

TRANSITION ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED



A GUIDE FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PLANNERS
NOVEMBER 2007



Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

United States Department of State

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Guide reflects the ideas and insights of individuals from across the U.S. government and the international and non governmental organizations with which we work. We are particularly appreciative of the contributions from USAID, including their making available Michele Schimpp, then USAID's Senior Advisor for Elections and Political Processes, to draft this report.

We also wish to thank Beth Cole, and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), for hosting a review and discussion by experts of the lessons presented in this Guide. In that review, we benefited greatly from the insights shared by all participants, including Jeff Fischer, Creative Associates, Eric Bjornlund, Democracy International, Madeline Williams, Barbara Smith, and Michaela Meehan of USAID, Owen Kirby and Lisa Kaplan with the U.S. Department of State, Ivan Doherty and Pat Merloe of the National Democratic Institute, Chris Sands of the International Republican Institute, Dan Calingaert of the American University, and Larry Sampler of the Institute for Defense Analyses.

Lastly, many thanks to staff within the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) for making this guide useful to a field audience, including Sue Nelson, Melissa Brown, Courtenay Dunn, Phyllis Dininio, and Kara McDonald.

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 OVERVIEW: THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSITIONAL ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN R&S PLANNING

1.2 OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF THE GUIDE

2. THE USG PLANNER'S GUIDE FOR TRANSITIONAL ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

2.1 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

2.2 STRATEGIC PLANNING

Figure 1: Strategic Planning Best Practices Checklist

2.3 IMPLEMENTATION BEST PRACTICES

--DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

Figure 2: Democratic Elections Best Practices Checklist

--COMPETITIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL PARTIES

Figure 3: Competitive and Representative Political Parties Checklist

--EDUCATION AND PARTICIPATION OF VOTERS

Figure 4: Education and Participation of Voters Best Practices Checklist

2.4 USG AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

2.5 MONITORING AND EVALUATION –EVALUATING SUCCESS

Figure 5: Monitoring and Evaluation Best Practices Checklist

3. APPENDIX

3.1 DEFINITION OF TERMS

3.2 POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION ESSENTIAL TASKS MATRIX FOR ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

3.3 OVERVIEW OF USG AGENCY CAPABILITIES

3.4 OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION CAPABILITIES

3.5 ELECTION BUDGET SAMPLE

3.6 INTERNET RESOURCES

3.7 KEY TECHNICAL EXPERTS

SUMMARY

In the fast-paced environment of reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) operations, it is particularly challenging for U.S. officials to apply best practices and lessons from the past to the unique and sometimes centuries-old country conflicts they encounter. Faced with the high costs of sustaining peacekeeping operations and with the pressure to recognize a legitimate government for development resources to flow, this guide is intended to help USG planners to adapt their decisions intelligently to country circumstances, informed at the outset by several decades of USG best practices.

For *policymakers*, Section 2.1 highlights the lasting importance of initial policy decisions made and the need to include parties to the conflict, as well as stakeholders for peace, in peace negotiations, dialogues, and key decisions. The report emphasizes the risks of locked-in election timetables and the dangers of excluding former combatants from the contest. Finally, it notes that overall security and election-specific security are flip sides of the same coin: getting former parties to the conflict to disarm, eschew violence, and participate will improve security for elections and help ensure a quality election.

For *strategic planners*, Section 2.2 emphasizes the need for unified approaches that link diplomacy, assistance, and peacekeeping efforts across the USG into support for a single strategic goal, as well as the need to extend our planning to connect to the efforts of other actors in the international community. Locally, not only

is it essential to engage the *election authority, voters, and political parties and candidates*, but the plan should also support *groups to monitor the election process and groups to educate and encourage voter participation*. Furthermore, the plan should anticipate and address potential actions by groups likely to oppose the elections (e.g. armed combatants, political party militia, organized crime and narco traffickers, incumbent political leaders, Diaspora, or groups in neighboring countries).

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 21(3)

For those planning for *implementation*, Section 2.3 offers best practices, including:

For **democratic elections**,

Reach agreement on the laws and systems that will govern elections as early as possible and publicize decisions broadly to defuse suspicion and misinformation. Place particular emphasis on arrangements that encourage moderate and accommodative politics and on approaches to make the election administration as widely-accepted and independent as possible. Seek equal participation by women and groups that were marginalized during the conflict.

Assist with election administration by supporting domestic administrators' to be professional and impartial. Equip administrators with technology and systems that are appropriate to the post-transition context, paying particular attention to voter registration procedures and the identity requirements that are often disputed during conflict. Rely on local capacity whenever possible, engaging international administrators only when local capacity cannot be built. Ensure that international administrators build local capacity for future elections.

Ensure oversight of the process by paying attention to each of its elements--voter and candidate registration, media access, campaign finance, campaign conduct, electoral preparations, election day voting, tabulation and announcement of results, investigation and resolution of complaints, and the seating of winners. As transitional elections are volatile and common flaws can undermine credibility without good oversight, combine multiple methods to enhance the integrity of elections, e.g. domestic and international observation, political party and media monitoring, voter registration audit, media training, and parallel vote tabulation. Ensure that observation organizations are objective and do not have a stake in the quality of the election. Ensure that media coverage is accurate and fair.

For **competitive and representative political parties**,

Promote a commitment to peace by bringing as many potential spoilers into the democratic fold as possible. Bans or prohibitions that exclude the participation of certain groups can provide a pretext for the return to violence. Before conflict erupts in the campaign period, negotiate early to determine how disputes will be resolved, codes of conduct respected, and the election process monitored by parties and candidates.

Enhance the viability of political parties through diplomacy and assistance to deter ethnic/religiously exclusive or hate based campaigns, encourage coalitions that cross conflictive racial, religious, ethnic, or regional lines, and identify sources of legitimate financing.

Support political parties in governing after the election to avoid gaps in service delivery during the political transition that could contribute to instability. Work with the losing political parties to become stronger so that they are more likely to support the democratic process than to resort to arms or destabilizing political action. Reinforce the importance of political parties representing and communicating with constituents, as well as delivering services and reaching out to potential future supporters, so that voters are engaged in politics between -- and not just during -- elections.

For the **education and participation of voters**,

Encourage and inform their peaceful participation by developing politically-sensitive, neutral voter education messages that are appropriate to local conditions and history targeted to particular audiences and hard-to-reach populations (internally displaced persons, refugees, women, minorities).

Engage marginalized groups through helping constitutional and electoral law drafters to consider systems to enhance the representation of formerly marginalized groups. Exercise caution in composing election management bodies proportional to the population. Too often these claims become political fights, particularly in the absence of reliable population data. Instead, encourage recruitment of members who identify themselves, first and foremost, as citizens. Engage marginalized representation by organizing structured consultative fora and help locals to eliminate previously-existing laws, regulations and practices that prevent women and other disadvantaged groups from participating. For example, use multiple languages for election operations and civic education and ensure access for the disabled.

Finally, for those **monitoring and evaluating progress**, Section 2.5 highlights that it is important to tie metrics to locally-relevant measures of conflict resolution, e.g., whether the election results expressed the popular will, the credibility of the process to the local population, the extent to which elections served to mitigate conflicts, the participation of formerly excluded groups, and the neutralization of spoilers. Governments should be encouraged to hold elections that meet international standards as free, fair, and transparent.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSITIONAL ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN R&S PLANNING

In a Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) environment, elections are often one of the first and most visible steps toward democratic political transition – threshold events for the transfer from international leadership to local representation and ownership. In the politically-fragile post-conflict period, decisions made by USG policymakers, practitioners, and security forces related to elections and political parties will be visible and contentious.

After a conflict, local and international authorities are often pressured to organize transitional elections to legitimate governing structures and to demonstrate democratic progress. The potential benefit of elections as the way to peacefully contain formerly-violent disputes entices citizens wearied by conflict as well as the international community. Yet, transitional elections carry a high risk of institutionalizing winner-take-all arrangements, encouraging zero-sum thinking, igniting violence, and/or reinforcing destabilizing social divisions. Too often transitional elections are portrayed as a precondition for the exit of international peacekeepers. Instead, the importance of transitional elections is as an entry point to longer-term international support for accountable, responsive governance and locally-led peace.

1.2 OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF THE GUIDE

This guide is a primer for USG officials so that decisions on elections and political parties are informed by best practices and lessons from roughly two decades of prior experience. The guide should inform strategic-level planning and on-the-ground implementation decisions. Unlike many other guides, it focuses on the election process as well as political parties and voters in pre-election, election-day, and post-election settings. Many of the standard lessons on elections and political processes do not apply, or apply differently, to elections in R&S environments. This guide attempts to capture those differences. It emphasizes how the ensemble of USG resources can best be brought to bear on the election process in R&S operations – which spans from the negotiations over a peace agreement to after the election event.

The guide is organized into four sections. The first section presents policy considerations that commonly arise in transitional elections and political processes. The second section presents the elements of strategic planning. The third section highlights best practices in implementation. A final section highlights monitoring and evaluation.

2. BEST PRACTICES: THE USG PLANNER'S GUIDE FOR TRANSITIONAL ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

2.1 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The policy issues that arise in election and political party work are relatively common across R&S settings. They include questions related to the determination of election rules, the timelines for elections, the goals of international engagement and conditions for withdrawal, the adequacy of security, and the approaches for turning warriors into politicians. Based upon U.S. and international experiences, a number of best practices to address these issues are summarized below.

During and following peace negotiations, policy decisions should be informed by experts, debated by locals, and analyzed by the international community. Early decisions have lasting consequences for the country's political system and power structures. Even seemingly-technocratic decisions can have profound implications for power relations in the long term. Negotiations that consider the transitional election system, timing and sequence of elections, delineation of voting districts, and other topics that could influence the election outcome should involve representatives of all local stakeholders. Furthermore, electoral experts should be consulted to explain to each group of stakeholders the implications for them of decisions taken. As much attention should be devoted to engaging groups with an interest in peace (e.g. women, conflict forced migrants) as is invested in former combatants.

