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HISTORICAL
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# PARTNERSHIP FOR PROGRESS: INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

*Edited by*

RICHARD W. GABLE
*Associate Professor*
*School of Public Administration*
*University of Southern California*

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# FOREWORD

The acceleration of interest and activity in the process of "helping people help themselves" is one of the most exciting developments in international affairs and holds out more promise for lasting solutions of many of the world's problems than do other more costly and dramatic programs. Technical co-operation, technical assistance, Point Four, the Expanded Program are various terms applied to the basic process of people aiding people.

The co-operative exchange of scientific and technical knowledge and skill has been carried on in almost all of the fundamental fields of human activity: health, agriculture, education, public administration, industry, mining, fisheries, transportation, engineering, communication, community development, and so forth.

The process of sharing has taken many forms. Oldest are the private programs conducted by religious agencies, foundations, and business firms. Public programs have been both bilateral and multilateral. The Point Four program of the United States and the agreements entered into between Soviet bloc nations and certain less-developed countries are examples of the former. The multilateral approach encompasses the programs of international organizations, like the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund, as well as regional programs, such as those of the Organization of American States and the Colombo Plan for South and Southeast Asia. In addition, a number of programs have involved both public and private agencies, as in the case of the International Co-operation Administration-university contracts to provide assistance abroad, or a public agency in one country aiding a private organization in another.

The motivation behind all technical co-operation efforts varies widely according to the sponsoring agency and the expressed needs of the recipient. Humanitarian objectives underlie most co-operative programs, but the motive seems to be especially prominent in the work of religious and private foundations. The desire to accomplish economic development pervades many of the multilateral programs while the enhancement of national interests, either directly or indirectly, dominates the bilateral programs. Elements of each motivation run through all programs.

The accumulating experience with technical co-operation reveals that its success depends as much, perhaps more, on the effectiveness of its administration as it does on the worth-whileness of the objectives, the amount of money spent, the nature of the assisting agency, or the zeal of the recipient. With good reason administration has been called the slow boat in the convoy of technical co-operation.

The critical importance of administration, first of all, is related to the serious shortage of the resources needed to acomplish long-run social and economic development. Money, materiel, and qualified personnel are never abundant; they are particularly scarce in this field. Administration, then, is vital because of the pressing need to make the most of resources and opportunities which are in short supply.[1]

Futhermore, technical co-operation may have long-run consequences beyond or apart from the success or failure of the immediate project. This phenomenon

[1] Edwin A. Bock, *Fifty Years of Technical Assistance* (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1954), p. x.

was elaborated on at length in the book edited by Margaret Mead, *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change.*[2] Thus, in the administration of technical co-operation the desired objectives must be achieved without at the same time causing more lasting and harmful effects on the social, moral, or political lives of the people. In the process effective administration may serve as demonstration which encourages honest and efficient administration in the host country. In countless cases technical assistance has stumbled on the inability of the host country to administer the project it needs and undertakes.

Yet, relatively little attention has been given to the administrative side of technical assistance although the literature in the general field is rapidly expanding. Philip Glick, in the Preface to one of the few thorough studies of administration of technical assistance to date, puts the matter bluntly: ". . . bad administration can destroy a good idea and . . . international technical assistance is a very good idea indeed and worth the most careful nurture."[3]

This volume examines technical co-operation from the perspective of its administration: its forms, problems, and illustrative cases. A notable omission is an article by a recipient of technical assistance. Efforts to solicit such an article met repeated failure. One prominent government official of a Middle Eastern country responded: "I do not consider it politically wise to undertake this task because I could only criticize very strongly the program and this, under present circumstances, would not be very wise, not only for me but for our relationship with the U.S. Government as well."

The feeling that critical analysis should be avoided is encountered all too often. One is admonished: "Don't rock the boat." Objective evaluation of limited aspects of a program is sometimes interpreted as wholesale castigation of the total program. Political considerations, the fear that any criticism is dangerous, the lofty ideals being sought, and the genuine good will of the participants are among the justifications for avoiding criticism. Yet, responsible, intelligent, and constructive evaluation should be encouraged in a field which is so new and experimental and where the possibility of making mistakes is so great. It is essential for sound policy development and evaluation. It is necessary to improve the means of carrying on technical co-operation and to avoid repeating mistakes.

There is a need for a frame of reference within which the administration of technical co-operation can be systematically evaluated. Standards and criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of technical assistance must be developed. Answers must be sought for such questions as, How can the results of technical co-operation be measured in meaningful terms? How can the direct effects be determined? Improvement of living standards is an objective criterion, but what values do different cultures attach to the various aspects of living standards? Does the program suit the actual needs of the country? How do you evaluate a program which appears to achieve its immediate objectives but has adverse repercussions—or fails to achieve the long-run objectives while accomplishing immedite benefits? How can one measure the change in human feeling from despair to hope?

Many other questions need to be answered in the specific cases of hundreds of on-going programs and projects. How does one know what is the best organizational form for technical co-operation. Does the technical expert have a respon-

[2] (New York: The New World Library of World Literature, 1955).

[3] *The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. xi.

sibility for helping to identify needs and propose projects? How are the various multilateral and bilateral programs being co-ordinated? Should the expert be an adviser, participant, employee, or supervisor? Should he engage in the building of support for his project? How do we know what to transfer and how is transfer accomplished? Are we transmitting weaknesses and defects along with the good?

Since technical assistance is worth doing it is worth doing well. Conscious attention to the problems of administration and systematic evaluation are required. The luxury of criticism from the sanctuary of fiction is not adequate to the task. There is another face to *The Ugly American*[4] which is worthy of more realistic analysis. Technical experts are real people facing new and difficult tasks, not stereotypes of "good guys" and "bad guys." The problems with which they wrestle daily are more fundamental than the amount of vermouth to put in a martini. While it is true that we need a "force of well-trained, well-chosen, hard-working and dedicated professionals," it is not necessary nor desirable that they be willing to "risk their health" in the pursuit of their objective.

This issue has been prepared as an introduction to the problems of administration of technical assistance in the hope that constructive evaluation will result and that the process of helping people help themselves will constantly be improved.

RICHARD W. GABLE

*Richard W. Gable, Ph.D., Los Angeles, California, is Associate Professor in the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California. From 1955 to 1957 he taught in the Institute for Administrative Affairs, University of Tehran, Iran, as a part of a project in technical assistance which USC has been conducting under a contract with the International Cooperation Administration. Currently he is serving as a consultant to an Executive Development Project USC is conducting for civil servants of Pakistan under an ICA contract. He has also taught at Stanford University, Ohio State University, and the University of California at Los Angeles. His publications include Public Control of Economic Enterprise (1956), co-authored with Harold Koontz, and articles in scholarly journals.*

[4] William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1958).

# An American Aid Mission Director's View of Technical Co-operation

By Alvin Roseman

Abstract: Economic development is now a prime national imperative in the less-advanced countries of the world. Technical co-operation—the organized international transfer of technical knowledge and skills—is one of the ways in which the more developed countries can aid less advanced ones to achieve their aspirations. The principal requirements for economic growth are a development climate, capital, and modern technology. The creation of an environment conducive to progress is a task for indigenous political leadership. Once that leadership faces up to its responsibilities, technical co-operation can contribute substantially to the country's economic growth—especially in assistance in economic planning; in introducing new techniques in agriculture, industry, and the public services; in the development of extension methods for spreading technical knowledge; and in the training of professional and technical manpower. A key characteristic of the United States' technical co-operation program is its emphasis upon mutuality with the participating country. This type of collaborative relationship sometimes may be immediately less effective than the direct operational methods employed by the Soviet bloc aid programs. However, it provides a sounder basis for strengthening the capacity of less-developed countries to meet their own problems. The success of United States technical aid depends very largely upon the capability of American administrators and technicians in the field of human relations and upon their understanding of the role of their technical specialties in the larger problems of economic and social advancement.

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*Alvin Roseman is Director of the American Economic Aid Mission to Cambodia. His previous positions overseas include assignments as United States Representative to the United Nations organizations at Geneva, Switzerland; as Deputy Director of the American Mission for Aid to Greece; and as Deputy Chief of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration's Missions to the Middle East and Balkans. He has also served as Chief of the International Activities Division of the United States Bureau of the Budget and as a member of the United States Delegation at various United Nations and other international conferences. The views expressed in this article are personal.*

SOME months ago I happened to be chatting with a Cabinet Member of a newly developing country—not the one where I am presently assigned—in which both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are providing large amounts of economic aid. The Minister was commenting upon the difference in approach in the aid programs of the two major powers.

> When the Russians agree to give us something under their program, they show us the design, tell us where they would like the site, bring in their architects, engineers, foremen and skilled workmen and materials, and proceed to construct the building. You Americans, on the other hand, want us to determine the plan, want us to select the location, want us to contract with a construction firm and, while you are always willing to give us technical advice and help in these matters—and in the case of my country, are also willing to bear most of the costs of the project—you always compel us to make the difficult decisions.

My Minister friend undoubtedly exaggerated the differences in the administration of Soviet and American aid. Moreover, his own country, and the reluctance of his government to make decisions, are somewhat atypical. But his contrast between the direct Russian operations and the technical advisory methods traditional in the United States economic aid program points up the question of whether or not our American approach is still sound in these days of Soviet bloc challenge to the United States in assistance to less-developed nations.

Throughout the less advanced countries of the world, economic development has now become a national imperative second only to the maintenance of sovereignty and of public order. As a matter of enlightened self-interest, the United States recognizes that aiding these nations towards the fulfillment of their hopes for economic advance is one of the keys to a peaceful and prosperous world.

The obstacles which the less-developed countries face in their efforts to achieve economic progress are manifold, but they usually fall into three principal categories. There is almost universal desire for economic improvement but hesitation—and in some cases, resistance—in coping with the changes in the traditional political, economic, and social way of doing things that such progress inevitably requires. There is a paucity of local capital for investment in productive enterprises and an insufficient amount of governmental revenue to support the public services required for economic advance. And there is a dearth of indigenous personnel with the experience required for planning, organizing, and operating an effective program of economic development.

## TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

To what extent can technical co-operation—the international transfer of technical knowledge and skills—help these countries to surmount these obstacles?

Even the most massive foreign aid program provides only a small fraction of a country's economic effort. External assistance may be able to supply the critical extra margin which enables a nation to break through the barriers which impede its progress. But it is an elementary fact, though one which often needs repetition, that the fundamental basis of economic development is the more effective use of the country's own resources and the increased productivity of its labor force.

The creation of a development climate—a combination of political, economic, and social factors conducive to progress—is a prerequisite to national economic growth. The establishment of such an environment is a task for indigenous po-

commitment to some form of statism. Every nation is confronted with competitive claimants for limited governmental resources. Even if no formal plan is established, the government's own budget reflects a series of decisions concerning the use of public funds for economic growth. Some measure of economic planning, expressed or not, is inherent in the country's monetary and credit policy, its tax system, and the measures it takes to encourage or to regulate domestic and foreign commerce.

The extent and nature of the American participation in the formulation of the country's development plans often is determined, not by any thoroughly considered doctrine as to the function of foreign advisers, but rather by the personal relations which exist between members of the American group and key national officials. Countries which have only recently gained their independence are hypersensitive about national sovereignty. Their leaders do not wish to appear to substitute a new group of foreign advisers for the recently departed colonial representatives. At the same time they are usually aware of the limitations of their own knowledge and desire the inconspicuous counsel of those who are familiar with other countries' experience.

The United States regards nations receiving American aid not as satellites or dependencies, but as sovereign equals who are voluntarily collaborating in a joint effort. American advisers who appreciate the conflicts which confront national officials, and who are skilled in dealing with their sensitivities, usually find ways in which they can make contributions to national planning. Even when there is resistance to official formal participation by American experts, the American mission may sometimes have its most significant influence in national planning through the mutual confidence which develops between the American technicians in specialized fields of agriculture, transportation, education and the like, and second or third echelon officials of the government, who in turn advise their own ministerial superiors.

## THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY

The use of the term "technical cooperation" rather than "technical assistance" as the official name of the American technical aid program is more than mere semantics or diplomatic politeness. Close collaboration between the recipient government and the United States in the formulation and execution of the activities to be undertaken is inherent in the concept.

Representatives of the two governments must agree about what is to be done under the program; where and for how long the activities are to be carried out; and how much each country will contribute in manpower, money, and material for the joint undertaking. The process of reaching agreement with national officials on those aspects of the country's total development effort which will receive United States assistance is ordinarily one of give-and-take discussion. In some instances, the government has well-formulated ideas; in others, its plans are vague and it may look to the United States representatives to advance specific proposals.

Out of a negotiation of this character, the American Aid Mission seeks to achieve a mutually agreed plan of collaborative activities which represents the optimum use of the funds and personnel resources at its disposal. The Mission is bound, of course, by certain general policies of the United States Government and by the specific laws and regulations governing the American aid program. Certain of the government's proposals may appear to it to be inappropriate for United States aid, because they seem unsound (whatever their local sponsors may think of them);

or they are of relatively low priority; or they require funds, personnel, or equipment beyond what the United States is willing or able to supply. While the Mission is well aware that its basic work is with the governmental services of the country, rather than directly with the local population, it also attempts to include some projects which provide opportunities to make evident to the people of the country that the United States shares their own government's concern about their welfare.

This concept of "jointness" as a fundamental method of operation is one of the basic differences between American economic aid—not only in technical co-operation, but also in more massive forms of economic assistance—and the aid programs of the Soviet bloc. Through the partnership relationship with their indigenous opposite numbers, which the Americans seek to establish in every phase of program formulation and program execution, there is a continuous exchange of information and experience. The educative process is a constant, collaborative, and often almost unconscious one which grows out of mutual identification in a common purpose.

As the Cabinet Minister whose complaint was cited at the beginning of this paper indicated, this concept of mutuality may, in the short run, be less effective than a direct arrangement under which the United States accepted more complete responsibility. It might be more expeditious for the Americans to adopt the Soviet technique of a "packaged job," in which almost all the work is done by foreign technicians and the local officials are relieved of responsibility and worry. But the objective of the American program is to help the less-developed country to increase the knowledge of its own people in fields important to economic development and to improve their skills in applying that knowledge to the nation's economic needs. If, as Americans generally believe, people learn best by doing, the direct operational approach would not achieve this basic United States' goal.

Activities planned and carried out primarily by foreign technicians are not likely to establish a foundation for continued economic growth. Sooner or later the foreigners leave and, when they do, they have not prepared the country to deal with its own problems. The technical co-operation program places its emphasis upon the creation or strengthening of indigenous institutions and services which will carry on under their own impetus after American technicians and other American aid have been withdrawn. The development of these institutions—economic planning organizations, agricultural extension services, systems of public health administration, educational facilities suited to the country's needs, credit banks, and industrial development centers—and the training of competent personnel to operate them, take time and patience. But the result is a solid, rooted growth rather than a fragile transplantation.

### FINANCING TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

The American Mission usually also seeks those activities which promise, over a period of several years, to involve an increasing financial contribution by the indigenous government and a decrease in the relative proportion of financing by the United States. The principle that the host government should bear a part of the cost of the joint undertaking is an important one; it assures that the government regards the activity as of sufficient importance to justify the expenditure of its own funds. In the initial stages the national authorities' ability to assume a substantial proportion of the total cost may be limited, but if the activity is soundly conceived and developed, their

share should increase. If, after a period of demonstration, the government does not consider the project of sufficient importance to justify a larger financial contribution, the Mission may well question whether the activity should be continued.

The internal budgetary resources of some newly developing countries are so limited that the government may not be able to carry the local currency costs of technical co-operation without curtailing other essential public services. The paucity of revenues may be so severe that the national authorities may consider it impossible for them to pay the salaries of the additional local personnel required, for example, to begin an agricultural extension service. United States legislation does not permit the funds appropriated for technical co-operation to be used for this type of expense.

The American Mission's response to this type of situation usually is to suggest a re-examination of the government's other expenditures to determine whether economies may not be made which would furnish the funds for these local costs. If this does not provide the requisite funds, the joint program may have to be curtailed. In extraordinary circumstances, in countries in which the United States is providing other forms of economic aid which result in the generation of "counterpart" local currency through the sales of American-financed imported commodities, it may be possible for the Mission temporarily to supplement the national government's resources through the use of such counterpart funds. This type of budgetary subvention may be justified as an emergency measure to assist a newly developing country to inaugurate the initial and most urgent steps towards economic growth. Like all subsidies, however, it is difficult to curtail. As the government's revenues improve, the financing of the salaries and other operational expenses of local technicians is ordinarily the first reduction sought in the American program.

### TYPES OF AMERICAN AID

Technical co-operation is only one of the types of economic aid the United States provides to less developed areas. A number of countries receive large-scale defense support aid to enable them to carry the extraordinary military burdens they have undertaken to protect their own independence and as part of the mutual defense of the Free World. Other nations are granted special economic assistance to help them meet critical economic needs. The sale of United States surplus agricultural commodities for local currencies provides funds which are used for certain types of economic development activity. American assistance for major capital needs, such as industrial plants, irrigation, electric power, roads and ports, is increasingly being furnished through long-term loans under the recently established Development Loan Fund. The Export-Import Bank also makes loans for certain types of economic development projects.

Each of these types of assistance involves an element of technical aid. For capital projects, reconnaissance surveys must be undertaken, detailed engineering and economic studies must be made, and complex applications for loans must be prepared. Technical training of local personnel is usually required to equip them for work in the construction phase and in the management of the completed project. Some aspects of this technical assistance may be provided as part of the capital financing; increasingly, however, assistance in the preliminary phases is being supplied as part of the technical co-operation program. Technical co-operation thus provides the "make ready" aspects of major capital undertakings.

### Co-ordination with Other Aid Programs

The United States is not the only nation which supplies economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. Almost every major Free World power carries on some activity of this character on a direct bilateral basis or through the Colombo Plan or other regional arrangements. The Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist regime, and several of the Soviet satellites provide both economic aid and technical assistance. In addition, the United Nations and its specialized agencies and the Organization of American States have far-flung programs of mutilateral technical aid.

The assistance programs of other Free World countries and of the multilateral agencies basically have a similarity of interest with those of the United States. While some aid-giving countries have special political or economic interests in certain less-developed areas, which the United States may not share, the identity of viewpoints are much greater than are the differences. Thus the relationships between the American program and the technical co-operation activities of other like-minded nations and of international agencies are usually matters which can be dealt with through local administrative co-ordination.

Ideally, the host government itself should provide the co-ordinative mechanism. The national government is the source of requests for assistance, and it is to its own interest that each available source of aid is used in the most effective manner and that duplication of effort is avoided. In some countries, the national authorities have established such a co-ordinating device, usually as part of the Ministry of Plan or as an inter-Ministerial committee. In others, especially those in which the government itself is still relatively weak and inexperienced, the task of working out mutually satisfactory relationships among the Free World aid sources must often be undertaken informally by the various resident aid missions. In either case, information concerning prospective programs and current operations is informally exchanged and potential conflicts are avoided. The needs of most developing countries are so great that the basic problem is that of how best to use all available sources of help.

A more complex problem exists in those countries which are accepting aid both from the Free World and from the Soviet bloc. Americans are convinced that the long-range objectives of the Soviet bloc aid programs are to establish Communist political and economic domination, but this viewpoint is not necessarily shared by the recipient nations. The United States has not withdrawn its aid program from these nations merely because the country has accepted Soviet bloc aid. Rather it has continued its activities in the expectation that the host government would learn from its experience about the true motivation of Soviet activity.

Since there can be no real identity of interest between Soviet bloc aid programs and American ones, the American aid mission does not co-ordinate its efforts with those of its Communist competitors. Instead, it works out with the government procedures to avoid any commingling of American funds, personnel, or equipment with those supplied by the Soviets. It attempts to demonstrate the advantages of American aid by its own superior performance and its scrupulous avoidance of objectionable political activity.

### The Human Relationship

Many foreign students of the American scene have remarked that the economic progress of the United States is attributable as much to success in

achieving co-operation and mutual tolerance among the diverse sectors of our society as it is to the natural resources with which we have been endowed. Every American is well aware that racial and social tensions are still one of our domestic problems. And yet those who have objectively observed the work of United States technicians in less-developed countries are often struck with the success with which many Americans have established sound relationships with their indigenous opposite numbers. Many of these technicians have been gravely deficient in knowledge of local languages and local customs; some of them have committed serious errors; but, on the whole, their record of performance has probably been more productive than that of personnel provided by European or Asian countries under other technical assistance programs.

Part of this success may reflect the outgoing "frontier" democracy which characterizes so many Americans. Part of it may also be the consequence of our well-known desire to be liked, which, in spite of its frequent awkwardness, often creates a reciprocal attitude on the part of those with whom Americans work. Part of it may grow out of increasing recognition that most Americans have accepted overseas assignments because of a basic desire to perform a useful service, rather than out of any absence of economic opportunity in their own country.

The most conspicuous element in American success, however, has been the willingness of United States technicians to get their hands dirty. In the status societies of many newly developing countries, local officials, who have traditionally regarded the purpose of education as that of relief from the necessity of manual labor, have not always initially welcomed the American technician's enthusiasm for showing a farmer how to manure a field or an equipment operator how to grease a piece of machinery, instead of describing the process or directing a laborer who does the physical work. But once the local technician overcomes his fear of losing status, he usually begins to appreciate the efficacy of his American colleague's methods. The American's conviction that all work is dignified communicates itself to others and forms the foundation for a sense of common effort.

In many parts of the world, Americans have learned that our own technology is not necessarily superior to that of other nations which are also providing technical aid to less-developed areas. Some of our normal practices are too complex or too expensive for these countries. Our technicians have often had to re-learn the methods used in their own grandfathers' times and use them rather than those employed in the United States today. But technical co-operation in essence is an interpersonal activity, and in the art or human relationships we have an overriding advantage over our totalitarian competitors. If we can staff our missions overseas with American technicians and administrators who have both professional competence and personal skill in building mutuality in every aspect of their work, and who also understand the relationship between their technical specialties and the larger problems of economic and social changes, we can expect increasing success in our assistance programs. We can also look forward to progress in achieving the larger United States objectives of aiding newly developing countries to maintain their independence and to strengthen their participation in the Free World community.

# A Resident Representative's View of Technical Co-operation

By Harry L. Spence, Jr.

Abstract: The Technical Assistance Board, composed of a central secretariat and a network of Resident Representatives' field offices, plays a significant part in the planning, co-ordinating, and servicing of the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. The success of the Program is evidenced by the almost unanimous support given it by both the receiving and contributing countries. The need and desire of improving the Program's impact upon the economic and social development of the world, requires constant evaluation studies and administrative adjustments to meet the realistic conditions determined from operation experience. The Resident Representative, functioning at the country level, witnesses the technical assistance operation from the closest point and, therefore, holds a key position in guiding the administration of the Program.

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IN undertaking to record one's views and experience with the administration of the United Nations Technical Assistance Program (ETAP) from the observation point of a Resident Representative, it is important that the reader understands that extreme variations, country to country, in the environmental conditions, the program's composition, national considerations and long established customs, plus the personality of the individual Resident Representative, may all contribute to rather marked differences in the problems which are faced and the approach taken in conducting the duties of a Resident Representative in any one country. It is with this criterion that an attempt is made to record *one* Resident Representative's personal observations, problems experienced, and appraisals as well as suggestions which are based on over six years' experience serving the UN family in three countries.

## A DEFINITION

I have been asked to present some of the problems which confront a Resident Representative: Surely one of the first of these is to achieve an understanding of the functions of the job in their proper perspective in relation to the Technical Assistance Program.

Elsewhere in this publication, Mr. David Owen has described the structure of the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance—probably the most fully multilateral source of economic aid currently in existence. Mr. Owen is Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board, which is the co-ordinating and executive body of the Program, operating out of United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Resident Representatives of the Board are its field arms, scattered to such points as Kabul, Khartoum, Phnom Penh, La Paz, Bengasi, and Accra. They are the Board's means of direct contact with experts, with governments, non-UN agencies, and all the other individuals and organizations which are concerned with technical aid.

The Resident Representative is generally assigned to one country for a period of one to three or four years. Although he establishes himself in an office provided by the government in the capital city, he also visits the outlying towns and districts where a good deal of the Program is being carried out. Officially, the Resident Representative is a point of reference between the government to which he is accredited and the various international organizations which make up the operating bodies of the United Nations technical assistance program. In practice, he tries to be—at one and the same time—an executive, an administrator, a diplomat, an economist, and a public relations officer.

It can well be seen then that the Resident Representative's terms of reference are broad in principle but rather vague in positive definition. This is perhaps due to the extreme variation in the requirements of each country office and to the fact that the job has grown slowly and haltingly parallel to the growth of a completely new and unique structure for aid. At any rate, the lack of a definitive job description often places the Resident Representative in a position where improvisation is the rule and flexibility an absolute necessity.

## FUNCTIONS

As field co-ordinator of the UN and agency program, the Resident Representative assists in the planning, the execution, and, later, the evaluation of the country's program. He keeps in close touch with the work of experts and helps to smooth out some of the inevitable problems that come up in the course of their work. He is responsible for maintaining liaison with representa-

tives of other technical assistance programs within the country to prevent overlapping or duplication of efforts. He assists experts by maintaining secretarial, transportation, and general administrative services—including the obtaining of visas and passport renewals, the making of travel arrangements, and dealing with currency conversion problems. The Resident Representative maintains central files on all technical assistance projects. He frequently assists government and UN agencies with the selection and preparation of fellows who will be sent abroad for training by the international organizations; later, it is his job to follow up the results of this training to see if it is being used as originally planned. In practice, Resident Representatives are often considered by governments as senior representatives of the United Nations and are usually accorded a rank equivalent to that of an ambassador or minister.

The life and work of a Resident Representative are shaped to a large extent by his position at the center of a fairly large group of individual technical experts. At one time during my service in Libya, our technical assistance group numbered eighty-seven experts representing thirty-six different nationalities. I was there to help them carry out their work as effectively as possible and to give each one the feeling of belonging to a team, especially where he or she might not, by virtue of background or assignment, be integrated with the group. Working with a diverse group of knowledgeable people is certainly one of the great rewards of the post of Resident Representative, but it presents its share of problems. Unfortunately, the international civil service has not yet matured to the point where there are commonly accepted codes and philosophies that can be applied uniformly by experts.

Of the 8,000 experts recruited and sent on missions during the past eight and one-half years, the greatest number were individuals accepting their first overseas assignment. A completely strange environment can often have strange effects on an individual's behavior. Any person should be entitled to live his private personal life in accordance with his own set codes and standards, but he must have great tolerance for other people's ways of life and not attempt to force others to accept his own. He must accept living and working conditions which will vary greatly from those to which he is accustomed and must be able to adjust his way of life as closely as possible to that of nationals in similar positions with whom he works.

These are not easy adjustments for many people to make, and they often bring about family problems and attitudes which affect the professional performance of the individual. It is natural that being in a different land without close friends, the members of the mission often call upon the Resident Representative to assist in solving their personal problems. The Resident Representative thus finds it necessary and advisable to accept a degree of responsibility for both the expert and his dependents' happiness and welfare.

As further illustrations of the rather wide divergence of problems which arise in administering a technical assistance program within a country, a few examples might be listed: personal negotiation for the release of a technical assistance expert held by a tribal group as the result of an unfortunate traffic accident; negotiations for an exit visa for an expert and his family held in the country because of a case for damages which had been filed in a religious court; diplomatic settlement of a territorial violation innocently incurred by an expert carrying out his job. These examples, though perhaps of minor im-

portance, are recorded to illustrate the rather complex nature of the administration of a technical assistance mission in the host country.

### CO-ORDINATION

In the majority of countries, the United Nations technical assistance program is but one segment of the technical assistance offered. A number of nations are offering technical assistance programs either on a straight bilateral basis or through a combination of countries, such as the Colombo Plan. In addition there are numerous foundations and independent or private groups assisting governments of the less-developed countries in their economic and social development. Few of the receiving countries are yet equipped with personnel or organization capable of full co-ordination of these total resources to a point where the maximum use or ideal effectiveness is obtained. Too often, the aid-giving agencies themselves have not been able to achieve the most fully effective co-ordination of their activities in the same country.

While a real effort has been made to develop an exchange of information and agreements between programs at a high level, experience has shown that the country level is the most important and effective point of co-ordination; there, it is largely the result of personal relations brought about by daily contact and understanding among those responsible for the administration of the various technical assistance programs.

It must also be remembered that while a closely co-ordinated relationship between the various aid-giving services is always encouraged and sought by receiving governments, activities do not always entirely reflect that policy. While cases of overlapping, if not duplication, still exist, there has been a vast improvement during the past few years. It is, however, important that continued attention be given towards developing a uniform procedure to assure total co-ordination of all technical assistance programs since an *ad hoc* arrangement depends too greatly on the personalities concerned, a rather unreliable factor when multinationalities are involved.

### PROGRAM PLANNING

Effective planning is and will remain the key to the success of any technical assistance program. During the first five years the United Nations technical assistance program was administered by dividing the total resources available for any one year on a fixed percentage basis between the various participating UN organizations. In turn the organizations through consultations with the various governments developed their program for each country.

In 1956 the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted what has become known as the Country Planning Procedure. As Mr. Owen has noted in his article, under the latter system the fixed percentage formula was abolished and the total funds were divided to give each country a target figure under which it has full freedom to develop its program to best fit its needs.[1] While there is still a division of opinion among participating agencies as to the workability of country planning, experience at the country level would confirm its soundness. Unfortunately the plan has not always been given a full opportunity to function because of the very human tendency of government ministries and UN agencies themselves to believe that their work is of the greatest priority. A minister of agriculture, for example, may be primarily interested in obtaining all of the support possible which will further the agricultural program in his country, when agriculture is of

[1] See also Arthur Goldschmidt's discussion of country programing procedures, this issue of THE ANNALS, pp. 54–55.

course only one segment of an over-all development program, and the program must be properly balanced for the best promotion of a sound economic and social structure.

It is therefore relatively easy for these considerations to upset the true theory of country planning. A successful technical assistance program must be measured to the specific needs of the country—and these vary widely—country to country. Fortunately there has been a steady buildup of planning and co-ordinating machinery in many of the less-developed countries, in many cases through the aid of the technical assistance program itself. Gradually, definite goals towards economic and social development are being established, and they will help to ensure that funds are employed in the proper ratios.

The Resident Representative during the planning period works closely with the technical representatives of the agencies in consultation with the responsible government officials to develop the program. Representing, as he does, the entire UN family and the interests of the government, he is able to advise and assist in the over-all co-ordination of the planning process.

### EVALUATION

During the early stages of the United Nations technical assistance program little time or thought could be, or was, directed to evaluating the results of what had already been done. It is strongly felt that we have now reached a point where evaluation must be constantly applied if the program is to be virile and efficiently operated. Mistakes and shortfalls in efficiency during the early years can be readily understood when one considers the broad scope of the program and the total lack of experience in administering an international program of its nature and size. Program evaluation is a most important and necessary exercise yet extremely difficult due to the lack of a criterion which lends itself to a uniform application for vastly differing projects. Nevertheless, future increase in the effectiveness of the technical assistance program depends largely upon the frank recognition of weaknesses and mistakes which have been experienced during these early years and the application of corrective measures which will increase the delivered quality of the program to its maximum.

The Resident Representative, in the past three years, has taken a leading role in the evaluation process—always in consultation with governments. During the early years of operations, governments did not have effective facilities for program evaluations. This is no longer the case, and governments are much more carefully studying and appraising the results of the technical assistance program.

Looking at international technical assistance from the vantage point of a field representative, and drawing on the experience that I have already had with evaluation, I might point out some of the ways in which technical assistance could be made to yield even greater results: First of all, technical aid must be recognized as the partnership arrangement which it is—with the host government and the aid-giving organization bearing an equal responsibility.

Many of the project failures or low efficiency experienced are due principally to lack of proper interest or servicing by governments. In nearly all cases, the receiving government is responsible for all supplies and personnel which can be obtained locally, plus office, secretarial, transportation, and general service required by the project. Therefore, before a project is begun and the expert arrives, full assurance of the availability of necessary servicing must be ascertained. These principles are spelled

out in the Basic Agreement signed by all governments. However, conditions in most countries are such that the different divisions of government are not fully cognizant of their responsibilities, and as a result an expert might spend several months in obtaining the facilities and support which largely determine the success or failure of his project. Greater attention at the time of programing, to the clear definition of each party's obligations, and before sending the expert to the country, would without question result in greater effectiveness of the technical assistance program.

### THE EXPERT

The contribution made by the United Nations Expanded Program of technical assistance is almost entirely dependent upon the performance of the experts, as only a relatively small percentage of the funds are used for equipment, and none for capital outlay. This is a significant difference when compared with the bilateral approach to technical assistance. It is therefore imperative that the standard of experts be held at a high level, and a project may be seriously delayed until the right man is found. One of the known obstacles to recruitment is the fact that the vast majority of contracts offered are of one year duration. While it is true that the majority of such contracts are extended from year to year, as the work requires, there is a lack of security of tenure which many qualified experts hesitate to accept. As a result it has been difficult to build up a pool of technicians who might be developed into an international career service. Many of the present experts accept appointments only because they are able to obtain a leave of absence from their established positions to which they can return after one or two years. A solution to this problem which would offer a career service for international trained technicians would greatly strengthen the program.

A second problem arises after the expert's arrival in his country of assignment. It is a relatively easy matter to judge a person's academic and professional qualifications from a curriculum vitae, but a much more difficult task to judge his personality and his ability to adjust to new environmental conditions. Usually, inability to adjust to the working and living environment will be evident after three to four months, and early transfer of the expert who obviously cannot adjust would be the wise solution. Such an expert might upon transfer to new conditions perform an outstanding job.

From my own experience with the needs of experts, it would certainly seem that every man and woman selected for a foreign technical assistance assignment should be thoroughly briefed in the history and background of the people and country of his assignment, as well as in the wide objectives of the United Nations. There is, of course, in addition, the need to be aware of the living conditions available to foreign experts, necessary supplies and equipment which must be taken to the country, medical and health facilities available, as well as churches and schools resources available. Every agency does attempt to brief its experts and a large share of the responsibility falls upon the Resident Representatives, as it should, following the expert's arrival in the country. However, there are numerous opportunities of improving and adopting uniform procedures.

### TRAINING

For an expert to be successful, he must have certain minimum services such as office or laboratory facilities and supplies, secretarial help, and transportation. These services are normally a responsibility of the receiving govern-

ment. Many countries in which the technical assistance program operates are virtually unable to fulfil these obligations because of shortage of foreign exchange and almost complete lack of trained people. The Office of the Resident Representative of TAB assists the experts by furnishing such services within a very limited field office budget. Comparisons will confirm that the expenditure for administration of the UN technical assistance program at the field level is by far the lowest among the technical aid-giving organizations.

The shortage of trained personnel in the less-developed countries becomes even more critical when it is reflected in the lack of national counterparts to work along with international experts. At least one counterpart should be provided for every expert, so that he can take over when the UN help is withdrawn. To help governments intensify the training program for their own people, a large part of technical assistance funds have been devoted to fellowships for training abroad, clerical and technical training within the country, regional institutes and training centers, as well as seminars and study tours in nearly every field.

There are two common problems experienced in the fellowship training program to which additional attention should be given. First, the development of a system which assures the selection of candidates solely on merit. Political as well as family pressures must be guarded against. Second, assurances must be obtained that the candidates will be given the opportunity to utilize fully the training on the completion of studies. Effective co-ordination of the training program between the aid-giving organizations operating in the country must also be perfected to maintain proper balance between the fields of training. In addition to assisting with the co-ordination, selection, briefing, and administrative arrangements for travel of the trainees, the Resident Representative maintains records on all training programs and follows up each candidate's activities after his return to his country to assure maximum utilization of his or her services. In the past some criticism has been directed at the UN and agencies for not devoting a larger percentage of funds to the fellowships and training phases of the technical assistance program. However, experience to date would indicate that the number of fellowships awarded closely parallels the availability of qualified candidates in most countries. As primary and secondary systems of education turn out a greater number of students, there will be greater need for advanced and specialized study. At present the training of workers who have established positions in government produces the maximum immediate benefits.

Experience with the fellowships program would also lead one to the conviction that training should be carried out in places where conditions are closely similar to the trainee's home environment. A fellow who studies for an extended period of time in the more advanced countries often has difficulties in adjusting to working conditions existing in his home country. The UN family is in an excellent position to place each fellow in the most appropriate country of study since it has established a network of facilities all over the world.

## CONCLUSION

An attempt at frank but constructive appraisal of the administration of the United Nations ETAP program, based upon the experience of one Resident Representative who has actively observed the program in but three of the ninety odd countries and territories where technical assistance is being fur-

nished, cannot be taken as representing a majority's views. The United Nations ETAP program, however, born without previous experience or tradition, is now nearing maturity. To guarantee that the program continues to be viable, energetic, and keyed to ever-changing conditions, constant review and evaluation is imperative together with the flexibility necessary to permit acceptance of needed adjustments.

Any attempt at documenting the observations, experiences, and personal conclusions of the administration of a program as vast and varying as that of the United Nations technical assistance, regardless of how objectively it might be made, could create some questions in the minds of the laymen as to its effectiveness in assisting the less-developed countries of the world in raising the living standards of their people. The almost total acceptance and support given the program by the countries of the world should still any doubt of its outstanding contribution. To one who has spent nearly seven years in the less-developed countries participating in the administration of the United Nations technical assistance program, no small question or doubt remains on the wisdom of those who created the technical assistance program or upon the amazing record of accomplishments made during the past eight and one-half years of operation. Its total beneficial impact upon the lives of millions of human beings and upon the stability of many governments cannot be fully or accurately measured. The program must continue to grow, but sound growth can occur only by benefiting from the lessons of the past and putting forth every effort to bring the program to maximum effectiveness.

# A Congressman's View of Technical Co-operation

By Porter Hardy, Jr.

Abstract: According to the Act of International Development of 1950, technical co-operation programs are "Programs for the international interchange of technical knowledge and skills designed to contribute to the integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of economically underdeveloped areas." To carry out this program the United States sends technicians to host countries, brings host countries personnel to the United States for training, and contributes to the joint support of bureaus in the host country. Since technical co-operation is primarily a program of education, the emphasis is on the transfer of skills and know-how. Before a program can be successful, three elements must be present. The initial demand must come from the host country —because the idea of self-help is inherent in technical co-operation, it must believe in and want the project. Further the host country must be willing to contribute its own funds to the project. When a program or project has been agreed upon, there must be proper planning. A realistic estimate must be made of the type and amount of knowledge and skill which can be supplied by us and of the time required to provide this education. It is also important to be aware of how much can be absorbed by the host country, keeping in mind the difference in culture between the host country and our own. When these elements are not present in the technical co-operation program or project, failures will result. Failures which have occurred so far have been ones of administration. —Ed.

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ADVOCATES of particular points of view commonly characterize as opponents those who are not enthusiastic supporters. For example, if a Congressman makes a speech or writes an article criticizing the conduct of a particular government program, he is forthwith considered as against it. When, as is often the case, he couples with his criticisms a pledge of support for the program he is apt to be accused, as politicians sometimes are, of talking out of both sides of his mouth at once, doubtless with an eye on the next election.

More careful observers recognize constructive criticism. They know that the adverse comments which Congressmen make about given activities of government do not always have ulterior motives. Instead, critical observations by Congressmen may often arise out of a sincere belief in and a profound concern for the very things being criticized. It is out of a concern for the success of our technical co-operation programs that I find myself in the role of critic.

We in the Congress have listened carefully year after year to the reports of performance and claims of accomplishment for these programs which are sent up by the International Cooperation Administration and the Department of State. Along with most of my colleagues from both sides of the aisle I have consistently voted funds for their continuance. But, as chairman of a House subcommittee charged with the duty of studying United States international operations, I have also had some special opportunities to observe their day-to-day conduct, and I have not always been gratified by what I saw. It is out of the experience of the past four years, in which I have studied at close hand technical co-operation programs from Iran to Uruguay, and from Cambodia to Mexico, that my judgments have been formed.

### AIMS AND PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRAM

The objectives of this program are most inspiring and unselfish, particularly for an activity undertaken by one government on behalf of another. The technical co-operation program is founded in hope and optimism. It envisions a future in which, through the sharing of technical knowledge and skills, a better life can be created for millions of people in other lands—people for whom over the centuries tomorrow has always been bleak.

It is by no means accidental that the United States has led the way in this bold and imaginative undertaking. The stoic acceptance of life as it is has never been an American characteristic. We have always considered ourselves masters of our fate. Coupled with this confidence is a deep humanitarian urge which impels Americans into action whenever they see human misery caused by poverty, starvation, disease, and ignorance.

Moreover, when such conditions exist in lands with untapped resources, to an American it appears that what is needed is the application of American know-how to make the stubborn earth yield its stored abundance, to push back the ancient enemy of disease, to feed and clothe and house the people and give them the hope for tomorrow which seems so tragically lacking.

This is the central objective of the technical co-operation program. This is the valid element which finds a response in the heart of every American. This is why Congress so consistently supports this effort.

A praiseworthy objective, however, does not by itself assure success. Good intentions must be matched by wise

actions. It is from this standpoint that it becomes the duty of even the most ardent supporters of technical co-operation programs carefully and coolly to examine the nature of these activities and the way they are carried out.

Section 418(a) of the Act for International Development of 1950 defines technical co-operation programs as

> . . . Programs for the international interchange of technical knowledge and skills designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of economically underdeveloped areas.

The United States contributes to this effort in three ways: by sending United States technicians to work in the host countries, by bringing host country personnel to the United States for training, and by contributing to the support of special joint bureaus set up within the host governments to carry out technical assistance programs. The emphasis throughout is intended to be upon the transfer of skills and know-how. Any expenditure for capital equipment is supposed to be limited to that needed for demonstration purposes only. It is, in other words, intended to be a program of education, not of economic aid.

The implications of this form of foreign aid are worth noting. One of the presuppositions of technical co-operation programs is that there are human and physical resources in the host country which will be employed as soon as the necessary know-how is made available. Another presupposition is that the host country can and will initiate, or take over and continue on its own, a given activity once the method of doing it has been adequately demonstrated. Finally, the concept presupposes that technical co-operation funds will not be employed to continue a given activity after know-how has been acquired by the host country. If additional United States dollars are necessary, they should either be provided through private sources or through other categories of the Mutual Security Program.

Out of a total of nearly 4 billion dollars of the President's budget request for the fiscal year 1959 mutual security program, 164 million dollars—about 4 per cent—was for technical co-operation. Thus the technical co-operation programs do not involve large sums of money when compared to the billions which we spend each year on other foreign aid activities. A portion of this amount represented United States contributions to technical co-operation programs carried out through international organizations like the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Of the total, however, 142 million dollars was for bilateral programs set up by agreement between the United States and individual host countries. The following comments relate principally to the bilateral programs.

I have already expressed myself as being impressed with the inspirational aspects of technical co-operation. It provides "people to people" contact—an element which should be supplied but is generally lacking in other aspects of our foreign aid program. Military assistance programs all over the world serve to protect the freedom of countries and their citizens—but the impact of such programs is not felt directly by the people. Military hardware does not fill empty stomachs. Economic assistance dollars too often are used for monumental projects such as dams and roads —projects which are primarily dedications to national pride. Although over a long period of time they contribute to an improved economy, they have little or no significance in the here and now for the ordinary man. The only programs that immediately encourage

and directly help the individual are those embraced under the Point Four concept—that is, technical co-operation. Through these programs, individuals are helped to better health, to useful and enlightening education, to a more adequate diet, and to improved sanitation and housing.

In the current year over 3,000 American technicians are working abroad in some 50 countries. Most of these technicians are working with their counterparts overseas in the fields of food production, public health, and education. These are basic areas for the improvement of living standards. Some programs have been broadened, in response to changing needs, to help solve problems of transportation, housing, industrial management, public administration, and community development.

### AGRICULTURE

In many countries technical co-operation programs have shown the way to better methods of cultivation, improved plant varieties and breeds of farm animals. Through these and the application of fertilizer to crops, improved tools and implements, control of plant diseases and insect pests, the production of food for hungry and growing populations has been vastly increased.

Even slightly improved tools or better methods of cultivation often make immediate and striking improvement. In Iran, a demonstration of the advantages of using a moldboard plow instead of a pointed stick in sugar beet cultivation resulted in three times the yield. In Ethiopia, a simple change to row planting of corn instead of broadcast planting increased production from 18 bushels an acre to 30 bushels.

Agricultural vocational schools and colleges have been opened in a dozen countries as a result of technical co-operation. Through agricultural extension activities, additional channels have been opened through which a continuous supply of scientific information flows to the farmers themselves in a form which they can understand and apply.

### HEALTH AND EDUCATION

The original activity of technical co-operation in Venezuela was in malaria control. In three years, malaria dropped from third place to sixth among causes of death. In the Philippines, malaria incidence fell 68 per cent as a result of DDT spraying. The malaria control program, in addition to its striking accomplishments toward better health, had the important side effect of tremendous expansion in food production—particularly in Indonesia and Iran. Mosquito control restored to cultivation much highly productive land which previously had been abandoned because of malaria.

The surge of interest in education in all newly developing countries is a phenomenon of the present era. In 1946–47 in Cambodia there were 38,000 children in primary schools; in 1955–56 attendance was 241,000. In Iran, since the United States technical co-operation program began in that country, school enrollment has increased from 20,000 in 1948 to 45,000 in 1955. The great need everywhere is for trained teachers, and technical co-operation projects in education have concentrated on filling this need, helping to give preservice training to more than 17,000 teachers and in-service training to more than 46,000.

I have given only a few examples to illustrate the operation of this program and the benefits it has produced.

Let us consider in more detail another example of accomplishment, in order to discuss the criteria applicable to a technical co-operation activity. In Chile, the government had sought over many years to establish a satisfactory program of preventive medicine. As part of the United States technical co-operation

program in the field of health, during the period from 1943 to 1953, five health centers were established and operated in strategic locations. These centers have since been turned over to the Chilean government, which continues to operate them today. More important, using these original centers as a pattern, the Chilean government has constructed ten additional health centers in Santiago Province alone and has made such centers the basic field unit in a reorganization of the Chilean National Health Service.

All the elements of a successful technical cooperation project were present in this case: (1) The project dealt with a problem which had been of concern to the host government; (2) it involved a demonstration of a method of solving the problem; (3) it resulted not only in an activity which could be and was turned over to the host government, but it stimulated expanded and continuing action by the host government in this particular field.

We have, as a matter of United States policy, sought to insure the presence of these elements by stipulating three conditions to be met in carrying out a technical co-operation activity. First, the host country must request it. Second, the host country must pay a fair share of its cost. Third, it must be related to efforts being made by the host country itself.

### HOST COUNTRY REQUEST

These are wise provisions which, if adhered to with reasonable consistency, would guarantee that every program and project was a truly co-operative undertaking. If we conduct only those programs which the host country requests we can be sure that we are responding to a genuinely felt need; by the contribution of host country funds, local interest in a program's success can be both measured and sustained; and by establishing a relationship with other activities and plans of the host country not only can we contribute to balanced progress and development but the encouraging effect of our help can spread beyond the individual programs.

Unfortunately, in altogether too many instances, these sensible rules have been broken. Investigations by our Subcommittee disclosed that some projects were being implemented where host country approval had been obtained through insistence by United States representatives rather than as a result of a bona fide interest on the part of the host government. To be sure, a formal request by the host government was on file, but it was little more than a piece of paper drawn up to meet technical requirements. Sometimes these projects originated simply because particular United States specialists were available and wanted to undertake them. In other instances, pressure from Washington was put upon United States field personnel to get certain types of projects under way. Almost invariably, as might be expected, such projects ultimately were financed almost entirely with United States funds. The interest of the host countries was as small as their contributions.

### HOST COUNTRY CONTRIBUTION

The second requirement, that the host country contribute a fair share to the support of projects, has also been applied very unevenly. In one country we found that the United States has been paying over 1 million dollars a year to support an agricultural program on the basis, not that the host country could not support it, but that it would not. In another, our technical cooperation funds were being used not to supply know-how but to underwrite a routine government activity, which is not in the spirit of the technical cooperation legislation. In a third coun-

try, a major agricultural project was of such little interest to the host country that when the time came to put in its contribution it refused to do so, even though we had allocated more than three-quarters of a million United States dollars to it.

The proportion of local support for individual programs and projects varies widely even within a single country. What appears to emerge is that host country contributions have been made to some projects and not to others, depending on the extent of host country interest in them. This, of course, is why the "fair share" requirement was instituted in the first place, but it has not been fully or adequately adhered to by United States administrators.

The importance of the level of host country contributions cannot be overemphasized. It is not a matter of specific amounts of money, for these might vary considerably from country to country and even from time to time within a given country, depending on the local financial situation. What is crucial is that the most reliable index of a host country's interest in a program or project is not how much it is willing to have the United States invest in it, but how much the country itself is willing to contribute.

The heart of technical co-operation is the idea of self-help. There is little to be gained by imposing on others plans and ideas in which they have no interest. These programs are intended to be co-operative efforts. Unless the recipient country wants and believes in a project or program, enough to put its own funds into it at whatever level it can afford, the co-operation aspect is lost.

In this connection, reports given to the Congress on the extent of host country contributions have been more than a little misleading. These are usually expressed for comparative purposes in terms of equivalent dollars. Yet, by the use of par-value exchange rates which have no current significance, the contributions of some countries have been greatly exaggerated. We found, for example, one country where local contributions as presented to Congress had been magnified in this way by a factor of twenty. In other instances, under a category called "contributions in kind," a dollar value had been placed on a number of intangibles and everything conceivable has been counted as a host country contribution, including duties they had waived collecting on imports for the program. Most ridiculous of all was reporting, as a host country cash contribution, the local currency obtained by the sale of United States commodities we had given them.

As I have pointed out earlier, local contributions, when account is taken of the general financial situation of the host country, can be most revealing about local acceptance of programs and projects. I therefore believe that more effort must be made to adhere to the "fair share" rule than is now the case. I make this observation out of a conviction that the planning of programs, their day-to-day conduct, and their chance of achieving their ultimate goals will be improved thereby.

### PROJECT PLANNING

The third requirement, that programs be related to efforts being made by the host country itself, brings up the question of planning. What seems to be absent in most cases is a realistic estimate of the situation. Projects are often initiated with only the most hazy idea of how extensive a problem is involved, without determining in advance the availability of the technical personnel who will be needed, and without fixing a goal by which progress toward completion can be measured. Few projects are based on the kind of preliminary survey and analysis which would determine how

much of what kind of technical knowledge or skill needs to be and can be supplied over what period of time. In place of careful planning, the tendency is simply to initiate and to expand programs, in the words of one overseas United States program officer, "to provide facilities which haven't been provided heretofore."

It is this approach which leads to pressures from Washington and even from officials in the field to get projects under way, not so much because they are relevant to local needs, but because a similar activity is under way in some adjacent country. This is hardly a sound basis for relating programs to activities of the host country, and it has accounted for a number of notable failures. Fits and starts in other cases have occurred because the problem of recruiting technical personnel to carry out the work was not adequately considered. In Uruguay, for example, a program in health was delayed for more than a year after the chief of the program arrived because four or five technicians could not be supplied.

## CONCLUSION

Reviewing these observations, it is clear that most of the faults in technical co-operation programs are matters of administration. Yet, paradoxically, some of them are at the same time tributes to the good intentions and zeal of the administrators who have been activated by a strong desire to obtain tangible results and impatient in their haste to reach ultimate goals. One can applaud enthusiasm—but not when it initiates action with inadequate planning and results in wasteful errors caused by hasty judgments.

A basic trouble, I am coming to believe, lies in a failure to appreciate the fact that there are significant limits to the rate at which technical knowledge and skill can be absorbed by an underdeveloped economy. As Americans we are attuned to a dynamic and open society in which technological change is rapidly assimilated. We must keep in mind the fact that the differing societies of many underdeveloped lands cannot now make use of all the skills we can offer them. First, some far-reaching changes must take place in the nature of the societies themselves. What I am referring to, of course, is the problem generally called "cultural lag." For example, it may be possible in a given country to suggest improved methods of agriculture and yet have few of them adopted because to do so may require a revision of age-old traditions of land tenure and ownership and perhaps even of family relationships. Similarly, technical improvements in tax administration may require a totally different view of the role of government within a given culture. Such changes do not come about quickly nor do they result from the availability of technical knowledge. The need for improved skills may be apparent now, but the demand for them may require cultural changes which time alone can bring.

No one is better fitted to take such considerations into account than host country officials who, of necessity, are representative of their own culture. This is why the participation of the host government in planning and carrying out technical co-operation programs is of such paramount importance. This is why unilateral judgments by United States officials of what projects are to be undertaken should be discouraged.

It can, of course, be argued that adhering strictly to the rules might result in a reduction in the number and scope of activities now under way. This, indeed, might prove to be the case and in some instances it might be wise. It is also possible that sounder programs might result. In addition, there is a

real possibility that when full account is taken of the limits imposed by cultural lag, to say nothing of administrative matters like the recruitment of adequate numbers and kinds of United States technical personnel, the seemingly modest level at which these activities are operating may turn out to be very nearly the maximum which is currently feasible.

I have not commented on the relationship of these programs to our more costly undertakings in the fields of outright economic assistance and military aid. Obviously they are related, since improved economies and greater military strength require added technical knowledge and skills. Conversely, the full use of such knowledge and skills may depend upon the addition of considerable amounts of physical capital.

Technical co-operation is basically education, and it is as an educational activity that it must be assessed. In my view, its fundamental concept is sound. The broad policy guides which have been set up for its conduct are inherently wise. If to the good intentions of the United States officials administering these programs there can be added sounder judgment and a greater degree of common sense, I believe we will more fully accomplish our purpose.

For its part, Congress, I am sure, will continue to give this activity its strong support. It is to be expected, however, that a careful Congressional eye will be kept on technical co-operation operations and that the sharpest criticisms will still come from those members of Congress who most devoutly want these programs to succeed.

# The United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance—A Multilateral Approach

By David Owen

Abstract: The United Nations and its family of agencies are only one of many sources of technical assistance in an era which has come to understand and to put into wide practice the concept of sharing economic skill and knowledge. In keeping with the nature of the Organization, the United Nations has organized a Program that gives every country the opportunity of being a partner in economic development. The word "multilateral" has come into its own as a description of this new kind of assistance, but it cannot do justice to the unique blending of the experience of almost every country in the world. The United Nations Charter pledges that the Organization will "promote higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development. . . ." Through the Technical Assistance Program, the UN has come a long way towards fulfilling this mandate.

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IN THE eight-and-a-half years during which I have had the privilege of serving as Executive Chairman of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board, I have been able to visit many of the economically less-developed countries of the world. I have seen for myself what the United Nations family and the other sources of economic aid and technical assistance have been accomplishing, and to measure this against the need which still exists. As our experience has broadened over the years, two main conclusions have emerged more and more clearly. First, it has become evident that the international organizations which take part in the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance provide a "most acceptable" —frequently *the* most acceptable—form of outside assistance. This aid is acceptable because it comes from an indisputably impartial source, because it offers a partnership approach to development and—most important of all—because it has proved itself effective in actual operation. The second conclusion—and this has been made clear in exchanges of views with government officials—is that international assistance is being provided on all too small a scale.

The technical assistance programs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies are, at one and the same time, modest and far-reaching. They are modest in financial resources and in comparison with the expressed needs of over half the countries of the world. They are far-reaching in the area they cover, in the extent of participation of different peoples and agencies, and in the complexity of their operations. The administration of the Program, therefore, requires us to take advantage of an almost limitless range of facilities within the very definite limit of funds. The operation of the Program as it applies to the process of initiating and guiding projects and to procedures of financial management and administrative "housekeeping" is based on fairly explicit directives of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Assembly of the United Nations. These directives, however, and the Program itself have changed perceptibly from year to year as the international organizations have responded to the changing requirements of governments and to the practical lessons of experience in the field.

## ORIGINS OF THE PROGRAM

Internationally organized or multinational technical assistance predates the United Nations by many years. The International Labor Organization (ILO), which came into being in 1919 in association with the League of Nations, was sending out "advisers" at the request of some of its Member Governments between the World Wars, and it continued this practice after it became a specialized agency of the United Nations. Other specialized agencies—notably the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—found soon after their creation that Member States sought out technical advice in their respective fields of competence. This advice was given in the form of survey missions, fellowship awards, and assignment of regular staff members for technical consultations. Later, when requests became so numerous as to deplete the regular staffs of the organizations concerned, the agencies hired experts for this purpose.

Some of the most important aspects of economic and social development, however, did not fall within the competence of any specialized agency; and the United Nations soon found that the facilities of its own Department of Economic and Social Affairs were being

called upon when Member Governments wanted guidance on such matters as the setting up of a public administration institute, the drafting of an economic development plan, the institution of social welfare services, improvement of transport and communications and allied fields.

These advisory services by the United Nations and the agencies were financed by drawing on the regular budgets of the organizations concerned, and a portion of the budgets of the United Nations and several of the agencies is still used to provide technical aid. It became clear, however, as the years brought an ever-greater volume of requests from more and more governments, that the regular resources of the international organizations could no longer meet what was obviously a growing demand for multilateral assistance. As far as the United Nations itself is concerned, an historic step was taken at the third session of the General Assembly, held in Paris in 1948, when a resolution provided for a modest sum of $300,000 to be put aside by the UN each year, specifically to give technical assistance for economic development. Soon after, at the beginning of 1949, President Truman gave his renowned inaugural address proposing, as Point Four, a United States economic development and technical co-operation program. At that time, feeling in favor of a similar program under United Nations auspices began to crystallize among delegations to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.

## AN EXPANDED PROGRAM

By the middle of 1949, the eighteen members of the United Nations Economic and Social Council had drafted a resolution, with the aim of establishing a joint UN and agency program, which would be financed from a special technical assistance account voluntarily contributed by governments. Resolution 222 (IX) of the Council received General Assembly sanction at the end of the year, and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance for the Economic Development of Less-Developed Countries came into existence.

