




USAID and Social Scientists Discuss Afghanistan's Development Prospects

by Louis Dupree



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Fieldstaff Reports

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The American Universities Field Staff

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USAID AND SOCIAL SCIENTISTS DISCUSS
AFGHANISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

by Louis Dupree

April 1977

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), after 20 years of less than unqualified success, appears to be on to something good, or, at least, to a program less harmful than most. The new guidelines established by Congress in 1973 emphasized that all American assistance should be slanted toward the "poorest majority of the peoples" (i.e., the "rural poor")! The constraints listed in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 have already resulted in rethinking, reassessment, and realignment in priorities.

In line with this new focus, an imaginative, energetic—and because of these traits, possibly expendable—AID official, David Steinberg (Director, Office of Technical Support, Near Eastern Bureau, USAID/Washington), asked the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska-Omaha (UNO)² to organize a conference on rural life in Afghanistan, with emphasis on developmental possibilities. The conference, AID sponsored and financed, would be the first of its kind, and therefore experimental in nature. AID did everything possible to give the participants intellectual free rein, the only caveat being that papers should relate to rural development. According to the first memo (prepared by History Professor Richard S. Newell—the University of Northern Iowa, the conference's official convener, "each participant will retain exclusive publication rights to his or her paper." Copies, however, would be submitted to AID for its official use. The memo also indicated that, if funds could be found the papers (and comments on them) might be published collectively.

The conference was held at the University of Nebraska in Omaha September 23-25, 1976 (see Appendix A for list of participants). As the meetings

were open to the public, a number of scholars interested in Afghanistan came from as far away as California and New York to attend the sessions and participate in the discussions. The only participants from outside the United States were myself and my wife, Nancy Hatch Dupree. We were sponsored by USAID/Afghanistan; lamentably, no AID official from Afghanistan was invited. More than 50 unofficial participants attended each working session (see Appendix A).

Thomas E. Gouttierre, Dean of International Studies and Programs and Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies,³ welcomed the guests on behalf of UNO, David Steinberg for AID. I subsequently presented a brief review of the current situation in Afghanistan, then the participants retired to prepare for the working sessions convened early the following morning (see Appendix B).

The Papers

Graham Kerr, in "Regionalism in Afghanistan: Strategies in Identifying and Collecting Data," summarized the experiences of the Afghan Demographic Studies (ADS), a joint Afghan-American effort, undertaken under an AID contract to the State University of New York (Buffalo). The ADS, which survived from 1971 to 1975, literally had to start from scratch to obtain even the most basic data. Afghanistan has never taken a national census, until 1975 there were no adequate statistics available. In 1971, the ADS identified more than 25 separate offices collecting statistics in various ministries. Few, however, were fully operational, and none used standardized collecting techniques. It is hoped that the creation in 1975 of the Central Statistical Office (CSO) as an independent organ within

the Office of the Prime Ministry and the promulgation of a new Statistics Law will revolutionize data collecting in Afghanistan.

ADS became a temporary part of the Department of Statistics in the Ministry of Planning and, according to Kerr, "was charged with providing improved demographic statistics on the population of Afghanistan, and also with institutionalizing within Afghan agencies the capability of collecting and analyzing high-quality data on a national basis." In an attempt to achieve these impossible goals, ADS worked within the framework of National Demographic and Family Guidance Surveys (designed by ADS) on settled and nonsettled populations, combined with Knowledge-Attitudes-Practices (KAP) studies done in conjunction with the Afghan Family Guidance Association.⁴

With practically no previous reliable data and contract constraints on time, money, and competent personnel, the impossibility of a nationwide census was immediately apparent to the Afghans and Americans involved in ADS. Project designs therefore focused on a national sample, and it is in the sampling area that ADS got most flak from its critics.

Kerr described the ADS sampling strategy as follows:

During stratification one tries to maximize homogeneity within each stratum, while simultaneously trying to maximize heterogeneity between strata. The same technique may be used when you regionalize a country for the implementation of a new rural works program. You divide up the country so when you are working in each region you use the same technique of implementation anywhere in that particular region, but as you move to another region you expect to change the program to accommodate the different conditions that exist in the new region.

The rest of Kerr's paper focused on other sources of information utilized by ADS. These included:

1. Sources outside Afghanistan (libraries in the United States and Europe; technical agencies; individual scholars).

2. Sources in Afghanistan

a. Sources in Kabul

- i. Nongovernment (libraries; scholars)
- ii. Government; (libraries; ministries; Cartographic Institute)

b. Sources outside Kabul

- i. Government (local officials)
- ii. Nongovernment (scholars; local people).

Kerr discussed in some detail the use of female interviewers in rural areas, for this was an innovative move. Only women could collect detailed and accurate data on pregnancy. It was difficult, but ADS managed to assemble a group of qualified women. Two more obstacles had to be overcome: the female interviewers' attitudes toward travel in rural areas (few women leave Kabul except to visit other urban centers); male attitudes toward females traveling about the countryside, accompanied by male companions, usually not relatives.

To minimize suspicion and disapproval, women always worked in pairs, and at times sisters or mothers and daughters formed data-collecting teams. Sometimes brothers accompanied sisters, and while females interviewed females, males interviewed males. Eventually adequate data were collected to complete the KAP survey.

ADS had all research reports translated into Dari (Afghan Persian), and left all basic data files in Afghanistan for use by future researchers and planners, Afghan and foreign. (Kerr's paper included a bibliography of all ADS publications, even the bi-weekly progress reports.⁵)

The final figures produced by the ADS programs are still in dispute in some Afghan (and even some non-Afghan) circles and, as Kerr himself concludes:

In spite of the hard work and effort of the ADS staff we were not able to assemble the data base required for a quantitative stratification of the country. Using maps of physical features, including relief, altitude, agricultural land use patterns and other variables

such as ethnic and linguistic groupings (all related to population characteristics), and the judgment of ten experts from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Cartographic Institute who had traveled extensively and knew about settlement patterns and relative population densities, some 28 strata were delimited on maps and used in the sampling procedure successfully. I say that it is a temporary solution because we can now improve it with ADS and ERTS (Earth Resources Technology Satellite—LD) data and other information still to be collected.

A final footnote should be added to Kerr's presentation. Many of the Afghans trained specifically for the ADS surveys are now without jobs, so an efficient cadre has been destroyed. But there is a ray of hope. The Central Statistical Office, with United Nations assistance, plans to tackle a full-scale census of Afghanistan, and may engage some of the ADS-trained personnel.

Thomas Eighmy's paper, "Population Density and Distribution in Rural Afghanistan," complemented Kerr's effort by reporting on the joint Afghan-American Afghan Demographic Studies project. According to Eighmy, "The overall low population density of so much of rural Afghanistan poses a hurdle to development. The areas are low density largely because of water or irrigable land restraints." In other words, only careful planning and implementation in the agricultural sector can produce the surplus that will sustain the concentration of population needed to achieve other development objectives.