The role of the international community in organizing and/or supporting the elections needs to be carefully considered and clearly defined in the peacekeeping agreement and/or international resolution. In some transitional elections, an international body, such as the United Nations (U.N.), is given responsibility for election administration. In other cases, responsibility may be shared with a national electoral management body. In other situations, especially those with little trust between local actors, an international body may supervise a nationally-administered process. Yet in other cases, the mandate of the international community is limited to providing assistance to the national electoral authorities or observing the election process. To the maximum extent possible, the international community should rely on local capacity to organize aspects of the election, with a view to establishing a sustainable national capacity for future electoral processes.

Peace agreements should avoid setting specific election dates and instead focus on benchmarks that set the foundation for more enduring democratic practices. Even apparently generous timelines during peace negotiations can cause problems downstream. In polarized post-conflict environments, tensions flare when organizing an election or negotiating agreements takes longer than anticipated. A USAID review of 14 post-conflict elections found that only three were not delayed. Although set dates can be used as negotiating tools and can galvanize action by local actors who might otherwise delay, equally useful is establishing benchmarks that need to be met for a quality election. Benchmarks could include reaching

THE HIGH STAKES OF ELECTORAL RULES

Different decisions on the electoral system and related rules will produce different results. That's why these decisions should be negotiated by local political groups and informed by experts. For example:

Electoral formula: Majoritarian or plurality formulas reward the largest vote getters, whereas proportional representation gives minority groups representation in the legislature.

District magnitude: the greater number of seats elected from an electoral district, the more proportional the overall results.

Thresholds: the higher the threshold for representation for a party or candidate, the less proportional the overall results

Sequence: if presidential and legislative elections are held on the same day, the party winning the presidency will likely take more seats in the legislature than otherwise. If held on different days, opposition parties are advantaged.

Boundaries: district lines can be drawn to favor or disadvantage parties or populations.

agreement on the legal framework, recruiting election commissioners, and securing funding for the election, with a timetable for elections a set number of months after achieving the benchmarks.

Parties to the conflict should be given incentives to participate, provided they agree to disarm and to eschew violence and crime. To increase the chances of a lasting peace, the parties to the conflict need to believe that violence is counterproductive to their goals, engaging in the political process instead of seeking their aims through violence. Alongside programs to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants, political incentives include assistance in transitioning from a warring to a political party, providing campaign opportunities, offering training, and providing access to media. If concerned that criminals, human rights abusers, and/or former regime leaders will be legitimized by winning and will use their office for criminality or violence, establish the means by which a competent body can judge the case before the elections. Deciding to prohibit the participation of individuals or groups can backfire by creating powerful incentives for political violence.

SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE (RUF/SL)

The Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 set the stage for former combatants to become political parties. These peace accords between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) ensured that RUF/SL was included in the political transition through the 2002 elections. This included the transformation of RUF/SL into a political party and its inclusion into a broad-based government of national unity through the provision of cabinet appointments. To read the Lomé Peace Agreement, see www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html

Marginalized populations will have specific needs that will require attention in the election process. Groups that have been excluded from the political process will require particular attention to ensure that the transitional elections meet international standards for universal suffrage. Measures must be taken to enfranchise people with disabilities. Women may have been excluded for religious reasons, ethnic or religious

REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN

Conflict affects gender relations. Men and women assume new responsibilities during war, and in the post-conflict period, election rules and processes are often changed to provide greater inclusion of women. In fact, post-conflict countries exceed the world average of 15% women in parliament.

- In Rwanda, constitutional reform coupled with electoral quotas for women raised the level of women parliamentarians from 17% (1988) to 48% (2003)- raising Rwanda to first place in the world's ranking.
- Similar efforts in Sierra Leone also resulted in a rise from 1% (1982) to 14% (2002).

(Inter-Parliamentary Union, *Post Electoral Support*, 2004)

groups may have been denied suffrage for fear that they would vote as a bloc or support extremism, or refugees or migrants were forced from their land and disenfranchised. Because election observers typically concern themselves with whether the election system granted special privileges to particular political parties or social groups and whether voter education was impartial, international actors may adopt a policy of *leveling the playing field* to enable formerly marginalized groups to compete more equitably. However, these efforts should not cross the line of influencing the election outcome since the losers' acceptance of the results sets the stage for sustainable peace.

Address as many security concerns as possible so that the perpetrators of violence cannot prevent the peaceful expression of the popular will through elections. Provisions to enhance security for an eventual electoral process should be established and should focus on creating an atmosphere conducive to a high turnout – enough security to instill confidence in voters but not so much to call into question whether the security forces could

influence the vote. Elections may be premature unless minimum security and administrative conditions exist, including an effective cease-fire, widespread demobilization and disarmament of former belligerents, access throughout the territory, participation by all relevant political forces, and a neutral electoral administration in place. Still, these minimum security conditions may not satisfy all participants. In war-torn and post-conflict

societies, candidates are rarely free from threat, and voting is an act of courage. Newly established security forces lack experience and may not be reliable. Even if disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration were successfully completed, there may be pockets of instability or sectors committed to insurgency. Security problems are inevitable, but to meet international standards the election environment should be sufficient to enable freedom of movement, speech, assembly, association, equal and universal suffrage, and the opportunity to participate.

If there are calls to postpone the elections, consider whether delay will undermine or enhance legitimacy and participation. If holding to particular deadlines would compromise the legitimacy or representativeness of the vote, then delay should be considered. However, delaying can also be a political tactic to influence election outcomes, or to undermine the credibility of election processes and institutions. Therefore, the international community should strive to help build as much momentum toward elections as possible—that way delay can be decided upon and announced only when absolutely necessary. In case of delay, it is best to announce it transparently to voters and candidates at the earliest possible date with sufficient time to remedy problems. The delay must also be perceived as legitimate by the main political actors and must not unduly favor the electoral prospects of an incumbent interim administration.

Elections are not an exit strategy but rather a step towards the peaceful resolution of disputes. In a post-conflict environment, voters and candidates in an election take serious risks – and in effect take a leap of faith. A ‘democracy-dividend’, where some small aspect of day-to-day life is improved shortly after the election, validates the decision to take those risks. Conversely, a worsening of conditions can discredit elections as a viable solution and incite a backlash that reignites conflict. Many spoilers identify this opportunity and await the post-election departure or downsizing of the international presence to undo the progress. Thus, the international community (including peacekeeping troops) must commit to stay engaged until the peace is sustainable, rather than focus on the election event to permit exit. Also, it is important to bear in mind that elections risk exacerbating political polarization in post-conflict situations. Therefore, alongside elections, it is essential to support efforts to promote reconciliation and build agreement on the rules and future of the country.

2.2 STRATEGIC PLANNING

The policy considerations outlined above will shape and influence strategic planning for transitional elections and political processes. The strategic planning process should involve at least five steps. Planners must assess the country context, the main obstacles or problems likely to be encountered, and the political, legal, and funding context for interventions (both USG and international). The plan should achieve consensus around a common USG goal for the election process. It must identify a combination of activities connected to the common USG goal. It must identify a budget. Finally, it must identify interconnections among elections, political parties and other R&S activities. The five steps below outline best practices related to strategic planning.

Step 1: Assess conditions on ground, the main obstacles or problems that may be encountered, and USG political, legal, and funding context. An assessment is essential to ground the plan in as comprehensive an understanding of the problems that will need to be addressed for the election as possible. To do this, it is important to understand:

- ❑ the context of the prior conflict and how it will influence the environment in which the elections will take place;

- ❑ what effect the political and electoral process will have on that context;
- ❑ whether there is or is not agreement on various rules governing the election and structures of the new government;
- ❑ the actors who have a stake in the outcome (see *Main Actors* text box);
- ❑ their interests, sources of legitimacy, and resources; and,
- ❑ potential scenarios to be encountered.

MAIN ACTORS

Essential Participants:

- ***an election authority*** to organize the election, whether national, international or some combination;
- ***political parties and candidates*** to compete; and
- ***voters*** to vote.

Others:

Groups to monitor the election process – need to become active as early in the process as possible and may require international support for their activities.

- *Domestic election monitoring organizations* may exist or may emerge from other types of organizations to monitor voter, party and candidate registration, to track media access and political party conduct, to conduct parallel vote tabulations or quick counts, and to monitor voting, counting.
- *International observers* are usually helpful in drawing international attention to the electoral process, prevent intimidation in susceptible areas, and lend credibility where domestic capacity is limited or biased.
- *Political party monitors* monitor the election process to look out for their own party's concerns.
- *Electoral Grievance Bodies* play a critical role in adjudicating election disputes.
- *Media* report on the election process and highlight progress or abuses.

Groups to encourage participation and educate voters – these groups too may require international support for their programs.

- *Civic education organizations* may exist or may form to educate voters and Get-Out-the-Vote campaigns.
- *Journalists* provide information to citizens about the election process, its shortcomings, the candidates and the parties.
- *Social Networks* like Parent Teacher Associations, women's groups, etc. may wish to educate and encourage the participation of their membership.

Groups that could oppose elections – those who may resist or spoil the election must be identified, understood, and their potential actions be anticipated and addressed in the overall strategy.

- *Armed combatants* – may oppose a peace process or democratic elections.
- *Political party militia* – armed factions tied to political parties.
- *Organized crime and narco traffickers* – often benefit from the conflict and will finance combatants or political parties.
- *Incumbent political leaders* – may expect to lose in elections and thus undermine the process.
- *Economic elites* – benefit from the conflict and/or fear loss of power via democracy.
- *Public servants and public enterprise employees* – who fear loss of their jobs.
- *Diaspora* – who may finance particular actors in the conflict or elections process.
- *Neighboring countries or specific populations in neighboring countries* – that benefit from the conflict and/or aim to influence the election to ensure a favorable outcome.

