




**Centre for Democratization Studies
Working Papers on Democratization**



**Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good
Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative
Study of the Policies of Four Northern Donors**

Gordon Crawford



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FOREWORD

The 1990's have witnessed a widespread process of dramatic political transformation in many parts of the world. The end of communist regimes has given rise to a range of experiments, some initially brave but often becoming hesitant, none yet complete, involving new political movements, some competitive elections, and a degree of constitutionalism in politics. But in the process, over 20 new states and many other would be 'nation-states' have emerged, often accompanied by major conflict. Replacement of authoritarian regimes by pluralistic and electoral politics, begun in Latin America in the 1980s, has continued in other parts of the 'Third World' - itself perhaps an anachronistic concept. In Africa, there have been attempts to replace military, non- or single-party states: pluralistic, competitive and constitutional forms of one sort have successfully emerged in 20 states, but been stalled in others, notably Nigeria. Such political transformations have also been attempted as a means of resolving conflict, in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Somalia - again with mixed fortunes and violent eruptions have emerged in Rwanda, Sudan and several West African countries. Similar aspirations have emerged in parts of the Middle East and East and South-East Asia - with as yet little progress toward anything recognisable as 'democratisation'. Meanwhile, institutions in the so-called 'democracies' themselves have been undergoing change and there is clear need for democratic deepening - not least in Britain, in the European Union and other new regional pan-state authorities, and in the increasingly influential institutions handling a more and more globalised economy.

These processes are dramatic and, where successful, inspiring, but they also provide a new challenging intellectual agenda. How successful has been 'democratisation' in specific instances - and by what criteria is such an evaluation made? Can social, economic or cultural pre-conditions that facilitate or inhibit democratisation be identified? As political transformation is sought in the former 'Second World' in a context of economic reform toward capitalism and in the 'Third World' toward a more liberalised capitalism, what can be said about the interaction and staging of the two processes? What explanation for the widespread emergence of political competition, either within or beyond a constitutional arena, taking the form of ethnic, regional or religious rivalries? And can in fact imaginative constitution-making and other political processes within civil society provide a bounded forum that contains potential conflict?

An agenda of these and many other issues raised by global patterns of political transformation and the actual trends of democratisation, both those successful and those which are not, provide a focus for the work of the Centre for the Study of Democratisation formed in Leeds in 1993. One of the issues raised by the political changes of the 1990s is the extent to which external powers and international agencies help or hinder in processes of democratisation. This question is the focus of a major research project being undertaken by the Centre on 'Aid & Political Conditionality'. This Report by Gordon Crawford in fact presents some of the initial findings of that research, documenting the objectives and strategies of four major donors as they have developed programmes of intervention to promote political change - both by stick, of withholding aid, or the carrot of funding for 'reform' measures. Other aspects of this work will continue the critical evaluation of such efforts, including assessment of their

impact on the overall political trajectory, especially in some African countries - Nigeria, Malawi, Kenya, Egypt and Zambia. Such work, as well as other projects within the Centre, will be the subject of future Papers in this Series (see list on Back Cover).

Other research within the Centre is exploring political transformation in the former USSR, especially the emergence and role of Parliament, and in the continued process of state (re-) formation in the Middle East. It also includes work on the European Parliament and the 'democratic deficit' in the European Union. An important corner-stone has been work on a 'Democratic Audit of the United Kingdom' - a timely topic in itself but the criteria developed as an assessment by David Beetham afford, with appropriate modification, an invaluable tool for evaluating transitions elsewhere.

The Centre's programme also extends to teaching and consultancy work. It offers a M.A. course of study in 'Democratic Theory and Process' as well as undergraduate options, contributing to the Leeds Politics Department's degrees in Politics and Parliamentary Studies which involve internships in Westminster, Washington, Ottawa, Madrid, Strasbourg and Moscow. A Consultancy Unit offering applied research, advisory and evaluation services on governance, human rights, election monitoring and other aspects of democratisation has recently been established.

David Beetham
Lionel Cliffe

January 1995.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This working report is based largely on primary materials in the public record collected by the author, i.e. political speeches, policy statements, aid agency documents etc, backed up by interviews with relevant government officials. It seeks to use such materials to characterize the policies of the four donor agencies examined. Every effort has, of course, been taken to ensure accurate representation of each donor's policies. However, two caveats must be stated. First, such accuracy is a measure not only of the efforts of the author, but also of the availability and accessibility of the information. The more opaque are the workings of government institutions, the less likely that the detail and depth of policy can be fully presented. Second, policy in this field is still evolving and depiction of it is somewhat akin to trying to hit a moving target. This creates some methodological difficulties in carrying out a comparative study. A snap-shot has been taken at the time of writing with an analysis of policy directions and patterns of policy development. However it is recognised that some of the differences between donors may be temporal and turn out to be less significant as ideas continue to develop and experience is shared; alternatively, similarities in policy rhetoric may be translated quite differently into practice.

I wish to acknowledge and to thank the following for their assistance in the preparation of this report: the government officials and other individuals interviewed (see Appendix 1) for their time, courtesy and helpfulness, often when faced with more urgent and important tasks than talking to a researcher; David Beetham, Lionel Cliffe, Carolyn Baylies and Anne Palmer for their comments on the first draft and their support generally; Anna Brodin for her comments, particularly on the Swedish sections; Kevin Bampton for comments particularly on British aid; Dot Moss for putting up with my overtime and for her own astute comments; Danny Farrar for production of the Figures; in particular Pauline Starkie for all her efforts in word processing so much text, including the Tables, and for her patience with my continual re-drafting. Nonetheless, responsibility for the text, both the views expressed as well as any errors or omissions, remains with myself alone.

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SUMMARY

Part 1. Introduction

Since 1990 there has been a major shift in the development co-operation policies of nearly all Northern 'donor' governments, with aid being linked to the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance in 'recipient' countries.

Such policies represent a break with Cold War practices when, with rare exceptions, no such concepts or principles informed aid policies and *realpolitik* was the only justification needed for support of authoritarian regimes. At the same time the recent policies of 'political conditionality' and aid for political reform can be seen as a continuity with economic conditionality, linking aid to the adoption of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs).

Aims of Report

This working report is a comparative study of the emergence and unfolding of what we call 'political aid policies', including both conditionality and support for political reforms, within four Northern donors, the governments of Britain, Sweden and the United States, plus the European Union. It traces the evolution of the policies, examines the meanings given to the three key policy goals of promoting human rights, democracy and good governance, and the measures proposed for policy operationalisation. It attempts a critical assessment of the policies, both in terms of the internal logic of the definitional and operational frameworks adopted by the donors, and by raising issues external to their terms of reference. It is the first report of an ongoing research project involving a larger team, and further work will look at how such aid policies have been put into practice, examining implementation by the four donors globally as well as evaluating implementation, impact and effectiveness in detail through three country case-studies in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia.

Part 2. Policy Evolution

Despite a striking concurrence in the introduction of political aid policies in the early 1990s, and an overall similarity in the policy statements, there are also some notable differences. Most fundamentally there are differing emphases, potentially leading to variant practices, on what constitutes the core policy area. Is human rights the central concern, or democracy, or public administration development?

Democracy and Economic Development

An assumption held in common by the four donors, though with differing degrees of assertion, is that democracy will contribute positively to economic development. Two points can be noted. First, this is a shift from earlier paradigms which tended to see 'strong regimes' as a pre-requisite for development. Second, the current assumption is not

unambiguously corroborated by academic research. There may be some evidence of such a correlation (Rueschemeyer et al 1992), but other reviewers state that this does not amount to "systematic evidence" of such a relationship (Healey & Robinson 1992), and there is no consensus on the direction of causal linkages. In addition there is a variance amongst donors in whether democracy is seen as an *end* in itself (e.g. the EU), or more as a *means* to economic development (e.g. the UK). The seriousness with which the latter objective will be pursued is questionable if the underlying assumption becomes more open to debate once again.

Positive and Negative Measures

There is a common emphasis amongst the donors examined towards positive measures to promote human rights, democracy and good governance, yet with some preparedness to take negative measures up to and including suspension of aid in situations of gross violations of human rights or reversals in the democratisation process. Some donors (e.g. UK and Sweden) also indicate the integration of human rights and democracy criteria into their procedures for determining overall country aid allocations. However, it remains to be seen how donors will detail such criteria, what means will be adopted for their evaluation, and what weight will be accorded to them amongst the range of factors determining country allocations. In addition, the rewards of additional aid for politically reforming governments, as particularly indicated by Britain, are unlikely to be generous in the face of overall budget constraints.

Geographical Focus

The explicit geographical focus of the policies is world-wide. However, it is likely that sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will be the region most targeted by the new policy agenda given the aid dependence of the many least developed countries there and the lack of countervailing commercial or strategic interests.

Explanatory Factors

Why have such aid policy developments occurred? Three key explanatory factors are put forward. The first is the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, ending the need, as perceived by many Western governments, of supporting right-wing authoritarian regimes, and ushering in the feeling that if 'democracy' has triumphed in Eastern Europe then it can be promoted everywhere. The other is the introduction by the World Bank in 1989, in the context of the disappointing results of SAPs in SSA, of the concept of governance. This expressed the perceived need not just for less government, but better government, as a means to economic reform and development. Although arising from different discourses, these two elements came together at the historical conjuncture of the early 1990s, and to a considerable degree account for the articulation of the new aid policies. A further explanatory factor stems from the domestic needs of aid agencies to build a constituency of support both within government and amongst the general public for maintaining development assistance levels at a time of budgetary pressures. Political aid policies contribute to a fresh rationale for aid.

Military Expenditure

Another element that commonly features in the policy statements is the issue of 'excessive military expenditure'. However, this is not addressed in this report precisely because none of the donors examined appear to have taken any steps to move beyond policy rhetoric in this area.

Part 3. Policy Operationalisation

The policy changes introduce not only a new and very broad agenda for donor agencies, but also a problematic one. In particular, the definitions of the three key terms, human rights, democracy and good governance, are all contested and interpreted in different ways. The meaning of democracy in particular is subject to much ideological contestation. Human rights at least benefits from some clarity bestowed by its incorporation into international law. The difficulties in defining governance, and *good* governance, stem mainly from its newness and that no standard definition exists separate from this new policy agenda itself.

DONOR DEFINITIONS

How do the donors define the three concepts and what is the degree of congruence or divergence between them?

Human Rights

Most consensus is found concerning human rights, all four donors delimiting human rights in this context as civil and political liberties only. Economic and social rights, where mentioned, are regarded as promoted through the aid programme as a whole. However this report adds its voice to challenging donor governments to demonstrate the degree to which this is in fact the case, questioning in particular how poverty-focused are their programmes. (See below: *Indivisibility and Aid and Economic and Social Rights*).

Democracy

There is considerable variation and lack of clarity in the donors' formulations of democracy, with unanimity only on free and fair elections within a multi-party system. The EU does not appear to have clearly outlined the other constituent elements of democracy; the UK does not use the term democracy, preferring 'legitimacy' of government. The adequacy of that formulation is questioned here.

Good Governance

There is a greater degree of difference among the four donors as to what constitutes even the broad parameters of governance. The EU again has not attempted to define what it means; USAID's term of 'lawful governance' incorporates elements more commonly discussed under

'democracy'; the UK and Sweden focus on public administration management and efforts to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. The latter interpretation has much in common with the World Bank's definition of governance, which, it is argued, is likely to become increasingly influential among bilateral donors - perhaps to the detriment of broader concerns with democracy.

DONOR MEASURES

As regards the operationalisation of the new policies, the aid agencies have generally identified a number of main areas as appropriate for their support and within each listed a range of possible measures. Different agencies tend to have addressed different aspects of the overall agenda with varying degrees of detail and clarity, indicating in part their own priorities. Sweden has developed the most comprehensive framework for the promotion of human rights. The US has outlined an extensive package of support for strengthening emerging democracies, yet coverage of human rights is limited. The Swedish and British aid agencies (SIDA and ODA respectively) have developed a comprehensive range of measures to promote the effective performance of government, particularly through improvements in public sector management. The lack of an EU strategy document reinforces the impression that its activities, proposed or actual, have been developed in a less well planned manner.

Democracy

As regards the promotion of democratisation, all donors emphasise support to democratic transitions with a focus on multi-party elections. However, if donor support is to go beyond electoral pluralism and focus on the sustainability and deepening of democracy, it is essential for more examination and identification of the conditions which will influence the prospects for democratic **consolidation**.

In order to consolidate democracy, most donors commonly emphasise the need to strengthen **civil society**. Yet the realm of civil society is itself a broad and differentiated area that needs unpacking. The term itself is subject to much current (renewed) academic debate. Donors need to identify more explicitly the elements they wish to direct support to. One would anticipate that such decisions are likely to be influenced by their overall objectives and conception of democracy.

This leads on to the question of what **forms of democracy** the donors are interested in promoting? Is it a narrow notion of democracy, a type of polity most closely associated with a radical free market economy, in which a representative government's use of state power is circumscribed, with minimal state intervention and large areas of economic and social life turned over to unregulated market forces? Alternatively is it a broader one in which popular participation in the democratic process from the bottom upwards is encouraged, strengthening the ability of grass-roots organisations and civil associations to influence and make answerable government decision-making? From the limited information gathered so far, the tendency seems to be towards the formal and narrow rather than the broader end of the spectrum.

Evidence of a more participatory approach might be seen in the donors' common emphasis on **decentralisation** from central to local government. However, decentralisation in itself does not guarantee democracy or greater representation, and attention also needs to be given to the democratic character of local government in the same way as national government.

Good Governance

A comparison of measures to promote good governance is made between ODA, SIDA and the World Bank, looking for elements of congruence or divergence. The most substantial differences found are between, on the one hand, the World Bank and ODA, and on the other, SIDA, underpinned by different conceptions of the role of the state in development. The former two agencies appear concerned to improve the performance of the state only in its minimal role of providing the 'enabling environment' for a radical free market economy. In contrast, SIDA's starting point is a broader perception of the state's role, particularly in the context of Africa, as the most important actor in dealing with the current crisis.

The main questions raised concern how bilateral donors will take forward their agenda of what good governance entails. Will they simply 'piggy-back' on work done by the World Bank, as occurred with economic conditionality and the provision of programme aid, involving in this instance a focus on the aspects of governance that relate most to economic management? Will the promotion of good governance involve a state-building exercise with a significant role assigned to the state in terms of governing the market, providing strategic economic direction, and furnishing basic social and economic needs? Or will governance measures focus more on maintaining the agenda of shrinking the state and keeping it in check, ensuring merely the improved performance of its enabling role to facilitate private sector development?

WIDENING THE AGENDA: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES

It is insufficient merely to compare and evaluate the donors' policies with each other and within their own terms of reference. It is also necessary to broaden the discussion and begin to assess the policies along other lines of enquiry. The wider issues and controversies raised in this way may, at present, pose questions rather than provide answers. However, the intention is, first, to highlight areas for further reflection, and, second, to develop a framework for the future evaluation of policy implementation, the next stage of the research.

Human Rights

The Final Declaration of the UN Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in June 1993 suggests a number of additional criteria along which donor policies can be assessed.

Universality. The universality of human rights may have become the dominant position in international circles, yet this conceals the vigorous debate on universality versus cultural relativity that has taken place in recent times. This should indicate to Northern governments that this is still contested ground, and point to the need to seek dialogue with both Southern

governments and NGO actors, including women's and minority organisations, regarding how human rights problems can be addressed and solved in *their own* countries.

Objectivity and Non-Selectivity. The international community is challenged in the Vienna Declaration to treat human rights globally "in a fair and equal manner", requiring the objective and non-selective application of human rights criteria. This contrasts, however, with past records of the selective and politicised use of human rights, condemning opponents and favouring allies. It remains to be fully documented whether, in the post-cold war period, commercial interests will replace geo-strategic considerations in subordinating human rights concerns and perpetuating inconsistency. The effectiveness of donor policies to promote human rights will be undermined if recipient governments can demonstrate such inconsistency.

Indivisibility. If human rights in the context of political aid are defined solely as civil and political rights, then, in order not to breach the principle of indivisibility, Northern donors will have to show how their overall aid programmes are promoting economic and social rights and the right to development, perhaps through an increased emphasis on poverty-reduction measures. It may also be relevant in this context for donors to consider operationalising the policy statements linking aid provision to 'excessive' military expenditure, given the inverse relation between military and social spending.

Treaty Ratification. If Northern governments are now commonly examining the human rights performance of developing countries, and relating it to aid conditionality, what is their own record in ratification of the UN treaties and relevant regional conventions? Table 6 indicates a mixed record of the three donor governments. If Northern governments are to be consistent and avoid accusations of double standards, it is essential they are prepared to be governed by the same international legislation and monitoring instruments.

Democracy

Sovereignty. If there is an emerging consensus in favour of human rights transcending national sovereignty in international law, there is considerably more disquiet about and objections to external intrusion in the democratisation process. The donors' underlying assumption appears to be that the purpose (i.e. democratisation) justifies the means. However, even if (almost) everyone is in favour of democracy, external intervention is by no means so readily accepted. In evaluating the legitimacy of the donors' interventions in terms of their infringement or not on sovereignty, it would appear that the *manner* of their practices and procedures is crucial.

Universality. Democratisation may be desirable, but there are many different interpretations of democracy, and no one notion can be imposed as universal. The determination of the precise nature of a democratic political system in any country is essentially an internal process. Will Northern donors respect a variety of forms, influenced by local forces, conditions and constraints?

Conditionality. Conditioning aid on democracy grounds is more contentious and problematic than human rights conditionality. How will donors define democracy? What criteria and methods will be used for assessment purposes?

Multipartyism and Ethnicity. In societies divided along ethnic or other lines, it is quite possible that the introduction of pluralism and multipartyism will lead to political parties organised mainly on ethnic lines, potentially setting off ethnic conflict. How will donors promoting democracy deal with such unintended and counterproductive effects? Will the necessary attention and reflection be given, in dialogue with local actors, to the forms of constitutional and institutional arrangements most appropriate to the management and resolution of conflict?

Good Governance

It is argued here that the World Bank's focus on improving governance is likely to become increasingly influential with bilateral donors. However the context in which governance concerns arose for the Bank, the mixed results of SAPs, raises some wider issues, along which bilateral donor policies will need to be assessed.

Governance and Structural Adjustment. What are the links between governance reforms and SAPs? Will measures to improve governance focus on a narrow agenda pertinent to improved implementation of SAPs, or a wider focus on strengthening the effectiveness of public administration more generally, including *indigenous* capacity building and *autonomous* policy-making?

Governance, Democracy and Sovereignty. Is the popular control of government, ostensibly being strengthened through the increased transparency and accountability of government, simultaneously being undermined by the effective removal from government, through SAPs, of economic policy choice? Are Northern donors, both multilateral and bilateral, now effectively taking over from the state the role of providing strategic direction over the economy, rendering moves to democratic control of national government less than meaningful, as well as raising issues of sovereignty?

Governance and Neo-liberalism. Does the new focus on good governance constitute a break with or continuity with neo-liberal theories of the role of the state? The governance initiative undoubtedly represents a recognition that the nature of government matters. However, it is contested whether this involves a rehabilitation of the state or whether the governance remit remains enclosed within a minimalist concept of the state's role.

Governance and Human Rights. The achievement of core economic and social rights requires positive action by the state in the distribution and management of public resources and in ensuring the provision of basic services for all. Will governance reforms aim at facilitating progress from weak to strong states, not in authoritarian terms, but in institutional capacity to effect such actions?

Part 4. Conclusion

The conclusion looks at some of the political questions that arise from the new policy agenda.

Promoting Democratization

Why are Northern donors now interested in promoting democracy and how serious and long-term will their support be? If donors' aims and underlying interests primarily concern democracy as a means to the end of economic liberalisation, rather than an end in itself, then continued support for democracy is likely to be influenced by its perceived contribution to market-orientated economic reforms.

Northern governments' interests and intentions will also be reflected in the form of democracy they show an interest in strengthening. Will it be a restricted, elite-dominated democracy in which power tends to shift only between different fractions of a ruling elite? Alternatively, will questions of broadening power be addressed and donors' support extended to movements and groups who emphasise popular participation and increased government accountability?

Whatever donors' policy goals, a number of pitfalls and constraints on the promotion of democracy by *external* agents have been identified. First, if democratisation is essentially an internal process, then an external role is limited to assisting internal change. Second, donor-pressurised reforms are likely to be 'facades', and subject to reversal, unless embedded in indigenous efforts. Third, democratic consolidation is a complex and difficult task, related to a range of factors and conditions in any particular country, not least the problems of constructing democracy in situations of poverty with bleak economic prospects.

Economic and Political Reform

A number of questions have arisen about the relationship between economic and political reform in the context of aid conditionality. First, the introduction in the 1980s of economic conditionality and economic reform as an aid policy goal has had a major impact on developing countries and on the aid programmes themselves. In contrast with political aid policies, despite the fanfare surrounding their introduction, remain more marginal in their impact?

Second, undertaking structural adjustment and democratisation simultaneously is an enormous challenge for the governments of many developing countries. The difficulties are intensified by the potential contradiction that developing country governments could be faced by external insistence on the maintenance of SAPs, and by internal demands for greater democratisation and participation in decision-making. Both multilateral and bilateral donors do not appear to have given much reflection to such issues. Donors are vulnerable to the accusation of hypocrisy, and may thus be ignored, if their advocacy of government accountability and transparency and a pluralist system turns out to exclude public participation in economic policy-making. In turn this raises questions of what will take priority in donor policies if there are incompatibilities between the two sets of reform. Will adjustment programmes be

moderated so as not to undermine fragile democracies? Or will the establishment of a free market economy take precedence and possible reversals to political authoritarianism be ignored?

Third, related to this discussion of donor aims, interests and assumptions is the issue of which of the three key concepts will become most prominent in policy implementation. Suffice to say that the economic dimensions of good governance have been well noted.

Implications for Donor Programmes

What are the implications of these recent policy developments for the donors' own aid programmes and foreign policies?

Aid and Economic and Social Rights. Support for the realisation of core economic and social rights can be equated to the poverty-orientation of aid. Yet even the official figures are disappointing, and a common call from development organisations North and South is for development assistance to have a greater emphasis on poverty-reduction. Tomasevski (1989) goes further in recommending that all aid be evaluated according to human rights criteria.

Democratising Aid Programmes. Ul Haq (1993) challenges donors to de-link their own aid programmes from the Cold War past, and direct aid away from high military spenders and strategic allies and towards the poorest countries.

Open and Accountable Aid. Greater transparency of information on aid programmes are required. Also changed methods of work are recommended, adopting more open and participatory approaches throughout aid projects and programmes, involving intended beneficiaries more closely (Sénécal 1993).

Foreign Policy Priorities. If aid is being linked to the *principles* of human rights and democracy in recipient countries, will these be overridden by Northern governments' strategic and commercial interests? One indication of Northern governments' preparedness to change their own practices would be to cut arms exports and military assistance.

Will Northern governments espousal of democracy and human rights assist the needs and interests of the poor, and embrace political (and economic) reforms which include questions of distribution, social equalities and justice, nationally and internationally?

The questions raised here are intended to be addressed by the project as a whole through further empirical research examining policy implementation in detail both globally and through the country case-studies.

PART 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH

Since 1990 there has been a major shift in the development co-operation policies of nearly all Northern 'donor' governments, with aid being linked to the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance in Southern 'recipient' countries.

The 1980s saw the emergence of economic reform in developing countries as a main objective of aid, indicated by the World Bank's move to policy-based lending and by the bilateral donors introduction of special programme aid, both conditional on the adoption of World Bank/International Monetary Fund-led structural adjustment programmes (SAPs).¹ The 1990s agenda of linking aid to political reform can be seen both as a continuity with 'economic conditionality' and as a break, at least in policy rhetoric, from Cold War practices when, with rare exceptions, *realpolitik* was the only justification needed for the support of authoritarian regimes.

The twin aid policy objectives of economic and political reform, in the post-Cold War context of the promotion by the major Western powers of liberal democracy and free market economics as the sole development model, represent a 'new orthodoxy' (Archer 1994), being pursued by both bilateral and multilateral donors. Economic conditionality and the impact of SAPs on Southern countries has been widely researched, including the effectiveness of World Bank (WB) policy-based lending (Mosley et al 1991). This working report is the initial outcome of a wider programme of research, involving a larger research team, examining what we call 'political aid policies', including both political conditionality and aid *for* political reform. The overall research intends to critically examine the reality of the changes in aid policy post-cold war, why Northern governments are now promoting democracy and human rights in Southern countries, the nature of the models being promoted, the links to economic liberalization, the limits to which external actors can promote political reforms, and the controversial issues raised in the context of North-South relations. It will examine in detail the policies in this field of four donor agencies, three governments, those of Britain, Sweden and the United States, and one international organisation, the European Union, and their implementation in three case-study countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia. Our focus is on bilateral donors because they are seen as taking the lead in this area², in contrast to economic conditionality where they have tended to 'piggy-back' on the adjustment policies of the multilaterals (Hewitt and Killick 1993 p.40). Our choice of country case-studies in SSA represents not only the expertise of the research team members, but also the region where the new aid policies appear to be most directed.

The aims of this working report are two-fold. First, it presents a comparative study of the unfolding of the political aid policies of the four selected donors, examining similarities and differences between their policy statements, their definitions of the key concepts, and their strategies and proposed measures for the operationalisation of policy. Second, it offers a critical analysis and assessment of the donors' policies, both within the definitional and operational framework adopted by the donors, and by raising issues external to their terms

of reference. This initial report does not look at actual implementation of the policies, not going beyond examination of the donors' proposed strategies. Hence the assessment of policies offered here tends to pose questions rather than provide answers. However, the intention at present is both to raise issues and highlight areas for current reflection, and to establish a framework for the future evaluation of policy implementation - the next stage of the research.

The report is divided into four main parts. First, this introduction continues by looking briefly at some examples of political aid policies from a range of both bilateral donors and international bodies *other* than our selected ones, indicating the widespread adoption of policies in this field. Part Two, focusing on the four selected donors, traces in detail the evolution of their policies, and compares the similarities and differences in their initial policy statements. In addition an analysis is put forward accounting in general terms for the emergence of these new aid policies. Part Three concentrates on the subsequent stage of policy development: the strategies of the donor agencies on how to operationalise policy. It examines the definitions and meanings attached by the four donors to the key concepts of human rights, democracy and good governance, along with their ranges of proposed measures. A comparative analysis of the similarities and differences between the donors in the definitions and measures is combined with a widening of the discussion, as indicated above, in order to assess donor policies along broader lines of enquiry, generally outside their terms of reference. Part Four concludes by commenting on some of the political issues raised by the new policy agenda, setting out questions for further research. A final twist is to briefly explore the implications of the new policies for the donors' own aid programmes.

The report is looking at what is still a relatively new area for donor agencies. It is based on materials in the public record at the time of fieldwork research. It is, of course, possible that the four donors have taken further steps forward in their work in this area, either subsequently or in internal documents.

Further stages of the research project, involving the wider team, will examine in more detail the implementation, impact and effectiveness of aid policies in relation to political reform in developing countries, particularly through the three country case-studies.

1.1.1 Selection of donors

As a UK institution we chose to study the British government for self-evident reasons. In addition the British government was one of the first to signal a policy change, has its own distinct concept of 'good government' and regards itself as influential in international circles in such matters.

We felt the inclusion of the European Union (EU) was vital for two reasons. First, the development assistance provided by the EU and its Member States comprises almost half of the total world official development assistance (o.d.a.), and the EU itself has the world's fifth largest programme (Randel and German 1994 p.132).³ Second, an increasingly common approach to development co-operation policies amongst Member States has evolved in recent years, becoming officially established in the Maastricht Treaty, and hence increasing the

significance of policy developments within the EU. Moreover, probably the first manifestation of such a common approach was in the area of human rights and democracy.

We chose Sweden and the United States as representing two countries with different aid traditions. U.S. foreign assistance, which includes military assistance as well as o.d.a., has been very tied up with Cold War foreign policy objectives, with assistance to a number of right-wing authoritarian regimes, for example, El Salvador and Zaire, and support for guerilla opponents of 'Marxist' regimes, for example, UNITA in Angola. Sweden's aid programme, particularly under the succession of Social Democratic governments, has emphasised the aim of equality, and hence given assistance during the 1970s and 1980s to many socialist regimes, for example, Tanzania, Vietnam, and also supported the 'front-line states' in Southern Africa, including the governments of Angola and Mozambique. In quantitative terms there are also notable differences. In volume, the U.S., until recently overtaken by Japan, has been the largest bilateral donor of o.d.a., totalling \$11,709 million in 1992. Sweden, though of course with a fraction of the population, is a relatively small donor, totalling \$2,460 million in 1992, but still ranking ninth out of the 21 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, as a percentage of GNP, the U.S. contributed only 0.2% as o.d.a. in 1992, only above Ireland in the DAC table. Whereas Sweden is one of the few countries to not only achieve the United Nations target of 0.7% GNP, which it has surpassed each year since 1975, but also, until recently, has contributed over 1% and, in 1992 ranked second only to Norway. (OECD 1994 Table 5 p.160).⁴

Hence our selection of the four donors has been determined by a range of factors, including size and importance of donor to policy developments, as well as the need to have donors representative of different points of the spectrum with regard to aid traditions, practices and performance. In addition all four donors have major programmes in countries in sub-Saharan Africa, essential for our case-study research.

1.2 A TREND IN AID POLICY: SOME EXAMPLES

In recent years there has been a remarkable consensus amongst Northern donor governments in the incorporation into aid policy objectives of political reform in recipient countries.⁵ We will examine the policies of our four selected donors in detail in Part Two, *Policy Evolution*. For now, to give a flavour of the new policies, we will look briefly at the policy statements of a few other donors.

The French government was one of the first to introduce political conditionality, with President Mitterand's statement in June 1990, at the biannual La Baule French-African Summit, that France "will link its financial efforts to the efforts made towards liberty" (cited in Uvin 1993 p.66), and would be less generous to those "regimes which conduct themselves in an authoritarian manner without accepting evolution towards democracy" and "enthusiastic towards those who take the step with courage" (cited in ODI Briefing Paper January 1992).⁶

The Japanese government, now the world's largest bilateral donor in aid volume, proclaimed its ODA (overseas development assistance) Charter in June 1992 declaring four principles for aid:

- the pursuit of environment and development in tandem;
- the avoidance of ODA's use for military purposes;
- attention to military expenditure;
- attention to democratization, market economy and human rights.

(Randel and German 1994 p.87)

The German government, in October 1991, introduced five criteria for the allocation of development aid: human rights, participatory democracy, rule of law, market-orientated economic systems, development orientation of public policies (op.cit. p.69).

The so-called Like-Minded Group of bilateral donors (i.e. the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Canada), with a tradition of more 'progressive' policies, particularly concerning human rights, and with a greater orientation towards poverty alleviation, have all incorporated policy objectives in this field. For example, the Dutch government have issued a new policy document, 'A World of Dispute', which updates previous guidelines in the light of more recent global political developments, particularly focusing on the effects of conflict and war. Conflicts are increasingly seen as the cause of stagnating development, and development co-operation is seen as having a key role in conflict-resolution and maintaining order. Hence, changes in Dutch policy include:

- a focus on 'peace-building, peace-making and peace-keeping', with an increased role for emergency aid;
- an emphasis on the greater importance of bringing development co-operation policy into line with foreign policy rather than being integrated with international economic policies, as was the prevailing view in the 1980s;
- the suspension of development assistance where human rights are violated, where there is stagnation in the democratization process or excessive military expenditure.

(Op. cit. p.91).

The examples of the Japanese and German governments' aid policy statements, cited in full, indicate the priority now accorded to aspects of the political systems of recipient countries. In the German case, three out of five criteria are political elements, with an interesting emphasis on *participatory* democracy. The Japanese are particularly firm, at least rhetorically, on not providing assistance to countries with a record of excessive military expenditure. The Dutch government's policies reflect new concerns, updated from the immediate post-Cold War period, where not only democratization is an issue, but also an orientation to conflict-resolution.⁷ The 'new orthodoxy', combining the two objectives of

democratization and free market economic reforms, is reflected in both the German and Japanese statements. However, the Dutch government signals some departure from the consensus, by focusing more on the political realm for itself, and by according greater importance to the integration of aid policy with their foreign policy than with international economic policy.

A number of international bodies have made policy statements in this area, in addition to those of individual donor governments. The DAC, which has a co-ordinating role amongst OECD member countries, focused attention at first on 'participatory development', at its annual High-Level meeting of government ministers in December 1990. Subsequently, reflecting the rapidly moving dialogue amongst donors and the rush of policy statements on political reforms, the DAC has broadened its heading to include 'participatory development and good governance', the latter term including issues of democratization and human rights, as well as governance itself. The December 1991 High-Level meeting devoted "much of its attention to ... recent developments in this field" as "critical items on the development agenda" (OECD 1992 p.6) and the 1993 Meeting endorsed a detailed policy paper covering participatory development, good governance, human rights and democratization as integral elements of sustainable development (OECD 1994 p.28).⁸

Since its 1989 Report on sub-Saharan Africa, the World Bank has moved the concept of governance up to near the top of its development agenda, alongside economic reform. (For more detail see Box 5.)