Participating in the Program and sharing in the special account are the United Nations itself and eight other members of the UN family: the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Health Organization, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The last-named agency is, of course, new to the Program and is giving technical assistance for the first time in 1959. The fields of each of the agencies are apparent from their respective titles. Together with the UN, they are prepared to help governments meet almost any kind of economic or social problem conceivable, from the most basic question such as the use of the hoe to the more sophisticated and modern use of radio isotopes.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (Fund)—two other specialized agencies whose services to governments do not quite fall within the definition of technical assistance, but are closely related—co-ordinate their work with the Expanded Program, as do such agencies as United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the UN Korean Reconstruction Agency, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

### SOURCE OF FUNDS

For 1959, some eighty-five governments, members of the UN or one of the specialized agencies, are expected to contribute over $30,000,000 so that we may continue our work this year. This total represents a significant increase over the $20,000,000 pledged by fifty-four governments in 1950–51, but it is still considerably short of the amount which the Technical Assistance Board (TAB) estimates as necessary to meet the most immediate needs presented to the Program.

At a Conference held for the purpose, generally in October of each year, governments make known the sums they are ready to pledge for the following twelve months. The fact that financial support must be renewed on an annual basis and the uncertainty of the amount which will be available from one year to the next accounted for some of the earliest and most acute management problems which faced the Program. The step taken by several governments to announce their pledges for several years in advance and the steady increase in financial support have alleviated the problem somewhat, but year-to-year financing remains inconsistent with the long-term nature of technical assistance.

Funds for field activities are used to the extent of 70 per cent to provide governments with the services of internationally recruited experts. Their assignments vary from a few months to several years. Because of the financial problem which I have just noted, experts' contracts are usually given for only one year and are renewed as their work requires it—and if funds are available. About 20 per cent of the Program's resources are used to provide fellowships for study abroad by nationals of the economically less-developed countries. The remaining 10 or 11 per cent goes for the purchase of a limited quantity of equipment, which is used by experts for demonstration purposes. In general, governments have regarded as most urgent the supply of expert services and fellowship study facilities. What funds remain after these most pressing needs have been met are not sufficient to provide equipment on an adequate scale. The lack of enough equipment has proved a drawback in quite a number of projects.

### GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Although the methods employed in the administrative management and the field operations of the Expanded Program have been modified over the years, in the light of experience, the guiding principles remain the same as the ones set down in our basic resolution: Assistance is given only at the specific request of a government; governments undertake specific obligations in regard to the payment of local costs in connection with the aid they are receiving, and they are further obliged to provide counterpart personnel and facilities so that the work of international experts will be perpetuated after they have finished their assignments; every request for assistance must be justified on the grounds that it will have a direct bearing on the economic development of the country; and, needless to say, the aid given is free of any political consideration.

If there is any doubt of the force which a United Nations resolution can have, it may be well to recapitulate the statistical results nine years after adoption of resolution 222 (IX). The United Nations and the specialized agencies have been able to give at least some assistance to a total of 135 countries. Between mid-1950, when the Program actually started operations, and 1958, over 8,000 men and women have served in the field as experts. In the same period, some 16,000 trainees from the less-

developed countries have studied abroad under fellowship awards, with placement facilities arranged by the international organizations.

### ADMINISTRATION AND CO-ORDINATION

Since the Expanded Program was to operate from the outset through the individual facilities of the UN and several specialized agencies, a co-ordinating and executive body was created along with the Program itself. This body—the Technical Assistance Board—consists of a representative of each of the participating organizations, and an Executive Chairman, aided by a small secretariat located at UN Headquarters in New York. The Board itself meets three times a year in New York or Geneva.

The Board ensures that the activities of its individual member organizations, insofar as technical assistance is concerned, are co-ordinated into one comprehensive program. Where the execution of the program calls for common methods of operation, it draws up uniform management procedures for the various organizations to follow; and in matters of concern to all member organizations of the Board, it serves as a central point of contact for governments and for the many programs in and outside of the UN whose interests are closely related: for example, the United States Technical Assistance Program, the Colombo Plan, the Bank, the Fund, and UNICEF.

The creation of the TAB facilitated the solution of many co-ordination problems from the outset. It became clear, however, from the earliest months of operation, that a far more comprehensive system of co-ordination would be necessary if the needs of governments were to have adequate attention.

At first the means was a modest network of field offices of the TAB in those countries where the size of the Program required some immediate means of co-ordination. Each office is headed by a Resident Representative[1] or a TAB liaison officer who may have a deputy but who is most often aided only by a small clerical staff provided by the host government. The Resident Representative serves as a point of contact between the different experts and between the experts and government ministries. He acts on behalf of the Board and of the individual organizations which comprise the Board. He helps to evaluate the effectiveness of the Program in his area and maintains contact with the representatives of other aid programs.

Perhaps his most important function is the role which he plays in helping the government to decide on, and submit, its yearly list of requests for aid. This year, there are thirty-nine TAB field offices spread through Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Far East and the Middle East, and Latin America. Two of them, in El Salvador and Thailand, are regional in scope. The system can still be called modest in point of the number of Resident Representatives and other field staff involved, but it has grown appreciably in area covered and in stature. I believe that the Resident Representatives have played an essential part in the effective organization of the Program, helping us to respond to the special needs of different countries and helping the governments themselves to make the best use of the aid available.

### PROGRAM PLANNING AND APPROACH

During the course of 1959, our plans call for an expenditure of some $33,000,000 to meet requests which have been received from more than 100 countries and territories. The process by which the Program is planned differs considerably from the practice in the first five years of operation, when

[1] See also Arthur Goldschmidt for a discussion of the role of the Resident Representative, this issue of THE ANNALS, pp. 55–56.

the international organizations and the Board allocated priorities among the flood of requests which came in throughout the year. Now the responsibility for fixing priorities is solely in the province of the requesting government. The Board's task is to decide upon the total amount, out of the annual resources, which can be made available for the provision of technical assistance to each government.

At this date in 1959, the Board has already estimated the total amount for each country for 1960, and governments are deciding on the projects which can be accommodated within the funds expected to be available for 1960. The governments are receiving technical advice from officials and experts of the UN and the specialized agencies and assistance from the TAB Resident Representatives, but the choice clearly rests with the governments themselves. From this emphasis in recent years upon planning and decision by the governments concerned has sprung an increasing awareness of the need for national development plans. Frequently, Expanded Program specialists have been called in to help in the formulation of such plans, particularly in such newly independent countries as Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.

The number of countries from which expert services, study facilities, and financial resources are drawn provides perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Expanded Program. Experts have been recruited from over seventy countries, largely from Western Europe and North America. At the same time, the contribution in technical knowledge and experience of experts from many of the economically less-developed countries themselves has proved to be an invaluable asset. Frequently, a problem will yield more readily to the attack of an expert informed by experience and understanding of life in a country whose circumstances are not dissimilar.

There are occasions when it is inappropriate to send an expert from, or to place a fellow in, an economically advanced country. Several community development experts have been recruited from India, where self-help work in the village has progressed to a point where a corps of practically trained community development workers and leaders has been built up, some of whom can be freed to assist in other countries. Several years ago the Government of Paraguay asked for the services of a postal administration expert who could help national authorities with the complete reorganization of the postal service. The expert provided under the Expanded Program was a former Director of the Postal Services of Colombia. He had the advantages of speaking a language common to Paraguay and of being familiar with many of the problems which had come earlier to his own country. The expert's successful and productive four-year stay in Paraguay demonstrated the benefit of applying the experience of one less-developed country to another.

The system of fellowship placement also takes advantage of the world-wide network of facilities. Industrial workers from Turkey and Yugoslavia have been trained in factories in England, Germany, and France; young scientists have taken advantage of excellent technological institutes in India; aviation ground crews from Latin American countries have been sent to Mexico by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which has sponsored a civil aviation training center adjoining the Mexico City Airport.

Curiously enough, so telling a use of such a wide range of facilities sprang, in part, from a financial problem which in the early years seemed to threaten the effective execution of the program. In making their financial contributions,

most governments indicated that they were to be in nonconvertible national currencies. Since each currency restricted in this way could not be spent outside the contributing country, the United Nations and the specialized agencies of necessity had to undertake a thorough development of the resources that were available through contributions in more than sixty national currencies. The results have exceeded our best expectations.

### THE HUMAN ELEMENT

Such success as the United Nations Technical Assistance Program has achieved has been due primarily, I believe, to the recruitment of exceptionally able and devoted men and women who have had the patience to apply themselves diligently, yet with imagination, to tasks which are often humble in themselves but which are nevertheless part of a grand design.

It is not difficult to list the qualities that make a good technical assistance expert, but the process of selecting human beings who possess them is far from easy. The mobilization of thousands of experts in almost all the major branches of contemporary knowledge has compelled the UN family of organizations to develop an intricate network of lines of information, extending throughout the world, by means of which the best qualified people can be found. University faculties, professional associations, government departments, the expert knowledge within the specialized agencies themselves, all are pressed into service. So varied and urgent are the requests, that in Europe —which supplies more than half of the total number of experts—many countries have set up central bodies to advise and assist in the search for suitable candidates. When a qualified candidate has been found, he is asked to free himself from other commitments to take on what is most frequently a temporary job, at a possible reduction in his customary salary, in conditions which might be very strange to him. Given these considerations, we can be most grateful for the missionary spirit which makes a UN field job attractive to many comfortably placed people.

It is difficult to single out, among the thousands of men and women who have already taken part in this Program, examples of exceptional talent for giving technical assistance. I would certainly have to include a whole team of experts who are living in the scattered villages of the Andean Range of South America. Living and working at altitudes of 10,000 feet and higher, these men have organized village clinics, carpentry shops, and schools for people who have rarely before known kindness from outsiders. I can also think of the Belgian agricultural economist who was asked by the Government of Haiti to advise on the establishment of credit institutions and who became the guiding spirit of an entire community. By showing the people how they could market their crops advantageously, he gave them the added income to improve their way of life—but more than that, he gave them the will and the impetus to do so.

Perhaps the greater number of our field staff work under conditions which are considerably less colorful and less adaptable to "story-telling": Nonetheless, from their offices in government ministries and research institutes, and from their work in factories and laboratories they have contributed just as dramatically to the economic growth of the less-developed countries. I have in mind a team of experts from the United States, India, Belgium, and the Netherlands who helped the Government of Egypt to establish and operate a public administration institute, where academic and practical training is being provided to Egypt's future civil serv-

ants. Another team in the Philippines initiated the idea for, and helped to create, a center for the training of statisticians. Also in the Philippines, a new Forest Products Research Institute, a branch of the University of the Philippines, is training specialists who will know how to take better advantage of their country's forest wealth. International experts, again, were involved in the planning and establishment of the Institute.

These are not undertakings that show immediate measurable results, but other projects do. In Yugoslavia, for example, many thousands of dollars have been saved in dozens of factories and industrial establishments because the management, foremen, or workers picked up suggestions from technical assistance experts or because they brought back new ideas from fellowship training in other countries. In Morocco and Tunisia, more than a million children have been treated for the dreaded eye disease, trachoma, in a five-year campaign directed by the World Health Organization. It is a well-known fact that many millions of children and adults all over the world have benefitted from WHO's work in malaria control, which is part of the technical assistance program.

### Different Levels of Aid

It is a long step from the average rural village to the inside of a government ministry, but UN experts can be found in both places. Although not foreseen in the first design for a multilateral aid program, a further method of giving assistance was soon developed. Soon after the program was launched, the Government of Bolivia asked for experts who would serve essentially as temporary government officials, helping to formulate policy in such matters as customs and tariffs, banking and credit, acting as executives rather than advisers. The competence of the team members selected, and their impartiality, stimulated interest in other countries. Beginning in 1959, a modest fund has been set aside so that additional help of this kind can be given to several countries which have asked for it. The fund will provide an Operational and Executive Personnel Service. The creation of the Service is one of several recent signs that the United Nations Technical Assistance Program is not resting on its early successes.

Indeed, the results of the first nine years of multilateral aid have stimulated the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to consider other ways in which present services and facilities can be extended to the peoples of the world. In doing so, both bodies have given expression to the feeling that the capacity of the international organizations to meet the basic needs of many countries is limited chiefly by meager resources and the continuing uncertainty over what funds will be available from one year to the next.

One outcome of this feeling has been the recent establishment of a new UN economic program. The Special Fund, as it is called, will begin this year to provide systematic and sustained assistance in fields essential to the integrated economic and social development of the less-developed countries, and it will work very closely with the Expanded Program. The Special Fund has been designed to undertake a smaller number of projects, but to concentrate greater resources on each, and to commit the resources over a greater period of time than the Expanded Program is able to do. Special Fund projects may take the form of surveys, research, and training institutions; demonstration centers; and pilot projects.

It would be a valuable help to governments in preparing the way for capital investment projects in many different fields.

# The United States Point Four Program—A Bilateral Approach

By Rollin S. Atwood

Abstract: Bilateral technical co-operation programs are being carried out by the International Cooperation Administration and the governments of approximately sixty-five underdeveloped countries of the world. These are countries which have requested assistance from the United States Government in those activities which are felt to be fundamental to their economic and social development. Programs in these countries are jointly planned, staffed, and financed. The International Cooperation Administration operates through the medium of a United States Overseas Mission, the Director of which reports to the United States Ambassador in the particular country. Programs are designed to demonstrate techniques and train local technicians and administrators. As soon as these objectives have been accomplished, negotiations are initiated to have the projects absorbed as normal functions of the country in question or to be terminated.

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BILATERAL technical co-operation is a concept with roots deep in history. It has been recognized as an integral part of relations between the nations of this hemisphere from the day of their independence. In fact, co-operation played an extremely important role in the achievement, and has characterized the successful maintenance of that precious independence whenever, however, and wherever it has been threatened. For more than fifty years religious organizations of the United States have been sending missionaries to Latin America. The efforts of these people have been largely in the fields of education, health, agriculture, and social and religious services. Many other organizations such as industrial firms, foundations, universities, and the United States Department of Agriculture have conducted projects of technical assistance.

During the period 1939-50, which was the ten year period prior to the launching of the Point Four Program, the United States Government conducted two programs within Latin America. The first of these was known as the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation. This was the first organized and systematic intergovernmental technical co-operation program in Latin America. More than twenty-five government bureaus were members of this Committee and the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs was its Chairman. The Committee began operations in 1940 with a budget of $370,500. This budget increased to about $4,000,000 per year during its last three years, 1948–50. The second program which came into being during this 1939–50 period was the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Institute was organized as a government-owned corporation in 1942 and is still in existence today as an integral part of the administrative structure of the International Cooperation Administration.

The present period in the history of technical co-operation began with the President Truman inaugural address of January 1949 which culminated in the Point Four Program a year and half later when Congress passed the Act for International Development. This was the point at which the concept of technical assistance was extended to underdeveloped countries throughout the world. From the inception of Point Four until the present time, the United States technical co-operation program has undergone a number of organizational changes.[1] In October of 1950 the Technical Cooperation Administration was established within the Department of State. In October of 1951 the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was enacted. Under this Act the Office of the Director of Mutual Security was established to co-ordinate military, economic, and technical assistance. In August of 1953 the Foreign Operations Administration was established. The functions of the Mutual Security Agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration were transferred to the Foreign Operations Administration. In July of 1955 the International Cooperation Administration was established within the Department of State. The Foreign Operations Administration was abolished.

The technical co-operation program in Latin America has gradually increased over the years and has embraced new fields of economic and social development. In the early years it was concentrated in the fields of agriculture, health, and education. Today it is operating in additional fields such as transportation, marketing, industry, administrative and management training, labor, housing, community development, and economic

[1] See Philip M. Glick, *The Administration of Technical Assistance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957).

planning. Over the years it has increased from a program that represented expenditures in the nature of 10 or 12 million dollars, with the United States supplying 90 per cent of the funds, to a program today which calls for the expenditure of slightly less than 90 million dollars, with the United States supplying approximately one-third of this amount. In 1942 the technical co-operation program in Latin America was made up almost entirely of United States technicians. Today it is a program with a total of 28,363 employees of which approximately 1,000 are United States nationals.

### HOW A TYPICAL BILATERAL PROGRAM IS DEVELOPED

The first step is that of a country indicating that it desires United States co-operation in helping to carry out a program to solve its economic and social problems. The International Cooperation Administration staff in the country concerned must first of all evaluate on a continuing basis all aspects of the economic and social development of that country. Special attention is given to the trends which can be recognized in the economic development and the extent to which this development is balanced or out of balance. This is done day by day and week by week and involves daily and weekly staff meetings which include International Cooperation Administration personnel, economic and political officers of the Embassy, and specialized attachés such as Treasury, Agriculture, Minerals, Labor. It also involves close working relations with representatives of international agencies, such as the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and specialized agencies of the United Nations. It also includes discussions with business and labor leaders and officials of host government departments and agencies. A running account is kept of the strengths and weaknesses in the economic balance sheet of the country. Emerging problems both long-term and short-term are discussed frankly and fully with responsible officials of the host governments. As the plan and programs of the host government are developed to cope with their national problems, the character and scope of the external assistance required to solve these problems are fully considered. The part which will presumably be played by private enterprise and the external financing by private and public banks or institutions are all carefully evaluated. Following this, a mutual decision is reached as to the type of United States government co-operation required. The national interests and policy objectives of both countries must be accommodated before a joint program is approved. Naturally this type of economic and technical co-operation requires a maximum degree of flexibility and the ability to make long-term commitments. On the basis of the discussions, review and evaluation of the host country's project proposals and additional screening by International Cooperation Administration offices in Washington, a decision is made to implement the projects. New projects are worked into the existing pattern of operations to provide the maximum economic benefits based on mutually agreed upon objectives.

#### *Social revolution in less-developed nations*

The underdeveloped countries of the world have been experiencing an extremely rapid economic and social revolution. There are, of course, sharp differences in the scope and rate country by country. The overriding fact however is that economic development is taking place at a rate far beyond the capacity of a majority of the people to understand. As it touches the lives of

more and more people, as it is bound to do, the reactions are personal and perfectly human. People resent the things they do not understand. Economic and industrial development must be accompanied by an understanding of the technical components, but of even greater importance, there must be developed an intelligent understanding and sympathetic appreciation of the human consequences of economic development. People must be able to adjust to the changing environment. They must be able to take part in the process that is going on around them. They must realize that they can achieve their most cherished objectives of a better life without losing freedom, independence, or dignity of the individual. They must come to appreciate through results, not promises, that personal initiative combined with technical skills and hard work will bring better homes, better farms and industries, better education, better health for them and for their children. They must discover that they can do it themselves if the determination and the right tools are available.

For the people of a country to have a feeling of achievement with regard to economic and social development, the country must have a balanced development program. If not, only one group, one segment, or one region will benefit, often at the expense of another.

The growing pains associated with rapid industrialization have served to intensify the zeal of most Latin American governments as well as of most governments in underdeveloped countries in other parts of the world. To expand their own activities, to satisfy the extremely vocal popular demand, the cries of the people have been for more housing, more schools, potable water supplies, and more roads. All too often, however, local budgets have been augmented to build public monuments, to keep up with the Joneses, in terms of tanks and jet planes and to provide liberal financing for facilities which would better have been left to private enterprise. Thus there has been, and will continue to be for some years, a serious shortage of local capital available on a long- and medium-term basis to finance those aspects of the economic and social development which have been seriously neglected.

Technical co-operation which helps to bring about balance in the economic development of a country will be of increasing importance as the industrialization of underdeveloped countries surges forward. An increasing portion of the transfer of strictly technical skills, especially in the fields of industry and mining is being supplied by private enterprise. Training in public administration, management and the accompanying experience in labor management relations is being considered in the bilateral program. We are also working directly with private industry in this important field and an increasing portion of this aspect of technical co-operation is being assumed by industry itself. Continued training and demonstration will be necessary for some time in the fields of health and sanitation, education, agriculture, transportation, and marketing. Those concerned with technical co-operation are giving more attention to improving the training capabilities within each of the host countries. We are also making increased use of trained local personnel throughout the entire program.

On the basis of experience, we should consider as a supplement to technical co-operation long-term loans to finance development in the neglected economic and social fields. The effective results of the total program could be multiplied many fold. It is probably safe to assume that over the next ten years private investment will continue to increase and that more funds will be available for the type of economic development

financed by the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, and the Development Loan Fund.

## ORGANIZATION: FIELD LEVEL

Basic differences between countries as far as desires and needs are concerned give rise to somewhat different patterns of organization and operation throughout the International Cooperation Administration program when looked at on a world-wide basis. In general, however, International Cooperation Administration activities are operated through the medium of what is known as a United States Operations Mission (USOM). The Mission Director in any country operates under the over-all supervision of the United States Ambassador in that country. Within the structure of the Mission, the amount of money available, the number of personnel and the exact operating pattern are determined primarily on the basis of requirements as established in the program planning carried out in co-operation with the government officials of the country in question. If one of the problems being tackled in a particular country is that of agricultural development, there will be an agricultural division in the USOM. This agricultural division will be staffed with those United States specialists and local technicians deemed necessary to deal effectively with the problem. In some instances problems are dealt with which, by and large, are considered of short duration. Where this is the case, instead of having a division set up and staffed to work on the problem, the Mission may have simply a number of specialists in pertinent fields who are brought into the country to work on particular problems. In general, these specialists would work within the framework of the Mission but in very close collaboration with the personnel of the host government agencies involved in the particular problem.

### *The Servicio*

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs worked out a unique system of co-ordination with government officials of a host country. This device was known as the "Servicio." It is probably the most interesting mechanism for international technical co-operation that has as yet been devised. The "Servicio" is a government entity, specifically established by the host government within one of its ministries to administer jointly with United States technicians a group of projects in a major functional field, such as agriculture or public health. The purpose of the "Servicio" is to create a program that will be jointly operated, the two partners being the ministry within which the "Servicio" has been established and the technical mission sent by the United States to work with that ministry. There are great differences in the pattern of operations between "Servicios" in the various countries. Their particular method of operation must of necessity be molded by local conditions, local laws, and the personalities who operate them. The common denominator, however, for "Servicios" in all countries in which this device is used is that of joint operations. The mechanisms or mechanics of getting the job done vary from country to country. However, the underlying concept of joint operations remains the same.

The director of the "Servicio" is at the same time head of the corresponding division within the United States Operations Mission. He is an American and reports administratively to the International Cooperation Administration Mission Director for the country. The "Servicio" would also have a co-director who would be a national of the host country. Personnel within the "Servicio" would be largely nationals with only those

United States technicians needed because of their special skills in training and demonstration activities. The financing of the "Servicio" is handled jointly by the ministry in the host country and the United States Government. Approximately 80 per cent of the costs of operating the "Servicio" are borne by the host government and 20 per cent borne by the United States. At the time a "Servicio" is established there is an agreement between the host country and the International Cooperation Administration Mission. This agreement provides for the type of program to be operated by the "Servicio," the financial arrangement between the host government and the United States Government, and also provides for joint approval of all personnel to be hired by the "Servicio." After a project has been in operation for sufficient time to have accomplished its objectives or to operate "on its own," every effort is made to have that particular project taken over by the appropriate agency of the government of the host country. In other words, when sufficient demonstration work has been done and there are enough local people trained in a particular activity, discussions are entered into between the appropriate ministry of the host government and the USOM to determine just how and when the activity will be absorbed by the host government as a normal part of its operations.

During the years of technical cooperation programs in Latin America there has been a wide variety of projects undertaken and terminated successfully. The manner in which the project has been continued in each country varies with the type of project and the economic and financial conditions in the country. Private enterprise has taken over such projects as could be put on a sound commercial basis. In some cases it is a governmental unit which continues the work. Local governments have initiated the development of local water supply or sewage systems once the techniques have been demonstrated. Vocational school or area health programs are most often taken over by the central government. Agricultural programs are generally taken over by the Ministry of Agriculture. More than 2,000 individual and readily identifiable projects have been turned over or terminated since the Latin American technical co-operation program began in 1942.

### ORGANIZATION: WASHINGTON LEVEL

The International Cooperation Administration is a semiautonomous agency within the Department of State. The operating part of the program is divided into four regional offices: Office of Latin America; Office of Far East; Office of Near East and South Asia; and Office of Africa and Europe. There is a Deputy Director for Operations to whom each of the four Regional Directors report. Within each regional office there are area directors and desk officers. Each area director is responsible for operations within a specific geographical area. His staff is made up of desk officers who are responsible for one or more countries. The desk officer is a key man in the organization in that he must have his finger on the pulse of everything that is happening within the country to which he is assigned. He serves as the connecting link between the Mission Director in the field and the Washington organization. In addition to working on problems which must be dealt with within the International Cooperation Administration organization, the desk officer must maintain close contact with the appropriate offices in the Department of State and with such agencies as the Development Loan Fund, Export-Import Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

Apart from the operating arm of ICA's Washington organization there are offices for program and planning, technical services, congressional relations, and management. Each of these offices operates under the direction of a Deputy Director who reports to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, who in turn reports to the Secretary of State.

Co-ordination of the program within ICA is accomplished through the medium of staff meetings. Co-ordination and supervision of field programs is accomplished through correspondence, cables, field travel, and meetings with field people.

## PROBLEMS

The problems with which the International Cooperation Administration has to deal are not all unique to this organization. Many of them are very similar to those faced by most other government agencies and many private corporations. Those problems which are rather unique to the International Cooperation Administration are generated by the complexity of the program.

The ability to attract and hold competent personnel is probably one of the most serious problems. Working effectively in foreign countries requires a degree of competence and a set of personal characteristics not normally required for work within the United States. A technician must have outstanding technical skills, outstanding personal qualities, language ability, unwavering loyalty to the United States Government and its policies, and something of a missionary spirit if he or she is to be effective in a foreign situation. The International Cooperation Administration is constantly trying to attract better qualified people and is intensifying its efforts to up-grade present employees.

Another major problem facing the organization has to do with understanding: on the part of the United States taxpayer, of the people in countries who are not receiving technical assistance but are nevertheless watching what the United States is doing, and of the people in those countries who are recipients of technical and financial assistance. The International Cooperation Administration is constantly striving to improve its methods and techniques and trying to further activities within the underdeveloped countries which will improve the lot of the average citizen. While problems will continue to exist there is much evidence indicating that substantial progress is being made and that in the over-all the bilateral approach to the situation in underdeveloped countries is making substantial inroads on poverty and attitudes.

The community of basic beliefs and common goals which characterize the inter-American family of nations is the strongest asset this hemisphere has. The religious and spiritual foundations which support our political, economic, and social objectives and guide us in the achievement of our common goals—are the surest guarantee of the freedom and happiness of our peoples and the star of hope for millions who seek that freedom and happiness.

# Sino-Soviet Bloc Technical Assistance—Another Bilateral Approach

By WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN and ZORAN S. HODJERA

ABSTRACT: Beginning in 1953 after the death of Stalin, the Soviet bloc broke out of its economic isolationism and began a program of aid, trade, and technical assistance directed primarily at the less-developed countries on the periphery of the Communist bloc. This program is moving steadily forward. The bloc technical assistance program is almost entirely on a credit basis, is geographically concentrated in a few key countries, and is smaller in world-wide scale than that of the United States. The organizational and co-ordinating arrangements seem adequate and effective. The methods used in negotiating with recipient governments are skillful and flexible. The bloc is also expanding its program of scholarships for students from non-Communist countries. The general economic effects of bloc aid and technical assistance cannot yet be judged. The psychological effects are more apparent, and this aspect has clearly been give careful attention in the planning and administration of the whole program. The political effects, which are the real objective of the program, are mixed: Growing prestige of the Soviets in some areas, growing skepticism about their purposes in others. But the long run political benefits from a Soviet point of view may yet be considerable.

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DURING 1958, the program of the Sino-Soviet bloc countries to enlarge and deepen their economic relations with the less-developed Free World countries moved steadily forward.[1] In the twelve month period, 601 million dollars of new credits and grants were extended for industrial equipment and technical assistance. The expansion of trading relationships proceeded in parallel. Trade and payments agreements with non-Communist countries increased from 149 with 28 countries at the end of 1957 to 177 with 31 countries at the end of 1958. Bloc trade promotion delegations were active, particularly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and well-financed exhibitions of bloc products were to be seen at trade fairs in many countries. Bloc trade with the less-developed countries increased steadily from 1953 through 1957. In the first half of 1958 bloc exports to the less-developed countries continued to rise at a significant rate, but imports showed a decline, reflecting in part the drop in world prices of some of the major commodity components.

An integral element of Soviet bloc credit agreements is the provision of technical assistance, and this aspect has shown a particularly sharp growth during 1958. In the latter half of 1957, 1,585 bloc technicians worked for one month or more on economic assignment in less-developed countries outside of the Soviet sphere. In the last six months of 1958, this total rose to 2,800.[2] Table 1 shows the breakdown by various countries and regions.

TABLE 1—ESTIMATES OF SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC AID PERSONNEL IN SELECTED COUNTRIES JULY–DECEMBER 1957 AND JULY–DECEMBER 1958[a]

| COUNTRIES | SECOND HALF 1957 | SECOND HALF 1958 |
|---|---|---|
| MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA | 555 | 1,105 |
| EGYPT | 360 | 535 |
| ETHIOPIA | 0 | 25 |
| IRAN | 5 | 10 |
| SYRIA | 110 | 275 |
| TURKEY | 15 | 60 |
| YEMEN | 55 | 200 |
| SUDAN | 10 | 0 |
| SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA | 915 | 1,635 |
| AFGHANISTAN | 455 | 600 |
| BURMA | 60 | 120 |
| CAMBODIA | 30 | 50 |
| CEYLON | 5 | 40 |
| INDIA | 260 | 555 |
| INDONESIA | 105 | 265 |
| PAKISTAN | 0 | 5 |
| LATIN AMERICA | 55 | 45 |
| ARGENTINA | 50 | 45 |
| BRAZIL, CHILE, MEXICO | 5 | 0 |
| EUROPE | 60 | 15 |
| YUGOSLAVIA | 50 | 10 |
| GREECE | 10 | 5 |
| TOTAL[b] | 1,585 | 2,800 |

[a] Data are based on unclassified information, unpublished as of February 1959, collected by United States Government agencies.

[b] Figures, which are rounded to nearest 5, include only bloc personnel on economic assignment for one month or more during the six-month period.

## TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: SOVIET STYLE

As used by the bloc countries, the term technical assistance means essentially the provision of experts or training for compensation from a contracting government, often in conjunction with credit sales of equipment. This type of training and expert assistance resembles

[1] Because of the extent to which their economic and technical assistance efforts are coordinated as well as because of the political ties which bind them together, the bloc countries in this analysis are considered as a unit.

[2] Totals exclude bloc personnel engaged purely in trade promotion, regular members of embassy staffs, and the considerable number of technicians engaged in military assistance projects; inclusion of the latter would raise the total by another 50 per cent.

that of Western private firms in connection with construction contracts and the sale of industrial equipment abroad. In the United States technical assistance is normally understood to mean expert advice and training given by one country to another—over and above the ordinary flow of technicians and training growing out of commercial trade and contracts.

In discussing Soviet bloc technical assistance, because of the fundamentally different character of Communist economic conceptions, we are obliged to warp further the meaning of an already somewhat unclear term. In all comparisons of bloc and Western technical assistance it must be remembered that the Western total, to be comparable with bloc figures, should include not only government-financed activity but also that of private foundations and voluntary organizations, plus a very large amount of privately organized commercial exchange.

Because bloc technical assistance arrangements are embedded in the credit agreements between bloc countries and the less-developed Free World countries, the content and characteristics of these agreements must be reviewed in some detail.

Typically, Soviet credits are for a period of twelve years and bear an interest rate of 2½ per cent, which is considerably below that charged by the World Bank and the United States Export-Import Bank. Satellite credits are sometimes for shorter periods and carry interest rates higher than those of the USSR. There is commonly a grace period before repayment begins, and repayment can often be made in goods or in local currency. World market prices are used generally as a yardstick for setting the value of bloc equipment to be delivered, but in the case of services the cost to the recipient country of bloc technicians is considerably below the going rate for comparable experts from the Western countries.

The bloc has concentrated its economic efforts in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. Within these areas it has been further concentrated: Egypt, Syria, Yemen have received 97 per cent of the economic aid to the Middle East and Africa; Afghanistan, India, and Indonesia have received 82 per cent of the aid to South and Southeast Asia. Although numerous cultural delegations have gone to the countries south of the Sahara in Africa and despite various aid offers, no major assistance agreements in this region have yet been concluded.[3] In Latin America, there have been a number of offers of technical assistance and credit, but until recently activity has been very limited. However, one of the major developments of 1958 was the signing of the first major agreement in the Western Hemisphere, a 100 million dollar credit to Argentina. In Europe, Yugoslavia was involved in a web of economic arrangements with the other Communist countries while a member of the bloc. In 1948, however, the Soviets broke all assistance agreements. In 1956 new credits were extended totalling 464 million dollars of which 300 million dollars have subsequently been indefinitely postponed, canceled, or allowed to expire.

In general, bloc credits have been focused on the financing of specific development projects, particularly in basic industries such as steel and textiles and in overhead investments like irrigation works, power, roads, and communications. To a much smaller extent they have involved equipment for the production of consumer goods and for agricultural development. Table 2 indicates the type and range of projects financed in three selected countries.

[3] Subsequent to the time of preparation of this article, February 1959, important bloc credits to Iraq and Guinea have been reported.

## TYPES OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

In the large majority of bloc credit agreements, provision is made for Soviet style technical assistance, that is the hiring of specialized services by the contracting country. Most commonly, experts are used to assist in preliminary

TABLE 2—SOVIET BLOC CREDIT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECTS IN THREE SELECTED FREE WORLD COUNTRIES[a]

| RECIPIENT FREE WORLD COUNTRY | SUPPLYING BLOC COUNTRY | PROJECT |
|---|---|---|
| EGYPT | EAST GERMANY | High-tension line |
| | HUNGARY | El Tabbin power station |
| | | Nile River bridge |
| | | Small revolving bridges (3) |
| | POLAND | Oil storage tanks (21) |
| | | Swing bridges |
| | USSR | Atomic energy laboratory |
| | | Oil research plant |
| | | Textile factories (3) |
| | CZECHOSLOVAKIA | Ceramics factory |
| | | Water filtration plant |
| | | Shoe factory |
| | | Cement plant |
| | | Bridges (9) |
| | | Bicycle factory |
| AFGHANISTAN | USSR | Silos, flour mill, and bakery |
| | | Road paving, Kabul |
| | | Asphalt factory, Kabul |
| | | Salang Pass road |
| | | Bagram airfield |
| | | Jungalot machine shop complex |
| | | Physics and chemical laboratory |
| | | Naghlu hydroelectric project |
| | | Pul-i-Khumri II hydroelectric project |
| | | Kabul fertilizer plant |
| | | Herat and Pul-i-Khumri vehicle repair shops |
| | | Mazar-i-Sharif glass factory |
| | | Kabul airport |
| | | Darunta irrigation project |
| | | Sardeh, Palto. and Kharwar irrigation dams |
| | | Oil storage tanks (3) |
| | | Port of Qizil Qala |
| | | Petroleum exploration |
| | CZECHOSLOVAKIA | Jabal-us-Seraj cement plant |
| | | Pul-i-Khumri cement plant |
| | | Kabul brick and tile kiln |
| | | Kandahar fruit cannery |
| | | Kabul and Herat tanneries |
| | | Kabul shoe factory |
| | | Baghlan cheese factory |
| | | Coal mining equipment |

TABLE 2—*Continued*

| Recipient Free World Country | Supplying Bloc Country | Project |
|---|---|---|
| India | USSR | Bhilai steel plant |
| | | Heavy machine building plant |
| | | Powerplant for lignite project |
| | | Korba coalfield development |
| | | Optical glass factory |
| | | Petroleum exploration |
| | | Bombay Technological Institute (partly UN, partly bilateral) |
| | | Oil drilling |
| | Czechoslovakia | Sugar refinery, Panipat |
| | | Sugar mill, Assam |
| | | Cement plant, Assam |
| | | Sugar refinery, Madras |
| | | Thermal power station |
| | | Foundry forge project |
| | Poland | Sugar refinery, Tanjore |
| | | Equipment for manufacture of electric motors |
| | East Germany | Textile machinery |
| | | Raw film factory |
| | Rumania | Petroleum refinery |
| | | Oil drilling |

[a] Source: Unclassified data, unpublished as of February, 1959, collected by official United States agencies.

engineering surveys, to supervise construction, and to direct the installation of equipment. Agreements have sometimes provided for basic resource surveys, the training of operating personnel either in the Free World country or in the bloc countries, economic advisory services, and mineral prospecting.

Scientific and educational facilities have been financed as special projects in a few cases. Among the more important examples are an atomic energy laboratory and an oil research plant in Egypt and an institution for advanced technical training in India. In Burma, the Soviets agreed to build and equip a complete scientific institute. According to a Russian announcement, the project would provide living accommodations for 1,000 students, apartments for the faculty and staff, a 500-seat assembly hall, a 100,000-volume library, reading rooms, restaurant, sports grounds, swimming pool, and 18 fully equipped laboratories.[4]

Because the available data are fragmentary, and because of definitional problems, estimates of the value of bloc technical assistance are necessarily crude. In mid-1958 Joseph Berliner judged the cumulative total, 1953–58, to be in the order of magnitude of 5 to

[4] Izvestia, February 19, 1956, quoted in *Soviet Technical Assistance*, Staff Study No. 7, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., July 12, 1956.

10 million dollars.[5] Since some forty technical assistance missions had then been identified, he assumed a total of 80 to avoid underestimating, assumed the cost of each to be $100,000, and arrived at a rough figure of 8 million dollars as a basis for his estimate.

If one were to add the value of scientific apparatus and training facilities, the cumulative total would increase by some 3 or 4 million dollars.

A quite different approach would be to calculate the current rate of technical assistance by taking the number of personnel and imputing a value to their services. The figures in Table 1 do not include technicians who worked abroad for less than one month nor do they give extra weight to those working for periods longer than one month. A monthly average of 600 for the most recent period in which data are available would therefore be a conservative estimate. Assuming a minimum direct cost of $500 per month for salary, maintenance and travel, the current monthly rate would approximate $300,000, or $3,600,000 per year. Assuming a monthly value of services at the approximate cost of maintaining an American technician abroad, namely $1,250, the current monthly value of bloc technical assistance would be $750,000 or an annual rate of $9,000,000. The actual cost of these services in local currency to the recipient less-developed countries is probably somewhere between these two extremes.

In summary, the bloc economic assistance effort has clear differences in scope and content from that of the United States government: In world-wide terms, the bloc program is much smaller; it is highly concentrated geographically in contrast to the widely dispersed United States program; it is almost entirely on a credit basis whereas the United States program is on a grant basis; and it is focused on individual industrial projects whereas the United States effort supports general development programs and agricultural development as well.

Important as these differences are, there are other and even more fundamental contrasts in organization, technique, and objectives.

## ORGANIZATION AND OVER-ALL CO-ORDINATION

Since 1953, the Soviet Union has repeatedly reorganized its system for administering foreign aid and technical assistance, each time raising the responsible agency to higher status and more comprehensive authority. At the present time, and since July 1957, such programs are directed by the State Committee for External Economic Relations of the Soviet Council of Ministers.[6] The Committee, which reports directly to the Council of Ministers, includes top level officials and is not a subordinate element of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor of any of the economic ministries. Its operating staff is organized on both a geographic and a functional basis. It probably administers military as well as economic assistance; it has sections for scientific and technical co-operation; it includes several foreign trade agencies which have been transferred to it from the Ministry for Foreign Trade.

In the past, such co-ordination as has been required within the bloc has apparently been handled directly between Moscow and the various agencies of the satellite countries dealing with foreign economic and technical matters. In recent months, however, it appears that plans have been laid for a greater degree of co-ordinated bloc economic policy and operations for the seven-year period, 1959–65. From meetings of the Coun-

[5] Joseph S. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 46.

[6] *The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive in the Less Developed Countries*, United States Department of State, May 1958, p. 27.

cil on Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in Warsaw in late 1958, there emerged reports of extensive discussion of means of creating a single, unified economy in the area,[7] including the concentration of research and development activities and of training activities for scientists and specialists from all countries. Apparently, consideration has also been given to the co-ordination of plans in the several bloc countries in bidding for major contracts for new factories and installations in the less-developed countries.

Although many details of the structure and procedure for planning, co-ordinating, and administering bloc economic assistance are not known, it is clear that essential co-ordination has been achieved and that the arrangements have functioned adequately. The bureaucracy in the USSR and the bloc has been able to act with speed, flexibility, and on occasion, finesse. Co-operation and participation by the satellites has been achieved and political, military, propaganda, and economic policies have been successfully orchestrated.

### TECHNIQUES OF NEGOTIATION

In economic dealings with the non-Communist less-developed countries, the Soviets have largely cast aside traditional methods of diplomacy. Preparatory contacts have taken a variety of informal channels—offers contained in speeches by delegates to the United Nations, in official newspaper articles, in propaganda broadcasts, in interviews at diplomatic receptions, in public letters from Soviet leaders, and so forth. With a fine sense of theatre, the basic negotiations have often been conducted by top Communist officials on state visits abroad. Such visits have often been timed at a moment of emergency in the economy or foreign policy of the recipient country. And in the old tradition of oriental potentates, handsome gifts have frequently been distributed to sweeten the general atmosphere of negotiations—a sports stadium to Burma, autobuses to Afghanistan, tractors to India, jet airliners to Syria and Egypt.

Once preliminary negotiations have been completed, concrete steps to implement the agreement are taken promptly. For example, Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Afghanistan in mid-December 1955 and a general aid and technical assistance agreement was concluded in three days, the Soviet Union pledging a loan of 100 million dollars. By the first of March 1956 the implementing agreement was signed specifying the individual projects to be financed. In May, the first equipment and experts began to arrive.

During the same period, incidentally, Afghanistan decided to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China, began trade negotiations with Czechoslovakia, and joined the Soviet Union in a declaration calling for general disarmament and a ban on atomic weapons.

### LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF BLOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

In the local administration of aid and technical assistance, the bloc countries follow methods and conceptions radically different from those commonly employed by the American government. First, the assistance is provided on a project-by-project basis. The recipient country is not required to develop a general plan or framework for development in terms of which specific projects have to be justified. Second, bloc negotiators tend to confine their action to the acceptance or rejection of individual project proposals from the recipient country, whereas United States operations missions typically become involved

[7] Fritz Schenk and Richard Lowenthal, "Economic Integration," *New Leader*, January 19, 1959.

in the whole development planning process. Third, bloc technicians and experts as required are brought in for a specific project and in the great majority of cases remain only for a few weeks. Fourth, they usually live as a group in a location near the project and have little direct contact with their embassy in the country. Fifth, the bloc embassies do not maintain resident staffs of economists and development experts as is the case with American embassies in less-developed countries. Finally, it appears that the bloc countries do not require detailed accounting of the use of funds and comprehensive progress reports.

### COMPETENCE AND BEHAVIOR OF BLOC TECHNICIANS

From various kinds of evidence—newspaper reports, impressions of American technicians who have worked in the underdeveloped areas, official American reports, estimates of United Nations officials dealing with technical assistance, and statements by representatives of recipient countries—it seems clear that bloc technicians who go abroad are fully qualified in their particular specialties. Here and there, as in the case of a sugar refinery project in Indonesia, there seems to have been some mismanagement. But generally their performance seems to be equal to that of their Western counterparts.

Contrary to some widely circulated reports,[8] bloc technicians on the whole do not seem to have superior linguistic skills. There are exceptions, as in Afghanistan where apparently a high proportion of the Soviet technicians were brought from Turkestan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where languages related to those in Afghanistan are spoken. But ordinarily Soviet technicians are not specially trained in the language of the countries to which they are sent. They generally rely on interpreters and frequently use the Western language which is best known in the foreign locality.[9]

In personal behavior, they have impressed people in the recipient countries as hardworking and serious, even to the point of being dull and wooden in personal relationships. On the whole, there appears to be little contact between the bloc specialists and the citizens of the less-developed countries apart from the work situation.

The evidence available is not conclusive that Soviet technicians have been used for espionage or agitation. On the contrary, although they have probably been expected to prepare the kind of economic intelligence reports which most countries expect of their experts who travel abroad, it seems that the Soviets prefer to leave delicate political functions to professionals.

### SCHOLARSHIP AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES

From a political as well as economic point of view, one of the interesting elements of bloc technical assistance has been the training of nationals from the less-developed countries in schools in the Communist bloc. In part this exchange is related to projects built with bloc credits, as in the case of several hundred Indian engineers and technicians being trained in the Soviet Union for work at the huge Bhilai steel plant. And in part it is based on bilateral educational exchange agreements administered separately from the technical assistance programs.

Since 1954, scholarships in increasing numbers have been offered by the Soviet

[8] E.g., William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, *The Ugly American* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1958), p. 274.

[9] *Soviet Language and Area Programs for Asia and Africa*, Division of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, United States Department of State, unclassified, Aug. 5, 1958.

Union and the other Communist nations. Although there was a generally hesitant reaction when such offers were first made, the rate of acceptance has increased and the number of students from Free World countries going to the bloc for training in 1958 was double that for 1957.[10] By Free World standards, however, the total volume remains small. Foreign students in the Soviet Union in 1958, including those from bloc countries, totaled 15,000, or a little more than ⅓ of the 43,391 foreign students in the United States during the period.[11] Of the Soviet total, it is reported that some 2,000 were from less-developed countries, principally Africa, the Middle East, and Asia; of the United States total, 27,000 came from Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.

A noteworthy aspect of bloc educational exchanges is the concerted effort made in a few selected countries. The United Arab Republic, where the USSR, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany all made special scholarship offers in 1958, is one focus of attention. Another is Algeria, from which students have traditionally gone to French universities for advanced training. They have experienced progressively greater difficulties as the Algerian war has intensified and the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Communist China have all come forth in recent months with attractive scholarship offers for study in the East.

## ECONOMIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND POLITICAL RESULTS

Bloc aid programs are only five years old. The bloc countries are still evolving their policies and experimenting with techniques. It is thus much too early to make any definitive assessment of results; but some tentative conclusions can be ventured.

From an economic viewpoint, a few of the projects financed, such as the paving of streets in Kabul, seem to have little more than propagandistic justification. But the great bulk of the assistance has gone for overhead investment and basic industrial projects, which are the economic sectors where the most serious bottlenecks to development frequently are found. These are at the same time the sectors which yield the greatest external economies over the long run and which make possible the most marked increases in productivity. On the whole, the list of bloc financed projects is creditable, and economic benefits to the recipient countries are undeniable. Moreover, given the relatively minor scale of bloc assistance, there is probably not much lost by operating on a project-by-project basis without attempting to fit each action into an overall development plan.

However, because of the enormous needs of Asia and the Middle East for development capital, needs which are compounded by rapid population growth, bloc assistance on the present scale cannot have decisive economic effect. On the other hand, the psychological and political consequences may be considerable. By the very act of providing assistance the Soviet Union and the bloc countries have neutralized the criticism of being indifferent to the needs of impoverished areas of the world, an awkward posture in which their refusal to provide aid prior to 1953 had placed them. Also, at a time of growing Soviet prestige because of industrial advance and military and scientific achievement, foreign economic assistance has added an appearance of respectability and responsibility to the naked fact of power.

[10] *Soviet Bloc Student Exchanges, 1958–59,* Division of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, United States Department of State, unclassified, Nov. 21, 1958.

[11] *Open Doors, 1958* (New York: Institute of International Education, June 1958).

At every step the bloc countries have been alert to the propaganda possibilities of economic assistance and have tailored the terms of agreements to fit local sensibilities and situations.[12] Administrative methods as well have been designed to minimize frictions with the recipient country and to reenforce the theme of "aid without strings." Through extensive publicity, concentration on visible and sometimes spectacular projects, and high geographical concentration in key countries, widespread popular awareness and approval has been created.

Whether more sophisticated leadership elements in the less-developed countries have been equally well impressed is another matter. Within the past year there have been two cases, Yugoslavia and Finland, in which the Soviet Union in headlong fashion attempted to exploit trade and aid relationships for political purposes. Perhaps as a consequence, public figures in a number of the countries which are major recipients of aid have indicated uneasiness about the aims and methods of Soviet policy. In Indonesia, in 1957, parliamentary doubts about the wisdom of accepting further bloc assistance delayed ratification of Soviet aid agreement. Nehru in 1958 for the first time publicly expressed fundamental concern and disagreement with the philosophy of Communism. Nasser in the United Arab Republic in early 1959 began a vigorous roundup of Communist elements.

But such signs of possibly increasing resistance far from cancel the long-range and subtle political gains which the Communist countries may reap. Their aid has been useful in stirring anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East, in embarrassing and diminishing the prestige of pro-Western governments, and in encouraging others to take a more neutral position in the East-West conflict. Their programs are spreading consciousness of Soviet strength and capability, familiarity with bloc equipment, and use of the ruble as an international currency. Hundreds of technicians trained in the bloc countries are returning home each year having acquired in addition to new skills a new ideological perspective. Bloc financed industrial projects in recipient countries have given local Communist party organizations new talking points, new encouragement, new prestige.

The patience of Communist leaders in awaiting long-range rewards is reenforced by deep doctrinal convictions. They believe the present governments in the less-developed countries eventually will be overwhelmed and are convinced that nothing less than Communist regimes with totalitarian methods of rigid planning and compulsory sacrifice by the populations can succeed in producing a rapid rate of development. Second, imbued as they are with Marxist conceptions of the social and political effects of industrialization, they undoubtedly attach importance to the concentration of assistance in the industrial sector in order to encourage the growth of a labor class and trade unions in the less-developed countries which in turn, they are confident, will generate revolutionary pressures.

Given the continuing vulnerability of the less-developed Free World countries, the mixed but still considerable success of bloc aid to date, and the clear capacity of the bloc to extend the scale of such activity in the future, it is likely that the economic front may become more active and important in the next phase of the cold war.

[12] Cf. Waldemar A. Nielsen, "Why We Are Losing the Ruble War," *Harper's Magazine*, September, 1958.

# Program Planning and Development

By Arthur Goldschmidt

Abstract: Program planning and development of technical assistance must take place at the level of the recipient country. Once the resources for technical assistance available to a country are determined, the government itself must identify its needs and establish its priorities—whether the assistance is to come from local, international, or bilateral sources. The "country programing" procedures under which the United Nations Expanded Program for Technical Assistance is established annually have helped to strengthen the program planning machinery of recipient countries. The single purpose, voluntary nature, and multilateral management of the United Nations program make it peculiarly acceptable as an instrument for assisting in creating and strengthening local institutions including ministries and other bodies responsible for planning and programing. The Expanded Program has also been successful in undertaking projects involving several recipient countries in major joint programs. While the United Nations program has an important place in technical assistance, its financing has not kept pace with growing bilateral programs of the United States, the USSR, and other countries. It may therefore be desirable to emphasize the possible role of the United Nations program in the process of development and co-ordination of other technical assistance activities.

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## RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS

THE * principal resources of technical and professional skills available to the governments of the developing countries are in their own trained nationals. The technical assistance programs, bilateral and multilateral, can only fill the gaps or broaden the base of these indigenous resources, or help to energize and support them. Outsiders can and do create and operate new services or institutions quite separate from any local initiative; but such superimposed interventions are not technical assistance, however useful they may be to the development of a country. Technical assistance consists of helping countries to help themselves.

Because the technical assistance programs provide only a fraction of the technical and professional resources of the developing countries, they cannot be a ready-made import, but must be locally tailored to meet the differing requirements of recipient countries. The programing of technical assistance cannot therefore be a global process of the agencies providing it, but must be an intimate local process of the governments and the institutions receiving it.

There is great variety in the technical assistance from abroad that is available to interested governments. Those that can pay for it can secure the services of a growing number of individuals, consulting firms, and business institutions experienced in providing assistance. Geographically limited multilateral programs such as the Colombo Plan and the program of the Organization of American States are available to their member governments. An increasing number of bilateral programs, variously limited geographically or as to technical or professional fields, are coming into being in addition to the relatively large United States program of technical co-operation. From these resources, and from the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, potential recipients may secure the foreign component of their requirements for technical skills.

The needs for technical assistance in the developing countries are equally varied. The process of economic development is complex and its components are so diverse and interrelated that there are few technical and professional skills not required in some measure by countries seeking to guide or accelerate that process. In each sector of the economy, in each ministry and agency, at various levels in both central and local governments, the development process shows up the need for new skills and new institutions. The process of programing technical assistance, multilateral or bilateral, is the matching of available technical resources to those needs and the identification of priorities in the use of those resources.

In the first ten years of intergovernmental technical assistance to less-developed countries this programing process has occupied much of the attention both of the agencies providing technical assistance and the recipient governments. The United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance has made a major contribution to the initiation or strengthening of that process in many of the countries that it has served. The further extension, development, and institutionalization of the work of programing technical assistance by recipient countries present the most important possibility for improving the effectiveness of technical assistance, bilateral and multilateral alike. More than this, it can aid in establishing an institutional mechanism in the developing countries

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the United Nations or other members of its secretariat.

for planning and the making of decisions in other areas of their administration of economic development.

### THE PRINCIPLE OF COUNTRY PROGRAMING

It is a basic principle of the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance that the recipient countries themselves determine the scope and shape of the technical assistance provided to them by the nine international participating organizations.[1] This principle is buttressed by three interrelated characteristics of the program: its single purpose, its voluntary nature, and its multilateral management.

The single purpose of the Expanded Program is to help governments help themselves in their efforts at economic and social development. It does not seek to change their political and social institutions; its experts must be chosen "not only for their technical competence, but also for their sympathetic understanding of the cultural backgrounds and specific needs of the countries to be assisted."[2] No expert may engage in political activities. The technical assistance "shall not be a means of foreign economic and political interference in the internal affairs" of the recipient countries. The donor government has no voice in determining how its individual contribution may be spent: "Contributions shall be made without limitation as to use by a specific agency or in a specific country or for a specific project."

The voluntary nature of the program is reflected both in its financing as well as in the expenditure of its funds. The 200 million dollars that governments have made available to the program since 1949 were contributed in amounts and currencies that each donor decided in light of its own estimates of its abilities. Governments also have a voice in determining the availability of any of their nationals as experts or of the use of their facilities for training individuals in their institutions. No assistance is provided to any government except upon its specific request. Within the confines of the amounts available and subject to the limitation imposed by commitments on continuing projects, each government determines each year the scope, shape, and content of its own program. The recipient government, moreover, describes the precise jobs to be done and has a voice in the selection of the experts to do them; it nominates its candidates for fellowships for training and observation abroad; it determines its own participation in any joint activity such as a seminar, study tour, or training center. All assistance to a recipient country must be provided "as far as possible in the form which that country desires."

The multilateral management of the program is perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the United Nations Expanded Program. While the pledging of funds is undertaken by a special conference called by the 82-member General Assembly of the United Nations, contributions are not confined to Member Governments. Voluntary contributions have been received from eighty-eight governments. Any government that is a member of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies may participate as a recipient.

Governments exercise their responsibility for policy determination and program approval through the 24-member Technical Assistance Committee (TAC), consisting of the 18 members of the Economic and Social Council augmented by 6 members who may be from any other Government Member of the

[1] The participating organizations are listed in David Owen's article, this issue of THE ANNALS, p. 27.

[2] This and the following quotations in this and the next paragraph are from Resolution 222 (IX) of the Economic and Social Council.

United Nations or one of the specialized agencies "having an important interest in the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance."[3] This Committee is representative of both donor and recipient governments and of all parts of the world concerned with the program.

The members of the staffs of the participating organizations that carry out the program are appointed with due regard to geographical representation. This applies also to the staff of the Technical Assistance Board (TAB), on which each of the participating organizations is represented. There are few countries not represented on the staffs of one or more of these agencies. At this time, the heads of the nine organizations represent seven different nationalities (there is currently one vacancy).

The program itself is fully multilateral in its operations: In 1957 the roster of experts included sixty-seven nationalities, and fellows studied in ninety-three countries and territories. Of the twenty-five hundred experts in the program in 1957 about 24 per cent came from the less-developed areas of the world—Asia and the Far East, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Similarly, study opportunities for more than 2,000 fellowship holders were equally widely distributed; more than 28 per cent of the host facilities were supplied by areas other than Europe, Canada, and the United States.

The strength of the multilateral approach has largely been in this use of the world's resources of profesional skills and training opportunities. It permits a closer alignment of the expert's qualifications to the needs of the country being assisted. But more than this, it involves the recipient countries as donors of assistance as well, making the program a truly co-operative one of sharing the blessedness of giving.

[3] Resolution 647 (XXIII) of the Economic and Social Council.

## ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

The principle of country programing makes the United Nations Expanded Program simply a sum of its parts: The various programs that governments themselves determine to be necessary to their economic and social development. But before the recipient governments can establish their programs, the available resources must be divided among them. This is done each year by the participating agencies and their joint body, the Technical Assistance Board, with the approval of the Technical Assistance Committee. Based upon an assumption of the amount of funds likely to be available for the following year, the Board establishes a "planning share" for each of the participating agencies, proportionate to the agency's share of the previous year's program.

Each agency divides its planning shares among the requesting countries. This division is based upon requests received, programs under way, or indications of need. The agency proposals are reviewed by the Board and fitted together to establish targets for each recipient country. The countries are informed of their targets for the following calendar year in May of each year and are expected to plan their programs within the target figure. These programs are transmitted to the Board and the participating organizations by July 1. The country programs are reviewed by the agencies and the Board and consolidated in a global program submitted to the Technical Assistance Committee after the Pledging Conference has established the amount of funds that can be expected to be available. The Committee reviews and approves the program and authorizes allocation of funds to the participating organizations in proportion to their shares of the approved over-all program.

This program exercise provides the

basis for initial co-ordination among the participating organizations and for supervision by the Technical Assistance Committee of the fairness of the allocation of resources.

### COUNTRY PROGRAMING PROCEDURES

The recipient governments are assisted in developing their programs by the Resident Representatives of the Technical Assistance Board, the experts, and the mission chiefs or country representatives of the participating organizations in the field, often augmented during the May-June programing period by staff from the headquarters or regional offices of the agencies. Except that they must honor commitments of the agencies continuing from the previous year's programs, the governments may utilize the target figures supplied by the Board without reference to the proposed agency subtotals. A government may utilize all the funds made available to it for one field of assistance and it may ask for experts only or utilize its entire target figure for fellowship opportunities. The participating organizations can and do propose programs, but the government itself disposes.