Geographer Hamidullah Amin's paper, "The Human and Physical Aspects of Afghan Regionalism," emphasized the variety of peoples making up Afghanistan's population. "There is no doubt," he wrote, "that throughout history the existing geographical and cultural regionalism has been a major obstacle toward the social, economic, and political integration of the country." Geography has also precluded close integration.⁶ One-third of the country consists of high mountains; road-building costs in such areas are about six times those of flatlands. In addition, few rivers are navigable, even to small craft, and innumerable bridges are necessary for developing an adequate transportation/commu-

nication infrastructure. The expense of maintaining an internal transportation system is prohibitive.

Amin described rural conditions and agricultural sectors in less than glowing terms:

The agricultural technology is primitive and the amount of land that can be used is small with a low amount of production per unit of land. Every year in most parts of the country from 50 to 75% of the agricultural land is not used due to insufficient precipitation and inadequate irrigation facilities. It is estimated that of the total area of the country only 7.8 million hectares comprising 12% of the total area is under cultivation. Of this area only 5.3 million hectares or 9% have irrigation facilities, but due to lack of water only 2.5 million hectares or 4% of the total area of the country is used regularly every year. Moreover, only 4.78% of the total area of the country mostly in the south and east is under forests. Much of the uncultivated countryside, however, provides summer grazing land for large herds of sheep, goats, and camels, all of which are important sources of income.

Instead of building large irrigation systems—the pattern of the past 25 years—Amin suggested that:

...steps should be taken towards the improvement of the existing irrigation systems, expansion of activities to avoid animal diseases, distribution of more fertilizer, improved seeds and agricultural equipment through the reinforcement of the credit organizations, the establishment of cooperatives, and enacting laws pertaining to the fair use of water, pastures and forests.

Afghanistan is basically rural, with 85 percent of the population living in its 9,699 villages, some 80 percent of which have fewer than 500 inhabitants. As described by Amin,

An Afghan village is mostly a world of its own, calm and almost independent and indifferent to what is going on in the world outside. As an economic unit, the village is largely self-sufficient, but certain necessities, such as cloth, sugar, tea, etc., may have to be obtained from nearby towns. Regardless of

size, the village is a social unit, and its people feel a sense of common identity.

Amin pleaded for a logical extension of rural development programs, which, although begun in 1954, have had little impact. In his view, the five basic problems which have hampered efforts in the past must be tackled simultaneously: (1) inadequate appropriations, which have limited even potential impact to a few selected villages; (2) lack of coordination between relevant ministries (mainly Agriculture and Irrigation, Education, and Public Health) and the Rural Development Department (initially under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, but transferred to the Prime Ministry after the 1973 coup d'état); (3) lack of understanding between often apathetic administrators and conservative villagers; (4) absence of proper planning, stemming from understanding of or sympathy for rural life in Afghanistan; (5) shortage of qualified personnel. While posing formidable obstacles, Amin sees none as insurmountable.

John F. Shroder, Jr.'s paper, "Regional Distribution of Physical Resources in Afghanistan," was rather more optimistic. Shroder, also a geographer, summed up his position in the first paragraph: "The good news is that Afghanistan has great potential which I intend to show herein; the bad news is that the bureaucratic confusion and political machinations hinder nearly every sensible project."

Identifying Afghanistan's natural resources with good developmental potential, Shroder noted petroleum and natural gas in the north, south, and southwest; iron in the central mountains (the Hajigak deposits); water for both irrigation and power;⁷ borehole wells and diesel pumps instead of huge dams; solar energy; geothermal energy. Among the major problems, he emphasized "...centuries of overuse and neglect" of the soil, lack of efficient forestry management, and periodic droughts and floods. While these resources have genuine potential, Shroder is withholding judgment on whether "the internal and external problems and pressures will allow the country to achieve its potential."

Christopher Brunner's paper, "Afghanistan's Land Tenure Policy," discussed the implications of the Land Reform and Settlement Law (August 1975)

and the Graduated Land Tax Law (July 1976). Both laws became operative in August 1976, and are now being implemented.

Brunner framed his analysis around seven basic questions:

1. Is modernization of agriculture necessary or desirable? He waffled a bit on this:

Modernization, even by modest improvement of the traditional means of production, changes the equilibrium of the agrarian situation. Sharecroppers lack the means or incentives to upgrade their technology; small landholders lack access to institutional credit and cannot profitably resort to private credit sources, to whom they are probably already in debt. It is the large landowners who can finance improved inputs and reap the profits of modernization—profits which may be hoarded or applied to consumption, entrepreneurial enterprises, or land purchases and loans to poorer neighbors. In Afghanistan it remains to be seen how the problem of access to improved technology will be handled through the emerging cooperative system.

2. What are the social limits of beneficial modernization; at what point does it become damaging?

"Modernization of an economic sector becomes harmful when it sacrifices social values to achieve production goals," Brunner observed, then pointed out, correctly, that modernization to produce higher profits often neglects the small farmers, sharecroppers, and landless laborers. The Iranian experience, said Brunner, is relevant to the situation in Afghanistan. In Iran the government broke up the larger, nonmechanized estates and gave the land to the cultivators (now largely reduced to subsistence level agriculture), but ignored the plight of the landless laborers, who, "...having lost their economic function and being socially marginal, now swell the shantytowns of Tehran and other key centers." In this regard, Brunner noted a phrase in the new tax law which states that the law aims at the "integration of smallholdings," the lack of further explanation was a source of concern to Brunner and many of the participants as well.

3. Should Afghan agrarian policy emphasize land reform? Because Afghanistan is primarily a country of owner-cultivators (over 60%), and many large estates are effectively hidden within extended kinship units, relatively little land would be affected, primarily those estates given to kinsmen or loyal followers of recent amirs (Abdur Rahman Khan, Habibullah Khan) and kings (Amanullah, Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah). The main problem is how to support the dominant small owner-cultivators with a reasonable loan system through the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the formation of cooperatives.

4. What are the social limits of land reform? Brunner believes the question irrelevant to Afghanistan. Implementing the new law will be difficult initially, for rural folk have always distrusted the central government. If the government attempts to replace the regionally oriented, reciprocal networks of rights and obligations in the countryside without providing institutional alternatives, local control will break down and the anticipated new economic opportunities will not materialize.

5. How do the aims and processes of modernization and land reform interrelate? Thus far, technological improvements (tractors and other machinery, water pumps, improved seeds, fertilizers) have gone mainly to the more affluent farmers, the good "credit risks." Brunner believes the ADB can reach a wide variety of small farmers through cooperatives. As Brunner noted, however, such programs need excellent planning, an efficient and relatively noncorrupt administration, and acceptance by the local farmers—all difficult, none impossible, given time and mutual understanding.