Once this analysis is complete, ***a number of questions should be asked:***

- ❑ Is there an election deadline? Is it a problem? What are the costs and benefits of possible timelines?
- ❑ Have combatants demobilized and disarmed? Is security a problem? How will it be addressed?
- ❑ How likely is it that contenders will participate?
- ❑ Has a constitutional process been completed? Does a reliable census exist?

- ❑ Is there agreement on the legal framework?
- ❑ Is the election administration independent and neutral?
- ❑ Can different areas of the country be accessed?
- ❑ Does an environment exist to enable competition (e.g. media freedom)?
- ❑ Will out-of-country voting or refugee voting need to be addressed?
- ❑ What is the budget and what are the financial resources available?
- ❑ Can international advisors and observers have access to the country to advise and observe?

The questions woven throughout this document are illustrative of the kinds of questions that should be asked about country context. In addition to this, planners and policymakers should assess the political, legal, and funding context. Most importantly, the assessment should serve as a base on which USG interagency (and sometimes international) consensus on goals can be built.

Step 2: Define the USG interagency goal in supporting an election. Without USG consensus on a policy goal, unity of effort among all actors on the ground cannot be achieved. For transitional elections, the goal is likely to place a great deal of emphasis on how well the elections serve to mitigate conflicts, whether they include people formerly excluded by virtue of the conflict, whether the spoilers are neutralized, and whether popular will is expressed. The goal should not focus on a specific election outcome, thereby providing the excuse for losers to boycott or resort to arms. Nor should the strategy fixate on a particular schedule, but rather, on the process of bringing people formerly engaged in violent conflict into a peaceful competition and an acceptance of the results.

INTEGRATED MULTI-SECTORAL WORK PLAN

A sequenced work plan was developed in Afghanistan that identified tasks to be accomplished in each area of the political transition, including the elections. It provided clear benchmarks towards ensuring the necessary legal, political, security and electoral preparations were put into place, and allocated responsibilities between governmental authorities, electoral structures, the UN and other international actors. (UN Peacekeeping: The 2004 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned.)

Step 3: Plan for a combination of activities connected to the common USG goal. A strategic approach to election and political processes incorporates the full range of USG assets – whether diplomatic, assistance, economic, information, or military – toward achievement of the set goal which will differ from context to context. In taking strategic advantage of the various tools available to the USG, *diplomacy* is particularly critical to help combatants agree on the rules of competition, to deter boycotts, to advocate for a peaceful pre-election environment, to encourage the acceptance of results, and perhaps most importantly, to ensure international community consensus on an integrated approach to support the process. *Assistance* should both inform and buttress the USG policy by supporting the election process, political parties, and the participation of voters, and providing incentives for spoilers to join the competition and deterrents to those derailing it. If there are international *military* forces present, whether USG or international, their engagement on improving security may be critical, as well as that of police or auxiliary police who may receive assistance to better perform their security responsibilities.

Step 4: Identify a budget. The budget should be based on the activities identified above. Nevertheless, some information on past budgets for transitional elections is worthwhile. In peacekeeping environments, the cost of an election tends to be between \$10-30 per registered voter. During larger, more complex operations, as in Cambodia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the overall budget ran into the hundreds of millions. Smaller countries with better communications and administrative infrastructure (Central America and the Balkans) had budgets in the tens of millions. In peacekeeping environments, the costs of promoting the integrity of the electoral process (e.g. domestic monitoring, international observation, political party poll-watching, etc.) account for roughly half of the budget. (See Appendix 3.5 for sample costing worksheet or visit www.aceproject.org/main/english/po/po45.htm)

Figure 1: Strategic Planning Best Practices Check List

- ✓ **Plan for an integrated process, but also for the different phases of the electoral cycle, including pre-election, Election Day, and the post electoral period and environment:** To the extent possible, assistance programs should have a long-term sustainability focus so that the institutions and capacity built last through subsequent elections. Minimize dependence on external advisors and avoid the introduction of expensive equipment and technology so that appropriate, cost-effective, and sustainable long-term systems are developed.
- ✓ **Plan for unexpected events that require surge capacity – both financial and human.** The process is rarely smooth and unanticipated delays and changes are common, but they should be planned for. For instance, a response fund could help support an unanticipated run-off or referendum. Delays in electoral calendars almost always result in increased costs for election administration and associated processes.
- ✓ **Anticipate use for last-minute funding. Sometimes, last minute funding becomes available.** To maximize impact of funds arriving late in the process, consider the purchase of media air time for voter education messages, get out the vote campaigns, peace messaging, or candidate debates; post-election surveys; and/or covering unanticipated last-minute logistical costs such as supervisory travel, communications with voting sites, faster recuperation of sensitive materials from isolated sites, and more frequent public messages from the electoral commission on the progress of the vote and count.
- ✓ **Coordinate activities and budgets with the international community.** The international community is most effective when it works together and when the actions are complementary. In some elections, support to the elections and political parties will be channeled through one mechanism, such as a UN Trust Fund. This can provide for an integrated effort and avoid duplication. In other cases, donor funding is provided bilaterally to joint or separate projects. These programs should be coordinated through donor meetings, usually chaired by the UN. If funding is provided through a multilateral mechanism, it is essential to have a clear understanding of how this funding is controlled and allocated. In many cases, the USG will contribute both bilaterally and multilaterally, as many multilateral trust funds do not allow for a donor to allocate funds to a particular activity.
- ✓ **A clear structure, division of labor, and common agenda among donors and technical experts are required** to ensure that programs and advisors are not working at cross-purposes and that certain activities or civil society organizations are not overwhelmed by international assistance. In many cases locals will be financially and technically dependent on internationals and unable to steel themselves against competing agendas. Technical assistance should be provided where possible on the counterpart system to build the capacity of the local election administrators and their staff and to ensure local ownership of the process.
- ✓ **Avoid large capital purchases and focus on appropriate technology for the context.** Keep technology acquisitions transparent and locally-appropriate. Large procurements are opportunities for patronage and graft, and some systems and equipment purchased can be inappropriate for local conditions and/or unsustainable for local election management bodies.
- ✓ **Plan well for security.** The electoral process can provide tempting, soft targets for spoilers. Electoral administrators, political parties, and the electorate can be targeted for violence and intimidated. Electoral sites and warehouses can be attacked. Access to polling stations or campaign sites can be blocked by violence. The election process can be sabotaged from within as well as from without. There is usually a tendency for such attacks to escalate as an election approaches. A comprehensive electoral security strategy should be thought through well in advance and adapted as circumstances evolve. In situations where there are US forces or international peacekeepers, local forces should provide the inner perimeter of security, supported and coordinated by international security forces, such as the UN civilian police or troops. Local and international security forces should receive training on their appropriate conduct and responses during the process and on the presence and roles of the press, observers, and monitors at electoral sites and polls.

Step 5: Identify interconnections between elections, political parties, and other R&S activities. Peacekeeping operations are complex, with inter-related activities designed to be mutually supporting. The interconnections will vary in the different operations and from country to country. However, several types of connections are common across R&S operations.

- ❑ **Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR):** In many peacekeeping situations, DDR will be underway. DDR activities can complement political party strengthening programs. For example, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former belligerents is one of the primary steps in transforming a combative force into a political party that seeks power through the ballot box instead of through force. Existing parties may also be armed, and a DDR program can help ensure their disarmament. The pace of DDR is also likely to influence the feasibility of an election date. In Angola and Cambodia, for example, holding elections without having completed DDR is often cited as a critical flaw. If delaying the election will result in a better security environment and not derail the entire peace process or invite constitutional debate, then delay may be prudent. If former belligerents are still largely armed and ready to mobilize, if there is not an effective cease-fire, if access throughout the territory is inhibited, and/or if relevant political forces will not participate, then elections are likely premature. In this period, efforts instead to create incentives for peaceful participation should be redoubled.

- ❑ **Security Sector Reform:** DDR is often a subcomponent of a longer-term Security Sector Reform (SSR) process. Planning for the electoral process should take into consideration the current status of any SSR efforts. Pre-existing security forces – whether military, police, or non-state actors – often are agents of one faction or another and, in some cases are sources of extra-judicial human rights violations. As part of election security preparations, international peacekeepers, local security forces, and /or other security providers should be properly coordinated and each must be capable of performing the assigned role during the election process. Since newly established security forces will lack experience and may not be reliable when confronted with a politically-charged election atmosphere, the credibility of the nascent or reforming security force and the election itself can be at risk. A range of technical measures focused on election security can lower the pressure on new security institutions, including the use of Joint Operation Centers, dedicated training on security, weapon exclusion zones, campaign cooling off periods, and codes of conflict (see <http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/elections-and-security>).

- ❑ **Political and Civil Affairs:** There is a strong connection between elections and the political and civil affairs structures and responsibilities that are typically undertaken in peacekeeping operations. Political affairs will deal with the political parties, making sure they participate in the process and that their grievances are heard. Civil affairs will work with civil society and local governments, and they are uniquely placed to support civil society efforts to promote democracy, monitor media coverage and support voter information and participation programs. Including these offices and leveraging their strengths and outreach should be a part of all elections planning and strategies.

**VOTER EDUCATION
FOR SECURITY FORCES**

Factional fighting in Cambodia (1997) split security forces along old party lines. With a 30-year history of political violence, it was essential that security forces remained neutral or the 1998 elections would not be free or fair.

The Cambodian Institute of Human Rights started a program to train the security forces, police and gendarmerie in *Neutrality, Human Rights, Democracy and Elections* with training focused on:

- meaning and importance of neutrality;
- roles, rights and responsibilities of security forces in elections; and
- rights of security personnel as voters.

Although the Cambodian Ministry of Defense stopped the training before all 1,300 master trainers were reached, many of those trained were senior officers deployed throughout Cambodia. The training had also aired on national radio and TV-- reaching many of Cambodia's 11.4 million citizens. Election education for security forces contributed to a relatively peaceful election in 1998.

