

**Basic Education:
A Review of USAID's de facto
Basic Ed Strategy**

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**Elizabeth Stites
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Basic Education: A Review of USAID's de facto Basic Ed Strategy¹

Few policy makers question the value of education in building healthy, economically productive, and stable societies. In 2000, representatives from donor organizations, wealthy nations, and developing countries met at the Dakar World Education Forum to re-acknowledge the importance of "Education for All" (EFA), as endorsed ten years earlier in Jomtien, Thailand. Also in 2000, the member states of the United Nations adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which include achieving universal primary school completion by 2015 and eliminating gender inequity in primary and secondary education by 2005. The United States supports both the MDGs and the Dakar Framework for Action, and Congress has steadily increased funding for international education programs since 2001.² Education programming has also taken on an increasingly political role in recent years. American officials make the case that providing education in developing nations improves U.S. national security, on the assumption that education contributes to stability, moderation, and democratic tendencies in developing nations and transitional societies.

The majority of U.S. funds in support of international education programs go through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).³ Congressional appropriations to USAID for basic education have climbed steadily since 2001, from \$103 million in fiscal year (FY) 2001 to \$326.5 million in FY2004.⁴ Congress appropriated \$400 million for basic education in FY2005, \$300 million of which must come from the development assistance (DA) account. In addition to regular appropriations, Congress made available roughly \$200 million for education programs in Iraq through supplemental appropriations in FY2003 and FY2004.⁵ In FY2004 Congress appropriated roughly \$100 million in economic support funds (ESF) for

¹ This paper was commissioned and funded by RESULTS Educational Fund, an advocacy non-profit organization based in Washington, DC. The author is an independent consultant.

² Other major donors have also increased official development assistance (ODA) for basic education since 2001. For instance, Japan increased ODA for basic education from \$66,889,000 in 2001 to \$112,912,000 in 2003; France increased funds for basic education from \$29,932,000 in 2001 to \$40,579,000 in 2003; Australia saw an increase from \$31,411,000 to \$66,417,000 in the same time period. For more information visit www.oecd.org.

³ United States government also funds international education programs through the Department of State, the Department of Labor, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Education.

⁴ Information from "Basic Education Funding History," compiled by the Congressional Research Service.

⁵ USAID spent roughly \$150 million in Iraq from May 2003 to March 2004. In July 2004 the Agency award a 24-month \$56.4 million contract for basic education programs in Iraq to Creative Associates International, Inc, a DC-based for-profit company. These funds come from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) account.

education in Afghanistan (another \$3 million for FY2004 and \$24 million for FY2005 for Afghanistan are to come from the allocated DA funds).

Congress has appropriated substantially more for basic education than was requested by the Administration in each of the past four years.⁶ Basic education has some strong proponents in Congress, as indicated in a bill introduced by Senator Clinton and Representative Lowey in the 108th Congress which called for increases up to \$2.5 billion a year in spending on basic education programs overseas. Voices beyond Capitol Hill have also heralded the importance of increased education spending. For instance, the 9/11 Commission Report, released in July 2004 to bi-partisan support, recommends increased funding for education, literacy, and youth vocational programs, especially in the Muslim world as a means to counter the rise of terrorism and anti-American sentiment. And in his address before the United Nations General Assembly in September 2003, President Bush announced that the United States would rejoin UNESCO after an 18-year hiatus, citing among other reasons the organization's important work on promoting "education for all."⁷

Funds to USAID for education have almost tripled since 2001, but USAID still does not have a publicly-available basic education strategy. Implementing partners of the Agency, Congressional staff members, and interested members of the public have all expressed frustration at the difficulty in receiving even rudimentary information from the Agency on recent education expenditures or on the spending plans for FY 2005 and beyond. Recognizing the lack of readily available and accessible information on USAID's education programs, this report examines the information that is available, analyzes apparent trends and themes in programs and spending, and discusses some of the views of those outside the Agency who are involved in education programs and policies.

⁶ The Administration requested \$125 million for basic education in FY2002; Congress appropriated \$150 million. In FY2003 the Administration requested \$165 million and received \$216 million; in FY2004 the \$212 million request was met with an appropriation of \$326.5 million. In the FY2005 budget the Administration requested \$212 million and will receive \$400 million.

⁷ For FY2005, the President requested \$71.9 million for the U.S. contribution to UNESCO. Although there were floor amendments in the House to prohibit funding for UNESCO, the amendments were defeated. For more information on the President's initiative to rejoin UNESCO, visit <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-4.html>

Methodology

Information for this report was compiled through interviews and a review of available documents. Interviews were conducted with individuals representing approximately twenty organizations or offices, including nongovernmental organizations, for-profit contractors, Congressional offices, universities, think tanks, and independent consultants. These respondents provided their perspectives on trends in education policies and programs, on the nature of USAID's de facto basic education strategy, and on their own organizational or personal experiences of lessons learned in international education. Individuals offered their ideas on the characteristics of a successful basic education strategy and discussed the apparent problems within USAID in realizing (or releasing) such a strategy. Interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis, and no names are used or provided in this report. Officials from USAID chose to be unavailable to be interviewed for this report.⁸

Documents reviewed include those that are publicly available on the internet (USAID country strategies, Congressional budget justifications, program documents from implementing partners, etc) and reports and papers provided by respondents. The latter category includes USAID notifications to Congress on changes in education programs, funding and program information summaries previously and selectively released by USAID, USAID's "Basic Education Report to Congress" on basic education programs from May 21, 2004, and USAID's draft strategy on basic education.

Section I of this report provides information on USAID's funding of basic education programs. Section II examines USAID's de facto and draft strategy through the perspective of individuals involved in education program and policy. Section III looks at some of the trends in recent years and the patterns visible in FY2004 programs. Section IV provides conclusions and revisits some of the main ideas raised in the report.

⁸ The author first made contact with USAID/EGAT in August to set up meetings for the month of October. After repeated requests and communication, USAID/EGAT informed the author in late October that staff members would not be available for one-to-one or group meetings. Instead, a USAID official suggested that the author attend a public meeting on forthcoming USAID procurement to be held sometime after November 15th.

