezuela from Doctrine to Dialogue, the National Planning Series, Syracuse University Press, 1965.

problems of recruitment because of the high expectations of the recipient and the scarcity of top level talent.⁷ Other problems involve the degree of independence of the advisors from the donor and the amount of participation in the operations of the planning agencies.

Recipients also have special problems in technical assistance to planning agencies in spite of the fact that they are fashionable at present. They are concerned about relationships with the donor, possibilities of interference in their affairs, and the fact that planning bodies usually operate at the core of national economic policy determinations. Internally problems are encountered with line agencies that do not want to be interfered with and view foreign planning advisors as a threat to their programs.

In view of these and other problems, donors and recipients are making efforts to increase the independence of planning advisors. This is being done by the provision of advisors: a) through the U. N. technical assistance program (either OPEX or EPTA); b) through private foundations (particularly the Ford Foundation); c) through encouraging or assisting recipient governments to hire private firms (i.e., Robert Nathan) to undertake planning assistance.

While bilateral donors do assist in national planning, though generally by contract, they often directly assist sectoral planning in agriculture or other fields. AID policy at present encourages direct arrangements by recipient governments or contracts with organizations which ensure the maximum possible independence status of planning advisors.⁸

During the course of the project the planning advisors and their recipient colleagues had some comments on technical assistance programs, many of which were substantiated by observation and other interviews. Their most common comment was the difficulty of obtaining adequate and accurate data, the complications of the recipient government's structure, and the lack of adequately trained staff. A number were also critical of the many delays involved in donor action where agreements had already been reached.

⁷ Requests for planning advisors are often the extreme examples of the tendency to request personnel of such a high level that those few in the donor country who qualify cannot be spared.

⁸ AID Policy Determination, No. 7, September 7, 1962.

Complaints about the United Nations were concerned with the lack of effective support for technicians and the lack of influence to meet and to deal with continuing project problems. Criticism of the U. S. programs centered on what was termed as arbitrary requirements and extensive administrative delay. Criticisms of the foundations were few, but many of the respondents were hired by foundations.⁹ It should be noted, however, that foundation programs were generally small and often concentrated.

Planning advisors see their role as a delicate one. They state that they must make great initial efforts to get acceptance and that this often takes considerable time. Our interviews tend to confirm the statement of one of the foundation advisors in Pakistan who stated:

. . . The real job of the adviser is teaching without seeming to instruct, criticizing without it seeming to come from the outside, speaking out on unpalatable truths, (which others know and sidestep) without it being resented. From the point of view of the national group, you must be accepted (liked) and trusted (respected). From this viewpoint of the adviser, you must really feel an identity with the group, without losing your identity (objectivity). The adviser must be dynamic and forceful in a restrained and patient sort of way. And of course he must have a sense of humor and a zest for life.¹⁰

Once in a position of confidence the contribution of planning advisors to the programming process is a multi-faceted one and is limited only by the skill of the advisor and the role of the planning body within the government. The improvement of the planning process and the quality

⁹ Two recipient members of planning boards, however, criticized the short-term consultants for project development as being used without proper discrimination. One stated that short-term consultants were sometimes sent out to set up activities that required a long-term analysis. Another criticized the limited economic outlook of foundation advisors. A third recipient (a Ph.D. in a high agricultural post) stated that the foundation financed short-term agricultural advisors were of such stature and ability that normal language and cultural factors were of little consequence.

¹⁰ Design for Pakistan: A Report on Assistance to the Pakistan Planning Commission by the Ford Foundation and Harvard University, February, 1965.

of the output of planning bodies as it is influenced by the planning advisors is, in itself, of significant value to both donor and recipient in goals and project agreements. Equally important, however, is the role of planning advisors as communicators and mediators between donor and recipient and sometimes even between different parts of the recipient government itself. Advisors frequently explain donor views to recipients and vice versa. They may have specific knowledge of the capacities or interests of individual donors or they may expedite the approval or modification of projects to assist both sides in reaching agreement.

In one case a planning advisor assisted a donor by obtaining a specific contribution to a Special Fund project which had been overlooked. In another case, a planning advisor was able to assist in bringing about agreement between a ministry of agriculture and a planning board in the development of an agricultural strategy. In still another, a resident representative was able to work with planning advisors to bring about agreements between operating and planning bodies on strategy.

Donor agencies also state that planning advisors are of great assistance in locating or obtaining basic data which is frequently necessary for project justification.

While it is clear that planning advisors must use judgment and discretion due to their delicate position, they also constitute a significant resource for the development of both overall objectives and agreement on individual activities.

Project Development:

Project development may follow from goal specification, modify existing goals, or form the basis for an implied set of common goals. With the emergence of development theory and national planning there is a tendency to examine the projects in terms of their relationship to a country development program or at least to justify existing projects in those terms. There are, however, a large number of influences on project development. Even in the most centralized donor and recipient structures project development derived strictly from program goals is an ideal which at best is only imperfectly achieved. In the donor agency

the same political bureaucratic factors impinge on project development that influence the rest of the process and development is only one of the inputs. In the recipient similar factors are important. The planning body may not have the power to control project development. Data from which plans were prepared are frequently inadequate and policies are often based on immediate problems rather than on long-range development objectives. Common goals, insofar as they are explicit, may be so broad as to encompass any kind of activity.

In any case experienced people in either donor or recipient agencies can write up projects to make them appear to fit almost any set of development objectives. For example, an agricultural extension project can be justified as under a number of goals such as: improving agricultural production, broadening the educational base, providing raw materials for industrial development, improving social conditions in rural areas, or increasing rural participation in economic and political life.

Where donors have a very specific objective (i.e. agricultural research) or very specific prohibitions on their activities (i.e. projects with public corporations), the basis for beginning project development is relatively easy. Where the goals are political stability, agricultural development, improved administration, etc., not only is selection more difficult, but the nature of the projects, in part, determines the ultimate rationale of the technical assistance program.

In addition to national development plans there are many other sources for project development, whether through intensive analysis or from preconceptions of one kind or another. Projects may arise from other projects, from the individual interests of donor or recipient personnel, and from crises which precipitate requests for assistance by the recipient government. Every minister, every field chief, every technician, and every visiting expert has some particular project to recommend which may result from his analysis of the country situation, his past experience or particular competence or his recognition of some special opportunity.

For closer analysis of these factors, donor agencies can be grouped according to their project selection patterns. They can be divided roughly into those which place emphasis on: 1) the acceptance of any reasonable request made by the recipient; 2) certain specific sectors or areas; and 3) the development of a specific strategy for each country.¹¹

Recipient Oriented Approaches

The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance of the U. N. (EPTA) will probably experience a shift toward centralization and greater goal orientation with its merger into the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Like all changes in international organizations, transitions move slowly, but the indicators at present point to the strengthening of the Resident Representative, increased control by the headquarters office, and the limiting of the influence of the Specialized Agencies. Regardless of these emerging changes, the operations of the EPTA program for the past fifteen years provide some useful insights into the problems of programming technical assistance and a particularly interesting departure from other agencies in project development. Its multilateral character, combined with wide dispersion of the small projects, have made it a unique and, at times, a controversial program of technical assistance.

Beginning in 1950 with a 20 million dollar budget, it has gradually increased to 51.8 million in 1964. In 1964 the EPTA program had 1,500 projects in 130 countries whose average cost was about \$35,000, as compared with 250 Special Fund projects averaging slightly less than a million dollars apiece.

Until 1954 the project development function was entirely in the hands of the Specialized Agencies. EPTA funds were allotted by predetermined shares to each agency to carry out its program. Arthur Goldschmidt succinctly explains the rationale for this early approach:

¹¹ Karl Mathiasen has developed the concept of Technical Assistance profiles as a device to compare programs in a most effective way in his New Dimensions for Technical Assistance: The UN in Africa, Chapter II and III, pre-publication draft.

The original plan of dividing the funds among the agencies was not solely a scheme for meeting the needs of participating organizations: in part it reflected an earlier assumption - not wholly unwarranted - that balanced development would have to be injected into the program in each country from the outside; that governments of less developed countries were themselves less developed and would not always have the capacity to identify their own needs effectively; and that agencies experienced with the problems of development would be able or readily to propose practical programs and establish priorities.¹²

Mr. Goldschmidt then points out the weaknesses which developed in the approach; the lack of experience of the Specialized Agencies themselves; the sensitivity of the recipient countries; and the inadequacies of rigid formulas in view of the complexities of the development project in widely varied country situations. To these might be added natural empire building tendencies of the Specialized Agencies, the overlapping of activities and the lack of coordinated effort which occurred on occasion. With the change to country programming, however, Goldschmidt makes the following statement:

Paradoxically, it has been largely since the reins of programming were firmly turned over to recipient countries that the influence of the agencies has been more firmly felt.¹³

He points out that by this time the Specialized Agencies had more experience in program planning and had developed important working relationships with recipient governments. Some other factors also influenced their role in the development of projects for the EPTA program. In the first place, Specialized Agencies had specific preconceptions about the importance of their particular sector in the country development program, and these preconceptions provided reinforcement and external support for the efforts of recipient ministries to obtain more funds in their field. In the second place, as has been noted previously, the Specialized Agencies sat on the technical assistance board (TAB) as Participating Agencies. They were, therefore, in the position of promoting and developing specific projects in the countries, providing

¹² Arthur Goldschmidt, "Program Planning and Development", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 323, May 1959, p. 57.

¹³ Ibid.

technical review, and sitting in judgment of the program on the TAB. This combination of a predominant influence on EPTA program decisions and strong support of the recipient agency in obtaining approval of a project within the recipient government structure tended to distort the country programming process in its beginning years and still continues to be important.

At the same time, however, a number of other things were occurring to balance the influence of the Participating Agencies in the project development process. The Resident Representative, as the contact for recipient governments with all U.N. agencies and frequently as the representative of some of the Participating Agencies, gradually began to have some effect on the centralization of country determinations of its overall request to EPTA. It was he who transmitted the target figures to the government and informally worked very closely with the country coordinating committee which determined the EPTA program. In many cases the Resident Representative was able to achieve some coordination between the different U.N. agencies because of his relationships with key decision makers in the recipient country through important influence with the different headquarters agencies, in addition to New York, as well as his capacity to harmonize the efforts of different agencies in the field. With the appointment of the Resident Representative as Director of Special Fund Programs and the introduction of the biennial EPTA program, his influence and capacity to resolve problems increased at the expense of the independence of the Participating Agencies. This provided an additional leverage for Resident Representatives to move toward a more integrated EPTA program.

During the course of these developments, recipient governments were expanding their technical assistance programs with a variety of different agencies involving a much larger amount of funds. This required countries to develop more comprehensive centralized techniques to determine the types of programs which they were to request from the different donors. The country coordinating committee under the EPTA program, which was often the occasional gathering of personnel from different agencies within the recipient government, was clearly not

adequate for this purpose. Furthermore, governments could not provide the necessary support for all of the projects which were being requested. Therefore, decisions had to be made as to the nature of programs with individual donors.

At the same time, the development of national planning or similar central offices designed to coordinate all programs of development provided another impetus toward more effective country determination of its own requirements. In this regard Mathiasen points out that countries with relatively good coordination of development programs seemed to be more satisfied that their particular needs were being met by the EPTA program, whereas countries with little coordination seemed to be responding to Specialized Agency pressures.¹⁴

Observations and interviews by personnel on the project reveal a wide variety of circumstances which make it difficult to generalize. However, the Resident Representatives frequently pointed out that "project salesmen" from the Specialized Agencies visited the country for a relatively short time and were frequently unable to follow through on their promotion programs. Many of the Resident Representatives also developed a set of relationships both with the country representatives of the Specialized Agencies and with key officials involved in project determination within the recipient government that made it possible for them to find an appropriate compromise between the interests of the country and those of the Specialized Agency. As expected, the more experienced and sophisticated Resident Representatives seemed to handle these problems with a minimum of difficulty.

Recipient officials were not altogether opposed to the project selling approach of the Specialized Agencies. In the first place, many of the officials in ministries found that a knowledge and experience of the Specialized Agency personnel and their recommendations for projects were useful, provided they had the opportunity to examine the proposal carefully to determine its adaptability to the country and its

¹⁴ Karl Mathiasen, op. cit., Chapter II

development program. In the second place, if the project is in approximate accordance with the objectives of the recipient, the implication of project selling is that the donor will provide additional support needed to obtain project approval and is prepared to implement the project expeditiously.

While the means of project development have been discussed in another report on this project, there are certain characteristics of the EPTA program which should be emphasized.¹⁵

Projects were negotiated by the individual Participating Agencies with the different ministries in the recipient government and the problems of determination of priority within the sector and the technical problems of implementing the project rest fundamentally with these two groups.

Projects were principally short-term, and the majority of the costs (ranging from 70% to 80%) were for experts. With the biennial program beginning in 1961-62 the concept of a long-term project was introduced which was requested for a two-year period and planned for a total of four years. While there has been some criticism of the two-year programming approach, it appears to have been generally acceptable to recipient governments and Participating Agencies.

A major focus of decisions on EPTA projects was the country coordinating committee, which made final decisions on projects to be submitted in Category I, which included projects up to the total of the target figure. Other projects were put in Category II, which is an additional group of projects amounting to 50% of the target figure, to be implemented only if there were savings from Category I projects. However, it should be mentioned again that 30% of Category I projects were not implemented and that recipient officials and Specialized Agency personnel agreed on the re-allocation of these funds to projects without necessarily drawing on Category II projects. This circumstance provided a kind of post-allocation re-programming without recourse to the formal procedures.

¹⁵ The Organization of United Nations Technical Assistance, op. cit. pp.23-29.

There is also some evidence that EPTA projects were useful to the central coordinating committee as a means of balancing the distribution of technical assistance activities among recipient organizations. The crucial role of the recipient in project determination in the EPTA program makes it possible to use these projects in this manner.

The submission prepared in cooperation with the Resident Representative and representing the total country program consisted of financial summaries of the requirements by agency for Category I and Category II requests and short data sheets for both long-term and short-term projects in Category I. This material provided an absolute minimum of description and justification on individual projects. However, since Participating Agencies provided the technical review and the EPTA headquarters in New York was essentially concerned with program consolidation, it is not difficult to understand why the request is brief.

Another aspect of EPTA was the funds in trust, provided by the recipient countries themselves. The growth of this approach is expressed by one observer in the following manner:

"Well over half of the countries receiving Expanded Program assistance have had such persistent need for aid, and such confidence in U.N. facilities and arrangements that they have financed additional assistance projects which the Specialized Agencies have undertaken for them. Only 18 countries used such assistance in 1960, but by 1964, 64 countries were buying technical assistance by placing funds in trust with the U.N. which Agencies could draw upon to cover project costs. The total amount of technical assistance purchased from the U.N. increased from \$2.5 million in 1960 to \$2.9 million in 1963, and to more than \$8.8 million in 1964."¹⁶

In summary, then, the EPTA program was recipient oriented only insofar as recipient governments take the initiative required to mold the program in the manner which they desire. Without this initiative the Participating Agencies were, in fact, the major influence in program determination in spite of the efforts of the Resident Representative. In the last few years prior to the merger, however, it appears

¹⁶ Karl Mathiasen, op. cit. Chapter II.

that the recipient government organization for receiving technical assistance improved to the point that it was exercising a significant measure of control on the project development. This control, combined with the increasing influence of the Resident Representative, and the rapid rise in the volume of activities of the Participating Agencies, including Special Fund projects, had forged the EPTA program into a unique multilateral cooperative effort.

The merger, as of this writing, has not instituted any major changes in programming procedures in the field. If, in fact, many recipient countries had assumed control of EPTA program determination, changes in its operation would have to be made with care.

The British bilateral program, formerly administered by the Department of Technical Cooperation (DTC), is now a part of the new Ministry of Overseas Development. The Technical Assistance budget increased from 22 million dollars in 1960/61 to 85 million in 1964/65.¹⁷

While most of the program is carried out in Commonwealth countries, Britain has also been expanding the scope of the program through international arrangements such as that of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (FAMA). Assistance also is increasing to a wide range of other countries, (i.e., Argentina and Yugoslavia). Excluding the Overseas Service Aid Scheme (OSAS)¹⁸ and a few aspects of Britain's regional arrangements such as CENTO, British technical assistance is committed to the policy of accepting any reasonable request from a recipient government. Recipient governments, however, are not informed as to the estimated sums which are earmarked for their country. The reasons stated by several persons interviewed were a need for flexibility

¹⁷ "The Administration of Technical Assistance: A Comparative Study of Administration of Bilateral Technical Assistance Programs of Fifteen Foreign Countries"- A Staff Paper on this project by John P. Kubert

¹⁸ This is a program exclusively of operational personnel, usually formerly colonial servants. The program "tops up their salaries" in order for them to remain in their posts in the newly independent countries. These persons are directly responsible to the governments for which they work. It is similar to the United Nations operations and executive personnel (OPEX) program. This program accounted for about half the British technical assistance program for the years 1961-65.

in the use of the funds in the area and the prevention of the common practice of sopping up allocated funds with whatever projects can be hurriedly put together at the end of the year.

As of 1964, DTC personnel made the remarkable statement that they had been able to accept all of the requests which had been received. Interviews in recipient countries indicate that British field personnel are usually experienced Foreign Service or Commonwealth Relations Officers and seem to be quite adept at informally screening requests at an early stage so that formal requests are usually only those which will be approved. There is also an implicit assumption, at least in the Commonwealth countries, that recipient leadership is either British or British educated and is likely to request only those activities which would be acceptable.

Other possible explanations for the limited number of requests are that the DTC program did not also administer a large capital program. As has been mentioned, recipient countries tend to be interested in large capital inputs and not as much in the more difficult and longer range technical assistance aspects of development. The ODI report points out some other factors that are significant to the lack of volume of request to the British program.¹⁹ These include the reluctance to enter into a recipient relationship, the lack of knowledge of the kinds of assistance which could be provided, the amount of high level management time required and the additional costs which are required from the recipient in order to maintain the technical assistance project. DTC projects are quite small (75% of them involved only one expert) and they involve a limited amount of equipment, with the exception of some research programs and small capital grants. It is, therefore, not difficult to understand why recipient countries facing large development problems would limit their requests to the British program to those particular activities in which they were convinced the British have a special competence.

¹⁹ British Aid - 4, Technical Assistance (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1964), p. 44.

Nevertheless, there are many needs for British technical assistance, particularly in the Commonwealth countries where the administrative structure of the Government is patterned on the British system. While the project development is at least formally completely in the hands of the recipient government, it appears that there is close cooperation and a good deal of knowledgeable informing of recipient governments of the availability and interests of the British technical assistance program.

The small field staff is within the Embassy or High Commission and is headed in larger countries by a Counselor of Embassy for Technical Assistance. Some of the staff interviewed stated that there was a need for additional people to follow up on activities, review proposals, conduct evaluations of projects, and follow up on returned trainees, but there appeared to be no desire for a separate technical assistance mission within the country.

Regular visits from members of the technical staff of the DTC in London are a major source of advice on requests for assistance and appear to be the means by which recipients are informed of particular capacities of the program as well as a certain amount of judicious suggestion about possible projects. The presence of many ex-British colonial officers, particularly in Africa, probably provides a basis for mutual discussion of ways in which needs of the recipient and the capacities of the program can be matched.

The DTC's Middle East Development Division, though a small unit based in Beirut, provides technical advice and supervision to programs in that area.²⁰ The Division may also assist in project development and brings to bear not only its technical resources but considerable knowledge of the area and activities going on within it. The Division identifies problems or projects and requests further assistance from London or suggests means by which governments can submit requests

²⁰ The Division covers an area bounded on the north by Turkey, on the south by Ethiopia, on the west by Lybia, and on the east by Pakistan.

for assistance. At present no other agency has a field based technical staff of this kind and it appears to be a rather successful feature within the limitations of its area and program. The ODI Report recommends similar Divisions for other areas.²¹ It appears to be an approach which should be considered by other agencies as well.

With the creation of the Ministry of Overseas Development there is some evidence that the British program is changing to a more goal oriented approach. But it is too soon to determine how far the program will move to a more structural programming approach.

Limited Objective Approaches

There are more than 250 voluntary agencies and at least a dozen smaller countries which offer some kind of technical assistance. Many of these programs are quite specialized either geographically or functionally. While most of its efforts are channeled through the U.N., Norway has a particular interest in fisheries. The Near East and Asia Foundations concentrate on specific areas. Each organization has some particular emphasis or appears to respond more readily to certain types of activities or requests from certain areas. Some agencies make these preconceptions explicit in their general principles and others would conceivably vary their emphasis if sufficient demand and justification were forthcoming.²²

The Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation and the Special Fund of the U. N. are three of the larger programs which have fairly well defined global objectives. These will provide useful insights into another type of project development.

The Rockefeller Foundation, which has divided its activities into natural and medical sciences, agriculture, and humanities and social sciences, set a new tone at a Board of Trustees meeting in 1963. The

²¹ ODI Report, op. cit., p. 140.

²² The Near East Foundation, for example, has accepted contracts in both Africa and Korea but along the lines of its specific interests in rural development.

President's Review describes the shift as follows:

Following a careful review of past activities, the Rockefeller Foundation's Board of Trustees met in special session on September 20, 1963, and issued a statement on future program and policy entitled "Plans for the Future." This succinct, sharply focused document describes in five sections the principal areas in which the Rockefeller Foundation expects to develop its program during the foreseeable years ahead. It is not a radical departure from the patterns of the past, but rather the sublimated product of program evolution, set in the contemporary context and projected into the future. The five interrelated areas of concentration are: Toward the conquest of hunger; The population problem; Strengthening emerging centers of learning; Toward equal opportunity for all; Aiding our cultural development. It is to a description of these areas and to the Foundation's objectives in each that this Review is directed.²³

There are two categories of activities: the grant program (U.S. and overseas); and cooperating programs with a few countries using a relatively small field staff. Major programs are in Mexico, Colombia, Chile, India and the Philippines. These programs are designed to attack long-range problems of food production, population, medical and scientific education and research.

The grant program is the largest activity in terms of expenditures. These grants range from a few hundred dollars to send a scientist to a meeting in another country, to more than one hundred thousand dollars to support the development of a faculty in a university.

Most comments praised the fact that this Foundation left no doubt as to its specific interests: agricultural and medical research and university development. Others mentioned the high caliber of the persons visiting the country and the careful and thorough consideration of grant requests. There were a number of comments to the effect that examination of activities in progress was rigorous but there was an understanding of the long-term nature of much of the work. Not all comments were of unconditional praise, but there were few informed respondents who did not note the clarity of objectives and the thoroughness with which grant requests were examined.

²³ "The President's Review" from the Annual Report, 1963, The Rockefeller Foundation, New York. pp. 4-5.

There was some criticism of what was called a closed group of persons with whom the Foundation tends to deal. It appears, however, that the Foundation depends on the judgment of senior scientists in the country, their own "graduates" and recipient officials who are in a position to give the kind of support to the Foundation activities that it considered necessary. Given the objectives of the Foundation, it appears that the "closed group" includes most of the serious and respected scientists in those areas where the Foundation has particular interests.