6. Does the defined policy constitute a land reform? Brunner feels that the policy is realistic because the government does not (for once!) overestimate its ability to bring about change under provisions of the new law: a person may hold 20 hectares of double-cropped, irrigated land, 30 hectares of single-cropped irrigated land, or 40 hectares of unirrigated land. In addition, an individual may hold up to 20 hectares of orchard land. The present regime continues its predecessors' policy of distributing government lands (usually recently

reclaimed) to landless peasants,⁸ but as Brunner noted, "The soundness of the new settlers economic position remains to be seen." Once again, Brunner placed his faith in the cooperative: "Hopefully, the farmer's selling position will be improved by cooperative marketing and his yield steadily raised (averaging out the fluctuations due to weather)."

7. Can the government administer its land reform program? It is too soon to hazard an opinion. The government has begun to introduce both the land reforms and the land tax law to various provinces, through newly trained specialists, but there appears to be an unavoidable time lapse between introduction and implementation.

In summary, Brunner seemed relatively—and cautiously—optimistic, but insisted that more flexibility may be necessary in the collection of taxes from small-scale, nonmechanized farmers. "The future evolution of the nation's agricultural system," he concluded, "will test both the republic's skill in adaptive economic planning and its professed concern for social justice."

* * * * *

Herbert Canfield's paper "Listening to the Public Voice: An Anthropological Suggestion,"⁹ was unimaginative, but his main points were valid: all institutions in a culture are interrelated and a change in one ultimately affects all; technology alone cannot solve the multifaceted, social, economic, and political problems of the developing world; foreigners and foreign-educated Afghans think and act alike and seldom really understand the rural milieu; various ethnic groups have their own distinctive traits and problems.

Canfield's reiteration of these truisms served as prelude to his real subject: missionarism. He first defined AID as "a missionary organization," then continued:

I know that word "missionary" to some people is an uncomplimentary term. It doesn't bother me—college professors proselytize for a living. But the last thing one would want to be known as in Afghanistan is a missionary. It is said that Afghans don't like missionaries. Actually they do; they have welcomed them for years. But only a certain

kind of missionary: the kind that doesn't know that he is undermining the system: that supposes he is only bringing the truth; and that specializes only in technical tasks; who never questions the system he works within; never expressly challenges the moral system of the 80 percent [the rural population] and never questions the moral assumptions of the 20 percent and the American government; never worries about the moral dilemmas he creates for the people he serves.

Canfield issued a challenge to all those interested in Afghanistan and its development:

I have gone to the trouble of saying so much only because I have begun to think that we scholars have an obligation to explain clearly, as best we can, what the problems are in the societies we study. . . . In addition to the usual obligation to find out what is true, or rather what we think is true, we must also in this period of human history—when the trajectory seems so clearly toward ever darker experiences for humanity—we must also reveal what we know in such a way to challenge those who are in responsible positions of power; to challenge them to honesty, and morality and responsibility. . . . What has been true in America can be true in Afghanistan. . . . It is the business of a responsible press and of scholarship to examine the relation between power interests and moral rhetoric, and always to press for sincere rhetoric, for genuinely moral objectives.

Jon Anderson's paper, "Structure and Power in Pakhtun Tribes," was not distributed to the conference participants, so I must rely on my notes to report his contribution.¹⁰ The title itself was something of a misnomer, for Anderson confined his remarks to one major Pushtun tribe, the Ghilzai of the Logar Valley.¹¹

Anderson described changes in patterns of "investment" and employment as particularly relevant to development. Wealth previously used to gain political influence (in the form of ritualized hospitality and loans to kin and neighbors) since the 1930s has been increasingly diverted to the economic sector by the purchase of tractors, lorries, water pumps, etc. With the tractors and related equip-

ment, however, the need for hired labor dropped drastically, since tractors can outproduce a man and two oxen at a ratio of 20 to 1. The usual happened, and landless peasants, who relied for survival upon periodic employment in agriculture, have moved to the expanding *bidonvilles* near Kabul.

Today, the major problems in the Logar Valley are the control and distribution of water for irrigated lands. Disputes and violence occur annually. The constant juggling for power between the local elites and government officials exacerbates the situation, although local leaders still serve as buffers between their kin and followers and the government. Attempts by outsiders to develop the area must consider the several levels of authority in Logar Valley and elsewhere.

Anderson rightly emphasizes the society's "tribal" aspects, where loyalty flows upward in ever decreasing intensity from the nuclear and extended family to the lineage and ultimately the name tribe (Ghilzai) and the ethnolinguistic group (Pushtun). "The tribe," to quote Anderson, "is a household writ large," but "the larger the group, the less corporate the institution."

Lincoln Keiser's "Socio-political Structure and the Allocation of Resources among the Sum, a Pashai tribe of the Lower Kunar Region," came to grips with conflict resolution within a specific ethnolinguistic group. First, he gave an excellent, short ethnographic sketch of the Sum. Basically, the Sum are mountain farmers (primarily wheat and maize) and herdsmen (mainly goats, some sheep and cattle) whose language is Pashai (a Dardic dialect of the Indic branch of the Indo-Iranian subfamily of the greater Indo-European language family). Men do most of the herding and the heavy farm labor—such as building and maintaining terraces, repairing the irrigation works—while women are responsible for cultivation, food preparation, and storage. Conflicts often arise when close kinsmen do not own adjacent, terraced, irrigated fields, for upkeep of the system requires close cooperation between owners of neighboring plots. Hence, a person's socioeconomic and ultimately political rights and obligations are both kin *and* work-group oriented.

The Sum, like most other groups in Afghanistan, hold periodic village councils to discuss problems that arise during the annual economic (agricultural

and herding) cycle. Unlike many other groups, however, the Sum have no formalized institution to deal with the blood feud. The classic "eye-for-an-eye, tooth-for-a-tooth" is the ideal. "Theoretically," said Keiser, "every murder sets up an eternal sequence of vengeance and countervengeance."

The ideal among Sum males is the "proud warrior, loyal to kin and dangerous to enemies." Folktales and folksongs help perpetuate these attitudes, as in most preindustrial, rural, peasant-tribal societies.¹² There is more talk than actual fighting, however, and violence, when it occurs, is usually mild and of short duration. Keiser maintained this is because the Sum live under a functioning network of conflicting rights and obligations that help inhibit and sometimes even prohibit violence. Further, he related these "criss-crossing webs of conflicting alliances" to the local allocation of resources.

When a murder or theft occurs, only a small number of people can participate in the resulting feud, because most will have reciprocal responsibilities linking them to both groups—the murderer's and the victim's—and prohibiting their involvement. Since so few can participate actively in the struggle, social cohesion is maintained until the feud ends. It also behooves those thus immobilized to try to bring about a quick solution through informal negotiations between the antagonists.

Another factor that proliferates such crisscrossing relationships is the Sum marriage custom: "Descent groups are exogamous since no one who shares a common patrilineal ancestor can marry," a custom running counter to orthodox Muslim practice by which a man is enjoined only from marriage to his mother, sister, sister's daughter, and brother's daughter. Curiously, descent does not govern a Sum's political allegiance: "In the contexts of fights and feuds, descent is irrelevant." On the other hand, the patrilineal descent group still governs "the distribution of authority, marriage, and inter-village relationships" [e.g., for certain ceremonials and rituals].