This procedure, giving the recipient governments unhampered freedom to establish the content of their own programs, grew out of dissatisfaction with the original arrangement under which there was an *a priori* division of resources among the six agencies then engaged in the program.[4]

The original plan of dividing the funds among the agencies was not solely a scheme for meeting the needs of the participating organizations: in part it reflected an earlier assumption—not wholly unwarranted—that balanced development would have to be injected into the program of each country from the outside; that governments of less-developed countries were themselves less-developed and would not always have the capacity to identify their own needs effectively; and that agencies experienced with the problems of development in similar countries would be able more readily to propose practical programs and establish priorities. It was then believed that the fresh view of an objective outsider would be clearer than that of custom-ridden, inexperienced local officials caught in the myopia of their own culture.

There were, however, three basic weaknesses in this view:

- The international agencies were themselves too new and their staffs too inexperienced to guide effectively the programs of the countries to be aided.
- The recipient countries were often extremely sensitive to outside interference, were not fully convinced of the objectivity of foreign advisers, and were unwilling to agree to programs masterminded from a distance. Paul Hoffman recognized this attitude in his dictum that technical assistance cannot be exported, it can only be imported.
- And finally, the processes of development and economic growth are too uncertainly known, the circumstances are too variable and the resources that must be brought into play are too varied to establish precise prefabricated formulae for each country to be assisted.

Paradoxically, it has been largely since the reins of programing were firmly turned over to the recipient countries that the influence of the agencies has been more fully felt. In part, this has been because the agencies are now more effective instruments for program planning: They have nearly ten years of

[4] See the discussion of financing the Expanded Program operations in Rowland Egger's article, this issue of THE ANNALS, pp. 82–83.

experience behind them. Their staffs have worked intimately with their counterparts in many countries. Similiarly, the officials of recipient countries have become accustomed to technical assistance and are more at home with the foreign expert and willing to work with him; they know his values and his limitations. The technical assistance programs, multilateral and bilateral, have made it possible for many of these officials to travel abroad and see their own problems being dealt with in other ways. The program has established a "consumer acceptance" that makes possible a greater degree of agency participation in planning than could be assumed in its early phases. The participating organizations can now transmit successful projects from one country to another for adaptation and can help to avoid initiation of undertakings that have failed elsewhere.

### ROLE OF THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE

With "country programming" has come an increase in the number and effectiveness of the Resident Representatives—officials of the Technical Assistance Board whose duties are to represent the Board with the recipient governments and provide co-ordination in the planning and execution of the program. These officials, who are generally assigned to a country for two or more years, become familiar with the workings of the government as well as with the experts and agency representatives. They frequently become key advisers on programs and are an important means of co-ordination between government agencies, with bilateral programs, and between the participating organizations. Their precise role has never been fully defined except in connection with the annual country programing procedure, and indeed it depends in large measure on the individual and upon the relationship that he establishes with the officials of the government.

Resident Representatives of the Technical Assistance Board have been appointed for twenty-eight countries. In addition, regional representatives provide similar services in Southeast Asia and in Central America. The size of the country program and the willingness of the recipient government to provide facilities for the Resident Representatives determine their appointment.

Resident Representatives, unlike the Country Directors of the United States Operations Mission, do not have large staffs working under their direction. At best they may have an internationally recruited deputy and secretary and a small locally recruited staff of clerical and maintenance workers. They do not head a mission to the government, for the experts in the Expanded Program are not considered a mission. The office of the Resident Representative is generally more nearly an extraordinary extension of the government. Although the Resident Representatives are usually included in the diplomatic lists, they are not diplomats; their governmental contacts generally reach to areas of government far below and beyond those usually touched upon by diplomats.

In their day-to-day operations, Resident Representatives may have the close co-operation of agency representatives in the country. Such agency representatives have been appointed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in some countries to provide a measure of local oversight and co-ordination of the programs of these agencies. The Resident Representatives are also in touch with the experts assigned to the country, but they are not generally in the chain of command over such experts. They may furnish experts

with office facilities, stenographic services, or transport where these are meagre in the government departments, but in general the experts under the Expanded Program are scattered among the government agencies and working with their local counterparts in government offices.

The key aspect of the Resident Representative's assignment comes in the programing of the expanded program funds available to the government. The country programs must be drawn up by the requesting government "in consultation with the resident representatives." [5] Here he assists in resolving the conflicts between government departments and between participating organizations. He must assist in seeing that the limited resources available to the government are used in a manner to meet the most urgent needs and to assure that all interests concerned with technical assistance are given a hearing in determining priorities. Agency representatives and experts may become partisans of the departments of governments with which they work or of fields of interest with which they are concerned; the Resident Representative is expected to remain the impartial referee.

## GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY

The most far-reaching consequence of country programing has been its role in the development within recipient governments themselves of the necessary mechanisms for channelling and screening their requirements and establishing priorities. Departments of governments can no longer apply directly to the participating organizations for the assistance they want, but are required to put forward their requests as part of the country program. This calls for a measure of consultation and co-ordination that is rare in most governments, developed and underdeveloped alike. While early in the program recipient governments sought to develop some organized approach to channelling technical assistance requests, country programing has resulted in the strengthening of this process and in broadening the scope of the governmental units to which it is assigned. In a recent review [6] of this aspect of the program, central planning and co-ordination units of thirty-eight of the recipient governments were studied in some detail. Twenty-three of these had been merged with the highest economic policy-making bodies of the government, either interministerial committees or the Prime Minister's office or special ministries for economics, planning, or finance that are responsible for over-all economic planning.

Country programing has not necessarily created the central planning and co-ordinating units, but there is little doubt that it has greatly strengthened them. In fact, some of the governments themselves have credited the program with this result by stressing that the "country programming procedure stimulates closer cooperation and teamwork among their own ministries in promoting national development activities." Moreover, experts provided by the Technical Assistance Program have been used to strengthen these and other central planning and co-ordinating units. The Program has assisted nearly forty governments in the process of planning or programing economic development—in a majority of cases in creating or developing the agencies or institutions necessary to the process.

## PROGRAM CO-ORDINATION

Of the thirty-eight central programing units for channelling and co-ordinating requests for assistance from the Expanded Program studied, twenty-four

[5] Resolution 542 (XVIII) of the Economic and Social Council.

[6] Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1957, E/3080 (New York: United Nations, 1958).

were also responsible for reviewing and formulating requests involving other technical assistance programs. This is perhaps the most significant development in co-ordination of the multilateral and bilateral programs. Since the inception of the Expanded Program, which coincided with the beginning of the Point Four program of the United States, the importance of co-ordination has been emphasized. But complete exchanges of information between the multilateral program and the United States and Colombo Plan programs, supplemented by frequent consultations, could not prevent duplication and overlapping in these country-oriented programs. Co-ordination, like program planning, cannot be achieved effectively anywhere except at the level of the recipient government.

As additional governments have taken up the task of providing assistance on a bilateral basis, co-ordination and consultation become more difficult as well as more essential. The geographical scope of bilateral technical assistance has been significantly increased in recent years. While world-wide interest has been centered on the initiative of the USSR in technical assistance, the Norwegian, French, West German, Italian, Israeli, Japanese, and other efforts are relatively unknown. This increase in the opportunities for help from bilateral sources over those available ten years ago makes it increasingly important, from the standpoint of donor governments as well as recipients, that the co-ordinating mechanisms and procedures be strengthened to provide a prudent and orderly use of available resources.

The experience of the multilateral program in the creation and strengthening of the governmental agencies necessary for program development and co-ordination suggests a possible role for the United Nations program in meeting the growing problem of providing more effective co-ordination of technical assistance programs generally. The Expanded Program operates in substantially all of the countries concerned with technical assistance. Its limited resources as well as its terms of reference make it no competitive threat to the large United States and USSR programs or those of the many other governments providing bilateral technical assistance programs. Because it is operated and managed on a truly multilateral basis, and controlled by an international body consisting of donor and recipient governments alike, it enjoys a special status. This is reflected in its use by recipient governments for projects of a nature not often considered for bilateral handling. Economic planning and programing, organization of government agencies, customs matters, and other projects touching on the sovereignty of governments have been successfully prosecuted under the United Nations program. Complex intergovernmental projects have also been undertaken effectively. The program for instance has brought the five Central American governments together for planning their economic and industrial development: This has involved working on joint problems of transport, industrialization, public administration training, and the problem of a common market with the help of United Nations experts.

The use of the international agencies in the planning and co-ordination of a program involving bilateral assistance has had an auspicious beginning in the joint project for planning the development of the Lower Mekong River in Southeast Asia. Here the governments of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, through which the Mekong flows, with the guidance of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, have turned to the United Nations and the specialized agencies to assist in assuring that the bilateral assistance that has

been offered by the United States, French, Japanese, New Zealand, Canadian, and other governments would be put to use under a plan and schedule worked out by experts supplied under the Expanded Program. This plan was initiated by an international mission headed by Lt. General Wheeler, former head of the United States Corps of Engineers, together with engineering colleagues from Canada, France, Japan and India, who outlined the work needed to be done effectively to plan the development of the Mekong. Further international studies will fill out the plan. Meanwhile, however, bilateral agreements have been negotiated to undertake various phases of the plan. An American engineering team is undertaking the basic hydrologic studies of the main channel. Japanese engineers are studying the principal tributaries. French equipment and New Zealand boats are being furnished under their respective contributions.

It was originally assumed by its founders that the Expanded Program would grow to become the major resource of technical assistance for the less-developed countries. United States policy, based upon that assumption, has considered its bilateral program to be a temporary one to be eliminated as the international program grew. But the multilateral program has not grown as fast as bilateral programs, even with the addition of the Special Projects Fund, which will greatly increase the multilateral resources available in 1959. It may well be that a more realistic view of the future role of the multilateral program may be found in emphasizing its experience in the process of program development and co-ordination, as a means of assisting the recipient governments in establishing priorities and utilizing the great bilateral resources available to them. Such an additional responsibility should not diminish the use of the multilateral program for direct technical assistance, especially for those assignments for which multilateral aid is singularly suited. The increased use of the Expanded Program in program development and co-ordination would necessarily have to grow out of a broadened awareness on the part of the recipient governments of the important role of assistance in the very process of receiving assistance. It would also depend upon the willingness of governments providing bilateral assistance to accept fully the practice as well as the principle of co-ordination.

# The Choice of Instruments for Technical Co-operation

By Philip M. Glick

Abstract: The choice of suitable instruments for giving technical and economic assistance is crucial to the success of the bilateral and multilateral programs. Here, choice is controlled not alone by the needs of the immediate task but also by the characteristics of public administration in less-developed countries and by the current status of agriculture, industry, health, and education. In the last eighteen years the programs have developed eleven instruments. Classified by principal function, these are: (a) preparation for program planning—the economic survey; (b) advice and instruction within the host country—the advisory mission; the visiting professor; seminars, conferences, and workshops; the training center; (c) fellowships for study and training abroad; and (d) joint operations—the Servicio; the operating mission; the university contract; other private contracts; the proposed international administrative service. The instruments for joint operation must form the backbone of the co-operative programs because technical assistance, to be effective, must go beyond advice and demonstration. Only in joint operations can the introduction and the administration of the new technology be adequately taught. Even without joint operations the programs can perform many useful tasks—but that is to fall short of the announced goal: Aiding the host countries to develop economies of self-sustaining growth.

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## THE PROBLEM OF CHOICE

NO manufacturer would attempt to fasten the aluminum plates of an aircraft with needle and thread. The devising of instruments suitable to their compound tasks is equally important in the bilateral and multilateral programs for assisting the less-developed countries to build national economies of self-sustaining growth.

For this purpose, the choice of instruments is controlled not only by the nature of the immediate task to be performed but also by certain environmental factors, such as the basic conditions of life and economic activity; the current status of agriculture, industry, health, and education; and the characteristics of public administration.

The average life expectancy is little over thirty years in the countries now generally described as underdeveloped. The incidence of preventable diseases is high. The average working life of those who do attain the productive ages is low because high death rates and disease hamper productivity. The average food supply for each individual is only 350 calories per day above the life-sustaining minimum.

The average annual per-capita income is less than $150. The levels of industrial investment are low, and only small amounts of mechanical energy are available to supplement the energy of human arm and back. Transportation and communication systems are gravely inadequate.

Agricultural income and crop yields are low. Planting, tillage, and harvesting practices of hundreds of years ago still largely prevail. Until recently many of these countries have had only rudimentary beginnings of national public health programs. Rural schools in these primarily agricultural countries have suffered from neglect. Three-fourths of the population ten years of age and over are illiterate.

The governments in these countries, with scattered exceptions, are unstable and highly centralized; political democracy is weak; there is a serious shortage of trained administrative personnel; government officers work part time, at low salaries, and little is expected of them. Governmental appointments scarcely pay lip service to merit principles; petty corruption in government office is frequent, and major corruption not rare; distrust of government officers has developed monumental complexities in paper work and procedural formality; and both academic and in-service training in administration is new, abstract, fumbling.

These facts mean more than that the poor countries are very poor. They mean that the instruments selected as the means to assist governments and peoples living and functioning in such social and economic environments to "move into the twentieth century," to develop strong and sufficient growing national economies, must be adequate to solve a problem of that nature, scale, and complexity.

Clearly, the task is not just to provide additional capital for investment because there are few enterprises to receive it, few skilled people to make the management decisions, few trained and healthy workers. New institutions must be created, new processes started, the basic "social capital" of schools and hospitals, transportation and communication, governmental skill in maintaining law and order, must itself be developed. Only against such frank definition of the problem to be solved can we properly measure the adequacy of the instruments to be employed.

Moreover, each of the country to be aided has its own history, traditions, and values, its own culture pattern. The

ability of the visiting technician or administrator to work successfully with his counterparts in the host government will depend upon his understanding sympathetically the society in which he has agreed to work; its attitudes toward work and leisure; the nature of its belief in progress; its belief or disbelief in the dignity of manual labor; its conception of the importance of machines and creature comforts; its notion of the proper role of government; and its social definition of the proper spheres and activities for its racial minorities, white-collar workers, women, and children. The myriad relationships among these beliefs, practices, and values, despite their many internal inconsistencies, give them a tough, coherent pattern. Change is not easily introduced or happily welcomed.

## THE AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS

In the years since 1940, the bilateral and multilateral programs have developed, between them, ten useful instruments, and the Secretary General of the United Nations has recently proposed an eleventh. The fashioning of eleven instruments in eighteen years is a good record. In fact, referring to each as an instrument is oversimplification; each is a method followed with variations. This section will attempt to describe these instruments. An evaluation of their comparative effectiveness will follow. Having made this the subject of a chapter in a book,[1] I need give no more here than a short summary.

### *The broad economic survey*

The United Nations introduced the survey report as the basis for formulating a national program of economic development in 1949, in Haiti, and later prepared similar reports for Bolivia and El Salvador. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development adopted the device in publishing such a survey for Colombia in 1950. By common consent such reports are now made only by the Bank, which carefully includes representatives of the bilateral and multilateral programs on the survey teams. The Bank reports now serve to guide not only action on loan applications but also the planning activities for technical and economic assistance.

An economic survey, by its nature, cannot do any of the things that need to be done to stimulate economic growth. Its purpose is to establish a reliable basis for enabling host country and co-operating agency to determine what technical and economic assistance the country requires and is ready to use and what tasks should be given priority. For example, the Bank's report on Colombia discussed the standard of living, national income and product, capital formation, agriculture, industry, fuels, transport, health and welfare, electric power, housing, education, public finance, monetary policy, and organization for planning and administration.

When a survey has been made, the ones who have learned most from it are the members of the survey team. This has led to the growing practice of including in these teams leading officers of the government for whose primary benefit the survey is made.

### *Technical missions: advisory and operating*

The best known instrument, one used in all the programs, is the technical mission. There are two broad types, the advisory and the operating mission; each has had a quite different history and is likely to have a quite different future.

At first, advisory missions took the form of a group of men who studied, say, a government department and sub-

[1] *The Administration of Technical Assistance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), Chap. II, p. 51.

mitted a report with recommendations. Several years of the frustrating experience that such reports tended to be profoundly ignored has created a shift within the technique of the advisory mission from the preparation of studious reports to the assignment of advisers who confer frequently with those to be advised, so that recommendations may be given in small doses, in varying degrees of formality, over a period of time. (There is little excuse for the fact that the United Nations program after eight years of such frustration still not infrequently sends an advisory mission to prepare a lengthy report.)

Even when permitted to advise in continuous small doses, the adviser has little organizational maneuverability. He finds it difficult to establish an effective base from which to secure access to the controlling facts and influence the taking of the necessary action at the proper time. It is folk wisdom that it is not easy to give or take advice. There is a high incidence of discouragement among members of advisory missions. A surprisingly large number take refuge in bitter criticism of the host governments.

And so, although no one ever formulated the notion of an operating mission that would be free of such defects and would supersede the advisory mission, many missions took on operating responsibilities, sometimes at the urgent request of the host government, sometimes by almost imperceptible development out of the mission's advisory work. The essence of the distinction is that the operating mission joins with the host government in the direct performance of the defined task.

*The advice and instruction tool*

The visiting professors, training centers, seminars, and conference techniques are an application to international co-operation of long established educational methods. The procedure takes several forms but consists essentially of sending people who neither advise nor join in operations, but teach. They may teach as a visiting professor in a university or research center, or participate in seminars or "workshops" to which government personnel and others go for intensive periods of study. Or they may serve for short or long periods as faculty members in a specially organized training center.

These methods are little used in the United States bilateral program but are frequent in those of both the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). The regional training center is the major instrument in the OAS program.

*Joint operation through a Servicio*

The great bulk of the work performed in the bilateral program in Latin America (and in a few countries in the Eastern Hemisphere) is done through the Servicio. This is a new type of public agency, invented by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (US) and the Latin American Governments. It is used by none of the multilateral agencies.

The Servicio is an entity specially created by the host government within one of its ministries, by statute or executive decree, to administer jointly with foreign technicians a group of projects in a major functional field, such as agriculture or public health. Its essential purpose is to bring into existence a program that will be jointly operated, the two partners being the ministry and the technical mission. Behavioristic in their educational psychology, the creators of the Servicio believed they could effectively teach and demonstrate only by working with their hosts daily, over a long period, in the same organization, on tasks they could share. Less than that, they believed—advising them, showing them how, but not doing it with

them in a joint enterprise—would be to "plow the sea."

Some forty-two Servicios are at work in Latin America alone. They differ greatly in their pattern of operations, being necessarily molded by local conditions, local laws, and chiefly by the personalities who operate them. There is a long distance, which the Servicio tries to bridge, between the formulation of a good idea and its translation into a living institution in which a trained body of men perform tasks they understand, with suitable tools, on a practical time schedule, to reach objectives agreed upon.

The theory of the Servicio, from which, in practice, many Servicio directors frequently fall away, calls for joint operations from beginning to end. To promote such union, the technical mission relies upon two requirements: Each project in the program must be agreed upon by the host minister and the head of the United States mission, and all projects are to be financed out of a joint fund made up of local currency contributed by the ministry and dollars contributed by the mission. The right to exercise a joint voice in administering all activities is almost literally "purchased"—by each partner.

To promote the freedom of action which the Servicio must enjoy to enable it to introduce new administrative patterns, the intergovernmental agreement to create each Servicio specifically provides that it shall not be bound by the rules and procedures of the parent ministry, but shall establish such arrangements and controls as the minister and the Servicio director (nearly always the head of the United States technical mission) shall jointly devise. This freedom carries a correlative danger; it opens the door to so extreme a degree of autonomy for the Servicio that the ministry may be unable to learn anything from Servicio operations. It also opens the door, where the members of the mission are impatient for results and forget that theirs is not to do but to teach by doing jointly, to the Servicio's becoming a competitor of its own parent ministry.

Successful operation of so daring and subtle an administrative instrument requires broad delegation of authority from the Washington headquarters to the top United States officers of the Servicio. Such delegation has in fact been alternately granted and recalled, and yet the Servicio cannot achieve true mutuality without it.

As soon as competent national officers are available to serve as co-directors of Servicios with their United States counterparts, such co-directorships should (I believe; but the point is in controversy among students of the Servicio) be established. The experience of Servicio Especial de Saude Publica (SESP) in Brazil demonstrates this, and the case is strengthened by the less happy experience of the public health Servicios in Mexico and Uruguay which failed to appoint co-directors when the situation became ripe.

### *The university and other private contracts*

Three types of university contracts can be identified. The earliest ones did little more than "borrow" university personnel for duty overseas. A second type is a contract under which the university assumes responsibility for the administration of a defined segment of a country program, not always an educational activity. The third type, which carries exceptional promise for the future, establishes a university-to-university relationship under which a United States university undertakes to work directly with a university in the host country to improve research and educational practice.

The late Dr. Henry G. Bennett, first Administrator of the Technical Coopera-

tion Administration, was the father of the interuniversity contract. He saw in it an instrument through which the Land-Grant Colleges, in particular, could assist universities in the less-developed countries in the trilogy of functions that has become characteristic for our Land-Grant Colleges: agricultural education, experiment stations, and extension.

Some troublesome problems are emerging. The universities tend to confuse the three types of contracts described and wish to believe that they are merely receiving a grant from the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) to finance educational work overseas. ICA today probably attempts too much supervision of the university-to-university contracts and too little of the other varieties of college contracts. In turn, the universities too frequently assume these difficult responsibilities casually, fail to see the vast difference between campus activities and international technical assistance, and fail to make the whole set of institutional resources available to support the faculty members sent abroad.

The International Cooperation Administration (US) makes many contracts with individuals or firms to enable them to provide new technical, engineering, or management services for a fee. The multilateral agencies almost never use this instrument. These contracts sometimes cost more than the alternative of recruiting government personnel, but they give the program additional administrative resources. Skilled persons may sometimes be employed by contract who would refuse government employment. Many private firms can initiate operations more rapidly than the government. And there are places where technical assistance from a private source, even when financed by the United States, is more acceptable than direct United States Government participation, as in some of the dependent territories. The same preference has been shown in certain sensitive operations, as in helping a government to formulate currency-exchange regulations or to administer supervised agricultural credit.

*Overseas fellowships*

Fellowships for training and study overseas is the oldest of the instruments, and yet the least developed of them all, and the least well used. Training is, of course, the overriding objective of all technical assistance activities, whether in making surveys, in technical missions, in Servicios, or under private contracts. The local training in many cases, however, needs supplementation from a fellowship for study abroad.

Bilateral and multilateral agencies alike use this technique and alike are struggling with the problems of selecting fellows who can make specific contributions to developmental needs, of devising solutions to the difficulties raised by language and cultural differences, of finding instructors who can translate the technology of a rich country into forms assimilable in a poor country, of persuading the mother countries to make suitable use of the trainee's new skills on his return.

*An international administrative service*

In May 1956, Secretary-General Hammarskjold made his first plea for creation of a new international civil service of officers who could serve as "public officials integrated in the national administrations of [the less-developed] countries while maintaining their international status." The suggestion has since been detailed and was approved by the General Assembly late in 1958. It will provide specialists to perform duties of an "executive or operational" character within the service of the government of a less-developed country. They will be more than advisers, they

will exercise authority and carry responsibility.

### THE CHOICE OF PROPER TOOLS

The available instruments can be classified in various ways. The following fourfold grouping emphasizes the purposes for which they are suitable: (a) preparation for program planning—the economic survey; (b) advice and instruction within the host country—the advisory mission; the visiting professor; seminars, conferences, and workshops; the training center; (c) fellowships for study and training abroad; and (d) joint operations—the Servicio; the operating mission; the university contract; other private contracts; the proposed international administrative service.

In many countries the programs are sufficiently large and varied to call into play all these instruments. Those who ponder the organization of technical co-operation within a country should understudy the orchestra conductor. They will need to control both volume and balance, and they must be able sometimes to call on the string instruments and sometimes on the brass.

But they must not procrusteanize. The authors of a new project need to cast it into a form molded around the specific needs being addressed—as these are shaped by the characteristics of country and locale—and not simply into the form of one or another of the devices already developed. The emphasis should not be on uniformity; the needs are diverse.

One way to stimulate the invention of better methods is to see the comparative advantages and disadvantages of those in use.

Advice and teaching, both within the host country and abroad, through classes and a variety of informal ways, are both indispensable and insufficient. Technical co-operation must go beyond advice and instruction. It must, through various methods of joint operation, build new institutions that actually use the new technology for economic development. The four or five instruments through which such operations may be carried on must be seen, then, as the backbone of a technical co-operation program. They are the instruments that must be relied upon to do most of the work.

A number of persons can be exposed to the new technology through advisory missions, training grants, visiting professors, and training centers. But the purpose of technical co-operation is broader than that. It is comforting to contemplate how many villages have been given their first medical center in these programs, how many plows have been introduced, how many individuals have had their horizons broadened. Yet, such serendipity is self-deceptive. The responsibility these programs have assumed is not just to scatter good works in isolated places, however intrinsically worth-while, but to spark and fuel the growth to vigor of entire national economies.

If, under the prevailing conditions already described, the programs are to succeed in introducing technological change, they must release the capacities of the more competent national personnel by lifting the smothering effect of the prevailing environment. This will take more than teaching and advice.

The budding science of government administration may borrow knowledge here from physics and biology. They have developed the concept of "the critical point," defined as the point at which nature takes on new patterns of behavior. The critical point at which water ceases to behave as a liquid and begins to behave as a gas is reached only at a given temperature under given barometric conditions. It is not too much to say that the history of the

technical co-operation programs has already demonstrated that government and other institutions in an underdeveloped society may be brought, through advice and demonstration, to approach the critical point at which they will undergo institutional change, but they can be brought to arrive at it only through our joining in conducting with them operations in the course of which new ways of practice become habitual through frequent performance.

*The Servicio: assets and liabilities*

Thus far, the Servicio has proved the strongest of the operating instruments. It assumes responsibility for getting a number of things done, and in the process it demonstrates and trains. It can use the services of both specialists and generalists, technicians and administrators, and many junior officers. It can establish its own regulations for personnel, fiscal, and other transactions and thereby demonstrate what improved public administration can contribute to economic development. It can combine long-range planning with short-term adjustments to emerging problems. It can induce increased expenditures for desirable purposes by the host government. It creates an administrative environment in which good work habits rub off onto all who are associated in the enterprise.

On the other hand, the Servicio has a built-in tendency to become dominated by the foreign technicians, to by-pass the ministry of which it is a part, and to become an enterprise competitive with the ministry. Only continuous vigilance and a strong sense of its purpose can protect it against these pitfalls. Some governments are reluctant to establish new Servicios (in a few cases, to continue some now operating) because of this built-in tendency and in part because the Servicio necessarily gives the visiting technician so much of a responsible voice in administration. In many situations, therefore, an operating mission will be acceptable where a Servicio may be unwelcome. Where the government already has substantial programs under way, it may be impossible to establish a Servicio without creating antagonisms and administrative complexity. The Servicio is never suitable for small or short-term projects alone. It is appropriate only where a broad operating program is required. Similarly, it is never suitable for regulatory or police programs. It is not true, however, as some maintain, that the Servicio is suitable only in very backward countries. One of the most successful Servicios is Brazil's public health Servicio, SESP. In fact, where the country is so backward that it has few competent nationals who can share the higher responsibilities with their visitor counterparts, the Servicio tends to become too much of a United States directed operation. It will function much better where nationals can gradually take over the more responsible positions, including the directorship.

The operating technical mission is a simpler device than the Servicio, suitable for less complex operations. It has less tendency to degenerate into a purely United States operation. It can be adapted to the performance of many necessary tasks even where the host is already doing much on its own. It has, however, less financial and procedural freedom and less power to induce host government financial contributions. It is less suitable for large operations, can less readily find a place for junior foreign technicians, and is more at the mercy of instability in the host government. The Servicio is a specialized form of the operating mission.

The greatest value of the university contract is in the establishment of a university-to-university relationship in which it can help improve the research and teaching practices of foreign univer-

sities. These relationships also broaden United States popular understanding of foreign countries and improve the training facilities within the United States that can serve foreign trainees. Some university contracts, however, have called upon educational institutions to give direct assistance to other governments on problems wholly outside the experience and skills of an educational institution. An operating mission or a Servicio would have been a better instrument in many such cases.

Similarly, other government-financed private contracts can supplement government personnel with skills not otherwise obtainable. In many cases a host government will prefer a contract with a private firm, because of the prestige many of them enjoy, or because of the activity's sensitivity.

All these instruments are likely to work more effectively if at least one Servicio is functioning in the country. Acting on behalf of the country director, it can give administrative service to all the visiting technicians, short-term and long-term. The country program can thus enjoy a hard core of competent continuous administration on which all personnel can lean.

The United Nations program does not use the Servicio device, but it can. That a multinational team can administer an operating program is proved by every specialized agency. The crux here is the shortage of UN economic aid funds; without joint financing there is no hope of winning acceptance of joint administrative control. But the new Special Fund and the proposed International Development Association promise to make such funds available. There is, however, no need for the United Nations to copy the Servicio; the kernel is the idea of joint operation, and the United Nations may well be able to devise a more successful technique for that purpose.

Concerning the new international administrative service, one must wait and see. It differs sufficiently from the only partially successful earlier United Nations experiment in Bolivia to carry a warm promise of achievement.

## CONCLUSION

We have been talking of the methods of organizing the flow of technical and economic assistance as the instruments of such aid. In a larger sense, the entire program is but an instrument. In emphasizing the importance of the choice of proper tools, we must avoid the fallacy of making that choice seem to be the only, or even the most important, decision to be made. International technical co-operation cannot succeed without adequate program planning, without appropriate administrative organization in headquarters and field offices, without adequate funds—including large doses of investment capital timely applied—without highly competent culture-adaptable personnel. But even if these other fundamental needs are met, the program's administrators must choose operating instruments that carry a cutting edge.

# The Government Contract as an Administrative Device

By Henry Reining, Jr.

Abstract: A considerable fraction of the United States technical assistance program is carried out by contract. Profit contracts are traditional with the government. Contracts with voluntary organizations are rooted in religious missions and war relief. University contracts are new but have quickly reached considerable proportions. The typical university contract is for a term of three years and is related directly to an institution in the host country with the United States Government acting as a third party. There have been many problems with these contracts but many adjustments have been made by the International Cooperation Administration. An Office of Contract Relations has been created, policies adopted, a manual and an illustrative contract published. Within that Office, a basic division has been made in the handling of profit and nonprofit contracts. Security clearance, an unsympathetic Congress, understaffing within the ICA itself, and inadequate opportunity for preparation to enter upon contracts and once in, to study and plan prior to commencing operations, are among the remaining problems. The universities on the whole have done well, but there have been failures. Co-ordination of contract and Mission efforts in the field has been a continuing problem, but have been considerably ameliorated recently. The balance sheet shows that there has been profit for all concerned. Finally there are presented ten operating assumptions for the newcomer to the field.

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ONE third to one half the total technical assistance program of the United States is carried on by contract. Strangely enough, little has been said in the literature of foreign aid on the contract as a device. There has been only one study specifically on the subject.[1] Yet the contract as a device to give aid overseas apparently falls within the anticipation of the policy makers who wrote the enabling legislation. They instructed that ". . . the participation of private agencies and persons shall be sought to the greatest extent possible."[2]

## ADVANTAGES OF THE CONTRACT DEVICE

Theoretically, the use of the contract has several advantages as a device of technical assistance. The ability to command otherwise unobtainable talent and services is an important advantage. The government does not need to dislodge the technical expert from his regular employment when he is "hired" by contract rather than directly. He remains employed by the corporation or firm, the university or voluntary service organization where he is making his career. His retirement arrangements are not disrupted; his promotion prospects are not dimmed.

The government theoretically gets more than a technician when it contracts with private organizations: It also gets the support-in-depth that such organizations—especially the universities, church-affiliated, and foundation groups—are capable of because of their other resources. In short, the government can invoke the force of the whole institution. Universities, for instance, have veritable networks of contacts and associations—professional, institutional, social and personal—which can be solicited into the enterprise.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett who, as first Director of the Technical Cooperation Administraton, is given the credit for inventing the university contract,[3] apparently had these things in mind when he created the device. Originally thinking of the land-grant colleges,[4] Dr. Bennett conceived of a directness of relationship between the United States and host country technicians that was impossible to achieve at the diplomatic level. Contract personnel could work with host country personnel without regard to the difference of government affiliation or national origin. They could come together on a professional or technical, indeed, on a grass-roots level.

Educational, religious, and commercial organizations also have a freedom of action, whether at home or abroad, that is denied to government agencies.

[1] Jerome Jacobson Associates, *The Use of Private Contractors in Foreign Aid Programs.* A Study Prepared at the Request of the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957). Incidentally, this study points out that if one were to compare the number of technicians on contract with those on direct hire, the proportion would favor the former by 2 to 1. These are admittedly rough estimates. Philip M. Glick in his National Planning Association study, *The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), estimates the ratio of contract to direct U. S. hire employees as between 30 and 40%. The Department of State publication, *The Mutual Security Program Fiscal Year 1958: A Summary Presentation* (Washington, D. C., June 1957), p. 58, speaks of 1500 of the "4600 U. S. technicians working overseas" as being contract employees.

[2] Mutual Security Act, as amended, sec. 413a.

[3] According to John A. Hannah, President, Michigan State University and himself deeply involved in the same development. See his talk, American Council on Education, *University Projects Abroad.* Papers presented at the Conference on University Contracts Abroad, East Lansing, November 17–18, 1955 (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1956), p. 51.

[4] Glick, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 92.

They are not under bureaucratic restraints, at least not those of a governmental nature. They can operate on an interinstitutional basis without always worrying about clearing with the Washington office or about meeting pertinent government protocol.

A final advantage, especially in the use of nonprofit contractors, is that it becomes possible for the government to get into certain countries, such as the neutralist ones, which would refuse aid or co-operation if offered directly by our governmental agencies. The contractor can operate within the government, even on the governmental process itself as in the case of public administration programs, without any interference with the sovereignty of the host country.

### TYPES OF CONTRACTORS

The contracts the International Co-operation Administration (ICA) enters into can be divided into the profit and the nonprofit ones. There is nothing new about government contracts with profit-making commercial firms. Through such contracts the government can draw into overseas work highly skilled talent not otherwise available and obtain other essential services.

The nonprofit contracts can be divided into those with voluntary groups and those with universities. Fifty-six voluntary, nonprofit groups were under contract in the field of technical assistance as of April 1958. These included such well-known foundations as Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie; special-area interest groups such as the American Korean Foundation, the Asia Foundation, and the Near-East Foundation; and a number of religious groups, such as the American Friends Service Committee, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Catholic Relief Services, and Lutheran World Relief. These groups had 10 million dollars worth of contracts in eighteen different countries, involving several times that many agencies in the host countries.

It seems quite clear even from the foregoing brief analysis that the United States Government gains immeasurably through this co-operation with the voluntary agencies. The government enlists the support and activity of this three score of dedicated groups who were already at work on the very objectives for which government funds themselves are appropriate. These groups with their established programs made it profitable for the United States Government to enter into the contracts to expand their activities and diversify them much more cheaply and effectively than the government could have done starting afresh. Finally these voluntary agencies can operate in a humanitarian atmosphere of good will which would not be possible for a government agency regardless of the nature of the service rendered.[5]

That all is not perfect with such contracts is equally clear. The most troublesome problem is with the religious groups. With them, there is the risk for the government of seeming to prefer one denomination over another, then there is the risk of religious proselyting or the appearance of it even when not present.[6] None of these difficulties has

[5] The following studies are illuminating: Edwin G. Bock, *Fifty Years of Technical Assistance: Some Administrative Experiences of United States Voluntary Agencies* (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1954); American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, *The Role of Voluntary Agencies in Technical Assistance* (New York: The Council, 1953); James G. Maddox, *Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Merle Curti and Kendall Birr, *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1954).

[6] All this was recognized by these groups themselves from the outset. American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 132.

proved to be insurmountable; the voluntary groups have gotten approval in the Congressional inspections which have been made.

In numbers and dollars committed, the voluntary group contracts have not been as important as either the contracts-for-a-fee or with the universities. However, in terms of total impact, including their own funds expended, their history, and their promise for indefinite continuity, contracts with these agencies have been important indeed.

The first university contract dates from 1951, but once the device was inaugurated the number of contracts increased rapidly. A high point was reached in 1954. Then the pace slackened somewhat. By July of 1956, fifty-two universities were operating eighty-one contracts in thirty-eight countries. Currently there are fifty-three universities with seventy-nine contracts in thirty-two countries.[7]

## NATURE OF THE UNIVERSITY CONTRACT

What are these contracts like? Usually their duration has been for a term of three years, although many have been extended beyond that period. The contracts set up a relationship between the United States university and a university in the host country, with a ministry of that country or directly with the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) itself. The purpose may be broad and general or narrow and specific. The variety just about runs the gamut of possibility: The establishment of instructional programs such as colleges of agriculture, medicine, public and business administration; the inception of research programs in these and other fields; the provision of specific services such as agricultural extension, industrial development, educational films. One purpose is uniformly present, namely the education and training of host country personnel, both academic and technical, both within the host country and at the United States university itself.

The activities engaged in by the contracting university correspond to these objectives—class room and in-service instruction and advice as to courses and curricula; the stocking of libraries; the establishment of research facilities; the provision of audio-visual and other instructional materials; advice on teaching, research, and other methods; and help to the host institution as to the qualifications and selection of participants in training programs. It is indeed a broad scope of activity.

The fields of work which have received the most attention under university contracts are agriculture and education. For the first five years of universities' contracts (1951–56) the larger number of contracts were for these fields, 54.4 million dollars out of a 68 million dollar total. Public and business administration was a poor third accounting for about 5½ million dollars. Public health and engineering ranked next. Labor, information, and community development received attention as well. Incidentally, this corresponds quite well with the major objects of expenditure for technical co-operation as a whole.[8]

With what countries are these contracts established? The clue is provided by major United States foreign policy efforts. Just as the Near East and the Orient have received other attention, so

[7] A number of contracts had of course expired by this time; International Cooperation Administration, *Quarterly Summary Statements, ICA-Financed University Contracts in Operation as of December 31, 1958* (Mimeographed, Washington, D. C., 1958).

[8] According to the 1958 U. S. Budget; see p. 59, The Department of State, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*) except that public administration, public health and engineering, respectively, reversed their order on the list.

do they have the greater number of university contracts, 56 out of the 79 which are currently in operation. Latin America has 16; Africa, 6 and Europe 1.

*Nature of participating universities*

What universities hold these contracts? As one might suspect from the origins of the program and their predispositions toward agriculture, engineering, and education, the state and the Agricultural and Mechanical universities have participated most actively in these contracts abroad. Their dominance is all the more emphasized by the fact that whereas twenty-one institutions hold two or more contracts, of these only four are independent or private universities. Only one independent university holds three contracts; thirteen state institutions hold three or more contracts. And two state universities hold four contracts each.[9]

There are no particular conclusions to be drawn from this distribution of contracts other than those already alluded to. It does raise the question, however, as to how the selection is made of the university with which to contract when a certain country asks for assistance. Apparently just about every conceivable method has been utilized. Host countries have had a voice in the selection process. Mission directors and other top United States personnel abroad have made suggestions. Currently, the trend seems to be for the ICA program staff to feel out those institutions of higher learning which seem qualified to carry out the project contemplated, to get expressions of interest from those who respond affirmatively, and to proceed to a contract by a process of elimination and negotiation. It is difficult to conceive how it could be done differently.[10] The question as to how well the ICA has done in its selections is impossible to answer; it probably never will be answered, given all the intangibles of such situations and the factors over which the ICA cannot be expected to have had any control.

## PROBLEMS WITH THE UNIVERSITY CONTRACT

Fault has no doubt lain on both sides. There certainly have been many problems. One has been delay. It has not been unusual for a year to transpire between the initial contacts and the final approval of a contract. The same length of time or longer has frequently been necessary to secure an amendment to an existing contract. Delays have been particularly destructive in university contracts because the academic time schedule itself requires long, lead time for faculty assignments, and so forth.

To be sure, delay is inherent and unavoidable in the complex environment of foreign aid. There are involved many divisions and several levels of the ICA itself, the meeting of the multitudinous rules and regulations common to the federal government, the many agencies and persons of the host country involved. At the level of the contracting university itself there is time spent dealing with the department of instruction concerned and academic and business officials. This necessary time allowance everyone has been willing to concede. But for a long time, there was in the ICA no common point of reference for contract work. Contracts were everybody's business in that agency and consequently nobody's in terms of definite responsibility. The contracting university felt that evasive tactics were

[9] American Council on Education, Office of Institutional Projects Abroad, *University Campus Coordinators* (Mimeographed, Washington, D. C., October 20, 1958).

[10] See the ICA Manual and Illustrative Contract; Jerome Jacobson Associates, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), pp. 7–8, 30–34; American Council on Voluntary Agencies, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), pp. 126–33.

being used. This situation fortunately has been corrected. An office of contract relations was established on March 3, 1956—after five years of university contract experience!

Another common complaint was that every contract was a "new voyage to the Indies, only to discover America." Great time was consumed because there was no policy, no standard, no common terms for contracts. Each one had to be drawn from scratch. The situation got so bad that the Universities in Conference Assembled demanded an end to the contract and the substitution of the foundation grant type of financing. This the ICA found unable to do, but it did publish an illustrative contract with standard paragraphs; it produced a manual for contractors; and it made some important policy decisions as guidelines for contracting with the universities. Perhaps even more important, all these things were done co-operatively involving a working group of five university representatives named by the Office of Institutional Projects Abroad.

*Restrictive measures*

One of the common complaints during the early years was that the government contracts with universities were unnecessarily restrictive. The government insisted on all sorts of precautions and required certain financial risks which might be appropriate to the profit-making contract but were completely inappropriate to nonprofit institutions—especially to universities. The universities insisted that profit and nonprofit contracts should be handled in a different way and indeed, be different. The ICA has met much of this difficulty by creating within the Office of Contract Relations two basic divisions to work on the two different kinds of contracts. This has helped greatly, in the opinion of contractors. Also, the ICA removed as many mandatory orders as possible and gave to the universities greater discretion as to the hiring, maintenance, and salaries of overseas-serving personnel, attaching these actions to the established procedures and practices of the contractor rather than to more complex government regulations.

Security clearance for contract employees has been and continues, in a lessening measure, to be a problem creating delay. For a time there was no consistency in its application. Then an attempt was made, after ICA came into the picture, to apply the clearance rule universally. Such alleviation as has been gained has resulted because of the ICA's relenting on security checks for on-campus personnel and because security officers began to give a fairly quick tentative clearance on university faculty proposed for overseas service, based on a check of the files, and to complete the full field investigation only when derogatory information was discovered. On the whole, the situation has been improved; the delays due to security clearance have been lessened.

In all fairness, it should be added that ICA has had to contend in such matters with a waspish Congress. It was fair game in those days, and still is to some extent, for Congressmen who were defeated in their efforts to cut or drastically reduce foreign aid appropriations, to harass the agency of such aid. The harboring of Communist sympathizers and homosexuals was all too ready a charge for such legislators to make. Unfortunately, it must be added further that the Congressmen succeeded with some members of the ICA and did scare them into a mental state of insistence that the security door be barred and bolted as well as locked. Such Congressional onslaughts plus the general reluctance of the United States public to recognize foreign aid as a continuing obligation of the nation drove many fine people out of the ICA too. Small

wonder there were delays. Small wonder that the ICA has seemed slow to learn from the contracting experiences of other federal agencies, indeed from past technical assistance experience itself. Small wonder that there has been so little effort made to capture and record our foreign efforts, let alone to evaluate those efforts for the purpose of improvement.

*Proper preparation*

The fault has by no means been one-sided. A most frequent failure has been the reluctance, refusal, or inability of the universities to make a proper assessment of the situation; to plan adequately and prepare both personnel and facilities to do the new job in a strange land, using a foreign language; to install an unknown service or institution in a cultural context which has not of itself produced such a service and which therefore can be counted upon to have many built-in resistances to the new venture. There have been two parts to this common failure: First, an inadequate survey preceding the contract negotiations; second, an inadequate opportunity or inclination for the contracting university to "tool up" for its contract obligations.

If a complete preliminary survey is not made, then chances are that the project will not be satisfactorily described and that as a consequence the contract itself will be faulty. It is indeed amazing how many contracts have been rushed into without a full description of the program and of the respective roles of the contracting parties and their personnel, even without adequate financing. Overseas efforts at best are difficult and demanding. Yet seldom is the preliminary, that is, precontract survey longer than a few weeks. Some have taken only a few days. A number of contracts have been entered into without the contracting institution or any of its representatives ever having set foot in the host country. Can such preliminaries possibly be adequate, leaving aside entirely the quality of the survey?

Even after the contract has been established, proper preparation remains a problem. There is great pressure to "get started" once the contract has been signed. This is natural especially since almost inevitably some months, maybe a year or more have elapsed since the host country first brought its need to the attention of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in that country. But such hurry does not give the opportunity to answer the question, "Get started with what, how, when, where?"

Furthermore, there is not one university contractor who feels he has been given half a chance to prepare his staff for their overseas duties before their dispatch and after their arrival there. Contract personnel are usually totally ignorant of the history, religion, and culture of the host country. Only last year, 1958, after the ICA itself received funds for training its own personnel, did it start to make any concessions to the preparation of contract personnel. And these concessions are still far from being adequate.

Is it surprising then that we Americans keep on trying to do overseas exactly as we do at home, even when it is foredoomed to failure? We have not taken, or been permitted to take, the steps to find out what is foredoomed and what is not. Nor have our faculty members been permitted to learn better, either beforehand or on the job.

The universities should at least get credit for the fact that from the first they have rung the changes on this complaint. One of the very earliest formal presentations made to the ICA by the Committee on Institutional Projects Overseas involved this point.

It must be admitted that universities have not always done their best as con-

tractors. Some have acted as though they were willing to try anything as long as they secured the contract. A number of universities have accepted contracts not at all related to research and education or anything else with which they have been familiar. Others have entered into contracts despite the absence of facilities, especially expert personnel to carry out the obligations of the contract.

Some have simply not met their obligations. They have recruited staff from elsewhere and have not sent their own faculty overseas, or if they have, have not sent their best. They have not recognized or have refused to admit the inherent difficulty of the new task. They have not "shifted gears" into cross-cultural activity. Overseas projects have been regarded as secondary rather than as primary obligations. The need to change programs and procedures, to meet the new demands in new ways has not been met. Students and scholars have been admitted into graduate programs, for example, without the addition of facilities and staff to meet the special problems of foreign participants; nor has accommodation been made in traditional curricula to permit the foreign scholar to prepare to meet the problems he will encounter when he returns home. In short, in some cases the universities have belied the premise on which contracts have been let, namely, that they will bring their total resources to bear in helping the host country institution help itself. Fortunately, in the main, the promise has been kept. The total effect has been beneficial, so far as we know, and the United States universities themselves have benefited greatly.

*Field co-ordination*

The field relationship of contractor staff and Mission staff has been a problem from the outset. Part of this was because some of the universities accepting contracts in the early days acted as though they were getting a grant to do something on their own, only to find that they had contracted to carry out part of an ICA program, under ICA supervision.

The American Council on Education, Office of Institutional Projects Abroad, published a statement concerning the working relationships between the, then, Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) and college project staffs in the field. The statement called for "well-planned educational activities, under the guidance of professional staff, on the one hand and on the other, upon their development within the broad framework of public policy," as interpreted by the country director of the United States Operations Mission. In other words, the contract chief and the Mission Director were to keep each other informed currently, were to keep out of each other's jurisdictions, and were to work together in terms of broad objectives of foreign aid, guided by United States public policy. The diplomatic guidance of the United States Ambassador was also acknowledged. This statement, in the main, was accepted by the FOA, and this acceptance helped a great deal to clear the air and in time to secure the kind of co-ordination and separation of function which was required for effective contract operations.

Another thing that helped was the recognition that the better form of university contract was the so-called third-party, rather than the direct university-to-ICA kind. As time went on more and more contracts were written to relate the United States university directly to the host university or institution, with the United States acting as an interested party, but nevertheless the third party. With the contractor directly related to the host institution, the Mission staff's relationship became more general in character and less apt to

cause trouble, at least of a day-to-day variety.[11] Again the problem of field co-ordination has not been entirely solved, but it has been considerably ameliorated.

*Other problems*

There is not space in this article for a full discussion of the problems attending the university contract as a device of technical assistance. Let us simply list a few more:

The term of most contracts has been too short to match the normally long period of time required to develop teaching and research institutions and to install and get acceptance for new services related to such institutions. Three years has been standard. The result has been that many contracts have had to be extended, some more than once. Others have expired prior to real assurance of continuation of the "investment."[12]

There probably has been insufficient evaluation by ICA of program accomplishment in most contracts. Part of this is due to a "means orientation" rather than an "ends orientation" on the part of ICA staff—the apparent domination of the ICA administration, from time to time, by the lawyer and the auditor rather than by the program division chief. The greater part of this fault is probably due to the starvation rations on which Congress has kept ICA staffs. ICA and its predecessor agencies have never had enough money for administrative purposes, never enough staff to give surveillance to contracts, let alone evaluate their results.

The establishment of overhead rates on university contracts remains a problem. The present effort to separate overhead rates for off-campus from those for on-campus activities is not tenable; the rate attached to personal services only is not logical; the whole effort of ICA to cut down on universities' overhead rates is much more appropriate to the profit than it is to the nonprofit contracts. The same kind of problem attaches to other financing, as well. In few contracts has enough money been permitted for so-called indirect costs. For example, seldom is the work of overall supervision of a contract, as at the dean's level, adequately recognized or reimbursed. There is one phase which is not repaid at all and that is the precontract negotiations. Many man-hours may go into travel, discussions with ICA, drafting of documents, for which absolutely no monetary allowance is ever made. For profit contracts, this kind of risk-taking may be all right. It does not fit the atmosphere of a university, especially of the smaller institution which must subsist on private financing.

The illustrative contract will not solve all contracting problems. A great deal of tailoring will still be necessary to each individual project, to local needs both at the host institution and at the home campus and to specialized objectives and activities, as well. Policies and standards will help a great deal but there is still need for intelligent and sympathetic negotiating, on both sides of the bargaining table. In the language of diplomacy, what is needed here is a cessation of "individual treaties" in such contracts, and the adoption of the policy of "most favored nation" treatment—that is, a new benefit to one is added for all.

Has ICA almost exhausted the number of interested and qualified universities with which to contract? In fact, as suggested above, some contracts may

[11] National Planning Association, Special Policy Committee on Technical Cooperation, *Technical Cooperation in Latin America: Recommendations for the Future*, pp. 104–105 (Washington, D. C., 1956).

[12] Paul Beckett called the present system "fit and jerk" programming, *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 1958), p. 440.

well have been entered into with institutions who were not qualified. Yet the needs continue to grow. Is there need for some kind of "conditioning contract" whereby Uncle Sam would pay for a university to brief and orient its staff and to adapt its facilities to the contracted task?

Finally, is ICA making maximum utilization out of strengths it itself has helped create and develop in the universities? For example, at the present time ICA has been given funds for training of its own staff. Can ICA do this itself successfully? Can the Foreign Service Institute? How about bringing all interested parties—not just the ICA but also the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the foundations—together into a scheme to create centers for overseas education and training? Courses and curricula for government personnel and for contractors'; predeparture briefing and orientation; continued training for experienced personnel; perhaps even debriefing experiences and sabbatical spending for both government and academic personnel, not to mention contract research, especially of the evaluation kind—all this and more could be done at a number of centers. This should be not only in terms of language and of regional and national culture, but should also include role identification, considering how different the role of almost every technician who goes overseas is from the one he is accustomed to playing at home. The shift of role from "operator" to "adviser" is illustrative and most common.

## THE BALANCE: PROFIT OR LOSS?

This article may be considered by some as full of criticism which it is. The criticism is offered, however, with the motivation to be constructive.

What then is the balance? How has the contract worked as a device of foreign aid? It has worked. There have been mistakes and failures. But the net has been considerable gain.

The government of the United States has gained along the lines already suggested and now that there is more of an attitude of partnership on both parts, the gains should increase considerably.

The universities have gained a great deal as well. The faculty members who have been overseas have, in the main, returned refreshed and refurbished intellectually, with many new ideas for teaching and research. The students and faculty on the home campus have also gained both from direct contact with students and scholars from other countries and from the innovations and improvements made in courses and curricula for the accommodation of those scholars. The kind of soul searching and review which the cross-cultural contacts force upon the academic body is a salutary influence.

Broadened intellectual horizons have in turn been provided for the local communities which have played host to foreign scholars and educators and to the professional societies, service clubs, and other groups, which have sponsored, entertained, heard speeches from, and seen the exhibits of those scholars and educators.

It is impossible to quantify many of these gains. Some are so intangible as to resist definition. It would certainly be shortchanging the equation to measure results only in terms of new area and language programs.

Overseas, results can be quantified in terms of new institutions and services installed by contract and enduring for the indefinite future. Furthermore, and perhaps even more important have been the lasting influences of the impact of United States educational ideas and attitudes on the whole educational system of host countries. The attitude of the university as a service institution

wherein a highly trained faculty helps the community to solve its problems instead of as an ivory tower into which the intellectual elite retire from the mundane; the seminar, the work shop, the conference, and the discussion group as substitutes for the formal lecture as the exclusive teaching device; the participation of the student through such instructional devices and by independent use of the library, the laboratory, and the field survey—these and many other academic changes have been left behind in the host countries albeit many have been unconsciously acquired and indirectly inspired.

The people of the United States have gained too in that the contractors who are now experienced in the foreign aid business—especially the universities and voluntary service agencies—constitute an anchor to windward for public policy and a protection against political storms and abrupt administrative changes within the government itself. Poetic? Perhaps, but let us remember that the United States foreign aid program has had even more directors than name changes! Steadying influences are indeed necessary, outside as well as inside.

## OPERATING ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE NEWCOMER

And how should you who is considering this contract business for the first time, look upon it all? To enter or not to enter?

Do enter, but as you do, bear certain assumptions in mind.

You will gain from an overseas contract albeit not financially, since you will put more into it than you will get out, in money.

You will find it hard-going: One of the most challenging tasks you have ever faced. Be prepared to contemplate change in everything and everybody involved including yourself. United States higher education, you will find is heavily "culture-bound," and so are you.

You will put in what will appear to be endless hours of contract consideration and negotiation—it is a time-consuming process, and you will not be paid for most of it nor will your expenses direct and indirect be reimbursed.

You will not have enough time for the precontract survey; even if you had a year—you will likely have three weeks —it would not be enough.

You will not have enough time, money, or facility to give your overseas faculty and staff the language, culture, and role training they require either prior to departure or after arrival at their post of duty. Again, a whole year would be inadequate, given the dimensions of the need.

You will have "trouble" with the ICA, both in the contract negotiations and afterwards, both in Washington and in the host country. The academic and the bureaucratic worlds are two different planets, one inhabited by a breed of men accustomed to academic freedom, the other by a race accustomed to hierarchical restraints. But the chances are you will surmount these troubles. You will emerge from the fray thanking God for your brothers, the program men in ICA, be they from the Agriculture, Education, Industry, Public Administration or some other Division.

You will have "trouble" with the host country institutions. You may have what you consider to be a complete set of commitments spelled out for your host; but your host will not meet those commitments fully and expeditiously. Why? Not because he does not want to but because he cannot and because he does not know how. Be prepared to help him, even with his commitments to you, and you will win him in an "arena" of co-operation in which he will be particularly appreciative. The key struggle will be to get him to accept,

really accept, the total responsibility for whatever you turn over to him.

You will have "trouble" with your own university to bring into play all the resources you should command for your overseas contract. Better make sure you have firm topside support before you sign that contract! Otherwise you will find the Business Office and the Curriculum Committee and the Graduate Dean and the other instructional departments—even your own will cause you concern—resisting your requests for help and for change in heretofore well-established practices, desperately needed though you may argue these are. Your colleagues will not understand until they in turn have been cross-culturally baptized.

The term of your contract will not be long enough for you to accomplish completely what should be done, even if your contract is extended once or twice during its life. Getting acceptance for cultural change—and that is involved in every trial of foreign aid— is a long, long task; you will be through before you are ready unless you are one of the lucky ones and secure foundation and other private support so as to be able to continue American influence and "conscience" on the spot. The conflict arises out of the fact that cultural change is measureable only in generations; government contracts are measured in years, and Congressional appropriations are made a year at a time.

You will not be sure after you are all done whether your efforts have been a success or a failure. You will feel good about some things and badly about others. You will wish there were standards of performance against which to measure yours. You will probably come away from your overseas contract experience feeling that, all things considered, you have gotten more than you gave.

# Financing Technical Co-operation

By Rowland Egger

Abstract: The major problems of financing both multilateral and bilateral technical co-operation derive from the precarious year-to-year underwriting of the programs and from the organizational and administrative separation of technical and economic co-operation, including investment. Congressional attitudes toward continuing commitment to the United Nations Expanded Program, plus annual reauthorization of the bilateral program, create uncertainties which prevent technical co-operation staff from going forward with the recipient countries in the formulation of long-term national economic and social development programs. The lack of such long-term programs, moreover, prevents the development of bench marks and priorities for the proper planning and budgeting of both technical and economic assistance. Technical co-operation is in consequence largely occupied with a string of accidental, *ad hoc*, opportunistically undertaken projects, few of which relate themselves effectively to major ongoing influences in general economic and social change. This situation is exacerbated by the complete separation of technical and economic co-operation in the United Nations system and the substantial separation of technical and economic co-operation in a large part of the Mutual Security Program. The financing problems of technical co-operation will not be solved apart from the solution of the larger problem of financing economic development and until it is properly reintegrated into multilateral and bilateral programs of economic assistance.

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TECHNICAL co-operation has become one of the blessed words of the English language. During the decade since the gentleman from Independence enunciated the principle of Point Four, it has been incorporated into the public and official vocabulary and is currently used as though it had precision, content, and limitation. In fact, it has none of these characteristics.

It has never been possible to distinguish satisfactorily between technical and economic assistance in the bilateral programs—and for that matter, some military assistance partakes strongly of the nature of technical and economic co-operation, and vice versa. In the multilateral context, the distinction between regular and Expanded Program activities is a purely artificial accounting device, and the difference between economic and technical aid on the part of the lending agencies is sometimes hard to define. This inevitable vagueness has perplexed and irritated the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Congressional appropriations subcommittees, the United Nations General Assembly, and Committee Five for a long time.