The cooperating programs are also based on a particular approach which is only available to independent donors. If a recipient agency wishes to initiate a program within the specific interests of the Foundation and is willing to accept its share of the expenses, it will consider a program. Rockefeller tends to limit its activities to a few major cooperating programs. However, its position is not as rigid as it would appear from the above statement.

In the first place, the fields of agricultural production, university development and medical science are broad enough to include a number of varied activities that may be of interest to most recipient governments. In the second place, once there is agreement on a given activity, the Foundation is quite flexible in heeding the government's particular requests regarding the organization of the program, the institutions with which it will be connected, and the means by which the activities will be accomplished. It is also willing to begin with small, intensive activities which will explore the means of achieving project objectives. The Foundation has experienced, high-caliber, short-term experts to assist in laying out the program. The grant program is also a means for the training of local personnel to meet future needs for present projects. There are, however, some cases in which the Foundation has a special interest in starting an international program, such as the International Rice Research Institute, in which the Foundation undertakes

to provide the majority of the resources since it is not strictly a program for ~~one~~ ²⁴ country.

In most cases the Foundation begins small and places heavy emphasis on advanced training. This is not only a means of upgrading the quality of the human resources for projects and the country, but it has the fringe benefits in that these persons will probably become the senior technical officials in the country with whom the Foundation will deal in the future.

An underlying factor in the Rockefeller approach is the long-term approach and the length of assignment of most Rockefeller career personnel in cooperating programs. The small career staff, combined with a cadre of consultants who have been advising the Foundation for many years, significantly improve the ability of the Foundation to build on its own activities with new projects, or to encourage countries to request projects which may further the common interests of both the Foundation and the country.

The Ford Foundation, while it does not functionally define its interests as does Rockefeller, has some clear-cut interests and combines them with the concept that the Foundation should make a unique contribution to country development programs, given its resources, its capacities, and interests. The Foundation's own statement of its policy is illuminating on this point:

The Foundation's Overseas Development program seeks to make strategic contributions to one or more fundamental needs -- the training of an efficient and dedicated civil service, the mechanisms (tax, fiscal, and land policy planning groups, for example) for analyzing the nation's resources and planning for their development and use; agricultural research and extension; managerial skill and technical manpower for industry; a modern system of public education.

²⁴ This Institute is a joint project of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. As of 1964 Ford had granted approximately 8 million and Rockefeller about 3 million for facilities and operations. The University at Los Banos offered land for building and experimentation, and the Philippine Government provides tax free status for the Institute.

It works primarily by helping to create effective, permanent on-the-scene institutions (training and research centers, planning agencies in education and economics, agricultural extension systems, etc.) to meet these needs. The Foundation may provide consultants and advisers, finance overseas training of host-country personnel, and provide the hard currency that the country itself cannot supply for research equipment, construction, and other costs. With its intimate ties to the educational world, the Foundation acts as the assembly point for the specialized talent required to do a job in a host country. The Foundation's ability to identify and make arrangements with specialists rapidly may make the difference as to whether or not their skills will be available at all. The Foundation has also enlisted for overseas projects more than two dozen American universities and such organizations as the Brookings Institution and the Dunwoody Industrial Institute.²⁵

The Ford programs have increased in expenditures to about 55 million dollars a year for overseas development in 1965. Originally active in international relations programs in the U. S., Ford began major overseas development programs in India in the early 1950's and has more recently initiated programs in Africa and Latin America.

Like the Rockefeller Foundation, Ford has a small, carefully recruited staff which is assigned to countries for variable periods, usually not as long as Rockefeller but longer than U. N. and bilateral programs.

There are a series of activities which the Foundation lacks the capability to undertake or in which it has little interest. Among these are specific fields reserved to other agencies by mutual agreement. For example, requests for medical education are referred to the Rockefeller Foundation.

The second group of activities, which have been referred to above, constitute the Foundation's major focus. Any request of this nature can expect careful consideration.

A third group of activities, in that grey area somewhere between the preferred and the prohibited, is sometimes requested by recipient countries. In such a case, the Foundation does not foreclose the possibility of project development, but requires considerable study by its own staff and/or outside consultants in order to determine the request's basis, the particular needs and requirements, and the contributions which the Foundation could make to such a project.

The burden of responsibility for decisions on the submission of all types of projects rests with the Foundation's representative in the country. Consultants report and make their recommendations directly to him. However, with a relatively small staff and some rotation, there appears to be a good deal of interchange informally about the problems involved in project development.

In addition to the general orientation toward projects which make a unique contribution to country development and are not easily accomplished by other agencies, there seems to be a growing tendency in the Foundation to be concerned with strategies for particular fields. There is also an increasing emphasis on field personnel to cast projects into the context of a country development program.

Field representatives can obtain consulting assistance for almost any activity which holds promise. Since project development may not always lead to initiation, country representatives are expected to have a "shelf" of projects which could be further developed and implemented in order to make effective use of funds for any given year. One of the problems mentioned by both field and headquarters personnel in project development is that there is a tendency to build up obligations and increasing requirements for ongoing projects to such a degree that a field representative finds himself unable to financially meet special opportunities which arise in changing country situations. On the other hand, if projects cannot be developed to the stage of implementation, the country representative cannot carry over funds until the next year. He must, therefore, maintain a careful balance between ongoing projects and

new activities and be alert to the problems of shifting funds from projects which are slow moving or must be terminated.

The field representative receives an annual letter from the Regional Director requesting a program submission which presents the status of present grants and projects, the country program for the following five years, including proposed projects, and possible activities with whatever degree of financial accuracy is possible at the time. As project development proceeds, additional information is gathered, probably through the use of consultants, and negotiations with the recipient are intensified. During this process there is informal consultation with headquarters. When arrangements are complete the specific request for a grant is made. Field representatives may concentrate their efforts in a given country on university education, population control, planning, etc., or the program may include such widely varied activities as educational television, orientation of foreign personnel in the country, and assisting in the development of a Department of Agricultural Economics.

The Foundation is not usually interested in initiating projects to be carried out by other donors nor providing assistance at the end of an activity. However, because of the timing and flexibility of its decision making process, there are some cases in which it has filled a gap by providing a preliminary survey or some high-level consulting services to assist in the transition of projects to recipient operation. Interviews and observations in the field indicate that field representatives are often sought out for this kind of assistance but ^{then} ~~then~~ to recommend it only when projects which the Foundation considers of high priority are involved.

In some cases the Ford Foundation engages in joint projects with other donor agencies, though only with limited frequency. The National Agricultural School in Mexico (AID and IDB) and the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines (Rockefeller) are major

examples of joint projects. In the opinion of a number of people interviewed in the Foundation and other agencies, there are distinct advantages to combining the capacities of different donor agencies on a single project, but this also adds to the problem of internal resolution between the donors and with the recipient government. This is particularly true when foundations which can act expeditiously are dealing with bilateral or multilateral agencies whose decisions require more time.

The major characteristics of the Ford Foundation, then, are the combining of regional and country approaches with broad functional interests, the latitude provided to the field representatives, the extensive use of consultants in project development, and the effective communication between field and headquarters.

The United Nations Special Fund, created in 1959 as a compromise to proposals for a U. N. capital fund, limits projects in a different manner.²⁶ The Special Fund concentrates on pre-investment projects of four different categories: 1) surveys which aim at prompt investment or increased productivity; 2) technical training projects with an identifiable relation to economic development; 3) applied research projects which provide for training of recipient country personnel as well as adequate examination of the findings; and 4) economic development planning (a very small category to date).

The Special Fund projects are usually three to five years in duration and, as noted above, much larger than the EPTA projects. The average input of the Special Fund in a project is over 900 thousand dollars. Recipient contributions average more than a million, not including the requirement for 15% cash input to be administered by the executing agency. Insofar as there is a defined budget cycle, it is related to the semi-annual meeting of the Governing Council, which considers projects submitted to it by the headquarters staff.

²⁶ For a description of the process leading to the creation of the Special Fund, see Johan Kaufman and John Hadwen, How United Nations Decisions are Made, (New York: Oceana Publication, 1962).

The Special Fund has relatively few criteria other than its global categories of projects, but it does expect that projects submitted to the Fund be related to a national development plan or the development policies of the government. In practice, the difficulty in obtaining good projects is such that any project which has the support of the recipient, is reasonably well prepared, fits one of the categories of the Fund's activities, and is somewhere within the long-range interest of the country's development will probably be accepted.

Special Fund projects may result from a wide variety of influences. Officials of the recipient government may discuss project ideas with Specialized Agency representatives or the Resident Representatives, who in turn informally communicate with Specialized Agency and Special Fund headquarters to determine their initial reactions. If the reaction is favorable, the recipient government, with the assistance of either Specialized Agency personnel or contractors, will proceed to work with the government to prepare the project for submission to the Special Fund.

There are occasionally some ongoing projects of the recipient government which need expansion and fit the Special Fund criteria. These projects provide a ready-made base on which important Special Fund activities may be developed. The technical training program in Colombia is a good example. Another example of an activity started on a regional scale by another agency proved to have a broad potential and was developed into a nation-wide Special Fund project.

Special Fund projects may also arise from successful EPTA projects which need expansion or additional funds to increase their impact. Both recipient personnel and field officials of the U. N. see some of the best EPTA projects as the natural basis for Special Fund activities. Special Fund headquarters, however, appears to be wary of the use of too many EPTA projects as the basis for Special Fund activities for fear that they will get locked into this channel of project development, thereby limiting their range of activities.

The Specialized Agencies may promote given types of projects through personnel stationed in the country, regional representatives, and visiting headquarters personnel. However, the Resident Representative exerts considerable influence on the development of Special Fund projects through his position as Director of the Special Fund in the country. All Special Fund proposals must be submitted through him and he may forward a confidential report on each project. At the same time, however, he must maintain a good relationship with senior personnel of Specialized Agencies, but he must also take into account the detailed review of each project by Special Fund headquarters. At the same time, his influence and understanding of the recipient country situation makes him an important source of advice to the Specialized Agencies in the project development process.

The Special Fund classifies the Specialized Agencies as executing agencies rather than participating agencies, as they were called in the EPTA program. Formally the Specialized Agencies do not enter the programming process until after approval of the project has been given and a Plan of Operations is to be negotiated. In fact, however, the Specialized Agencies do participate frequently in the development of projects.

As with all U. N. activities, there is some pressure to have at least one Special Fund project in every country. However, because of the size of the projects and the Special Fund's insistence on extensive support, there is also a limitation as to how many can be maintained by any given recipient. As of June 1965, there were some 522 projects in 130 countries. Of these, 223 were resource surveys, 186 in technical training and 104 in applied research. There are also 9 projects in the economic development planning category. The distribution of projects among executing agencies indicates quite a different pattern than in EPTA, which has continued very close to the original agency shares totals.²⁷

²⁷ See The Organization of United Nations Technical Assistance, a staff paper on this project, p. 31.

Project development in the Special Fund has placed more emphasis on increased responsibility by recipient agencies, the role of the Resident Representative, and the influence of headquarters review, and quite different relationships with the Specialized Agencies. There is greater use of consulting groups and a more comprehensive approach to project development, although much of the detail of implementation is worked out after approval in the Plan of Operations.

Donor Strategy Approaches

Most agencies vary their programs to meet the particular circumstances of regions and countries. The Special Fund has an explicit emphasis for its pre-investment activities in each area.²⁸ The Ford Foundation policy of a unique contribution to development implies a different approach to each of the countries in which it operates. Ford is also moving toward more broadly analytical country presentations from the field in its yearly submissions. EPTA, DTC and several other agencies assume that the individual countries have a defined strategy and that any project requests will be in conformity with it.

AID and the World Bank go somewhat further in that they analyze the country situation, including its strategy, and provide some specific objectives for their action in any individual country. Both agencies design their activities to reinforce those country policies or programs which, in their judgment, are most conducive to accelerated development. Since the World Bank has a very limited activity in the technical assistance field, it will be more instructive to consider the AID program as an example of an agency that develops its own strategy for individual countries.

Fundamental to AID project development is the fact that technical assistance is only a small part of the total AID program.

²⁸ Opening up new land and strengthening education and training institutions in Africa; resources and manpower for industry in Latin America; improving the technological foundations of agriculture and industry in Asia; and overcoming natural obstacles such as shortage of water and erosion in the Middle East. See United Nations Special Fund, Progress Report, June 1965.

The AID program is geared to the broader foreign policy objectives of the U. S. throughout the world. Technical Assistance project development, therefore, fits into two different systems: the policy system and the programming system. As a part of the policy system it is one instrument of the AID program aspect of U. S. policy as are Development Loans, Program Loans, Supporting Assistance, and Contingency Funds. In the other system it is part of the total programming process of the Agency which includes the statement of U. S. objectives; the analysis of the country situation; the development of a country assistance strategy; the formulation of goal plans; and a detailed statement of each activity in relation to the established goals of the program.

Project development in technical assistance in this sense is prescribed, at least formally, as an activity developed in response to the agreed strategy and goals of the total program in each country. It may include advisory services, training, commodities, general surveys, certain types of construction, and even advice on non-AID financed capital projects.

AID manual orders require the development of well defined, realistic targets through the examination of the economic, social, and political aspects of the proposed activities. From this examination proposed projects are derived and analyzed, and then written up in an Activity Description. The Activity Description includes financial details for personnel, training, and commodity requirements for the life of the project, and a narrative of the activity targets, the course of action, the progress to date and the funding requirements.

The project should fit into the Goal Plan which has also been spelled out in detail and is in turn derived from analysis of the proposed U. S. role in the country development plans and activities.²⁹ The Goal

²⁹ While it is a fundamental step in the actual process, no mention is made in manual orders of country requests for assistance. Manual Order 1311.1, Section IIB 1. reads in part: "Where applicable, goal plans should provide the basic framework for selection of optimum technical assistance projects, and should focus attention on specific, realizable goals. These goals can provide the link to the overall country plans."

Plan is incorporated into either an LAS (Long Range-Assistance Strategy) or CAP (Country Assistance Program). The CAP, which may be 100 pages in smaller country programs to close to 1,000 pages in the largest ones, is forwarded yearly to Washington for review.³⁰

Project development in technical assistance is also influenced by its relative importance in each Regional Bureau. Technical cooperation projects vary both in size and in percentage of the total Bureau program, as shown in the following table:

Percentages and Amounts of AID Technical Cooperation Program by Regional Bureaus, FY 1967 (in millions)

	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Africa	94	42
Latin America	95	16
Far East	48	7
Near East and South Asia	56	6
Regional Support and Research	70	
Total Technical Cooperation	363	15% *

* Of total AID economic program of 2.4 billion.

In practice, some projects arise from an examination of the specific requirements of country plans. Others arise from the identification by the AID mission of important areas of activity which are of common interest to both donor and recipient. The pattern, however, is clearly stated by a former program officer whose experience includes both headquarters and the field:

The design and content of the programs submitted by the USAID's reflect intensive efforts by embassy as well as USAID personnel to determine what programs are best for the country. Where the country has strong views about what it wants most from the U. S., these views are indeed an important consideration. However,

³⁰ The Program Book has been reorganized and enlarged many times. Its present form includes two sections -- objectives and country analysis in Section I; goal plans and project descriptions in Section II. A conservative estimate of the amount of management time involved in initial preparation of a 300-page program book indicated that something more than 375 man-days of management time were required by U. S. officials.

where host country views are not clearly expressed, or where in the U. S. view they do not seem related to the country's needs or to the specific U. S. objectives in that country, the proposed program depends heavily upon USAID's analysis and programming efforts.

Even in the least developed countries, where the program consists of predominantly technical assistance projects, this intensive programming routine is followed by the USAID's. Given the difficulties which underdeveloped nations face in determining and maintaining priorities USAID's in these countries frequently find it necessary to suggest "appropriate" programs. As a consequence, these countries often find themselves responding to USAID ideas, rather than requesting specific assistance activities of their own design.³¹

"Suggesting appropriate programs" is perhaps an understatement considering the general mobilization of support for project proposals which is accomplished by the project salesmen in both AID and the recipient government. Projects are frequently promoted by technicians, headquarters visitors, consultants, Congressmen and embassy and mission officials for what they consider to be completely justified reasons in terms of the needs of the country and the objectives of the U. S. mission. Projects are also promoted by country officials and private citizens through channels within the local government. In spite of headquarters guidelines and the continuing analysis by the field mission, resulting goal plans are almost always broad enough to enable project promoters to fit most projects within one of the major goals of the USAID mission in the country.

This conflict between the logically ordered program requirements and the reality of the field situation constitutes a continuing problem for the field mission. On the one hand it must fit projects into a cohesive goal-plan structure, and on the other, changing circumstances of the country situation. Projects must be developed with an eye to the fact that they will be initiated 18 months hence, without any sure knowledge of what changes will occur in political or administrative conditions. This is one of the reasons why mission personnel attempt to

³¹ Karl Mathiasen, op. cit., Chapter III, pp. 6-7.

work out projects with more stable elements in the recipient government - i.e., autonomous agencies, key officials who will be less influenced by political change, and organizations which can count on continued support from the private sector. There is also a conflict between the need to define projects broadly with recipient officials and the problem of specific delineation in the program's submission. Headquarters expects projects to be worked out in detail for the CAP, and yet the more precise the detail, the less likely it will be applicable at the time of initiation.

Another major problem of project development revolves around a difference of opinion between field people on priority vs. feasibility. The scattered nature of early projects in technical assistance and the tendency for this pattern to continue because of the special interests of mission and recipient officials has brought about a strong reaction from a number of generalists in both headquarters and the field. "Beware," they say, "of the technician riding into your office astride his favorite project." According to this view, a program should be a concentrated group of high priority activities which reinforce each other. "Scatter-ation" is the reason why AID programs are not effective. It is necessary to work with the country on developing agreed priorities and derive projects from them.

The other view is that the mission should invest less time, particularly that of top level mission management, in the process of determining arbitrary priorities, and concentrate on selecting activities which are feasible and can be well done. The search for careful priority ranking is another evidence of the belief in a magic solution which does not exist. This group further argues that there are so many things that need doing that it does not matter where you start as long as you pick projects which will succeed. As long as those few relatively obvious useless or destructive kinds of things are avoided, it will be possible to concentrate energies on the question, "Will it succeed?" instead of, "Is it important?" In the long run, the argument continues, successful projects will have a greater effect on both development and the U. S. image in the country than high priority projects which do not succeed.

In fact, project selection is often influenced by the fact that Minister X is likely to remain in office and will favor the project, technician Y is either in the country or can be obtained, and the headquarters man Z will take a particular interest in seeing that adequate backstopping is provided.

However, these and a variety of other practical factors are weighed together with technical and economic analysis and yearly headquarters guidelines in considering the acceptability of a project.

As the time for preparing the yearly submission approaches, all of the available information, analysis and the judgments of division chiefs, technicians, and program officers are focused on a review held by the mission director. He and the senior staff raise basic questions about project proposals (and ongoing projects) and determinations are made about which ones will be included in the submission and how they will be modified to meet various requirements.³² This series of meetings is the culmination of mission efforts to combine headquarters guidelines, mission objectives and the problems of the country situation into a program presentation which will be justifiable to headquarters and feasible to accomplish.

Subsequent to the decisions but concurrently in time the process of putting together the CAP proceeds, often at a frantic pace.³³ Activity Description must be costed and written up to fit into predetermined goal plans in order to make a logical and well ordered presentation.

The Assembly of the CAP is a complex, detailed, and time-consuming effort. It involves extensive narrative materials and voluminous tabular material on economic and financial aspects of the country and the assistance program. When there are modifications in goals, policies, emphasis in program guidelines, shifts in ministers and other

³² These sessions have been colloquially referred to as the "Inquisition" and the "Nuremburg trials."

³³ For FY 1967 the problem was alleviated somewhat by scheduling the submission of Section I (objectives and country analysis) in July and Section II (goal plans and projects) in September. See Footnote 30, p. 112, for estimate of time involved.

officials of the recipient government, or key officials of the AID mission, many items must be recast or possibly combined with other activities in the same field to meet the differing requirements.

In a somewhat broader time perspective there are times when project development becomes a major activity as new opportunities arise, emphasis in the country increases or some important area becomes the center of attention. At other times when there are important political problems, important shortages of funds or personnel, or difficulties in getting recipient support, the mission attempts to keep ongoing projects alive and prepare for the time when it will be possible to expand activities. There is also another phenomenon which influences project development which might be called the Mission Director's program cycle.

When a new Mission Director arrives in a country he begins by reviewing the present program. Recently briefed by policy makers and interested groups in Washington, he is determined to mold the program into a cohesive and hard hitting instrument to assist the country to attack basic problems of development. He has had little, if any, time with the previous Mission Director and has not overlapped with him in the country. He is usually surprised at what he finds in the technical cooperation program. Some projects are aimed at what he considers to be basic problems, but many of them are not moving ahead well enough. Other projects are a hodge-podge of different activities, many of which are only vaguely related to the total country goals. He begins to review each project to determine which can be combined, de-emphasized, or allowed to perish from attrition when technicians are transferred. By a careful assessment of the individual projects, giving attention to the support which they receive from the recipient government, embassy and mission officials, and different groups which exercise significant influence in Washington, it is possible to gradually cut down the number of projects and emphasize the "best" ones for which he can obtain agreement for continuing support. During this process, interested recipient groups, technicians on his own staff, and different elements in Washington

are all trying to mobilize support for the projects which are threatened. However, the Mission Director is at the center of this situation and if he is shrewd and effective, will begin to put his stamp on the program within two years.³⁴

As programs are gradually reduced to a "manageable" number of projects, the new emphasis which the Mission Director has given the program begins to take shape. Then a variety of new project opportunities begin to arise which will reinforce this approach. Recipient agencies begin to request the types of projects which fit the pattern, Washington visitors begin to promote the development of projects with the recipients in the new framework, and his own staff uncovers activities which will fit into the emphasis of the program. As the program begins to expand again, the Mission Director will probably be transferred and a new one will arrive to begin the process anew.

From 1960 to 1965 there were 43 mission directors for 17 countries in Latin America. Observations in other areas indicate that this is not an unusual situation and that a mission director who remains in one mission for as long as 5 years is a rarity.³⁵ In one mission where there were four mission directors in five years, the program book in 1963 showed no projects lasting beyond two years. Most projects which were more than four years old were to be phased out within one year.

There are a number of other factors that contribute to the general instability of the AID program with a consequent effect on development. Headquarters emphasis, reflected in a guidelines for program

³⁴ In a sample set of eight countries selected for intensive study in a given year, only 22% of the technical cooperation projects were new ones, and this percentage was influenced by one country with a 33% because it was being given special emphasis as a show case in a particular area. It would, therefore, be difficult for the Mission Director to create major modifications in a country program in less than two years.

³⁵ Between 1950 and 1955 Glick found that 19 Latin American countries had 40 different mission directors. Philip Glick, *op. cit.*, p. 174. This phenomenon is not limited to Latin America. For example, Iran had five directors in ten years and Pakistan seven in fourteen years.

submissions to be sent to missions each year, tends to vary the program emphasis on both a world-wide and a regional basis. This emphasis reflects the pressures from lateral departments of government and the shifting influences within the AID bureaucracy.