International bodies representing Southern governments have also appeared to endorse such policy developments. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at its Heads of State meeting in July 1990 declared its commitment to democracy, the importance of human rights and the rule of law, and the need to promote people's participation in both government and development (cited in IDS Bulletin January 1993 p.7).⁹ The Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit in Harare in October 1991 similarly made a positive declaration concerning assistance for entrenching the practices of democracy, accountable administration and the rule of law (op.cit. p.8). Donor governments tend to quote such statements as evidence of international support, South as well as North, for the new policy agenda.¹⁰ However, such meetings did not give "unreserved approval" (Robinson 1994 p.49). The OAU meeting also expressed concern at the "increasing tendency to impose conditionalities of a political nature" on the granting of development assistance (cited in ODI 1992 p.4) and the governments of India, Malaysia and Zimbabwe expressed similar reservations at the Commonwealth Summit (ibid.).

Amongst other international development organisations, the most consistent opposition to political conditionality has come from UNDP. While itself at the forefront of promoting the importance of democracy and political freedom as an essential element of human development¹¹, the UNDP has been opposed to external donor pressure and the conditioning of development aid on democracy and human rights. They claim that 'informal dialogue' is likely to be more effective than 'formal conditionality', stating that "Democracy is a native plant - it may wilt under foreign pressure" (UNDP 1992 p.25).¹²

PART 2. POLICY EVOLUTION

Part Two looks at the evolution of the political aid policies of the four selected donors. In four main sections, firstly, it examines in detail their policy statements and the rationales behind the new policies; secondly, it provides a comparative analysis of the similarities and differences between the policies; thirdly, it puts forward an explanation of this general shift in development aid policy; lastly, it takes an initial look at some of the wider issues and questions that arise.

2.1 POLICY STATEMENTS

2.1.1 British Aid

British development aid policy is not laid down in legislation¹³ or in a comprehensive policy document¹⁴ but is found in annual reports and in Ministers' speeches. The emergence of what is termed 'good government' by the British Government was highlighted in two ministerial speeches.

In June 1990, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, in one of the first indications of the policy shift by Western governments, introduced the concept of good government, its connection to economic development, and the consequences for aid policy.¹⁵ Apparently influenced both by the 1989 World Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa¹⁶, in which the relevance of governance to prospects for economic reform was first given prominence, and by the "recent dramatic events in eastern Europe", he spoke of "the need to move away from the inefficient and authoritarian models of the past" as "centralised political, economic and social structures have failed to deliver the goods", (Hurd 1990 p.2). Without using the terms 'democracy' or 'democratization', and with an emphasis on good government as a means to economic development, Hurd declared that, "Economic success depends to a large degree on effective and honest government, political pluralism and observance of the rule of law, as well as freer, more open economies" (ibid.), with Eastern Europe providing "ample evidence that economic and political liberalisation are inseparable" (op.cit. p.7). Further, a causal relationship is virtually asserted with the statement, "Political accountability is increasingly seen as a *pre-condition* for economic reform" (my emphasis) (ibid.).¹⁷ The consequence for aid recipients is that political criteria, i.e. countries' tendencies towards "pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights and market principles" (op.cit. p.2), will influence aid allocation.¹⁸ These criteria will be applied world-wide, not just to Africa.

A year later in June 1991, the Minister for Overseas Development, Lynda Chalker (now Baroness Chalker), outlined in more detail the three aspects of good government:

- the promotion of *sound economic and social policies*, including the introduction of market forces and facilitation of private sector activity,

economic reform with a human face, and the avoidance of excessive military expenditure;

- the *competence* of governments and other institutions, the need for open and accountable systems, requiring pluralism and democracy;
- *respect for human rights and the rule of law.*

(Chalker 1991 pp.2-3).

The dimensions of good government, rather than involving a particular model of government, are regarded as universal principles, which all governments should be guided by.

In discussing political systems Lady Chalker explicitly used the term democracy, stating that "democratic rights are fundamental human rights" and that "democratic reforms are necessary in many countries for broad-based sustainable development" (op.cit. p.3). In response to some of the criticisms that Douglas Hurd's speech had met with, she also stated that good government policy was *not*:

- an attempt to promote Westminster-style democracy
- an excuse to cut the aid programme
- neo-colonialist or neo-imperialist - "we cannot directly impose good government on developing countries: we can only support their own efforts"

(op. cit. p.1).

In addition Lady Chalker addressed disquiet concerning the introduction of a new form of conditionality. She argued that elements of good government such as accountability helped to safeguard the effective use of aid, and, with budget constraints, the importance of channelling aid where it will be used most effectively. "Some might call this conditionality. I call it common sense". (Op. cit. p.4). However, the ease of such policy rhetoric was brought into sharp contrast with the realities of development aid by the Pergau dam affair in early 1994.¹⁹

In implementing good government policy an emphasis on positive measures was stressed, helping governments to improve their performance. However, where good government criteria are not adhered to by particular governments, the intention to take negative measures was stated, i.e. reduction of, or, in severe cases, suspension of aid (as had already occurred with Sudan and Burma).²⁰ It was noted that improvements in good government can also be achieved through instruments other than aid, for example, dialogue, diplomacy and démarches, the latter particularly with regard to human rights issues.

Lady Chalker also stressed the importance of co-ordination with other donors and dialogue with recipients in promoting good government policies, in which she saw Britain as taking a strong lead in international circles.

In concluding, she summarised the aims of the new policies as "to ensure respect for fundamental human rights while increasing aid effectiveness and enhancing development" (op.cit. p.8). In addition she re-stated the claim that "the link between good government and development is firmly established" (ibid.), and ended with a rhetorical assertion that raised the anticipated outcome of good government policy to pivotal and unrealistic levels - it "makes the prospects for sustainable economic and social development in the Third World brighter than they have been for many years" (ibid.).

British policy in this field has been further explicated by two subsequent speeches by the Foreign Secretary and the Overseas Development Minister. Speaking in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 1993, Douglas Hurd sought to clarify (and justify) the British government's focus on good government. The point was re-stated that "we are not demanding or asking for multi-party democracy on the lines we see at Westminster" as "carbon copies don't work" (Hurd 1993 p.11). Rather "democracy has to grow out of the out of the requirements and traditions of local people, but it does have to grow" (ibid.). Nonetheless, basic freedoms are stressed as universal, e.g. freedom of association, of assembly, of the press, which means "different models of democracy respecting these universal freedoms" (op.cit. p.12). Pluralism was also emphasised, defined as distributing political power throughout society, including "the state, government, parliament, the media, the business community, the judiciary, the universities, other traditional structures" (ibid.), but not including a broader and more representative range of organisations in civil society. The strong link between economic and political liberalisation is again stressed, good government and economic development going "hand-in-hand... each needing the other" (ibid.).

In July 1994, three years on from her original speech, Baroness Chalker re-affirmed the British government's commitment to the objective of good government as a central issue in aid policy and for development alike - "The quality of Government in developing countries can make a huge difference to the quality of life" (Chalker 1994). In the intervening years 'good government' has been defined as the legitimacy, accountability and competence of government, along with respect for human rights and the rule of law. (See 3.1.1).

She outlined how good government considerations effect the aid programme in a matrix of four linkages, positive and negative at both the macro and micro levels. The quality of government, good or bad, influences the macro level of overall aid allocations, as one of a number of factors. At the micro level of individual projects, there is both positive support for the promotion of good government activities, as well as the right to decline aid for projects in general (e.g. health, education) which do not meet good government principles of participation by beneficiaries, proper accountability, non-violation of human rights.

More recent policy developments are indicated by the focus on three future issues. First, the promotion of democracy "implies both wider-ranging and longer-term positive measures to help nurture and sustain democracy", requiring "more complex analysis and a deeper

understanding of the process of democratization and of individual country circumstances" (ibid.). Second, the prevention of corruption focuses on strengthening "systems for procurement, accounting and audit" within government (ibid.). Third, "good government is not just about government" but about the strengthening of institutions outside government to hold it accountable, as well as encouraging NGOs to play a larger role in service provision itself, especially where the capacity of government is limited (ibid.). It is noteworthy that two of these three issues directly involve an emphasis on 'strengthening civil society'.

In Departmental Reports for the last three years, the promotion of good government has been one of the six or seven priority objectives of Britain's aid programme and it is stated that the quality of government is taken into account in the annual allocation by country of the aid budget.²¹ Promoting good government is also an important part of the political work of the Diplomatic Wing of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. As regards human rights, improved respect for them is stated as an intrinsic part of the UK's good government policy, as well as an objective of British foreign policy in its own right, and to this end a Human Rights Policy Unit was established within the FCO in mid-1992 (British FCO 1993 p.15).

Rationale

In summary, what are the reasons given by the British Conservative Government for the introduction of this new aid policy? The policy change came soon after the collapse of communism, and the initial policy rhetoric is very much in the context of the triumph of capitalism and its assertion, particularly its most liberal, free-market version, as "the best way known to mankind for improving its standard of living" (Hurd 1990 cited in Lone 1990 p.28).

Hence, perhaps not surprisingly, the policy of good government, essentially in the political domain, has distinct economic aspects. Political liberalisation appears to be seen less as an end in itself, than as a means to economic development in developing countries, with both Ministers asserting a strong link. Overseas Development Minister, Lady Chalker, affirms more the value of democracy in its own right, especially in human rights terms, yet the first element in her earlier definition of good government is in fact the promotion of particular economic policies, reflecting current neo-liberal orthodoxy. Her later speech reflects more a belief that the elements of good government are important in themselves and also essential for economic and social development.

A further stated reason for the policy shift is in terms of increasing the effectiveness of aid through channelling it to where it will be best used.

2.1.2 European Union Aid²²

Before examining policy evolution it is necessary to remind ourselves of the important distinction within the European Union's development aid programme between development co-operation with the 70 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, signatories of the Lomé Convention, and with the countries of Asia and Latin America, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. Development assistance to each entails distinct legal, financial, policy and administrative frameworks, though policy developments will tend to impact on both.

The sign of a shift in development policy at the European Community level came with the negotiations and drawing up of the Fourth Lomé Convention in 1989. A provision on human rights was included under the 'Objectives and Principles of Co-operation' (Chapter 1, Article 5). This states that development "entails respect for and promotion of all human rights", and development co-operation "is conceived as a contribution to the promotion of these rights", (Article 5, paragraph 1, Lomé IV).²³

Preceding both the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the resurgence of democratization movements in Africa, this clause, unsurprisingly, linked development (and development co-operation) to human rights only.²⁴ However with the ensuing dramatic events on the international scene and in many developing countries, policy evolution followed rapidly, largely initiated by the Member States.

The European Council, the biannual summit meeting of Heads of Government, provided the general direction of policy development. Declarations were made at the Dublin Summit in June 1990 on human rights and good governance in Africa, at the Rome Summit in December 1990 on the promotion of democracy and human rights in external relations, and at the June 1991 Summit that respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic political institutions are the basis for equitable development. The details of policy were developed by the Commission, with decisions taken at the regular Council of Ministers meetings, the EU's main decision-making body. The Council of Ministers (General Affairs) meeting of 19 December 1990, in considering separate development co-operation policies with Mediterranean and with Asian and Latin American (ALA) countries, included statements in both declarations on the observance of human rights and democratic values. (Cited in European Commission 1991 p.3).

The most significant policy statement stemmed from the Commission Communication of March 1991 to the Council and Parliament entitled 'Human Rights, Democracy and Development Co-operation Policy'. This examined "the relationship between development co-operation policies on the one hand and the defense of human rights and support for the democratic process in all developing countries on the other". It felt it "vital that human rights and democratization figure more prominently in the guidelines for co-operation policy than has hitherto been the case". This was regarded as a significant shift for the Commission who had previously positively regarded their aid programme as free of political considerations, unlike other donors in the cold war context, and indicating that the initiative for policy change came from the Member States. The subsequent Resolution of the November 1991 Council of Ministers (Development) on 'Human Rights, Democracy and

Development' made the promotion of human rights and democracy both an objective and a condition of development co-operation not only for the European Community but also for Member States. Both the Commission's proposals and the Development Council Resolution to include these new dimensions in European development co-operation policy were supported by the European Parliament.²⁵ The landmark nature of this Resolution was not only its content, but also it "was the very first example of a joint resolution of the Council and Member States" (Chalker 1992), signifying agreement on this common policy objective by all European Community countries.

The Resolution outlined four elements as part of a larger set of requirements to achieve sustainable development: human rights, democracy, good governance and decreased military expenditure. It gave "high priority to a positive approach that stimulates respect for human rights and encourages democracy", but warned that appropriate measures will be taken "in the event of grave and persistent human rights violations or the serious interruption of democratic processes" up to and including suspension of co-operation agreements.²⁶ The latter was a significant development from Article 5 of Lomé IV which, in addition to only addressing human rights, did not involve a sanctions clause.²⁷

The Resolution gave strong signals for the re-negotiation of future co-operation agreements, including the Lomé Convention, with current agreements remaining governed by their pre-existing legal basis.²⁸ However, developing countries could be immediate recipients of funds from the budget line created to support positive measures.

Policy developments since November 1991 have been three-fold. First, the follow-up mechanisms to the Resolution, in the form of annual reports from the Commission, have included further discussions and conclusions on how to move forward in this area. These will be examined in Part Three of this report *Policy Operationalisation*. Second, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union incorporates for the first time a chapter on development co-operation policy into the legal framework governing the Community and its Member States. Third, the Lomé IV Mid-term Review indicate how the general policy declarations will be translated into change to the form and content of co-operation agreements. The latter two processes are examined here.

The Maastricht Treaty and Horizon 2000

The Maastricht Treaty on European Union defines for the first time the objectives of EU development co-operation (Title XVII Articles 130 u-y).²⁹ High priority is accorded to "the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms", (Article 130u paragraph 2). In addition the principle of 'complementarity' is established, i.e. Community policies and those of Member States should be complementary.³⁰ To achieve this, the Community and Member States shall co-ordinate their policies and consult each other on their programmes, (Article 130x, paragraph 1). An important exclusion is that the Articles do not affect co-operation with the ACP countries as the Lomé Convention is not funded from the Community budget but from the European Development Fund (EDF), raised separately by the Member States.

The Treaty does *not* mean that a common Community-wide development co-operation policy is being established, which Member States will be legally bound to implement. However, 'complementarity' does mean that increased co-ordination and increased effectiveness is being sought between the aid programmes of the Community and Member States. The consequences have been to set in motion a process known as "Horizon 2000",³¹ a review of the development co-operation policies and programmes of the Community and Member States, examining how co-ordination and effectiveness can be improved. In its first Declaration on this process, the Development Council of November 1992 again affirmed the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as a key general objective. However, the programme of priority areas the Council has subsequently established for enhancing policy and operational co-ordination are: the fight against poverty; health policies; food security policies; education and training policies. It was felt that policy co-ordination in such areas as human rights had already been provided, and efforts should now be concentrated on implementation, (Development Council 25 May 1993).

The Lomé IV Mid-Term Review.

Lomé IV was signed for 10 years (1990-2000), unlike the previous three Conventions which were for five years only. However, the ten year period was split into two Financial Protocols, with a mid-term review, which is being negotiated for completion by early 1995. The Mid-term Review, far from merely dealing with financial questions, has been taken as an opportunity by the EU to re-negotiate significant aspects of the Convention, particularly pertaining to the aid provisions. The EU's proposals, adopted as a negotiating mandate by the Council of Ministers (General Affairs) in February 1994, include the following changes to the Convention with regard to human rights and democracy:

1. A broadening and strengthening of Article 5 to include democracy and the rule of law, as well as human rights, and this to constitute an 'essential element' clause. In addition, an explicit suspension clause to be included allowing for the total or partial suspension of the Convention (which involves trade and investment provisions as well as aid) in the event of violation of the essential element clause.³²
2. Good governance would become an 'objective' of co-operation.
3. The creation of a fund for 'incentive allocations' to priority sectors including institutional development (i.e. good governance) and human rights and democracy. I.e., if ACP governments include programmes in these sectors in their national indicative programmes (NIPs), extra resources can then be allocated.³³
4. The ACP-EU Joint Assembly to be composed only of Parliamentarians from the ACP states (i.e. disallowing non-elected Government representatives) and meetings to be reduced from biannual to annual.

Other changes related to questions of human rights and democracy are as follows:

5. The encouragement of decentralised co-operation (i.e. funds to NGOs) through ACP governments indicating the amounts to be set aside within their NIPs for such activities and the principles and conditions governing their use. NGOs can then submit projects directly to the Commission.
6. The replacement of a commitment of funds (i.e. total NIP) by an indicative figure, and the introduction of 'phased programming', i.e. the allocation of the NIP in two tranches, with the second dependent on performance.

Negotiations on these proposals are ongoing at the time of writing between representatives of the European Commission and the ACP states, with the latter doubtless seeking amendments and changes. Issues arising from the EU's proposals appear to include the following, (pertaining to the same numbered paragraphs as above):

1. It appears that there is agreement between the EU and ACP states on the introduction of the essential element and suspension clauses. However, there are surrounding issues to be resolved. First, who will take decisions regarding any alleged violations of the essential element clause, and on what criteria? Will the EU take unilateral decisions or will there be joint decision-making procedures with ACP member states? Will criteria and guidelines be transparent and agreed by both sides? Second, suspension of the Convention would include trade and investment provisions as well as aid, raising the issue of inconsistency. Suspension under such terms "would treat the ACP partners more severely than the Community's other co-operation partners" (ACP-EU 1994, cited in Euro-Cidse September 1994 p.18). In addition it is pointed out that "there has never been any suggestion that the EU should suspend trade relations with Indonesia in response to its human rights abuses in East Timor" (European Research Office 1994a p.5).
2. Simply, what is meant by good governance? Will there be any attempt to define it?
3. In the absence of additional funding, as seems likely,³⁴ the use of the term 'incentive' is criticised as a misnomer. "It is nothing more than ringfencing within a (tranche) NIP" (Euro-Cidse September 1994 p.19).
4. The restriction of a democratic forum to one meeting per year appears at odds with the EU's commitment to promoting democracy, and has, unsurprisingly, been opposed by the ACP-EU Joint Assembly (reported in Euro-Cidse October/November 1994 p.23).
5. Decentralised co-operation may be a means of promoting greater participation of civil society organisations in development activities, and simultaneously strengthening their ability to hold governments accountable. However, concern centres on whether the policy, as proposed, will strengthen, as is essential in a national democratic context, "dialogue and partnership between governmental and civic bodies in ACP states" (ACP-EU 1994, cited in Euro-Cidse October/November p.22)? Or, on the contrary,

will such relationships be undermined with Southern NGOs becoming more beholden to Northern donors?

In addition, will the institutional capacity of national governments be adversely affected, contrary to good governance objectives, by the removal of decision-making and planning from recipients to donor headquarters?

6. The proposed changes to indicative figures only and to 'phased programming', ostensibly introduced to speed up utilisation of resources, gives the EU more potential leverage in influencing the content of a country's development co-operation programme. Questions raised include: what will be the criteria for making decisions as to the second tranche; will criteria be merely quantitative (i.e. based on actual disbursement of resources) or will criteria also be qualitative (e.g. human rights)? (European Research Office 1994b p.4).

In summary, it is evident that the introduction of human rights and democracy factors into the Lomé Mid-term Review could have significant impact on the overall ACP-EU relationship, with a particularly adverse effect on the principles of partnership on which the Lomé Convention is based. Human rights and democracy have clearly become a cornerstone of EU development policy, as for other donors. However, it is clear that such policies, notwithstanding a consensus on the desirability of human rights and democracy amongst donors and recipients alike, are far from uncontroversial.

Rationale

The EU's 'Human Rights, Democracy and Development' policy appears to have originated from the Member States rather than from the Commission. In the context of the end of the Cold War and internal democratization movements in developing countries, the European Council Declarations of December 1990 and June 1991 created the overall political objective of the promotion of democracy and human rights as ends in themselves in external relations. The November 1991 Resolution of the Development Council, reinforced by the Articles in the Maastricht Treaty, extended such aims specifically into the field of development co-operation. In these latter documents the link is also made with economic development, stating that prospects for equitable and sustainable development are enhanced by political improvements, but in a modest tone.³⁵ This perhaps reflects the nature of inter-governmental declarations, which, in order to achieve the necessary consensus amongst Member States, are often at a level of greater generality and less strident in tone than those of an individual government.

2.1.3 Swedish Aid

Democracy and Human Rights

Swedish aid is unusual in that 'democratic development' has been implicit as one of its objectives since its development co-operation programme lifted off in 1962.³⁶ In 1978 the Swedish Parliament explicitly laid down four goals of development assistance which included the development of democracy in society.³⁷ A recent government publication adds "respect for human rights" to the objective of democratic development (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1993a p.6)

How has the democracy goal been pursued historically? Swedish aid, particularly in the 1970s gave priority to economic and social equality and not to political systems. A major review of Swedish aid in 1977 stressed that 'equalisation' and "economic and social justice must be the principal aim of development co-operation", with assistance being directed not only at the poorest countries, particularly those with egalitarian aims, but at the poorest people in those countries. (Cited in Ljunggren 1986 p.77). It was thought that economic and social equality could be achieved in different political systems, both single-party and multi-party. The same review only devoted one page to the goal of democratic development.³⁸ It is generally acknowledged that it was never really specified what was meant by democratic development and little emphasis was given to this objective over a period of more than two decades.³⁹ It has been argued Sweden's emphasis on literacy programmes, for example, met the democracy goal as they established the pre-conditions for democracy. However, in such situations, democracy must be regarded as a secondary, rather than a primary, objective. A stronger argument could be made that the substantial so-called 'humanitarian assistance' given by Sweden over the last 20 years could be classified as support for democracy. Such assistance went primarily to liberation movements in Southern Africa, for example, FRELIMO (Mozambique), ZANU, (Zimbabwe), the ANC (South Africa) and SWAPO (Namibia), and to victims of military dictatorships in Latin America, especially Chilean refugees and victims of political oppression within Chile after the 1973 military coup.⁴⁰ The relevance and importance of this aid in fostering democracy is particularly evident in the context of recent world events, in which such organisations have played a leading role in the establishment of an independent and democratic government in Namibia in 1989, in the historic multi-racial elections and transition to majority rule in South Africa in April 1994, and in the election and inauguration of a civilian President in Chile in March 1994, almost 21 years after the overthrow of Allende.

In 1988 there came signs of the shift in thinking that was to increasingly characterise many governments' aid policies over the next few years. In a Swedish government-sponsored study on "*Recovery in Africa*", the political scientist Göran Hydén pointed to the importance, in the context of economic crisis and structural adjustment, of getting "not only prices but also politics right" (Hydén 1988 p. 145). He saw the poor performance of one-party states and a state-centred approach to development (in many African countries) as due partly to shortcomings in political rights and the system of governance.⁴¹ He asserted that:

"The notion of development that is emerging today is highly political. Bringing about an enabling environment is an act of political reform. If donors take this concept seriously they also accept that foreign aid is potentially a means of bringing about political reforms" (op.cit. p.155).

With regard to necessary action, Hydén suggests the following re-orientation by the donor community of its aid policies towards Africa:

1. *Creating greater pluralism* by support for non-government organisations, both in the private sector and in civil society generally, both to spread institutional responsibility in society and to increase public demand on, and the accountability of, government institutions.
2. *Reducing the softness of the State*⁴² i.e. reducing state involvement in development yet enhancing its capacity as a socially responsible agent.
3. *Redefining aid in terms of human rights*, both social and economic, and civil and political, particularly through channelling assistance to NGOs.
4. *Prioritising governments ready to accept reform*, i.e. rewarding governments who are prepared to facilitate local development initiatives and to respect human rights.

Such views, though not uncontested in the same volume, appear to have struck some chords with the then Minister for Development Co-operation in the Social Democrat Government, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, who stated in the *Introduction* that, "A greater awareness of the political conditions for development and of the necessity of a democratic development is of the utmost importance" (Hjelm-Wallén 1988 p.15).⁴³

In September 1990, the Nordic Ministers of Development Co-operation meeting at Molde in Norway, signalled the evolving policy trends. A substantial part of their Communiqué was devoted to the 'new challenge' of support for democracy and human rights initiatives. They declared that, "The connection between democracy, human rights and sustainable development has become more and more evident... It has now been recognised that open democratic systems and respect for human rights give impetus to efforts to achieve development, economic efficiency and equitable distribution." They stressed the need for giving "moral and economic support" to the process of democratization and of dialogue with partner countries about such matters. However, the Communiqué also warned that lack of progress in democratization will affect the willingness of donors to provide aid. (Nordic Ministers of Development Co-operation 1990).

In October 1991 the incoming Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, of the four-party Conservative dominated coalition government which had replaced the Social Democrats, presented the new government's policies to Parliament. The section on development co-operation affirmed commitment to development assistance and to the target of 1% of GNP, but signalled a change in policy with the promotion of democracy and market economies becoming the

guiding principles of development co-operation. The new government indicated its intent not to tolerate single-party systems by announcing simultaneously a reduction in aid to Vietnam and the cessation of aid to Cuba.⁴⁴

In January 1992, the Government submitted its first Budget Bill to Parliament and established human rights and democracy as one of the three criteria influencing the allocation of development assistance funds.⁴⁵ It has also added 'human rights' to the title of both the Minister and Ministry, so that it became 'Development Co-operation and Human Rights'.

The 1993 Budget Bill reaffirmed such policy developments with the Minister, Alf Svensson, stating that the Government was putting "the goal of democracy development at the centre of the process of change underway in Sweden's development assistance programme". Not only are "respect for human rights and development of greater democracy of value in their own right", but provide the best conditions for development. The rule of law, freedom of expression and political pluralism, and multi-party systems were seen as universally valid, "as relevant in poor nations as in rich" (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1993b). In addition the Minister made clear that respect for human rights must extend to women and children, including such social and economic rights as better education and health care.

In summary, the Social Democrat Government (in power until 1991) began to stress the need for democracy and respect for human rights, especially in relation to Sweden's 'programme' countries, on which assistance was concentrated. However, their approach favoured the use of the 'carrot' rather than the 'stick'. They wished to encourage democracy through dialogue with long-standing government partners in recipient countries, rather than using development aid as a means to press for democracy through conditionality. The centre-right Coalition Government gave, at a minimum, considerably more weight to these policy trends. Alternatively, it could be argued that it initiated a more decisive shift in policy than previously towards aid becoming conditional on progress towards democracy and respect for human rights.

Good Governance and Military Expenditure

In a recent government publication on development policy in the field of democracy and human rights, mention is also made of two other key concepts: good governance and excessive military expenditure. Good governance, defined in World Bank terms as public administration reform, is regarded as essential for economic and social development. Emphasis is placed on the importance of democracy for good governance,⁴⁶ and it is stated that "Good governance, democracy and human rights are intimately and closely related" (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1993c p.10). Swedish aid draws a distinction, however, between activities in the area of good governance, defined as effective public administration, and those concerning democracy and human rights. Firstly, public administration development has been a particular concern of SIDA's, the principle Swedish government agency administering bilateral aid, for a considerable number of years, especially in its work with government institutions in Southern Africa. Secondly, although they see linkages between public administration development and democratization (see 3.2.1.) the

main concern is to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the state, which may or may not be democratic.

As regards military expenditure, the "clear link" between peace and development is expressed and it is stated that, "Initiatives to solve armed conflicts and to reduce unreasonably high military expenditure will ultimately also contribute to improving protection for human rights" (op.cit p.12). However, no statement is made conditioning the provision of development assistance on non-excessive levels of military spending.⁴⁷

Other Policy Developments

In May 1993 the Riksdag (Parliament) approved certain changes in the administration of development co-operation, which came into effect in the financial year commencing 1 July 1993, with implications in the area of democracy and human rights.

First, the Swedish Embassy and Development Co-operation Office have been integrated under the Ambassador. Previously the Development Co-operation Office was formally separate with its own head, but now the Ambassador has overall responsibility for development co-operation, including decision-making powers. A consequence would appear to be that aid decisions are likely to become more linked to general foreign policy considerations. In addition, democracy and human rights factors, as joint diplomatic and development co-operation concerns, could receive higher priority.

Second, and of greater significance for development co-operation as a whole, the system of 'programme countries', [i.e. the concentration of resources into a relatively small number of countries (19 in financial year 1992/93) selected for long-term co-operation], has been replaced by 'co-operating partners'. These will comprise a broader range of countries, up to 35, who will receive substantial assistance. As no additional funds are available, the change is likely to involve a dilution of the funding to the former programme countries.⁴⁸ In addition, the 'financial frames' previously committed to programme countries, on the basis of Parliament's annual decision on overall country allocation, have been replaced with 'indicative figures' only.

Third, the Swedish Government intends to be more involved at a policy level in determining the development co-operation programmes with 'co-operating partners', previously delegated more to SIDA to decide in accordance with the overall principles established by Parliament and the Government. The Swedish Government will initiate a high-level meeting in the host country with the recipient government every three years, generally headed by the Under-Secretary of State, to discuss the general goals for development co-operation, as well as a specific programme for the next three years. This will result in a 'Memo of Understanding', containing not only agreed areas of co-operation and indicative figures, but also the necessary conditions for co-operation to take place, including reforms at both economic and political levels. The aim is evidently to stress at high inter-governmental level, in accordance with the policy priorities of the Swedish Government, the importance of democracy and market economic reforms as central features of its development co-operation programme.

Subsequently, the centre-right Coalition Government of 1991-94 has been replaced by a new Social Democrat Government, who re-gained power, though not an overall majority, in the general elections of September 1994. It remains unknown at time of writing whether they will introduce any major policy changes in this field. However, there is little doubt that democracy and human rights will remain high on their agenda, although perhaps with some fresh orientations. Two trends are evident. First, the new government is stressing the link between international security and democracy and development, perhaps reflecting a similar response to the adverse effects of increased global conflict as noted earlier with Dutch government policy. Hence greater emphasis is likely to be accorded to not only conflict-resolution, but also conflict-prevention, in which democracy building is a key factor. Second, there is an increased focus on democracy as a complex, long-term process which "much evolve from within and cannot be commanded from outside", and greater support is likely for "the roots of democracy" (i.e. a democratic culture and a strong civil society) to foster and enhance that process.⁴⁹

Rationale

The conviction that democratization will enhance development prospects can be traced throughout the evolution of these policies. This was clear in the views of the influential political scientist Goran Hydén with regard to Africa, in the statements of the Social Democrat Minister for International Development Co-operation, and in the Molde Communiqué from all Nordic Development Co-operation Ministers.

The Coalition Government in power from 1991 until 1994 made democracy and market economic reforms the two central pillars of its development policy, providing in its view, the best conditions for development. Democracy is valued not only in its own right, but there is "a growing realisation that democracy is also beneficial for the general development of a country" (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1993a p.8). The positive links between a democratic political system and a market economy are also emphasised. Market reforms are regarded as not only essential for economic development, but important for achieving democracy - "If these reforms do not take place, economic stagnation may undermine democracy" (op.cit p.10). However, the question does not appear to have been put the other way round of whether democratization will enhance or impede economic liberalisation.

With General Elections every three years, policy shifts accompany the cycle of changes in government. The new Social Democrat Government appears to stress more the directly political dimensions, democracy as important in itself and as a factor in maintaining international security, as well as an awareness of the complexities of democratization.

Policies in this field apply to all Sweden's development assistance with all developing countries. Nevertheless it would appear that in the rationale behind the policies it is the countries of sub-Saharan Africa that attention is focused on. This is perhaps not surprising given the large proportion of Swedish assistance to the African continent.⁵⁰ However, this focus raises some concerns regarding the equal pertinence of the underlying rationale to countries of other continents and the implications of this for consistency of policy implementation.

2.1.4 United States Aid

The Democracy Initiative

In March 1990 the US Secretary of State, James Baker, stated the post-cold war mission of the US government to be "the promotion and consolidation of democracy" (cited in Gills et al 1993 p.11). Subsequently in December 1990, the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), the principal US government agency administering bilateral development assistance, created its 'Democracy Initiative'. This was one of four policy initiatives announced by A.I.D. at this time⁵¹ following its new Mission statement of September 1990, which included 'support for democracy'. Both the Mission statement and the policy initiatives indicated a re-focusing by A.I.D. on its activities.

The legislative mandate for support for democratic development had existed since the enactment of Title IV of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which, as amended, is still the current legislation.⁵² However, it is acknowledged that prior to the new Mission statement, "support for democracy was not a principal focus for A.I.D." (USAID 1990 p.3). In fact US development assistance activities were much subordinated to strategic and military considerations during the Cold War years, with US support for "a number of regimes that were clearly undemocratic in the name of anti-communism" (Morfit 1993 p.18). Yet, during these earlier years, the US government disguised its support for such authoritarian right-wing regimes and for counter-revolutionary movements in developing countries, e.g. the Contras in Nicaragua, in the same rhetoric of 'support for democracy'.⁵³ Indeed, the Reagan Administration initiated a 'Project Democracy', approved by Congress in 1983, which included the creation of a small 'Democracy Program' within USAID, as well as creating the National Endowment for Democracy, a publically-funded private foundation. However it was evident that "funds under the program would flow only to those with similar ideological orientations" (Forsythe 1988 p.19).

The Democracy Initiative of 1990 reflected the perceived triumph of 'market democracies' accompanying the end of the Cold War. It saw democracy as complementary to the transition to market-orientated economies and supportive of sustained economic development, though without citing evidence in support.⁵⁴ The Democracy Initiative had four components:

1. To strengthen democratic institutions, (e.g. electoral bodies, legislatures, civic associations).
2. To integrate democracy into the A.I.D. programme.⁵⁵
3. To reward progress in democratization, (i.e. by increasing country allocations).⁵⁶
4. To establish rapid response mechanisms, (i.e. to give immediate support to democratic opportunities and assist 'democratic breakthrough').⁵⁷

(USAID 1990 p.1).