It must be expected, therefore, that the semantic obscurity of "technical co-operation," which is only slightly less uncategorical than "underdeveloped country," should sometimes be evident in any discussion of its financial foundations. Perhaps the prudent approach to the problem is to deal only with the major institutionalized governmental programs specifically identified as technical co-operation. As *The Ugly American* suggests, this may result in the omission of some of the more colorful, and possibly the more significant, forays into social and economic change; however, it at least keeps the discussion within identifiable limits.

## MULTILATERAL TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

Multilateral technical co-operation is currently managed through six international agencies: the United Nations, the Colombo Plan, the Organization of American States, the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara, the Caribbean Commission, and the South Pacific Commission. The budgets of the three latter agencies are so small that they need not concern us. As has been suggested, some technical and economic co-operation is afforded by agencies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and others, but these activities are not identified as technical co-operation and will not be considered here.

Technical co-operation in the United Nations rests upon bifurcated financial pediments.[1] First, the "regular" programs of technical assistance undertaken by the United Nations and the specialized agencies, which in many cases antedate the establishment of the Expanded Program in 1950, are financed from the assessed budgets of the organizations. Second, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, actually administered by the United Nations and the specialized agencies, is financed through voluntary contributions to a sort of international community chest on the part of Member States and other well-wishers of multilateral technical co-operation.

Operationally, the distinction is hardly worth drawing. Projects have been moved from regular to expanded programs and back again, and sometimes

[1] Walter R. Sharp, *International Technical Assistance* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1952), pp. 8–14 and 59–106, summarizes the regular program activities as of the time of the establishment of the Expanded Program.

it is difficult to ascertain where the project belongs until the final accounting is made. This is as it should be, and rigidity with respect to project financing on the basis of the derivation of funds would immeasurably complicate an already difficult and perplexing administrative problem. On the other hand, the fact that the organizations are engaged in the same kinds of activities supported by Expanded Program funds from their regular budgets and are engaged in surveys and research under their regular programs which by the most ephemeral psychological accommodation on the part of the accountants could be transformed into projects eligible for Expanded Program financing, militates strongly against effective control by the Technical Assistance Board (TAB) of even Expanded Program activities.

## UN REGULAR PROGRAM OPERATIONS

As the report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1957 points out:

> The amount of technical assistance provided under the Regular Programmes varies widely as between one Participating Organization and another. For example, in the Regular Programmes of ICAO and ITU there is at present virtually no provision for technical assistance of the kind given under the Expanded Programme. The regular budget of the ILO provides only small sums specifically earmarked for technical assistance, and that of FAO none at all. On the other hand, UNTAA, UNESCO and, more especially WHO, provide a substantial volume of technical assistance under their Regular Programmes, even though each of them handles a much larger volume of assistance under the Expanded Programme.[2]

Technical co-operation financed from the regular budgets of participating organizations is paid for, of course, by the annual assessments made by the organizations upon the Member States for the total expenses of the organization. The percentage rates of assessment against the United States for 1958 were as follows: United Nations 32.51; Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 32.51; International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 33.33; International Labor Organization (ILO) 25.00; International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 4.88; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 31.30; Universal Postal Union (UPU) 2.71; World Health Organization (WHO) 32.38; World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 15.19; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 33.33.[3]

It should be noted that neither the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development nor the International Monetary Fund participate in the Expanded Program so that all of their technical assistance operations are, in effect, Regular Program. The Bank spent in 1958, $639,347 for services to Member Countries, largely technical assistance.[4] The Fund does not separately designate technical co-operation in its administrative budget, but its activities in the field are substantial.[5] The administrative budgets of both organizations are sustained, of course, from earnings on their capital and are not assessed against Member States.

## EXPANDED PROGRAM OPERATIONS

The Expanded Program of the United Nations is financed from voluntary contributions made annually at a pledging

[2] E/3080 (United Nations, 1958), p. 50.

[3] *United States Contributions to International Organizations*, House Document No. 360, 85th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1958), pp. 52–65.

[4] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Thirteenth Annual Report 1957–1958* (Washington, 1958), p. 57.

[5] International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report 1958* (Washington, 1958), pp. 11, 16, 31.

conference usually held toward the end of the session of the General Assembly. From the inception of the Expanded Program in 1950 until the programing of 1956 operations, the money secured by the pledging conferences was distributed according to a percentage formula set up by the General Assembly as follows: United Nations 23; ILO 11; FAO 29; UNESCO 14; ICAO 1, WHO 22.[6] This purely arbitrary pie cutting was unsatisfactory to many of the national delegations, and largely under the leadership of France, the Economic and Social Council in 1954 took certain limited steps toward the integration of operations carried on with the voluntary contributions. It required the development of projects on the basis of country programs formulated by the requesting governments in consultation with resident representatives of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board and the allocation of funds to organizations in accordance with approved projects. However, a stop-loss order was included, which prevents any organization from receiving less than 85 per cent of the amount received the previous year.[7]

The Technical Assistance Board, which is the co-ordinating mechanism of the Expanded Program, except for its independent chairman is composed of the executive heads of the specialized agencies participating in Expanded Program funds. The heads of the technical co-operation programs in the several agencies normally sit for their principals in the Board. In other words, the co-ordinators are the same as the co-ordinated. In these circumstances it is understandable that the status quo ante in respect to the allocation of voluntary contributions to the participating agencies has been maintained with some rigor and that, except for very minor variations, the money is apportioned in about the same relative amounts provided for in the original formula.

In 1958 total pledges by 84 governments for the support of the Expanded Program were $32,317,900. The United States pledged $15,500,000 or 45 per cent of total contributions, whichever was the smaller. Total contributions of $34,444,445 would have been required to collect the maximum United States pledge; the actual United States contribution is approximately $14,543,000. Eleven other governments, including the Federal Republic of Germany which is not a member of the United Nations, account with the United States for about 83 per cent of all pledges. These are: Australia $625,000; Brazil $832,400; Canada $2,000,000; Denmark $579,100; France $1,542,900; Federal Republic of Germany $952,400; India $525,000; Netherlands $1,092,500; Sweden $792,600; USSR $1,000,000; United Kingdom $2,240,000.[8]

The USSR contribution, which with the pledges of the rest of the Communist bloc came to $1,349,600 in 1958, is far from an unmixed blessing.[9] The contributions are in the main in nonconvertible rubles, zlotys, and others. The USSR, moreover, has refused to permit

[6] *United Nations Technical Assistance Conference: Resolutions and Final Act* (United Nations, 1950), E/CONF. 10/11.

[7] Economic and Social Council Resolution 542 B (IX). The scheme is described in detail in the *Report of the Technical Assistance Board 1955* (United Nations, 1956), E/2842, paragraphs 32–33 and 393–400. See also Goldschmidt's discussion of country programing procedures, this issue of THE ANNALS, pp. 54–55.

[8] *United States Contributions to International Organizations* (note 3, *supra*) pp. 76–77. Total adjusted in accordance with additional pledges reported by TAB in *Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1957* (United Nations, 1958), pp. 93–94.

[9] See Robert L. Allen, "United Nations Technical Assistance: Soviet and East European Participation." *International Organization*, Vol. 11, No. 615 (Autumn 1957).

more than 25 per cent of its contribution to be converted into other currencies, and then only for projects which it approves. To be sure, other countries make contributions in nonconvertible currencies or currencies of limited convertibility to the Expanded Program; but while the British pound has until very recently been nonconvertible, there has always been a brisk demand for British pounds in connection with projects undertaken under the Expanded Program. The same demand for Iron Curtain currencies does not exist. In effect the UN administers two programs of technical co-operation—one for countries in which it can utilize Soviet bloc currencies and another for other countries requesting assistance. Much of the Soviet bloc contribution can, as a practical matter, be used only for supplies and equipment from the Iron Curtain countries since few Soviet experts come to the multilateral programs and no experts go to the Soviet. The net effect of Soviet policies is to subvert the multilateral program of the UN and to make it in some places, such as India, a mere appendage of Soviet export operations. As a practical matter, the Expanded Program would be substantially better off if the Communist bloc would keep their pledges, like their money, at home.

Allocational data for 1958 have not yet been published, but there is little reason to think that they will differ substantially from 1957. Total regular earmarkings for 1957 were $31,321,327, of which the percentages attributable to the various participating organizations and the TAB were as follows: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAA) 21; ILO 11; FAO 25; UNESCO 14; ICAO 4; WHO 17; ITO 1; WMO 1; TAB 6.[10] Bearing in mind that the total has been required to accommodate the TAB overhead, plus participation by ITU and WMO not provided for in the original formula, it seems clear that disturbances in the financing patterns of the participating agencies under the new dispensation have been held to a minimum.

## THE COLOMBO PLAN

The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, which is neither an organization nor an operation, grew out of the meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Ceylon in January 1950.[11] This meeting was concerned with the problem of raising living standards in the countries of South and Southeast Asia. The Consultative Committee created by the meeting of Foreign Ministers met in Sydney in May 1950. It recommended: (1) that each of the countries in South and Southeast Asia draw up a broadly based six-year plan of economic development to cover the period July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1957; (2) that members of the Consultative Committee pledge themselves to a program of technical assistance amounting to a maximum of 8 millions over a period of three years from July 1, 1950. These pledges have from time to time been expanded and renewed.

The only central machinery established by the Colombo Plan is a small secretariat at Ceylon which expedites bilateral negotiations; however, the Consultative Committee continues to meet regularly. The Plan itself provides no experts, offers no fellowships or study grants, manages no investments. When a country in the area requires a foreign technician, it makes a request to Ceylon, which in turn puts the requesting government in touch with a government

[10] *Op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*) p. 60.

[11] A good summary of Colombo Plan operations is contained in *Technical Assistance*, Senate Report No. 139, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1957), pp. 211–14.

having available the kind of help required. From that point on, negotiations are bilateral. If an expert is sent, the cost is charged to the sending country's pledge to the total technical co-operation expenditure.

The Colombo Plan is mainly significant for its emphasis on national economic planning as the foundation for economic development; the importance which it has given to training; its success in combining technical and economic aid. This does not mean that the Colombo Plan has been any more successful than other schemes of technical co-operation. Some of the national plans of economic development drawn up for the initial six-year period were no better than those which have been cobbled together in response to the Expanded Program of the United Nations. Pakistan's first six-year plan, as its prime architect, Chaudri Mohammed Ali, freely admitted, was little more than a string of projects which collapsed completely after the cessation of hostilities in Korea depressed the world jute market. India, on the other hand, had done a considerable amount of work even before Partition on establishing a scheme of priorities for national economic development. The Tata Plan and the Five-Year Plan had produced a body of fairly competent technicians and no little economic and political sophistication in respect to purposeful social and economic change. While its current six-year plan shows some signs of disorientation, in contrast to the remarkable achievements of Pakistan and the Littauer School during the past four years, economic planning at least on the subcontinent is still a going concern.

The Colombo Plan has also put much more emphasis on training than has either the United Nations or the United States bilateral programs. The United Nations ratio of trainees to experts, under both regular and expanded programs, is about 0.9 trainees to 1 expert. The United States ratio is about 1.3 trainees to 1 expert. Colombo Plan trainees number about 7 to each expert.

The combination of technical and economic aid in the same project, which has been carried to an advanced stage in many projects engineered under the auspices of the Colombo Plan, is also highly instructive. This has permitted and fostered the maintenance of a close reciprocal relationship between co-operation and economic and social development which has sometimes become attenuated in programs such as those of the United Nations and the United States, where the authority and responsibility for technical co-operation and for economic assistance have become rather widely separated. Technical co-operation that is not directly and visibly related to economic development is not very different from the kind of mere "do-good" for which the nations striving for economic change have little need or desire in these parlous times. On the other hand, foreign investment and domestic economic change that is not built upon solid foundations of economic and social knowledge can readily defeat the objectives of development programs and hinder, rather than aid, the process of orderly social improvement. In addition, as every knowledgeable civil servant knows, it is much easier to finance the cost of adequate technical preparation as a part of the cost of getting the work done than as an independent undertaking that must be justified separately from the end product itself.

### THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

The Organization of American States and its associated specialized agencies conduct technical assistance activities in a pattern somewhat similar to that of the United Nations and raise some of

the same problems of interorganizational relationships.[12]

First, it should be noted that the specialized agencies associated with the Organization of American States have for some time engaged in certain technical assistance activities and financed these operations from their regular assessed budgets. The activities of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau in the promotion of public health, for example, antedated by many years the formal establishment of the OAS at Bogotá in 1948. Other specialized agencies, such as the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences and the Inter-American Statistical Institute have similarly carried on technical assistance work as a part of their regular operations, as has the Pan American Union. The percentages of the regular budgets of these organizations currently assessed against the United States are as follows: OAS 66; Inter-American Children's Institute 40; Inter-American Indian Institute 17.39; Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences 67.23; Pan American Institute of Geography and History 39.02; Pan American Sanitary Bureau 66.[13] The budget of the Statistical Institute is provided by OAS.

However, shortly after President Truman's 1949 inaugural address, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council established a Committee on Technical Co-operation to develop a special technical assistance program for OAS. This was done, and a Coordinating Committee on Technical Assistance, composed of the executive heads of the participating agencies or their representatives, was established generally to manage and supervise the program. The participating agencies are: The American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood, the Inter-American Indian Institute, the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, the Inter-American Statistical Institute, the Inter-American Institute of Geography and History, the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, and the Pan American Union, which is the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.

The annual work programs developed by the Coordinating Committee, reviewed by the Committee on Technical Assistance, and finally approved by the Economic and Social Council, are financed by voluntary pledges from the 21 republics. Total pledges for 1957 were $1,787,587, of which the United States pledged 70 per cent, or $1,251,311.[14]

The special technical co-operation program financed by voluntary contributions supplies no direct technical assistance. Direct technical assistance is provided by the regular programs of the participating organizations. The special program is centered entirely in a series of regional training operations desired by member governments and sponsored by the participating organizations, sometimes in collaboration with national governmental agencies. As in the UN Expanded Program, money must be apportioned to participating agencies. But OAS fortunately avoided the UN experience and started out with specific projects as the center of fiscal and administrative gravity. Hence the allocation of funds to a participating organization in the OAS program is in fact an incident of project authorization. In the UN it is only in theory an incident of project authorization; the converse is more likely to be true. The Pan American Union, moreover, started out with

[12] See Philip M. Glick's excellent chapter on the OAS program in his *The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 318–37. This is the best analysis in depth of technical assistance administration that has so far been made.

[13] *Op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 66–69.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 46 and 71.

a firmer hand on the special program and has maintained more control than the United Nations secretariat has ever been able to exercise. The kind of work undertaken under the OAS special program, being essentially institutional in character, perhaps lends itself better to integrated management than the scattered techniques of the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

Despite the generally favorable recognition accorded to the regional training approach to technical assistance, for which Alberto Lleras is primarily responsible, the special OAS program is criticized for some of the same shortcomings of the UN program—inadequate articulation of technical and economic assistance and inadequate national economic planning as a foundation for purposeful social and economic change.

### BILATERAL TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

Bilateral technical co-operation constitutes about 4.66 per cent of the total Mutual Security Program. Of the total Mutual Security Agency (MSA) new funds appropriated for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1958 in the amount of 2,769 million dollars, technical co-operation received 130 million dollars. The bigger portion goes for other purposes—military assistance 1,340 million dollars, defense support 689 million dollars, the development loan fund 300 million dollars, special assistance 225 million dollars, and special multilateral and other programs 85 million dollars.[15] All this comes from direct appropriations from the United States Treasury and is financed by tax and other revenues of the United States Government.

These technical co-operation funds go primarily to maintain some 4,500 United States nationals, more or less expert, in about 65 countries and overseas possessions of other countries in which technical co-operation agreements are operative and to finance fellowships for 5,300-odd persons from countries receiving technical assistance for study and training in the United States. Of the technicians abroad, approximately 40 per cent are in the Far East, 31 per cent in the Near East and South Asia, 20 per cent in Latin America, 7 per cent in Africa, and 2 per cent in Europe. Some of the larger missions include Korea with over 400 technicians; Thailand with more than 350; Vietnam with about 300; Iran with almost 300; Pakistan with 250; and Turkey, India, and Cambodia with about 200 each. Of the trainees, about 30 per cent are from the Far East, 13 per cent from the Near East, 25 per cent from Europe, 31 per cent from Latin America, and 1 per cent from Africa.[16]

Although the general bilateral program of technical co-operation will soon be ten years old, and although the regional program inaugurated by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs began almost a decade earlier, the political mythology of the Congress insists upon regarding technical co-operation as a transient phenomenon. The Mutual Security Act annually extends for one year the program of technical co-operation and authorizes, also for one year, appropriations from which funds for the support of the program are allocated. This one-year-at-a-time program authorization is despite a report of the same committee which considers the Mutual Security Act to the effect that:[17]

> It cannot be too strongly emphasized nor too often reiterated that technical assistance is a long-range program in which continuity of effort is at least as important as magnitude of effort. A basic project can hardly be well-started in a year, much less com-

[15] International Cooperation Administration, *Operations Report: Data as of June 30, 1957* (Washington, 1957), inside cover.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 47–52.

[17] *Op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), p. 27.

pleted in that time. The subcommittee has seen projects operated by private agencies which turned out to be highly successful, but which had to be carried on for as long as 6 or 7 years before they began to take hold.

In American politics it is understandable that a Congressional committee should at times ignore the request of the President, as the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has, for more realistic enabling legislation for mutual security. It is understandable that one Congressional committee should ignore the advice of another. But for a committee to ignore pointedly the advice of its own subcommittee emphasizes the extent to which the mutual security program has become the tool of personal power politics amongst Congressional committee chairmen.[18]

Some of the reluctance of Congress to provide authorization and financing of technical co-operation on a continuing basis may be attributable to the shaky programmatic foundations of technical co-operation budgeting. Presentations by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress are based upon "illustrative" project budgets rather than anything resembling firm work programs. To a limited extent this is inevitable, since ICA does not initiate technical co-operation projects, and it is difficult to forecast the demands of receiving governments for technical co-operation. On the other hand, one of the major factors contributing to the planless and wholly *ad hoc* basis of project formulation is the failure of technical co-operation to develop the kind of systematic planning for economic development in countries receiving technical assistance that would provide criteria for the judgment of project priorities. An astute observer of bilateral technical co-operation in Latin America where technical co-operation has had the longest history and where administrative arrangements should be the best developed, has written:[19]

> The habits of independent operation which IIAA's field missions had enjoyed since 1942 were reluctantly yielded and in some countries not surrendered at all. Where the country director and the heads of the principal technical missions had themselves come to realize the need for broader planning, they welcomed the new structure and it worked reasonably well. In other countries it was difficult, as late as 1955, to see evidence that program planning for economic development was seriously pursued.

On the other hand, Congress has been little more willing to give long-term authorization for military assistance, which is planned and budgeted on a fairly comprehensive country-program basis. This suggests that something besides the adequacy of program and budgetary mechanics underlies the unwillingness of Congress to concede that technical co-operation is a continuing function of the United States Government.

### UNSOLVED FINANCING PROBLEMS

Obviously, the major unsolved problems of both multilateral and bilateral technical co-operation are their precarious financial underwriting. The annual pledging conferences of the United Nations and the Organization of American States and the annual renewal of authority and funds for the bilateral program of the United States Government provide no adequate foundations upon which a planned and systematic attack on problems of economic development can be based. Even the loose-knit Colombo Plan, which established no elabo-

[18] See H. Field Haviland, Jr., "Foreign Aid and the Policy Process 1957," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 52, No. 680 (September 1958).

[19] Glick, *op. cit.* (note 12 *supra*), p. 118.

rate central administrative machinery, started off with technical co-operation support pledged for a three-year period. There has never been a time when either the United Nations Expanded Program or the United States Point Four program could look that far ahead.

This does not mean that the programs have been starved. On the contrary, there are strong reasons for thinking that the Senate committee was correct in its estimate that the present levels of technical co-operation represent about the optimum capacity of the recipient countries to absorb technical assistance and use the kind of technical training the programs provide.[20] The problem is not the inadequacy of funds available for technical co-operation but the uncertainty under which the organizers of technical co-operation must operate. This is, of course, primarily a psychological matter. But United States Congressional policy seems to have been carefully calculated to maximize the uncertainty and to prevent any reassuring conclusions from being drawn from the fact that we have actually pledged and paid our part of the United Nations Expanded Program each year or from the fact that we have extended the authorization and appropriated substantial funds for the bilateral program in each session of Congress.

There is no real assurance, either at the UN or in Washington, that technical co-operation will be continued. This means, as has been pointed out, that: [21]

> At the present time our overseas operations are gravely burdened by the necessity of coping with ten- and twenty-year problems with four- or five-year projects manned by one- or two-year personnel.... We cannot keep repeating the first year of our programs; sometime we have got to get on to the second and third and tenth and twentieth year.

This very precariousness of financial underwriting, on the other hand, militates against the kind of technical assistance capable of stimulating and co-operating in the formulation of soundly based national plans of economic development that would get technical co-operation off its present *ad hoc* and largely opportunistic basis into the main stream of national and international affairs. For example, although only nine of the thirty-eight countries included in the TAB evaluation review in 1957 had anything resembling adequate plans of economic development, the Expanded Program was devoting only 14 per cent of total field program expenditures to national planning development and the improvement of public administration.[22] Although it is not possible to make a meaningful comparison with the United States bilateral program, its contribution to the furtherance of planning for national economic development is largely imperceptible.

Furthermore, although ICA makes a considerable point of the increase in "project-type" assistance, in which the bilateral program supplies technical "know-how" and equipment for specific projects, the fact remains that the project program is still only a little more than half of the total program.[23] This is a substantial improvement, however, over 1953 and 1954, when the project program was about one-sixth of the total. Since the United Nations program of technical co-operation is not accompanied by defense support, development assistance, and other economic aid, none of its work is "project-type" assistance in the ICA sense of the term.

On the other hand, the complete sepa-

[20] *Op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), pp. 25 and 272–73.

[21] Harland Cleveland and Gerard J. Mangone (Eds.), *The Art of Overseasmanship* (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1957), p. 150.

[22] *Op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), pp. 16 and 74.

[23] *Op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*), p. 7.

ration of Expanded Program technical co-operation from the activities of the Bank, the Fund, and the International Finance Corporation has tended further to shunt the Expanded Program out of the main stream of economic development activities. It is of some significance that the over-all surveys which in several countries have provided the basic data for national economic development planning have been made under the auspices of the Bank itself; the Expanded Program has had little or no part in them.

This separation of general technical co-operation and investment and economic assistance, most pronounced in the United Nations program and the OAS program, not only tends to establish a low ceiling for technical co-operation financing, but divides economic development activities which should never be permitted to pull apart. No ILO technical assistance mission, for example, should go into a country to establish or revise its labor and social security legislation and administration without understanding fully the ramifications of its work in respect of investments, production costs, and profits. No International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Finance Corporation mission should go into a country with funds for investment in industrial or commercial development without understanding fully the implications of its investment with respect to wages, conditions of labor, social security, education, health, and the public welfare. No social worker or public health expert should go into a country without understanding that his business is fundamentally economic development, and no industrial or transportation adviser should go in without understanding that his business is fundamentally the improvement of living conditions. The supreme business of all of them, of course, is to help in the building of indigenous institutions for the management and development of a democratic polity and economy.

# The Role of the Technical Expert

By Lynton K. Caldwell

Abstract: Insofar as we can realistically speak of an expert's "role" it is shaped by four principal elements, only one of which can be relied upon to approximate constancy. These elements are the technical co-operation agency, the expert himself, the requirements of the task to be fulfilled, and the host government. Each of these elements is subject to variations and contradictions that make it improbable that a generally satisfactory definition of the expert's role will be discovered accidentally. The great variety of technical co-operation tasks and the individual differences among experts make generalizations concerning the role of experts of questionable validity. Insofar as clarity of purpose regarding objectives is shared by the technical co-operation agency, its expert, and the host government, clarification of the expert's role becomes more nearly possible. Responsibility for the clarification necessarily rests primarily with the co-operation agency. It is in the planning of the project and in the selection and briefing of the expert that the shared objectives of the project are brought to focus on the particular task to which the expert is assigned and hence on the role which he is to play.

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THE ROLE of the expert is compounded of a number of elements, principal among which are: definition of his task by the agency employing him; his own view of his role; the knowledge, skills, and action that his task requires; and receptivity in the host country where he is to work. When related in a mutually consistent manner, these elements provide a basis for clarity of decision as to what the expert should do—when, where, and how. But when these elements are inconsistent, or in conflict one with another, the expert will at best experience frustration and at worst he will experience failure.

To the degree that communication and comprehension are refined and perfected, the operating problems of the expert are minimized. Unfortunately for the expert, the processes of human communication and of understanding are grossly imperfect. Technical co-operation is therefore much less "technical" than the term might suggest.

The environment of the expert is characterized by relativity and uncertainty. It is rarely definable in extremes of black and white, but rather in an infinity of grays that vary in scope and intensity with change of time and circumstance. There is no attaining absolute harmony among the elements that determine his role. Thus the expert works in an environment in which operating problems, being inevitable, should be anticipated. Only through correctly appraising the problems with which he is confronted can he discover how most effectively to play the role for which he has been cast.

The role of the expert in technical co-operation does not really differ in principle from many other occupational roles in society. The elements of: definition of the job by the employer, employee self-image, employee's knowledge and skills, and expectations of clientele combine to form the roles of the members of any administrative organization. What is distinctive about the role of the expert in international technical co-operation is the degree to which disparities exist among these elements and hence the multiplication of points at which misunderstanding and conflict may occur.

Cultural differences underlie most of the operating problems encountered in technical co-operation. Where recognized and understood, differences in values, attitudes, and customs may be taken into account and possibly dealt with successfully. Misunderstanding and conflict are more likely to occur when deep-seated cultural values indirectly and unobtrusively influence policies and attitudes in the institutional framework within which the expert works. The expert may fail to interpret these policies and attitudes correctly because he has not perceived the cultural forces that make them intelligible.

Where cultural differences within national boundaries are pronounced, many of the difficulties which confront the expert in the international environment emerge. Efforts of the government of the United States to influence and assist the American Indians provide numerous illustrations. In the international context, the experiences of various missionary ventures and of colonial administrations are instructive. What they teach is that the factors which determine the success of the technically qualified expert are, broadly speaking, cultural.

Cultural differences, including psychological differences, condition human relations in whatever context they occur. Only through realistic appraisal of the influence of these cultural factors upon the task before him can the technical co-operation expert discover how to play his role effectively. This appraisal may be intuitive as well as conscious and systematic; it will in some measure unavoidably be subjective. If the expert is

to play a constructive role, the "sizing-up" of his job must be somewhere near correct. To the extent that he is unable to appraise the conditioning circumstances correctly, constructive accomplishment on his part is largely a matter of chance.

## AGENCY CONCEPT OF THE JOB

Initial determination of the role of the expert is begun by the government that requests technical co-operation, but the formal definition of that role is principally a responsibility of the agency that supplies it. The agency may be any of several types. It may be an international organization, such as the United Nations; it may be an agency established by a national government, as for example the United States International Cooperation Administration; or it may be a nongovernmental philanthropic foundation or consulting firm. The agencies that initially define the expert's job obviously set the conditions that influence the choice of individuals to fill the job, and the subsequent development of the expert's role in relation to the job.

The fewer the commitments of the technical co-operation agency, the simpler and easier will be the definition of its mission and, to this extent, of the expert's role. As the number of voices seeking to define the mission of the agency increases, the chances for a consistent, generally acceptable definition diminish. Thus private consulting firms and foundations are ostensibly better able to develop a clear concept of the technical co-operation job than is the governmental or international agency that must try to reconcile larger and more complex differences of viewpoint, interest, and objective.

When the newly recruited technical co-operation expert first attempts to find out just what his agency expects of him, his introduction to the frustrations of his assignment begins. He discovers, but not always as readily as he should, that his employing agency is an abstraction. The reality is the officials, line, and staff, who negotiate agreements, draft contracts, write policy directives, control expenditures and enforce personnel rules. The expert may discover that the executive officer who must authorize his transportation and housing in the field does not necessarily have the same concept of his role as the program officer who prepared the specifications for his assignment. He may learn to his dismay that the concept of his job held by agency representatives in the field is not necessarily the one he understood to be held at agency headquarters.

As he moves to implement his assignment in action, he may find himself pulled up short by budget or personnel officers who are proceeding along lines of reasoning quite dissimilar from those that are uppermost in his mind. Technical co-operation operations abroad tend to exaggerate the already existing differences between line and staff responsibilities. The staff continues to function within the confines of its own culture or administrative milieu whereas the line, to which the expert belongs, must adapt to conditions in the host country.

### *Defining the task*

In the course of time, the expert discovers that the agency concept of his role is a composite of diverse objectives assumptions, and attitudes. Idiosyncracies of agency administrators, the various regulations and procedures of the agency, the prevailing political situation in Congress or in Committee Five, the relative temperature of the cold war—all are random examples of the types of factors that may influence the agency concept of the expert's job.

It is not in the nature of the situation for anyone in his agency to be able to tell him fully or exactly what his

role is intended to be. And, in any event, the capacity of the employing agency to define his role is limited by the specific nature of the work to be done and circumstances in the host country which influence the shaping of his role regardless of intentions in his employing agency.

In brief, the expert needs to understand at an early stage in his work that his agency cannot, indeed should not, provide him with a complete or wholly consistent definition of his task. This is not necessarily an undesirable state of affairs, particularly when, as often happens, the expert is engaged in an exploratory or pioneering venture. But the expert does need agency support in identifying the forces and factors that shape his job in order to avoid embarrassment to himself and disaster to his program. He needs to know the apparent limits of the possible and the permissible so that if these boundaries present obstacles to his assignment, he may prepare himself to cope with them.

Certainly the agency can increase the possibilities for successful technical cooperation insofar as it can achieve clarity and consistency in its purposes and operations. Effective executive leadership at the top levels of technical cooperation agencies is an essential condition for the formulation and propagation of agency concepts that give unity and drive to agency programs. Where top policy leadership falters, subsidiary influences in the agency—notably legal, fiscal, and careerist—gain in relative strength. Lacking guidance from the top, they proceed to affect agency policy in their own respective ways, sometimes in a manner inconsistent with agency program objectives. The agency cannot and should not attempt to define completely the expert's role; but to the extent that the agency heads are unclear or indecisive regarding goals and objectives, the agency cannot provide the guidance and support that the expert may rightfully expect from it.

### SELF-IMAGE OF THE EXPERT

Even if circumstances did not compel the expert to play a large part in the definition of his role, his behavior would in any case be influenced by his concept of himself in relation to his concept of the task.

There is an obvious relationship between the expert's self-image and the reasons he entered international technical co-operation work. The reasons are usually mixed. They are not necessarily consistent, and they are always personalized beyond any possibility of categorical analysis. Among the reasons that motivate experts, the following may be identified as fairly common: urge to help people in need of his expertise, desire for change and adventure, professional challenge of the assignment, improved living standard, sense of obligation to his employer, and escape from some of life's insoluable complications.

The motives of the expert may therefore be influenced by factors unrelated to his actual assignment in the field. Dissatisfaction with his job at home, difficult domestic relations, desire to enhance his professional reputation, or merely to earn more money may be the decisive factors in his decision to accept an assignment abroad. These self-serving factors may, but do not of necessity, preclude the expert's giving his best to his field assignment. If theoretically "appropriate" motives were an exclusive basis for determining which experts engaged in international technical cooperation work, their numbers would indeed be few. Selfless motivation offers no assurance of an expert's effectiveness.

The self-image of the expert in relation to his task involves also his assumptions regarding the people with whom he is to work, particularly the nationals of the host country. What he thinks

the host country people think of him, what he wants them to think of him will also influence his appraisal of the total situation and his role in it. Casual observation, insofar as it can be relied upon, indicates that the American technical expert characteristically differs from his European or Asian counterpart in his greater concern for being liked and his lesser sophistication in relations with host country peoples. As a result, the behavior of some American experts abroad is puzzling to host country associates. Their apparent disregard of national values and sensitivities does not seem to square with protestations of friendliness. Nevertheless, the open friendliness of many American experts has often won friends where the status-conscious reserve of certain experts from older cultures has imposed an additional barrier between the expert and the host country people.

There is a myth pervasive among large numbers of Americans that, beneath superficial dissimilarities, people everywhere are fundamentally the same. In a rigorously limited sense the belief may be valid; in the broad generalizing sense in which it is often used, it is untrue and misleading. The myth makes mischief when the American expert convinces himself that people everywhere really want to be like Americans and that present dissimilarities are largely the consequence of "regressive" forces such as economic underprivilege, colonialism, tradition-bound authoritarianism, communalism, and "immorality."

A misconception of this sort can seriously prejudice the ability of the expert to play a constructive role abroad. He may in effect become a missionary more concerned with the cultural transformation of the host country than with the specific problem for which his assistance has been sought. In host country eyes, he may well be an egregious meddler who must be tolerated if he cannot be dismissed. Non-Western peoples in particular have developed immunities to gratuitous interference by well-meaning representatives of more "advanced" cultures. The expert is permitted to keep himself busy in relatively harmless ways while host country officials employ tactics of procrastination, deliberation, and delay until his tour of duty ends.

In brief, the self-image of the expert may be neither more nor less realistic than those of people in other walks of life. It is the effect of his self-image on the situation in which he operates that makes it important. For in his situation, human relations assume a problematic character that is much greater than he would ordinarily experience in his own country or among his own people.

### REQUIREMENTS OF THE TASK

The tasks for which technical co-operation is sought are not abstract technical problems; they involve factors of time, place, and people. The interrelations between these factors and the particular need for which the knowledge and skills of the expert are sought are seldom understood and interpreted in the same way by all of the parties concerned. Top leadership in the technical co-operation agencies, and frequently also in host countries, tends to appraise the task of the expert in political terms whereas the expert and sometimes his host country counterparts tend to think in technical or professional terms. Technical co-operation administrators, having ideas of their own about what is good for the host country, may not be altogether frank with host country officials about what they intend that the expert accomplish. And there are circumstances, some of which will presently be detailed, under which host country officials cannot or will not define the technical co-operation task in realistic terms. National pride, political insecurity, lack

of information or understanding are among the more apparent reasons for an inapt projection of the task by host country officials.

The expert arrives on the scene of action to begin his work. How will his task shape his role? Particularly if he is inexperienced in international technical co-operation, the factors in the task that in the beginning will appear most important are the demands made upon his particular brand of expertise, upon his professional knowledge and skills, as for example engineering, medicine, agriculture, or accounting. These technical requirements of the task are important and do shape the expert's role; but they also entail factors of place and people. If, for example, the expert's task involves improving potato culture in the Peruvian Andes, he may have to consider how to obtain changes in agriculture as practiced by the Andean Indian whose culture belongs more to the sixteenth than to the twentieth century and who notoriously lacks enthusiasm for "improvement." Time, climate, and culture make potato growing in Peru a problem somewhat different from potato culture in Maine, even though the botanical behavior of potatoes may be roughly the same.

The professional badge that the expert wears cannot therefore adequately identify his role. The role follows partly from the profession in relation to the task, but the task invariably imposes additional requirements upon the human relations skills of the expert with particular emphasis on ability to communicate.

Effective communication may require the expert to know the language of the country in which he works—a knowledge of several languages and dialects may be required. But the expert must be able to communicate in his own language and this is not only a matter of linguistics but also a matter of mental attitude. Ability to listen, awareness of nuances of meaning and emotion, sensitivity to the situation—these also are part of the process of communication.

Perhaps the only universal and constant requirement that all technical co-operation tasks impose on the expert is gaining the confidence of those with whom he must work. Confidence in this sense does not necessarily mean affection, friendship, or trust in all instances. It does entail respect for and trust in the integrity and judgment of the expert insofar as his expertise is concerned. Experts have sometimes aroused the hostility of host country officials when their technical advice or service inadvertently interfered with cherished political schemes or ambitions. Nevertheless, these same experts have often been highly regarded as objective and accurate advisers even though their advice was distasteful and perhaps unacceptable. If the expert loses the confidence of the host country officials, his usefulness ends, no matter how right he may be. He can no longer successfully perform the technical aspects of his task because the human relations requirements of his work are no longer met. The task of the expert cannot therefore adequately be understood in wholly technical terms.

## RECEPTIVITY IN THE HOST COUNTRY

Regardless of how the expert or his agency defines his role, circumstances in the host country will have a great deal to do with how the role may be played. There are at least three factors, quite independent of the personality or formalized assignment of the expert, that shape his task and exert a general influence on the situation in which he works.

The first of these is the receptivity of the host country to technical co-operation from abroad in principle and from the expert's country in particular. Guag-

ing the expectations and receptivity of host country officials is seldom easy. The officials do not always fully reveal their purposes in requests for technical co-operation. They may be persuaded to accept co-operation that they do not fully understand or desire. Moreover, the individuals filling public offices may change. Those who negotiated a technical co-operation agreement may be out of office when the expert arrives and discovers that the original enthusiasm and support for his program has disappeared.

The newly developing countries that are the principal recipients of international technical co-operation vary considerably in their receptivity to foreign expertise. They also vary in the types of programs that they welcome. Where public officials are highly sensitized to the possibility of foreign interference in their domestic affairs (as in countries formerly under colonial administration), the expert may be constrained to play a more cautious role than in countries in which no excessive fears of foreign intervention are nourished.

A second factor is the attitude of host country officials concerning the need for the expert's services. Where demand for the service is great and technological skills are weak, the expert may find himself pressed to engage in operational duties—to perform services that the host country has no personnel of its own to provide.

It is often easy for the expert to enter into the operational role. He may know better how to perform the particular service than anyone in the host country. He may indeed have been recruited for an operating assignment and this may be the role in which he can make the greatest immediate contribution. However, he may be tempted into an operating role under less appropriate circumstances. In default of host country support, he may assume operating responsibilities in order to attain the appearance of having achieved technical co-operation objectives. In so doing he risks defeating what may have been his original purpose—to help the host country help itself through developing new capacities in its nationals. Unfortunately, host country officials may be willing to permit him to act as a substitute for one of their own nationals if thereby they obtain the semblance of a successful program and a service with minimal cost to their national budget. The results may superficially appear successful to the expert's superiors at home. But the more fundamental objectives of international technical co-operation are seldom realized in this manner.

*Readiness of host country to use new knowledge*

A closely related third factor is the readiness of the country to respond to or to support the particular brand of knowledge that the expert represents. Careful program planning should have ascertained the ability of the host country to attain the level of personnel skills and financial support needed to complement and to sustain the work of the expert. But the expert needs to understand that the concern of the host government for his particular services will almost necessarily be sporadic and will be placed (sometimes lost) in a broad, politically colored context. If the expert understands this, he may better overcome feelings of neglect and ingratitude, and he may be better prepared to cope with the delays and false starts that must be reckoned with in technical co-operation work.

The enthusiasm and ambition of host country officials sometimes make them overly optimistic regarding their ability to utilize the level of technical service that they seek. They may, for example, prepare to establish new universities

when by any objective appraisal of need, attention to elementary and secondary schools should claim priority. Another illustration may be drawn from a South American country, where experts arrived to install expensive therapeutic equipment for a hospital only to discover that no technicians had been trained to the point of readiness to receive instruction in the operation of the equipment. If the expert's assignment is inadequately programed in relation to host country readiness to play its role in the co-operative venture, difficulties and disappointments can be safely predicted.

As with American states receiving federal grants, there is sometimes an understandable tendency among nations receiving international technical assistance to obtain such aid as may be available with a minimum of commitment. At worst this may lead to acceptance of programs for which the government in question has no real understanding or enthusiasm and of experts for which it has little use. Under these circumstances it may be impossible to formulate any workable role for the expert.

For example, some years ago a Middle Eastern government requested international technical co-operation to establish machinery for advice on matters of high-level economic policy. A distinguished team of experts was assembled in the country prepared to begin work. Meanwhile, however, the heads of the government changed their minds about the desirability of providing machinery for advice that they had reason to believe might prove annoying or embarrassing. But they were not prepared to admit that they had made a mistake. In consequence, the experts were required week after week to cool their heels in the capital city. They were not permitted to proceed with their assignment; neither were they permitted to abandon it. After several months of frustrating negotiations, this abortive mission was terminated, but with deplorable cost in wasted funds and human resources.

Misguided enthusiasm, national pride, and political importunities among host country officials unfortunately give rise to circumstances in which the expert may find himself confronted with a script quite different from that for the role which he expected to play. When he arrives in the host country it is too late to call off the assignment except under most exceptional circumstances. Realistic and timely appraisal of the expectations and capacities of the host government by the assisting agency and its expert therefore becomes an essential stage in the definition of the role of the expert.

## CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF THE EXPERT

Of the four principal elements that influence the expert's role, the agency concept of his task is the one most susceptible of modification. The greatest opportunity for substantial clarification of the expert's role rests with the agency that extends technical co-operation and employs the expert. For reasons already detailed, the three other elements that shape his role are less amenable to change.

The requirements of the task, technical and behavioral, are fixed by the very nature of the things to be done. They can be changed only insofar as other factors change; for example, the way in which host country officials interpret the task. But it is not realistic to rely altogether upon host country officials for clarifying the expert's role. They must, of course, be involved in the clarification, but we have noted numerous reasons why they cannot assume full responsibility for it. Nor can the expert himself be fully trusted to define his own role even though he will inevitaby shape its development. The expert brings not only knowledge and

skills to his task but also a self-image and a complex of personal, sometimes contradictory, motives. In the absence of institutional guidance and direction, these personal factors could seriously distort the role required of him if the purposes of technical co-operation are to be fulfilled.

We are thus ultimately forced back upon the fundamental question regarding the role of the technical expert: What is the purpose of the technical co-operation assignment for which his services are enlisted? Definition of purpose is the inescapable responsibility of the agency that extends assistance and provides the expertise in technical co-operation projects. To the extent that those who formulate and execute the policies at top levels in technical co-operation agencies are unable to achieve clarity or consistency of purpose, it is futile to seek objective clarification of the expert's role in other places.

# Personnel Management for Technical Co-operation

By Ronald W. Jones

Abstract: Since technical co-operation is achieved primarily through people, personnel management assumes particular importance in the effective administration of the programs. While many of the problems are common to domestic activities, many others arise out of the unique nature of this type of program. Requirements are primarily for technical specialists having sufficient experience and maturity to serve as advisers to newly developing countries. Therefore most of those entering this field necessarily do so at mid career without the benefit of specialized preparatory training or experience. Few will have had previous overseas work experience, still fewer in an activity in which the entire family plays a significant role in achieving the objectives of the program for which the father is employed. Until recently, the United States had little experience in building a continuing overseas staff of technicians, ranging from health educators to economists, to agronomists, to tax experts, and others. Over the past few years, however, the International Cooperation Administration has undertaken a fundamental reorientation of its overseas personnel system to better meet the longer range as well as the immediate needs of co-operative programs with sixty-odd newly developing countries. In this review of major problems of personnel management for international technical co-operation, the approaches which ICA is finding practicable are presented as illustrative of principles and techniques which may have broader applicability.

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THAT personnel management is accorded separate treatment in this compendium suggests there must be something fundamentally unique about the personnel requirements of technical co-operation programs. There is. The staff member new to this type of activity finds himself, first of all, "away from his home," perhaps for the first time. He and his family must learn how to adjust effectively to a completely new cultural, social, and even physical environment. They must learn how to gain acceptance as "foreigners" and by their acts and attitudes reflect credit upon their organization and their country. Few will have had previous experience of the entire family's playing a significant role in achieving the total objectives of the program in which the father is employed. And every one of them must play this role "in a goldfish bowl," so to speak, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year.

On the professional side, the employee also typically finds himself in a new role: That of an adviser, a demonstrator, a stimulator in a technical field in which his whole prior experience probably has been as a "doer." To elaborate the qualifications necessary to perform this essential function effectively would carry us far beyond our present purpose. Suffice it to say that technicians engaged in technical co-operation programs obviously must have the expertise which newly developing countries so sorely need to achieve progressive development and internal stability. More importantly, they also must have the ability to put their knowledge to work on practical problems in a way which will help develop the capabilities of co-operating country technicians to cope effectively with similar problems in the future.

On another front, the very nature of technical co-operation programs necessitates unique approaches to personnel programing and management. Being co-operative programs, it is as necessary as it is reasonable that the host government be a full partner in deciding both the program content and the number and qualifications of "outside" technicians needed to carry it out. Unless the means as well as the purpose of foreign assistance is acceptable to the receiving country, how can they be effective in furthering mutual objectives? From an operating standpoint, however, the time required for this step is an additional factor in planning both recruitment and reassignments; hence, in the timely filling of positions.

While many of the problems of personnel management for technical co-operation are broadly common to all public and private organizations engaged in this type of activity, each organization necessarily must approach them in light of its own particular situation. About three years ago, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) began a fundamental reorientation of its overseas personnel system to better meet the longer range as well as the immediate needs of the Mutual Security Program. Toward making the succeeding review of a few of the broad personnel management problems confronting most organizations conducting technical co-operation programs more specific, we shall illustrate briefly these ICA approaches to meeting these respective problems.

### PERSONNEL PROGRAMING

What does any organization have reason to expect from its personnel system? Basically: A staff of the quality, composition, and size required to carry out its program in an efficient and timely manner. Personnel programing must, therefore, be geared in the first instance to translating the substantive program into specific personnel requirements and relating them to probable availability of

staff to meet them. Secondly, and more importantly, it must be geared to meeting dynamic personnel requirements at the time and place planned throughout the program implementation stage. The mechanism, therefore, must provide for advance time scheduling of a multiplicity of interrelated actions. Finally, in a continuing technical co-operation activity, the system for personnel programing must make adequate provision for furthering simultaneously other desirable personnel management practices—for example, balanced staffing in the sense of teaming complementary skills and experience, periodic transfer, selective assignments to broaden the experience and develop the capabilities of individual staff members, enhance retention of qualified staff.

In meeting this combination of overall and specific personnel programing requirements, ICA employs three primary tools:

Staffing Patterns (tables of organization) as the primary bases for advance planning of the number and type of staff required to carry out an approved country program, combined with the Personnel Roster reflecting the most pertinent information for each incumbent—for example, time at present post, home leave eligibility date, expected continuity in program.

An Assignment Board which co-ordinates the planning of all assignments and insures not only proper matching of the employee's qualifications and the duties he is to perform, but also that his capabilities are best utilized and developed.

A Completion of Tour Report submitted by the employee and his Mission six months prior to completion of a regular two-year tour of duty which brings their respective recommendations on the employee's immediate future systematically into Assignment Board consideration at the very outset.

## KNOWING THE STAFF: THE KEYSTONE TO PURPOSIVE PERSONNEL DECISIONS

Seldom is the adage "to act wisely one first must know the facts" more applicable than in the field of personnel management. The hopes, aspirations, and basic satisfactions of people are involved as well as efficiency in achievement of program objectives. And, it is not enough that the system provide top management with the knowledge about the staff which it needs for informed personnel decisions. The individual staff members must have confidence that decisions are arrived at objectively in full consideration of their particular capabilities in comparison with those of all others throughout the organization.

Without necessarily arguing that the same approach is equally applicable to all organizations engaged in international technical co-operation programs, experience has demonstrated that for ICA centralized control of assignments, promotions, and related major personnel actions best meets the needs. We should hasten to add, however, that each Mission Director is delegated sufficient flexibility in use of staff assigned to him to best meet current program requirements. Put another way, there is flexibility in the use of staff during a given tour of duty so long as it does not basically affect future use of this employee elsewhere in the total program.

Accurate, comprehensive records on employee performance and professional potential are vital prerequisites to well-informed personnel decisions in this type of situation. Fully as important is the use of this information in such a way as to insure objectivity and fairness to every individual employee. For these purposes, ICA uses four primary interrelated techniques:

Employee Appraisal (Efficiency Report) covering not only an evaluation of the employee's performance of present

duties but also that of a wide range of personal and related qualities indicative of strengths and weaknesses for future assignments. In addition to a comprehensive factor rating, this periodic evaluation also includes a narrative discussion of various aspects of the individual's performance and potential.

The Completion of Tour Report, discussed in the previous section, provides the Mission's current evaluation of the employee and recommendation for his next assignment.

An Employee Career Appraisal is designed to elicit the individual's judgment of his best longer range role in the program and the kind of assignments—including training—which will best prepare him for reaching this goal.

Evaluation Panels have been introduced to synthesize all of the above and other relevant—and documented—knowledge about individual employees in making a comparative evaluation of the capabilities of each employee who has completed two or more years in the ICA service overseas. These comparative evaluations, covering an employee's entire professional career, focus primarily upon his future potential and how best to use and develop it. All major personnel decisions—assignments, promotions, terminations, training, commitments with respect to security of employment—are guided by the results of these comprehensive, competitive annual reviews by Evaluation Panels. The second round of these annual Evaluation Panel reviews is now in progress. They are proving invaluable as means for making knowledge about staff an effective tool for purposive personnel management.

## PERSONAL RANK AND FLEXIBILITY

To achieve the essential flexibility in use of staff to best meet dynamic program needs, ICA has adopted a "personal rank" system for setting the grade and salary for the level of officer (Foreign Service Reserve) staff. Each employee's grade and salary is established competitively on the basis of his qualifications and potential value in the ICA program overseas. Entrance grade and salary for a new employee are set by a Selection Panel. This Panel considers his qualifications—both technical and personal—in relation to those of other candidates and of present employees in the same occupational field. Personal Ranks for in-service staff were established on the basis of Evaluation Panel reviews.

Under this system, the individual's Personal Rank—grade and salary—remain fixed until changed as a result of competitive evaluation by an Evaluation Panel. While assignments normally are made to positions classified at the same level, they may be to positions carried on the Staffing Pattern at higher or lower grades if program needs warrant. In either event the employee's salary grade remains at that of his Personal Rank.

The advantages of this flexibility in meeting current priority requirements are fairly apparent. In addition, ability to use qualified staff elsewhere in the program, when they finish their assignments in a particular country, without necessarily waiting for an opening at exactly the same grade level, helps materially to reduce time loss in transfers and also complete loss of individuals needed in the program. The flexibility provided by a Personal Rank system also contributes significantly to security of employment for those who are qualified for and desirous of continuing in the program.

## THE LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT

Ideally every man, woman, and child going abroad for service in technical

co-operation programs should be able to converse fluently in the language of the country in which they will be living and working. Not only would the employee's technical effectiveness be higher. He and his entire family would find adjustment to their new environment much easier, their contacts with the people of their new community mutually more interesting and reassuring. Realities, however, strew the path to this "ideal" with well-nigh insurmountable obstacles. The sixty-odd countries in which ICA operates, for example, comprise considerably more than a hundred different language-dialect areas. Many of these languages are exceedingly difficult to master. Gaining a working proficiency of even the easiest ones requires months of intensive instruction; the more difficult ones up to several years. Transfers to best meet program needs frequently mean starting over with a new language. Basing selection for assignment primarily upon language competence would be to sacrifice unduly technical qualifications in most instances. Keeping a person for long periods in the same country merely because he knows the language would also be to sacrifice other priority objectives of over-all sound personnel management.

About a year ago, in initiating a substantially expanded and intensified program of language instruction for its overseas personnel, ICA adopted a selective job-related approach as being best suited to its immediate needs. Like those of the entire new personnel system, of which language training is an integral part, the policies underlying this program are aimed toward meeting the longer range as well as the immediate needs of the Mutual Security Program. To identify priorities, the importance of language to effective total performance of each position in each country was established at the outset, primarily on the basis of judgment of the Mission to that country. At the same time, each employee reported his best estimate of his own proficiency in foreign languages. Between them the two provide a basis for establishing individual language training needs.

The importance of language to job effectiveness is but one side of the equation. On the other are the practical considerations of feasibility of equipping an incumbent with the proficiency needed. These necessitated varying the approach to different language areas to take account of the difficulty of the language, its transferability to positions in other co-operating countries, and so on. Also consideration had to be taken of the feasibility and comparative advantages, in different situations, of providing language training away from the post and at the post, respectively. Here the time flow of numbers to be trained and the amount and intensity of instruction to be given assume particular importance.

Out of these considerations have evolved five basic patterns of language instruction each tailored to the needs and the feasibility of meeting them in the near future in different situations. In carrying out this language training program, ICA utilizes primarily the language instruction facilities of the Foreign Service Institute in providing the actual training. Shared use of these facilities by ICA, the Department of State, and the United States Information Agency makes it possible to provide, at minimum cost, the quality of instruction and technical linguistic supervision so essential to efficient language training.

This effort to make language a positive tool for enhancing the effectiveness of technical co-operation is yet in its infancy. Many operational problems are still to be fully resolved. And, at best, meeting the language requirements of a diverse and dynamic technical co-operation program is a continuing and

long range undertaking. The objectives, nonetheless, are well worth the effort toward achievement.

## DEVELOPING THE PERSONNEL RESOURCE

A comprehensive exploration of the unique character of the employee development "problem" in technical co-operation programs, and the opportunities for and experience of various organizations in increasing the effectiveness of staff performance through planned approaches to employee development would require a separate book in itself. Such a book needs to be written some day. A number of individuals and institutions already have done or have under way exceedingly promising research on various aspects of this problem. But, for the present, let us consider only a few of the major areas.

### *Orientation*

How effectively a person performs in any new position depends in large measure upon how well he understands what is to be done and the total environment in which the activity takes place. Orientation as a planned and systematic activity of the respective organization aims toward facilitating and expediting this essential learning and adjustment process.

How long would be required to adequately prepare a family for their first overseas assignment in a technical co-operation program is hard to say. Certainly longer than ICA, and no doubt most other organizations, can practicably devote to it. In any event, prearrival orientation can never meet the total need. A foreign culture remains an abstraction until a person is in it and has a chance to see and feel the contrasts with his accustomed surroundings.

All ICA employees new to the overseas service participate in a fairly comprehensive three-week orientation program preparatory to departure for their respective missions. In content this program focuses upon the purpose and objectives of the Mutual Security Program; the organization and methods for achieving these objectives; and the sensitizing of the employee to major cultural, social, economic, and political factors in adjustment to a foreign environment. This predeparture orientation is extended and particularized to the respective country by systematic programs conducted at each mission.

### *Career development planning*

Purposive assignment—in the sense of best utilizing and developing an individual's capabilities—necessarily must aim toward some concept of that person's best use in the program at some time in the future. Unless all concerned with the assignment aim toward the same goal, there can but be disagreement and compromise. If the employee's own expectations are inconsistent with the longer range plans conceived by those responsible for his assignment, he is likely to be dissatisfied with the intermediate steps. And, unless the basic facts regarding his potential are adequate and accurately analyzed, achieving his actual best use over time may be purely accidental.

Systematic career development planning is basically a research job. It cannot be done satisfactorily amidst the pressures surrounding individual assignments. Conversely, however, no plan, regardless how carefully prepared, can be more than a guide in the actual assignment process. But, used as guides, and changed as new evidence warrants, individual career plans based upon comprehensive knowledgeable evaluations and discussion with the employee have a real contribution to make to efficient personnel management for technical co-operation as well as for other types of programs.

The International Cooperation Ad-

ministration is moving progressively toward such a system of career planning for selected employees. The annual comparative appraisals made by Evaluation Panels together with the materials from which they are derived—including Employee Career Appraisals—provide an excellent basis for systematic forward planning. Experience of the Department of State and the United States Information Agency has demonstrated such an approach to be feasible in an international service. While the process will be more complex, there is no apparent reason why the basic concept cannot also be adapted to the international technical co-operation field.

*Staff development training*

Training needs in technical co-operation are of two broad types. One is that common to all organizations: Developmental training aimed toward expanding a particular kind or level of competence for which there is a special need or/and the employee's capabilities for higher responsibility. The second broad type is essentially peculiar to technical co-operation personnel. This is the need for periodically updating and revitalizing the technician's knowledge and skills which literally increases with continuity of a technician's service. This is inherent in the technician's role of transporting and adapting technical expertise from a technologically more advanced economy to one which is less developed. The longer the technician works continuously with one project, the farther out of date his own contribution becomes. Thus, periodic training assignments, designed to keep his technical competence fresh and vigorous, can make significant contributions to efficiency of performance.

Beginning in fiscal year 1958, ICA launched—as an integral part of its reoriented overseas personnel system—a comprehensive program of staff development training focusing upon the complex needs outlined above. Operationally, the approach to evaluation of individual training needs is a three-step process: The agency's interest in the man, that is, his potential for future service; how training would enhance his contribution to furthering the Mutual Security Program; and finally the prospective returns in relation to costs including other requirements for his services at a particular time. Training, where given, therefore, must, and does, take a variety of forms. In each respective case the content, method, and duration are tailored to the needs of that particular situation.

In meeting its training needs, ICA utilizes existing facilities of other agencies, universities, colleges, business firms, and others to the fullest extent. In some cases, however, special training programs have to be developed to meet needs unique to this agency. For example, the programing of technical and economic assistance to newly developing countries requires a kind of specialized competence which neither regular academic courses nor work experience in the United States adequately provides. To meet the particular needs in this area, an Institute on ICA Development Programing has been developed and is being conducted for ICA by the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

In addition to these staff development training activities, ICA also has in operation two companion training programs. Both are designed to bring into the program a number of carefully selected younger staff members who have the potential for growing with experience in the program. Prior to initial assignment to regular duty positions, they are given the kind of broad-based work/training experience in the techniques and methods of technical co-operation with newly developing countries

which will prepare them for assuming positions of higher responsibility. This type of training program provides a means for at least partially meeting the problem of filling positions from below which is especially difficult in technical co-operation programs where needs are predominantly for staff sufficiently experienced and mature to serve as technical advisers to co-operating countries. They also provide opportunities for well-qualified, but less experienced, persons interested in technical co-operation as a career to follow before they get too settled in other occupations.

## SELECTIVITY IN EMPLOYMENT

Few will seriously question that employment for service in international technical co-operation programs must be highly selective. Precisely how to select the "right" people and avoid sending any who may fail, however, is a different matter. True, there are some guidelines. For example, experience has demonstrated that evidences of inflexibility, emotional instability, a dominating personality, alcoholism, domestic strife, fear of living abroad, and a number of related factors are danger signals. While the converse of these negative characteristics usually tend to be on the plus side, there is no guarantee that this will be true in the individual case. Fortunately, factors affecting success and failure of Americans in technical co-operation and other types of public and private activities overseas are receiving increasing attention by institutions and individual scholars as a field for significant action-oriented research.