Recipient government support, which is crucial to the effectiveness of new projects, is also adversely affected by a high turnover of its senior officials. Recipient and donor technicians frequently complained of shifting of high officials or changing emphasis. In one country, for example, there have been 17 ministers of agriculture in 15 years.

Recently there have been a number of actions taken at both the field and headquarters level to mitigate these influences. The use of short-term consultants to assist project development is increasing. Project officers have become more sophisticated in their analysis of projects. Stable elements in both the government bureaucracy and in the private sector have been used to ensure continuing support for new projects. Headquarters personnel have been sent out to missions to assist in program preparation.

On the recipient side, the development of planning organizations, in part through technical assistance, has been the stabilizing factor. There has been a promising but gradual increase in the number of skilled administrators and technically qualified individuals who can assist in preparing projects. Each of these has made a contribution to improved project development.

Another recent development is the emphasis by Washington on project implementation which tends to shift more mission attention to operational effectiveness, but it has been accompanied by an increase in required reports. ³⁶ Project concentration has received much attention by Washington headquarters, mission chiefs, and program officers.

In the past several years the program coordination staff at headquarters has given considerable attention to the overall problems of

³⁶ | AIDTO circ. A43, A104 and A138 of 1964

development, particularly in the area of developing macro-economic models and such other techniques as incentive programming, which are generally applicable to only the capital aspects of the program. In the technical assistance area, however, a recent staff paper develops the concept of targets of concentration and targets of opportunity in a more precise and useful manner than has been done previously.³⁷ The essence of the argument is that different procedures should be developed for preparation and review of technical assistance projects for two different categories of activities:

- 1) The small, relatively unrelated projects which have important possibilities for future development or are the small beginnings of larger activities:
- 2) Larger, more comprehensive projects which are related to the major goals of the program.

While this document has received relatively little attention in AID, it appears that much more needs to be done to test this approach. It seems to be a promising approach for AID in particular and possibly for EPTA, Ford and the British program.

Each agency seems to have developed the approach to project development that appears to be adapted to its particular needs. The conclusions in Chapter 6, while cast within a different framework, will propose changes which affect project development. However, there seems to be some agreement among a number of officials involved in the programming process that the following administrative practices constitute important elements that should be considered by all agencies in organizing for project development:

- 1) the continuity of field chiefs in one country for a long enough time to provide continuity and stability.
- 2) the establishment of clear-cut, well understood objectives of each program in any given country.

³⁷ See AID Memorandum from Bartlett Harvey, AA/PC (drafted by L. Kornfeld), August 19, 1965.

- 3) the incorporation of the recipient in project development to include efforts to obtain support from elements within the country which will have continuing influence.
- 4) the use of short-term consulting groups in project development. This is particularly true when intermittent use is made of the same group. The responsibility of these groups to the field chief also appears to create less conflicts in project determination.
- 5) the capacity for early initiation of projects, even though on a small scale, to capitalize on early enthusiasm and interest of recipient.

Project Review

Project review is generally concerned with the proposals prepared by the field office in a submission to a regional or headquarters office. The review that takes place within the field mission is, for the purposes of this paper, arbitrarily defined as part of the project development process. The fact that project review is a given stage in the programming process does not mean that project development terminates with the submission for review. Some agencies have a formal process for continuing project development, but in most cases it continues informally in the field during and particularly after the review has taken place. As with all stages in the programming process, there is overlap and influence of one upon the other, depending on the nature of the program process in the donor agency.

Substantively project review may involve any or all of the following considerations: policy, strategy, technical factors, budget and capacity. Projects may be considered individually as they arrive at a point where they can be reviewed or in functional or geographical groupings as a part of a total program. The review generally reflects the depth of participation of headquarters in the programming process and the degree of attention which must be given to the approval or funding body. The review process also is an indicator of the degree of centralization within the agency. In general, those agencies which have more complex programs and project development processes have more complex review processes. In part this is due to size and internal inputs

but also to the administrative structure of the agency.

Limited Review Procedures

The EPTA review was the most limited and clear-cut. The Specialized Agencies, who have usually been involved in the development of the projects were responsible for the technical review. This often consisted only in the ratification of an extensive participating agency review of field proposals with particular attention to budget requirements. Until the merger of the EPTA and the Special Fund into the United Nations Development Program, these same specialized agencies sat on Technical Assistance Board (TAB) which then recommended the total program to the Technical Assistance Committee (TAC). The TAC was composed of a representative from each of the 18 countries represented on the Economic and Social Council, plus twelve members selected by that Council to give the Committee a broader geographic representation. The TAC then reviewed and approved the overall program and authorized funds for its implementation. In practice there are a number of reasons why New York headquarters had a limited role in project and program review. The three main factors are:

- 1) the policy of EPTA is to accept all reasonable requests up to the target figure.
- 2) the strategy of the program is mainly the responsibility of the recipient country coordinating committee.
- 3) the technical review is the responsibility of the participating agency in the sector of activity involved.

The British program, prior to the Ministry of Overseas Development, based its review on a similar policy of accepting any reasonable government request. However, headquarters (including the Middle East Development Division) was able to provide or arrange for technical analysis which would influence both the field chief's decision to submit the project and the headquarters' decisions during the review. The strategy of the technical assistance program was, to a great degree, the province of the field chief. There were, however, major policy questions or strategy problems into which the British High Commission

or Embassy and various agencies in London might be drawn. The question of country strategy was assumed, in most cases, to have been developed by the country. The field chief has considerable flexibility in both the question of influencing the country's determinations and obtaining support from headquarters for his views.

The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations accomplish project review in quite a different way. While there are important variations between Ford and Rockefeller, there are some common elements to the two approaches. First, Ford and particularly Rockefeller limit their programs in quite specific ways, which reduces the need for an extensive policy review. Second, the small headquarters and field staff have considerable continuing informal contact during the project development process. Thus, many of the problems of the review process of other agencies never arise. Third, as has been pointed out earlier, there are few outside independent groups which directly impinge on the decision making process of the foundations, and therefore the internal resolution of difficulties between field, headquarters and the Board of Trustees is the only requirement to program determination. Fourth, the use of high level consultants, many of whom have had previous experience in project development for the foundation, provides a technical review and sometimes a useful strategy analysis.

Headquarters does question projects on policy strategy and technical considerations, but except in cases of budget and capacity limitations there is considerable flexibility in meeting the special requirements of the country situation. In cases of important differences of view, field officers may often return to headquarters to resolve individual problems of project or program emphasis.

Interviews with both field and headquarters personnel indicate that in most cases in which projects are technically and strategically justified, headquarters provides sympathetic review with regard to policy considerations. A few cases of direct intervention of headquarters in modification of projects were reported but in these cases headquarters personnel had particular technical competence in the activity

or field experience in similar situations. The headquarters review of the foundation appears to be characterized by analysis and constructive suggestions all during the process of project development, rather than concentrated at a specific point.

Since the Rockefeller Foundation is organized into functional divisions, it therefore tends to emphasize technical review through both headquarters staff and regular consultants. Furthermore, its long-term concentration on specific programs (i.e., cereal breeding and medical schools) allows for careful initial analysis, a small beginning and gradual expansion of activities. This essentially shifts the character of project review in the development, operation and review seem to be more of a continuing process than in most other agencies.

While the Ford Foundation is organized regionally and has a broader range of activities, there seems to be no organized formal review of the field representative's yearly program statement. The submission is examined by different elements within the headquarters agency for consistency and conformity to policy. It is the individual projects that get the detailed attention at different stages in their development prior to their final submission to the Board of Trustees.

Intensive Review Procedures

The Special Fund project proposal review is related to the semi-annual meetings of the Governing Council, but a project can be presented to any meeting when the headquarters staff considers the proposal to be well enough developed for fund earmarking. While country strategy is a consideration, policy categories and established regional emphasis stated above and technical soundness are the major concerns of the review.³⁸

When the project is submitted to headquarters, a summary of the proposal is prepared and, together with some comments and an evaluation by the New York staff, is sent to those specialized agencies which have competence in the subject matter, whether or not they have been involved in project development or will be selected as the executive agency.

The Resident Representative may also submit a confidential report on the relationship of the project to country problems or any

³⁸See pp. 107 and 110n.

other matter he considers important. New York remains the focal point of the review process and often raises technical, economic and strategy questions requiring further study or analysis. As with all U. N. activities, there are political and geographic considerations regarding the distribution of projects. For example, it would appear that the rapid growth of independent nations in Africa and the urgent problems of assessing development problems account in part for the concentration of one third of its projects and resources in that area.

Up to the present time, the capacity of the headquarters staff of the Special Fund in New York to analyze projects and gather additional information through Specialized Agency review and country consultation has been such that the Governing Board has not refused to approve any project presented to it. One problem has been the question of timing and the difference in requirements of project approval and the Plan of Operations. Ideally the Governing Board should earmark the funds for a project at some point during project preparation when the objectives are well defined, justified and the basic design of the project is clear. The refinement process should continue and culminate in the Plan of Operations. Frequently countries treat the two operations as quite different parts of project development without understanding that Governing Council approval can be given at any point in the preparations leading to a Plan of Operation.

The most comprehensive review process is that of AID in which policy, strategy, and to a great degree the technical review, are responsibilities of the headquarters office. Even in cases where short-term consultants participate in project development and review, these teams are either responsible to the headquarters office or exercise influence at the headquarters level.

As outlined in its manual orders, the AID Washington review process determines whether each project is justified in terms of U. S. objectives; whether the targets are reasonable in view of the country situation and U. S. capabilities; whether the project contains sufficient

details to demonstrate that it is well conceived through completion; whether it is feasible in terms of timing; whether the necessary personnel and commodities are available; and whether the fund schedule is appropriate to the scope of work and the sequence of action. In addition, AID/W considers the interest in and receptivity of the recipient country to the project and the firmness of commitment of country contributions which are expected to be contributed by the recipient country.³⁹

The procedure which is established to accomplish the review leaves considerable flexibility to the regional bureaus. Some bureaus set up special reviews for all new projects and request that they be submitted whenever they are able to be prepared. One Agency administrator established a pattern of holding a hearing for certain selected technical assistance projects from each bureau.

While the manual orders allow for bureaus to review country programs through an "informal process", in most cases each country program, after it has been examined by the staff of the bureau, has a hearing, at which the recommendations to the administrator are formulated. In some bureaus the mission director is called into Washington for this hearing. Other persons from the Budget Bureau, the Departments of Agriculture, Health, Education and Welfare, may also be invited to those country reviews with which they are particularly involved. Department of State desk officers and other personnel are also normally present.

Bureau level hearings consider the strategy of the program in relation to U. S. policy, interests and objectives for the country, and the relation of the projects to country analysis and program goals. The significance of technical assistance in this review depends on the size and nature of the program. If important policy issues are raised by any part of the program there may be a formal hearing on the country program at the Administrator's level.

After the review a Country Assistance Strategy Statement (CASS) is developed to reflect the final agreement on the program strategy. The

³⁹ AID Manual, Order 1323.1 - III

1967 submission, however, calls for the preparation, modification or ratification of the CASS by the field mission.

The Country Assistance Programs (CAP) from each bureau are summarized and consolidated to form the total submission to the Bureau of the Budget and ultimately to the Congress. During Congressional consideration, information and questions flow back and forth between the field and Washington.

The problem of Congressional review opens up a much more complicated set of problems which are beyond the scope of this paper. During the hearings by at least four different committees there is a continuous process of political and bureaucratic interaction involving the White House, the Department of State, AID, and other departments and interested groups. Frank Coffin, a former Congressman and Deputy Administrator of AID, has described the process with precision and clarity.⁴⁰ His proposals for change are some of the most useful and constructive attempts to deal with the Congressional problem to date.⁴¹

Project review as described above would appear to be a relatively well ordered process through which a mass of country material is analyzed, determinations agreed upon, and a polished digest provided for the Bureau of the Budget and Congressional justification. However, the pressures of time, and the volume of material which requires attention restrict the amount of analysis. Program decisions are limited by the nature of the CAP and the problems of resolving the different influences impinging on it. The emphasis which emerges, then, is the development of a presentation to ward off the ever present Damoclean sword of appropriation cuts which hangs over the head of the Agency. There must be a logical consistency of policies, strategies, goal plans, and projects which will demonstrate to the Executive and the Congress that the program for any given year is: 1) carefully and rationally planned to assist in the countries' basic problems; 2) is in the national interest; and 3) is likely to be successful. This is a critical problem made more diffi-

⁴⁰ Frank M. Coffin, Witness for AID, Chapter IV "The Annual Minuet", (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1964).

⁴¹ Ibid., Chapter XVII.

cult by the lack of powerful constituencies and the detail which is required by both the Budget Bureau and the Congress. Headquarters is constantly aware of the complications of this problem and, therefore, understandably emphasizes this aspect of the review.

In a program requiring the yearly preparation of material, the pressures of time are enormous. Guidelines often are sent to the field late. Guidelines almost always introduce changes in both format and emphasis.⁴² Material must be hurriedly gathered and worked into the format with the emphasis prescribed by the global and area guidelines and forwarded to Washington to meet the deadlines. Submissions, too, are sometimes late, which complicates the review schedule.

The appearance of about 60 program books at one time provides a heavy burden for the regional bureau staffs.⁴³ When CAP's arrive in Washington, the country review schedule is such that most people do not have time to read all of the material, so they concentrate on those particular aspects of the submission which are of particular interest or their responsibility. This means that the preparation for the country program review is often less than adequate because of the volume of detailed and complex material which must be covered. The technical staffs tend to be concerned with the concentration which the program places on their particular field and the conformity of the projects to the current emphasis within the sector. Administrative personnel are concerned with recruitment, procurement, and the problems of field support. While

⁴² The FY 67 guideline (AIDTO Circ. A-342) placed special emphasis on food supply, population, and infant nutrition. It changed the procedure on the CASS, increased emphasis on implementation, and provided some welcome provisions for flexibility. A new budget summary was introduced along with changes in forms. The E-1 table (tabular project description for life of project) to which only recently an E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-1a, E-1b, and E-1c have been added. The 67 guideline added an E-1d (formerly E-4), a new E-4, an E-2a (formerly E-5) and an E-2b, c, and d.

⁴³ While there are programs in 70 countries, a number of African countries have either Washington or regionally based personnel handling the program submission.

program personnel are concerned with overall policies and strategies, there is a tendency to emphasize the internal consistency of the program as it is written up. There is, in addition, the question of just what project detail of the CAP represents. The data available in the country is approximate at best and sources of information about specific problems which relate to project development are few. The activities proposed will not take place for at least another year and the country situation will have changed by that time. The activity has been only generally discussed with the recipient, if at all. As pointed out in project development, the mission also makes the decision to submit the project based on the country situation, broad policies and objectives, and then writes up the project according to the yearly requirements or emphasis in the program guidelines.

The CAP is, therefore, an abstraction of the project development process that describes the project as it might have been developed logically and how it will be carried out if the present situation remains more or less the same in the future. If any kind of consulting or other special studies are done, the project will probably be significantly modified. Nevertheless, predictions are made not only about the way the project will be operated but about salaries, training and other types of costs for the life of the project. The CAP contains a good many boxes filled with consistent figures and justifications provided to satisfy the particular requirements of the presentation, including rosy statements of the ongoing projects and hopeful predictions of the new ones.⁴⁴

Consider, for example, a difficult but not extreme case of an ongoing institution building project for an important higher education institution in one country. The director of the institution, a relative of an important cabinet minister, is making few efforts to modify the approach of the institution and orient it toward a more effective role in developing manpower for country modernization. A

⁴⁴ One mission director proudly stated that with a great deal of special effort he had begun to make the program book a meaningful tool. Most experienced officials did not think that it was a good place to obtain accurate information about a project.

U. S. university contract has been closed out for lack of progress. A disinterested logical analysis of the activity might seriously question that any further attempts be made to continue the activity at this time. The mission is convinced, however, that in the long run this school is the major hope for the development of qualified technicians to promote development in this sector. Further, it is not sure that the university handled the project properly.

As difficult as the problems are, terminating the project would have repercussions at the cabinet level and there is a need for continuing efforts to find an opportunity to accelerate the school's institutional growth. While it will be difficult to change the director, some pressure can be expected from newly trained faculty and there are efforts which may change the project situation. The importance that the country attaches to some loans in this same field may provide the leverage for certain changes. The director can be influenced with visits to the U. S. and to similar successful projects in the area.

After considerable discussion, the mission decides to take the risk. It is then written up as part of a human resource goal, referred to in manpower development terms (a currently popular concept) combined with other university activities. Improvements in laboratories, library facilities, and the faculty training program are cited, along with the need for assistance if progress is to be continued. A new contract with a university is proposed and a senior direct hire advisor is requested to deal at a higher level in the government and provide closer supervision of the contract.

Probably the desk officer and the technical services officer in the Bureau are at least aware of the difficulties and risks, but there is no useful purpose in subjecting the project to a detailed discussion in the program review in AID/W, especially since there are other major issues to be considered. Mission efforts to improve the situation will continue and disapproval of the project, which would be likely, can only prevent the important but frustrating process of laying a basis for accelerated change in the future.

This composite example only illustrates a few of the many difficulties involved in reviewing complex country situations. There are a number of projects in most country programs which present problems that cannot be effectively discussed in the program book. Decisions on many of these problems are usually obtained through informal channels.

Though the technical assistance part of the project section is, in fact, more illustrative than real, the overall country analysis, strategy, and goal plans usually provide important background material which constitute a basis for a review of the general direction of the program in relation to the country's problems, needs, and its own program. This part of the CAP has been improving steadily in the past few years. Some of the material duplicates embassy political and economic reporting but the focus on development is some justification for a separate document. In the larger countries it is this aspect that receives a larger share of attention.

For the technical assistance projects, the CAP is the reality with which headquarters deals. When the mission director participates, there can be some very useful and important discussions of the kinds of problems that exist and the approaches necessary to successfully attack them. Even so, the kinds of questions asked in the review session at headquarters are quite different from those asked at the field review. In part this is because headquarters, as has been discussed in Chapter Three, has to face the particular reality of its own situation. This involves the Congress, the Bureau of the Budget, other agencies in the Government, internal bureaucratic pressures and a variety of other extra-governmental influences. The review brings to a focus all these different interests in order to forge a common agreement that will justify the program and obtain adequate support.

The review, then, may or may not deal with the specific problems to which technical assistance is directed. A good deal may depend on the presentation of the mission director, the respect with which he is held in Washington and the relation of the program to the particular emphasis provided in the yearly guidelines. In some cases

individual projects may be modified significantly and in others only the goal plans are examined.⁴⁵ The support the mission director gets in the review depends not only on his reputation and his presentation, but also on the reputation and influence of some of his field chiefs. A highly respected and experienced agriculture chief's projects are usually given the benefit of the doubt by agriculture personnel at headquarters. In any case, both the senior officials and particularly the mission director, do a good deal of lobbying for their program at different levels in Washington. Whenever the mission director comes to Washington, he expedites action on continuing programs and tries to get adequate information to prepare himself for the emphasis which can be expected in the review session. One mission director, experienced at headquarters, stated that after only four months at the mission he could usually parry Washington criticisms or questions.

One of the most useful techniques to get headquarters support is to find every possible excuse to get headquarters people out to the field to acquaint them with the progress and problems.⁴⁶ A team from headquarters which will assist in program preparation will result not only in a better presentation but will increase support in Washington.

In spite of increased rotation and efforts to improve communications with the different environments of field and headquarters, it is not possible, and probably not entirely desirable, to eliminate all the differences in views of the program review. There remain, however, important impediments to better understanding.

It is an optimistic assessment of the interests and capacities of AID/Washington to state, as the manual does, that it should determine whether a project is justified, reasonable, well conceived and feasible in its timing, funding, receptivity and scope. The varied conditions

⁴⁵ There is considerable dispute as to how much attention technical assistance projects receive. Measuring in terms of the problems which they have, field people argue that they receive very little attention. Headquarters people, measuring in terms of relative amounts of money, argue that technical assistance receives a disproportionate share of their attention.

⁴⁶ The Washington image is double-edged. Many recipient officials believe that anyone from Washington has more authority than the mission director. It is therefore possible for Washington officials to be of great help by reinforcing the director, but they can also sell projects he does not want or finds hard to justify.

of individual countries and the complexity of technical assistance activities would make Washington judgments tenuous, even if they were not made 18 months in advance of the initiation of the project.

The expectations from the review process in AID are inordinately high. This is in part forced on headquarters by Congressional and other external demands, but it is also influenced by the needs of many internal elements. The pursuit of a tidy result through the process of headquarters' review of mission submissions is simply unrealistic, given the conditions under which technical assistance operates.

In spite of the fact that past efforts at simplification have often led to more complex submissions, there is at present a healthy tendency to reduce the volume of material which must be reviewed each year. The gradual emergence of the country assistance strategy statement (CASS) and the consideration of a semi-annual report which can be computerized offer some hope of significant changes in the submission and review process.⁴⁷ There is also some movement toward handling detailed review of projects at the mission level. However, this may transfer the extensive long-term project planning activities to an expanded mission staff which may result in their dealing with the same type of abstract representation of the planning process as is presently done in Washington. What has yet to be considered is the classification of projects in terms of their complexity and their need for extensive preparations. The system suggested in Chapter V is a preliminary approach to this problem. However, recent efforts within the Office of Program Coordination to find a means to reinforce the practical approaches of some of the individual bureaus in concentrating on major issues, will be a significant step forward.

⁴⁷ It is still too early to tell if the present efforts to simplify the program process will in fact do so. There is still another indeterminate influence emerging from the wings, the program budgeting emphasis (PPBS). In its early stages it appeared to be pushing the programming process in the opposite direction.

Programming after Approval

Up to the point of project approval, programming has been the major focus of attention by the participants in the process. After approval the focus changes to implementation, and programming becomes one of the tools which contribute to early initiation, readjustment, and coordination of activities. In between submission and approval there may have been certain types of pre-initiation activities, such as additional technical studies, detailed planning, efforts to locate personnel, etc. At this point the major problem is making sure that any changes in donor and recipient positions or in the country situation are incorporated into project plans.

In the field, programming after approval deals with the same problem of resolving different views in order to achieve the detailed agreement that will make initiation possible. Later, as a project matures, there are subsequent agreements which must be obtained about resource inputs, emphasis, and ultimately the means for transfer of the project to the recipient government. During the course of implementation the program process is the means by which policy changes of both donor and recipient are related to the ongoing activities of the project.

The budgeting aspect of programming also continues insofar as the program process is the means by which requests and justifications for funds are required at given intervals. Coordinating activities with other donor agencies on the overall shape of the program and the activities of individual projects are a part of programming after approval.

While there are important problems of coordination in both the project development and review stages, its impact becomes apparent in the implementation stages. As donors have increased, the problems have become more complicated with a resulting increase in emphasis in finding a means to deal with the problem. While no one questions the importance of coordination per se, too often it is a device which everybody is in favor of until it means modifying cherished activities. In many cases the problems of coordination are handled after technicians of different

agencies have begun their work and some overlap appears. The resulting attempts to resolve the problem may result in spreading the conflict to the recipient government, achieving constructive complementary action or any number of arrangements between these extremes. Fortunately, the nature of the problems which technical assistance attacks is such that conflict avoidance, which is a common reaction, is not necessarily a negative result. What needs to be reviewed is the assumptions about coordination, the way it is accomplished, and the circumstances in which it is desirable.