Section I: Some Basics

- “Basic education” as defined by USAID:

“Basic education is defined to include all program efforts aimed at improving early childhood development, primary education, and secondary education—delivered in formal or informal settings—as well as training for teachers working at any of these levels. USAID also counts training in literacy, numeracy, and other basic skills for adults or out-of-school youth as part of basic education.” (*Improving Lives through Learning*, USAID education strategy, draft, 2004.)
- Countries: 20 countries received basic education funds in FY 2001. 43 countries received basic education funds in FY2003.
- Funds appropriated by Congress to USAID for basic education programs:⁹
 - FY2001: \$103 million
 - FY2002: \$150 million
 - FY2003: \$216 million
 - FY2004: \$326.5 million (\$235 million of this to come from the DA account)
 - FY2005: \$400 million (\$300 million of this to come from the DA account)
- Countries with basic education programs in FY2004, by region:¹⁰
 - Africa, 15 countries: Benin, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia. In addition, the USAID Missions in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda were “adding education to their country programs” as of May 2004.
 - Asia and the Near East, 15 countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, West Bank/Gaza, and Yemen.
 - Europe and Eurasia, 5 countries: Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
 - Latin America and the Caribbean, 8 countries: Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru.
- Proportion of basic education funds allocated by region, FY2004 (the dollar amount is not included, as it is unclear what portion of funds remain with the centralized EGAT bureau):
 - Africa (AFR): 34%

⁹ Information from “Basic Education Funding History,” compiled by the Congressional Research Service.

¹⁰ As listed in USAID’s “Basic Education Report to Congress,” May 21, 2004.

- Asia and the Near East (ANE): 46%
- Europe and Eurasia (E&E): 2%
- Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC): 15%

- Countries with strategic objectives (SOs) dedicated to education:¹¹
 - FY2002:
 - Africa: 11 countries
 - Asia and Near East: 4 countries
 - Europe and Eurasia: 0 countries
 - Latin America and the Caribbean: 5 countries
 - FY2003:
 - Africa: 12 countries
 - Asia and Near East: 7 countries
 - Europe and Eurasia: 0 countries
 - Latin America and the Caribbean: 5 countries
 - FY2004:
 - Africa: 14 countries
 - Asia and Near East: 9 countries
 - Europe and Eurasia: 3 countries
 - Latin America and the Caribbean: 3 countries
 - FY2005:
 - Africa: 13 countries
 - Asia and Near East: 9 countries
 - Europe and Eurasia: 3 countries
 - Latin America and the Caribbean: 3 countries

Section II: Strategy for basic education

The basic education office within USAID has prepared a draft strategy on basic education, entitled *Improving Lives through Learning*, but this draft had not yet been publicly released at the time of the writing of this report. USAID's draft strategy adopts a broad definition of basic education, which includes primary and secondary education as well as early childhood development and skills training for adults and out-of-school youth. The strategy is composed of two objectives: "promoting equitable access to quality basic education" and "building productivity-enhancing capabilities." The first objective focuses on basic education as defined

¹¹ Of the 43 countries listed as "basic education countries" in USAID's "Basic Education Report to Congress," May 21, 2004.

above, while the second objective allows USAID to invest resources in activities beyond the standard parameters of basic education, such as work-force development and tertiary education.

Views on the current strategy are mixed. Some individuals in the education policy and program world who have reviewed the draft document feel that the strategy is a “presentable piece of work” (especially in comparison to earlier iterations of the document) or a “fairly reasonable articulation of what USAID does,” while others point out that it “lacks creativity and innovation” and “still doesn’t explain how the Agency is planning on making these things [increased enrollment/completion] happen.” There is general frustration (or even amazement) at the amount of time it has taken USAID to come up with a strategy. People cite a variety of factors that may have contributed to this delay, including the Agency’s failure to give priority to education, tensions between the education office and the Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade (EGAT) bureau where the education office is housed, and general weakness of the Agency, EGAT, and/or the education office.

One of the central complaints regarding USAID’s draft document on education is that the strategy does not include clear linkages to the education goals in the Education for All (EFA) initiative and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The EFA/MDG agenda seeks to achieve universal primary school completion by 2015 and gender equity in primary and secondary schooling by 2005. By endorsing the MDGs,¹² the United States created an expectation that USAID’s education strategy would focus—or at least clearly link to—the methods for reaching these goals. The current draft strategy does reference the EFA goals, and highlights in particular the importance of achieving gender equity and promoting female access to education. However, there is no reference to the importance of primary completion, and no clear mechanisms detailing the ways in which USAID plans to achieve either gender parity or universal completion by the target dates. It is not just the EFA/MDG benchmarks that are conspicuous in their absence: the draft strategy also does not include a set of Agency goals that might operate in parallel or as a step toward the EFA/MDG education agenda. Underpinning the lack of strategic goals is the omission of the means of tracking explicit educational indicators. The draft strategy does not explain what outcomes the Agency seeks to monitor, track, or record

¹² The United States joined with the other member states of the United Nations in supporting resolution 55/2, the United Nations Millennium Declaration (<http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm>)

in an effort to reach either universally recognized or internal benchmarks of progress. Without the identification of such indicators and the means to track the outcomes it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discuss progress toward any set of goals.

Some individuals feel that the preparation of the current strategy should have involved greater collaboration outside of USAID. They believe that the inclusion of a wider range of views of implementing partners and interested parties would have resulted in a strategy that more accurately reflected the reality of the challenges facing education programs and efforts on the ground. In particular, outside observers feel that the draft strategy falls short in how it addresses gender, conflict, and HIV/AIDS. The strategy discusses the benefits of education for girls and women, and raises the problem of access for girls. Some gender specialists, however, stress the importance of educational quality in keeping girls in school. The draft strategy does touch on the importance of quality, but does not make the link between quality and girls' retention/enrollment, thereby – in the eyes of certain respondents—missing a key dimension of gender in education.

Access to education is a key component in achieving universal primary education and gender parity in enrollment rates. USAID lists “promoting equitable access to quality basic education” as one of the two main aspects of its basic education strategy. The strategy document discusses the importance of “removing physical, economic, and social barriers to education, especially for populations underserved because of their poverty, rural residence, ethnic background, disability, or sex.” Although the draft document does not include a comprehensive strategy on how to do away with these barriers, there are several relevant and important points on this topic found in various sections of the document. For instance, the strategy acknowledges gender-specific barriers to girls' access to education and stresses the need to examine the social inequities behind these gender-related barriers. The strategy provides specific recommendations aimed at host-countries for reducing gender barriers, including hiring more female teachers, removing gender stereotypes from books and materials, and providing separate toilet facilities for girls. Non-formal and accelerated learning programs are recommended for children who did not start school or dropped out. If implemented effectively these programs may reduce barriers for students who are older than their grade level, or for those unable to attend regular school sessions due to

employment or domestic duties. In order to address economic barriers to education, the strategy also “encourages host countries to replace school fees with adequate public funding for primary education wherever possible” in order to increase access for children from poor families. Notably, the draft strategy does not recommend a mechanism for eliminating school fees, and does not mention problems arising from other economic barriers, such as uniform costs, textbook fees, or school meals. Positive incentives to increase enrollment and promote retention of students do not appear in the draft strategy. These incentives might include school feeding schemes, the provision of primary health care in schools, or material incentives for families to enroll female children (such as extra food rations).

