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# FIGHTING RETREAT



## MILITARY POLITICAL POWER AND OTHER BARRIERS TO AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

*Prepared for Non-Governmental Organizations, Scholars, Media,  
and Government Officials in Africa and the United States*

*Demilitarization for Democracy*

*July 1997*

# **FIGHTING RETREAT: MILITARY POLITICAL POWER AND OTHER BARRIERS TO AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION**

## **This Report Contains:**



**Political Summaries** for each of the 53 African nations, analyzing the status of crucial aspects of democracy:

- \* *Political and Economic Power of the Armed Forces*
- \* *Civil Conflict*
- \* *Accountability*
- \* *Respect for Human Rights*
- \* *Economic Opportunity*
- \* *Freedom of Speech and Press*
- \* *Elections*



**Continent-Wide Snapshots** for key variables:

- ★ *Degree of Democracy*
- ★ *Political and Economic Power of Armed Forces*
- ★ *U.S. Support for Armed Forces*
- ★ *Level of Civil Conflict*



**Country Rankings** for measures of militarization:

- *Military Spending as a Share of National Budget*
- *U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Training Per Capita*



**Recommendations for U.S. Policy:**

- ✓ *End military support for non-democratic armed forces*
- ✓ *Prevent conflicts through regional force and threat reduction talks*
- ✓ *Condition World Bank/IMF loans on military transparency and demobilization*
- ✓ *Increase Africa's voting power at the World Bank and IMF*
- ✓ *Promote accountability and other non-electoral aspects of democracy*
- ✓ *Ban anti-personnel landmines*

# Africans Speak About Democracy to Visiting DFD Researchers



## Democracy and Elections

*Our “multiparty” elections are meaningless, due to the government party’s “rules of the road,” like intimidating voters with “door-to-door” election day visits, hiring opposition politicians as party officials, bankrupting critical newspapers by driving away advertisers, and setting standards for public campaign funding that only they can meet.*

— Head of a human rights group, Zimbabwe

*The constitutions in Africa are all European, 100 percent. There is no concertation (discussion in the group to achieve consensus) in them, so they are not African. Democracy is a system that must be based on traditional cultural values accepted by the people, and here that means not just elections, but participation by all in the decisions affecting them.*

— Leader of a non-governmental development organization, Senegal



## Democracy and Military Political Power

*When basic needs are not provided for and people are dissatisfied with corrupt civilians, then the military always returns, and intervenes. But it acts even worse: instead of food, people are given bullets; instead of freedom, people get detained; instead of health care, people are beaten into a stupor.*

— Jurist, Nigeria

*There are no arms factories in Somalia. The weapons that kept that dictator in power came from democracies outside this continent.*

— Human rights activist, Ethiopia



## Democracy and Accountability

*When those officials get punished for demanding my chickens, that is democracy.*

— Subsistence farmer, Malawi

*First, we must achieve accountability and transparency in governance and governing bodies.*

— Director of a women’s legal aid center, Nigeria



## Democracy and the International Institutions Controlling Africa’s Future

*The fight for democracy has replaced the fight for independence of 30 years ago as the essential struggle for African self-determination, but national democracy is irrelevant without international democracy.*

— Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), at a conference on democracy in Ethiopia

*The only "structural adjustment" should be in the World Bank's relations with the base of people it affects. Living standards have fallen so far that the people in the village are asking: "When will all this democracy be over? We've been hearing talk about democracy for ten years, and then the French devalue the franc without discussion in two days."*

— Leader of a non-governmental development organization, Senegal



### **Democracy and Economic Opportunity**

*The word "democracy" is meaningless for the rural majority here, who choose daily whether to eat their corn or put it aside for next season's planting.*

— Railway worker, Ethiopia

*Pro-military people say: "Nigerians aren't interested in democracy; they just want food on their table." But I know, from the size of the street protests, that Nigerians do want to choose their government, and to remove it, as well.*

— Head of a civil liberties group, Nigeria



### **Foreign Efforts to Promote Democracy**

*And just what have you been teaching the parties?*

— Malawian religious leader, after a U.S.-trained political party charged a rival party with plotting to circumcise all adult males

*In principle, the Organization of African Unity could press members to respect human rights, but it does little in practice, since it is stymied by its other principle of non-interference in state matters, which allows unelected governments like Nigeria to block policy moves.*

— Director of a pro-democracy institute, South Africa



### **Democracy and Group Loyalty**

*Most importantly, we need a change in consciousness away from "If you're not with me, you're my enemy" toward accepting that being in a different political party can be healthy, within a community and even a family.*

— Secretary General of the OAU, Ethiopia

*Remember, to be an African is first and foremost to be a member of a tribe, not a nation.*

— Student activist, Nigeria

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“Democracy.” It is a word that generates much debate and disagreement among diplomats, generals, journalists, scholars, and other “experts” when it comes to this planet’s second largest continent – Africa. However, the three years of research for this report (including two extended trips in Africa) have revealed that at least within one group a surprising level of consensus is emerging about what

*Concertation means that minority rights are taken into account by the majority, both within a country and in the international decisions that affect it.*

“democracy” means to Africans, and, just as importantly, what it does not mean. This group consists of members of African non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) who, through their efforts to promote development, human rights, and political freedom, have their fingers close to the pulse of average citizens and their needs and aspirations.

The emerging NGO consensus can be expressed in part by the French word *concertation*, meaning “working together” to make decisions openly with the participation of the various groups affected by decisions. In the African context, this definition contrasts sharply with the primary definition that U.S. policy-makers have used and pursued there – the holding of Western style elections. While elections have an important part to play in any democracy, they have often been manipulated in Africa to strengthen the hand of non-democratic ruling parties. In any event, *concertation* involves much more than elections, even free and fair ones.

*Concertation* means that minority rights are taken into account by the majority, both within a country and in the international decisions that affect it. For such a system to develop, there must be open debate, a free press, and a legal system that protects the rights of the individual and holds officials accountable. Armed forces must focus on protecting borders rather than on controlling what happens in the political process within them. And, obviously, citizens’ ability to improve their lives through the process of *concertation* will be hampered to the extent that a country has been savaged by war and its deadly legacies, such as devastated infrastructure or millions of landmines.

Using this NGO consensus for the definition of democracy, where is Africa in its transition to democracy, and what role is the United States playing? Detailed analysis in the body of this report of the political situation and of U.S. relations with each of the 53 African countries provides this snapshot as of June 1997.



## Degree of democracy (Charts 1a & 1b)

Six of the 53 countries, or 11 percent, are **Consolidated Democracies**, defined as countries characterized by free and fair multiparty elections, respect for human rights, a credible judicial system, and a tradition of civilian control of the armed forces. Another 17 countries, or 32 percent, are **Transitional States** in which there has been substantial movement from a one-party or authoritarian form of government toward a democratic state. While there may be some limitations on freedom of expression and the press, some abuse of power by the ruling party, or some lack of accountability in

the armed forces, the government generally reflects the will of the people as expressed in a free and fair election. Putting these two categories together, **43 percent of African countries are either democratic or on the road to democracy.** This accounts for 26 percent of the continent's 700 million people.

U.S. policy-makers and foreign aid programs can take credit for assisting with the electoral process in a number of these difficult transitions by linking U.S. relations to the fairness of the elections and by providing technical help. **However, U.S. policy-makers have not similarly promoted other key aspects of democracy, such as reducing the political and economic power of armed forces,** requiring accountability through a functioning judicial system, distributing the benefits of economic growth, controlling the arms trade and banning landmines, or giving Africa a fair share of power in the international institutions that have so much impact on it, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations.

In part because of this failure, 26 countries, or 49 percent, are governed by **Authoritarian Regimes,** meaning one-party systems or military rule. In a number of these countries there is technically a multiparty system, but citizens are effectively denied the ability to change their government by peaceful means because the ruling party controls the system through intimidation, restrictions, the use of government resources, and lack of accountability. Finally, four countries, or eight percent, are **Dissolving Nation-States,** characterized by anarchy or a severe civil war that renders the central government irrelevant in many parts of the country. Putting these categories together, **57 percent of African countries (accounting for 74 percent of the population) are clearly not democratic.**

### **Political and economic power of the armed forces** (Chart 2)

**In 40 countries, or 76 percent, the armed forces hold substantial political and economic power.** In these countries the armed forces are either the ruling power or operate independently of the control of elected civilian authorities or a functioning judiciary, with key decisions on their budget and promotions made internally. They lack accountability for human rights abuses, their non-military commercial activities, and corruption. In the remaining 13 countries, or 24 percent, the armed forces wield only moderate (seven countries) or minimal (six countries) political and economic power.



### **U.S. support for armed forces** (Chart 3)

The high level of military political and economic power is one of the primary barriers to the democratic transition in Africa, but U.S. policy-makers have done little to confront it. Indeed, despite the terrible results of the 1980s, when the five largest recipients of U.S. weapons in Sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire) descended into anarchy, U.S. policy still seems locked in its Cold War policy of strengthening the armed forces of non-democratic African rulers. **An astonishing 94 percent of all nations in Africa received U.S. military assistance from 1991 to 1995. Of the 3,408 African officers trained during this period, 71 percent came from authori-**

**tarian regimes or dissolving nation-states. The number of African countries conducting joint combat exercises with U.S. forces has risen from 20 in 1995 to a proposed 33 in 1998.**

Due to the tremendous variety between countries' political and military situations, raw data on assistance programs are not by themselves enough to categorize the degree of U.S. military support as substantial, moderate, or minimal. By reviewing each country's situation, however, we have judged that the armed forces of 11 nations, accounting for 21 percent of all African nations, have received **Substantial** support from the United States in the form of arms transfers, officer training, and joint combat exercises. The armed forces of another 26 nations, or 48 percent, have received **Moderate** U.S. support under these programs, so **a total of 37 nations, or 69 percent, who have had their armed forces strengthened significantly by the United States.** Another 13 armed forces, accounting for 25 percent of African nations, have received **Minimal** U.S. support, and three armed forces, or six percent, have an **Adversarial** military relationship with the United States.



#### Level of civil conflict (Chart 4)

18 African countries, or 34 percent, are suffering the effects of recent civil war or significant internal conflict. This figure includes only countries where fighting continues today or took place in 1995, 1996, or 1997. With another 14 countries, or 26 percent, embroiled in conflict earlier in the 1990s, **only 21 countries, or 40 percent, have avoided civil conflict in the 1990s** -- and many of these "peaceful" countries have been indirectly affected by conflict, as refugees streamed across borders and investment was scared off from entire regions. This finding alone could explain Africa's current political and economic weaknesses: development is extremely difficult after conflict, particularly because of the widespread use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines. The Clinton administration has been a barrier to the completion of a Canadian proposal to ban anti-personnel landmines because the Pentagon opposes such restrictions on its defense posture in Korea and elsewhere.

U.S. willingness to respond to African requests to provide humanitarian relief and political stability in the aftermath of armed struggles for power is to be commended. **It would be far preferable for both U.S. and African interests, however, if the United States would support an aggressive program of democracy building and conflict prevention to keep these devastating civil wars from happening in the first place.** This report proposes a U.S. Plan of Support for Democracy in Africa that includes the following elements:

#### **1. Stop supporting repressive governments:**

- Bar arms, military training, and other support programs such as exercises for non-democratic governments and human rights abusers, as defined in the Arms Trade Code of Conduct developed by Reps. Cynthia McKinney and Dana Rohrabacher;
- Condition macroeconomic (cash) aid on civilian audits of, and resulting cuts in, military budgets, as required by laws governing U.S. voting at the World Bank and IMF that were authored by Rep. Joseph Kennedy and Sen. Patrick Leahy; and
- Bar the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies from using bribery and other illegal or corrupting methods in gathering information in Africa.

**2. Back international initiatives to prevent conflicts and save resources through mutual force reductions and collaborative security:**

- Support the establishment of a system of U.N. special envoys for regional confidence-building and disarmament, as proposed by former Costa Rican President and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Dr. Oscar Arias and the Year 2000 Campaign to Redirect World Military Spending to Human Development;
- Provide bilateral and multilateral aid to Africa for post-conflict reconstruction, and to demobilize soldiers after conflicts or force reductions; and
- Sign the treaty banning anti-personnel landmines in Ottawa in December 1997.

**3. Press for democracy in the international institutions affecting Africa:**

- Work with democratic developing nations on a “structural adjustment” of the voting rules of the World Bank and IMF that would increase the power of Africa and other developing nations; and
- Block multilateral loans and adjustment plans that have not been planned with popular participation at the national and local levels.

**4. Grant “diplomatic status” to accountability and other non-electoral aspects of democracy by focusing programming, publicity, and sanctions on them:**

- Place such issues as civilian control of armed forces, women’s and minority rights, judicial control of human rights abuses and corruption, and open media at the top of the agenda for U.S. pro-democracy programming and high-profile visits; and
- Lead international coalitions that use political and economic sanctions to spur reforms in specific elements of democracy.

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# I. WHAT DOES "DEMOCRACY" MEAN IN AFRICA, AND WHAT IS ITS STATUS?

In her March 1997 trip to Africa, First Lady Hillary Clinton praised the growth of democracy in Africa. In Senegal, she backed a U.S. policy of engagement in Africa, noting that in the last six years the number of democracies on the continent has quadrupled. In South Africa she said that "in Africa, we find country after country becoming a touchstone of democracy and freedom." Many analysts agree.

They believe that Africa is undergoing a remarkable transformation in which non-governmental organizations, po-

*Who is right, Ms. Clinton or Mr. Kaplan? Both. Africa is in crisis, but there is now widespread agreement on the continent that democracy is essential to resolving that crisis.*

litical parties, legal experts, media, and even governments themselves are agitating for systems of government and accountability that reflect the popular will. From this point of view, more African nations are joining the democratic camp, and most African citizens enjoy an overall quality of life their parents could not have imagined.

In a recently-published book, The Ends of the Earth, Robert D. Kaplan rejects this notion. According to Kaplan, Africa is plagued by ethnic strife, corruption, military dictatorship, grinding poverty, widespread disease, environmental destruction, and refugee crises. Many analysts agree. In no other region of the developing world did colonial rule end so recently, or leave such a bleak legacy of division within the nation and dependency outside it. Amidst such chaos and gloom it seems at best premature to speak of Africa being part of the world-wide transition toward democracy.

Who is right, Ms. Clinton or Mr. Kaplan? Both. Africa is in crisis, but there is now widespread agreement on the continent that democracy is essential to resolving that crisis. But what is meant by democracy, in today's African context? Research conducted for this report, including dozens of interviews with members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and leaders of civil society during two research trips to Africa, revealed a surprisingly broad, common-sense consensus on the essential elements of a fully-functioning democracy. It was the elements of this consensus that formed the definitions used to categorize countries in this report.


## **Defining Democracy: An Emerging Non-Governmental Consensus**

That any consensus should be evident even among non-governmental actors is remarkable: the 53 African countries are so dramatically divergent in their traditions as to make generalizations highly suspect. These differences are not simply the huge dissimilarities between Islamic countries of the North and West (such as Egypt, Algeria, and Senegal), or the Christian and Traditional countries of the Center and South (such as Congo or Zimbabwe), or the explosive countries where these two traditions meet (such as Nigeria or the Sudan). In fact, differences in culture, religion, and political tradition are often far greater between neighboring states, such as multi-ethnic, Orthodox Christian Ethiopia and ethnically homogeneous, Sunni Muslim Somalia, or the tiny pastoral Kingdom of Swaziland and the industrialized goliath it borders, South Africa.

Simply put, this NGO consensus holds that elections, even if regular, free, and fair, are not enough, and that focusing on elections as the primary measure of democracy obscures the need for dramatic reforms in other areas. Of course, the specifics of implementing the consensus will vary dramatically from country to country, just as the specifics of economic reform must. Applying the same standards or methods in each nation will bring similar failure to African politics as it has to African economies under the “cookie cutter” structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

It is important to note that the African NGO consensus is in many respects not consistent with many aspects of U.S. policy toward Africa. The divergence is addressed in Chapter II. The elements of democracy embraced by the consensus include:

◆ **An end to civil conflict.** In modern African history, the use of violence and repression to gain and maintain power is the rule rather than the exception. Colonial



*The use of violence to resolve internal political disputes is the curse of Africa. Here a Liberian soldier prepares to execute an unarmed civilian (1994).*

powers in the late 19th and early 20th century used force to conquer and control Africa. Then Africans used force to end colonialism and white minority rule in the mid-20th century, and in the case of Portuguese and some breakaway British colonies, well into the late 20th century. It is not surprising, then, that changes in government during Africa’s period of independence have often come not from democratic procedures but from military action. Europeans told Africans to do as they said, as they

talked of democracy, and not as they did, as they took and ruled by force. This hypocritical reality colors all Western relations with Africa today, and continues in the contradiction, noted in the next chapter, of U.S. and other Western powers arming dictators in Africa as they speak of the need for democracy.

The use of violence to resolve internal political disputes is the curse of Africa. It is remarkable, and indeed bodes well for the future, that so many countries have succeeded in creating a politics of debate and elections. Most of those that do, however, are still damaged by their neighbors’ conflicts, which inevitably send refugees streaming across borders and scare off financial and human capital in an entire region. Democracy and economic growth will certainly elude Africa if the next decade does not bring a dramatic reduction in civil conflict, a ban on anti-personnel landmines and the removal of the over 40 million mines still emplaced on the continent.

◆ **Reduced political and economic power of armed forces.** African armed forces have not only fomented numerous civil conflicts, but have also played a dominant and largely negative role in politics since independence. Military coups overwhelmed electoral politics in the 1960s and 1970s, and the decline in straightforward military rule in the 1980s and 1990s reflects not so much an acceptance of civilian rule as the development of more sophisticated ways to maintain power from

“behind the throne.”

In many cases, the armed forces and police have their genesis not in liberation movements, but in the colonial powers themselves. French, British, and Belgian strategy developed national security forces to control the population, and after independence these forces continued in that role for the new government, for example in French West Africa, Morocco, Nigeria, and Zaire/Congo. Even where the security forces emerge from the army of liberation, as in Algeria, the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, or the former British colonies of Egypt, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, they can become associated with a dominant ethnic group or political faction and take on some of the repressive features of the security forces they defeated. In either case, the armed forces of these nations are rooted not in the philosophy of protection of borders and interests from foreign adversaries, but of the suppression of dissent and the contest for power *within* the nation.

In most countries membership in the armed forces is seen largely as a means of enrichment. Officers are expected to augment their meager salaries with business arrangements requiring the corrupt use of their military connections, and soldiers typically augment their often non-existent salaries with simple street shake-downs. France, the United States, and other foreign powers train African armed forces to carry out “nation-building” tasks such as construction of roads or the delivery of health services. These “civic actions” may temporarily improve life for residents, but they also bring substantial kick-backs for officers and empower the armed forces at the expense of civilian institutions.

Nigeria and Zaire/Congo, two of the largest countries on the continent, show the degree to which armies and security forces with a colonial heritage can become alienated from their people, ruling by force and stealing openly from the public treasury. In Nigeria, the army itself shows videos on the national television channel of its beatings of market women who refuse to pay fees that are thinly-disguised bribes. In rural Zaire/Congo, people referred to the Mobutu government in Kinshasa and its army as “the Belgians.” Nothing could improve Africa’s democratic prospects more than an end to the armed forces playing the role of an occupying army, and indeed to all military involvement in politics and in the civilian economy.

*Nothing could improve Africa’s democratic prospects more than an end to the armed forces playing the role of an occupying army, and indeed to all military involvement in politics and in the civilian economy.*

◆ **Accountability of civilian and military officials.** Democratic rights are only as real as the ability of the judicial system to protect them. Democracy requires accountability for the powerful. The weakness of democracy in Africa is illustrated most clearly by the general impunity of military personnel for human rights abuses and corruption, large and small. With armed forces largely expected to fend for themselves financially and fully expected to defend themselves from civilian orders, the judicial system is badly wounded when it is unable to hold them accountable. Powerful civilian officials from politicians to local bureaucrats also operate above the law. When their flagrant corruption is also ignored, people lose all faith in “going to the authorities” with a complaint. Many minor infractions and disputes are handled by the quasi-public “customary” or religious courts. While these courts afford the average citizen some means of redress, they are

unable to service a modern economy, with its need for predictability to protect investments in business and finance. The rule of law is crucial not just for human rights but for economic growth.

Police can hardly be expected to serve as fair arbiters of the rules in such a setting. They tend, as a leading legal figure says of the Nigerian police, to “follow the colonial order they inherited: corrupt, inept, and brutal,” as they ignore legal procedure, for example, by holding family members hostage to force a political prisoner to surrender. Until predictable, fair accountability is established, the same can be said for most government functions for the average African: the government will be seen as a continuation of colonial power, disrupting the traditional chieftains’ power and ability to administer justice.

◆ **Expansion of women’s rights.** Women’s rights are deeply compromised in many African countries. Women are systematically denied political and economic power in ways large and small, ranging from voting practices, if not rules, to education, expression, economic opportunity, inheritance laws, and marriage practices. Democracy obviously cannot thrive if half the population faces such systematic repression. The deep-seated cultural practices within many of these nations, however, make women’s rights one of the most difficult reforms to link to outside policy pressure. The transition toward greater independence for women and girls is nevertheless essential to the promotion of democracy, however fraught with controversy it may be.

Part of any dialogue about democracy both within countries and between donors and governments must be a consideration of how policies promote women’s rights, and what their impact will be on women. It is essential to the transition to democracy that women be leaders in that dialogue and other national debates. Civil war and poverty as much as modernization have disrupted traditional ways of life that, if oppressive in many ways to women, at least provided some protection. The emergence of the previously unthinkable phenomenon of prostitution in Ethiopia is just one macabre example of a tragic fact – despite increased awareness of and activism for their rights among Africa’s women, women’s rights in Africa are still under assault throughout the continent.

◆ **Meaningful economic opportunity.** The weak economic growth registered in the past fifteen years in Africa tends to discredit any government, democratic or not. Governments that are guiding a transition to democracy must show tangible benefits of the transition or risk losing the confidence of the public. In country after country in the 1980s and 1990s political reform has foundered on public discontent. “Structural adjustment” plans have reduced living standards in the short term by devaluing the currency and cutting vital social services such as the education and health budgets. The resulting political turmoil often drives out capital, and the desperate level of economic need promotes corruption, both of which damage economic and political prospects before long-term benefits are realized. The debate in international development circles about “growth



*Civil war and poverty as much as modernization have disrupted traditional ways of life that, if oppressive in many ways to women, at least provided some protection. Here a Somali woman with her child (1993)*

versus equity” has become a tragic joke for much of Africa, where there is neither growth nor equity.

Economic growth often comes first to urban areas, where citizens have an easier time bringing their concerns to the attention of the government. Rural Africans have virtually no means of participating in decisions on national or local economic policy. Africa’s cities contain great poverty, but also far more opportunity for enterprising citizens than rural areas. Despite the phenomenal sprawl of cities like Dakar, Lagos, and Addis Ababa where ethnic groups mix and do business in some common language, it is important to remember that most Africans still live in the season-to-season rural economy, among people of their own ethnic group, speaking only their language. Democracy must deliver to them as well, or fail.

*The debate in international development circles about “growth versus equity” has become a tragic joke for much of Africa, where there is neither growth nor equity.*

◆ **Democracy in international decisions.** Crucial decisions that affect Africa are made outside the continent. The U.N. Security Council, in which no African country has the veto enjoyed by the five permanent members, decides on multilateral military intervention, and outside powers such as France and the United States often intervene unilaterally, or strengthen repressive forces through arms transfers and military training. The United States and China, among others, are holding up progress on banning landmines, which have been a developmental and humanitarian disaster for the continent.

Former colonial powers, and France in particular in its CFA Franc zone, control currency and investment rules either openly or informally. Trade and tariff decisions by developed nations have huge implications for African nations, whose trade patterns are still decidedly colonial. The international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, are dominated by the voting shares of developed nations, and they arguably make the most important decisions about Africa’s future. The Bank and Fund have in effect run Africa for 20 years, with at best disappointing results. Developed nations pressure the World Bank to spend its funds on goods and services from their own economies, and the degree of corruption and favoritism in this process in Africa is disturbing even to Bank officials themselves.

Given all the power to affect Africa that lies outside the continent, there is a danger that progress toward democracy will be overwhelmed by external decisions such as currency devaluation and arms transfers. The lack of international democracy has created resentment against developed nations among the very Africans most sympathetic to their call for democracy at the national level. Developed nations must make progress in bringing democracy to the international decisions affecting Africa if they are to work in coalition with Africa’s democrats.

◆ **Consensus decision-making and protections for minorities.** “To be African is to be a member of a tribe,” says a student activist in Nigeria. He treats this as a fact, neither good nor bad in itself, but he bemoans the development from that fact of the attitude that “either you are with me, or you are my enemy.” African politics are forged in two fundamental traditions: the development of consensus within groups (broadly defined as ethnic, religious, clan, or regional groupings) and the

expectation of conflict between them. These traditions become contradictory when distinct groups must share a country, as is the case for almost all of Africa because of the continuation of colonial borders. National parliaments are often alienated from the tradition of consensus, because as Maxwell Owusu argues in his study Democracy: A View from the Village, they are comprised of people who see themselves primarily as representatives of tribes.

This reality brings with it the danger that modern capitalism and party-based politics can, in the African context, cement inequities and be fundamentally anti-democratic. Since national identity is not as strong as ethnic, religious, or extended family identity, parties tend not to develop ideological or class affiliations, as in the West. Similarly, business ventures are expected to put ethnic connections above simple profit-taking. Therefore, victory by a party or success of a business, whether at the local or national level, brings with it the perception that other groups are being excluded.

Cohesive national politics and economics therefore requires consultation and open incorporation of the minority's interests. The openly undemocratic transition rules in Zimbabwe and South Africa, where whites were guaranteed their economic interests through disproportionate political power, may be necessary in many countries with difficult ethnic tensions and histories. Indeed,

*This reality brings with it the danger that modern capitalism and party-based politics can, in the African context, cement inequities and be fundamentally anti-democratic.*

many Western democracies have grown from undemocratic schemes that were needed to bind mistrusting regional, ethnic, or class partners. The Constitution of the United

States contained numerous examples of such schemes, such as the undemocratic Senate, where states with small populations have the same voting rights as large states. That undemocratic component has survived now for over 200 years, while in Great Britain the House of Lords, which provided disproportionate power to the wealthy classes, was stripped of its power in the early 20th century.

Transitional schemes that make sense for one country's politics will make absolutely no sense for another. What is common across Africa, however, is the reality that mistrust between ethnic groups requires some special protections for minorities. Capturing all the political and economic power in a nation for one ethnic group is certainly not the essence of democracy, but this is precisely what the imposition of Western economics and politics would bring to many countries. Political parties have played a largely negative role in the construction of African democracy because they have represented ethnic interests, and tried to seize as much power and benefit as possible for their constituents. Political parties are vehicles for ethnic combat, not compromise, and will remain so until group loyalties are tempered by national identity. Parties based on trade unions are breaking down some of these barriers, but anemic economic growth and weak legal protections for organizers have delayed their advance. Simply redrawing borders won't mute the problems of ethnic identity, since conflict across borders and ethnic cleansing within them would create as many ethnic problems as the new borders would solve.

Where many Africans see grounds for hope is in the use of the principle of consensus, or, in French, *concertation*, to make national decisions between groups. Ethnic politics need not be fatal to African democracy, but it will take decades for their influence to be muted. In the meantime

concertation, a dialogue in which common ground is sought even though one party clearly could outvote the other, may be the best way to protect minority concerns. Some Western countries have focused on political party development rather than *concertation* in Africa. In doing so, they are attempting to bring in from the outside what can only be developed internally. Unfortunately, at the same time, these nations are also bringing in the very tools, such as weapons and funding to elite groups, that undermine the indigenous development of these concepts.



*Some Western countries have focused on political party development rather than concertation in Africa. In doing so, they are attempting to bring in from the outside what can only be developed internally. Unfortunately, at the same time, these nations are also bringing in the very tools, such as weapons and funding to elite groups, that undermine the indigenous development of these concepts. Here former Zairian Dictator Mobutu Sese-Seko surrounded by his elite guard. The United States was the principal supplier of weapons to Mobutu's regime during the Cold War.*

◆ **Free and fair multiparty elections.** African elections have received far more press and policy attention in the West than these other elements of democracy, and have become viewed with some skepticism by Africa's democrats. This is not to say that Africans are hostile toward elections, or see multiparty politics as some alien, Western-imposed construct. Indeed, multiparty elections are an essential element in African democracy. As James Jonah, who led the drive for fair elections in Sierra Leone in 1996, told the *New York Times*: "A lot of people told me I was crazy, or that I was importing European ideas that didn't apply here. But I was convinced that if the people got a chance to have a say in how their country was being run for once, they would seize it."

The problem with focusing on elections as a means toward a more democratic society is that even if the balloting and counting are fair, the domination of politics by the ruling party and its government resources, media preferences, and its security forces can badly handicap opposition parties. Centralization of power in Africa means that a range of benefits from jobs in universities to food relief is often controlled by the ruling party. Citizens are hard-pressed to oppose a party that will make their voting district's life miserable through reduced services or even ethnic violence after the ballots are counted. Of course in some cases citizens will ignore all the unfairness of media and

all the threats to their lives and vote out a ruling party, as they did in Malawi to end the tenure of Hastings Banda, or in Zambia to end the tenure of Kenneth Kaunda. More typical, though, were the results in Kenya and Zimbabwe, where ruling parties returned to power over an opposition made weak by government design. Outright repression of potential political challengers, as in Egypt, makes some elections even less meaningful. If the elements of democracy are implemented, elections will become meaningful around the continent; if they are not, even the best-run elections will continue to be cruel hoaxes.

## Statistical Findings on the Status of Democracy in Africa

### A. Degree of democracy (Charts 1a & 1b)

Chapter III of this report features a summary of the political situation in each of the 53 African countries. Based on summaries, each country was rated as resting at one of four positions in the transition to democracy:

1. *Consolidated Democracy*: characterized by free and fair multiparty elections, respect for human rights, a credible judicial system, and a tradition of civilian control of the armed forces.
2. *Transitional State*: characterized by movement from a one-party or authoritarian form of government toward a multiparty and democratic state. While there may be some limitations on freedom of expression and the press, some abuse of power by the ruling party, or some lack of accountability in the armed forces, the government generally reflects the will of the people as expressed in a free and fair election.
3. *Authoritarian Regime*: characterized by military government, a one-party system, or a multiparty system in which the ruling party controls the system to such a degree that citizens are effectively not able to change their government by peaceful means.
4. *Dissolving Nation-State*: characterized by anarchy or a severe civil war that renders the central government irrelevant in many parts of the country.

As Chart 1 shows, the breakdown of the 53 African countries on this variable of **Degree of democracy** is as follows: six countries *Consolidated* (11 percent), 17 countries *Transitional* (32 percent), 26 countries *Authoritarian* (49 percent), and four countries *Dissolving* (eight percent). As Chart 1b shows, the breakdown of the 700 million Africans by their type of government is as follows: eight percent *Consolidated*, 18 percent *Transitional*, 66 percent *Authoritarian*, 8 percent *Dissolving*. Another way to state these results is that 43 percent of African countries are either democratic or headed in that direction, and that 26 percent of Africans live under such governments. Both of these figures are far higher than they would have been just five years ago. (The size of some of the non-democratic governments, such as Nigeria with 98 million people, Egypt with 61 million, Ethiopia with 54 million, Zaire/Congo with 43 million, and Sudan with 29 million, explain the lower share of democracy by population: these five non-democratic countries account for 280 million people themselves.)

## **B. Political and Economic Power of Armed Forces (Chart 2)**

In this variable, where judgments are made on the overall impact of the armed forces on society, three categories were possible:

- 1. Substantial:* The armed forces rule directly or provide essential support to an authoritarian regime, or continue to be an independent actor in a transitional state. By definition, in countries in anarchy, the armed forces that are struggling for power play a “substantial” role.
- 2. Moderate:* The armed forces have a significant degree of political influence and independence from an elected civilian government, receive and spend their budget without meaningful civilian control, or operate or control non-military businesses. However, they do not play a key direct role in the governance of the nation.
- 3. Minimal:* The armed forces remain aloof from the political process, operate under the control of a civilian authority that provides their budget, and do not operate or control non-military businesses.

As Chart 2 shows, 40 of the armed forces (or 76 percent) have *Substantial* power, seven (or 13 percent) have *Moderate* power, and six (or 11 percent) have *Minimal* power. This low percentage of Minimal power for armed forces reveals an obvious need for the demilitarization of politics in Africa.

## **C. U.S. Support for Armed Forces (Chart 3)**

An astonishing 94 percent of all nations in Africa received U.S. military assistance between 1991 and 1995. Armed forces other than Egypt’s received \$249 million in U.S. arms transfers (Egypt received another \$4.9 billion), and over 3,400 African officers received U.S. military training. From 1995 to 1998, the armed forces of 33 of the 53 African nations have conducted or will conduct joint combat exercises with U.S. armed forces. Due to the tremendous differences among the African nations in terms of the size and political power of their armed forces, these raw data are difficult to interpret. Therefore, we have analyzed each country in order to place it in one of four categories ranking the importance of its U.S. military support. By looking at U.S. military assistance to a nation per-capita (Table 7), the number of officers trained by the United States, as compared to the overall size of the armed forces, the presence of joint military exercises, and the level of overall U.S. military assistance compared with that nation’s military budget, an overall picture emerges. The categories are:

- 1. Substantial:* U.S. has and continues to have a considerable military relationship, including significant arms transfers, a high number of officers trained, and/or joint exercises.
- 2. Moderate:* U.S. has joint exercises, or has trained a disproportionately high number of officers, or given a disproportionately high level of military assistance. U.S. has been a provider, but a not sustainer of these armed forces.
- 3. Minimal:* U.S. does not have a significant military relationship.

4. *Adversarial Relationship*: U.S. actively works to undermine the capabilities of the nation's armed forces by, as in Libya and Sudan, using military and economic force to oust military-backed regimes.

11 nations, accounting for 21 percent of the 53 African militaries, have *Substantial* support from the United States. 26 nations, accounting for 48 percent, have a *Moderate* level of military support. 13 nations, accounting for 25 percent have *Minimal* support (including a number, such as Angola, Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire, who had a substantial military relationship with the United States before 1991), and three nations, or six percent, have an *Adversarial Relationship* with the United States. Adding up the first two categories, the United States has a strong supporting relationship with 69 percent of Africa's armed forces. Of these 37 armed forces, 19 served authoritarian regimes and one a dissolving nation-state while receiving their U.S. support, 12 served transitional states, and only five served consolidated democracies. This breakdown shows that the United States is not using democracy as a condition when forging military relationships in Africa, and so is continuing a Cold War posture that seriously undermines the development of civilian authority on the continent.

#### **D. Level of Civil Conflict (Chart 4)**

A final and perhaps most important variable for which data was gathered is the presence of conflict. Countries were divided into three categories, based on the existence of significant violence between citizens and government forces since 1990:

1. *Current Civil Conflict*: Significant conflict, 1995-1997
2. *Recent Civil Conflict*: Significant conflict, 1990-1994
3. *No Civil Conflict*: No significant conflict between 1990 and 1997

As Chart 4 shows, the breakdown of the 53 African countries is as follows: 14 (26 percent) have experienced *Recent Civil Conflict*, 18 (34 percent) are experiencing *Current Civil Conflict*, and 21 (40 percent) have had *No Civil Conflict* between 1990 and 1996. This means that 60 percent of African countries (accounting for 81 percent of the population) are either engaged in conflict or recovering from a recent conflict, while many of the other countries are affected by these conflicts, as refugees stream across borders and investment is scared off from the entire surrounding region. This devastating figure could in itself explain Africa's political and economic weaknesses: development in these areas is impossible during, and extremely difficult after conflict.

\* \* \*

## II. U.S. POLICY TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A Plea for Historical Awareness

The United States has both a tremendous responsibility for and a tremendous self-interest in a democratic transition in Africa. Current and former U.S. policy-makers forcefully make the case for the latter, stressing in their speeches and statements that African democracy increases political stability and reduces conflict, leading to economic growth, U.S. exports and jobs, and less need for disaster aid and U.S. peacekeeping missions. However, they studiously avoid placing any responsibility for Africa's conflict, poverty, and repression on the history of massive U.S. support throughout the Cold War for non-democratic governments and rebel groups who cooperated with U.S. military and intelligence initiatives.

National Security Council senior director for Africa Susan Rice demonstrated the policy consequences of this ahistorical attitude at a 1996 meeting sponsored by TransAfrica Forum on the crisis in Zaire (now Congo). Rice announced that the U.S. contribution to resolving the crisis was to dispatch U.S. generals to counsel top Zairian officers to be professional and apolitical, and to promote civilian control and the transition to democracy. These same Zairian officers, of course, had benefited from decades of aid provided to Gen. Mobutu's regime by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Pentagon, and the Agency for International Development (AID). They had been kept in power by U.S. military airlifts that brought in Moroccan, Belgian, and French soldiers to put down the 1977 and 1978 Shaba rebellions. Predictably, the scolding of 1996 had little impact when contrasted with the support of the previous 30 years, and Zaire continued to spin out of control.

*"There are no apologies for our relationship with Mobutu during the Cold War years,"*

*—Chester Crocker, U.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa under President Reagan*

Chester Crocker, who was President Reagan's assistant secretary of state for Africa, reflects a strain of belligerence toward history among former policy-makers that trumps even Rice's insouciance. "There are no apologies for our relationship with Mobutu during the Cold War years," said Crocker in a Washington Post interview in 1997 as civil war raged in Zaire. "He played an interesting and important role in maintaining a kind of blocking defensive strategy in Central Africa at a time when the Soviets and Cubans were in a more adventurous mode in that part of the world."

African scholars and advocates of democracy interviewed for this report uniformly argued that this historical myopia hampers the ability of the United States to fashion a truly pro-democratic policy in the Cold War's aftermath. Research on current U.S. policy undertaken for this report supports this complaint. U.S. policy toward democracy in Africa is confused and contradictory, particularly toward the proper role of the armed forces in politics. If U.S. policy-makers could acknowledge the disastrous history of Cold War support for repressive forces, it would help them assess current programs and reassure Africans that we are determined not to repeat our mistakes.

What is that disastrous history? In recent years it starts with one terrible fact: Of the eight

largest recipients of U.S. arms and training in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s, five (Angola, Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire) were all engulfed at tremendous human and economic cost by civil wars that this support fueled. The other three (Cameroon, Nigeria, Uganda) are all ruled by authoritarian regimes.

These military support programs were undertaken for strategic reasons, such as gaining access to naval and air facilities for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force in the Persian Gulf, maintaining communications facilities for U.S. military and intelligence entities, and winning cooperation in CIA covert actions against Soviet or Cuban-backed neighbors. These programs, funded through a


*U.S. soldiers who lost their lives, American taxpayers who provided relief aid, and American workers who lost their jobs as export markets collapsed paid their own price for Washington's decision to aid repressive regimes in Africa.*

combination of Pentagon and CIA programs and subsidized in most cases by AID economic aid, reached their height under President Reagan. Nearly all,

though, were well underway prior to his tenure, and received bipartisan support. U.S. policy-makers knew they were aiding repressive forces who might commit human rights abuses to maintain their power, but argued that the strategic benefits to the United States of their cooperation outweighed these costs.

U.S. policy-makers were not only immoral to sacrifice Africans' democratic aspirations and lives to gain U.S. strategic advantages, but also wrong to ignore the strategic risks to the United States of aiding repressive forces. The conflicts in these five countries destabilized entire regions, and so as a group destabilized nearly the entire continent, badly setting back U.S. strategic interests in an economically strong and politically stable African continent. U.S. soldiers who lost their lives, American taxpayers who provided relief aid, and American workers who lost their jobs as export markets collapsed paid their own price for Washington's decision to aid repressive regimes in Africa.