Rights and obligations relating to the feud are based on "equilateral filiation," which simply means a person must support kinsmen on *either* side of the descent pattern: "One's obligations to support a mother's brother's son are equal to one's

obligations to support a father's brother's son." If one disputant is in one's father's descent line, and the other in the mother's, one is effectively barred from participating because of conflicting allegiances; thus "...no fight or blood feud can ever divide the majority of village members into opposing groups."

The concept of voluntary friendship associations also plays an important role in Sum peace-keeping. Friends often feel more strongly toward one another than toward their own brothers, for brothers usually compete for land, livestock, and portable property. As custom requires a person to support his own kin against a friend's kin, if the two become involved in a fight, friends always try to prevent a feud from developing.

Keiser assessed the possibilities for development in the Sum area, with particular reference to the introduction of the new, high-yield varieties of wheat and maize. Noting first that both ecology and culture combine to limit the probability of success, he then observed that "successful development" could very well destroy the basic social structure. The new crops require region-wide organization, coordination, and acceptance of technological innovations. One possible outcome would be the concentration of landholding among a few individuals.

Keiser's conclusions merit attention:

First, the hill people of the Hindu Kush have existed in their environment for thousands of years. They are intelligent people, and have devised ways of exploiting their environment which in general are quite successful. In many cases, there are good reasons for their customary practices. Although it may seem to us that there are obvious improvements to be made, in the long run these may result in actually decreasing the quality of life.

Second, among the Sum, as among any society based on a subsistence economy, making a living is both difficult and time-consuming. It cannot be accomplished unless there is a certain degree of social stability. Social stability among the Sum is maintained through the balance of conflicting allegiances. If this balance were

upset, there would be no other indigenous mechanisms to take its place. The only recourse would be to the legal institutions of the Afghan state. Dispute settlement in Afghan courts is an expensive process, and the result could easily be the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few families. This could easily alter, if not destroy, the traditional tribal structure.

Finally, almost any kind of development will undoubtedly result in social change. In my opinion, our responsibility is to help implement the kind of development the people themselves desire. We should point out to them possible implications of certain development projects which our expertise allows us to see, but the final choice must be theirs.

* * * * *

By the end of the first day, it was obvious that the participants knew little about AID's new approach to Afghanistan and were basing their comments on the previous 20-year record of fouled up programs there. Before we began deliberations on the second day, I outlined some of the new and more innovative AID programs, all directed toward the "poorest majority," described in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973.¹³

* * * * *

Panel Three assembled to consider "Local Group Interactions, Their Implications for Development." The first paper, "Tribal Government vs. National Government in Nuristan," by Richard F. Strand, was a logical complement to Keiser's description of the Sum, for the Kom of Nuristan have both formal institutions for resolving conflicts *and* periodic warfare. Strand compared the two systems of government that function in Nuristan—the official government administration and the traditional tribal system. "The two systems are sometimes conflicting, sometimes complementary, and often intertwined, providing Nuristani tribesmen with a broad base of options for conducting their political lives."

Internal disputes among the Kom usually are resolved by peacemakers acceptable to both parties. The mediators must find a solution voluntarily accepted by accuser and accused, or new peace-

makers are engaged. Rapid solution of Kom disputes is essential because "interpersonal conflict perturbs the performance of citizenship and kinship and, if left unresolved, such conflict may spread and threaten the integrity of the entire community."

The Kom always try to avoid confrontations with the government, but occasionally disputes are brought before government officials. Theoretically, a person comes to the district center voluntarily and makes a formal complaint. This is recorded on an official form, numbered, and assigned a place on the docket of the district judge (*qazi*). All parties to the dispute appear before the judge, a decision is reached and recorded, compensation paid, or culprits jailed. In reality, however, such complaints are usually written on a plain sheet of paper, and the district governor (now called *Woluswal*, although the old term *Hakim* is often used) suggests an out-of-court settlement, over which he (and the *qazi*) will preside—given adequate compensation (whatever the traffic will bear). The case is then referred to the traditional peacemakers, and when a decision is reached and fines are paid, local government officials pocket the money for services rendered. No paperwork has been required, so neither files nor money are forwarded to the provincial center.

According to Strand, one reason for the increase in the number of cases brought to the attention of government officials is that litigants have little influence over the decisions of impartial traditional peacemakers. The Kom believe that "a government official's position in a case is usually negotiable." This is probably true, although understandable, in that government officials in Afghanistan are grossly underpaid, and these "unofficial fees" make it possible for them to live in a manner they see as appropriate to their status.

The Kom divide government officials into a meaningful trinity of "good," "average," and "bad." "Good" officials, a rare breed—judge cases fairly without regard to compensation received. "Average" officials permit litigants to bid against one another for a favorable decision. "Bad" officials extort money by threatening to stack the case against first one and then the other disputant.

Most Kom believe the government system "... in reality is calculated to sap tribal strength," a not-so-subtle attempt to employ divide-and-rule tactics.

Although the out-of-court settlements have the aura of tribal sanction, ill will often remains to poison the atmosphere in the village or region. "Their [the Kom's] evaluation of the government's role in an important area of tribal life reinforces the feeling of many Kom that the government is merely the means by which the dominant ethnic group, the Afghans, exploits a vanquished people."

The Kom see their beliefs confirmed in their experience with various development programs. The public education program introduced in 1953, for example, produced a manpower shortage in the rural area with crippling effects on an already ailing economy. A new road, built into the Kom territory in the early 1960s, produced a growing balance-of-payments deficit: "The Kom import more than they export." The opening of the road also encouraged a major export of lumber to the outside world, from which the Kom have derived little benefit, and the forests near the road are being rapidly denuded.

In conclusion, Strand pleaded for "well-conceived development projects" in which Nuristanis would be involved "in all phases of planning and administration."

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Nazif Shahrani's paper, "Kirghiz, Wakhi and Itinerant Traders: Dynamics of Closed-Frontier Socio-Economic Processes in the Wakhan Corridor," discussed the interrelationships among the three groups. The 2,000 Turkic-speaking Kirghiz are pastoral nomads, living in the Pamir mountains; the Wakhi, who speak an Indo-European dialect, are farmer-herders in the Wakhan Corridor, west of the Pamir proper; the traders are a mixed group of Turkic-speaking Uzbek and Dari-speaking Tajik from Badakhshan and Kabul, and a smaller group of Pashto-speaking Pushtun from Ningrahar Province to the south.