The draft strategy mentions conflict as a challenge to educational development in certain countries, but adopts a narrow focus in its understanding of conflict and the role education can play in a transitional or post-conflict society. The document limits its discussion of conflict to the numbers of “mostly illiterate and untrained boys and young men, who must be reintegrated back into post-conflict society.” The only programmatic response to the challenge posed by conflict is the establishment of non-formal schools to help reintegrate the former boy soldiers into society.¹³ This narrow view fails to fully understand the impact of conflict and its effects on populations and communities. First, a large number of the child soldiers in conflicts are girls,¹⁴ but the draft strategy mentions only young men and boys. Demobilization programs often overlook these girls and young women, and education and reintegration programs need to be specifically designed to take their needs (and the needs of their children) into account. Second, the draft strategy appears to assume a “stable” post-conflict state. In reality, schools and education systems often restart during or continue throughout unrest and instability. The schools and the role that these institutions play within societies and communities are especially important

¹³ The draft strategy does include a paragraph on “fragile states” at the end of the document, within the section “Education’s Role in Other Core Areas.” This section touches on some key aspects of education that are not addressed or only touched on earlier in the document, including “Humanitarian Assistance” and “Global and Transnational Issues—HIV/AIDS.” The discussion of conflict does recognize the important role of schools as symbols of recovery and government legitimacy, but the strategy itself does not discuss these aspects within the framework for implementation.

¹⁴ A recently published study of conflicts between the years 1990 and 2003 found that girls were included in government, militia, paramilitary and/or armed opposition forces in 55 countries, and were directly involved in armed conflict in 38 of the 55 countries. In Africa, girls made up an estimated 10-30% of forces (rebel, government, and pro-government militias) in most countries, and up to 50% in the conflicts in Uganda and Sierra Leone. See Susan McKay and Dyan Mazurana, *Where are the girls? Girls in fighting forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique: Their lives during and after war*, Canadian International Development Agency, 2004.

in transitional periods for populations that may have experienced trauma, displacement, and violence. Third, the draft strategy does not take into account the important post-conflict symbol of a school as the sole institutional representation of a central, regional, or local government in a given area (this role is referenced at the end of the document, but is not included within implementation plans). When involving local participation, the reestablishment of a school can help to build community cohesion, create a link between the population and the local or central authorities, and provide an essential social service for children and their families in the move toward economic and social recovery. The links between education and post-conflict recovery are not addressed in the current draft strategy.

Respondents in the basic education community point to the cursory manner in which HIV/AIDS is addressed in the body of the draft strategy. Although the strategy recognizes the financial, productive, and personnel losses caused by the disease in many countries, it does not mention the effect of HIV/AIDS on communities and the resulting impact on schools. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has led to declining rates of retention as older children and girls drop out of school to care for ill parents or younger siblings, cousins, and non-related orphans. Orphans are also less likely to attend school than children with one or two parents.¹⁵ In order to be effective in mitigating HIV/AIDS, schools must have the resilience to provide services for a growing number of orphans and children affected by AIDS. Ideally, schools should be able to provide psychosocial, nutritional, and health support to the children within the community.¹⁶

Schools in countries ravaged by HIV/AIDS have the added responsibility of teaching children and communities how to prevent the transmission of the virus and how to cope with the impact of HIV upon their own lives. Many feel that the role of schools in addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis should be a crosscutting issue that appears in every aspect of the draft strategy. While the current draft strategy mentions the problem of HIV/AIDS and the positive role that education systems can play, the document does not include any practical, programmatic, or policy elements that indicate how these aspects of the HIV/AIDS crisis will influence USAID's current and future strategy for basic education.

¹⁵ UNICEF, *Africa's Orphaned Generation*, 2003, Chapter 3.

¹⁶ Such activities are authorized by Public Law 108-25, the "United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis Act of 2003"

The “Ideal” Strategy

In the absence of an officially accepted and public strategy for basic education, many people discussed USAID’s on-going education programs and accompanying policy as a sort of de facto strategy—or set of operating procedures—for the implementation of basic education programs. (Not in all cases. Some respondents simply said, “USAID has no education strategy, and they never have.”) One of the most widespread criticisms of this de facto strategy referred to its piecemeal nature. An individual working for a think tank explained, “Within a given country, USAID may have multiple projects—e.g., an out-of-school youth program, a teacher-training program, and policy level reform program—but there is no clear indication of how these different pieces operate together to inform a country-specific strategy that aims to get all kids in school.” These separate activities may all be high-quality projects, but there is often no overall education strategy for the country or region that explains how one activity links to the next, why these particular educational projects have been selected and implemented, or how the various components will come together to advance a clear set of educational goals for the given country. The need for an overarching framework made up of clear and specific country strategies with obvious linkages and criteria was repeatedly cited as a central component in an ideal USAID education strategy.

One of the outstanding questions not addressed in the draft strategy is the extent to which USAID seeks to work with country governments to develop and implement their national education plans. Participants at the World Education Forum held in Dakar in April 2000 reiterated the responsibility of individual countries in achieving education for all, but also emphasized the role of the international community in assisting countries that lack the financial or technical resources to achieve this goal. USAID’s draft strategy contains recommendations aimed at promoting policy reform and improving institutional capacity at the country government level, but does not explain the mechanisms for technical assistance or how individual country plans are developed or reviewed. Although the international consensus is for greater financial support to those countries which demonstrate commitment to educational reform, the majority of USAID funds for basic education go to U.S.-based for-profit contractors

or nongovernmental agencies, not country governments or even national organizations in the recipient countries. The current draft strategy does not discuss the importance of supporting country governments that demonstrate commitment to educational goals, and does not explain the criteria used to provide funds to international organizations over national governments.

Although USAID's draft strategy spends little time discussing interaction with local governments, there is much evidence of this type of work in the strategic objectives and intermediate results for the specific countries. These documents detail partnerships or close ties with Ministries of Education, work with regional and local officials, and efforts to involve parents and communities as well as high-level ministers in the process of educational reform. The reports from the Missions/desk officers indicate that USAID is involved in comprehensive educational reform, but the draft education strategy as prepared by EGAT does not accurately reflect the nature, extent, or end result of these programs, nor does it seek to monitor outcomes that may indicate progress over time toward achieving universal educational goals.