Evaluation provides a basis for both the modification of ongoing activities and the re-ordering of program goals. While it is a complex subject which goes well beyond the scope of this paper, evaluation is a fundamental input to the programming process. There have been many excellent evaluations in a number of agencies, but so far there has been little clear definition of its scope, role and function for technical assistance. The variety of environments, objectives and approaches make operational definition a complicated problem in itself. There is an unfortunate tendency for auditors, technical specialists and program officers to examine activities from different points of view and to raise their conclusions to the level of evaluation. In searching for some kind of a definition for evaluation it is necessary to go beyond these approaches to a concept of evaluation which raises questions about the overall approach and individual effectiveness.⁴⁸

Therefore it is possible, although somewhat arbitrary, to divide programming after approval into 1) arrangements for implementation and readjustment of activities, 2) coordination with other donor agencies, and 3) evaluation.

Arrangements for implementation and readjustment of activities

In many cases it is difficult to separate the preparatory stages

⁴⁸ An important contribution to this section and by far the most useful document on evaluation which has appeared so far is A.I.D. Program Evaluation (Washington Department of State Agency for International Development 1965).

from the actual initiation of activities, since both sides try to maintain a continuing interest in the activities during the period of review and approval by studies, surveys or other limited activities. These efforts reinforce the justification of the project and provide information necessary for initiation when the project is approved. In many cases the project is related to an operating agency of the recipient government. In this case the determinations concern how the technical assistance inputs will be incorporated into the activity.

In theory the continuous attention to the development of the project during review and approval provides the volume of detailed planning which makes final agreement on initiation a ratification of detailed planning which has already taken place. In fact, however, there are a number of different kinds of changes which may occur between the submission of the project for approval by the donor field mission and the actual initiation of the project. There may be changes in the leadership or the technical staffs of the recipient government or the donor field mission. There may be changes in the political situation in the country or in the policies of either the donor or the recipient regarding the problem which the activity will attack. There may be a variety of other unforeseen circumstances involved with the actual implementation of the project which require a change in approach.

The more complex a project is, then the more detailed the preparation for undertaking the project must be in order to initiate it. In many cases projects are designed to tackle relatively limited problems in the complex situation and the problem of both donor and recipient is not so much to justify the activity as a technical assistance project but to determine the linkages with the broader and more complex environment in which it will operate and multiply its impact.

Another factor is the centralization of the decision making process. In some agencies field personnel can presume that those activities which they have selected will, except in unusual cases, be approved and can therefore proceed with additional plans for implementation prior to the actual agreement by headquarters. In other agencies

the variety of problems within headquarters during the review and approval process are such that great caution must be exercised in order not to give the impression that the project will be approved when, in fact, it may not be. However, in cases where there are long delays or some uncertainty about a project, headquarters informs the field of its reservations early in the review process and may adjust its pre-initiation actions accordingly.

Frequently it is not possible to obtain the type of skilled personnel either in the recipient government or the donor agency until after approval, which partially impedes progress on the project during the approval process. This problem is sometimes mitigated by the use of other funds to provide consulting assistance in the detailed development of the project prior to initiation.

The flexibility of the foundation programming system and the relationships between field and headquarters personnel make project approval one step in the continuing process of project development. If a project matures rapidly, foundations can accelerate the process of making the grant. If, on the other hand, there are significant delays, foundations are not locked into a fixed cycle of expenditures and can normally wait until the recipient is prepared to provide its share of the elements of the project. As has been pointed out before, there are pressures on field people to use funds which have been programmed, but since these funds may be retained in headquarters, as for example in the Ford Foundation, they are not as amenable to the same kind of year-end pressure which is the case in AID.⁴⁹ Foundations also have another means of program leverage after approval, if they are disposed to use it. Their grants are made for a period of years. At the end of that period the agreement must be extended or revised, and this provides the opportunity to adjust the project to current problems. With the multiple year grant there is reason to expect certain types of progress in comparison with the year-by-year funding, in which lack of progress tends to be related to the short funding period.

⁴⁹ This is the practice of delaying negotiations until the donor agency comes close to the deadline of obligation of funds in a given year. In some agencies recipients are able to extract important concessions from the donor in this situation.

The United Nations Special Fund has two distinct interlocking procedures which have been discussed above, the first leading to the earmarking of funds and the second to the development of a Plan of Operations which is the detailed basis for implementation. In theory there is considerable flexibility in the timing of the arrangements for these two different actions. In fact, preparation for the justification of projects before the governing council has been the immediate concern of most countries. After approval the Plan of Operations is developed by the executing agency in consultation with the recipient government and Special Fund Headquarters. Using the Governing Council agreement as a base, the detailed arrangements for the project are worked out. The major problems involve finding a project manager at an early stage, obtaining competent personnel, and agreeing on the details of implementation.

In the EPTA program, preparation of projects has in the past been extremely limited, projects have been small, and in many cases for only advisory services in ongoing institutions, which seem to require a very limited amount of planning. However, the interviews with U.N. technicians in the EPTA program point out the fact that very frequently the EPTA technicians arrive to encounter serious problems because of the lack of detailed planning and arrangements which were made prior to the initiation of the activity.

In the AID program the size and variety of activities and the long interim period between approval and implementation have led to a number of complex interim procedures. Formally missions are notified of those projects which are approved, disapproved and in need of modification before the beginning of the fiscal year in which they are to be implemented. Prior to this, however, the mission director has returned from Washington or received information on the effect of the review on the program. In some bureaus the comments on the CAP are put together and sent to the field as guidance for the following year. Once the field mission knows which projects have been approved, it can take whatever action it considers necessary to maintain interest and provide additional

information. In view of the Congressional review and the fact that they are unlikely to be able to proceed with implementation for approximately a year, the use of consultants or the gathering of additional information and attempts to locate possible resources is as much as can be done in the meantime.

Because of the overlap of the programming cycle, new projects are included in the new CAP submission and may be reviewed again prior to implementation. When Congress appropriates the funds, they are distributed to the Bureaus and the missions, and implementation is authorized. Missions then work out details with the recipient and execute a Project Agreement, which commits the funds and defines the responsibilities of both parties in project implementation. Every year the project is brought up to date in the CAP and the Project Agreement is amended to incorporate changes.

There are provisions in the Manual Orders for multi-year authorization increasing funding of approved projects and initiating small projects (up to \$50,000) which address approved goals. During the course of the project almost no cases involving these three provisions could be found. There was, however, a good deal of shifting of funds between projects within the 15% flexibility provision which allows the increase or decrease of any project or part of a project in that amount.

Coordination ⁵⁰

Over the past several years there has been a general increase in the emphasis upon the need for the coordination of technical assistance activities between the various parties concerned, especially the donors. This emphasis has taken the form of instructions to the various missions stressing coordination activities and the attempt to develop effective instruments of coordination at both the headquarters and country level. For example, AID has frequently encouraged the management of the U.N.

⁵⁰ This section is a result of some joint research with John White, an assistant on the project and incorporates portions of his memoranda on the subject.

and the other bilateral programs to direct their field operations to coordinate their activities with AID missions. In terms of concrete measures to date this policy seems to have increased the exchange between the Special Fund and AID and to have encouraged a number of efforts in the field.

While, from our analysis to date, there appears to be some ambivalence in the field about the real meaning of coordination in the host country, Washington has spelled out its intent in broad but clear terms. For instance: ⁵¹

Earlier instructions have also encouraged direct communications between USAID Directors and U. N. Resident Representatives, not simply to prevent duplication of effort but rather to ensure maximum consistency between all aspects of UNSF, EPTA, UNICEF projects, and the bilateral projects of the U.S. and to make the most effective use of these resources.

This quote refers only to U.N. programs but it can be generalized to bilateral programs as well.

In light of the increasing emphasis by several agencies on coordination, it is fruitful to carefully analyze the assumptions, difficulties, and desirability of technical assistance coordination at the host country level.

Assumptions - While the need for coordination seems obvious in any complex operation such as technical assistance, this basic assumption is loaded with implications. It assumes that all of the parties are working toward a common goal and therefore desire to reach the goal in the most rapid manner with the least resource cost. In the case of technical assistance it would probably be agreed that the goal is economic and social development for the less developed countries. However, this goal is so vague and ill-defined as to be non-operational. And the more short-range goals of the various participants are complex, somewhat ill-defined, and very often non-complementary. The recipient desires development, but the various elements within the government charged with technical assistance also desire strength and prestige for

⁵¹ AIDTO Circ. A-322, April 18, 1963.

their particular ministry, party, ethnic or social group, etc., as well as a myriad of other motives. The numerous donors desire not only development for the country, but also such goals as: the establishment of favorable political and social institutions, strength for their own position, continuing viability of their operations in the country, an acceptance by the country of their techniques and perspectives, and even a proprietary interest in certain kinds of technical assistance activities. It would appear that the assumption of common goals among the parties is false, at least in the short run.

Even if the assumption of a common goal were accepted, coordination would imply that the parties have agreed upon the paths to achieve that common goal. Here also, there is considerable disagreement. The parties to technical assistance find it difficult to agree upon what kinds of projects will provide the greatest payoff. This basic conflict is not difficult to understand in light of the lack of either an accepted theory of technical assistance or unambiguous empirical evidence of the most successful kinds of activities. This lack of a strong foundation for agreement is made more difficult by the differences in cultures, professions and perspectives by the practitioners.

Without a basic consensus, agreement is only possible if one of the parties has the power to impose its concepts upon the others. While it is generally agreed that the logical party for this role is the host countries, the very concern with coordination by the donors signifies their failure to date. As a consequence of less developed countries' impotence, the donors, especially AID, have felt compelled to perform the coordination, in some cases even circumventing the host country. In fact, it would appear that much of the desire of AID to develop coordination is an attempt to impose its concept of a country program upon both the other donors (especially the U.N.) and the host country.

Where the country presented well formulated requests for projects which were of relatively low priority, USAID's could assist the U.N. RR in resisting such proposals, and in helping the U.N. and the recipient country to formulate alternative proposals in other sectors with higher priorities.⁵²

There are a great many difficulties to be overcome before any effective coordination can be established in any host country. Perhaps the most basic problem is the apparent resistance of the less developed country to most coordination proposals. It seems that very few countries actively encourage formal, or even informal, coordination between the donors. There is good reasons for this resistance.

Coordination tends to decrease the bargaining power of the host country and to limit its choice of projects. It fears that the donors will "gang up" and that its freedom and initiative will be the cost of a "rational" allocation of technical assistance activities.

The donors often resist coordination for similar reasons. They each have an intense feeling of the importance of their particular activities and a proprietary interest in certain projects. They appear to feel that both will be jeopardized by cooperation with other donors with different points of view. Coordination limits the donor's ability to get the best projects or those most likely to be successful in the agency's terms.

The sheer size and heterogeneity of technical assistance in any major less developed country is a strong impediment to effective coordination. There are so many donors, technicians, and projects that, even if it is desirable, effective coordination is a formidable and expensive task.

Finally, the inability of the U.N. to speak with a single voice considerably complicates the matter. The failure of intra -UN coordination suggests the difficulty of the overall task.

Desirability - Technical assistance is only one of many instruments used in assisting the less developed countries and in fact one of relatively minor cost. There is a great deal of empirical evidence that only a percentage of all technical assistance projects will yield a significant payoff. Therefore, might it not be better to leave this part of development activities to the innovator?⁵³ Will not innovation be

⁵³ See Karl Mathiasen, op. cit., Chap. V, for some innovative proposals on U.N. technical assistance.

stifled by formal coordination which forces all into a "safe" country program?

Also in light of the resistance to technical assistance coordination by the less developed countries there is a considerable risk of damaging invaluable relationships and making the cost of coordination greater than the return.

Finally, if all of the above problems are solved and coordination found to be desirable, there must be a careful weighing of its costs in resources, including time, against the returns achieved. The returns must not be measured simply in terms of the ability to force technical assistance into a country programming framework but also in terms of the way the very process of coordination changes the character of technical assistance activity.

While it is not suggested that any definitive answers are supplied at this time, the following actions would be a reasonable beginning, even if the wisdom of the current coordination policy is accepted:

1. If donors really believe that coordination can best be achieved by a competent and informed recipient country staff, they could launch a major effort to acquaint government officials with the objectives, capacities, preconceptions and interworkings of the major donor agencies and give them the necessary training to do an effective job.
2. Donors could demonstrate the value of coordination by engaging in more joint projects and by building on each other's projects.
3. Donors could make a serious effort to standardize their requirements of the recipients of technical assistance and thus provide the less developed countries with a much easier management task.

Evaluation

In spite of the many perceptive guides and competent studies, an objective approach to evaluation leaves any investigator concerned with the reality of technical assistance somewhat disillusioned. Evaluation must be made against a set of criteria, but on close examination these criteria have a way of evaporating. Evaluating technical assistance

by its contribution to country development ignores, in the short run, the limited role which it plays in the total external inputs on the development process. In the long run any specific country objectives change, technical assistance may have accelerated the change, but its achievement cannot be measured against the new objectives. With the realization that approaches cannot be transferred intact and that material inputs are inhibited by patterns of behavior, another objective of technical assistance has been to change attitudes and behavior. However, the empirical measurement of such changes is extremely difficult. Another criteria is that evaluation is the measurement of achievements contrasted with the specific objectives set up at the beginning of the project. In reality, experienced practitioners know that the ultimate rationale of a project is often quite different than the original objectives. Those projects which appear to be most effective adapt to the changing conditions of the environment by strategic and tactical adjustment of both methods and specific objectives. This is, of course, not to say that criteria for evaluation of technical assistance cannot be developed but merely to point out their complexity and the need to avoid inflexible prescriptions.⁵⁴

Equally troubling are the ways in which evaluation is attempted. When it is built into the programming process it is often distorted in order to meet the needs of obtaining funds. Reporting procedures focus on specific problems which need attention and not at the factors that will provide information on increasing the efficiency of execution of projects nor assist in planning. Some internal project evaluations seem to be useful (i.e., AID Project History and Analysis Reports) until some individual projects are studied using the reports as a guide. Some anomalies appear as the donor classifying the project as a failure and the recipient classifying it as a success have been found as well as a number of other seemingly unreconcilable conditions or results.

⁵⁴ For example, on another project we have developed some provisional criteria for success of new institutions which involve autonomy, survival, structural impact, acceptance and influence on other institutions and activities. See Technical Assistance and Institution Building. Progress report to the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, November 1966 - ditto.

The use of internal groups (specially appointed or outside the Chain of Command) for evaluation has produced some useful contributions to individual agencies and in some cases to technical assistance in general. There is, however, some apparent correlation between the existence of critical (and therefore atypical) country situations which are the focus of major policy problems and the mounting of evaluation efforts.

There is also a good deal of evaluation that takes place after a new policy or a new chief has been installed which appears to be a means to change projects to accord with new policy. There are a number of other internal approaches to evaluation. There is the problem solving type of evaluation designed to recommend ways to rescue a project from possible failure. Colonel Lincoln mentions the "aha" evaluation where a team of evaluators look at a program until they find a problem project at which point they say "aha" and concentrate their attention on it.⁵⁵

The use of outsiders for evaluation has been another source of objective insights and constructive recommendations, but have been subject to another set of problems. It is extremely difficult for the outsider to know ~~what~~ the assumptions ^{and} in intricacies ~~are~~ which ^{lie} ~~lay~~ behind those objectives stated in the project descriptions and used for the justification of the project. The extreme cases of this problem are the cases in which projects undertaken for political considerations are evaluated in terms of their contribution to development. The nuances of the relationships within and between recipient and donor organizations are as important in the evaluation of activities as the overlay of stated purposes. Outsiders also have more of a tendency than insiders to overlook the environment in which the early planning and initiation took place with a consequent statement that if such and such had been done (which may have been precluded by the circumstances), then certain problems would not have occurred.

It should be clear from the above that the problem of evaluation is fundamentally a problem of definition and criteria. Each segment of

⁵⁵ AID Program Evaluation, Op. cit., p. 10.

a technical assistance organization tends to think in terms of evaluation as the means for making its own measurements, but not always related to the total problem.

The United Nations concepts of dividing evaluation into technical soundness and operating efficiency provides a useful step toward better definition, as do some of the criteria which have been established from time to time in studies accomplished by other agencies.

The recent evaluation study done for AID is particularly significant because of its approach and its frame of reference, as well as its conclusions. It proceeds from a concise review of AID and other evaluation activities to definition, a set of categories of evaluation methods, feed-back, and finally to sets of criteria. While the definition is in terms of all the activities of the AID agency, it is broadly applicable to the problem: "Evaluation is the examination of our experience to provide guidance which can be utilized to improve program execution and to improve program planning. More specifically:

- a. Evaluation is the examination (1) of actual performance in relation to specific activity plans and (2) of the significance of completed and ongoing AID activities in terms of U. S. objectives.
- b. The purpose of evaluation is to help us get better answers to the questions: (1) are we conducting AID activities as effectively as we can? (2) Are we selecting the right activities?
- c. To be effective, evaluation activities must be designed to produce usable results, and must incorporate adequate provision for the feedback of these results both to improve activities that are underway and to improve the planning and execution of new activities (including the abandonment of seemingly good ideas that do not work)." 56

The categories of evaluation include compliance evaluation which is essentially a tool of administrative control; performance evaluation, which seems to include both efficiency and goal achievement; and evaluation research which includes development of criteria and methods. The methods

⁵⁶ AID Program Evaluation, Op. cit., p. 11.

include built-in procedures which are a part of the activities of the organization, special internal groups operating independently of regular operations and research elements which may be internal, external or a combination of both. Feed-back involves not only the incorporation of reports and information into the planning activities of the agencies but visits, conferences and other means to generate interest in the sharing of knowledge about past problems. Sets of criteria stress the clarification of objectives, the use of techniques drawn from the social sciences, the accumulation of meaningful data and the incorporation of professional judgments.

For technical assistance the idea that there must be effective pressure from policy levels for continuing critical evaluation and that the need for experienced and sophisticated individuals is as significant as the methods and criteria may not be profound or new, but it places the emphasis on two of its often underestimated fundamentals.

In the actual accomplishment of evaluation, there are among the different agencies a variety of evaluation reports which have been prepared by groups drawn from within the organization and consultants from the outside. The United Nations has until recently used consultants to provide a review of programs in different subject matter fields, with the evaluation essentially related to technical soundness, whereas operational efficiency has been the subject of internal scrutiny. With the formation of the United Nations Training and Research Institute, which will be responsible for developing criteria and evaluation studies, the possibilities of some important improvements in the depth and scope of evaluation should be forthcoming.

One of the special techniques of the Rockefeller Foundation which amounts to a kind of continuing operational evaluation of certain activities is the use of the same consultant in the same activities over a period of years. The consultant spends a certain amount of time in each year in the country, developing activities, supporting both donor and recipient technicians and uncovering problems which need attention. This approach, while informal, seems like a particularly useful combination of the incorporation of professional judgment and insight into the internal operation of the organization.

AID has a variety of internal offices which are concerned with different types of evaluation. Much of this, however, is concerned with what was called above compliance evaluation concerned essentially with the adherence to rules, regulation, policies, etc. High level visits to field missions, the yearly program submission, and the project history and analysis reports (PHAR) provide some aspects of program and project evaluation. The Operations Evaluation staff has provided the resources of experienced senior persons directly responsible to the administrator's office. Other special teams have been sent to individual missions but usually when programs are critically important to national policy and when important policy changes have been initiated. The major problem in AID has not been the lack of accumulation of data for evaluative purposes but rather, its storage, systematization, dissemination and application. The short-lived activities of the technical assistance study group provided an important beginning toward a gathering of data and opinions. It catalogued information on activities and recorded the experience of individuals in a manner which might have led to more comprehensive evaluation. The AID program evaluation study contained some excellent recommendations, but it is still too soon to determine the degree to which they have been put into operation.

One of the most interesting and promising approaches to project evaluation has come from the development of three case histories on Ford Foundation projects in Iran.⁵⁷ These reports are candid and critical in their appraisal, pointing up clearly the strong and weak points of projects. They are well documented and oriented toward the generalized hypotheses which are transferrable. The reports are unusual in another way in that most of the preparation was done by scholars of the country ^{with} in the guidance of the field representative. In fact, one of its purposes was stated to be the provision of an opportunity for Iranians to examine technical assistance activities which have significance to them and their country. The additional commentary of the field representative and his staff, plus the specific orientation toward fundamental problems in all technical assistance activities, makes these reports a model on which can be built

⁵⁷ Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Supervised Agricultural Credit Project and the Vocational School in Shiraz.

important future project evaluation studies.

In spite of much of the work that has been done, what is still needed is the development of a classification of the types of technical assistance projects and the development of sets of criteria for each type. This would involve some extensive evaluation research to determine the types of formal and informal inputs to an ongoing evaluation process with the participation of practitioners and scholars. Such a project should result in a typology of technical assistance projects with criteria for each type. In addition, a relatively simple means could be designed for regular data accumulation to provide field missions with a basis for project evaluation and headquarters with the necessary information for overall program evaluations.

A Concluding Comment

In sum the stages of programming are not only flexible, they are intricate, interdependent, and overlapping. They depend on established procedures and on carefully developed informal relationships. They are accomplished through the combination of factual analysis and an intuitive grasp of a given situation. They require careful resolution within each group as well as an understanding of what will "sell" in the environment of the other groups on which the successful completion of the programming process depends. Each stage builds on the others and contributes to the others. There are occasions when stages are done perfunctorily and when they must be repeated to incorporate necessary support. Stages vary greatly with the different environments and yet there are a number of common elements which can be abstracted from them.

Agencies with highly structured processes seem to handle large complex projects with skill, but many small projects become mired in the process. Those with relatively unstructured processes seem to avoid many of the common problems of resolution between groups, but their successes are limited to less complex activities. Organizations with relatively small and flexible programs are able to tackle problems which cannot be handled by others but their effect is sometimes limited by the size and scope of their activities. Agencies with limited long-range programs have the advantage of clear-cut objectives and the necessary amount of

time to develop mature and institutionalized projects, but they are limited in their ability to meet a variety of country needs.

Under these conditions standard guidelines and general prescriptions are severely limited. However, some patterns must be developed if we are to utilize the knowledge of social and economic change which is available to us and profit from the experience of past practice.

At the level of macro-theory there have been significant developments in social change, development economics, comparative government, public administration and international relations which promise an increasing base for informed action in technical assistance. At the other end of the scale, there have been important developments in the application of public administration and management techniques to complex modern problems. Given the number, the nature, and the autonomy of the different organizations which impinge on the programming process, incorporating social science into the problems of the transnational administrative relationships found in technical assistance is not only complex, it is probably unique.

Some intermediate propositions would be useful to assist in the determination of the optimum combination of social science and administrative technique for each of the wide variety of circumstances encountered during the course of the programming process.