The national research project on the Education and Training of Americans for Overseas Service being conducted by the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, for example, is producing a wealth of valuable insights into what to look and watch out for in selecting new employees for assignments abroad.

From research studies of this type and operating experience of organizations engaged in technical co-operation activities, three broad conclusions appear quite clear. First, that personal qualifications are, if anything, more important to success abroad than is pure technical competence. Second, adaptability of the employee's wife and children to a foreign environment warrants fully as much consideration as that of the employee.[1] Behavior of a wife and/or children can more than undo an excellent technician's contribution. Conversely the family can and does make a highly significant contribution toward achievement of over-all objectives of the program when its attitude is positive and its conduct exemplary. Finally, successful performance at home is no guarantee of success abroad.

More definitive knowledge about factors in success and failure and their relative importance would be very helpful. In actual practice, however, the selection problem is less one of knowing what to look for than of identifying positive and negative characteristics prior to employment. The technical competence side is fairly easy; personality traits and family adaptability to a foreign environment very difficult. Despite these handicaps, ICA experience over the years has been quite good. The number sent overseas who, in retrospect, should not have gone has been gratifyingly small. The vast majority have performed as well or better than could be expected, many with distinction under very trying circumstances.

Even so, practicable means have continually been sought for learning more about the prospective employee and

[1] For example see Harlan Cleveland, "The Pretty Americans," *Harper's Magazine* (March 1959).

evaluating this information more critically before an offer of employment is made. At present, these include a record of the individual's work experience and performance, education and other professional qualifications; his credit history; comprehensive reference checks covering both technical and personal qualifications; security investigation; and medical examination. In addition, the prospective employee and his family are interviewed in their home by a person knowledgeable about the personal and family qualifications required in the ICA program overseas. To economize both time and funds, these interviews are conducted by ICA consultants located throughout the country who are employed on a part-time basis. This feature was introduced only a few months ago, and early results strongly commend its continued use.

Evaluation of each candidate's qualifications—both technical and personal—for service in the ICA program overseas is by a Selection Panel. For those judged to be of the caliber needed, these Panels recommend the grade and salary appropriate to the individual's qualifications and potential value to the program. Thus systematic group judgment is applied both to selection and to determination of the Personal Rank with which the individual enters the ICA overseas service.

### MEETING REQUIREMENT NEEDS

Some no doubt will wonder why recruitment comes at the end instead of the beginning of this discussion of personnel management. Obviously a staff has to be recruited before it can be managed. And it is equally self-evident that regardless of its effectiveness in utilizing and developing the staff once employed, a personnel system's success depends largely on its ability to fully staff the program it services. Dropping individuals whose performance, while not unsatisfactory, is below the high quality needed is difficult when the alternative is a lengthy vacancy. Selectivity of employees inevitably varies directly with the number of candidates available. Holding staff members out of regular duty positions for fuller orientation, language training, or substantive training which clearly would be a good investment in the long run must be weighed in relation to immediate program needs.

In short, all of the other aspects of personnel management discussed earlier affect or are affected by the organization's ability to provide enough staff members of the right kind at the time and place needed. To these aspects must be added the fact that in technical co-operation programs, requirements are primarily for specialists sufficiently mature and experienced to serve as advisers to co-operating countries and be so accepted by that country and its own technicians. This requires recruitment, for the most part, of persons already settled in a domestic career. Furthermore, the recruits usually have children of an age where educational facilities and related considerations assume particular significance.

In meeting its recruitment needs, ICA employs a variety of techniques and facilities. Primary emphasis must be upon "pin point recruitment" for specialties needed. Active co-operation of other agencies and the colleges and universities is invaluable. Recently this agency has experimented with paid advertisements in professional journals. Results have been highly encouraging. Effective contacts at professional society meetings also pay dividends.

To facilitate personalized recruitment —always the most effective in meeting specialized requirements—ICA uses a number of consultants on an "as needed" basis. For economy, these consultants are persons located throughout the coun-

try who are highly knowledgable of ICA needs in their respective subject matter specialties. Selected overseas staff also are given specific recruitment assignments in conjunction with their home leave. Means such as these are proving valuable supplements to the direct recruitment efforts of the headquarters staff.

In addition to recruitment, as such, two management devices are built into the overseas personnel system to facilitate meeting program needs. These are the Employment and Reassignment Complements: Positions established in ICA in Washington and used on a revolving basis for temporary assignment of selected overseas personnel. The Employment Complement makes it possible to employ a well-qualified candidate at the time he is available without waiting for all the details of co-operating country clearance to be completed. In addition to those actually employed temporarily on this Complement, its availability enables recruitment in general to be positive from the outset, thus helping to reduce declinations during the processing period which seldom can be less than several weeks.

The Reassignment Complement serves to reduce the recruitment load. This Complement makes possible the retention in temporary duty status of overseas staff members the agency definitely needs to meet future program requirements but for whom a specific job assignment cannot be made when they complete their home leave. Most frequently, the need to use this facility arises out of positions being abolished or from delay in effecting country clearance. It also is used in those cases where a temporary medical disability precludes immediate reassignment to an overseas post. Since it was established in October 1956, upward of 200 well-qualified persons have been retained temporarily on this Complement. Many of these no doubt would have been lost to the agency had their only alternative been an indefinite period of leave without pay. Not only would this have required recruitment of replacements; these replacements usually could not have brought with them that added and invaluable qualification of proven capability to perform effectively in technical co-operation overseas.

## IS TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION A CAREER FIELD?

To give a flat yes or no answer to the general question of career opportunities in technical co-operation would be foolhardy at best and misleading at the worst. Too much depends upon the field and breadth of the individual's specialty. If he is a nuclear physicist, for example, the prospects would be pretty slim. Conversely, if his field were teacher training or agricultural extension or one of the other broad fields in which most newly developing countries need and request assistance, the outlook would be quite different.

In short, technical and personal qualifications vis-à-vis the volume of comparable requirements are the paramount determinants. For the person who has that combination of education, experience, interest, adaptability, and flexibility in large demand in technical co-operation programs, there is every reason for him to expect to find a challenging and professionally rewarding career in the technical co-operation field.

As has been indicated throughout the earlier sections of this paper, the ICA overseas personnel system is designed to meet the longer range as well as the immediate personnel requirements of the technical and economic co-operation programs with sixty-odd newly developing countries which this agency has responsibility for administering. It has evolved out of experience with operating this type of program since 1942. It is

concerned with the management of an overseas staff some 95 per cent of which is engaged in the technical co-operation phase of the Mutual Security Program. It is premised upon the assumption that the responsibilities which the United States has newly assumed for technical and economic co-operation with developing countries will require sustained effort for a considerable period ahead. The fundamentals of this system were presented to, and concurred in, by the Congress in 1957 and progress toward getting it installed reviewed in 1958. More significantly, on its own initiative, the Congress increased the appropriation for fiscal year 1959 requested by the Executive branch for bilateral technical co-operation by 8 million dollars ". . . primarily for personnel improvement." This not only lent added confidence in the objectives sought but very materially speeded up progress toward their achievement.

While not a career service in a formal sense, the ICA overseas personnel system embodies the principal desirable features of such a service. It therefore provides a useful case study of the adaptation of basic personnel management principles and practices to the unique requirements of technical co-operation activities. Progress and results thus far have been most encouraging.

# Technical Co-operation for Administrative Improvement

By George W. Lawson, Jr.

Abstract: The program providing aid in administrative improvements in governments is extensive. Need for improvement is found in all levels and branches of government. Approaches to management improvement include the individual expert or adviser, the contract, and the development of local institutions. Problems in this field are those arising from the formerly dependent status of a country; those resulting from the new independent status; and administrative problems of developing countries. The United States adviser should not try to transplant our methods of management to the host country, but should try to find solutions adaptable to the culture of a particular nation. He usually trains host government personnel and looks for promising trainees. The mature leading officials prefer on-the-job training, and in-service programs have been instituted in many countries. Academic training is effective at the junior level only. A better known aspect of technical co-operation is that of training foreign officials and students in the United States; it is also an important part of technical co-operation in management. Training grants may involve academic training, observation, organized experience, or a combination of these. Observation tours are usually combined with other forms of training. There have been some outstanding accomplishments in the management improvement program of technical assistance, however, there is need for further activity in this field.—Ed.

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NEARLY all technical co-operation involves administrative improvement in one way or another. The malaria eradication project may be bogged down because the wrong kind of insecticide was ordered by the purchasing office. The vocational education program may be lagging because the ministry of finance is slow in paying contractors engaged in putting up the needed buildings. The irrigation project may be stalled while needed equipment is rusting on the docks because the shipping papers have been lost. Unfortunately, all too often the need for administrative improvement is recognized only after projects have slowed to a walk, or ground to a halt.

Assisting governments accomplish administrative improvement has become big business. In 1958 the United Nations and the United States Government applied over 11 million dollars directly to technical co-operation in public administration.

Frequently, projects in administrative improvement result from a discovery that an administrative shortcoming is general rather than peculiar to the ministry in which it first appeared. Examples are weaknesses in supply management, record keeping, and statistics.

The need for improvement has been found at all levels of government—in the offices of presidents and prime ministers, in the ministries, the provinces, the states, the districts, the barrios, and the villages. Management improvement has been pursued in the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches and in government enterprises—railroads, post offices, and electric power systems.

There have been a number of surveys of the need for management improvement. In 1953, John Blandford surveyed twenty Latin American countries, found much activity in progress, much still to be done. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its economic surveys frequently discovers the need to improve administration. The Bell Mission to the Philippines in 1950 sparked a large co-operative effort to achieve management improvement that has produced impressive results. The economic debacle following the Mossadegh regime brought to Iran a realization of need for management improvement in government.

## APPROACHES TO MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT

A number of approaches are being used in the solution of management problems through technical co-operation. I will attempt to describe the more important. There is first the individual expert. He may be a member of a co-operative agriculture or other field party, he may be attached to a management team—either a firm engaged for this purpose or a Public Administration Division in a United States Operation Mission—or he may be a lone management adviser. The management expert may be a "direct-hire" employee, on the payroll, of the International Co-operation Administration (ICA) or a United Nations specialized agency. He may have a contract with the assisting agency to provide his services to the host country. Or he may have a contract with the host country, financed by the assisting agency. The management adviser who is an integral part of a joint field party in health, for example, has some distinct advantages. He tends to have the support and confidence of the other members of the field party. He can concentrate his efforts in one ministry. However, many of his management problems will have their solution in other ministries—finance, civil service, supply.

The adviser who is a member of a public administration division of a United States mission will have other

experts upon whom to draw for the solution of various facets of management problems. The Public Administration Division will normally have an entrée into several ministries—thus increasing the opportunity to solve interministerial problems, and will normally have a "backstop office" to provide specialized information or other assistance. One of the possible disadvantages of this approach is that a public administration adviser may be regarded as an interloper by other technicians in other disciplines in the same ministry. In addition, he may be so highly specialized in the techniques of "management" that he fails to see the forest for the trees.

The lone adviser may be in the country to survey the need for additional management assistance. He may have come to help solve a particular problem. He may be required to oversee the work of one or more contractors. His success will depend upon his task being clearly defined and of manageable proportions. It will depend upon the degree of support his work receives from the host country officials as well as the way he fulfills his role, his professional and personal qualities, and the cultural barriers he encounters.

*The contract and development of local institutes*

Management firms under contract either to the assisting agency, the host country, or both have also been used. Universities on occasion have the furnishing of management advice and research into management problems as a part of their contracts with assisting agencies.

The contract has certain distinct advantages in providing technical assistance where management improvement is needed in very complex situations. A contractor can usually be found who has had extensive experience in solving the various types of management problems encountered in the host country. A successful firm will normally have available a sizable number of capable people who can be dispatched fairly quickly. If the firm is large, it will have a highly desirable degree of flexibility in assigning specialists for short periods to do particular jobs. Good firms provide competent leadership.

Contractors are best used where the management problem is one of clearly definable size and scope, where a team can go in, make a study, recommend a course of action, and to the extent that their recommendations are accepted, install the system or procedure and train host government personnel to carry on. In some cases the contract is more acceptable to the host country, which may not wish to appear to be taking management advice from officers of a foreign government.

There have been some highly successful management firm contracts especially where the contractor can provide a team which has worked together before on similar problems, where they have some language facility and previous foreign experience. One of the disadvantages is that contracts are more expensive man-for-man than "direct hire" personnel.

A longer run approach to the improvement of administration has been through the development of local institutions to train personnel in both business and public administration. Typically, public administration institutes are attached to an existing university although in a few instances they are located in a ministry or a staff agency of the host government.

Locally created institutes are being equipped to provide a wide range of training from typing to input-output analysis. Some offer graduate level work, others undergraduate work, still others offer both. Some offer training only for government employees, others limit

themselves to pre-entry programs. In a number of instances the institutes are inaugurating research programs and consulting services in order to develop teaching materials and to train both faculty and students.

## EXAMPLES OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS

In 1958 the United States Government was co-operating in one hundred projects in public administration designed to contribute to the solution of such problems as the lack of management know-how; antiquated tax, customs, and fiscal systems; inefficiently organized government services; complex, burdensome controls on business.

In the Philippines an International Cooperation Administration financed contractor working with a Philippine Reorganization Commission concluded a government reorganization project which produced some forty-one reorganization plans. It also trained the Filipino staff in a newly established Management Services Division of the Budget Commission to put the plans into operation. The Budget Commission, assisted by another ICA financed contractor, completed the installation of performance budgeting for the entire government. Improvements in tax collection have nearly doubled revenues in four years without changes in either tax rates or base.

In Iran a unique institution has been established with the technical assistance of ICA advisers. The High Council for Administrative Improvement—composed of permanent Administrative Under Secretaries—has met weekly for over a year to obtain government-wide consideration of problems between ministries. The "permanent" under secretary concept has so far weathered nearly all ministerial changes, including that of prime minister.

In the Philippines through a contract with the University of Michigan (terminated in 1955) an Institute of Public Administration has been firmly established and is now under Philippine leadership. The Rockefeller Foundation is supporting one American professor at the Institute to assist in its continued development. The Institute was instrumental in founding EROPA, the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, and is conducting "third-country training" for government employees from neighboring countries.

In Italy, with assistance provided through an ICA financed contract with the University of California, there has been developed at the University of Bologna a School of Public Administration (now assisted by the Ford Foundation) designed to prepare students for service in the Italian Government. The Ministry of Treasury has pledged five years' support to the school in the form of funds and the annual assignment of thirty to forty civil servants for advanced training in public administration.

The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania is helping the University of Karachi develop an Institute of Business and Public Administration. The Institute now has a student body of approximately 650 students, including evening school and special students, and has generated great interest and support in the business community.

### *Programs in Latin America*

In the Central Bank of Paraguay the work of two short-term consultants resulted in the establishment of an audit unit, the reconciliation of all figures on the balance sheet, a change in the system of unsecured loans from a commercial bank, and a drastic reduction in the number of governmental accounts.

In São Paulo, Brazil, the Michigan State University has helped the Bra-

zilians establish a school of business administration that is winning support from the business community in the form of scholarships; an active market for graduates; and demand for expansion of research, consulting services, and management seminars.

In Peru a "Working Guide for Elementary Training in Records Management" growing out of his field experience was prepared in Spanish by an ICA technician. It has been reproduced and distributed throughout Latin America.

In Panama, the first codification of the nation's 2,600 laws and 7,000 executive decrees enacted since the nation's founding in 1903 was produced. As a result of the project, the business man or lawyer can find a law or decree if he knows its subject, date of enactment, or the ministry to which it applied. A staff of Panamanian law students trained under this project had, at the time this paper was written, almost completed a study to determine which of the laws are now in effect.

In Costa Rica an ICA technician helped to draft and install one of the best personnel systems in Central America. Costa Ricans are now advising their neighbors on improved personnel practices.

## PROBLEMS IN ACCOMPLISHING IMPROVEMENT

What sort of problems does the American technician encounter as he sets about to help promote administrative improvement in a developing country? An ICA public administration adviser recently summarized several years of field observation of the problems that may face the management technician newly arrived in a developing country.[1] The problems he found fall into three general categories: Those arising from the formerly dependent status of the country; those resulting from new independent status; administrative problems of developing countries generally.

The formerly dependent status of a number of the developing countries presents the United States management technician with administrative systems of whose origins he may be only slightly, if at all, familiar. They may be British, French, Dutch, or sometimes once removed, as in Iraq where institutions essentially French in origin were introduced during the Turkish regime. He will encounter holdover administrators, now titled advisers, but actually directors behind the scenes. These advisers frequently resist change and may be at the very least unfriendly to the newly arrived technical assistant. Frequently there will be a scarcity of native administrators; the colonial powers too often neglected to train such people for supervisory and administrative positions.

There may be well-established business relations and subtle cultural and social ties to the former mother country that will have implications both favorable and unfavorable for administrative improvement.

New independent status will have created problems which the management technician must understand. There will be a pressing need to man the new government for a long time after it emerges from the exciting first months of independence. Good people will be in demand as legislators, as policy makers, as administrators. Some posts will be filled by persons who are not prepared for them. Frequent changes in personnel, including cabinet ministers, cause difficulties of uncertainty concerning policies, programs, and staff responsibilities. Able men will be called upon to do double or triple duty. Excessive nationalism may create suspicion of for-

[1] Joseph R. Starr, "Inaugurating Country Programs in Public Administration," unpublished manuscript.

eign advisers, even when their help has been requested by the new independent government. Just when the new administration has begun to settle down, a coup or a revolution may push some of the ablest men aside.

There will be great demand for new state services, in education, and social welfare. Plans, promises, and expectation will far outstrip manpower resources. The new government, for one reason or another, will probably be in charge of a high percentage of major enterprises in the nation. It is then compelled to attempt the resolution of manifold and complex administrative problems.

The management technician will certainly encounter at least some of the ordinary administrative difficulties found in most developing countries. A partial list would include a general shortage of qualified personnel; low professional standards of government employees; no tradition of public service; inadequate salaries of civil servants; overcentralization and inadequate delegation of authority; cumbersome governmental procedures; bad working conditions; poor records systems—with antiquated filing systems; poor budget and accounting systems; lack of training facilities at all levels—secretarial, in-service, university, business, and public administration; weak general housekeeping services; absence of training materials—textbooks, manuals, training films, audio-visual aids; ignorance of staff work, with the need for co-ordination between agencies unrecognized or quite inadequate; improper distribution of functions—some ministers take their favorite functions with them as they change ministries.

## METHODS OF IMPROVING MANAGEMENT

How does the technician go about helping to improve management in the host country? The successful management adviser does not attempt to transplant the methods of his own country. He avoids frequent reference to "the way we do it in the United States." He studies the problem to be solved, develops a number of alternative solutions, lets the host government official select the best solution offered—or stimulates him to develop a new one better suited to the local culture and environment.

While pursuing his advisory activities the alert technician is constantly looking for opportunities to improve management through the training of host government personnel. He is constantly on the lookout for promising trainees. Their training may take a number of forms—in-service, conference, seminar, workshop, academic, observation, on-the-job. The training may be obtained in the host country, in the United States, or in a third country.

As a general rule, the mature official of high caliber does not take kindly to academic training. For him, training must be of the on-the-job character—such as is implicit in the relationship between such officials and the foreign adviser—or it must take the form of a round-table conference with his peers—perhaps under the guidance of an outside expert.

Management officials at the middle level, too, are loathe to "go back to school." In most foreign countries, it is not the custom for a man to continue with formal study once he has begun his career. Hence the need for seminars, conferences, observation tours.[2]

Academic training is effective primarily with junior officials who are selected on the basis of their future potential.

[2] These observations often apply to public officials in the United States except that "going back to school" does not carry the stigma in this country that prevails in many of the less-developed countries in which public administration programs are going forward.

In-service training has been initiated in a number of countries under technical co-operation programs. Projects have ranged from secretarial courses in Guatemala to organization and methods in Iran. Courses are normally run in government quarters during working hours.

A good many of these courses have been highly successful—besides improving basic skills they have opened up opportunities for major administrative improvements. Sometimes the foreign technicians have done too much of the training themselves; they have not developed local teachers. The idea of "training trainers" is being increasingly stressed.

Some of those engaged in technical assistance in management believe that the effort with the best chance of producing lasting benefit will be the management training institutions being established in the developing countries. The technical co-operation objectives here are generally to train a staff of competent teachers, either in the host country or abroad, to construct a curriculum designed to meet the most pressing management needs in the country, to introduce improved teaching methods and standards of scholarship. Research and management service to local government of business are frequently subsidiary purposes.

The college contract has been used most frequently by the ICA in helping to build management training institutions. The UN has generally used its own experts. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations have also supported the development of institutions which give management training—usually with the assistance of American universities.

## TRAINING OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES

Perhaps the best known aspect of technical co-operation is that which brings foreign officials and students to the United States for training. It is an important part of technical co-operation in management. In 1958, the ICA alone brought 881 men and women to the United States for such training. The UN, the foundations, the trainee's own governments, individual benefactors, and businesses send additional people abroad for management training every year.

The people coming from abroad to be trained are called variously, participants, scholars, fellows, associates, and visitors. The training grant may involve academic training, observation, organized experience, or a combination of two or more of these.

Each of the devices has its advantages and disadvantages. Where a university has developed courses specifically for foreign students—as in taxation at Harvard, local government at Wayne State, economic development at Vanderbilt—the student can gain much from the experience. But regular graduate and undergraduate courses may contain considerable material of no particular relevance for the foreign student and may be presented at too rapid a pace. From the university's point of view, the special course requires extra effort and expense because of the need for especially prepared materials and more personal consultation with individual students.

A few courses are being offered in a foreign language at American colleges and it may be expected that there will be more of this in the future. Believing that facility with English is important to the success of foreign students enrolled in American universities, the ICA requires a minimum score of 70 in written and oral categories on the American Language Center test. If he needs it, the trainee is also given intensive language training after his arrival in the United States.

Observation tours are usually combined with some other form of training.

The observation tour will normally involve visits ranging from a few hours to several weeks at installations, projects, government offices, business firms, industrial plants, and universities. The tours may last as little as a month or may run for as much as six months, depending on the level and scope of the visitor's interests, the length of time he can be spared from his work at home, and the availability of suitable things for him to see. Occasionally high-ranking visitors or groups with the same general interests from the same country will be accompanied by interpreters. Government officials, business firms, educational institutions, local and national associations have been generous in providing the foreign trainees with time, information, and social activities. It has not been a one-way street. Many of the hosts have learned much about the world around them from these charming visitors.

When they arrive, the visitors want to see as many places as possible; when they leave they often complain that they were scheduled at a nightmarish pace, that did not stay in any one place long enough to really learn very much. It is difficult for their advisers to find the golden mean.

Organized experiences have taken several forms. An executive development scheme for members of Pakistan's Superior Civil Service is bringing to the United States for management seminars and workshops at the University of Southern California and on-the-job associations with local, state, and federal officials, two groups of fifteen to twenty of these top Pakistani officials each year for three years. This training of the leading civil servants is expected to prepare the ground for further efforts to introduce modern management concepts in Pakistan.

The ICA has developed workshops in personnel, organization and methods, supply management, budgeting, and accounting. The workshops utilize role-playing, case studies, lectures, group projects, carefully planned and conducted observation tours. These workshops frequently are timed to allow the participant to obtain some academic training as well. Increasing use is being made of assignments of trainees to actual survey parties or as members of staff in state, local, and quasi-governmental agencies. This device is highly regarded but is difficult to arrange for large numbers of trainees.

Every study so far made of public administration trainees, whether trained in the United States, in a third country, or in their own country, has shown that a substantial majority of the people's skills and knowledge are effectively utilized after receiving training under technical co-operation projects. The test here, however, is not whether the returned trainee is found back in the public service—the real test is that the returnee displays a change of attitude toward his work. Has he learned the problem-solving approach, the search for available facts as a basis for finding the answer to a problem? Has he abandoned the practice of attempting to solve problems by intuition? Does he now appreciate the necessity and feasibility of delegation of authority, of reaching decisions through consultation, of group work, of co-ordination? Has he discovered that the administrative problems of his country or agency are not unique and that the experiences of other countries or agencies may contribute to the solution of problems confronting him?

It is difficult to say which method of training is more effective, just as it is difficult to say which of the several ways

of technical co-operation in administration is the most effective. There is naturally some slippage due to faulty selection and to changes in the situation at home which is beyond the control of the trainee or the training agency.

The people concerned with providing technical assistance in management improvement can point to a number of outstanding accomplishments, but there is no room for complacency. They see a continuing need for administrative improvement if the people of the developing countries are to realize their aspirations for economic, political, and social improvement.

# The Cultural Curtain

By Dorothy Lee

Abstract: The introduction of technical change into non-Western cultures has, in the past, been done rather haphazardly. Even when the motivation for such efforts has been completely humanitarian, the effects are frequently unfortunate. At times it is impossible to introduce changes because of cultural resistance; on other occasions an "improvement" in a culture has had disastrous ramifications because neither the values of the culture nor the relationship of the environment were considered. It is possible, however, to overcome the difficulties presented by cultural differences. Careful study of a culture is needed; this must include a consideration of motivations, values, the symbolic significance of even seemingly unimportant acts, and a consideration also of all of the dangers inherent in the disturbance of the delicate balance between a culture and its local environment. Such study can result in the introduction of technological improvement which neither destroys the culture it is designed to improve nor opens up a Pandora's box of dangerous secondary results.—Ed.

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PROGRAMS of induced change are being initiated with increasing concern for the requirements of organization and planning, as well as for the technical training and selection of workers. Yet, throughout the years, their success or failure cannot be explained solely on the basis of these factors. Proposed changes which were clearly necessary and beneficial have often been summarily rejected by the people concerned, or have met with apathy and indifference. Programs have been launched successfully only to fail in the long run. Worse than this, the change itself has sometimes been readily accepted, but has brought unpremeditated results in its wake—destruction of the fabric of the society, loss of the meaning of life, and other unimaginable hardships.

## THE FACTOR OF CULTURE

In such cases, the factor which has been overlooked, the factor which has made for difficulties of communication, is that of culture. Perhaps a proposed program runs completely counter to the religious tenets of a people. For example, it is reported that the Girl Scout manuals which were recently sent from the United States to a school in Indonesia were thrown away unused. The people to whom they were sent are Mohammedans, and they explained that as Moslems they found it abominable to have human beings equated with bears, beavers, and wolves, and to have girls urged to name themselves after animals.[1] Sometimes no account is taken of social groupings. In this country, when Navahos were resettled on irrigated farmland, the arrangements went counter to their established groupings. They were established as individual families of parents and children, far from their relatives, despite the fact that they had been used to working their fields co-operatively in larger units, along extended kinship lines. For these and similar reasons, the project did not prosper.[2]

Most of all, we have often been unaware of the importance of the totality of a way of life. Students of culture are coming to realize that any practice or concept is linked to, as well as supports, many other practices and beliefs which eventually constitute the whole cultural framework; and that it has a special function within this framework. A person from a different culture often finds it difficult to discover or recognize this function; it is easy to see the trait as merely a queer custom. So, in our ignorance, we have tampered with one trait, not realizing that thus we were actually tampering with the whole.

Until recent years, changes were introduced, whenever they appeared obviously necessary or desirable, by traders, missionaries, or colonial governments in a piecemeal or even haphazard fashion. Though some such changes were introduced through the rapacity of traders or the exigencies of colonization, many stemmed from humanitarian motives, and were clearly indicated at least in the eyes of the Western agents.

It was clear to workers in South Africa, for example, that when infants nursed until they were two or more they exhausted their mothers physically and interfered with their work. Bottle feeding was introduced. Soon the mothers were even more exhausted, because they began to bear children every year. The taboo on intercourse during lactation no longer worked to space their children at intervals of three or four years. Again, it was clear to colonial governments and missionaries that infanticide and headhunting, as well as the poor sanitation attending childbirth, were evils to be

[1] Arthur Goodfriend, *Rice Roots* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 47.

[2] Tom Sasaki and John Adair's article in *Human Problems in Technological Change*, edited by Edward H. Spicer (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952), pp. 97–111.

eradicated. Yet they never considered the results of such an eradication and were unprepared for the enormous increase in population in areas where population and food resources had previously been kept in balance. The consequence of their humanitarianism was overcrowding, malnutrition, and a sentence of emigration for people deeply attached to their homeland.

What went wrong here? The change had obviously been effectively introduced; it had been accepted by the people, or at any rate it had not been rejected. In fact, it had probably been welcomed. But this was not enough. The agents literally had not known what they were doing. They knew nothing of the cultural framework of the society with which they were dealing, and they tampered in ignorance with one of its sustaining parts. They knew nothing of the ecological relationship with the habitat which the culture helped maintain. This is not to say that, knowing this, they would have refrained from acting to save lives and abolish fear; but rather that they would have taken account of the function of the traits which they were changing or displacing, and then would have acted accordingly.

## RECOGNITION OF TOTAL PATTERN

We have learned since then that, in taking account of the cultural factor, we have to consider not only the function which the trait serves within the whole cultural framework, but also the role the trait plays in relating man to his habitat. Man adjusts to his environment by means of his culture. When he moves to a cold climate, he does not grow fur. He builds an igloo and lives warmly in it, grouped closely with his family; or he invents central heating and makes possible the comfort and privacy which he values; or, like the Sioux, he teaches himself physical endurance, he exalts the virtue of hardihood and learns to take the cold in his stride proudly. But each society does this in its own way, meets its environment through its own particular culture, through a patterned constellation of traits. Sometimes the cultural adjustment works hardship on the members of the society and its neighbors, or is an out-and-out evil from the point of view of Western culture, as for example, infanticide and ritual murder. Sometimes, we merely regard a practice as wrong, or as based on ignorance and move in to help without considering the whole picture. So progressive Turkish farmers were persuaded by Western-educated Village Institute workers to remove from their fields the stones which served to keep the moisture in through the long dry weeks of the summer; as a result their crops withered, while those of the conservative farmers prospered.

In addition, we have learned to take into consideration the function of each trait as an integral part of the whole. We have learned that no trait is too small or unimportant to be manipulated safely, without repercussion. For instance, earlier in this century, an apparently slight and insignificant change was introduced among the Australian Yir Yoront. A Mission was established among them and the missionaries gave steel axes as gifts to adult men and women, and to young people of both sexes. The axe was not new to the Yir Yoront; they already had stone axes. Yet this one friendly gesture, according to Lauriston Sharp, is probably responsible for the eventual destruction of the entire internal social structure of the group as well as of its intertribal relationships.

The ownership of an axe had been, up to then, a badge of adult masculinity. Traditionally, only adult men could own them. Axes were loaned by an adult man to a younger man, and by a man to

a woman; and along these established lines of axe-borrowing fell the relations between man and wife, older brother and younger brother, father and son. Now axes were owned by women and young men, and the established relations became confused. The symbol of authority was lost and authority itself became unclear; this gave rise to confusion, and to the insecurity of uncertainty. In addition, the stone for the axes was quarried far to the south, and was traded north along a route of trade partners, who also participated in the ceremonials of one another's groups. All these relations, all this participation in the rich life of the ceremonials of other groups, was now lost. The small and obviously desirable change from stone to steel axes turned out to be neither insignificant nor beneficial.[3]

## CULTURE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

To balance such unfortunate occurrences, we have many cases where change has been introduced with happy results, by agents who have had knowledge and understanding of the culture of the group with which they were dealing. Such is the work of the British Health Centre in Natal, which was established in 1940. These workers studied the ramifications of the entire culture, as well as the history of the Zulu group with which they were dealing. According to the report written in 1953, the comprehensive health program they proposed to institute suggested the introduction of change in three areas: in food habits, in the treatment of tuberculosis, and in practices which led to erosion. The first of these was definitely successful; the second only partially so; and the third was not attempted because investigation showed that if it could have been effectively introduced, it would have taken away from the people practices which were of great value to them.

The first undertaking was of a kind which is usually very difficult to carry out. The effect of malnutrition is not directly demonstrable; it is difficult to explain to people why a change in their food habits is necessary. Why interfere with them? What harm do they do? An attempt to change them usually meets, in addition, obstacles stemming from the emotional and symbolic significance of food Among the Zulu, general resistance stemmed from their close tie to their ancestors. This, they said, had been the diet of the ancestors; it was the sanctioned diet. The ancestors, who were concerned with the daily affairs of the people, would be angered if the diet was changed. The team, however, armed with history, showed the people that the diet had in fact been richer and more varied in ancestral times, before the coming of the Whites.

There were additional difficulties when it came to the attempt to increase the consumption of milk, particularly among women of childbearing age. These came from a taboo protecting the cattle, which represented perhaps the greatest value to the Zulu. Women, in any reproductive capacity, while pregnant or lactating or lochial or while menstruating, were dangerous to the cattle, and should therefore avoid all contact with them; to consume milk was to come into such contact. To prevent all possibility of error, girls after pubescence were forbidden milk at all times. In addition, people could consume the milk only of the right cattle; these were the cattle owned by the head of the household to whose kinship group they belonged. This meant that, if they were away from the appropriate cattle, they could not include milk in their diet.

The team of workers recognized and respected the strength of the religious beliefs that supported these customs.

[3] Lauriston Sharp's article in *ibid.*, pp. 69–90.

They did not attempt to tamper with them. Instead, they hit upon a simple solution. They introduced powdered milk. Though the nature of this was known, it could not be associated, either symbolically or emotionally, with cattle.

In their attack on tuberculosis, the team of workers again met resistance. For people who found deep satisfaction in eating out of a common dish and living in close contact with friends and relatives, the concept of isolation was thoroughly unacceptable. To go to a hospital a hundred miles away, to be long ill away from all loved ones, to face the probability of dying away from home and the protection of the ancestors, was a terrifying prospect. Besides, the Zulu had no reason to doubt the efficacy of their curative methods. These stemmed logically from a set of premises which the Western workers could not prove to be wrong, although they knew them to be so. Through a consistent effort at understanding and responding to the cultural roots of the resistance, the workers finally did make some progress in changing methods of treatment. However, they had to abandon their plan to enlighten the people as to how tuberculosis was spread because, to these Zulu, any disease associated with labored breathing or pains in the chest was due to the machinations of an ill-wisher. Therefore to tell a father that his daughter had brought tuberculosis into the family would be to accuse her of being an evil witch. If they had insisted on keeping their Western plan of a "good" attack on tuberculosis, they would have endangered their entire tuberculosis program.

When the team came to consider the question of erosion, they found out that the pressing need was for the reduction of the herds of cattle. Yet the meaning of life for the Zulu man was bound up with the lives of his cattle. He saw in them the link between himself and his ancestors. With them he validated his marriages, and created and strengthened all affinal bonds. He knew and loved each one of his cattle, each detail of their personal appearance and each idiosyncracy. To ask these people to reduce their herds would have been tantamount to asking them to destroy a loved family member or the strength of their social bonds, or to give up an important part of the value of life. So the team abandoned this part of their program, at least temporarily; they wisely decided to refrain from destroying value.[4] In fact, the people's values would probably have defeated all attempts to institute voluntary reduction of herds.

## VALUES AND CHANGE

The factor of values is often responsible for the rejection of a proposed change. For instance, the Baiga of Central India refused to be persuaded to change from a digging stick to a plough in the cultivation of their fields. The earth for them was a generous, loved, and kindly mother. With a stick they could help her gently to bring forth fruit for them; they could not bring themselves to cut her "with knives."[5]

In fact, when attempts at mechanization, or even at the introduction of an iron plough to replace the light wooden plough, have necessitated the consolidation of scattered holdings into one continuous field, they have sometimes been defeated by this factor of value. People have not wanted to part with one small plot in exchange for another contiguous to their other holdings because, as Dube says of the village his group studied, "The earth occupies a

[4] John Cassel's article in *Health, Culture and Community*, edited by Benjamin David Paul (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955), pp. 15–41.

[5] Verrier Elwin, *The Baiga* (London: J. Murray, 1939), pp. 106–107.

mother's position, and parting with any fragment of it is nearly tantamount to separation from the Mother."[6]

Fertilization of arable land has also been widely rejected on the basis of value, in this case of the value of what we might call autonomy—the autonomy of land and plants. So Cambodian farmers have generally rejected fertilization as interference.[7] And in Ettawah, a village leader saw green manuring as an act of violence against the living plant: "Green manuring involves a very cruel act of plowing under the sanhemp leaf and stalk before they are ripe. This act involves violence."[8]

If we manage to change the practices of such people without understanding the function they serve we may be taking away from them sources of deep emotional satisfaction and security. If what they see us urging them to do is a violation of the rights of land and nature in general, we are also forfeiting their respect, and our claims to democratic principles will accordingly be considered hypocritical.

However, a profound knowledge of the culture may help the worker to rest his proposed change upon the basis of the cultural values, and even to enlist these in his work. This has been done by perceptive agents of change. In Ettawa, for instance, when the worker suggested green manuring as a means for greater agricultural production, the leader countered rejecting all improvement: "Our culture teaches us not to be too greedy or anxious for more economic production. Remember that Kabir, the saint poet, prayed to God, 'Give me only so much wealth that my family may meet its average needs, that I may not remain hungry, and that the saints or mendicants may not go away from my door hungry.'" The worker, versed in the principles of Brahmanism, argued convincingly that it was important to increase production, since most villagers found themselves unable to meet these sacred obligations to the family, the religious mendicants, and themselves.[9]

## CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

There is more to effective cross-cultural relations, however, than the recognition of the integrity of culture and a respect for cultural values. The entire structure of premises and assumptions differs from culture to culture. The background of concepts and categories and expectations which shapes our perceptions differs; and the symbolic meaning of an act differs according to cultural background.

I see a Cretan woman, for instance, meticulously picking up every breadcrumb which has fallen on the floor.[10] What I see is a house-proud woman, keeping her floor unlittered, neat and clean. Someone else sees a hungry woman, saving every scrap of food. But the Cretan woman is neither. She is not performing a utilitarian act; to her it has a religious significance. She is fulfilling a sacred duty to bread, the sacred food. If she leaves it on the floor, she may be responsible for an act of sacrilege; someone might step on it and thus desecrate it. Therefore, it is imperative for me not only to observe this act, but to perceive it in terms of the framework in which it finds its motivation and derives its meaning. Other-

[6] Shyama Charan Dube, *Indian Village* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 75–76.

[7] David J. Steinberg and others, *Cambodia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press, 1957), p. 201.

[8] Albert Mayer and others, *Pilot Project, India* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), p. 209.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 208–209.

[10] Leland G. Allbaugh, *A Case Study of an Underdeveloped Area* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 104.

wise I might be tempted to give the woman food, or a broom, in an irrelevant and possibly insulting attempt to help.

The woman's act conveyed reverence; it was a meaningful rather than a utilitarian act. And the meaning of an act is hard for the foreign agent to discover. Yet to overlook symbolic or religious meaning is often disastrous. We have made such mistakes, as when, to combat Communism, we made posters showing pictures of great religious figures contrasted to pictures of Stalin and Lenin; to the Moslem Indonesians a pictured Mohammed was anathema.[11]

It is also a mistake to assume that our own symbols are universal. Thus, for me to seat a guest on my right is to show him public honor; my Chinese guest would view this as a slight since for him the left is the place of honor. To me, a room of my own means coveted privacy and convenience, as well as prestige. If my firm gives me a desk in an office shared with others, or my hostess offers the only guest room to another friend and expects me to double up with the children, I shall probably feel slighted. To people of another culture, a room of one's own may spell rejection or deprivation.

At best, to be blind to the symbolism of the culture with which we are dealing may mean that we cannot communicate effectively. And we cannot depend on our own inventiveness, or our knowledge of so-called human nature. We have to discover the symbols of the people with whom we are dealing. I know that it would never have occurred to me to teach reading with the imagery which Nahuatl teachers were advised by the Mexican government to use: Introducing the words as friends, urging the child to search for his new friend in the population of the page, and later in other such "communities."[12] Yet symbolic meaning can be discovered; the examples I have given so far have all been reported by perceptive people coming from outside the cultural group they were observing.

Another obstacle to cross-cultural communication is the difference in perception between people of different cultural backgrounds. Here the foreign agent of change labors under a double handicap. He perceives according to his own familiar categories, and he is perceived according to unfamiliar categories. The anthropologist, Malinowski, working with South Sea islanders forty years ago, was asked what kind of magic he used to grow yams in England. This question assumed fallaciously that Malinowski farmed, that when he farmed he naturally grew yams, and that he worked magic over his yams. Our questions must often be as irrelevant when we deal with people in cross-cultural situations, but the assumptions behind them are usually held unconsciously and are therefore hard to eradicate. A young Hopi schoolboy, the Christian son of a Christian mother who had herself attended a white mission school, recently asked a white visitor to what clan she belonged. Many anthropologists return from field trips unaware of having made equivalent mistakes.

An occurrence is often perceived as a fact according to the precepts of the culture. The Hopi Talayesua, for example, knowing four to be the valid number, perceives that cocks crow four times before daybreak.[13] We observe the unhurried pace of others and perceive them as lazy or inefficient, yet Jane Belo, who describes the sauntering

[11] Goodfriend, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 18.

[12] W. D. Preston, "Reviews," *International Journal of American Linguistics*, Vol. 16 (January 1950), p. 58.

[13] Leo W. Simmons, *Sun Chief, The Autobiography of a Hopi Indian* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 62.

of the Balinese, goes on to speak of her neighbors in Bali, who—a family with two children of eight and ten—"sauntered" fifty miles to a temple and back in less than twelve hours.[14]

And so our own acts, our own motivations, are usually perceived not as we see them but according to the cultural framework of those who see us. It is enlightening to read how the Sioux chief, Sitting Bull, perceived the achievements of civilization in the eighteen seventies: "They claim this mother of ours, the Earth, for their own use, and fence their neighbors away from her, and deface her with their buildings and their refuse. They compel her to produce out of season, and when sterile she is made to take medicine in order to produce again. All this is sacrilege."[15]

Throughout the world, we have offered material aid to groups of people who recognize responsibility only to their families and their relatives, and cannot understand why anyone should want to help complete strangers. We saw ourselves as generous, or as laudable for recognizing our responsibility; they often saw us as naive, perhaps stupid; or they could explain our queer act only as an attempt at a form of bribery.

## LOGICAL TENETS

In Western culture, we have the notion of opposites which are mutually exclusive. This notion shapes our thinking as well as our acts, and has made for much difficulty in our attempts to introduce change among people who do not have this notion. Among most societies of my own knowledge this notion does not exist. What we call opposites do not oppose, nor do they exclude each other. A test which was recently given to Zuni children based on pairs of opposites failed because "good" and "bad," for example, were not opposites for the Zuni.

In China, our mutually exclusive opposites enclose a complementary whole. In Japan, they set limits for the "in-between path of moderation." In such societies we have not "either-or" but "either-and." Our Western workers have to introduce change to people who can hold two contradictory stands simultaneously, and who cannot see why we insist that they give up the old while accepting the new.

The co-existence of either-or is in fact very common throughout the world. Chinese Communist leaders made use of it, as the yin-yang principle, in presenting thought control and decentralization to the people as complementary. In the United States, the Navaho see no difficulty in considering their divine beings as simultaneously good and bad, and a sick man, in becoming identified with such a being during the curing process, asks to become both good and bad.

We take it for granted that certain conclusions follow from certain premises. We learn, for instance, that the Cambodians are not attached to their land and are ready to leave it and acquire another piece. So we conclude from this that they are therefore ready to contemplate study in a foreign country or to emigrate. But we are wrong. In fact, it seems that most Cambodians would rather be executed than leave their homeland since, if Cambodians die elsewhere, their souls may be unable to find their way back to be reborn as Cambodian. Their constitution outlaws punishment by exile as too harsh a sentence.[16]

[14] Jane Belo, in *Personal Character and Cultural Milieu*, edited by Douglas G. Haring (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1956), pp. 158–159.

[15] Quoted in Charles A. Eastman, *Indian Heroes and Great Chieftains* (Boston: Little Brown and Co[illegible]), p. 120.

[16] Steinberg, *op. cit.* (note 7 *supra*), pp. 42 and 36.

### PROGRESS AND ASPIRATIONS

Many of us in Western society assume that progress is good and is naturally recognized as such by all. But in many other societies progress is not a goal, nor a desired good beckoning to action. We can possibly introduce change to these people as the eradication of ills, but not in the name of the "bigger and better," or even of the new. We have assumed that, if people had a higher income, they would spend it in the interests of what is in our own view a higher standard of living; we have found to our confusion that this is not necessarily so. From the Middle East, from the Far East, from Africa come reports that when the price of agricultural products or the level of wages is raised, people work less since they can maintain their known and tried way of life with less effort. We have learned that people have to be helped to recognize their wants and aspirations. And beyond this, we have helped them to see that it is possible to achieve what they want, to translate their dreams into plans. Occasionally, we have interfered to the extent of creating aspirations where none seemed to be present.

The obstacles presented by cultural differences have often been overcome. Many cases such as that of the comprehensive health program among the Zulu, carefully and reflectively undertaken, have been reported in recent years. Planned change is also being brought about by people working in their own countries who know the culture they are dealing with, its symbolism, its values, and its pattern of perception. So Ibn Saud quoted the Koran over the radio and the telephone when inaugurating these systems,[17] Chinese Communists reinterpreted Confucianism in support of Communist ethics,[18] and Japanese architects used their understanding of native notions of space and family relations to achieve the miracle of housing families in a net space of 380 feet square.[19] In this country, we are studying profitably the introduction of these changes. To this, and to our increasing awareness of the factor of culture in experience and communication, we can add what we already have as our heritage—an understanding of the technology we are introducing within the cultural framework of which it is a part.

[17] Carl C. Taylor and others, *Experience with Human Factors in Agricultural Areas in the World*, United States Department of Agriculture, Extension Service, No. 1018, 1949, p. 19 (Multigraphed). See also Najmeh Najafi, *Reveille for a Persian Village* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958) and Ernestine Friedl, "Hospital Care in Greece," *Human Organization*, Vol. 16 (Winter 1958), pp. 24–27.

[18] David S. Nivison, *Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition* (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1954), pp. 18–20 (Mimeographed).

[19] Saburo Asaba, "Housing Design Problems for Japan Housing Corporation," *Papers of The Sixth International Conference of Design* at Aspen, Colorado, June, 1956

# The United Nations Program in Brazil

By Michael H. H. Louw

Abstract: Brazil is on the threshold of a great economic development and social change and needs large numbers of skilled administrators and technicians in all fields to carry through the necessary programs for using its vast natural and human resources. The role played by the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance in this development has been most significant because first, it was timely, and second, it focussed public attention on key areas where developments could be expected to have widespread effect. This is especially true for the projects associated with regional development, such as that of the Amazon Valley, the San Francisco Valley, and the Northeast. Two national projects: the Brazilian School of Public Administration and the Educational Reform Program have also made important contributions in the formulation of future policies in the fields of administration and education.

On these various projects a large number of specialists from many fields, specialized agencies, and nationalities, served together as teams or groups; and in the process, they in turn, learned the art of effective personal and interdisciplinary co-operation, not only among themselves but also with their Brazilian colleagues.

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IN geographical size and in population Brazil is the second largest country on the American continent. But, in spite of vast natural resources and tracts of valuable agricultural land, the standard of living of the majority of its people is relatively low, and Brazil cannot provide for many of its food and industrial needs. In a very special sense, however, Brazil is the land of tomorrow: Its society is dynamic and mobile, its people forward-looking and confident of the future. The realization that a vast job of reconstruction and development has just begun has made the Brazilian people and its government particularly receptive to modern ideas and techniques of economic and social development. The association of the United Nations and its specialized agencies with this extensive social and industrial revolution of Brazil is therefore, in spite of its relatively small scale, of special significance.

Brazil has long been a forceful advocate as well as a recipient of international technical aid. It has sponsored a number of UN resolutions on technical assistance, notably in the field of public administration. Brazil is one of the two countries (the other is Denmark) which has established its own national fund (Catalogue of Services), out of which fellowships for students from other countries studying at its institutions are financed. It was also one of the first countries to establish a National Committee for the Coordination of UN Technical Assistance which ensures an orderly and systematic annual country program of United Nations aid to its various requesting agencies.

However, the very fact that Brazil is on the threshold of a period of great economic development and social change points up some of the country's serious deficiencies in skilled manpower to carry through this development, especially in the technical, managerial, and administrative fields. Its government administration and its business system are not yet extensive or specialized enough to fulfil all the necessary basic functions which are necessary in large-scale economic development. In spite of its vast national resources, many still unsurveyed, Brazil lacks the necessary investment capital to exploit them, and such investment is further complicated by the existence of a serious inflationary trend.

Since the resources of the United Nations Expanded Program are too limited to embark on many or on large-scale programs, the projects for which technical assistance was provided had to be chosen on the basis of their relatively small cost and their potential significance in stimulating further development within the country. This policy is in agreement with the general view of the United Nations Technical Assistance Expanded Program—that is, that individual assistance programs should not be too large in order to allow a distribution of resources over a number of different types of programs, and that projects should have a "multiplier effect," that is, they should have a wide stimulating effect by arousing public interest or further government action. The major projects in Brazil undoubtedly satisfy these two requirements—the Brazilian School of Public Administration has had a tremendous impact in creating public and governmental interest in improved public administration, not only in Brazil, but throughout South America; the Amazon Valley, the San Francisco Valley, and the Northeast Brazil projects have demonstrated the possibilities of regional development; the Educational Reform project has generated extensive public interest and debate; and the International Labor Organization (ILO) assistance to vocational training has met with appre-

ciative response from the business community.

The specialized agencies and the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (Participating Organizations) work jointly through a Technical Assistance Board to determine the overall program and the target figures for each recipient country within it. The following projects, in many of which a number of Participating Organizations took part, are described.

## THE UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

The United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAA), which was established as a department of the United Nations Secretariat in 1950, is a Participating Organization in the Expanded Program and is responsible for technical assistance in the fields of economic development, social welfare, and public administration. It was also given the additional responsibility of providing aid in areas of activity not specifically or inferentially covered by the other specialized agencies, and technical assistance projects of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) are administratively supported by UNTAA.

UNTAA has provided technical assistance in the following projects:

### *The economic development of Northeast Brazil*

This vast area, with a population of 18 million inhabitants, is often afflicted by serious droughts which cause great hardship and migration to the south. Its per capita income is less than half of that of the national average. For many years the federal as well as state governments have been concerned with improvements in the economic and social conditions of this depressed area and particularly with measures, such as the construction of dams and irrigation works, to counteract the effects of droughts.

As a major step to stimulate economic development in this area, in 1953 the government established a regional development bank—Banco do Nordeste do Brasil—in Fortaleza, capital of the state of Ceará, to finance private and public enterprize. This bank has since become a focal point in development programs in Northeast Brazil, and a number of UN experts have been associated with it.

The first expert from UNTAA arrived in 1954 to advise the bank on general economic survey work in the region, to prepare plans for an economic program, and to help the bank in the establishment of an effective research unit and the training of some of its research personnel. In co-operation with the Northeast Association for Rural Assistance and Credit (ANCAR) and the bank, in 1955 a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) expert arrived to assist in the development of a system of supervised agricultural credit covering eight states in the northeast. He also advised and served these institutions in the organization and training of field supervisors and in the operation of a supervised credit program. Another FAO expert prepared a report for the bank on the feasibility of an agricultural development program for the region with special reference to its indigenous resources, such as vegetable oils and waxes, animal husbandry, and fibres. He was followed by another expert in 1958 to give advice on the marketing of agricultural products.

It became increasingly evident that some co-ordination of the various development programs of the different federal and state agencies was essential, and in 1957 a Working Group was established

by presidential decree. A number of UN experts were assigned to work directly with this Group or through the bank, which was designated as the central activating agency for the Group. A senior public administration expert, the former Chief of Personnel of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was designated by UNTAA to co-ordinate the work of the UNTAA team assigned to work with the Group. The team included a development economist, a minerals expert, a transport economist, and three public administration experts: budget, personnel, and training. With the exception of the team co-ordinator, who was stationed in Rio, all these experts were attached to the Northeast Bank in Fortaleza and worked in close co-operation with the bank's officials in drafting short- and long-term programs. The United States Government, through its International Cooperation Administration, also provided the bank with an expert in loans to public authorities, and he worked in close and effective relationship with the UN team.

In 1957 an International Labor Organization (ILO) expert in manpower problems was assigned to the bank to assist in surveying the manpower situation in the northeast area. His work covers labor supply and demand, occupational distribution of the labor force, and the analysis of the occupational requirements of industry and agriculture. In addition, two short-term United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) experts assisted in planning and developing an educational survey of the northeast. The UNESCO team of two hydrogeologists was also reassigned to the Working Group in the northeast to train hydraulic engineers for work in that area. Their work included the establishment of a hydrogeological laboratory and a postgraduate course in applied geology at the University of Recife.

*Escola Brasileira de Administraçao Publica (EBAP)*

In 1951 the Brazilian Government, acting through the nonprofit, government-supported Getulio Vargas Foundation and in collaboration with UNTAA, established the first training center in public administration in Latin America. The initial phase of this joint project consisted of a pilot course held November 1951 to March 1952 for about 60 senior officials from Brazil and various other Latin-American countries and of an international seminar on the "Organization, direction and functioning of the auxiliary services and staff agencies" held in February 1952. The documentation prepared for this seminar and experience gained from the pioneering pilot course proved to be most useful in the subsequent formal establishment of the school in April 1952. Under a supplementary agreement covering a period of five years, UNTAA provided the services of one project officer and four experts in public administration and assistance for twenty-one fellowship years. UNESCO provided the services of one expert in comparative administration.

These experts were succeeded by others in the same fields and in the fields of public relations and municipal administration until the end of 1956 when the agreement expired and only the provision of unused fellowship years remained. During these five years, eighteen experts—ten from the United States, two from the United Kingdom, one each from Brazil, Venezuela, France, Sweden, South Africa, and Puerto Rico—taught and advised at the School, and 1369 students—of which 1130 came from Brazil and 239 from other countries in Latin America—received training in specialized courses in public administration. Of the twenty-two Brazilians who went overseas for advanced

studies, twelve received UN fellowships and ten received fellowships under the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.

The School has become one of the two most important centers of training and research in public administration in Latin America—the other also being a UN-assisted project, the Advanced School of Public Administration in Central America, at San José, Costa Rica—and has made a significant contribution to the improvement of public administration, not only in Brazil but (through some of its alumni) also in other countries in the region.

*Other projects*

The training project in economic development is an extension to Brazil of the intensive eight-month training program in economic development initiated by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in 1952 at Santiago and later repeated in Colombia. The course, with some modifications, was started in Brazil in 1956 with 55 students and was repeated in 1957 with 66 students. The project's main purpose is to train economists and senior public officials in the principles of economic development. It embraces courses given by UNTAA expert lecturers and Brazilian specialists in social accounts, programing economic development, preparation of economic development projects, financing, and administration. Special lectures on Brazilian economic problems were also provided.

The government has expressed its satisfaction with the project and requested that it be established in the form of a permanent training center in 1958.

Since 1957 UNTAA has provided the Institute for the Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped in São Paulo with the services of three experts: a general adviser, a physical therapist, and a prosthetic technician. The general adviser is primarily concerned with the development of administrative procedures. In 1958 an ILO expert on vocational rehabilitation was assigned to the Center to advise on programs for vocational training and guidance of the physically handicapped.

Two World Meteorological Organization (WMO) experts were appointed, one to make a survey of general meteorological requirements and another to train radiosonde observers and direct the installation of equipment.

## FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which has a regional office in Latin America, has long taken a keen interest in the special problems of food, forestry, and agriculture in Brazil. Its work has therefore been mainly associated with regional projects.

The exceptional opportunities of the San Francisco River for rational exploitation of its hydroelectric and irrigation resources led the Brazilian Government to establish two commissions: the Hydroelectric Commission of the San Francisco (CHESF) and the Commission of the San Francisco Valley. The latter Commission was especially concerned with the provision of a settlement area to alleviate overpopulation in the northeast region.

In 1953, FAO initiated its assistance to this Commission by providing five experts to advise on different aspects of land and water development, soil productivity, colonization, land tenure, farm management, and irrigation. Their work entailed the making of soil surveys; the training of sixty-three students in soil morphology and classification; the determination of the optimum farm unit for resettlement; and advice on the planning of irrigation and drainage

works, on land settlement policies and programs, on farm organization, planning and financial arrangements for the purchase of new land, and on water use policies.

A number of fellowships for overseas study in these specialized fields were also awarded to Brazilians, mostly from the region.

To accelerate the exploitation of the vast timber resources of the Amazon basin and to improve the relatively low living standards of its inhabitants, the Brazilian Government decided to establish a special body for the development of this region: the Superintendency of the Plan for Economic Development of Amazonia (SPVEA).

The first FAO team of experts in 1952 studied forestry development possibilities in the area and reported that it would be feasible to increase forest production threefold during the next ten years. These experts also advised on forest policy, saw-milling, logging, and forest inventories. They also participated actively in the setting up of a logging demonstration center at Benjamin Constant and a training center for saw-milling at Santarém.

In 1953 the team was joined by a forest inventory expert, who through the newly developed technique of photogrammetry by 1956 completed an inventory map of all timber species in an area of two million hectares. This sample inventory will provide a basis for future policies of forest exploitation. In 1955 a sylviculturist initiated a program of tropical forest research—including the establishment of demonstration plots and nurseries—and of a research plan at the Amazonian Research Institute at Manaus in forest botany, ecology, forest soils, and wood technology.

In 1957 the logging center was closed down and all its equipment and facilities transferred to Santarém. Here was built a large-scale training center under three FAO experts, two in logging and one in sawmilling.

*Geology, agricultural practices, fisheries, and animal husbandry programs*

In 1955 UNESCO provided two experts in geology to work with the FAO team and with SPVEA in making geological surveys of selected areas. These surveys produced important information on mineral deposits in the soil and subsoil in the area and provided a basis for future exploitation. But the lack of suitably trained local staff to work with the UN experts hampered further survey efforts, and this fact was repeatedly brought to the attention of the authorities, especially its relation to a long-term survey program. Although a number of geologists received some training through the UNESCO mission in Recife, this was not enough. Difficulties in recruiting local counterpart personnel eventually prevented UNESCO from continuing assistance on this project in 1957, but the project was revived in 1958.