The relationships among the groups are organized along a spectrum of economic dependence, all of which developed after the closure of the frontiers to the north by the U.S.S.R. and to the east by China. The frontiers' closure forced the Kirghiz, who formerly roamed freely from Russia to China to Afghanistan, with incursions into Gilgit, to look west, toward what they regarded as the "inferior" Wakhi in order to obtain cereal grains. The Wakhi,

in turn, had been virtually self-sufficient through the 1920s. In the '30s and '40s, the Kirghiz and Wakhi evolved a relationship of mutual economic dependency. In the 1950s, however, most Wakhi became almost totally dependent on the Kirghiz. Some have lost their lands and herds and attach themselves to Kirghiz as *hamsaya* (clients). In other cases, Kirghiz have purchased lands from Wakhi and kept the former owners as tenants.

The Kirghiz barter livestock products and produce (seldom live animals) for grains and horses from the Wakhi. In addition, many Wakhi males work for the Kirghiz during the summer months, doing heavy labor around the yurts, cutting peat (fuel), building sheep pens, and repairing irrigation channels. The Kirghiz have recently begun to grow some wheat at lower altitudes. For reaping the wheat and also for cutting sedge as fodder, they use large hand scythes, rather than the small sickles used by other Afghan farmers.

During the past three to four decades, each group has learned the other's language. Moreover, the Kirghiz have begun to smoke opium and drink black Indian tea like the Wakhi. In fact, a number of new tastes have been cultivated by both groups and itinerant traders have encouraged increased consumption and consequent indebtedness. The outside traders' excessive influence began after World War II, and accelerated in the 1960s and '70s. Because the area is now linked to Badakhshan by improved roads, lorries can now deliver shoddy, manufactured items to drop-off points only a day or so by donkey from Wakhan-Pamir. Corrupt officials commonly assist the itinerant traders, who now virtually control commerce with the outside world. Conducting business by barter as well as cash, they charge very high interest to purchasers to buy on credit.

Traders not only encourage Wakhi to trade wood and skins for opium and tea, but also to buy or barter manufactured cloth from the mills of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Japan, and the U.S.S.R. The Wakhi no longer make their own cloth, and often wear secondhand clothing from the West, also made available by the itinerant traders. The triangular trade that has emerged is similar to that of pre-Revolutionary America, in which cloth manufactured in England was traded in Africa for slaves, who were then sold to the West Indies and in America, where

they worked on plantations producing tobacco, sugar, and cotton for England. The Wakhi get animals from the Kirghiz in return for labor; the Wakhi trade wool, skins, wheat, and barley to the traders in return for cloth, secondhand clothing, tin and plastic products, opium and tea; the traders go the Kirghiz with wheat, barley, opium, tea, transistor radios and batteries, in return for cash, live-stock products, and, occasionally, animals.

Some Kirghiz and Wakhi (and, I might add, Badakhshi Tajik) herd livestock over mountain trails to sell in Kabul (a 45-day trip), returning with goods purchased in Kabul for their own personal use or for sale, but this is still rare.

Shahrani stressed a point often ignored or overlooked by development specialists concerned with the "rural poor." He insisted that a rural-urban dichotomy could be avoided by integrative policies that recognize their symbiotic functions. Shahrani proposed the study of regional, ecological, economic adaptations as a whole, and not as separate rural and urban units, particularly where local small-scale industries can meet local demands and help relieve local unemployment. Counseling a cautious approach toward a "Western agricultural technology designed for intensive and excessive fossil use," he recommended moving first into a more efficient "intermediate technology geared to extensive use of human and animal energy."

* * * * *

Nigel Allan's paper, "Ethnic geopyony in central cis-Hindukush," was an abridged version of a much longer document based on his research in the Koh Daman (north of Kabul) on interrelationships in the agricultural, herding, and ecological patterns of the region's ethnolinguistic groups.¹⁴

Allan was concerned about the loose use of ethnic group terminology. He did not wholly trust the identifications the people gave themselves, so as his data unfolded he gave the various ethnolinguistic groups contrived names. For example, he referred to sedentary Pushtun as "Pakhtun," and formerly nomadic Pushtun as "Pashtun." *All* these terms are interchangeable and refer to members of the same ethnolinguistic group, all speaking a Pashto dialect. Pushtun, Pashtun, Pakhtun,

Pukhtun, Pakhtoon, Pushtoon—all are transliterations from the pens of Western linguists.

Allan separates the Safi from the body Pushtun, which he could rightly do had he also identified the other Pushtun by major tribal designations (he says there are 25 in Koh Daman), or simply referred to various Pushtun groups as "new settlers" or "sedentary Pushtun" versus "formerly nomadic Pushtun"—or any such combination.¹⁵ Allan correctly points out that few ethnically "pure" villages exist in the Koh Daman. Therefore, it probably would have been better had he invented new ecological-ethnological terms rather than using old, recognizable terms like Pakhtun, Safi, Pashtun, and Tajik, which resulted from his subjecting the crop patterns of various villages to discriminant analysis.

Allan's main point is that knowing the crops grown in varying percentages in the Koh Daman, groups can be identified ethnically. Conversely, if a group is identified, we will know what crops it grows. Or, given the total ecological patterns, indigenous populations grow crops most suitable to a region; outsiders tend to bring in their own cropping patterns, compatible or not. For example, Allan's "Pakhtun," who are recent settlers, continue to grow wheat and depend on dairy products, but the local peoples' diet consists mainly of mulberries and pulses. Dwarf cotton is also widely grown, but used only for local consumption. The raw cotton that feeds the nearby Gulbahar textile complex comes from the Turkestan Plains.

The foregoing should serve as a warning to development experts who believe that local farmers can do no wrong, and who uncritically accept any crops grown locally as being ideal for the region. The expert should also be encouraged, for the pattern shows a tendency toward experimentation.

Allan has projected his research through three phases: so far, he has identified the ethnic groups and used discriminant analysis to relate ethnic groups to crop patterning. As a last step, he will use cluster analysis of the data on cropping patterns and ethnolinguistic distribution to refine his conclusions. To his great credit, Allan has insisted on microfield work, on foot when necessary, rather than the usual survey by vehicle, and thus is pro-

viding valuable basic data for planning both by the relevant Afghan ministries and foreigners.

* * * * *

Pamela Hunte's paper, "Responses of *Dais* (traditional birth attendants) to modern medicine in Afghanistan," was one of two in the final session—"Responses to changes in Afghan rural communities"—that focused attention on women.

Using data from the Afghan Demographic Studies (ADS) project, which dominated several parts of the conference, she summarized current *dai* beliefs and technical competence.

Basically, the *dai's* traditional medical kit has developed from several systems: *dawa-yunani* (the Greek Hippocratic system, probably introduced before Alexander's invasion, but which certainly spread quickly after his arrival on the scene); the Ayurvedic medicines and treatments from India; the classic Arabic theories of Ibn Sina, Razi, and other greats. The humoral concept of hot versus cold permeates the theories of Afghan traditional medicine, as well as diet and individual personality traits.¹⁶ The individual is constantly trying to maintain balance (temperament rather than temperature) and a "cold" illness demands "hot" medicines and foods, and vice versa. Women, temperamentally, are thought to be "hotter" than men, at least until menopause.