Using the past chapters as a background, what follows is an attempt to develop a beginning in this direction through devising a framework and basing specific recommendations on the analytical structure which it provides.

CHAPTER V

A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAMMING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Up to this point, what has been attempted is essentially a description of the emergence of the programming process as a device of technical assistance, an examination of the roles of the major participants in the process and a discussion of several of the crucial points in the development of the process.

This description was designed to point up certain fundamental factors: 1) programming is a natural outgrowth of the increasing complexity and centralization of technical assistance decision making; 2) it has been influenced by the desire for administrative control of widely dispersed activities; 3) the program process has increased in significance with the emergence of theories of development based to a great degree on economics; 4) most projects are subject to important external influences usually political, bureaucratic and personal; and 5) that there is frequently a disparity between the way in which the programming system is designed and the way it actually works. In order to construct a framework, the first step is provisional definition of programming.

A Definition of Programming

There are no agreed or established definitions of programming in technical assistance except in the most general terms or as a handbook of requirements for project planning. Fundamentally it is a process; it involves a set of relationships and a series of determinations. For the purposes of the development of the framework the following general definition will provide a basis to abstract the elements which make up the process.

Programming is therefore defined as an administrative process by which differing objectives articulated by the participants in technical assistance are resolved into meaningful and acceptable courses of action. More specifically, it is the means: 1) by which donor objectives are formulated and translated into program goals through common agreement with the recipient; 2) by which specific project activities are developed and reviewed in accordance with these goals; 3) for obtaining continuing commitment by donor and recipient for the initiation and continuation of

project activities; 4) for assembling the information necessary for an overall view of the total program at required intervals; 5) for modification as required by changes in policies, or conditions of the environment; 6) for developing a strategy of transfer of technical assistance activities to the recipient organizations; and 7) for coordinating activities with other donors.

Given the above definition of programming, as a beginning point this chapter will attempt to describe the conflicting elements in the wide variety of prescriptions usually advanced in the programming of technical assistance. On examination many of these elements represent ideal extremes. Real situations are somewhere between these extremes. Therefore, by devising continua between them it is possible to approximately locate actual conditions and form a profile of the programming elements.

Using the variability which the continuum approach allows, the operational components of programming will be described in the form of problems, project types and instruments available. These elements will be related in a framework which can serve as a useful guide in project development and justification.

It should be noted that there is an attempt here to find some common ground between abstract precision and operational relevance. At this stage in the development of the scheme it is clear from the point of view of theory building that the concepts and relationships are somewhat primitive. On the other hand, from the view of the practitioner the generalized nature of the components will require pragmatic adaptation to the operational reality existing in each case. It is hoped, however, that this approach will lead to application and study in order to provide additional empirical understanding of the program process. Further refinement should provide some broadly applicable administrative propositions to guide technical assistance administration.

The Context of Analysis: Some Basic Continua

Considering the wealth of experience of individuals in the different approaches to programming by a number of organizations, it is interesting to note that there are few principles for programming technical assistance below the level of sweeping platitudes on which almost everyone can agree. It may be that the need for justification and standard

organization has resulted in what some have called the search for a magic solution and others premature prescription. Further, it is true that many experienced practitioners in both the field and headquarters have developed formal and informal means to adapt (some would say distort) the general prescriptions to the reality of their particular situation. However, it is also true that standard detailed guidelines or even relatively simple formats for submission do not provide for the different kinds of criteria needed for development and review of the many varieties of technical assistance projects.

In attempting to take initial steps toward providing guidelines which will meet the different needs, it is necessary to make some different kinds of assumptions; to proceed to some general and therefore approximate tools of analysis to establish the context; (the continua) and then to more specific elements (the framework).

A principal assumption is that the country situation and the problems which technical assistance seeks to solve are so complex and interrelated that no cardinal ranking of projects is currently possible. This does not mean that there cannot be an ordinal ranking of preferred activities. The rating process can classify activities in terms of greater or lesser significance. In this sense the significance of a profile gathered from comparing different elements along a number of continua can be a useful basis for selection of activities.¹ The continua are also designed to dispense with what the fallacy of the undivided middle, which has been the source of many of the difficulties in programming. The prescriptions of the program guidance manuals about soundness, feasibility, impact, and a variety of other similar statements add little to the process of project development. Projects are not planned or unplanned; sound or unsound; or feasible or infeasible.

In this situation the development of continua provides a beginning toward ~~dealing~~ ^{DEALING} with the problem of real situations in which activities are more or less sound and more or less feasible. The following continua illustrate the kinds of broad decision making choices that can be drawn from examining components in programming in relative terms.

¹ For an approach to developing profiles in different technical assistance programs which indicate the possibilities of the technique, see Karl Mathiasen, New Dimensions for Technical Assistance: The UN in Africa, Chapter II and III, pre-publication draft.

The Analysis Continuum

It is a truism to say that different projects and circumstances require different kinds and amounts of analysis, but little has been done to determine the analysis requirements based on previous experience. One extreme would be a project which involves so many complex problems of substance and administrative organization that extensive analysis, or maybe even a special project, might be needed to provide the data base on which programming decisions could be made. The other extreme would be the ideal "target of opportunity" self-evident in value and immediate in possibility, relatively simple in execution and possible only if initiated promptly.

In between these extremes, where most projects lie, are all manner of combinations of need for analysis and action. The tendency is for headquarters to treat all projects as belonging to the analysis end of the spectrum and for the field to treat all projects as falling into the action end. In practice there is a good deal of pragmatic judgment exercised by both donor and recipient about the amount of analysis which is necessary for a given project, but all too frequently projects observed suffered from either over or under analysis.

If realistic criteria based on experience with different types of projects, instruments, and situations are developed, guidelines could be prepared to provide a basis for field staffs to make determinations on the amount of analysis which may be necessary in different circumstances.

The framework developed later in this chapter attempts to provide categories through which some variation in analytical requirements can be estimated.

The Acceptability Continuum

Acceptability as an approach to a classification scheme might be more easily handled as a function of desirability and feasibility, but the two factors can be combined into a single factor. That is to say the ideal project has high desirability and high feasibility. However, any project with either high desirability or high feasibility is worthy of consideration. This conflicts with the prescription that only projects which should be initiated are those which are high priority in terms of the strategy for development.

In practice, projects may be initiated because of the availability of funds or qualified donor or recipient personnel, the opportunity to make an immediate impact, or many other reasons related to feasibility. There is a group of program officers who argue that within the broad range of objectives, feasibility is the controlling factor in project selection.

The feasibility of moving the ruins at Luxor, Egypt, because of the Aswan dam is unquestionably very low, but the desirability of maintaining intact the imposing works of an earlier culture is certainly controlling in those circumstances. While an extreme example, there are priorities in technical assistance (population control, for example) that may face almost insurmountable problems of feasibility in the time span of an ordinary project. Such projects may have to be started with the simple faith that their importance combined with concentrated efforts will create some future feasible opportunities to accomplish its objectives. It should be noted that desirability is the expressed mutual priorities which are usually to promote socio-economic development, and feasibility in terms of the capacity to be operationally successful.

The problem is finding the means for placing the project along the acceptability scale. Desirability may result from national planning, from self-evident needs or from preconceptions of either party. A great deal of scholarly and practical work has been done on the substances of the desirability problem, but the concept of operational feasibility is much more complex. Cost-benefit analysis is a beginning toward dealing with this problem, but it requires the quantification of factors that are often unquantifiable. This may lead to over simplified approach or in some cases over complicate it.² Hopefully the present efforts to improve the cost benefit approach may provide bases for new methods of assessment which can be better adapted to intangibles.

The External Influence Continuum

Program guidelines usually postulate that all projects should arise from an analysis of the nature of the problem within the limitations of objectives and capacities of both parties. However, by the nature of the relationships in technical assistance, there are many influences outside

²See John Lindeman, Transport Administration in Developing Countries: A Report to the Brookings Institution, 1965 for some problems of cost benefit analysis in transportation. See also Robert Dorfman (editor), Measuring Benefits of Government Investments, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1965, for some useful new approaches to the cost benefit techniques.

the mainstream of analysis which must be taken into account. Recipients have been known to insist on a particular project as a prerequisite for a technical assistance program. High level officials sometimes agree on a project which must be initiated regardless of its relevance to program objectives. Project selling may occur at any level through professional, political or personal interests on either side of technical assistance.

Frequently the negative aspects of external influences are more important than the positive ones. A given department or ministry may consider any given project a threat to its own activities or consider it contrary to national or organizational policy. Powerful clientele groups, such as labor, business or farmers may place particular constraints on any given program or project. However, the dream of every donor and recipient official who is convinced a project can be important is that the project be "found" or supported by some high official or powerful group in a position to ease its problems. Not a few successful projects owe much to external influence.³

Prestige projects or particular fads in organization or development strategy also have a place on the external influence continuum. Sometimes the programming process will result in the modification of this type of project or its pigeonholing, but often the pressures for acting in accord with the external pressures are strong.

Another serious problem of this type of project may not only be that it may lack relevance to primary objectives, but that it is evaluated as if these pressures were not the reason for its approval. All too often projects resulting from the political interests of the recipient, agreement on political or military support, or the influence of powerful donor or recipient groups are later criticized on technical or developmental grounds.

The general rating of projects ranging from those which are most lacking in external inputs whether positive or negative to political or other support is not only difficult task but agencies are sometimes reluctant to admit that such pressures can influence their decisions. There is also

³These projects have problems too. See Albert Gorvine, The Revelle Report: A Case Study in the Administration of Technical Assistance, a staff paper on this project.

no question but that different elements within the decision making structure of both sides have different views of the value of the external influences involved.

This type of project is unlikely to disappear given the political nature of much of technical assistance. External influences involved in projects should be clearly recognized and can on occasion be used to improve the quality of projects. The process of assessment, whether reporting or evaluation can be improved by making clear (at least internally) the degree of external influence involved in programming and implementation.

The Motives Continuum

The problem of convergent or divergent motives in project or program development is a subtle and difficult one. Its value, in great measure depends on the perception by the donor and recipient officials of the meaning of each others organizational and individual behaviors. One of the important techniques of international relations has been to obtain agreement among diverse groups or individuals even though their motives for agreeing are not necessarily the same. Since technical assistance agreement is on a relatively long term basis, motives assume great importance for continued project implementation. There are cases in which motives are similar, or different motives may converge and, therefore, some are unlikely to impede project accomplishment. There are other situations where an agreement on objectives may be made for motives that diverge and, therefore, will affect project accomplishment.

In one case the recipient may agree to an agricultural extension project for, among other things, the prestige it will give the minister in the rural areas in furthering his political ambitions. If, at the same time, one of the donor's motives is in improving its own image with the rural population, these two motives can be said to be convergent.

In another case, a project may be agreed upon by the recipient to obtain the buildings and equipment which will be forthcoming. The donor, on the other hand, may have a major interest in upgrading human skills. There is reason to believe that these divergent motives cause serious problems during the course of implementation.

The problem, of course, is to separate out of the many motives of different individuals and organizations those which are significant to continuing agreement. There are clear cut cases when capital grants, political factors or prestige is involved, but the usual case is one of complex motives on both sides which are difficult to analyze. The growing current of comparative administration studies and the data on the problems which have, in the past, resulted in divergent and convergent motives can be extremely useful.⁴ Project interviews confirm that the intuitive assessment of motives by practitioners has, on occasion, paid big dividends in project development.

The continua are neither exhaustive nor totally mutually exclusive. They isolate some of the identifiable key factors which reflect the considerations in program decision making in practice. They also allow for the kind of variations which occur among country environments, differing objectives, and changing relationships between donors and recipients. They provide one means by which technical and administrative analysis, political and intuitive judgements can be incorporated into an approximate profile to assist in making program decisions. Such a profile would recognize the significance of a particularly high value placed on a single factor.

These continua, however, have some important limitations. They are, first of all, abstractions from the reality of the programming situation and very general in character; secondly, they do not relate one factor to another. They do not, specify an accurate means for placing projects along the individual continuums.

What they do provide is a context of relativity within which a more detailed examination of a programming can take place. By giving these

⁴For analysis of bureaucratic patterns see Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of a Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964). For case examples of problems in approach between donor and recipient see John Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid, published for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) and Jhangir Amuzegar, Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).

continua operational meaning, through the specification of the different dimensions of the programming process, the types of projects and the instruments available, it will be possible to be somewhat more specific and more accurate in representation of the reality of the environment. The operational definition of these elements and their placement in a more specific relationship to each other does not, however, eliminate the need to view the elements of programming decisions along a continuum on which any given factor is of greater or less intensity rather than absolute.

The Basis for a Programming Framework

Referring to the definitions in Chapter I, technical assistance can be operationally summarized as the cooperative and purposeful transfer of techniques to improve human and institutional capacities and resources. Programming can also be restated in the following operational sequence involving: 1) a specified set of objectives for planned change; 2) examination of the reality of the environment in which the objectives are to be achieved; and 3) a set of incremental decisions which prescribe the structure of operations and resolve the problems of strategy and organization to assure the achievement of objectives.

The objectives for planned change are in the best of circumstances a synthesis of the donor and recipient objectives. Because of the level at which they are agreed upon, these program objectives must be broad enough to encompass the varied activities which may be undertaken for their achievement and require minimal modification during a normal course of evolutionary change within the environment. Any abrupt or significant shift at this level of objectives may withdraw the underpinnings from at least part of the program.

The reality of the environment includes not only substantive information (economic, technical, etc.) related to the achievement of the objectives, but also to the political factors, the administrative organization, the cultural content and the attitudes and behaviors of the individuals who will be involved in the accomplishment of the objectives.

The incremental decisions provide the sequence whereby agreement on objectives, strategy and action is determined. Each decision is based on the previous one but adds new knowledge and refinements of the agreement

process in order to modify the course of action toward greater achievement of objectives.

Under these circumstances, programming decisions apply available knowledge and information (agency policy, environment analysis, etc.) to each individual decision within the time sequence and in the environment which it takes place. In action oriented activities the focus is on each decision rather than attempting to smass all of the available information prior to making a definitive decision.⁵ Through the application of new knowledge and past experience, the strategy can frequently be modified, sometimes radically, as the sequence of decisions continue.

The Components of the Framework

On a broad level administration determinations break down into three general components: A) The Dimensions of Agreement; A series of dimensions which set forth the basic problems to be resolved through the programming process: B) Developing a Structure of Operations: The types of projects which can be established, classified as to their objectives; and C) Choosing the Appropriate Instruments: A categorization of the different tools available to technical assistance in project implementation, classified as to salient features.

It should be remembered that this is, once again, a logical reconstruction of the process as it is represented formally after the fact. There are situations in which both donor and recipient become enchanted with a given instrument (i.e. institutional contract or joint operations), a particular type of project (survey or institution building) or with some basic dimension of the agreement process (i.e. knowledge accrual or feasibility) which then dominates the process. In general, however, the dimensions of agreement, as they are developed from policy and negotiation, tend to suggest a structure for operations which in turn limits the types of instruments available in achieving the objectives.

A. The Dimensions of Agreement

The process of resolving different policies and objectives continues throughout the course of a technical assistance activity. The problems which need to be resolved during this period constitute the dimensions of agreement and are a major focus of the programming process. Stated in an approximate order of occurrence they are:

⁵Derived from the approach in Charles E. Lindboom, "The Science of Muddling Through", Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring, 1959),

1. The Accrual of Knowledge.
2. The Development of Congruence.
3. The Determination of Feasibility.
4. The Assessment of Resources.
5. The Determination of the Extent of Commitment.
6. The Maintenance of Flexibility.
7. The Promotion of Transfer.

1. The Accrual of Knowledge:

It is a truism to state that any activity designed to introduce changes into a society requires knowledge of the elements of the existing situation and how they interact if it is to be successful. For programming in developing countries, however, there are crucial questions which must be asked regarding the quantity of information, its availability, its quality and reliability. The paucity and unreliability of information is one of the most common problems in technical assistance. It is, therefore, important to determine what data are needed and what can be reliably obtained.

Knowledge is concerned with more than technical and economic data but must take into account the institutional and administrative climate and capacities of both the donor and recipient government. Different types of projects have different knowledge requirements, depending to a great degree on the complexity of the activity and the ramifications of the changes which are to be attempted. Different environments also have different knowledge requirements in order to introduce activities which will promote changes. As Linton has pointed out, some societies operate like a Swiss watch -- that is, if you introduce anything, everything else quivers, and others operate like a waterwheel -- that is, modifications can be initiated with only limited shuddering.⁶

There are, in fact, strict limitations on the amount of reliable knowledge that can be accrued during the given time sequence in which information must be gathered prior to action oriented decisions. There are those who would argue that technical assistance is frequently a victim of under-analysis of activities prior to their initiation. In many cases, however, it would seem that they have not taken into account the time limitations

⁶Ralph Linton, "Cultural and Personality Factors Affecting Economic Growth," In the Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, edited by Burt Hoselitz, Chicago University, Chicago Press, 1952, p. 86.

and the sharply diminishing returns from analysis on many types of projects. Indications from project materials point more to a problem of overemphasis on technical and organizational knowledge accrual and general lack of attention to specific political and institutional factors in the environment.

Aside from the need to increase the amount of data which is available to support any given type of project, it appears that an important and little considered factor is the determination of relevance and reliability of different types of information for different activities. These discriminations plus the gathering of the information needed is a formidable problem, given the pressures for action and the needs which confront technical assistance programs.

2. The Development of Congruence:

At the highest level agreement is easily obtained on those broad objectives which are little more than platitudes. The problem has been well put by one experienced scholar and practitioner as follows: "The experience seems to me to indicate that one of the real problems is that of agreement being reached at high levels on general objectives without everybody else concerned being committed to the subordinate changes that have to be made if those objectives are going to be realized."⁷

The problem of developing congruence involves more than assessing motives and specifying objectives; it is dependent on effective channels of communication. These channels, when they are open, provide the means for the inputs to the resolution of differing views, the incorporation of knowledge needed for project development and the dissemination of information so that all individuals and groups involved know what kinds of changes are to be attempted.

The development of congruence for the accomplishment of common activities requires, therefore, joint action on project or program development, mobilizing support, facing and resolving problems arising from different external or internal restraints on activities to be undertaken. Further, there must be a frank treatment of resource scarcity, output delay and shifting conditions and a variety of other problems

⁷Letter from Ronald W. Jones, May 4, 1966.

which arise during the programming process.

There is also an important need for donors to state their objectives clearly and inform recipients of the nature of the process of project development and approval which they are required to follow so that more detailed discussions can be held prior to approval. Since recipients often approach different donors with the same project to see which one reacts favorably, additional knowledge on the objectives of different donors should be possible to predict which donor will be interested in a particular project so that specific project determinations can begin at an earlier stage.

Finally congruence involves, not only agreement on specific objectives but the agreement to develop the kind of enabling support which will lead to a continuing commitment to the activity.

3. The Determination of Feasibility:

Operational feasibility combines, to some extent, assessments of knowledge, congruence and resources into an estimated projection of the likelihood of an activity prospering in the time and place where it will be undertaken. Economic feasibility has received considerable attention and some of the more recent work on comparative administration has provided a very useful beginning toward assessing the administrative feasibility.⁸

The concept of social feasibility is relatively new and the tools for it are few. There is a good deal of intuitive experience by administrators and technicians and a good deal of study of different aspects of social organization in underdeveloped countries by anthropologists and sociologists. However, the accumulation of data as a basis on scholarly research on the problem of social feasibility for technical assistance has yet to be attempted in any systematic way.

There are times, of course, when feasibility is a limited requirement, as was pointed out earlier. In other cases, however, feasibility may be a controlling factor in achieving the objectives within the environment. The determination of the importance of feasibility to any activity and the development of tools which will provide at least minimal

⁸ See for example Fred W. Riggs, Op. cit., and the occasional papers of the comparative Administration Group of the American Society of Public Administration.

notions of operational feasibility are the crucial concern of the programming process. The task may be much more complicated than that of cost benefit analysis in economics or the examination of administrative environments in the donor agency, but it is an area which requires a great deal more attention. Some research combining economic and administrative feasibility could lead to some useful guidelines for different types of technical assistance.

Finally, it should be recognized that the most feasible activities may be those which provide the least change in the environment. The proper focus of programming is in the feasibility of introducing a given change within the environment not just feasibility of operation.

4. The Assessment of Resources:

Knowledge about the availability of resources from donor, recipient and other sources and how these resources can be applied to any given activity has been separated as an individual element for particular attention even though it might be subsumed under either knowledge or feasibility. The question for the assessment of resources concerns the kinds which are needed, their availability, how they can be obtained, and the way they can be effectively applied to the achievement of the objectives. There is both a minimum and a maximum of resources which can be effectively applied to any activity.

There is a balance between human and material resources which can sometimes be delicate. Financial resources may be delayed in the approval process, but the development of the trained human resources and the changing of attitudes and behavior is a longer and more complex undertaking.

There are times when the early inputs of materials will force acceleration of changes in behavior (jet planes in a program to develop an airline) and others in which the behavior shifts determine the material inputs (willingness of extension agents to go to the field and use of jeeps). There is also the question of the significance of resources to the activity. In extremely complex projects the assessment of the volume and timing of resources can be crucial and in projects with one technician advising a recipient official of minimal significance.

The amounts of resources that are likely to be available may alter the planning of an activity in a number of important ways. The

particular requirements of approval and funding bodies may also mean that activities must be described in particular ways in order to obtain the necessary funds.

Technical assistance has special problems in matching the availabilities of donor and recipient resources. Different budget cycles, different limitations on the use of personnel and a variety of other problems require planning to integrate both the sources and the kind of support. The period of time over which the resources will be available is another factor which must be taken into account in the planning of activities. There are specific availability of funds and limits in the amount of time which they must be used.

In the long term context of technical assistance, the initial assessment of resources must usually be a general pattern of planned resource utilization which allows for continuing reassessment and change.

5. The Determination of the Extent of Commitment:

The existence of a relatively high degree of congruence does not necessarily produce a continued commitment to technical assistance activities. Constancy of both donor and recipient in providing resources is influenced by the emergence of new priorities, shifts in personnel, and other changes of the environment. The continuing search for that project, or group of projects, which will promote major impact often leads to the belief that new activities hold greater promise than old ones. Substantive or administrative fads, as well as the emergence of new knowledge seems always to promise a shortcut to the achievement of objectives.

The ability to predict the extent of commitment over a period of time is a difficult aspect of the programming process. However, the examination of experience with technical assistance in particular circumstances, when information is available, often provides a useful basis for anticipating the possibility of changes in commitment during the life of a project. Joint operations or joint funds, earmarking of loans, and contracts are a few of the means which have been used to promote continuing commitment to activities. In addition to particular types of administrative organization, the capacity to influence new officials and to incorporate key supporting elements (i.e. clientele and politically influential groups) into projects have been a major factor in obtaining commitment.