Emphasis was placed on supporting local initiatives and institutions, with the statement that democracy cannot be exported from outside. The concept of *governance* is mentioned only briefly in relation to the legitimacy of democratic regimes, which require honesty and financial accountability. Likewise, respect for *civil and human rights* is included only as one element of a democratic political system.

Discussions within A.I.D. led to the publication, in November 1991, of a policy paper entitled "Democracy and Governance". Here the objective of the Democracy Initiative is stated as support for democratic political development, both as a fundamental value in itself and as a means to broad-based economic growth. Both 'governance' and 'human rights' are given a higher profile in this document. It defined the primary areas of focus as including:

- Strengthening Democratic Representation
- Supporting Respect for Human Rights
- Promoting Lawful Governance
- Encouraging Democratic Values

(USAID 1991 p.1).

Aid and Human Rights

United States development assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, has been linked, in fact, with respect for human rights since the mid-1970s. In 1975 Congress passed an amendment, section 116, to the Foreign Assistance Act. (This is also known as the Harkin amendment after its sponsor). This prohibited development assistance to the government of any country which engages "in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights..." (s.116(a)). However, an exception is that assistance can be provided where it "will directly benefit the needy people in such a country", i.e. mainly through non-governmental agencies. Further sections state that A.I.D. take certain human rights considerations into account in setting development assistance levels (s.116 (c)), and authorise funds for the promotion of civil and political rights through project support, as long as they do not influence an election or support a political party (s.116 (e)).⁵⁸ & ⁵⁹

The Clinton Administration and Aid

The change of Presidency and Administration in January 1993 has resulted in a number of policy developments. First, under President Clinton the promotion of democracy and human rights has been accorded a higher profile, as one of the stated three pillars of his foreign policy. (The other two are 'economic competitiveness' and 'national security'). In addition Clinton has affirmed foreign assistance as a central component of effective foreign policy. Administrative and personnel changes reflect the shift in emphasis and priorities. Within the State Department, the former Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs has been re-named the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. At A.I.D., the new Administrator (i.e. the head) is the former President of the National Democratic Institute, one of the four core grantees of the National Endowment for Democracy and affiliated to the Democratic Party, and the Deputy Administrator is a professor of political science.

Second, under the Clinton Administration and with its new Administrator, A.I.D. has redefined its strategy and reorganized its programme. Its overall goal is now defined as 'Sustainable Development', under which are incorporated four fundamental objectives:

- broad-based economic growth;
- protecting the environment;
- stabilising world population growth and protecting human health;
- building democracy.

In what could be regarded as a cost-cutting exercise, its assistance is also being concentrated on fewer so-called 'sustainable development' countries, rationalised as those offering the best prospects for attaining its objectives, with the closure of 21 country offices.⁶⁰ Building democracy, defined as assisting the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world, is seen both as an end in itself and as a means to achieve the other objectives. Democratization enhances popular, informed participation and public sector accountability, on which success in the other core areas depend. Hence democracy building will be pursued not only through specific programmes to strengthen democratic institutions but also by integrating "participation, transparency and accountability" into all economic and social development programmes (USAID 1993a p.36).

Democracy building programmes will occur in three categories of USAID countries:

1. 'Sustainable development' countries.
2. 'Transition' countries emerging from a national crisis or natural disaster, where short-term assistance is required, which could include support for democratic movements or institutions. (See 'rapid response capacity' above).
3. Countries where USAID's presence is minimal, (e.g. on human rights or 'poor performance' grounds), but aid to NGOs could aim to build civil society, alleviate repression, etc.

(Op.cit. p.37).

A third significant change has been considerable budget cuts, with overall foreign assistance, which includes military and security assistance as well as development assistance, decreasing from \$14.6 billion in 1992 to \$13.7 billion in 1994. More severe cuts are anticipated for subsequent years with foreign aid on the chopping block of the new Republican-controlled Congress, (see below).

A fourth development is the proposed Peace, Prosperity and Democracy (PPD) Bill to replace the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It is being put forward as a major overhaul of the previous Cold War-inspired, and now badly outdated, legislation, with a new emphasis on supporting emerging democracies and promoting peace. However, in continuity with the Cold War period, it seeks correspondence between foreign policy and foreign assistance goals, linking resources to foreign policy objectives. Building democracy focuses on support

for countries making the transition from communism to both a liberal democratic polity and a market economy, indicating that geographical priorities may lie East rather than South. Prohibitions on assistance are also redefined in terms of general criteria, rather than country-specific. The role of democracy and governance policies is evident both as a new rationale and to "revitalize support" for assistance, at a time when altruism is not enough, and as a rationalisation for cutting assistance to particular countries. Support for democracy and market economies is put forward as in the "strategic interest" of the US, holding the promise of lower defense expenditures and long-term economic benefit (USAID 1994). The criteria for choice of sustainable development countries, in which (less) resources are being concentrated, are those with "greatest need" and those that will make "most effective use" of resources (ibid.). The latter judgement is determined by such criteria as the existence of government transparency and accountability, an independent judiciary, decentralisation of authority, democratic local government, freedom of political parties, NGOs and the media, indicating both areas for positive support and also providing reasons for withdrawal of assistance (ibid.). The Bill failed to get through Congress in 1994 and hence is now unlikely to be enacted in the near future with the change to Republican control. However its continued relevance is that it remains policy for the Administration and for USAID in its allocation of aid resources.

Republican Control of Congress

However, the control of both the Senate and House of Representatives by the Republican Party, following the elections of November 1994, is likely to impact adversely on the Clinton Administration's policies. Radical proposals are reported as planned for the overall aid budget, involving swingeing cuts of 20% in total assistance, a slashing of aid to Africa, an increased orientation to Eastern Europe, and the possible abolition of USAID with some functions subsumed within the State Department and others taken on by a new 'Development Foundation'. Policy criteria for country allocation could change from 'greatest need' and 'human rights' to 'US security and economic interests', (Guardian 14 December 1994).⁶¹

Rationale

The policy rationale that has directed the Democracy Initiative appears to have two components: the political aspect with democracy valued as an end in itself; and the development aspect with democracy valued as a means to sustained economic development. However, as regards the latter, the stridency with which the link between democracy and economic development has been asserted, has waned since the Initiative's inception. The original paper on the Democracy Initiative stated that, "Democracy is complementary to and supportive of ... sustained, broadly based economic development" (USAID 1990 p.1), with the consequence that, "Democracy, therefore, is an economic development issue as well as a political one" (op.cit. p.2). This was modified to, "The debate about the relationship between democracy and sustained economic development is substantial, but thus far yields no firm conclusions concerning any direct, causal link between democracy and development" (USAID 1991 p.1). An examination for A.I.D. of some of the academic research on democracy and development similarly concludes that "the causal relationship between economic development and democracy is *tentative*" (my emphasis), but notes nevertheless

that "the linkage system between the two in achieving broad-based, economic growth increasingly is accepted within the academic and donor communities" (Schimpp 1992 p.2). Further, in April 1993, A.I.D. hosted a conference for donors⁶² examining the potential impact in Africa of political liberalisation on economic reform. This addressed the complexities of the linkages between the two reform processes. Conclusions were not necessarily negative, with new democratic regimes seen as offering their own promise of enhancing development prospects, especially through governance reforms. However, the assumption that a positive relationship exists between economic and political liberalisation was very much questioned. Dependent on varying circumstances and in different stages of democratic transition, political liberalisation could potentially have a negative impact on economic reform, making programmes more difficult to implement, especially in the short-term, (USAID 1993c). It remains to be seen how A.I.D. and other donors will interpret the implications of such possible tensions as regards the implementation of both economic and political reform programmes, and the future evolution of policy in this field.

If the economic development linkage of A.I.D.'s democracy and governance programme has been subjected to some internal questioning, the political aspect of the policy rationale, democracy as a goal in itself, has been reinforced under the Clinton Administration with the redefinition of A.I.D.'s strategic objectives. However, it must be recalled that US policy in this field in recent times was initiated by the Reagan and Bush Administrations where the rhetorical cloak of democracy promotion concealed the underlying motive of support for the political right, in government or in opposition, often non-democratic and human rights violators. The same rhetoric of democracy building takes place in a changed world in the 1990s and, at present, under a Democratic Administration, but it must be questioned how far motives have changed. To what extent is democracy now being promoted for its own sake as a humanising influence in the world or as a continued smoke screen for promoting allies favourable to US foreign policy and to US economic interests?

2.2 COMPARISON OF DONOR POLICIES

This section examines the similarities and differences in the policy statements and their evolution of our four donor agencies. Table 1 presents a comparison of a number of key features. With the exception of United States aid, information in Table 1 is mainly taken from the original policy statements by politicians, which heralded the policy shift at the beginning of the 1990s, supplemented with some up-dated developments on the political front. The subsequent stage of putting the detailed flesh on the skeletal policy framework by the respective government aid agencies is examined in Part 3, Tables 2 and 3. In the case of the US, the original policy initiatives were mainly presented in aid agency documents. In this Table, as in all subsequent Tables, the terms and phrases used by the donors are retained as far as possible, attempting to present their policies concisely but accurately.

TABLE 1. Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance: A Comparison of Four Donor Policies.⁶³

FEATURE	BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
1. Earlier Policies (pre-1990).	No.	Lomé IV Article 5 on human rights; no sanctions clause.	Democratic development implicit as goal since 1962; made explicit in 1978. Little emphasis in practice.	Harkin Amendment to FAA in 1975, prohibiting aid to countries where 'gross violations' of human rights, plus limited funds for promotion of human rights. Reagan Administration's 'Project Democracy' including 'Democracy Program' within USAID.
2. Source of New Policy.	Foreign Minister and Overseas Development Minister of Conservative Government.	European Council and Council of Ministers initially established framework for promotion of democracy and human rights in external relations. Developed by Commission and ensuing November 1991 Resolution declared by Council of Ministers (Development).	Minister for Development Co-operation in Social Democrat Government initially raised link between development and democracy and human rights. Centre-right Coalition Government from October 1991 gave greater emphasis to promotion of democracy and human rights, and, in addition, to market economies.	Secretary of State announced US mission to promote and consolidate democracy (March 1990); USAID introduced Democracy Initiative (December 1990). The Clinton Administration declared democracy and human rights as one of three pillars of foreign policy. 'Building democracy' has become one of four objectives of USAID (1993a).
3. Involvement of legislature.	No.	Commission document on human rights, democracy and development co-operation policy submitted to European Parliament. These proposals, plus subsequent Council resolution, supported by Parliament.	Policies presented to Parliament by Government.	Legislative mandate for democratic development in FAA of 1961. New 'Peace, Prosperity and Democracy' Act, proposed by the Administration to replace the FAA, but failed to get passed by Congress in 1994.

Table 1 continued....

FEATURE	BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
4. External Influences.	World Bank 1989 Sub-Saharan Africa Report. Otherwise unknown.	Individual Member States.	Swedish academics; World Bank 1989 SSA Report; own report on 'Recovery in Africa', with external contributors.	U.S. academics; independent consultants; in-house Centre for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) researchers.
5. Title of Policy.	Good Government.	Human Rights, Democracy and Development.	Democracy and Human Rights.	Democracy Initiative; now Democracy and Governance.
6. Main Elements of Policy, as stated.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sound economic and social policies. - Competence of governments, including open and accountable government, pluralist and democratic political systems. - Respect for human rights and the rule of law. <p>(Chalker 1991)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Human rights. - Democracy. - Good governance. - Excessive military expenditure. <p>(Council of Ministers 1991)</p>	<p>Priorities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Human rights. - Democracy. <p>Less emphasis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good governance (but pre-existing policy). - Excessive military expenditure. <p>(Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1993b)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Democratic representation. - Human rights. - Lawful governance. - Democratic values. <p>(USAID 1991)</p>

Table 1 continued...

FEATURE	BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
7. Link between democracy and economic development.	Strong positive correlation, almost causal relationship. (Hurd 1990, Chalker 1991)	Moderate positive correlation; democracy as one of a number of requirements. (Council of Ministers 1991)	Strong positive correlation by centre-right Government, but nature of linkages and direction of influences left imprecise. (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1993b)	Strong positive correlation initially, but assertions moderated with more attention to complexities of relationship. (USAID 1990 and 1991)
8. Policy rationale: a) Democracy and human rights as end in itself. b) Democracy as means to economic development.	Weak. Strong.	Strong. Weak.	Moderate-strong. Moderate.	Strong. Strong initially; Moderate latterly.
9. Measures.	- Positive. - Negative. - Changes in country allocations. - Integration into overall development programme.	- Positive. - Negative.	- Positive. - Negative. - Changes in country allocations. (1992 Budget Bill stated human rights and democracy as 1 of 3 criteria influencing country allocations)	- Positive. - Negative. (Mainly laid down in pre-existing legislation on 'ineligible countries' e.g. human rights violators, military regimes, communist countries). - Integration into overall development programme.

Table 1 continued...

FEATURE	BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
10. Geographical Focus	World-wide, though first policy statement was in the context of development prospects in sub-Saharan Africa. (Hurd 1990).	World-wide, with policy on human rights and democracy being integrated into separate development co-operation agreements with ACP countries, Asian and Latin American countries, and Mediterranean countries.	World-wide, but initial evolution of policy again in context of discussion of recovery in SSA. Also large proportion of aid to 'programme' countries in Africa. However, this may become more dispersed with replacement by 'co-operating partners'. Main negative measure against Vietnam.	World-wide, with policy to be implemented by all USAID Regional Bureaux.
11. Organisational Structures	<p>a) FCO. Human Rights Policy Unit established 1992.</p> <p>b) ODA. Good government policy integrated into work of Government and Institutions Department.</p>	<p>a) Human Rights Unit in DG1A (External Political Relations).</p> <p>b) Small Democracy & Human Rights units created in DGs dealing with development co-operation, but essentially dealing with disbursement of funds from newly-created budget lines to support democracy and human rights.</p>	<p>a) Foreign Ministry. No specialist human rights unit, but officers responsible for human rights issues.</p> <p>b) SIDA. Human Rights & Democracy section set up with responsibility for policy matters and disbursement of funds from newly-created budget line.</p> <p>Pre-existing Public Administration and Management Division deals with governance issues.</p>	<p>a) Human Rights Bureau in State Department.</p> <p>b) USAID Office of Strategic Planning responsible for overall Democracy and Governance policy. Regional Bureaux responsible for policy development at regional level, e.g. Office of New Initiatives in Africa Bureau.</p> <p>c) Democracy Center established within USAID Global Bureau in 1994 to provide technical support to Regional Bureaux and field offices.</p>
12. Co-ordination with other donors.	<p>- World Bank CGs.</p> <p>- DAC.</p>	<p>- World Bank CGs.</p> <p>- DAC.</p> <p>- Member States.</p>	<p>- World Bank CGs.</p> <p>- DAC.</p> <p>- Nordic Ministers of Development Co-operation Meetings.</p>	<p>- World Bank CGs.</p> <p>- DAC.</p>

Table 1 continued...

FEATURE	BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
13. Dialogue with recipient governments.	Importance of dialogue stressed, yet in context of "making sure recipient countries know what we expect" and as a way of "exerting pressure on governments" (Chalker 1991 p.5)	The Lomé Convention, distinct from other aid relationships, is based on dialogue and "equality between partners" (Article 2, Lomé IV). However, there are fears that the introduction of human rights and democracy criteria will result in a practice of increased conditionality, less influence by ACP states, and overall a more conventional aid relationship.	Dialogue an historical feature of co-operation with 'programme countries'. Previous Social Democrat Government emphasised dialogue, rather than conditionality as best practice in this field. Centre-right Coalition Government less tolerant of single-party regimes. It instituted a new form of dialogue with three-yearly high-level meetings between governments to discuss development co-operation, including political reform issues.	Policy is to engage host governments in dialogue on issues of democratic development. However, demonstrating the importance USAID accords to these issues is seen as delivering "a powerful message to host governments" (USAID 1991 p.11).
14. Place in overall development aid policy.	High. Listed second after economic reform.	High. Prioritized in Maastricht Treaty. Cornerstone of development policy.	High. Democracy and market economies as guiding principles of development policy of Coalition Government.	High. One of four objectives, within overall goal of 'Sustainable Development'. Priority reflected in title of Clinton Administration's proposed new foreign aid Bill.

Table 1 continued...

FEATURE	BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
15. Link between aid agency and Foreign Ministry	Strong. 'Good government' also part of diplomatic work of Foreign Office; respect for human rights also objective of UK foreign policy. Foreign Office Human Rights Unit has advisory role.	Moderate. Foreign policy input involves co-ordination between Member States and with Commission. Increased political influence on aid policy is likely with the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy dimension of the Maastricht Treaty, including the creation of DG IA (External Political Relations) to provide a greater Commission input into political affairs.	Strong. Not only are these policy issues shared concerns of the Foreign Ministry, but their emergence is linked to an increased role being taken by Foreign Ministry in development co-operation programmes.	Strong. Explicit statements by the Clinton Administration on democracy and human rights as 1 of 3 pillars of foreign policy, and foreign assistance as component of foreign policy. State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has advisory role on human rights issues as regards both bilateral and multilateral aid.
16. Related changes in development assistance policies.	No significant changes.	<p>1. Chapter in Maastricht Treaty on development co-operation includes objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law.</p> <p>2. Lomé IV Mid-Term Review proposals include the introduction of human rights, democracy and the rule of law as an 'essential element' clause, backed up by a suspension clause.</p>	<p>1. Development co-operation offices in recipient countries subsumed under responsibility of Ambassador.</p> <p>2. Restructuring of country allocations, changing from 'programme countries' to larger numbers of 'co-operating partners', and from 'financial frames' (commitments) to 'indicative figures'.</p> <p>3. Initiation of high-level meetings every 3 years between Swedish Government and recipient government to discuss goals and programme of development co-operation.</p>	<p>Under Clinton Administration:</p> <p>1. Redefining of USAID's strategies, including democracy building, and restructuring of country allocations, concentrating development assistance on smaller number of 'sustainable development countries'.</p> <p>2. Budget cuts.</p> <p>3. New 'Peace, Prosperity and Democracy' Bill proposed in 1994, but failed to get enacted.</p>

Given the broad consensus amongst Northern governments on this new dimension of development co-operation policy, it is not surprising that we are more struck in Table 1 by the similarities between the donors. Yet there are also significant differences. Both are examined in turn.⁶⁴

2.2.1 Similarities

In the immediate post-Cold War period all four donors have linked development assistance to political reform, and accorded a high priority, at least at the rhetorical level, to this new objective within their overall development aid strategy. Leading politicians, especially in Britain and in Sweden, and more latterly in the United States, have played a prominent and significant role in the evolution of the policies. The influence of executive officials, both in the Foreign Ministries and in the aid agencies, has been less apparent, with the exception of the United States, where USAID officers appear to have had greater involvement in initial policy development. Given the above, plus the overt political nature of these policies, it is not surprising that the link between the aid agencies and the Foreign Ministries is particularly strong with regard to this aspect of aid policy. However, this indicates the likelihood of aid continuing to be highly politicised, despite the post-Cold War context.

All donors stress the priority given to positive measures to support political reform processes, yet also signal some resolve to reduce or cut aid where lack of progress occurs. The US and Britain also state an intention to integrate elements of pluralism and democracy into their aid programme generally, for example, the encouragement of greater participation and accountability within projects in other sectors. The four donors all state the importance of co-ordinating their activities with other donors and to engage in dialogue with recipient governments.

2.2.2 Differences

Within what appears to be an overall consensus amongst the four donors on linking aid to political reform, there are some important differences of emphasis. The titles given to the policies in themselves indicate such a difference. The European Union and Sweden give primacy to 'human rights', the United States to 'democracy', whilst the British term, 'good government', is peculiar to itself. The main elements included in the policies are generally similar, though again with the exception of the United Kingdom, the only agency to include economic policy amongst essentially political criteria. The US government is the only one which does not include any reference to 'excessive military expenditure'.

The rationale behind the policy changes indicates similar thinking in that all donors value political reform not only as an end in itself, but also as a means to economic development, or, more specifically, to the implementation of World Bank/I.M.F. economic reform programmes. However, looking at these assumptions also reveals some important differences of emphasis particularly between the British Government and the other donors. The British Government is less explicit about the value of democracy in itself, yet its Ministers make the strongest assertions of the link between political reform and economic development, seeing political and economic liberalisation as mutually reinforcing. Other donors perceive a

positive correlation between democracy and development, but tend to remain more cautious in their statements about the exact nature of this complex relationship. Notably USAID has moderated its initial strong, but unsubstantiated, assertions on these linkages.

2.3 EXPLANATION OF POLICY SHIFT

The linking of development assistance to the political circumstances in recipient countries is of course not new. Donor governments from different points of the political spectrum have always chosen which developing countries to support with aid, influenced in part by foreign policy considerations of a strategic and ideological nature. This was most evident during the Cold War period when both West and East gave financial assistance to existing allies and in attempts to gain new ones. It is no doubt an inevitable aspect of development aid. It is equally apparent by Sweden's preference during the 1970s and 1980s for assisting governments, mainly socialist, which espoused social equality and a greater emphasis on social welfare, and by their support for national liberation movements in Southern Africa. However, the allocation of aid on the basis of ideological preference does not amount to a political conditionality. What is new and different about the policy developments in the early 1990s is the explicit linking of aid to political *reform* in developing countries, in terms of both political institutions and structures, and the process of government, the governance dimension. Democracy and human rights become threshold criteria for the provision of aid, and a proportion of development assistance is allocated to specifically promote such reforms.⁶⁵

Why have such significant policy developments occurred? There are three key explanatory factors, as well as a number of more marginal influences.

The first key factor is the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, obviously heralding many major changes in international relations. As regards development assistance it became no longer as necessary for Western donors to support right-wing authoritarian regimes in strategically important countries. However, the end of the Cold War is not sufficient in itself to fully account for the positive espousal with which Western governments are now promoting democracy and human rights, at least in their policy rhetoric.^{66 67} A related factor is an element of Western triumphalism accompanying the demise of the Soviet bloc, leading to policy statements promoting liberal democracy and free market economies as the sole development model.⁶⁸ However, such triumphalism is already disintegrating in the light of the complex realities and problems faced in the post-Cold War world.⁶⁹ This signals a question for later consideration concerning the seriousness with which donors will continue to pursue this new policy agenda, and which elements of it will be emphasised, as the going gets tough.

Two other influences on policy shifts, related to the first key issue of the end of the Cold War, but which themselves carry less explanatory weight, are as follows. Firstly, it is suggested that Western governments have responded to the internal movements for political reform, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, which gained momentum after the events in Eastern Europe. Secondly, policy changes were needed in order for equanimity with

economic assistance to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which, at least through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), has been made conditional on a commitment to "multi-party democracy, pluralism and market economics" (EBRD Charter).^{70 71}

The second key factor is an issue raised by the World Bank, initially in relation to sub-Saharan Africa in its 1989 Report, published shortly before the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the context of the poor results of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the Bank concluded that the policies were correct but not being implemented properly, and raised the issue of the competence and quality of government. In this Report the Bank's concerns were stated in fairly overt political terms, with attention being drawn to the benefits of pluralism and multi-partyism. Subsequently the Bank's interest in this issue of governance has broadened geographically but narrowed definitionally to focus on the administrative and economic management aspects of government, in accordance with its non-political Mandate.⁷² However, it is important to note that even in their earlier statements the World Bank did not value democracy and pluralism in their own right, but as a means to economic reform and development.

Hence, these two key factors at the international level, the end of the Cold War and associated Western triumphalism concerning its political and economic systems and the World Bank's new emphasis on the importance of the process of government and governance, have origins in different discourses and lead to different elements of political reform being valued and for different reasons. Yet, at the historical conjuncture in the early 1990s, they came together, and, with mutual reinforcement, have been major reasons behind the articulation of the new aid policies examined here.⁷³

A third key factor influencing the introduction of such policies has quite different origins again. It stems from the domestic needs of donor government 'Aid Ministries' to mobilise a constituency of support both within government and in the general public if levels of foreign aid are not to be heavily cut, especially in the context of recession and budgetary pressures. Rationales as different as 'anti-communism' (US) and 'third world solidarity' (Sweden) have equally become well-worn with time and the changing international context. Policies emphasising democracy, human rights and good governance provide a new rationale around which to present a fresh profile for development aid in a number of ways. Firstly, human rights and democracy (or 'good government') provide a new principle, unanimously agreed as desirable, on which to base the provision of assistance, and simultaneously counter the arguments of opponents that it is used to 'aid dictators'. Secondly, in practice, it provides a basis for the re-orientation of aid to a different set of 'worthy' recipients, including a rationale for cutting aid through the application of political conditionality criteria. Thirdly, prioritising good governance similarly serves to reassure the public and government colleagues that aid is being well spent and not misused. Fourthly, again in practice, it enables the introduction of tighter controls within the aid programme itself on how money is spent, requiring a greater 'accountability' of recipient governments.

In addressing the same question of why this new agenda has emerged, some critics point to more hidden reasons. At different levels such critics question the 'good faith' in which

donors have introduced the promotion of democracy and human rights in developing countries. At one level it is argued that such policies could be used as an instrument to cut aid through the application of conditionality on political criteria. Such concerns are not ill-founded in a situation of greater competition for scarcer resources: not only are many donor agencies faced with decreased budgets, in the context of overall government expenditure cuts, but also there are greater demands on the aid budget through the inclusion of the needs of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, with some diversion from the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. At the same time, it is evident from above that the policies could also function to defend and protect aid budgets against greater cuts.

Attributing more Machiavellian motives, it is argued that behind the rhetoric of democracy and human rights are concealed other intentions more consistent with the role of aid as serving the interests of the donors themselves. In a much-quoted article, Barya, focusing on Africa, contends that the new policies are an ideological facade that "have nothing to do with the desire of Western countries to actually encourage democracy in Africa" (Barya 1993 p.16). Instead his proposition is that the new aid policy agenda is "part and parcel of a wider global scheme by the West ... to create a new economic and military order ..., using a populist ideology of democracy" (ibid.). More specifically, the new political conditionalities are designed "to crush once and for all the ideology of socialism and replace it unambiguously with the ideology of free enterprise worldwide", and "to create a new credible source of legitimacy for hegemony and thereby ensure leverage over specific countries which are considered politically or economically useful to the West" (ibid.).⁷⁴ Barya's contention is that such a new economic order would operate in the interests of international finance capital.⁷⁵ If the donors were serious about the promotion of democracy, it would require, in Barya's view, not just a change of personnel in control of the state and its resources through multi-party elections, but a strengthening of autonomous organisations of civil society, facilitating their participation in the decision-making processes of the state. But his contention is that the donors will not support such organisations and merely equate democracy with multi-party politics.

The conspiratorial nature of Barya's propositions may be challenged, as well as a questioning of global capital's interest in a continent which is increasingly economically marginalised in the world economy, and in which the trend is of finance capital's withdrawal.^{76 77} However, the predominance of SAPs on economic and political life throughout Africa and other developing regions, their impact in binding the South ever closer to the North, and the close association between political conditionality and economic conditionality, suggests that the critical thrust of such arguments as Barya's should not be dismissed.

An indication of the validity of Barya's claims will be whether donor agencies do or do not take seriously the strengthening of autonomous civic organisations. However, a fuller evaluation of Barya's propositions, and other hypotheses about why Northern governments have introduced this political dimension into development aid policy, can be achieved through empirical research, as part of an overall evaluation of the impact of the aid policies in this field. The future work of this research project aims to contribute to such evaluation.

2.4 ISSUES AND QUESTIONS

What general issues and items of concern arise from the examination of the donor policy statements, which themselves constitute an agenda to be addressed by further, ongoing research?

First, a key issue is the relationship between *democracy and development*. The predominant assumption amongst donor governments that democracy will enhance development prospects has been noted. However, such an assumption is controversial and considerable academic debate surrounds the nature of this relationship. A recent review and evaluation of the research literature over the past two decades concludes that:

"There is no systematic evidence that more 'democratic' types of regime - in the sense of being popularly elected, politically competitive and having respect for civil and political rights - are more successful in achieving economic growth or a lower degree of income inequality" (Healey and Robinson 1992 p.122).⁷⁸

Turning from the wider question to a more specific variant concerning the relationship between political and economic liberalisation, particularly relevant in the current context, Healey and Robinson conclude similarly that:

"Third World experience so far does not give any assurance that political liberalisation or more representative government will *per se* result in better economic management or more decisive or effective adjustment policies, faster economic growth or less inequality" (op.cit. p.124).

The donors' general assumption that political liberalisation will lead to improved economic reform and development may make most 'sense' in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, with the perceived failure of other models of development, and a 'feeling' that democratization constitutes the most promising framework for economic reform. However, this is at best conjecture, and remains uncorroborated. In considering the *prospects* for sub-Saharan Africa in this respect, Healey and Robinson examine both likely areas of compatibility between political liberalisation and economic reform and potential areas of tension, and conclude that "there can be no assurance that political liberalisation or multi-party democracy will also ensure better economic management" (op.cit. p.157). If areas of tension and incompatibility do arise between SAPs and the process of democratization, what will take priority?

Second, the policies linking aid to political reform have risen rapidly to the top of the development co-operation agenda, being accorded high priority by all the donors examined here. However, what will be the *effects* of their policies in practice?

- Will punitive measures be increasingly applied and aid reduced or denied to a growing number of 'ineligible' countries? Will these policies be used as an instrument to cut aid?

- How significant will be the allocation of resources to promote democracy and human rights, especially in the face of budget constraints?
- To what extent will democracy, human rights and governance considerations affect overall country allocations? Are rewards for reformers realistic or punishment for poor performers more likely?
- Will concerns for such policy elements as participation, transparency and accountability remain a discrete area at the level of government, or will they be integrated throughout the development co-operation programme, with greater impact?

Third, where will future *emphasis* lie? Given our identification of two separate and distinct factors accounting for the emergence of the policy agenda, the end of the Cold War and the World Bank's new concern with the process of government, will priority be given to democratic consolidation as an end in itself, or to governance issues as a means to more effective economic management and reform?

Fourth, will policies be applied in a *consistent* manner? Or will democracy and human rights concerns be subordinated in situations of predominant commercial and other foreign policy considerations, particularly in the economic growth areas of E. Asia, e.g. Indonesia and China? Will political conditionality be applied mostly in the aid dependent countries of sub-Saharan countries and less so elsewhere in the world?⁷⁹ & ⁸⁰

Fifth, whilst aid to support dictatorships has become indefensible, what will be the impact of the introduction of political aid policies on the *sovereignty* of developing countries to *determine* their own political systems? The issues of dialogue between donor and host governments and of co-ordination between donors become pertinent, given the overall power relations between North and South. Firstly, donors do stress both a commitment to and a preference for dialogue with host governments on political reforms, rather than the imposition of conditionality. However, concerns do arise regarding the nature and practice of dialogue, particularly in the light of the experience of economic reform processes and SAPs. Dialogue has been characterised in the latter by negotiation between two unequal parties, with recipient governments frequently having little or no option but to accept the conditions of the donors. Table 1, item 12, indicates that donors will at a minimum be informing, rather than discussing, the threshold political requirements for development assistance. It remains uncertain how much equal and meaningful interchange will take place between the two parties on political reform in a country. Fears have been expressed, particularly in the context of European Union and Swedish aid, that the introduction of policies in this field, could lead to less serious and purposeful dialogue than hitherto. Secondly, donors also stress the importance of co-ordination between themselves, particularly through the forum of World Bank-led Consultative Groups. At face value this may appear to make good sense, avoiding duplication of effort and enabling individual donors to focus on their comparative advantage. Again, however, the experience for recipient governments of donor co-ordination behind World Bank/IMF-led SAPs, with bilateral and multilateral aid, Paris Club debt rescheduling, and even private sector financing, all becoming conditional on

the implementation of an agreed reform programme, leads to concerns that donor co-ordination in effect will mean a relatively powerless developing country government being confronted by a united front of the major Northern donor governments in respect of the political reforms it is expected to undertake in order to have access to development assistance funds.⁸¹

Finally, what will be the overall impact of political aid policies on North-South relations? Will the new aid policies, couched in the language of promoting democracy and human rights, be a real step forward in assisting the increased participation of the people in political decision-making in developing countries? Alternatively, will they turn out to be another means by which leverage is exerted over developing countries and their governments, reinforcing the domination of the South by the North?

PART 3. POLICY OPERATIONALISATION


Following the establishment of the new policy objectives in the early 1990s, the subsequent policy development was the elaboration of a strategy by which to operationalise policy. However, the linking of aid to political reform introduces not only a new and very broad agenda for donor agencies to integrate into their aid programmes, but also a problematic one. In effect there are three agendas corresponding to the key concepts of 'democracy', 'human rights' and 'good governance'. The problem is that the definitions and meanings of the three terms are extremely contested and subject to a wide variety of interpretations. Part 3 addresses the questions associated with policy operationalisation in two main sections. First, the problems of defining human rights, democracy and good governance are considered, examining both the donors' definitions as well as some additional perspectives which serve to provide a wider context. Second, the donors' strategies are assessed both comparatively with each other and along broader lines of enquiry arising from the wider contextualisation.