In 1955 an agronomist was assigned to the team to advise on crop production in small colonies along the banks of the Amazon and on the development of selected settlement areas. In 1956 a pasture expert was added to advise on the development of the grazing and fodder resources of the Amazon Valley. An agricultural economist joined the team in 1958 to advise on the economic aspects of proposed projects and to evaluate their financial implications.

In 1956 a fisheries expert explored the Amazon and its more important tributaries to determine the possibilities of improving fishing gear and of increasing productivity. He was later joined by a fish preservation research specialist. A third expert on fish processing prepared a handbook on methods of fish salting and drying for the Amazon region and

outlined designs for fish processing demonstration centers.

Since 1956 three veterinarians have been advising on methods for increasing the output and raising the efficiency of animal production in the Amazon region. In 1958 a dairy production expert arrived to advise on improved methods of milk production, dairy herd management, and on the organization of milk quality control measures.

*Other FAO assistance*

Besides the two major regional projects, FAO also provided a number of other experts in specialized fields.

In 1951–52 a fishery economist advised the government on the general state of the fishing industry. He was followed by two marine fisheries biologists—one surveyed the available data on resources and initiated a system for the collection of statistics of fishing operations and catches and the other made some echo-sounding and hydrographic surveys and began with an assessment of the marine fishery resources of the central Brazilian coast.

A fishery engineer associated with this project later started an experimental fishing program for the yellow tuna catch in the northeast and advised on the most suitable equipment to be used for this purpose. In 1955 a fish processing technologist began a program of advising the federal and state governments as well as private enterprises on fish processing technology which resulted in the establishment of a research laboratory in Rio Grande do Sul. Two fish marketing specialists surveyed facilities for fish distribution and initiated schemes to promote fish marketing and consumption which resulted in such improvements in distribution and marketing methods that they have also been introduced in the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

In 1953 two FAO veterinarians assisted local technicians in investigating causes of the principal diseases affecting cattle in Brazil, and another expert helped set up a diagnostic laboratory and advised on methods of vaccine production. A field veterinarian advised on problems of livestock management.

In 1950 FAO assigned an expert to the Rural University near Rio de Janeiro to recommend measures and deliver a series of lectures to strengthen social science work at that institution.

In 1957, FAO provided an expert in agricultural institutions and services.

## UNESCO

UNESCO has had a number of projects in Brazil, the most important of which is the one associated with educational reform.

A major development in Brazilian education in recent years has been the widespread movement towards reform and modernization of the educational system. This has resulted in the official establishment of a special agency, the Campaign for the Training of Senior Educational Personnel (CAPES) to survey and analyze the educational system and to formulate plans for a basic reorganization of the primary, secondary and technical education systems. UNESCO has been associated with this center since the planning stage and has provided experts in various fields related to educational reform: a sociologist, stationed in São Paulo to undertake a pilot research project on social mobility, two anthropologists, and a social psychologist to assist in preparing a long-range plan. In 1956 an expert was appointed for a long term to act as co-director of the center and to assist in implementing the first phase of practical reforms. The program covered a project for school decentralization in the state of Goiaz and a plan, promoted by the federal government, for extending primary schooling from four to six years

Extensive research on social mobility and on school-neighborhood relationships is being carried on by these UNESCO experts and by Brazilian personnel. They also helped to initiate a public inquiry into the educational reform program and to establish a postgraduate course in social science research methods.

As a result of recommendations made by a geological survey mission in 1954, an expert in hydrogeology was assigned to the University of Recife, where he has taught special courses in hydrogeology to about 250 students from government and public organizations concerned with soil conservation and engineering. A second expert joined him in 1956, and they concentrated on plans for the establishment of adequate and permanent training facilities for geologists. These plans were later approved by the government and the necessary budgetary appropriations made for the creation of four regional geology training institutes in different parts of the country. The team was also entrusted with the task of undertaking a geological study of a number of dams, among them the dam to be constructed for the new federal capital, Brasilia.

In 1955 an ecologist was appointed to collaborate with the National Museum in planning a pilot project for the study of the general problem of migration, including the effects that physical environment and natural resources have on the movements of people. The program was subsequently modified, and the expert prepared a manual on Brazilian ecology for publication by the government.

### INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

The ILO has concerned itself particularly with industrial training, for which the fast-rising industrialization in Brazil is in such need. The major agency concerned with such training is the semiautonomous National Service of Industrial Apprenticeship (SENAI) to which ILO had been giving assistance since 1952. In that year, a team of thirteen ILO experts and instructors initiated extensive programs for the training of instructors in shop organization, general mechanics, cabinet making, auto mechanics, photolithography, heat treatment of metals, audio-visual aids, job analysis, diesel mechanics, and automobile body work. The SENAI, which is financed by contributions from businessmen and maintains relatively high standards in its training, is the outstanding institution of its kind in Brazil.

An extensive program of science teaching methods was also carried out through seminars in different towns of Brazil to train SENAI science teachers, and to establish an over-all plan for science teaching in SENAI schools. Another expert was assigned to the newly organized Center of Personnel Training (CAP) for which he prepared plans for training SENAI staff at all levels and organized a training course for instructors and for directors of technical schools from SENAI schools, as well as from other countries in Latin America.

### WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

The regional office of WHO in Latin America—the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (PASB)—has a field office in Rio.

One of the most difficult problems in providing medical services to the people in Brazil has always been the acute shortage of trained nurses. The Ministry of Health has been making a survey, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, of existing needs and training facilities. A WHO nurse educator has collaborated in planning a nursing program based on its findings.

Trachoma is an endemic disease in several regions in Brazil, but it is particularly concentrated in the States of

Ceará, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul. The number of cases is estimated at 750,000. The government initiated a pilot program in 1957 to determine more accurately the areas of infection and to find an economical and useful method of control to be applied in a nationwide program to reduce the incidence of the disease. In 1958, WHO provided a consultant to work on this project.

For a number of years the sporadic outbreaks of sylvatic plague have led to uncertainty about its seriousness and incidence. Control measures could only be taken on the basis of systematic investigation, and in 1957 WHO provided a consultant to work with a Brazilian field team in a survey of the distribution and presence of the disease.

Two medical officers and some equipment were provided in 1957 to assist in organizing a national campaign against yaws in order to eradicate the disease.

### FELLOWSHIPS

In addition to the provision of experts, and to a small extent, equipment, the United Nations and the specialized agencies provided fellowships which enabled Brazilian technicians to go overseas for advanced studies and observation. These have been in the fields of public administration, economic development, tariffs and trade, housing and building, soil mechanics, industrial administration, road transport and highway construction, social security, land and water use, fisheries technology, nutrition, agricultural administration, hydrogeology, education, epidemiology, and trachoma. The countries in which they studied included the United States, England, the Netherlands, France, Morocco, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, and Australia. On their return, a number of these fellows have been appointed to senior posts in the organizations within which the assistance projects were located—an ex-UN fellow became head of the geology section of the National Department of Anti-Drought Measures (DNOCS), a number of ex-UN fellows in public administration have been appointed as professors at the Brazilian School of Public Administration.

### ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF THE UN PROGRAM

The central figure in the administration of UN technical assistance in Brazil is the Resident Representative of the Technical Assistance Board (TAB), who since 6 March 1953 has been Mr. Henri Laurentie, a former senior French civil servant. His main function is to assist the National Technical Assistance Commission in the co-ordination of the annual program within the limits of the target figure laid down by TAB. In 1957 this figure was $615,088, in 1958 $526,300, and for 1959 the figure recommended is $566,887. This is always a most difficult operation because many government agencies press strongly for their particular project proposals on the National Commission. The Resident Representative has played a very important role in making informal contacts with these agencies and smoothing over some of the differences there might have been between them. A system of priorities has also been introduced in the country program: Category I list contains those projects which are to be carried out during the year and Category II list contains those which will only be implemented if funds become available through savings elsewhere.

In Brazil the Resident Representative is also the agent of all the Participating Organizations and has to look after the projects and interests of each of them. He receives and briefs experts when they arrive, and his office performs a whole range of services for these

experts: travel arrangements and the payment of their salaries and allowances. He has also made a point of personally visiting the experts wherever they may be, talking with them and with national officials about the progress of their work. This has enabled him to get first-hand information on the projects and to maintain the personal contacts with UN experts and national officials which are so valuable in the pioneering work of technical assistance. He has also consistently encouraged informal consultations and social contacts between experts in different fields to see how far they can be of help to one another. Finally, he has maintained regular and co-operative relationships with the Director of the American ICA program in Brazil.

Four methods of financing technical assistance are used in Brazil.

The Expanded Program contains a list of all the projects for the next year and their costs, the total of which cannot exceed the "target figure" laid down by TAB for that year. This program is financed from the voluntary contributions of member, as well as non-member, nations of the UN at an annual pledging conference in New York.

The Regular Program has contained a small number of projects, financed by some of the Participating Organizations out of their own budgets.

Funds-in-Trust are funds provided by the Brazilian Government to the United Nations and specifically earmarked for the payment of the salaries of such experts as are recruited on the government's behalf by the United Nations through its world-wide contacts.

The Catalogue of Services contains a listing of funds and facilities which the Brazilian Government makes available to non-Brazilian users—stipends to Latin-American fellows who come to Brazil for training in such institutions as the Brazilian School for Public Administration, the National Steel Company and others. As these funds are used, they are counted as part of the Brazilian contribution to the Expanded Program.

## CONCLUSION

In spite of the relatively short time it has been in operation, the United Nations program in Brazil has worked well and has made some significant contributions. Co-operation with the government, through its National Commission and the various government agencies, has generally been very good in spite of a number of changes in government and many ministerial changes. There seems to be, especially among government officials, a general understanding of and receptivity towards UN technical assistance. UN assistance is appreciated mainly because, being international, it does not have political overtones as is sometimes the case in bilateral assistance. It also makes available experts from many national backgrounds and adds to the range of national technical practices from which Brazilian technicians may choose their own solutions.

Most observers agree that the major contribution of the UN program in Brazil is the national interest it has aroused in regional development. Like many other newly developing countries, Brazil suffers from the unhealthy effects of having a metropolitan center (in this case there are actually two, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) which dominate its political, economic, and social life. Because these cities drain away most of the available investment capital and skilled manpower, the vast interior is left in economic apathy. Most Brazilians agree that this trend can only be reversed by large-scale programs of regional development. The government has created a number of regional development agencies, but their work has

been seriously hampered by a lack of basic regional studies of resources and by the lack of qualified personnel to make them. The UN program has not only resulted in some significant resource surveys, for example, the forest inventory of the Amazon region, but also in the training of a large number of Brazilian officials who can carry on with such technical tasks.

An important feature of the Brazilian program, and especially of the regional projects, is the extent to which specialists from different fields, different specialized agencies, and different nationalities have worked together on joint or interdisciplinary problems. The members of the various teams realized that they were faced with challenges for which their individual specializations could provide only partial answers, and that economic development, whether of a region or a country, involves purposeful action in many interrelated sectors and, therefore, co-operation between the specialists in those sectors. This has resulted in a new understanding and intellectual enrichment on the part of most experts.

Interest in the UN program in Brazil may be expected to increase in the future. Numerous new projects have been proposed which could be carried out as funds become available from the tapering off of existing programs. Within some programs too, there is often a broadening of the range of specialists—a general economist may be followed by an industrial specialist or an agricultural economist by a marketing specialist and an agricultural extension specialist. Technical assistance in one area, therefore, often stimulates it in another, and new projects are often born out of previous ones. As Brazil enters in an era of internal expansion and development, so dramatically symbolized by the construction of its new capital, Brasilia, in the interior, its need for technical assistance will increase, mainly for the purpose of stimulating and guiding the development of its own, already impressive, national technical resources.

# The United States Operations Mission in Iraq

By Henry Wiens

Abstract: The program of technical co-operation in Iraq, prior to the Revolution of 1958, was frequently cited as an example of the ideal Point Four program. The overthrow of the established government led naturally to questions concerning the "failure" of American technical assistance in that country. A close examination of the efforts of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in Iraq indicates, however, both that there were some severe obstacles faced by the mission and that, despite these, the success achieved was considerable. Under the direction of the Iraq Development Board, an agency of the Iraqi Government, three kinds of aid were provided: United States technicians advised or worked with the Iraqi Government; supplies and equipment were provided for demonstration purposes; and Iraqi personnel were sent to the United States or third countries for observation or training programs. The bulk of assistance was directed towards improving agricultural methods, but much also was achieved in such areas as preventive medicine, education, and administrative improvement. To consider the Revolution as proof of failure is to misunderstand both the purposes and potential achievements of the Point Four program. Economic improvement can be made to serve political ends but is not political in itself. Also, it is a mistake to consider technical assistance as a means to support the status quo; the aim of the Point Four program is to promote the combined growth of economic improvement and political freedom.—Ed.

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THIS case study in technical co-operation describes and analyzes the historically significant features of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) program in Iraq prior to the Revolution of July 14, 1958. It also attempts to evaluate what "went wrong" with Iraq's development program which had frequently been cited as a model capital investment program.

The ICA program in Iraq, which was limited to technical co-operation,[1] typified the Point Four ideal espoused by the late Dr. Henry G. Bennett, first Director of the Technical Cooperation Administration. Under this concept, the United States helps newly developing nations acquire technical "know-how" needed for promoting economic growth. Even some of the sterner critics of "foreign aid" conceded that the results of this program in Iraq were impressive.

## OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of the program was to promote the economic development of Iraq. As defined in the bilateral agreement of April 10, 1951, it was "to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of Iraq." This wording paralleled closely that employed in the bilateral agreements with other countries desiring Point Four programs. It was in harmony with the definition and objectives of Title III of the Mutual Security Act of 1954,[2] which adds the further purposes of improving the working and living conditions of the people in the country involved.

Underlying these stated objectives were the more basic United States foreign policy objectives such as helping Iraq to build her economic strength in order to help her maintain her independence, to provide a base upon which orderly political development might occur, to enable her to contribute toward world prosperity as a growing trading partner within the Free World, and to enable her to participate more effectively as a sovereign and equal partner in the community of nations.

It will be noted that these objectives contribute directly to the maintenance of the security and prosperity of the United States as repeatedly defined by the President.

## IRAQ'S DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

The establishment of the Iraq Development Board and the reservation of 70 per cent of the country's vast oil revenues gave proof of the Government's intention to carry out the objectives set forth in the Technical Cooperation Agreement. The semiautonomous Development Board exercised vast powers within the framework of general multiple-year programs approved by the *Majlis* (parliament). Consisting of ten members, the Board included three ex-officio members—the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Finance and Development—who served for the duration of any given Cabinet, and seven permanent members. Of the permanent members five were senior Iraqis—ex-Prime Ministers or ex-Cabinet members—appointed for five years, and two were foreign members nominated by the British and United States governments, respectively, but appointed by the Government of Iraq.

The substantive work of the Board was executed by technical sections: irri-

[1] Some economic aid was provided on a one-time basis under the Eisenhower Doctrine in a commitment made by the Richards Mission to the Middle East in 1957, but even here the funds were used essentially in support of the technical co-operation effort.

[2] This authorizing act is subject to annual renewal by the Congress. Title III derives largely from the Act for International Development of 1950, the original legislation setting up the technical assistance program.

gation and power, public buildings and roads, industry, agriculture, and public housing, plus a semiautonomous land settlement administration (*Miri Sirf*). These sections were staffed by senior foreign and Iraqi technicians. The Board undertook most investment programs through these technical divisions, but later also made financing available for projects to be undertaken by the regular ministries. Consulting engineering firms of international repute provided much of the vast amount of technical assistance required for large construction projects. These firms were retained to make surveys, formulate projects, develop detailed specifications, advise on the letting of contracts, and supervise construction. This essentially American technique enabled the Board to get many projects under way expeditiously.

The magnitude of the funds available to the Board may be judged from the fact that the 140 million dollars it received in 1955 was roughly equivalent to the entire normal governmental budget.[3]

## THE ICA PROGRAM

The technical co-operation program in Iraq, as in most other countries, provided aid of three types. First, United States technicians were detailed to advise or work with the various branches of the Government in response to specific requests for their services. Since over three-fourths of the available funds were used for this purpose, this feature will receive the most attention in this article. During the past four years, an average of well over 100 technicians were supplied. The staff of the Iraq Mission was large when compared on a world-wide basis with other countries. Eager to have a maximum number of technicians, the Iraqi government paid a larger share of their expenses than did many other countries. Technicians usually remained for two years at a time, after which they took home leave and might return to post if so desired by the host government. A number of consultants and short-term technicians were also provided.

Second, limited amounts of supplies and equipment were provided for demonstration purposes. These were used largely by United States technicians to demonstrate the effectiveness of new techniques. Since host government officials did not always understand these new techniques, they frequently could not see the reason for providing funds for purchasing the necessary equipment. In some countries, budgetary difficulties also stood in the way. In Iraq, a minimum of United States funds was provided for this purpose, as the Government usually made provision within its own budget for such needs. One instance in which ICA funds were thus used in Iraq was for the purchase of land-levelling equipment to permit our technicians to demonstrate the value of levelling irrigated farms for the conservation of water and soil and for increasing production.

Third, Iraqi officials, technicians, and students were sent to the United States or third countries for programs of observation or training. Originally this was largely limited to mid- and early-career training for government employees and technicians. But later it was broadened to include university training, including summer or short courses, for students and technicians. The American University of Beirut under a special contractual arrangement with ICA carried on a large and growing regional program for all countries of the Middle East. ICA progressively emphasized the idea that training programs should be undertaken in nearby countries where

[3] 1955 is used as the pipelines were destroyed during the Suez crisis of 1956 and annual oil exports were not fully restored until 1958.

appropriate facilities were available. The costs were substantially less than sending persons to the United States and conditions more nearly approximated those in the host country.

The magnitude of the ICA Program did not vary greatly from year to year. It averaged approximately 2.5 million dollars annually. Toward the end of the period under consideration, the total of United States personnel was about 140, of which about 115 were hired directly, and about 25 were contract employees.

### FIELDS OF ACTIVITIES

Since 75 per cent of the population derive their livelihood from the soil, agriculture quite properly constituted the most important area of United States Operations Mission (USOM) activity and accounted for well over half of all technicians supplied to Iraq. Agricultural technicians were supplied to five different branches of the government: the Ministry of Agriculture, the Irrigation Directorate, the Land Settlement Administration (*Miri Sirf*), the Development Board, and the Agricultural College at Abu Ghraib. The principal emphasis was on the well-known triumvirate of the American land grant college system—research, education and a country-wide extension service.

In public health, the USOM emphasized preventive medicine, since in Iraq as in most other underdeveloped countries preventive medicine was not practiced as much as was curative medicine. This probably derives from the fact that curative medicine produces dramatic results for individuals whereas prevention, by its nature, does not personalize its results. It is the old story of the effectiveness of articulated demands—more importance is usually attached to the cries of a single sick baby than to the well-being of 100 babies who escape illness as a result of preventive measures.

In education, emphasis was placed on technical training. Advisers were provided for a number of special technical schools which were in the process of being established. Technical advisers were also provided to assist the ministry in its efforts to place greater emphasis on agricultural and technical work in the public schools. A substantial effort was made in helping to establish an audio-visual training center, an obvious need in a country where illiteracy is high.

The public administration program as such got off to a slow start although in a larger sense most ICA efforts were toward improving public administration. Surveys were made in several fields such as personnel, finance, records management, and so forth. More recently a public administration training program was established as well as a public safety training program.

The community development program planned the establishment of a nationwide system of multipurpose village-level workers who were to seek means for getting villagers to improve their own lot. A generalist in various technical subjects, this worker was trained in techniques for stimulating local initiative and co-operative community action. In transportation, the USOM supplied under contract a group of engineers to help the Ministry of Works and Communications develop a highway department. Emphasis was placed on maintenance.

### ICA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The United States Operations Mission was organized largely as in most other countries. Headed by a Director,[4] and

[4] Dr. Lewis H. Rohrbaugh served from 1951 to December 1953; the writer from January 1954 to August 1956; Ben Hill Brown from September 1956 to November 1958. Mr. Brown also served as Field Co-ordinator for Baghdad Pact projects during the latter part of his tour.

later also a Deputy Director, the Mission had a small central staff to provide supervision and administrative services. It consisted of a program officer, a controller, an executive officer, a training officer, and their United States and local employee subordinates. This staff was housed in a building near the American Embassy.

The vast bulk of the mission was made up of the technicians assigned to the various branches of the government. They were actually housed in the regular governmental office buildings. From a mission viewpoint, they reported to the directors of their respective divisions, such as agriculture, health, or education. While the directors served as advisers to their respective ministries, they were also administratively responsible to the USOM Director and were given office space in the Mission building as a convenience to transact their necessary Mission business.

From an Iraqi viewpoint, these United States technicians were given formal appointments within the governmental hierarchy, and they worked side by side with their Iraqi associates. Most ICA technicians served as advisers in line with standard ICA policy. However, the Iraqis frequently desired to have these technicians assume full administrative responsibilities. This was sometimes permitted temporarily, but only when the USOM was convinced that training objectives would be better served by these means. Technicians were constantly reminded that their success would be measured by how quickly they could work themselves out of jobs.

The position of the United States member of the Development Board deserves special mention. Nominated by the United States Government, he was detailed to the Government of Iraq, which formally appointed him with all of the prerogatives of other members of the Development Board. He was forbidden to reveal confidential matters to the United States Government, and the United States Government did not attempt to influence his decision on matters before the Board. It was believed that the Government of Iraq could benefit most from his considerable technical and managerial abilities if it had complete confidence in his objectivity. The importance which the Government of the United States attached to this arrangement was demonstrated by the caliber of the two officials who held this position.

## PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

Ideally, the program of technical cooperation to be undertaken in any country should be truly responsive to the desires of the host government, and the details of the program should be formulated co-operatively. Since the economic objectives of the two governments involved were essentially in harmony, this ideal appeared to be easily obtainable in Iraq. But certain difficulties emerged in practice.

From the Iraqi side, the chief problem resided in that government's failure to co-ordinate its requests for technical assistance. This in turn grew out of the general problem of program co-ordination. While the Iraqi Development Board constituted an excellent vehicle for the formulation and execution of programs, no effective arrangements were made to provide for co-ordination of the Board's activities with those of other branches of the Iraqi Government. This was a serious and constantly growing problem to which successive cabinets addressed themselves without effective result. It was even referred to so eminent a foreign consultant as Lord Salter.[5]

No adequate procedures were set up

[5] Better known to Americans as Sir Arthur Salter, the British economist and statesman.

to establish government-wide priorities for the use of foreign technical assistance. There was no central office with which the USOM, or other foreign missions engaged in providing technical assistance to Iraq, could enter into negotiations. A liaison office for technical assistance was established within the Foreign Office, but it was used chiefly as a channel for formal communications and was virtually devoid of actual authority. This imposed on USOM the necessity to determine priorities as between requests of the various branches of the Iraqi Government, a role hardly appropriate to the spirit of a truly co-operative program.

## FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

The problem also presented obstacles on the United States side. Almost a year before the beginning of a fiscal year, the ICA in Washington began collecting information about the technical assistance requirements of all the countries concerned as a basis for preparing the request to Congress for the next year's funds. Requests to Missions for information had to be timed carefully to avoid interfering with other important deadlines. Of necessity, therefore, they had to be issued on an urgency basis which ill afforded time for adequate consultations with the host government.

Moreover, until recently consultations had to be conducted in an extremely guarded manner, as ICA was reluctant to reveal the illustrative figures for each country to be submitted to the Congress. Bitter experience had taught the agency that some countries considered such figures as firm commitments; if the amount of aid subsequently granted that country was less, the result sometimes created serious misunderstandings. Yet this prohibition to discuss a potential aid figure made it patently difficult to discuss meaningfully the program contemplated.

The problem was renewed after the funds were finally appropriated by Congress, a process which usually occurred during August, the second month after the beginning of the fiscal year. A number of programing steps had to be undertaken in Washington before allocating to the various countries the funds appropriated—almost invariably smaller than the amount requested. The USOMs had to be consulted about how the reduced amount should be programed. But since the fiscal year was already well advanced, the time factor again made adequate negotiations difficult. Yet this was, in fact, the first occasion on which the Mission could reveal the actual aid figure to the host government. The system of annual appropriation of funds thus made programing on a mutual basis with the host government extremely difficult to achieve. The saving grace was that most technical co-operation programs were of a continuing nature so that relatively few projects were actually of great importance in this annual programing process. Moreover, the Mission Director and his principal officers attempted to discuss future technical assistance requirements on a year-round basis so that they would better understand the country's requirements on the next occasion when Washington had to have a quick answer.

In the process of program justification, the USOM in Iraq pioneered in the formulation of a total country policy statement in which the ICA projects were directly related to over-all and subordinate Iraqi and United States objectives. The program office developed a comprehensive diagrammatic chart illustrating the relationship of over-all objectives to the means whereby these were to be sought and the specific steps to be taken for their achievement.

### CO-ORDINATION

Co-ordination of USOM activities was achieved by a variety of means. Internal co-ordination between the various divisions was achieved principally through weekly staff meetings and by supervision of the Director. Division directors and technicians were encouraged to co-ordinate their activities directly, raising problems higher only as required or if a wider significance were at issue. Frequently, USOM interdivision problems reflected greater Iraqi interministerial problems. These were brought to the attention of their various ministries.

Co-ordination with the Embassy and all other elements of the United States official family was achieved under the leadership of the Ambassador, pursuant to Executive Order 10575 of November 6, 1954 and related orders. These orders definitively established the authority of the Ambassador, as the representative of the President, to co-ordinate all United States Government activities within any given country. The Mission Director regularly attended weekly Embassy staff meetings and periodic meetings of the Country Team consisting of the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission (the Counselor of Embassy), the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), and the Chief of the United States Information Service (USIS).

Co-ordination with the United Nations was achieved through frequent informal meetings and telephone calls between the USOM Director and the UN Resident Representative. Field co-ordination between UN and ICA was in line with repeated identical instructions issued by the UN and the ICA. But despite mutual efforts, certain types of problems persisted. The natural tendency of technicians toward professional jealousy and technical differences was accentuated by national differences and their association with different organizations. With the best intentions of the respective leaders, it was not always possible to eliminate all innate competitive tendencies.

### EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICA PROGRAM

The question naturally arises as to how effective was United States technical assistance in Iraq. Without purporting to answer this question fully, the following comments may be suggestive.

First, from an over-all operational standpoint, the efforts appeared effective. A significant contribution was made by USOM technicians toward getting the general development program under way in Iraq. The program was clearly advanced beyond what it might have been without United States assistance and encouragement. Its content, direction, and tempo were obviously influenced.

From a narrower viewpoint, there was a considerable transfer of skills, particularly in the fields where ICA had the most technicians. Point Four was responsible for a number of remarkable technological advances in Iraq. ICA training objectives were thus being realized as well.

The influence of the USOM was most effective in areas where the interests of the Iraqi ruling group were not in conflict with the basic developmental objectives of the bilateral agreement. This covered a large area of activities. But USOM influence was relatively small whenever the interests of the ruling class appeared to them to be in jeopardy, although such problems could be and were discussed with entire candor with members of the government. Arguments for accelerating the benefits to the general population, for expediting the *Miri Sirf* land settlement program, for supporting a genuine village self-

improvement program on an urgent basis, and many more such proposals were applauded in principle but failed to get adequate support.

While the planning of construction projects proceeded quite well—indeed remarkably well for a country with so little previous experience—there was little response to the urging that planning and budgeting be undertaken for the development of Iraq's human resources. There was, for example, urgent need for a manpower survey, the results to be correlated with the skills needed for implementing the development program. The deficiencies thus revealed and projected into the future could have served as a basis for instituting training programs. Suggestions for the co-ordination of other more sophisticated aspects of planning, for instance the co-ordination of various programs of different types such as agriculture, public health, and education, found relatively little response until quite recently.

Casting up such a trial balance raises questions as to the basic effectiveness of a "pure" technical assistance approach where vested interests are involved. Could more rapid results have been achieved with a few demonstration projects, perhaps employing some devices such as the joint fund technique so widely used in Latin America? Is technical co-operation more effective when used jointly with U. S. economic aid funds? Clearly, this last alternative could hardly have been justified in Iraq in view of her own financial resources.

While it is too early to determine what the future holds for the co-operative program in Iraq, one fact is clear: United States technicians will occupy only advisory roles. The position of the American member of the Development Board has been abolished, as was the British position somewhat earlier. Other Americans occupying administrative positions in various agencies of the Iraqi Government have been relieved of such responsibilities. While this is a striking change, it is neither surprising nor out of harmony with the policies of ICA.

## THE IRAQI PROGRAM IN RETROSPECT

Many questions are being asked by thoughtful people about the Iraq Development Program. For example, why did it not succeed in creating conditions which would have obviated the Revolution? What went wrong?

While this is not the place to analyze the causes underlying the Revolution, a few comments on it appear relevant to this discussion. These comments are offered with the realization that issues become much clearer in retrospect. As one who worked closely with the former regime, the writer approaches this task of looking backward with reticence and a sense of personal humility.

Judged exclusively in operational terms, the Iraq Development Program did not fail; the planning job was done with reasonable effectiveness, projects were undertaken quite expeditiously, an impressive number of projects were completed, and there was visible evidence of economic change and improvement.

This Revolution, like so many others, illustrates again the "primacy of politics." While there were contributing economic factors, the political factors were clearly controlling. For example, the *ancién regime* failed to appreciate the intensity and extent of popular support for the new Arab nationalism. It chose not to align itself with this force and even gave the appearance of opposing it. As the founders of the older Arab nationalist movement, the Iraqi leaders appeared baffled by the turn which this newer movement was taking.

From the point of view of political

impact on its own people, the Iraq Government's development program overstressed long-range capital investments. The dream of recreating a Garden of Eden from the sun-baked deserts of Mesopotamia so enthralled many Iraqis in high places that they failed to see the urgency of alleviating the sufferings of the general populace. An articulate segment of Iraqi officialdom pleaded for earlier popular benefits, an approach which also had the full support of the ICA mission in line with official United States policy. Eventually this view gained considerable acceptance in the Iraqi Government but it was another case of "too late and too little."

The old regime appeared genuinely puzzled and hurt that paternalistic efforts were not appreciated by the people. The late Crown Prince was quoted as saying that if only the Iraqi people could be put to sleep for five years, they would wake up with deep gratitude to their government! Such a "father knows best" attitude assumes that people are satisfied by having things done for them rather than with them, or better still, doing the things themselves. The success of community development programs in India, Pakistan, Burma, or the Philippines, and of the agricultural extension programs being sponsored in many countries by ICA indicates the vitality of the idea of involving people in their own destinies. But the leitmotiv of the Iraqi development effort was that an all-wise, bountiful government was doing things which the people ought to recognize and appreciate as being good for them. Neither Americans nor Iraqis respond favorably to such an approach.

The failure of the government to take some effective steps toward land reform constituted an issue of critical importance. Land reform could not be permanently ignored without serious political consequences. The government was, to be sure, working on a number of approaches on a long-term basis, but this was hardly known outside a small coterie. On the other hand, the domination of the Parliament by the landowning sheikhs was so complete that any significant relief appeared hopeless within the foreseeable future.

## LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

Some general lessons might be learned from this experience in Iraq. These are not new, but simply tend to confirm conclusions reached from experiences elsewhere.

First, it is usually a mistake to expect that political problems can be solved exclusively by economic means. As one wag puts it, "It's like trying to saw a board with a hammer." But economic measures can often be used effectively in support of political measures. If this principle were clearly understood, it might eliminate much confusion in thinking about foreign policy.

Second, economic development does not necessarily promote political stability. Indeed, the opposite may frequently be the result. While political stability is sometimes cited as a goal of American foreign policy, this probably arises from a lack of careful thinking. Such a static concept is hardly appropriate in a changing world where the strong desires for greater freedom and growing popular participation in government are well-nigh universal. The promotion of the orderly political development of these countries, combined with increasing popular participation and a trend towards liberty, is more nearly the United States philosophy. While rapid economic growth may not always promote such political development, it appears safe to say that, given the intensity and universality of rising expectations, this type of orderly political

development is no longer possible without substantial economic growth. On this point, political leaders the world over have agreed with striking unanimity since World War II.

Third, the popular assumption that economic development leads naturally and inevitably toward greater freedom and democracy is demonstrably false. For reasons suggested above, it certainly did not prove to be the case in Iraq. The concomitants of economic development—its guiding policies and the climate within which it is carried on—are important, as elucidated by Eugene Staley.[6] In sponsoring economic development programs the world around, the United States Government and the American people must understand this point clearly.

[6] *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).

# The Ford Foundation Program in Pakistan

by George F. Gant

Abstract: At Independence, in 1947, Pakistan suffered not only a severe shortage of trained personnel needed for its development but also a dearth of institutions for the training of personnel. The Ford Foundation has made grants since 1951 to help Pakistan establish and strengthen key institutions to produce competence. Grants are made for projects which are within the framework of Pakistan's Five Year Plan, the interests of the Foundation in key research and educational institutions, and the gaps in other foreign assistance programs. Foundation funds are made available for such assistance as training of institutional staff abroad, foreign advisers, and the dollars needed for the import of equipment and material. Pakistan pays the local currency expenditures for construction, equipment, and staff—the larger share—on the basis of development "schemes" often prepared with the assistance of consultants financed by the Foundation. Foreign advisers, consultative and research services, and training facilities included in a grant are provided by such universities as Harvard, Oklahoma State, Chicago, and Michigan State. The evolution of the Foundation's grant for Education Extension Centers is described for purposes of illustration. Since it takes a long time to develop a new institution, the Foundation has elected to assist with only a few in order to permit the length and depth of aid which is required. New projects will be taken up as older ones mature. Future emphasis of the Foundation program, together with the co-operating American universities, will be to improve the methodology of technical co-operation and the implementation of grants.

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PAKISTAN is unusual among nations in two major respects—its chief unifying force is religion, Islam, and its two wings, East and West, are a thousand miles apart, separated by India. The acts by which India and Pakistan achieved independence from Great Britain in 1947 at the same time partitioned the subcontinent. East Pakistan, essentially the deltas of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna Rivers, is a wet country heavily overpopulated by 45 million Bengalis of whom over three-quarters are Muslim and one-fifth Hindu. West Pakistan is primarily a dry and comparatively sparsely populated area of 35 million Sindhi, Punjabi, Pushtu, and Baluchi speaking peoples, over 90 per cent of whom are Muslim. The economic factor common to both wings in 1947 was that they represented the outlying and least developed areas of the underdeveloped subcontinent of India. Although it has large reserves of natural gas, prospects of oil have not been realized and mineral deposits have not been found or exploited in any significant quantities. Pakistan's resources are chiefly agricultural. It exports jute, cotton, tea, and skins and hides, but in most years it has had to import rice and wheat for food.

## NEED FOR TRAINED PERSONNEL

At Partition and Independence, Pakistan and India engaged in what was perhaps the largest exchange of populations known to history. Probably 12 million people migrated from one country to the other. The influx of 7 million refugees into Pakistan added one more burden to the new nation already occupied in establishing a government, a currency, and international connections. Perhaps more seriously, Pakistan lost most of the trained professional leaders and staff from its government departments, banking and commerce, and universities and schools. Before 1947 these positions had been held preponderantly by Hindus, almost all of whom moved to India. Most of the immigrating Muslims were farmers and artisans. Furthermore, since most of the subcontinent's research and specialized training institutions were in the area that became India, Pakistan came into being with a critical shortage not only of trained leadership and manpower, but also of the institutions to produce the scientists, engineers, teachers, entrepreneurs, civil servants, and other professional and skilled personnel necessary to its survival and development. Not without reason did the Pakistan Planning Board identify the trained manpower shortage as a major barrier in fulfilling its Five Year Plan—a barrier as formidable as the shortage of economic resources and foreign exchange.

## THE FORD FOUNDATION'S ROLE

The Ford Foundation established its Overseas Development program in 1951 on the basis of recommendations made by some of its officers after an exploratory trip to South and Southeast Asia and to the Middle East. The largest part of this program has been expressed in South and Southeast Asia; Representatives stationed in Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Grants have been made to institutions in several countries of the Near East and the program is now being extended gradually to Africa and to Latin America.

In Pakistan the question considered by the Foundation in 1951 was whether a private philanthropy could make any contribution to a country receiving technical and economic assistance from the United States Government at the rate of over $100,000,000 per year, from the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia under the Colombo Plan at the rate of over $20,000,000 per year, and from

the United Nations and its affiliates. The answer was clearly affirmative, from the point of view of both Pakistan and the Foundation. Most aid from the United States and from the Colombo countries is economic, it went for physical development—for the construction of dams, fertilizer plants, roads—or for underwriting the general economy. Only a comparatively minor portion is for technical assistance in developing research and training institutions. Assistance from United Nations agencies, on the other hand, is chiefly for consultants who can help make development plans but who do not have the funds needed to carry them out. Also, the policy and procedural limits of the programs of these governmental and international agencies fall short of some of Pakistan's major needs.

It takes a long time to create new institutions anywhere in the world. The process is particularly complex in a country like Pakistan where teaching and research skills in many new fields must be started from scratch. Annually budgeted programs of assistance, especially when designed to meet immediate economic urgencies, do not lend themselves well to institutional development. The Foundation and the Government of Pakistan agreed that they could fruitfully co-operate in the establishment or strengthening of institutions vital to Pakistan's long-range development. In addition, the Foundation could assist Pakistan in sensitive fields in which Pakistan might be reluctant to receive assistance from a foreign government. Above all, the Foundation's interest in Pakistan would symbolize the private, nongovernmental concern of Americans for the welfare of humanity everywhere. This effort to increase the ability of the peoples of the new nations to deal effectively with their problems reflects the spirit of the Foundation's Overseas Development program.

## FIRST FOUNDATION PROJECTS

The Foundation's first grants, in 1952, were designed to help establish three polytechnic institutes and a college (later increased to three colleges) of home economics. The polytechnic institutes offer a three-year post-high school course to fill the gap between trade schools and apprenticeships on the one hand and engineering colleges on the other. The home economics colleges will be key points in Pakistan's expanded and enriched education program for girls and women. The Foundation has financed the costs of foreign advisers, staff training abroad, and the foreign exchange requirements for equipment and construction. Oklahoma State University has provided the advisory and training services in both fields.

A few months after the first grants, others were made to assist the Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Program and the Government of Pakistan Planning Board. The V-AID program was designed to encourage and assist villagers to organize themselves to deal locally with as many of their problems and opportunities as they could in agriculture, small industry, co-operatives, education, and health and sanitation, and to tap more effectively the technical assistance of the government's nation-building departments in carrying out their plans. To encourage local self-government and to marshall the villagers' interests and energies behind the nation's development program, Pakistan gave V-AID first priority. The International Cooperation Administration provided the foreign advisers and much of the equipment for village-worker training centers, and the Foundation provided funds to help Pakistan set up the training centers more rapidly than its budget would otherwise permit. There are now nine centers, training over 1,200 village workers a year.

One of the most difficult problems faced by a new nation is to plan its program of development so that the priorities it selects fit realistically the available resources. Aware that priorities had to be selected to make the most of limited money and manpower, Pakistan established a Planning Board in 1953 to draft a five year plan. Since then, planning organizations have been set up in each of the two Provinces, and the Planning Board has been made a permanent organization. The Ford Foundation made a series of grants that enabled the Planning Board to obtain advisers from Harvard University. Harvard's major assistance at this stage is to help the Planning Board strengthen its staff and its procedures and techniques of planning toward the day when foreign advisers will not be needed. The Harvard-Planning Board Project is noteworthy in two respects. First, in a sensitive and intimate function of government Pakistan has benefited from assistance it would have been reluctant to accept from another government. Second, the Harvard experts have worked as advisers so anonymously and effectively that there has never been criticism of their role although such criticism, in so controversial a process as planning, could certainly have been expected.

### EXPLORING AND SELECTING NEW PROJECTS

For several years the four areas mentioned above—polytechnic education, home economics, V-AID, and the Planning Board—attracted the major grants of the Foundation in Pakistan. In late 1955 and in 1956, however, the Foundation's Representative initiated a process of exploration which culminated in several new projects. The framework of the exploration consisted of the priorities of Pakistan's Five Year Plan, the interests of the Foundation in key institutions—chiefly educational—and the gaps in other foreign assistance programs. Within these limits and the limits of Foundation funds available to Pakistan, a wide range of opportunities remained. This range was narrowed in conferences with the Central and Provincial Ministries and with many heads and staff members of universities, colleges and government departments and agencies. The selection process was guided by the suggestions of the Chairman of the Planning Board and by the Secretary of Economic Affairs who coordinates foreign aid. The possibilities emerging from this process were discussed in detail with the officers and staff of the Foundation in New York. Several were selected for fuller exploration.

Pakistan's development program, within the general framework of the Five Year Plan, consists of many "schemes." A scheme, which does not have an exact counterpart in American administration, is a detailed plan for a new project—a new college, say, or a dam, or an expanded agency program. It includes detailed statements of justification, method, recurring and nonrecurring expenditure, and sources of support. A scheme must follow a slow and tortuous process of review and approval, after which, if it is included in Provincial and Central budgets, it provides the authority for implementation and expenditure. Changes of any consequence in the plan or expenditure of an approved scheme must, before approval, follow the same review procedure as a new scheme. A scheme usually originates in a Provincial department, and it must be reviewed and approved by the Provincial Departments of Planning and Finance before transmittal to the Central government. Any schemes of consequence are required to be approved by the Central government because most of them require central

financial assistance or foreign aid, or both. In any case, central review assures co-ordination with the national Five Year Plan.

In the Central government, the scheme must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate ministry (for example, a proposal for a new teacher training college would go to the Ministry of Education), by the Planning Board, by the Finance Ministry and, if foreign aid is involved, by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Any of these steps of review may involve referrals to the point of origin for clarification; hence approval of a scheme takes at least six months and, often, from one to two years. By that time the scheme has acquired an almost statutory status. However, the end is not yet. Before it goes into operation, the scheme must receive financial sanction. This means that it must be included in both the Provincial and Central budgets.

*Approval of schemes*

Any foreign aided project that involves Pakistan's funds must be through the slow but thorough process involved in the preparation, consideration, approval, and financial sanction of a scheme. This elaborate procedure is a major factor in the administration and effectiveness of foreign assistance. It means that schemes must be carefully drafted and that Pakistan's financial and administrative participation cannot be assured until the process is complete. If this fact is not taken into account, foreign contributions of expert personnel and equipment will be premature and frustrated. Much misunderstanding and unhappiness about foreign assistance in Pakistan is due to unfamiliarity on the part of aid-giving agencies with Pakistan's system of administration. Many a foreign expert has sat out his two-year term helplessly because he arrived in Pakistan before his scheme had been approved or given financial sanction. And much equipment has rusted on the docks or in storage bins.

Having failed in the early years to understand and then to follow Pakistan's system of planning and budgeting, the Ford Foundation made grants which also languished. It has since learned to relate its process of project exploration and assistance to that of Pakistan. The first and most important consideration is the quality of a scheme. When Pakistan and the Foundation have explored an idea for a new project to a point which warrants the project's translation into a scheme, the Foundation, at Pakistan's request, often provides consultants to collaborate with Pakistani officers in drafting the details. Consultants are sought particularly in connection with projects that involve institutions or skills not yet available in Pakistan. After the scheme is drafted, the consultants leave Pakistan during the six to eighteen months period it takes to move the scheme to approval and financial sanction. In the meantime the scheme provides the Ford Foundation with a full and detailed statement upon which to judge its own potential contribution. Also, the Foundation's Representative, in his advisory capacity, consults with the several Pakistani departments and ministries as they consider the scheme.

A major factor in Foundation consideration of projects is their priority in Pakistan's program of development. The Foundation does not have a kitful of projects it is urging upon Pakistan. Rather, it selects from among the many suggested that also coincide with the Foundation's area of interest. The clearest evidence of Pakistan's intent about a project is not only its inclusion in the Five Year Plan, but also its inclusion in the budget on the basis of an approved scheme. The Foundation's path is clear once Pakistan decides to

devote to a project such local currencies and skills as are needed. The Foundation can then make a grant to supplement Pakistan's investment with foreign exchange and specialized advice and training.

Before the Five Year Plan was approved and the annual development budget system was established, there was a tendency for well-wishing aid-giving agencies to press upon Pakistan projects that were not related in time, and in terms of Pakistan's ability to operate or maintain them, to a more rational plan of development. Pakistan's needs are great and many projects are "good," but it was a disservice to Pakistan to encourage the commitment of a large part of its future budgets to projects which were taken up not because they fitted into the sequence of Pakistan's requirements but because some foreign aid was available.

### METHODOLOGY OF ASSISTANCE: USE OF GRANT FUNDS

The Foundation's Overseas Development program constantly faces the challenge of making the best use of available funds to assist projects once they have been selected. This problem has four aspects:

- How many institutions of the same type in one country should the Foundation assist?
- To what uses should grant funds be put to assist an approved project?
- Under what arrangements should foreign advisers be provided?
- Should foreign experts establish, administer and staff a new institution at the outset, or should nationals?

Because the Foundation's resources are limited, it confines its assistance to amounts necessary to help a country to set up and test new kinds of institutions or programs. The Foundation's aid is further limited to those cases needed to demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of new undertakings. Pakistan's program for polytechnic institutes, for example, calls for a series of such institutes throughout the country, but the Foundation is assisting with only the first three; perhaps two would have been sufficient to give Pakistan the "know-how" to establish others on its own. It is true that Pakistan needs economic assistance in constructing and equipping additional institutes, but neither the nature nor the resources of a private philanthropy are adapted to these purely economic needs.

The Foundation has evolved a pattern of assistance in Pakistan that is broad enough to cover all the foreign-aid needs of its projects but narrow enough to rely on Pakistan for local funds and staff. In this way, the Foundation can devote its resources to meeting each project's total dollar requirements—construction, equipment, foreign advisers, and foreign training of staff. Some other aid-giving agencies can provide only part of the foreign aid needed and sometimes must help find supplementary assistance from one or more other foreign agencies. More than one foreign-aided project has failed because all the components were not available or, if available from several sources, became hopelessly entangled in procedural confusion and conflicts in policy and methodology.

The Foundation assists Pakistan with projects which Pakistan intends to support but for which foreign technical help is needed. In most cases this means that Foundation funds provide foreign advisers; scholarships for the foreign training of staff members; and import of equipment, books, and construction materials. In Pakistan, it is still necessary to import steel, glass, and some fixtures for building construction—all of which comprise about 20 per cent of the total building costs. Pakistan's foreign

exchange is so tight that new buildings for educational purposes take a lower priority than those for industrial and agricultural production. When new buildings are an essential element in a project in which the Foundation expresses an interest, therefore, the foreign exchange costs are often included in the grant.

## METHODOLOGY OF ASSISTANCE: FOREIGN EXPERTS

The essence of foreign assistance is the quality of the foreign advisers. If competent and understanding foreign advisers are not available, it is far better not to undertake a project than to provide second raters and misfits. The simplest and most direct method of tapping and holding the interest of outstanding advisers would be for Pakistan, under a Foundation grant, to recruit, select, and employ the foreign personnel it needed for a project. This method is not feasible, however, partly because Pakistan does not have the facilities which make either the recruitment or the employment practicable, but mainly because the length of employment on a single project does not provide a continuity of career sufficiently attractive to the kinds of experts needed. Nor can the Foundation, although it has the facilities to recruit and employ expert advisers on behalf of Pakistan, assure tenure of employment. The Ford Foundation does not have continuing overseas programs in Pakistan or elsewhere. Rather, the Foundation makes grants to assist Pakistan and certain other countries with their own diverse programs and projects. Furthermore, the Foundation is not an operating organization, like ICA, or like the Rockefeller Foundation in connection with its agricultural research in Latin America and South and Southeast Asia.

The problem of recruiting qualified experts for Pakistan has been solved through arrangements with interested and competent American universities and other appropriate institutions to provide the consultation, advisers, and foreign training needed. The universities can assure advisers of career and professional continuity as well as opportunity for unique experience. O. far greater importance, the universities can provide outstanding direction to consultative and advisory and other services through their major faculty members, adding both stature and depth to the quality of leadership devoted to institutional development. In other words, the Foundation's assistance to Pakistan is broadened enormously by supplementing the Representative's efforts with those of some of America's leaders in education, development economics, technical education, agriculture, home economics, and development administration. Dividends of this method are the enrichment and strengthening of the American universities' own educational programs through the experience of their staff members in foreign assistance. Harvard's program in development economics and Chicago's program in comparative education exemplify the fruitful two-way benefits that accrue from university contribution to projects in Pakistan.

Consequently, while the Foundation has a Representative, with a small staff, who confers with the government of Pakistan about new projects and helps to monitor grants, the burden of technical assistance falls upon American universities and institutions under agreements financed by Foundation grants. The typical agreement calls for general consultation, recruitment, and provision of foreign advisers, and training of Pakistani staff members in the United States or elsewhere abroad. Foreign experts and advisers, although recruited and employed by American universities, are

selected only with the approval of the Pakistan agencies concerned. Once employed and located in Pakistan, foreign advisers work with and for the heads of the institutions or agencies to which they are assigned. Their offices are located at the Pakistan institutions and not at the Ford Foundation or separate offices established by the American universities.

*Adviser-agency relationship*

Neither an adviser nor the agency receiving his advice has an easy role. The best relations are rooted in a clear and commonly held understanding of the agency's purpose and methods. In establishing a new institution, the basic question often is whether the institution should be set up, administered, and staffed at the outset by foreign experts and then turned over later to the local staff, or whether the national agency should have full charge from the beginning with only advisory assistance from the foreign experts. Foundation-assisted institutions in Pakistan are developing under the second formula. Although the first method of foreign responsibility may produce more results more quickly, the Foundation believes that the second method achieves the best results in the long run. To take again a polytechnic institute as the illustration, Oklahoma State University might have constructed and equipped an institute and produced technicians faster than Pakistan did. But the objective was not to produce technicians in a hurry; that could have been done by sending young men to technical institutes abroad. Rather, the objective was to help Pakistan learn to establish and operate polytechnic institutes within its framework of educational administration and policy. Although much more needs to be learned about the art and science of foreign-national co-operation in institution building, the Foundation's experience in Pakistan leads it to believe that the best basis of relationship is for the Pakistan authorities to be in charge and doing the work from the outset.

## CASE STUDY OF A GRANT: EDUCATION EXTENSION CENTERS

The evolution of the Foundation's relations with Pakistan's Education Extension Centers and pilot schools of secondary education illustrates the specifics of institutional planning. Major educational objectives of Pakistan's Five Year Plan are to broaden and enrich its secondary schools, which have been heavily literary in emphasis, and to improve teaching methods. The Plan calls for five education extension centers for the reorientation and in-service training of school inspectors, headmasters, and teachers as a primary means of accomplishing this objective. It also calls for the experimental and demonstration use in forty secondary schools of new curricula, with emphasis on science and vocational subjects, and new teaching and examination methods. In the fall of 1956 it was suggested to the Foundation's Representative that the Foundation might assist these projects. Discussion and exploration over several weeks convinced both Pakistan and the Foundation that the Foundation could be helpful, but that detailed schemes were needed upon which both could make firmer judgments. The Government of Pakistan asked the Foundation to provide consultants to assist in preparing schemes.

Anticipating that, if the schemes were well drawn and approved, the Foundation would be asked to arrange advisory services from an American university to help implement them, the Foundation asked the University of Chicago to provide the initial consultants. The University, by participating in the planning stage could form its own judgment about a continuing advisory role later. Uni-

versity of Chicago consultants studied Pakistan's education situation for three months in the spring of 1957. They formed a team with a group of Pakistani educators which, during the summer of 1957, studied in-service teacher training and secondary education in the Near East, Europe, and the United States. Then the joint team drafted schemes for two education extension centers and the pilot secondary schools to suit Pakistan's particular needs and education system. The Ford Foundation financed the dollar cost of this process of study and planning.

In the fall of 1957 the schemes were started on the long process of review and consideration in the Provincial and Central governments. In the meantime, the Foundation considered how it might assist with the projects, if requested, and the University of Chicago considered whether it would provide advisory services. The schemes were approved in the spring of 1958, early enough to be included in the budget year beginning April 1. Pakistan asked the Ford Foundation for funds to finance consultation and foreign advisers from the University of Chicago, the training of key extension center staff, and the import of equipment and construction materials. Pakistan indicated its intent by sanctioning the schemes and by budgeting local costs of construction, equipment, and operation. The University of Chicago accepted Pakistan's invitation and the Foundation made two grants—one to finance the services of the University of Chicago and one to finance the dollar cost of equipment and construction.

## FOUNDATION ASSISTED PROJECTS IN PAKISTAN

Much the same process of exploration and grant making has been followed in other major projects—with Oklahoma State University in the fields of home economics and polytechnics, with Harvard University for the Planning Board, and with Michigan State University for the establishment of two Academies of Development Administration. Other projects include assistance to Teacher-Student Centers at the Universities of Dacca and Punjab, the President's Commission on Education, the Inter-University Board, a new College of Agriculture at the University of Peshawar, and an Institute of Personnel Training. Under exploration now is a major project of research and demonstration in rural industry; schemes are being drafted with the assistance of the Stanford Research Institute.

It takes years to get a new institution on its feet, especially in a country where the subject is new and key staff has to be trained abroad. The Foundation has decided to assist with a relatively small number of such institutions in Pakistan so that it can help each to the extent and for the duration necessary. It is now in its sixth year of assistance to the Planning Board and in its seventh year of assistance in home economics and polytechnic education. The Foundation has been making grants for projects in Pakistan at the rate of 2.5 million dollars a year. These funds support the Foundation's contributions to the projects already in hand; they can assist new major projects only as older ones mature and no longer require the Foundation's assistance.

## IMPLEMENTATION AND PERSPECTIVE

The Foundation has completed much of its program planning in Pakistan, although planning must continue in phasing out assistance to maturing institutions and exploring a limited number of new projects. The most demanding task now for the Foundation's Representative is the effective implementation of grants. This task consists chiefly of encouraging and assisting the American universities able and willing

to provide the services Pakistan needs.

Considerable help and information can be given foreign advisers and their families in connection with the local living conditions—housing, health, schools, and others—that plague the newcomer to any environment. The answers for more basic problems of implementation, however, are more difficult to provide, although experience is fast accumulating. Little is known about the methodology of technical co-operation: What works and what does not, particularly over a span of time? The Foundation and the co-operating universities plan evaluating specific Pakistan projects to shed more light on this question and perhaps to suggest some answers to it.

Since this review was first drafted, Pakistan has passed through a bloodless revolution and is now operating under what is called the "new regime." The Constitution was abrogated, and political parties were abolished. Pakistan is technically under martial law, although the civil servants and the regular officers of the government departments remain in immediate charge of law and order, collection and disbursement of revenues, and the development program. Although deploring the failure of its first efforts at constitutional government, perhaps most people in Pakistan welcome the new regime for its immediately successful efforts in halting corruption, slowing and perhaps reversing the serious economic decline, and improving the morale and efficiency of government. The first effect of the "new regime" was to improve the environment for development. The lasting effects will depend, of course, on whether repressive methods of control are instituted or whether sound foundations and processes for representative government are laid.

The Foundation has received many indications that the institutions it is assisting, not only in Pakistan but in other new nations, are well regarded by changing political forces except the Communists who are its continuing critics. Projects which receive Foundation aid are not political in nature. They are devoted to the long-time development of competence through which people will become more and more able to shape, control, and stabilize their political, economic, and social forms. The Foundation's assistance at this level of development, rather than at the level of current political and economic pressures, makes it welcome and free of suspicion as an expression of its pervading purpose—to advance human welfare.

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## *ASIA AND AFRICA*

Albert Mayer and associates in collaboration with McKim Marriott and Richard L. Park. *Pilot Project, India: The Story of Rural Development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh.* Pp. xxiv, 367. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. $5.50.

This is a unique book about the problems and the execution of an outstanding program of rural development. Albert Mayer is, rightly, the central figure in the story. Captivated and deeply moved by the capacities and predicament of India and the Indians, and receiving from Indians in high positions and low a most unusual degree of respect and affection, Mr. Mayer was much more than "Advisor" to the program.

Perhaps the most important technical qualification which Mr. Mayer brought to his task was his competence as a planner. Too many rural development projects, amply fueled by enthusiasm, have foundered on the rocks of unrealistic targets of achievement or of inadequate organization, or both. Mr. Mayer did not lack enthusiasm for the task, but realistic planning and execution were his technical tools and he knew how to use them. While references to this are to be found all through the book, a substantial portion of Chapter 4 (pp. 143–59) is devoted specifically to this phase of the work.

Programs for rural development differ widely in two respects. First, nearly all of the emphasis in some programs is on increase in physical production, while in other programs the major emphasis is on the development of rural human resources. Second, some programs place major reliance on organization and operational techniques, while others emphasize the concern and love of the staff for rural people.

Part of the genius of the Etawah Project has been that it cuts across these classifications. As for the first, as stated on page 131, "In the long run, there need be no conflict between the two central aims of rural development: a maximizing of material production can proceed along with an expansion of personal and village-organizational resources."

As for the second, Mr. Mayer sought a synthesis at two points. Within the Project, he put major effort into molding the attitudes of members of the staff toward both the village people and their co-workers. To this process he gave the name of "inner democratization." Meanwhile, he kept hammering away at the need for a new relationship between superior and subordinate officers and a decentralization of powers throughout the governmental framework within which the Project had to operate. Mr. Mayer came to see the Project as a young plant growing in a fissure of the rock of governmental administrative practices (pp. 67–70); either the rock would dwarf the plant or the plant, if it were to grow, would have to split the rock.

He gave equal attention to strengthening the plant and to modifying the rock.

Richard L. Park and McKim Marriott have done well a difficult editing job.

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ROSS N. BERKES and MOHINDER S. BEDI. *The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations.* Pp. x, 221. London: Oxford University Press; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. $5.00.