A number of other anti-democratic U.S. policies in Africa were also undertaken for strategic reasons, such as maintaining NATO or Rapid Deployment bases, gaining cooperation and information, blocking Soviet and Cuban influence, and promoting the Middle East peace process. These included: support for Portugal in its bid to defeat independence movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique in the 1960s and 1970s; opposition to the liberation movements in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa; the policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa, despite its attacks on its neighbors and continued rule by force at home; the promotion of corruption through payments to government and military officials by the CIA and other intelligence agencies; and significant military and intelligence alliances with repressive governments in Egypt, Kenya, Mo-



*U.S. soldier Michael Durant after being taken hostage by Mohammed Farah Adid's forces in Somalia*

rocco, and Tunisia.

A singular difference between American and African political culture appears to be in the use of history. It is striking to an American visitor how history is a current topic in African political discussions, not an interesting sidelight. Past U.S. policies of support for non-democratic forces are as much on African policy-makers' minds as they are absent from their American counterparts'. This divergence is the source of much tension and suspicion, as President Clinton talks about democracy while the Pentagon strengthens non-democratic armed forces, AID administrator Brian Atwood talks about good governance while the CIA bribes government officials, and First Lady Hillary Clinton talks about children's rights and Secretary of State Madeline Albright about women's rights while U.S. opposition to a ban on anti-personnel landmines results in thousands of casualties among African women and children each year. In some ways, the most important single change in U.S. policy recommended by this report is simply to acknowledge the past. Much wisdom would flow in current U.S. policy from that simple change in attitude.

### **U.S. Programs in Africa: Democratic Words and Anti-Democratic Deeds**

Many of the stated goals of U.S. policy in Africa are the same as those of the non-governmental consensus presented in the previous chapter. The Departments of State and Defense, along with AID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the international arms of the Democratic and Republican parties that they fund, all argue that their programs in Sub-Saharan Africa foster democracy, the rule of law, reduced military spending, civilian control of armed forces, and conflict resolution. Most U.S. agencies place the North African nations, from Morocco east to Egypt, in their Middle East bureaus, which make similar, if somewhat more cautious, claims about U.S. support for such reforms in these Arab, Islamic nations.

? While united on goals, the different programming arms of the U.S. Government have not developed a working consensus on some of the most difficult questions about methods used to achieve them. This becomes readily apparent in the contradictory impact of the programs and policies that are analyzed in this chapter under four categories: military support; intelligence-gathering; pro-democracy programs; and opposition to a ban on landmines. Some of the questions that must be answered if the confusion is to be eliminated from U.S. policy include:

? What role should armed forces play in the political and economic life of African countries, inward-looking or outward-looking? That is, should we be encouraging armed forces to be "nation-builders" who take part in economic development through "civic action," play a key role in internal political affairs, and involve themselves in commercial business matters? Or should we be encouraging them to limit their missions to border defense and participation in international peace-keeping operations?

? Should the United States be engaging or isolating armed forces serving non-democratic regimes? That is, should we be training and arming these soldiers and officers, building contacts for potential military and intelligence activities while we discuss with them the need for civilian control of the armed forces, and for accountability for human rights abuses? Or should we be making it clear that U.S. military support is contingent upon a nation's concrete progress toward those goals?

Are elections the cornerstone of African democracy, deserving the lion's share of U.S. support? Or should U.S. relations also be conditioned on, and pro-democracy programs and their high-profile delegations focus resources and attention on, civilian control of armed forces, the ability to organize parties and unions, a free press with equal access to citizens, women's rights, and a rule of law that limits corruption and human rights abuses?

### A. Military Support Programs: Training, Exercises, and Arms Transfers


In the 1990s the Pentagon and State Department have continued a policy from the Cold War years of maximum contact and involvement with politically-powerful armed forces in Africa. These programs include military training, joint military exercises, or weapons transfers with nearly every armed force on the continent. Of the armed forces of 53 African countries, 49 have been provided U.S. military support. Only Libya and the Sudan (who are open antagonists of the United States) and Liberia and Somalia (whose previously-U.S. aided armed forces have ceased to exist) did not receive training, exercises, or weapons.

The primary purpose of these programs appears to be to build a base of contacts for cooperation in future U.S. military and intelligence initiatives. In some cases, the cooperation is current: overflights in Egypt, transit rights in Morocco and Tunisia, support for anti-Sudanese rebels by Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, initial development of a U.S.-backed Africa Crisis Response Force in six countries, and almost certainly the secret basing of regional transmitting facilities in a number of countries.


#### Training:

Providing training to armed forces is a core U.S. policy in Africa. From 1991 to 1995, the U.S. International Military Education and Training program (IMET) trained 3,408 personnel (nearly all of them officers) from 47 African countries. This surprising reach of the IMET program means that it makes a significant contribution to strengthening the combat capabilities of the African officer class. In addition, the prestige of being selected for training by the United States enhances the political stature of these officers. However, the vast majority of these officers are in armed forces that pose a problem to the transition to democracy: 2408, or 71 percent, serve governments that are "authoritarian" or "dissolving" under the Degree of Democracy variable; and 2746, or 81 percent, came from countries with a substantial degree of military political and economic power.

*Breakdown of IMET Trainees, 1991-1995, by Degree of Democracy*



### Breakdown of IMET Trainees, 1991-1995, by Military Economic and Political Power



The IMET program brings most of its trainees to the United States, where they learn combat skills (such as night and day patrolling and attack, using light arms and crew-served weapons, driving or piloting military vehicles, and commanding operations) alongside U.S. officers and soldiers in their regular, English-language military development courses. While some African officers take courses under the Expanded-IMET program, which started in the early 1990s and features seminars on such areas as civil-military relations and military judicial systems, the vast majority of IMET instruction time is still taken up by combat training. IMET trainees who lack proficiency in English receive language training at U.S. military schools before entering the regular courses. A minority of IMET trainees are instructed in their country by mobile teams led by U.S. Special Operations forces (Green Berets).

The IMET program spent \$51 million in foreign aid appropriations to train Africans from 1991 to 1995. However, a Pentagon review in 1989 estimated that such appropriations cover only 29 percent of true program cost, because the operation of the training facilities and the instructors' salaries are absorbed by the regular Pentagon budget. Using this cost estimate, the United States invested roughly \$175 million to provide training to African officers from 1991 to 1995, at a time when the Agency for International Development was seeing its funds for training Africans in civilian skills being sharply cut.


#### Exercises:

DFD interviews with Pentagon officials and documents provided by those officials indicate that U.S. joint military exercises involve thousands of U.S. and perhaps tens of thousands of African officers and enlisted men in exercises in up to 33 countries each year (*see chart next page*). From 1995 to 1998, a total of 34 of the 53 nations in Africa had or will have a joint exercise with U.S. forces. In these exercises, ranging from Morocco in the north to Zimbabwe in the south, and from Benin in the west to Rwanda in the East, U.S. armed forces train African counterparts primarily in skills needed for infantry, naval, and air operations, communications, medical treatment, and "civic actions" such as construction of infrastructure

Most of these exercises focus on light infantry and other combat training under the following exercise programs: Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Field Training (FTX), Special Operations Forces (SOF), Tactical Air (TACAIR), Surface Ship (SURFEX), and Amphibious. The number of countries engaging in combat exercises has increased steadily: 20 in 1995, 23 in 1996, 29 planned in 1997, and 33 proposed preliminarily for 1998. As is the case for IMET training, most of these countries are classified in this report as authoritarian (52%) and as having armed forces with

substantial political and economic power (71%). In addition to combat exercises, there are medical training exercise under the MEDFLAG and MEDCAP programs, civic action exercises under the National Guard International Training Activities Program (although none in the past two years in sub-Saharan Africa), Navy Seabee civic action exercises, and Naval exercises during the West African Training Cruise.

***COUNTRIES HOSTING U.S. JOINT COMBAT EXERCISES, 1995 to 1998***



1995 Combat Exercises: 20 countries: Benin, Botswana, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; 1995 Medical Exercises: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, and Namibia.

1996 Combat Exercises: 23 countries: Benin, Botswana, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; 1996 Medical Exercises: Mali

1997 Proposed Combat Exercises: 29 countries: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; 1997 Proposed Medical Exercises: Benin, Eritrea

1998: Proposed Combat Exercises: 33 countries: Benin, Botswana, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; 1998 Proposed Medical Exercises: Eritrea, Guinea, Kenya.

U.S. forces also engage in training and other activities with African armed forces under "subject matter expert," mobile training team, and service institution programs. In the past two years these activities ranged from small-unit instruction in combat and infrastructure skills to an affirmative action seminar in South Africa and Air War College sessions on civil-military relations.

#### Arms Transfers:

From 1991 to 1995, the United States transferred \$249 million in arms under the Foreign Military Sales program to 42 African countries other than Egypt. (Egypt, which receives its U.S. weapons as part of foreign aid package with Israel, was at an entirely different level, with \$4.9 billion, for a continent-wide total of \$5.154 billion.) Major recipients of U.S. weapons included Morocco (\$78 million), Tunisia (\$76 million), and Kenya (\$14 million), all of whom, like Egypt, are authoritarian governments with armed forces that wield substantial political and economic power.

This average of \$50 million per year (other than for Egypt) made the United States an important arms supplier on the continent, although Russia, at roughly \$150 million per year in the 1990s, has been the leading supplier on the continent (again, excluding Egypt). The United Kingdom has essentially dropped out of the arms business in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, and France averages roughly \$50 million per year in arms transfer agreements in this region, although it maintains regular forces and advisory groups in many of its former colonies.

There were other spigots of U.S. arms to Africa as well. U.S. military contractors delivered another \$192 million in arms to African nations under the Commercial Sales program from 1991 to

1995, \$62 million of which went to countries other than Egypt. In addition, according to the Federation of American Scientists' authoritative 1996 review of transfers of "surplus" U.S. arms, from 1990 to 1995 eight African countries received at no or greatly reduced cost 1,260 main battle tanks (240 to countries other than Egypt), 92 military aircraft (81 to countries other than Egypt), and 16,600 small arms (1,600 to countries other than Egypt).

As noted above, large U.S. arms transfer programs in sub-Saharan Africa ended in the 1980s because of congressional cutoffs and the collapse of many of the top recipients, such as Zaire, Liberia, Somalia, and the Sudan. The weapons from those transfers (and CIA transfers in Angola and other nations) are now circulating throughout Africa, fueling common crime and ethnic conflict. Despite this track record, the Pentagon and State Department are still actively promoting U.S. arms transfers to Africa as a means to gain access and influence, rather than working to find a common policy of restraint with other important suppliers, such as Russia, France, China, and South Africa.

### Analysis

The Pentagon's published security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates the contradictions that emerge when U.S. policy wants both to "help create and nurture an 'enabling environment' that is conducive to democratization" in Africa, and to strengthen armed forces that are not consolidated democracies:

◆ The strategy recognizes that "ruling elites have used military organizations as a domestic enforcement apparatus, leading these organizations to grow and become powerful political elites." However, the very next paragraph states that "some African militaries foresee a new mission in contributing to economic development in their nations, a goal that the U.S. government continues to support." This "support" comes in the form of Pentagon promotion of "civic action" by African armed forces. U.S. forces teach them to build roads and schools and provide medical services in rural areas. Not only does this discredit

*This set of contradictions boils down to one essential question: do we or do we not support a continuing political and economic role for armed forces?*

civilian authorities and provide backing to the political aspirations of armed forces, but where military accountability is weak (as in most African countries) it also provides fertile ground for corruption, as both commanders and soldiers use the opportunity to demand bribes from local authorities and citizens.

◆ The strategy acknowledges that "politicized militaries are often the greatest threat to democracy in African states," yet wants "closer cooperation" with African militaries since they "remain an important political actor."

◆ The strategy promises to provide experts to help "downsize" armed forces that are "oversized, far exceeding the legitimate security needs of the state and acting as a brake on the economy," yet it advocates providing something resembling an economic payoff that maintains their budgets for non-military reasons: "If the interests of African militaries are not addressed, they are likely to undercut prospects for successful transitions." Similarly, U.S. embassies urge their hosts to adopt reasonably-sized military budgets at the same time that they, as ordered by a policy directive, pro-

mote the sale of U.S. arms.

This set of contradictions boils down to one essential question: do we or do we not support a continuing political and economic role for armed forces? If the answer is yes, we will continue on with current military support programs, offering confused lectures about a new role in a democracy but no incentives for armed forces to adopt that role. If the answer is no, we will use U.S. resources to develop civilian capacities for infrastructure and social programs, and deny U.S. resources to armed forces that are an internal political and economic power, and deny U.S. diplomatic support to their governments.

Government advocates of military support programs argue that foreign officers who are exposed to U.S. forces and their respect for elections and civilian control of military forces will be absorb those values. These advocates acknowledge that most of the African armed forces supported by U.S. programs have a history of independence from elected civilians, and many have engaged in human rights abuses. However, they see this not as a reason to hold back from support programs, but rather as a justification to undertake them. For example, in March 1997 assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs Thomas McNamara provided this response to a question by Senator Russell Feingold: "In general, we believe countries whose military forces engage in human rights abuses should receive IMET. Our position is based on the premise that constructive engagement of the military — as opposed to severing ties — provides us with an opportunity to improve the human rights situation in a given country."

Former Bush administration deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs James Woods presented this U.S. policy choice even more starkly in a January 1997 commentary for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Woods' commentary was submitted in response to a paper by Wayne State Professor Eboe Hutchful, a Ghanaian, "Militarism and Problems of Democratic Transition," which argued that armed forces continued to be a major stumbling block to the transition in Africa. Woods said: "Bottom line: We can either get involved and get our hands dirty trying to help set the course, or we can stand back and continue to carp." This formulation appears to set up a false choice, however, because being "involved" with African armed forces to encourage movement toward democracy need not include support for combat capabilities, and movement can also be encouraged by setting achievable conditions for eligibility for military support.

***"In general, we believe countries whose military forces engage in human rights abuses should receive IMET."***  
— Thomas McNamara, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs

Interestingly, the country Secretary McNamara cited as a success story to justify training of human rights abusers in Africa was Indonesia. He argued that U.S.-trained officers there have led the Indonesian police and military to use less force and "minimize the loss of life" when "handling" protests, and have otherwise improved respect for human rights. Of course, these officers are serving, and helping to preserve, a repressive military dictatorship that has no intention of permitting a democratic transition. The logical conclusion of the use of Indonesia as an example is that the goal of U.S. assistance to African armed forces would be satisfied with continued repressive rule, as long as the rule is less brutal.

It is important to recall that there has been no evidence or study submitted to support administration claims that exposure to U.S. military personnel and training programs changes officers' attitudes and leads to a transition to democracy. To the contrary, there has been a great deal of evidence from the Latin American experience (compiled in a report to the Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus in 1989) that arming and training non-democratic armed forces strengthens them politically as well as militarily, and actually slows down the democratic transition.

For example, in El Salvador in the 1980s, U.S. pressure on the armed forces to move toward democracy and curb human rights abuses was badly undercut by continued arming and training of these forces, who rarely took the pressure seriously until their U.S. military support was cut. The senior commanders who decided which junior officers would receive the privilege and reward of training in the United States saw their power augmented. Finally, the training experience itself, in which U.S. officers and officers from both democratic and non-democratic countries took orders from an unquestioned military hierarchy, often reinforced the Salvadoran officers' pre-existing sense of elite solidarity and contempt for civilian authorities and their necessarily haphazard, consensus style of decision-making.

Even compared to Latin America during its days of open military rule in the 1970s and rule from behind the throne in the 1980s, in Africa today armed forces enjoy tremendous freedom from democratic scrutiny. African citizens and NGOs in nearly every country find it dangerous to raise questions publicly about military budgets, officers, policies, corruption, and contracts. In this environment, which is often charged by ethnic divisions between the armed forces and various groups, **it is dangerously naive to think that exposure to U.S. personnel, rather than a clear linkage of military behavior and democratic governance to U.S. military support, will promote civilian control of armed forces.**

## B. Intelligence-Gathering Programs

In addition to these military support programs there are clear indications — from credible press reports compiled by *CIABase* and *Covert Action Quarterly* and from analysis by organizations such as the Center for International Policy that study U.S. intelligence operations — of large-scale intelligence-gathering activities in Africa by the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence arms of the military services. While these activities are classified and therefore impossible for researchers and other citizens to assess fully, it appears that they include widespread bribery of military and other government officials to obtain information on political and military matters and to facilitate cooperation with U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic initiatives.

To the extent that this is accurate, the United States is subverting the loyalty of officials of African governments, encouraging them to treason, and undercutting the culture of accountability. It may or may not be true, as is frequently claimed both by researchers studying the U.S. intelligence agencies and by African activists, that the CIA station chief covering one or more African countries usually has more employees in those countries than the State Department. Certainly, recent State Department budget cuts have forced it to cut staff in Africa, and despite reports of CIA budget cuts in Africa, it is unlikely that its staff cuts have been as severe. The secrecy of the CIA means that the truth cannot be known. However, the fact that this is a serious question, and even that there is a

station chief at all whose known tools include bribery, means that Africans must assume that the United States is actively promoting corruption and treason through payments to their government and military officials that it would never tolerate among its own officials.

Even when cooperation with U.S. intelligence activities is gained by a formal payment to an African government, as would probably be the case with basing an NSA listening post in a country, because of the secrecy of the payment there is a good chance that some or all of it will go not into the general treasury of the country, but into the pockets of the officials approving the cooperation. Again, to the extent that U.S. officials do not make sure that the payments reach the treasury, they are abetting corruption and weakening the fabric of an accountable government. In addition to

***Africans must assume that the United States is actively promoting corruption and treason through payments to their government and military officials that it would never tolerate among its own officials.***

intelligence-gathering and cooperation activities, it appears from credible press reports that despite the end of the Cold War the intelligence community still engages in arms transfers, military training, and other forms of covert action designed to influence events in Africa without

the U.S. role being known. As noted above, the truth is impossible to ascertain, but Africans must assume that if the United States is thwarted in a public initiative, it may well pursue the same goals covertly.

### C. Pro-Democracy Programs

Potential counterbalances to the anti-democratic impact of these military and intelligence programs are State Department, AID, and National Endowment for Democracy (NED) programs that spend about \$100 million annually to promote democratic initiatives in nearly every country in Africa. The vast majority of these funds is expended in the formal electoral sector in planning and monitoring elections, helping political parties organize and campaign, and training and providing services to legislators, although other important aspects of democracy, such as human rights, judicial systems, free media, and civil-military relations are supported through grants to both government and non-governmental entities. The programs include:

- ◆ short-term discretionary funds controlled by the U.S. ambassador in each country, which are provided in small amounts (ranging from a few hundred dollars to as much as \$25,000) to local human rights and pro-democracy groups for publications, conferences, and other organizational activities;

- ◆ longer-term funds (amounting to roughly \$90 million annually) for promoting democratic governance that AID provides with State Department approval to sustain and train government and "civil society" entities that: hold or monitor elections; train, operate, or monitor legislatures and judiciaries; or conduct other non-partisan activities designed to reform government actions in such areas as human rights, press freedom, economic planning, and civil-military relations. Some of these funds are programmed through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which are affiliated with the Democratic and Republican parties;

◆ funding by the NED for non-partisan election-oriented activities (such as election-monitoring by domestic observers and high-profile international delegations) and seminars on other governmental reforms (such as citizen participation in decisions, and civil-military relations) that typically include legislators and prominent citizens from the United States, the host country, and other countries. Again some of the funds are programmed through the NDI and IRI; and

◆ funding for partisan election activities (such as party-building, campaign strategies, and electioneering) as well as for non-partisan activities such as training legislators and establishing legislative service offices. Funds for partisan activities are provided exclusively by the NDI and IRI, although again they come from the appropriation to the NED, and are passed through to the party institutes.

The impact of these well-intentioned programs appears to be minimal in Africa, for three reasons.

1. Very little of the \$100 million in programming funds are provided to pro-democracy civil society groups as cash support for their budgets. These agencies choose to spend the vast majority of the funds on the salaries, fees, expenses, and overheads costs of U.S. personnel and consultants, and choose to direct the vast majority of the activities of these personnel and consultants toward elections and legislative institutions.


A single U.S. consultant living for one year in Africa can easily account for over a quarter of a million dollars in total cost for salary, benefits, travel, living and family expenses, production of reports and audits, and overhead directly attributed to the activity by the U.S. agency, the host government's ministry (if the consultant is working with government personnel), and the consultant's own institution (such as a university, think-tank, or private contractor). A 20-person delegation of U.S. observers to an African election or of Africans attending the U.S. presidential conventions could cost as much as half a million dollars for travel, reporting, consultants, and overhead.

In addition, foreign aid activities that require the approval or cooperation of government ministries, as many AID and NED pro-democracy programs do, are often vulnerable to demands for "kickbacks" that inflate their cost. According to foreign aid personnel working for both U.S. and multilateral institutions, an entire culture of kickbacks to senior officials has developed, ranging from the technically legal to the blatantly illegal. Common examples include: ministries overstating their overhead charges during negotiations so that the officials can siphon off the excess after it enters their own budgets; relatives or acquaintances of the officials being hired as consultants, who then do little work and share their payments with them; and the officials being invited to be speakers or participants in conferences with healthy per-diem charges, which are paid no matter how long they stay.

This type of expenditure pattern can cause even \$100 million to evaporate fairly quickly. As a result, there is little funding left to sustain the very change agents that U.S. policy states are the most essential element in the democratic transition: non-governmental human rights and pro-democracy groups. Even the small but important grants from the U.S. ambassador's discretionary funds are usually used for specific projects, such as printing human rights handbooks for citizens, rather

than institutional support.

In contrast, an annual infusion of \$100 million to the most dynamic African change agents would revolutionize politics on the continent. Their comparatively low salaries and office costs would permit them to establish the sort of significant long-term presence that could constantly challenge repressive governments at the local and national levels. It is interesting to recall that the primary change agent in South Africa, the African National Congress, was assisted during the apartheid years indirectly by AID, because some of its members received scholarships to study in the United States. However, the ANC was able to survive apartheid and then became a national presence during the transition to democracy because of massive cash assistance from foreign governments for its general operations.



One might argue that because of small cash contributions from the United States and many other donor governments, Africa's pro-democracy groups are already receiving significant institutional support at a \$100 million level. However, the time required to obtain and report on all the grants either discourages NGOs from applying or absorbs a significant amount of energy. Indeed, consultants and NGOs in both Africa and the United States told DFD researchers that they no longer apply for AID funding because they would have to spend about half of their entire program time "servicing" the grant by providing budgets, reports, and briefings to auditors and evaluators.

It is ironic that AID, NED, and the U.S.-funded World Bank try to promote participation by citizens in decision-making at the project level, while they decide on their main parameters for programming long before they get to the project level. If African non-governmental organizations were consulted on these parameters, there is no doubt that they would reverse the current ones, and

devote the vast majority of funding to institutional support grants, and direct the vast majority of these grants toward groups promoting reforms in non-electoral aspects of democracy.

2. Non-electoral aspects of democracy receive little policy emphasis. In addition to its funding programs, the United States uses a variety of policy tools from private discussions to public sanctions to press governments to make the transition to democracy. Again, the vast majority of U.S. pressure relates to the holding of elections, and not to other elements of democracy. Elections have been accorded what might be called "diplomatic status" in U.S. relations with many countries, meaning that the entire array of benefits of close relations with the United States — including visas, trade, aid, and support in the United Nations and other international forums — can become dependent on progress in that area.

In some countries with direct rule by armed forces, such as Nigeria, or uncontrolled armed forces, such as Zaire/Congo, U.S. policy-makers have cut off military support in recent years, citing the lack of an elected government. However, this distancing has usually come only with pressure from the public and Congress, and the Bush and Clinton administrations have shied away from using trade or financial sanctions to push for a transition. This is unfortunate, because the history of U.S. sanctions in Africa has had some noteworthy successes, including the end of minority rule in Rhodesia, Southwest Africa, and South Africa.

Free and fair elections are not always accorded diplomatic status. They have been in a number of smaller countries, such as Malawi and Benin, but in a number of larger or diplomatically important countries, such as Egypt and Zimbabwe, the United States has tacitly accepted a one-party system and not held up U.S. bilateral aid or World Bank loans to pressure the government to permit the development of opposition parties and meaningful elections. As director of the NED's International Democratic Forum, Larry Diamond, has pointed out in a recent review of all these programs for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict entitled Promoting Democracy, U.S. government agencies promoting elections and other democratic initiatives often find their ability to convince foreign officials to undertake reforms weakened because U.S. security policy requires continued close relations. Still, most African governments understand that the quality of their electoral process can be a key element in setting bilateral and multilateral economic aid levels and determining other aspects of their relations with the United States.

Not only the vast majority of U.S. funding but also the vast majority of U.S. policy emphasis is placed on promoting elections and follow-up legislative training and services. High-level delegations come from the United States to assess the quality of the campaigning, voting, and counting, and serious irregularities will usually result in a negative assessment and tense relations with the United States. In Malawi and South Africa, in a positive sense, and in Kenya and Nigeria, in a negative sense, the quality of elections has probably been the essential element in determining U.S. relations.

As a result of this disproportionate emphasis on elections, when it comes to most other areas of reform identified by U.S. agencies as essential to the transition to democracy — such as civilian control of armed forces, reductions in military spending and economic activity, accountability, a free media, the rule of law, a functioning judiciary, participation in economic planning, and women's rights — African governments receive a far murkier message from U.S. policy-makers.

The exception to this rule that non-electoral aspects of democracy do not enjoy diplomatic status (and hence generate little pressure for change) is the area of gross violations of human rights.

Due to years of unremitting pressure by human rights officers and other State Department officials and by U.S. and host country human rights groups, African governments are now well aware that flagrant abuses by government forces will inevitably damage their relations with the United States and other donor nations. While most governments still

***Both the acceptance of multiparty elections in Africa and the sea-change in attitude on human rights should give U.S. officials hope that if they work with NGOs to develop a clear policy that accords diplomatic status toward specific achievements in other aspects of democracy, significant improvement is possible.***

have a long way to go in protecting basic human rights, over the past 15 years the average citizen in an African country (other than one consumed by anarchy) has become safer from outright torture and murder by government forces. Even the incidence of less flagrant abuses, such as arbitrary detention and harassment of members of the political and social opposition, has also fallen under the scrutiny, reporting, and stiff protests of U.S. officials working in close collaboration with NGOs.

Both the acceptance of multiparty elections in Africa and the sea-change in attitude on human rights should give U.S. officials hope that if they work with NGOs to develop a clear policy that accords diplomatic status toward specific achievements in other aspects of democracy, significant improvement is possible. If U.S. funding agencies and high-level U.S. delegations emphasized the need for media freedom, civilian control of armed forces, or transparency of civilian and military budgets as much as they emphasize assisting, observing, and assessing elections, NGOs would have far more room to operate as they pursue these goals.

3. Even in the promotion of elections, U.S. presence and U.S. sanctions, and not U.S. programming, are the basis of a successful policy. In cases such as South Africa and Malawi in the early 1990s, U.S.-funded electoral reforms took hold in the context of a clear U.S. policy that included stiff, multilateral sanctions and a strong U.S. presence that could quickly dispute government actions undercutting the democratic transition.

In Malawi the United States joined the World Bank, the United Kingdom, and other donors in reducing or threatening to reduce essential foreign aid until the regime of Hastings Banda halted human rights abuses and held first a plebiscite on multipartyism and then the resulting multiparty election in 1994 that swept him from power. In the South African case, the enactment by the U.S. Congress of the anti-apartheid act in 1986 triggered stiff financial sanctions that were added to an existing U.N. arms embargo and a number of nations' trade and sports sanctions. The resulting economic and political pressure induced the National Party to negotiate the transition to majority rule in the 1990s.

A good example of how presence, rather than programming, is effective comes from the transition in Malawi, where DFD staff were able to observe U.S. political party-building activities. NDI staff were assisting the new political parties as they prepared for the 1994 election. NDI staff wrote and taped radio commercials for the parties, and held workshops to help them develop a

national message. However, the parties were strongly identified with regional interests, and made that clear in their U.S.-funded newspapers, which featured scare tactics such as headlines saying that a victory by another region's party would result in circumcision of all adult males.

Religious leaders and civic activists at a conference DFD attended were skeptical of NDI's party-building activities, but they were far more bemused than hostile. Discussion revealed that they were appreciative of the efforts and the commitment of the NDI staffer who was describing the activities, and that they wanted more Americans like him to be present during the election season, so that the government would know that any cheating or violence would be exposed. Fair elections were held, regional loyalties prevailed in voting, and the parties in Malawi continue today to be parochial and ineffective. In short, while the NDI party-building effort was doomed to failure because of the programming model and the political realities within which it had to operate, the mere presence of NDI staff in the country was helpful to the electoral process.


DFD researchers discovered this theme repeatedly: Africans from the village to the national level may not agree with everything that the United States and other donor governments are doing in the promotion of democracy, but they appear by far to prefer it to the alternative of disengagement. The presence of U.S. personnel concerned with democracy and human rights, almost regardless of what programming they provide, brings attention to the issues and brings pressure on the host government to accord citizens their rights. If the same level of U.S. programming and presence relating to elections was established in the areas of press freedom, civilian control of armed forces, and other non-electoral aspects of democracy in tandem with a clear U.S. policy of protest and then bilateral and multilateral sanctions for failure to make progress, similar results could be expected.

Of course, there is no guarantee of success in a country even if U.S. policy is clear and firm, because the essential element in democracy is the existence or development of a democratic political culture. Ethiopia and Kenya provide two disparate examples of how U.S. pro-democracy policy can falter even when U.S. bilateral and multilateral aid is clearly announced to be linked to free and fair elections. In both countries in the 1990s, ethnic divisions and alliances stymied the development of national political parties and negated strenuous U.S. efforts to promote a meaningful electoral process. The lesson that should be drawn from these experiences is that donor countries can prepare the ground where both electoral and non-electoral elements of democracy can take root, but for the crop to grow, the seeds and their nurturing must come from within the country.

#### D. Opposition to a Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines

A particularly damaging aspect of conflict in Africa has been the use of landmines — weapons that are triggered by the inadvertent contact of a person, animal, or vehicle. Over 41 million have been laid in Africa by both governments and rebel groups, and casualties in the past decade number in the tens of thousands, nearly all civilians killed or wounded well after battles have ceased. In addition to taking this terrible human toll, landmines are a significant development problem in at least a dozen countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, and the Sudan, where not just marked borders, but roads, fields, farm-to-market trails, and infrastructure were mined. Rehabilitation services and mine-clearance are costly, but are only the tip of the economic problem. Far more costly is the drop in economic activity caused by landmines.

Some mines were laid for essentially military purposes, to protect villages or patrols from attacks. Other mines were laid for clearly terrorist purposes, to deny villagers the ability to farm, trade, or gain access to water, and so drive them away from areas controlled by the enemy. In either case, though, the minefields were rarely marked, and continue to cause casualties and depress economic activity long after conflicts end, as documented in the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation's seminal 1995 study, After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines.



Many African NGOs and a growing number of African governments, led by South Africa, have banned the use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs), and have joined the Canadian-led initiative to ban these weapons in a multilateral treaty to be signed in Ottawa in December 1997. However, President Clinton accepted a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1996 and announced that the United States would continue to use both long-lived and self-destruct APLs in Korea and would reserve the right to use self-destructing (short-lived) APLs in all other parts of the world. The President ordered the Pentagon to undertake an urgent search for alternative technologies and tactics to replace APLs, but after one year there has been no change in policy that would permit the United States to sign the Canadian treaty.

U.S. failure to ban APLs and join the Ottawa process badly undercuts the movement to ban landmines. Many other countries will follow the U.S. lead, so the stigmatization that an overwhelming signing would bring to the use of APLs throughout Africa will be weakened. If that is the case, then APLs will continue to be laid in Africa, to the detriment of civilians and economic development. Democracy has also been a victim of landmines, because newly-elected governments, such as those in Angola and Mozambique, lose credibility with their citizens when they fail to deliver economic opportunity. In some countries, an international ban on APLs may be the most important contribution that the United States can provide to the democratic process.


### **Recommendations: A U.S. Plan of Support for Democracy in Africa**

The United States can best promote the consolidation of democracy in Africa by undertaking four interrelated tasks: (1) stop supporting repressive governments and armed forces; (2) prevent conflicts through regional negotiations for mutual reductions; (3) bring democratic principles into the decision-making at the international agencies that control Africa's future; and (4) broaden the

definition of democracy so that non-electoral aspects gain “diplomatic status” and are promoted with both aid and sanctions.

**1. Stop supporting repressive governments through arms, training, intelligence activities, and multilateral cash assistance.**

A. U.S. arms, military training, and other military support programs such as exercises should be barred to non-democratic governments and human rights abusers, as defined in the arms trade Code of Conduct being promoted in the United States by Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-Ga.) and Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Cal.) and internationally by former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias and his panel of fellow



*From Left to Right: Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Dr. Oscar Arias, leaders on the U.S. and International Arms Trade Code of Conduct*

Nobel Peace prize winners. The Code of Conduct's definitions of democracy and human rights cut to the core of the problem of military political power identified in this report: if the actions and budget of the armed forces of a country are not firmly under the control of a freely-elected civilian government that protects political and other human rights, then those forces should not be strengthened. In short, it is an illusion that one can impart “professionalism” on an army that serve a repressive government or ignores an elected one. Democracy should be the condition for U.S. military support, not its goal.

Exceptions to strict conditionality should certainly be made for programs that specifically, and only, assist in strengthening the skills of elected civilians who are trying to control armed forces through transparent budgeting, functioning judicial systems, and the development of institutional accountability. However, if these leaders are unable to make significant progress toward these goals, the programs should be suspended.

A Code of Conduct would virtually eliminate U.S. arms and military training programs in Africa. This would put the United States in a strong position to ask for matching action from other important arms suppliers in Africa, such as Russia, France, China, and South Africa. However, such a U.S. initiative would lack credibility with other suppliers, particularly if, as likely, it excluded North Africa. Aggressive U.S. marketing efforts in North Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, and Europe make it the leading arms merchant in the world. Other suppliers would rightly point out that applying a standard like the Code of Conduct just to Sub-Saharan Africa would harm their trade earnings while leaving worldwide U.S. arms sales virtually unchanged. If the United States hopes to restrain arms transfers in Africa, the political dynamic of the world market will require it to take the lead elsewhere, as well.

B. Macroeconomic (cash) aid should be conditioned on civilian audits of, and resulting cuts in, military budgets. The United States provides up to \$2 billion to African governments each year in economic aid other than assistance for specific development projects. This macroeconomic

assistance takes the form of “fungible” cash, meaning foreign exchange credits that can be used for general imports and debt payments, targeted sector loans, and commodity import programs. The majority of these funds is provided through the U.S. contribution to the concessionary programs of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank’s International Development Association and the International Monetary Fund’s Expanded Structural Adjustment Facility. Some U.S. macroeconomic assistance, however, is included in bilateral programs, such as the commodity import program for Egypt and what effectively amounts to sector support in a number of other countries.

Provision of macroeconomic assistance, whether multilateral or bilateral, is usually “conditioned” on the adoption of specific economic policies by the recipient. Top U.S., World Bank, and IMF officials have long called for adding the reduction of military spending to the typical list of conditions at the international financial institutions and the Treasury. Indeed, candidate Bill Clinton in 1992 specifically included this concept in his foreign policy positions, and in 1994 Congress required U.S. representatives at these institutions to take into account when deciding on loan proposals the recipient’s efforts to reduce excessive military spending and end military control of civilian sector businesses. However, no clear policy has emerged, either within the U.S. Government or the institutions.

In 1996 Congress required U.S. representatives to start opposing in 1999 macroeconomic loans to governments who had not performed a civilian audit of the military budget. Both the 1994 and 1996 laws were sponsored by Sen. Patrick Kennedy (D-Vt.) and Rep. Joseph Kennedy (D-Mass.), and are consistent with proposals by Dr. Arias and his Year 2000 Campaign to Redirect World Military Spending to Human Development. Representatives of the 80 citizens’ groups backing the campaign in 1997 provided a detailed plan to the Treasury Department for U.S. collaboration with other donor governments in linking foreign aid to cuts and audits in military budgets. The administration should implement a similar plan, and apply the same standards it proposes for multilateral aid to its bilateral programs.

The \$13 billion African governments spend on armed forces in preparation for conflict is itself a staggering waste. If donor nations can collaborate with African civil society in pressuring their governments to put this part of the budget on the table for open debate and justification, the resulting savings could easily compensate for recent cuts in U.S. development assistance to areas of need such as health, education, and small-scale business and farming.

C. The CIA and the other U.S. intelligence agencies should be barred from using bribery and other illegal or corrupting methods in gathering information in Africa. This standard would strike a blow for honest governance on the continent, while providing a windfall of good relations and publicity for U.S. policy and personnel. An even more dramatic move would be for the United States simply to announce that it was ending all intelligence activities in Africa. If the United States sent the CIA home, it would provide impetus for other nations outside the continent, such as France, to do the same.


Raising questions about the need for foreign intelligence would also strengthen the hand of citizens groups throughout Africa who want to end surveillance and harassment by domestic intelligence services. These services often intentionally create a climate of fear and unpredictability that

is contrary to the rule of law and the proper functions of police. If it renounces the use of secret methods in Africa, the United States will be in a better position to help citizens' groups ask for the same from their government.

## 2. Get ahead of the curve by backing international initiatives to prevent conflicts and save resources through mutual force reductions and collaborative security.

A. The United States should support the establishment of a system of U.N. special envoys for regional confidence building and disarmament. The Year 2000 Campaign is promoting a U.N. General Assembly resolution that would provide the Secretary-General with the authority to appoint roughly a dozen special envoys. The special envoys would meet individually with heads of state and military planners in all the countries in a region, and explore proposals for mutual force reductions that would enhance the security of the states in the region. The chances for winning this

resolution and getting the envoys off to a quick start so that initial mutual cuts could be made by the year 2000 would be greatly improved if the United States sponsored the resolution and announce its willingness to take part in these talks in the regions where it has military commitments or concerns (such as, in addition to North America, Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East). In June 1997, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an amendment by Rep. Joseph Kennedy (D-Mass.) urging President Clinton to promote this resolution.



*The suppliers have an obligation both to staunch the flow of new weapons, and repair the damage done by the old ones. Here some of the grisly results of the genocide in Rwanda (1994)*

It is in the long-term strategic interests of both Africa and the United States to start a process of building down, rather than up, to achieve mutual security. Regional organizations of governments, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum in East Asia, have resisted moving beyond limited confidence-building measures, such as exchanges of information on exercises. As a result, they have been unable to negotiate the sort of dramatic mutual reductions in forces and limitations on the number and geographic basing of advanced weapons that led to increased, and less

expensive, security in the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty signed by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

It is unlikely that the Organization of African Unity, the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference, or other regional forums in Africa comprised of governments could negotiate regional force reductions without the technical support, political imprimatur, and skilled prodding of U.N. special envoys. Certainly, the United States should support any meaningful initiatives for confidence-building that arise from Africa's regional forums, but it should continue to promote the promising U.N. initiative.

## B. The United States should provide bilateral and multilateral aid to Africa for post-conflict

reconstruction, and to demobilize soldiers after conflicts or force reductions. Africa is awash in weapons, nearly all of them supplied from outside the continent. The suppliers have an obligation both to staunch the flow of new weapons, and repair the damage done by the old ones. The United States is responsible for a wide range of weapons that continue to plague Africa, from landmines still in the ground in Angola to AK-47s that UNITA soldiers are selling to South African criminals. More importantly, the United States backed repressive governments that caused devastating civil wars. Demilitarization should be a priority for U.S. aid including such elements as reconstruction, transition assistance and training to support the demobilization of soldiers (both after conflicts and in other countries that are willing to reduce forces), the removal of mines, rehabilitation services such as prosthetics, training, and transition assistance for mine victims, and redevelopment of mined areas.