Respondents discussed their recommendations for elements of a basic education strategy that would be able to take into account possible further and substantial increases in funding. Overwhelmingly, those interviewed said that USAID would have to develop a coordinated strategy that was based on collaboration with other U.S. government agencies, country governments, international donors, multilateral lending organizations, international financial institutions, and U.N. bodies. (USAID purports to be engaged in close coordination with other U.S. government agencies in the "Basic Education Report to Congress," but this claim is widely viewed as lip-service to placate Congress.) Respondents also repeatedly pointed to what is seen as a crisis in staffing in the education sector at USAID. The belief is that many of the good education officers and highly experienced headquarters staff left the Agency roughly ten years ago, and that the Agency has not filled this shortfall in the education field.

A common complaint shared by staff at implementing partner organizations is that USAID does not appear to possess a clear set of criteria for determining where new education programs will be implemented or how specific projects are to be prioritized. For example, there is apparently no documentation or publicly shared strategy that explains the selection process for the 23

countries added to the basic education portfolio since FY2001. This raises a larger question: Is USAID pursuing a strategy of greater breadth of programs (i.e., expansion to more countries), or one of greater depth (i.e., expansion and progress in the existing countries)? Other non-partner respondents expressed frustration at what appears to be USAID's inability to provide a straightforward explanation which says, "This is where we have chosen to operate and this is why, and this fits into our larger framework in the following ways." People spoke of the need for innovative, flexible, and creative solutions to enrollment and retention shortfalls in primary and secondary education. In order to improve access to education, USAID will need to analyze the barriers to schooling in a given country and, in close collaboration with country governments and civil society, seek methods to eradicate these barriers. This will require identifying best practices, admitting to failed policies and lagging programs, and making changes accordingly.

Section III: Trends and Patterns

USAID has greatly expanded basic education programs in the past three years in response to mandated increases in Congressional appropriations. Although there is no clearly articulated public strategy to guide this expansion, an examination of current programs, objectives, and funding levels provides a sense of the Agency's focus and priorities. Some possible trends in program and policy shifts are also visible. The analysis in this section draws primarily from publicly available documents (e.g., Congressional Budget Justifications and reports compiled by implementing partners) and also from the experiences and perceptions of those who have worked with USAID in Washington or in the field.

Politicization

Development assistance and humanitarian aid have become increasingly politicized in recent years. In today's geopolitical climate, the United States government seeks to leverage foreign assistance to "win hearts and minds," to promote U.S. national security interests, or to provide support to a particular side in an armed or ideological conflict. The renewed importance of development assistance places great pressure upon USAID to rapidly initiate and implement relevant programs. USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) usually takes the

lead on rapid reaction in politically charged environments (such as in the aftermath of the earthquake in Bam, Iran in December 2003), but the Agency's regional and technical bureaus have increasingly been expected to step into this position as well since 2001. Education has entered the realm of important political programs as American and allied leaders seek to stem anti-Western sentiment in schools and communities around the world. In response, USAID has scaled-up programs or initiated new programs in strategically important Asian and Muslim nations, including Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Yemen, and of course Iraq and Afghanistan.

Some individuals feel that USAID has been quite successful in responding to the increased political pressure by rapidly creating or expanding education programs in select nations. A staff member at a USAID-partner organization praised the Agency for "stepping up to the plate" by rapidly implementing an education program in Indonesia following President Bush's announcement in Bali in October, 2003, that the United States would seek to improve education in the country.¹⁷ According to the respondent, USAID went to work quickly, even though the Agency had no experience with education in Indonesia at the time. USAID/Washington sent education officers into the field and developed a country-level education strategy at headquarters. Three Requests for Proposals (RFPs) were released, each of which called for a high level of monitoring of programs. The respondent felt that USAID had worked well under pressure and was able to implement a decent education program in a very limited time frame while under political scrutiny.

Other observers stress the dangers of rapid implementation of programs based on a political imperative. These dangers include lack of understanding of local needs, inadequate monitoring and oversight of the project, lack of a fully competitive tender process, insufficient community involvement or ownership of project, and the creation of unsustainable or irrelevant projects. These risks may be best countered if the Agency works in close coordination with other parts of the Administration (such as the State Department, the Executive Office of the President, and the newly created Millennium Challenge Corporation) to ensure that the resulting programs are

¹⁷ This implementing partner is not currently receiving USAID funds for education projects in Indonesia

appropriate, well-conceived, implemented effectively, monitored to ensure desired results, and sustainable as designed and implemented.

On a more strategic or macro level, individuals outside of government express concern that the nation's political agenda is pulling USAID away from what they feel should be central to the Agency's mandate—poverty alleviation in the developing world.¹⁸ Some fear that the Administration and Congress will seek to divert funds once dedicated to low-income countries to those nations with greater strategic importance in the fight against terrorism or the global narcotics industry. Such a shift in focus is predicted to affect the ability of USAID to make gains in countries with current and long-standing programs. One respondent said, “One of the biggest problems with USAID regarding efficacy is that even the best laid plans for poverty reduction get way-laid by politics. How can the Agency focus on realizing goals within a set number of countries when they are buffeted by the political imperatives of the White House and the State Department?”

The shift of attention and funds toward strategically important countries is viewed as having potentially detrimental effects on efforts to improve educational shortfalls in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. There is fear that a limited pot of money for education will simply be spread too thin. This will obviously be less of a concern if Congress continues to increase funds for basic education (and to provide these funds to USAID), but if and when this tap shuts or slows the Agency will be forced to prioritize programs to receive continued funding. USAID will have difficulty cutting programs or projects in Asia and the Near East for as long as the “war on terror” continues. At present, strategic importance is being balanced against and occasionally outweighing need in deciding which countries should receive the greatest amount of funding. For instance, although sub-Saharan Africa had the highest proportion of children not attending primary school (roughly 60% of school age children) in 2001,¹⁹ Africa received only 34% of USAID basic education resources in 2003, compared to 46% for Asia and the Near East.²⁰

¹⁸ In reality, USAID does *not* prioritize poverty alleviation, and clearly states that U.S foreign assistance should be geared toward “furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world.” (http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/)

¹⁹ Basic Education Coalition, *Teach a child, transform a nation*, Washington, DC: Basic Education Coalition, p. 10, data from UNDP, 2003.

²⁰ USAID, “Basic Education Report to Congress,” May 21, 2004.