A fourth element in the policy statements, and potentially a fourth agenda to be addressed, is the issue of 'excessive military expenditure'. However, this is not examined further as, hitherto, none of the selected donor agencies appear to have taken any significant steps to operationalise this concept as a condition for aid or to promote military reform.⁸² & ⁸³

3.1 DEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Attempting to define human rights, democracy and good governance is a very difficult task, given the contentious nature of all three concepts. This is particularly true of democracy with huge contestation as regards its meaning in both theory and practice. Human rights at least benefits from some clarity bestowed by its incorporation into international law. The difficulties in defining not only 'governance', but also what constitutes *good* governance, arise partly due to its recent introduction into international development parlance and that no definition of it exists separate from this new policy agenda.

Adding to the definitional difficulties, the concepts of human rights, democracy and good governance are all interconnected with considerable areas of overlap, as shown in diagrammatic form below (Figure 1).⁸⁴ However, for purposes of analytical clarity, each concept is considered separately.



**Human
Rights**

**Good
Governance**

Democracy

civil society

civil
and
political
rights

open and
accountable
government

local
government

free and fair
elections

3.1.1 Donor Definitions and Measures

If the initial policy statements examined in Part 2 stemmed mainly from politicians, the succeeding task of developing a strategy by which to operationalise policy fell to the government aid agencies. SIDA and ODA both produced a 'strategy document' in June 1993 and October 1993 respectively; USAID produced its more detailed 'Democracy and Governance' policy paper in November 1991, and a draft Strategy Paper in October 1993, published in March 1994, covering the four re-formulated strategic objectives including 'Building Democracy'; the original resolution of the EU's Council of Ministers in November 1991 doubled as a policy statement and a strategy document, and further developments in EU strategy can be gleaned from the two annual 'implementation reports' dated October 1992 and February 1994. These documents tend to address the task of operationalising policy in two stages. First, definitions are given of the key concepts, outlining their constituent elements. Second, a range of possible measures is identified by which such elements could be promoted or strengthened. For example, if one of the components of 'democracy' is defined as a 'healthy civil society', then the measures to foster this could include supporting professional associations, trade unions, women's organisations, advocacy groups, grass roots movements, etc.

With information taken from the above documents, Table 2 presents in comparative form the definitions of human rights, democracy and good governance given by the four donors, whilst Table 3 outlines the menus of activities identified under each heading and sub-heading. Commentary on the Tables and assessment of how the donors' definitions and measures compare with each other is given below in section 3.2.1.

TABLE 2. Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance: A Comparison of Donor *Definitions*.

BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
<p>1. <u>Human Rights</u></p> <p>‘Human Rights and the Rule of Law’ put together.</p> <p>1.1 Human Rights:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - protection of civil and political rights, including freedom of expression and association - promotion of institutional pluralism, i.e. economic and social interest groups in civil society, particularly those representing disadvantaged groups (undefined). <p>1.2 Rule of Law:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - framework of known and fair law - impartial legal processes - independent judiciary - legal information and representation - anti-discrimination legislation - minority rights protected. <p>(ODA 1993)</p>	<p>1. <u>Human Rights</u></p> <p>Human rights in this context defined as civil and political liberties, to be promoted "in parallel with economic and social rights," presumably seen as supported through the overall development co-operation programme.</p> <p>(EU Council of Ministers 1991)</p>	<p>1. <u>Human Rights</u></p> <p>1.1 Civil and political rights, as defined in the ICCPR.</p> <p>1.2 Economic and social rights seen as supported by Sweden’s development assistance programme generally.</p> <p>(SIDA 1993a)</p>	<p>1. <u>Human Rights</u></p> <p>1.1 Reference made to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a distinction made between three categories of rights:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - integrity of the person, i.e. freedom from torture, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment etc - civil and political rights - social and economic rights. <p>Not clarified which human rights are the focus of AID’s programme, although those which protect the ‘integrity of the person’ are given prominence.</p> <p>(USAID 1991)</p>

Table 2 continued... *Definitions*

BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
<p>2. <u>Democracy</u></p> <p>Covered by the term 'legitimacy'.</p> <p>2.1 Legitimacy criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - multi-party democracy - or other means of consultation and responsiveness to popular needs and aspirations, where multi-party system "impractical or unsustainable". <p>2.2 Other requisites:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - healthy civil society - basic education and literacy. <p>(ODA 1993)</p>	<p>2. <u>Democracy</u></p> <p>No definition of the main components of democracy, although attention is drawn to the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - elections - establishment of new democratic institutions - the rule of law - strengthening the judiciary and the administration of justice - NGOs, necessary for a pluralist society - equal opportunities for all. <p>(EU Council of Ministers 1991).</p>	<p>2. <u>Democracy</u></p> <p>2.1 Defined as</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a political system in which decision makers selected in regular, free and fair elections, with universal franchise. <p>2.2 Free elections imply a number of civil and political rights, e.g:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freedom of speech and association, of religion etc - political opposition as legitimate - an effective legal system to protect rights. <p>(SIDA 1993a)</p>	<p>2. <u>Democracy</u></p> <p>Characterised by:</p> <p>2.1 Political participation and peaceful competition, involving:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - free and fair elections - freedom of expression and association - free flow of information - healthy civil society <p>2.2 Strong democratic values, notably:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - tolerance and political compromise - majority rule and minority rights - civil authority over the military - peaceful resolution of differences . <p>(USAID 1991)</p>

Table 2 continued... *Definitions*

BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
<p>3. <u>Governance</u></p> <p>Covered by the concepts of 'accountability' and 'competence'.</p> <p>3.1 Accountability:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - of executive to legislature - of government officials to politicians - between government institutions, e.g. of parastatals to central ministries - of government institutions to external audit institutions - of government institutions to society. <p>3.1.1 Accountability criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - definition of expected performance standards - transparency of decision-making - availability of information, including free press - mechanisms to hold responsible individuals to account. 	<p>3. <u>Governance</u></p> <p>Uses the term 'good governance' very broadly as an umbrella covering all major policy elements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - sensible economic and social policies - democratic decision-making - governmental transparency and financial accountability - a market-friendly environment - measures to combat corruption - respect for human rights and the rule of law. <p>(EU Council of Ministers 1991)</p>	<p>3. <u>Governance</u></p> <p>Narrow concept of governance covering public administration and management.</p> <p>3.1 Support for 'capacity building' of public sector institutions preceded democracy and human rights concerns. Scope of pre-existing policies included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - improving efficiency and effectiveness of public administration - strengthening policy-making capacity - re-building government legitimacy, through increasing citizens' participation and by protecting the most needy - making more effective use of local initiative and resources. <p>(SIDA 1991 pp. 43-44)</p> <p>(continued below)</p>	<p>3. <u>Governance</u></p> <p>Uses the term 'lawful governance', broader than competent and effective government, (the latter being not necessarily democratic).</p> <p>Its key characteristics are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a just and responsive judicial process to which all state officials (including military and police) are subject - a system of laws impartially enforced by an independent judiciary - accountability of the executive through transparency of its actions and established procedures for public scrutiny. <p>(USAID 1991)</p>

Table 2 continued... Definitions

BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
<p>3.2 Competence, involving government 'capacity' or 'capability' to plan and manage services, (not service provision), including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - formulating policies - taking decisions, both long- and short-term - managing service delivery <p>Competence criteria generally not concerned with policy content, although 'command economic model' not appropriate, and other exceptions are excessive military expenditure and excess luxury consumption by elite, where government competence would be questioned.</p> <p>3.3 'Accountability' and competence both represent the antithesis of corruption.</p> <p>(ODA 1993)</p>		<p>3.2 More up-dated definition of 'good governance' as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - increasing the efficiency of the state apparatus - increasing its responsibility and accessibility to citizens - promoting public control over state operations - increasing service- orientation and democratic work methods. <p>(SIDA 1993b p.3)</p>	

TABLE 3. Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance: A Comparison of Policy Measures.

BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
<p>1. <u>Human Rights</u></p> <p>1.1 Measures to promote human rights and the rule of law.</p> <p>1.1.1 Drafting of laws</p> <p>1.1.2 Strengthening <i>civil society</i>, through support for organisations representing the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the disadvantaged, including women, the poor, minorities - business associations and trade unions - professional associations - community groups - the media - community-level conflict resolution. 	<p>1. <u>Human rights</u></p> <p>1.1 Support to local human rights organisations.</p> <p>1.2 Educational schemes (human rights information or awareness-raising.</p> <p>1.3 Support for vulnerable groups i.e. victims of discriminatory and violent practices (minorities, political prisoners, children, torture victims).</p> <p>1.3.1 Legal and other material support to target groups through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - local NGOs - public-sector establishments (e.g. universities, human rights ombudsmen). <p>Cross-cutting focus on the rights of women, children and indigenous communities.</p>	<p>1. <u>Human Rights</u></p> <p>1.1 In countries where the government is involved in human rights violations, support to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - organisations, national and international, which document violations of human rights. - activities, national and international, which create public opinion against the type of government. - victims and their families - conflict solving and national reconciliation measures, in civil war situations. <p>1.2 In countries where governments aspire to respect human rights measures could include the following.</p>	<p>1. <u>Human Rights</u></p> <p>1.1 Promoting respect for human rights by supporting:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the establishment of a framework of law and legal procedures - human rights education - the rights of women, children, cultural and religious minorities - institutions that monitor and advocate respect for human rights. <p>(USAID 1991)</p> <p>The latter institutions can be local, national, regional or international (USAID 1993).</p>

Table 3 continued... *Measures*

BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	
<p>1.1.3 The <i>courts</i> including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the judiciary - prosecution and defense services - courts administration. <p>1.1.4 Legal advice, assistance and representation.</p> <p>1.1.5 The police.</p> <p>1.1.6 Initiatives addressing inequalities, e.g. gender, race.</p> <p>1.1.7 Limiting arbitrary power by officials through Ombudsman or community organisations.</p> <p>1.1.8 Initiatives to strengthen community level conflict resolution.</p> <p>1.1.9 School education for a democratic society.</p> <p>(ODA 1993)</p>	<p>1.4 Support for conflict prevention or resolution.</p> <p>1.4.1 Support to victims of conflict, e.g. ex-combatants.</p> <p>(European Commission 1994)</p>	<p>1.2.1 Measures to strengthen the rule of law in the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - legislative capacity and law-making - police training re. human rights - prosecution authorities - courts - prisons - state organisations for enforcement of debt, awards of damages, and other court decisions - legal advice and assistance, legal aid - ombudsman institutions - anti-corruption measures and institutional arrangements - training of lawyers. 	<p>1.2.2 Other measures, as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - information programmes to increase <i>citizens' awareness of legal rights and responsibilities</i>, including through the media - to create public opinion in favour of <i>ratification of international human rights conventions</i> - to strengthen the situation and <i>rights of women</i> - to strengthen the situation and <i>rights of the child</i>, particularly 'street/working children', in war situations, handicapped children - to strengthen the situation and <i>rights of ethnic minorities</i> - to strengthen the situation and <i>rights of disabled people</i> and other vulnerable groups. <p>(SIDA 1993a)</p>

Table 3 continued... *Measures*

BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
<p>2. Democracy</p> <p>2.1 Measures to promote legitimacy include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - electoral activities, including pre-elections - institution building for legislatures, including both national and local institutions, e.g. training for legislators, parliamentary clerks etc - assisting the transition from military to civilian rule, e.g. demobilisation - encouraging participation in government, both local and national - curriculum development for civics teaching in schools. <p>2.2 Measures to enhance political accountability include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - restructuring of government, e.g. decentralisation 	<p>2. Democracy</p> <p>2.1 Activities to support democratic transition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - pre-election measures - elections <p>2.2 Activities to strengthen the rule of law, including support for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - newly-founded parliaments - independent judiciary - draft constitutions and electoral codes - regional decentralisation and participatory local government. <p>2.3 Activities to strengthen civil society:</p> <p>2.3.1 Support to local NGOs, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> local associations that promote democracy - grass-roots development organisations 	<p>2. Democracy</p> <p>Also see measures to strengthen respect for human rights, above, regarded as simultaneous support for democracy.</p> <p>2.1 Measures specific to promoting democracy include support for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freedom of speech, including the media and culture - constitutions and other statutory instruments on forms of Government - elections, including pre-electoral support and election supervision - parliament - local government - popular participation in political life, e.g. voter registration campaigns - transfer of knowledge of democratic network and procedures to local community organisations 	<p>2. Democracy</p> <p>2.1 Strengthening democratic representation:</p> <p>2.1.1 Elections, including activities to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - strengthen electoral systems and institutions - observe and monitor elections - educate and register voters - improve professionalism of political parties. <p>2.1.2 Representative political institutions, including activities to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - enhance professionalism of legislators - strengthen legislative research, analysis and drafting capabilities - strengthen accountability of local government. <p>2.1.3 Civil society, including activities to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - support professional associations, civic groups, labour organisations, business groups, advocacy groups. <p>2.1.4 Free flow of information, including activities to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - support independent policy research institutions

Table 3 continued... *Measures*

BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - strengthening information systems within government, particularly for disadvantaged people, e.g. the illiterate - development of the media. <p>(ODA 1993)</p>	<p>Particular attention given to rights and position of women.</p> <p>(European Commission 1992)</p> <p>2.3.2 Literacy campaigns.</p> <p>2.3.3 Support to independent media, including audio visual.</p> <p>2.4 Activities to support democratic consolidation stated as future priority.</p> <p>(European Commission 1992 and 1994)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - citizen's awareness of how their country is governed, e.g. through the media or the education system - greater transparency of public administration systems, to allow public control. <p>(SIDA 1993a)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - support independent mass media - reduce censorship - support transparency of government decision-making. <p>2.2 Encouraging democratic values through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - civic education - leadership training. <p>(USAID 1991)</p> <p>2.3 Democracy Building.</p> <p>The later strategy document includes the following additional areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - constitution drafting - political parties and other national political organisations, (though subject to statutory prohibitions against influencing election outcomes) - improved civil-military relations, including civilian control of the military. <p>(USAID 1993a)</p>

Table 3 continued... *Measures*

BRITISH AID	EUROPEAN UNION AID	SWEDISH AID	UNITED STATES AID
<p>3. Governance</p> <p>3.1 Measures to promote public accountability include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - clarification of definitions or responsibilities and standards - strengthening systems of financial planning, accounting and audit - anti-corruption measures - reform of systems of procurement and tendering - encouraging institutions to be outward looking and more responsive to their clients. <p>(ODA 1993)</p>	<p>3. Governance</p> <p>Activities to promote good governance do not appear to have received much detailed attention. In the Commission's 1992 Report, 'Good Governance' is included as part of activities to strengthen the rule of law, but only one measure listed, 'greater openness in the management of public finances', corresponds to the concept of governance, as narrowly defined. Along with the rule of law, good governance is stated as a second priority area, but then discussion moves on to how structural adjustment support programmes are contributing to good governance. (European Commission 1992).</p> <p>The 1993 Report, in the conclusions, lists good governance as a future priority. Governance is now more narrowly defined as open and transparent public administration, and examples given on governance reforms are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - decentralisation - effective supervisory bodies - tax reform <p>It is also noted that good governance is a priority area in the Commission proposals for the Lomé IV mid-term review.</p> <p>(European Commission 1994)</p>	<p>3. Governance</p> <p>3.1 Earlier support focused on government agencies that perform 'core functions', i.e. Ministries of Finance, Planning, Public Administration, etc. Within such 'systems development', the following specific areas are prioritised:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - financial policy-making and management, e.g. budgeting, accounting, taxation, central banking - services to assist government planning, e.g. national statistical services - administrative development and reform, (i.e. organisation and reform of human resources), eg. personnel administration, management training - decentralisation and support for local government - promotion of women in the public sector - public administration co-operation at regional level <p>(SIDA 1991 pp. 21-32)</p>	<p>3. Governance</p> <p>3.1 Promoting lawful governance by support for the following.</p> <p>3.1.1 Legal and judicial systems, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - legal education - judicial reforms - independent judiciary - legal advice and assistance services. <p>3.1.2 Accountability of the executive, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - formal constraints on all state officials - establishing ombudsmen - procedures for financial accountability - anti-corruption measures - monitoring of military budgets by civil authorities. <p>(USAID 1991)</p> <p>The strategy document also highlights support for institutions that increase government accountability at state (regional) and local levels, as well as national.</p> <p>(USAID 1993)</p>

Table 3 continued... *Measures*

BRITISH AID	S W E D I S H		A I D
<p>3.2 Measures to increase competence include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - policy making skills, particularly macro-economic planning - improving the management of government itself, e.g. the Cabinet Office, civil service reform - strengthening budget/resource allocation systems - a range of institution building activities to enhance effectiveness - developing the capacity to review and redefine the role of government, e.g. substituting private sector activity for government intervention. <p>(ODA 1993)</p>	<p>3.2 The context of economic and political reform has led to the development of new areas of support, including outside the public sector.</p> <p>3.2.1 Support for the development of a market economy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - establishment of a legal framework to regulate private business, plus state instruments to monitor and supervise the private sector - development of policy analysis capacity, e.g. support to research institutions - support of educational efforts in strategic sectors, e.g. training of bankers, managers, etc. 	<p>3.2.2 Strengthening of important institutions outside the public sector. I.e. the development of competence in strategic civic organisations, e.g. bar associations, institutes of chartered accountants, in order to facilitate an equal interplay between the public sector and civil society.</p> <p>3.2.3 Support for the development of the legal system. (However, no distinction is made between activities in this area relevant to good governance and those promoting democracy and human rights).</p> <p>3.2.4 Higher education, including support to relevant university departments, e.g. law, economics, politics, business and administration, to increase the amount of qualified personnel.</p> <p>(SIDA 1993b pp. 5-6)</p>	<p>3.3 However, all such identified measures are in the context of two general principles of development co-operation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - support shall be adapted to the specific country context, and its current political, economic, social and cultural features - in line with 'Changing Roles', it is anticipated that recipient country governments identify their priorities and make co-operation requests. <p>(SIDA 1993b)</p>

3.1.2 Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance: Widening the Context

Tables 2 & 3 facilitate comparison *between* the definitions of human rights, democracy and good governance and associated measures, given by the four donors. The limitations of this, however, are evident. It is also essential to evaluate the donors' definitions outside their terms of reference. Yet comparison with any external benchmark or standard treatment of the three concepts is not possible, given their contested nature. It is also impossible to deal here with the variety of different interpretations of such broad and contentious concepts. Hence this section furnishes some additional perspectives, without any claim to comprehensiveness, on the definitions of human rights, democracy and good governance, with the aim of providing some contextualisation of the donors' definitions and enabling a fuller assessment along broader lines of enquiry. A related aim is to provide the background information for the raising of a wider set of questions regarding Northern governments' introduction of these concepts into development co-operation.

1. Human Rights

Of the three concepts being examined, human rights is the possible exception in that an international consensus on its definition is evolving by their incorporation, post-1945, into international law, through the systems of UN Treaties and of regional conventions. Box 1 outlines the former and Box 2 the latter.

BOX 1: The UN and Human Rights

UN Treaties

Although the idea of human rights has existed for many years, it has received particular recognition throughout the world since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. The original *UN Charter* (1945) included a pledge by Member States to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all" (Article 55). The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, was the first definition of these rights and freedoms to which they had pledged themselves.⁸⁵ However, it was not legally binding on Member States. Subsequent attempts to turn the Universal Declaration into legally binding obligations resulted in the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR), and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR), collectively known as the *International Bill of Rights*.⁸⁶ These were both adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966, and both came into force in 1976 when each treaty had been ratified by the required minimum of 35 states. Examples of the rights included in the ICCPR are: the right to a fair trial; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of association; the right of assembly; the right to vote. The rights recognised in the ICESCR include: the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing; the right to work; the right to health and education; the right to social security; the right to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. Almost all the rights in the Universal Declaration are included in the two International Covenants.⁸⁷ The main reason for the division of the rights into two Covenants was seen as a consequence of the essentially different nature of civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other. The former are obligations on governments not to abuse state power which, given the political will, can be realised immediately, not dependent on the stage of economic development. The latter are described more typically as 'aspirational' rights, which governments are expected to progressively realise for their people as a whole.⁸⁸ As of 1st January 1994, 125 states had ratified the ICCPR and 127 states had ratified the ICESCR.⁸⁹

The other main UN international human rights treaties are as follows:

- the *International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)*, (adopted 1965, entered into force 1969, 138 ratifications);
- the *Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)*, (adopted 1979, entered into force 1981, 130 ratifications);
- the *Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)*, (adopted 1981, entered into force 1987, 78 ratifications);
- the *Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)*, (adopted 1989, entered into force 1990, 152 ratifications).

Obligations

State parties to these international treaties take on limited legal obligations, the most common of which is a periodic requirement to report on the measures adopted to give effect to the provisions of the Conventions, and described as "the most widespread and established implementation technique for the international implementation of human rights" (McGoldrick 1994 p.62). On ratification, state parties to the ICCPR and the ICESCR, for example, have to submit an initial report on measures taken to give effect to those rights, and thereafter every five years. The other treaties above all have similar reporting procedures.

In addition some treaties have optional provisions for inter-state and/or individual complaints concerning alleged violations, but none automatic. The inter-state procedures are rarely used, and, thus, uncontentious.⁹⁰ The first Optional Protocol (OP) of the ICCPR recognises the right of individual complaint, ratified by 74 out of the 125 state parties to the Covenant. Individual rights of petition are also provided for in the ICERD and the CAT, recognised by only 19 out of 137 state parties in the former, and 33 out of 78 state parties in the latter. The other treaties mentioned above, including the ICESCR, have no individual right of petition. On ratifying a treaty state parties can also make reservations to the main articles of a Convention, some of which may be insubstantial matters of detail, others of greater significance; some can be ruled to be contrary to the intent of the Convention itself.

Supervisory Bodies

Each treaty has a supervisory committee, responsible for monitoring implementation of its provisions, and to whom state party reports and individual complaints are submitted. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) is responsible for monitoring implementation of the ICCPR, and, since 1987, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) for the ICESCR. The HRC itself reports annually to the UN General Assembly (GA) and the CESCR to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Both Committees are made up of 18 independent experts, elected by state parties for four year terms. The other international conventions listed above all have similar monitoring mechanisms. The state parties' reports are generally examined at public hearings, and the Committees are able to consider information from other sources, including from specialist UN agencies, for example, ILO and UNICEF, and from NGOs.⁹¹ The powers of the monitoring bodies are generally restricted to non-binding comments and recommendations, including on issues of concern, to state parties. Such comments can, however, also be included in their annual reports to the appropriate UN organ. State party reports are published as official UN documents. As regards individual rights of petition, (known as 'communications'), the relevant Committees have the power to express their 'views', including changes required in national legislation, in the event of allegations of violations being upheld. Again, there are no enforcement mechanisms, and compliance with a Committee's 'views' is, in the final instance, up to the state party itself.

BOX 2: The Regional System of Human Rights

European Convention on Human Rights

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was adopted by the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1950 and came into force in 1953. It essentially covers civil and political rights, with many of the rights protected being the same, and their definitions substantially similar, as in the ICCPR (Robertson 1989 p.132). The ECHR includes a mandatory inter-state complaints procedure, and an optional individual right of petition.⁹² Accession to the ECHR has become a condition of membership of the CoE, which in turn is a condition for potential applicants to the EU. Hence, as of 1.1.1994, all 28 CoE Member States, now including a number of central and eastern European countries, had ratified the ECHR and the optional right of individual petition. It is monitored by the European Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR), with the power to make recommendations to the Committee of Ministers of the CoE, who in turn can make a decision on whether or not a violation has occurred, or refer the case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The jurisdiction of the latter has also been agreed to by all state parties.⁹³

American Convention on Human Rights

The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) was adopted by the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1969, and came into force in 1978. Again, it recognises a very similar list of rights and freedoms to the ICCPR (op.cit. pp.166-167). An additional Protocol was adopted in 1988 in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, but, as of 1.1.1994, it had only received 3 ratifications and had not come into force.

In contrast to the ECHR, the ACHR has a mandatory right of petition for individuals, groups of individuals and NGOs who allege violations, and an optional inter-state complaints procedure. As of 1.1.1994, 25 out of the 32 OAS members had ratified the ACHR, with 10 allowing inter-state complaints. The US has not yet ratified the ACHR despite signing it in 1977 (Stewart 1993 p.83). The ACHR is monitored by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACmHR) with the power, if a complaint is upheld, to make recommendations as to measures to be taken by the State concerned within a fixed period of time. If its recommendations are not implemented within the time period, the IACmHR can publish its report. Separately, the Commission produces country reports when particular human rights concerns arise, (e.g. Chile annually from 1974 - 1980, El Salvador 1979, Argentina 1980). Cases can also be referred to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), but only when state parties have agreed to its jurisdiction, either generally, or specifically for a particular case. As of 1.1.1994, 16 state parties had made a general declaration recognising the Court. Ultimately the Court cannot enforce state compliance with its judgment, but it can report a state for non-compliance to the annual General Assembly of the OAS, which governments would no doubt wish to avoid (Robertson 1989 pp.180-181).

African Charter on Human and People's Rights

The African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1981 and came into force in 1986. It recognises a broadly similar range of civil and political rights as the other regional conventions and the ICCPR. However, it also gives more coverage to economic, social and cultural rights, and is supplemented by more unique conceptions of, firstly, people's rights, and secondly, individual duties. The economic, social and cultural rights covered are not as extensive as the ICESCR but indicate a greater emphasis by African states on the importance of such rights. The people's rights identified both augment the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination, including the rights to liberation and to assistance against oppression, and also incorporate other rights such as the right to free disposal of wealth and natural resources and the right to development. The balancing of rights with individual duties towards the family, society, the state, and to promote African unity, add another distinctive

feature to the Charter. By 1.1.1994, 49 African countries had ratified the Charter, leaving only a handful that had not, but including ratification by such unlikely proponents of human rights as the current governments of Sudan, Zaire and Equatorial Guinea. The Charter includes both mandatory inter-state complaints and a mandatory right of complaint to individuals, groups and NGOs, accepted automatically upon ratification. In addition, again in contrast to the ECHR and the ACHR, there is an obligation on state parties to submit biannual reports on steps taken to implement the Charter.

The African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACmHPR) is responsible for overall monitoring of the Charter. Its functions are more wide-ranging than its European and American counterparts. Not only does it deal with any inter-state complaints and those from non-state entities, it also has a promotional role, including research on African problems in this field, and in addition, it monitors the biannual reporting obligations of state parties.⁹⁴ The African Charter makes no provision for a court, but steps are being taken towards an amendment of the Charter and the establishment of an African Court of Human Rights (The Interdependent May 1994).

2. Democracy

"Democracy is without doubt the most contested and controversial concept in political theory" (Hoffman 1988 p.131).

Almost everyone purports to be in favour of democracy and few dare to state their opposition to it. Such is the power of the word that advocates of disparate political systems this century have all tried to accord legitimacy to their system by labelling it democratic, ranging from the 'liberal democracies' of the West, the 'peoples democracies' of the communist regimes of the East, to the 'one-party democracies' of a number of post-colonial developing countries, particularly in Africa.⁹⁵ Similarly, in political theory there are many different versions of what democracy entails. This is not the place to review such debates, however, and two modest tasks only are attempted here. First, an indication of the spectrum of ideas even within the overall framework of liberal democracy is provided by contrasting the notions of neo-liberal 'legal' democracy and participatory democracy. These versions are selected for their polarisation, one narrow and one broad, and for their likely pertinence to contemporary debates, and are examined in Box 3. Second, if definition of the term democracy evades possibility, some clarification at least of its key components is necessary to provide some structure and guidance for the comparative analysis of the four donors' definitions and of the types of measures they propose to strengthen emerging democracies, to which this is a prelude. For this purpose, in Box 4 the recent work of one political theorist, David Beetham, is examined and his views outlined on the key principles and components of democracy. At the same time it is recognised that these represent one opinion only and may be far from universally accepted.

BOX 3: 'Legal' or 'Participatory' Democracy?⁹⁶

Two widely varying notions of democracy are put forward by 'neo-liberalism' and by proponents of 'participatory democracy', the former seeking to restrict the sphere of democratic control and the latter to extend it.

Such different notions of democracy, narrow and wide, are not new. The history of liberal democracy has been one of tensions between its liberal and democratic components, with struggles over the extent and form that democratization should take from disputes over the extension of the franchise onwards (Beetham 1993a pp.58-60). Classic liberalism's concern was to enable private business (a market economy) and personal and social life (civil society) to develop with a minimum of state interference. This was achieved through a combination of, on the one hand, the rolling back of state power and, on the other, assuring that state power was not exercised arbitrarily but subject to constraints. The latter led to the creation of democratic structures of representation. "The tradition that became liberal democracy was liberal first ... and democratic later" (Sorenson 1993 p.5).

The rise of neo-liberal (or New Right) ideas since the mid-1970s, gaining influence and prominence in the US and UK under the Reagan and Thatcher governments, has echoed such a minimalist conception of the state, putting strict limits on any regulatory or redistributive activities of government. As is well known, neo-liberalism has promulgated the rolling back of state involvement in the economy and social sectors, and concurrently the extension of the market and private capital into more and more areas previously dominated by the state. In the struggles within liberal democracy referred to above, it advocates the cause of liberals versus democrats, seeking to limit the democratic use of state power, and increase the areas of social life which are unregulated by and unaccountable to the state. It is a restricted notion of democracy which David Held has termed 'legal democracy' (1987 pp. 247-254). Based on Hayek's writings on the relationship between the individual, democracy and the state, Held characterises legal democracy as follows.

Legal democracy involves representative democracy as a safeguard against arbitrary government, but with provisos. First, there is the danger of 'oppressive' majority rule placing restrictions on individual freedoms, and second, the potential of displacement of majority rule by the rule of its agents, i.e. political representatives and bureaucrats (Hayek 1978 pp.152-162, cited in Held 1987 p.247). Hence a constitutional state, backed up by the *rule of law*, is required precisely to narrow the boundaries over which the state has legal authority. Government intervention in *civil society*, which encompasses economic activity, must be limited to creating a framework for the operation of the free market, and redistributive measures are excluded as unwarranted interference in its workings (Sorenson 1993 p.6). In essence, 'legal democracy' sets the political parameters for a radical free market-based society with minimal state intervention. Democracy is more a means to that end than an end in itself. As Hayek states, it is "a utilitarian device' to help safeguard the highest political end: liberty" (1982 p.39, cited in Held *ibid.*).

An alternative and opposing notion of democracy, more associated with the political left, is that of 'participatory democracy'. Its advocates criticise the limits of representative democracy. It has its own historical tradition in the ideas of Rousseau, although his model of 'direct democracy' was more applicable to small pre-industrial communities. More contemporarily, participatory democracy challenges the Schumpeterian notion of democracy as restricted to the occasional, periodic vote, after which the elected government gets on, uninterrupted, with the task of governing. Participatory democracy is generally advocated less as an alternative model to liberal democracy, and more as a challenge to deepen and create a more substantial democracy. In more practical terms, its proponents put forward, firstly, the extension of democratic decision-making beyond government to other societal institutions, for example, local community organisations and workplace democracy. Secondly, they advocate the democratization of the ongoing process of government, between elections, by enhancing mechanisms for both increased political party and pressure group participation in decision-taking, and by political parties themselves becoming more internally democratic. Such changes would simultaneously increase government accountability. Thirdly, formal political equality through the franchise is criticised as contradicted by the lack of equal opportunity for political participation due to economic and social inequalities and social relations of subordination (e.g. of women). Hence redistributive policies and the elimination of inequalities in social relationships are advocated, leading to a more egalitarian society generally, and which in itself is more democratic.

BOX 4: Democracy: Principles and Components - One View

The information and analysis here is taken from Beetham (1993b, 1994) and Beetham and Boyle (1995).

4.1 Two Principles

David Beetham contends that common democratic principles underlie opposing definitions of democracy. In his view there are two key principles of democracy: *popular control* over collective decision-making, and *political equality* in the exercise of that control (i.e. equality of rights). Dependent on the extent that these principles are realised in the decision-making process of an association of people, we can call that association 'democratic'. This applies to associations at all levels of society, from family and community groups to nation and state, although issues of democracy are most commonly concerned with control of national and local government.

Three implications arise from the foundation provided by these two key principles. The first is that democracy is not an all-or-nothing affair, rather it is a continuum, and countries can be assessed according to the degree to which the principles of popular control and political equality are realised in practice. Second, it is evident that no state realises these principles fully and popular struggles to consolidate and extend democracy will take place in all societies, including Western established democracies. Third, in order to conduct an assessment of where improvements can be made, the two principles need to be broken down into a set of criteria which will establish not only minimum standards but also a sense of 'best practice', similar to the standards and measures already achieved in the international monitoring of human rights. As the basis for such an assessment Beetham defines what he considers to be the main components of democracy and their constituent elements, through which the principles are realised.⁹⁷

4.2 Four Components

Four components of democracy are outlined: free and fair elections; open and accountable government; civil and political liberties; a democratic society. These are all interconnected and each component is necessary to the whole of a functioning democracy. However, for analytical purposes they can be treated separately.

4.2.1 Free and Fair Elections

Regular elections by universal suffrage are the chief instrument of popular control over government. Beetham distinguishes three key elements.

Firstly, the *electoral system* and the legal rules governing it must ensure the principle of political equality, including the following aspects:

- electoral registration and voting
- equal value of each vote
- equality of opportunity to stand for public office.

Secondly, as regards the *electoral process* of how elections are conducted in practice, it is essential that:

- it is not under the control of the current government
- there is a reasonable choice between parties and candidates
- there is a level playing field between parties and candidates as regards their opportunities to communicate their policies to the electorate.