The World Bank has started to engage in reconstruction and demobilization plans, but because the aid is provided in concessionary loan form, it adds a future burden to struggling governments. As the largest share-holder in the World Bank, the United States should press for more aid for these purposes, and for the conversion of loans to grants. In addition, the United States should continue its funding, often through other international agencies, for demining and victim assistance, and end its policy of training and encouraging African armed forces to take on economic tasks under civic action programs, which runs counter to these demilitarization efforts.

C. The United States should sign the treaty banning anti-personnel landmines in Ottawa in December 1997. Citing its need to use APLs in Korea, the United States has announced that it will not sign a treaty, such as the one being developed by Canada, that bans the use of APLs. This policy should be reversed, since the United States has so many other military tools to use in assisting South Korea in deterrence and defense that can easily be put in place by the time the treaty takes effect (most likely in the year 2000). The Canadian treaty provides a ten-year period for the removal of existing mines, which provides another margin of protection for U.S. troops as alternatives are developed. The hypothetical casualties among U.S. forces and South Korean citizens due to the loss of APLs simply do not compare with the very real human and economic toll of APLs in Africa and elsewhere today. If it is truly concerned about democracy and development in Africa, the United States must lead, and not impede, a ban on landmines. Enactment of a bill preposed by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Rep. Lane Evans (D-Ill.) would ban U.S. use of APLs by the Year 2000, and permit the United States to sign the Ottawa treaty.

### **3. Press for international democracy, including a “structural adjustment” of the voting rules of the World Bank and IMF.**

A. The United States should work with democratic developing nations on an initiative to make the voting formula at the World Bank and IMF one that increases the power of developing nations. While it is clear that the current voting system established at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 is undemocratic and outdated, it is not clear what the democratic alternative would be. As is the case in any entity composed of groups with widely differing interests, there is no single voting method at these institutions that all would consider democratic. Moving to a formula based solely on population would concentrate power in China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Nigeria, leaving small countries as weak as they are now. Moving to “one country, one vote” would favor small countries, leaving the majority of people in the world subject, as they are now, to the whims of a

coalition representing a tiny minority. At present, both schemes would concentrate power in governments that are themselves not democratic.

The United States and other developed nations should form a partnership with a working group of consolidated democracies and transitional states in developing nations to come up with a proposal for a redistribution of voting power in the World Bank and IMF. As in the American Constitutional Convention in 1787 and the recently-completed constitutional process in South Africa (and in contrast to the Bretton Woods meeting), participants would seek a system that protects minority interests and provides the majority with the ability to make most decisions. The biggest stumbling block to fashioning a democratic system is the fact that most member states are not themselves consolidated democracies — although perhaps half could lay claim to being at least transitional states under the definitions used in this report. Consolidated democracies or transitional states such as South Africa, India, Argentina, and the Philippines should provide guidance in the deliberations on how to address this problem.

**B. The United States should try to block loans and adjustment plans that have not been openly planned with popular participation at the national and local levels.** Both while the current voting rules apply and after democratic reforms take place, the United States should promote the principle that representatives of affected groups must have taken part in the planning of World Bank and IMF programs. The World Bank has recently tried to improve its record in this area, but the IMF continues to operate in secret with government officials only. Possible methods (and they are likely to be different in each country) include national debates with full media access to proposals and options, seminars and discussions with representatives of civil society, and even a referendum on proposed dramatic changes. The World Bank and IMF must have staff who understand the politics of a country to advise them on how to increase popular participation in these decisions. At the board level, countries should be encouraged to send directors who have the background and institutional interests to support this process. In the case of the United States, that means that the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and not the Secretary of the Treasury, should be appointing the executive directors and leading interagency discussions to set U.S. positions.

#### **4. Grant “diplomatic status” to accountability and other non-electoral aspects of democracy, and focus programming, publicity, and sanctions on them.**

**A. U.S. pro-democracy programming and high-profile delegations should place at the top of their agenda such issues as civilian control of armed forces, women’s and minority rights, a judiciary that punishes human rights abuses and corruption, and a free media.** Just as much publicity, both in Africa and the United States, should be given to a visit and assessment of these issues, which might broadly be called “accountability,” as is given today for election-monitoring. NED and international observers sponsor many missions to observe elections. Proof that a broader conception of democracy has been developed will be when they sponsor as many missions to observe and pass judgment on the judicial system at work, on the ability of elected civilians to control the budgets, private investments, promotions, and discipline of armed forces, and on the ability of citizens to report corruption or brutality and have it disciplined. In short, the United States should send less experts on parties and campaigns, congresses, and elections, and more experts on auditing of civilian and military budgets, protection of human rights, and demilitarization.

One program element that should simply be eliminated to free up resources for others is the campaigning and party-building activities of the NDI and IRI. Well before the latest round of campaign scandals in the United States — such as the Lippo group, the Lincoln bedroom, and \$10 million in military industry PAC contributions — African activists told DFD researchers that they looked with alarm on the U.S. electoral process and its Political Action Committees, “soft money,” multi-million dollar congressional campaigns, focus groups, and television attack advertisements highlighting racial tensions. The development of parties in Africa would be best pursued in Africa without advice from the parties responsible for these phenomena.

In the longer term, U.S. pro-democracy programs should be planned from the ground up with African civil society, and not, as today, predetermined by a preference for U.S. consultants, delegations, and program priorities. Unless civil society specifically identifies it as a priority, support for political parties and campaigns should be removed from current U.S. programming guidelines, with the funds made available for the area of accountability. Similarly, the United States should focus its programming on civil society groups, and not provide funding for foreign government agencies for such tasks as holding elections or paying judges and other parts of the justice system. Political will, and not outside money is the basis of long-term democratic institutions. In any event, governments that are truly interested in these reforms will demonstrate that by finding the resources in other parts of their budgets, such as the military budget. Governments that are not interested enough to find additional resources themselves will tend to use the reforms as window dressing.

B. The United States should lead international coalitions that use political and economic sanctions to spur reforms in specific elements of democracy. Accountability, and not just elections, should be the test of U.S. relations with African countries. Specific reforms should be developed as conditions in consultation with civil society, as they were in the anti-apartheid act placing pressure on South Africa. In addition to the linkage of military support to the consolidation of democracy as proposed by the Code of Conduct, potential country-specific tools might include linking economic aid in Egypt and Zimbabwe to fair treatment of opposition parties, linking an oil embargo in Nigeria to an end to military rule at the national and local levels, and simply highlighting in private and public discussions a few non-electoral reforms in each country as important to U.S. relations.

The United States will be a more credible, and hence more effective, broker of democratic reforms in Africa if it takes some of the dramatic steps toward promoting democracy proposed above — such as ending military and financial support for repressive governments, banning bribery in intelligence-gathering, and pushing for increased African voting power in the World Bank and IMF. If the United States is respecting the dictum of “above all, do no harm” it will find it much easier to do some good in supporting Africans’ aspirations for democracy.

### The Costs, and Benefits, of Implementing a Pro-Democracy Plan

The policy initiatives described above will be most successful if pursued in alliance with both developed and developing nations, but they will never be successful if the United States doesn’t take the lead and set a standard to challenge those other nations. The United States cannot lead the development of an international consensus on these initiatives if it cannot achieve its own national consensus. At present, the United States has no consensus among its policy-makers because it is


trying to have its cake and eat it too: it wants to promote democracy in Africa without accepting the limitations that the necessary steps will place on U.S. policy, both in Africa and elsewhere.

There would be real costs to U.S. strategic interests to a serious policy of promoting democracy. For example, under this plan: U.S. military and intelligence officials would lose thousands of cooperative contacts within African armed forces, because intelligence payments would be banned throughout the continent and military training, arms transfers, and exercises would be provided only to consolidated democracies under a Code of Conduct; U.S. forces in Korea would have to find alternatives to anti-personnel landmines (although the Canadian treaty provides a ten-year period to remove currently-emplaced weapons); there would be a reduction in U.S. voting power (and ability to win contracts for U.S. firms) at the World Bank and IMF; the United States would incur the anger of military dictatorships such as Indonesia and government with independent armed forces such as Chile by opposing World Bank loans until there is an audit of and reductions in their military budgets; there would be a loss of revenue for some American corporations, such as arms-exporters if the United States follows a Code of Conduct, or oil companies if the United States imposes an oil embargo on Nigeria, or other corporations if repressive governments retaliate for U.S. sanctions; and there would be pressure to cut U.S. military forces as part of the regional talks led by the U.N. Special Envoys for Conflict Prevention.

On the other hand, there are real benefits to U.S. security under such a plan. This plan would promote the democratic transition in Africa, which as the Clinton administration has said repeatedly, would benefit our strategic and economic interests in a growing African economy and an end to African civil wars. However, there are also benefits to U.S. security from some of the very steps that are noted above as costs. Controls on arms exports and negotiated reductions in military forces would permit reductions in U.S. military spending and U.S. taxpayer subsidies to arms exporters (which some economists argue already negate the positive impact on the American economy of arms exports).

U.S. military forces are placed at risk by the "boomerang effect" of current arms export and procurement policies. The United States exports its finest weapons, like the F-16 fighter, and then buys the expensive next generation, like the F-22, so that its own forces can maintain an advantage over this increased foreign threat. In addition, U.S. troops sent abroad

on peacekeeping or combat missions often face forces armed by the United States itself. In Panama in 1989, Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1992, and Haiti in 1995, U.S.-trained and armed armies and groups tried to thwart U.S. objectives, and hundreds of U.S. soldiers died or were wounded.



*The arms trade "boomerang" effect in Africa. U.S. forces in Somalia are endangered by militias armed with U.S. weapons (1993).*

Finally, some of the losses to U.S. security interests may not be as high as policy-makers think. Open-source intelligence-gathering by State Department representatives in the normal course of their analysis of trends in African countries may well provide nearly as much information to U.S. policy-makers as the CIA's bribery. U.S. forces in Korea may find their defense capabilities increased, not decreased, by such alternatives to anti-personnel landmines as sensors and other "smart" weapons systems or additional South Korean force structure; and granting additional voting power to developing nations at the World Bank and IMF may result in more realistic, and hence more successful, stabilization plans for African and other developing countries.

U.S. policy-makers who are committed to paying a price for democracy — such as officials at AID, NED, and the State Department — must not throw up their hands at the thought of challenging the entrenched bureaucratic and political power of the CIA and the Pentagon. At present, they are AWOL from this side of the policy debate. The reasoning of pro-democracy advocates within the U.S. government appears to be that they will jeopardize the positive impact they are having — for example, in funding women's development or clean water projects, or limiting some arms exports — if they openly challenge underlying U.S. military and intelligence policies.

But people who ask Africans to dream of changing entrenched realities must demonstrate that they too can do so in their own country. The United States is washing away the impact of its limited pro-democracy programs with a flood of support for repressive armed forces and the non-democratic rulers they serve. It is undercutting its own efforts to attack corruption and support accountability when its agents suborn treason through bribery. Who is better placed within the administration to force an open debate on changing these policies than the current advocates of African democracy?

\* \* \*

### **III: COUNTRY POLITICAL PROFILES**

# ALGERIA (Algiers)



**Population** 27.9 million



**Size of armed forces** 126,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 4.5




**GNP per capita** \$1,452




**Military spending** \$1.335 billion **Share of government budget** 7.5%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Military-backed High State Council seized power in 1992 to forestall election of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an Islamist party. Former general chosen president in 1995 election that excluded the FIS.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Seized power with former one-party government, controls president, and deployed to fight opposition.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Western countries, including U.S., generally backed the coup. In 1993: \$1 million in U.S. arms transfers, 12 officers trained. \$2.123 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 51 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes: severe conflict between military government and Islamic resistance, 50,000 people killed. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** While Algeria has an elected president, former general Liamine Zeroual, it is effectively governed by the armed forces. A military-appointed National Transition Council is comprised of military leaders and representatives of the National Liberation Front (FLN), which led Algeria in its fight for independence from France in the 1950s and 1960s. The FLN held single-party control of the country until the elections of 1991. The opposition Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) gained momentum in the 1980s because of a failing economy, government corruption, and, according to religious conservatives, the "impiety" of government officials. Open opposition to government practices was seen as early as 1979. A series of riots by university students began in 1988. They were joined by laborers and union workers, and eventually forced the FLN to open the way for multiparty politics. Despite irregularities, such as some 900,000 undistributed ballots in FIS-controlled areas, the FIS was the apparent victor in the first round of the December 1991 elections taking 47 percent of the vote.

In January 1992 the army and Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, shocked by the results, responded by canceling the second round of the elections and forcing then President Chadli Bendjedid to resign. He was replaced by a Military High Council lead by Mohammad Boudiaf, who was later assassinated. The Council cited the electoral misconduct in some FIS-dominated areas as the reason for the annulment, but there is little doubt that the FIS won the elections. Most Western countries,

including the U.S., supported the Council, arguing that the FIS would establish a theocratic government and never permit fair, multiparty elections itself. The FIS was declared illegal and its leaders were arrested. The FIS went underground, dividing into several armed factions under the banner of the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) – the military wing of the FIS. A widespread conflict erupted and continues to date.

At first the Council was divided, with some army members preferring a full military takeover, and some FLN leaders seeking a compromise with the FIS. Weary of the endless conflict, representatives of the major Algerian opposition parties, including the FIS, met in January 1995 in Rome to develop a cease-fire proposal and a transitional government. The Council denounced the meeting, however, and pushed forward with presidential elections in November 1995. Liamine Zeroual, backed by the military, and three candidates, including a member of Hamas (a moderate Islamic party), chose to run. President Zeroual was the victor with 61.3 percent, defeating Mahfoud Nahrah, the Hamas candidate's second-place showing of 25.4 percent. Even though the FIS called on the population to boycott, turnout for the elections was high, with French reports putting the total at 75 percent. Voter turnout dropped to 65 percent in the June 1997 parliamentary elections which took place under the guard of 300,000 Algerian security officers. The new National Democratic Rally party that has taken the government mantle for the FLN dominated the election. Zeroual is now conducting constitutional talks that would outlaw religious parties.

Civil conflict continues, with human rights abuses mounting on both sides. More than 50,000 people, mostly civilians, have died in the conflict since 1991. No segment of society has been untouched. While government forces target AIS forces, especially the Armed Islamic Group, considered the most violent faction in Algeria, inflicting tremendous numbers of civilian casualties, the AIS has a two-track violence campaign targeted at the government it perceives to be illegitimate, and at those in the country it perceives as "un-Islamic." The second track has caused great civilian suffering from the deaths of foreign nationals or non-Muslim religious persons, to a school girl shot to death because she was unveiled. The conflict has not remained confined to Algeria's borders. In 1994 the Armed Islamic Group unsuccessfully hijacked a plane from Algiers, forcing it to land in Marseilles; three passengers were killed and 13 were injured. Algerian terrorists are also suspected of a December 1996 train bombing in France that killed two people and injured dozens of others. Both sides have been documented as using torture in their activities.

Algeria's judiciary is divided into civil courts, which try misdemeanors and felonies along Shari'a (Islamic) law, and the military courts, which have been known to try civilians for terrorist offenses. While the government recently abolished three special courts to try subversion and terrorism cases, transferring the power back to the civil courts, the Minister of Justice admitted that 18,000 of their 34,000 prisoners had not yet been tried. All civil judges are appointed by the President. The press continues to be tightly controlled since the Anti Terrorist Decree of 1992 suspended the constitution's free speech and press guarantees.

Algeria's economy is suffering from depressed oil prices (oil and gas represent 95% of foreign revenue), low agricultural productivity due to drought, and a shortage of trade credits. Unemployment is currently estimated at 30 percent. Political instability has sharply curtailed foreign investment, although Western oil and gas industry investment has rebounded in the past two years. Similarly, Western governments and the World Bank and IMF have backed the government with \$20 billion in debt rescheduling in 1994 and 1995 alone.


# ANGOLA (Luanda)




**Population** 9.8 million



**Size of armed forces** 126,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 4.5




**GNP per capita** \$513




**Military spending** \$515 million **Share of government budget** 12.4%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) Fair multiparty elections were held in 1992, but the major opposition group chose to resume the civil war. A cease-fire and peace accord have been in effect since the 1994 Lusaka Accord.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) They guarantee survival of the government from rebels, and both sides' armies rely on export earnings.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) The U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s gave up to \$1 billion in covert aid, funneled through the CIA, to the UNITA rebels. The U.S. now permits arms sales to the government, but has not given it any military assistance to date other than for demining.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes: based on ethnic and regional lines. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No: cease-fire since November 1994.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Angola, born of a violent 13-year liberation struggle against Portugal, was immediately a victim of both the Cold War and South Africa's struggle to preserve apartheid. At independence in 1975 one of the rebel groups, the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), with the backing of the Soviet Union and Cuba, successfully competed for control of the government, defeating rebel groups backed by Zaire, South Africa, and the United States. One of those groups, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi, then pursued a 20-year civil war with, at various times, South African, Zairian, and American backing. That war destroyed the economy, claimed the lives of over 500,000 people, mostly civilians, and rendered 100,000 people amputees. Significant human rights abuses occurred on both sides of the conflict.

As the Cold War wound down, the United States, Russia, Portugal, and the U.N. all pushed for an end to the conflict. In 1989 the MPLA and UNITA signed a peace treaty. By 1990, however, hostilities resumed. In 1991 the two sides signed another peace accord that included internationally-monitored elections. A force of 400 unarmed U.N. military advisors was unable to enforce a demobilization accord. When the MPLA won the first round of the 1992 presidential elections and a slim majority in the legislature, Savimbi refused to take part in the run-off election. With his army still intact, Savimbi resumed the war. International observers rejected Savimbi's claim of rigged elections, calling the

elections generally free and fair.

International isolation and the loss of strategic areas led UNITA to accept a new peace treaty in November 1994. This "Lusaka Accord" is being carried out in fits. It guarantees UNITA a share of power in the government, and is being implemented by 6,000 armed U.N. troops. UNITA has slowly begun disarming and quartering his soldiers under the accord, and some will join the national army. Although Savimbi lacks his one-time external sponsors, some analysts predict he may still resume the conflict if the government weakens. The government is said to be divided between leaders who wish to eliminate UNITA and those who grudgingly accept its incorporation into the government and army.

Although the military conflict has ceased, each side continues buying weapons. In the past three years the Government has spent \$3 billion on its armed forces. UNITA has expressed concerns at reports of the government receiving Russian military hardware in violation of the Lusaka Accord. The government has countered the allegations, saying that UNITA has been replacing its weapons stockpile through connections with "old guard" South African security service members. While the United Nations are satisfied with the progress of the military demobilization, the continuing allegations on both sides combined with the planned U.N. withdrawal has left the final result of the Lusaka Accord in doubt.

The institutions of democracy are weak. Few opposition politicians have taken their seats in the assembly, and it has essentially functioned as a rubber stamp for the powerful executive branch. Local elections have yet to held, and freedom of political expression is severely constrained in both the government and UNITA sectors of the country. While the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, including the presumption of innocence, the right to a public trial, and an arrest warrant process, the judicial system in practice is weak and lacks both independence and the funding to provide for the rights of the accused. Constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and press are ignored, as the MPLA routinely uses intimidation and reprisals to force journalistic self-censorship. The government monitors all political meetings, and maintains tight control of the country's only daily newspaper, television station, and major radio stations.

Before the civil war, Angola produced a surplus of food, but for the two decades of conflict it has had to rely on foreign food aid to feed its people. A significant problem is the extensive use of landmines throughout Angola, which has made much land unavailable for use, and through extensive civilian casualties has maimed, killed, or made refugees out of a substantial portion of Angola's farming population. Its manufacturing capacity, apart from petroleum production that accounts of 90% of export earnings, is virtually nil. The battlefields have been primarily in oil and diamond areas, which serve as sources of military funding for both sides. The warring parties have financed arms and soldiers with oil and diamonds at the expense of the population's basic needs. The government receives revenue from offshore oil wells pumped by American companies at a rate of 55,000 barrels a day. In 1992 UNITA received an estimated \$250 million from diamonds it smuggled through Zaire to Belgium.

# BENIN (Porto Novo)



**Population** 5.3 million




**Size of armed forces** 6,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.1



**GNP per capita** \$277



**Military spending** \$34 million **Share of government budget** 12.8%



**Main ethnic groupings**



42 ethnic groups

most prominent: Foni, Adja, Yoruba, and Bariba

**Main religions**



Christians 15%

Muslims 15%

Traditional beliefs 70%



**Degree of democracy:** 1 (*Consolidated*) Civilian “coup d’etat” in 1990 paved way for free and fair elections. Military has remained aloof from political process, and opposition press exists in all media mediums.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Limited at present, but historically strong; 17 years of military rule recently ended.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) \$326,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 29 officers trained, U.S. establishing joint military commission and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Benin, after 17 years under the Marxist military regime of General Mathieu Kerekou, held multiparty elections in 1991. This push towards democracy was spurred by an economic crisis resulting from a combination of economic mismanagement, corruption, and a collapse of exports such as cotton and oil which virtually bankrupted the government. France and the international donor community, unwilling to give unconditional assistance, tied loans to the observance of human rights and movement toward elections. The easing of repressive actions set the stage for what amounted to a civilian coup d’etat in 1990. A “national conference” had been convened to form a national consensus on economic reforms, but the participants from social, religious, professional, and political interest groups declared themselves “sovereign and executive.” This effectively neutralized Kerekou’s powers.

The presidency was reorganized, a constitution was written, and a timetable was set for elections. In 1991 a civilian, Mr. Nicephore Soglo was overwhelmingly elected president in elections that were judged free and fair by international observers. Power was concentrated in the hands of the president, his cabinet, and the National Assembly. Critics denounced the government for delaying the implementation of other democratic institutions required by the constitution, while the government blamed the delay on insufficient funds. The Soglo government did, for the most part, respect the fundamental

rights as written in the 1990 Constitution.

Soglo's credibility was weakened by accusations of corruption, and in voting in March 1995 the opposition parties captured the majority of seats in the National Assembly with the help of unions angry over salary cuts. Then, in a remarkable show of frustration with high unemployment and corruption, the former dictator Kerekou, now a born-again Christian, was returned to the presidency in the 1996 election. Nearly 90 percent of voters turned out in a free and fair election to choose between Soglo and Kerekou. During the counting of the ballots, the two candidates praised the management of the elections and called on their supporters to respect the results. The once dominant Beninese armed forces have remained aloof from political debates, but could pose problems in coming years due to declining troop morale, ethnic imbalances, and a dubious commitment to constitutional rule.

While the government generally respects and upholds the judicial system, mob justice and vigilantism are continue to be problematic. Judges are beholden only unto the law, but the executive and Justice ministry hold administrative power over the judges. The government continues to own the largest and most influential radio, television and newspaper sources, but there are no prohibitions on freedom of the press. Active opposition press exists in all media mediums.

Benin's economy is dependent on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. Small scale off-shore oil production and regional trade are being developed, but poor natural resources, a bloated bureaucracy and high debt service are slowing Benin's economic growth. IMF austerity plans have cut much-needed public projects, and rising unemployment and deteriorating standards of living have resulted in several civil strikes and protests against the IMF.

# BOTSWANA (Gaborone)



**Population** 1.4 million



**Size of armed forces** 8,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 5.9




**GNP per capita** \$2,800




**Military spending** \$229 million **Share of government budget** 14.1%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 1 (*Consolidated*) Long-time multiparty system, free expression, and independent judiciary.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) Military has been traditionally aloof from political process, but recent unexplained military buildup casts uncertain shadow.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) U.S. military training program began in 1980. \$5.771 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 166 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Botswana, the longest-standing democracy in Africa, gained its independence from Britain in 1966 after 80 years of colonial rule. An elected president serves a five-year term and legislative power is vested in the 38-seat National Assembly, which also turns over every five years. Of the several functioning political parties, the dominant and ruling one is the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), currently under the leadership of President Quett Masire. The judicial branch functions independently, and freedom of speech and expression are protected by law and practice. The government has a good human rights record, with the exception of its treatment of the Basarwa, or San, who are being pressured to leave traditional lands within a national game reserve.

The small military force focuses on border patrol. It is apolitical and does not pose a threat or impede the operation of the government. Recent activities have, however, cast an uncertain shadow. Despite having no discernible external threats, the government is engaged in a rapid expansion of its forces. The Botswana Defense Force (BDF) is planning another 25 percent, raising their armed forces to 10,000 soldiers. Also raising alarm, the formerly tankless BDF has already bought 36 British tanks, and recently ordered an additional 50 from the Netherlands. Canada has also agreed to sell 13 F-5 fighter jets to Botswana. Radio reports say that the BDF is being bolstered for improved U.N. peace-

keeping ability. Zimbabwe perceives no immediate threat from the expansion. Some analysts suggest that the buildup is due to internal politics, but the rationale remains unclear.

President Masire was re-elected in 1994, and his ruling BDP retained control of parliament. Although the BDP has been in power since independence in 1966, the opposition has been growing, due to a slowdown in economic growth, an increase unemployment to 25 percent, and a number of political scandals. In the 1994 elections, the leading opposition group, the Botswana National Front, won 13 out of 39 contested seats. There is a free press, and opposition politicians have access, if somewhat limited, to the government-controlled radio station.

Despite poor soil, frequent drought, and a lack of public infrastructure upon independence, Botswana has become one of the fastest developing African nations. Botswana's export economy is based on diamond and other mineral mining, while the majority of the population survives on small-scale pastoralism. Botswana encourages private entrepreneurship, and despite dependence on international market trends, commercial agriculture and in particular livestock industries have become relatively stable sources of income. The government is working to expand social services. Health care and education are available in urban areas, but are often inaccessible in the rural areas where about half the population live.

# BURKINA FASO (Ouagadougou)



**Population** 10.1 million



**Size of armed forces** 9,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 0.9



**GNP per capita** \$180



**Military spending** \$43 million **Share of government budget** 12.8%



## Main ethnic groupings



50 ethnic groups

largest are Mossi with 2.5 million, other significant groups include Gurunsi, Senafo, Lobi, Bobo, Mande, and Fulane

## Main religions



Christians 10%

Muslims 25%

Traditional beliefs 65%



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Despite attempts at multiparty elections, one-party rule is still in effect.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** (*Substantial*) Through violence and intimidation, military helps to keep Compaore government in power. Armed forces commands more funds than basic human needs, and government promises to reduce the military budget substantially have not been adhered to.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) No U.S. arms transfers due to Compaore's cooperation with Libya and his support for Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor. \$107,000 in IMET spending in 1991; 5 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Burkina Faso has been ruled since independence in 1960 by a series of autocratic civilian and military regimes. In 1983, after a bloody coup, Captain Blaise Compaore and the Front Populaire (FP) came to power. External pressure from international donors and internal pressure from opposition groups, however, forced FP to open up the political process. The direction and the specifics of the movement toward representative government have been dictated by Compaore and the FP. The opposition parties reacted by boycotting the 1991 presidential election. Compaore, having resigned from his army commission, stood unopposed and won with an electoral turnout of 25 percent.

In the 1992 legislative elections, 27 opposition parties participated after receiving the government's assurance that the voting would be free and fair. Compaore's new party, Organization for Popular Democracy/Labor Movement (ODP/MT) won the majority of seats, due to the opposition's disunity, lack of access to financial resources, and ODP/MT's control of the government's resources. There were numerous election violations, but none serious enough to call into question the overall result of the voting.

Although the 1991 constitution provides for the separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government, and the establishment of a multiparty system, President Compaore and his renamed Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) party have been adept at maintaining his power base and thwarting true multiparty development. Municipal elections in 1995 provided evidence of strong multiparty movement, with the ruling party taking only a bare majority of the available seats. The May 1997 parliamentary elections, however, put power squarely in the hands of the CDP, as it won 101 out of the 111 seats in the National Assembly with 68.6 percent of the overall vote. Voter turnout was estimated at 44 percent.

The armed forces receive generous support from the government and takes priority over sectors such as health and education. In 1994, the government began the process of reorganizing the armed forces, including the removal of the gendarmerie from the military chain of command. The main problem with the security forces continues to be their impunity. Investigations into human rights abuses rarely produce results. This gives the military, gendarmerie, and police tremendous power to control the civilian population both by threat and action. Burkina Faso also has a "People's Militia" with 45,000 men and women between 20 and 35 trained for civic and military duty serving part time for two years. In May 1991, president Compaore promised to reduce military expenditures by 14 percent each year as part of its structural adjustment program. That promise, however, has not been adhered to. Burkina Faso's military budget has remained virtually constant since the 1991 pledge.

The government's human rights record remains poor. Security forces killed suspected criminals and convicts as part of "Operation Punch," a 1994 campaign aimed at eradicating urban and rural banditry. The Burkinabe Movement for Human Rights and Peoples (MBDHP), has publicly condemned these extrajudicial killings, but like other human rights abuses, they went unpunished. The campaign was discontinued, but the government plans to put together other "crime-fighting" brigades. The shooting deaths of two high-school demonstrators by the Gendarmerie in 1995 also led to a human rights inquiry that netted no results.

Freedom of speech and the press were limited by the practice of self-censorship, due to the government's broad interpretation of defamation. In 1993 this broad interpretation was dropped, and a burgeoning opposition press, particularly in the private radio sector, has resulted. Social unrest has been on the rise. Students have staged protests against cut-backs on social services under an IMF austerity plan, and against government nepotism and corruption. The Supreme Court is becoming more independent, but the executive branch continues to hold much sway over their actions. The government also created a "Mediateur du Faso" to mediate disputes between the state and its citizens. Retired General Marc Garango was appointed to that position in 1995.

Eighty percent of Burkina Faso's population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, whose success or failure hinges upon rainfall levels. A large portion of the population finds seasonal or permanent work in neighboring countries such as Mali and Cote D'Ivoire, making labor the country's major export. Light industry and agricultural processing are developing, but are handicapped by weak transportation and communication infrastructures. Successive droughts have hurt the rural sectors, especially in the north where pastoral production is the mainstay.

# BURUNDI (Bujumbura)



**Population** 6.1 million



**Size of armed forces** 17,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 2.8




**GNP per capita** \$142




**Military spending** \$32 million **Share of government budget** 19.3%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 4 (*Dissolving*) Weak coalition government of moderates from Hutu majority and Tutsi minority was rendered ineffective by extremist groups even before it was overthrown in 1996 by Tutsi-led army.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) The country has a history of rule by a Tutsi-dominated army, which continues to operate without judicial or political restraint.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$315,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 33 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes: driven by deep-seated ethnic conflict. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Burundi is a nation mired in anarchy, based on ethnic conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi people. Initially, they were distinguished only by their occupations: Hutu were cultivators and Tutsi pastoral. During the colonial period, the Belgians exploited this difference and favored the Tutsi over the Hutus. Since independence in 1962, regimes have come and gone as a direct result of the power struggles between the two groups. The Hutu comprise 85 percent of the population and the Tutsi make up 15 percent.

In 1972 and 1988, the government's brutal response to Hutu uprisings resulted in the massacre of 100,000 and 20,000 people, respectively. Economic and political pressure from surrounding nations forced the military regime of Major Pierre Buyoya to seek reconciliation with the Hutu majority. Several nominal government appointments were made, a more inclusive constitution was designed, and multiparty elections were held in 1993. The Hutu party, the Burundi Democratic Front (FRODEBU), under the leadership of Melchoir Ndadaye, won the elections. Ndadaye attempted to decrease ethnic division by forming an ethnically balanced government, but he was killed in an October 1993 military-backed coup. His assassination set off another round of ethnic violence in which over 150,000 people were killed. The initial massacre of Tutsi by Hutus was mitigated by the Tutsi-controlled army, whose brutal retaliation sent 700,000 Hutu refugees to neighboring countries.

Burundi's criminal courts ceased functioning in 1993, and with the vast majority of judges being of Tutsi heritage, the justice system is widely considered another tool of Tutsi rule. Freedom of speech and press are restricted to being in "a manner consistent with the public law and order." Most newspapers are merely political propaganda. The two radio stations allow for a rotation of broadcasts from different political parties, but some opposition parties have complained that the agreement allowed for insufficient access.

After all three constitutional successors were assassinated in the 1993 coup, a coalition consisting of FRODEBU, the major Tutsi political party Unity for National Progress (UPRONA), smaller political parties, religious, business, and civic leaders agreed to install Cyprien Ntaryamira as President as part of a new power sharing arrangement. This alliance, unfortunately, was short-lived: in April 1994, a suspicious plane crash killed the presidents of both Burundi and Rwanda. In the aftermath of the crash, the violence that ensued has further polarized the people and the government. The Tutsi-dominated army professed allegiance to the government, but continued to turn a blind eye to acts of violence committed by fellow Tutsi. The armed forces continued to commit serious abuses of human rights, but the complete lack of civilian leadership left the army free from any civilian accountability.

An interim government under FRODEBU leader Sylvestre Ntibantunganya attempted to hang onto power despite the increased violence by extremist Tutsi and Hutu groups, but yet another massacre in 1996 led the army, again under Major Buyoya, to take power in July. Since then, accounts of mass killings perpetrated by the military have been on the rise. Buyoya, is resisting international calls for a return to civilian rule. He states that the current government will remain in place for at least three years. Neighboring states Zaire, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia have been unsatisfied with Buyoya's efforts, and began enforcing tight sanctions on Burundi in August 1996, allowing in only emergency relief materials. Since Buyoya's coup, the civil war has again escalated. In September 1996, the United States military evacuated all its remaining citizens and expatriates from Burundi.

As the violence increases, the militias take on an increasing level of importance. As the Hutu militias, now being termed "rebel groups" step up their fight against the Buyoya government and rival Tutsi militias, the waves of violence are ever increasing. A disturbing report from the United Nations says that the human rights situation is being made much worse as both sides are increasingly using landmines in their struggle.

Central to this struggle is the issue of power-sharing within the government as well as the armed forces. As each group pushes its own ethnically-based agenda, the number of moderate Hutu and Tutsi political figures willing to discuss democracy is declining.

Burundi is densely populated and one of the poorest countries in Africa. A majority of the land (60 percent) is reserved as pastures for Tutsi livestock, and 25 percent is left for Hutu subsistence cultivation. Many Hutus remain tied to Tutsi landlords by patronage. The cash crops coffee and tea account for 75 percent of the nation's foreign exchange. This source of hard currency is rapidly shrinking as farmers abandon fields to find safety from ethnic violence; additionally, international prices have been steadily dropping, thereby increasing Burundi's dependency on international assistance from the World Bank and IMF. The government fears that new austerity measures being imposed will exacerbate ethnic tensions.

# CAMEROON (Yaounde)



**Population** 13.1 million




**Size of armed forces** 12,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 0.9




**GNP per capita** \$405




**Military spending** \$102 million **Share of government budget** 10.5%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Government chosen by dubious multiparty elections, and continues to repress dissent.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Maintains one-party rule.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$1.511 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-95; 65 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** In 1991, forced by domestic agitation for multiparty politics, President Paul Biya was compelled to open up the political process. He did so, but very much on his own terms. His refusal to hold a sovereign national conference resulted in a prolonged campaign of civil disobedience. Much of the opposition boycotted the 1992 legislative elections, which allowed Biya's party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), to win a bare majority of seats. The elections were marred by corruption and irregularities. Despite the opposition's call for new legislative elections, presidential elections were held later in 1992. Biya triumphed, in large part because factionalism among opposition parties resulted in eight candidates running instead of a single candidate, but there were also even more significant irregularities than in the legislative elections. His term expires in 1997.

The government functions as a one-party state. Biya maintains power through a campaign of intimidation, violence, and arrests, and rules through a circle of advisors from his ethnic group and party. There is no neutral election commission, so the government can, and does, exclude candidates from election lists. The opposition coalition, the Alliance for Change (FAC), frequently organizes strikes and demonstrations. FAC leader John Fru Ndi, who is Biya's strongest rival, campaigned across the country for new elections. He is often the target of police intimidation.

Under pressure from opposition parties to hold a constitutional conference, Biya announced his intention to hold a national debate in 1996 to plan governmental and constitutional reforms. He then undercut this popular measure by issuing a decree in December 1995 that the meeting would occur the next day, with a secret list of participants who would meet behind closed doors for seven days. The opposition refused to take part in what they saw as a hijacking of the constitutional revision process. Although dissatisfaction with Biya is growing, the opposition has been splintered with ethnic and linguistic divisions making it difficult to form a forceful coalition to remove him.

Parliamentary elections were held in May 1997, with disappointing, if expected, results. Biya's renamed Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (RDPC) took 109 out of the 180 seats, but the results of the elections were immediately contested by the two main opposition parties, John Fru Ndi's Social Democratic Front (SDF) and the National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP). International observers witnessed cases of rigging at ballot boxes, violence against voters and opposition leaders, and the unjustified presence of self-defense units at polling stations. Opposition parties also denounced the use of the state-run media who ran early television announcement that the RDPC was heading toward a "profitable absolute majority" based only on provisional results. Both the SDF and UNDP have called for the elections to be annulled.

Cameroon's human rights record remains abysmal. Although there were no cases of political killings in 1994 and 1995, government security forces continue to commit serious human rights abuses which includes a number of extrajudicial killings. Biya has the support of the leaders of the armed forces, whom he has generously funded over the years. He has enlisted their help to suppress the opposition by using tactics which have included raids on opposition headquarters, violent suppression of demonstrations, and outright combat with members of opposition groups. Freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association are official rights, but they have been severely circumscribed through censorship, arrests of editors, and denial of approval for meetings and marches.

The judicial system is dominated by the government and there is no clear indication that a December 1995 declaration to create an independent judiciary will be enforced in any meaningful manner. Arbitrary arrests and detentions are commonplace, as the police have up to four days to legally detain anyone without charge.

Until the late 1980s Cameroon was a model of a successful African economy due to the conservative budgetary policies of President Ahidjo and a diversified range of agricultural exports and offshore oil reserves. However, the sharp drop in world oil prices and the devaluation of the CFA franc eventually forced the government to impose austerity programs. Cameroon's economic problems worsened with reductions in U.S., World Bank, and IMF aid in the early 1990s due to fiscal mismanagement and political repression. Despite international actions taken on the Biya regime due to its atrocious human rights and anti-democracy record, France, Cameroon's former colonial ruler, has continued to aid the government with economic aid and military support.

# CAPE VERDE (Praja)



**Population** 400,000



**Size of armed forces** 1,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 2.4




**GNP per capita** \$779



**Military spending** \$3 million **Share of government budget** 2%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**

Roman Catholic fused with traditional beliefs



**Degree of democracy:** 1 (*Consolidated*) Several rounds of elections since 1991 shows active and unrestrained opposition. Press has successfully challenged strict libel laws in functioning and independent courts.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) Military was separated from police in 1992, and police retrained along Western model. No reports of human rights abuses by security forces since that time.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$1.981 million in U.S. arms transfers 1991-1995; 20 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current Civil Conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Cape Verde is an Atlantic archipelago 500 miles west of Senegal. After becoming independent from Portugal in 1975, Cape Verde was ruled for 15 years by President Aristides Pereira. Although Pereira's Marxist party, the Partido Africano da Independencia de Cabo Verde (PAICV) was the only political party allowed under the constitution, its policies were pragmatic and during the 1980s they became increasingly inclusive of citizens not in the party. Nevertheless, increasing pressure for an end to the one-party system from church and academic groups, which were encouraged by the movements for democracy in West Africa convinced Pereira to step down in 1990 and allow the creation of a multiparty system.

Legislative elections were held in 1991, and the forces of change swept the opposition group, Movement for Democracy (MPD) into power. Presidential elections followed, with Antonio Mascarenhas Monterio, an independent, emerging as the victor. The constitution was redrafted to include provisions for human rights and a market economy.