Afghan midwives are proud of their profession and realize its vital importance. Many have developed their own treatments which they believe efficacious, or are particularly adept with certain types of cases. Hunte's study embraced 40 *dai*, average age 60, with an average of 9 pregnancies of their own, who had worked in their respective villages for an average of 22 years. Of these 40, 11 had delivered over 1,000 babies; the rest ranged from 50 to 750 deliveries. With all this experience, they could certainly be trusted by their communities, but few realized the psychological importance of their roles, as perceptively described by Hunte:

To both the *dai* and her clients the traditional approach to health care furnishes an explanatory model which makes sense of upsets in an individual's constitution and guides a woman through the mysterious

process of procreation. The *dai* plays a key role in resolving crisis and uncertainty among her many patients; indeed, one of the most striking characteristics of the *dais* with whom I spoke was their dynamic personality makeup. Usually closely acquainted with or related to the women they serve, these energetic health practitioners seem to be exceptionally perceptive in their treatment, and are able to intimately interpret the social and emotional factors in each case. A comment provided by a client in the Mazar-i-Sharif region illustrates this point: "Especially at birth the *dai* is important. She talks to the mother about all kinds of things, makes her laugh, and makes the whole thing go easier."

The *dai* have ambivalent attitudes about the newfangled medical institutions and the individuals connected with them. Some regard the hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, doctors, and *qabilas* (government licenses nurse/midwives) as competitors; others simply consider them, especially the *qabilas*, as complementary to their own role. At times, the *qabila* and *dai* work hand in hand: the *dai* help the mother through the prenatal period; the *qabila*, with her new techniques, sterilized procedures, and equipment, makes the delivery, and the *dai* return for the postpartum call.

Hunte argued convincingly that the *dai's* role in the community makes her an ideal disseminator of new information and ideas:

The Afghan *dai* occupies a crucial position in a network among the female sector of her community and is certainly accustomed to diffusing traditional information concerning health-related topics. Her potential as a diffusion agent of modern health information is a subject which warrants future exploration. The establishment of modern medicine in many Afghan communities has not led to the displacement of indigenous medicine but has simply increased the health care options open to the population. With what type of decision-strategies do the *dai* and her clients meet these additional options? Of more importance in this discussion, how does the *dai* influence her clients' decision-making behavior?... We

have much to learn from indigenous health practitioners such as the *dai* that will aid in both the understanding of sociological change and in the designing of more effective health care systems in Afghanistan; both she and her clients could profit from the incorporation of a variety of modern medical techniques into her health care repertoire.

* * * * *

Asen Balikci, well-known for his films on the Netsilik Eskimo, presented his observations of "The nomad family in transition." Balikci's main point is a controversial one. "Sedentarization," he contends, "is a process resulting in substantial economic inequality among families, implying a fragmentation of society into social classes.... Social class is characterized by unequal access to the basic means of production, in this case sheep and land." In fact, using Balikci's data, the opposite can also be shown. The partial sedentarism of Wuluki Shinwari and the Lakernkhel actually appears to have encouraged a mixed economic base (herding, agriculture, commerce), thus broadening the options. Of course, as new economic opportunities open up, some become richer than others. Some former flock owners, for instance, have lost their flocks and become clients (*hamsaya*) of more fortunate herdsmen, or laborers in nearby villages and towns. However, Balikci admits "There is no substantial difference in life styles between rich and poor pastoralists. Tents, clothing, and food are similar, division of labor along sex lines identical, with women responsible for fetching water, gathering steppe-grass, cooking food, milking and preparing milk products."

The Wuluki, according to Balikci, comprise 300 tents, 200 of which migrate from Pakistan to the Hazarajat in the summer. About 100 families live permanently in the lowlands because they have lost their herds. Unfortunately, Balikci was not able to observe the settled Wuluki firsthand, but they are reported, he said, to "live in tents and subsist miserably as harvesters and as sellers of steppe-grass to the local peasantry. Some find employment as shepherds and servants with the pastoralists without hope of becoming flock owners."

The process as described above is not unique and *not* necessarily a transitional phase toward total

sedentarism. Few, if any, major groups of herd-owning nomads (*maldar*) have become fully sedentary. Most have evolved or are evolving into seminomadic or semisedentary groups.¹⁷ The groups described by Balikci may deviate from the norm, or his data, as presented, may be incomplete. In any event, he apparently is accepting Barth's description of the Basseri too uncritically.¹⁸

In Afghanistan, even those nomads who have lost their flocks because of drought, freezing weather, or other natural disasters, and have been reduced to a sedentary existence, dream and plan and save to buy sheep and return to at least seminomadism. In such cases, it is the *sedentary* phase that should be considered *transitional*.

The Lakernkhel, Balikci's second group, live in the Narin Valley of Baghlan Province. The three lineages represented were all pastoral about 50 years ago. According to Balikci's informants, about 20 years ago several extremely cold winters wiped out many flocks, resulting in sedentarism for two of the lineages. This somewhat contradicts the historical experience as interpreted by other semi-sedentary and seminomadic groups in the same area. They say that the partial sedentarism came about when the Afghan government began to move sedentary farmers into the area from Pakiya (Pushtun) and the lower Hilmand (Baluch) about 30 years ago. These new settlers were given lands in the *maldar's qishlaq* (winter quarters). To prevent the loss of all their winter grasslands, the nomad khans either purchased land from the new settlers or obtained land from the government. (Many cases concerning disputed land ownership are still in the courts of Baghlan Province.) Secure in the ownership of their winter quarters, the summer migrations to the Hazarajat and Badakhshan continued, but with a certain percentage of each group remaining behind to farm some of the land.

Balikci cites two case histories that seem to contradict his conclusion that sedentarism has led to social fragmentation and increased economic inequality. Both represent the *miskin*, Balikci's lowest class, who "are hopelessly poor and stand no chance to better their position." Seventy-year-old Haji Sahib inherited only a blind camel from his father yet rose to a dominant position in social, economic, and political power in his group. Inzir, who had been born into a wealthy family, was re-

duced to poverty and servitude when cold killed his family's sheep. Haji Sahib subsequently purchased the family's land, presumably at an unfair price. According to Balikci's latest information, Inzir had parlayed a loan of Afghanis (afs.) 500 (from Balikci) into a working capital of afs. 3,000 in six months. In other words, just as Haji Sahib rose to his present position with an initial capital of only a blind camel, Inzir, too, may be on his way back up the social and economic ladder. These cases certainly do not connote a rigid, inflexible class system.