- **Transitional Justice:** Truth and justice commissions are sometimes created in countries coming out of civil war, such as Sierra Leone. In other countries, such as Bosnia, war-crime tribunals may be established. The timing and mandate of these types of proceedings are usually determined in the peace agreement, but they need to be carefully considered in relation to the electoral timetable. Although a means toward reconciliation, transitional justice efforts can be divisive and adversely influence the electoral process by producing new information, resurfacing memories, and/or publicly placing blame and holding individuals accountable. For election purposes, it is optimal that potential candidates be subjected to a judicial process prior to the election. Otherwise, it falls to election bodies to determine whether individuals or groups should be allowed to compete – decisions that are better handled by justice authorities. At a minimum, timing should be coordinated so that transitional justice activities do not disrupt the electoral process or discourage former belligerents from joining the process.

2.3 IMPLEMENTATION BEST PRACTICES

The following sections focus on the three main objectives of election and political party programs: democratic elections, competitive and representative political parties, and informed voter participation. They highlight what to look out for and the main components of, and lessons related to, the holding of transitional elections.

A. Democratic Elections

The following section focuses on key components and lessons learned in supporting democratic elections. The first half identifies some key variables related to the nature of the environment in which the election will take place. The second half lays out some “must have” components and lessons learned for laying the groundwork for a successful election.

Main components/phases

There are three main components in supporting democratic elections: 1) reaching agreement on the legal framework; 2) supporting election administration; and 3) ensuring oversight of the electoral process. (Political parties and voter education – while complementary and critical -- are covered in two additional, separate sections that follow.) In terms of priority and sequence, agreement on the general parameters of the election rules is a precondition for all subsequent election work. Election administration is of secondary priority since without it the election cannot take place. Oversight is highly important to ensuring a democratic process. The checklist in Figure 2 identifies best practices from election assistance in R&S operations. Not all activities implied by the checklist will be appropriate for USG action or feasible in all settings, but the lessons merit an initial consideration.

KEY VARIABLES TO CONSIDER

- Unilateral invasion vs. multi-lateral intervention – the extent to which internationals are perceived as neutral
- Whether there is ongoing conflict that will influence the outcome
- Whether the Constitution has been approved
- Whether an election law has been approved
- Whether a political party law has been approved
- The type and sequence of elections (national first, local first)
- Whether issues of citizenship and national identity have been resolved
- Whether elections will be locally, internationally, or jointly administered
- Whether the election system has been established, boundaries delimited, formulas for translating votes-to-seats in legislative bodies.

**Figure 2: Supporting Democratic Elections
Best Practices Check-List**

<p>Reach Agreement on the Legal Framework</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Build consensus on rules and systems. Gain agreement on rules via constitutional or electoral law drafting process, and emphasize the inclusion of eligible voters, as well as political parties and candidates. Forge consensus on the type of representation, the type of executive, the balance of powers, and checks and balances in the system. Gain agreement on the process for dispute resolution. ✓ Adopt laws early in the process. Enhance the credibility of the process by engaging early in constitutional/electoral law drafting and through their earliest possible passage and widest publication of the resulting legislation. ✓ Select appropriate electoral and constitutional systems. Assist the people who must agree on the legal framework to understand constitutional and other legal electoral provisions that may encourage moderate, accommodative politics. Some of the arrangements to consider are power-sharing, federalism, ethnic partitioning, proportional representation, and all-inclusive formulas of representation. ✓ Ensure rational sequencing. Assess context to determine the sequence that is most likely to build peace rather than promote divisiveness. Be wary of local elections standing alone, absent plans for eventual national elections, as this can serve as a tool for authoritarian leaders to project a façade of democracy. ✓ Seek a widely-accepted election administration. Often the composition of election administration bodies and how they manage the process are a source of conflict. Mitigate conflict via legal requirements for election administration, such as minimum job requirements, interethnic composition or political balance of the electoral management board or staffing, use of minority languages in outreach, manuals, and voter information, and facilitation of voter and candidate registration, including external registration and voting. Actively recruit women into the electoral administration. ✓ Support independent election management. Buttress the election management body from manipulation by ensuring that the legal framework gives it control of its own regulations, budget, staffing, and facilities. Engage political parties through structured and periodic consultative forums with the election managers, so they can participate but not unduly influence the process. ✓ Work for transparent and regulated political finance. Ensure that the election framework specifies permissible sources of political finance and includes public disclosure and reporting requirements and sanctions, with particular attention to financing originating from abroad which often make transition elections prone to questioning. Do not create regulations that cannot be enforced, otherwise the authorities appear weak or biased. ✓ Ensure the opportunity for equal participation by women and other marginalized groups. Help locals to eliminate laws that discriminate against women, minorities/ethnic groups, and the disabled and that prevent them from participating fully in the electoral process, including running for office. In addition to equity issues, women are often among the strongest pro-peace constituency. ✓ Carefully examine mechanisms designed to increase participation of marginalized groups. Examine costs vs. benefits of adopting mechanisms such as quotas as a means to increase participation of women and marginalized groups. If election administration capacity is weak, quotas may be difficult to enforce and are only one of a variety of means to ensure fair representation of marginalized groups. Quota systems alone may also not address the power relationships and imbalances that led to the discriminatory actions and practices.
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**Assist
Election
Administra-
tion**

- ✓ **Use and build local capacity.** Use local capacity wherever possible and don't under- or over-estimate local ability to conduct elections efficiently. Where basic requirements for security and political trust are met, the material and procedural aspects of elections should be left as much as possible to local actors. Plan from the outset the need for large-scale recruitment of temporary electoral workers and the contraction of the electoral institution to a core staff and facilities after an election.
- ✓ **Ensure international administration is neutral.** If elections are internationally administered, ensure administration is neutral. Plan for and transfer to domestic authorities any responsibilities assumed by internationals at the earliest possible time.
- ✓ **Strengthen domestic administration professionalism and impartiality.** Assist election administrators to be as neutral and professional as possible, particularly in their openness to the voices and concerns of contenders. Nevertheless, be aware that establishing a neutral body is often impossible. Use diplomacy and assistance to deter partisan bias by the Authority. Recommend a code of ethics for election administrators.
- ✓ **Adopt appropriate technology and systems.** Avoid introducing complicated technical innovations (e.g. computerized voting, overly complex voter registration). Transition elections are enough of a challenge for inexperienced election administrators, and complicated and expensive systems may be unsustainable in the long-term. Approaches to conducting the elections should be locally appropriate and transparent. Consider high integrity voting security measures such as indelible ink, tamper proof containers, external processing of voters registers, and printing of ballot papers.
- ✓ **Support a well-planned voter registration.** Plan for an initial voter registry that can be reused and updated in future elections. This will avert the need to start from scratch at future elections, make voter registration more cost effective over time, and allow for the improvement of the quality of voter lists in subsequent elections.
- ✓ **Strengthen grievance and appeal systems.** Ensure a fair, timely, and transparent process for the adjudication of election disputes is established, as well as a manageable process for appeals. Some situations will require a special body, independent from the election commission that can address most disputes without delay.
- ✓ **Adopt appropriate identification requirements.** Establish requirements that strike a locally-appropriate balance between the need for strict documentation (to ensure that only those who meet the agreed criteria can register) and encouraging wide participation through an accessible system. Be wary of literacy or education requirements that could unfairly exclude groups.
- ✓ **Use existing population data where possible.** Exert caution before attempting to conduct a census before an election. Accurate demographic data is generally lacking post-conflict, so often there are calls for a census before an election, particularly to determine districting. However, a census can require a few years to conduct, and it can be divisive or be manipulated to further electoral aims. In some cases, single district proportional representation can avoid the need for districting.
- ✓ **Do contingency planning.** If possible, encourage contingency planning and simulations to prepare local and international administrators for possible problems, security issues, etc., and to improve capacity and build confidence.

<p>Ensure Oversight of Election Process</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Maintain a process focus. Ensure that domestic and international observers are able to assess the pre-electoral process and climate (such as voter and candidate registration, media access, campaign conduct, electoral preparations) and the post-electoral context (the tabulation and announcement of results, the investigation and resolution of complaints, and the seating of electoral winners, as well as election day voting and the count). Overemphasizing election day observations can yield an overly favorable assessment. What may look like a minor technical flaw on election day may be evidence of far more serious fraud that would go undetected without a long-term observation. This also builds credibility and trust in the process and its results. ✓ Train overseers. Train observers and monitors to document irregularities, including political party monitors and the media. This provides consistency, enables quick checks of allegations by electoral authorities and prevents wild and unsubstantiated claims. ✓ Encourage impartial observation. Anticipate that observers and monitors can and do pursue partisan political agendas to the detriment of their work. Therefore, when neutrality is an issue, support observers and monitors from multi-partisan or multi-national perspectives. Even when a neutral actor is managing the elections, there should always be third party validation of the process to ensure reliability and lend legitimacy. If an organization is supervising the election or providing technical assistance to the election management body, an impartial third party should conduct observation. ✓ Consider parallel vote tabulations (PVTs). If fraud in the vote count is a concern, a quick count is often used. It projects the election results from a sample of precinct-level voting results as a check on government tabulations. It should be undertaken by long-term observation efforts and political party monitors. PVTs can also be helpful in difficult elections where one of the parties may not accept the election results and mediation is anticipated. It is important to note, however, that PVTs and quick counts <i>cannot detect other types of fraud such as ballot stuffing, multiple voting, or vote buying.</i> ✓ If PVTs are not appropriate, consider exit polls. Exit polls can also serve as a check on official results and are useful in settings where ballot stuffing is an issue. They may be less reliable than PVTs, however, in environments where voters are intimidated or fearful of retribution. In post-conflict settings, exit polls may be divisive and undermine the perception of the secrecy of the ballot. ✓ Remember security for observers. Domestic and international election observer missions should be independent and able to travel freely so as to not bias the observation process. In environments where observers can become targets, they may need to provide for their own security if they are not part of a bilateral or multilateral observation effort. This can significantly increase costs. Collaboration between domestic and international observers can maximize geographic coverage and access. In some threatening environments, teaming international observers with domestic observers can serve as a deterrent to intimidation of the local observers.
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B. Competitive and Representative Political Parties

The following section focuses on key components and lessons learned in enabling representative political parties to compete in the elections. The first section identifies some key variables related to the nature of political environment. The second section lays out some “must have” components and lessons learned for laying the groundwork for a peaceful and competitive election.