Since 1993 a number of top government administrators have resigned, due in part to personal rivalries, but also over the pace of economic changes. Within the ruling MPD there is a radical faction pressing

for substantial economic adjustment while more conservative members want to take a slower approach. Other opposition groups have been formed, which gave Cape Verdeans a wider political choice in the 1995 and 1996 elections. The MPD dominated the 1995 legislative elections, with Carlos Veiga returning as prime minister. Independent Mascarenhas was re-elected to the presidency in 1996, with 73 percent of the vote. Voter turnout was only 45 percent, but analysts were quick to blame this on "voter fatigue" from two other recent votes for Parliament and Mayors.

The police, not the military, is charged with internal security. The police force was separated from the military in 1992, and then was retrained along a Western police force model. The secret police was disbanded, and there have been no reports of human rights abuses by security forces since that time.

Cape Verde has a functioning and independent judiciary. The Supreme Court has five members who may not be members of political parties. One is chosen by the President, one by the National Assembly, and three by the High Council of Magistrates. Trials are usually fair and public, but a lack of funding has hampered due process. Arbitrary arrests are uncommon, and the police may hold a suspect without charge for five days, but only with the court's permission. Freedom of the press is a constitutional mandate, however, much of the press is government-owned. State-employed journalists routinely practice self-censorship for fear of demotion, and government officials have tried to use the nation's strict libel laws to attack journalists who levy harsh criticisms. Independent papers, however, have been successful defending themselves in court when charged with libel.

Cape Verde's economy functions primarily at a subsistence level. Given its limited amount of arable land, cyclical bouts of drought, and catastrophic floods, Cape Verde is only able to provide 20 percent of its food needs. It relies heavily on foreign aid coming from the European Union, Arab states, and the United States among others, and remittances from Cape Verdeans living overseas, whose numbers exceed those living in the country. Despite these shortcomings, the government throughout the 1980s and 1990s made strong strides in developing small-scale infrastructure, irrigation, and desalinization projects. State-owned enterprises are being privatized rapidly in a bid to promote foreign investment. Moreover, the government has increased funding to health and education, improving dramatically access to health care.

# CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (Bangui)



**Population** 3.1 million



**Size of armed forces** 5,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.6




**GNP per capita** \$302




**Military spending** \$30 million **Share of government budget** 12.7%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) Multiparty elections ousted dictator in 1993, but government reforms were delayed, and ethnic division and corruption led to coup attempts.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) After adopting a low profile since 1993 elections, the traditionally-independent army mutinied three times in 1996 and once in 1997. French troops, who usually assist the army, have helped to put down the mutinies.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$328,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 37 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current Civil Conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** From 1979, when he deposed the self-appointed emperor Bokassa, to 1993, when he lost the country's first fair elections, General Andre Kolingba held a tight reign over the politics and economy of the Central African Republic. In the late 1980s, as the economy began to falter due to sluggish world markets, government corruption, and mismanagement, there was a marked increase in domestic and international pressure for Kolingba to permit democratic reforms. In 1990 Kolingba conceded to having the Democratic Assembly of Central Africa (RDC), the sole political party, hold a national congress. Sweeping public strikes over salary arrears and the slow pace of political reform forced the government to hold multiparty elections in October 1992.

Kolingba annulled the election results, citing violence, irregularities, and missing electoral equipment. Opposition groups contended that the real reason was the poor showing of the president's RDC party. New elections were held in September 1993. Kolingba was defeated and Ange-Felix Patasse emerged as the new president. The new government was able to put the country back on track, after the turbulent years of public strikes and school closings. The Patasse government restructured the judicial system and decentralized the bureaucracy. The human rights situation improved, with the traditionally-powerful armed forces not challenging the government and not engaging in substantial abuses.

However, local watch-dog groups documented government misuse of police power to intimidate political opponents, and Patasse failed to call municipal elections appointing leaders instead.

While the judicial system has been reformed to a certain extent, reports of direct interference by the executive have still been reported. An even larger obstacle to an effective judiciary is a severe lack of funds and adequately trained personnel. For example, the civilian criminal court had to be shut down for two years for lack of funding. There are over a dozen opposition newspapers who openly criticize the government, but the government has sued journalists when they have reported stories on official corruption. The government will not allow non-governmental radio stations to broadcast.

Patasse's successes have been overshadowed by the devaluation of the CFA currency in 1994 and the disclosure that \$13 million in missing loan guarantees were found in his Swiss bank account. There has been a drop in public confidence in Patasse's government, as reflected in the 10 percent voter turnout for a 1995 referendum that increased Patasse's term to 18 years and strengthened his presidential powers. The referendum, marred by gross irregularities, was roundly denounced by the opposition as an attempt to derail the democratic process.

In April, 1996, government workers went on strike for back pay, and the army, which had also not been paid, took to the streets and demanded Patasse's resignation. French troops restored order with a show of force, but when Patasse put a presidential guard in charge of the armory, the army mutinied again in May, and this time French troops had to defeat the mutineers in a violent clash.

In June 1996, a new government of national unity was formed by Jean Paul Ngoupande, the former ambassador to France. The seven-party Democratic Council of Opposition Parties (CODEPO) refused to join the new government, still under the ultimate control of President Patasse. While the first priority of this government was to pay back salaries to civil servants, clashes between mutinying soldiers and French troops resumed in November as approximately 200 rebel troops again protested a lack of pay and troop reassignments away from the capital. Complicating the situation, factional fighting within the army has also erupted led by rebels from the Yakoma ethnic group. A truce was declared in December 1996, but violence again erupted in Bangui in June 1997. As many as 250 people, mostly civilians, have been killed as mutinous soldiers battled African peacekeepers and French troops.

The Central African Republic is a sparsely populated, landlocked country whose inhabitants practice subsistence agriculture. The chief exports are coffee, cotton, timber, tobacco, and diamonds. The devaluation of the currency and an economic restructuring program has created hardship for urban and government workers, but the economy has stabilized. French Cooperation Minister Jacques Godfrain has said that France will help pay the back salaries of the civil servants in order to help foster overall economic reform.

# CHAD (N'Djamena)



**Population** 5.5 million



**Size of armed forces** 30,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 5.5



**GNP per capita** \$164




**Military spending** \$24 million **Share of government budget** 9.6%



**Main ethnic groupings**

200 Distinct  
Ethnic Groups

**Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) While the military still has a great deal of autonomy and helps to prop-up the Patriotic Salvation Movement, opposition parties are making gains and the courts are showing signs of greater independence from government influence in assisting with electoral fairness issues.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Politically-independent army is aided by 900 French troops.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) U.S. joined France in backing the Habre government in 1980s against Libyan-backed rebels, providing \$60 million in military aid. Current Deby government collaborated with the CIA in its anti-Libya operations, and receives U.S. arms and training. \$5.743 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 72 officers trained, and joint exercises planned for 1998.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** In 1990 President Hissein Habre was ousted by his chief military advisor, Idris Deby, and the Patriotic Salvation Movement. Although Deby had close ties to Libya, the Bush administration did not oppose the new regime. The U.S. negotiated with the Deby government for the release of 600 Libyan prisoners of war, some of whom were recruited by the CIA to serve in a rebel force against Libyan President Quaddafi's government.

Despite having the support of both Libya and France, President Deby has had a difficult time consolidating his rule because of internal power struggles and the challenge posed by the exiled Habre. Deby has delayed his promise to establish full multiparty democracy. In 1993, after continual pressure from students, trade unions, and international donors, a national conference was held to debate Chad's political future and to introduce reforms. This resulted in the election of a Transitional Council (CST), which was supposed to operate as a temporary parliament to guide the country through the constitution writing and elections. In reality, the CDT has become a rubber stamp for the government. Although there are over 50 opposition parties, disorganization abounds and no viable candidate exists to challenge Deby.

The presidential elections, scheduled for April 1995, were postponed until the end of 1995 and then July 1996. In July, opposition leader Ngarlegy Yorongar was arrested in violation of legal procedure while working on the second round of the presidential elections. A number of opposition leaders and human rights activists were threatened or detained during the process as well. An environment of general lawlessness and independent military power made the elections suspect, but turnout was high as Deby was elected president.

Substantial democratic gains seem to have been made in the January 1997 legislative elections. Not only did opposition parties win 30 of the 64 seats, but the Chadian Court of Appeals has ordered a re-run in 10 of the races due in part to decisions in favor of candidates who lost to Deby's Patriotic Salvation Movement (PSM). The tightness of the elections combined with the independent court overturning PSM victories seemed to be very good indicators of a burgeoning democratic mentality in Chad.

Members of Deby's Zaghawa clan, which straddles both sides of the Sudan-Chad border, have strong representation in the army, and are reluctant to see Deby lose power. They have used their presidential immunity to extract money from the custom office and state companies, and to run car hijacking rings. Killings, torture, and disappearances of both rebels and civilians by the military have continued during its conflicts with rebel groups, and Deby is hard-pressed simply to hold together his government. Military and security forces rarely obey due process laws within the Constitution. While the judiciary is supposedly independent, a lack of funding has rendered it unable to function as an effective check on government or military abuse. The sizable military also poses a consistent drain on the Chadian economy.

Chad has been plagued by three decades of continuous warfare both internally and with Libya, and by repressive leadership. Rural areas are underpopulated, as farm families have migrated to urban areas seeking security and work. Cycles of drought and migration have disrupted agricultural production, making food self-sufficiency a remote goal. Eighty percent of the population practices subsistence agriculture, fishing, and livestock raising. Cotton, Chad's most important export, is experiencing reduced production rates and a declining international market. Chad has had to rely heavily on financial assistance from France to meet recurring budgetary costs. However, the recent discovery of oil reserves of up to 1 billion barrels may offer the government a way out of its current financial crisis.

# COMOROS (Moroni)



**Population** 490,000

**Rank**  49/53

**Size of armed forces** n/a **Soldiers per 1000 people** n/a

**Rank** n/a

**GNP per capita** \$510

**Rank**  17/51


**Military spending** n/a **Share of government budget** n/a

**Rank** n/a

**Main ethnic groupings**

Antalote, Cafre, Makoia,  
Oumatsaha, Sakalava

**Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) 1996 elections saw Djohar ousted and opposition party victorious in elections, but long-standing instability and mercenary interference with governments continues to threaten democratic development.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Numerous coup attempts show that the military remains an independent and potent political actor.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) \$85,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 13 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes: coup attempts. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Comoros is a three-island archipelago located off the northern coast of Madagascar. Comoros has always suffered from political turbulence. After gaining independence from France in 1975, three regimes fell in three years in the face of natural disasters, returning refugees, and mercenary intervention. Comoros is presently an elected Islamic republic under the leadership of former interim president Said Mohamed Djohar, who was elected in a 1990 run-off. A representative National Assembly has been elected, although the Comoran Union for Progress (UDZIMA), one of the larger opposition groups, boycotted the elections.

Djohar had become interim president by ousting South African mercenary Bob Denard, who had effectively ruled through figurehead Abdullah Aderamane since Comoros became a one-party state in 1982. During this period, Comoros became a strategic South African arms dispensary for RENAMO troops in Mozambique, and a navy port for France.

A constitutional referendum was passed in 1992 that limited presidential tenure and called for a bicameral legislature. However, passage of the referendum did little to quell Djohar's pursuit of total control. Opposition parties have repeatedly complained about violence, intimidation, and the president's disregard of constitutional rules. In a December 1994 local election, the interior minister and local

police units supervised the voting, instead of the appointed National Election Commission.

The Comoros Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and law is based on a combination of French and Islamic legal codes. While civilian trials are generally open and fair, a severe lack of lawyers makes it difficult for the accused to find counsel, and the government will not provide these resources. Freedom of the press is also guaranteed, and is practiced by several small opposition newspapers, but the government shut down the only opposition radio station; thereby leaving the government station the only radio news source on Comoros affairs.

Djohar was backed by the restructured Comorian Defense Forces (CDF) and gendarmerie when dissatisfaction with his leadership and a sluggish economy prompted three coup attempts, the last in September 1992. Several opposition leaders were arrested and detained by the armed forces. Security forces have committed serious human rights abuses without punishment. In 1995, Denard attempted to regain power in a coup attempt using foreign mercenaries and some Comorian troops, and French troops were called in to put down the revolt. Djohar stayed out of the country for three months, with Prime Minister Caabi El Yachroutou assuming many presidential duties. Under an Organization of African States (OAS) agreement, Djohar returned for elections in 1996.

The Presidential elections went off in May, with Mohamed Taki Adloulkarim of the National Rally for Development party ousting Djohar with 64 percent of the vote. The Federal Assembly elections took place in December, and results showed that President Taki's party had won an overwhelming majority of the 43 seats. The previous Prime Minister, Tajiddine Ben Said Massonde and his cabinet resigned to allow Taki to create his own.

Still heavily dependent on financial assistance from France and the European Union, Comoros remains one of the least developed nations in the world. It has few natural resources. Agriculture is the pivotal economic activity, representing 95 percent of export earnings and employing 85 percent of the working population. The agricultural sector is unable to sustain the country, however, due to a severe shortage of cultivable land, lack of agricultural inputs, and increasing population. The 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc severely hampered the already-fragile economy and increased reliance on French assistance.

# CONGO (Brazzaville)



**Population** 6.1 million





**Size of armed forces** 10,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 4.1



**GNP per capita** \$475



**Military spending** \$28 million **Share of government budget** 6.2%



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) The ruling party was turned out of power in multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections. Ethnic conflicts and competition dominate the political process.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Army operates with little restraint.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$13,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 32 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes, factional fighting resumes in 1997.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** In July 1991 military leader Dennis Sassou-Nguesso announced political reforms in response to rising public pressure for political freedom and better living conditions. A national conference was held that year to set an agenda for the introduction of multiparty democracy, including restrictions on the ruling Parti Congolaise du Travail's political monopoly, legalization of other political parties, and the adoption of a new constitution. Pascal Lissouba was elected president in 1992 with the support of the Presidential Movement, a coalition of various groups who later won the majority of parliamentary seats in the 1993 legislative elections. The opposition claimed the 1993 election was unfair, but international jurists rejected most claims and others were resolved in run-offs.

Under President Lissouba, the Congo has seen a worsening of existing ethnic rivalries. Lissouba, like his political opponents, has used ethnicity as a major criterion for filling ministerial positions. The government's major opponents are former presidents Sassou-Nguesso and Bernard Kolelas, leader of the Congolese Movement for Total Democracy and Development. They each have formed private militias whose clashes with the army have caused the deaths of at least one thousand people.

While the majority of human rights abuses in the Congo have been committed by the militias, the army

is also culpable. Kolelas and Sassou-Nguesso urged their supporters to undertake acts of "civil disobedience," which often translated into wanton acts of violence and looting, especially in the capital, Brazzaville. The violence escalated to such a point in 1993 that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had to step in and broker a peace agreement between the government and opposition parties. This agreement was short-lived, due to the kidnapping of two senior-level government officials. The Libreville peace accord of 1994 finally brought ethnic strife to a halt, and created the international panel that resolved the election disputes. However, armed conflict between Sassou-Nguesso's militia and the armed forces under Lissouba reignited in June 1997. After a week of looting and wanton violence, a cease-fire was arranged. French and American troops have still been evacuating foreign civilians from Brazzaville as a lasting peace remains in doubt. Presidential elections are scheduled for July 1997.


Although there are constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and the press, the government controls the broadcast media and limits access to it by opposition journalists. The Judiciary, consisting of local courts and the Supreme Court, is in practice independent of the government, but problems still remain with protecting the rights of the accused. Vigilante justice continues to be a concern.

Congo's economy depends on income from petroleum exports and external borrowing. A drop in oil prices in 1985 resulted in the Congo falling far behind on its foreign debt payments, and it has yet to recover its credit-worthiness. Only France has been willing to assist the government, but French aid is not enough to cover the external debt, which has accounted for up to 400 per cent of its GDP. Despite this debt, Congo has one of the highest per capita incomes in sub-Saharan Africa.

# COTE D'IVOIRE (Yamoussoukro)



**Population** 14.3 million



**Size of armed forces** 15,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.0




**GNP per capita** \$381




**Military spending** \$61 million **Share of government budget** n/a

**Rank** n/a

## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) Presidential elections marred by restrictive candidacy rules and boycott, but legislative elections have been largely fair.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Traditionally independent, and likely to mutiny if pressured. French troops helped put down a mutiny over pay in 1993.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$2.496 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 48 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who ruled Cote d'Ivoire for 30 years, had been unchallenged until the late 1980s, when the economy began to falter. By 1990, international and domestic pressure had forced Houphouet-Boigny and his ruling Democratic Party (PDCI) to open up the political process. For the first time, legislative and municipal elections were contested. Still, opposition parties bitterly disputed Houphouet-Boigny's 1990 re-election as fraudulent and unsuccessfully called for new elections.

Houphouet-Boigny had not chosen a successor when he died in December 1993; however, a constitutional amendment provided for the speaker of the National Assembly, Henri Bedie, to assume the presidential duties. Rivals within the ruling party protested and called for the formation of a transitional government. Bedie was able to consolidate his power base and gain the support of the international community, thereby avoiding a possible military coup. Bedie continued to face not only internal power struggles within his party but also pressure from opposition groups, such as the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), that gained strength in the more open political atmosphere. While the media is dominated by government outlets, political debate has become robust, and election rules are being set by non-partisan bodies.

In 1995, the opposition boycotted and disrupted the presidential election that returned Bedie to another term, citing restrictive candidacy rules. However, after negotiations, the subsequent legislative elections were openly contested and deemed free and fair by international observers. While the PDCI took 150 National Assembly seats to the FPI's 25, violence prevented some areas from carrying out the vote. A supplemental election was held in December 1996 with the PDCI and FPI each taking 3 seats.

Serious human rights abuses, extra-judicial killings, and detentions still occur, often in relation to ethnic differences between security forces and the opposition. Violent crime in the larger cities is on the rise, and as a result the security forces have stepped up their use of lethal force. There is little separation between the judicial and executive sectors, guaranteeing little risk of penalty for government human rights abuses. The armed forces have become an independent power in many respects since Houphouet-Boigny's death, and they mutinied in 1993 over a lack of pay. French troops, 500 of whom are regularly assigned to assist the army, put down the mutiny.

Cote d'Ivoire has an agricultural economy that relies on two principal cash crops, cocoa and coffee, for its export revenue. It is the world's largest producer of cocoa and the fifth largest producer of coffee. Cote d'Ivoire's economy has progressively deteriorated since the 1980s when it was one of the strongest in West Africa, due to rising foreign debt, low export yields, unwise government investment, and corruption. An unpopular IMF structural adjustment program was implemented in 1991, and the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 increased economic hardship for Ivorians. As the standard of living declined served as an rallying issue for opposition groups, political unrest rose. In 1995 and 1996 the decline was arrested and growth of eight percent was registered, due to the selling off of government corporations and foreign investment in off-shore oil and gas fields.

# DJIBOUTI (Djibouti)



**Population** 400,000



**Size of armed forces** 8,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 19.4




**GNP per capita** \$250




**Military spending** \$25 million **Share of government budget** 12.8%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Election process did not provide meaningful representation of public opinion.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Aided by 3,300 French troops.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Substantial*) \$4.118 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 34 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** The Afars and the Issas have been in conflict with one another in this tiny country since independence from France in 1977. Until the early 1990s the Issas maintained a repressive political monopoly under the one-party rule of self-proclaimed President Hassan Gouled Aptidon and the ruling People's Rally for Progress. Confronted with growing civil agitation for regional autonomy by the Afar insurgent group, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), Gouled declared a series of measures meant to institute "reasonable multipartyism" in June 1992.

Although the constitution allowed for four political parties, only two were officially recognized by the government, the Issas-led Party for Democratic Renewal (PRD) and the Affars-led National Democratic Party (NDP), and then the NDP boycotted the December 1992 elections, claiming lack of access to the electoral process. FRUD, which is comprised largely of the Afars ethnic group, who make up roughly 35 percent of the population, also declined to take part in the 1992 elections. The boycott resulted in a 50 percent voter turnout, the PRD claiming all parliamentary seats, and Gouled's reelection as president for the fourth consecutive time. The next elections are scheduled to take place in 1999.

From 1991 to 1994 FRUD led an insurgency movement in the northern part of the country. The gov-

ernment responded by tripling the size of the armed forces, thus boosting military spending in 1993 to account for thirty five percent of the central government budget. Several attempts were made to resolve the conflict; the most recent is the December 1994 peace accord. The accord is quite vague and is riddled with inconsistencies. Moreover, it is not supported by all elements of FRUD. Those rejecting the accord believe it does not deal with the root causes of Afar concerns, which are: the demobilization of the government-recruited clan militia; constitutional changes to allow for extensive pluralism; administrative decentralization; and the revision of electoral lists. However, the peace is holding, and the government has recognized FRUD as a political party.

Constitutional and legislative changes have not significantly changed the distribution of political power in Djibouti, because President Gouled and the PRD have controlled this process. Consequently, rights guaranteed by the constitution remain limited in practice, and restrictions on the press and speech continue as well as arbitrary arrest and detention. Government and FRUD troops continue to commit human rights abuses, including detention, torture, and extra-judicial executions.

Situated on a volcanic desert, Djibouti has few natural resources. It is only able to provide three percent of its food requirements. The industrial sector is virtually nonexistent and the government is the largest employer. The unemployment rate for adult males living in the capital is 60 percent. Djibouti's major sources of income include the provision of services to the 12,000 expatriate residents, most of whom are French (including 3,300 French military personnel) and the operation of a seaport and airport.

# EGYPT (Cairo)



**Population** 61.1 million



**Size of armed forces** 430,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 7.0




**GNP per capita** \$689




**Military spending** \$1.742 billion **Share of government budget** 8.9%



## **Main ethnic groupings**



## **Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Tightly-controlled electoral process produces an effective one-party state.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) President is retired general and army preserves government.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) \$1.2 billion in annual military aid, co-production of weapons, joint exercises, 611 officers trained in the past five years. Received \$4.915 billion in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1996?** Yes. The Islamic Group continues to attacks foreigners (tourists), Egyptian Christians, government officials, and police personnel.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** President Hosni Mubarak and his party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) have a firm grip over the reigns of power at both the local and national levels. In 1993 Mubarak was re-elected unopposed to a third six-year term by the People's Assembly, which is a rubber-stamp body dominated by the NDP through a variety of anti-democratic elections practices. The major opposition parties have no real voice in the government, and those based on religious affiliation, like the popular Muslim Brotherhood (MB), are banned from organizing. In the 1995 elections, the NDP gained 71 percent of the seats with a 50 percent turnout, and nearly all the other seats went to independents rather than opposition leaders. The NDP controls the electoral process through party licensing, technical rules, the distribution of jobs, and the broadcast media. The low voter turnout reflects the belief of most Egyptians that elections are controlled by the government, and that the NDP will ensure its own triumph.

Although Mubarak has made cosmetic attempts at opening up the political process, real power remains in his hands and those of a small group of trusted advisors. The most vocal voice of opposition has come from Islamic movements, particularly the Islamic Group, a secretive organization that advocates the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt. The Islamic Group and other militant Islamic organizations have been responsible for brutal acts of violence against Egyptians and tourists, in an attempt to

destabilize the government. MB and other Islamist parties enjoy tremendous popularity in the rural south of the country and in the impoverished urban areas due to an increasing rich-poor gap blamed on the government. Mubarak has abandoned the human rights standards enshrined in Egyptian law, and is ruthlessly crushing not only militant Islamists, but also the main political opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, whose predominantly upper-middle-class membership includes prominent lawyers and doctors. Security forces have arrested several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and are holding them under emergency laws that allow the detention of suspected terrorists. In its attempt to limit the influence of Islamists, the government has also targeted unions and has enacted legislation to control union elections.

In December 1994 the government began to arrest and detain members of groups that previously existed without harassment. The Egyptian security forces utilize arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, torture, extrajudicial killings, the destruction of the homes of families where sons and husbands are suspected members of Islamist fundamentalist groups, and have even resorted to taking relatives hostage to force fugitives to surrender.

Freedom of the press is a constitutional provision, but it is limited by the government's power to license newspapers. Contrary to Egyptian officials claims that the Egyptian press is free, the government has been arresting, detaining, and harassing Egyptian and foreign journalists. One journalist, Sattar Abu Hussain was tried and sentenced by a military court for publishing information about the armed forces which had already been published in foreign newspapers. The television and radio media are more stringently controlled than the newspaper. Allegations of human rights abuses and sharp criticisms of the government are rarely broadcasted. The Egyptian courts, based on Napoleonic codes, are generally considered to be fair and independent of government coercion. However, the 1981 Emergency Law to deal with terrorist activities has curtailed rights by allowing all acts considered terrorist to be tried under military or state security courts. There have also been cases cited of government intimidation of defense and human rights attorneys.

Although Mubarak has been internationally praised and rewarded for continuing the Camp David peace process with Israel as well as backing the United States in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, these accomplishments do not translate into popular support at home. Egypt is riddled with a bloated and inept bureaucracy, widespread allegations of corruption, and entrenched cronyism. Despite domestic grumbling, Mubarak's regime is not in immediate danger because he still has the support of the 400,000-man army. However, fears of a reduction in the United States' \$ 1.2 billion annual military aid package and scarcity of some of the traditional benefits of being in the army, such as low-cost cars, are creating tensions within the military and security forces, particularly between the officers and enlisted men. Mubarak is lobbying for continued U.S. assistance by presenting the militant Islamists as a threat to the stability of the region.

Egypt has a mixed economy, with agriculture serving as the largest employer. Agriculture's contribution to export earnings have decreased from 60 percent in 1978 to 10 percent in 1990. This reduction is due in part to a rapid rise in the population. Self-sufficient in food during the early 1970s, Egypt now must import more than half of its food. Cotton, recognized world wide for its high quality, rice, and sugar cane are the major export crops. Egypt has significant oil and natural gas reserves, and the government is trying to stimulate non-oil exports and has begun to privatize and restructure public sector businesses.

# EQUATORIAL GUINEA (Malabo)



**Population** 400,000



**Size of armed forces** 1,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 2.4



**GNP per capita** \$274



**Military spending** \$2 million **Share of government budget** 7.5%



**Main ethnic groupings** Bioko, Rio-Muni

**Main religions** Largely Roman Catholic



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Elections rendered meaningless by fraud.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Preserves ruling regime.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$260,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 7 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** President Teodoro Obiang Nguema M'basogo came to power in 1979 by overthrowing his uncle, dictator Francisco Macias. As former vice-minister of defense and now ruler of the nation, Obiang dominates both military and civilian branches of government. He entrenched his power by declaring his Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) the sole legal party in 1986 and won an uncontested 1989 presidential election.

In response to international and domestic pressures, Obiang submitted a new constitution to a November 1991 National Referendum. Although the new constitution provides for a multiparty system, it preserves presidential powers, provides legal immunity to Obiang, and does not address protection against reported human rights abuses.

In both the 1991 and 1993 elections, PDGE overwhelmingly won by using violence, intimidation, and election fraud. Both elections were boycotted by the major opposition groups and resulted in voter turnout of less than 50 percent. Both U.S. and Spanish observers called the presidential elections fraudulent. Following the 1993 elections the opposition formed a coalition, Joint Opposition Platform (POC), which is appealing to the international community to apply trade sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Obiang to annul the election results. The pattern of abuse worsened during the February

1996 elections as international observers considered the elections that returned Obiang to power with 98 percent of the vote to be openly fraudulent. Security forces arrested and beat opposition leaders as they attempted to campaign, and all voting was done without a secret ballot. Opposition parties were allegedly barred from polling areas. Viewing the open corruptness, many opposition leaders chose to boycott the elections rather than lend them any credibility.

Obiang's security forces operate to preserve the PDGE, and regularly abuse basic human rights without fear of accountability. They have repeatedly stopped Severe Moto Nsa, the head of the POC, from leaving the country, and have jailed and intimidated other members of the opposition. In October 1994 several members of the ruling party and parliament resigned in protest over Obiang's obstruction of the political process and the government's abysmal human rights record. Political and other extrajudicial killings continue, and torture and cruel treatment is routinely used by security officers on prisoners. Additionally, the government has a poor record on upholding the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech and the press. Citizens and most journalists must practice self-censorship of political expression, because criticism of the government is viewed by the security apparatus to be tantamount to treason. No local newspapers exist, and foreign newspapers and magazines are not permitted. All news is reported through government controlled television and radio stations. The judiciary is not independent. All judges serve at the pleasure of the president, and corruption is rampant. In 1995 Moto was sentenced to a jail term for "libeling" the government.

The economy of Equatorial Guinea continues to move in a downward spiral. Most of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. The small monetary sector contains timber, petroleum, and declining cocoa industries. New oil deposits were found in 1995, offering some hope of an monetary sector. Government mismanagement and pervasive corruption thwart international investment and stifle the private sector. The government's failure to implement economic reforms resulted in the 1993 suspension of economic assistance from the International Monetary Fund. Most other donors have followed suit. The government has continued to resist reforms, and the economic decay has reached a point where barter now constitutes the principal form of business transaction.

# ERITREA (Asmara)



**Population** 3.6 million



**Size of armed forces** 55,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 15.3




**GNP per capita** n/a

**Rank** n/a

**Military spending** \$39 million **Share of government budget** n/a

**Rank** n/a

## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions

Muslims, Coptic Christians, Roman Catholics, Protestants



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Led by the army and party that won independence from Ethiopia, but preparing for 1997 elections.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Dominate government.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) \$660,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1995; 22 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1996?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Eritrea, Africa's newest nation, emerged from a 20-year civil war waged by Eritrean insurgents against the Ethiopian government. In May 1991, the Ethiopian army under President Mengistu Haile Mariam surrendered to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Eritreans, in a U.N.-supervised referendum, then voted for independence from Ethiopia. A transitional government was formed under the leadership of Assayas Aferworki, head of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), renamed in 1994 as the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). Although starting as a one-party state based on the army, Eritrea committed to developing a democratic government by 1996, but date that has now been postponed to late 1997 or early 1998.

Assayas continues to face the formidable challenge of turning a guerrilla movement into a functioning state. He has tried to quell discontent within the army over salaries by purging disgruntled officers, and he has established a national service program to help in the demobilization of ex-combatants. Initial progress towards political liberalization was slow. A PFDJ-dominated commission was charged with producing a constitution. A draft constitution was completed in July 1996, with its adoption scheduled for 1997 by an independent constitutional commission.

In the interim, there are no formal opposition groups, although Isaias has said that other parties will be

permitted. The most important unofficial opposition groups are: the Eritrean Liberation Front Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC), which campaigns for a multiparty system and has a national support base; the Eritrean Democratic Liberation Movement and ELF-Central Leadership, which are allied with the ELF-RC; the Sudanese-backed Eritrean Islamic Jihad, which has launched armed raids; and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) under the leadership of Abdullah Idriss. The ELF-RC has complained of exclusion from the constitutional review process, but members of its coalition did work with the constitutional commission.

Reports of human rights abuses have lessened since the war, and freedom of speech, press, and association are officially protected. The government has made a significant effort to reduce the size of the armed forces from the 95,000 at the end of the war to 55,000. While the police is generally responsible for internal security, the army can still be called in "times of internal disorder." One of its main missions has been to counter sporadic terrorist attacks from the Sudan-Based Eritrean Islamic Jihad. This mission is suspected to have expanded into a covert war against the Sudanese army itself. Ethiopia and Uganda are also reported to be fighting the Sudanese government in an undeclared conflict aided by the United States. The capture of Eritrean army captain Abdel-Gadir Ali Younis by the Sudanese army in May 1997 has lent some credibility to these speculations.

The judiciary is independent, and there have been no known incidences of executive interference with judicial matters. A lack of resources, however, make it difficult to dispense justice in a timely manner. There are no private newspapers and open debate is unusual. Isaias describes his system of governance as "controlled democracy." Some Western critics liken his regime to that of Singapore, and citizens challenge it at their peril. In 1994 the government took away citizenship from Jehovah's Witnesses for refusing to take part in military service.

Eritrea has been economically devastated by war, with agricultural production cut by 40 percent and over half the population dependent on food aid. The poverty level is very high, with a per capita income of less than \$150 a year. While there has been work to repair the infrastructure, most industries are inoperable, and transportation, communication, and other urban infrastructure have been demolished. Potential for economic growth lies in the service, fishery, and agriculture sectors. The government has reluctantly adopted free market strategies, enabling it to join the World Bank and receive \$50 million in loans and recovery credits in 1996. IMF and other international donor group decisions are still pending, and the government has been receiving assistance from some of the Persian Gulf states. The transitional government plans to promote a mixed economy by privatizing former Ethiopian government-owned industries, encouraging entrepreneurship, and subsidizing some necessities to meet its population's basic needs. However, the most pressing problem facing the new nation is feeding its population: half a million refugees are returning from Sudan.

# ETHIOPIA (Addis Ababa)



**Population** 54.3 million



**Size of armed forces** 120,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 2.2




**GNP per capita** \$91




**Military spending** \$128 million **Share of government budget** 9.1%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Multiparty elections boycotted by main opposition groups claiming limitations in election process.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) While attempts are being made to nationalize the military, the army is still primarily staffed with members of the Tigray People's Liberation Front, which led the military struggle that concluded in 1991, and dominates the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$2.140 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 37 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1996?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** In the 1970s and 1980s, Ethiopia was best known for its role as a Cold War pawn. First a U.S. ally under Emperor Haile Salassie, Stalinist dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam's forces took over in 1974. In the late 1970's, the United States and Soviet Union switched their alliances as the Soviets took Ethiopia while the U.S. allied with the Barre government in Somalia. The Cold War saw much super power-sanctioned political repression and a militarization of both the external and internal tensions in Ethiopia.

Decades of dictatorial rule and civil war came to an abrupt end when President Mengistu Haile Mariam fled to Zimbabwe in May 1991 and his army surrendered. A coalition of ethno-political organizations, under the leadership of the insurgent Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), established a transitional government headed by President Meles Zenawi. The government set up an interim quasi-legislative body composed of 4 constituent parties of the EPRDF. The transitional government was heavily influenced by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).

The EPRDF has been tackling the difficult problems of nation-building and restructuring a government in a country whose economy has been devastated by war, famine, and drought. A national conference was held in June 1991 with the participation of 20 political groups, and a total of fifty parties were

legalized. Elections were held in 1992 and 1994, but irregularities, cases of widespread detention and arrests, and even murder of government opponents, and the boycott of most major opposition parties showed that the election process was still in need of much reform.

The government has intensified efforts to create a national, apolitical army by demobilizing thousands of Tigrayan soldiers, and replacing them with recruits from other ethnic groups. Training programs to increase the professionalism of the troops have also been implemented. This attempt to create a more non-ethnic national system has been extended to the courts as well by training new criminal and civil judges, and by dismissing many older judges supposedly involved in judicial malfeasance.

In 1995, the transitional government created a new decentralized "ethnic federalist" system, giving greater control to the regional governments. Analysts saw this new experimental system as an attempt to preempt the kind of ethnic instability that has plagued Ethiopia and neighboring countries in the past. Nine regions were carved out, each of which would send representatives to the Federal Council whose primary function would be to oversee equality in these regions. Opposition political groups were vehemently opposed to this approach. They felt that it did nothing to truly change the process, and that the EPRDF would remain in control. The opposition therefore boycotted the elections, which paved the way for a EPRDF landslide victory. The United States and other foreign powers were involved in talks regarding the lack of representation of the large ethnic groups making up the opposition, but these talks failed to convince the opposition that the campaigning and elections would be fair.

Meles Zenawi, who had been president of the transitional government, became the prime minister. International observers claimed that other parties had access to the political process if they chose to participate, and the elections themselves were generally free and fair. Only groups who have not renounced violence, such as the Medhin, the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, and the Oromo Liberation Front were excluded from the political process.

Although Ethiopians are enjoying far greater freedom of expression than before the overthrow of Mengistu, there are still continuing problems in the area of human rights. The judicial system is weak, and thousands of officials and soldiers from the former government and the OLF have been jailed without trial. The government continues to harass journalists and some members of opposition parties. Scores of villages of the once-dominant Amharic ethnic group have been razed by ethnic opponents. While the new federal regions have indeed shifted power from federal to local authorities, it has created additional problems for the federal government to protect the constitutional rights of its citizens. Local administrative, police, and judicial systems remain weak, and the security forces are still known to be committing human rights abuses.

The economy is in transition from a highly-centralized, state-owned system to a market-oriented system. Some 80 percent of the population is engaged in smallholder agriculture. Coffee is the main export, accounting for 60 percent of all goods shipped overseas. Ethiopia is receiving international support for its economic reform program designed to liberalize the economy and balance the budget. The World Bank recently released statements praising Ethiopia for its liberalization of the economy, cuts in defense expenditures to two percent of their GDP and the elimination of export taxes. Ethiopia's real economic growth for 1996 was seven percent.

# GABON (Libreville)



**Population** 1.1 million



**Size of armed forces** 6,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 5.3



**GNP per capita** \$2,884



**Military spending** \$93 million **Share of government budget** 8.6%



## Main ethnic groupings



40 different ethnic groups

Four major groups:  
Fang, Eshira, Bapounou and Bateke

## Main religions



Other (including Muslims & Animists) 25-45%

Christians 55-75%



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) Military-dominated government functioned as a one-party state until 1996 elections. Opposition victories in municipal elections provide positive sign of democratic transition. Elections dominated by ruling Parti Democratique Gabonais were marred by violence and fraud perpetrated by security forces.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Maintains ruling party.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) \$421,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 9 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1996?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** President Omar Bongo has ruled Gabon for 26 consecutive years, during which he has been re-elected twice for seven-year terms in uncontested elections. Public protest and discontent in 1989 led Bongo to formulate a new constitution, which provided for basic freedoms and the abolition of the one-party state. However, these promises remained unfulfilled in practice, and until 1996 Gabon remained an effective one-party state backed by the armed forces.

The ruling Gabonese Democratic Party, renamed the Parti Democratique Gabonais (PDG), won a majority of the seats in the 1990 multiparty legislative elections. In the 1993 presidential elections, Bongo prevailed with 51 percent of the vote. International observers found administrative chaos and elections irregularities. However, they stopped short of charging outright election fraud. The opposition coalition, the Convention of Forces for Change, headed by Paul Abessole, refused to recognize Bongo's victory, despite the constitutional court's validation of the election results.

The opposition set up a parallel government, which had a series of bloody clashes with the Government in 1994. During one encounter, the Presidential Guard destroyed the only opposition-run radio station. Gabon's security forces have a history of significant human rights abuses. The Government

has repeatedly used the well-equipped Presidential Guard during the political crisis, resulting in a number of extrajudicial killings and the mistreatment of detainees. In accordance with the Paris accords, the National Assembly reassigned authority over all security forces from the Ministry of Defense to the civilian Ministry of the Interior. In 1995, there were no reports of the use of undue force by security forces.

The political impasse between the opposition coalition and the government was resolved by the 1994 Paris Accords, which gave the opposition six slots in the 27-member cabinet and created a non-partisan electoral commission. The economic hardship brought on by the 1994 devaluation of the CFA currency pushed more opposition groups to join the opposition coalition. In a fair and free 1995 referendum, with opposition monitoring of results, 96 percent of voters approved the Paris reforms, pointing the way to the establishment of a National Election Commission (NEC) and municipal and national elections which were held in October and December 1996 respectively. Despite poor organizing, opposition groups won most of the municipal council seats during voting in October and November. This trend, however, was reversed in the December National Assembly elections, as the PDG Bongo took 85 out of the 120 seats, and in the January/February Senate elections where the PDG took 52 out of 91 seats. Opposition parties claimed massive fraud by the military and NEC in insuring the PDG's victory.