USAID's current draft strategy on basic education does not directly address the politicization of education programs and objectives. The document acknowledges the link between U.S. national security and international development in the opening section, but then states (under "Guiding Principles") that USAID will allocate education "resources according to country need and commitment." This guiding principle appears to overlook the current political reality, in which decisions about education policy are made by the State Department and the White House as well as by USAID. Furthermore, when politics is the primary motivating factor behind the programs, these programs are likely to be much better funded than those in countries which have great education needs but little strategic interest to the United States.

Combining education and health objectives

Several implementing partners mentioned the merger of education objectives into health programs as an increasingly common trend within USAID programs. Education has been paired with a variety of other objectives in the past (such as democracy and governance and economic growth), but the combination of education and health is seen as more widespread and as gaining in popularity within the Agency. Mixing education and health goals is not, these partners posit, an inherently bad idea. In fact, many people stressed the need for integrated programs of exactly this nature, but said that they did not feel that (in its current capacity) USAID had the structure, expertise, or ability to effectively manage this type of dual objective without prioritizing one goal at the expense of the other. At present, the combined health and education strategic objectives fall under the Global Health pillar, as opposed to EGAT, and this allocation inevitably places greater emphasis on the health portion of a strategic objective.

An examination of changes in strategic objectives in the past three fiscal years does indicate a movement toward combined health and education goals. This trend, however, is not universal, and appears to be most prevalent in cases where education objectives were already combined with other non-health objectives, or in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where very large

and expensive social service programs have been implemented rapidly.²¹ Only four countries that had a stand-alone education strategic objective in FY2003 have a combined health/education strategic objective in FY2005 (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Guatemala, and Honduras).²² Uganda has had a combined health and education strategic objective since FY2002. El Salvador went from a combined economic growth, agriculture, and education objective (under EGAT) in FY2003 to a health and education objective (under Global Health) in FY2005. Nicaragua had a combined health and education objective in FY2003, but this objective was under both the EGAT and Global Health pillar, whereas now the combined objective is strictly within Global Health. Jordan has an objective (under the Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, or DCHA, pillar) that combines health, education, and governance. Afghanistan and Iraq both have objectives that combine education and health (and “other social services” in the case of Iraq), but these programs are somewhat anomalous due to their massive size and the speed at which they were implemented.

Five other basic education countries (Dominican Republic, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Macedonia) have strategic objectives which combine educational achievement with other goals such as economic growth, justice, and social and economic opportunity. In summary, 15 out of 43 countries with basic education programs (35%) have strategic objectives which combine education with another goal, and 10 of these 15 countries combine health and education objectives (23% of basic education countries). In FY2004, 28 countries with basic education programs had stand-alone education strategic objectives. This number fell to 27 in FY2005 after USAID/Washington approved a combined health and strategic objective for Ethiopia.

USAID implementing partners who discussed the combination of education and health objectives offered a variety of possible explanations for this shift. First, within the USAID system there are only a set number of strategic objectives available for each country, and country missions must prioritize and combine programs based on their allotment of strategic objectives. Second, health is a greater priority than education for the Administration and for USAID, as is

²¹ This information is drawn from Congressional Budget Justifications from FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005, as well as a review of Congressional Notifications by USAID from FY2004 for basic education countries. Strategic objectives that have changed since the FY 2005 CBJ and were not notified to Congress will not be picked up here.

²² The new strategic objective for Ethiopia was approved in March 2004 and was notified to Congress on July 14, 2004.

apparent in funding levels for health programs (including HIV/AIDS) and the structure of USAID (in which Global Health is one of three pillars). Third, there is increasing pressure upon USAID from Congress, the White House, and the State Department to demonstrate results from development programs. Priority is likely to go to health programs in such an environment, because of the perception that health inputs have more obvious, immediate, and predictable results than do education inputs (in the absence of strategies to increase enrollment and equity in schools, this may well be the case). For instance, a USAID field monitor or implementing partner can report that 20,000 children were vaccinated or that 500 people completed a course of TB treatment, and these are tangible and obvious successes or gains. In contrast, there are fewer immediate impacts from the inputs provided in an education program. One exception is the rapid increase in enrollment through the eradication of school fees or the removal of other barriers for specific groups of children. Even so, the longer term repercussions of these visible educational gains are difficult to quantify. We know that a vaccination against polio will prevent polio; we do not know that a child who turns up for school on day one will be there a month or year later.

As an Agency, USAID is viewed as placing greater priority upon health than upon education. As a result, efforts to combine health and education objectives do not result in integrated programs, but in health programs that contain a secondary basic education component. This problem is likely to continue without a shift in Agency organization or overall strategy. In the interim, however, it should be possible to develop an integrated approach to the challenges of providing quality health and education services in the developing world. This will require USAID to increase the number of trained education specialists at headquarters and in the field, improve communication within EGAT and between EGAT and other bureaus, and develop a more collaborative and open approach with partners, external education specialists, and interested members of the public.

Program trends

In the absence of a comprehensive basic education strategy, a review of USAID's strategic objectives by country provides insight into the Agency's priorities in basic education funding. A breakdown of 21 specific program components by country offers some indication of patterns

across countries and regions (see Annex A). In the following analysis, the selected program components are listed if they appear in the strategic objectives with clear actions for execution under an intermediate result. Program components are not counted if they appeared only in the objective title, program summary or overall country strategy. For example, the summary of the strategic objective for Egypt's "Improved Basic Education" program states that USAID will support education efforts that "expand girls' access in areas with the greatest poverty and gender gaps" and says that the "[s]trong emphasis on gender equity will continue." However, the text describing the programs does not mention gender equity or improving girls' access to schools, and the Egypt program is therefore not listed as including a component on "access or enrollment for girls."

The selected program components do not follow obvious geographic patterns except in a few cases, and most are evenly spread throughout the world. Of the 21 components tracked in the strategic objectives, "work with local communities" was the most prevalent, appearing in 33 out of 43 basic education countries. Teacher training is nearly as popular, and appears in education programs in 30 countries. Twenty-four education programs seek to work with the national education ministries, and 13 programs specify that they will work on curricula support (although not all of these programs mentioned work with education ministries). Twenty-five education programs highlight efforts to improve the overall quality of basic education.

Programs to increase enrollment by gender and social or economic group were not as prevalent as anticipated. For example, activities to increase the enrollment or access of girls appear in only 13 countries. (As with the example from Egypt above, programs for girls programs are mentioned more frequently in country strategy or program summaries, but do not always appear within the description of actions to achieve the intermediate results). Programs aimed at the inclusion of or outreach to marginalized children and vulnerable groups (other than girls) appear in 12 countries. These programs are varied, and include scholarships for orphans in Zambia, outreach to children with disabilities (and other children) through educational TV programs in Bangladesh, and activities to increase the enrollment and retention of Roma children in Macedonia.