I maintain that the nomadic groups with which I am familiar usually adapt well to new opportunities and that in the system as it now functions these opportunities permit anyone to succeed or fail. Unequal access to means of wealth is the pattern in almost all societies, but access fluctuates through time. Natural disasters (drought, extreme cold, flock diseases) cannot be predicted nor overcome. More disastrous, however, would be the central government's attempt to settle nomads by force. As indicated earlier in this critique, given time and opportunity, nomads will partly, never completely, settle themselves and adapt to a mixed economy, which functions symbiotically throughout Afghanistan.¹⁹

* * * * *

The formal sessions ended with Nancy Hatch Dupree's paper: "Afghan Rural Women: The prospects for change in their roles and outlooks." From the outset, Dupree emphasized that her paper would focus on the rural women of north Afghanistan, mainly the Tajik and Uzbek villages in which she had lived and worked. She pleaded for competent research programs in other areas, usually studied by men, and attempted to dispel the belief, commonly held, that Afghan village women are "deprived of any opportunity for human development," and no better than "chattels." Such attitudes are culturally biased, she maintained, and originate with Women's Liberation in the Western world or the urban, Western-influenced Kabul elite, not with the village women themselves.

The male-female relationship in Afghan villages fosters family security, an internal sense of accomplishment by working within well-defined, logical divisions of labor, and praise and respect from

those outside the family. Dupree said that "because of the closely integrated roles of rural males and females, it is unwise to think simply in terms of special programs for women, but rather in terms of programs for families, and the community as a unit."

Dupree made an important psychological distinction between rural and urban women:

Afghan village women are fortunate in that they have opportunities to fulfill their expectations. This is a major difference between Afghan rural and urban women. The latter often cannot begin to approach fulfillment of even a few of the expectations dangled before her. I only hope that development programs can avoid saddling rural women with urban frustrations, which they need not experience, unless artificially introduced from the outside.

Whereas the urban woman's life is typically idle and lonely, often culminating in emotional crises, the village woman's day is filled with work and social activity. Her housework is usually completed by about 8 A.M. and the men have left for the fields. Then, the women literally take over the village. They exchange visits with kin and friends, always taking work along with them. They card and spin wool and cotton, and often hold sewing bees to work jointly on items for a family member's dowry. A sense of cooperation, of belonging, permeates the daily and annual cycles. In many parts of Afghanistan, entire families move with the agricultural demands of the season from village to country quarters, and all members participate in the reaping, threshing, and winnowing, or in picking melons or other crops.

Mistreatment of women is as rare in villages as it is common in urban areas. In fact, village women exert influence on all decisions made in the family: social (who will marry whom); economic (women control sale of handicrafts and most nonagricultural produce); political (few husbands attend a village council without consulting mother, wife, and sisters).

It is necessary to differentiate between Afghan village women's public (subordinated, symbolized by the veil) and private role. Behind the com-

pound's mud walls, women are quite strong. Conflicts, however, can and do emerge, especially in the classic confrontations of mother-in-law vs. new daughter-in-law, or where two or more wives share a husband. Although Islam permits polygyny, rural Afghan marriages are overwhelmingly monogamous.

Dupree emphasized,

Development experts must be careful where they tread. All projects should embrace both men and women and their families, and, once begun, should be continued. To start only to stop is criminal. And long-range planning is necessary, and the projects must relate to the needs of the rural population. In village schools, young girls seldom go beyond the third grade, and lose whatever literacy they had gained. Literacy for the sake of literacy often does more harm than good.

Village and provincial girls, given educational opportunities, make good use of them. Of the first 39 provincial girls to graduate from Kabul University, 34 have returned to work in the provinces.

It will be a long time, Dupree predicted, before changes in life style now affecting women of the Kabul middle class and elite will be felt in the villages, though legal reforms are paving the way. Family Courts in Kabul and several larger provincial centers attempt to arbitrate family problems. The number of cases of young women and men challenging the right of parents and family to choose mates for them, suggests that a revolution in urban behavior is in the making.

Dupree expressed the hope that legal innovations in Afghanistan will follow the "essence of Islam, which does not consider women inherently inferior [according to Modernist interpretations], but glorifies the human individual, regardless of sex or status." She ended with the hope that "the men of Afghanistan will be able to keep pace with the emancipated women."

Summary

What did AID learn from its rather expensive—and, at that time, unique—exchange with social

scientists interested in Afghanistan? For one thing, AID officials attending the conference realized that all papers should be prepared and circulated in advance of any future assembly. Also, AID itself should prepare a summary of AID projects (direct and contract) in the country under discussion, as well as noting legislative or other constraints on implementation. Many papers dealt with the participants' past knowledge of AID activities in Afghanistan; some participants had been away from Afghanistan for more than 20 years. It was also obvious that someone from the AID mission in Afghanistan should have been present to field questions about current and planned projects.

At any future conference, especially if it is to be held in Afghanistan, Afghan government officials should be included, particularly those in the ministries responsible for rural development: Planning, Education, Public Health, Agriculture and Irrigation, Water and Power, and such semi-independent institutions as the Central Statistical Office and Rural Development Department in the Prime Ministry. In addition, the various faculties at Kabul University are honeycombed with talented Afghan specialists. On the other hand, inviting Afghan government officials may also have an inhibiting effect on other Afghan participants.

The final panel, ably chaired by Nake M. Kamrany, achieved consensus on several points. None startlingly new, but reminding us how little attention is ever paid to the human factor in development. The first—and probably most important—point was the *complexity* and *diversity* of regional ecology and of ethnolinguistic and cultural groups in Afghanistan. Development experts like to lump, social scientists to split. Somewhere between the lumpers and the splitters, meaningful compromises must be found. The problems of Nuristan cannot be solved by using techniques that were successful in the Hilmand Valley. Nor will what worked in Paktya take root in Logar. Ecology and culture vary from region to region, and solutions should be sought within the ecology and culture of any given region. All agreed that the holy trinity of research-implementation-analysis should be fed into all rural development programs.

Kamrany, an economist, talked in terms of "vicious circles" and "circles of entanglement," be they ecological (available resources, use and

misuse) or economic (present level of technology permits only enough food to be grown to support present population). Both being reinforced by tradition, the perpetuation of the old ways.

Another important point dealt with the lack of project coordination. It is a mistake to compartmentalize, to separate education programs from agriculture, to design special women's programs; all must interrelate. But given both the United States and the Afghan administrative procedures, is this at all possible? In the same vein, rural and urban programs should be interrelated. As surplus rural labor moves to town, small-scale industries should already be available to absorb them. Because of lack of proper planning, about 20,000 high school graduates are currently unemployed. Crash programs—urban *and* rural—could quickly absorb this group.

Finally, to initiate and institutionalize change, a revolution in administration must occur.²⁰ The problems of linking the current bureaucratic structure (primarily a horizontal institution, which maintains law-and-order, collects taxes, and fiddles with development) to the vertical, sociopolitical structure in the countryside remains formidable.

Discussion ended with a plea, most notably from anthropologists, that the final choice of programs be with the people. If this is indeed possible, no clear answers were given, but only agreement on principle that all programs should be approached with each region's unique characteristics in mind—and on paper.