A third element is the relationship between national government and popularly elected local and/or regional government, with the latter forms having sufficient powers to carry out their functions without interference from the centre.

The detailed criteria for evaluating how free and fair is a given election through all its stages from vote registration to election outcome has been defined to a large extent by international electoral monitoring bodies (e.g. Commonwealth, United Nations etc).⁹⁸

4.2.2 Open and Accountable Government

Open government involves four main strands:

- the provision of information about its policies by government
- access of public and press to government documents
- openness of official meetings to public and press
- consultation by government of relevant interest groups in the function and implementation of policy.

The requirements of open government include freedom of information legislation, an independent public statistical service, and legislation regarding procedures for the process of consultation.

Accountable government has three main dimensions. First, *legal accountability* is the accountability of all state personnel, both elected and non-elected officials, to the courts for the legality of their actions. This requires that the judiciary and courts are independent from other branches of the state.

Second, *political accountability* is the accountability of the government or executive to the legislature. This covers, firstly, the accountability of all non-elected officials (civil service, police, military) to their appropriate elected head (usually government minister), who in turn is accountable both to the legislature and to the public for all government policy and action. This requires the key role of the legislature in its powers both to approve legislation and to scrutinise the actions of the government.

Third, the narrower concept of *financial accountability* covers the accountability of government for expenditure of public funds on purposes approved by the legislature and in a cost-efficient manner. Routes of financial accountability are similar to those of political accountability but with the important addition of an auditor general's office, itself accountable to the legislature, but independently scrutinising government expenditure.

4.2.3 *Civil and Political Liberties*

Civil and political liberties have already been defined as laid down in the UN ICCPR (see BOX 1). However, what is the relationship between democracy and civil and political rights?

Civil and political rights are a constituent part of democracy. They are a necessary condition for people to act politically, e.g. freedom of assembly and association, freedom of expression. They may be essentially *individual* rights, but "their value lies in the context of *collective* action" (Beetham and Boyle 1995 qu. 15 (ii)). At the same time civil and political rights constitute certain spheres which are guaranteed and outside the reach of majority decision (op.cit. qu.57). Such rights are defined by a state's ratification of the International Covenant and/or by a 'Bill of Rights' within its Constitution. The UN World Conference on Human Rights (held in Vienna June 1993) stated that the relationship between human rights and democracy is "inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing" (UN 1993b).⁹⁹ Hence, civil and political rights are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of democracy, and civil and political liberties are themselves best protected in a democratic society.

4.2.4 *A Democratic Society*

This element is the least clearly defined. It refers to the sphere of *civil society*, i.e. independent of the state and government. Among the key elements of civil society are:

- most importantly, a flourishing network of self-governing associations in all areas of social and economic life, e.g. trade unions, professional associations, women's groups, self-help groups, development organisations, religious bodies, grass-roots organisations;
- a representative and accessible media (i.e. not simply independent of government);
- civic education (or education for citizenship) in schools and other education curricula;
- a culture supportive of democracy, i.e. that encourages participation and decision-making at all levels of society.

A vibrant civil society is important for two reasons. First, independent social and economic associations are essential for the sustainability of democracy at governmental level. They act as some counterweight to the power of the state, making active representation to the government both directly and indirectly through elected representatives, and also contribute to holding the government to account for its policies and action. Second, provided they are internally democratic, they constitute an important aspect of the practice of democracy in their own right.

Although the least easy to define and to assess of the four elements of a functioning democracy outlined here, the importance of an active democratic or civil society is perhaps indicated by the view that a democracy's best defense is a belief in its principles and purposes and a widespread participation in its practice by a country's citizens, manifesting a feeling that it is possible to have some degree of influence over the forces that control their lives.

3. Good Governance

The definitional problem associated with the term 'governance' is of a different order from that of democracy. Its recent wide usage in international development parlance is conspicuous more by a *lack* of definition. The World Bank has been at the forefront not only in the rise of 'governance' to become a central concern of aid donors, but also in addressing its definitional shortcomings. Their work on 'Governance and Development' is outlined in Box 5.

However, three prior questions must be asked. First, how does 'governance' differ from 'government'? Second, what is *good governance*? Third, what is the relationship between democracy and governance?

As regards the first question, 'good governance' and 'good government' are sometimes used interchangeably by donor agencies, though the former is much more common.¹⁰⁰ We would suggest that what little distinction can be drawn between the two terms is as follows: 'government' constitutes the institutions and personnel; 'governance' is the activities and process of governing. To some extent this is a distinction between form and content. Second, what constitutes *good governance*, at one level, is quite arbitrary and depends on the norms and values of the particular actor using the term. There is likely, however, to be general accord, at least among most Northern governments, with the World Bank identification of good governance as "predictable, open and enlightened policy-making, a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos..., the rule of law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society" (1994 p.1).¹⁰¹ It characterises poor governance, on the other hand, as typified by "arbitrary policy-making, unaccountable bureaucracies, unenforced or unjust legal systems, the abuse of executive power, a civil society unengaged in public life, and widespread corruption" (ibid.). Third, there is not a determinate relationship between forms of government and nature of governance. For example, an authoritarian regime does not necessarily display symptoms of poor governance and a democratically elected government is not necessarily characterised by good governance. Nevertheless, good governance is much more likely to be realised by a democratic government. And indeed, there are considerable overlaps between the definitions of democracy and good governance, particularly in the area of 'open and accountable government'. (See Figure 1).

In defining governance in more detail, we will concentrate here on a narrow definition, focusing on the management of economic resources, expounded particularly by the World Bank. Such a delimitation is not necessarily a restrictive one, avoiding repetition of the more 'political' aspects covered in the definition of open and accountable government as a component of democracy.

BOX 5: Governance and Development: The World Bank View.

Governance has become a central concern of aid donors largely through the work of the World Bank. The concept first came to prominence in the 1989 World Bank report 'Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth'. In examining the impact of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in sub-Saharan Africa, the Bank acknowledged that improvements were small, slow and reversible (World Bank 1989 p.35 and p.189). A previous Bank report had considered the problems of implementation of SAPs to be a matter of political will. However, it was now asserted that, "Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance" (op.cit. p.60), and "Africa needs not just less government but better government" (op.cit. p.5). Governance is defined as "the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs" (op.cit. p.60). In contrast with later definitions (see below), the political dimensions of governance are more evident here with political legitimacy, bottom-up participation and institutional pluralism all seen as desirable features (op.cit. pp. 60-61). Botswana is cited as an example of, at least, better governance, characterised by pluralism, respect for the rule of law, and protection of press freedom and human rights (op.cit p.60). Further it is noted that the two countries with the best economic performance in Africa, Botswana and Mauritius, both have parliamentary democracies and a free press (op.cit p.61). The linkage is assumed.

The result of the Bank's new focus on governance was the setting up of a team ('task force') to examine the implications of governance for development policy.¹⁰² Its outcome, a report to the Board and a publication entitled 'Governance and Development', involved a stepping back from the more political dimensions that had surfaced in the 1989 Report. Governance is defined, for its purposes, as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development" (1992 p.3). Three aspects of governance were distinguished: (a) the form of political regime; (b) the processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources; and (c) the capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policy, and to discharge government functions (World Bank 1992 p.58). The first, as advised by their General Counsel, is outside the Bank's mandate not to interfere in a country's internal political affairs and to take only economic considerations into account in its decisions. Thus their focus is on the second and third aspects only.

Four key economic dimensions of governance are identified as of relevance to the Bank's work: public sector management; accountability; legal framework for development; and transparency and information. It appears that there is overlap here with elements of 'open and accountable government', defined above as a component of democracy. However the Bank states that it restricts itself to consideration of the economic aspects of these concepts.

Public Sector Management

This area concerns the efficiency of governments: their capacity to formulate and implement public policy; the effectiveness of public programmes; the strength of public institutions. Improving public sector management concentrates on civil service reform; public enterprise reform and privatisation; and financial management. It is an area that is not new to the Bank. However, activities have grown in volume and changed in type with its changed perceptions of the role of the state, i.e. a smaller state, with a professional bureaucracy, providing an 'enabling environment' for private sector led economic growth (op.cit. pp.12-13).

Accountability

The Bank's concern is with economic accountability, particularly in the public sector, regarded as antithetical to corruption. It identifies three levels of accountability.

First, *macro-level accountability* entails two main aspects:

- financial accountability of national governments, involving improved accounting and auditing practices;¹⁰³
- accountability of governments for overall economic performance, particularly through the strengthening of their own monitoring and evaluation of economic policy implementation.¹⁰⁴

Second, *micro-level accountability* involves enhancing the responsiveness of government agencies to public pressures by strengthening local participation and NGO involvement.¹⁰⁵

Third, *decentralisation of government* is seen as a *macro-micro linkage*, based on the argument that local government can be held to account more easily than national, with easier access to decision-making and participation.¹⁰⁶

(Op.cit. pp. 13-28).

The Legal Framework for Development

The Bank's concern for the rule of law is limited to establishing a framework for economic activity. More particularly it is directed to creating an 'enabling environment' for private sector economic development including, for example, laws to protect property rights, to govern commercial behaviour, and to limit the power of the state. In the Bank's view these create a stable and predictable setting in which economic actors can go about their business with confidence.

Five critical elements are outlined:

- (a) there is a set of rules known in advance;
 - (b) the rules are actually in force;
 - (c) there are mechanisms ensuring application of rules;
 - (d) conflicts are resolved through binding decisions of an independent judicial body;
 - (e) there are procedures for amending the rules when they no longer serve their purpose;
- (op.cit. p. 30).

Establishing the rule of law in this area is also seen as a means of reducing corruption.

(Op.cit. pp. 28-39).

Transparency and Information

Transparency or open government involves the provision of information and is clearly linked to accountability - to be accountable the actions of government agencies need to be visible. Again this has been examined above as an element of democracy. Three reasons are stated for the Bank's interest in transparent government:

1. It is seen as improving economic efficiency. Access to relevant information by economic actors about government policies and actions increases their efficiency and effectiveness in a competitive market economy. In addition transparency of the process of economic policy-making facilitates opportunities for the public to affect policy decisions. Although it is recognised that the latter depends on the form of government, beyond the Bank's remit.
2. It helps prevent corruption. Transparency in government affairs reduces the opportunities for corrupt activities, particularly transparency in budgets and in public procurement procedures.
3. It enables the analysis and dissemination of information, for example by government statistical offices, including the central bank. This relates, as above, to the involvement of non-government organisations and institutions (e.g. professional associations, trade unions etc) in articulating the needs of their constituents to government and in contributing to policy formulation. In turn, to promote this process, the capacity to understand and analyze information must be enhanced through, for example, strengthening the media and research institutes.

(Op.cit. pp. 40-47).

3.2 ASSESSMENT OF DONOR STRATEGIES

To recap, section 3.1 presented two differing types of information. Tables 2 and 3 laid out in comparative form the four donors' definitions of human rights, democracy and good governance and their proposed measures by which to implement policies in these fields. Boxes 1-5 aimed to provide some broader perspectives on the three concepts relevant for the subsequent assessment and evaluation of the donors' strategies, which is attempted here.

The discussion and evaluation undertaken here is itself in two parts. Firstly, based on the information presented in Tables 2 and 3, a comparative analysis of the four donors' definitions and proposed measures is carried out, examining the similarities and differences *between* them. However, it is insufficient merely to compare and evaluate the donors' policies with each other and within their own terms of reference. Therefore, secondly, the donors' policies are assessed and critiqued in more general terms, particularly along lines of enquiry suggested by the wider treatment of the concepts in Boxes 1-5. In each part the three concepts, human rights, democracy and good governance, are taken in turn.

3.2.1 A Comparative Analysis of Donor Definitions and Measures

1. Human Rights

Definitions

There is a reasonable degree of consensus amongst the four donors regarding their definition of human rights, probably reflecting the clarity and agreement achieved through the incorporation of human rights into international law. All four donors (in the context of political aid policies) define human rights as *civil and political liberties*. Sweden is the most specific, defining such rights as those in the ICCPR. The US is the least clear and most aberrant from a consensus, both with its three-fold category of human rights and its apparent emphasis on rights involving 'integrity of the person', essentially a sub-division of civil and political rights.

Where do economic and social rights fit in? Sweden's position is the most clear-cut, stating that it sees such rights as being promoted through the aid programme as a whole. The European Union appears to make the same point, but with less clarity. Similarly, ODA says that economic and social rights are the subject of other aid policy objectives, hence the emphasis under 'good government' on civil and political rights.¹⁰⁷ Donor governments clearly argue that both sets of rights are promoted through aid policy as a whole. However, such statements beg the question as much as answer it. To what extent are the promotion of economic and social rights an *explicit* objective of aid policy and to what extent do aid programmes contribute to the realisation of such rights? (See further discussion below in 3.2.2 on 'Indivisibility' and in 4.2 on 'Aid and Human Rights').

What is the relationship between human rights, democracy and the rule of law? Britain is distinctive in linking human rights and the rule of law together as one aspect of overall policy. SIDA offers clear analysis of the linkages, affirming the "interdependence between

democracy and human rights", with genuine democracy implying respect for civil and political liberties, and the existence of an effective legal system being of "decisive importance if democracy is to be created and maintained" (1993 p.5). The other donors would generally appear to agree with such an interdependence, even if not stated so explicitly. (Although differences become more apparent when proposed measures are discussed below). Yet it is perhaps of interest that Britain picks out a particular connection between the rule of law and business activities, emphasising the importance of civil law to protect the security of economic contracts and ensure investment is not discouraged. The view is expressed that the rule of law, seen as the antithesis of 'excessive' and 'corrupt' official controls, often has more impact on, and is of more concern to, people in their everyday lives than have political rights. (ODA 1993 para 2.15).

Measures

In addition to Table 3, a further breakdown by *themes* of the 'Measures to Promote Human Rights' is given in **Table 4: Measures to Promote Human Rights**.¹⁰⁸

THEMES	BRITAIN	EUROPEAN UNION	SWEDEN	UNITED STATES
Rule of law.	✓ Extensive range of measures.	Covered in 'Activities to support Democracy' but more related to political rather than judicial institutions.	✓ Extensive range of measures.	✓ Very brief mention of legal framework here; covered more fully in 'Governance' section under 'lawful governance'.
Civil society.	✓ Support for fairly wide range of organisations.	✓ Support more orientated to local NGOs, including grass-roots development organisations.	Term not used, but strengthening position of oppressed groups (see 2.2.2 Table 6) could coincide with strengthening civil society.	Included in democracy section.
Vulnerable and oppressed groups.	✓ The 'disadvantaged' within civil society plus initiatives addressing legal inequalities and discrimination.	✓ Support both for victims of human rights violations and for women, children, indigenous groups generally.	✓ Support for victims of violations in situations of oppression and a general focus on strengthening the rights of women, children, ethnic minorities and disabled people in situations of human rights promotion.	✓ Very brief reference to rights of women, children, minority groups.
Conflict resolution.	✓ At community level.	✓ Including support for victims of conflict.	✓ In civil war situations.	X
Human Rights NGOs.	X	✓ Local (i.e. Southern).	✓ National (i.e. Southern) and international.	✓ All types (Southern and Northern).

Some degree of similarity between the four donors is evident here, though with different emphases and attention to detail. The rule of law is accorded importance as the framework in which civil and political rights are protected, with the range of activities involved given most attention by Britain and Sweden. All donors signal an intention to target development assistance to strengthen the rights and position of particular groups, notably women, children and ethnic minorities. The European Union and Sweden also state their support for victims of human rights violations. Support for conflict resolution is mentioned by all donors except the United States, and financial support for human rights NGOs is indicated by all except Britain.

There are also important differences. The US, at least so far, has dealt most cursorily with measures to promote and strengthen human rights, although this could reflect the fact that the question of human rights has, at least formally, been part of US foreign assistance legislation since the mid-70s, separate from recent policy trends (see 2.1.4). Sweden has drawn up the clearest framework for its support, being the only donor to distinguish between its support in countries where the government is involved in human rights violations and those where governments aspire to respect human rights. Such a distinction is important if the commitment by most donors to re-channel aid to non-governmental organisations, in the event of government-to-government aid being reduced or suspended on human rights grounds, is not to remain merely rhetorical. Stating explicitly to whom support would be directed in such situations is also necessary to counter the argument that such conditionality punishes ordinary people, not the government (see ul Haq 1993 p.46). In countries where there is more of a climate of respect for human rights, Sweden has focused more specifically on the promotion of the rights covered in the main international conventions, including support for their ratification. Despite their earlier definitional statement, this involves rights covered not only in the ICCPR, but also in the anti-discrimination conventions and the rights of the child convention.

In contrast, Britain has a broader and less focused outlook, with its proposed measures covering activities to strengthen both the rule of law and civil society. The other agencies include the subject of civil society under the heading of 'democracy'. Is this merely a question of different categorisation, of little or no consequence? One consequence of 'civil society' being classified by ODA under the heading of human rights appears to be, ironically, that despite a broad range of activities to support civil society being outlined, the specific issue of strengthening the protection of civil and political *rights* at the non-state level is omitted (e.g. human rights NGOs, victims of violations etc).

In a different twist, I have categorised the European Union activities to support 'the rule of law' in Table 3 under 'Democracy', as the proposed measures, with the exception of an 'independent judiciary', focus on strengthening *political* institutions. Measures specific to human rights appear to be virtually all in the NGO sector, with a lack of attention to protecting civil and political rights through strengthening the legal system and other state-related or public sector institutions.

In the light of these comments I would suggest, firstly, that measures aimed at strengthening civil society should constitute a distinct set of activities under the broad heading of

'Democracy'. Secondly, a clear objective of Northern donor support should be, at a minimum, the promotion and protection of civil and political rights at both state and non-state levels, and ideally, following Sweden's example, the promotion of other related rights defined in international conventions.

2. Democracy

Definitions

Tables 2 and 3 reveal considerable variation and some confusion amongst donor agencies with regard to a definition of democracy. Taking Beetham's four components of democracy (see Box 4) as a framework for comparing the donors' definitions, I attempt to provide some clarification.

The four donors all include the first two components, free and fair elections and civil and political liberties. The latter is included under the separate heading of human rights by all donors. Only Sweden *explicitly* recognises and acknowledges the inter-relationship with democracy and that support for civil and political rights is simultaneous support for democracy. There is almost unanimity on free and fair elections within a multi-party system as a minimal, necessary condition of democracy. Yet even this is subject to qualification by Britain, who indicate a preparedness to sanction other means of consultation etc, where multipartyism is "impractical or unsustainable" (ODA 1993 p.2.5). What is the purpose of this qualification? Is it to be interpreted positively as representing an open and adaptable attitude to other forms of democracy which may vary from the more standard Western liberal democracy, for example recognising the recent developments in the Ugandan political system as legitimately democratic? Or should it be interpreted more cynically as an escape-clause to justify continued support for certain undemocratic regimes in circumstances where trade or other foreign policy considerations predominate, under the pretext that democracy is "impracticable"? The danger is that even if the policy intention is to engender more flexible attitudes to notions of democracy, it could also serve to enable the latter practices.

The degree to which the other two components, 'open and accountable government' and a 'democratic society', are included in donors' definitions, varies from sketchy inclusion to omission, revealing substantial differences. USAID provides the broadest definition of democracy, if short on detail, of the four donors examined here. Their definition is based around the principles of political participation and peaceful competition, the defining characteristics of which include the free flow of information (essential to open and accountable government) and a healthy civil society, as well as free and fair elections and civil and political liberties. In addition a democratic society requires the fostering of certain values, such as tolerance and compromise, majority rule and minority rights etc, (see Table 2). In contrast, SIDA restricts itself to a minimal definition of democracy, confined to free and fair elections and civil and political liberties, plus a legal system necessary to protect such rights. The European Union has not attempted a definition of democracy either in the original Council of Ministers' Resolution or in the two subsequent Implementation Reports. Instead, various elements of democracy are mentioned in a rather ad hoc and incoherent way,

with little attention to the detail of what such terms involve. (For example, what is meant by ‘the rule of law’? It must be more than just an ‘independent judiciary’).

Britain is distinctive in that it does not use the term democracy, but instead refers to the ‘legitimacy’ of government. This term appears to be defined broadly, encompassing a healthy civil society and participation in local and national government, as well as electoral processes. However, I argue that it is not an adequate substitute term for democracy. We noted Britain’s uniqueness in its use of the title ‘Good Government’ to describe its policy in this whole area (2.1.1). In similar vein, in contrast to the terms most commonly used by other donors, human rights, democracy and good governance, to describe the key elements of political aid policies, the British government identifies the four components of ‘Good Government’ as the ‘legitimacy’, ‘accountability’ and ‘competence’ of government and ‘respect for human rights and the rule of law’. As indicated in Table 2, democracy is broadly covered by the term ‘legitimacy’, being concerned with the nature of government, its institutions and how its personnel are chosen; whereas ‘accountability’ and ‘competence’ are more issues of governance, (and are mainly considered in that section, below), with the exception that the accountability of the executive to the legislature is obviously a democracy issue. The main criterion of a legitimate government is stated as being ‘multi-party democracy’, but with the qualification referred to above. However, in my view, ‘legitimacy’ is an inadequate concept. It is subjective, value-laden and lacks specificity. What is legitimate depends entirely on what you believe in and thus different forms of government can be sanctioned as legitimate. For example, if one believes in the divine right of kings, then monarchy is legitimate; or theocracy is legitimate to a fundamentalist religious believer. I would suggest that the constituent elements of ‘legitimacy’ in British policy should in fact be under the heading of democracy.¹⁰⁹

Measures

The menus of measures put forward by the aid agencies to support democracy (see Table 3) generally reflect and underline the tendencies of emphasis and omission identified in the definitions. Support for electoral activities is widespread, as is a subsequent strengthening of legislatures, but support for some of the less tangible aspects of democratic consolidation, involving a broadening and deepening of democracy, is not so apparent, even at this level of *proposed* measures.

Free and Fair Elections

There is an emphasis by all donors to support democratic transition, not surprisingly given its pivotal importance, but contrasts with their erstwhile tolerance, if not support, of authoritarian regimes. There is an obvious focus on elections, but also attention is given to crucial pre-election activities (e.g. draft constitutions, electoral codes, voter registration and education), and, in the case of the US and UK, additional support where transition is from military to civilian authority.

Open and Accountable Government

What support is proposed for other aspects of democracy? ‘Accountability’ and ‘transparency’ are terms which feature strongly in donor policy statements, particularly in the speeches of British government ministers. However, both concepts appear to receive less attention in practice.

First, as regards transparent or open government, USAID include in their policy measures support for the ‘transparency of *government decision-taking*’, whilst SIDA’s version of ‘greater transparency of *public administration*’ is more dilute, and, weaker still, UK ODA discusses ‘strengthening information systems’ within government. The espousal of open and transparent government by Northern governments to their Southern counterparts is a sensitive issue raising questions of sovereignty and paternalism. To do so with justicity, and without hypocrisy and double standards, depends on their own practice and acceptance of being judged by the same standards, as with human rights. In this respect Sweden has the greatest legitimacy with its tradition of all government documents being on the public record; the US has its Freedom of Information Act, but its system of government is characterised by a strong Executive Presidency, which, particularly in the area of foreign affairs, has been accused of conducting actions unbeknown to Congress far less the US public (e.g. Iran-Contra Affair); the UK has a particularly poor record with its culture and tradition of government secrecy (Official Secrets Act), and lack of access to information (no freedom of information legislation). As the British government does not itself ‘practice what it preaches’, this not only undermines its legitimacy in raising such issues but probably means that it is less likely to seriously attempt to translate its policy rhetoric into a concrete programme.

Second, as regards accountable government, three dimensions were distinguished earlier (see Box 4), legal, political and financial accountability. We concern ourselves only with political accountability here. (Legal accountability involves an effective legal system and the rule of law, considered above in the *Human Rights* section; financial accountability is examined below in the *Governance* section). ODA has given most attention to the concept of accountability in general, but only a few measures enhance *political* accountability as such. One such measure, included by all donors, is the strengthening of national legislatures, part of whose role is, of course, to hold the executive arm of government to account. Another measure concerns local government and its relationship with central government, particularly the issue of decentralisation. This latter measure is not only subject to greater variation in approach between donors, but also in my view more controversial, and requires fuller consideration.

USAID discusses strengthening the accountability of local government, whereas ODA, SIDA and the EU all talk of ‘decentralisation of government’, presumably with the implicit assumption that local government is more accountable to the local population and its needs, and more open to participation than central government. However, two related issues emerge here. Firstly, decentralisation is not in itself sufficient to ensure accountability.¹¹⁰ Attention must also be paid to the *democratic* character of local government, its electoral system and institutions, in the same way as national government. Secondly, although decentralisation of power has been argued for as desirable in development terms (e.g. basic needs literature), promoting a policy which involves restructuring the roles and responsibilities between central and local government can be intrusive on the sovereignty of the recipient country to

determine the nature of its political system. It could be particularly contentious given the overall context of the neo-liberal reform agenda advocated by the IFIs and many Northern governments, itself drastically shrinking the role of central government in economic development.¹¹¹ In the case of the British government, the prescription for developing countries appears at odds with their practice at home, where both increased centralised control over local authority budgets and the removal or weakening of local government control over certain sectors (e.g. education) has occurred under the present national government, in power since 1979. Their view on the efficacy of central government control versus decentralisation would seem to depend on their view of the states in question and their political complexion. A more legitimate activity for all donors would appear to be support to strengthen local government, both its democratic character and its capacity to carry out ascribed functions, provided this is desired and agreed by the recipient government at both local and central levels.

Civil Society

The UK, EU and US have all explicitly emphasised the strengthening of civil society. The UK and US both outline support for a range of diverse civic organisations from business associations to local community groups. (In the case of the UK, this is under the heading of human rights). Activities to strengthen civil society are one of the three types of eligible activities outlined by the European Commission in their 1992 Report, though given the least priority. EU support also appears to be focused on a narrower range of civic organisations, more concentrated on grassroots democracy and development NGOs. SIDA, in contrast, does not explicitly mention the term civil society in its strategy document, though it does outline measures to strengthen oppressed, minority and vulnerable groups in the human rights section. SIDA's non-inclusion of this whole area is somewhat surprising given its history of support for popular movements. However, this may be explained by their general commitment, in countries which respect human rights, to the government as "the natural partner" (SIDAa 1993 p.23).¹¹² In addition, without using the term civil society, SIDA do appear to have given thought to this area, offering a perspective distinctive from the other donors on two counts. First, SIDA acknowledges that locally-based interest groups are a fundamental element of democracy, but states that such organisations are more likely to become widespread and independent if their forms and methods are adapted to the resources of the particular country. Hence "external support" shall be "very limited", avoiding "creating dependency on foreign support" (op. cit. p.21). Second, given that a vibrant civil society is important both as a counterweight to the state, and, provided organisations are internally democratic, as an area of democratic practice itself, SIDA states that one appropriate use of external financial support is to transfer knowledge of democratic methods and procedures to local organisations. The tendency amongst other donors is to value and promote a healthy civil society for its role in holding government to account, whilst perhaps neglecting the importance of civic associations themselves being internally democratic, which certainly cannot be assumed.

The concept of 'civil society', although having a long history in political thought, has experienced somewhat of a renaissance in recent years with the current interest in democratization. However, in common with the term democracy itself, civil society is heavily contested, with many different interpretations. We noted in Box 3 that in its liberal usage, the term civil society focuses on the independence of *economic* activity from the state.

A more democratic interpretation, found especially in theories of participatory democracy, emphasises the self-activity and self-organisation of local associations, focusing on political activity. Hence, although civil society is currently a term on everyone's lips, including the donor agencies, its meaning is far from transparent. Yet none of the donor agencies examined here has attempted to define it. Thus it is likely that the different interpretations of the concept they implicitly make, and in turn the different range of activities they emphasise, from the economic activities of business associations to the self-organisation of citizens, will reflect the wider interpretation of democracy they are advocating.

In common with other aspects of political aid policies, support for 'civil society' is a new area for donor agencies. A more fundamental test will be in policy implementation. It remains to be seen what proportion of resources are channeled to civil society and to what types of organisations by the four donors.

Form of Democracy

Broadening this discussion, what forms of democracy are the donors interested in promoting, and where on the spectrum between neo-liberal 'legal' democracy and participatory democracy can they be located?

Returning to the examination of policy statements, it is clear that the three donor governments all see their promotion of democracy as interconnected with and complementary to their advocacy of free market economic policies, similar to their support for simultaneous economic and political liberalisation in Eastern Europe. To recall, for the UK government an important aspect of good government *itself* is 'sound' economic policies, meaning the introduction of market forces and the facilitation of the private sector (see 2.1.1). The centre-right coalition government in power in Sweden from 1991-1994 made democracy and market economic reforms the two central pillars of its development policy (see 2.1.3). USAID's Democracy Initiative policy paper saw democracy as complementary to market-orientated economics (see 2.1.4). Somewhat in contrast, the EU places less emphasis, at least overtly, on free market economic policies as a counterpart to liberal democracy, seeing democracy merely as part of a larger set of requirements for sustainable development (see 2.1.2). (Also see Table 1).

Hence, from the policy statements it would be anticipated, at least in the case of the three donor governments, that their notion of democracy is likely to be a narrow, restricted one, more in line with the development of a radical, free market economy. Is this in fact borne out by the donors' definitions and proposed measures? Or, on the contrary, is popular participation in the democratic process encouraged, increasing opportunities for people to shape and influence the decisions that affect their lives, from the grassroots level upwards?

The donors' definitions (Table 2) tell us little, except their intention to strengthen civil society, which in itself is open to such different interpretations. In Table 3, EU policy measures appear to be informed more by an approach that encourages participation from below, with support for local pro-democracy groups and grass-roots development organisations and an emphasis on promoting women's participation. In addition, literacy and an independent media, including audio-visual forms important in societies with high rates of illiteracy, are incorporated as important requisites for increased participation in political

processes. Further, support for participatory local government is mentioned. However, the focus on channelling support to NGOs is in accordance with the EU policy of 'decentralised co-operation, and apparent support for aspects of participatory democracy may be as much due to this separate policy. As regards the three donor governments, the UK emphasises participation most, including measures to encourage participation in both local and national government, though unspecified, and also discusses increased political accountability through development of the media and greater openness of government information. SIDA talks of giving support for popular participation, but its example (voter registration) is itself restricted to electoral democracy. Most USAID measures are directed at strengthening state or state-related institutions, though with support for a range of interest groups in civil society and for an independent media.

Whilst it is not possible on current evidence to precisely locate on our spectrum the form(s) of democracy favoured by the donors, it is evident that the general tendency is towards the narrow end.

3. Good Governance

Definitions

Taking the World Bank's definition of governance as a point of departure and comparison, the following questions are posed. To what extent have the four donor agencies themselves defined 'good governance'? How broad or narrow are their concepts? What are the common elements in their definitions and where do they diverge? Do they include both political and economic aspects of governance, and which do they emphasise? To what degree do their definitions correspond or contrast with that of the World Bank?

The most extensive coverage of similar terrain to that outlined by the World Bank, focusing on the state bureaucracy, is provided by ODA and SIDA. Two of the four components of the British government's notion of 'Good Government', 'accountability' and 'competence', are located in the realm of governance. Similarly, SIDA's pre-existing work on the 'development of public administration' pertains to many of the same issues, and in fact the latest policy document in this area states that it "sets out a strategy for the development of what is known as good governance" (SIDA 1993b p.3). In contrast, the European Union uses the term governance, though with different meanings at different times, but has not attempted to define it. And although USAID's overall policy title in this field, as noted before, has changed from 'Democracy Initiative' to 'Democracy and Governance', its definition of 'lawful governance' is quite distinct from that of the World Bank or other donors, being more concerned with the dimensions of democracy described here as legal and political accountability (see Box 4), and more commonly discussed by the other aid agencies under the heading of democracy.

Therefore it is immediately evident that there is not even agreement among the four donors over the broad parameters of what constitutes the area of governance, far less a common definition. This is hardly surprising given that it is not a term with a legal definition (as human rights), or with centuries of literature behind it (as democracy), but rather that it has been conceived recently, particularly as part of the aid and foreign policy agenda itself being considered here. Therefore, I will concentrate here on SIDA and ODA, whose work in this

field constitutes, at least, a discrete set of activities distinct from those examined under the headings of 'democracy' and 'human rights'.

SIDA has developed the most comprehensive policy framework and guidelines for activities in the area, under the heading of support to public administration and management (SIDA 1991 and 1993b). However, three points must be stressed. First, public administration support has been a priority of SIDA for over ten years, initially in its work with governments in Southern Africa, preceding and unconnected with more recent policy statements on human rights and democracy. Indeed such work was concerned with strengthening public administration whatever the nature of the government, democratic or otherwise.¹¹³ Further, 'Public Administration and Management' and 'Human Rights and Democracy' are the responsibility of different sections within SIDA. Second, in Sweden the policy developments post-Cold War that this study focuses on had the starting point of human rights and democracy, not good governance. Rather the (ill-defined) notion of good governance associated with these policy developments in general has tended to coincide with activities that SIDA was already involved in. Third, SIDA's policies for public administration support preceded and are not based on the good governance concept of the World Bank. Differences are outlined more fully below (see *Measures*). However, it is interesting to note here that SIDA's guidelines for support to public administration development in sub-Saharan Africa, based on an analysis of the African state from its colonial roots to the then (and ongoing) crisis situation, concluded that "the role of government has become even more vital and central than before" (SIDA 1991 p.21). There may be disputes over what the government should or should not do, but in general it is "the only organisation in any condition to meet the crisis" (op.cit. p.38).