Main components/phases

There are three main components in supporting competitive and representative political parties: 1) promoting a commitment to peace; 2) enhancing the viability of parties; and 3) addressing post-election governance.

In terms of priority and sequence, promoting a commitment to peace is particularly important in transitional elections because agreement by political parties on the general parameters of the election rules is a precondition for all subsequent election work. Enhancing the viability of political parties is of secondary priority but it is critical to ensuring that the election contest offers voters a choice. Addressing post-election governance is a later priority, but it should be planned for at the outset. The greatest opportunities to help parties become more representative exist after the election. Figure 3 identifies the main best practices from political party assistance in R&S operations. Not all activities implied by the checklist will be appropriate for USG action or feasible in all settings, but the lessons merit an initial consideration.

KEY VARIABLES TO CONSIDER
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The role of different political parties in the conflict and their interest in an end to conflict ▪ What criteria are applied for party registration ▪ Whether important groups in society are unrepresented by political parties ▪ The number and strength (internal organization/external support) of political parties ▪ Whether significant political forces will participate or boycott elections ▪ Whether election administrators are perceived as biased toward certain political parties ▪ Whether radical and criminal groups have the assets to dominate the electoral process, and whether the political process will encourage the emergence of moderate voices ▪ Whether a level playing field can be created as the basis for the election

**Figure 3: Competitive and Representative Political Parties
Best Practices Check-List**

Key Components

Best Practices

Promote a commitment to peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Engage early. Begin engaging political parties, civil society, and other key players as early as possible to get their buy-in, clarify expectations, and convey the rules of the game. ✓ Build consensus on the need for DDR before going to elections. Avoid setting an election date until there is demonstrable progress toward demobilization and disarmament and there is sufficient agreement on election rules. ✓ Foster inclusion. Bring as many potential spoilers into the democratic fold as possible to avoid having them resort to violence. Develop partnerships between the international community and political parties by getting them informed and participating in all important policy decisions, i.e. inclusion in peace negotiations and decisions on electoral systems. ✓ Temper bans on participation. Determine if there are bans on the electoral participation of certain sectors of the population, such as a set of former combatants or incumbents. An excluded group of individuals will have little incentive to work through the system and may be among the most dangerous of election spoilers, so exclusion should be avoided. ✓ Promote democratic criteria. USG assistance should only be offered to political parties that are committed to democracy and that adhere to nonviolent, constitutional means to attain power. ✓ Identify and address triggers of violence. Decide where political parties and issues might trigger violent conflict. Identify and implement means to reduce the likelihood. ✓ Track political violence. Systematically gather information on threats to candidates, party-linked violence, systematic exclusion of groups, and other forms of political violence. This information should inform decision-making by the election management body, security planning, and the public. It should also be used by the international community to confront sponsors of violence. ✓ Support party monitoring. Assist political parties to organize long-term monitoring and short-term poll watching programs to ensure that they have their own source of comprehensive information on the preparations for the elections and the conduct of key election events throughout the country (e.g. voter and candidate registration, voting, counting).
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<p>Enhance the Viability of Political Parties</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Promote positive, issue-based campaigns. Deter political parties from engaging in ethnic/religiously exclusive or hate based campaigns. Political parties should develop programmatic agendas, but coming up with in-depth platforms in the immediate period between conflict and elections may not be realistic. ✓ Support coalition building. Assist smaller political parties to coalesce into larger, more viable groupings, ideally crossing conflictive racial, religious, ethnic or regional lines. ✓ Encourage base-building. Encourage political parties to become more oriented towards constituents and structured to be responsive to citizen needs. This helps to promote political party roots in society and the accountability and decentralization of power structures. ✓ Suggest non-violent methods of peaceful protest. Educate political parties on the costs of violent conflict to counterbalance or dampen the tendency toward the use of violence during elections. ✓ Encourage women’s participation. Help aspiring women candidates across democratic parties to develop their skills to win office and emerge to positions of leadership. ✓ Ensure the availability of political finance. Direct USG financial assistance to political parties is prohibited. Commodity assistance can be provided but if it is not widely accepted by all political parties and offered equitably to all democratic political parties, it can taint those that receive it. Instead, consider including host-county public financing in local law or establishing a multi-national donor fund administered by the election management body or a neutral international entity.
<p>Support political parties in governance post election</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Promote representation. Engage political parties after the election to better represent and respond to their constituents. Consider programs to help newly elected governments avoid gaps in service delivery that could contribute to instability as delivery of essential services is often disrupted during political transitions. ✓ Strengthen delivery of services. Seek to help newly elected governments avoid gaps that could contribute to instability as delivery of essential services is often disrupted during political transitions. ✓ Maintain a long-term engagement. Engage losing political parties and help them to learn from electoral defeat, strengthen their structure, promote their outreach and highlight their function as a “loyal-opposition.”

Challenges

Two main challenges to the international community are common in supporting political party programs – ensuring appropriate competition by parties supported and maintaining donor neutrality.

Ensuring appropriate competition. Competition is often seen as a dirty word – implying conflict and winner-take-all scenarios – and the political parties that play that game usually get tainted. The motivations of candidates may be selfish. Political competition at all levels is often as much about the control of important economic and environmental resources as it is about ideologies, policies, and programs. In R&S settings, it is very likely that some political parties will attempt to exploit and manipulate the societal divisions that led to the conflict in order to win office. Some political parties may be forming out of highly-vertical military structures. Other political parties were probably underground, operating in opposition but without a firm,

constructive agenda. Often, elections exacerbate existing ethnic tensions by encouraging voters to align themselves with their deepest rooted identity. Inter-ethnic confrontation could be reinforced by supporting purely ethnically-based parties, particularly in an uneven or biased manner. While it is not the aim to overcome or blur ethnic divisions through political parties, at least parties should be viewed as peaceful, democratic organizations through which grievances or values are represented in lieu of violent conflict.

Maintaining donor neutrality. Political party assistance may exacerbate conflict when used to favor a particular party, or a group of parties, over other democratic contenders. The legitimacy of the electoral process as the means for peaceful conflict resolution and political competition is undermined when an external actor, whether the United States or another foreign government, appears to be providing resources to assure the electoral victory of one democratic candidate or party over the others. It can be difficult to determine where to draw the line on what makes one party *democratic* and another *non-democratic*. The U.S. and other countries have often supported democratic forces in their fight against authoritarian oppression, communism, and *non-democratic* parties. USG policy requires that assistance be provided to democratic parties on an equitable basis. In the interests of maintaining peace, it is often possible in R&S operations to engage non-democratic parties in other ways, short of assistance, to expose them to democratic norms, to deter boycott, or to discourage a return to violence (see *USAID Political Party Development Assistance Policy*, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pdaby359.pdf).

C. ***Education and Participation of Voters***

The following section focuses on key components and lessons learned in educating and encouraging the participation of voters. The first section identifies some key variables related to the nature of the environment in which programs will take place. The second section lays out some “must have” components and lessons learned for laying the groundwork for informed and active voter participation.

Main components/phases

There are two main components in educating and encouraging the participation of voters: 1) encouraging and informing peaceful participation; and 2) engaging marginalized groups. In terms of priority and sequence, both are essential and urgent. A legitimate election relies on the participation of informed voters. Educating voters is typically referred to as either *voter education*, which is election-specific information on how and where to register and vote, or *civic education*, which is more generalized learning on the rights and responsibilities of living in a democratic society. Regardless of the type of education, if participation is undermined because voters do not understand the process or the stakes, or because certain groups do not participate, it is unlikely that the overarching election goal can be achieved.

KEY VARIABLES TO CONSIDER

- If the Constitution and electoral process are entirely new or similar to prior ones.
- If people understand the roles of the positions being contested.
- Extent to which particular populations require targeted attention (e.g. women, particular ethnic/religious/geographic populations, disabled).
- Political and cultural history.
- Education level of population.
- Infrastructure to support dissemination of election information.

Figure 4 identifies the main lessons learned from informing and motivating voters in R&S operations. Although not all activities implied by the checklist will be appropriate to or feasible in all settings, they merit consideration nonetheless.

**Figure 4: Voter Education and Participation
Best Practices Check-List**

<u>Key Components</u>	<u>Best Practices</u>
Encourage and Inform Peaceful Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Design context-specific messages. Help election administrators and civic organizations design – and test with local focus groups – a coordinated set of messages on the election process that are clear, simple, and agreed-upon by all. Set aside time to research the best venues for reaching target audiences with messages that are tailored to the unique needs of the situation. Pay attention to conflict-related critical issues that could undermine the credibility of the election (e.g. security, perceptions of bias by the elections management body, secrecy of the vote). ✓ Sequence messages according to timeline. Initial information should focus on the new constitutional/electoral systems, building to voter registration, peaceful campaigning, and how to cast an informed vote, as well as accepting the results and supporting the new national government. All should build donor trust and confidence as well as inform and manage expectations. ✓ Ensure targeted message delivery. Support credible local authorities and organizations to deliver ample information, with special emphasis on marginalized and hard to reach populations (e.g. IDPs, refugees, women, minority populations, marginalized groups). Use pre-existing networks to conduct voter and civic education: women’s groups, farmers’ networks, faith based institutions, traditional networks. This is cost-effective as well as programmatically effective. The choice of institution and network through which the message is conveyed will affect how it is received, thus care must be taken in selecting the messenger. ✓ Ensure messages with political sensitivity and neutrality. Biases, or perceived biases, for or against certain competitors can backfire, undermining the credibility of overall USG election assistance. Messages need to be perceived as neutral and not divisive. ✓ Manage expectations. Post conflict elections are not perfect events and are only one event in the long-term process of establishing democracy. There is a need to manage the expectations of citizens of the newly elected government and what it can deliver. This can be done effectively though voter outreach messaging. ✓ Reserve resources to counter misinformation. Keep a reserve of resources and capacity to deflect misinformation, disinformation, and rumors that can undermine election credibility.
Engage Marginalized Groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Consider election systems that enhance representation. Assist constitutional and electoral law drafters to understand systems and methods to enhance the representation of marginalized groups. These can include quotas, reserved seats, and districting, some of which can be extremely effective but also controversial. ✓ Support inclusive election administration. Mitigate potential conflict via legal requirements for election administration to ensure they are inclusive, such as interethnic composition of the electoral management board, use of minority languages in electoral operations and civic education, and facilitating voter and candidate registration (including out-of-country registration and voting).