Early childhood development programs exist in six countries, and initiatives to focus on non-formal education appear in seven countries. Two countries (the Philippines and Mali) seek to improve education in *madrassas*. Middle school education is a focus of programs in Senegal and Indonesia, and programs in ten countries include a focus on adolescents through school-to-work programs or adolescent health. In an interesting parallel to the pattern of merging education objectives into health goals, four countries include nutrition and child's health activities in their education programs (Djibouti, Haiti, India, and Zambia). Although higher education is not included in most definitions of basic education, USAID basic education monies go to support tertiary institutions and higher education in six countries (including funding foreign students to study in the U.S. in some cases).

There are only five country strategies that list HIV/AIDS intervention or prevention as a component of education programs (Ghana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia). The manner in which HIV/AIDS is included in the education program varies from one country to the next. For instance, in Namibia HIV/AIDS education is incorporated into all lessons plans in all primary classrooms. In Malawi a Life Skills for HIV/AIDS curriculum is taught at teacher training colleges, and teachers then introduce the curriculum in their classrooms. In Ghana USAID supports a ministerial-level School Health Education Program (SHAPE) that seeks to work with communities and in schools on HIV/AIDS prevention. USAID provides technical assistance to the Department of Education in South Africa to develop models to support students and teachers affected by HIV/AIDS. In Zambia USAID collaborates with the Ministry of Education and local organizations to introduce prevention programs into schools. These examples demonstrate that USAID does have the capacity to integrate health and education goals without compromising educational progress. Furthermore, the wide variation among the programs indicates that USAID or its implementing partners are able to adapt strategies in accordance with local needs, priorities, and policies. However, this type of integration exists in few countries at present. If USAID is to replicate the successes from these programs elsewhere, the Agency will need to dedicate time and money to track outcomes and compile best practices and lessons learned.

There has been much discussion about the merits of technical assistance in donor programs. Technical assistance is not listed as one of the program components in Annex A, as the range of activities that can be classified as technical assistance is extremely broad. This range includes policy support to education ministries, work with regional education officials on school plans, advice on creating standardized tests and models for data collection, and work with local communities and parents to establish and build the capacity of PTAs and local school committees. Most people agree that local level technical assistance (such as work with school administrators or PTAs) is likely to have the most tangible results with parents and communities. Others point out that higher level technical assistance is an important method for assisting national governments to develop or implement their own education policies or programs. Delivering such assistance, however, requires close work with the governments in order to understand their priorities, as well as coordination with other donors and multilateral agencies who may be working in the same country.

Some respondents express concern about growing amounts of money directed toward technical assistance. They feel that technical assistance is perhaps the easiest line-item to inflate or exaggerate, and measuring the impact of technical assistance dollars on increasing school enrollment is difficult. A few of the more forthright critics feel that “technical assistance” is sometimes used as a cover for the high rates of overhead levied by USAID contractors. The bottom line is that *if* USAID had a set of goals for achievements in education (whether these be the Millennium Development Goals or others), a mechanism for tracking outcomes to measure progress toward these goals, and a publicly available and collaborative strategy on basic education, then there would be fewer detractors voicing concern that “technical assistance” is a ruse to cover lack of progress, high corporate overheads, or ex-post-facto accounting at the end of the fiscal year.

Implementing Partners

An analysis of USAID prime implementing partners illustrates clear patterns in vendor preference (see Annex B). A financial breakdown of contracts received was not attainable, but the two largest recipients are Academy for Educational Development (AED) and Creative

Associates International, Inc (CAII), both large contractors who hold Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IQCs) for education and training awarded by USAID. Of the contractors in Annex B, World Learning and Development Associates, Inc also hold current IQCs for education and training with USAID. Many of the other implementing partners—both for-profit contractors and non-profit organizations—manage other organizations as sub-contractors.

Some respondents raise questions about the efficiency of providing such large amounts of money through American non-governmental organizations and contractors. As emphasized at Dakar in 2000, education is ultimately the responsibility of national governments, not the international community. Other U.S.-based aid mechanisms such as the Millennium Challenge Account give greater prominence to funding governments directly. In contrast, the majority of the education funds that pass through USAID go to operational agencies, which in turn work with country governments and local communities. These agencies and organizations provide a great deal of assistance to governments through technical assistance, curriculum support, policy planning, etc, but in only a few cases (in Central America) does it appear that funds go directly to the governments which bear primary responsibility for improving educational standards within their countries. Some argue that USAID can better control the outcome of U.S. foreign assistance dollars if these monies are provided to U.S.-based organizations, particularly contractors. (Others counter that it is difficult to see how USAID could monitor the progress of these organizations if the Agency has no apparent means of tracking outcomes and indicators). The underlying question is one of efficiency: Is it a better use of resources to fund national governments and local organizations or to fund international organizations? Which method will provide the greatest progress in increasing enrollment rates, breaking down barriers to access, and increasing gender equity? There are no easy answers to these questions, and the ability to implement effective programs that produce results will ultimately depend on a combination of capacity, experience, and commitment.

The debate over providing assistance through American organizations or directly to national governments is unlikely to go away, and extends well beyond funding for education programs. Non-profit organizations and contractors who receive USAID funds are a vocal and influential group, and many of these organizations and staff are dedicated to improving the lives of people

in the developing world. At the same time, these organizations and the staff positions within them are maintained by the consecutive contracts reaped from USAID and other donors. These organizations are often effective in using their mandate and extensive field experiences to sway policy and influence funding levels. USAID relies heavily upon the expertise, presence, and access of these organizations—in fact, without these implementing partners there would be no U.S. development assistance or humanitarian programs in many countries. This results in a symbiotic relationship. The Agency does not have the resources (financial or personnel) to effectively run programs on the ground in the absence of the implementing organizations. As a result, the partners take on the role of both implementers and managers, but continue to rely on the largess of USAID to stay afloat. The dependency of the implementing partners on USAID makes it difficult in many (but not all) cases for the recipient organizations to advocate effectively, to question poor programmatic decisions on the part of USAID, to push for a clear and cohesive strategy which may or may not prioritize the organization's niche program, and to be accountable and transparent in their own right.