6. The Maintenance of Flexibility:

The nature of technical assistance and the consequences which result from its activities accentuate the many changes which take place in developing countries. These very changes, in turn, create important problems in readjustment of project activities if they are to continue to pursue their broad objectives and remain innovative in the environment. If technical assistance is to be effective, the programming process must take into account these problems in the establishment of objectives in the design of activities, and in their regular review. The unanticipated consequences of activities may provide opportunities, as well as threats, to the accomplishment of given objectives. It is rarely possible to predict which parts of any given activity will progress rapidly or obtain more acceptance in the environment. As activities progress they incorporate other groups or organizations in the society, uncover new and promising avenues of activity and develop more effective ways of accomplishing tasks. These developments may require changes in approach, organization, personnel, and in some cases even shifts in specific objectives.

There are situations in which commitment to a particular approach can impede the flexibility of operation. Therefore, the maintenance of flexibility involves designing activities in such a way they can be modified as conditions change through a periodic assessment of progress, orientation and problems.

Some projects can be expanded and intensified as they develop, but the commitment to modify activities also implies the possibility of premature termination as one aspect of the maintenance of flexibility within a total program.

If technical assistance is considered as experimentation with change in the environment, then modification is a necessity and termination must be considered a possibility. The problem is to build in the means which allows maximum opportunities for modification and minimizes the consequences of termination when it becomes the only alternative.

7. The Promotion of Transfer:

The end objective of all technical assistance activities is that they be gradually incorporated by the recipient country with the quality of leadership, administrative organization and acceptance within the

environment which is required for continuing effectiveness. Although a few projects make some specific contribution and are then terminated, most projects in order to be successful go through a gradual phasing out process in which they are transferred to the recipient government.

Transfer can be built into any activity through the specification of gradual changes in responsibility, organization or operations, or it can grow out of training, effective implementation, the emergence of local leadership, and increasing support in the environment.

Recipient governments often begin to take for granted the additional services which are provided by the donor in technical activities. Donor personnel also become equally involved in technical assistance activities and rationalize their participation as being indispensable to the continuation of the activity. In the view of those who are most closely involved, many projects are never "quite ready to be turned over" and "require only a short extension of time" prior to effective transfer. It is in this type of situation that the design of a strategy for transfer or the development of a means for transfer, is an important role for programming.

Transfer, however, does not always mean that there will be no further donor activity in relation to the project. In a review of projects which have been successfully transferred, it appears that gradual phasing out of donor activity from either operating or advisory responsibilities to occasional consultation or continued training has been one of the most effective means for transfer of technical assistance activities.

B. Developing a Structure of Operations

Ideally the determination of the structure of operations results from a synthesis of several of the dimensions of agreement. Most of the organizations involved in agreement are "given" in the sense that they are a part of the structure of the donor organization or the recipient government and are fixed by determinations beyond the scope of technical assistance. However, the determination of the type of project to be used to accomplish a specific technical assistance objective is open to determination through the programming process. Some agencies are disposed toward a particular type of project and some types of projects have been fads at one time or another. Most agencies have at their disposal a

variety of project types from which they may select the one that seems most appropriate for a given objective. New project types and more effective structures continue to emerge with increased experience in technical assistance activities.

During the course of reviewing the variety of different project types used by different agencies, project objectives seem to provide a common basis for classification. Project types have been selected from some of those used by several agencies, but in some cases the names have been arbitrarily assigned to reflect the classification according to objectives.

In logical sequence agreement on objectives influences project type which, in turn, influences the selection of instruments. The framework allows for the sequence to vary since all three of the elements interact throughout the process of program determination. In the same way that the dimensions of agreement may be predetermined by an existing state of knowledge or resources, project types may be self-evident (i.e. institution building) and instruments may be immediately available for use in implementation.

It is quite possible that one type of project in a particular situation may have certain similarities to others or lead to other types of projects as an end result. Projects are therefore classified in terms of major emphasis rather than as mutually exclusive entities.

The following project types will be briefly explained and considered as individual entities within the framework: 1) Presence Projects; 2) Survey and Analysis Projects; 3) Capital Support Projects; 4) Policy Development Projects; 5) Capital Intensive Projects and 6) Institution Building Projects.

1. Presence Projects:

This group of projects have oblique, or inferred, objectives which may not be specifically related to the project itself. They are usually government to government projects in which the purpose of technical assistance is to maintain a presence in the country because of commitments resulting from political, economic, or other types of relationships. These projects also include cases in which a recipient government insists upon a project as a condition for other technical assistance activities. Some of

these projects have been, over a period of time, transformed into both relevant and successful projects of other types while in other cases, they have only provided continuing communication between the donor and recipient. As mentioned above, projects with oblique objectives are often reviewed and evaluated on the basis of their apparent objectives rather than the ultimate rationale of the project. The programming exercise in relation to such projects may be a perfunctory ratification or an attempt to find a justification for a project which has already been agreed upon.

When projects of this type must be undertaken, all agencies attempt to make them as effective as possible, but it is clear that they involve very different considerations in their development and in the nature of their operation.

2. Survey and Analysis Projects:

This type of project is designed for the purpose of gathering information and providing additional knowledge about substantive or environmental factors for the use of other organizations within the environment such as the encouragement of investment or to develop future capital or technical assistance project. In cases where projects emphasize the preparation of reports, determinations of feasibility or accrual of knowledge, the project is normally terminated when its objectives are achieved. There are other long term survey projects which emphasize the creation of organizations to provide continuing information to the environment. These projects might be more properly classified in the Institution Building category. However, frequently the institution building aspect of the project is a later phase and initial objectives are clearly in the survey and analysis category until such time as its emphasis is changed.

Survey and analysis activities are characterized by relatively specific objectives and a defined relationship to subsequent activities. Survey projects are usually thought of as a short term activity. With the advent of the United Nations Special Fund, long term, highly complex surveys have been undertaken. These surveys are probably only occasionally or marginally in this category since they may have elements of policy development, institution building and other project types. In general, however, survey projects, in addition to having a value in terms of particular accomplishments, are often a useful programming tool.

3. Capital Support Projects:

Technical assistance may be one element of a large capital or loan project within which there are certain advisory requirements, training components, or problems of administrative organization. In these cases all of the objectives and the approach to technical assistance are subordinate to the broader determinations which are made about the capital project. In most cases the scope of technical assistance programming is limited to those determinations which will increase its particular contribution to the capital program objectives.

4. Policy Development Projects:

These projects are designed to improve the country's capacity to formulate policy and organize for effective planning and implementation. They may involve advisory groups at different levels in national or sectoral planning organizations, individual advisors to high level government officials, or other types of supporting activities which will improve the caliber of human resources and increase the knowledge base for policy formulation.

Policy development has special problems of considerable delicacy. While recipients usually lack enough competent and sophisticated personnel to provide the data and analysis on which to base informed development policy choices, the specter of manipulation by outsiders is ever present. Even though the advice is to come from a highly specialized advisor, the political and administrative implications of a foreign advisor in policy development must be given careful attention during the course of project development. On the other hand the use of experienced outside (and presumably objective) experts can be of great assistance to top level recipient officials in policy development.

While bilateral programs do engage in a variety of policy development projects, the relative independence of the foundations from national policy of their own government, and their ability to attract and pay top level personnel, has been important to their involvement in this field. For similar reasons multilateral agencies have a number of this type of project.

5. Capital Intensive Projects:

Capital intensive projects usually require heavy capital inputs, but in contrast to the capital support projects it is the technical assistance component which is controlling in the accomplishment of the objectives. The capital input is dependent on changes in skills, organization or behavior of individuals or groups in order to make the capital inputs effective. These projects are sometimes referred to as "impact" projects, but in fact the changes in patterns of action which must take place over a longer period are often a limiting factor in achieving the impact intended.

In the case of a fish harbor, for example, while it may require large amounts of money for construction and equipment, it is the changes in the pattern of catching, handling and marketing of the fish which will determine the effectiveness of the capital inputs.

On capital support projects the reverse is true. Construction of a steel mill imposes changes in the organization, operation and marketing. Technical assistance may organize operations or train personnel, but it is the capital project that provides the controlling decisions as to its use.

6. Institution Building:

Institution building projects are designed to support the creation of reconstitution of institutes as a device to foster and support changes in the society. Much of technical assistance in the past has been directed intuitively at some or all of the aspects of institution building. In one sense institutionalization is one of the most effective ways to insure the continuing impact of contributions which technical assistance has provided. Recently, however, institution building has become a more explicit focus of the programming process in many agencies. It is beginning to be the subject of an increasing amount of analysis by both scholars and practitioners.⁹

Since institutional building projects are one of the most complex activities for technical assistance, they often require intensive planning

⁹For a few examples, see Milton J. Esman and Hans C. Blaise, "Institution building Research: The Guiding Concepts" mimeographed. A statement of the Inter-University Institution Building Research Program. See also Hiram Phillips, "Foundation Stones and Building Blocks in Institution Building", and AID staff paper, and my "Technical Assistance and Institution Building" delivered at the Society for International Development, March, 1966.

and careful development even when they grow out of other types of projects. In many cases technical assistance can provide a particular channel to the power structure of the recipient country in order to protect and support the institution during the early stages of its development.

As the understanding of the difficulties of introducing change in developing countries has increased, the institutionalization of the project has become a principal objective in many types of technical assistance projects. A policy development project may concentrate on building a permanent planning board rather than simply providing advice and analysis for the decision makers. Similarly a capital intensive project may involve central institutions, such as a credit bank, which require the establishment of different types of relationships with farmers, and the growth and acceptance of the bank as an institution in the environment. Even survey and analysis projects when they are large and long-term may be involved in developing an institution to continue the type of survey which is being introduced.

At present there are those who argue persuasively that institution building is the major focus of any effective technical assistance program. The argument, however, does not distinguish between institutionalization of an activity and institution building itself. There are a variety of different kinds of functions which technical assistance can perform ranging from initial surveys to advisory services to highly institutionalized organizations in society. Therefore, institution building will be treated as a separate type of project in this paper.

C. Choosing Appropriate Instruments

The third component of the program is the selection of instruments for achieving the objectives within the structure of operations. Some instruments are more expensive than others; some require more highly trained personnel than others; and some instruments require a more detailed agreement with the recipient than others. These and a variety of other considerations must be taken into account in the selection of instruments appropriate to a given project.

Generally donors and recipients have preconceptions about the type of instruments which will meet its particular needs in any given situations. Some agencies, because of the size and nature of their

organization, tend to use one particular type of instrument. Other agencies use a limited number of instruments in different situations. In some cases there have been changing preferences for instruments as new ones offer particular advantages.

Some of the smaller foundations and privately sponsored operations have used the individual technician almost exclusively with occasional teams or consulting groups for special circumstances. Other agencies have placed great emphasis on the consulting advisor and the consulting group. The UN EPTA program has emphasized the individual technician. The Special Fund program has usually been staffed by a direct hire team of an executing agency, although contracts have occasionally been used for either project development or implementation.

The U.S. program, in its earlier stages, placed considerable emphasis on joint operations and joint funds. In Latin America, at one point, most of its activities were Servicios (Joint Operations).¹⁰ The present emphasis of the program is heavily on institutional contracts although there are a variety of other instruments used extensively.

Normally one instrument is the primary means of implementation, but frequently additional instruments may be used at different stages in the process of project development. Consultants are often used in addition to other instruments for example.

For the purpose of this framework the instruments have been arbitrarily classified into six groups - each of which may have variations in different agencies or different situations.

1. Joint Operations:

The common joint operations instrument was the Latin American "Servicio" which was an operating agency of the host government. It normally involved a number of discrete smaller projects in a given area. Its financing was characterized by a separate account into which each government deposited funds for its operations. Servicios were normally administered jointly by co-directors as an autonomous agency of either a given ministry or even of the government, although in this case ministers and high level officials of both the recipient and donor mission usually

¹⁰ In 1955 there were 42, and in 1964 the last Servicio was phased out.

composes its board of directors. In general, donor personnel worked on the staff of the institution both in advisory and operating positions. Since they were in Agriculture, Education, Health, and Industry in all the Latin American countries and in a few instances in Africa and Asia, there were many variations on the standard Servicio general pattern.

The Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) on Tiawan was composed of Chinese and American officials appointed by their respective presidents, and Chinese and American personnel held positions at all levels of the organization. The JCRR put particular emphasis on financing other local and regional organizations and providing assistance to them in achieving their objectives.

The Khuzestan Development Service (KDS) operated by the Development and Resources Corporation was totally financed by the Iranian government, but both foreign and Iranian personnel were involved in operations at different levels. With the creation of the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority in 1960, the KDS began the process of transferring authority which was completed in 1963. Foreign and Iranian personnel still occupy both operating and advisory positions, but a planned reduction of the foreign personnel as Iranians become qualified is gradually being accomplished.

While it appears that joint operations are little used by other programs and presently out of favor in the U.S. program, the success of the Tiawan, Khuzestan and some Latin American Servicios indicate that it can be a valuable tool when it is used in appropriate circumstances. In two recent reports to AID recommendations were that joint operations should be used once again on a selective basis.¹¹

2. The Individual Technician:

In AID individual techniques are referred to as direct hire and they are frequently career employees of the donor agency. They may, however, be borrowed from another agency or contracted as individuals for a specific period of time. Since the technician is used for longer term projects he is normally assigned to an organization to assist in the development policy, the introduction of specific technology, or the organ-

¹¹ John D. Montgomery, Rufus B. Hughes, and Raymond H. Davis, Rural Improvement and Political Development: The JCRR Model. A survey report submitted to AID June, 1964, and Robert J. Shafer, The Servicio Experience, a study requested by AID, June, 1965, a report on this project.

ization or modification of administrative patterns. His role may change with the administrative situation, the interests or the requirements of either donor and/or recipient.

3. The Technical Team:

The team usually refers to a group of individual technicians with different skills advising or working within a single project. They may be used together to form a specialized team or they may be deployed to advise different aspects of an activity. A team, in the sense referred to here, often consists of career employees of the donor agency but they may be borrowed or individually contracted. Like the individual technician, their participation in the project may be advisory, operational, or they may perform research. A team is also a long-term instrument and its functions and manner of participation in a project may vary over the course of the activity.

4. The Institutional Contract:

While individual technicians and consultants may be contracted, the institutional contract is a separate instrument. It is designed to draw on the resources and special capabilities of an entire institution through a contract by which the institution assumes major responsibility for implementation of a project. It may be with a university, business firm or some other institution having the required capacity. The contract usually involves technicians, training and possibly some equipment or materials. The duration may range from two to five years or longer.

After a project has been agreed upon, the donor normally negotiates the contract with the concurrence of the recipient. In other cases, the recipient may actively participate in the negotiations or in rare occasions negotiate a contract using capital or other funds made available by a donor. The relationships between the contractor and the donor agency vary but usually the contractor has a more carefully defined scope of action than individual technicians or technical team, but has more autonomy of operation within its frame of reference.

5. Consultants:

As defined here, consultants may refer to a team or to individual consultants. Consultants are specialized experts who perform specific services for a short period of time. Consultants may be used in project development or in its implementation, but their normal requirements are to examine some specific situation and provide a report or recommendations

for future action in which, normally, they will not participate directly. Some consultants, or consulting teams may visit individual technical assistance activities regularly to review, advise and recommend certain types of changes or the introduction of new technology. Consultants are normally short term, ranging from a few days to several months, but there are cases in which consulting assignments have lasted for a year or more. In such cases, they would be defined arbitrarily as individual technicians.

A Proposed Framework for the Programming of Technical Assistance

Now that the basic dimensions of the programming problem have been abstracted, the operational structures and the instruments defined, the problem is to relate them to each other in some manner which will be meaningful to the decision making process.

To provide some standard pattern which would prescribe the relationships for all situations would be another attempt at a magic solution and would be contrary to the whole thrust of the paper thus far.

What can be done, however, is to set up a framework in which the generalized relationships of dimensions and instruments to operational structure in such a way that it allows for the adaptation of the framework to any given set of circumstances. At the same time, the relationships in any given situation allow for a more specific placement along the continua through defining the significance of problems according to project type. This will increase the accuracy of the profile and probably permit further refinement of the continua or additions to it.

The Framework as it is presently set up, in a generalized form, allows for the varying significance of the components to each other in different situations but does not show a variety of other relationships which could exist between its elements. For example certain project types may be useful in solving certain problems (survey and analysis for knowledge and feasibility) and some instruments may be related to individual problems or projects (teams for survey and analysis and consultants for flexibility and knowledge). The framework is therefore a choice of relationships which seem to be most applicable generally.

The framework applies to any set of objectives, provides a guide for the examination of the reality of the environment and indicates the requirements for the incremental decision process.

It should be noted, however, that the significance of elements to each other is measured in broad levels of low moderate and high. Given the problems of measuring the dimensions, this appears to be as accurate as can be usefully achieved. However, if each of the dimensions could be broken down into its components (i.e., political, technical, administrative, knowledge, etc.) the classification of significance might be made more detailed. Such a breakdown appears to be possible in specific situations, but there is some question as to the relevance of this additional precision except in special circumstances. In any case, the framework is ultimately dependant on the judgement of the field personnel in analyzing the significance of the elements in each situation.

Chart I is therefore, generalized set of relationships between dimensions and operational structure and Chart II is the generalized relevance of instruments as major elements of operational structure.

**GENERALIZED SIGNIFICANCE OF GIVEN PROBLEMS
FOR EACH TYPE OF PROJECT**

CHART I

Dimensions	Operational Structures					
	Presence	Survey	Capital Support	Policy Develop.	Capital Intensive	Inst. Bldg.
1. Knowledge	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate	High
2. Congruence	Low	Moderate	Mode	High	High	High
3. Feasibility	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate	High
4. Resources	High	Moderate	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
5. Commitment	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
6. Flexibility	Low	Moderate	High	High	High	High
7. Transfer	Low	Low	Moderate	Low	High	High

Explanation of Chart I

The key to the chart is the word "Significance" - that is, the importance of elements to the decision making process: high means critical; moderate means significant; and low means limited.

The chart can be made to work in both directions - that is, the requirements for a given type of project or the type of project which most fits the existing or obtainable condition of the different dimensions. It

should also be clear that the larger number of high and moderate ratings, the more complex the project and the more involved the decision making process. The chart, in this situation, would seem to indicate the importance of survey and analysis and policy development as less complex activities which could lead to more complex ones.

The time sequence is implied in the order of the dimensions, but each one requires some consideration at every stage. The determination of commitment, maintenance of flexibility and promotion of transfer may occur in later stages, but they should be considered earlier just as knowledge is considered in later stages. In order to clarify the chart further, there follows some brief comments on each project type.

Presence projects have political objectives, usually of interest to one party; the significance of all elements except resources is low. The major problem is normally to provide the justification necessary to obtain material and human resources from both sides in these situations. Unless there are strong external influences on both sides, often a presence project must be, at least formally, partially misrepresented to obtain necessary funds.

Survey and analysis projects are designed to increase knowledge, determine feasibility, promote congruence and commitment, and normally have few problems of transfer. If the project is to be effective, however, some congruence is significant to its initiation, as is obtaining resources and maintaining flexibility.

In capital support projects, knowledge, feasibility and resources are of minimal consequence since technical assistance is a small part of a capital project. The problems of congruence, commitment and transfer are significant to the success of the project. Flexibility is a critical element in the timely contribution of technical assistance to total project objectives.

Policy development projects normally have no problem of transfer, but congruence and flexibility are critical elements if technical assistance is to provide the kinds of services which the recipient desires during the course of the activity. The other elements are significant.

In capital intensive projects, congruence, commitment, flexibility and transfer are critical if the project is to have the impact intended. Other factors are significant.

In institution building projects, the complexity of the activity makes all of the elements critical except resources which is still significant. Generally, the resolution of the critical problems of knowledge, congruence and feasibility eases the problem of fund justification, but there may be difficulties of obtaining the caliber of human resources required.

It must be remembered that there are generalized relationships which assume an agreed set of objectives and average relationships between headquarters, field and recipient. Different country environments, different sets of objectives, different policies of each donor or recipient may modify the nature of these relationships.

What is important to the operation of the programming process is an understanding of these relationships so that emphasis can be placed on those aspects of the project which are most important. The usefulness of the chart is that it illustrates an approach to the programming problem which can provide a basis for project decisions in a given environment and which can be justified in terms of the agreed objectives in each case.

**GENERALIZED RELEVANCE OF INSTRUMENTS
TO OPERATIONAL STRUCTURES**

CHART II

Operational Structures	THE INSTRUMENTS				
	LONG TERM				SHORT TERM
	Joint Operations	The Individual Technician	The Technical Team	Institutional Contract	Consultants (Individual or Team)
Presence	0	2	2	0	1
Survey	0	1	2	0	2
Capital Support	0	1	1	1	2
Policy Develop.	0	1	1	2	1
Capital Intensive	2	1	1	2	0
Institution Building	2	1	1	2	0

- 0 - generally not useful
- 1 - useful under some conditions
- 2 - frequently useful

Explanation of Chart II

In determining the significance of given instruments, there may be a number of limiting factors built into the donor agency operations. It is unusual for non-government agencies to have present projects, although they could possibly have both capital support and capital intensive activities. Some agencies may operate on a small scale and therefore be limited to direct hire individuals or consultants. In a similar way, country environment may prevent or encourage the use of some particular instrument or a recipient government may have preconceptions about the instruments which should be used on a given project.

The chart is concerned with the instruments on which major emphasis is placed for any given type of project. All projects may use consultants effectively at different stages in their operations and some may use different instruments at different times in their development. The Chart is therefore concerned with the generalized significance of each instrument as a major tool in achieving the objective of a particular type of project.

In presence projects, it is important that the personnel working on the project be under direct control of the donor agency because of the political implications of the activities which are undertaken.

Survey and analysis projects are often short term, highly specific in their requirements. They lend themselves well to the use of consultants because of these factors and the ease with which consulting operations can be terminated at the completion of the activity.

Capital support projects have been carried out successfully in many different ways but consulting services appear to have the flexibility required under the usual circumstances of capital projects.

The importance of institutional contracts to policy development projects is the independence of the personnel from the donor agency. The formation of policy is a delicate matter in most recipient governments and persons who are too closely tied to the donor agency, particularly if that agency is of another government, are frequently suspect. In the case of foundations or multilateral agencies the problem is less difficult and other types of instruments may be used.

For capital intensive projects, the flexibility and independence of joint operations and institutional contracts have particular value. They normally provide a broad base of human resources from which to draw. Because of the importance of the timing of financial inputs, these instruments can be freed from normal budget cycles and progress.

Institution building projects require a long-term commitment and knowledge of the intricacies of the situation that comes with a continuity of relationships. Both institutional contracts and joint operations enable projects to be organized on this basis, and in addition, provide the variety of resources and the flexibility in their use which is important to this type of project.

Some Concluding Comments

The basis for the framework is the definition of technical assistance as a means of resolving different views. This does not in any sense subordinate the objective conclusions derived from economic, political or social analysis. It is precisely the articulation of these conclusions which can influence changes in the attitudes of the donor and recipient and make the agreement process easier. Neither does it subordinate the technical field since, once again, many of the problems to be solved respond to the precision with which technical requirements can be stated.

There is, as yet, no empirically tested approach by which technical assistance can accelerate the type of human and institutional change required for development and modernization in the real world which it must face. If there were, the many external influences which affect the different groups involved in decision making in technical assistance would still have to be resolved into agreed courses of action. Resolution, however, does ^{not} mean the compromise of the lowest common denominator. It means the interaction of groups in the pursuit of some established common goals.