The legal system works on a presumption of guilt. The courts are divided into civilian, military and a relatively new "state security" court established in 1990. While civilian criminal courts tend to be fair and public, the ad hoc nature of the state security court gives great leeway for government manipulation and misuse. Freedom of speech is openly practiced, and opposition newspapers exist. The government has control of all electronic media, and occasionally censors international print media.

Gabon's economy is dependent on petroleum exports, and it is the third largest producer of oil in Sub-Saharan Africa. This makes the economy very vulnerable to price fluctuations in the world oil market. Low oil prices in the 1980s plunged Gabon into debt and forced Bongo, in 1991, to implement limited austerity programs to meet IMF standards. The government advocates a mixed economy and encourages entrepreneurship. Gabon also is endowed with rich natural resources, such as manganese, uranium, and timber. These vast resources, if matched with a stable currency and political scene, could attract foreign investors to Gabon.

# THE GAMBIA (Banjul)



**Population** 1 million



**Size of armed forces** 1,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.0




**GNP per capita** \$385




**Military spending** \$14 million **Share of government budget** 18.7%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Armed forces have run government since 1994 coup d'etat.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Armed forces control government.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) Lt. Jammeh received military training in the U.S. before he seized power in the coup d'etat in 1994. \$1.887 million in U.S. arms sales, 1991-1995; 34 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Until the 1994 military coup, Gambia had enjoyed a long history of political stability. The country was governed by a bicameral parliament and a president, both elected every five years. President Jawara, who has ruled the nation since its independence, was re-elected in 1992. His ruling party, the Progressive People's Party (PPD) won a majority of the 36 seats in parliament after legislative elections against opposition and independent candidates.

Jawara had steadfastly held onto his presidency despite a coup attempt in 1982 and numerous government scandals. However, by 1994, Jawara's popularity had plummeted due to wide-spread corruption, the devaluation of the CFA currency, and the implementation of an IMF/ World Bank structural adjustment program. This dissatisfaction spilled over into the armed forces. On July 22, 1994, Gambia's democratic traditions were shattered with a bloodless military coup staged by four Gambian National Army lieutenants.

The new government is called the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), and it is headed by 29 year-old Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh. The coup leaders explained their actions as an attempt to eradicate government corruption and mismanagement, and vowed to improve living stan-

dards. However, the coup soon began to resemble a simple military grab for power, as Lt. Jammeh: suspended the constitution; detained without charge dissident officers in the police and armed forces; abolished political parties, publications, and activities; harassed the press; and transferred the assets of senior officials and prohibited them from traveling. The initial anti-corruption rhetoric ceased, and many of the Ministers removed earlier were reinstated.

International reaction to the coup was reserved. Senegal, unlike during a 1982 coup attempt, did not intervene militarily, due in large part to the scrapping in 1989 of the Senegambian Conference by President Jawara. In response, the United States suspended economic and security assistance. Domestic reaction to the coup was also initially muted, but as the economy, especially the tourist industry, began to falter, Gambians became more vocal in their opposition.

The AFPRC published a timetable for the return to democratic rule in December 1998. Jammeh gave notice of his intent to remain in the political arena, and started a military party called the 22 July Movement. Due to increasing domestic and international pressure, he revised the date to July 1996. Presidential elections were held in September 1996 and Yahya Jammeh's defeated his closest rival, maintaining the presidency. The Carter Center is questioning the fairness of the vote because main opposition parties were banned, the press was muzzled, meetings were prohibited between rival candidates and foreign diplomats, and the AFPRC used soldiers to attack opposition rallies. There were several irregularities reported. Observers noticed voters were calm, which suggested coercion by soldiers and intelligence agents. Amnesty International decried the many reports of military violence and intimidation in the September elections, and called upon the government to allow free opposition participation in the January 1997 legislative elections. Nevertheless, the APRC won the National Assembly elections with 52.1 percent of the vote, giving it 33 out of the 45 seats.

While the Gambian constitution calls for an independent judiciary, the AFPRC has exempted itself and all its decrees from judicial oversight. Therefore AFPRC military and government officials are completely unaccountable for their actions. Rights of the accused are virtually non-existent, and there are documented cases of serious government corruption and intimidation. The AFPRC has significantly curtailed freedom of speech and the press.

Gambia is an agricultural society, with nearly 85 percent of the population living in the rural areas. Export earnings are derived from rice millet, maize, and especially groundnuts, which is the main export crop. The private industrial sector is comprised of fisheries, horticulture, and tourism.

The coup has thrown the Gambian economy into a tailspin. As a result of the coup, Gambia saw a significant decline in business confidence and donor support. The economy suffered from capital flight, as many businesses relocated to more stable countries, such as Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. Economic growth, which stood at five percent in 1994, fell to zero shortly after the coup. Trade, tourism, and the manufacturing sector, which employs 20% of paid employment, lost 15,000 jobs.

# GHANA (Accra)



**Population** 17.2 million



**Size of armed forces** 7,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 0.4




**GNP per capita** \$309




**Military spending** \$41 million **Share of government budget** 3.6%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) 1996 elections returned the ruling party to power, but independent observers called them free and fair. Opposition parties did participate, and high voter turnout indicates a fair sample of electorate. However, this is Rawlings' final term as mandated by the constitution, and his commitment to the democratic process is questionable.



**Political and economic power of the armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) With former officer ruling for 15 years. Since the 1992 elections, the armed forces have taken a lower profile, but remain a potent actor behind the scenes.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$2.03 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1996; 88 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Since independence in 1957, Ghana has vacillated between military and civilian rule. At present, it occupies an uncertain position between the two poles. Jerry Rawlings has dominated the political landscape since his coup, as a junior Flight Lieutenant, in 1979, which forestalled a scheduled return to civilian power. The tenure of his first government, the populist Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, was brief, as it handed over power to Dr. Hilla Limann of the People's National Party (PNP), who had won the previous presidential election. The armed forces sat on the sidelines as the economy slid into disarray, until Rawlings seized power for the second time in 1981.

Rawlings' new government, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), suspended the constitution and banned political parties. For ten years the PNDC held a monopoly on power, overseeing the executive branch, national, regional and district offices, the armed and security forces, and the judiciary. Increasing domestic pressure due to adverse economic conditions, pervasive fraud and corruption, human rights abuses, as well as Western donors' decision to link aid with democracy, forced the PNDC to open the political process. In 1992, the government legalized opposition parties, repealed the newspaper licensing law, and revoked laws permitting the detention of individuals who "threaten

national security.”

The 1992 multiparty presidential elections did not alter the distribution of power. Under the watchful eye of international observers, Rawlings secured 60 percent of the vote to become the president of Ghana's Fourth Republic. The opposition, claiming widespread vote-rigging and intimidation, boycotted the subsequent parliamentary elections, allowing the PNDC to claim all the contested seats. Although police had to enforce curfews to quell violent eruptions in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections, the armed forces remained in their barracks. Since then the armed forces have focused their military efforts on participating in a number of regional peacekeeping efforts. The 1996 elections returned Rawlings to the presidency with 57.4 percent of the vote with an estimated 77.8 percent voter turnout. Ghamalet, a non-governmental human rights organization that observed the elections called them generally free and fair with a few problems to be corrected in the next cycle. Opposition parties did participate with John Kufor of the Great Alliance NPP/PCP party gaining 39.6 percent of the vote. According to the constitution, this will be Rawlings' last four-year term.

The 1993 constitution provides for checks and balances between the executive branch, the judicial branch, and the unicameral parliament. There has been a marked decrease in human rights abuses, due to both the Constitution's inclusion of strong provisions in support of human rights and to the independent power of the courts. The new government has not actively suppressed freedom of speech, but its control over the print and electronic media limits the opposition's rights. Despite Ghana's active independent press, criminal libel laws make many journalists practice self-censorship.

Although the armed forces have taken a lower political profile in recent years, the return to constitutional government has not substantially weakened their grip over the government. Top layers of the military and public service bureaucracies are still filled with senior officers, and all parties are well aware of the armed forces' willingness to step in again if they find their interests threatened.

After independence Ghana enjoyed a higher standard of living than most of its neighbors, due to high producer prices for exports of cocoa, gold, timber. Years of overspending, corruption, and falling world cocoa prices brought Ghana to the brink of economic disaster in the early 1980s. In 1983 Ghana, under the direction of the World Bank and IMF, implemented an economic recovery program. Initially, the population suffered under the restructuring program, but the economy eventually stabilized, and then achieved growth measured at a sound 4.5 percent annual rate.

# GUINEA (Conakry)



**Population** 6.4 million



**Size of armed forces** 12,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.9




**GNP per capita** \$513




**Military spending** \$50 million **Share of government budget** 7%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Questionable election procedures and irregularities marred the multiparty presidential and legislative elections.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) The president was the former head of the previous military regime, and the armed forces remain an independent power.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$1.519 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 32 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Guinea began its transition from military to democratic rule in 1990, but it has yet to complete it. In 1990 the military government bowed to citizen pressure and approved a new constitution. In 1991 a Transitional Committee for National Recovery replaced the ruling Military Council with a civilian cabinet. Independent newspapers were legalized in 1992, and a Supreme Court was instituted as the highest level of appeals. The 1993 presidential elections, with over 40 political parties participating, brought to a formal end the nine-year military regime of Lansana Conte. General Conte had seized power in 1984 from Guinea's first president, Sekou Toure, as he lay on his deathbed.

The election did not bring about sweeping political changes, as the power brokers effectively traded their uniforms for business suits: Conte was elected president with 60 percent of the vote, more than all the candidates of the other 41 participating political parties combined. Conte's overwhelming victory had less to do with his popularity than with the Government's failure to insure the integrity of the election. The Government refused to form an independent national electoral commission, thus making it impossible to evaluate numerous election irregularities. In addition, Conte divided the opposition by reversing the order of the election: the presidential elections were held before the legislative election. This tactic prevented the opposition from backing a single candidate who had secured

the highest number of seats in the national assembly.

Conte immediately began working to improve his party's chances for success in the parliamentary elections. Without the consent of the electoral commission, he decided to disenfranchise all nationals outside of Guinea. This accounts for 3 million people, a large portion of the opposition's power base. International observers found that the process in the 1995 legislative elections did not permit a true challenge from opposition parties. Guineans seemed to affirm that judgment, as only 30 percent of eligible voters turned out. While calling the process a farce, major opposition parties did take their seats in parliament.

Despite formal legal protections, human rights are frequently abused by the armed forces and the police. Government security forces intimidate the opposition by preventing and halting meetings. Citizens' limited access to legal resources makes arbitrary arrest and detention a persistent threat. Although there are constitutional provisions for freedom of the press, they are circumscribed by a press law that gives the government broad power to restrict unfavorable press.

As president, Conte does not have the full support of his former colleagues in the armed forces. A cross-section of military personnel who are displeased with his leadership style wrote him a stiff letter in June 1993, putting him on notice not to ignore their interests. The President has control of the militarily autonomous Red Berets. In 1996, 2000 soldiers mutinied, protesting low salaries. The mutiny evolved into an attempted coup d'etat that nearly toppled the government. 30-50 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Conte responded by firing his Minister of Defense and appointing himself minister. Shortly thereafter, he appointed a new Prime Minister and government. The almost total lack of accountability of every armed forces branch has led to intense corruption and frequent human rights abuses among soldiers and officers alike.

Over eighty percent of Guineans are engaged in subsistence agriculture. The country's major exports include bauxite, gold, and diamonds. IMF austerity programs implemented by Guinean officials have failed to promote growth, and have drastically increased unemployment, especially in the public sector, and have exacerbated the already serious problem of corruption.

# GUINEA-BISSAU (Bissau)



**Population** 1.1 million



**Size of armed forces** 7,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 6.4




**GNP per capita** \$218




**Military spending** \$8 million **Share of government budget** 8.2%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) Multi-party parliamentary system started in 1991, with former one-party ruler still holding power. Government harassment of opposition and control of media hold back transition to full democracy.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) They remain a political force, and some high-ranking officers launched an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1993.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$2.143 million in U.S. arms transfers between 1991-1995; 30 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Guinea-Bissau's transition toward democracy has been peaceful, and shows promise of being completed during this decade. The first steps in the process came in negotiations in April 1990 between the military-backed government and the Bafata Resistance Movement, which had hinted at the possibility of civil war if political reforms were not made. Shortly after this meeting, President Joao Bernardo Vieira of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which arose from the struggle for independence and had ruled for 15 years, approved the introduction of a multi-party political system.

Opposition political parties were permitted under the 1991 multiparty constitution, and they formed a coalition, the Democratic Forum, that successfully pressured the government to establish a multiparty commission to organize and oversee the transition. Multiparty elections were set for November 1992, but were postponed three times due to such problems as a disagreement over the sequence of presidential and legislative elections, a failed coup attempt, and technical election difficulties. The World Bank and IMF along with Western governments then added pressure on Vieira's military government to transition to democracy. Finally, in July and August 1994, legislative and presidential elections were held. Vieira won by a narrow margin, with 52 percent of the vote, while his PAIGC party did even better, capturing 62 out of 100 parliamentary seats. The opposition did poorly in large part because it

failed to develop a unified position based on popular needs, particularly in the countryside.

Guinea Bissau's human rights record is improving, but the police force, the main body charged with internal security, continues to engage in arbitrary detention and occasional harassment of opposition party members. A poorly paid, poorly trained judiciary is very susceptible to corruption and government manipulation. Freedom of the press is circumscribed by the government's ownership of electronic media. Although there are two independent newspapers, journalists practice self-censorship.

Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world. Its per-capita income is \$200 a year. Nearly 75 percent of the rural population lives in poverty. Although only 30 percent of arable land is cultivated, agriculture accounts for 80 percent of export revenue and 20 percent of gross domestic product. The main export products are palm oil, cashews, groundnuts, and cotton. Oil and phosphate production have been rising. The fishing industry's potential has not been fully realized, and foreign fishers regularly poach Guinea-Bissau's fishing resources representing an annual loss of \$25 million.

Guinea-Bissau has undergone two structural readjustment programs encouraged jointly by the World Bank and IMF involving several currency devaluations, tax reform, and privatization of public enterprises. The economy has been growing steadily, due in part to an increasingly dynamic private sector. Despite this achievement, there are long-term structural constraints on the economy, such as heavy debt and insufficient tax revenue.

# KENYA (Nairobi)



**Population** 28.2 million



**Size of armed forces** 22,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 0.8




**GNP per capita** \$232




**Military spending** \$138million **Share of government budget** 6.7%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Recent multiparty system is dominated by former single-party ruler through state control of government and intimidation.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Army officer corps is dominated by Moi's Kalenjin ethnic group, and is increasingly involved in causing or allowing a significant clamping down on opposition. Military chief is ultra loyalist to KANU and holds extensive business holdings.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) During 1980s, U.S. aided armed forces in return for base rights at port of Mombassa. \$14.337 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995, 210 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Although Kenya has formally made a transition in the early 1990s from a one-party state to a multiparty system, in reality the country continues to be dominated by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party of President Daniel Moi through the centralization and abuse of government power. In 1991 widespread dissatisfaction with human rights abuses and the government's lack of fiscal accountability caused domestic unrest and the suspension of \$1 billion of World Bank and bilateral aid. Moi responded promptly by repealing a 1982 constitutional amendment barring a multiparty system, releasing prominent political prisoners, and stopping the practice of holding critics in indefinite detention.

Despite these reforms, human rights violations became even more prevalent in 1992. Government forces were accused of fueling ethnic violence in order to inhibit opposition activity, as clashes erupted in the Rift Valley region between the ruling minority ethnic group, the Kalenjin, and the Kikuyu and Luos people. Over 150,000 people were displaced and 1,000 killed during disputes over land tenure.

Multiparty elections were held in December 1992 with Moi and KANU with taking one-third of the vote. Because a plurality system was used for the presidency, Moi was elected president without a

runoff, and through the drawing of election lines KANU also took two-thirds of the seats in parliament. International and domestic monitors reported serious flaws at every stage of the election process, but the election was seen by the donor community as an important step forward. The polling, in which the divided opposition received two-thirds of the vote, was a generally accurate reflection of public opinion. The opposition protested the election results, charging the government with election fraud and voter intimidation. Although many of the opposition's claims were credible, the root cause of its defeat lay with its inability to transcend ethnic differences and unite behind a single candidate and party.

In 1993, after initial positive steps on human rights, governance, corruption, and economic reforms, international aid was resumed to Kenya. However, these political and economic reforms did not continue, as public officials continue to lack accountability and Moi used the machinery of government to control political allegiance and violence to repress critics. Africa Watch concluded that the Moi government used the president's ethnic group, the Kalenjin, to destabilize areas where the opposition could gain a base of political support. As a result, the Rift valley, holding the largest number of seats in parliament, has been transformed into a Kalenjin land-owning area. By their inaction, the armed forces and police have effectively sanctioned vigilante violence favoring Moi and KANU.

The senior army officers are becoming more and more under the direct control of Moi's Kalenjin clan, and are becoming more and more aggressive in clamping down on anti-KANU opposition. The Chief of the General Staff, Mahmoud H. Mohammed, controls extensive business interests in Kenya and is considered a political kingpin in the military and an ultra loyalist to KANU.

Moi and his party continue to dominate the political process, controlling, and demanding personal loyalty from, the bureaucracy of the civil service and universities, and from all provincial, district, and local governance systems. Constitutional protections for freedom of speech, press, association, assembly, and fair trial are often undercut by government action. Access to media and press is limited, arrests on charges of rumor-mongering, sedition, and incitement of violence are common for members of opposition groups and the press. Since the government controls the electronic media, the opposition is not accorded equal access. However, there is greater diversity of opinion in the print media, but few outside the cities read the papers.

While another round of elections are due in 1997, many opposition groups have given up on defeating KANU under the current electoral format. Kenneth Matiba, the man who ran second to Moi in the 1992 elections, is asking instead for a constitutional conference to reform the process.

Kenya has a strong agricultural sector, which exports cash crops such as tea and coffee and provides enough food for domestic consumption. The private sector is very vibrant in trade and light manufactured goods. Tourism stands out as the major earner of foreign currency. Poverty continues to be high as the annual Gross Domestic Product per capita is \$270. Challenges to economic growth are extensive government corruption, unpredictable exchange rates and an inadequate infrastructure.

# LESOTHO (Maseru)



**Population** 1.9 million



**Size of armed forces** 2,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.0




**GNP per capita** \$695




**Military spending** \$26 million **Share of government budget** 6.4%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) Fair multiparty electoral process threatened by independent military power.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Mutinied in 1994 and remain a separate power.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Minimal*) \$200,000 in U.S. arms transfers in 1991-1995; 32 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** The political atmosphere in Lesotho has substantially changed in recent years due to the three-way power struggle between monarchists who want King Letsie III, the son of King Moshoeshe II (who died in 1996) to rule, military officers who want to continue their traditional strong influence, and political parties who are trying to strengthen representative democracy. The transition from a military to a civilian government began in 1991 under the Military Council and its administrative staff. Political activity was vigorous in 1992 as fourteen parties campaigned for elections, and in 1993, after 23 years of autocratic rule either by the monarchy or the military, Lesotho held multiparty elections.

The Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), led by Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle, triumphed in a landslide, winning all the seats in parliament. The armed forces (the Lesotho Defense Force, or LDF), were initially supportive of the democratic process, but some factions concerned with their dwindling power staged a mutiny in January 1994. At first the mutiny was seen as a dispute over army salaries, but a closer look revealed that it was also a struggle between competing army factions. Monarchist officers who are members of the opposition Basuto National Party (BNP) and support the return of the king were pitted against loyalists who support Mokhehle's government.

King Letsie III suspended the Parliament and parts of the Constitution from August to September 1994. Letsie's decree was not permitted by the Constitution, but it was still approved by the High Court's chief justice. He demanded the return of his father, King Moshoeshoe II, who had been ousted and exiled by the previous military regime. As a result of national and international pressure, the constitutional crisis ended with an agreement between the king and Prime Minister Mokhele to return Moshoeshoe to the ceremonial throne and return to constitutional rule.

In June 1997, Prime Minister Mokhehle surprisingly left the BCP, formed his own party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and announced that the LCD would be in power until the scheduled January 1998 elections. Opposition parties including the BCP announced a civil disobedience campaign coupled with a series of strikes aimed to cripple Mokhehle's government. Mokhehle claimed that the BCP was not able to reach their objectives because it was formed not for ruling, but in the liberation struggle against Great Britain. Opposition parties claim that this is nothing but a usurpation of power from the people who elected the BCP, and that Mokhehle was angry because he had been replaced as the head of the BCP.

The LDF and the Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP) supported King Letsie, and were responsible for extra-judicial killings and arbitrary detentions in 1994 that have not been punished. These two forces and the national security police take orders from a combined Defense Commission that operated largely independent of civilian control. In 1996, a concerted effort from the government was made to bring the military under greater civilian control. Thus far, the attempt seems to have been successful. The LDF and LMP now answer to the Prime Minister, and the National Security Service (NSS) answers to the Minister of Home Affairs. Since the transition, reports of human rights abuses have been isolated. The armed forces did become involved in an internal struggle in February 1997 by putting down an 11-day police mutiny that had paralysed the country.

Although freedom of speech and the press are included in the constitution, with the suspension of the constitution, security forces were able to force the official media to adopt an anti-government tone. Independent journalists, intimidated by security forces, still practice self-censorship. The courts are constitutionally independent, but the primary courts, the magistrates, are particularly vulnerable to government and local leadership influence.

Lesotho is economically dependent on South Africa, since it is landlocked and relies on remittances from its workers there. One-third of the male population is employed in South African mines, accounting for 40 percent of the country's GNP. Only 10 percent of its land is suitable for agriculture, making Lesotho a net importer of food. Very few private industries exist in Lesotho. The agro-industry and agri-business sectors are dominated by state-owned organizations. Major issues facing the new government are job creation and expansion of social services.

# LIBERIA (Monrovia)



**Population** 3 million



**Size of armed forces** 5,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.7




**GNP per capita** \$480




**Military spending** \$30 million **Share of government budget** n/a

**Rank** n/a

## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 4 (*Dissolving*) Warlords vying for power have destroyed the government's ability to function. Outside assistance has proved unable to help cease the fighting, and warlords are now having increasing difficulty controlling their own troops.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) There is no single armed force, but rather a variety of armies that control areas of the country, including a regional (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force and a number of armed militias.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) U.S. was the primary funder of Doe and his armed forces giving the government \$41.8 million in Military Assistance Program Grants and \$17.7 million in Foreign Military Financing during the 1980s. Congress cut off aid in 1990 and President Bush withdrew U.S. military advisors and other support when Doe's government appeared doomed.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Liberia is the closest thing to an African colony to the United States that exists. Settled by freed slaves in 1827, Liberia became the first black republic in Africa and the second only to Haiti in the world. Modern Liberia is a country ravaged by decades of dictatorship and seven years of civil war. Internal hostilities, owed much to the disparities in wealth and freedom between Amerigo-Liberians and the indigenous population, exploded in 1989 when Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, backed by many outside powers, overthrew the ruthless regime of President Samuel Doe. The U.S.-backed Doe had come to power as a Master Sergeant in 1980 in a bloody coup aided by gratuitous executions. He received U.S. military aid throughout the decade, in part because he allowed the former U.S. colony to continue to act as a CIA coordinating center for Africa.

After Taylor seized power and had Doe executed, violence continued as other factions sought to displace Taylor. Alarmed by the chaos, the nations in the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) intervened in 1990. These nations, consisting of Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Mali, deployed a peace-keeping force, ECOMOG, to regain control, but Liberia plummeted

deeper into a state of anarchy. ECOMOG installed an interim government, but Taylor declared war on it, and ECOMOG has been unable to quell the violence or enforce disarmament either inside or outside the capital, Monrovia. In 1996 U.S. armed forces deployed to the capital to evacuate American citizens, and fought with various factions to protect the evacuation.

Numerous peace treaties have been made and broken by the various warring factions. The 1994 Akosombo accord proposed that a five-person State Council run the government, work with the peacekeeping forces to supervise demobilization, and prepare for the November 1995 elections. Fundamental flaws in the accord made it unworkable. It gave political roles to only three factional groups: The National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor; The United Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO); and The Armed Forces of Liberia, who are supporters of former president Doe. These groups do not contain all the important sources of military power, and the interim government opposed the accord for giving too much power to unrepresentative military factions. A similar fate befell a 1995 cease-fire agreement that pointed to elections in 1996, because renewed combat in 1996 led the United States to evacuate its embassy. Another demobilization agreement has been agreed to, but factions continue to block aid to civilians and fight among themselves – with civilians caught in the crossfire.

Liberia is a country in anarchy, where human rights abuses abound. Every factional group including ECOMOG is guilty of indiscriminate killings and wanton acts of destruction. Over 150,000 people, out of a population of 3 million, have perished in this war, and an estimated 2 million have fled across borders or have been internally displaced. Approximately 800,000 of these people have sought refuge under the protection of ECOMOG in Monrovia.

The dissolution of order is so great that not even the warlords can control their increasingly younger base of “soldiers.” The desperation for order was proven in August 1996 as Liberia’s warlords met with ECOMOG states in Nigeria. Despite their continued bitter disagreements over many central issues, all sides agreed that Ms. Ruth Perry should become the Council of State, the title for Liberia’s chief executive. Ms. Perry has accepted, becoming the first woman head of any African nation in the modern era. The United Nations has proposed measures aimed at establishing a credible political framework for elections in May 1998. The obstacles, however, remain formidable.

Liberia’s major exports were iron ore, rubber, timber, diamonds, and gold. Endowed with fertile land, Liberia once had the capacity to feed its people. But the war has destroyed Liberia’s economy, making its people totally dependent upon food and medical supplies from international aid agencies. Continual factional fighting has curtailed relief assistance outside of Monrovia. Unemployment now stands at 95 percent. In 1994, the UN withdrew all its workers to the capital, and the flow of refugees led to a poorly-functioning sanitation system, power cuts, and water shortages.

# LIBYA (Tripoli)



**Population** 5.1 million



**Size of armed forces** 80,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 15.8




**GNP per capita** \$6,506




**Military spending** \$1.399 billion **Share of government budget** 8.3%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Ruled by Gen. Qadhafi and his Arab Socialist Union through the armed forces and local pro-Qadhafi councils.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Deeply involved in controlling the country with Gen. Qadhafi.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 4 (*Adversarial*) In 1986 the U.S. attacked Libya in retaliation for its suspected involvement in bombing of U.S. military personnel, and the CIA has reportedly organized groups to overthrow the government.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes, organized armed opposition, possibly foreign-funded, active in parts of the country.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** General Muammar Al-Qadhafi has ruled Libya with an “iron fist” for nearly three decades after taking power in an army coup in 1969. He has established a political structure that draws upon Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic ideologies to create a system of rule through local councils called Revolutionary or People’s Communities. Qadhafi, in his self-written political bible The Green Book, claims that his new system of government ended “all conventional forms of government — authoritarian, family, tribal, factional, class, parliamentary partisan or party coalition” and replaced them with “direct democracy” and “people’s power.” In reality, the People’s Committees function as an extension of Qadhafi’s power, and simply rubber-stamp his policies. All political parties are prohibited, and major government decisions, appointments, and laws are made by Qadhafi and his close associates in the armed forces.

After a military fiasco in its war with Chad in 1987, Libya engaged on a tremendous military buildup in the early 1990s, using their tremendous oil wealth to purchase sophisticated military hardware from the Soviet Union, France, Italy, West Germany and Eastern Europe. While spending has declined significantly, the size and strength of the military in Libya remain formidable.

The human rights situation has always been grim, but after a 1993 coup attempt by a faction of Army officers, the situation worsened: thousands of people were detained and dozens have died in jail. Libyan law makes it a crime, punishable by death, for any person to associate with a group that opposes the principles of the "revolution." Libyan law also permits security forces to hold detainees incommunicado for an unlimited period without being charged. It has been reported that torture is used both during interrogations and as a form of punishment. The security network is so extensive that it is able to monitor the activities of, and launch deadly attacks on, individuals at home and abroad. The government is believed to be holding 400 to 500 political prisoners.

Freedom of speech and the press is practically non-existent. There is little tolerance for dissenting opinions in People's Committee meetings and at the General People's Congress, and it is obviously dangerous to speak out against Qadhafi and his regime. Since there is no independent media, all publications reflect the opinion of the government. When media criticism of the government does appear, it is actually an attempt by the government to prepare public opinion for a new direction in policy. The judicial system is completely under the government's control. Lawyers are not allowed to practice unless they are members of the government's Secretariat of Justice. Even so, Qadhafi has often circumvented the legal process by encouraging extrajudicial action from his security forces against suspected opposition.

Libya has become isolated internationally due to its apparent role in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 in retaliation for the accidental U.S. downing of an Iranian commercial flight. Qadhafi's refusal to hand over two intelligence officers implicated in the case has resulted in a 1992 U.N. Security Council order that has embargoed most goods and services other than oil (Italy and Germany, who buy 750,000 barrels per day, opposed an oil ban). The embargo has created problems, but it has not crippled Libya's economy. Embargoed goods and spare aircraft parts continue to flow across its borders, due in part to Egypt's support. Egypt rationalizes its support as necessary to prevent Libya from falling into the hands of Islamist extremists who might use Libya's oil wealth to support Islamic revolutions throughout the region.

Libya's economy revolves around petroleum, and 95 percent of its hard currency is derived from oil sales. Years of vacillating world crude prices have caused Libya's economy to shrink drastically. By 1993 crude sales brought only \$8 billion to Libya, about one-third the level of the 1970s. Detailed economic data are non-existent, but Libyan officials have acknowledged a "bad phase" in the economy.

# MADAGASCAR (Antananarivo)



**Population** 13.4 million



**Size of armed forces** 21,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.6



**GNP per capita** \$200




**Military spending** \$24 million **Share of government budget** 4.2%



## Main ethnic groupings

Two dominant groups: "highlanders" of Malayo-Indonesian origin, and "coastal" groups of mixed African, Arab, and Malayo-Indonesian ancestry

## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) In the 1990s Madagascar made a rapid transition from a one-party state to a multiparty system, and then equally rapidly entered a period of governmental crisis brought on by World Bank and IMF pressure.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) The armed forces have stayed apolitical throughout the turbulent economic and political crises, and did not react when the armed forces were reduced in size.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) \$648,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 25 officers trained.



**Civil conflict in 1990s?** No, mass protests, largely peaceful, led to the transition.  
**Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No, difficult political disputes have been non-violent.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** President Didier Ratsiraka and his Supreme Revolutionary Council ruled Madagascar for 16 years as a socialist state, relying heavily upon the support of the Soviet Union. In 1990, the opposition, traditionally fragmented, regrouped under the coalition group, Forces Vives, and organized a series of mass general strikes that paralyzed the economy and resulted in the creation of a national transitional government under Prime Minister Guy Ratzanansy and a plan for multiparty elections.

In 1993, after fair and free elections, Albert Zafy, leader of Forces Vives, was elected president, and Francisque Ravony was selected Prime Minister by the National Assembly. The initial public euphoria over the changing political order dissolved quickly due to the government's failure to improve the economy. The government was deeply divided over the pace and scope of an economic restructuring program. While the World Bank and IMF insisted on a currency devaluation, repayment of the former government's huge \$4 billion external debt, and reductions in the budget deficit and the size and cost of the civil service, civil servants urged the government to maintain the status quo.

In 1994 civil servants staged a series of strikes to protest proposed cuts. Trying to balance domestic

concerns with those of international donors, the government devalued the currency but also printed new money, increasing inflation. The government was so divided on this issue that the National Assembly censured its own ruling party. When President Zafy refused to accept an IMF austerity plan, the World Bank halted new lending. Madagascar's credit rating plunged, and Zafy tried to finance the deficit through private sources, including alleged money-launderers for drug traffickers.

In 1996 Zafy won a national referendum that rejected the IMF plan and allowed him to fire Prime Minister Ravony. The National Assembly responded by impeaching Zafy. The High Constitutional Court, whose independence has been kept limited due to Zafy's restrictive interpretation of judicial independence, found the impeachment legal, and Prime Minister Norbert Ratsirahonana became acting president. After no candidate could take a majority in November 1996, runoff elections for president took place in 1997. The two main candidates, Zafy and former military ruler Ratsiraka contended for a return to power. International observers claimed the election was generally free and fair. Ratsiraka defeated Zafy in a tightly contested election. Legislative elections are scheduled to take place in 1997 as well.

The human rights situation has improved since the coming of a multiparty system, but there have been cases of human right abuses in the new law enforcement and judicial systems. The armed forces have stayed apolitical throughout the governmental disputes. In 1995, the government increased civilian control over the military through the establishment of the High Council on Defense and an Interministerial Defense Committee to allow the President and Prime Minister to set and execute military policy. A downsizing of the armed forces to 21,000 was not contested by the military. Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, it is still influenced by the Ministry of Justice. The National Assembly has elevated the importance of human rights by establishing the Office of the Mediator as the official constitutional promoter and protector of human rights. Freedom of speech and press is, for the most part, respected.

Madagascar is an island nation endowed with many natural resources, but years of economic mismanagement and political instability have made it the tenth poorest country in the world. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy and earns the bulk of Madagascar's foreign exchange from the export of vanilla, cloves, and coffee. The tourism, fishery, mining, and light manufacturing sectors are small and have been unable to attract substantial foreign capital. Foreign investors are reluctant to invest, due to chronic trade deficits and unstable exchange rates. World Bank and IMF programs composed of budget reductions and financing for traditional export sectors such as vanilla, rice, and coffee have not produced economic growth or sustainability. Unemployment remains especially high among the young.

# MALAWI (Lilongwe)



**Population** 9.7 million



**Size of armed forces** 10,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.0



**GNP per capita** \$405




**Military spending** \$13 million **Share of government budget** 3.8%



## Main ethnic groupings

Ethnic groups include Chwea, Nyanja, and Tumbuko, but ethnic rivalries are not strong. Stronger divisions occur on a regional basis: North, Central and South.

## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) 1994 elections were free and fair, but there is a weak judicial system and the outgoing dictatorship still controls much of the economy.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Played a positive role in the transition once it started. Traditionally a counterweight to other paramilitary forces.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$983,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 40 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** In a national referendum held in 1993 Malawians voted overwhelmingly for a transition to a multiparty system, rejecting "Life President" Hastings Kamuzu Banda and his Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Banda had run a virtual police state for thirty years, silencing opposition through detention, torture, assassination, and censorship.

The impetus for the referendum came from a citizens' movement, highlighted by a public denunciation by Malawi's Roman Catholic Bishops of the government's human rights abuses. Banda was also weakened by a conflict between his two primary enforcers of dictatorship, the armed forces and the paramilitary MCP party group, the Young Pioneers. When Banda responded to the citizens' protests with even more extreme violence, he triggered a suspension of aid by many Western donors such as the United States, Britain, and Germany, and the threat of a World Bank cut-off.

Malawi is extremely dependent on foreign aid, so Banda tried to defuse the crisis by scheduling a referendum, repealing edicts that permitted the detention of political opponents without trial, and releasing seventy long-term detainees. He did not expect to lose the referendum, but despite his control of the media and the process, his one-party proposal was defeated soundly.

Multiparty elections were then held in 1994, and they were deemed fair and free by international observers. The speed of the change from police state to open, non-violent political debate was stunning to Malawians and outsiders alike. From seven registered political parties, only three emerged as dominant players, and they corresponded roughly to historical, quasi-ethnic regions of the country, north, central, and south. These three parties were Banda's MCP, the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), led by human rights activists and former exiles, and the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was composed of political refugees who had left the MCP.

The UDF won a narrow legislative victory and UDF's Bakili Muluzi won the presidency, but because the results broke down along regional lines the UDF was unable to obtain a simple parliamentary majority. The government spent a great deal of its political capital trying to consolidate power. AFORD, after a temporary alliance with MCP, was induced with ministerial appointments to forge a ruling alliance with the UDF of 122 seats in parliament, leaving the MCP with only 55.


Banda's legacy still overshadows the new government as it tries to build democracy within a country devoid of this tradition. The civil institutions that are emerging are fragile and often easily influenced by politicians. The newspapers (the only media regularly available) aptly reflect this reality: they serve as party mouthpieces and many are owned or at least controlled by Banda's associates and so reflect their opinions. The labor union movement, once stifled by Banda, is beginning to grow slowly. The government has made little progress in developing a functioning human rights commission, law commission, and judicial reforms. The army, previously the enforcer of Banda's rule, has fallen into step with the new political order, but remains an independent force.

Malawi is a land-locked country where agriculture is the mainstay of the economy. Ninety percent of Malawians engage in subsistence agriculture, and until recently this sector enjoyed steady growth. Cash crops grown in large estates include tobacco, tea, and coffee. Declining prices of these exports, devaluation of the currency, the 1992-93 drought, and the aid suspension lowered the standard of living. Aid has been reinstated, but the government faces an uphill battle in fulfilling its election promises, since it inherited a budget deficit created by massive pre-election spending by Banda. Moreover, Malawi's economic power still remains in the hands of Banda and his associates, who during his tenure used public funds to create the powerful Press Trust Company that controls much of the land and the business sector.

# MALI (Bamako)



**Population** 9.1 million



**Size of armed forces** 8,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 0.9




**GNP per capita** \$202




**Military spending** \$34 million **Share of government budget** 7.3%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) There have been fair multiparty elections and citizens enjoy freedom of expression, but security forces continue to have impunity for abuses under a weak judicial system.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Army assisted in transition to elections in early 1990s, but retains independence today.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$1.137 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 38 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes, conflict in the Northern Tuareg region. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No, most groups signed a peace agreement in 1995.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** The 23-year long military regime of General Moussa Tarore dissolved in 1991 as a result of violent demonstrations led by Malians demonstrating for democracy and multiparty elections. After bloody battles with protesters the armed forces stepped in, arresting Tarore and forming an interim military government that ruled for 11 months. In 1992 free and fair multiparty elections brought to power a civilian government headed by Alpha Oumar Konare. Significant conflict between government forces and liberation movements of the Tuareg peoples based in northern Mali ended with a 1995 peace agreement.

The road to democracy has been rocky for the new civilian government, in part due to the high cost of servicing its debt, which absorbs 60 percent of fiscal receipts. Citizens associate democracy with the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc and the resulting stagnation of the economy, and some are looking with nostalgia to the past military regime. Students have been demonstrating against the government's refusal to increase financial assistance.

The elections of 1997 had mixed results. The April parliamentary elections were marked by numerous irregularities, prompting protests by opposition parties. The Constitutional Court was petitioned,

agreed with the opposition, and nullified the elections. The May presidential elections were upheld by the Constitutional Court, and Konare, running on the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) ticket won with over 85 percent of the vote. Voter turnout appeared low, with only 27 percent voting outside of Konare's native region of Kayes. Opposition parties said that the low turnout was a response to their call for a voter boycott, and they would not recognize the legitimacy of a president elected on that ballot.

The government is largely observing the constitutional provisions of freedom of the press and speech. A national "open forum" permits citizens to question leaders on the radio each year. There are 50 independent newspapers and journals in circulation, as well as a collection of independent radio stations. In 1994 an editor of an anti-government newspaper was arrested on charges of publishing false information that threatened national security. He was acquitted of all charges.

Although the constitution provides for an independent judicial system, the executive branch continues to exert influence over it. There are elements of the security forces that appear to be operating without fear of discipline, especially those that were charged with suppressing liberation movements in the northern regions by the Tuareg and Maur populations.


The military establishment is under the control of a civilian Ministry of Defense. The armed forces were criticized for human rights abuses in the northern regions, where serious violations have been committed by all parties to the conflicts. The participation of security forces in extrajudicial killings, abductions, and village raids in the North created a large number of displaced people. Several thousand refugees have sought asylum in Algeria, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. \$3 million was given to the government by international donors in 1996 to assist with the demobilization of 9,000 Tuareg rebels in accordance with the National Peace Pact.