Section IV: Conclusion

USAID provides an easy target for critics and detractors. Implementing partners, staff members in other government agencies, and outside observers cite a common refrain: “There are some very competent and qualified people at USAID, but on the whole the Agency is a bloated bureaucracy that suffers from the simple inability to get things done.” The education office within EGAT proves to be no exception. For three years in a row, Congress has provided increased funding for basic education programs, and the Agency still has not been able to come up with straight-forward strategy on how, where, and why the money will be spent. Furthermore, the Agency is unwilling to engage in dialogue on these topics with interested parties, implementing partners, and concerned taxpayers. As is evident in the report accompanying the House Foreign Operations appropriations bill in FY2005, Congress is frustrated at the inability of USAID to articulate how this money has been spent and what outcomes are sought from these expenditures. And yet Congress continues to give USAID another chance through the increase in funding for basic education for the fourth year in a row, to \$400 million in FY2005. USAID's tactics, however, may eventually prove to be self-defeating,

as it is difficult for Congressional staff, members of partner organizations, and outside observers – even those who are strong proponents of increased funding for international education programs—to continue to advocate for increase monies to USAID when the Agency cannot explain how this money has been used or how it will be used in the future. Although this apparent intransigence may simply be ineptitude, lack of adequate personnel, or lack of voice within the larger Agency, it creates the appearance of a lack of accountability and transparency.

USAID/EGAT could rectify this negative image by completing, releasing, and implementing a comprehensive basic education strategy that contains clearly defined goals and focuses on improving enrollment in, access to, gender equity in, and quality of basic education programs. Such a strategy will need to contain straight-forward criteria for how countries, regions, or communities are selected, while containing the flexibility to respond to the shifts in geopolitical imperatives as dictated by the Administration. Such a strategy will also need to incorporate a list of indicators to be tracked and monitored to ensure progress toward the desired outcomes. This strategy will need to emphasize work with country governments and national organizations, and commit to coordination with other U.S. agencies, multilateral organizations, and other international donors.

ANNEX A

BASIC EDUCATION PROGRAM COMPONENTS BY COUNTRY, FY 2004

Note: Components of overall goals mentioned in the country strategy or strategic objective summary are *only* listed here when the intermediate results include measures to reach this end.

Access or enrollment for girls	Overall Quality	Textbooks provided	Teachers Trained	Community Development, Participation, Involvement	Emphasis on marginalized groups (other than girls)	Curriculum support	Work with Education Ministries	Literacy stressed (children or adult)	Teacher kits materials
Benin DRC Djibouti Ethiopia Ghana Guinea Nigeria Senegal Sudan Afghanistan India Morocco Yemen	Benin Djibouti Ghana Guinea Kenya Tanzania (Zanzibar only) Zambia Afghanistan Cambodia India Indonesia Morocco Pakistan Yemen Macedonia Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan DR Haiti Jamaica El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Peru	Benin Djibouti Ethiopia Afghanistan Iraq Pakistan Kyrgyzstan (civic ed)	Benin DRC Djibouti Ethiopia Guinea Kenya Malawi Mali Namibia Nigeria Senegal South Africa Sudan Zambia Afghanistan Bangladesh Cambodia Egypt India Indonesia Iraq Morocco Pakistan Philippines Yemen Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Haiti Jamaica El Salvador(05) Honduras Uganda	Benin DRC Djibouti Ethiopia Ghana Guinea Kenya Malawi Mali Namibia Nigeria Senegal Sudan Zambia Bangladesh Cambodia Egypt India Indonesia Iraq Pakistan Philippines West Bank/Gaza (school construction) Yemen Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Dominican Republic Haiti Jamaica El Salvador Peru	Ethiopia Kenya Zambia (scholarships for orphans) Bangladesh (disabled through TV) Cambodia India Sri Lanka (OVC) Macedonia (Roma) Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Haiti (domestics, street children) Nicaragua (vulnerable/ street children)	Benin DRC Mali South Africa Cambodia Egypt Jordan Macedonia Jamaica (05) El Salvador (05) Honduras Guatemala Nicaragua	Benin Guinea Kenya Malawi Mali Namibia Nigeria South Africa Zambia Cambodia Egypt India Iraq Jordan Pakistan Yemen Macedonia Jamaica El Salvador Honduras Guatemala Nicaragua Peru Uganda	Djibouti Ethiopia Ghana Guinea Mali Afghanistan Egypt Iraq Morocco Pakistan Yemen Haiti Jamaica	Djibouti Ethiopia Iraq Morocco Pakistan Haiti El Salvador (05) Uganda

Radio/TV Instruction (teachers and/or students)	HIV/AIDS prevention (within an education program)	Adolescents/ youth (including school-to-work)	Support to district/ regional officials	Non-formal education	Tertiary education or scholars supported	Emphasis on early learning	Institutional construction or rehabilitation	Emphasis on middle school education	Improved nutrition and child's health in schools programs	Emphasis on madrassas (teachers/ students)
Ethiopia Guinea Mali Zambia Afghanistan Bangladesh (TV) India Philippines Haiti Honduras	Ghana Malawi Namibia South Africa Zambia	Djibouti (girls health) India (social/econ opps.) Indonesia Jordan Morocco Philippines Sri Lanka Haiti Jamaica	Ethiopia Ghana Mali Namibia Nigeria Senegal Egypt Indonesia Iraq Nicaragua Peru Uganda	Ethiopia Ghana Sudan Indonesia Philippines Yemen Honduras Uganda	Malawi South Africa Afghanistan Iraq Macedonia West Bank/Gaza	Bangladesh Jordan Pakistan Sri Lanka El Salvador Honduras	Djibouti Guinea Senegal Sudan Afghanistan Iraq Morocco Pakistan (tribal areas) Sri Lanka West Bank & Gaza Yemen Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Haiti Uganda	Senegal Indonesia	Djibouti Zambia India (health and hygiene) Haiti	Mali Philippines

Principal Contractors

Contractors listed as prime or principal included here. When lead not specifies in strategic objective all contractors are listed.