<p>Engage Marginalized Groups</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Facilitate voting and registration for displaced and marginalized citizens. Ensure that marginalized groups and/or displaced populations have or can obtain identification that will enable them to register and that they are aware of the voter registration and voting processes. Organize polling in refugee camps or consider absentee voting arrangements. ✓ Consider out-of-country voting for refugees and Diaspora. Depending on the situation, it may be prudent to help facilitate out-of-country voting, especially for refugees in neighboring countries. In some circumstances, out-of-country voting for large numbers of refugees or Diaspora may be critical for electoral legitimacy and long-term stability. However, costs can be high. ✓ Use targeted voter education. Ensure that voter education is tailored to the unique needs of all the groups involved in the electoral process, including former combatants, marginalized groups, language minorities, and the disabled. ✓ Promote equal participation. Help locals to eliminate laws, regulations, and practices that prevent women and other disadvantaged groups from participating fully in society and support initiatives that teach women and others how to cast an informed vote, advocate, manage, and govern. ✓ Ensure equal access to the media. Media access in post-conflict countries may be dominated by one faction or be state-owned. All sectors must have equal access to the media to conduct voter information and education as well as for political campaign purposes. Note that marginalized groups are often marginalized from mainstream media due to language, distance, poverty and other factors, so additional efforts may be required to reach these groups. ✓ Compensate for illiteracy. Be aware that widespread illiteracy may be an obstacle to be overcome, particularly among marginalized groups. This will impact methods for outreach, voter education, and technical decisions such as ballot design.
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2.4 USG AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

International assistance to elections in R&S environments can take a variety of forms. Depending on the situation, the international community can run and/or supervise the election, be part of an electoral commission, or provide technical assistance to sovereign bodies. Supervision is typically the task of the U.N., and often the U.N. is the lead coordinating body for the international community. However, the USG often plays a major leadership and coordination role, either bilaterally or as part of a U.N.-led core group.

TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO TRANSITIONAL ELECTIONS

- **Elections Organized by International Community** (Kosovo; Bosnia; Cambodia '92; Eastern Slavonia; East Timor '99)
- **International Representation on Electoral Commission (With or Without Vote)** (Afghanistan; Iraq; South Africa; Liberia)
- **Technical Assistance to National Sovereign Body** (Haiti; Cambodia '98; Tajikistan; Burundi)

USG Coordination. In country, a USG election coordinating committee should be formed as early as possible to include, as appropriate: staff from the Embassy Political Section to be responsible for diplomatic initiatives; USAID's democracy office to be responsible for assistance; the Public Diplomacy Office responsible for USG local and international outreach; and the military liaison officer for matters related to election security. This group should hold regular meetings to agree upon the strategy, main activities, responsibilities, deadlines, changing local circumstances, coordination, and information sharing. It is also recommended that

a similar group be formed in Washington, and that conference calls or simultaneous video teleconferences be organized regularly between the two groups. When appropriate, meetings should include USG-sponsored grantees or contractors who provide election, political party, and security related assistance.

Coordination with International Actors. Good international coordination is essential to ensure unity of message and to avoid duplication of financial and technical assistance. A regular working-level coordination meeting should be organized that includes the range of international actors involved in election and political party assistance. In most transitional elections, the meeting is chaired by the U.N. However, as mission structures often vary across R&S environments, it is likely that roles and responsibilities may also vary. An inclusive approach to constituting the committee can be extremely helpful, as most donors and international actors operate under certain legal and financial constraints. With proper coordination they can meet most needs. Getting donors together as early as possible for budget coordination is important, as it helps ensure that donors with constraints can earmark funds for areas that they can support, or pledge in-kind donations such as ballot paper or ink.

It is also essential to have a high-level diplomatic committee to ensure that important policy issues are discussed and political decisions made, whether by the host country government or by the international community. This group can also track critical political issues such as the lack of will for democratic elections or potential boycotts by significant parties. It can help mediate disputes and broker compromises between political factions. An international community that coordinates and speaks with a unified, consistent message can help keep difficult transitions and elections on track while maximizing the effectiveness of its assistance.

Coordination with Military. Whether a US-led coalition or international peacekeepers, USG civilian policymakers should coordinate with and include military forces in planning both on the ground and in Washington. Depending on the mission, they can play a major role in election security and assist with the logistical operations of election administration, or they can play a supporting role, assisting local security forces and the election management body as requested. Increasingly, civilians and military are coordinating on elections through Joint Operation Centers. An important task for the coordinating body is to map the country's election risk profile, determining the mission-critical aspects (people, infrastructure, materials and information) to decide how best to protect them. Anticipating the victims, perpetrators, and motives for the violence is key. Violence is not only between political rivals or instigated by insurgents. The interim government can target voters – or voters the government -- to influence election results.

Whether or not the military will formally assist in the election, it is critical for civilians to understand the military mission, rules of engagement, and their implications for the electoral process. On the ground, civilians should coordinate with the commanding officer who has the authority to make decisions and commitments. In environments where security is a major issue and operations are complex, it may be beneficial to place civilians in the military command structure to ensure safety and communications. In situations where the military is engaged in civil affairs, coordination with civilian efforts is particularly important.

In any R&S environment, scenario-based contingency planning and/or exercises (whether within the USG or involving the international community and/or local actors) may help prepare all involved to work together effectively during the electoral process and especially on election day and the critical days following the vote.

SECURITY PLANNING

In militarized post-conflict electoral processes, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, consideration must be given to security threats for each stage of the process. Decisions on the timing, type and level of election must take into account the military, financial and diplomatic resources available to secure the process and sites as well as to deter worst case spoiler scenarios.

(UN Peacekeeping Best Practices: The 2004 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan. Lessons Learned)

2.5 MONITORING AND EVALUATION - EVALUATING SUCCESS

2.5.1. “Free and Fair” Elections.

Whether the election was free and fair is a question that will undoubtedly arise. But there is rarely a simple answer to this question in any election, never mind one in a war-torn society emerging from conflict. The international community generally agrees on the basic democratic principles that must be met for an election to be deemed “free and fair.” These include equal voting power for all citizens, freedom to organize for political purposes, ability to campaign for office, right of access to political information, and holding elections that are decided by freely cast votes. International observers and domestic monitors should assess the quality of the elections using criteria to determine the extent to which elections met international standards, as well as issue pre-election assessment reports that highlight areas that require improvement (such as voter and candidate registration or campaign conduct) and post-election statements that identify strengths and weaknesses of the voting, tabulation of results, and complaint adjudication processes.

2.5.2. *Best Practices in Developing a Metrics Plan for Elections and Political Party Interventions.*

The measure of success for elections will depend on the goal that was established in the strategic plan. *Did the results express the popular will? Was it a credible process to the local population? How well did the elections serve to mitigate conflicts? Did the people who were formerly excluded by virtue of the conflict participate? Were potential spoilers of the peace neutralized or de-legitimized? Were those who wanted to compete able to do so? Was there equal access to media? Were candidates able to meet with their constituents and campaign without government interference or intimidation?* It is important that metrics are identified during the strategic planning process to ensure that policymakers agree on what constitutes success and how to evaluate it. Metrics can be developed to measure whether assistance, policy, or security interventions achieved goals.

Illustrative Indicators/Metrics for Elections

Measures of success should be grounded in the reality of the country context as well as how the election process supports the democratic transition and a lasting resolution to violent conflict. Therefore, it is best to identify indicators that highlight changes by locals to break the conflict cycle. For example,

- ❑ Voter turnout in districts where disenfranchised groups reside --as a reflection that the election reflects popular will
- ❑ Voter registration levels – ideally tied to the efforts of locals to conduct a credible and participatory registration effort
- ❑ Participation in the contest by the main political forces –connected to parties fielding party monitors, engaging in debates, etc.
- ❑ Acceptance of results by losers
- ❑ Incidence of electoral violence, disaggregated as appropriate to the context with attention to “red zones”
- ❑ Adherence to codes of conduct by parties, candidates, media, and security forces
- ❑ Achievement of targets-levels of polling stations observed by domestic observers or political party monitors
- ❑ Percentage of complaints submitted/resolved, disaggregated by parties and locations

POPULATION ESTIMATES

In Bosnia, the lack of a voters list and old, unreliable census data meant there was no baseline to measure voter turnout. This problem was addressed in Kosovo, where population experts from KFOR, University of Pristina and other organizations worked together to agree upon a realistic population baseline for evaluation purposes. Civil registries have formed the basis of the voter list since 1999.