NOTES

1. For details, see Louis Dupree, *The New Look in American Aid in Afghanistan* [LD-3-'74], Fieldstaff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. XVIII, No. 6, 1974.

2. See Louis Dupree, *Afghan Studies* [LD-4-'76], Fieldstaff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. XX, No. 4, 1976.

3. Louis Dupree, *The Afghan-American Educational Commission* [LD-1-'74], Fieldstaff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 1974.

4. Louis Dupree, *Population Dynamics in Afghanistan* [LD-7-'70], Fieldstaff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. XIV, No. 7, 1970, and *Population Review 1970: Afghanistan* [LD-1-'71], Fieldstaff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1971.

5. Title of complete work is: *National Demographic and Family Guidance Survey of the Settled Population of Afghanistan, 1975*. Vol. 1: Demography; Vol. 2: Methodology; Vol. 3: Tables; Vol. 4: Folk Methods of Fertility Regulation; and the Traditional Birth Attendant (the *Dai*), State University of New York—Afghan Demographic Survey, 1976. The study of the nonsettled population had not been released as of November 1976.

6. For a more detailed analysis, see H. Amin and G. Schilz, *A Geography of Afghanistan*, The Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1976 (204 pages, \$7).

7. Shroder recommended the effective use and expansion of *kariz* (or *qanat*), the underground canal system used effectively by Afghan farmers for centuries.

8. Despite governmental checks, some farmers receiving lands under this scheme *do* own land elsewhere.

9. Canfield was originally scheduled to present a paper entitled "Authority and Control among the Hazaras of the Hindu Kush," shifting subjects after learning that two Christian missionaries had been excluded from the conference in deference to Afghan sensibilities.

10. Anderson has published a similar article, "Tribe and Community among the Ghilzai Pashtun," in *Anthropos* 70: 575-601, 1975. He is currently completing a Ph.D. dissertation on the same subject at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

11. The Logar Valley consists not only of several Ghilzai subtribes and lineages, but pockets of Dari-speaking Farsiwan at places like Khoshi. That the Khoshi people are mainly Shia Muslims, whereas all Ghilzai are Sunni further complicates the ethnolinguistic picture.

12. For descriptions, see Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton University Press, 1973, pp. 248-251; Louis Dupree and L. Albert (eds.), *Afghanistan in the 1970s*, New York and London: Praeger, 1974, pp. 1-13.

13. For details, see Louis Dupree, *The New Look in American Aid to Afghanistan* [LD-3-'74], Fieldstaff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. XVIII, No. 6, 1974.
14. Available by request from Nigel Allan. Department of Geography, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13210. See also N. Allan, "The Modernization of Rural Afghanistan: A Case Study," in *Afghanistan in the 1970s*, L. Dupree and L. Albert (eds). New York and London: Praeger, 1974, pp. 113-126.
14. Pushtun, Pashtun, Pakhtun, Pukhtun, Pakhtoon, Pushtoon—all are transliterations from the pens of Western linguists.
15. For a cautious attempt at terminology, see Louis Dupree, "Settlement and Migration Patterns in Afghanistan: A Tentative Statement," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1975, pp. 385-400.
16. Hot foods include bread, chicken meat, onions, billygoat meat, long grain rice, peppers, garlic, spinach, sugar, black tea, melons, raisins, dried fruits and nuts. Cold foods include beef, nannygoat meat, cow or goat milk, short grain rice, potatoes, carrots, squashes, cucumbers, green tea, dairy products (yoghurt, cheeses, etc.) river water, and water-melons.
17. See footnote 15.
18. F. Barth, *Nomads of South Persia: The Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh Confederacy*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961.
19. For elaborations on this theme, see Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973; L. Dupree, "Afghan Nomads," *Faces of Change* Film Essay Series, Hanover, AUFS, 1976; R. Tapper, "Nomadism in Modern Afghanistan: Asset or Anachronism?," in *Afghanistan in the 1970s*, L. Dupree and L. Albert (eds.), New York and London: Praeger, 1974.
20. See Louis Dupree, *Imperialism in South Asia* [LD-3-'76], Fieldstaff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. XX, No. 3, 1976.



APPENDIX A

LIST OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

- Ludwig Adamec (History): Near East Studies Center, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85711
- Nigel Allan (Geography): Department of Geography, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13210
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- Robert Canfield (Anthropology): Department of Anthropology, Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130
- David Champagne (History): Department of History, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712
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- David I. Steinberg, Director, Office of Technical Support, Near East Bureau
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Peter Benedict, Senior Social Scientist, Office of
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Roxanne Van Dusen, Office of Technical Support,
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Grace Langley, Senior Population Specialist

Bradshaw Langmaid, Director, Office of Develop-
ment Planning, Near East Bureau



APPENDIX B

PROGRAM AND PAPERS

Thursday, September 23, 1976

2000-2030: Welcome addresses by Thomas Gouttierre and Richard Newell
Response by David Steinbert

2030: Afghanistan, 1976, by Louis Dupree

Friday, September 24

Panel One: Variety and Identity in Afghan Regionalism

Regionalism in Afghanistan: Strategies of Identifying and Collecting Information,
Graham Kerr

Physical and Human Aspects of Afghan Regionalism, Hamildullah Amin

Regional Distribution of Physical Resources in Afghanistan, John F. Shroder, Jr.

Population Density and Distribution in Rural Afghanistan, T. Eighmy

Discussants: David Champagne and Louis Dupree

Luncheon with Chancellor Ronald W. Roskens, University of Nebraska at Omaha

Panel Two: Local Leadership and the Control of Resources

Afghanistan's Land Tenure Policy, Christopher Brunner

Listening to the Public Voice: An Anthropological View, R. Canfield

Structure and Power in Pakhtun Tribes, Jon Anderson

Socio-Political Structure and the Allocation of Resources Among the Sum, a Pashai
Tribe of the Lower Kunar Region, L. Keiser

Discussants: M. Jamil Hanafi and Gerald Williams

Saturday, September 25

Panel Three: Local Group Interactions: Their Implications for Development

Tribal Government vs. National Government in Nuristan, R. Strand

Kirghiz, Wakhi and Itinerant Traders: Dynamics of Closed Frontier Socio-Economic Processes in the Wakhan Corridor, N. Shahrani

Ethnic Geopony in Cis-Hindu Kush, N. Allan

Discussants: Brian Spooner and Yousuf Nuristani

Panel Four: Responses to Change in Afghan Rural Communities

Responses of *Dais* (Traditional Birth Attendants) to Modern Medicine in Afghanistan: Some Observations and Research Considerations, Pamela Hunte

The Nomad Family in Transition, A. Balikci

Afghanistan's Rural Women: Their Prospects for Change in Their Roles and Outlooks, Nancy Hatch Dupree

Discussants: Ludwig Adamec, Mr. Alam Miran, Said S. Hashimi

Panel Five: Conclusions Chairperson: Nake M. Kamrany