The continua are designed to indicate the wide variety of conditions which may exist in the environment in which technical assistance must operate. The fallacy of the undivided middle postulates that there can be clear-cut distinctions between the extremes of criteria. The continua purports to show not only that the individual elements can vary widely, but that in different situations, different values of a given element satisfy the decision making requirements.

The framework is designed to illustrate an approach rather than to represent some absolute values. It is clear that considerable field testing is necessary and that there may well be important modifications in the structure during that period. Nevertheless, if it can be developed for individual countries or particular areas, it provides a means by which the appropriate emphasis can be given to those problems which are critical in the process of decision making. Further, it provides an array of project types and instruments which can be fitted to individual circumstances.

The entire formulation, in summary, is an attempt to provide some kind of rational basis for decision making which will meet the equally important but often quite different problems of the headquarters process of justification and the varied decision making conditions in the field.

What remains in addition to the more complex process of field testing the framework is to formulate the conclusions of the research in terms of the dimensions of agreement postulated by the framework. This will be, in effect, a test of the relevance of the problem areas to the reality of the decision making process.

CHAPTER VI

SOME PROPOSITIONS AND SUGGESTIONS *

The growth of the programming process, the major influences on it and the means by which it is accomplished in a representative group of agencies have constituted the major portion of the report. Programming was defined in Chapter V and its structure and elements abstracted into a generalized framework. The attempt to describe the reality of programming activities, the comparative approach showing the significance of certain approaches and the comments throughout the paper have pointed up critical problems and indicated some of the types of actions which may improve the administration of technical assistance and programming in particular.

Many initial conclusions emerged from a review of the literature, the interviews and through the examination of cases and discussion with colleagues and other knowledgeable persons, those initial hypotheses have been reduced to some fundamental propositions and some diverse suggestions rather than recommendations.

Technical assistance does not want for recommendations. There have been a continuing flow of policy proposals, organizational recommendations and a variety of detailed suggestions all of which range from naive to informed and sophisticated.

To borrow from the terminology of technical assistance, the only way to improve the programming process is to help the practitioners help themselves. There have been continuing efforts in all technical assistance agencies by informed and experienced persons to find better solutions to its many thorny problems. No outsider addressing himself to a variety of agencies, or even a single one, should presume to be more than a source of information, insight, objective analysis, and constructive suggestions.

* There will be no footnotes in this chapter. Any references will include the author's name and will be found in the bibliography.

It is a common failing of these types of reports that their authors cannot know all of the many factors that impinge on decisions in the different agencies. It is hoped, however, that the way the process has been described, the way the framework has been constructed and the way the suggestions are presented will provide stimulus and support for the continuing efforts to improve the administrative elements of the programming process.

The most important result of the report could be wide discussion of the problems and suggestions treated in the paper and the experimentation with new approaches resulting from such discussion.

The propositions will postulate basic conditions which require concentrated attention and where possible indicate general approaches to dealing with them. The suggestions are grouped under the dimensions of agreement which were developed as a set of components of the framework in Chapter V. Thus, the structure of the chapter provides a preliminary test of the relevance of the classification of problems in the framework.

Some of the propositions and suggestions are not new, but they bear reiteration. Reports and commentary by other scholars and practitioners have resulted from a different approach to the general problem of improving the efficiency of technical assistance administration, but many are similar in essence to those which are contained in this report. It is satisfying to find that the results of the independent analysis upon which this report is based are corroborated by the findings of others. However, it is disturbing to find that the conclusions and recommendations of some of the best of these earlier reports often did not get attention commensurate with the serious effort and conscientious analysis from which they were derived.

Those who have read the previous chapters are aware that the position of this paper is that technical assistance programming is a complex process which is not amenable to generalized prescriptions beyond the level of platitudes. The volume of variables, and more important, the complex relationships between variables challenges the ingenuity of the practitioner and the social scientist even in specific situations. Solutions cannot be drawn from a content analysis of interviews or from some sophisticated correlation. In many cases over-sophistication in the

programming process has been much more destructive than a pragmatic approach to problems as they arise.

Finally it should be noted that no document can pass unscathed between the Scylla of generalizations which simply restate old imperatives and the Charybdis of highly specific suggestions which may apply to only one bureau or agency and not apply to another. However some general suggestions will be made for all technical assistance programs and then some more specific actions for AID.

SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITIONS

1. Technical Assistance is long range and high risk in terms of individual projects but a critical input to the capacity of underdeveloped countries in their efforts to modernize. Further, it is different in nature and operation from capital and loans and therefore requires a different kind of programming system. This can be accomplished without altering its relationship to the goals of all other external assistance.

2. There is no magic solution - nor even a standard mold - for programming different activities in different countries. The benefits to be gained by permitting, and even encouraging, creative approaches dealing with the pragmatic problems of the field far outweigh those gained from the insistence on standard formulas of rational presentation.

3. If there is a single most influential aspect of programming technical assistance it is its cooperative nature. The tendency to impose a concept of a development, an administrative approach or a set of objectives on countries, particularly those which do not have the capacity to develop and put forward their own, has been irresistible in too many cases. The time, and the special efforts required to insure both thorough understanding and commitment at different levels is a fundamental factor in the success of technical assistance. In each agency observed there have been enough examples of conducting technical assistance in a truly cooperative manner for the techniques to be applied on a much wider basis.

4. Independent external influences to the programming process are a double edged sword of critical proportions. They complicate programming in the measure that they must concur in program decisions yet their support is usually important to planning, obtaining funds, or

continuing support. The administrative efficiency of some agencies results, in significant measure, from the relative absence of these inputs. The problem is complex and different for each agency, but there are ways in which external elements can be incorporated without reducing the decision making process to a search for the lowest common denominator. In this regard, the relationship between the Special Fund and the Specialized Agencies illustrates a particular pattern which may provide some helpful insights.

5. There is a basic dualism in the programming process. First there is a need for rational presentation and justification to meet policy and enabling bodies' requirements. Second there is a need for pragmatic handling of the complex problems which arise in formulating and implementing a program in the field. In view of the fact that these often conflicting requirements cannot be eliminated except in the smallest and most closely knit agencies, they must be lived with and the administrative means found to adjust to them in each agency.

6. Though it has reached proportions of a cliché, problems of communication are basic to the resolution of different views into common courses of action and to the understanding by headquarters, field and recipient of the consequences of their decisions in the other environments. Much greater attention must be given to more direct contacts between these three groups and to improving communications between them.

7. Even though headquarters must necessarily be the final arbiter, the primary focus of attention of a technical assistance donor always should be on the field program. While there is no symmetrical division of responsibilities, the roles of headquarters and the field can usually be divided as follows:

- a. Headquarters determines the nature and magnitude of the program. This includes such things as global emphasis on capital versus technical assistance and loans versus grants; the allocation of funds between countries; the inclusion or exclusion of certain types of activities; and broad global procedures.

- b. In the determination of country program goals headquarters' decisions must rely heavily on field analysis and recommendations. For example, in the determination of sectoral emphasis and approach and the total country objectives, field analysis of the situation is the critical input.
- c. In the determination of projects or individual activities the instruments by which they will be accomplished, the field determination should predominate, unless there are major over riding reasons which preclude its support. At this level the burden of proof required to reverse a field decision should be on the headquarters and the benefit of the field.

In reality of course, administrative situations are not always this clear cut. Further, no particular set of regulations can impose this administrative posture on a technical assistance organization, although it can be important. It is basically the organizational leadership which can establish this approach to dealing with technical assistance problems.

The hardship post for programming should be headquarters. The job of the field should be to examine its own situation realistically and determine which feasible activities will make the most effective contribution to the goals. Then, headquarters should translate these proposals, with field assistance, into the pattern of presentation which will satisfy the enabling body. It makes no sense to have to deal with reality through the looking glass of a slick formalized unreal programming process whether simple or complex. Enabling bodies are generally favorably disposed toward technical assistance programs and must be treated as sophisticated enough to be told that technical assistance is long range, complex and critical, and that the field should be supported rather than given some standard prescriptions for project development.

8. Drastic changes in organization and frequent changes in leadership at various levels create many more problems than they solve. Improving most of the existing organizational structures for technical assistance and drawing leadership from broadly experienced senior personnel will prove much more effective in improving the quality of technical assistance in the long run. This is equally true of project types and instruments. Neither contracts, nor institution building projects are the answer to mounting successful technical assistance. The only real answer is having a "kit of tools" varied enough to meet the individual situations as they are encountered.

THE ACCRUAL OF KNOWLEDGE (160*)

Technical assistance has special problems of knowledge accrual since in essence it is designed to change the level of skills, organizational structure and influence attitudes and behavior. Its programming can be assisted to only a limited degree by the standard kinds of economic and political information which is routinely gathered for capital programs and diplomatic purposes. More important, it requires a particular combination of technical, social and administrative data about the country, sector and particular case, along with knowledge of past experience in introducing similar activities in other developing countries. Even so such information, because of the changing circumstances of the country environment, must be understood to be the basis for informed and sophisticated guesses by experienced officials as to the nature, timing and organization of different activities.

Another factor in technical assistance is that because it involves small amounts of money, it is expected to attack critical problems which will have an influence on the overall development program. The material gathered must therefore be convincing to headquarters and fund authorizing bodies in terms of broader program objectives. The time limitations and the reliability of data constitute still another difficulty in gathering information for technical assistance. All of these factors

* The number in parenthesis after each title indicates the page in Chapter V where this dimension of agreement is discussed as a component of the framework.

complicate the problem of finding the right kind of knowledge for the planning of successful projects.

There has, until recently, been too much reliance on the data gathered for other types of activities, too many implied assumptions about the transferability of organizational structures from developed countries, and too little gathering of past experience with similar activities in other developing countries in any meaningful and transferable way. Furthermore, the skepticism of headquarters and enabling bodies have led to a reluctance to point out the limited relevance, reliability and complexity of the kind of data available. In some cases the justification required for a technical assistance project in a developing country would tax the facilities of a developed one. Both the time available for planning and justifying individual activities and the need for convincing figures has led field missions to make optimistic claims and to underestimate the time involved in accomplishment.

Since many of the major problems technical assistance must attack are self evident to experienced officials of both the donor and recipient agencies, and because obtaining the amount and kind of information lead to long delays, there is a tendency to accept any opportunity or request and move ahead. On the other hand, the rallying cry for many program officers is the scattered and ineffective projects which were not adequately planned. To some extent both arguments miss the point. If there is continuous attention to the kind of country knowledge, past experience and critical problems which are relevant to technical assistance needs, opportunities can be captured by only a limited amount of additional technical and organizational analysis easily obtained through consultants or short term studies. At the same time critical problems can be the focus of continuing study which will lead to the initiation of activities as enough knowledge is made available for proper planning.

The problem of accrual of knowledge, then, is one of shifting to gathering the kinds of general knowledge about the country which are relevant to administrative and behavioral change, recognizing the long term experimental nature of the activities and building in the knowledge gathering elements in projects so that intermediate decisions will

compensate for the lack of initial information. Finally, much more attention must be given to supporting the experienced field official with the results of past experience and shortterm assistance in the technical and social science analysis which will make possible more timely and informed program decisions.

Suggestion 1: Limiting Knowledge Needs by Classification.

There are a variety of ways in which program goals, regional and country objectives and other factors can be classified to limit knowledge requirements. The framework in Chapter V attempts to classify knowledge requirements for different types of projects. Galbraith's scheme sets out some regional objectives -- human resources in Africa, social structure in Latin America and productive capacity in Asia. These approaches and other country and organizational concentrations provide a basis on which to limit the amounts of knowledge required for given situations. Field and headquarters teams working together can determine the critical types of information needed by both groups for categories of activities. Field offices can then place the emphasis on gathering only that information which is significant to program decisions in particular situations.

Suggestion 2: Development and Utilization of Country Resources.

Donor agencies should encourage, and if need be, promote individual and institutional knowledge gathering as a priority activity in each country. Some attention has been given to planning organization and statistics agencies but there are a wide variety of public, private and professional organizations in most countries which have, or can be encouraged to, develop important information needed as a basis for program and project activities. In a few observed cases small amounts of money expended to assist or support activities which promise relevant and useful information have made significant contributions to program and project development.

Suggestion 3: Development of a Donor Agency Memory.

The collection, clarification, storage and easy availability of the great volume of available material which each agency has accumulated over the years is a critical element in the continuing improvement of the effectiveness of the program process.

The increased emphasis on evaluation by some agencies is a beginning (see pages 142-148). The Technical Assistance Study Group, the single debriefing recording an AID and the three Ford case studies in Iran are isolated discontinuous but promising possibilities. AID's efforts at a computerized semiannual report is another start if, among other things, a multitude of other marginally useful reports required of the field are eliminated.

What is needed is an organization partially removed from operations on which both field and headquarters can depend for support, information and assistance in their programming activities. Scholars and practitioners can be rotated to it for short periods to provide information, or for long periods of training and research. Such an organization could provide the resources for evaluation and the gathering and storage of different types of information. It could be expected to provide short term assistance to operating departments and field missions so that it would maintain close contact with practical problems. In order to get acceptance it would have to begin by conscientiously serving the field needs for information but it could become a repository of analyzed experience and easily available research results and a source of trained personnel for short term program support. The nature of the organization would vary with the agency as would the size and function. Ideally it might lead to a future international agency designed to assist all donors in a similar way.

Suggestion 4: Regionally Based Centers.

The International Rice Research Institute, U.N. Regional Organizations and the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences are just a few of the resources which can be better utilized as a source of gathering and disseminating knowledge. The Middle East Development Division of the British Program and the regional Offices of WHO are examples of the organizations which can provide direct field guidance support which could be strengthened in terms of accumulating knowledge in each area. Research institutions need strengthening in training personnel at different levels, training and operating offices need to be able to gather and store information on the special problems of their area. The beginnings have already

been made in this area, there simply needs to be more attention given to cooperation between agencies in supporting or combining existing regional efforts and joint activities to create new ones.

Specific Actions for Aid.

- A. Missions should be encouraged to use technical support funds for the purpose of supporting or commissioning individuals, institutions and professional groups to contribute specific types of knowledge, both general and specific, needed in the country. Where appropriate, mission officials should work with local scholars in such activities as project evaluation, assembling of available information and promotion of special studies.
- B. The Human Resource Development Center proposed in 1963 in Latin American Bureau should be revived. The idea involved the utilization of universities as continuous information gathering and research organizations. In this capacity they could provide both background data and specific studies as needed in any country in the area. They could also provide training, orientation and other services. Similarly the activities of the Far Eastern Bureau in promoting and supporting different types of research should be encouraged and expanded.
- C. The wide circulation of documents giving sources of information either by region or specific field could be extremely useful to both project development and review. There are some materials on training resources in Europe and Latin America for example, and in a few cases material from mission files and libraries have been put together. The UN Resident Representative's office in Iran prepared the U.N. IN IRAN, which gives a comprehensive listing of all projects, personnel and reports in a form extremely useful to anybody working in that country.
- D. A few of the variety of other things needed are: incorporating graduate students into the intern program to do research; re-initiating the debriefing for field personnel; and accelerating present plans to rotate personnel between field, headquarters and universities; and the gradual shift of emphasis in TCR towards the type of function suggested in 4. above.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRUENCE (161)

Congruence is more than agreement. It is common understanding, at different levels, of both the objectives and the intermediate changes which have to take place if the objectives are to be achieved. It involves the conscious search for, and development of, converging motives and the anticipation of the problems of diverging ones. It is an understanding of the different kinds of cooperation and resolution which have to take place in the programming process during the period of planning and implementation.

At the level of agreeing to undertake a cooperative program, the goals only need be within the objectives of the country and not conflicting with the global objectives of the donor. However, at the level of sectoral and project activity, important efforts must be made by both sides, to understand what agreement means and the degree to which it will lead to future resolution of common problems. There are times when one side or the other can be persuaded, over a period of time, to support a given activity but even that requires an understanding of just what kinds of actions will encourage common agreement.

Among the many problems involved in obtaining agreement based on congruence between the parties involved, there are two fundamental ones. First, the donor tends to assume that development is the critical element in the country and since the donor program is designed to accelerate this process, it should be the major concern of the country, and deserving of continuous high level attention. In fact developing countries may have many more equally important and urgent problems, such as political organization, economic stability and social unrest. They are continually caught in the dilemma of dealing with immediate crises and building for future improvement.

Second, recipients assume that the donor has unlimited resources and high level personnel to devote to their program. They expect donors to act rapidly, provide additional resources when they cannot contribute their share and that they will provide outstanding people for their projects. Every consultant should be the leading authority in the donor country, if not in the world, and every university contract should be with M.I.T., Harvard, Johns Hopkins or one of a few other institutions highly respected in the country.

There are a variety of other problems including the different patterns of administration which lead both parties to approach agreement in different ways, the lack of understanding of the intricacies of the country environment by donor personnel and the lack of knowledge by recipients of the complicated requirements for supporting new activities to promote change. There are also problems of political relationships between donor and recipient, the balance between various donors and the need to modify national policies or global guidelines to meet the needs of a particular activity.

The fundamental elements of developing congruence are understanding, adaptability and persuasion. The increasing sophistication of officials in both donor and recipient agencies makes all of these more attainable than in the early periods of technical assistance. Recipient officials are less self conscious about their problems and more willing to discuss them frankly provided they are convinced that the donor officials are interested in helping them find solutions. Donor agencies now have enough projects and experience to know that they need to explain their administrative and personnel problems prior to entering into firm agreement to undertake activities. Both sides know that the development of a working rapport allows for mutual persuasion and compromise leading to more understanding and the capacity to solve the many unanticipated problems which arise on all projects.

On the fringe of the congruence problem is the coordination problems about which discussion and suggestions were previously made (See pp. 138-142). The existence of sophisticated personnel in the recipient government and the need for a variety of creative approaches to the problem only reinforce those comments.

Suggestion 1: Increasing Donor Recipient Contacts.

The frequency of non-bargaining of contacts between donor and recipient is a measure of the opportunities there are for exploration of common problems. Time is critical for top level people, but much more can be done at middle levels where much of the material for higher level decisions is put together. It is not easy for busy people on both sides to take the time required to get a better understanding of the variety of problems with which each must deal. However, it is these efforts which bring about the resolution of common problems.

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has made some good beginnings in Thailand and East Africa. Although labeled as coordination, these opportunities for donor-recipient communication, both formal and informal, illustrate one approach that should be used more widely. In addition to the DAC, planning advisors and U.N. Resident Representatives have done a good deal of bringing people together in useful ways. Again there is no set formula but in each country there are means which can be developed if some attention is given to the matter.

Suggestion 2: Joint Programming.

The increasing competence of country officials and the need for increasing contact lead directly to the greater sharing of the program preparation. Programming personnel cannot be expected to work themselves out of a job in the same manner as other technicians, but they should try. The benefits of these efforts will pay dividends in congruence, training, and capacity to develop effective projects. There is some intermediate point between EPTA's formal dependence on just country preparation and the tendency of AID to monopolize the programming job. In the EPTA case, participating agencies may actually do the job and in the AID case the requirements are so complex and change so often that it is hard to keep technicians informed, let alone recipients. The problem of implied commitment prior to headquarters' approval and the scarcity of local personnel with appropriate skills, usually given as reasons, do not constitute an insuperable problem. The incorporation of country personnel into the early surveys and joint development of project programming is increasing but it deserves more attention.

Suggestion 3: The Training of Planning Officials.

In the present situation those groups which are the most modern, best organized, and most informed about the agreement process get the most technical assistance. Therefore, the more training of central planning personnel and officials in different sectors who deal with programming problems, the less difficulty there will be in project development. It is commonly agreed that donor countries have difficulty in adapting this type of training to the needs of developing countries, and that many of the best people cannot be spared from the country. However, there is an increasing number of centers where training programs are adapted to

particular needs. Senior officials can attend conferences and professional meetings which provide substantive information and opportunities to exchange ideas with both donor and other recipient officials. The courses at the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning are one example. There are similar institutions which need support in Africa and Asia.

Suggestion 4: Clarifying Administrative Practices.

While difficult to isolate, that cases in which there was greater mutual knowledge of administrative patterns, there were less problems of obtaining meaningful agreement. There is, of course, no standard way in which this is achieved, but it is a focus of attention of experienced field chiefs. The growth of research on administration in developing countries can be a useful base for country studies. Donor personnel can be encouraged to make clear the structure and problems of their agencies in obtaining approval, providing support. Visits by senior recipient officials to headquarters offices, universities or other agencies cooperating with the donor have been useful. Those studies indicating that identification with recipient problems is more important than knowledge of the language were supported by interviews with recipients. The problem in field missions was much less one of "going native" than of not understanding recipient problems. Recipients on the other hand were often equally bewildered by donor agencies' administrative patterns.

Specific Actions for Aid.

- A. The agency should increase its support for the activities of DAC and U.N. Resident Representatives to bring about more frequent contact between donor and recipient officials. Where it is possible missions should have recourse to funds to organize meetings, and conferences incorporating the country, mission and outside officials to uncover particular problems, areas of agreement or means of accomplishing established goals.
- B. Additional encouragement should be given to foundations to conduct planning and policy development projects, missions should increase the non-project training of recipient country officials who are involved in national and sectoral planning activities.

- C. There are a number of ways in which returned participants might be given internships for a given period of time, either with the mission or a recipient government agency, in order to acquaint them with technical assistance problems within the country and at the same time utilizing their skills to provide additional information for the program.
- D. Orientation courses on the country such as the one at the School of Economics in New Delhi conducted by local personnel with the assistance and support of donor agencies can be an extremely useful device to orient all donor personnel toward a better understanding of the kinds of problems with which they will deal in the country.

THE DETERMINATION OF FEASIBILITY (162)

The basic question of feasibility is whether or not an activity can be successfully undertaken considering the costs and risks involved in achieving the objectives of the project. The acceptability continuum discussed in Chapter V postulates the ideal project as being both high priority and high feasibility, but it is set up in such a way that any project which is either high in priority or feasibility should receive serious consideration.

There is continuing conflict between those groups who consider feasibility a primary factor in project determination and those who insist on development priorities as primary. In reality there are a variety of combinations of these two factors in most technical assistance programs. The essence of the feasibility problem for technical assistance is some kind of a resolution of these two factors. There has been a good deal of intuitive skill in their combination in the field, but more effective techniques for feasibility determination which goes beyond economic and technical feasibility are needed.

Suggestion 1: Categories of Feasibility.

In individual countries proposals can be ordinally grouped according to both priority and feasibility. By comparing these strata an optimum selection of activities can be made from different levels of both priority and feasibility. There will be some critical activities initiated

which need efforts to find some feasible way for their accomplishment. Other projects which can be easily accomplished may influence the acceptance of the entire program through the ease with which they can progress.

Suggestion 2: Regional Expert Teams.