In addition to monitoring and evaluating the impact of U.S. efforts, there are a number of standard indicators that were developed by the Director of Foreign Assistance for all elections, political processes, political party, and consensus-building programs. They include:

- Number of domestic election observers trained with USG assistance
- Number of international election observers deployed with USG assistance
- Number of election officials trained with USG assistance
- Number of people reached by USG assisted voter education
- Number of laws or amendments to ensure democratic elections drafted with USG technical assistance
- Number of electoral administration procedures and systems strengthened with USG assistance
- Percentage of USG-assisted election polling stations without major logistical problems during an election
- Number of individuals who receive USG-assisted political party training
- Number of political parties and political groupings receiving USG assistance to articulate platform and policy agendas effectively
- Number of USG-assisted political parties implementing programs to increase the number of candidates and members who are women, youth and from marginalized groups
- Number of consensus-building processes assisted by USG
- Number of groups trained in inclusive consensus building techniques with USG assistance
- Number of groups trained in conflict mediation/resolution skills with USG assistance
- Number of USG-assisted consensus-building processes resulting in an agreement

Figure 5: Monitoring and Evaluation Best Practices Check-List

- ✓ **Develop metrics early:** Work early in the intervention to build interagency (or international) consensus around specific objectives for interventions and appropriate measures to monitor and evaluate results. If there is a lack of consensus on goals and objectives, this process will identify that. Indicators or metrics must match the overall program or intervention objectives.
- ✓ **Keep it simple:** Data collection is particularly difficult in R&S environments, so develop measures based on data that can be easily collected. If the effort is well coordinated and sufficiently simple, various international and local actors can be responsible for collecting data using the same metrics.
- ✓ **Get baseline data:** Where possible and appropriate, gather data for each measure at the outset so that a baseline is known. In R&S environments, data is often unavailable or unreliable. If this is the case, establish a consensus on the baseline data and how it was measured. Baselines are essential for most indicators to measure progress.
- ✓ **Budget for monitoring and evaluation:** Build the cost of monitoring and evaluation into the budget for operations. Determine funding for both qualitative and quantitative collection and analysis.
- ✓ **Focus on manageable interest:** A common problem in evaluation is the tendency to choose a metric that is too lofty for the given intervention, and then being held accountable when clear results or causal relationships on that metric are not achieved. In choosing a specific metric, make sure it is something upon which the intervention can actually have a causal effect and where the data is easily available.
- ✓ **Combine qualitative and quantitative measures:** While quantitative measures are important, qualitative data collection and analysis is also critical to understanding the complete picture.

3. APPENDIX

3.1 DEFINITION OF TERMS

Democratic Political Party: a democratic party supports peaceful, democratic means to obtain power, respects human rights, the rule of law, and the freedom of religion, press, speech, and association. Internal party democracy is difficult to find in most R&S environments, but should be one of the objectives of party strengthening assistance

Election Authorities or Election Management Body: the entity(ies) responsible for administration and supervision of the election, assisted by a team of officers and employees responsible for many aspects of electoral process. This often takes the form of an electoral commission made up of appointed/elected commissioners and a technical secretariat.

Electoral Framework: the rules that govern the organization and holding of elections. These include the Constitution, election laws, and associated regulations.

Electoral System: the electoral system determines the structure of the elected institutions and how votes are converted into seats by political parties and candidates. Main systems include: proportional representation, majoritarian (or first past the post), and mixed.

Federalism: a federal system of government in which power is divided between a central government and several regional ones.

First Past The Post: an electoral system in which the winning candidate is the one with the most votes.

Monitoring: the process of monitoring the electoral process. Monitors have certain rights to intervene in the electoral process if a problem is detected. The extent of a monitor's supervisory powers is determined in the electoral framework and/or peace accord.

Observation: the process of observing the electoral process to ensure it respects the electoral framework of the country and meets basic international standards for free and fair elections. Observers are not participants in the process and only report on findings.

Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT): a forecast or verification of electoral results based on actual observation of the vote count in statistically-significant, randomly-selected polling places.

Parliamentary System: a system of government based on a governmental authority vested in the legislative body and a cabinet headed by a prime minister or equivalent. Parliaments are usually selected using the proportional representative system that allocates seats to parties according to the percentage of vote received

Political Finance: funding raised and/or provided to political parties and candidates by the state (public financing) or via private donations (private financing).

Political Party: a political party is an entity that organizes to win elections, operate government and determine public policy. It can include political movements, electoral coalitions or alliances.

Presidential System: a system of government with a separation of power between the executive and legislative bodies, with separate elections held for each.

Proportional Representation (PR): an electoral system that allocates seats in the legislative body to each party or group approximately equal to the share of votes received during an election. PR systems can use open or closed lists. An open list allows the voter to select his/her candidate(s) from a party's list, while a closed list allows the voter to select the party of his/her choice, yet the individual candidates elected as a result are pre-determined by the party. Some open list systems, sometimes called free lists, give voters as many choices as there are seats and allow voters to select candidates from across multiple party lists.

Quick Count: a projection of election results carried out by observers or parties based on a sample of the voting table results. To be accurate, the sample must be representative. Often, but not always, used interchangeably with the term Parallel Vote Tabulation

Registration: enrolling prospective voters on a registration list for electoral purposes. There can also be a party registration, whereby parties register as political party entities and/or to compete in an election.

Register Of Voters: a list of voters eligible to vote in an election. Accurate lists need to be maintained and updated on a regular basis (to account for voters who move, come of age or die) by a government or electoral authority.

Voter Information: basic information needed by voters to be able to vote (e.g. date, time, polling locations, type of election, method of casting a vote, registration and voting requirements). This information is usually provided by the electoral authorities and can be supplemented by civil society and political party messages.

Voter Education: provides voter information and addresses issues such as voter motivation and preparedness to participate fully in an election (e.g. role, responsibilities and rights of voters, secrecy of the ballot, why each vote is important, how votes translate into seats). This type of information is usually provided by election authorities and supplemented by education campaigns of civil society organizations.

3.2 S/CRS POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION ESSENTIAL TASK MATRIX FOR ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES.

Participation			
Elections			
	Initial Response	Transformation	Fostering Sustainability
	<i>Goal: Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation</i>	<i>Goal: Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes</i>	<i>Goal: Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes</i>
Elections Planning and Execution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Set realistic timetable, goals, and budget for elections *Facilitate indigenous decision on the mode of representation and sequence of elections (national/local) *Determine identification requirements for registration/voting *Establish independent national electoral commission *Establish or verify voter registry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Assist national electoral commission in developing appropriate laws, procedures, and rules for election, including security of candidates and ballot box, and in promulgating rules of election *Ensure secure and fair election campaign 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *(I) Provide logistical support for elections (ballot boxes, voting stations, etc.) if required *Assist national electoral commission in planning and execution of election *Promote sustainable election methods and mechanisms
Elections Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Secure agreements for international and domestic monitoring presence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Recruit and organize indigenous and international election monitoring teams 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Deploy monitoring teams *Support development of domestic monitoring and watch dog groups
Elections Outreach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Enable electoral commission to publicize election timetable and encourage citizen participation *Gauge public opinion through polling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Disseminate information about electoral process *Undertake voter education campaign 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Make election results widely available to avoid fraud and misperception *Institutionalize process for investigation and redress of allegations of electoral malfeasance
Political Parties			
	Initial Response	Transformation	Fostering Sustainability
	<i>Goal: Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation</i>	<i>Goal: Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes</i>	<i>Goal: Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes</i>
Party Formation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Support political competition *Ensure clear legal status, protections, and regulations of political parties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Encourage creation of multiple parties *Require transparent and legal funding mechanisms *Oversee registration of political parties in accordance with election laws *Establish political party code of conduct, including the renunciation of violence and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Support political activities by backing democracy promotion objectives *Link parties to legitimate international counterparts
Party Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Identify and assess capabilities of potential political party leaders and structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Sponsor workshops and provide assistance to develop political parties (i.e., constituency outreach, issue analysis, platform development, media relations, fundraising, voter mobilization, campaign strategy, mediation and conflict resolution) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Facilitate democracy, governance, management, and negotiation skills training for elected representatives and party leaders *Develop leadership skills and encourage candidacies of women and marginalized groups

3.8 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF USG AGENCY CAPABILITIES

Responsible Agency/Bureau	Areas of Possible Assistance	Types of Assistance	Mechanisms for Assistance	Restrictions	Timing
USAID					
Field Mission	Democratic Elections Political Parties Voter Ed/ Participation	Technical; Programmatic; Financial; Commodity	Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements to NGOs, INGOs, regional & international orgs		If funding available, it takes apprx two weeks for processing after receipt of proposal/writing of SOW.
Regional Bureaus	USAID Mission Backstop	Advisory & resource for Mission, Funding	Country Desk		
Democracy and Governance Office (DCHA/DG)	Democratic Elections Political Parties Voter Ed/Participation	Technical; Programmatic; Financial; Strategic: TDY Support	CEPPS worldwide Cooperative Agreement and Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IQCS) for Elections and Political Processes		Minimum 2 week notice
Office of Transition Initiatives (DCHA/OTI)	Election information dissemination / election commission support	Technical Assistance, Small Grants	SWIFTII		Few days to 1 month
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM)	Peace-building & conflict management; Adapting elections and governance programs to conflict environments; DDR & SSR.	Technical; Programmatic; Financial; Strategic: TDY Support	IQCs for Instability, Crisis, and Recovery Programs (ICRP)		Minimum 2 weeks notice
STATE					
Embassy	USG policy guidance in-country; Follows political/electoral developments				
Regional Bureaus	Post Backstop; Policy Development	Policy guidance, resource for post, chair DC Interagency Coordination Funding: ESF	Desk		
Political and Military Affairs (PM) Bureau	DDR & Security Sector Reform as related to peacekeeping operations (link to election security)	Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)			
International Organizations (IO) Bureau	US contribution to Peacekeeping Missions	Backstop with international organizations	Contributions for International Peacekeeping (CIPA)		

Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) Bureau	Democratic Elections Political Parties Voter Ed/Participation/Media training support that addresses elections	Technical assistance and training	Grants, using Democracy Fund (DF) or ESF using DRL's Human Rights & Democracy Fund	HRDF has notwithstanding authority	Varies
Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) Bureau	Refugee Reintegration	Financial contributions, mainly to UNHCR or IOM	Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)	Does not directly implement programs; relies on multilateral organizations dealing with refugees	As much advance notice as possible
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)	Interagency coordination & development of interagency strategic plans. Elections as component of post-conflict reconstruction & stabilization activities	Coordination planners and advisors with regional and technical expertise Integration of civilian and military planning Contingency planning	State Department Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) resources; 1207 funding via DoD; Active and Standby Response Corps	Does not directly implement programs. Relies on USG operational agencies.	Rapid (24 hour) deployment of staff
Public Diplomacy	Public information; Exchange Programs	Technical, Financial, Commodity,	Contracts, Grants, International Visitors Program		
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau	Security/justice environment – link to election security	Police trainers/mentors; criminal justice sector reform and development	Bilateral Programs (Letter of Agreement) or secondments of police to UN, under contract	Non-lethal aid to host nation; self-defense Rules of Engagement; no stability policing	10-12 weeks