ODA also has a history of support for administrative structures and the civil service in developing countries, but its concerns for the 'accountability' and 'competence' of government processes pertains more to its recent 'Good Government' policy. The accountability of politicians was included under the 'Democracy' heading (see Table 3). Here we examine ODA's focus on the accountability and competence of government institutions, including parastatals and their non-elected officials. 'Competence' involves what is often termed 'capacity building', strengthening the capability of government institutions and their personnel.

Measures

Taking the World Bank's four key dimensions of governance as a framework, Table 5 presents in comparative form the similarities and differences between the range of the Bank's activities to improve governance and those of the British and Swedish governments. The Table again retains the terms and phrases used by the donor agencies as far as possible, attempting to present their activities concisely but accurately. Differences in policy measures by either of the bilaterals from those of the World Bank are highlighted in italics.¹¹⁴

TABLE 5. Good Governance: The World Bank and the Bilaterals - Congruence or Divergence?

WORLD BANK	BRITISH ODA	SIDA
<p>1. Public Sector Management i.e. efficiency of government administration.</p>		
<p>1.1 Aspects include:</p>		
<p>1.1.1 Policy formulation and implementation.</p>	<p>Policy-making skills, particularly macro-economic planning.</p>	<p><i>Need for (African) governments "to increase their capacity for autonomous policy-making" (1991 p.44). Support focused on 'core agencies', including Ministry of Planning.</i></p>
<p>1.1.2 Effective public programmes.</p>	<p>Concerned with management capability to plan and manage, but <i>not service delivery</i>, (i.e. more limited).</p>	<p>Aim of overall programme of public administration development to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the administration of (African) governments.</p>
<p>1.1.3 Strengthening of public institutions.</p>	<p>Institution building activities to enhance effectiveness.</p>	<p>Ditto. Objective of overall programme.</p>
<p>1.2 Improvements include:</p>		
<p>1.2.1 Civil service reform.</p>	<p>Civil service reform, including strengthening accountability and decreasing corruption.</p>	<p>Administrative reform programmes (i.e. the organisation and reform of human resources).</p>
<p>1.2.2 Public enterprise reform and privatisation.</p>	<p><i>Competence "not synonymous with adherence to a particular set of economic policies" (1993 para 2.10). However, competence measures include developing "capacity to review and redefine the role of government (para 4.6), and accountability measures include "reform of systems of procurement and tendering" (para 4.5).</i></p>	<p>Support for development of market economy (added in 1993b), but includes <i>supporting the state to stimulate the growth of private institutions</i> (e.g. by appropriate legislation and regulations).</p>
<p>1.2.3 Financial management</p>	<p>Strengthening budget and resource allocation systems.</p>	<p>Financial policy and management as a priority area.</p>

Table 5 continued...

WORLD BANK	ODA	SIDA
<p>2. Accountability.</p> <p>Opposite of corruption</p>	<p>Increasing accountability means decreasing opportunities for corrupt activities.</p>	<p><i>Corruption not mentioned.</i></p>
<p>2.1 Macro-level:</p> <p>2.1.1 Improving financial accountability of national governments through strengthening accounting and auditing practices.</p>	<p>Strengthening systems of financial planning, accounting and audit.</p>	<p>Financial sector a priority area, including accounting and auditing.</p>
<p>2.1.2 Increasing accountability of governments for overall economic performance, through strengthening of monitoring and evaluation procedures.</p>	<p><i>Not covered explicitly</i></p>	<p><i>Need to strengthen policy analysis and management in relation to processes of change being encountered (1991 p.44).</i></p>
<p>2.2 Micro-level:</p> <p>2.2.1 Increasing responsiveness of government agencies to public pressure, through strengthening local participation and NGO involvement.</p>	<p><i>Improving accountability of government institutions to society. (Note different emphasis: strengthening state-related mechanisms of accountability, rather than local participation).</i></p>	<p>An aspect of the rationale behind public administration development is the need for (African) governments "to rebuild their popularity and legitimacy, through increasing their citizens participation, decision-making understanding" (1991 p.44).</p>
<p>2.3 Macro-micro linkage</p> <p>2.3.1 Decentralisation of government (as local government easier and more accessible to hold to account).</p>	<p>Covered under 'legitimacy' (se Table 4 Democracy 1.2)</p>	<p>Decentralisation and <i>support for local government</i> as priority area. (Emphasis on support to increase capacity/competence of local government, e.g. physical and financial planning, local authority administration, etc).</p>

Table 5 continued...

WORLD BANK	ODA	SIDA
<p>3. Legal Framework</p> <p>3.1 Establishing the rule of law re. economic activity, through the creation and application of appropriate laws, enforceable by an independent judicial body.</p>	<p>Covered under 'Human Rights and the Rule of Law'. The importance of civil law stressed as it governs business contracts, in order not to discourage investment or economic activity (1993 para 2.15).</p>	<p>A new area of activity is the development of "regulations and legislations allowing the private sector to function <i>and giving the state the instruments needed to monitor and supervise this section</i>" (1993b p.5) (their emphasis).</p>
<p>4. Transparency and Information</p> <p>4.1 Access to information by economic actors essential to improve their economic efficiency. (Also noted that transparency of government economic policy-making enables public to contribute to policy discussions, but outside the Bank's remit).</p>	<p>Included as necessary conditions of accountability, (see Table 3, Governance 3.1.1). <i>But strengthening of information systems for benefit of society as a whole, especially disadvantaged.</i></p> <p><i>Public participation in economic policy-making not covered.</i></p>	<p><i>Availability of information not covered explicitly, but perhaps implied in 2.2.1 above, though again to benefit all citizens.</i></p> <p>Increasing citizens participation.....see 2.2.1 above.</p>
<p>4.2 Transparency as anti-corruption measure, e.g. transparency in budgets and in public procurement procedures.</p>	<p>Reform of systems of procurement and tendering.</p>	<p><i>Not covered explicitly.</i></p>
<p>4.3 Enables analysis and dissemination of information by government statistical officers, which in turn facilitates involvement of NGOs and pressure groups, particularly through strengthening the media and research institutes.</p>	<p><i>Not covered.</i></p>	<p>Support both to government statistical offices and research institutes included.</p>

What does Table 5 show? It indicates that interventions in this area, although not new to any of the three agencies, are becoming more extensive in range. Overall there is a high degree of congruence between the World Bank and the two bilateral agencies in the policy measures outlined, with a greater degree of similarity between the Bank and British ODA. In addition, some of the highlighted differences may be fairly insubstantial or due to policy still evolving, rather than of greater significance.

The more substantial differences between the World Bank and ODA, on the one hand, and SIDA on the other, can be traced back to different conceptions of the role of the state. The World Bank and ODA, the latter perhaps by default, appear to have very little that is positive to say about the state's role, with the exception of its 'enabling role' for private sector development. In contrast SIDA's starting point, in its 1991 document focusing on Africa, is a positive perception of the state as the most important actor in dealing with the current crisis (in Africa), and their objective is to support and to strengthen the state in that role. Its more recent strategy document (1993b) reflects the changed international climate and includes a new area of support for the development of a market economy. Yet even here measures involve, firstly, *support for the state* to stimulate private institutions, compared with the Bank's prescription of privatisation. And, secondly, agreement with the Bank on the need to establish a legal framework for economic activity contrasts with the differences in what this entails, with SIDA stressing, in addition to legislation to allow the private sector to function, the need for regulations to enable the state to monitor and supervise the private sector. Such a position is distinctive from the neo-liberal agenda of the World Bank, and of many bilateral donors, on which de-regulation is the order of the day, and, as regards the state-market debate more generally, on which there is no place for consideration of the failings or inadequacies of the market. The idea that the state can play an important role in monitoring and regulating the activities of the market is anathema to the neo-liberal view. SIDA's position appears more comprehensive and well-rounded, suffering less from the shortcomings of either a state-centred development strategy or a doctrinaire market approach.

The comparative analysis of the four donors' interpretation of the term governance indicates wider variances between donors and a different set of issues arising than for human rights and democracy. This stems, on the one hand, from the relative newness of the concept in international development circles, hence such diversity in understanding that meaningful comparison was only possible between two of the donors, and, on the other hand, from the lead given by the World Bank in clarifying the term and associated measures to improve governance. In addressing these issues I will first summarise the World Bank's purposes in promoting the notion of good governance, and then pose the main questions that arise from the preceding analysis and discussion as regards how the bilateral donors will proceed in developing activities in this area, including to what extent they will follow the lead of the Bank.

The World Bank's objectives in promoting good governance appear three-fold. Firstly, to keep the state in check. The economic reforms introduced under SAPs continue to reduce the state's role. The task of 'governance' measures, consistent with a negative view of the state, is to increase the state's 'accountability', (including to the Bank itself), and hence restrict opportunities for corruption, and ensure 'transparency and availability of information'

about its activities.¹¹⁵ A second objective, in line with the state's 'enabling' role, is the establishment of a legal framework for private sector activities. Thirdly, and importantly, many of the measures advocated, particularly under the headings of 'Public Sector Management' and 'Accountability' are directly related to improving the implementation of SAPs by developing country governments. The adherence to the particular set of economic reforms encompassed by SAPs is a key concern of the Bank, and of many bilateral donors, in their development interventions. A major problem has been the high degree of 'slippage' in their implementation by Southern governments.¹¹⁶ Governance measures may appear to be a more neutral strengthening of the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration, but they also function to ensure greater compliance with the terms of SAPs. Relevant aspects include the strengthening of economic policy formulation and implementation skills,¹¹⁷ improving financial accountability, and, through strengthening monitoring and evaluation procedures, increasing the accountability of governments for their overall economic performance. This is not to say that many of such measures are not positive developments in themselves, but to point out their relevance to the Bank's interests in policing the implementation of SAPs. This latter aspect is particularly pertinent given that many Southern governments, despite the recent 'wave of democracy', remain more accountable for their performance to the World Bank and the IMF, and more dependent on these institutions for their survival, than to their own electorate.

How will bilateral donors take forward *their* agenda of good governance. First, 'good governance' is the least well-defined by the donor agencies of the three main concepts, unsurprisingly given its recent 'rise' to prominence. Attention to the concept by the World Bank, however, has provided a clear definition of its main dimensions and the outlining of a range of possible activities, though weighted towards the economic aspects of governance, as befits the interests and purposes of the Bank. Will the bilateral donors 'piggy-back' on this work by the World Bank, adopting the same general orientation and policy measures, even if supplemented by some more political aspects of governance? It will be interesting to see if this occurs with USAID and with the European Union. At present there does not seem to be a 'Washington consensus' on the concept of 'governance'. However, will greater convergence occur, in particular with USAID moving towards the Bank's definition? Similarly, will the European Union, having flagged 'good governance' as a future priority, adopt similar measures as those favoured by the World Bank and British ODA?

Second, the issue of good governance, assuming the narrow definition we have focused on here, is more separate from those of democracy and human rights, which are more inter-related, although there is some overlap between good governance and 'open and accountable government', defined as one dimension of democracy. This distinction in practice is clearest, amongst our four donors, in the case of SIDA, for whom good governance was a pre-existing area of activity, preceding the policy development in human rights and democracy, and with the two issues dealt with administratively by two separate sections within the organisation. Yet, what is likely to be the place of good governance measures in policy and programmatic development in this overall field? Will they be marginal to the main thrust of democratization and human rights issues? Three factors suggest that, on the contrary, governance could become more prominent. The World Bank's lead role in governance issues, given its predominance in international donor circles as the largest development

organisation and as chair of the Consultative Group meetings, suggests that governance concerns will become more widespread amongst all donors.¹¹⁸ The continued dominance of SAPs in the poorest countries of Africa and Latin America, and the close link between many governance measures and SAPs, could also indicate the likelihood of an increasing focus on this issue. Lastly, the perceived role of good governance in promoting economic development has strong resonance with the overall rationales of the donors, viewing political reforms not only as an end in itself, but also as facilitating economic reform. (See section 2.1).

Third, underpinning the issue of governance, more so than democracy or human rights, is the question of the role of the state in development. Different conceptions of this role, and consequentially different policy measures, were seen in our comparison of the World Bank, ODA and SIDA, (see Table 5). Will the promotion of good governance, ostensibly about strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration, involve a state-building exercise, with the focus on the key features of successful economic governance, based on experience in different parts of the world including East Asia? Or will it be used to further a neo-liberal agenda aimed at promoting a radical free market economy and keeping the state in check? Which interpretation of governance, state-building or state-limiting, is the more appropriate to a resolution of the crisis facing many of the poorest and most marginalised countries in the world economy, and their inhabitants?

3.2.2 Wider Issues and Controversies

The introduction by Northern donors of human rights, democracy and good governance concerns into development co-operation raises a number of wider debates and controversies. It is insufficient merely to compare and evaluate the donors' policies with each other and within their own terms of reference. It is also necessary to broaden the discussion along other lines of enquiry. The manner in which these wider concerns are addressed by the donors, including a failure to address them, itself constitutes part of any assessment of policies in these fields, but which it is only possible to begin here. The treatment of these issues may, at present, pose questions rather than provide answers, but the aim of their consideration is two-fold: first, to highlight areas for further reflection; second to establish a framework for the future evaluation of policy implementation.

This broader discussion and assessment of donor definitions and policy measures is itself in two parts, related to what is included and excluded by the boundaries of donor concerns. Hence, for each of the three key concepts in turn, first, it examines questions that arise from the donors' overall focus, but not explicitly discussed by them; second, it raises other pertinent issues that are, significantly, not included within the donors' parameters of concerns.

1. Human Rights

"All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-related. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and to protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms". (Part II, paragraph 3, Final Declaration of the UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, June 1993).

A. Donor Focus: Questions Arising

It was noted that in the context of the recent political aid policies the four selected donors all defined human rights as civil and political liberties. However, even within this framework of civil and political rights only there are a number of controversial matters that appear not to have been given full attention.

Universalism or Cultural Relativism?

The recent history of human rights in international relations has involved considerable debate on whether human rights are universal or culturally relative, with the latter arguments being more associated with representatives of developing countries.¹¹⁹ The universalist standpoint posits one set of human rights which embraces common needs and embodies common standards that applies to all countries at all times, whatever their political, economic and cultural system, and irrespective of their level of development? Conversely, it is claimed that human rights can take a variety of 'distinctive and defensible'¹²⁰ forms in different cultural and historical contexts, for example, the role of women is defined in different ways in different religious contexts.¹²¹

An attraction of the relativist position has been its anti-imperialist stance - i.e. that the assertion by Western nations of human rights as universal is a disguised attempt, in imperialist fashion, to impose on the non-Western world their particular values as general. But such arguments do tend to neglect the contributions to human rights activities, including the UN system, of many Southern scholars and activists. However, the extremes of both perspectives are untenable. Universalist prescriptions that all human rights be implemented in identical ways in all countries is impracticable (Donnelly 1993 p.36). A shortcoming of the relativist position is its 'moral abstentionism', "allowing the predominant opinion in any locality to prevail" (Vincent 1986 p.55), and disallowing criticism, far less interference, from outside. Hence a particular form of oppression or discrimination, for example the genital mutilation of women, could thus be justified. In addition such arguments are open to abuse by repressive rulers wishing to shield off external criticism of their actions.¹²²

The essential universality of human rights does appear to have become generally more accepted. In addition to its inclusion in the Final Declaration of the Vienna World Conference (see quotation above), the African, Latin American and Asian and Pacific states all affirmed the principle of universality in the Declarations from their respective Regional Preparatory meetings.¹²³ However, the statement in the final Declaration appears to have

gained consensus agreement by incorporating a moderate version of cultural relativity: universality is qualified by the need for "various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds" to be borne in mind.¹²⁴

As regards aid policy, the universality versus cultural relativity debate should at least act as a warning that this is not uncontested ground. In raising human rights issues in developing countries, Northern donor governments would be advised, firstly, to recognise that conceptions of human rights do vary with culture and to take these into account, and secondly, to seek dialogue with both government and non-government actors, e.g. women's and minority organisations, as to *their* views on human rights problems and potential solutions in *their* country.

Objectivity and non-selectivity

To treat human rights globally in "a fair and equal manner" requires the objective and non-selective application of human rights criteria, stressed by both the Latin American and Asian and Pacific Declarations from their Regional Preparatory meetings (UN 1993a). The concern is that a common standard (universality) is often replaced by double standards, particularly on the part of the most powerful nations in the world, when considering violations of rights. Condemnation and judgements on human rights performances were certainly characterised by selectivity and lack of objectivity during the Cold War period. "Too often states condemn the record of their opponents and overlook the record of their allies" (Beetham and Boyle 1995 qu.54). Whether such practices have changed post-Cold War, or whether commercial interests will replace geo-strategic considerations in subordinating human rights concerns, remains to be seen.

The independent monitoring of human rights established through the UN and Regional systems (see Boxes 1 and 2), as well as the work of international human rights NGOs, furnish Northern governments with considerable materials on which to make an objective evaluation of a country's human rights performance. The achievement of 'fair and equal treatment' can also be achieved by other measures. First, donor governments could themselves practice transparency by informing recipient governments of the human rights criteria being taken into consideration (e.g. articles in the ICCPR). Second, donor co-ordination could, if possible, agree on the minimum threshold criteria for the provision of aid, and minimize the potential of host governments being faced by a confusing disarray of different criteria being used by various donors.

Sovereignty

Sovereignty and self-determination have been very important principles to developing countries in the post-colonial period. Both principles are well established in international law. The right of self-determination is the subject of a stand alone article in the ICCPR and the ICESCR (Part I Article 1 in both). The right to sovereignty is included in the UN Charter of 1945 (Article 2.7). How is this potential conflict between national sovereignty and international protection of human rights to be resolved? The British government states that expressions of concern at violations of human rights cannot be considered as interference in

the internal affairs of a state and asserts that "Third World Governments increasingly acknowledge that human rights are a matter of legitimate international concern" (FCO 1991 para. 11). Uvin adopts a more cautionary tone, stating that, "The intellectual case in favour of rendering sovereignty subservient to respect for human rights (foremost the right to nutrition) is slowly being constructed, but it is not by any means a generally accepted international principle and is unlikely to become one in the foreseeable future" (1993 p.68). There maybe a developing consensus that human rights transcend national sovereignty in international law, legitimising intervention in situations of violations. However, some developing countries express fears that the powerful governments in the world will use human rights concerns to intervene less legitimately in their affairs, and have reasserted the right to sovereignty and the non-use of human rights as an instrument for political ends.¹²⁵

B. Human Rights: Broadening the Agenda

Economic and social rights are defined out of the concerns of this specific aid policy objective, but seen as being promoted generally through the overall aid programme. Yet this raises the following issues.

Indivisibility and The Right to Development

The indivisibility of human rights, as confirmed in the Vienna Declaration, means that one set of rights should not be prioritised over another. This is the rhetoric of official declarations, yet the practice has been somewhat different.

For four decades since the Universal Declaration in 1948 different emphasis has been given to different sets of rights by different political groupings of states. The former communist states of Eastern Europe gave precedence to economic and social rights.¹²⁶ Western states have stressed the importance of civil and political rights. Developing countries have been concerned with questions of self-determination and sovereignty, and have generally expressed more enthusiasm for the concept of economic and social rights.¹²⁷ These differences have led to the perception amongst some contemporary governments and other organisations in developing countries that the term 'human rights' as used by many Northern governments has come to refer to civil and political rights only.¹²⁸ At best this leads to claims of a 'Western' imposition of 'individual rights'; at worst it confirms a suspicion that Northern governments are not so much interested in the economic and social development of countries in the South as using selective criticisms of civil and political rights performance as an instrument in maintaining a world economic order that works to their advantage.

Acceptance of the indivisibility of human rights has implications for governments in both the North and the South. Northern governments should accord equal status to both sets of rights, and show more commitment to the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights. This also has implications for the perceived role of the state in development. Whereas civil and political rights are construed as '*rights from*' interference by the state in legitimate activities, economic and social rights are '*rights to*' economic and social needs being met, requiring positive action by the state. For Southern governments, the indivisibility of human rights implies that respect for civil and political rights and enjoyment of economic and social rights

are mutually reinforcing, which invalidates the argument that priorities need to be made and political freedoms have to be curtailed in order to first satisfy the material needs of the population: "Bread now and freedom later is a false dichotomy. There is a danger that people will end up having neither bread nor freedom." (Dias cited in IPS 1993 p.7).

Related to the issue of indivisibility is the debate over the right to development. At least half of the 30 articles in the Universal Declaration concern rights to economic and social development, subsequently put into a legally binding form in the ICESCR. However, the view of many developing countries has been that in the field of human rights little emphasis has been put on the realisation of these development rights. The *Declaration of the Right to Development* by the UN General Assembly in 1986 was an attempt to redress this imbalance. (The Right to Development was defined as the right "to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development", in which states have the primary responsibility for creating national and international conditions for its realisation). However, a number of Northern governments did not support this (non-legally binding) Declaration and have expressed staunch reservations about it.¹²⁹

Despite the official statements on the indivisibility and interdependence of rights at international conferences etc, discussions at the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1992 indicate that the old debate on the relative importance of civil and political or economic and social rights, and which is a pre-condition of the other, is still very much alive. The US and UK delegates stressed political and civil rights and an open and fair legal system respectively as the foundation for economic and social development. In contrast, the delegates from Pakistan and Mexico stated that development creates the basis to promote all human rights, strengthening individual freedoms and not the other way round.¹³⁰ (UN 1993a, Human Rights and Development.) Current donor policies could tend to reinforce the prioritisation and continued emphasis on civil and political rights.

Will the revived interest of Northern governments in human rights in the post-Cold War period remain restricted to civil and political rights, or will their concerns focus equally on economic and social rights, i.e. poverty eradication as well as political injustices? Any tentative answer to this question requires looking at aid policy as a whole and to what extent aid is poverty-orientated. (See 4.2 for conclusions on this theme).

In summary, although clearly defined and with standards set in international arenas, it is evident from the above points that the linking of human rights to the provision of development assistance is far from uncontroversial, and there are a number of wider issues for donor governments to address in the implementation of such policies.

C. Human Rights: The Donors' Record

If Northern governments are now commonly examining the human rights performance of developing countries with respect to aid conditionality, how willing are they for the same international standards to be applied to themselves? Table 6 compares the records in ratification of the UN treaties and relevant regional conventions of the three governments whose policies we are examining.

TABLE 6. Human Rights: The Donor Governments' Record

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS	UNITED KINGDOM	SWEDEN	UNITED STATES	INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS	UNITED KINGDOM	SWEDEN	UNITED STATES
International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR)				International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)			
Signed	✓	✓	✓ 1977	Signed	✓	✓	✓ 28.9.66
Ratified	✓ 20.5.76	✓ 6.12.71	✓ 8.6.92	Ratified	✓	✓	X
Ratified First Optional Protocol on individual complaints	X	✓	X	Optional right of individual petition (art.14)	X	✓	X
Optional declaration on inter-state parties complaints (art.41)	✓	✓	✓	Comments	No right of individual petition prevents complaints to CERD (monitoring committee) under Art. 4 concerning propaganda and organisations which promote and incite racial discrimination, stipulating their prohibition and the punishment by law of such activities.		Sent to Congress for ratification in February 1978, and remains pending.
Comments	Reservations affecting immigration & nationality.		Some reservations.				
International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (ICESCR)				Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)			
Signed	✓	✓	✓ 5.10.77	Signed	✓	✓	✓ 17.7.80
Ratified	✓	✓	X	Ratified	✓	✓	X
Comments			Sent to Congress for ratification in February 1978 & remains pending.	Comments		Involved in drafting of a UN Declaration on violence against women.	Sent to Congress for ratification in 1980 and remains pending.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS	UNITED KINGDOM	SWEDEN	UNITED STATES	REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS	UNITED KINGDOM	SWEDEN	UNITED STATES
Convention against Torture & other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)				European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)			
Signed	✓	✓	✓	Signed	✓	✓	N/A
Ratified	✓	✓	X	Ratified ...	✓	✓	
Optional declaration on inter-state parties complaints (art.21) (34 declarations in total).	✓	✓	X	Comments ...	Brought before ECtHR in 57 cases, 2nd only to Italy, with judgements against on 31 occasions (ECtHR 1994). No ratification of Protocols Nos. 4, 6, 7, 9.	Brought before ECtHR in 31 cases, with judgements against on 20 occasions (ECtHR 1994).	
Optional rights of individual petition (art.22) (33 declarations in total).	X	✓	X				
Comments			Ratified by Congress on 27.10.90, but ratification not yet deposited at the UN (as of 1.1.94) pending adoption of necessary legislation by Congress (Stewart 1993 note 6).				
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)				American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)			
Signed	✓	✓	X	Signed	N/A	N/A	✓ 1.6.77
Ratified	✓	✓	X	Ratified ...			X
Comments	Reservations cover issues of immigration & nationality and child labour obligations for 16-18 year olds.	Actively working for compliance with Convention, e.g. the largest donor to UNICEF.		Comments ...			Sent to Congress for ratification in February 1978 & remains pending.

Table 6 indicates how the three donor governments have differed in their acceptance of what are limited obligations under international human rights treaties. Sweden has the best record with early ratification of all treaties, generally without reservations, signing up to optional elements and recognising the competence of monitoring bodies. In addition Sweden has taken a pro-active role in the overall implementation of CEDAW and CRC in particular. The UK has ratified all the main treaties, yet with some reservations, most frequently pertaining to its immigration and nationality legislation, and has not allowed UK citizens the right of complaint about alleged violations of civil and political rights to the Human Rights Committee. In addition it was one of the few countries not to recognise the Right to Development. The US has a very poor record, with ratification of most of the main UN treaties still outstanding, despite becoming a signatory to them a considerable number of years previously, mainly during Carter's Presidency in the late 1970s. Even where ratification has taken place more recently, in the case of the ICCPR, it has been with some reservations and without signing the first OP, and, in the case of the CAT, this treaty still awaits being brought into effect. In addition, during the Reagan Administration, the US stood alone at the UN in opposing the Right to Development.

If Northern governments are to condition aid to developing countries in a way that retains credibility and legitimacy with Southern governments, and without double standards, it is essential that they are prepared to be governed by the same international legislation and monitoring instruments. The US is on particularly shaky ground if it wishes to hold up the human rights performance of others, which can be done most legitimately by referral to the UN treaties and regional conventions, if it has not ratified these itself. Hence it is considered vital that the US government ratifies the outstanding UN treaties, without reservations and including recognition of the competence of monitoring bodies where appropriate, as well as ratifying the ACHR, including recognition of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. The UK government should accord the right of individual complaint to its citizens, particularly as there are provisions in the UN treaties (e.g. ICCPR) not covered by the ECHR, and display more willingness to accept the competence and jurisdiction of supervisory bodies.¹³¹

2. Democracy

A. Donor Focus: Questions Arising

I have noted a tendency towards a narrow version of democracy, more in accordance with the model of legal democracy than participatory democracy. Again, within this framework there are a number of matters at issue.

Universality

Is democracy a Western concept which donor governments are imposing upon developing countries in the context of post-Cold War triumphalism and notions of the 'end of history'? Past arguments that Western liberal democracy was not appropriate to the situation in many developing countries, especially in the immediate post-colonial context, now appear less persuasive and less pertinent with the failure of alternative political systems, both

'communist' states in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and single-party states in Africa.¹³² Within the context of democratisation in Africa at least, most leading African scholars now appear to support a democratic political system, understood generally within the liberal democratic tradition, as desirable.¹³³ Beetham contends that the basic democratic ideals of 'popular control' and 'political equality' are present as aspirations in most historical societies, at least among the population at large, even if not shared by their rulers (see Box 3). There now appears less contestation or alternative in most parts of the world to multipartyism with periodic elections as the *minimal* necessary condition for the transition to a democratic political system.¹³⁴ However, as some donors themselves have pointed out (e.g. Britain), this does not mean the wholesale transfer of, for example, the Westminster or Elysée models.¹³⁵ It is important that political institutions and practices should be adapted to suit local needs and conditions.¹³⁶ Questions regarding the role and nature of donor intervention could arise post-democratic transition when issues such as the appropriate form of democracy, constitutional and electoral reforms, and increased mechanisms for participation are debated at a national level.

Multipartyism and Ethnic Divisions

A related issue about the applicability of pluralism, of real contemporary concern particularly in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, is the question of whether multipartyism will lead to increased, or diminished, ethnic conflict and violence. It is argued that multiparty competition can intensify ethnic divisions, with parties based on ethnic identities.^{137 138}

However, a counter-argument is that whether multi-party democracy leads to increases or decreases in ethnic conflict is not to do with democracy *per se*, but the particular *form* it takes. Democracy comprises a variety of institutional arrangements and practices. Some, most notably the Westminster model, characterised by majority, winner-takes-all rule, can indeed exacerbate conflict in plural, heterogeneous societies divided along ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, ideological, etc, grounds.¹³⁹ In contrast, a consensual model of democracy can moderate such winner-takes-all situations, giving greater influence in government, and protection to, minority social groups. Mechanisms to foster consensus decision-making include: an electoral system based on proportional representation; executive power-sharing, (i.e. guaranteed seats on executive for all main political parties, representing major social groups); power-dispersal through regional autonomy; guaranteed constitutional rights that are immune from majority vote; adequate representation of women.¹⁴⁰ The new South African government of national unity, which includes many of these features, is a good example of what is *possible* in constructing a consensual model, even in a situation where one party (the ANC) enjoys overwhelming majority support. In addition, an appropriate democratic political system can potentially provide constitutional and peaceful means for discussing and resolving conflict, without resorting to political violence.

Nevertheless, the issue of ethnic conflict remains a very grave one, as tragically displayed by the appalling events and bloodshed in societies as different as Bosnia (1993/94) and the Central African countries of Burundi (October-November 1993) and Rwanda (April-July 1994). It is an issue which, even if reinforcing rather than undermining arguments for democracy, must remain at the very top of the agenda of all actors, national and

international, involved in crafting democracy. It is essential that any external assistance in building democratic political systems ensures that the most appropriate constitutional and institutional arrangements are developed to facilitate management and resolution of conflict in divided societies, without recourse to violence.

Sovereignty

In the four decades of decolonisation in Africa, any interference in the internal political affairs of a country by Northern powers will be regarded by many as neo-colonialist, and not only by incumbent elites who stand to lose from political change. The principles of self-determination and non-interference must be upheld as important principles of international law. Northern governments, in seeking to promote democratization in developing countries, *are* engaged in external intervention. It is essential they give careful consideration to such interventions and the *manner* in which they are devised to ensure that they do not infringe sovereignty. Are development co-operation measures to support political reforms being formulated sufficiently in conjunction with local actors, either the government if legitimately elected and representative, or democracy movements in situations of oppression? At the same time, it is also increasingly unacceptable for oppressive régimes, who violate the civil and political rights of their citizens, to invoke 'sovereignty' as a shield to protect themselves from external disapproval and pressure.

Conditionality

Are donor governments likely to make the provision of development assistance conditional on a democratic political system in recipient countries? Such democracy conditionality is more contentious than human rights conditionality, given the international legal framework encompassing human rights questions and their more specific, definable character, and it is likely to arouse more opposition from recipient governments. It is also less straightforward to implement, lacking the international monitoring institutions and procedures that exist in the human rights field. What are the minimal elements of a democratic political system that will satisfy the donors? What criteria and methods will be used for assessing these and will these be transparent?

If applying such conditionality, donor governments may well restrict themselves to questions of multipartyism and periodic free and fair elections, and maybe advised to relate their concerns to Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁴¹ However, such conditionality also raises issues of 'sham compliance' and 'democratic facades', and potential problems of 'countervailing actions' (i.e. what a government does with one hand it can undo with the other).¹⁴² These are extensive issues and will be investigated further in future research, both in the detailed country case-studies and by examining individual country examples more widely.

B. Democracy: Broadening the Agenda

Participation

The concept of 'participation' could be crucial to efforts to resolve some of the issues and controversies identified above. Debates about universality versus imposition of Western models become less heated if there is agreement on the need for participation and determination at the national level of the form of democracy appropriate to local needs and conditions. Similarly, in constructing a form of democracy appropriate to divided societies, the participation of minorities appears essential to diminish the potential for conflict. The increased participation of women is vital if democratisation is to enable greater representation of women's interests. Further, the participation of local actors, both government and non-government, in identifying their needs and priorities to strengthen their emerging democracies is vital if Northern intervention is to be in accordance with, rather than in violation of, the principle of sovereignty.

However, it was discussed earlier that the tendency of donors was towards a narrower, formal notion of democracy rather than the broader, participatory one. As stated above, from the limited evidence so far assembled, it is not possible to come to any firm answers on the question of what form of democracy are the donors interested in promoting. It is an empirical question requiring detailed information on how donors are implementing their policies in emerging democracies, the subject of the next state of this research. However, at this stage, it is possible to put forward the proposition that Northern donors' notion of democracy is likely to be narrow in two respects. First, it will focus on electoral democracy, in which power may shift from one set of rulers to another, but who constitute different fractions of an overall elite. The extent to which power is extended more widely and governments made more accountable to the wider population, it is contended, will be limited. Further questions follow. In whose interests does such a form of democracy operate? Does it consolidate the capacity of certain groups to rule, and, if so, which ones? Is there any perceived correspondence with donors' interests? Second, the donors' notion of democracy will reflect a form of representative government whose use of state power will be circumscribed, with minimal state intervention and large tracts of economic and social life turned over to 'market forces'. Correspondingly the promotion of pluralism will concentrate on increasing the influence of business and professional groups. In such a context, the possibility of increased opportunities for grass-roots pressure groups and civic associations to influence government decision making, and of progress to formal political equality being matched by advances in economic and social equalities, (or even by achievements of basic economic and social rights), through redistributive policies, are both limited. Such propositions will be returned to and examined further in the next stage of this research.