In 1953 Professor Ross N. Berkes offered a graduate seminar at the University of Southern California on the subject of India's role in the United Nations. From that seminar has emerged a detailed study of Indian diplomacy which carefully documents the country's position on most of the important questions to come before the United Nations during its first twelve sessions. In their opening chapter, Berkes and Bedi show how India conceives the United Nations to be two things: "an instrument through which the needs and wants of a heretofore voiceless world can seek remedies," and "an instrument of negotiation, and of the reconciliation of interests." Two dominant psychological factors govern India's conduct in the United Nations. The first is Nehru's notion that war can be avoided only if the climate of war—of fear and suspicion—is dissipated. The second is the Indian identification with movements aimed at the overthrow of colonial rule and the elimination of racial discrimination. By means of copious quotations from the speeches of Indian delegates, the authors show how these factors influence Indian diplomacy and account for many apparent inconsistencies. India takes a firm stand on moral grounds against violations of human rights in colonial areas but fails to "stand and be counted" regarding "communist outrages in the field of human rights." The authors draw attention to this apparent double standard with tact and ample documentation.

Despite the obvious care and thoroughness with which United Nations sources have been used, there are several parts of the book which might have been given greater depth by interviews with some of the Indians discussed. Even as a product of library research the work suffers from an almost exclusive reliance on official United Nations documents. The only Indian source used is the flimsy bulletin of the information service in Washington which is responsible for the authors' saying that "no text of Nehru's November 9 speech seems to have been preserved in the usual places." One of the "usual places" for most students of Indian affairs is the Madras *Hindu* whose issue of November 11, 1956 carries the text of the speech in question. This narrow approach gives an air of superficiality to the treatment of India's role in the Korean war and the Hungarian crisis. On the Korean war one may certainly question the unargued assumption "that the United Nations Command had no alternative but to proceed beyond the 38th parallel." This view has caused the authors to ignore the political consequences in the United Nations of the fait accompli occasioned by MacArthur's premature and unsanctioned crossing. In trying to explain Indian behavior on the Hungarian question in theoretical terms they fail to note the key role played by President Tito in advising Nehru, and the possibility that Krishna Menon and New Delhi were not in agreement. Both subjects received considerable official and journalistic comment in India.

Nevertheless, when someone finally sits down to write the definitive diplomatic history for India's first ten years of independence, this book will be a valuable guide to the intricacies of her behavior in the United Nations.

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BRYCE RYAN in collaboration with L. D. JAYASENA and D. C. R. WICKREMESINGHE. *Sinhalese Village.* Pp. x, 229. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press. 1958. $3.95.

Admirable for its brevity and clarity, this book offers a penetrating study of the most important aspects of life in a Low Country Sinhalese Village. Moreover, it not only shows the inter-relations between these aspects, but shows how the village as a whole interacts with the surrounding society in the general process of social transition. The research procedure is adequately described and there are both explanatory notes and a Bibliography, which could well have been extended.

The first part is mainly descriptive, but includes much valuable analysis. After describing the village and its economics, attention is turned to the family, the kin, and the marriage system—with these could have been put more conveniently the chapter on social stratification. There can be no understanding of Sinhalese society, from almost any aspect, without an adequate understanding of these basic structures and processes; and there is no better guide to them than this book.

Two intercalary chapters on Buddhism and the supernatural world provide a thoughtful analysis of relationships which, although widely separated, have become closely fused in the mind of the villager. From this intricately interwoven web of theology, myth, and magic spring many of the value systems and motivations which are so baffling to the foreigner, but of which Ryan gives a clear though condensed picture.

The last four chapters deal with secularization processes by defining their channels, analyzing their effects on community organization and the culture value systems, and finally by providing a sensitive and perceptive analysis of the general pattern of secularization as a total process.

While this case study of a single village will appeal mostly to the student of rural sociology, it should find a warm welcome elsewhere, especially among those who, under both national and international agencies, are engaged in "development" work among rural societies. In particular it should help them to understand the relationship of cultural barriers to induced social change, the difficulties involved in transplanting democracy to societies with multi-dimensioned hierarchic bases, the factors which underlie interpersonal tensions, and the mechanisms involved in the social breakdowns so characteristic of Sinhalese society and which have become so much more marked since the protocol data were collected for this volume.

Many recent events in Ceylon, ranging from court litigation through municipal and committee suspension to rural reactions and land reform legislation as well as other political moves, provide validation of Professor Ryan's analysis, which so nicely balances the descriptive approach with the analytical and the objective with the subjective and which also demonstrates the value of collaboration with Sinhalese coworkers, one of whom was a native of the village studied.

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LAWRENCE H. BATTISTINI. *The Postwar Student Struggle in Japan.* Pp. xiii, 167. Rutland, Vt.: The Charles E. Tuttle Company in co-operation with The Gotham Foundation of New York, 1958. No price.

This is a singularly badly written book about an important subject. Mr. Battistini sets out to give us a detailed picture of the postwar student movement in Japan. In part he succeeds, if only because of the great volume of names, dates, and organizations which are listed. But he gives the reader a hard time in doing so.

One's dominant impression is that Mr. Battistini has hastily assembled several reports originally prepared for the American Occupation, added some later post-Occupation information, and published them without serious editing or thought. One result of this kind of unevaluated "documentation" in the governmental mode is a peculiar disjunction between language and political judgment. On the one hand Mr. Battistini seems to have fallen complete victim to leftist language—he accepts the jargon of his "documents" uncritically. His descriptions sound like a leftist thesaurus: "social movements," "mass elements," "struggles," "unification," "tasks," "sectors," and so forth. Without tongue in

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# *The Journal of Asian Studies*

*The Journal of Asian Studies,* formerly known as the ***Far Eastern Quarterly,*** is the publication of The Association for Asian Studies. It is the leading scholarly journal dealing with research in the various disciplines of the social sciences and humanities on East, Southeast, and South Asia, from Japan to Pakistan. Articles, book reviews, and review articles are published in the four regular numbers annually. In addition, a fifth number, the "Bibliography of Asian Studies," lists significant books and articles in Western languages published on this area during the preceding year.

Membership in the Association, which includes a subscription to the five numbers of the *Journal* and the Association's ***Newletter,*** is $10.00 a year, domestic or foreign (with a special $7.00 rate for students). For subscription or membership, apply to the Secretary of the Association, Box 2067, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

cheek or quotation marks, he states flatly that "A principal general aim of *Zengakuren* was to oppose war and fascism" and speaks like the leftist he is not, of "the baneful effects of disunity in the private-university sector." On the other hand, his political comments leave no doubt of his opposition to the leftists.

The reader, however determined in his interest, seethes with questions on every page. At no time can he be sure whether "self-governing student societies" means student societies which govern themselves —as distinct from being governed by the university administration—or societies for the self-government of students. Nor will he be sure of what some of the outstanding issues were all about. For example, the author speaks frequently of the "struggles" for the "rehabilitation of education"; but nowhere is it explained what this means. Or we read that a large student meeting in 1948 passed a resolution against the American Occupation-sponsored Local Board of Education Act, but we are left to wonder whether this was because the students were against decentralization or because they wanted "more democratic" boards.

The style of documentation is equally puzzling. Mr. Battistini seems to have secured much of his information through personal interviews. Now while this is a very satisfactory way to get secret or "inside" information, or to explore the activities and attitudes of individuals, it is an odd way to document general trends or matters of public knowledge. Certain events, like the date of the establishment of organizations, the dates of national conventions, and so on, seem more appropriately documented by news sources. The fact that the Communist Party adopted its "lovable party" policy in 1952 is so generally known that there is something strange in documenting it on the basis of "Talks with Seiichi Okamoto, Chief of the Student Bureau, Doshisho University, Mar. 26, 1953." Similarly, the authority for a statement about a Molotov-cocktail bombing of the home of a police official in Kyoto on July 14, 1952—surely a matter of public knowledge—is given as "Talks with Hajime Yamayoshi, Head of the Student Section, Osaka University, Mar. 31, 1953." And why does Mr. Battistini cite *Sekai* magazine, surely a very inappropriate source—it is one of Japan's leading leftist journals —as authority for the very important judgment that "Despite the prominence of students in this incident [the Imperial Plaza demonstration of May Day 1952] only a small part of the total number who had assembled at Meiji Park were involved in the acts of violence."

A reviewer can only regret having to write a review like this. But poor preparation obtrudes itself at every point between the reader and the materials, interesting as they often are. If the Tuttle Company, which I count among my friends, had exercised a little more editorial authority, this might have been a valuable reference work. As it is, it falls sadly short of the mark.

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ALLEN S. WHITING and SHENG SHIH-TS'AI. *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?* Pp. xxii, 314. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958. $5.00.

This book describes Soviet strategy in Sinkiang from 1933 to 1949 and seeks to analyze power shifts which took place there as the Russians, the Japanese, the Chinese Nationalists, the Chinese Communists, and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai himself pursued their devious purposes.

In broad fashion, the volume falls into two parts: an analysis of Soviet strategy by Allen Whiting of the RAND Corporation, and a translation of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's memoirs for the period when he ruled Sinkiang—first in collaboration with the Russians and with the Chinese Communists from 1933 to 1942 and, later, under the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek.

The memoirs reveal Sheng Shih-ts'ai both as an unscrupulous leader and as a complex and intriguing personality. Dr. Whiting's part of the book presents an astute analysis of little-known and perplexing networks of political, economic, and military interrelationships.

It becomes evident, for example, that

Stalin's chief objective here was to secure Sinkiang as a closed sphere of Soviet Russian political and economic influence. The so-called "Tin Mines Agreement" signed between Sheng and Soviet representatives in 1940 "granted Moscow privileges in Sinkiang so extensive as to constitute a state within a state. . . ." And nine years later, as Chinese Communist troops were marching into nearby Kansu province, the Soviet consul general in Urumchi proposed to a Nationalist general that Sinkiang should be declared independent on the precedent of Outer Mongolia. "If you do this," the Soviet consul general declared, "we will order the Chinese Communists not to continue their advance into Sinkiang."

Once more we perceive that Stalin seldom allowed ideological ties with the Chinese Communists to stand in the way of Soviet national interests. It also appears, however, that Mao Tse-tung was usually quite aware of this, and quite aware also of Chinese national interests.

In view of Sinkiang's alleged mineral deposits—not excluding uranium—we might do well to keep in mind that in this particular region of the world Chinese and Russian interests are not much more compatible today, with the Communist Chinese in control of Sinkiang, than they were in the days when Sheng collaborated with the Russians—or later, when he switched his allegiance to the Chinese Nationalists.

Whether Sinkiang is a pawn or pivot seems to depend very largely upon one's particular frame of reference and one's assessment of the power balance at any given moment. In any case, the book fills some important gaps in our knowledge about a region that is remote, from our point of view, but by no means inconsequential.

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NATHANIEL PEFFER. *The Far East: A Modern History.* (University of Michigan History of the Modern World.) Pp. vi, 499, xii. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. $7.50.

Intended as one volume of the University of Michigan's History of the Modern World series, this book is sensibly and sensitively written for college students who want a quick and comprehensive view of what has happened in the Far East. It is based largely on the few standard but solid texts mentioned in the bibliography. Very little if anything new has been added. Occasionally we get an indication of the author's own feelings and courage in the first part of the book when, with reference to the missionary movement, he writes "But to go out to a race of high culture and long tradition with philosophical, ethical and religious systems antedating Christianity and to go avowedly to save its people from damnation as dwellers in heathen darkness . . . was something not only spiritually limited but almost grotesque" (p. 118). However, to ape the television program "To Tell The Truth," the real, real Professor Peffer does not reveal himself until we come to the chapter on "Russia's Part in the Chinese Nationalist Movement" which is three-fifths of the way through the book. He then begins to present more of his own views and his own analysis of events. He so rightly says that the Communists did not win China but rather that the Nationalists lost it. Even though all essential facts are related, one feels that the story is just too briefly told and encompassed in too small a volume—a Readers Digest of Far Eastern history. For example, in connection with the problems of South East Asia, the story of Thailand is given in fourteen lines and that of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in ten! Occasionally the style becomes just a little too journalistic as when discussing Japan's decision to surrender and the Emperor's part therein, the author says "Those around the table bowed assent and burst into sobs" (p. 418). His concluding remark is that "East and West will now interact in international politics instead of the East being pulled by the magnetic attraction of the West" (p. 481).

Merely to say that this book is a "fine addition to the literature on the subject" would be to damn it with faint praise; this is not a high enough appraisal, especially when consideration is given to the audience for which it was designed. Just as there was a race between the Soviet Union and

the United States to get the first Sputnik into the air, it almost seems as if there has been a race with Professor Clyde to get out the first up-to-date textbook on the Far East. The difference lies in the fact that whereas the two countries do not benefit much from each other's experience, these two books can very well supplement each other, and both are excellent for classroom purposes.

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GEORGE H. KERR. *Okinawa: The History of an Island People*. Pp. xviii, 542. Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1958. $6.75.

This book will undoubtedly remain the standard history of Okinawa in the English language for some time. It will do so deservedly. Attractively published, it is well written and supplemented with a valuable Bibliography and Appendix on reference materials. It ably introduces the beginner to its subject and at the same time serves readers who have professional and scholarly interests.

Given Okinawa's importance in Far Eastern history, the destruction of the ancient archives of the former kingdom in 1945 was a disaster. "Students must now rely upon materials surviving in Japan and upon the works of Japanese scholars who had access to original documents before 1945" (p. xiv). This is what Kerr has had to do for the earlier periods.

His work is a product of the program of Scientific Investigations of the Ryukyu Islands (SIRI), inaugurated by the Pacific Science Board of the National Research Council under authorization by the Department of the Army. Kerr's original report in 1953, entitled *Ryukyu: Kingdom and Province before 1945*, was translated into Japanese as *Ryukyu Rekishi* (*Ryukyuan History*) in 1956. The earlier text was then expanded "to bring forward the story of European and American interest in the Ryukyu Islands in the 19th century, and to note (by way of introduction) the manner in which the United States government established a legal basis for the present occupation" (p. xv).

Okinawan history begins to emerge from the mists of legend in the thirteenth century, when writing was introduced from Japan. In the fourteenth century formal diplomatic and trade relations were established with China. Shortly thereafter Okinawa became a united kingdom. For two centuries she prospered as a maritime nation whose ships were the principal carriers in the trade between China, Indonesia, and Siam on the one hand and Korea and Japan on the other. Invaded from Japan in 1609, the Ryukyus came under political control of the Satsuma clan of Kyushu. By indirect rule Satsuma completely controlled Okinawan trade relations in her own interests. Okinawa was progressively impoverished from then on, but the fiction of her independence was carefully maintained for diplomatic reasons until 1879, when the kingdom was terminated and the Ryukyus were formally annexed by Japan.

Strongly influenced by China, her nominal overlord, Okinawa developed a distinctive and attractive civilization in her prosperous days. Even in her decline, visiting Europeans found in Okinawans a highly cultivated people whom they greatly admired. The tendency in more recent times to regard them as barely emerging from a primitive condition of life is most unfortunate. The publisher's own reference to Okinawans on the dust jacket of this book as a "childlike people" underscores the problem we have in overcoming our idiotic stereotypes of alien folk. The people to whom Kerr introduces us suffer no such shabby treatment from him. In his hands Okinawan history is an epic of kindness, patience, and humane living in the face of extremely trying circumstances. His book should be required reading for all Americans who have a voice in policies and decisions affecting Okinawa today.

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HOWARD A. SCARROW. *The Higher Public Service of the Commonwealth of Australia*. (Duke University Commonwealth —Studies Center Publications, No. 5.)

Pp. xi, 180. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1957. $3.50.

It is a fortunate scholar who finds a significant field of study without text or conspectus and also knows how to write them both. As Dr. Scarrow's dissertation provided the conspectus, so this book gives the text. Here is everything that the student needs to know of the development, composition, and role of the senior ranks in the Australian Commonwealth Public Service. Kept to 158 pages of text, and thus to a smaller price, the book nevertheless is but the second full-scale consideration of its subject. And it is the first since 1942 when R. S. Parker's invaluable *Public Service Recruitment in Australia* appeared. Parker's work, despite its modest title, presented the landscape prior to the flood of war, welfare, and the interventionist state.

Anyone who wishes to compare Australian civil service structure, methods, and problems with those in like countries will be well served by the organization of the book and, in particular, by the clarity of its last three chapters. The reader must be prepared to be his own Duverger, however, for Dr. Scarrow is as careful not to stray beyond his ordered series of pros and cons as if he were an official advising a "tetchy" minister of the opposite political persuasion. He shows us what has been and what is, but cautiously refers most of what ought to be to a future Royal Commission with wide terms of reference.

The author's own terms of reference were set more narrowly around the senior administrators. He cannot direct the reader to an account of the Public Service as a whole and therefore has had to sketch the mountain in order to describe the doings above the snowline. After a brief survey of the Australian political background—which probably could have been dispensed with in a short, specialized work—he deals at length with the conceptual foundations and machinery of the Service.

The pressure to state it all quickly and exactly has squeezed this section rather dry but interest quickens with the freer use of example and comment in the three principal chapters. There is still no indulgence for those who like to muse on the individual experience. The excellent percentage tables have had to exclude the vignettes of personality.

Perhaps there is a fault here, a fault of overly-rigorous economy in whoever chose this size for the book. The literature about Australian public administration is fairly inaccessible. For those students who have access to the relevant articles and reports, the well-chosen references will illuminate the text. The others may wonder why the only book on the subject does not incorporate more at least of the argument of some very articulate and knowledgeable civil servants and political scientists. Since Dr. Scarrow is one of those rare Fulbright scholars who found mentors, material, and money enough to enable him to produce an authoritative dissertation, it is a pity to see him having to pare so much away at the final stage of publication. Fortunately there is no skimping of Bibliography or Index and the footnotes are where they ought to be, at the bottom of their pages.

The author is to be thanked for a closely-packed, orderly, and balanced survey of a worthwhile subject.

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DAVID H. FINNIE. *Desert Enterprise: The Middle East Oil Industry in its Local Environment.* (Harvard Middle Eastern Studies.) Pp. x, 224. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $5.00.

Mr. Finnie's brief and lucid study inaugurates the Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, a series of monographs sponsored by the Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies, established in 1954. It is a very fitting introduction, for the volume deals with one of the basic sources of wealth in the Middle East and some of the fundamental problems attendant thereto. Moreover, as Sir Hamilton Gibbs writes in his foreword, the book is concerned with "the major American involvement in the Middle East—major not only in terms of business enterprise, but also in respect of the political, social, and economic repercussions with the areas of operation of the oil companies."

As the title itself indicates, *Desert Enterprise* treats of something more than the structure of the oil industry in the Middle East, although the first three chapters adequately summarize the companies, the concessions and the ground rules, and the oil operations, and tell this somewhat familiar —if very complicated—story. But the book is particularly interesting because of its concentration, in very concise form, on the "local environment," on the impact of the oil industry in the Middle East on the politics of the area, on the people involved, whether directly or indirectly, and on the ramifications of the oil industry within the economies of the area. There is also an excellent chapter which deals with "the dilemma of public relations," with all the nuances involved in this particular field of human relations.

Mr. Finnie is well qualified for his task, for he was the recipient of a two-year Foreign Research and Study Fellowship from the Ford Foundation (1954–1956) and completed his project as a research Fellow at the Harvard Center. Now associated with an oil company as an attorney, the author shows a distinct awareness of the falls and pitfalls in the Middle East, although the sections of his work dealing with Iraq are now definitely dated in the light of the events of July 1958. He feels that the oil companies operating along the Middle Eastern crossroads have been in the area for a sufficiently long period of time to "become acquainted with its proud and mercurial spirit," and that, having been "badly jarred once" at Abadan, they are determined not to be so jarred again. In his view, the lesson of adaptability has been well learned. Perhaps only time and circumstance may tell that story.

The work is replete with tables and maps, and is well annotated as to source material, which contains the essence of its Bibliography. The book is to be especially commended for the lucidity with which the author examines the human, as well as the social and economic, impact of the oil industry in the deserts of the Middle East. It should have a wide reading.

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WALTER Z. LAQUEUR (Ed.). *The Middle East in Transition: Studies in Contemporary History.* Pp. xix, 513. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $8.75.

When thirty-five authors from eight countries—including the United States, Britain, Israel, Syria, and Russia—join to discuss a region as varied and changeable as the Middle East, the skeptical reader may fear that the presentation will be superficial, the argument inconsistent, and the conclusions soon to be left behind by events. *The Middle East in Transition* is by no means free of such faults. There are occasional lapses into cliché and even bombast: "a region where legend becomes history and history legend before the sun has set on an eventful day"; misleading or downright inaccurate statements: "No Arab has yet analysed the meaning of Arab culture to Arabs themselves"; the Soviets' "refusal to assist the separatist movements of Azerbaijan or . . . Mahabâd"; "the course of events within Egypt has seldom been palpably affected by the existence of Israel"; and disagreements among the authors such as Sir Hamilton Gibbs' and Mr. Kedourie's opposite views on pan-Arabism. Moreover, despite its inclusive title, the volume deals almost entirely with the Arab countries from the Nile to the Tigris: the chapters on Turkey, Iran, and Israel by Messrs. Mango, Kazemzadeh, and Sir Isaiah Berlin are among the best in the book but lack organic connection with the rest.

Far more remarkable than these and other predictable shortcomings is the fact that the volume does have a coherent theme, and that it rather consistently addresses itself not to ephemeral events but to their underlying causes. The dual thesis of the volume, elucidated from numerous perspectives, is the absence in today's Arab society of any well-organized, experienced, and responsible group of political, administrative, and managerial leaders (Part One); and Soviet Russia's attempt, by capitalizing on anti-Western resentment among such leaders as there are, and on newly aroused social and political aspirations among the masses, to harness both to its imperialist designs (Part Two). "The Arab world,"

states Professor Berger, "is not likely to become industrialized (if at all) through the efforts of a local entrepreneurial class" (p. 61), and Professor Mills adds that aside from entrepreneurs "the middle leadership on which top leaders have to rely to execute their policies" constitutes a crucial "missing link" (p. 73). The founders of the Iraqi kingdom, says Mr. Kedourie, "came to politics not through consideration of concrete difficulties or the grind of pressing affairs or daily responsibility, but by way of a doctrine"; and British policy "gave them suddenly a country to govern" (p. 101). In pre-1952 Egypt, Mr. Baer finds, "None of the parties . . . ever had a clearly defined social or economic programme" (p. 85). "While the rootless intellectual is deplored as an exception in the West," Mr. Tütsch "gets the impression that in the Arab world he is the rule" (p. 15). "The weakness of the political leadership," Professor Gibb holds, "forced it to distract public resentment into anti-Western channels . . ." (p. 9). While Professor Issawi perceptively examines the "Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy" in the Middle East (pp. 33 ff.)—or rather their absence—Dr. Laqueur warns that "there seems to be no facile correlation between economic development and political progress" (p. 326). And Mr. Bennigsen reminds us that "the aim of [current] Soviet policy is precisely to modify . . . the social structures of the Middle East, and thereby to bring about the 'objective conditions' required for their overthrow" (p. 361). Professors Bernard Lewis and N. A. Faris examine the relationship between Islam and Communism as ideological systems, and the latter concludes, rather floridly, that Arab Muslims today are tempted "to make league even with the devil, especially when the devil has donned a turban, has partly concealed his hammer and sickle under his newly acquired burnous to make it look more like a crescent —and finally has started to quote the Qur'an!" (p. 359).

By far the most absorbing chapters for this reveiwer were those dealing with the intense Soviet controversy over the correct evaluation of the mid-nineteenth century Muslim resistance movement to Czarist expansion in the Caucasus (Paul Henze, "The Shamil Problem," pp. 415–444), and other tergiversations in official Soviet attitudes toward the Near East since 1917. A better appreciation of the historical and intellectual evolution of Soviet Near Eastern policy may do much to dispel the widespread and fatalistic notion of the Kremlin's diabolic infallibility and thus help us solve a problem barely touched upon by Dr. Laqueur and his associates—that of devising an effective counter-strategy.

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WILLIAM YALE. *The Near East: A Modern History.* (University of Michigan History of the Modern World.) Pp. xi, 485, xix. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. $7.50.

While there is no prefatory note to set forth his purpose, Professor Yale pretty clearly intended his volume to serve primarily as a college textbook. For such use, the book is made up into thirty chapters and equipped with a brief list of books for extended reference, a number of illustrative sketch maps and charts, a few appended documentary texts, and pertinent chapter notes.

In an over-all sense, the most striking feature of the book is its concentration on the latter stages in the history of the Ottoman Empire and on the political readjustments made in consequence of the dissolution of that empire during and after World War I. Events in what the author prefers to call the "Near" East during World War II are sketched in a single chapter, and situations arising in the Arab countries—including Egypt—in the contemporary period receive attention in hardly more than three of the final chapters. This proportional arrangement is the more readily appreciated in consideration of the author's personal experiences in parts of the Near East at the close of World War I. These have enabled him to throw interesting sidelights from his own observation on events in peculiarly formative years, while it may be that this same background has contributed to a certain subjectivity in attitude which shows up every now and then.

This is a noteworthy book and readable withal. It discloses at once an extensive knowledge of the factors that have produced characteristic trends in the development of the Near East and a concern for the response to these trends on the part of the West. At the same time, the numerous virtues of the book do not quite atone for its blemishes, such as repetitive passages, occasional use of decidedly inelegant expressions, and implications in a number of passages that cannot be accepted without question or qualification. The author unhesitatingly speaks frankly on any topic of interest to him, let the obiter dicta fall where they may. Yet his observations usually are cogent. Relative to the Palestinian Arab refugees, he notes, for example: "Truman's proposal to solve the problem of 100,000 Jews in the camps for displaced persons in Europe a few years later resulted in there being several hundred thousand displaced persons in Asia." He considers that there can hardly be peace in the Near East "as long as American politicians believe they can win votes by doing justice to one group at the expense of injustice to another."

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JEAN and SIMONNE LACOUTURE. *Egypt in Transition.* Translated by Francis Scarfe. Pp. 532. New York: Criterion Books, 1958. $7.50.

This is a timely book on a country to whom many nations in Asia and Africa now look for leadership. Although the authors of the book begin their story of how Egypt attained this position with Napoleon's invasion in 1798, the bulk of the book is devoted to a study of the Egyptian Revolution. This is perhaps the most detailed account that I know of on the background of the Revolution, its leaders and achievements; and it is written by two journalists who gathered their material directly from the authors of the Revolution and other public men.

The book is divided into five parts. Part One deals with a survey of Egyptian history from the advent of Napoleon in Egypt in 1798 to the burning of Cairo in January 1952. There is nothing new in this part, and the authors often make generalizations not always acceptable to the student of Egyptian history. Parts Two and Three give an excellent background on the Egyptian Revolution and its achievements, and deal sympathetically with such personalities as Naguib, the Ikhwan, and some of the Wafd leaders. They are not unsympathetic to Nasser, praising him for his competence and achievements, but reproaching him for his dictatorship and authoritarian rule and questioning his judgment on several of the stands he has taken on some national and international issues. The last part of the book deals with the Suez crisis and the creation of the United Arab Republic. As French citizens, the authors criticize Nasser for the steps he has taken to cancel the concession of a foreign company which has contributed greatly to Egypt's international position, but they pay tribute to him and his men for their efficiency in operating the Canal at a time when many foreign observers predicted the collapse of Nasser's venture.

The book is neither written by professional historians nor intended to be scholarly, but it is written with such precision that it will certainly benefit scholars as well as delight the general reader. The authors are to be congratulated for painting a precise and fascinating picture of the rulers and people of the leading Arab country.

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L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS. *The [illegible] of Israel.* Pp. 229. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. $4.[illegible]

The most unusual feature of the [illegible] by Mr. Williams is its calm tone wh[illegible] discussing a subject about which calmness [illegible] even moderation, is rare. Mr. Williams chooses to describe rather than argue. Not until the very last part of the book does he enter upon a discussion of the international situation which lies behind the tensions between Israel and its neighbors. At that point the taking of sides is un-

avoidable; but before this he limits himself to detailing the facts of life inside Israel. What the book loses in interest it gains in authority.

The book opens with a very brief survey of Jewish history and the events leading up to the establishment of the state in 1948. It then describes the little country as a part of Europe transferred to Asia. Israel's rapid mechanization and the vigor of its population contrast sharply with the more leisurely tempo of the rest of the Near East. The efforts to create unity out of the diversity of Israel's population next holds the author's interest. Coming from seventy-four different countries and from five continents, the Jewish immigrants constitute a sociological problem heretofore faced by no other country. Moreover, the immigrants have presented an economic problem of vast proportions, since most of them have had to learn new occupations. The soil, too, has had to be reclaimed, and Mr. Williams devotes a chapter to this baffling problem, which has been intensified by the active opposition of Israel's neighbors. The author provides an illuminating survey of Israel's agricultural colonies, their successes and failures.

Israel is a welfare state. Mr. Williams makes no effort to explain this fact as other than the necessary result of conditions. Though more could, in fact, be said on this subject, the explanation is sufficient. Most interesting in this connection is the description of Israel's educational organization and the growing number of Israel's Arabs—even the girls—who attend school. The chapter on public affairs portrays the government in operation.

The final chapters deal with the Arabs in and outside of Israel. The last events mentioned are those connected with the five-day war against Egypt in 1956. Mr. Williams retains his calm here, too. The blame for the situation is clearly attributable to the cold war and the West's need for oil. But for these factors, Arab and Jew would long ago have arrived at a modus vivendi, to the mutual benefit of both.

Mr. Williams writes clearly and simply. There are more interesting books on the subject of Israel and its unusual problems; but few are more factual and, therefore, more persuasive.

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KAROL JÓZEF KRÓTKI. *21 Facts about the Sudanese: First Population Census of Sudan, 1955/56.* Pp. 49. Sudan: Ministry for Social Affairs, Population Census Office, 1958. No price.

*The Population of Sudan.* (Report on the Sixth Annual Conference.) Pp. 110. Khartoum: Philosophical Society of Sudan in conjunction with the Department of Statistics, Government of the Republic of Sudan, 1958. No price.

These are two reports on the first population census of the Sudan, designed to arouse interest in the census results by drawing attention to the most important findings and presenting them in two attractive and easy-to-read books. Krótki, who was Controller of the Census, concentrates on the most important statistical findings, while the papers of the Philosophical Society cover a variety of subjects including the purpose of the census, the labor force, political statistics, and tribal nomadic movements. A study is also being made of national income during the census year, and when this comes out the minimum basic data will be available to make possible intelligent development planning in the Sudan.

Roughly, what the census found in the Sudan is a largely African population in process of natural Arabization. Members of Arab tribes are in a minority, 39 per cent of the total population, and will become increasingly so since the rates of increase of the Southern African tribes are greater than theirs. Fifty-one per cent of the population, however, already speak Arabic as their home language and with the increasing influx of the Southerners into the North the latter are increasingly exposed to it.

As is rather typical in Africa, this first census found many more Sudanese than the government had previously guessed were present: 1.5 million more in fact. The census population of 10.3 million in

January 1956 was also found to have one of the fastest rates of population growth in the world—around 3 per cent per year. As this is in spite of a high death rate of around 20 per 1,000, the probability is that the rate of population growth may accelerate as the death rate drops.

While the Sudan still has plenty of room and available resources to absorb more people, it takes little imagination to realize the problems the existing rate of natural increase poses. One important one is educating the large number of children. The census discovered that even on a broad definition of literacy less than 5 per cent of the population are literate. The future is hardly going to be better; only 7 per cent of the children of school-going age are now in school. One of the Philosophical Society papers calculated that to get 100 per cent attendance it would be necessary to spend on education alone one and one-half times the present total budget. Just to build the school buildings necessary for 100 per cent attendance would take 24 times the present total net capital investment of the whole Sudan. At the present rate of building schools, it would take 500 years to provide schools for the present lot of children.

The discussion in the two books and especially the photographs give one a sense of the difficulties encountered and the thorough planning and execution it took to carry out the census in so large and primitive a country as the Sudan. A taste of the field problem is found in the census instructions: "A household is defined as a group of persons who regularly share the same cooking-pot for their main meals." An amusing example of the difficulties in the processing of the raw data is given in Krótki's paper. He warns that the figures on illegitimacy are too low: "A very respectable, capable, and reliable Government pensioner was in charge of checking this aspect of the analysis work . . . he got it into his stubborn head that a woman with a child must of course be married. He thereupon proceeded to change all single mothers into married mothers as they must have been wrongly recorded due to an enumeration mistake. Being otherwise so reliable, his work was checked less than the work of other r embers of the Analysis Wing, until it was too late to re-do his work without very considerable additional expenditure."

In sum, the two books achieve their purpose of being a good introduction to the first population census of the Sudan and, in fact, succeed in being a good introduction to the Sudan itself.

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JAMES S. COLEMAN. *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism.* Pp. xiv, 510. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. $7.50.

This is both a timely and significant book: timely, because it is an illuminating study of an important African country soon to become a sovereign member of the British Commonwealth of Nations; significant, because as a scholarly and systematic case analysis of the background, context, and features of nationalism in Nigeria, it provides clues to the understanding of nationalism generally, particularly the varieties which have emerged under conditions of alien rule.

While Professor Coleman is acutely aware that nationalism in Nigeria is merely one manifestation of a fundamental and historic phenomenon, his primary concern is to provide a thoroughly documented study of the Nigerian case. With this aim in mind, he gives a careful survey of what he terms the "relevant features" of the physical, ethnic, cultural, and historical setting of Nigeria; an analysis of the emergence of Nigerian nationalism, in terms of its relation to Western economic forces, Christianity and the missionary enterprise, Western education and the rise of a westernized elite; the story of the nationalist movement, from the earliest traditional resistance movement to the Western impact to the end of World War II; and a detailed analysis of the postwar developments in the nationalist movement up to 1952, the terminal point of the study. Fortunately for the general reader, he provides a supplementary chapter which covers the important developments from 1952 to 1957. By 1957, it was clear that not later than

1960 the Federation of Nigeria would be a sovereign member of the Commonwealth of Nations.

In a final chapter, "Critique and Conclusions," Professor Coleman points to some of the general implications emerging from the study and calls attention to certain special features of Nigerian nationalism. The value of the book is enhanced by its excellent Bibliography, carefully formulated documentary notes, and the useful Appendix, "A Note on Concepts and Terms."

While a number of studies have been made of nationalism as it emerges in its varied forms under conditions of alien rule, more needs to be done in this field, particularly in Africa. This empirical study by Professor Coleman—which he modestly regards as exploratory—should provide both stimulus and guidance to present and future scholars who investigate this fascinating and important phenomenon.

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KENNETH INGHAM. *The Making of Modern Uganda.* Pp. 303. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958. Distributed by The Macmillan Company. $5.75.

This is a useful introduction to the history of modern Uganda and its present day problems. The book covers a wide span since it starts with an account of the Uganda of 1862—the year of Speke's visit—and ends with a description of recent constitutional developments and the growth of African political parties during the years 1949 to 1956. The work is also most comprehensive in scope. Most of the tribes in Uganda are mentioned and the book deals not only with the history of British administration in the territory during the last 50 to 60 years but also with the economic development of the area, with educational and missionary activities, and Uganda's contribution to two world wars.

The history of Buganda, the most famous of the African kingdoms in this region, is now comparatively well documented, but the author has had access to government files not available in England and he gives us some new facts on the pacification of Toro and Bunyoro, on the conclusion of the Protectorate Government's agreement with Ankole, and on the early administration of Eastern Uganda under the rule of Kakunguru, a well-known Ganda chief. Ingham's summary of the events which led to the deportation of the Kabaka, or traditional ruler of Buganda, in 1953, and his return to sign a new agreement with the Protectorate Government in 1955, should be of wide general interest and is commendably objective. The chapter on tribal history is less satisfactory, since it contains inaccuracies and omits any reference to recent anthropological work such as that of Fallers on the Soga, of Southall on the Alur, or Beattie on the Nyoro. Otherwise the Bibliography is full and useful and the list of government publications and government papers will be found very helpful.

The author follows a strictly chronological order, apparently based largely on the sequence of the government papers he examined. His chapters are devoted to periods of time such as 1900–1914 or 1914–1930, rather than to the specific problems facing the administration. Each chapter therefore deals with a number of separate issues and it may be somewhat difficult for the political scientist to pick out points of theoretical interest to a student of comparative colonial administration. The number of names of Uganda personalities which occur in the last chapters may also make it hard to see the wood for the trees. Those familiar with the area will, however, recognize at once that some of the major issues confronting present-day Uganda were quite apparent in the early years of British administration. For instance the Buganda of 1958 wants a separate existence or a dominant position over the other tribes of Uganda. Her Government has refused to elect representatives to the central Legislative Council and has petitioned the Queen for recognition as a separate state. This unwillingness to be treated as a province of Uganda was evidently voiced in 1898 when Buganda's ministers tried to claim rule over neighboring tribes. So also the idea of a federal as distinct from a unitary Uganda which has attracted a good deal of support from present-day African politi-

cians was mooted and then abandoned in 1899. The proposal to unite Uganda with Kenya and Tanganyika which was one of the causes of the recent clash between the Kabaka and the Protectorate Government is also shown in some interesting references to be at least as old as 1900.

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## *EUROPE*

CHARLES B. MCLANE. *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931–1946.* (Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.) Pp. viii, 310. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. $5.50.

This book is a welcome addition to the growing list of monographs which improve our understanding of the relationship between Moscow and the Chinese Communists. Professor McLane has surveyed virtually all of the Russian sources available in this country for the period 1931–1946 in order to reconstruct Soviet strategy in China, its impact upon the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the consequent co-operation or conflict between Soviet policy and the CCP. While recognizing the hazards of working from open Soviet materials, the author has combined diligent research with sophisticated speculation so as to offer a highly plausible and stimulating account of a most elusive subject.

Professor McLane concludes, "There is no clear evidence that the Russians made any strenuous efforts during this period to intervene in the internal political affairs of the CCP in support of one faction over another. . . . Second, there is no good evidence that the Chinese Communists, for their part, ever used their independence either to evade Soviet policies . . . or to refute formulations in Marxism-Leninism. . . . Third, there is no occasion after the the Fourth Plenum of the CCP, held in January, 1931, when the Russians are known to have expressed their disapproval of Chinese Communist policies" (pp. 261–62).

The author cautions that these findings may be qualified by additional research in Chinese sources which he was not able to employ. He believes CCP policy was wholly compatible with that of Moscow during the 1936 Sian crisis. However, Edgar Snow's *Random Notes on Red China, 1936–1945* (Harvard, 1957), offers important, albeit hearsay, evidence of Comintern orders which forced the CCP to acquiesce in Chiang Kai-shek's release and in his subsequent incarceration of Chang Hsüeh-liang. Similarly Professor McLane's picture of the inner struggles of the CCP during the Long March may be modified by the forthcoming memoirs of Chang Kuo-t'ao, a key participant in these events. Finally, the complex period of the war and its aftermath still obscures critical issues, among them the degree to which Stalin looked favorably upon Mao Tse-tung's creation of "a Chinese or Asiatic form of Marxism," described by Liu Shao-ch'i to Anna Louise Strong in 1946.

Even Chinese sources, however, are unlikely to alter the main outlines of Professor McLane's study. Particularly interesting is his tracing of Soviet references to CCP leaders during the early nineteen-thirties, wherein Mao Tse-tung was praised as head of the Chinese Soviet government but not of the Chinese Communist Party (p. 32). Only in 1934 did Russian writers grant him fuller recognition, apparently after realizing that the conflict for power among rival CCP groups in Kiangsi, Shanghai, and possibly in the Moscow headquarters of the Comintern, had been resolved in Mao's favor.

Similarly McLane finds the handling of Chiang Kai-shek in the Russian press a valuable clue to the willingness of Stalin to shelve the CCP, at least temporarily, when it suited Soviet foreign policy. In September 1936, a leading Soviet specialist on China, Voitinskii, did an abrupt about-face in offering a favorable estimate of Chiang, a view which was to prevail in Russian commentaries until after World War II. This is only one of many instances where the value of this book goes

beyond the specialist in Chinese communism. For those concerned with Soviet foreign policy as well as with Far Eastern international relations in general, Professor McLane's study will be a standard reference.

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W. G. F. JACKSON. *Seven Roads to Moscow*. Pp. x, 334. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. $7.50.

Lieutenant Colonel W. G. F. Jackson, a former instructor at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, undertakes in this volume to discuss from the point of view of the military historian the principal invasions of the Russian lands. These "seven roads" refer in fact to the incursions of the Varangians, the Tatars, the Poles, the Swedes, and the French under Napoleon, as well as the two Germanic onslaughts of this century.

The author contends that the Varangians alone were permanently successful; the others only achieved temporary gains, however dazzling. In Mr. Jackson's own words, "From the military point of view, the Varangian invasion is unique in Russian history. It was the first and only invasion which has been lastingly successful. Moreover, it was the only invasion, with the exception of the momentary passage of the Goths, which came down the River Road. All subsequent invasions have come from east or west, and have succumbed to the natural genius of the Russian People and to the defensive strength of the Russian Lands. Only the seafaring Norsemen of Rurik succeeded in establishing themselves permanently in the Russian Lands, because they provided constructive services which the inhabitants needed, and because they advanced by a route which turns the defensive strength of the Russian river lines and which in itself is a natural line of communication. . . . The Vikings conquered or occupied a clearly defined domain, the River Road, but all other invaders have been drawn on to their doom in the unlimited spaces of the Russian interior."

On the face of it, the arguments here advanced—with the corollary that he who may attempt to invade Russia in future, following "the Swedish, French, and German roads . . . must fail,"—are certainly open to question. For one example, Mr. Jackson, in describing the campaigns of Charles XII, lucidly demonstrates that despite the recklessness, even folly, of the young Swedish daredevil, he almost won at Poltava. The author's geographical determinism is shunted to the background in the detailing of the Swedish invasion.

The historical sources utilized are mainly standard secondary ones in English such as Pares, Sumner, and Vernadsky. Thus, as might be expected, background Russian history is treated in quite a conventional way, with many a slip as far as factual detail is concerned.

The value of the work lies in its analytic discussion of campaigns and battles, and of the strategy and tactics involved in the military invasions of Russia, especially those of modern times. The clarity of the text at these points is greatly heightened by various sketch maps.

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RICHARD HOUGH. *The Fleet That Had to Die*. Pp. xi, 212. New York: Viking Press, 1958. $3.95.

In October 1904, the Imperial Russian Baltic armada—poorly supervised and ineptly manned by conscripts, reservists, and a number of restive revolutionaries—set sail from Revel. What resulted was a magnificent and yet hopeless attempt to salvage a foolishly provoked war and "take vengeance on the insolent Japanese who had troubled the peace of Holy Russia; and to maintain the glory of the Russian Navy."

Thus begins an extraordinary and popular version of the great naval debacle, Tsushima, which gave evidence of Tsarist Russia's inability to fight a major war successfully. It is at once keyed to a high sense of the dramatic, vivid, and grimly tragi-comical. Mr. Hough, a British editor of children's books, deftly paints a picture of that doomed fleet, inanely ordered to sail around Europe and Africa, past Madagascar, across the vast stretches of the

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*Edited by* DOUGLAS F. DOWD, *Cornell University*

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Indian Ocean and East Asian waters to relieve the beleaguered Port Arthur garrison and, finally, to an ocean grave expertly prepared by the splendid tactics and "breathtaking rashness" of Admiral Heihachiro Togo.

The entire astonishing incident is here, from the first incompetent debarkation to the firing upon unarmed British fishing trawlers in the North Sea in the fantastic notion that they were Japanese torpedo boats. Included also are the stream of impossible communiques from St. Petersburg and the general monotony and demoralization that was endemic among officers and crew. The fleet, moreover, had no coaling stations and the Hamburg-Amerika Line had to be commissioned to meet the fleet with colliers at designated points in order to replenish the ships' coal supplies. Wisely, most of the events aboard ship are drawn from Novikoff-Priboy's classic eyewitness account of the journey and the battle.

Who was to blame for this madness? Was it Russian Admiral Zinovi Petrovitch Rozhestvensky who displayed a crushing lack of imagination and initiative in battle? Mr. Hough writes of "the momentary hesitancy of a tired and wasted admiral" who failed to take advantage of the one opportunity for victory afforded him by Togo during the clash (p. 163). Nevertheless, something should be said for Rozhestvensky's remarkable shepherding of the motley fleet across 20,000 miles of inhospitable oceans, harassed by the British and his own naval ministry; his ships obsolete, his crew balky, his supply lines tenuous. Looking backward, neither Rozhestvensky —including for that matter, executed subordinates Nebogatoff and Clapier de Colongue—nor his officers and crew were guilty. The real culprits could only have been those representatives of the Imperial Government who sent their fellow Russians to disaster for next to nothing.

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M. G. SAUNDERS (Ed.). *The Soviet Navy.* Pp. ix, 340. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $7.50.

The formidable Russian Navy created by Peter the Great could at the end of his reign have turned the Black Sea into a Russian lake. Peter, devoted to his fleet, commissioned himself a Vice Admiral, and in his *Table of Ranks*, he ennobled all commissioned naval officers. Stalin commenced early a program of naval expansion that continues under Khrushchev, and to a degree that today the Soviet Navy is second "in immediately available offensive and defensive power." Where and how Soviet seapower may be used is commented on together with its strength and weaknesses in this well-edited, first authoritative account of the Soviet Navy today.

Will there be a war? Commander M. G. Saunders, RN, editor of this informative work, points out that there are "incompatible elements" in the character of the Russian people—"a carelessness that derives from the *nichevo* of fatalism, combined with an uninhibited determination to assert themselves against other nations." Saunders considers Russia a country of extremes where anything may happen; and therefore urges that "we not shrink from the burden of preserving the freedom of the seas, without which the world cannot prosper." Because of its factual, professional flavor the book should be of great value to all serious students of geopolitics, global strategy, and sea power in particular.

The presentation is well balanced and comprehensive. One interesting feature is the appraisals of the Russian Navy in two World Wars, written by German and British experts. In fact, the book has eighteen contributors including British, American, French, and German authorities.

After a solid introduction by Commander Saunders, Part One: Retrospect, then presents in four chapters excellent background for Part Two: The Elements of Sea Power. This latter division of 194 pages commences with *Strategic Background, 1958*, by Hanson Baldwin, and concludes after nine chapters on the modern Soviet Navy with a final text: *Implications of Soviet Seapower*, by Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, USN. A few illustrations, an Index, and an Appendix that gives biographical detail about the contributors enhance the book. Five simple but interesting maps assist the

reader in understanding the maritime defense problems and probable sea strategy of the Red Empire. It seems to be a foregone conclusion that whether it be armed conflict or "cold war" containment, sea power will play an important role both for the Soviets and the Free World.

LELAND P. LOVETTE

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FRIEDA WUNDERLICH. *Farmer and Farm Labor in the Soviet Zone of Germany.* (Bookman Monograph Series for Historical and Political Science Studies.) Pp. 162. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1958. $4.00.

Studies on the Soviet Zone of Germany, one of Russia's satellite states, have a different import than studies on other satellites behind the Iron Curtain that are more or less sealed off from the West. East Germany, through various leaks and windows in its prison walls, is accessible to western eyes. The refugee stream from the Soviet Zone, chiefly through West Berlin, provides a fifth of a million witnesses annually, each of whose story contributes to our knowledge of the Sovietization process going on in the lands east of the Elbe. Because of the light which this sheds on the analogous process that went on in other satellites, and even in the Soviet Union itself, such studies on East Germany have a special significance. And since agriculture is still one of the great unsolved problems in the whole Soviet bloc, including Red China, and might well prove to be the Achilles heel of Communism's planned economy, it is well to take a close look at what is happening to agriculture and farmers in East Germany.

The present study by a German-born expert who has taught at the New School for Social Research for many years is based on all available published sources, including East German government and party documents, newspapers and magazines, official reports of the Soviet and Allied military administrations, as well as West German documents, newspapers, and scholarly studies. Of particular importance were the numerous monographs on "Central Germany"—the official West German designation for the Soviet Zone—published by the West German Ministry for All-German Questions, the *Bonner Berichte aus Mittel-und Ostdeutschland.* Of the latter, the excellent study by Matthias Kramer, *Die Landwirtschaft in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone* (Bonn, 1953; a revised, much enlarged edition, with copious Annex, appeared in 1957), proved particularly valuable. These reports are based on East and West German official sources as well as on interviews with refugees. In addition to these valuable official publications, there are the reports, surveys, and periodicals of a great number of West German and West Berlin organizations, research institutes, and political parties, all of whom draw heavily on refugees and underground contacts in the Soviet Zone.

Miss Wunderlich's study is an admirably objective report, packed with facts and figures documenting the depressing story of forced, doctrinaire collectivization in accordance with the Soviet model. Of course the Communist bosses of the Ulbricht regime—still the most Stalinist of all—encountered obstacles and resistance—the June Revolt of 1953 marked the high point of this resistance—and were obliged to make tactical concessions at times. But the meaning of the various stages of agricultural policy—expropriation and breakup of large estates, formation of collectives and machine-tractor stations (MTS), and the imposition of planned production and deliveries—is clear: the Communist masters are determined to convert East German agriculture to the Soviet type, and the final elimination of the independent farmer is only a matter of time.

Of course, no analytical statistical study can tell the whole story, which is in this case not one merely of economic change and deterioration—East Germany was once self-supporting and the grain chamber of Germany—but one of total change affecting every person in the Soviet Zone and wrought with incalculable human tragedy. The vigorous, sympathetic Foreword by Alvin Johnson summarizes the historic and worldwide implications of this process of

agrarian sovietization as well as the unique value of this study in an admirable manner.

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KONSTANTYN KONONENKO. *Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations Between Ukraine and Russia (1654–1917)*. (Marquette Slavic Studies, IV.) Pp. xvi, 257. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958. $6.50 paperbound; $7.50 clothbound.

The problem posed in this study is this: with respect to soil, climate, precipitation, and mineral resources, the Ukraine is one of the richest and most diversified regions in Europe; it is strategically located with respect to Central Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, and has access to the ice-free waters of the Black and Oziv Seas; yet neither agricultural nor industrial development of the region has matched that attained by less favored areas. Why?

Kononenko asserts that the Ukraine was already at a relatively high stage of commercial development when it came under Russian sovereignty, but that it was never unified economically with Russia; instead, ". . . Russian economic policy always aimed at differentiating Ukraine from Russia, and of keeping Ukraine in the status of a colony" (p. 32).

Although the analysis is limited to the period from the abolition of serfdom, which took place in 1861, to 1917, one chapter of thirty-two pages is devoted to developments from 1648 to 1861. Major attention is given to agrarian developments from 1861 to 1917 (67 pp.), to industrial developments, with detailed examination of the sugar, coal and metallurgical industries (56 pp.); and to conditions in banking and "finance capital" (37 pp.).

In his analysis, Kononenko uses official government statistics, state papers, letters of government officials, and numerous studies made by Russian scholars. His conclusion is clear cut: from the beginning, "The aim of Russian policy was not merely to shield their industry and commerce from dangerous Ukrainian competition but also the transformation of Ukraine into a source of raw material and a market absorbing their production" (p. 108).

A variety of tools was used to accomplish these goals. Railroads were located to serve industries in Moscow and Petersburg, and the freight rates imposed were discriminatory both as to commodities and direction of traffic; a tax system was constructed which not only channeled revenues into Russia without corresponding expenditures in the Ukraine but which also raised prices of Ukrainian products to the point of discouraging domestic consumption, thus forcing the goods into export trade which helped provide a favorable balance of trade. In other cases, export of Ukrainian raw materials was prohibited in order to channel them, at low prices, into Russian factories. At one time, we are told, erection of certain factories was prohibited by law, and some Ukrainian plants were dismantled and rebuilt in Russia. Extensive use was made of customs duties, both internal and foreign, always to the disadvantage, we are told, of Ukrainian interests.

Developments in the field of banking and foreign investments were both more complex and more subtle; but the end result was the same: the earnings and capital accumulation arising from such Ukranian industry as was permitted were channeled out of the Ukraine into the hands of Russian capitalists or the imperial treasury.

At times the economic reasoning is difficult to follow. It is especially difficult to believe that all phases of economic relationships between the two regions were so carefully planned and so successfully administered as to work always to the disadvantage of this particular territory.

The numerous tables throughout the study usually carry no headings; actual contents must be discovered from the text itself. A Bibliography of six pages is appended, and a four-page Index.

CHARLES P. WHITE
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RICHARD MANSFIELD HAYWOOD. *The Myth of Rome's Fall*. Pp. 178. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1958. $3.50.

The "myth" which this book seeks to explode is that the Roman Empire in the West fell because of internal weaknesses which made its fall "inevitable," rather than because of external attacks. As an introduction to his argument, the author has given a masterly survey of the rise of the Roman Empire, its salient characteristics at the time of its height in the second Christian century, and the various calamities which befell it in the third century. He then devotes several chapters to the fourth century, discussing the recovery initiated by Diocletian, the economic and social problems and how they were met, cultural conditions, and the significance of the transition from paganism to Christianity. He concludes with an account of the "fall" in the fifth century and a short chapter on the changing culture of the epoch.

This is a very scholarly work that is a pleasure to read. With most of it the reviewer is in full agreement. Where he differs is in the emphasis to be placed on certain phenomena of the fourth century. For the author, the Empire at this time was politically stable, administratively reasonably efficient, economically reasonably sound, culturally creative, and militarily competent. For the reviewer, this is too favorable an appraisal. Granted that the attacks of the barbarians in the fifth century were needed to topple the imperial structure in the West, we must still ask, with Aymard, why a state of its size, population, and resources could not ward off peoples vastly inferior in numbers, wealth, and culture, and possessed of no superior weapons or military skill.

The only answer can be internal weakness—the inability to muster resources effectively for defense. Symptomatic of this weakness were the Empire's military dependence upon barbarians, the lack of the will to resist among its civilian population, civil war and rebellion, treachery in high places, and above all the inability to assimilate the barbarians recruited for its service or settled within its borders. Aymard seems to be right in holding that the recovery begun in 284 lost its momentum by the mid-fourth century after which stagnation and some deterioration set in. As E. Stein pointed out, the disaster at Adrianople marks "the beginning of the end" of the Roman Empire as the Mediterranean world empire. Christianity contributed little to the fall in the West, but there it failed to provide the basis of loyalty which it later gave to the Byzantine Empire. Nor can we ignore the fateful division of the Empire in 395, and the hostility of the East to the West. As for the East, it barely escaped a like fate. The break-up of the Hun Empire, a sounder economy, a stronger population, more astute military policy, and more effective diplomacy were the main factors in its survival.

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RICHARD HERR. *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain.* Pp. xii, 484. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. $7.50.

In this significant study Professor Herr establishes the validity of his central thesis —that "on the fundamental questions of the form of government and religion there was no cleavage of any depth in Spain before the outbreak of the French Revolution," and that "the French Revolution . . . provided the irritants that transformed into cancerous growths the hitherto innocuous discords brought on by the Enlightenment and economic expansion."

The pursuit of the complex events behind his analysis led the author into thorough examination of secondary works and wide use of primary sources. The narrative is divided into two parts, entitled The Enlightenment and The Revolution, and ranges through such chapters as "Land Boom and Land Hunger," "French Propaganda Campaigns," "Godoy and the Revival of Enlightenment," and the—renewed —"Jansenist Offensive."

The most useful and original part of the book deals with the impact on Spain of the events which occurred between 1792 and 1802—the execution of the French monarch, war and peace with France, and war with England. Here the author contributes to the knowledge of many aspects of Spanish history; yet it is precisely here

that he has difficulty in fully demonstrating the accuracy of the second part of his thesis. This is true not because of any defect in the extent, accuracy, or organization of his material, which is first rate throughout the book, but because "the cancerous growths" appear in later years with which the book does not deal, and there is no visible connection between these unseen events and those which continue to resemble, in the decade after 1792, the "innocuous discords" of earlier years. There is also the fact that Spanish history reflects the peculiar obduracy of the Spanish people to conform to the causal forces of Western society. One must ask whether Spanish liberalism would ever have become morbid to the body politic without Napoleon's destruction of the monarchy. Would not the people—Jovellanos and all—have gone on suffering in the Spanish manner their innocuous, or not so innocuous, discords? One hopes that Mr. Herr will pursue such fundamental continuities in future studies of Spanish history.

The shadow of Jean Sarrailh's distinguished study *L'Espagne éclairée de la seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle* (1954) falls across Professor Herr's book, as the latter acknowledges in his frank and modest preface. Yet Herr has achieved a different focus than that of Sarrailh and adduced sufficient material to cause his book to be a worthy complement to that of the French scholar.

Prof. Herr is to be congratulated on this handsome and important contribution to a field so carefully avoided by United States historians.

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W. J. M. MACKENZIE and J. W. GROVE. *Central Administration in Britain.* Pp. xvi, 487. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1958. $6.00.

The authors have made a praiseworthy attempt to distil the juice from a large and well-compiled bibliography, and it is no disparagement of their efforts to say that they have only partially succeeded.

To compress into 465 pages a comprehensive description of the structure, organization, and working of the British Civil Service, including its relations with Parliament, the Courts of Law, local authorities, and the nationalized industries involves the jettisoning of some material; in order to enable them to describe how the machine works, the authors have deliberately rejected any idea of describing what the machine does. Their justification of this will not convince everyone.

As regards the central administration itself, they argue that, because books about individualized departments have failed to give an adequate account of what they do, it would be absurd for a general survey to attempt even to outline what the central administration does. The authors have therefore adopted the alternative of describing, in some detail, the structure and organization of six departments selected "somewhat at random." If, however, there is not room in a book to describe what an organization does, is it worthwhile to attempt to explain how it does it?

When they turn to describe the relations between the central administration and other "spheres of action," such as local government and the nationalized industries, the authors adopt a different argument and justify their failure to attempt any explanation of the latter by the assumption that the reader knows enough about them. Would it not be safer to assume that, if in fact any reader has put himself to the trouble of acquiring a sufficient knowledge of the work of parliament, the courts of law, local government, and national industries, he has also put himself to the trouble of digging out, from the same sources as the authors, the factual information about the central administration which is contained in this book?

Though there is some good and useful writing on organizational detail, there are other major defects besides these in the book, of which the most serious is the failure to give any adequate account of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility.

The general impression with which one is left is that the authors have not gone for advice in the Civil Service to anyone who had reached a high enough rank to absorb the spirit of the Service. There is hardly

a chapter which would not benefit from such advice.

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A. J. P. TAYLOR. *The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939.* Pp. 207. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958. $3.50.