Mali is a land-locked, semi-arid country with very few economically viable areas. Eighty percent of the population engages in subsistence agriculture. The major cash crops are cotton and groundnuts. Persistent drought, low producer prices, and institutional mismanagement have led to a significant drop in productivity. In the past, Mali had a vibrant livestock sector, but recurrent drought has reduced its stocks. Despite attempts to encourage the development of private enterprises and the implementation of World Bank and IMF fiscal reforms, Mali's economy continues to be depressed and highly dependent upon international donors. However, the U.S. and other donors have started to reward Mali's political transition and economic liberalization with increased foreign assistance. Largely due to its transition, Mali is now host to the largest Peace Corps contingent in Africa and ranks in the top tier of the United States' non-military aid recipients on the continent.


# MAURITANIA (Nouakchott)




**Population** 2.2 million




**Size of armed forces** 10,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 4.6




**GNP per capita** \$442




**Military spending** \$36 million **Share of government budget** 13.5%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**



**Degree of Democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Military-dominated party holds 70 of 79 seats in parliament through questionable elections. Judiciary influenced by ruling party.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Officers from earlier coup serve in top government posts, and President Taya is the former military dictator.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) The U.S. has not transferred any arms to Mauritania since 1990 but 4 officers were trained in 1991, and joint exercises in 1997 and scheduled for 1998.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes, the armed forces violently expelled 70,000 black citizens to Senegal from 1989-1991. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No, some unrest in social protest, but little violence.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Mauritania is a racially-divided country, where the Moors of Arab-Berber descent continue to dominate black Africans from the Pulaar, Soninke, and Wolof ethnic groups. There are reports that slavery is still practiced. From 1989 to 1991 the government launched a brutal campaign to remove black Mauritians from their traditional homes along the Senegal River valley, which was considered vital to Mauritania's economic prosperity. Under the direction of President Maaouya Taya, an officer who seized power in a 1984 military coup, 70,000 blacks were deported to Senegal and stripped of their citizenship, over 500 were slaughtered for suspected involvement in a coup attempt, and hundreds were tortured. As a result, significant tension exists between Senegal and Mauritania. The black Mauritanian Armed Forces of Liberation (FLAM) has vowed to continue a low-level struggle against the Taya regime, since it has been denied dialogue with the president and representation in government.

Western countries raised little protest as Mauritania systematically carried out its campaign against black citizens, but in 1990 Mauritania chose to side with Iraq during the Gulf War, including Mauritians volunteering to support Iraq's armed forces against the allies). After this a number of

donors finally suspended aid to the Taya government in 1991. In response to these pressures, Taya introduced multiparty politics. However, the presidential and municipal elections held in 1992 were so marred by irregularities and fraud that the major opposition parties boycotted them and international observers denounced them. Taya and his party, Parti Republican Democratique, won the presidency and 66 of 79 seats in parliament. A similar round of government-dominated elections took place in 1996, with 70 of 79 seats going to the ruling party. The racially diverse Union des Forces Democratique (UDF), the major opposition party, chose to boycott the elections. Widespread fraud was reported, and the U.S. State Department marked the elections as "a backward step in the country's efforts to establish a pluralist democracy."

Although Taya has left active military duty, formally discarding his uniform for civilian clothes, the armed forces still sustain his government. Members of the previous military council continue to hold positions of power. Despite the government's overwhelming electoral showing, it has little tolerance for opposition groups. Reports of government-led violence systematically targeting opposition groups continued in Taya's first term. UDF was prohibited from holding a demonstration to protest alleged election fraud.

The government has cracked down hard on Islamist militant groups by arresting leaders and banning some meetings. The government is able to maintain its grip over society through the threat of force by the armed forces, national guard, gendarmerie, and police, which are unaccountable for abuses. The executive branch continues to wield heavy influence over the judicial system. Freedom of press, although a constitutional right, is restricted by the use of pre-publication press censorship.

Mauritania has an economy based on subsistence agriculture, herding, and a small commercial sector. The economy is burdened with cyclical drought, desertification, insect infestation, and extensive unemployment. Urbanization is occurring at a rapid rate due to low rain levels in recent years. The settlement of nomadic groups is straining the limited resources of the government as well as increasing tensions between the nomadic and sedentary populations.

# MAURITIUS (Port Louis)



**Population** 1.1 million



**Size of armed forces** 1,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 0.9




**GNP per capita** \$3,092




**Military spending** \$11 million **Share of government budget** 1.4%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of Democracy: 1 (Consolidated)** A republic since 1992, Mauritius has a functioning democracy. Free and fair elections provided for a peaceful exchange of power between the ruling party and the opposition. Mauritius has a functioning, independent judiciary.



**Political and economic power of armed forces: 3 (Minimal)** The small size and stature of the armed forces makes it an insignificant political player.



**U.S. support for armed forces: 2 (Moderate)** U.S. arms totaling \$650,000 in 1994; 10 officers trained in 1992 and 1993.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s? No. Current civil conflict, 1995-1997? No.**

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Mauritius became a Republic in the British Commonwealth of Nations following a constitutional vote on March 1992. Mauritius is a parliamentary democracy governed by a Prime Minister, Council of Ministers, and elected unicameral National Assembly. A president, appointed by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the National Assembly, replaced the British monarch as the head of state.

National and local elections, supervised by an independent commission, are held at regular intervals. The political scene is dominated by four large political groups, although several smaller ones exist. Prime Minister Sir Anerood Jugnauth, ruling for the past 12 years, including eight under British sovereignty, faced increasing opposition in the 1996 elections because of allegations of corruption within the government. He was removed from power in December 1996 by the overwhelming victory of the opposition coalition, and Labor Party leader Navinchandra Ramgoolam became Prime Minister.

The armed forces are comprised of a well-trained, apolitical paramilitary group, and a 240-man special support unit that operates under the command of the police commissioner. The modest size and expenditures of the military and police force make them insignificant in national politics. Mauritius does not have a history of serious human rights abuses. However, in its effort to fight drug trafficking

there have been some unexplained injuries and at least one unexplained death of a detainee in police custody. Law enforcement officials receive training from the United States through its regional counter-narcotics training program.

Freedom of speech and press is protected by the constitution. There are strict libel laws, but they are used infrequently. The judicial system has a good track record for providing fair trials. There is little indication of executive influence on the judiciary.

Mauritius has an export-oriented economy specializing in tourism, textile manufacturing, and sugar, which is planted on 85 percent of its cultivable land. The Lome Convention between African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries and the European Union has helped to provide markets for Mauritian agricultural exports as well as given the textile business an edge over Asian competitors. Mauritius boasts a 95 percent literacy rate among those under thirty, a two percent unemployment rate, low inflation, a one percent population growth rate, and an extensive social services network. Shortages of labor has prompted the government, with the assistance of international donors, to diversify the economy by shifting its focus from labor to capital-intensive investments. Mauritius has begun to invest in businesses geared to high technology and offshore banking.

# MOROCCO (Rabat)



**Population** 28.6 million



**Size of armed forces** 195,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 6.8




**GNP per capita** \$1,057




**Military spending** \$1.228 billion **Share of government budget** 13.8%



## **Main ethnic groupings**



## **Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Military-backed monarchy controls political process and judicial system, although elections provide some degree of input for opposition.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Sustains monarchy.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Deep and long pattern of military aid and training. U.S. has military bases and transit facilities in Morocco, and Morocco took part in U.S. intervention in Zaire in the 1970s and served as a training ground for CIA-backed rebels in Angola in the 1980s. \$77.534 million in U.S. arms transfers 1991-1995; 304 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes, military clashes between the Polisario Front and Moroccan forces in the Western Sahara. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Morocco is officially a constitutional monarchy, but King Hassan II controls the political process to such a degree that he rules with little interference. In response to public demands for change after 30 years of domination by monarchist parties, constitutional reforms were enacted in 1992 to broaden representation in parliament. Under these reforms, 222 deputies were directly elected and the remaining 111 were selected by constituency groups dominated by the King's allies.

The 1993 parliamentary elections were marred by fraud, as the opposition parties won a majority of direct seats but lost control of parliament because they won few of the indirect seats. They declined to take part in a coalition government controlled by the King, because he refused to offer them key cabinet posts covering internal security, foreign affairs, and the judiciary. In 1996 the King won a dubious 99.5% majority in a referendum that sets up a second parliamentary house based entirely on indirect elections by local councils and groups he dominates, such as employers. The armed forces preserve the King in power, and are unaccountable to elected civilian control.

In the Western Sahara, a territory occupied by Morocco since Spain and Mauritania left in 1975 and

1979 respectively, tensions still exist between the government and the region's independence movement, the Polisario Front. After a cease-fire in 1991, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has been charged with maintaining the peace and helping to set up the United Nations referendum to determine the independence of the region or its integration into Morocco. The referendum has been repeatedly postponed, largely because of Morocco's insistence that tens of thousands of Moroccans who claim Saharawi ancestry be allowed to register. This transparent bid for continued control has raised the possibility that the Polisario rebels might resume their long-standing guerrilla war. While the MINURSO mandate was extended by the Security Council until May 1997, it was reported in a November 5, 1996 Secretary-General report that the differences between the Morocco government and the Polisario Front are irreconcilable. It was reported that each have intensified military activity, maintaining combat readiness. Tensions are also high between Algeria and Morocco following a 1994 attack that killed two Spanish tourists. Morocco alleges that the group responsible for the attacks was directed from Algeria.

Morocco's human rights record remains poor despite legal changes in the 1990s. The Ministry of the Interior wields tremendous power as it controls information, assembly rights, and security forces with the exception of the Royal Gendarmerie, which reports directly to the palace. Detainees are tortured, beaten, and deprived of basic necessities. Incriminating confessions and testimony are extracted under torture and used for convictions. Many advocates of independence for Western Sahara remain in prison. There are prohibitions on criticizing the monarchy or the government's claim to the Western Sahara. Freedom of assembly is limited by decrees that allow the government to prohibit demonstrations and mass gatherings. In 1994 the Ministry of the Interior denied permission for opposition conferences on human rights and democracy. Domestic security remains tight, civil liberties are frequently suspended, and there is weak and often corrupt judicial control.

Freedom of the press is further limited by the government's authority to license domestic newspapers and journals. The government has used this power to prohibit the publication of materials it considers beyond tolerable dissent and to close the offending printing press. Although the government has generally been tolerant of the foreign press, it seized 1994 editions of Jeune Afrique because of articles urging the government to support a Moroccan accused of murder in France, and reporting contacts between the Polisario Front and Algerian groups.

Morocco's economy is based on agriculture, which employs 40 percent of the population and accounts for 15 percent of GDP. In 1994 Morocco had a record harvest, but the lack of rain in 1995 drastically reduced Morocco's agricultural exports and forced it to import grain. The service sector employs 35 percent of the work force. GDP rose a record nine percent in 1994, but unemployment and inflation have limited growth since then. In response, the government is trying to accelerate the pace of privatization of state-owned enterprises.

# MOZAMBIQUE (Maputo)



**Population** 17.3 million



**Size of armed forces** 11,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 0.6




**GNP per capita** \$69



**Military spending** \$104 million **Share of government budget** 14.3%




## Main ethnic groupings



Majority of population belong to local groups.

## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) Weak judicial institutions; ruling FRELIMO party dominates national institutions, and even local government in areas won by RENAMO opposition.



**Political and economic power of the armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) The armed forces continue to be important to FRELIMO's power.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Received \$368,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 19 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Nearly 30 years of warfare ended recently in Mozambique, and an elected government presides over an uneasy peace and a devastated economy. The former rebel group Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) does not have a significant role in the new government of the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) party, despite winning 45 percent of the parliamentary seats, but debate appears to be prevailing over the possibility of renewed conflict.

Mozambique's economy and infrastructure were effectively destroyed by the time the long war of independence with Portugal ended in 1975 with victory by FRELIMO's army. The Soviet-backed FRELIMO formed a socialist government whose centralized programs were effective in providing basic social services but stifled economic development. In the 1980s the rise in public discontent toward FRELIMO, especially in the northern countryside, provided a base of support for RENAMO, a brutal rebel group that at times resembled an army of bandits rather than a political movement. RENAMO was initially funded by the white regime in Rhodesia and later (after Zimbabwe's independence) was backed by the apartheid South African government in response to FRELIMO's aid of the African National Congress liberation movement in South Africa.

RENAMO's armed assault on the social and economic structure of the country continued into the

1990s. The conflict claimed the lives of approximately one million people, displaced five million others, and caused roughly \$15 billion in damage. Horrendous human rights abuses were committed by both sides. Political changes in the patron states South Africa and the Soviet Union finally defused the war, and Mozambique began to move from a one-party socialist regime to a social democratic government in 1990, adopting a liberal constitution that was widely debated and approved in the people's assembly. The new constitution provided for: separation of executive, legislative and judiciary powers; abolition of the death penalty; an end to censorship; the right of workers to strike; freedom of movement; and a government based on majority rule.

In 1992, after several failed peace agreements, a lasting peace accord was brokered. It included a cease-fire and multiparty elections within one year of the cease-fire. The United Nations, having learned from its experience in Angola the importance of fully demobilizing both sides before the election process, poured in almost \$1 billion during the two year UN-backed process. Hours before the start of the 1994 elections, RENAMO tried to pull out, but after intense diplomatic pressure, leader Alfonso Dhlakama agreed to keep his party in the elections. Ninety percent of Mozambicans took part in these free and fair elections, and they voted to keep FRELIMO in power under the leadership of Joaquim Chissano. In the presidential race, Chissano received a 53 percent majority, with Dhlakama receiving 34 percent of the vote, while the parliamentary vote split 52-45 percent for FRELIMO.

Despite Western pressure for the formation of a unity coalition government, FRELIMO decided to take advantage of its majority and dominate all levels of government. The cabinet it appointed is comprised exclusively of FRELIMO supporters, as are its regional representatives. The supposed independent judiciary is in fact dominated by FRELIMO, especially the members Supreme Court which are appointed by the President and ratified by the National Assembly. FRELIMO also keeps a tight hold on the press by controlling the country's only two daily newspapers.

RENAMO appears to be accepting its fate, but despite the pace of demobilization it may be capable of returning to combat if it remains excluded from a role in government. RENAMO officials have raised protests on the process for the 1997 elections, and have threatened to boycott the local contests. They feel that too many elections are being held in urban areas where FRELIMO has more strength rather than RENAMO's traditional rural strongholds. The government is focusing its efforts on reconstruction, disarmament (tens of thousands of weapons remain in circulation), and access to land. It is far too early to consider Mozambique safely on the way to a democratic form of government that protects human rights and minority interests.

Mozambique's economy has been devastated over the years by civil war, drought, floods, famine, displacement of population, and a scarcity of skilled labor. Development has also been stifled by the millions of landmines scattered indiscriminately throughout the country. During stable times, 80 to 90 percent of the population engaged in agriculture. Only five percent of the arable land is cultivated, but it represents 50 to 60 percent of Mozambique's GDP. The major cash crops are cashew nuts, sugar cane, cotton, tea, and sisal. The war's end and good rains boosted agricultural productivity in 1994. An additional peace dividend is an increase in activity at Mozambican ports, which are the only viable outlet for landlocked neighbors.


# NAMIBIA (Windhoek)



**Population** 1.6 million



**Size of armed forces** 8,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 5.0




**GNP per capita** \$1,836




**Military spending** \$56 million **Share of government budget** 4.8%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 1 (*Consolidated*) Multiparty elections in 1990 and 1994 declared free and fair. Functioning judiciary is independent and opposition allowed free expression.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Former SWAPO military commander leads current government, but armed forces have been following civilian government's instructions.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Received \$3.570 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 76 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Namibia, a former German colony, was occupied by the apartheid South African government from 1917 when it was given a mandate over the country by the League of Nations. Its occupation became illegal in 1966 when the apartheid government attempted to make Namibia a province of South Africa, and the United Nations revoked its charter. The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) waged a 26-year war of independence against the South African Army in which thousands of civilians were killed, jailed, and harassed. After a series of costly military engagements, South Africa bowed to international pressure and negotiated an end to its rule. The U.S. and the Soviet Union helped broker the peace accord, which resulted in multiparty elections in 1990. The United Nations brought in 7,000 peacekeepers, who successfully monitored the free and fair elections.

With a voter turnout of 90 percent for the presidential elections, SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma was elected president in 1995 with 57 percent of the ballots. In the legislative election, SWAPO won a majority of seats (45 of 78) in the National Assembly, and its main opposition (the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, or DTA) won 25 percent. SWAPO's margin of victory was increased in the 1994 parliamentary and 1995 presidential elections, also considered free and fair, as SWAPO took 53 of 72 seats, while the DTA took only 15. Nujoma garnered 76.3 percent of the presidential elections, with

Mishake Muyongo of DTA taking 23.7 percent.

As the 1994 and 1995 results showed, SWAPO continues to dominate the political scene, and the opposition groups are fragmented, with each reluctant to play a secondary role to any other in a coalition. There has been public discontent about government corruption, delays in implementing land reform, and slow improvement in living standards, but it appeared to have little effect on the elections.

The government has respected the constitutional protections of a wide range of civil, economic, and political rights. Namibia has no political prisoners. The Judiciary is independent, and while a severe lack of magistrates has created a severe backlog of criminal cases, a fair trial and the presumption of innocence is generally practiced in fact. While the government owns the primary radio and television stations and there are some cases of self-censorship, foreign electronic media is widely available, and a variety of opposition newspapers function without restriction.


The Namibian Defense Forces (NDF) have followed the direction of the elected government led by their former military commander, Nujoma. However, reports of extrajudicial killings of civilians along the Angolan border by NDF forces have been made (though unconfirmed), and the government has not made any attempts to investigate the reports.

Namibia is a sparsely populated country where mining, ranching, and fishing are the most productive sectors. Most enterprises in these sectors are owned by white Namibians, with black Namibians supplying the labor pool. Liberal investment codes have been enacted to encourage investment by nationals and foreign entrepreneurs. The government hopes this will translate into increased jobs for the impoverished majority. Fear of falling into the debt trap like many of its neighbors has made the government reluctant to borrow money to spur development. The income gap between Namibia's white population and the black rural poor continues to widen.

# NIGER (Niamey)



**Population** 9 million



**Size of armed forces** 7,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 0.8




**GNP per capita** \$168




**Military spending** \$14 million **Share of government budget** 5.1%



## **Main ethnic groupings**



## **Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Military coup in 1996 brought Colonel Bar to power. Elections that keep him in power are widely denounced.



**Political and economic role of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Armed forces overthrew elected government in 1996.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$6.166 million in U.S arms transfers, 1991-1995; 71 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Civil conflict continuing, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** From 1993 to 1996, the people of Niger made a concerted attempt to shed authoritarian rule. Niger's three years of democratic institutions emerged from growing social and political pressures in 1990 for a multiparty system. In 1991 General Ali Saibou was allowed the convening of a national conference to plan the country's transition to multiparty politics. The conference declared itself sovereign, appointed a prime minister, Cheiffou Amadou, to head a transitional government, and drafted a new constitution.

The constitution, which provided for a multiparty political system with checks and balances, was overwhelmingly supported by Nigeriens in a 1992 referendum. Legislative elections in 1993 ushered into power The Alliance of the Forces of Change, a coalition of nine parties. Similarly, in the 1993 presidential election, eight political parties joined together to defeat the party created by the former military rulers, and elected Mahamane Ousmane President. While there were some irregularities, international observers deemed both elections to be free and fair.

In 1994 the new government was besieged by numerous crises. The Libyan-backed Tuareg separatist insurgency in the north repeatedly clashed with military forces, leading to civilian and military fatalities. However, a cease-fire accord was signed late in 1994 and a formal peace treaty in 1995.

Government salary cuts and delayed payments caused many students and unionized public sector workers to take to the streets in protest. The first political victim of this crisis was Prime Minister Issoufou, whose August 1994 resignation threatened the cohesiveness of the ruling coalition. President Ousmane called new elections in 1995, but the opposition gained a majority. The split between president and parliament led to legislative stalemate and rising frustrations in the armed forces, who had remained largely independent of civilian control.

After three years of elected government, the armed forces stepped in during a parliamentary impasse and staged a coup in January 1996 led by Colonel Ibrahim Bare Mainassara. Bar claimed that he had no political aspirations, and created a National Forum in April to draft a new constitution to aid a swift transition to democracy. Beginning with this forum, however, Bar's commitment to multiparty politics became suspect. Bar promoted himself general, and his Coordinating Committee began to ignore the National Forum. Government troops kept former politicians under arrest, and the law forcing any military officials to resign for three months before running for office was lowered to eight days in order to let Bar run in the July presidential elections.

As the elections drew near, General Bar's hold on power increased. Bar used the state-run media to cover his numerous campaign trips. He continued the ban on political activity until May despite the shortened campaign season. The military government then created a new High Court of Justice, and by decree changed to composition of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, raising the specter of trials against opposition candidates, and putting the judiciary squarely under Bar's control. Expatriate citizens were not allowed to vote, and no verifiable voter lists were made available. The election took place July 7 and 8, and, predictably, General Bar was elected with 52.2 percent of the vote, and took 56 of the 83 parliamentary seats in the December 1996/January 1997 elections.

Opposition leaders and international observers claimed the elections were completely fraudulent. Bar quickly outlawed opposition parties after he was declared the winner, and prohibited public gatherings. He disbanded the Independent National Elections Commission (CENI) and replaced it with the Interior Ministry-controlled Commission Nationale Electorale (CNE). The four other candidates for president were placed under house arrest. The government has severely curtailed the freedom of the broadcast and print media. And through the arrests of many civic and political leaders, a climate of fear has returned.

In January 1997, Niger protesters and police clashed violently in Niamey as former president Ousmane attempted to hold a mass meeting and march to launch what he called a new democratic initiative. Thousands of protesters have continued to demonstrate demanding for the release of the remaining political leaders still detained by the government.

The economy lies at the heart of much of Niger's problems. Niger's economy was crippled by the 1994 CFA franc currency devaluation and a severe economic restructuring program. Niger is a semi-arid country plagued by persistent drought, so only three percent of the land is cultivated. Most of the population engages in subsistence farming and livestock rearing, which accounts for one-third of their GDP. Low demand for Niger's major export, uranium, has made it difficult for the government to service its debt and pay public sector salaries. While the World Bank and IMF have been hopeful that the currency devaluation will eventually stimulate Niger's economy, the financial assistance from the international community has barely been keeping Niger fiscally afloat. U.S. aid was suspended due to the coup, and it has yet to be restored due to the fraudulent elections.

# NIGERIA (Abuja)



**Population** 98.1 million

**Rank**   
1/53

**Size of armed forces** 80,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 0.8

**Rank**   
47/51(T)

**GNP per capita** \$421

**Rank**   
23/51


**Military spending** \$324 million **Share of government budget** 5%

**Rank**   
38/46

## Main ethnic groupings

Over 250 ethnic groups; main groups include Yourba in the southwest, Hausa and Fulani in the north, and Ibos in the southeast.

## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Since taking power in 1993, General Sani Abacha has talked of returning to democracy, but he has disbanded national and state legislatures, removed elected civilian governors, and banned all political activities.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) The armed forces run the government at all levels and maintain its power. They are independent of civilian or judicial control.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) After a long relationship of aiding the Nigerian armed forces, the U.S. cut off military aid after elections were annulled by the armed forces in 1993. \$461,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 73 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Democratic governments have been the exception, not the rule, in Nigeria. The armed forces have ruled for 27 of its 37 years of independence, and ended all three attempts at civilian rule by coup. It has been over ten years since General Ibrahim Babangida, then the military ruler, vowed to restart democracy, and there is no end in sight to military control of national, regional, and local politics under the present regime of General Sani Abacha.

Babangida carefully structured the transition process so that he and the armed forces would continue to maintain political influence despite leaving office. In 1989 he cited ethno-regionalism to refuse the registration of 13 parties. Instead, he created, funded, and wrote the platforms for only two political parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC). Even this limited democratic experiment came to a halt when Babangida nullified the 1993 election, fearing the apparent victory of the independent-minded SDP candidate, business magnate Moshood Abiola. The government, contrary to the reports of international election observers, cited massive election fraud as grounds for the nullification.

Inundated by international and national condemnation, Babangida set up an interim government including civilians to organize new elections. The hand-picked council tried to stem the rapid decline of Nigeria's economy, but not by challenging the armed forces' brazen theft of billions of dollars in oil

revenues. Instead the council cut the fuel price subsidy, leading to street protests in Lagos. After only three months of interim rule, the armed forces formally took back the reins of power, and replaced Babangida with General Sani Abacha, his former defense minister.

Since coming to power in 1993, Abacha has talked of returning to democracy, but he has disbanded national and state legislatures, removed elected civilian governors, and banned all political activities. He set up a controlled Constitutional Conference, but rejected its 1996 date for civilian rule and in 1996 set up a new, controlled process calling for elections in 1998. The active Nigerian opposition has rallied around the right to constitutional rule and recognition of the 1993 elections, but the government has escalated its attacks on opponents, jailing those it could not co-opt through bribes and jobs, and violently suppressing street protests. Abiola has been held on charges of treason. The courts are either controlled by the government or powerless to protect the dissidents.

Abacha rules by decree through the military-dominated Provisional Ruling Council (PRC). The PRC directs the 32-member Federal Executive Council, which is comprised of many prominent Nigerian politicians. Although there is a constitution, the government uses it at its own discretion, and several decrees have been enacted curtailing press freedom and civil liberties. The government's human rights record is abysmal. Excessive force and arbitrary detention are used to intimidate critics. After the executions of regional dissidents including poet Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995, the United States and European governments considered, but then backed away from, an oil embargo against the Nigerian government. Corporations from these countries continue to produce the oil that funds the government.

Seeing itself as a guarantor of "peace and stability" in West Africa, the Nigerian military has engaged in peacekeeping missions in such war-torn nations as Liberia and Sierra Leone. The level of success of these missions is dubious, bringing stability to some areas, but the main success seems to be the enrichment of the Nigerian armed forces. The culture of corruption of the Nigerian armed forces has been clearly on display in Liberia, as officers have siphoned resources out of the economy by mining diamonds in areas under their control, selling iron ore, and even stripping railroad tracks and electrical grids for shipment back to Nigeria for sale. The regular soldiers often supplement their paychecks by moonlighting as rebels, sometimes looting the very towns that they are supposed to protect by day. Some analysts have suggested that General Abacha has his armed forces so active beyond Nigeria's borders to make sure there are no plans for a military coup of his government.

Ethno-religious identity has always played a strong role in Nigeria's politics. Although Abiola is a Muslim, he is not from the Muslim North, where the armed forces and current government draw their support, and is identified with some of their ethnic rivals. The North, too, is starting to split into Sunni Muslims, who form a majority and have backed the armed forces, and Shiite Muslims, many of whom support the Muslim Brothers, whose leader Ibrahim al-Zakzaky was jailed in 1996.

Nigeria has the largest population in Africa: its roughly 100 million people account for 14 percent of the continent's total. Prior to the development of the petroleum industry in the late 1960s Nigeria had an agricultural economy that accounted for 75 percent of export earnings. Now, oil earnings account for 90 percent of export earnings, and Nigeria is dependent on food imports. The economy is collapsing under \$28 billion in external debt that is barely serviced by production of two million barrels of oil a day. Corruption keeps national and international private investment down, inflation and unemployment rates are soaring. The IMF and Western donors have suspended all aid talks.


# RWANDA (Kigali)




**Population** 8.4 million



**Size of armed forces** 40,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 4.8




**GNP per capita** \$70




**Military spending** \$114 million **Share of government budget** 23.9%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**



**Degree of Democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Government is dominated by Tutsi army that overthrew Hutu dictatorship. Some Hutus have been brought into the government, and elections are tentatively scheduled for 1999.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Army dominates political process.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Received \$442,000 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1992; no military aid since 1992; 15 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Civil conflict continuing, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** As in neighboring Burundi, Rwanda's legacy of ethnic animosity has had a devastating impact on human rights and political development. During the Belgian colonial period, ethnic tensions were heightened by the imposition of indirect rule through the Tutsi over the exploited Hutu majority. Although ethnic lines had been blurred by intermarriage, making it difficult to determine a person's ethnicity by sight, the forced use of identity cards kept ethnic labels alive.

Tutsi dominance came to an abrupt halt after independence from Belgium in 1959. After the Hutu systematically purged the Tutsi from all levels of government, violence erupted between the two groups. Over 150,000 Tutsi fled to neighboring countries, but not before some 20,000 had been killed. In 1973 General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, came to power in a bloodless coup and promised national unity. In reality his repressive regime not only exacerbated existing ethnic divisions, but also discriminated against Hutu from regions other than his own.

Some discontented Hutu joined Tutsi refugees in Uganda who had formed the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), which launched a civil war in the late 1980s. RPF successes on the battlefield translated into political power-sharing concessions at the negotiation table. In 1992 the government agreed to multiparty elections and appointed a Tutsi prime minister, Dismas Nsengiyaremye. Under the Arusha

Accords, a transitional government representing both sides was to be formed in 1993 and elections were to be held in 1995. Delays in implementation by the government allowed the opponents of the accords to organize against them.

In April 1994 a plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down, killing all on board. There is no clear evidence of who caused the crash, but it is speculated that Habyarimana was killed by his own Hutu security forces in order to sabotage the Arusha Accords. It is clear, however, that this was a well-organized plot, because within hours of the crash road blocks were set up by the army, police, and civilian militias who began the indiscriminate massacre of Tutsi.

During three months of attacks, over 500,000 civilians, primarily Tutsi and moderate Hutu, were slaughtered, and 1 million Tutsi fled to neighboring countries. The bloodletting ended in July when the RPF took control of the capital, Kigali. The defeated government, its armed forces, militia, and two million Hutu citizens, fearing RPF reprisals, fled to Zaire and other neighboring states. In 1996 political and military developments in Zaire and Burundi loosened the power of Hutu extremists who controlled the refugee camps, and most refugees began returning to Rwanda.

The RPF government headed by President Pasteur Bizimungu, an ethnic Hutu, has pledged to build a multiparty state for both Hutu and Tutsi. Hutus are currently represented in the cabinet. Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, was made Vice President and Minister of Defense. Because there is still no functioning police force, internal security is maintained by the Rwandan Patriotic Army, mostly comprised of RPF soldiers. While the cases of human rights abuse have lessened since the mass repatriations, the RPA has still been responsible for many abuses, mostly against innocent civilians in the country side during the army's "security sweeps."

Elections are scheduled for 1999, but continuing turmoil may well delay significant political organizing. The United Nations' war crimes tribunal has begun trying a few Hutu accused of involvement in the 1994 massacre, but the judicial system as a whole remains in disarray. The government's most pressing problems are the re-integration of refugees into society and the integration of former Rwandan soldiers into the RPF-dominated army.

Since the RPF victory, the judiciary has begun to function again. While some non-genocide cases are being heard, the majority of the court's time and energies are being concentrated on cases pertaining to the 1994 massacre. The press has also begun to function again, but cases of government intimidation of the media persist.

In the wake of the civil war and massacres, Rwanda's economy has virtually disappeared, and is wholly dependent upon international assistance. Prior to the conflict, Rwanda's economy was based on subsistence agriculture which engaged 91 percent of the labor force. Agriculture as a whole accounted for 46 percent of Rwanda's GDP in 1991, and the major cash crop, coffee, accounted for 59 percent of export revenues in 1991. Rwanda had small industrial and manufacturing sectors. Its principal mineral export has been cassiterite, a tin-bearing ore.

# SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE (Sao Tomé)



**Population** 100,000

**Rank**  52/53

**Size of armed forces** 3,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 21.9

**Rank**  1/51

**GNP per capita** \$171

**Rank**  41/51

**Military spending** n/a **Share of government budget** n/a

**Rank** n/a

## Main ethnic groupings

Europeans (primarily Portuguese), Servicais (contract laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde), Tongas (Children of Servicais), Forros (descendants of freed slaves), Mestico, Angolares (descendants of Angolan slaves).

## Main religions

Christian (Roman Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, Seventh-Day Adventist)



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) Multiparty democracy undercut by coup attempt in 1995. 1996 elections restore democracy, but continuing political power of armed forces makes situation volatile.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Coup attempt in 1995 resulted in increased military role in national decisions.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$349,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 15 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Sao Tome and Principe, an archipelago in the Gulf of Guinea, is Africa's smallest nation. Until a 1995 military coup attempt it was also one of its most peaceful and democratic states. During the coup, military officers held the president hostage for a week and received both an amnesty and a promise of greater involvement in national policies that affected the armed forces.

In 1975 Portugal handed power over to the nationalist group, the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP), whose leader Pinta da Costa was appointed president. Miguel Trovoada was chosen as prime minister. The 1975 constitution gave absolute power to the president and central committee of the MLSTP, leaving Trovoada and the cabinet with limited power.

Under Costa the country had a socialist-leaning government, but it never had any formal commitment to the Eastern bloc. By 1989 Costa was faced with growing domestic opposition, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact donors, and pressure from Western donors to reform the economic and political systems. He approved a democratic opening, and in 1990 citizens voted overwhelmingly for a constitution with a multiparty political system, guarantees on human rights, presidential limits of two five-year terms of office, and a unicameral legislature.

The first multiparty elections were held in 1991, and Trovoada, running as an independent, was elected president. The opposition Party of Democratic Convergence (PCD) won the legislative election. In 1994 the executive and legislative branches were locked in a struggle over the issue of constitutional powers. Trovoada dismissed parliament and replaced the prime minister. Opponents accused Trovoada of maximizing his political power in order to obtain economic gains from French businesses. In the October 1994 legislative elections, power was peacefully transferred back to the MLSTP. The MLSTP won 27 seats while the PCD won 14, and a third party, the Independent Democratic Action Party, headed by Trovoada's son, won 14 seats. After the coup attempt, new presidential elections took place in July 1996. Trovoada won after a run-off with former ruler Pinto da Costa. International observers declared the elections free and fair.

The government does not have a history of human rights abuses, and freedom of speech and press are generally respected. While the judiciary is in practice independent, severe financial problems has hindered due process and the rights of the accused severely. Discrimination against women, and an archaic plantation system of labor practices that limit workers' rights continue to hinder equal economic and social opportunity.

Sao Tome and Principe's chief export, cocoa, is produced on a neo-colonial system of plantations called "empresas." Due to falling world cocoa prices and government mismanagement in the 1980s, the country was forced to turn to the World Bank and IMF for assistance. In 1987 the government undertook a three-year economic recovery program, but it slowed the pace of the changes because of public opposition and the IMF suspended funds in 1991. In 1992, after a devaluation of the currency and progress in privatization, the IMF resumed funding. Sao Tome and Principe continues to face an uphill battle servicing its external debt and diversifying the economy.

# SENEGAL (Dakar)



**Population** 8.7 million



**Size of armed forces** 14,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.6




**GNP per capita** \$425




**Military spending** \$60 million **Share of government budget** 7.9%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) Fairness of multiparty elections undercut by domination of electoral machinery by ruling party. Senegal has generally open association and a free media, but a weak judicial system.



**Political and economic power of the armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) Armed forces are traditionally under civilian control and are apolitical, although they are currently powerful in the Casamance region, due to the continuing ethnic conflict.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Received \$13.212 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 132 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes, in the Casamance region.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Senegal's elected President, Abdou Diouf, has served in office since 1981. The elected unicameral legislature has been controlled by the President's Socialist Party (PS) since independence from France in 1960. The successor to legendary PS leader and noted literary figure Leopold Senghor, Diouf continued to rule for himself and the PS after he won the controversial 1993 elections. The opposition parties, the most powerful of which is the Senegalese Democratic Party (SDP) under the leadership of Abdoulaye Wade, filed charges of massive election fraud. The Supreme Court upheld the election results and international observers, although noting elections irregularities, judged the elections to be free and fair. Both presidential and legislative elections are set for 1998.

Anger at the election process, the assassination of Supreme Court judge Babdou Diouf, and the subsequent detention of Wade and other opposition leaders touched off public protests. Domestic unrest continued to build, and exploded into violence in February 1994 when people took to the streets to protest price hikes resulting from the January currency devaluation of the CFA franc.

Police restored order and quickly blamed political opponents and Islamist groups, who were among the

loudest critics of the government, for inciting the riot. This gave the government the opportunity to ban Islamist groups and jail religious and political opponents. However, domestic and international pressure from the United States and Europe over the pre-trial detention of opposition leaders helped to speed up their release. President Diouf offered opposition leader Wade a place in the government. Wade accepted, further reducing tensions arising from this rare spate of violence and repression in Senegalese politics.

Senegal has a well-disciplined army that has traditionally been apolitical, and has directed its ambitions toward playing a role in international peacekeeping operations. However, in the bitter ethnic conflict of the Casamance region, which has flared up repeatedly since the early 1980s, the army and the separatist rebels have both engaged in human rights abuses with little accountability.

It has been reported that paramilitary gendarmerie is far less professional than the army. Officers committing serious human rights abuses have been subsequently promoted. The police have been responsible for a number of serious human rights abuses, including the arrest and extended detention of political opposition figures and the torture of prisoners. Although the constitution provides for freedom of assembly and the press, some publications and meetings have been restricted under laws barring the expression of views that discredit the state or incite people to disorder. The judiciary system is supposed to be independent of the executive, but low salaries and poor working conditions make it vulnerable to political influence.

Senegal has an agricultural-based economy. Over 70 percent of the labor force is engaged in farming. The major cash crop is groundnuts. The structural adjustment program, pursued sporadically since 1983, has not revived and in some ways has further damaged the depressed economy. The January 1994 currency devaluation greatly added to the economic hardship of most Senegalese.

# SEYCHELLES ISLANDS (Victoria)



**Population** 71,000 million

**Rank**  53/53

**Size of armed forces** 300 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 4.2

**Rank**  16/51

**GNP per capita** \$6,210

**Rank**  2/51


**Military spending** \$9 million **Share of government budget** n/a

**Rank** n/a

## Main ethnic groupings

Seychellois (mixture of Asian, African, & European)

## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Multiparty elections, but ruling party uses machinery of government to dominate.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Defense Forces Council plays a strong role in politics.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Received \$315,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 14 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Seychelles is an archipelago located in the Indian Ocean that received its independence from Great Britain in 1976. The coalition government that was formed, comprised of the two dominant political parties, was overthrown in 1977 in an armed coup d'etat by one of the parties, the Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF). SPPF leader France Albert Rene, who had been prime minister, was installed as president. The new government rewrote the constitution to make the SPPF the sole legal party. Middle-class opposition to the government's socialist programs began to mount, and there were numerous unsuccessful coup attempts. However, it was not until 1991, under pressure from France and Great Britain, that the government agreed to return to a multiparty political system.

Presidential and legislative elections were held in 1993. The SPPF won 27 of the 33 National Assembly seats, and France Rene was returned to the presidency. In 1993, after a bipartisan drafting process, 73 percent of the voters approved a new constitution. Despite the free and fair elections, the president and his SPPF party continue to dominate the country at all levels, due to a well-oiled political patronage system that doles out jobs, government contracts, and other public resources.

The government's human rights record has improved, and for the most part, the government respects

the human rights of its citizens. However, the president operates with little fear of legal investigation, as he personally controls the country's security system, including the national guard, the army, and the national police. There is poor accountability through the judicial system.

There are constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech and press, but these rights are restricted by libel laws. Government officials at times arbitrarily detain citizens they claim threaten national security. The government controls the media, owning the only television and radio stations and the daily newspaper. There are several weekly newspapers. The most important weekly, which has been highly critical of the government, suspended publication at the close of 1994 due to a libel suit.

Seychelles is heavily dependent on tourism, which provides 70 percent of its foreign exchange. In recent years, the government has tried to diversify the economy by promoting fishing, farming, small-scale manufacturing, and petroleum exploration. At the urging of the private sector, the government has begun to encourage local and foreign investment. Domestic spending has been cut dramatically to increase the country's foreign exchange reserves, but the public and quasi-public sectors continue to dominate the economy. This allows France Rene and the SPPF to control virtually all aspects of the economy through banking regulations, the marketing board, and other state organizations.