3.4 OTHER KEY ACTOR CAPABILITIES

Organization	Areas of Possible Assistance	Types of Assistance	Mechanisms for Assistance	Remarks
United Nations				
UN Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD)	Democratic Elections Voter Ed/Participation	Needs assessment; Election administration, Technical Assistance, Monitoring & Observation, Verification & Supervision	Directly, through UNDP or Peacekeeping Operation	Part of Department of Political Affairs www.un.org
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO)	Electoral & Political Components of Peacekeeping Operations	Can be comprehensive depending on mandate	SRSRG, Peacekeeping operations, Trust Fund	Can use various UN mechanism for staffing (UN EAD, UNOPS etc) www.un.org
UN Development Program (UNDP)	Democratic Elections Political Parties Voter Ed/Participation	Technical, Programmatic, Financial, Commodities, Donor Coordination	Resident Representative UNDP Project Trust Fund	Disbursement can be slow. Service fee usually negotiable. www.undp.org
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA)	Democratic Elections Political Parties Voter Ed/Participation	Technical, Programmatic, technical backstop for UN		Works closely with UNDP www.unpan.org/dpepa.asp
UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	Elections and Census Technical and Operational support	Technical, operations planning, procurement, commodities, logistics	Implements directly when contracted	www.unops.org

Multilateral Organizations				
European Union	Democratic Elections Political Parties Voter Ed/Participation	Technical; commodity; Financial; observation	Contracts, grants, fields own observation missions	Needs lengthy advance time for funding decisions www.europa.eu.int/comm
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission)	Democratic Elections	Legal drafting & opinions, Training, Technical Assistance	Assistance to Election Management Bodies & courts	www.venice.coe.int
International IDEA	All	Assessments, Studies, Manuals		www.idea.int
Organization of American States	Democratic Elections Political Parties Voter Ed/Participation	Technical, Financial, Commodity, Observation & Monitoring	Unit for the Promotion of Democracy	www.oas.org
Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OECD/ODIHR)	Democratic Elections	Election Administration, Technical Assistance, Observation & Monitoring	ODIHR is the OECD office for elections assistance	www.oecd.org/odihr
Bilateral Organizations				
Australian Elections Commission	Democratic Elections	Election Administration TA, Training, IT	Usually funded by AusAid	Developed BRIDGE training with the UN & IFES www.aec.gov.au
Elections Canada	Democratic Elections Voter Ed/Participation	Technical Expertise	Usually through CIDA	Large pool of electoral experts available for contracting www.elections.ca
Federal Electoral Institute (Mexico)	Democratic Elections	Technical Expertise		Usually short-term & small scale TA www.ife.org.mx
Organizations Accessible Through Pre-Competed USG Agreements				
International Foundation for Electoral Systems IFES	All	Technical, Procurement, Civil Society support	Grants & Contracts	Worldwide www.ifes.org
International Republican Institute IRI	All	Political party work, Civil Society Support, Observation	Grants	Worldwide www.iri.org
National Democratic Institute (NDI)	All	Political party work, Civil Society Support, Observation	Grants	Worldwide www.ndi.org
The Asia Foundation	All	Technical Assistance, Civil Society Support, Monitoring Observation	Grants	Works throughout Asia www.asiafoundation.org
The Carter Center	Democratic Elections	Observation, electoral mediation	Grants	Worldwide www.cartercenter.org
Democracy International	All	Technical, Procurement, Civil Society support, monitoring	Contracts	Worldwide www.democracyinternational.us
Creative Associates	All	Technical, Procurement, Civil Society support, monitoring	Contracts	Worldwide www.caii-dc.com

3.5 ELECTION BUDGET SAMPLES

Election administration budgeting information and sample costing worksheets for almost all election administration line items can be found at www.aceproject.org/main/english/po/po45.htm

A sample of the work sheets available:

COSTING WORKSHEET		ACTIVITY: ELECTION FORMS AND MATERIAL Sheet 1			
PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES:					
COMPONENT DESCRIPTION	CRITERION	NUMBER REQUIRED	UNIT	UNIT COST	TOTAL COST
STAFFING					
Estimating, ordering, inventories			(person/days)		0
Quality monitoring					0
Warehousing/distribution					
- Goods acceptance/w/house control			(person/days)		0
- Parcel material for distribution					0
- Loading/driving/distribution					0
STAFFING SUBTOTAL					
BALLOT PAPERS					
Design and production of masters					0
Printing					
individual constituencies	(expected voters + reserve 10%)				#DIV/0!
PR party list	"				#DIV/0!
County	"				#DIV/0!
BALLOT PAPER SUBTOTAL					
ELECTION FORMS					
Appointment of election staff	(no of staff)				#DIV/0!
Appointment of agents					
Individual constituencies	(no of candidates)				#DIV/0!
PR party list	"				#DIV/0!
county	"				#DIV/0!
Declaration of secrecy	(no of elect staff, cand, agents)				#DIV/0!
Notification of venues - Voting					
- Counting					#DIV/0!
Officials ID's	(no of officials)				#DIV/0!
Instructions to voters					
Individual constituencies	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
PR party list	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
County	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
Voting station notices					
No smoking	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
Entrance/Exit	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
Hours of polling	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
Other	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
Objection to voter	(no of reg voters)				#DIV/0!
Questions to challenged voter	(no of reg voters)				#DIV/0!
Declaration by challenged voter	(no of reg voters)				#DIV/0!
Adjourned polling	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
Voting station inventory	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
Receipt for voting material by PC	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
Receipt for ballot papers by PC	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
Ballot paper account - end of voting					
individual constituency	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!
PR party list	(no of vot stations)				#DIV/0!

3.6 INTERNET RESOURCES

The ACE Project www.aceproject.org is an electronic encyclopedia of elections information for election administration. It covers the spectrum from staffing to polling and political party financing to election IT. This is a joint effort of the UN DESA, International IDEA and IFES. Information is available in English, French and Spanish.

The BRIDGE (Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections) Training program www.bridge-project.org/ was developed by the AEC with the UN EAD and IFES to professionalize and standardize election administration training.

Election Access <http://www.electionaccess.org/> is an IFES clearing house for information on the participation of people with disabilities in the electoral process.

The **IFES Buyer Guide** <http://www.ifesbuyersguide.org/> has information on procurement of electoral commodities.

Inter-Parliamentary Union, has a *Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections* at: www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm

International IDEA <http://www.idea.int/> has a series of election publications including;

- *Code of conduct for Political Parties Campaigning in Democratic Elections.*
www.idea.int/publications/coc_campaigning/index.cfm
- *Code of Conduct for the Ethical and Professional Administration of Elections.*
www.idea.int/publications/conduct_admin/index.cfm
- *Electoral System Design: The new International IDEA Handbook*
www.idea.int/publications/esd/index.cfm
- *Epic Project* which provides comparative country-by-country data on election systems, laws, management and administration. It is a joint project of IDEA, UNDP and IFES
www.epicproject.org
- *Political Finance Database* on Political Finance Laws and Regulations from 100 countries.
www.idea.int/parties/finance/db/

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) had a Political Rights and Enfranchisement System Strengthening (PRESS) project to improve the capacity of refugees, internally displaced persons, and other forced-migrants to participate in their home country political processes. <http://www.geneseo.edu/~iompress/>
One paper is *Enfranchising Conflict-Forced Migrants: Issues, Standards and Best Practices.*
http://www.geneseo.edu/%7Eiompress/Archive/Outputs/Standards_Final.pdf

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has a series of election monitoring handbooks available at <http://www.ndi.org/globalp/elections/programselc/manuals.asp> including:

- *Building Confidence in the Voter Registration Process*
- *Media Monitoring to Promote Democratic Elections*
- *The Quick Count and Election Observation*

RAND Corporation recently published *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* with a section on democratization http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG557.pdf

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)

<http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections> has a series of manuals:

- *Election Observation Handbook* http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_13585.html
- *Guidelines to assist National Minority Participation in the Electoral Process* www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_13590.html
- *Handbook for Domestic Election Observers* www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_13586.html
- *Handbook for Monitoring Women's Participation in Elections* www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_14004.html
- *Resolving Election Disputes in the OSCE Area: Towards a Standard Election Dispute Monitoring System.* www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_13590.html

The United Nations Development Program and IFES recently produced *The Core Report: Getting to the CORE – A Global Survey of the Cost of Registration and Elections*

http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=472999

United Nations, Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women held a 2004 conference on Enhancing Women's Participation in Electoral Processes in Post-Conflict Countries. Report and conference papers are at: www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/meetings/2004/EGMelectoral/

USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance has several election related manuals available at:

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/dgtpindx.html#pnacr223 including:

- *Managing Assistance in Support of Political & Electoral Processes*
- *Money in Politics Handbook: A Guide to Increasing Transparency in Emerging Democracies*
- *USAID Political Party Development Assistance*
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pdaby359.pdf

Additional USAID studies:

Post Conflict Elections: An Experience Review (2005) by Rafael Lopez-Pintor available at:

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADB897.pdf

From Bullets to Ballots, Electoral Assistance to Post Conflict Societies, available at:

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACD084.pdf

Venice Commission http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/Elections_Referendums_E.asp has electoral guides including:

- *Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters*
- *Election Evaluation Guide*
- *Guidelines for constitutional referendums at national level*

3.7 TECHNICAL EXPERTS: U.S. GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL, AND PARTICIPANTS IN USIP REVIEW CONFERENCE

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