3. Good Governance

A. Donor Focus: Questions Arising

A particularly extreme divergence between the four donors with regard both to their definitions of good governance and associated measures has been noted, perhaps unsurprising given the newness of the concept itself. The narrower focus on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration systems in host countries would appear, at face value, to be less contentious than issues of human rights and democracy. However, we have noted how definitions of governance and measures to promote its improvement were situated in the much contested terrain of the role of the state in economic development. Significant differences between SIDA, on the one hand, and the World Bank and ODA on the other, were accounted for in this way.

I put forward that the World Bank definition of governance, focused on efficient economic management, is likely to gain increasing influence and incorporation by bilateral donors. If this proposition is correct, then wider issues of controversy are raised, given the location of the World Bank's notion of good governance within its espousal of a minimalist state, and with strong links of governance to the implementation of SAPs.

B. Good Governance: Broadening the Agenda

As is well known, the neo-liberal model of the state, which gained the status of orthodoxy during the 1980s, is of a minimalist state whose main role is to provide an 'enabling environment' for private sector-led economic growth. The World Bank and its sister organisation the IMF, along with many Northern governments, have been frontline advocates of the shrinking of the state in developing countries, particularly through the implementation of SAPs. Nonetheless, such activities have come up against a paradox: the state is seen as the problem, yet, simultaneously, it is part of the solution, being itself the agent responsible for the implementation of economic reform programmes. As Evans, citing Kayler, states:

"orthodox policy prescriptions, despite their disdain for the wisdom of the politicians, contained the paradoxical expectation that the state (the root of the problem) would somehow be able to become the agent that initiated and implemented adjustment programs (became the solution)" (1992 p.140).

The new focus on the concept of governance by the World Bank constitutes an attempt to resolve this dilemma. A consequence of not paying sufficient attention to the nature of government was the disappointing impact of SAPs, as acknowledged in the 1989 SSA Report, and the emphasis on governance can be seen as a means to improve that record. It involves a recognition that government matters and that what the state does must be done efficiently and effectively, requiring a professionalised bureaucracy. Nevertheless, this context in which the governance initiative is situated, neo-liberal notions of the role of the state and the implementation of SAPs, leads to a number of questions raising controversial issues.

First, are the World Bank's governance measures aimed at improving economic management *per se*, or the management of economic reform, providing improved conditions for the implementation of SAPs? If it is essentially the latter, then governance reforms themselves cannot be separated from the controversy surrounding SAPs, perhaps the most controversial area of all the Bank's work, with their dominance of the current African political economy. As an expression of neo-liberal economics, SAPs are politically contested both at the theoretical level, as well as conflicting judgments on their success or failure.¹⁴³

Second, the association between governance reforms and SAPs has an implication for both democracy and sovereignty. SAPs are criticised for the removal of economic policy choice from national governments to the international financial institutions, backed by Northern governments. In Oxfam UK's words, "Is genuine democracy compatible with the *de facto* transfer of economic policy sovereignty to Washington based institutions?" (1993 p.25). The implementation of SAPs, particularly in SSA since the mid-1980s, has been characterised more by the lack of policy choice, with national governments having little or no option but to accept the IFI's package of economic reforms in desperate economic circumstances where access to much-needed finance has been conditional on agreement to implement an adjustment programme.¹⁴⁴ Yet the democratic principle of popular control includes *government* control over policy, which the populace in turn influences both through regular, periodic elections and through other mechanisms facilitating ongoing inputs into the policy-making process. Ostensibly the World Bank seeks to strengthen the latter mechanisms through governance reforms, improving the transparency and increasing the accountability of government. Yet it can be argued that simultaneously they are undermining such processes by the removal of government control over economic policy, which effectively lies in their hands and those of the IMF, backed by most donor governments. This raises crucial questions. Governance reforms may bring about improvements in transparency and accountability, but do these enhance *popular* control, or rather do they facilitate the better surveillance of a government's economic management and intensify its accountability, not to their own people, but to the IFIs themselves? Are Northern donors, both multilateral and bilateral, now effectively taking over from the state the role of providing strategic direction over the economy, rendering moves to democratic control of national government less than meaningful, as well as raising issues of sovereignty?

Third, does the new focus on good governance constitute a break with or continuity with neo-liberal theories of the state? Some commentators suggest that this policy initiative constitutes "recognition of the state's centrality" (Evans 1992, p.141) or "rehabilitates the state" to the centre of the development process (Archer 1994). Other critics (Moore 1993; Sandbrook 1990) maintain that governance initiatives remain enclosed within a minimalist concept of the state's role, with implications for the particular type of governance reforms advocated. Briefly, what evidence is there to support either point of view? In discussing the new emphasis on good governance by both bilateral and multilateral donors, Archer claims that "government again becomes central to economic development as manager, planner and provider of four services.....: public education, public health, economic infrastructure, and the rule of law" (op.cit. p.13). But is this correct? Particular prominence is purportedly given by donors to the need for "high quality education", a requirement of a market economy and a modern democracy. Yet many organisations, including development NGOs, continue

to provide evidence of spending *cuts* in many developing countries in health and education, due mainly to the constraints on public expenditure imposed by neo-liberal SAPs.¹⁴⁵ Promotion of the rule of law can be restricted to a narrow agenda related to a legal framework for economic activity, very much in line with neo-liberalism (see Box 3), and indeed this aspect is given primary attention by Archer under that heading.

In contrast, Moore points to the ideological nature of 'governance' as a product and an expression of the doctrine of Anglo-American liberalism that currently dominates the World Bank. As a consequence, he believes, the governance experience of East Asian countries with successful economic performance, "appears to have been largely ignored" (Moore 1993 p.41).¹⁴⁶ In conclusion he asserts that the World Bank is willing "to keep a close eye on the state ... but ...unwilling and unable to take state-building seriously" (op.cit.p.49).

Similar criticisms were made by Sandbrook in response to the World Bank 1989 Report on Sub-Saharan Africa. The Bank is prescribing a minimalist state yet "experience has shown ... that extensive government involvement is essential for achieving rapid economic development" (Sandbrook 1990 p.681). In his view, the emphasis on the importance of governance is right, but the Bank's concept is too narrow. The state's role should be not only to maintain an 'enabling environment' but also "to undertake the directive, co-ordinating role which.... rapid capitalist development requires" (op.cit. p.695). The aim of governance reforms should be "to foster a public sector capable of effectively intervening in economic life" (ibid.). As evidence Sandbrook similarly cites the experience of East Asia - "The 'secret' of East Asia's newly industrializing countries... is a strong, interventionist yet market-conforming state" (op.cit.p.682).

In summary, the governance initiative undoubtedly represents a recognition that the nature of government matters. However, are Northern donors merely paying more attention to the limited role of government as defined by neo-liberalism, assigning it the same narrow tasks, but attempting to ensure that these are done both effectively and accountably? Or, alternatively, do the policies represent changed views by Northern donors on the role of the state, designating an extended role to government, distinct from the more extreme neo-liberal views of the 1980s. In my opinion, the evidence on the rehabilitation of the state's centrality remains thin, and, as such, unconvincing. Ultimately, however, whether the focus on good governance, and the other aspects of political aid policies, represents a break with or continuity with neo-liberalism requires fuller empirical answers.

3.2.3 Policy Limits

The preceding discussion has appraised the parameters and delimitations of the donors' policies in the three areas of human rights, democracy and good governance, critically examining their inclinations towards narrower definitions of the three concepts. Hence human rights focuses on civil and political liberties, not economic and social rights; democracy leans towards a 'legal' rather than a 'participatory' form; good governance is more disposed to keep the state in check, than state building. As a way of concluding this section, Figure 2 sums up in diagrammatic form the general perceived tendencies of inclusion and exclusion amongst the donors examined.




Fig 2 : Donor Policies: Inclusions and Exclusions

PART 4. CONCLUSION

To recap, in *Policy Evolution* I traced the emergence of the recent shift in development co-operation policy in linking aid to human rights, democracy and good governance, and analysed factors accounting for its rise to the top of most donor governments' policy agenda. The main thrust of *Policy Operationalisation* was to problematise this new policy agenda by demonstrating how the three key concepts are all contested and open to different interpretations, and by examining the controversial issues surrounding their introduction into development co-operation. At the same time, a comparative analysis of the policies of the four selected donors has been carried out in both parts.

To conclude, firstly, I wish to make some final comments on some of the wider political issues that have arisen in the discussions of aid policies in this field, and set forth some of the questions that further research will address. Secondly, and finally, I wish to briefly explore some of the implications of the new donor policies for their own aid programmes.

4.1 POLITICAL ISSUES AND FURTHER RESEARCH QUESTIONS

4.1.1 Sovereignty

A recurrent issue in discussions of all the three main concepts, human rights, democracy and good governance, has been the question of sovereignty. In the case of human rights, it may be that international law is increasingly being recognised as taking priority over the sovereignty of states, signalling a fundamental change in international relations, as national governments take on treaty obligations and monitoring and reporting systems become better established. However, human rights remains the exception to the international principle of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. There is no such construction of international law as regards a democratic political system, nor likely to be in the foreseeable future, given its highly contested nature. The onus must be on donor agencies to justify their interventions and demonstrate they do not constitute external interference in internal affairs, particularly given the considerable power and potential leverage they have over the poorest, indebted and aid-dependent countries. In turn, it is the task of other actors, including academic researchers, to evaluate the validity of their justifications.

The question of sovereignty is not an easy one, and its complexities and difficulties are not being underestimated here, including the criteria by which a government can claim sovereign rule over a nation and its people. It may be timely, when deliberating and evaluating of the relations between donor and recipient governments and how these relate to sovereignty, to be reminded of the principles and objectives of the Lomé Convention (if not its practice), often taken as a model of development co-operation:

"ACP-EEC cooperation shall be exercised on the basis of the following fundamental principles:

- *equality between partners, respect for their sovereignty, mutual interest and interdependence;*
- *the right of each State to determine its own political, social, cultural and economic policy options. "*

Article 2 of the Fourth Lomé Convention.

It is pertinent that it is precisely these principles that are felt to be undermined in the current Lomé Mid-Term Review, in which issues of 'Human Rights and Democracy' feature so prominently, with increasing control over co-operation programmes transferring to the European Commission. (See Sudworth 1993; also see 2.1.4).

4.1.2 Promoting Democratization

Closely interrelated with the discussion of sovereignty are the questions of why Northern donors are promoting democracy, what forms of democracy they are interested in strengthening, and what are the pitfalls and constraints?

Why Democracy Now?

In summarising the four donors' rationales behind the introduction of the political aid policies (see Part 2), I noted some tension (as well as variance between donors) between democracy being valued as an end in itself, and as a means to the end of economic liberalisation and reform. In addition many incumbent elites in developing countries have come to be seen recently by Northern governments as an obstacle to the promotion of free market economies, given the perception that they are wedded to the state for control of the resources it provides, partly necessary for distribution as political patronage to ensure their survival. If a donor's aims and underlying interests primarily concern economic liberalization, then the seriousness with which it continues to support democracy is likely to be directly proportional to the perceived success, or not, of democratic reforms in contributing to economic development within the framework of a free market system.

What Forms of Democracy?

Northern governments interests and intentions will also be reflected in the type of democratic polity they show interest in strengthening. In summarising where the four donors are locating themselves in the contested territory that encompasses different interpretations of democracy, broadly delimited by the narrow, neo-liberal model and the more comprehensive model of participatory democracy, I noted (see 3.2.1) that the (limited) evidence so far indicates a general tendency to the narrow end of the spectrum.

Questions requiring further empirical research, which this project intends to address, are whether Northern donors' interests will be served sufficiently by a restricted, elite-dominated democracy, with a focus on a formal set of political procedures, particularly periodic elections, in which power tends to shift only between different fractions of a ruling elite,

mainly comprised of the business class (industrialists and traders), rural landowners, urban professionals and state bureaucrats? Or alternatively, will donors' support extend to those movements and groups, self-organised in civil society, (e.g. labour, women's and community groups), who emphasise popular participation and increased government accountability, and whose interest in democracy tends to be part of a wider, developmental project of socio-economic reforms, including redistribution and equity goals? In other words, will questions of *power* be amongst donor concerns? Democracy, unless narrowly defined, is about greater popular control over the power of the state. It is about broadening power. In supporting democratization processes, will donors' assistance be confined to the establishment of a formal political system involving the (potential) periodic replacement of one elite group by another as power-holders, or will they help foster an extension of popular control? Research will address who are the beneficiaries of donor assistance, and, in the broader context, who are the beneficiaries of democratic reforms? Is it merely elite groups or a wider section of the populace?

External Support: Pitfalls and Constraints

Whatever the varied aims and interests of donors, supporting democracy in developing countries is a far from straightforward venture. A number of pitfalls and constraints are considered in turn.

First, (aside from sovereignty issues), can external agencies be effective in changing internal power structures? Is democratization by definition not an internal process, with democracy unlikely to take root unless embedded in indigenous efforts? Is not the limit of external agencies to assist internal change? (Although, following the discussion immediately above, donor governments are still able to choose which type of indigenous groups they wish to strengthen). Such understanding leads to a less abstract perspective of what changes are in fact feasible, and to the need for careful consideration on a country-by-country basis of the opportunities and the constraints. USAID, with its initial democracy assessments for individual countries, appears to have developed this approach furthest. (Such assessments will be considered in more detail in the next stage of the research).

Second, following on, democratic reforms which are not internally-driven are more likely to be 'empty-shell' or 'facade' reforms resulting from the 'sham compliance' of ruling governments with external donor pressure. In addition, reforms not internally-rooted are unlikely to be sustainable and liable to reversal.

Third, in this context, a further note of caution is the need for awareness, as donors have generally signalled, that a transition to democracy is only the first stage of the democratization process, and that democratic consolidation is essential if the pendulum is not to swing back again in a series of reversals to authoritarian rule. Two points emerge. Firstly, the difficulties involved in ensuring free and fair elections at the transition stage are magnified in the much broader process of democratic consolidation, involving not only the building of democratic institutions and processes, but also the less tangible aspects of a democratic culture. The complexities indicate, again, the need for a country-by-country approach in which the measures taken by Northern donors are shaped through a high degree

of dialogue with a wide range of local actors on how the democratization process in their countries can best be strengthened. The second point concerns the question of conditions for democracy, on which a substantial literature has developed since Lipset's original work in 1959. Whilst wishing to avoid the more determinist implications of socio-economic *pre-conditions*, a pertinent point is that democracy is far less likely to flourish in conditions of material deprivation and poverty, indicating the need for attention to poverty reduction by governments, both South and North, including through development co-operation programmes, as crucial in itself and as an important factor in democratic consolidation.

4.1.3 Economic and Political Reform: Compatibilities and Priorities

The addition, in the 1990s, of political reform to the objectives of development assistance follows on from the change, in the 1980s, to linking aid to specific economic reforms, namely SAPs.¹⁴⁷ In general, political reform is given high priority by most donors (see Table 1), and currently sits alongside economic reform at the top of their aid policy agenda. The links between economic and political reforms have been a recurrent theme throughout this report. They lead to a number of final questions.

First, the introduction of economic conditionality occasioned a major re-orientation of development assistance, including the shift in emphasis from project to programme aid. Will political aid policies, probably introduced with a greater fanfare, lead to such significant changes in practice? Questions posed with regard to policy implementation will be addressed in the next stage of the research. However, one hypothesis now is that democracy and human rights policies, though scoring high on rhetoric, will remain marginal in performance in terms of expenditure and in overall impact on the aid programme.

Second, in *Policy Evolution*, I noted most donors' assumption that economic and political liberalisation are mutually compatible and reinforcing, whilst stating that this largely remains unsubstantiated. This raises the question of what will take priority if areas of tension and incompatibility do arise between SAPs and the process of democratization? Will modifications be made in the pace and content of economic reform programmes in order not to undermine a fragile democracy? Or will the establishment of a free market economy take precedence and moves to increasing political authoritarianism be ignored?¹⁴⁸

Third, following on, I noted the distinction between, on the one hand, democracy and human rights as more political concepts, and, on the other, good governance with greater economic dimensions. In addition I gave reasons why governance could become more prominent in policy implementation. Again, questions of priorities arise, particularly in the context of incompatibilities between economic and political reforms. Would governance measures take precedence, with their close association with economic reform, with democracy and human rights concerns becoming more peripheral, indicating Northern donors primary aims and interests? In a nutshell, will the main policy orientation be democratising the state or increasing managerial efficiency (Schmitz and Gillies 1992 p.16)?

Fourth, as argued in this report, the fate of democracy and human rights within these overall policies also depends on whether they establish themselves as a break with neo-liberalism.

If they are more in continuity with neo-liberalism, notions of democracy and civil and political liberties will remain restricted and subordinate to the requirements of a free market society. In addition, as the poor in both the North and the South are only too aware from the increased inequalities and declining living standards of the past 15 years, any possibilities for "realising a minimum agenda of economic and social rights are likely to prove incompatible with untrammelled private property rights and the unrestricted freedom of the market" (Beetham 1995). It is recognised that the emphasis on the importance of government and good governance does indicate a shift in the 1990s from the more extreme neo-liberal prescriptions of the 1980s. However, as stated earlier, the jury is still out on whether this will constitute a distinct break with neo-liberalism or merely a modified version. The most significant evidence could be from the nature of the governance measures advocated and the underlying role of the state they betoken.

4.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR DONOR PROGRAMMES

The introduction of aid policies promoting human rights, democracy and good governance in recipient countries in turn has implications for the donors' own aid programmes and foreign policies.

Aid and Human Rights

It was noted how most donors, in the context of their aid policies in this field, delimited the concept of human rights to civil and political liberties only, justified on the basis that economic and social rights are promoted through their aid programmes as a whole. However this begs the following question - what is aid's record in contributing to the realisation of at least, a minimum core of economic and social rights?¹⁴⁹ The question is a difficult one to answer given the lack of statistics on aid's performance in relation to economic and social rights. Nevertheless, assuming that aid directed at poverty alleviation is more or less equivalent to the aim of realising a minimum agenda of economic and social rights, it is possible to make some comments. Poverty reduction is included on the list of aid objectives by most donors. Whilst not wishing to devalue the impact on poverty that aid has had, even the official figures are disappointing, and often disputed by non-government organisations.¹⁵⁰ A recent report contrasts the greater priority accorded to other policy objectives and the doggedness with which they are pursued, namely structural adjustment in the 1980s and human rights and governance in recent years, and comments that "at present it does not seem that the donor community is prepared to put the same level of commitment behind poverty reduction" (Randell and German 1994 p.15). Cassen states that the role of aid in combatting poverty is double constrained by commercial and political pressures on bilateral donors and by the domestic policies of recipients (1994 p.54). The former is in the hands of donor governments themselves; the latter is dependent on recipient governments, but given the pressure being put on recipients in other areas, (e.g. economic and political reform), the issue of poverty alleviation measures could easily be made "a key agenda item in donor-recipient dialogue" (Randell and German 1994 p.15). Given the international consensus on the indivisibility of human rights and the need to give equal emphasis to all categories of rights, the failure of many donors to give greater attention in their aid

programmes to poverty reduction, and by implication to the attainment of minimal economic and social rights, is not only depressing in itself, but also undermines their legitimacy in raising issues of civil and political liberties with recipient governments. In addition, the achievement of basic economic and social rights, if not a precondition, certainly enhances the prospects for a sustainable process of democratization.

Tomasevski goes further in turning human rights criteria around and applying them to donor policies and practices. She asserts that aid projects and practices can themselves impinge on human rights, (e.g. exploitation of cheap labour, forced displacement especially of indigenous peoples), and to prevent such violations aid projects should be evaluated according to human rights criteria. This approach is taken a step further by the proposal that human rights criteria should be applied throughout development aid, including the economic and social programmes that are supported through aid, as a corrective against 'maldevelopment' and to ensure the compatibility of aid policies and practices with universal human rights norms. (Tomasevski 1989 ch.7). By such means all development aid would be consistent with and would promote the realisation of human rights.

Democratising Aid Programmes

Donors are also challenged to reform and democratise their own aid programmes. Ul Haq, citing UNDP data, points to how many aid programmes are still linked to the Cold War past: only 25% of total aid goes to 75% of the poorest people; twice as much aid per capita goes to high military spenders than to moderate spenders; \$370 per capita per annum to Egypt compared with \$4 to India; in 1992 the US gave as much assistance to El Salvador as Bangladesh, despite the latter having 24 times the population and being 5 times poorer (1993 p.85). His message to donors: "You need to reform your own programmes and link them to poverty, link them to human development, link them to restraint on military spending" (ibid.).

Open and Accountable Aid

In making demands on recipient governments to improve their systems of governance, donors should also be willing to improve their own practices in such matters. Two implications are evident. First, transparency of information on aid programmes themselves is essential both to citizens of donor and recipient countries, if pluralism is to be meaningful and interested parties are to play a full role in contributing to policy discussions and evaluation, including disagreement.¹⁵¹ Second, policy in this area implies a challenge to donor agencies as regards their methods of work, with the need to adopt "more open and more participatory approaches to the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of projects and programs", including involving intended beneficiaries more closely in decision-making (Sénécal 1993 p.88).

Foreign Policy Priorities

Previous attempts to link aid to human rights have not lasted long due to Northern governments' overriding commercial and strategic interests. If the policies adopted more

recently are to fare any better, as well as avoiding the accusation of hypocrisy in lecturing to developing countries on their lack of respect for democracy and human rights, then it is important that Northern governments look to their own foreign policy records. One simple indication of their own preparedness to change, and to shift from previous priorities, would be to cut arms exports and military assistance, and to operationalise aid conditionality on the military expenditure record of recipient governments - probably the least controversial of aid conditionalities.¹⁵²

Final Comments

The shift from the Cold War practice of aiding dictators is to be welcomed. However, this working report has tried to demonstrate how the promotion by Northern donors of human rights, democracy and good governance in developing countries is problematic, controversial, and, despite similar sounding policy statements, subject to varying interpretation and practices, often underpinned by different ideological orientations. I have attempted to articulate some of the issues and questions being raised by various actors in the policy process, as well as suggesting some myself. Further research will examine the empirical information on how the donors have implemented their policies, and attempt to provide some responses, if not answers, to questions raised here.

For now, there remains one broader political question raised by the policy developments examined here. Democracy and human rights are common slogans used by a wide range of political actors in the contemporary world, whilst pursuing different agendas. In recent times there has been the *appearance* of a congruence of aims and interests between the policies of Northern governments and the democratic aspirations in developing countries for more influence and control over their rulers. However such a coincidence of interests could be short-lived. For most Northern donors, democracy is a limited activity which buttresses, or at least does not challenge, the inequalities of the present international economic system, over which they preside. Tensions and contradictions could emerge between this agenda and that of the needs and interests of the mass of the population in poor countries if they have the opportunity to press for political and economic reforms which could include questions of distribution, social equalities and justice, both nationally and internationally. To what extent the political space for the expression of such demands will be opened up by the current focus on democratization, and whether the role of Northern governments will be to strengthen such opportunities or to collude in their denial, remains to be seen.

NOTES TO TEXT

1. Prior to the early 1980s, almost all multilateral and bilateral loans and grants were 'project' aid, i.e. to assist specific development projects.
2. The mandates of the multilaterals, e.g. the World Bank, generally prohibits them from engaging in 'political' activity. For more detail, see Box 5 and section 3.2.1. 'Good Governance'.
3. In 1992 the E.U. and its member states gave 49% of the o.d.a. provided by the OECD countries, totalling \$27,667 million, of which \$4,205 million was through the E.U. itself. (OECD 1992).
4. Sweden's aid allocation for the 1993/94 financial year was reduced from 1% to 0.9% GNP, as part of overall government expenditure cuts in response to the economic crisis recently experienced there. The Government has stated the intention to meet the 1% target again when economic conditions permit, but Swedish NGOs think this will not be for some considerable years. (Randel and German 1994 p.111).
5. Development aid has, of course, always had a political dimension, with donor governments choosing which developing countries to support, in part determined by foreign policy considerations. However, what is new about the recent policy developments is the explicit linking of aid to political reform in recipient countries.
6. The French government has also been the first to explicitly apply the brake if not go into reverse gear on these policies. The foreign minister and development co-operation minister in the present Conservative government have both rejected the imposing of political conditionality on recipient countries in contrast to President Mitterand's La Baule speech. The foreign minister, Alain Juppe, stated that Africa must evolve towards democracy and human rights "at its own pace, with its own constraints, which of course takes time and does not mean hasty elections" (The Guardian 5 June 1993).
7. Other donor governments are similarly emphasising conflict-prevention and resolution within their political aid policies as the euphoria (for some Western governments) of the New World Order has quickly faded with the sobering reality of an upsurge of violent conflicts in various parts of the world.
8. The DAC is unusual in placing side-by-side the two distinct policy agendas of 'participatory development' and 'good governance', apparently due to its attention to the former immediately preceding the emergence of good governance issues. Participatory development or 'popular participation' generally means a bottom-up strategy for development, advocated particularly in the context of rural development, which emphasises the importance of local community involvement in the development process, and espouses such concepts as 'empowerment' and 'decentralisation'. Participatory development also has an equity dimension, with local communities, generally comprising the poor, being the beneficiaries of development efforts. The 'good governance' agenda, with its three constituent elements of democracy, human rights and governance, focuses more on political reforms at the level of the state. The two agendas potentially overlap if the definition of good governance includes a participatory form of democracy, the strengthening of civil society associations, and enhancing pluralism throughout society. However, if discussions of

democracy are more limited to multi-party elections, then the two agendas may sit uneasily together, with the possibility that 'participatory development', in the context of DAC, will get swamped by the inclusion of the good governance agenda which donor agencies, more used to government-to-government relations, are likely to feel more at ease in implementing.

9. The OAU declaration followed shortly after the adoption of the 'African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation' at an international conference in Arusha, Tanzania in February 1990, organised under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Its major point, according to Ake, was that "the absence of democracy is the primary cause of the chronic crisis in Africa" (Ake 1991 p.36).
10. For example, Baroness Chalker, Britain's overseas development minister, in her keynote speech on 'Good Government and the Aid Programme' in June 1991, commenced with two quotes from Southern sources which affirmed the link between democracy, human rights, good governance and economic and social progress.
11. UNDP takes a somewhat more intricate view on the relationship between democracy and development. In contrast to other development organisations asserting a strong correlation, they recognise that 'economic and social progress' can be "out of step" with 'political freedom' for some periods of time, (e.g. in Eastern Europe or East Asia). However, economic growth is only part of their definition of *human development*. As political freedom is also an essential element, then, by definition, development has to be based on democracy and popular participation. (UNDP 1992 p.27).
12. Mahbub ul Haq, UNDP Special Adviser and chief architect of their Human Development Reports, advises donors not to link aid to human rights violations, giving three reasons. First, democracy has nowhere succeeded because of external aid conditionality, rather such pressure could be counterproductive. Second, conditionality punishes the wrong side, the people not the rulers. Third, it can be highly selective, with some countries being targeted and not others. (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1993 pp.48-49).
13. The legislative framework for British aid is the Overseas Development and Co-operation Act of 1980. However, this is a technical piece of legislation, mainly consolidating in one Act administrative provisions from a number of other Acts relating to overseas development, but bereft of policy. The only matter of policy is the broad-ranging statement that assistance shall promote "the development ... of a country ... or the welfare of its people" (Part 1, section 1).
14. The last such policy document was the 1975 White Paper 'Help for the Poorest'.
15. This speech, at the Overseas Development Institute, London was at an international conference on African prospects in the 1990s, organised under the auspices of the UN Africa Recovery Programme.
16. World Bank (1989), *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*.

17. However, such statements ignore an important difference between the two regions. Political liberalisation preceded economic liberalisation in Eastern Europe, whereas free market economic reforms were introduced in sub-Saharan Africa from the mid-1980s onwards, well before the trends to political reform.
18. This, of course, is in addition to economic criteria associated with World Bank led structural adjustment programmes. In a written policy statement, Mr. Hurd had stated that "we do already insist on economic reform as the price of our aid" (in *Crossbow*, cited in Lone 1990 p.28).
19. Criticisms of the funding of the Pergau dam in Malaysia, the biggest ever single British aid project, highlighted not only the ineffective use of a substantial amount of scarce resources on a project with limited benefits in a relatively better-off developing country, but also the abuse of aid for non-development (and disreputable) purposes by its link, despite government denials, with the securing of military contracts. In an unprecedented move the British pressure group, the World Development Movement, successfully challenged the government in the High Court over the legality of funding the £234M project out of the aid programme. The High Court ruled that the project did not promote the development of a country's economy as required by the Overseas Development and Co-operation Act of 1980, (*The Guardian* 11 November 1994, p.1).
20. In countries where aid to governments has been reduced or suspended, it is stated that the provision of humanitarian aid to the population will continue, particularly channelled through NGOs.
21. The Departmental Report 1994 lists the seven priority objectives as follows:
 - to promote economic reform
 - to promote enhanced productive capacity (i.e. infrastructure and utilities)
 - to promote good government
 - to undertake direct poverty reduction activities
 - to promote human development, including health, education and population policy
 - to promote the status of women
 - to help developing countries tackle national environmental problems(British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1994).

ODA would no doubt challenge a presumption that these objectives are ranked in order of priority, but it is perhaps not wholly insignificant that economic reform and good government are at the top of the list.
22. The former 'European Community' became the 'European Union' on 1 November 1993 with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. In general we will continue to use the term 'European Community' to refer to activities before November 1993, though all references are listed under 'European Union'.
23. Lomé III (1985 - 1990) did in fact include a reference to human rights. However the provision on human rights in Lomé IV was considerably strengthened by its inclusion in the main body of the Convention.
24. However, although not covering democratic policy structures as such, it does place emphasis on initiatives "to achieve in practice real participation of the population in the development process". (Article 5, paragraph 1, Lomé IV).

25. Resolution on 'Human Rights and Development Policy' adopted by the European Parliament on 22 November 1991, document number PE 155.084.
26. Resolution of the (Development) Council and of the Member States on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, 28 November 1991. Document number 10107/91.
27. In practice, however, despite the lack of a legal basis, development co-operation agreements have been suspended on human rights grounds under Lomé IV, e.g. Sudan, Somalia, Malawi, Zaire, Haiti, Liberia and Togo. The Commission Communication of 25th March 1991 states that, "Although the Lomé Convention contains no express sanctions clause in the case of human rights violations, the spirit of the Convention allows certain consequences to be drawn as regards the management of co-operation if Article 5 is breached."
28. The awareness of the implications of the November 1991 Council Resolution for a future Lomé Convention are indicated by the interest and discussion it aroused in ACP-EC circles. It was the main feature in the July-August 1991 edition of *The Courier* on 'Human Rights, Democracy and Development', and secondly by the debate, acrimonious at times, on the Pons-Grau report and resolution on this subject which dominated both the Luxembourg (September-October 1992) and Gaborone (March-April 1993) sessions of the ACP-EC Joint Assembly. (See *The Courier* May-June 1993 no. 139).
29. Title XVII Article 130u, paragraph 1, states in full that:
 1. Community policy in the sphere of development co-operation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster:
 - the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;
 - the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;
 - the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.
30. This is distinct from the principle of 'subsidiarity' established more generally in the Maastricht Treaty (Article 3B), where the Community will only take decisions and actions when objectives cannot be achieved by member states.
31. "Horizon 2000" is more fully entitled 'Development Co-operation Policy in the Run-up to 2000'.
32. In the absence of a suspension clause, the legal basis for action in the event of an alleged violation of the essential element clause would be through the provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (Articles 60 and 65), which imply a three-month delay and the possibility of objections by the ACP state.
33. In theory, the ACP states are 'masters' of their NIP, determining the focal areas for co-operation. This proposal of 'incentive allocations' appears to be an attempt by the EU to gain favourable consideration for their 'priority sectors' within NIPs.

34. The Council President Repnik is reported as stating to the European Parliament Development Committee that no additional funding was envisaged with regard to incentives for human rights and democracy (Euro-Cidse September 1994 p.19)
35. The Commission noted the shortcomings of authoritarian and single-party models, often leading to economic and social decline (European Commission 1991 p.4), and the Development Council Resolution stated that human rights and democracy are part of a "larger set of requirements" for sustainable development.
36. The Government Aid Bill of 1962 stated that:
- "it seems reasonable to try to direct our aid so that it contributes... to development in the direction of *political democracy* and *social equality*. It would contradict both the motives and the aims of Swedish aid, were it to help conserve a reactionary social structure". (Cited in Andersson 1986 p.39).
37. The four goals were :
- economic growth
 - economic and social equality
 - economic and political independence
 - the development of democracy in society.
- A fifth goal, 'environmental quality', was added by Parliament in 1988.
38. The review was conducted by the Commission for the Review of Sweden's International Development Co-operation, which consisted of members of all five parties represented in Parliament. Its report was submitted to the Government in 1977.
39. For example, Staffen Herrström, Under-Secretary of State in the 1991-1994 Coalition Government and Liberal Party MP, stated that "the democracy goal that was outlined during the sixties had very little practical effects for Swedish democracy policy until the end of the 1980s". (Interview 8 September 1993).
40. The Swedish Government ended its financial support for the ANC in January 1994, stating that the ANC had now become a political party and therefore did not qualify for support. The ANC had received SKr110m (£9.1m) in the 1992-93 budget year out of a total of SKr240m development aid to South Africa. Total aid levels to South Africa are being more or less maintained. (Financial Times 28 January 1994).
41. Similar views on the relationship between development, political rights and governance were stated in the influential World Bank study, "Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth", published shortly afterwards in 1989.
42. A soft or weak state is one which has a limited capacity to enforce its legal and administrative power across its territory. This does not, of course, preclude it from being an authoritarian or repressive state, and in fact its very weakness may increase its likelihood to resort to strong-arm tactics.