# SIERRA LEONE (Freetown)



**Population** 4.6 million



**Size of armed forces** 13,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 2.8




**GNP per capita** \$157




**Military spending** \$36 million **Share of government budget** 20.2%



## **Main ethnic groupings**



## **Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Military rule ended with multiparty elections in 1996, and army turned over power to elected president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. A military coup in May 1997 led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma cut the transition to democracy short and sent Kabbah into exile.



**Political and economic power of the armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Coup during 1997 indicates continuing independence of armed forces after 18 years of military rule.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Received \$2.106 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 50 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes, five-year civil war with Revolutionary United Front. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes, peace accord signed in 1996, but violence resumed after coup.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** From 1978 to 1996, Sierra Leone was under military rule. Under pressure from citizens and donor governments, multiparty elections were held in 1996, and former U.N. development official Ahmad Tejan Kabbah became president. Tragically, the transition toward democracy was cut short by a military coup in May 1997 by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. The new regime immediately curtailed the freedoms instituted by the civilian government.

General Joseph Momoh and his All People's Congress took power in 1978 promising to institute a multiparty system and respect for human rights, but his 14 year-rule was characterized by corruption and a lack of accountability. It ended in a coup by Captain Valentine Strasser and the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) in 1992. Strasser pledged to end corruption and return the country to civilian rule by 1996. Other officers replaced Strasser in January 1996 with Brigadier Julius Bio, in part to ensure that the elections took place.

Until 1996, freedom of speech and press were circumscribed, particularly on grounds of endangering national security. The elected government freed three judicial systems (regular, local, and traditional

courts) from the intervention of special commissions of inquiry that were established by the NPRC to circumvent the judicial system. A flourishing print press also emerged, with 28 newspapers, some printing sensational stories with undocumented sources. The government monopoly on the country's radio stations was lifted, but security forces continued to detain journalists when they printed controversial stories.

Due to the work of the electoral commission led by former U.N. official James Jonah, voters were not intimidated by widespread, last-ditch opposition by the army, and turned out in large numbers for the presidential elections. In the final round, voter turnout was 75 percent, as Ahmad Tejan Bakkah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) was elected with 59.5 percent of the vote. The SLPP took the plurality, but not majority, in the House of Representatives receiving 27 of the 68 seats. U.S. Ambassador John Hirsh called the elections "an extraordinary moment for the forces of democracy in Sierra Leone and an extraordinary moment for the forces of democracy in Africa."

President Kabbah's first order of business in 1996 was to broker a peace agreement with the assistance of the Cote d'Ivoire that ended a devastating five-year civil war with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the mineral-rich southeast area. The insurgency began in 1991 when Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor financed a guerrilla invasion to destabilize General Momoh, who had backed the West African peacekeepers in Liberia. Rebel leader Foday Sankoh directed looting raids against towns, as did another group based in Guinea. Army troops far outnumbered the rebels, but a lack of adequate weapons and pay for the government soldiers (some of whom moonlighted as rebels) allowed the rebellion to spread throughout the country. The government hired Gurka and South African mercenaries, and a bloody stalemate ensued. Human rights abuses were committed by all sides, including summary executions and torture.

The transition to democracy was halted abruptly in May 1997 by Army Major Johnny Paul Koroma who engineered the bloody coup. A bloody firefight between Koroma's forces and Nigerian troops representing the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOMOG) ensued. President Kabbah was able to flee to Guinea, and Major Koroma's new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was ushered in by reports of the widespread looting of Freetown by his forces. Koroma then announced his opposition to two recently passed bills increasing freedom of the press, and closed down all the country's private radio stations. The coup has been universally denounced by outside national and international institutions.

Sierra Leone has an agriculturally-based economy, with more than 70 percent of the population engaged in subsistence farming. The principal exports had been palm products, coffee, and cocoa; however, during the war agricultural exports were minimal. Sierra Leone also has rich deposits of diamonds, gold, bauxite, and titanium-bearing rutile, although mining revenues have often been siphoned off by smuggling operations. Foreign development aid is extremely important to the economy. This made donor pressure a key factor in encouraging the military government to hold elections in 1996.

The financial toll of the war consumed 20 percent of the national budget. The military government complied with an IMF structural adjustment program by stabilizing the exchange rate, bringing runaway inflation down to less than 30 percent, and beginning to privatize the nation's 44 state-run enterprises. However, the short-term effect of the program has been to impoverish further the people of Sierra Leone, which is already one of the poorest countries in the world.

# SOMALIA (Mogadishu)



**Population** 6.7 million



**Size of armed forces** n/a **Soldiers per 1000 people** n/a

**Rank** n/a


**GNP per capita** n/a

**Rank** n/a

**Military spending** n/a **Share of government budget** n/a

**Rank** n/a

## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions

Majority Sunni Muslim.  
There is a small Christian  
Community.



**Degree of democracy:** 4 (*Dissolving*) There is no formal government, and the country is ruled by various armed factions.



**Political and economic power of the armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) The army supported the dictatorship that fell in 1990. Its weapons and soldiers have been divided among the armed factions. Warlords and their armies now represent the governing bodies of Somalia.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 4 (*Adversarial*) U.S. armed the Barre dictatorship with \$205 million in military aid in the 1980s, and took part in the United Nations humanitarian relief and peacekeeping missions in the 1990s. During that mission, U.S. troops battled the forces of Mohammed Farah Aidid after he was declared an outlaw by President Bush.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Somalia was ruled for 21 years by the corrupt military dictatorship of Siad Barre. Barre capitalized on the politics of the Cold War and received economic and military from both sides of the political divide: Soviet Union and the United States. He used this assistance to exploit clan alignments, which are the foundation blocks of Somali society, by pitting one clan against the other. This method defused challenges for two decades, but eventually visceral hatred for Barre became a rallying point for many dissatisfied clan groups.

Barre's regime began to crumble in 1990 when coordination started between three regional, clan-based rebel movements: the northern-based Somali National Movement (SNM), the southern-based Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the United Somali Congress (USC) in central Somalia. By 1991 the rebel troops were able to force Barre and his remaining troops to flee Mogadishu. Despite this success the rebel groups were unable to form a unified government due to factional fighting, and Somalia plunged into a state of anarchy. The SNM declared the northwestern region a separate country, Somaliland.

Intra-factional fighting and the creation of splinter organizations continued through 1992, with the USC, which controlled much of southern and central Somalia including Mogadishu, divided into two camps: the Somali National Alliance under the leadership of Mohammed Farah Aidid and the Somali Salvation Alliance under the control of Ali Mahdi Mohammed. Remnants of Barre's loyalists joined the banner of the Somali National Front (SNF), which is located in the extreme south, and began to clash with the SPM. In the new state of Somaliland, the SNM faced factional fighting as well.

The United Task Force (UNITAF), the U.S.-led U.N. operation, was deployed in December 1992 to secure safe havens and protect humanitarian relief supplies and efforts. The disaster relief mission was successful, but when the United States tried to force a political solution to the problem in 1993 the mission fell apart. Eighty three U.N. soldiers, 26 of whom were American, were killed by supporters of Gen. Aidid in Mogadishu. President Clinton reacted by first doubling U.S. forces and then setting a March 1994 deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The deteriorating security situation and an absence of political reconciliation forced the United Nations to withdraw its troops one year later.

Ali Mahdi and Aidid were unable to reach a political agreement, so as the United Nations pulled out, fighting escalated, with various clan groups attempting to secure their support base. Peace continues to elude Somalia, and reconciliation at this juncture seems far off. Aidid died in 1996, and was to many people's surprise replaced by his son Hussein Mohammed Farah, a U.S. citizen and former U.S. marine in his mid-thirties, who continued attacks on Ali Mahdi's forces.

Respect for civil and human rights is a moot topic, as factions jockey for control of strategic areas. All factions have indiscriminately detained, tortured, raped, and killed civilians. They have bombed hospitals, schools, and homes; destroyed water, communication and transportation infrastructures; and looted humanitarian relief supplies and medicines, exacerbating an already tragic humanitarian crisis. What judicial system still exists is an amalgam of Shari'a (Islamic) law, local traditions, and pre-1991 law. Enforcement is rare, and where it is done, it is often strict enforcement of Shari'a law including amputations. Different clans operate small radio stations, but freedom of the press is non-existent.

Somalia is a semi-nomadic society where crop, livestock production, forestry, and fisheries once accounted for the bulk of exports. The civil war had caused many to flee their fields and pastures. Thousands of people have returned to their homes and, despite the intra-factional fighting, agricultural production has been revived in parts of the country. Aided by good rains, the 1994 fall harvest attained 75 percent of prewar levels, and the 1994 commercial export of bananas was estimated at a strong 13,000 metric tons. In northern Somalia, livestock production has reached pre-civil war levels. However, a bad rainfall in 1995 created food shortages again in 1996, exemplifying the precarious situation the Somali people are in. Somalis are slowly beginning to rebuild their lives, but long term economic stability is contingent upon achieving a lasting peace.

# SOUTH AFRICA (Johannesburg)



**Population** 43.9 million



**Size of armed forces** 102,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 2.3




**GNP per capita** \$2,720




**Military spending** \$2.899 billion **Share of government budget** 7.4%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 1 (*Consolidated*) Multiparty campaigning and media protected by independent judiciary and vibrant opposition parties.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Under apartheid, the Defence Force preserved the white government but at times operated independently of its control. Now integrated and under civilian leadership, it is still a major factor in political decisions.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) The U.S. has just started relations with the new South African National Defense Force (SANDF). The United States is being very cautious because of the military relationships that South Africa continues to have with U.S.-labeled "rogue" states such as Cuba, Libya, and Syria.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes, particularly between supporters of ruling African National Congress and Zulu-dominated Inkatha Freedom Party, as well as within Zulu factions. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No, although 60 to 80 people died in election violence between ANC and Inkatha supporters in KwaZulu-Natal province.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** On April 26, 1994, after 46 years of white minority rule known as "apartheid," South Africans participated in a free and fair multi-ethnic election that ushered into power Nelson Mandela and the Government of National Unity. The coalition was comprised of the Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) with 252 seats in the 400 seat National Assembly, the Nationalist Party (NP) with 82 seats, and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) of Zulu Chief Buthelezi with 43 seats. The ANC's Thabo Mbeki was named Deputy President, and former President F.W. de Klerk of the NP served as the second Deputy President until he resigned in 1996 after passage of the new constitution, and the NP left the coalition.

Mandela has had to walk a political tightrope, trying to allay the fears of whites and deliver the promised benefits of democracy to impoverished blacks. Many blacks are disgruntled by the slow pace of reforms, and there is an extremist black movement that is demanding radical economic change. Chief

Buthlezi, head of the IFP, has protested the new constitution over its alleged lack of local autonomy, and the IFP and ANC engaged in a bitter, and sometimes violent, election contest for local parliaments in KwaZulu-Natal province in 1996. Independent courts have been able to punish violence on all sides, including some dramatic cases from the apartheid years. A Truth Commission has reported in detail on human rights abuses during apartheid, although it does not have the power to disturb the amnesty that was declared for most of those abuses.

Human rights abuses have dramatically declined since the 1994 elections. However, violent crime has become a major problem for all sectors of society. The South Africa National Defense Force and the South African Police Service are undergoing radical reforms (including civilian leadership, and the integration of non-whites and former ANC soldiers into their ranks) but they still remain powerful and have a high level of autonomy inside the government. The primary function of the military, however, will remain domestic peacekeeping.

In a move strongly supported by the armed forces, Mandela has changed his position on limiting arms exports by the South African Arms Supply Corporation (Armcor), the powerful parastatal arms industry. Through lack of action, Mandella has allowed Armcor to expand its arms sales clientele, particularly in Asia. The armed forces have helped Armcor keep potentially profitable export lines afloat by buying indigenous military equipment such as the Rooivalk attack helicopter. The continued profitability of Armcor during a transition period in the South African economy, combined with a mostly reactive government foreign policy, has given it a tremendous amount of clout and autonomy in conducting arms sales in Africa and worldwide. The South African government is currently working to make the non-governmental mercenary organization "Executive Outcomes" illegal, but this controversial organization, made up of primarily former South African apartheid soldiers, are resisting these attempts virulently.

The National Assembly and the Senate promulgated South Africa's new constitution in 1996. It continues the interim constitution's system of a bicameral parliament, an independent judiciary including a Constitutional court that can overturn legislation, and a strong executive state president. There are constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and press, which are being respected. The mainstream and alternative media keep the public informed and freely criticize both the government and the opposition without fear of reprisal.

South Africa has a diversified economy with solid agricultural and industrial sectors. The manufacturing sector accounts for \$112 billion, which is 25 percent of the GDP. Despite South Africa's strong economy, an estimated 60 percent of blacks are unemployed. Mandela, in trying to redress this problem, has called upon international investors to invest in South Africa, but few are increasing their current levels of investment after an initial surge in 1994. Investors are concerned about currency exchange controls, trade barriers, a militant labor force, crime, and a 23 percent decline in the value of the Rand in 1996.


# SUDAN (Khartoum)



**Population** 29.4 million



**Size of armed forces** 82,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 2.8




**GNP per capita** \$320




**Military spending** \$725 million **Share of government budget** 65.9%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Government controlled by National Islamic Front and its leader, Hassan al-Turbai.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Army, led by President (Lt. General) Hassan Bashir, supports NIF and continues 15-year civil war with southern rebels.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 4 (*Adversarial*) U.S. aided heavily in 1980s, through both overt foreign aid program and CIA, in return for cooperation with anti-Libya policy. U.S. now favors international sanctions on Sudan as "terrorist" state, and is reported to be arming neighboring nations to fight the Sudanese military.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Civil conflict continuing, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** The Sudan is a country with a history of chronic instability and violent internal conflict. It has had 30 governments during its four decades of independence, ranging from weak elected civilian governments to corrupt and oppressive military regimes. The current government took power in a 1989 military coup engineered by the National Islamic Front (NIF), toppling an elected, but hardly democratic, government. The National Salvation Revolution Command Council (RCC), headed by Lt. General Hassan Bashir, suspended the 1985 constitution and banned all political parties and trade unions. In 1993, Bashir was elevated to the position of President and the RCC was replaced by a government-appointed Transitional National Assembly (TNA). The NIF, under the leadership of Hassan al-Turbai, has firm control over all government operations.

Added to this political maelstrom are three decades of religious civil strife pitting southerners, blacks who are largely Animist and Christian, against the Arab Muslim northerners. Southerners opposed to the government's policy of Islamization and Arabization have been waging a 15-year armed struggle. Although the majority of Southerners oppose the government, the opposition is divided between those favoring secession and those hoping to overthrow the government and seize power over all the Sudan. The major rebel group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), has splintered into the main-

stream faction led by John Garang and the Southern Sudan Independence Army led by Riek Mechar. The civil war has claimed the lives of at least 1.5 million people.

The warring parties have been unable to find a peaceful solution despite numerous attempts. The latest cease-fire was engineered by former President Jimmy Carter in 1995, but was violated by both sides and was not be extended after its two months expired. Fighting has reached an impasse, with neither side able to win. Splits within the rebel groups allowed the government to recapture some of their strongholds in 1995, but demoralized government troops, financial constraints, and rebel control of roads prevent the government from consolidating its victories, and there were rebel successes in 1996.

Government and rebel forces are engaged in widespread violations of human rights, with no accountability. The government is overseeing a reign of terror, including massacres, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture, and forced displacement of non-Islamic citizens in southern and western Sudan. People viewed as sympathizers or collaborators are dealt with harshly by both sides. Forced conscription and relocation, bombing, pillaging, and rape are common in SPLA strongholds. Relief supplies are looted and humanitarian groups are denied access to certain war zones.

The government severely curtails freedom of speech, press, and religion through intimidation and surveillance conducted by an informer network and Islamist organizations. Radio, television, and the print media are controlled by the government and required to reflect its position on all issues. The judiciary system is also tightly controlled by the government. Most judges are supporters of the NIF. Government-controlled elections were held for parliament and president in 1996 with the predictable result of returning Bashir and the National Islamic Front to power. The elections were not free or fair in any meaningful way, and were boycotted by all major opposition parties.

Prior to the war Sudan had an agriculturally-based economy that engaged 61 percent of the population. The principal export crops were cotton, sorghum, and groundnuts. However, civil war, economic mismanagement, high inflation, over 4.5 million internally displaced persons, and a refugee influx from neighboring countries have devastated Sudan's agricultural economy. Despite its privatization of state-run firms, the government has failed to revive an economy burdened with massive military expenditures. Sudan's large petroleum deposits once held promise of lucrative returns of billions of dollars per year, but years of armed conflict have curtailed foreign investment and potential earnings in this area.

During the 1980s Sudan financed its war through foreign assistance, which accounted for one-third of its GNP. This source of funding has been drastically cut due to Sudan's human rights record, and Sudan now finances the war by exporting badly-needed grain, freezing government salaries, and defaulting on its foreign loans. The U.S. made an exemption in the 1996 U.S. anti-terrorism act for the Occidental Petroleum Company to attempt to make a deal with the Sudanese government to explore an oil field in the Southern Sudan. The Khartoum government rejected the deal because of the United States' alleged arming of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea in order to topple the Sudanese leadership.

# SWAZILAND (Mbabne)



**Population** 900,000



**Size of armed forces** 3,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 3.2




**GNP per capita** \$1,033




**Military spending** \$16 million **Share of government budget** 4.1%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**



**Degree of Democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Traditional monarchy, with some popular institutions such as an advisory parliament, but a ban on party activity.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Both the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force and the Royal Swaziland Police operate under the King's control and are responsible for external and internal security. They continue to maintain the monarchy's control of power through harassment and detainment of opposition leaders.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) No recorded weapons transfers, 1991-1995; 42 officers trained, and joint exercises proposed for 1998.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Swaziland, a tiny country almost completely surrounded by South Africa, is governed as a modified traditional monarchy. Swaziland is unique because the society is virtually homogenous, resulting in no wars among ethnic groups. The King, Mswati III, holds executive, legislative, and judicial powers, but has exercised them since 1993 with the advice of an elected, non-party parliament. There is a structure of laws, decrees, and implementing agencies, including an independent judicial system.

Despite this attempt at modernizing the political system, power still rests with the King and his circle of traditional advisors. Parliament cannot pass laws without the approval of the King, and when the parliament is not in session the King legislates by decree. The 1993 parliamentary elections were only held due to domestic pressure to open up the political system. It was the first time in 20 years that Swazis had been allowed to elect a parliament. By secret ballot, citizens chose 55 members of the House of Assembly, and ten more were appointed by the King.

Political parties are prohibited and all political meetings and demonstrations in public places must

have the consent of the Commissioner of Police. Despite the 34-year old ban on political parties, many labor unions such as the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) have picked up the fight for political change in the kingdom. There has been a series of strikes since January 1995 by the labor unions and teachers. The labor unions had 27 demands relating to democratization, especially a review of the constitution. The repeated calls for popular representation led the King to announce the preparation of a written constitution.

People have become extremely restless because of the delay-tactics of the government. The King hand-picked a committee that was supposed to an open, public constitutional review. Soon after the King followed with a decree that made the committee's work closed to the public. Labor-led protests continued to gain steam, with the longest general strike in the country's history in January 1996, and a mass labor "stay away" to press for democracy by the SFTU in February 1997. Mswati, as analysts predicted, has not backed down. The government arrested four SFTU leaders and passed an extraordinary law providing for a life sentence for anyone charged with sabotaging essential services. Neighboring unions such as Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSTAU) is calling on its members to handle all goods to and from Swaziland "very slowly."

The Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force and the Royal Swaziland Police are under the King's authority, but brutality by them is a common complaint by many criminal and suspects and political organizers. The human rights situation remains problematic, with restrictions on assembly and political speech, prohibitions on political activity and parties, harassment, detention, and arrest of members of incipient political parties and independent media. The government-controlled media and private media practice strict self-censorship.

Swaziland is often called the "Switzerland of Southern Africa." While it is one of the smallest nations in Africa, it boasts one of the highest per-capita incomes. It has been able to diversify its economy and move away from relying solely on agriculture and mining. Still, the majority of Swazis are subsistence farmers. Swaziland has a free-market economy driven by its export sector, which is comprised of large, foreign-owned firms. Exports of goods and services account for 85 percent of all income. Swaziland has a small manufacturing base, which processes agricultural and forestry products. There is also a small mining sector comprised of diamonds, asbestos, iron ore, and, most importantly, coal.

# TANZANIA (Dar es-Salaam)



**Population** 28 million



**Size of armed forces** 50,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.8




**GNP per capita** \$74




**Military spending** \$69 million **Share of government budget** 7.2%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Multiparty system is dominated by former ruling party through control of resources and security forces, although the opposition has neutralized these advantages in some regions.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) Maintained single-party for three decades.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Minimal*) No recorded weapons transfers, 1991-1995; 45 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Civil conflict continuing, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Constitutional changes in 1992 allowing multiparty politics launched a transition toward democratic rule in Tanzania. Non-religious, non-racial, and national political parties were legalized after 27 years of exclusive rule by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. Despite a proliferation of political parties and the first national multiparty election in 1995, the CCM continues, under the Presidency of Benjamin Mkapa, to dominate the political system. This effective one-party state is clearly in transition, with opposition candidates overriding government advantages in a number of regional elections.

The CCM took 186 of 232 seats in parliament and 62 percent of the presidential vote. Irregularities in a number of key districts led to annulment of initial returns and a new round of voting. The CCM's success was attributed to the continuing popularity of long-time President Julius Nyerere, its monopoly over government resources, and its cache of party funds. It has branch offices in every district and owns two newspapers, while the opposition groups are new, poorly-organized, and vulnerable to harassment without accountability. In future elections, the opposition is likely to manage stronger returns if it can broadcast its message of discontent with the CCM to a broader audience.

The CCM has as a primary goal the preservation of the political union between Tanzania and Zanzibar, an autonomous island province that merged with Tanzania in 1964. Since 1993, when Zanzibar joined the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) as its own entity, legislators in both governments have questioned the validity of the union. Zanzibar's 1995 election was plagued by irregularities, and the CCM won with a slim majority.

Tanzania's political transition continues to be marred by the government's desire to control its speed and direction. The government has repeatedly curtailed civil rights and compromised many constitutional provisions such as the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of the press. Although opposition members are able to criticize the government publicly, they do not have equal access to the media. The government owns or controls large segments of the print, radio, and television media. Despite the government's liberalized approach, in which it includes stories critical of the administration in its own official publications, the independent press still practice self-censorship for fear of government reprisal. Tanzanian security forces for the most part respect human rights and the rule of law. There are no reports of political or other extrajudicial killings, but there are cases of detention and intimidation of members of the opposition. While the judicial system has been increasingly independent of the CCM's control, the widespread corruption and inefficiency of the system prevent just accountability or due process.

Tanzania is an impoverished nation that relies heavily on donor funds. In 1992 bilateral development assistance accounted for 48 percent of GNP. Agriculture is the foundation of the economy, providing 90 percent of employment. The major cash crops are cotton, coffee, sisal, and tea, which combined accounted for 84 percent of export earnings in 1990. Tanzania is trying to reverse its economic decline after three decades of socialist planning. It has implemented a number of restructuring programs with the assistance of the IMF and World Bank by liberalizing agricultural policies, privatizing state-owned enterprises, rescheduling foreign debt payments, and floating the currency exchange rate. Although these measures have helped stimulate economic growth, the short-term social and economic impact on Tanzanian citizens has been devastating, and threatens the CCM's appeal.


# TOGO (Lome)



**Population** 4.3 million



**Size of armed forces** 6,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.4



**GNP per capita** \$218



**Military spending** \$25 million **Share of government budget** 10.5%




## Main ethnic groupings



Among most predominant are Ewe, Mina, and Kabye; European & Syrian-Lebanese under 1%

## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Despite recent multiparty activity, one-party military government continues to control the political system.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) The army, largely representing the Kabye ethnic group, ignores the instructions of the opposition-led parliament, and backs the Kabye president who has ruled for three decades.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) Aid cut off pending free and fair elections. \$371,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 6 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict, 1990s?** Yes, mass exodus of Togolese in early 1990s because security forces fired on a crowd of opposition demonstrators. Later, two security officers were killed, causing a retaliatory killing and looting spree. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Togo's President Gnassingbe Eyadema has tenaciously held onto power since 1963, when he led a military coup that overthrew an elected government. In the 1990s, as demands for political change grew louder, Eyadema reluctantly agreed to abandon one-party rule and move towards a multiparty political system. The opposition organized under the umbrella group Coalition de l'Opposition Democratique, and held a 1991 national conference in which it declared itself the sovereign power, and suspended the constitution.

The national conference appointed Joseph Kokou Koffigoh as prime minister and head of a transitional government, the High Council of the Republic (HCR), and adopted an interim constitution. Although Eyadema's powers were curtailed initially under the HCR, he was able to consolidate his power and neutralize its effectiveness when the army decided to follow his orders and not the HCR's.

In 1993 Eyadema was re-elected president in an electoral process marred by grave irregularities and

boycotted by both voters and political candidates. The opposition parties participated in the 1994 legislative elections, in which they won more seats than the president's Togolese People's Party (RPT). However, their failure to form a pact before the elections weakened their ability to control parliament, and Eyadema and the armed forces have largely ignored the parliament. In the August 1996 bi-elections, President Eyadema and his RPT party manipulated the rules governing the electoral process and further consolidated their majority in the legislature. There were reports of security forces visiting towns weeks in advance of the election and warning their populations of violence if opposition candidates were elected. An RPT parliamentarian threatened at a public meeting in Mango that opposition candidates would be killed if they won.

Institutions created to ensure transparency in electoral procedures and to adjudicate election disputes, such as the National Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Court, are either controlled by the President or still not in place. The RPT faces little judicial or other accountability for its actions. The democratic transition has, for now, stalled.


There continue to be significant human rights violations, and the army and security forces who are responsible of the majority of political and extrajudicial killings are rarely held accountable. The army has used intimidation and violence to silence those critical of the government, including the media. Although freedom of speech and press are protected in the constitution, the government has effectively muzzled the press by suspending critical publications and violently harassing journalists. The judicial system, which is supposed to be independent of the government, is heavily influenced by the executive branch.

Togo has an agricultural based economy that accounts for one-third of GDP and one-half of export earnings. The primary export crops are cotton, groundnuts, and cocoa beans. Togo has rich reserves of phosphate and top-grade ore. The economy has declined in recent years due to a drastic drop in world phosphate prices, currency devaluation, domestic unrest, and the 1993 U.S., French, German, and EC suspension of aid until "free and fair" elections are held. Despite flawed elections, France and the IMF have resumed aid.

# TUNISIA (Tunis)



**Population** 8.7 million



**Size of armed forces** 35,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 4.0




**GNP per capita** \$1,742




**Military spending** \$543 million **Share of government budget** 9.2%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of Democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Effective one-party system, press controlled, judiciary not independent.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Especially in urban areas.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) U.S. Navy has refueling access; arms sales and training. \$75.824 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 476 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Tunisia is governed by President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally Party (RCD). Ali has ruled since 1987 when, as an army general, he overthrew the thirty-year rule of Habib Bourguiba. The Tunisian constitution provides for a parliamentary democracy, but for all intents and purposes the country functions as a one-party state. The President appoints the prime minister, his cabinet, and the 23 regional governors. In 1992 Ali ran unopposed and was elected for his second 5-year term. The RCD won the 144 parliamentary seats that go, winner-take-all, to the winning party, leaving just 19 seats for four opposition parties.

Despite cosmetic attempts at opening up the political process, Ali and the RCD continue to dominate at all levels of the government. In 1995 municipal elections, the RCD won 4,084 of 4,090 positions. The Islamic group Hizb al-Nahda offers one of the few real political challenges to the RCD. It has been banned following the conviction of its leaders for plotting to overthrow the government.

As the government represses Islamist groups, its human rights record continues to falter. Using an authoritarian approach, security forces have detained suspected supporters of the Hizb al-Nahda, the

Tunisian Communist Workers' Party, and other critics of the government. There are credible reports of torture of detainees, and a number of cases of detention without charges past the customary ten days. Amnesty International reports that there are 2,000 political prisoners, most of whom are prisoners of conscience, in Tunisian jails.

Although there are constitutional provisions for freedom of expression and the press, ambiguous defamation and subversion laws circumscribe these rights. In March 1995 two self-proclaimed presidential candidates were arrested for criticizing the government. Journalists and writers, fearing government retribution, practice self-censorship. The government provides official texts on major domestic and international events. Those newspapers which do not adhere to these text are reprimanded.

Despite an added security focus on its border with Algeria as a result of the ongoing civil conflict in that nation, the overall size of the military has remained constant. The paramilitary national guard which shares responsibility for internal security has been consistently charged with human rights abuses. All security forces, military, paramilitary, and police, have been charged with eradicating Islamist opposition in the country due to Ali's fear of Tunisia following Algeria's bloody path.

Tunisia's economy is robust for an African nation, centering around agriculture, tourism, petroleum, textiles, and manufacturing. The economy has benefited from a ten-year economic structural adjustment program, which was completed in 1995. Growth in the GDP has been maintained between three and one-half and four and one-half percent over the past few years, giving rise to Tunisia being called the closest thing to an "Asian Tiger" in Africa due to its pursuit of economic growth over democratic or social progress.

# UGANDA (Kampala)



**Population** 19.1 million



**Size of armed forces** 60,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 3.1




**GNP per capita** \$231




**Military spending** \$66 million **Share of government budget** 7.6%



## Main ethnic groupings



## Main religions



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Ban on political parties permits president to run an effective one-party state. Elections in 1996 dominated by government through its control of the campaign process.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) President Lt. Gen. Museveni led the rebel army that seized power in 1986, and the army continues to sustain his rule.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$235,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 74 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes, Lord's Resistance Army has devastated northern region. **Current civil conflict 1995-1997?** Yes, brutal LRA attacks on civilians continued in 1996.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** The National Resistance Movement (NRM), led by President Yoweri Museveni, has been in power since 1986, following a five-year armed struggle against the Obote and Okello regimes. Upon seizing power, Museveni brought some opposition leaders into the government, but banned open party politics. This arrangement was extended several times, and in 1995 an elected constitutional committee dominated by the NRM imposed a five-year continuation of one-party rule as suggested by a Museveni-appointed Constitutional Commission. Elections under the one-party system were held in 1996, with Museveni winning the presidency 74.2% of the vote. The elections also allowed the NRM to dominate the parliament with 156 out of the 276 seats. His primary opponent, former opposition leader Paul Ssemogere, was barred from effective campaigning.

Museveni's ability to lift Uganda from the brink of economic chaos and social despair has come at the expense of movement toward democracy. Museveni sees democracy and development as mutually exclusive, and says he has sacrificed democracy for development. Opposition groups ranging from Baganda monarchists to the Sudanese-backed Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda,

roundly criticize him. However, these groups have no clear or united platform to use to challenge his rule.

As the National Resistance Army (NRA), the armed forces were a politicized entity under Museveni's control that quelled rebellions in the north, east, and southwest of the country. In 1995 the NRA was renamed the People's Defense Force and placed under civilian authority, but it continues to function as the internal guarantor of Museveni's power. Although the human rights situation is improving, there are cases of human rights abuses by both the armed forces and rebel groups, ranging from detention without charges to torture and execution. Apart from these extrajudicial killings in zones of insurgency, however, there have not been political killings attributed to the government in recent years.

Freedom of the press and speech and peaceful assembly are constitutional rights, but the government routinely limits them. The government uses sedition laws and periodic arrest of journalists to intimidate the press. It also routinely denies permits for public gathering and prohibits political rallies.

Uganda's economy is based primarily on agriculture. Coffee accounts for the vast majority of exports (95 percent in 1993-1994). Economic growth rates slowed to 4 percent of GDP in 1993 and 1994 partly due to the price of coffee and Uganda's other cash crops decreasing. Despite massive rural poverty and a slowing of growth due to falling coffee prices, the government continues to implement a tough economic reform program. Uganda is heavily dependent on foreign aid, which accounts for about 50 percent of government spending.

# ZAIRE/CONGO (Kinshasa)



**Population** 42.7 million



**Size of armed forces** 53,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.2



**GNP per capita** \$133




**Military spending** \$117 million **Share of government budget** 44.2%



**Main ethnic groupings**

Over 200 ethnic groups.  
Largest are: Mongo, Luba,  
Kongo, & Mangebetu-Azande.

**Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 4 (*Dissolving*) President Mobutu's autocratic, personal rule collapsed in May 1997 under the forces of Laurent Kabila. Kabila's new government offers little hope of a democratic transition, and has yet to bring appreciable stability to the nation.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Elite army units sustained President Mobutu. Kabila's military commanders are often more powerful than top civilian officials in the new government.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) The United States cut off military assistance to Zaire in 1991 after bringing Mobutu to power in the 1960s. The Pentagon and CIA provided cash, weaponry, and a blind eye to gross human rights violations in return for cooperation with their operations in Angola. U.S. led Western military interventions to stop secession of Shaba province in 1977 and 1978. \$1.387 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 36 officers trained.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** Yes. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** Yes.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** After 30 years under the corrupt and brutal leadership of Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire ceased to function as a modern state. Mobutu's army functioned as a lawless band, harassing civilians and businesses for funds. Mobutu's siphoning of money from state industries until they were bankrupted gave rise to a new term describing his form of government – "cleptocracy." In May 1997, rebel forces under the command of Laurent Kabila marched on Kinshasa and forced Mobutu into exile. Kabila renamed the nation Congo, but his leadership style immediately began to mirror the autocracy of his predecessor.

Against the backdrop of a disintegrating society, President Mobutu made fledgling attempts over the past decade to open up the political system, such as lifting a 20-year ban on opposition parties in 1990. However, when it appeared that new parties stood a chance of gaining power, Mobutu managed through violence, bribery, and political manipulation to hijack the process. After reductions in U.S. and international assistance, Mobutu convened a National Conference to hammer out a new constitution in 1993. The opposition formed a coalition group, Sacred Union, and took part. The conference delegates stripped Mobutu of his powers by declaring their decisions binding, and selected Etienne

Tshiekedi, leader of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) as prime minister. Mobutu fired Tshiekedi and appointed Fauslin Birindwa as his prime minister. Tshiekedi, refused to step down, and set up a parallel government. This resulted in the existence of two governments, neither of which were capable of ruling.

In 1994 the impasse was temporarily broken when the two governments formed a transitional parliament and selected Leon Kengo, a political centrist, as prime minister to replace Tshiekedi, whose refusal to talk with Mobutu had resulted in a loss of support by the U.S., France, and other Western powers. Kengo's fiscal reforms were blocked by Mobutu, who refused to cede power.

Mobutu's armed forces operated outside any legal framework. Since 1965, the United States was the major supplier of the Zairian armed forces until Congress cut off aid in the late 1980s. Mobutu purposely kept the regular army weak to prevent it from threatening him, concentrating military power in his elite presidential guard. Human rights abuses continue unabated by the armed forces and police, despite requests from U.S. generals to their former clients. Freedom of speech and the press does not exist. Those who criticize the government were often detained, tortured, or killed. Mobutu, eager to regain international support, allowed Zaire to host the Rwandan refugees, but his role was tainted by charges of corruption, looting, and extortion by Zairian armed forces in the refugee camps.

In 1996 rebels in eastern Zaire led by Laurent Kabila's core forces of Tutsi aided by Rwanda's Tutsi-led government cleared out Rwandan refugee camps controlled by Rwanda's former Hutu government and began a civil war against the Mobutu regime. Fighting between government forces and rebels intensified greatly after Mobutu left the country in August 1996 for health reasons. Kabila's forces, called the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFLC), took over control of the eastern part of the country, and took Kisangani—the military and commercial hub of northern Zaire, in March 1997. Mobutu returned in February and then March 1997. His representatives met with Kabila in South Africa for talks sponsored by Nelson Mandela.

After the failure of Mandela's and other attempts to find a diplomatic solution, Kabila's forces forced Mobutu into exile. Shortly after taking power, Kabila restructured the government by eliminating the prime minister and vice presidential positions, consolidating all power in the president, himself. He then virtually shut out all other parties other than his ADFLC, and suspended virtually all civil rights until a new constitution is written. His soldiers enforced this rule by forcibly breaking up a small demonstration in favor of Sacred Union leader Tshiekedi in Kinshasa. Despite Kabila's promise of elections in 1999, the chances of a transition to democracy seem remote, and the tremendous power of the Tutsi minority within the military, many of them former Rwandan military officers, has raised the specter of increased ethnic tension within this new Congo.

Zaire/Congo is a country rich in strategic minerals and agricultural resources. Mobutu's 35 years of corrupt rule, however, has left it unable to maintain its basic infrastructure such as roads and a telephone system. Massive corruption by Mobutu and many officials, mismanagement, unfavorable terms of trade, and irresponsible economic policies have impoverished most of the population with skyrocketing inflation and unemployment rates. Eighty percent of the labor force is employed in the non-monetary subsistence sector. The inflation rate is in the thousands of percentage points per year; diamond production, once the backbone of the export economy, is functioning at a fraction of capacity, and 80 percent is reportedly stolen and smuggled.

# ZAMBIA (Lusaka)



**Population** 9.2 million



**Size of armed forces** 16,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 1.7



**GNP per capita** \$352




**Military spending** \$39 million **Share of government budget** 4.8%



**Main ethnic groupings** 99% from 70 Bantu groups.

**Main religions**

Muslims & Hindus 24-49% Traditional beliefs 1%



Christians 50-75%



**Degree of democracy:** 2 (*Transitional*) Multiparty format, with an independent judiciary and generally open press. Government pressure on opposition party and exclusion of its leader hampered popular expression in 1996 elections.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 3 (*Minimal*) Security forces remain aloof from political process. Police force abuse of human rights remains most significant problem.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$450,000 in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 36 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** Zambia was ruled for 27 years by the socialist government of the United National Independence Party under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda. In 1990 growing public discontent over falling living standards as well as an attempted coup forced Kaunda to abandon the one-party state, lift the ban on opposition parties, and hold multiparty elections in 1991. Kaunda was soundly defeated by former trade unionist Frederick Chiluba and his party, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). The election was judged free and fair, and 30 political parties participated.

The initial public euphoria over Chiluba's pledge to bring democracy to Zambia has given way to disillusionment due to cabinet-level corruption scandals and the harsh economic realities of an IMF/World Bank-supported economic structural adjustment program. This program has cut a wide range of consumer price subsidies and government services. Chiluba has tried to stem the tide of discontent with corruption by signing into law a Parliamentary and Ministerial Code of Conduct.

Despite the advantages of incumbency and access to governmental machinery to publicize his candidacy, Chiluba was thought to be facing a tough election in the fall of 1996. However, Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) was unable to form an alliance with the other main opposition

parties, and finally boycotted the elections because of the enactment of a constitutional provision, directed at Kaunda, that barred people whose parents were not born in Zambia from contesting the presidency. In the November elections, Chiluba won by 70.2%. UNIP was the only party to boycott the elections. In parliament, Chiluba's party the MMD won 60.8% of the vote.

Police brutality is the most pressing human rights problem. Despite reform efforts in 1994, the police continue to use excessive force, and the judicial system does not appear capable of punishing these abuses. There were, however, no reports of political killings from 1994 to 1996, and the National Human Rights Commission has started to address the issue of police brutality.

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press, but libel and presidential defamation laws have been used at times by the government to restrict the press. Additionally, an amendment to the Code of Conduct bill requiring journalists and media managers who print parliamentary corruption allegations to reveal their sources to an investigative tribune or face prison is viewed by many as a further infringement on press freedom.

Zambia's economy centers around the agricultural and mining sectors. These sectors account for 60 percent of the economy. In 1994, due to poor rains in the past two growing seasons, agricultural output dropped by 19.8 percent, and the shortfall in the staple of maize required the government to import maize from South Africa. The copper industry's output also dropped below 1993 production levels, despite an increase in world prices.