Abt Associates

Country	Program
Uganda	technical assistance

AED

Country	Program
Djibouti	Improved Access
Djibouti	Teaching/learning quality
Djibouti	Girls' access
Ethiopia	Teacher quality
Ethiopia	District level training
Malawi	Technical support to Ministry
Nigeria	Local demand for social services
Nigeria	Improved access to services
Senegal	middle school access
Senegal	improved teaching/ learning environment
Egypt	education reform
Kyrgyzstan	teacher training
Kyrgyzstan	community involvement
Kyrgyzstan	strengthen local mgmt capacity
Kyrgyzstan	general education support
Tajikistan	teacher training
Tajikistan	community involvement
Tajikistan	strengthen local mgmt capacity
Tajikistan	general education support
Uzbekistan	teacher training
Uzbekistan	community involvement
Uzbekistan	strengthen local mgmt capacity
Uzbekistan	general education support
El Salvador	overall quality; early childhood development
Guatemala	policy reform- tech assistance

Nicaragua	policy reform- tech assistance
Peru	policy reform, national level
Peru	policy reform and implementation, regional level
West Bank/Gaza	post-graduate exchanges to USA

Africa-America Institute

Country	Program
Africa Regional	"partnerships" for teacher quality, pilots, MOE support, etc

Aga Khan Foundation

Country	Program
Pakistan	community involvement
Pakistan	math, science, ESL teaching
Tajikistan	teacher training
Tajikistan	strengthen local mgmt capacity
Tajikistan	general education support

Aga Khan University

Country	Program
Pakistan	est. national exam board

AIR

Country	Program
Djibouti	improved access
Djibouti	teaching/learning quality
Djibouti	girls' access
Malawi	improved classroom practices
Egypt	education reform
India	access for at-risk children
Macedonia	education reform
Haiti	radio instruction, overall quality
El Salvador	overall quality; early childhood development

American Councils for International Education

Country	Program
Kyrgyzstan	overall education support

Association Liaison Office for University Cooperation in Development

Country	Program
Macedonia	improving access

CARE

Country	Program
Benin	girls' access
Sudan	teacher education
Sudan	rehab of and support to schools
Sudan	non-formal education
Bangladesh	early learning
Bangladesh	innovative learning tools
Yemen	basic education
Haiti	community mobilization
El Salvador	overall quality; early childhood development

Chicago State University

Country	Program
Africa Regional	develop teacher development centers in RSA

Creative Associates

Country	Program
Benin	curriculum development, textbooks, training
Benin	girls' access
Afghanistan	leads Afghanistan Primary Education Program (APEP)
Iraq	leads Education program
Yemen	basic education

Creative Center for Community Mobilization

Country	Program
Malawi	improved classroom practice

CRS

Country	Program
Macedonia	civic education
Haiti	community mobilization

Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu

Country	Program
Uganda	effective use of social services

Dept. of Health & Human Services

Country	Program
Africa Regional	strategic and tech support to country Missions

Development Associates

Country	Program
El Salvador	overall quality; early childhood development
Uganda	technical assistance

EDC

Country	Program
DRC	teacher training
Guinea	technical assistance to ministry
Guinea	teacher training
India	technology innovations for teaching
Macedonia	education reform
Haiti	out-of-school youth
Haiti	radio instruction, overall quality
El Salvador	overall quality; early childhood development

Elizabeth City State Univ.

Country	Program
Senegal	improved teaching/learning environment
Africa Regional	text book design, printing, and distribution

Falconbridge Foundation

Country	Program
DR	private sector/community involvement

Hampton Univ., Alabama A & M Univ., Dillard Univ., St. Augustine's College, Albany State Univ.

Country	Program
Africa Regional	textbook design, printing, distribution

International Foundation for Election Systems

Country	Program
Kyrgyzstan	civic education
Tajikistan	civic education

International Institute for Education

Country	Program
Egypt	education reform

International Rescue Committee

Country	Program
Uganda	effective use of social services

IOM

Country	Program
Tajikistan	civic education
Uzbekistan	civic education

IFESH

Country	Program
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Benin	teacher training
Africa Regional	teacher quality, pilots, MOE support, etc
Ethiopia	teacher quality

John Snow International

Country	Program
Uganda	effective use of social services
Uganda	technical assistance

Joint Clinical Research Center

Country	Program
Uganda	effective use of social services

Juarez & Associates

Country	Program
Jamaica	school attendance
Jamaica	teaching quality

Management Sciences for Health (MSH)

Country	Program
Afghanistan	Accelerated health-focused literacy for rural women

PACT-Children's Resources International, Inc (PACT-CRI)

Country	Program
Pakistan	math, science, ESL teaching
Pakistan	literacy

Plan International

Country	Program
Bangladesh	early learning
Bangladesh	innovative learning tools

PSI

Country	Program
Nigeria (with AED)	Local demand for social services
Nigeria (with AED)	improved access to services

RTI

Country	Program
Benin	Community involvement
Pakistan	education quality
Pakistan	teacher aids and tools
Pakistan	Community involvement
Pakistan	literacy

SCF-US

Country	Program
Ethiopia	PTA development
Malawi	improved classroom practices
Bangladesh	early learning
Bangladesh	innovative learning tools
Haiti	community mobilization
Haiti	radio instruction, overall quality
El Salvador	overall quality; early childhood development

Sesame Workshop

Country	Program
Bangladesh	early learning-TV program
Bangladesh	innovated learning tools
El Salvador	quality, early children development

State Univ. of New York

Country	Program
DR	private sector/community involvement

UMASS

Country	Program
Malawi	improving teacher skills

UNESCO

Country	Program
Iraq	textbooks

UNICEF

Country	Program
Djibouti	teaching and learning quality
Djibouti	girls' access
India	sanitation, hygiene, and health in schools
Iraq	school kits/teacher training
El Salvador	overall quality; early childhood development

United Negro College Fund Special Projects (UNCFSP)

Country	Program
South Africa	curriculum support; support to tertiary institutions
South Africa	Institutional strengthening

Virginia Tech

Country	Program
Malawi	improving teacher skills

Winrock

Country	Program
DRC	Teacher training (?) unclear role

World Bank Institute

Country	Program
DR	private sector/community involvement

World Education

Country	Program
Benin	community involvement
Guinea	civil society involvement in schools
Guinea	regional and gender equity
Mali	improved teacher education
Mali	curriculum development
Mali	community and parental involvement

World Learning

Country	Program
Benin	girls' access
Ethiopia	PTA development

World Vision

Country	Program
Haiti	community mobilization

National Organizations

(when a prime partner)

Org/Country	Program
Tigray Development Association / Ethiopia	PTA development
Ethiopian Children's Fund/Ethiopia	Non-formal ed
Peoples Action for Community Transformation/Jamaica	literacy
REST/Ethiopia	Non-formal ed
Malawi Institute of Education (MIE)/Malawi (and several other Malawian orgs)	improving teacher skills
Ministry of Education, Youth and Culture/Jamaica	main partner on several projects

Foundation pour l'Enseignement Prive (FOHNEP) Haiti	out-of-school youth; radio programs'; overall quality
Salvadoran Institute for Integrated Development of Children and Youth (ISNA)/El Salvador	overall quality; early childhood development
Ministry of Education/Guatemala	increased investment in education
Fabretto Foundation/Nicaragua	vulnerable and street children