43. At the same time, Hydén's suggestions on a more fundamental re-orientation of development assistance to local development NGOs has not been taken up to the same degree by donor governments, including Sweden. An increased proportion of Sweden's aid has been channelled through NGOs in recent years, but bilateral assistance generally remains primarily government-to-government. In addition donors have stressed the importance of improving governance and strengthening the capacity of recipient governments which Hydén appears to give little priority. Indeed Beckman criticises him in the same volume for ruling out the state as a development agent and hence supporting neo-liberal strategies (Frühling 1988 pp. 154-163).
44. Aid to Cuba was in fact very minimal in 1991, the main aid programme through SIDA having been cut under the previous centre-right coalition government of 1976-82. The only remaining assistance was a small programme of technical co-operation through BITS, (the Swedish Agency for International Technical and Economic Co-operation). Hence the termination of all aid to Cuba was of greater significance as a political statement by the government regarding its opposition to a particular regime type.
45. The three criteria are:
 - human rights, democracy and equal opportunities
 - development of a market economy
 - aid effectiveness.
46. Unlike the World Bank which is careful when discussing 'governance' to stay within its non-political Mandate. For further discussion of this see section 3.2.1.
47. UNDP in particular have drawn attention to the relationship of inverse proportion between military expenditure and social expenditure, particularly health and education, in many developing countries, and the consequences for human development performance. See UNDP 1990 Figs. 4.5 & 4.6 pp.76-77, and UNDP 1991 Fig. 6.3 p.83.
48. Sweden has always provided development assistance to many other countries in addition to its programme countries. However the latter were the only ones allocated an annual country budget of bilateral government-to-government aid, which constituted a substantial proportion of Sweden's official development assistance.
49. Information and quotations from interview with Mats Karlsson, Under-Secretary of State for International Development Co-operation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 November 1994.
50. In 1991/92, 46.6% of Sweden's total development assistance and 56.5% of SIDA's disbursements went to Africa (SIDA 1993 p.12 and p.23).
51. The other three policy initiatives were:
 - Environment
 - Business and Development
 - Family and Development.
52. However, at the time of writing, a new Bill, the Peace, Prosperity and Democracy Act, was being considered by Congress. See below in main text.

53. For example, in 1982 President Reagan made speeches to the US Congress and the British Parliament launching a self-styled "crusade for democracy" whilst giving support, e.g. in countries of Central America, to undemocratic right-wing forces and military-backed regimes responsible for mass human rights abuses. ("Promoting Democracy and Peace", President Reagan's speech of June 8 1982 to the British Parliament).
54. The document merely states that "there is *growing evidence* that open societies.... (with) the rule of law and open and accountable governments provide better opportunities for sustained economic development." (USAID 1990 p.2) (my emphasis).
55. Democratic participation was not seen as an 'add-on', but to be incorporated in all development projects and programmes both as a desired end in itself and as a means to increase effectiveness.
56. It was intended in this way to place democratisation on a comparable footing with progress in economic reform as a factor in allocating A.I.D. funds.
57. This required new legislation as, under the current Foreign Assistance Act 1961, many such countries would be "ineligible" for foreign assistance, (e.g. communist countries, human rights violators, military coups), and at present would have to await legislative action by Congress to lift restrictions. At the time of writing, a new law had still not been introduced, but greater flexibility in responding quickly to democratic opportunities is being incorporated into the proposed Peace, Prosperity and Bill. (See below in main text).
58. With regard to United States multilateral aid through the international financial institutions (e.g. World Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank), section 701 of the International Financial Assistance Act of 1977 instructs the United States Executive Directors of such institutions to oppose loans to countries where there is a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights, unless assistance meets basic needs criteria (USAID 1993a p.3.34). Advice on such matters is given by the multilateral section of the State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
59. However, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, the international wings of the Democratic and Republican Parties respectively, disburse public funds to foreign political parties. They are two of the four core grantees of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), funded by the US Government purportedly to support democracy world-wide, but which functions as a private organization, therefore less subject to public accountability. (See Council on Hemispheric Affairs 1990).
60. A re-organisation and categorisation of USAID's countries has recently occurred as part of its overall re-structuring. Development assistance is being concentrated on fewer so-called 'sustainable development' countries, that are seen to offer the best prospects for achievement of its objectives. As a consequence, A.I.D. is closing down its offices in 21 countries that have: a) 'graduated' e.g. Botswana; b) are too small; c) or are 'poor performers' either on economic or on democracy and governance grounds, and therefore deemed a bad investment of scarce development resources, (e.g. Zaire). The latter countries could still receive limited funds through NGOs or regional organisations, but A.I.D.'s presence will be minimal.

61. Such proposals are reported as planned by Mitch McConnell, the new Republican chair of the Senate sub-committee on Foreign Operations from January 1995. (See Guardian 14 December 1994).
62. The conference was organised as part of the World Bank-led Special Programme of Assistance (SPA) for sub-Saharan African countries, set up in order to co-ordinate donor activities and to mobilize resources to support economic policy reform in Africa's low-income 'debt-distressed' countries. A condition of assistance is adherence to World Bank/IMF-endorsed adjustment programmes.
63. The main documents used in compiling Table 1 are as follows.
 - British aid: Hurd (1990 and 1993); Chalker (1991).
 - European Union aid: European Commission (1991); Council of Ministers (1991).
 - Swedish Aid: Ministry for Foreign Affairs (1993a and 1993c).
 - United States aid: USAID (1990 and 1991).
64. There are some methodological difficulties in carrying out a comparative analysis from speeches and papers at somewhat varying moments in time in an area where policy is still evolving. This runs the risk of overemphasising differences which, although apparent at the time, may turn out to be less significant as ideas continue to develop and experience is shared. To minimise this risk the comparison, on the whole, is limited to the initial policy statements by politicians in the early 1990s.
65. A precedent in terms of conditionality was the 1975 Harkin amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act which, as previously noted, denied aid to the governments of countries which engaged in consistent, gross violations of human rights. However, it was not implemented in a coherent or consistent manner, especially during the Reagan and Bush administrations. A few other donors also conditioned aid in earlier years to human rights criteria, e.g. Canada.
66. Some donors argue that they always had these objectives to promote democracy and human rights but Cold War constraints kept these off the agenda. However, the particularly unsavoury nature of many regimes actually supported in previous years undermines the credibility of such an assertion.
67. To take the relationship between Britain and Kenya as an example, it is an insufficient explanation that Britain suspended parts of its aid (programme aid and new project aid) between the end of 1991 and 1993, and exerted pressure on President Moi to move to a multi-party system, merely due to the end of the Cold War, with the consequent decreased importance of Kenya, both as an example of capitalist development in Africa and geo-strategically for its ports. A long-time favourite, President Moi was praised by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1988 for his "strong and decisive leadership within a constitutional framework", (cited in The Guardian 19 November, 1992), and the British Government's support for Moi's single-party regime could well have continued post-Cold War. Additional factors must contribute to the explanation of why it did not.
68. Note that the first policy statements by Douglas Hurd and President Mitterand of France followed little more than six months after the commencement of the historical events in Eastern Europe in late 1989.

69. The complexities of political and economic reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe are indicated, firstly, in horrifying terms, by the rise of nationalism and ethnic conflict in a number of regions, especially Bosnia, and secondly, by the unexpected return to power, at least in coalition governments, of reformed and renamed Communist Parties in the second wave of elections in Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Hungary, reflecting the difficulties and failures of free market economic reforms. In addition the appalling violence in Central Africa in Burundi (October/November 1993), following a military instigated coup d'etat that overthrew the recently elected democratic government, and in Rwanda (April/July 1994), following the assassination of the President, underlines the complex problems faced in constructing democratic political systems in poverty-ridden and ethnically-divided societies.
70. See Overseas Development Institute Briefing Paper, January 1992, by Mark Robinson, which includes these latter two factors, amongst others, as explaining the new donor interest in questions of democracy and governance.
71. However, it is worth noting the distinction between countries in Eastern Europe where 'people's power' had already resulted in the overthrow of the old regimes, and the situation in many developing countries where political reform remained a highly contested and complex issue.
72. For more detail, see section 3.1.2 and Box 5.
73. I am grateful to Mick Moore for suggesting this analysis at a seminar he gave on "The Good Government Debate" in Leeds in January 1994.
74. In other words, the single- and no-party regimes that characterised the African political landscape until 1990 had become discredited, including those previously supported by Western countries. Therefore, by participating in their removal, the West gains credibility and legitimacy for its continued dominant influence (hegemony) on most African states.
75. A similar analysis is made by Ajulu (1992). He argues that Northern governments in the so-called New World Order of the post-Cold War period are not championing democratic ideals for their own sake. Rather, citing Chomsky (1991), he asserts that their main interest is in reinforcing the traditional role of the third world as a supplier of raw materials and markets for the West. He suggests that, rhetoric aside, "the New World Order is about the restructuring of conditions of global accumulation and establishing new forms of the international division of labour." Hence Northern governments' immediate concern is with the kinds of political structures that can best replace discredited authoritarian forms as vehicles of capital accumulation.
76. For a similar criticism of this proposition see Moore 1993 p.3.
77. Investment in many developing countries rose in the early 1990s, after its decline and then stagnation in the debt crisis years of the 1980s. However new investment has varied considerably by region, with the increases in Asia from 1990 and Latin America from 1991 not being repeated in Africa. Africa remains highly dependent on official assistance, both grants and loans, for its capital inflows. (Page 1993 pp. 14-18). In 1992, the net resource flow to sub-Saharan Africa of \$17.3 bn. was made up overwhelmingly by official grants and loans, with

little over 5% of foreign direct investment, and nil portfolio investment. (Jun 1993).

78. At the same time there is no general evidence that authoritarian regimes fare any better. There are examples where economic success has occurred under politically authoritarian regimes, particularly in East Asia, South Korea and Taiwan for instance. However, there is no convincing evidence that "their poor civil and political rights record in the past was essential to this" (op.cit. p.123).
79. A review of German aid has recently pointed to such inconsistencies, with human rights and democracy criteria being applied mainly in poor African countries, with no significant German economic interests. Whereas in more prosperous countries, e.g. China, Turkey, Indonesia, where presumably German business interests feature more, the "aid programme has not been significantly affected by undemocratic policies and human rights violations". In fact, in 1994, China ranks number one in the list of bilateral aid recipients, and Turkey and Indonesia at places five and six. (Randel and German 1994 pp.6-9).
80. In the case of Sweden, negative measures were initially taken not in African countries, but addressed at Cuba and Vietnam by the incoming Conservative coalition government in 1991, explained not only by the new policy emphasis but also by their long-term antipathy to communist-orientated regimes.
81. A contrary view questions the effectiveness of political conditionality, pointing to the case of Indonesia and the Netherlands as an example of a recipient country being able to play off one donor against others. In November 1991, after a massacre in East Timor, illegally annexed and occupied since 1976 by Indonesia, the Dutch government alone upheld a decision to freeze its aid programme. However, in March 1992 the Indonesian government itself rejected Dutch aid, giving them one month to phase out all development assistance, and asking the World Bank to take over the chair of the Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia, an aid co-ordinating body previously chaired by the Dutch. (Robinson 1993 pp. 61-62 and Uvin 1993 pp.69-70). However, at exactly the same time, November 1991, the Kenyan government was faced with a much more coherent donor front, forcing it to move to a multi-party system. Which example is more indicative of likely future practice? Given the consensus amongst donors at the policy level, recipient governments seem more likely to be confronted by a united front of donors if democracy and human rights criteria are applied consistently. However, as noted above, if donors give priority to other commercial or foreign policy considerations, especially in the relatively better-off developing countries of East Asia and Latin America, then breaks in the ranks are more likely. Experience could be different regionally, with African countries faced with a united front, and countries elsewhere, particularly in East Asia, more able to evade political conditionality.
82. Other donors, notably the Japanese, German and Canadian governments, have begun to identify countries where the level and nature of military spending is problematic (Ball 1992 pp. 66-70). In April 1992 the Japanese government proposed to the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD that other governments "take into account the trend of military expenditures and arms trade of recipients in their provision of assistance" (cited in Ball 1992 p.69). Such an aid policy has obvious implications for the arms exports policies of the donor governments and their arms industries, sometimes government subsidised (e.g. the U.S. military aid component of its Foreign Assistance Programme), if the accusations of hypocrisy and double-standards are to

- be avoided. Lack of will to impose restrictions on the arms trade may explain why the largest arms exporters (e.g. U.S., France, U.K.) are not making progress to implement policy in this area.
83. If donors were to move beyond policy rhetoric in this area, they would have to, firstly, define what constitutes excessive military expenditure and methods for measuring this, and, secondly, define what constitutes inappropriate military policies and actions. Nicole Ball herself has made an important and significant contribution to such work which donors could benefit from, given the political will. (Ball 1992 pp.60-65).
 84. Figure 1 is adapted from 'an original' by David Beetham on beer mats!
 85. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights consists of thirty articles. Article 2 established the principle of non-discrimination in the enjoyment of rights (i.e. no distinction as to race, sex, language, religion, etc). Articles 3-21 set out civil and political rights, and Articles 22-27 recognise economic, social and cultural rights.
 86. Although correctly described at the level of international law as 'legally-binding', the shortcomings of the two International Covenants are evident in terms of limited legal obligations of compliance, with enforcement by monitoring instruments with rather circumscribed powers. See below.
 87. One notable exception is that the "right to own property" (Article 17 of the Universal Declaration) is not included in either covenant.
 88. The distinction is also sometimes made between civil and political rights as 'individual' rights and economic and social rights as 'collective' rights. This can be somewhat misleading as many positive civil rights, e.g. right to freedom of association, are collectively realised.
 89. All information on ratification by state parties to the various international human rights conventions is taken from the Human Rights Law Journal vol. 15 no. 1-2 1994 pp.53-64, and is correct as of 1st January 1994.
 90. For example, as of July 1990, the optional inter-state procedure of the ICCPR had never been invoked (McGoldrick 1994 p.50).
 91. The CESCR in particular has encouraged NGOs with consultative status to submit both written and oral information, (see CESCR Resolution of 11 May 1993 on NGO participation, cited in Chapman 1994 p.134). However, there is criticism that consultative status is only accorded to international NGOs, thus precluding local NGOs from notification of State parties reporting schedules, when and where meetings taking place, etc., (op.cit. pp.133-134). In the past there has been some disagreement within the HRC on the admissibility of information from NGOs, as there is no provision in the ICCPR for other sources of information except UN specialist agencies. However, McGoldrick states that the use of NGO sources is no longer an issue in the HRC (1994 p.79).
 92. A new eleventh Protocol has made the individual right of petition an automatic obligation.

93. Steps are underway to reform the monitoring machinery of the ECHR and replace the existing two-tier, part-time European Commission and European Court of Human Rights by a new, permanent Court. (Human Rights Law Journal vol.15 no.1-2 1994 p.68).
94. Although additional to the set of obligations of the European and American systems, the fulfilment of the reporting requirement has been disappointing so far, only 7 countries having submitted reports by November 1991, with 28 overdue. In addition reports were said to be thin in quantity and quality. (InterRights November 1991).
95. Even if the latter two systems have largely been discredited as 'democratic', the definition of the word democracy still remains contested within the 'liberal democratic' variants. (See Box 3).
96. The information and analysis here owes much to Held (1987) ch.8 pp.243-264.
97. Of course, realisation can be through different institutional procedures and practices dependent on particular historical contexts.
98. In addition the recommendations of the International Electoral Institute Commission, set up by the Swedish Government, are that a new electoral assistance institute should be established to provide training and support to national groups involved in electoral processes. (International Electoral Institute Commission 1993).
99. This is an assertion that all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, are best achieved in a democratic society.
100. The term 'good government' used by the British government describes their overall policies in this area rather than one aspect of it.
101. This definition, however, still contains arbitrary aspects. For example, what constitutes *enlightened* policy-making remains completely subjective.
102. The task force of 22 members researched this area for almost two years.
103. Improvements here are of particular relevance to the Bank where it is providing programme lending in support of SAPS.
104. Again this is of relevance to SAPs and the economic conditionality imposed by the Bank on further lending.
105. These are referred to as strengthening "voice" mechanisms, after the concepts popularised by A.O. Hirschman. (Reference in World Bank 1992 bibliography. Also see World Bank 1994 p.25 note 13.)
106. A later document states that decentralisation of government has become one of the principal ways in which greater accountability is being achieved. Though it also acknowledges this entails a fresh look at a number of associated issues (World Bank 1994 pp 17-18).
107. Correspondence from Kevin Sparkhall, Head, Government and Institutions Department, ODA. 20 January 1995.

108. As stated in the Preface, the measures noted here as included or excluded by the different donors may be temporal and subject to change as policy continues to evolve.
109. British ODA state they use the term legitimacy firstly to avoid overemphasis on election processes that may be flawed and secondly to encompass participation. (Correspondence from K. Sparkhall, ODA). However, whilst recognition of both these issues is welcome, the concept of democracy is perfectly adequate to incorporate them. *Free and fair* elections are a necessary but not sufficient component of democracy and different models of democracy give more or less emphasis to 'participation' (see Box 3).
110. SIDA's general support for decentralisation is conditional on a case-by-case decision, with the acknowledgement that decentralisation can both strengthen and weaken democracy, depending on the local power structures (1993a p.29).
111. It is also interesting to re-call in this context that the World Bank, despite its non-political mandate and avowed concern with economic accountability only, also espouses the cause of decentralisation of government (see Box 5).
112. More fully, when discussing selection of partners in this field SIDA states that, "the **Government is the natural partner** - in the same way as for other programmes of development assistance", though this "**does not exclude**" SIDA from working with NGOs at the same time (SIDA 1993a pp.22/3).
113. Notwithstanding such comments, some links were being drawn between public administration development and democratization. Public administration development will aim at "democratising the structures and procedures of government" and "increasing the accessibility and accountability of the public sector to the people" (SIDA 1991 p.11).
114. USAID measures under the heading of 'lawful governance' are not included in this comparative analysis, firstly, as they mainly involve activities categorised by other donors under the headings of democracy and human rights, and secondly, because those that correspond more with the governance activities of SIDA and ODA have yet to be developed in comparable detail. The European Union has not yet outlined any activities in this field, though has stated 'good governance' to be a future priority.
115. Also the state's sphere of influence is further eroded by cutbacks under the guise of 'civil service reform' and 'public enterprise reform' and by decentralisation of power to local government.
116. See Mosley et al (1991) for a comprehensive examination of 'slippage' by recipient governments in complying with loan conditions agreed with the World Bank/IMF.
117. Note the difference in SIDA's position, stressing *autonomous* policy-making.
118. The Consultative Group meetings co-ordinate action by all donors for each recipient country. Gibbon (1993) argues that the influence of the World Bank in international donor circles has risen during the 1980s and 1990s and that it now occupies an undisputed leading role.

119. See Vincent (1986) pp.37-57 and Donnelly (1993) pp.34-38.
120. Phrase taken from Donnelly 1993 p.35.
121. A related claim is that human rights, as fundamentally individual rights, are alien to cultures which give more weight to the concept of 'community' and an individual's responsibilities and duties to it. However individual rights and obligations to community need not be incompatible, and in fact have both been included in the *African Charter of Human and People's Rights* (see Box 2). "There is no evidence that the recognition or protection of the individual's human rights damages human solidarity and community". (Beetham and Boyle 1995 qu.54). In addition the protection of individual rights generally strengthens the ability to act collectively.
122. For example, the current Chinese government tends to use cultural relativist arguments to disallow criticism of its human rights record from the West.
123. The *Tunis Declaration* (November 1992) of the African countries stated most strongly that "the universal nature of human rights is beyond question; their protection and promotion are the duty of all states, regardless of their political, economic or cultural systems." The *San José Declaration* (January 1993) of the Latin American and Caribbean countries included 'universality' as one of the 'guiding principles' of international human rights. The *Bangkok Declaration* of the Asian and Pacific countries recognised the universality of human rights, but with the qualification that they must be considered in the context of "various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds". (United Nations 1993a).
124. Reading between the lines, it appears evident that this qualification was included particularly at the insistence of Asian and Pacific countries, as the sentence is lifted almost word-for-word from the *Bangkok Declaration*.
125. The *Bangkok Declaration* paragraph 5 "emphasizes the principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the non-use of the human rights as an instrument of political pressure." (United Nations 1993a).
126. All the former Warsaw Pact countries ratified both International Covenants, arguing that civil and political rights were provided for in their constitutions. (FCO 1978 paragraphs 32, 42-43).
127. It is obviously difficult to generalise about 'developing countries', which constitute such a wide variety of economic, political and cultural states. However, such common concerns are expressed, for example, at Non-Aligned Movement Conferences and by the Group of 77 at the United Nations.
128. In addition many international human rights NGOs have focused primarily on civil and political rights.
129. The Declaration on the Right to Development was adopted at the UN General Assembly by 146 votes to one, only the United States, under the Reagan Administration, being opposed to it. However, there were 8 abstentions, including Germany, Japan and the UK.

130. In more detail, in evidence to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1992, the US delegate J. Kenneth Blackwell stated that, in his opinion, political and civil rights are the foundation on which the economic and social welfare of the individual should be constructed. The UK delegate, Henry Steel, said that the ordinary citizen would not be motivated to play a full part in the development process unless human rights were fully respected and protected by an open and fair legal system. Pakistan's delegate, Mohammed Saeed Arisari, told the Commission that the realisation of the right to development was a sound foundation upon which the superstructure of the entire body of human rights could be raised. The Mexican delegate, Eleazar Ruiz y Avila, stated that the right to development strengthened individual freedoms and not the other way round. (Cited in United Nations 1993a, Human Rights and Development).
131. McGoldrick describes Britain's continuing refusal to sign the first Optional Protocol of the ICCPR as "increasingly isolated and indefensible" (1994 p. xvii).
132. Proponents of such systems have, historically, asserted their democratic nature. Marxist-Leninist parties have been presented as modelled on the principles of 'democratic centralism', but in practice have been characterised more by top-down control than influence from below, and such regimes have generally degenerated into authoritarian rule and repression. The attempts to construct 'single-party democracy' in a number of post-colonial African states, with a choice between individual candidates at elections, may have been well intentioned in terms of building national unity in ethnically divided societies. However they also tended towards increasing authoritarian and unresponsive rule, with leaders dependent on dispensing patronage rather than legitimacy to retain their power.
133. See, for example, the works of the following authors who have emphasised the significance and universality of democracy: Ake (1990 and 1991) puts the 'case for democracy' and its inherent desirability; Mkandawire states "Democracy is good in itself"; Anyang 'Nyong' o (1988) for whom "Democracy is important to Africa's development in and of itself"; Meyns (1992 p.5) asserts that "democracy has come to be accepted as a universal value". (All cited in Buijtenhuijs and Rijnerse 1993 pp.32-33).
134. Of course there are a number of exceptions world-wide, including countries as diverse as Sudan, Saudi Arabia, China and Burma where dictatorial regimes of various types have held out against pressure for political liberalisation. However, it is worth noting that in the 49 nations of sub-Saharan Africa in 1989, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, only four countries had established multi-party states (Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius and Senegal), with Namibia a newcomer, and multipartyism under threat in Zimbabwe. Yet, excluding Somalia, by spring 1994 only Sudan's military Islamic fundamentalist regime has held out against pressure to hold, or to promise, multi-party elections, with the democratisation process also suspended in Nigeria after the annulment of the Presidential elections in June 1993 and return to military rule. The free and fair nature of a number of elections has nevertheless been contested, especially where unpopular incumbent regimes have remained in power, e.g. Togo.
135. Baroness Chalker, the British Aid Minister, stated that good government policy was not an attempt to promote Westminster-style democracy (1991 p. 1).

136. In criticising the 'imported transplants', some authors go further and stress the importance of rooting democracy in the traditional political culture of a country. In discussing democratisation in Africa, Munslow (1993), drawing on the work of Davidson (1992), argues that not only do all political systems draw their strength from their own historical roots and evolution, but also African pre-colonial political culture included democratic aspects such as widespread participation. "Establishing democracy (in Africa) requires rooting the democratic system within the context of the established culture, traditions and history of a culture", rather than denying its validity as current dominant thinking is prone to do (Munslow 1993). However, what such arguments imply in practical terms for democratisation in African countries is not elaborated on.
137. Such arguments historically were used to advocate a single party state in many African countries as best suited to building national unity. However, in practice there was no guarantee that the ruling party would not be dominated by or favour a particular ethnic group, with exclusion and disadvantage experienced by the others. In addition, the dispensation of political patronage on an ethnic basis has further accentuated this situation.
138. President Moi of Kenya used such arguments in his initial opposition to the pressure, both internal and external, for political liberalisation. However, his arguments were regarded as disingenuous, and allegations have also subsequently been made that the ruling party (KANU) was actually involved in inciting ethnic violence before the elections of December 1992. Nevertheless, fears of increased ethnic conflict are real and the Tanzanian government, in its opening up to a more pluralist party system, has specifically banned the formation of purely ethnic based parties.
139. The Northern Ireland government and its Stormont parliament, disbanded in 1972, based on the Westminster model, was particularly inappropriate for a divided society. It institutionalised the rule of the Protestant/Unionist majority in the Six Counties, who benefited disproportionately in the distribution of state resources (e.g. employment, housing), with discrimination against the Catholic Nationalist minority. This led to the civil rights movement of the late 1960s which prefigured the conflict of the last 25 years.
140. For a comprehensive review and comparison of these two contrasting models of democracy, majoritarian and consensus, see Lipjhart 1984. His conclusion is that majoritarian democracy works best in homogeneous societies, whereas consensus democracy is more suitable for plural societies (pp.3-4).
141. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
 1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
 2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
 3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
142. See Mosley et al (1991) for a discussion of 'countervailing actions' in relation to economic conditionality.

143. A recently published World Bank survey of 'Adjustment in Africa', examining the performance of 29 countries, concludes that "adjustment is working" (World Bank 1994 p.1). However, their findings and conclusions will be hotly contested. Two initial reactions are as follows. Brittain states that their judgments in depicting Mozambique and Sierra Leone as success stories goes "beyond the misleading into the surreal" and that the detail of the report contradicts its optimistic tone with the Bank "torn between a public relations gloss and intellectual honesty in reporting it" (Brittain 1994 - Guardian 14.3.94). Watkins disputes that adjustment is working, stating that "Across Africa structural adjustment has failed either to generate a platform for economic recovery or poverty reduction." Rather it has widened inequalities and undermined the social and economic infrastructure on which future development depends. (Watkins 1994 - Guardian 17.3.94)
144. The lack of choice has been intensified by the condition of agreement to an adjustment programme not just covering World Bank and IMF loans, but its extension by governments and private banks to any debt re-scheduling or further financial loans.
145. Christian Aid, for example, provides continuing evidence of declining health and education indicators, e.g. increased female childbirth mortality rates and decreased secondary school enrollments in Zimbabwe 2 years after the introduction of a SAP. (Madeley et al 1994).
146. Moore suggests a more appropriate methodology, involving empirical study, for the examination of governance by the World Bank 'task force' would have been:
1. To classify developing countries in terms of their recent economic performance.
 2. Examine governance patterns in a sample of countries (which would include East Asian countries).
 3. Determine the extent to which differences in economic performance could be attributed to differences in governance.
 4. Identify the key features of the more successful systems of economic governance and appraise their more general applicability.
- He believes this procedure would lead to a substantial focus on and empirical examination of countries in East Asia, (Moore 1993 p.41), and, presumably, the likelihood of different conclusions (GC).
147. In addition to economic and political conditionality, other objectives of development assistance have emerged in recent years, particularly the issues of women in development and the environment, leading to 'multiple aid conditionality'. (See Nelson and Eglinton 1993).
148. One unencouraging precedent is the example of Russia. Western governments, notably the U.K. and the U.S., but also including Sweden, continued to support President Yeltsin in the name of democracy both during and subsequent to his dissolution and physical destruction of the Russian Parliament in September 1993. There is a strong argument that democratic reform has in fact been the casualty of these events. In addition to Yeltsin's unconstitutional overthrow of Parliament, he has subsequently taken a variety of measures to boost Presidential power at the expense of the Duma (Parliament), which has become a very weak and ineffectual legislature. The new constitution places the President above and beyond Parliament, with the power to appoint the Prime Minister, reject legislation of the Duma and to dissolve it. (Guardian 10 November 1993). Personal Presidential power has been vastly increased with Yeltsin's assumption of direct control over the security services, the defence, interior and foreign ministries, and

over the state television and press agencies. (Guardian 11 January 1994). Given that the original contest with the former Russian Parliament was over the pace and content of the economic reform programme, it appears evident that the Western governments have backed Yeltsin not in the name of democratic legitimacy, as their rhetoric stated, but as the best bet of ensuring the continued delivery of free market economic reforms.

149. There is a general consensus, including the CESCR, that such a 'core' of economic and social rights comprises the right to food, clothing, shelter, clean water and sanitation, basic health care and at least primary education.
150. For example, the British Minister for Overseas Development claims that "about 30% of our bilateral aid was spent on the basic needs of health care and education", yet this is misleading as a large proportion of education funding, for instance, does not have a poverty focus, but is spend on higher education, etc (Randell and German 1994 p.118).
151. It is noteworthy that the scandal over the misuse of British aid in the Pergau dam affair only surfaced in January 1994, following a National Audit Commission report (October 1993) and subsequent questions from the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, almost 5 years after the formal agreement was originally signed by then Prime Minister Thatcher in April 1989 and 3 years after its confirmation by Prime Minister Major in February 1991.
152. In 1990 the value of arms exports to developing countries from the UK and UK were 37% and 38.6% of overseas aid respectively (cited in Randell and German 1994 p.17).

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APPENDIX 1

Interviews

1. British Aid

- 1 July 1993 Kevin Sparkhall, Head, Government and Institutions Department, and Alan Michael, Aid Policy Department, ODA.
- 3 December 1993 Sally Morphet, Research and Analysis Department, FCO.
- 3 December 1993 Sally Healey, Research and Analysis Department, FCO.
- 25 February 1994 Julie Ashdown, Human Rights Policy Department, FCO.
- 25 February 1994 Kevin Sparkhall, Head, Government and Institutions Department, ODA.
- 25 February 1994 Alan Michael, Aid Policy Department, ODA.

2. European Union Aid

- 12 July 1993 Lydia von de Fliert, researcher on human rights issues at European Parliament.
- 13 July 1993 Joào Freiria, European Commission DG8 (Development), democracy and human rights issues.
- 13 July 1993 Daniela Napoli, European Commission DG1A (External Political Affairs), Head of Human Rights Unit.
- 13 July 1993 Richard Calvert, UK Permanent Representation, responsible for development policy.
- 13 July 1993 Carl Greenidge, Deputy Secretary General, ACP Secretariat.
- 14 July 1993 Eileen Sudworth, Executive Director, Euro-Cidse.
- 15 July 1993 Denis Corboy, European Commission DG8, adviser to the Director-General on political affairs.
- 15 July 1993 Victoria Palau, European Commission DG1 (External Relations), democracy and human rights in Latin America.

3. Swedish Aid

- 7 September 1993 Claes Sandgren and Enrique Ganuza, Secretariat for the Analysis of Swedish Development Assistance (SASDA).
- 8 September 1993 Lars Ronnås, First Secretary, Department of International Development Co-operation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- 8 September 1993 Mats Karlsson, (then) foreign policy adviser to the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group; (now UnderSecretary of State, Department of International Development Co-operation).
- 8 September 1993 Staffan Herrström, Secretary of State for Co-ordination (Liberal Party), and Torbjörn Pettersson, Liberal Party adviser on economic and foreign affairs.
- 9 September 1993 Håkan Falk, Head of Human Rights and Democracy section, SIDA.

4. United States Aid

- 14 December 1993 Robert Charlick, Associates in Rural Development, consultant to USAID on Democracy and Governance issues.
- 14 December 1993 Michelle Wozniak-Schimpp, Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE), USAID.
- 15 December 1993 Josiah Rosenblatt, Jane Bart-Lynn and Wendy Silverman, Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State.
- 15 December 1993 Larry Garber, Senior Policy Adviser on Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC), USAID.
- 16 December 1993 Andrew Sisson, Senior Economic Adviser, Africa Bureau, USAID.
- 17 December 1993 Michael Rugh, responsible for human rights issues, PPC USAID.
- 17 December 1993 Ted Dagne, staff member, House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Africa sub-committee.
- 17 December 1993 Robert Shoemaker, Chief, Democracy and Governance, Africa Bureau, USAID.

5. World Bank

- 14 December 1993 Alberto de Capitani, Director, Public Sector Management.
- 17 December 1993 Mike Stevens, Public Sector Management Adviser.

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