Chiluba's austerity program has begun to turn the economy around. Inflation has dropped from 200 percent a year to 30 percent and servicing of the \$6.8 billion debt has been made easier by Chiluba's ability to gain Western donors' confidence and their pledge of another \$2.1 billion in aid. Chiluba is paying a high political price for this assistance: underemployment and unemployment is estimated to be 80 percent for the 3.6 million-person labor force and this rate will go up as privatization of government parastatals, such as copper mines, increases.

# ZIMBABWE (Harare)



**Population** 11 million



**Size of armed forces** 43,000 **Soldiers per 1000 people** 3.9




**GNP per capita** \$463




**Military spending** \$188 million **Share of government budget** 12.9%



**Main ethnic groupings**



**Main religions**



**Degree of democracy:** 3 (*Authoritarian*) Effective one-party state. Multiparty format, but with overwhelming domination of the process by ruling party, and an opposition boycott of most elections. However, there is an independent judiciary.



**Political and economic power of armed forces:** 1 (*Substantial*) Elite military units and the intelligence agency have operated with little accountability, particularly in opposition Matabeleland.



**U.S. support for armed forces:** 2 (*Moderate*) \$1.77 million in U.S. arms transfers, 1991-1995; 107 officers trained, and joint exercises.



**Significant civil conflict in 1990s?** No. **Current civil conflict, 1995-1997?** No.

**POLITICAL SUMMARY:** President Robert Mugabe of the Shona-led Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has ruled since the white-minority government of Rhodesia turned over power in 1980 following a civil war and the first-ever use of mandatory United Nations sanctions. While ZANU-PF became the ruling party, the new constitution gave the tiny white minority disproportionate political power over other minority groups in order to keep white Zimbabweans from fleeing the country. This has left black minorities with virtually no political voice.

Mugabe opposed multiparty politics as destabilizing, preferring to bring opponents into his party. While he agreed to a parliamentary system and multiparty elections every five years, he did not share responsibility for governing with the minority parties, and so rendered them irrelevant. Indeed, Mugabe subsequently abolished the entire upper-house of the Zimbabwean parliament (including all the white seats). Mugabe attempted to keep the white minority and its capital in the country with strong rhetoric about reconciliation, restricting the amount of funds that could leave the country, and not aggressively nationalizing land and property.

Violence and intimidation impugned ZANU-PF's overwhelming victory in the 1990 elections. In 1995's parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF ended up with 147 out of 150 seats. Voter turnout was approximately 57 percent, which was a 20 percentage point increase from 1990. While the voting itself was fair, the campaign again suffered from intimidation and domination by the ruling party. Opposition groups boycotted the elections, citing presidential selection of all four members on the electoral commission, ZANU-PF's \$7.2 million in government funding due to a law basing funding on parties' votes in 1990 election, and biased reporting by the dominant, government-controlled media.

Despite ZANU-PF's overwhelming victory, there is public discontent with the slow pace of land reform, which until recently was used to punish political opponents of the government, an IMF-backed structural adjustment program that has forced sharp cuts in domestic spending, and black exclusion from much of the economy. In the 1996 presidential election that returned Mugabe to power, only 31 percent of eligible voters took part. 20 percent of those who voted still chose opposition candidates who had dropped out in protest.

Zimbabwe's security forces have been a record of human rights abuses, particularly in the 1980s in Matabeleland. The powerful Central Intelligence Organization as well as the feared Fifth Brigade were credibly accused of systematic intimidation and even murder there during that period. The opposition protested when ZANU-PF granted amnesty in 1988 to all military and police personnel for human rights abuses, many of which took place in Matabeleland. In recent years the human rights record has improved, due in part to Supreme Court rulings upholding the rights of women, free assembly, and due process. However, reports of government abuses still come from Matabeleland, and the government has passed a new amendment to the constitution turning human rights from enforceable rights to perambulatory statements that are unenforceable by the independent courts.

The constitution provides for freedom of the press but limits this freedom for national security, public safety, or state economic interests. The government indirectly owns the major media, and influences editorial appointments and removals. There are a few small media outlets that have been critical of the government, and while no overt measures have been taken to silence them, ZANU-PF has effectively pushed advertisers away from them. Anti-defamation laws make both the government-influenced press and the independent press practice self-censorship.

The white-dominated agricultural and mining sectors continue to be the backbone of Zimbabwe's economy. The agricultural sector has been hurt throughout the 1990's by persistent drought. There is also a diversified manufacturing base and a growing service sector. Mugabe rejected his original socialist vision after a sluggish and corrupt bureaucracy slowed growth in the late 1980s. He has tried to revive the economy with a World Bank plan that has cut subsidies for staple foods and raised an already high unemployment rate to 45 percent. There was 4.5 percent growth in GDP in 1994, but it has not resulted in a better business environment: 82 percent of firms operated below capacity, and international investment remained low. The adjustment plan has sparked public protests over its job and subsidy cuts. Mugabe's 1992 Land Expropriation Act, which enables the government to seize and redistribute land among small farmers, has created anxiety among the white minority population, but it proved popular with black voters in the 1995 election.

## *IV: DEMILITARIZATION AND THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA*

*Commentary by  
Professor Sulayman S. Nyang  
Howard University  
Department of African Studies*

Since the decolonization of Africa in the late fifties and early sixties of this century the African peoples have faced the difficult task of state-building and national integration simultaneously. These challenges have been exacerbated by the gross misappropriation of state power and national wealth by a select few who happened to be at the helm of affairs at the time of independence. These men and women were the politicians who declared one-party states soon after independence and the soldiers who later toppled them only to repeat the same political mantras of their civilian predecessors. Both groups of maladministrators of the post-colonial era of Africa rose to their positions of power largely because of their familiarity with some aspects of things Western and modern. For the politicians, it was their familiarity with Western intellectual discourse and methods of political agitation and mobilization; for the soldiers, on the other hand, it was their mastery of the Western military tradition and of the ways in which modern armies employ weapons in warfare. This exposure to things both Western and modern has led to their primacy in African societies.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting end of U.S.-Soviet competition has changed the world scene, and the African continent has now become the theater of contending forces for democracy. No longer supported by their former Cold War patrons, and facing a populace that is increasingly restless about the way things are run in their societies, the African leaders can no longer survive public discontent through the direct intervention of foreign forces. Still, unless the flow of military hardware and training is limited, if not effectively curtailed, chances are that the old dictators will manage to stonewall the democratic movement by employing weapons obtained from overseas to intimidate, and if necessary eliminate, political opponents by force of arms. This condition already exists in some of the African states and the pro-democracy movements are trying desperately to convey that message to political activists in the United States and Western Europe. Their plight is becoming well known to political activists as well as politicians in the West, but the conditions to which they point cannot be changed unless there are new policies and new attitudes in developed, supplier countries towards military power and its use in the Third World.

Related to the condition of use and misuse of military weapons in the contest for political power in post-Cold War Africa is the question of accountability on the part of the rulers of African military-dominated governments. Much has been written by scholars and journalists about the democratization process in Africa, and much has also been written about the various strategies employed by pro-democracy groups to cultivate the seeds of greater African responsibility in the development of civil society. What needs to be borne in mind here is the urgency for greater cooperation and coordination between political activists in the West and the African pro-democracy groups. These two forces have a common agenda of helping create a viable and self-sustainable African political system that can deliver both the political and economic goods. How can these two communities come together and what can government leaders in the United States do to facilitate the process? This report by an American group based on extensive travel and consultation with African groups is an important step towards answering that question.

I believe that four points should be remembered in any discussion of the relationship between demilitarization and democracy in Africa:

**(1) On the African continent the politics of the belly — meaning the control of food — have been manipulated to discredit and hold back the politics of the head — meaning the development of democratic self-government.** Those who are in positions of political power throughout Africa have tried hard to subordinate all forms of political expressions to the tyranny of the politics of the belly. This is to say, in many parts of Africa, politicians have controlled the majority of the population by capturing the sources of food supplies and by making sure that foreign donors of food channel all aid through them. This monopoly of the state and the access points for food aid has translated negatively in the political arena of many African countries. Rather than allow people to vote on policies, especially agricultural ones, that affect their lives and destinies, these men and women of power have consistently used the state to set the agenda and to cow into submission any political force that tries to register alternative opinions about the way societies are to be run. This aspect of African politics has led to the primacy of brawn over numbers and brains. The politics of the head pre-suppose the primacy of reason and rationality in the way humans govern themselves, but the politics of the belly give more sway to desperation.

**(2) Democracy is not likely to take hold as long as the bullet — military political power — is accepted as co-existing with the ballot — again, a system of democratic self-government.** For the military men and their families the African state has become the milk cow and any one who tries to divert the flow of milk from this source of nutrition and privileged life styles is dealt with severely. In most cases the would-be source of irritation is eliminated without any mercy. The over-emphasis on what the military gets out of the state has created a corporate interest group which

functions interestingly very much like the old tribal system. The main difference between this new military order and the old tribal system is that in the latter emphasis was placed on social solidarity based on blood ties and mythical ancestry, whereas in the case of the military corporate group, the badge of identification is based on socialization in military practices and protocols.


**(3) Government personnel, both civil and military, in many instances see themselves not as the neutral servants of the political class and the people these men and women claim to represent, but as fellow players in the game of politics.** They invariably take sides and are sometimes too political to be of any use to the public they are expected to serve. Furthermore, their engagement in corruption helped undermine the integrity and respectability of the civil servant class and the armed forces in the society. This pattern of behavior has been noted by scholars and journalists examining African bureaucracies. Although the doctrine of civil servant and military neutrality was carried over from the colonial times, in the case of the former British colonies in Africa, there is ample evidence to show that this doctrine might have served colonial interest in maintaining African loyalties to the colonial order headed by what Sir Ivor Jennings called "the imported oligarchy."

**(4) Democracy can only succeed when a civil society is either in place or is in an advanced embryonic state.** In many African countries the budding civil societies were nipped in the bud by civil and military dictators who fear the electoral process. After having captured social power in the name of the concept "We are all Africans" and having inherited political power from the departing colonialists, these men and women saw the budding organizations and institutions, such as youth groups, labor unions and others, as actual and potential threats. As a result of this paranoia they set out to eliminate or co-opt them soon after independence. The origins of the one-party state in Africa lie in this past.

Because of this history, and in the name of greater democracy, those of us who wish to help Africans in their struggle for greater transparency and accountability in their governments must appreciate the realities of the African condition and do the necessary homework to help resolve the moral and political crisis in the continent. Asking policy-makers to take note of these four points is only part of the process. We must ourselves fashion policy proposals and urge their adoption on the policy-makers. This report by Demilitarization for Democracy asks that U.S. officials correct their relations with Africa by ending military support programs for repressive forces and focusing greater attention and resources on non-electoral components of democracy. I heartily endorse these recommendations, and hope to see their rapid adoption.

\* \* \*

# CHART 1a: DEGREE OF DEMOCRACY BY COUNTRY



Country	Government
Algeria	3
Angola	2
Benin	1
Botswana	1
Burkina Faso	3
Burundi	4
Cameroon	3
Cape Verde	1
Ctrl. African Rep.	2
Chad	2
Comoros	2
Congo	2
Cote d'Ivoire	2
Djibouti	3
Egypt	3
Equ. Guinea	3
Eritrea	3
Ethiopia	3


Country	Government
Gabon	2
Gambia, The	3
Ghana	2
Guinea	3
Guinea-Bissau	2
Kenya	3
Lesotho	2
Liberia	4
Libya	3
Madagascar	2
Malawi	2
Mali	2
Mauritania	3
Mauritius	1
Morocco	3
Mozambique	2
Namibia	1
Niger	3

Country	Government
Nigeria	3
Rwanda	3
S. T. & Principe	2
Senegal	2
Seychelles	3
Sierra Leone	3
Somalia	4
South Africa	1
Sudan	3
Swaziland	3
Tanzania	3
Togo	3
Tunisia	3
Uganda	3
Zaire	4
Zambia	2
Zimbabwe	3

**Key:**


- 1=Consolidated Democracy
- 2=Transitional State
- 3=Authoritarian Regime
- 4=Dissolving Nation-State

# CHART 1b: DEGREE OF DEMOCRACY BY POPULATION



<u>Degree of Democracy</u>	<u>Population (in millions)</u>
Consolidated	53.7
Transitional	124.39
Authoritarian	463.971
Dissolving	58.5

## CHART 2: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER OF THE ARMED FORCES




Country	Pwr. of A.F.
Algeria	1
Angola	1
Benin	2
Botswana	3
Burkina Faso	1
Burundi	1
Cameroon	1
Cape Verde	3
Ctrl. African Rep.	1
Chad	1
Comoros	1
Congo	1
Cote d'Ivoire	1
Djibouti	1
Egypt	1
Equ. Guinea	1
Eritrea	1
Ethiopia	1

Country	Pwr. of A.F.
Gabon	1
Gambia, The	1
Ghana	1
Guinea	1
Guinea-Bissau	2
Kenya	1
Lesotho	1
Liberia	1
Libya	1
Madagascar	3
Malawi	2
Mali	2
Mauritania	1
Mauritius	1
Morocco	1
Mozambique	1
Namibia	2
Niger	1

Country	Pwr. of A.F.
Nigeria	1
Rwanda	1
S.T. & Principe	1
Senegal	3
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Somalia	1
South Africa	2
Sudan	1
Swaziland	3
Tanzania	2
Togo	1
Tunisia	1
Uganda	1
Zaire	1
Zambia	3
Zimbabwe	1

Key:  
 1=Substantial  
 2=Moderate  
 3=Minimal

### CHART 3: U.S. SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES



Country	U.S. Support
Algeria	2
Angola	3
Benin	1
Botswana	1
Burkina Faso	3
Burundi	2
Cameroon	2
Cape Verde	2
Cent. African Rep.	2
Chad	1
Comoros	3
Congo	2
Cote d'Ivoire	2
Djibouti	1
Egypt	1
Equ. Guinea	2
Eritrea	1
Ethiopia	2


Country	U.S. Support
Gabon	3
Gambia, The	3
Ghana	2
Guinea	2
Guinea-Bissau	2
Kenya	1
Lesotho	3
Liberia	3
Libya	4
Madagascar	3
Malawi	2
Mali	2
Mauritania	2
Mauritius	2
Morocco	1
Mozambique	2
Namibia	1
Niger	2

Country	U.S. Support
Nigeria	3
Rwanda	2
S.T. & Principe	2
Senegal	1
Seychelles	2
Sierra Leone	2
Somalia	4
South Africa	3
Sudan	4
Swaziland	2
Tanzania	3
Togo	3
Tunisia	1
Uganda	2
Zaire	3
Zambia	2
Zimbabwe	2

Key:  
 1=Substantial  
 2=Moderate  
 3=Minimal  
 4=Adversarial Relationship

## CHART 4: LEVEL OF CIVIL CONFLICT

No Significant  
Civil Conflict--40%



Civil Conflict  
in the 1990s--26%

Current Civil Conflict  
1995-1997--34%

Country	Civil Conflict
Algeria	1
Angola	2
Benin	3
Botswana	3
Burkina Faso	1
Burundi	1
Cameroon	2
Cape Verde	3
Ctrl. African Rep.	1
Chad	1
Comoros	1
Congo	1
Cote d'Ivoire	3
Djibouti	2
Egypt	1
Equ. Guinea	3
Eritrea	2
Ethiopia	2

Country	Civil Conflict
Gabon	2
Gambia, The	3
Ghana	3
Guinea	3
Guinea-Bissau	3
Kenya	2
Lesotho	3
Liberia	1
Libya	1
Madagascar	3
Malawi	3
Mali	2
Mauritania	2
Mauritius	3
Morocco	2
Mozambique	2
Namibia	3
Niger	2

Country	Civil Conflict
Nigeria	1
Rwanda	1
S.T. & Principe	3
Senegal	1
Seychelles	3
Sierra Leone	1
Somalia	1
South Africa	2
Sudan	1
Swaziland	3
Tanzania	3
Togo	2
Tunisia	3
Uganda	1
Zaire	1
Zambia	3
Zimbabwe	3

**Key:**

1=Current Civil Conflict, 1995-1997

2=Civil Conflict in the 1990s

3=No Significant Civil Conflict

## RANKING TABLE 1: POPULATION (IN MILLIONS)

Country	Population	Rank	Country	Population	Rank
Nigeria	98.1	1	Somalia	6.7	27
Egypt	61.1	2	Guinea	6.4	28
Ethiopia	54.3	3	Burundi	6.1	29
South Africa	43.9	4	Chad	5.5	30
Zaire	42.7	5	Benin	5.3	31
Sudan	29.4	6	Libya	5.1	32
Morocco	28.6	7	Sierra Leone	4.6	33
Kenya	28.2	8	Togo	4.3	34
Tanzania	28	9	Eritrea	3.6	35
Algeria	27.9	10	Ctrl. African Rep.	3.1	36
Uganda	19.1	11	Liberia	3	37
Mozambique	17.3	12	Congo	2.4	38
Ghana	17.2	13	Mauritania	2.2	39
Cote d' Ivoire	14.3	14	Lesotho	1.9	40
Madagascar	13.4	15	Namibia	1.6	41
Cameroon	13.1	16	Botswana	1.4	42
Zimbabwe	11	17	Gabon	1.1	43
Burkina Faso	10.1	18	Guinea-Bissau	1.1	44
Angola	9.8	19	Mauritius	1.1	45
Malawi	9.7	20	Gambia, The	1	46
Zambia	9.2	21	Swaziland	0.9	47
Mali	9.1	22	Comoros	0.49	48
Niger	9	23	Cape Verde	0.4	49
Senegal	8.7	24	Djibouti	0.4	50
Tunisia	8.7	25	Equatorial Guinea	0.4	51
Rwanda	8.4	26	Sao Tome & Prin.	0.1	52
			Seychelles	0.071	53

## *RANKING TABLE 2: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA (IN DOLLARS)*

<u>Country</u>	<u>GNP per capita</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>GNP per capita</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Libya	6,506	1	Zambia	352	27
Seychelles	6,210	2	Sudan	320	28
Mauritius	3,092	3	Ghana	309	29
Gabon	2,844	4	Ctrl. African Republic	302	30
Botswana	2,800	5	Benin	277	31
South Africa	2,720	6	Equatorial Guinea	274	32
Namibia	1,836	7	Djibouti	250	33
Tunisia	1,742	8	Kenya	232	34
Algeria	1,452	9	Uganda	231	35
Morocco	1,057	10	Guinea-Bissau	218	36
Swaziland	1,033	11	Togo	218	37
Cape Verde	779	12	Mali	202	38
Lesotho	695	13	Madagascar	200	39
Egypt	689	14	Burkina Faso	180	40
Angola	560	15	Sao Tome & Principe	171	41
Guinea	513	16	Niger	168	42
Comoros	510	17	Chad	164	43
Liberia	480	18	Sierra Leone	157	44
Congo	475	19	Burundi	142	45
Zimbabwe	463	20	Zaire	133	46
Mauritania	442	21	Malawi	129	47
Senegal	425	22	Ethiopia	91	48
Nigeria	421	23	Tanzania	74	49
Cameroon	405	24	Rwanda	70	50
Gambia, The	385	25	Mozambique	69	51
Cote d' Ivoire	381	26	Eritrea	-	52
			Somalia	-	53

## RANKING TABLE 3: SIZE OF ARMED FORCES (IN THOUSANDS)

Country	Size of Armed Forces	Rank	Country	Size of Armed Forces	Rank
Egypt	430	1	Mozambique	11	27
Morocco	195	2	Congo	10	28
Algeria	126	3	Malawi	10	29
Angola	120	4	Mauritania	10	30
Ethiopia	120	5	Burkina Faso	9	31
South Africa	102	6	Botswana	8	32
Sudan	82	7	Djibouti	8	33
Libya	80	8	Mali	8	34
Nigeria	80	9	Namibia	8	35
Uganda	60	10	Ghana	7	36
Eritrea	55	11	Guinea-Bissau	7	37
Zaire	53	12	Niger	7	38
Tanzania	50	13	Benin	6	39
Zimbabwe	43	14	Gabon	6	40
Rwanda	40	15	Togo	6	41
Tunisia	35	16	Cent. African Rep.	5	42
Chad	30	17	Liberia	5	43
Kenya	22	18	Sao Tome & Principe	3	44
Madagascar	21	19	Swaziland	3	45
Burundi	17	20	Lesotho	2	46
Zambia	16	21	Cape Verde	1	47
Cote d' Ivoire	15	22	Equatorial Guinea	1	48
Senegal	14	23	Gambia, The	1	49
Sierra Leone	13	24	Mauritius	1	50
Cameroon	12	25	Seychelles	0.3	51
Guinea	12	26	Comoros	-	52
			Somalia	-	53

## ***RANKING TABLE 4: SOLDIERS PER 1000 PEOPLE***

<u>Country</u>	<u>Soldiers/1000 People</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Soldiers/1000 People</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Sao Tome & Principe	21.9	1	South Africa	2.3	27
Djibouti	19.4	2	Ethiopia	2.2	28
Libya	15.8	3	Guinea	1.9	29
Eritrea	15.3	4	Tanzania	1.8	30
Angola	12.2	5	Zambia	1.7	31
Egypt	7	6	Liberia	1.7	32
Morocco	6.8	7	Central African Republic	1.6	33
Guinea-Bissau	6.4	8	Madagascar	1.6	34
Botswana	5.9	9	Senegal	1.6	35
Chad	5.5	10	Togo	1.4	36
Gabon	5.3	11	Zaire	1.2	37
Namibia	5	12	Benin	1.1	38
Rwanda	4.8	13	Cote d' Ivoire	1	39
Mauritania	4.6	14	Gambia, The	1	40
Algeria	4.5	15	Lesotho	1	41
Seychelles	4.2	16	Malawi	1	42
Congo	4.1	17	Burkina Faso	0.9	43
Tunisia	4	18	Cameroon	0.9	44
Zimbabwe	3.9	19	Mali	0.9	45
Swaziland	3.2	20	Mauritius	0.9	46
Uganda	3.1	21	Kenya	0.8	47
Burundi	2.8	22	Niger	0.8	48
Sierra Leone	2.8	23	Nigeria	0.8	49
Sudan	2.8	24	Mozambique	0.6	50
Cape Verde	2.4	25	Ghana	0.4	51
Equatorial Guinea	2.4	26	Comoros	-	52
			Somalia	-	53

## RANKING TABLE 5: MILITARY EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA (IN CONSTANT 1994 DOLLARS)

Country	Military Expenditures	Rank	Country	Military Expenditures	Rank
Libya	277	1	Guinea	8	27
Botswana	169	2	Sierra Leone	8	28
Seychelles	127	3	Guinea-Bissau	7	29
Gabon	82	4	Senegal	7	30
South Africa	66	5	Benin	6	31
Tunisia	62	6	Equatorial Guinea	6	32
Angola	49	7	Mozambique	6	33
Algeria	48	8	Togo	6	34
Morocco	43	9	Burundi	5	35
Djibouti	42	10	Cote d' Ivoire	5	36
Namibia	35	11	Kenya	5	37
Egypt	28	12	Burkina Faso	4	38
Mauritania	17	13	Chad	4	39
Swaziland	17	14	Mali	4	40
Zimbabwe	17	15	Zambia	4	41
Gambia, The	14	16	Nigeria	3	42
Rwanda	14	17	Uganda	3	43
Eritrea	13	18	Zaire	3	44
Lesotho	13	19	Ethiopia	2	45
Liberia	12	20	Ghana	2	46
Congo	11	21	Madagascar	2	47
Sudan	11	22	Niger	2	48
Central African Republic	10	23	Tanzania	2	49
Mauritius	10	24	Malawi	1	50
Cameroon	8	25	Comoros	-	51
Cape Verde	8	26	Sao Tome & Principe	-	52
			Somalia	-	53

## ***RANKING TABLE 6: MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES***

<u>Country</u>	<u>Military \$ as % of Govt. \$</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Military \$ as % of Govt. \$</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Sudan	65.9	1	Uganda	7.6	27
Zaire	44.2	2	Algeria	7.5	28
Rwanda	23.9	3	Equatorial Guinea	7.5	29
Sierra Leone	20.2	4	South Africa	7.4	30
Burundi	19.3	5	Mali	7.3	31
Gambia, The	18.7	6	Tanzania	7.2	32
Mozambique	14.3	7	Guinea	7	33
Botswana	14.1	8	Kenya	6.7	34
Morocco	13.8	9	Lesotho	6.5	35
Mauritania	13.5	10	Congo	6.2	36
Zimbabwe	12.9	11	Niger	5.1	37
Benin	12.8	12	Nigeria	5	38
Burkina Faso	12.8	13	Namibia	4.8	39
Djibouti	12.8	14	Zambia	4.8	40
Ctrl. African Republic	12.7	15	Madagascar	4.2	41
Angola	12.4	16	Swaziland	4.1	42
Cameroon	10.5	17	Malawi	3.8	43
Togo	10.5	18	Ghana	3.6	44
Chad	9.6	19	Cape Verde	2	45
Tunisia	9.2	20	Mauritius	1.4	46
Ethiopia	9.1	21	Comoros	-	47
Egypt	8.9	22	Cote d' Ivoire	-	48
Gabon	8.6	23	Eritrea	-	49
Libya	8.3	24	Liberia	-	50
Guinea-Bissau	8.2	25	Sao Tome & Principe	-	51
Senegal	7.9	26	Seychelles	-	52
			Somalia	-	53

## RANKING TABLE 7: U.S. MILITARY AID AND TRAINING PER CAPITA (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

Country	Population	IMET Spending 1991-95	Military Sales 1991-95	Total Military Training & Aid	Total Military Training & Aid Per Capita	Rank
Egypt	61.1	6,834	4,915,683	4,922,517	80,565	1
Djibouti	0.4	653	4,118	4,771	11,928	2
Tunisia	8.7	5,263	75,842	81,105	9,322	3
Seychelles	0.071	294	315	609	8,577	4
Sao Tome & Principe	0.1	431	349	780	7,800	5
Cape Verde	0.4	624	1,981	2,605	6,513	6
Botswana	1.4	2,432	5,771	8,203	5,859	7
Namibia	1.6	1,053	3,570	4,623	2,889	8
Morocco	28.6	4,731	77,534	82,265	2,876	9
Guinea-Bissau	1.1	694	2,143	2,837	2,579	10
Gambia, The	1	430	1,887	2,317	2,317	11
Senegal	8.7	3,059	13,212	16,271	1,870	12
Chad	5.5	1,353	5,743	7,096	1,290	13
Equatorial Guinea	0.4	198	260	458	1,145	14
Niger	9	1,555	6,166	7,721	858	15
Comoros	0.49	287	85	372	759	16
Mauritius	1.1	157	650	807	734	17
Gabon	1.1	307	421	728	662	18
Sierra Leone	4.6	720	2,106	2,826	614	19
Kenya	28.2	2,716	14,337	17,053	605	20
Swaziland	0.9	513	-	513	570	21
Ctrl. African Republic	3.1	800	328	1,128	364	22
Guinea	6.4	773	1,519	2,292	358	23
Congo	2.4	749	13	762	318	24
Lesotho	1.9	400	200	600	316	25
Zimbabwe	11	1,476	1,770	3,246	295	26
Eritrea	3.6	282	660	942	262	27
Cote d' Ivoire	14.3	946	2,496	3,442	241	28
Mali	9.1	861	1,137	1,998	220	29
Cameroon	13.1	1,198	1,511	2,709	207	30
Ghana	17.2	1,258	2,030	3,288	191	31
Burundi	6.1	754	315	1,069	175	32
Benin	5.3	596	326	922	174	33
Malawi	9.7	633	983	1,616	167	34
Togo	4.3	126	371	497	116	35
Algeria	27.9	592	2,123	2,715	97	36
Rwanda	8.4	368	442	810	96	37
Madagascar	13.4	526	648	1,174	88	38
Uganda	19.1	874	235	1,109	58	39
Mozambique	17.3	586	368	954	55	40
Zambia	9.2	8	450	458	50	41
Ethiopia	54.3	521	2,140	2,661	49	42
Zaire	42.7	453	1,387	1,840	43	43
Mauritania	2.2	84	-	84	38	44

## *RANKING TABLE 7: U.S. MILITARY AID AND TRAINING PER CAPITA (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) CTD.*

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>IMET Spending 1991-95</u>	<u>Military Sales 1991-95</u>	<u>Total Military Training &amp; Aid</u>	<u>Total Military Training &amp; Aid Per Capita</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Tanzania	28	595	-	595	21	45
Nigeria	98.1	688	461	1,149	12	46
Burkina Faso	10.1	107	-	107	11	47
South Africa	43.9	401	-	401	9	48
Angola	9.8	-	-	-	-	49
Liberia	3	-	-	-	-	50
Libya	5.1	-	-	-	-	51
Somalia	6.7	-	-	-	-	52
Sudan	29.4	-	-	-	-	53

## Master Tables

Country	Population Millions	Armed Forces Thousands	Armed Forces per 1000 People	Military Expenditures (ME) Million dollars	Central Government Expenditures (CGE) Million dollars	ME CGE Percent	GNP Per Capita Constant 1994 dollars
Algeria	27.9	126	4.5	1,335	17,900	7.5	1,452
Angola	9.8	120	12.2	515	4,168	12.4	560
Benin	5.3	6	1.1	34	266	12.8	277
Botswana	1.4	8	5.9	229	1629	14.1	2,800
Burkina Faso	10.1	9	0.9	43	336	12.8	180
Burundi	6.1	17	2.8	32	166	19.3	142
Cameroon	13.1	12	0.9	102	974	10.5	405
Cape Verde	0.4	1	2.4	3	152	2.0	779
Central African Republic	3.1	5	1.6	30	237	12.7	302
Chad	5.5	30	5.5	24	251	9.6	164
Comoros	0.49	-	-	-	-	-	510
Congo	2.4	10	4.1	28	454	6.2	475
Cote d' Ivoire	14.3	15	1	61	-	-	381
Djibouti	0.4	8	19.4	25	195	12.8	250
Egypt	61.1	430	7	1,742	19,480	8.9	689
Equatorial Guinea	0.4	1	2.4	2	27	7.5	274
Eritrea	3.6	55	15.3	39	-	-	-
Ethiopia	54.3	120	2.2	128	1,402	9.1	91
Gabon	1.1	6	5.3	93	1,084	8.6	2,844
Gambia, The	1	1	1	14	75	18.7	385
Ghana	17.2	7	0.4	41	1,125	3.6	309
Guinea	6.4	12	1.9	50	717	7.0	513
Guinea-Bissau	1.1	7	6.4	8	97	8.2	218
Kenya	28.2	22	0.8	138	2,053	6.7	232
Lesotho	1.9	2	1	26	405	6.4	695
Liberia	3	5	1.7	30	-	-	480
Libya	5.1	80	15.8	1,399	16,792	8.3	6,506
Madagascar	13.4	21	1.6	24	576	4.2	200
Malawi	9.7	10	1	13	343	3.8	129
Mali	9.1	8	0.9	34	465	7.3	202
Mauritania	2.2	10	4.6	36	267	13.5	442
Mauritius	1.1	1	0.9	11	776	1.4	3,092
Morocco	28.6	195	6.8	1,228	8,897	13.8	1,057
Mozambique	17.3	11	0.6	104	729	14.3	69
Namibia	1.6	8	5	56	1,173	4.8	1,836
Niger	9	7	0.8	14	275	5.1	168
Nigeria	98.1	80	0.8	324	6,438	5.0	421
Rwanda	8.4	40	4.8	114	476	23.9	70
Sao Tome & Principe	0.1	3	21.9	-	4	-	171
Senegal	8.7	14	1.6	60	755	7.9	425
Seychelles	0.071	0.3	4.2	9	-	-	6,210
Sierra Leone	4.6	13	2.8	36	178	20.2	157
Somalia	6.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Africa	43.9	102	2.3	2,899	39,110	7.4	2,720
Sudan	29.4	82	2.8	725	1,100	65.9	320
Swaziland	0.9	3	3.2	16	390	4.1	1,033
Tanzania	28	50	1.8	69	952	7.2	74
Togo	4.3	6	1.4	25	238	10.5	218
Tunisia	8.7	35	4	543	5,911	9.2	1,742
Uganda	19.1	60	3.1	66	869	7.6	231
Zaire	42.7	53	1.2	117	265	44.2	133
Zambia	9.2	16	1.7	39	814	4.8	352
Zimbabwe	11	43	3.9	188	1,455	12.9	463
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>700.6</b>			<b>12,921</b>	<b>142,441</b>		<b>43,848</b>

## Master Tables

Country	ME Per Capita Constant 1994 dollars	Military Sales 1991-95 Dollars in Thousands	IMET Spending 1991-95 Dollars in Thousands	IMET Student 1991-95	Political & Economic Power of the Armed Forces	Degree of Democracy	Civil Conflict	U.S. Support for African Armed Forces
Algeria	48	2,123	592	51	1	3	1	2
Angola	49	-	-	-	1	2	2	3
Benin	6	326	596	29	2	1	3	1
Botswana	169	5,771	2,432	166	3	1	3	1
Burkina Faso	4	-	107	5	1	3	1	3
Burundi	5	315	754	33	1	4	1	2
Cameroon	8	1,511	1,198	65	1	3	2	2
Cape Verde	8	1,981	624	20	3	1	3	2
Central African Republic	10	328	800	37	1	2	1	2
Chad	4	5,743	1,353	72	1	2	1	1
Comoros	-	85	287	13	1	2	1	3
Congo	11	13	749	32	1	2	1	2
Cote d' Ivoire	5	2,496	946	48	1	2	3	2
Djibouti	42	4,118	653	34	1	3	2	1
Egypt	28	4,915,683	6,834	611	1	3	1	1
Equatorial Guinea	6	260	198	7	1	3	3	2
Eritrea	13	660	282	22	1	3	2	1
Ethiopia	2	2,140	521	37	1	3	2	2
Gabon	82	421	307	9	1	2	2	3
Gambia, The	14	1,887	430	34	1	3	3	3
Ghana	2	2,030	1,258	88	1	2	3	2
Guinea	8	1,519	773	32	1	3	3	2
Guinea-Bissau	7	2,143	694	30	2	2	3	2
Kenya	5	14,337	2,716	210	1	3	2	1
Lesotho	13	200	400	32	1	2	3	3
Liberia	12	-	-	-	1	4	1	3
Libya	277	-	-	-	1	3	1	4
Madagascar	2	648	526	25	3	2	3	3
Malawi	1	983	633	40	2	2	3	2
Mali	4	1,137	861	38	2	2	2	2
Mauritania	17	-	84	4	1	3	2	2
Mauritius	10	650	157	10	1	1	3	2
Morocco	43	77,534	4,731	304	1	3	2	1
Mozambique	6	368	586	19	1	2	2	2
Namibia	35	3,570	1,053	76	2	1	3	1
Niger	2	6,166	1,555	71	1	3	2	2
Nigeria	3	461	688	73	1	3	1	3
Rwanda	14	442	368	15	1	3	1	2
Sao Tome & Principe	-	349	431	15	1	2	3	2
Senegal	7	13,212	3,059	132	3	2	1	1
Seychelles	127	315	294	14	1	3	3	2
Sierra Leone	8	2,106	720	50	1	3	1	2
Somalia	-	-	-	-	1	4	1	4
South Africa	66	-	401	19	2	1	2	3
Sudan	11	-	-	-	1	3	1	4
Swaziland	17	-	513	42	3	3	3	2
Tanzania	2	-	595	45	2	3	3	3
Togo	6	371	126	6	1	3	2	3
Tunisia	62	75,842	5,263	476	1	3	3	1
Uganda	3	235	874	74	1	3	1	2
Zaire	3	1,387	8	36	1	4	1	3
Zambia	4	450	453	-	3	2	3	2
Zimbabwe	17	1,770	1,476	107	1	3	3	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1308</b>	<b>5,154,086</b>	<b>50,959</b>	<b>3408</b>				

## SOURCES & METHODOLOGY

The following statistics were derived from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995 produced by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency unless otherwise indicated. Charts such as Degree of Democracy, Political and Economic Power of Armed Forces, U.S. Support for Military, and Level of Civil Conflict were explained in Chapter I. Rankings are out of 53 nations except where data was unavailable.

**Population** Statistics for Eritrea and Seychelles were derived from The Military Balance, 1995/96 produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The statistic for Comoros came from African Development Indicators, 1996 produced by the World Bank.

**Rank** All nations included in this ranking

**GNP per capita** Statistics for Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sudan were derived from World Military and Social Expenditures 1996 produced by World Priorities, Inc. Statistics for Comoros and Seychelles came from African Development Indicators, 1996. The statistic for Djibouti was derived from Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995, produced by the United States State Department.

**Rank** Eritrea and Somalia are not included in this ranking.

**Size of armed forces, Soldiers per 1000 people** Statistics for Eritrea and Liberia were derived from World Military and Social Expenditures 1996. The statistic for Seychelles came from The Military Balance, 1995/96.

**Rank** Comoros and Somalia and not included in this ranking.

**Military Spending** Statistics for Angola, Eritrea, and Seychelles were derived from The Military Balance, 1995/96. Statistic for the Sudan came from World Military and Social Expenditures 1996.

**Share of government budget** The most recent available central government expenditures statistic is for 1994. Those nations that did not have a 1994 statistic but could be estimated are Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Estimates for these nations were derived by finding the most recent central government expenditure. The gross national product for that year was divided by the 1994 gross national product to derive a growth rate. The central government expenditure for 1994 was then derived using that growth rate. For some nations, the 1994 gross national product had to be derived using the 1992 and 1993 statistics. The military as a share of the government budget was then calculated by dividing the military expenditures by the central government expenditures.

**Rank** Comoros, Cote D'Ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, Seychelles, and Somalia were not included in this ranking.

**Military spending per capita** Statistics for Angola, Liberia, and Sudan were derived from World Military and Social Expenditures 1996. Statistics for Djibouti, Eritrea, and Seychelles came from The Military Balance, 1995/96.

**Rank** Comoros, and Sao Tome and Principe were not included in this ranking.

**Main ethnic groupings, Main Religions** Statistics derived from the World Fact Book produced by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the A to Z Geopedia Online web page.

**U.S. military aid and training per capita, 1991-1995** Statistics derived from adding military sales and International Military Education and Training (IMET) spending from 1991-1995. All statistics for U.S. military assistance were derived from Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1995 produced by the United States Defense Security Agency of the Department of Defense. Total was then divided by the population to find the per capita number.

**Rank** All nations included in this ranking

**Political Summary** Information for the report has been collected over the past six years including two trips to Africa to talk with African NGOs in Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The bibliography contains all the resources used for the report. The bibliography contains primary resources and secondary resources.

## **Electronic & World Wide Web Resources**

- A to Z Geopedia Online (<http://www.geopedia.com/online/contents.htm>)
- African News Service Online, (<http://www.afnews.org/ans/>)
- Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book (<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/95fact/index.html>)
- **ClickArt Incredible Image Pak 65,000**, T/Maker Company
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- Africa Business
- Africa Confidential
- Africa Events

- Africa News
- Africa Report
- Africa Research Bulletin
- Africa Today
- Associated Press
- Atlantic Monthly
- BBC Focus on Africa
- Boston Globe
- Center for Strategic and International Studies Africa Notes
- Chicago Tribune
- Christian Science Monitor
- Constitutional Rights Journal
- Current History
- Defense News
- Economist
- Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report
- Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile
- FBIS
- Focus
- Guardian
- Harper's Magazine
- Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law: Southern Africa Project
- Los Angeles Times
- MACLEAN'S
- Middle East Business Week
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- New African
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- Parameters, Winter 1993-1994
- Reuters
- Review of African Political Economy
- Somalia Today
- Time
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