Regional teams which are expert in basic fields such as health, education and agriculture could ideally be international in character and based at a regional center. However, this approach will probably have to be developed by individual agencies in the beginning. Such experts could be informed on the problems of given types of projects in all parts of the region. They would be based in some centrally located institution in the field which conducts research and training in their particular subject matter. The team could bring a knowledge of technical, resource and feasibility problems in other countries to bear on the examination of individual projects which are being considered.

Suggestion 3: Research on Feasibility Criteria.

In order to accomplish a categorization mentioned above more research is required to find the basic tools and guidelines of operational feasibility in country situations. With all its shortcomings, cost benefit analysis provides a beginning from which some efforts to include political and administrative factors, as well as economic, will assist in eliminating least feasible projects if not in selecting the best.

Suggestion 4: Increasing the Use of Short Term Personnel.

Some of the most effective projects observed have had short term consultants during the planning stages and at determined intervals during their implementation. The encouragement of joint teams of donor and recipient personnel in project preparation and assessment can be an important factor in building feasibility during the programming process.

Suggestion 5: The Small Beginning as a Pattern.

The problems of feasibility are usually more difficult to estimate than those of priority. However, activities which have already been initiated by the recipient or other donors which have proven their capacity to build a base for progress. Supporting or complementary activities can be undertaken which will benefit from the progress already made. In other cases it may be necessary to make a small, carefully defined beginning

and make special efforts to determine progress and support potential. Much can be gained in project design and adaptation to the environment as there is little to lose if initial activities must be closed out.

Specific Actions for AID.

- A. The efforts which are presently being made to simplify the CAP should be intensified. A technical assistance section of the Country Assistance Strategy Statement should be the central document for program review. Detailed project preparation should be the responsibility of the field. In such a situation more of the personnel presently involved in the analysis of projects could be available to the field for assistance in relating priority and feasibility of different project proposals.
- B. AID should take the lead in developing regional expert teams in basic fields which would be available to missions for project analysis, interim operation and advisory services, and assessment of projects during the course of their implementation.
- C. Wherever possible AID should increase its participation in joint projects. In spite of the difficulties involved in working with other agencies having different methods of funding and approval, building on or supplementing other activities reduces problems of feasibility determination.
- D. The concept of operational feasibility and the means to determine it should be a subject of intensive research and testing in different areas. AID should begin by contracting with an institution which has experience in technical assistance to develop some guidelines for feasibility based on multi-disciplinary field study of different situations.

THE ASSESSMENT OF RESOURCES (163)

The long term nature of technical assistance makes the determination of resource needs and availabilities particularly difficult and the justification of any given amount of resources over time somewhat arbitrary. Timing of human and physical inputs may be as important as their need and availability.

There are never enough funds to meet the needs of proposed projects, but toward the end of a fiscal period in most agencies there are more than can be immediately committed. This occurs because of delays in approval and implementation, changed donor and country circumstances and a variety of other reasons. There is in all agencies some pressure to commit these funds prior to a given deadline. In the case of AID the time between planning and actual availability of funds is one and a half fiscal periods, and the deadline for commitment is often half a fiscal period. While some other agencies operate more flexibly, the availability of funds at the time they are needed is a continuing and difficult problem. It is these frictional shortages of funds which add to the difficulty of making the appropriate inputs to those projects which are critical to program effectiveness.

The scarcity, underutilization and timing of human resources are critical factors for both donor and recipient. For the donor the mobilization of experienced personnel with specific skills has always been a problem. Field missions must frequently use such staff as may already be in the country to fill in until technicians are available. Overlap among different technicians on the same project is unusual. Robert Iversen's report discusses technical assistance personnel but the programming process must tailor many of its decisions to personnel availability and provide the estimates on which personnel mobilization is based.

For the recipient, scarcity of adequately trained personnel is constant. All donors expect that all of their personnel will be accompanied by adequately trained recipient counterparts who will, in the course of time, assume greater responsibility. Ideally, of course, expert technicians should have three or four counterparts as a minimum, if they are to provide the kind of multiplier which is required in changes involved in technical assistance. In fact, however, personnel problems are such that it is unusual if a technical expert can begin as an advisor. Various types of training and continually increasing assumption of responsibility are more important than the debate about whether technicians should be advisors or operators.

Suggestion 1: Adjusting Fund Commitments.

Donor agencies should plan their inputs to technical assistance projects in accordance with the availability of recipient funding. It may

mean that donor agencies will have to adjust their technical assistance allocations to the recipient government budget cycle. Some agencies already do this and for others it does not appear to be an insuperable problem for most donor agencies. Such an approach will prevent some of the problems of timing inputs and will prevent different budget cycles being used as an excuse for not initiating activities.

Suggestion 2: Illustrative Presentation.

It is usually possible to make fairly accurate estimates of work plans for the first year or two, the period covered by a technical assistance project, but to require long term detailed presentations is a waste of valuable time. Goals and sectoral emphasis and objectives can be precise, but project proposals should be illustrative, laying out broad direction and providing specific information on initial activities. Headquarters should be able to request information on progress at such intervals as they or enabling bodies may require. Unless there is some important variation in project objectives, the modification of the project to meet the original objectives should be an administrative process within the organization.

Suggestion 3: Improving Resource Utilization.

There is a much more information which can be gathered about the availability of both human and physical resources. Financial resources, trained personnel, and institutional resources can be mobilized in the interests of more effective technical assistance programming. There are more than 200 Ph.D.s in agriculture in Latin America and it appears that there is presently little information on where they are and how they could be better utilized. In the donor countries programming would benefit from the knowledge of personnel availability. This requires better communications on career personnel and mobilization of a pool of qualified personnel from which to draw. Short orientation and information seminars for larger groups of potential professional personnel would acquaint them with advantages, problems, and techniques of technical assistance. It would also provide a basis for proceeding with development of certain types of projects.

Suggestion 4: Regional Expert Teams.

These teams mentioned in Suggestion 5 of Feasibility can provide the interim human resources required to fill gaps between technicians or to capitalize on recipient interest prior to the assignment of long term personnel. Rotation of personnel between universities, headquarters and field, mentioned earlier, will provide additional resource availability for technical assistance activities.

Specific Actions for AID.

- A. Reconsideration, including consultation with Congressional Committees, should be given to the illustrative programming procedure used in the late 1950's with a view to reducing the quantity of detail required for program submissions for TC funds. Study and experimentation with radical reduction in CAP presentation is a critical need.
- B. The present efforts to obtain multi-year authorization from Congress should continue and the agency should make more use of the present regulations allowing for multi-year approval of projects.
- C. Present authorizations to expend up to \$50,000 for new projects with approved goals should be enlarged and the use of flexibility provisions presently contained in the Manual Orders should be greatly increased. This will require some changes in fund allocation procedures but through the development of careful guidelines the capacity of technical assistance to meet targets of opportunity and changing circumstances will be measurably increased.
- D. Authority for the obligation of funds in accordance with the country budget cycle or the availability of recipient funds for initiation of a project should be explored for technical cooperation funds. This will mean, in some cases, a carry over of funds but these funds can be held in headquarters by some means such as earmarking until evidence of capacity to initiate is available.

E. The training of government officials and university personnel on a short term basis, such as that which was provided by the Latin American Bureau to members of the Internal Revenue Service should be a regular activity of the agency in its attempt to mobilize qualified personnel.

THE DETERMINATION OF THE EXTENT OF COMMITMENT

The achievement of the objectives of a technical assistance project requires more than the common understanding of a problem and the agreement to undertake its modification or solution. The introduction of new patterns of action and the relatively long period of time required for their incorporation and accommodation in the environment of developing countries engenders many problems which can only be solved through constancy of effort and the determination of both parties to find the means for continued progress. Many projects owe their success to the capacity of both groups to weather the most trying of adversities. Political, administrative and other changes in the environment, financial, personnel and support crises are not at all unusual in the complicated long term process of project accomplishment.

The basic political, economic and administrative problems of project progress are not easily determined during the planning stages and they are compounded by cross cultural elements and some of the special notions which technical assistance has developed. Among the many different and sometimes cherished notions are those of donor program personnel that if a project is well planned it will have few problems. This combines well with the traditional patterns of recipient administration which assume that once an action has been approved it will automatically be accomplished. Fortunately during recent years there has been enough study of the problems of implementing plans of all kinds that the assumption about projects which have serious problems as having been poorly planned is no longer acceptable as a generalization. Nevertheless the notion remains a threat to the constancy of effort on projects.

Other problems which affect the continuing support of activities are contained in the "new project notion" which is in part rooted in the fact that it is easier to justify a new project than an old one, particularly if its optimistic expectations have not been achieved. The innovative nature of technical assistance often makes its subject to the influence of

each new theory of development social change or new means of organization. The tendency is then to initiate a new activity and absorb the old one into it. While this may have some advantages in starting fresh or in justification, no evidence was found that these projects prospered any better than those which remained separate.

Almost all projects go through that period when it appears that they are either disintegrating or at the very least have arrived at a plateau from which they may not emerge. Altogether too many interim assessments do not take into account the faltering steps by which individual projects move erratically toward that particular measure of success which characterizes a high risk, long term innovation in complex environments.

This is not to say that projects do not fail or should not be eliminated when the problems which they encounter are irremediable. What is necessary is a great deal more attention by those involved in programming to what constitutes a natural plateau and what amounts to a dead end. It cannot be an easy job but it is a crucial one. Developing a method of analysis which will permit either gradual phasing out or support during difficult periods is a fundamental element in commitment and hence in programming decisions.

Suggestion 1: Mobilization of Support.

A basic element in both donor and recipient continuing commitment is the mobilization of relatively stable and interested groups in government and among private individuals and institutions. Industrial, agricultural, medical and educational institutions, professional and other associations, insofar as they can be incorporated, will provide a basis of support which no individual officials' short tenure will normally provide.

It is true that innovative projects may tend to threaten certain established groups but even limited investigation shows that there are organizations or elements within established economic and political groups which support changes leading toward modernization. It may be that industrial elements can be incorporated and the commercial ones only neutralized, or that important autonomous organizations in the government can provide additional continuing support. In any case the effort to enlist the support of stable institutions which can be of assistance and encourage and win over others is critical to the maintenance of continuing commitment.

Suggestion 2: A Stable Source of Funds.

Equally important is the effort to provide some stable source of financial support for an activity. In recipient governments this may require efforts with the finance ministry to establish project funding as a budget line item, an established part of a ministry, or in some other category. For the donor it may include contracting, joint funding or other direct multi-year commitment. Foundations have used multi-year grants as an effective means of insuring continuing funds, and recipient governments have on occasion, provided special taxes to support projects or institutions. In addition to the ingenious efforts of some practitioners to obtain funding there is enough general experience in developing a means for stable financial inputs which, if disseminated, could significantly assist in increasing the commitment to most projects.

Suggestion 3: Early Implementation.

The effect of a long delay between the initial planning and the implementation of a project dampens the early interest for the project by which many elements of continuing support can be arranged. At the time of approval, the project is the focus of high level attention and if implementation follows shortly, the problems of continuing financing can be made a subject of determination at a high level. If, on the other hand, the delay between approval and implementation is long, the interest and capacity to insure support has been transferred to other activities which are in the final stages of approval.

Suggestion 4: Institutionalization.

Quite apart from the institution building project as a type, the need to incorporate any technical assistance activity into some particular niche of the institutional structure of the country is often an important device for obtaining continuing support. Activities which can become effective as a part of a university, credit bank, or a ministry, and which are directly involved with some aspects of their function, can be related in such a way that they become a standard part of the budget for that institution. In the case of a new institution, the problem is much more complicated and somewhat more critical but there is an increasing amount of practical knowledge and research which provides valuable guidelines.

Suggestion 5: The Targets of Opportunity and Concentration.

The constancy of support to projects is not necessarily conditioned to maintaining them at the same level of activity at all times. There are periods in which limited participation of technical activity should take place, and others when it should be intensified. This matter is stressed below in Suggestion 1 of the Flexibility Problem. (See also pp 118-119.)

Specific Actions for AID.

- A. As with other problems of technical assistance the attitude changes required to improve the approach to commitment are not easily incalculated. The emergence of new techniques of development, Congressional attitudes, the average tenure of two years for mission directors, and one and a half years for the Administrator, all mitigate against it. Technicians get attached to projects through both their interest in the substance and intimate acquaintance with the activity. However, this often results in a parochial view. If they could have short term assistance at critical periods to meet problems of ongoing projects, there could be more objective information gathered to determine how projects can be adjusted so that they can more effectively achieve their objectives.
- B. Field project preparation should include those particular organizations and associations to which the efforts to gain support should be directed. They cannot always be immediately incorporated, but efforts to interest them should begin as early as possible. In addition, the groups who are likely to oppose activities should also be recognized and efforts made to see how they can be neutralized, eventually incorporated, or bypassed.
- C. AID should not terminate a project without an adequate analysis. The field mission should be able to change the emphasis or the approach. In the last analysis it also should make the decision regarding its termination; but not before study is completed by agency or outside personnel.
- D. Several other techniques need to be introduced or strengthened. Multi-year approval, multi-year funding, authorizing missions to take some initial actions as soon as the recipient is able to implement. Projects should be started on a small scale so that modifications can be made before it becomes too well established.

THE MAINTENANCE OF FLEXIBILITY (165)

Flexibility is the capacity to adjust means to changing circumstances in the pursuit of given ends. For technical assistance there are two separate but interrelated factors in the flexibility.

Program flexibility involves the ability to meet problems, changed circumstances and opportunities in such a way that the total program will continue to make an optimum contribution toward achieving overall goals. It includes shifting emphasis to the more promising parts of a program, varying the time sequence and the fund allocation either in a total program or an individual project. Program flexibility also includes the deemphasis or termination of a project. There are also times when projects must be allowed to coast while they consolidate and adjust to changes already initiated.

Project flexibility involves the adjustment of inputs, variation in the mix of instruments, modification of approach, and change in level of activity in order to increase the project's progress toward its specific objectives. Some flexibility can be built into a project by anticipating the necessary change which should take place as it begins to be effective. It is not possible, however, to determine precisely when and what kinds of adjustments will have to be made to assure that a project provides continuing innovation, improvement of human capacity and the progress toward fulfilling its role in the program.

The key to flexibility is an administrative structure which permits periodic assessment to determine how a program or project can best be adjusted to operate effectively in modified circumstances. Equally important is the capacity to act on this analysis by changing the mix of instruments, varying the resources and shifting emphasis to the more promising activities. Frequently the capacity for flexible adjustment of projects is basic to maintaining commitment and promoting transfer.

Flexibility, however, is not necessarily retreat in the face of adversity, but rather the capacity to deal with the natural reactions to any attempt to introduce important changes into a developing country. The attempts to change attitudes and behavior are the most complex undertakings of all external assistance and they require continuing analysis and acute perception of environmental problems.

Suggestion 1: Targets of Opportunity and Concentration.

Any technical assistance program should have a number of activities which constitute its central focus and a number of other activities which are designed to explore critical problems, develop opportunities and provide supplementary contributions. This approach is excellent framework by which to build small activities into important ones and to move activities which have arrived at a plateau into an intermediate position without necessarily terminating them. The conscious classification of technical assistance activities in a program in terms of these categories would provide an approach which, when tested, could have major consequences for flexibility, simplification of presentations and a variety of other improvements in the program process. A memorandum from the Program Coordination office of AID on August 19, 1965 provided a detailed description of the approach which should be useful to all agencies. (See pp 118-119.)

Suggestion 2: Reallocation Capacity.

The capacity of field missions to shift funds from one project to another within generally approved program goals on its own initiative should be an accepted practice. While this capacity theoretically exists in most agencies it tends to be complicated in practice. The allocation and the carryover procedures of the Ford Foundation is a pattern which deserves study and adaptation to other agencies.

Suggestion 3: Multiple Focus Programming.

The programming process has been too heavily involved with the beginning of projects and too little involved in problems of continuing commitment, flexibility and transfer. The intensity of programming efforts should be focused on several specific points in program, and not just on project development. These points should be during the initial preparation of a project, at a few critical stages during implementation and in devising a strategy for termination or transfer.

Suggestion 4: Operational Phasing.

Projects should be planned in terms of specific stages of development insofar as these stages can be anticipated. The stages should be laid out in such a way that the shifts of inputs of personnel and funds to meet changing circumstances can be made on the basis of actual project conditions rather than given fiscal periods or tours of duty of employees. This should

include built in regular interim assessments to determine what changes are necessary in order to adapt projects to changing requirements. The example which should be studied in detail is the Development and Resources Corporation's Khuzestan Development Program in Iran which developed the phasing of operations, responsibilities and personnel.

Specific Actions for AID.

- A. Manual orders contain the necessary flexibility for technical assistance at the present time but it appears that their use has not been encouraged by AID/Washington and that Mission Directors have not been willing to assume the responsibility for exercising them. It has been previously recommended that the \$50,000 flexibility provision be modified with the needs of given technical assistance programs. In addition, the capacity to shift funds between approved projects should be raised from 15 to 25%.
- B. The basic document on the targets of concentration and opportunity, produced in the program coordination office of AID, should be expanded and tested to determine the way by which this approach can increase the flexibility in the technical assistance program.
- C. Program flexibility requires an overall sectoral analysis of activities of which technical assistance is only a part. The Lincoln report on evaluation provides recommendations for sectoral analysis which if followed will provide a basis for adjusting technical assistance projects.
- D. Project flexibility should be the province of the Mission Director and he should be able to call on regional teams, as recommended above, or specifically contract short term foreign consultants and/or local experts to determine what kinds of changes in projects will increase their effectiveness. As pointed out in commitment, in the case of termination he should be required to obtain some kind of outside advice prior to phasing out a project.

THE PROMOTION OF TRANSFER (165)

There are few more sacred tenants of the philosophy to technical assistance than the concept of transfer. Yet it has received almost no serious research or little practical attention. The concept was inherent in the standard language of early technical assistance which advocated

"leaving something behind" and has been enshrined in the academic analysis as, among other things, "institutionalization".

There is ^Not question that both in theory and practice, the end objective of technical assistance, with rare exceptions, is the introduction, operational adaptation, stabilization and transfer to the recipient of particular innovative activities and institutions. Moreover, the usual expectation is that these changes will in turn, promote subsequent and more wide spread social and economic change. There are a few activities in which the end product may be a report, a seminar, or a group of trained personnel, but usually these activities are connected with some broader more long range activity of either the donor or some other agency involved in a more comprehensive activity.

There is general recognition of the significance of transfer but the focus of programming in most cases, is concentrated on the development of projects rather than with their effective transfer. In part this is because the strategy for transfer requires a kind of analysis which has not frequently been attempted in technical assistance.

There is a lack of understanding by both donor and recipient of the amount of protection afforded to innovating activities and organizations by the cocoon of technical assistance. Depending on the circumstances, it can provide legitimacy, prestige, important functional relationships with other agencies, and a short circuit of communication to top leadership in a country. Even the gradual transfer of any project is accompanied by the stress and strain of exposure to the rude world of bureaucratic competition. The problem of incorporating diverse elements of support and maintaining the pace of activity without the special resource which technical assistance provides has led to the demise of many projects which were seemingly operating well but transferred too soon.

On the other hand, foreign technicians can develop strong vested interests and exaggerated notions of their importance to any given activity and neglect the problems of development of leadership and incorporation into the recipient environment. Recipients also may come to depend on technical assistance for the services and support necessary to continuing project operations. In any underdeveloped country there is a shortage of dynamic and competent leadership needed by innovative projects. Assumption of total responsibility for a projects puts a strain on the already thinly spread qualified personnel.

Over expansion of activities using the special resources of technical assistance is another pitfall for transfer in the many technical assistance projects. In the zeal for increased output, broader scope and coverage, the institutional development and training components may not be given the attention they deserve.

The studies which were accomplished by this project on phase-out and termination do not provide any definitive answer, but they do indicate an urgent need for a more detailed analysis of termination, transfer and phase-out so that this aspect of technical assistances does not continue to be a graveyard for a number of otherwise successful activities.

Suggestion 1: Phasing.

Any abrupt termination of any project whether it appears to be failing or not compounds the problem, may influence other activities, and limits opportunities for future resurrection. If a project can not be reduced to the category of a target of opportunity as suggested previously, then it can be gradually phased out or integrated into some other activity of the country environment making maximum use of experience gained. Successful projects require even more careful phasing out. They need personnel who have the capacity to move from operational or advisory positions to occasional consultants. In a similar way, activities and organizations must be gradually exposed to the harsh realities of the bureaucratic struggle in developing countries.

Suggestion 2: Strategy and Analysis.

At present the evidence available supports the hypothesis that the critical variables in effective transfer are the quality of leadership, and the relationships with other parts of the environment which insure cooperation and support. A strategy for transfer to full control by recipient personnel in such a way that the problems of adjustment to the withdrawal of technical assistance will be minimized, requires a careful examination of these and other problems. Such a strategy must be developed with the full participation of recipient officials.

Suggestion 3: Training.

The development of a training component, which includes the donor and other developed countries, developing countries with similar problems and the building of a pattern of local and on-the-job-training, is a fundamental basis for transfer, but it can be built into project planning.

Training, in its broadest sense, also involves gradual assumption of responsibility by recipient personnel. All of these aspects are formally recognized by donor agencies and the subject of training is too large and complex to discuss in detail. For programming purposes what is needed is the location and mobilization of training resources, more involvement of recipients and means to assure the return of trained personnel.

Suggestion 4: Institutionalization.

The comments under suggestion 4 of Commitment are equally applicable to the problems of transfer. It is obvious that the more a project has become an accepted part of the country environment the more the transfer problem can be reduced to a problem of training leadership and staff.

Suggestion 5: Continuing Services after Transfer.

The withdrawal of technical assistance cannot be accomplished in accordance with budget cycles, or standard tours of duty of personnel. It must be adapted to the specific needs of a given project. In almost every case, technical assistance must provide certain types of advisory, consulting or supporting services for a project after it has been transferred. No matter how gradually the transfer is undertaken, the use of consultants or other services to assist in meeting the special needs of the activity after transfer will not only provide an important support but can assist in insuring that the new organization continues to be innovative. It is important however that the donor take initiative in encouraging the transfer, but at the same time make available intermittent consulting services as they are requested.

Specific Actions for AID.

- A. The commitment to transfer any activity should be made clear at the beginning of a project. As the project begins to mature, specific time phased plans for transfer should be set forth with the idea that they are approximate targets which will be examined as the time arrives. This tends to psychologically condition the recipient and force the kind of planning which is required on both sides if the project is to be successfully launched as a country operated activity.

- B. The selection of personnel during the final stages of a project should be given particular consideration in terms of the capacity of technicians to promote the transfer of responsibility. One U.N. technician had been providing important contributions to the leadership of an activity but spent the last six months of his assignment simply as an observer and acting as a consultant on request.
- C. The general pattern of AID projects is characterized by heavy expenditures early in the project and an arbitrary termination date rarely based on the actual progress of the project. A slower start in projects with funds peaking in later periods would provide the opportunity for the training and organizational development required for transfer. In addition, dates for accomplishing intermediate stages would be more useful and termination dates should result from a phase out strategy.
- D. Mission directors should require preparation of a strategy for the phasing out of projects which are ready for transfer and the missions should have the funds for those limited short term consulting and supporting activities which are required after transfer.