It would be unfortunate if anyone were misled by the dust jacket of Mr. Taylor's Ford Lectures into believing them to be "history on a grand scale." For this is, in fact although not in tone, a very modest volume. The author sets out to examine the ideas and behavior of "the Dissenters," those radical critics of their country's foreign policy who have ever been the despair of foreign secretaries and whom, as Mr. Taylor points out, historians have rather too often brushed aside as "merely dogmatic theorists, who knew nothing of the real world." It is a labor of love for him; as he says, the book "deals with the Englishmen whom I most revere." He takes understandable pleasure in showing that today's ideas about foreign policy have usually been borrowed from the unpopular pronouncements of yesterday's Dissenters.

With author and subject so well matched, it is a pity that this often perceptive and amusing book is repeatedly marred by carelessness, exaggeration, and a straining for paradoxical effect. From the fact that Radicals and Imperialists, far from being opposites, were often the same people, Mr. Taylor concludes flatly that "Imperialism was a product of Radical enthusiasm," and somehow manages to convert Milner, Cromer, and Kipling into Radicals for the occasion (pp. 90–91). He is capable of contradicting himself in successive sentences—concerning the Church of England hierarchy and opposition to the Government (p. 77), for example. His love of superlatives is positively American: Cobden was "the most powerful reasoner who has ever applied himself to practical politics"; the Don Pacifico debate was "perhaps the greatest debate on the principles of foreign policy in our parliamentary records"; Bright's speeches on the Crimean War were "perhaps the greatest ever delivered in a parliamentary assembly"; and so on. He has a weakness for the facile elevation of a single factor to explain complicated developments—for instance, Gladstone's Egyptian intervention "ruined Radicalism for more than a generation." In fact, Gladstone comes off quite badly in this book, presumably because of his having so often forsaken dissent to assume power; the author's main charge against him appears to be that he was guilty of taking the interests of the Liberal Party into account—not such a heinous sin, considering that he was its leader. Mr. Tayor is at his best on some of the lesser figures, notably the Turkophil, David Urquhart. This is, in short, a stimulating, provocative, but uneven and unreliable book.

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J. L. MCCRACKEN. *Representative Government in Ireland: A Study of Dáil Éireann 1919–48.* Pp. viii, 229. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. $4.80.

The subtitle of this book indicates its precise focus, while the main title indicates its broader significance. Professor McCracken has made a detailed study of the elective house of the Irish parliament from its origin in the revolutionary climate of 1918–19 until Ireland became a republic and severed its last formal connections with the Commonwealth in 1948–49.

Although the Dáil Éireann was described by one head of the Irish government as "the most important institution of the state," it never really achieved that status. Instead of developing into a genuine legislative and deliberative body it was actually the main instrument and support of governmental policy at a time when Irish politics was dominated by two parties which were not far apart on fundamentals, and by two men, Cosgrave and de Valera, the only prime ministers Ireland had between 1922 and 1948. Strong government was needed in Ireland, "first to meet the repub-

lican challenge to the state, then to direct the politico-economic struggle with Britain, and then to preserve neutrality during the World War" (p. 166).

Until 1922 the Dáil led a precarious existence— it was in fact suppressed by the British authorities in September 1919—and it remained a kind of rump parliament until 1927, when the anti-treaty party, led by de Valera, finally decided to participate in its deliberations. Nevertheless the Dáil functioned with remarkable vigor throughout the entire period from the signing of the Anglo-Irish treaty in 1921 until the Republic of Ireland Act became effective in 1949.

Among the broader questions which Professor McCracken considers are the following: the place of the Dáil in the Irish political system; the changes in its composition and functions as a result of the major political developments in the period 1919–48, including constitutional changes and elections—no fewer than eleven general elections were held between 1922 and 1948; the problem of creating a suitable second chamber of the Irish parliament; the effects of the system of proportional representation—contrary to the usual experience elsewhere, it did not lead to a multiplicity of parties or instability of governments; the nature and evolution of political parties, especially the Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil; the role of leaders, notably Cosgrave and de Valera; and the influence of the successful efforts of "the reluctant dominion" to loosen Commonwealth ties and to contribute to "a new conception of Commonwealth relations" (p. vii).

With respect to two objectives on which the two major parties were agreed—namely the establishment of Gaelic as a national language and the ending of partition—the Dáil made singularly little contribution. Very few members of the Dáil could speak Gaelic and those who could not usually resented any attempt to use it in a major debate. Partition was a much-discussed theme in Dáil debates, but the main agitation against it was carried on outside of the chambers of the parliament. Discussions of this subject in the Dáil reflected the same air of unreality and over-simplification which continue to surround this problem. There is in fact considerable point to an observation by Paul Johnson in a recent issue of *The New Statesman* that "in a very real sense partition has become a psychological crutch for the Irish Nation."

This monograph achieves its major purpose of contributing "to the understanding of representative government by making a detailed study of a single institution" (p. vii). It is therefore of interest not only to students of Irish history and institutions but to all who are concerned with the workings of representative institutions in the modern world.

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HADLEY CANTRIL. *The Politics of Despair*. Pp. xv, 269. New York: Basic Books, 1958. $5.00.

"Politics of despair" are the political attitudes of French and Italian voters who cast "protest" ballots for Communist candidates, even though these voters are non-Communist. In the French elections of January 1956, over five and one-half million votes, or 25 per cent of the total, were Communist, although party membership was less than ten per cent of this figure. In the June 1953 elections in Italy over six million voted Communist—23 per cent of the total—although party membership was less than a third of this. Dr. Cantril reports on a series of interviews which were made in an attempt to explain this voting behavior in terms of certain concepts in social psychology. It is doubtful, however, that this book contains any new insights, even though it does remind us of some important generalities. Dr. Cantril finds that the "protest" is a personal and private one: individuals are dissatisfied with their own personal lot, and although they may make references to the "working class" in contrast to other groups, there is no real sense of class conflict or of international solidarity on the working-class level. Even more important, the protest voters of France and Italy are not protesting only against economic conditions, even though

many of their problems are specifically economic. As individuals, they are aware of various constraints upon their opportunities, upon their freedom of choice in many areas, and upon their participation in the social and economic decisions that affect them. Whether or not they are as eloquent or sophisticated as the author makes them out to be, the Europeans interviewed are aware that there is more than material comfort involved. This is why most of them are not "really" Communists—they know the Communist record of despotism and oppression. Now, all this is very well and good; we all too often rely on material arguments in our attempts to influence world opinion, but we knew this before.

In France 1,656 people were interviewed, and 605 were interviewed in Italy. Although the technical difficulties of surveys of this type are readily acknowledged by the author, the validity of this extremely small sample is never clearly established, and neither is the method of selection. Most of those interviewed were manual laborers and although others are included, the statistics are based on the former group. The respondents are referred to as "important industrialists," "experienced professional people," "well placed" manual workers, shop stewards, and others: and they are described as being known beforehand as politically well informed. How this was determined is not clear, and the relations of the samples to the total populations are not explicated. At least a third of the book consists of quotations from the interviews, and much is made of their necessary inclusion—anticipating the criticism that they are there only for flavoring. They allow us, the author writes, "to avoid the error which we know intellectually we should avoid . . . of looking at the other fellow from our point of view." The study is characterized as "a first person view, as contrasted with the view of an 'outside,' 'objective' observer. For if we take the point of view of the 'outside' or 'scientific' observer, we shall fail to sense the real nature of an individual's experience *as he experiences it*: . . . the priorities of the values *he* is striving for and weighing in *his* decision-making processes." The logic of this statement is hard to fathom, especially in the context of what is presumably empirical social research.

This reviewer has the feeling that most of the organizational effort of this study went into the statistics and not into the prior problem of determining the conceptual framework of the inquiry. There are two excellent but all too brief chapters on the "reality world" of the worker. These sections sketch the differences between American and European capitalism and the relative positions of organized labor, but they should have been greatly expanded as a background for the general reader for whom the book is obviously intended. Another defect is that the complaints of the individuals interviewed are rarely pushed so as to yield any positive "non-despairing" statements. Respondents were tested on their attitudes toward certain "abstractions"—the standard democratic arsenal of "freedom," "personal integrity," "self-determination," and the idea of the perfect society and how to best achieve it. But the method of testing, not original but ingenious, does not control whether the respondent is expressing his opinion about generalities or about genuine abstract concepts of which he has some grasp.

In sum, the subject is important, this is one way of going about getting some vital information, and the book has its distinct merits; but at this stage of the reporting, it could have been compacted into a lengthy article.

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CONSTANTIN MELNIK and NATHAN LEITES. *The House Without Windows: France Selects a President.* Translated by Ralph Manheim. Pp. 358. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958. $5.50.

A remarkable fact about modern political science is the variety of approaches used in studying the political process. The present volume is a striking instance of novelty, and of innovation that succeeds. No one can read this report of the election of the second President of the Fourth

French Republic without reaching a new level of insight into the circumstances that led to the re-emergence of General de Gaulle.

The authors made an hour-by-hour investigation of the behavior of French political leaders and the strategies relied upon. All practicable sources of information were exploited to describe the perspectives and the actual operations performed by the "Congress of the Parliament" when the two chambers of the French Parliament convened at Versailles. The press was examined to give evidence of what went on at the Congress, to reveal the behavior of the newspapers themselves, and to assess the participation of "outsiders" in the Versailles proceedings. Interviews with representative figures chosen from the principal parties and groups supplemented the picture.

The result is one of the most dependable and detailed accounts of a political decision ever made. From the balcony we are able to look down upon the amalgamated National Assemblymen and Councillors of the Republic as they meet in formal conclave. We follow them into the corridors and the "smoke filled rooms." The searchlight plays upon the members as they go and come, enabling us to trace the intricate maneuvers by which shifting alignments eventally crystallize into the ultimate outcome. The material is presented chronologically, and the text is supplemented by tables and a valuable guide to the "Rules of the Game" (pp. 339–350).

We have long known that in a large-scale democracy the professional politicians tend to build a special arena in which and with which they become intensely preoccupied. It is to the advantage of each to reduce his vulnerability by assuming as little responsibility as he can. When constitutional arrangements make it possible for elected representatives to keep responsibility at a minimum, the proclivity to reduce risk is the dominating trait of the political process. Hence the "prolonged agony" of Republican institutions in France.

It was not within the scope of this book to probe for fundamental explanations or even to register approval or disapproval. It is a masterful report of naturalists who have voyaged in a *Beagle* no farther than Versailles, but with rich results.

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ROBERT ARON in collaboration with GEORGETTE ELGEY. *The Vichy Regime, 1940–44*. Translated by Humphrey Hare. Pp. vi, 536. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. $7.50.

In *The Vichy Regime, 1940–44* we have the 1958 translation and abridgement of the original French edition of 1955. This volume is well indexed for persons and places but not for ideas and movements. Its unannotated Bibliography of three pages, listing only books in French, is a rigorous abridgement of the original bibliography of eleven pages. It is indeed frustrating to read or review 517 closely packed pages without being able to validate any statements, for there are no authenticating footnotes. Although the style improves as the book progresses, Aron displays little flare for making vivid and exciting the dramas and traumas of the Petain interlude.

In this seriously needed political narrative, diplomacy and ideologies play a supporting role. This is a detailed account with few roots in the past; only when Aron discusses the ideology of the National Revolution does he show much appreciation for historical background. His chapter on "The National Revolution-Doctrine" is his best.

Aron hews firmly to the thesis that DeGaulle, Laval, Darlan, and Petain each followed a separate code of values. No one, not even Laval, is a real scoundrel—his patriotism was "authentic but wayward" (p. 242). Nowhere does he clearly thrash out the issue of whether loyalty to France involves perforce loyalty to republican and democratic values. To be sure, objective history requires impartiality, but with Aron objectivity becomes humanitarianism.

Starting with the military defeat of 1940, Aron details the controversy and confusion leading to the armistice. Here Premier Reynaud comes off rather well. The narrative of the scuttling of the Third Republic reveals Petain's affection for authori-

tarianism and Aron's appreciation of Laval's skill and energy in destroying the Republic. Aron handles well the North African invasion. Believing that democracy and the democracies were done for, Laval and Darlan looked to a large place for France in a new Europe, certainly to be directed from the Wilhelmstrasse and patterned after *Mein Kampf*. They and Petain resisted German demands at times and with some successes, but the impression steadily mounts that Laval collaborated too readily. We are fortunate to have this sorry story told so fully so that we may know the works of the Lavals and the courage of such men as Lucien Romier who worked with Vichy without ceasing to be republican and anti-German in outlook.

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## *AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY*

CORNEL LENGYEL. *Four Days in July: The Story Behind the Declaration of Independence*. Pp. 360. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1958. $4.95.

This represents an attempt to reconstruct the small bones of the history which surrounds the agreement on the text of the Declaration of Independence. Although this event is of tremendous importance in the history of political thought, documentary records of it are not numerous. Many of the best sources were written from memory by participants in those historic sessions of the Continental Congress. It is indeed unfortunate that the Congress did not have a James Madison among its members.

Soaking himself in the literature of the Revolution, Cornel Lengyel, a recognized master of dramatic poetry, has sought to do for the fathers of the Revolution what Carl Sandburg did so magnificently for Abraham Lincoln. The result is thoroughly successful, even though it falls far short of the Sandburg masterpiece. The principal shortcoming of the Lengyel interpretation is that it remains too consistently at the political level, too much enslaved by the figures whom he is motivating, and too little concerned with the sources of their thinking.

The author is not interested in debunking history. The traditionally recognized leaders remain undisturbed in the places to which historians have assigned them. Jefferson, the Adamses, Franklin, Washington, and Hancock are the chief characters in this national drama. Dickinson, Rush, Tom Paine, and Sherman are supporting characters. These ten figures stand out from the Rutledges, Carrolls, and others in the background. Of course George III and Lord North are the chief villains. Curiously, Edmund Burke is not mentioned, even though the Elder Pitt and Fox appear briefly. Vergennes and Beaumarchais are the most important Frenchmen in the drama.

The author forcefully presents the chief ideological division present during consideration of the Jefferson draft of the declaration. Even though the war was already fifteen months old, there were those, under the leadership of John Dickinson, who hoped that negotiations might bring further concessions from the British government and a restoration of peace. New England was practically unanimous for independence, and in this view she received support from divided delegations from New Jersey, Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, and the three southernmost colonies. Conservative members regarded Jefferson's classic condemnation of monarchy in general, and of George III in particular, as unnecessarily impolitic, in that it might prevent further growth of pro-American sentiment in Britain and France. And except for the dissent of the South Carolina and Georgia delegations, slavery was universally condemned. Unanimity for the declaration was achieved only through the deletion of the Jefferson proposal for abolition of slavery. How the course of American history might have been changed but for that deletion!

This is an excellent interpretative study of American history.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING
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*PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS,*

*Princeton, New Jersey*

HUGH A. BONE. *Party Committees and National Politics*. Pp. xv, 256. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958. $4.50.

The author of this work warns us that it is "an impressionistic product, an attempt to sift contradictions, to weave together confirmations, and, to a considerable degree, to evaluate hearsay and judgments of those who work within the agencies." No reviewer with respect for the diligence of a colleague would be so ungracious as to ignore this warning and to indulge in any carping criticism. Nevertheless, if I may be pardoned a few adverse comments of a trifling nature, I should like to note a few omissions and inaccuracies.

Professor Bone indicates that the period when Stephen Mitchell was chairman of the Democratic National Committee is included in his survey. It seems to me that he cannot adequately evaluate Mitchell's contributions without giving Frank McKinney credit for the fine organization he had developed before Governor Stevenson's nomination and Mr. Mitchell's assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee. McKinney's Research Director, Dr. Bertram Gross, is mentioned (p. 118) but without comment on the excellent collection of research materials he bequeathed to his successor. There is no comment on this gentleman, who is a Negro economist. Dr. Franklin's selection for this important post was of some significance in the campaign—although the results did not appear to justify the expectations. Wilson Wyatt of Louisville, who was supposed to be "brain-trusting" Stevenson's 1952 campaign from Springfield, Illinois while Mitchell was cooling his heels in the Mayflower Hotel in Washington is also not mentioned. The "Iklopedia" (p. 74) was compiled and published long before Butler was made chairman. Finally, Mr. Wesley Roberts, whose shenanigans were in all the papers, might have had a little more notice (p. 39). True, Roberts preceded Hall, and by the author's plan did not come within the scope of this book—but I do not see how Hall can be evaluated fairly without some reference to the mess he inherited.

These are really picayune objections to a very well-written and authentic historical account. Unlike so many recent studies of political institutions which try to achieve precision by using new terms and abstruse methods of measurement and comparison, Dr. Bone's study gives us a quite satisfactory survey of recent activities on the part of both major party committee structures. There is no need for a further study of this type. But it is to be hoped that Messrs. Alcorn, Butler, Hall, and Mitchell, as well as scores of others who have participated in committee work, will write short autobiographical sketches filling in the gaps. What they add, however, will not invalidate Bone's conclusions. I suppose it is fair to say that his most important one is that our present-day party committees do about as well as can be expected in a democracy such as ours, encumbered by federalism, checks and balances, and a widespread distrust of politicians.

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JAMES F. BYRNES. *All in One Lifetime*. Pp. x, 432. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $5.00.

Several years ago, upon resigning as President Truman's Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes wrote his first book, *Speaking Frankly*, an account of his service in the ranking cabinet position. *All in One Lifetime* is the author's second book. Not only is this narrative interestingly related, but Jimmie Byrnes has an unusual story to tell. Indeed no other South Carolinian, with the exception of the illustrious John C. Calhoun, has served so brilliantly in so many high offices as Byrnes.

Born a half-orphan of a poor mother, Byrnes had very little formal education, but managed to learn shorthand and became a court reporter. Admitted to the bar in 1904, he was elected Solicitor in 1908 and to Congress in 1910, where he served for fourteen years. Byrnes recalls vividly some incidents of Wilson's administration. Most interesting, perhaps, was a talk that Wilson gave a Congressional group urging passage of the Federal Reserve Banking Act.

Defeated in his first attempt to go to the Senate by Cole Blease, Byrnes practiced law for six years and then turned the tables on his adversary. In 1931 he began a ten-year span in the United States Senate. Byrnes did much spade work for Franklin Roosevelt before the New Yorker's nomination, during the pre-election campaign, and thereafter. Widely heralded as one of F.D.R.'s most trusted lieutenants, Senator Byrnes never called himself a New Deal Democrat but a Democratic moderate. Generally speaking, F.D.R. could count on Byrnes' loyalty, but not so during Roosevelt's attempted purge, in 1938, of Southern conservative Democratic senators. Byrnes might well be criticized for opposing the President's attempt to make the Democratic party liberal and thereby give the voter a real choice in our two-party system.

Although Byrnes did much to defeat Roosevelt's attempted purge in 1938, he worked hard to help F.D.R. break the third term precedent in 1940. The President expressed a desire for Byrnes' nomination as vice president but took Henry Wallace instead. In 1941 Roosevelt named Byrnes to the Supreme Court. One of the most fascinating parts of this memoir is that section dealing with its author's tenure on the Supreme Court. The reader is taken behind the heavy curtains and is permitted to see conditions among the judges as they existed during Byrnes' tenure on the bench.

When war was declared Justice Byrnes volunteered his services to F.D.R. Dissatisfied as an interpreter of the law, Byrnes resigned from the bench to become "Assistant" President with almost complete powers on the home front. Again, F.D.R. declared that he wanted Byrnes as his running mate but could not clear it with Sidney Hillman. Eventually Roosevelt accepted Harry Truman. As the war ended, and as F.D.R. approached death, Byrnes resigned from his position in the White House.

Within days after Truman became President, Byrnes was named Secretary of State. In this capacity he attended the Potsdam Conference with the President. Subsequently, Byrnes matched wits with Molotov in conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, Moscow, Paris, and so forth. Byrnes was influential in having Wallace fired as Secretary of Commerce for a speech the latter made on foreign policy. Soon thereafter Byrnes retired from the Cabinet.

Back in South Carolina, Byrnes writes that he yielded to popular demand to become a candidate for Governor. Elected easily he banished the Ku Klux Klan, levied a sales tax, borrowed money to build hospitals, and started a veritable educational revolution, especially for Negroes. As was stated at Yale when he was presented with an honorary degree, "James F. Byrnes has shattered the tradition that all energy ends at the Mason-Dixon Line."

This book quite naturally is pro-author, as autobiographies are, but it makes good reading. It should be widely read by Americans everywhere. Other accounts will correct Byrnes' understandable bias.

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DAVID LOWENTHAL. *George Perkins Marsh: Versatile Vermonter*. Pp. xii, 442. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. $6.50.

In 1862 George Perkins Marsh wrote *Man and Nature; or Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action*. He issued revised editions in 1874 and 1885. Its last printing was on the eve of Theodore Roosevelt's White House Governors' Conference on conservation in 1907, for which it was, so to speak, the theme-song. A generation later Lewis Mumford reminded us that it was "the fountain-head of the conservation movement." In 1956, an international symposium on *Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth* took place—"eighty scholars from a score of sciences engaged in a 'Marsh Festival'" (p. 274). In an era when the universe was viewed as created for man's use and man was viewed as the creature endowed to improve nature, Marsh struck a new note: "Man is everywhere a disturbing agent. Wherever he plants his foot, the harmonies of nature are turned to discords." It is natural that Mr. Lowenthal, research associate of the American Geographical Society, should be

attracted by the author of "the most important and original American geographical work of the nineteenth century."

But Marsh was sixty-one years old when he wrote this book. He was then United States Minister to Italy, a post which he held for twenty-one years—the longest tenure in the United States Foreign Service. His international scholarly reputation at the time was in an entirely different field. He was American Secretary of the London Philological Society, author of a grammar of Icelandic, and consultant to dictionary-makers on etymologies "using Old Catalan, Hispano-Latin, Old Dutch and Old Scandinavian sources 'in great part new to English etymology'" (p. 201).

Marsh had represented Vermont in Congress for six years, where he was influential in shaping the program of the new Smithsonian Institution as an organ of basic research, not merely a practical extension service. As a relief from private debts incurred in business ventures, he had then obtained an appointment as Minister to Turkey—patronage for the literati—which served as springboard for camel trips in Arabia, leading to a book in 1856 urging the introduction of the camel to the U. S. Southwest, prescribing its care and nurture.

In one year of respite in Vermont in 1857, he served as Railroad Commissioner and wrote as report an essay in political economy painting the corrupting influence of railroad stock-companies on public morality and demanding their regulation; he served as commissioner for the design and construction of a new State House; and as Fish Commissioner he wrote a forty-five page pioneer report on the artificial propagation of fish. Later he wrote on *Irrigation: Its Evils, the Remedies and Compensations*, five years before Major Powell's famous *Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States*. If, as Schlesinger says, "Omnicompetence has been a marked trait of the American from the start," Marsh, "Versatile Vermonter," was an engaging, indeed a breath-taking, specimen who well deserves this first full-length biography.

Mr. Lowenthal's book is engagingly written and in its own way a tour de force. He has ransacked collections of family letters, court records, and unpublished papers galore. He has followed Marsh down each of his paths—some far from geography—and mastered enough of the Congressional politics of the day, the factionalisms of the Italian *risorgimento*, to offer balanced judgments of Marsh's role. And he has placed Marsh's view of man and nature in its philosophic setting of New England Transcendentalism. Altogether, this is an admirable work.

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*The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. VII: *Services Around the World*: Prepared under the editorship of Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate by the USAF Historical Division. Pp. lii, 666. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. $8.50.

With this volume the official history of the Air Forces comes to a conclusion. Dealing with the various non-combat Services that made victory possible, it is in many respects the most valuable volume of the series.

The account of the accomplishments of the Air Transport Command (ATC) is particularly useful. For example, ATC ferried overseas 267,000 planes; it airlifted over the Hump from India to China alone about 650,000 tons of gasoline and other supplies—a volume equivalent to the capacity of 6,500 American freight cars. It transported over 300,000 wounded and sick from battle areas to the rear and thus saved thousands of lives. Within five months after hostilities ended, more than 160,000 passengers were flown across the Atlantic to the United States without a single fatality. The efficiency with which the Command carried out such a stupendous task was not only essential to victory but also proved conclusively that vast quantities of cargo and passengers could be delivered quickly anywhere in the world even under unfavorable conditions. This proof of the potential of air transport paved the way for the later airlift into Berlin.

As always in time of war, medicine made significant progress. Two outstanding con-

tributions made by Air Force surgeons in treatment were the early ambulation of post-surgical patients and the aggressive rehabilitation of sick and wounded. The Weather Service made invaluable permanent contributions to the science of meteorology. The chapters on morale and demobilization also provide an important guide for the future.

While this volume contains much that can be helpful in future planning, the first six volumes of the history, it now seems, present merely an interesting and reasonably accurate history of the Air Forces' role in World War II. For, contrary to expectations when the project was launched, the operational history offers few, if any, lessons for the future. Recent developments in very long range weapons will certainly alter tactics and even strategy so greatly that any general conflict will be waged on lines for which there are no historical precedents. Only if we have to fight a "limited" war will the first six volumes on operations be of practical value.

Now that the task is finished, high praise is due to Professors W. F. Craven of Princeton, and J. L. Cate of Chicago for the masterly manner in which they have supervised the work of the numerous contributors to this important history.

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PAUL P. VAN RIPER. *History of the United States Civil Service*. Pp. xvii, 588. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958. $7.50.

The growth of the Civil Service of the United States from a few hundred employees under Washington to a complex and powerful army of more than two and a quarter millions has been one of the most significant developments of our national history. This volume, which contains a full and accurate account of this growth, is based on thorough research and shows keen insight into the political, economic, and social factors that have shaped our administrative service.

After a survey of the beginnings of the service under the Federalists and Jeffersonians, and the development of the spoils system under Jackson and his successors, the author devotes some five hundred pages to an account of the evolution of the merit system under the provisions of the Pendleton Act of 1883.

Advocated first as a great moral reform to eliminate corruption, then as a move for economy and efficiency in government, and finally as a necessary prerequisite for enlisting personnel adequately equipped to carry on the technical functions of an increasingly complicated governmental organization, the merit principle has been widely extended throughout the federal service. Most presidents since 1883 have added additional classes to the system. Their successors have on occasion recalled some of them from the classified service but such retreats have usually been less extensive than the advances. Today approximately 90 per cent of all civilian employees of the national government are within the merit system. They are selected for the most part on the basis of competitive examinations, they are reasonably protected from partisan removals, and they are probably more fully representative of the population they serve than are the government employees in other countries.

In the author's opinion, however, there are serious defects in the present civil service system. Although many of the recruitment, training, and classification functions are presently administered by the operating agencies, he thinks there is still too much centralization, and too much emphasis on rigid controls and police surveillance. Agreeing with the recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Management and the Hoover Commissions, he would intrust most personnel functions to the executive agencies as an essential part of line management and have the central commission serve chiefly as a staff agency for advising the president. Whether the merit system has been firmly enough established to permit such an arrangement without inviting the return of the spoils system is a question about which authorities disagree.

Since presidential patronage has often been a useful means for obtaining congressional approval for national programs, how

far can the merit system be pushed into the higher ranges of the administrative heirarchy without unduly weakening the presidency? What are the advantages and disadvantages of limiting entry into the classified service to the bottom levels? Does the rule of three too greatly restrict the discretion of appointing authorities? Is the classification system too rigid? Have too many restrictions been placed on the removal power? Can a career system be reconciled with the maintenance of a reasonably representative bureaucracy? How seriously have loyalty investigations undermined employee morale? What has been the effect of veterans' preference? The author lays no claim to definitive solutions for problems such as these. But he considers alternative solutions with fairness and sound judgment.

This in an important book. It is interesting, thought-provoking, and authoritative, and should serve as a useful guide to personnel officers as well as to students of public administration. The summary chapter is a model of its kind.

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HARRY HOWE RANSOM. *Central Intelligence and National Security*. Pp. xiv, 287. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $4.75.

It was a Frenchman who described the old League of Nations as "impossible and indispensable." And the thoughtful reader of Mr. Ransom's thorough, compact, and well-organized book is likely to conclude that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is both undesirable and inevitable. It also appears to be extravagant and immature, yet already muffled in a toga of smug exclusiveness.

On the Washington scene and in the name of national security, the CIA can do no wrong. The spoiled only child whose whims must not be thwarted is racing into the holier-than-thou adult whose necessities may never be questioned. This has resulted in few if any dazzling secret intelligence coups; it has produced an aggravated case of occupational elephantiasis.

Mr. Ransom, an industrious researcher and gentle faultfinder, makes it clear that the CIA is not only vast but is also a vast improvement in the field of American intelligence. Through two world wars, and the turbulences of the years in between, our intelligence "community" remained a scattering of largely independent villages, competitive, mutually mistrustful, and lost among dreary wastes of disparagement and neglect.

Even politicians saw that unification was imperative. Yet our numberless intelligence agencies resisted reform and the manifest destiny of amalgamation with all the vigor and suspicion of the thirteen original Colonies. Some are still resisting.

Mr. Ransom writes discreetly. His study is important, entertaining, enlivened with some excellent anecdotes. He reminds us, for example, that "in order to protect the famed 'Magic' system of cryptanalysis" the alerting of Pearl Harbor was delayed. So "Magic" was protected and the battlefleet was plastered.

The skipper of the doomed *Maine* "praised" our consul general in Havana (1898) for his "helpful 'spying' activity." Presumably Captain Sigsbee praised Fitzhugh Lee a few days before the battleship was blown up.

A nation which has been naive and consciously reluctant about wartime espionage and secret service is bound to abominate the "peace-time" growing pains now thrust upon it. Mr. Ransom quotes those who suspect "all secret intelligence operators" because they are inclined "to use their secret information as a weapon to influence" men and policies, on the proven "principle that knowledge is power."

Intelligence, grudged its pittances in the past, is today granted unaudited billions to spend, or squander; but the problem of personnel remains, and even the most dedicated CIA director must surmount it at his own, and our, peril.

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JORGE CASTANEDA. *Mexico and the United Nations*. (National Studies on International Organization.) Prepared for el Colegio de México and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp.

xi, 244. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958. $3.00.

AURELIANO AGUIRRE. *Uruguay and the United Nations*. (National Studies on International Organization.) Prepared under the Auspices of the Uruguayan Institute of International Law for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp. xi, 129. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958. $3.00.

These are the twelfth and thirteenth volumes to be published in a series of studies, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, of the relations between individual national governments—selected from various regions of the world—and the United Nations. When completed, the series is expected to embrace twenty-four studies, of which the last two are to be devoted to over-all summaries and analyses.

While the general arrangements for the series permit of independence of treatment in the individual studies, the Mexican and Uruguayan volumes were prepared in essentially the same manner. In each case, the primary responsibility for the writing of the manuscript was entrusted to a single author—an official of the Mexican Foreign Office in one case; and an editor of *El País*, a Montevideo newspaper, in the other—who was assisted by a study group composed of remarkably distinguished public figures. Thus nine people, seven of them current or former government officials, took part in the Mexican project, and twelve, of whom nine were current or former public officers, participated in the Uruguayan. In the latter, but not the Mexican, case, the final draft of the manuscript was approved by the study group before publication.

Both books are significantly authoritative statements of the topics selected for discussion. These deal with the foreign policy objectives of Mexico and Uruguay, and the positions taken by their delegations to the United Nations in pursuit of those objectives. This reviewer would be hard-pressed to name more authoritative books on these subjects than these two. Moreover, while they differ somewhat in approach—the Uruguayan volume is more historically oriented than the Mexican—they share a sufficiently common formulation of the problems to permit them to be regarded as essentially comparable. The social scientist should not overlook the positive value of this circumstance. In an area of study frequently characterized by widely disparate interests and approaches, it is often difficult for a scholar to use or build on the earlier research done by others. In the two books under review, however, the generally common treatment of the same subject matter is sufficiently structured to permit later students interested in these questions to find these two volumes of considerable utility.

It should be pointed out that the subject matter of both studies is heavily formal and legalistic in character. There are two minor exceptions to this: the Mexican book, interestingly enough, contains a brief section on public opinion, and the Carnegie Endowment has added to the Uruguayan volume an Appendix on the political parties and newspapers of that country. But in the main both projects are devoted to formal doctrine and legal questions. Neither work discusses the administrative organization of its foreign office, the mechanisms for its interaction with its delegates at the United Nations, or the degree of autonomy those delegates may exercise, let alone the dynamic processes by which the two countries' foreign policy decisions are made.

Most of the Mexicans and Uruguayans who conducted these studies are current or former government officials, but theoretically they contributed to these books in the capacity of private citizens of their countries. It has been observed that when a man wears two hats he looks funny. Thus, although these volumes are not official statements of the policies of the Mexican and Uruguayan governments in the strict or technical sense, the books do exhibit some of the characteristics of official pronouncements. Both works, for example, tend to be defenses of, or apologies for, the two countries' roles in the United Nations, rather than objective analyses of these roles. Essentially, the basic correctness of Mexican and Uruguayan policies is the assumption upon which these volumes are based rather than an hypothesis to be tested by the studies. Accordingly, the

coins of the two countries almost always come down heads and almost never tails, and Aguirre has no difficulty in stating flatly in his final chapter that "full and loyal support of the United Nations may, in conclusion, be considered the basic rule of Uruguay's foreign policy" (p. 95).

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J. FRED RIPPY. *Latin America: A Modern History.* (University of Michigan History of the Modern World.) Pp. xiv, 579, xx. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. $10.00.

To begin with, two comments may be made about Dr. Rippy's book: it is not just another textbook on Latin American history, and it is the most recent and up to date one. However, some readers may wonder why Professor Rippy devoted his time and energy to a new college text instead of continuing to prepare special studies of greater value to the average student. His volume does not have all of the characteristics of a textbook. Chapters are subdivided but there are no paragraph headings. Notes are located in the back of the book. Reading lists are not always well selected. There are only fourteen maps in the text and several of these, although they are copied exactly from other sources, have no credit line. The Index is not a textbook Index and leaves much to be desired. However, the publishers rather than the author can be blamed for many of these characteristics. In any case, the true test of a text is in the teaching, and each instructor will weigh the book in the balance of classroom use.

As may be expected by those who know Dr. Rippy's previous works, this one contains considerable emphasis on the international relations of the Latin American countries both with the United States and with other parts of the world. Also he has emphasized the economic aspects of their national and international life. The book is divided into three sections: The Colonial Period (pp. 1–172); The Early National Period (pp. 173–386); and The Recent Period (pp. 387–543). The chronological dividing line between the last two sections is about 1900. Dr. Rippy, like all teachers of this subject, is concerned—if not perplexed—with the periodization of Latin American history, especially since the end of the Wars of Independence. Consequently, some teachers will radically disagree with his 1900 dividing date. However, as much can be said in favor of this date as for 1870 or 1918 or 1930, or other years advocated by various Latin Americanists.

Dr. Rippy has a writing style all his own. It is interesting and often subtly witty, frequently sly, and sometimes lecturing in tone. He is keen to point out mistakes—especially mistakes of the United States government made by its various branches. Latin Americans are delightfully characterized and criticized, and so are individuals and organizations in the United States. Do-gooders are castigated and those who do good are praised. Some heroes are cut down to size. The book is interpretative to a greater extent than other college textbooks. This fact may or may not please some readers, but students will like it. And so does this reviewer.

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JOHN J. JOHNSON. *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors.* Pp. x, 272. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. $5.00.

This study's thesis is that Latin American "urban middle groups are vitally, if not decisively, important in an area where one still commonly hears and reads that there is 'no middle class to speak of.' . . ." The author concludes that the future, also, "holds considerable promise for them," for "middle sectors" now have increasing economic power, political knowledge, and "cultural experience," as well as the sympathy of foreign governments. The Latin American republics analyzed in depth are Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, the author's contention being that the developmental patterns of these five will impose themselves on the remaining fifteen states.

Despite the deviousness and incompleteness of the various current theories of

social structure, to write an entire book based on premises concerning classlike entities and to propound neither explicit theory nor adequate definition is unfortunate. Although Professor Johnson has thus—somewhat unnecessarily—condemned himself to an impressionistic survey, the results are good if not optimal. Let us take an example. The author argues that what cohesiveness his "middle sectors" have is based on their being predominantly urban, having above average education and believing in public education, in their being obsessed with industrialization, nationalistic, in favor of state interventionism, and inclined to use the party instead of the family as the extra-governmental instrument of political activity. This list is a descriptively useful one but it is theoretically slipshod, for it does not take into account the inherent comparability or the level of generality of each factor, a serious fault when one or more points may have to be subsumed under another, as in the case of nationalism and the secularization of public life. A statement of the degree to which each point may be pertinent is also necessary, for certainly some middle class groups oppose state interventionism, certainly the family continues to cushion political shocks for these persons despite their intellectual desires for impersonal institutionalization, and just as certainly there are other basic factors making for cohesion, such as the occupational labeling imposed on individuals very often by law as well as custom, an identification which has much to do with self-conception and hierarchical placement and thus political behavior.

This book is easy to criticize adversely because the author has entered fields where sociologists, political scientists, and cultural anthropologists should have preceded him. His analysis must suffer because of the neglect of his fellow academicians. This work should serve as an honest challenge, and since it is invariably insightful, intelligent, and ingenious, it is also likely to give long service as a breeding ground of hypotheses.

The 60-page Bibliography is most impressive, especially for sources in English. Unfortunately, key books on social class in Uruguay—a Sociological Study of the family in Montevideo and Carlos Rama's *Sociologiá Uruguaya*—and Chile—*Cuentas Nacionales*, a Chilean Development Corporation study vital to occupational analysis—are missing. A paucity of footnotes is also regrettable, especially so in a pioneer work of this kind where possible replication is highly desirable.

A most charming characteristic of the book, and one which adds to its reliability and general value, is that Professor Johnson knows of what he speaks with his head as well as with a splendid sense of "feel" for the area.

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## *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

PETER GROTHE. *To Win the Minds of Men: The Story of the Communist Propaganda War in East Germany.* Pp. xi, 241. Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1958. $5.50.

Peter Grothe, special features editor of *Stars and Stripes* in Berlin, and presently studying political science at Stanford University, made good use of his talent and off-duty time to observe, study, and collect material on the current Communist propaganda war in East Germany. Berlin was an unrivaled base of operations. Information from the Eastern Zone and the knowledge of experts were available to him; he interviewed over one hundred refugees and made numerous visits to East Berlin as well as single journeys to Potsdam, Leipzig, and Dresden. He interviewed German church officials and a number of Communist personages including Gerhart Eisler.

As a journalist and student of political behavior, the author believes that "Winning people's minds is the most important business of the twentieth century," that the results of Communist propaganda among a captive people can best be studied in East Germany, and that the success or failure of the indoctrination program may decide the East-West struggle.

An opening chapter, illustrated from interviews, newspaper excerpts, and personal observations, presents a summary sketch of political and economic conditions in the German Democratic Republic (DDR). The purpose and major tasks of the directors of the propaganda effort are then described and the principal campaign themes presented. Separate chapters follow on the propaganda of terror, the press, radio and television, the arts, direct agitation, and the most significant and successful bid to win East German youth through the educational system and the Communist youth organizations. The two final chapters describe the agencies and programs of the counter-propaganda which emanates from West Berlin. Well deserved praise is accorded Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), the America House, the American Memorial Library, and the investigating Committee of Free Jurists—certainly not a "big team" compared with the opposition. After describing the resistance of the Christian churches to Red pressure and persuasion, the author concludes with a reasoned statement of the significance of the worldwide propaganda war and the inadequacy of the United States effort. Getting down to specific cases he pleads for a bigger budget for the United States Information Service and the doubling, at least, of the effort in East Germany by the American agencies.

The author set himself a restricted task and this he has accomplished well. His book is essentially a report and not a study in depth. To the non-specialist in German and Central European affairs it will be highly informative, but to the initiated the terrain will be quite familiar. Moreover, the underlying assumption that the biggest and most aggressive propaganda is going to win unless equally big and aggressive counterpunches are delivered is a debatable hypothesis.

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MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI. *Fonction publique internationale et influences nationales.* Pp. xviii, 674. New York: Frederick A. Praeger under the Auspices of The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, European Center, 1958. $12.50.

It is singularly appropriate for a scholar trained in the French legal tradition to turn his attention to an emerging international administrative law, as Bedjaoui does here. This book is his doctoral dissertation, which in 1956 won him first prize in the annual competition which the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace holds in Europe to encourage studies of international organization.

Mr. Bedjaoui starts from the incontestable premises that states do carry on business through international organizations and that these organizations employ administrators. He asserts that if "international officials" are to accomplish the aims of the institutions which employ them, they must be completely free from all national authority. Proceeding deductively, he posits the sine qua non of an international civil service in recruiting, setting salary and leave practices, establishing privileges and immunities, terminating contracts, and arranging for employee representation, and then contrasts the desiderata with actual practice.

Although many of M. Bedjaoui's facts are familiar, he ranges far more widely than the authors of most international administrative studies. He writes not only about the United Nations, but also about the earliest international public unions, the specialized agencies, and regional bodies. The notes and bibliography, citing many European source materials, are especially valuable.

Because his legal norms are high, M. Bedjaoui's commentary shows how far states are from achieving optimal conditions for an international civil service. He diligently notes the influence, usually deleterious, of nation states—including the United States, through the late Senator McCarthy's committee—on international administration. Sometimes M. Bedjaoui exaggerates these influences, however, as when he implies that governmental pressure, rather than administrative ineptitude, constituted the most significant obstacle to reorganizing the United Nations Secretariat. Certainly one cannot reshuffle high international officials without taking na-

tional sensibilities into account, but external governmental pressures should not blind us to either the faults of particular international administrators or the weaknesses of some ways of administering international organizations. Although as M. Bedjaoui notes, it did take several years to reorganize the Secretariat, Mr. Hammarskjold showed in 1954—and has continued to show since—how a Secretary-General can make significant and wide-ranging administrative changes. M. Bedjaoui refers to them only in a footnote, however, almost as if the facts were getting in the way of his theory. In this instance at least, M. Bedjaoui's pessimistic references to the inherent weakness of the heads of international organizations arise less from the facts than from the contrast between the facts and his values.

Not surprisingly, M. Bedjaoui concludes that the international civil service today reflects the imperfections of international co-operation. As he sees it, a stronger international civil service will in turn help promote international co-operation. His book may well serve to catalyze this process, if not immediately, perhaps at some time in the future.

RICHARD N. SWIFT
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*British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East.* A Report by a Chatham House Study Group. Pp. vi, 123. Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. $2.00.

This is a tract for the times, and the time is of British and Western political deflation. Early in 1956 the Council of Chatham House established a study group to examine British interests and policies in the Middle East. Then came the Suez nationalization, the Anglo-French convulsive reaction, and the Western retreat. The tragedy and shame of it all sank deeply into the bones of the eminent scholars, diplomatists, soldiers, and men of affairs who were members of the study group. They examined the historical evolution of Britain's traditional claims to paramount and even exclusive interests in this bridge land, the protection of which was the function of British power and arms. But they found that Britain can no longer assume this task. "The difference between the British position in the Middle East in 1945 and in 1957 is so great as to make it clear that Britain has suffered a defeat of major dimensions."

Britain's special interests are now reduced to the treaty obligations assumed in the last century to protect the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms; for the rest, they are shared with the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and indeed with the non-Soviet world at large. The two principal interests are the supply of oil and the free passage of trade, and those are of course world interests. "The scope for the individual use of force by Britain has dwindled. . . . Its desirability, moreover, has also almost disappeared. At Aden and in the Persian Gulf we still have private obligations and may be forced to act alone. But we ought to welcome any chance to share these obligations. . . . Our chief difficulty is going to be to persuade our allies to share the burden and the responsibility."

Consequently, traditional policies, attitudes, and techniques have to be fundamentally changed. In the political sphere the scope for British action is thought to be very limited—"and the arguments for inactivity are undoubtedly cogent." No longer masterly inactivity, but just plain inactivity. In social and economic spheres Britain must co-operate with the young, revolutionary forces. One of the supreme tasks is the maintenance of Britain's cultural position and the reputation of British goods and services. Information services, export of technicians, trade union co-operation, exchange of students, trade fairs—in these ways we shall demonstrate our unity, washed of all taints of bloody imperialism and dry cleaned of residues of ill-gotten materialistic gains. Perhaps in a few centuries Britain might even succeed in wiping out the debt of the horrible past.

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NICHOLAS MANSERGH. *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-War Change 1939–1952.* Pp. xvi, 469. New York: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. $10.00.

This outstanding volume gives descriptions, profuse illustrations, and adequate interpretations of how the British dominions deal with their senior partner and with one another. The book is well proportioned, half of it being allotted to the intricate problems of military and political co-operation during World War II. One-fourth of the space covers the post-war changes of status for India, Burma, Ceylon, and Ireland. The last fourth of the book discusses international and inter-Commonwealth relations.

In discussing the wartime concert of effort, the author's theme is to demonstrate the capacity of the Commonwealth system to achieve unity of purpose and effort among several governments and peoples—whether in the bleak days of 1940 when, without major allies, Britain and the Commonwealth faced Germany and Italy, or later, down to the complete victory of a world-girdling coalition against the Axis dictators.

In the second segment, the post-war transformations of several dominions into republics is detailed. The changes reveal a process and an adaptability to meet change—without confusion or war. Both the process and the adaptability are still transforming the Commonwealth. It is to be hoped that the author will extend the account of these changes for the period after 1952, using his same writing techniques.

The third segment of the book stresses international politics, demonstrating the ability of several members of the Commonwealth to preserve their cohesion with the changing world political conditions that produced a new balance of power. The interposition of the United States as a military ally of Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand apparently does not disturb the sense of loyalty and co-operation among the several Commonwealth partners themselves. Moreover, all Commonwealth dominions and republics widened their world horizons through active participation in the United Nations. Already a miniature league of nations, broader opportunities have thereby been found for the Commonwealth states to pursue the common objectives of security, peace, and progress.

Interesting glimpses are given of the political personalities to be found playing decisive parts. If Winston Churchill exercised abundant power in London in the conduct of Britain's part in the war, the dominion prime ministers nonetheless always retained their freedom to act independently. That they generally co-operated in the war effort is testimony of the binding spirit of the Commonwealth.

Appendices list, for 1931–1952, the principal Commonwealth officers and the Commonwealth representatives within the Commonwealth and in foreign countries.

This volume is one of a series. It follows immediately upon a volume by the same author discussing *Problems of External Policy, 1931–1939.* Two companion volumes, *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931–1952,* include important source material for the period as a whole.

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SIGMUND SKARD. *American Studies in Europe:* Vol. I & II: *Their History and Present Organization.* (A Publication of The American Institute, University of Oslo in co-operation with the Department of American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania.) Pp. 357; 364–735. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958. $10.00.

This study-survey must already have commanded the favorable interest of teachers and scholars in international relations, diplomacy, other social sciences, literature, European and American history, as well as of those in the relatively new interdisciplinary programs in American studies.

For some the volumes will constitute a

work of reference on curricular developments and present outlooks in Europe. For others, the concise historical backgrounds will be usefully informative.

The distinctive aspect of the chapters is that they weave general history into the histories of organized education. The reception in Europe of the fact and idea of the United States, not infrequently put as "the 'impact' of America on," has been treated here and abroad—see "List of Sources" in volume II; nevertheless, the field may still be regarded as an underdeveloped one. *American Studies in Europe* is a unique addition to this literature. No other study has put together such information covering the whole of Europe. Twenty-five countries get into the picture by way of their educational curriculums from the secondary school to the university, with major attention given to higher education.

According to Mr. Skard, "The term 'American studies' in this book means the study of the Civilization, past and present, of the United States of America, principally the study of those aspects that are fundamental to all national civilizations: human and cultural geography, political, economic, social, religious, and intellectual developments, laws and institutions, language, literature, and the arts" (p. 8). As Mr. Skard asserts, there are other conceptions of American studies, but for the most part they are consonant with the one just quoted. Although he properly does not single it out for analysis here, he is intimately ecquainted with the relatively new academic handling of American studies in the United States, which became in a sense an official though quite flexible doctrine with the establishment of the American Studies Association in 1950. This homeland situation is pertinent to the work being commented upon for several reasons. First, many readers of the work will be caught up by learning of the late arrival of instruction about America in some European countries and institutions, and the early arrival in other places, whatever the nature and duration of the instruction. Why, for example, were American subjects so late to arrive in Italy and Ireland, when their people in such large numbers had arrived in the United States to stay and reproduce? Answers to this are given. Second, several European American studies programs have been influenced by current programs in this country (pp. 655 ff). Under United States government scholar-exchange operations the European demand for American studies specialists has become so great as to require special administrative attention. Third, after the Parliament of Norway, in 1946, set up at the University of Oslo a chair of "Literature, especially American," Mr. Skard, who received that professorship and then became as well director of Oslo's American Institute, which opened in January 1948, visited the United States to study current American studies programs. He has subsequently been a teacher and lecturer here, and the influences of these experiences is apparent in his volumes.

The birth of American studies in this country is short of being contemporaneous with the signing of the Declaration of Independence. The present systems—and they are not one—had their beginnings in the 1930's, granted a few extra years if interpretation requires them. *American Studies* by the late Tremaine McDowell, and *American Studies in the United States* by Robert Harris Walker both take up this question.

Earlier, instruction in the United States about the United States was ordinarily offered through history or literature, neither of which had too easy a time of it, as European traditions and cultural accumulations were accorded dominance. In fact, those who encouraged or took the first doctorates in American literature displayed a certain occupational courage, although once taken, the gamble did pay off. The present American studies program at its broadest may enlist the co-operation of half a dozen departments; in smaller institutions history and literature usually predominate. The basic objective is to give to the student an integrated knowledge of American civilization. This is Mr. Skard's hope for Europe.

Mr. Skard deserves a hearty vote of appreciation. He has not only acquired American as a second language: he has

also, in spirit, adopted the United States as a second country.

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C. WILFRED JENKS. *The Common Law of Mankind.* (The Library of World Affairs, No. 41.) Pp. xxvi, 456. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, under the auspices of The London Institute of World Affairs, 1958. No price.

MOSES MOSKOWITZ. *Human Rights and World Order: The Struggle for Human Rights in the United Nations.* Pp. xii, 239. New York: Oceana Publications, 1958. $3.95.

"The common law of mankind" and the term "international law" are identical in the sections of Jenks' volume entitled Preface, Contents, and Text—pages xvii–xxvi cover a collection of cases, legislation, treaties, and other "international instruments."

The Introduction covers the transition from ancient and medieval to modern times. "Can we," the author asks, "deduce a sufficient consensus of general principles from legal systems as varied as the civil law with its multifarious European, Latin-American, and . . . the common law with its own varients of the Islamic law, Hindu law, Jewish law, Chinese law, Japanese law, African law in its varied forms, and Soviet law to give us the basic foundation of a universal system of international law?" In condensed form the answers to the queries implied are offered in ten chapters.

The volume by Moses Moskowitz is concerned with political reality which takes us back to the time "when the pater familias claimed the right of life and death over his children . . . as well as over his slaves—and to 1933, when Goebbels invoked before the League of Nations the old adage about a man's home being his castle to deny the outside world the right to concern itself with the treatment the Nazis meted out to members of minorities. . . ."

The Foreword offers high appreciation for "human rights and world order."

The two authors defend with conviction the reality, functioning, and effectiveness of the United Nations—inevitably disappointed, the hapless reviewer must confess to unavoidable omissions and inevitable regrets.

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## *ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY*

CHARLES WOLF, JR., and SIDNEY C. SUFRIN. *Capital Formation and Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Areas.* (Maxwell School Series.) Pp. x, 170. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1958. $3.00.

This study is concerned with only one important aspect of economic development—capital formation and foreign investment. The authors have prepared an inventory of research work recently completed or under progress in this field, and used it as a basis for the analysis and evaluation of additional research needs and suggestions for action programs, particularly for South and South East Asia and the Near East. Three main problem areas are specially selected: entrepreneurship and the demand for capital; technological alternatives and optimum use of capital; and foreign investment and capital formation.

The authors believe that one of the early obstacles to economic development is the lack of demand for capital. In spite of the limited size of the market, there are many profitable opportunities for investment in backward areas. Savings or potential savings are also ready at hand, in the form of idle cash balances, capital held abroad, gold hoardings, unemployed or underemployed labor, and a high proportion of national resources diverted into unproductive channels such as ceremonials, tobacco, and so forth. These, however, remain untapped because of a dearth of entrepreneurs. If favorable grounds were created for the stimulation and successful operation of enterprise, these sources could supply the necessary savings. An inquiry into how the local islands of entrepreneur-

ship spring up in underdeveloped areas, and how they can be multiplied and their effects diffused through various devices such as centralized distribution agencies and easy credit terms would, therefore, constitute a useful field of research. Wider research work into the inevitability of historical abuses connected with the growth of entrepreneurship, the role of out-groups in economic growth, the volume and pattern of savings and investment, and the classification and ordering of significant social, economic, political, cultural, and resource factors in relation to countries and regions would also be welcome.

It is widely conceded that the most up-to-date techniques adopted in developed countries are not necessarily likely to be the best techniques for underdeveloped countries with their different factor endowments, different natural resources, and different social structures and organizations. Hitherto, however, because the economists took techniques as given and the engineers were only familiar with recent methods, this fact has not received its due attention. An intensive study of the techniques adopted in countries with different backgrounds—for instance, the United States, a Scandinavian country, and Japan—under convenient headings such as capital/output ratio, the location of the industry, the scale of the plant, the skilled labor requirements, and management and organizational techniques, may greatly pay. The strategic role played by certain sectors in the economic histories of different countries may also be investigated to find out where developmental efforts could first begin with great advantage.

In the field of foreign capital, valuable research work could be done by finding out the capital-multiplier effects of foreign investment and the tax-elasticity of such investment. Contracts involving only foreign management and technique without capital aid may also be evaluated, and five or six profitable opportunities for foreign capital should be specified for each country.

Assuming the field limitation of the authors, there are still a few important questions that remain unmentioned. There is no doubt that inadequate entrepreneurship and consequent lack of demand for capital are important obstacles to growth, but there is no reason to believe that their removal will in itself activate idle funds, mobilize gold hoardings, and stop unproductive consumption. Each of these maladies is the result of varied persistent causes and not easily amenable to any single remedy, much less to the growth of entrepreneurship alone. The millions of disguised and not-so-disguised unemployed can only be put to productive work through tremendous efforts and organization, probably involving some compulsion, and requiring a great change in atmosphere and attitudes. The question of the adoption of optimum techniques is well made, but on the action front it is necessary to distinguish between the most profitable technique from the individual entrepreneur's viewpoint and the optimum technique from the national viewpoint. Because of wage regulation and interest fixation by law or custom, the two may violently differ, and it may require action by the state to make the individual adopt the optimum technique. To devise techniques specifically suited to the resources and circumstances of underdeveloped areas may need research laboratories as well as a detailed and careful glance through the techniques adopted in different countries at different times.

The book will be very interesting and useful to students of economic development and will provide much material for research students intending to work on developmental topics.

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*Income Tax Differentials.* Symposium Conducted by the Tax Institute, November 21–22, 1957. Pp. vi, 258. Princeton: Tax Institute, 1958. $6.00.

This is one of the series of annual symposiums "conducted by the Tax Institute to focus attention on a major problem of taxation by affording an opportunity for discussion by informed participants representing different points of view."

In this case the participants included university professors of law, finance, and economics; accountants, especially those in

income tax practice; representatives of various kinds of business, and of business and labor organizations; business management and investment advisers; government officials; and even representatives of authors, artists, and inventors.

Various kinds of differentiation were discussed, such as those effected by tax rates, deductions, exemptions, administration, and so forth. Nearly all attention was given to the United States income tax; scarcely any to state or local, although one paper by a former British tax official compared United States, Canadian, and British differentials.

Special sessions of the symposium were devoted to tax differentials in compensation; the effects of differentials upon investment; the double taxation of dividends; and how taxes should be reduced. As would be expected, these sessions included controversial discussions of high and low rates, both personal and corporate; percentage depreciation for oils and other minerals; special rates on capital gains; various questionable manipulations in defining capital gains; failure to allow adequate credit for capital losses; reorganization; mergers with loss concerns; favors to executives through pension, deferred pay, and option plans.

Attention was called to the great variation in percentages of income reported for taxation by different classes—for example, by wage and salary receivers on the one hand and by farmers and dividend receivers on the other. Severe criticisms were made, also, of the exemption of interest from state and municipal bonds; the deduction of interest and taxes that are really personal in nature; and the omission of imputed income such as the rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

The cumulative effect of this symposium is to impress the reader with the vast conglomeration of differentials in law, rulings, and administration, and the political difficulties of remedying the situation instead of complicating it further by additional favors to others who feel that they are discriminated against. What can the average ordinary individual do in the face of well-established practices, large determined pressure groups, and the fear of most politicians to antagonize voters? How can a business organize or conduct its business without the expensive advice of legal experts as to the intricacies of the tax law and its administration? How can anyone with other than the simplest small income afford not to employ expert advice even to fill out his tax returns? It is hoped that readers of this volume and others will not be benumbed into hopelessness but rather will be jolted and galvanized into effective action which will bring substantial corrections.

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DRAGOSLAV AVRAMOVIC assisted by RAVI GULHATI. *Debt Servicing Capacity and Postwar Growth in International Indebtedness.* Pp. xvi, 228. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. $5.00.

The Great Depression of the 'thirties had a deep impact on the financial institutions in virtually all countries of the world. The reason was that, in the post-World War I period, many countries had borrowed large amounts of funds, and the debtor countries were unable to service this international debt when their export shrank in quantity and value as a result of the curtailment of production in the creditor countries, particularly in the United States.

The rapid rebuilding of a new set of international indebtedness and of international obligations of debt service within a ten-year period after the war is the topic of this study.

In 1955 fifty-two debter countries had a public external debt of 22.9 billion dollars, or dollar equivalent, outstanding, and a service on this public debt of 2 billion dollars per year. To this has to be added external debts in private account which required payments or accruals of about 3.2 billion dollars or dollar equivalent. About four-fifths of this indebtedness is the result of capital movements in the first post-World War II decade.

The study has been carried out by staff members of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It is quite understandable that the Bank wanted to know if these international obligations were in line with the development of the

economic capacity of the debtor countries to pay and if their capacity to pay could be endangered by possible unfavorable developments in the world markets for their export products.

Carefully presented, the report offers a treasure of information on the development of external debt, debt service, international trade, production, government revenues, and gold and foreign exchange reserves of the various countries during the first post-World War II decade. Where data were available comparisons with previous periods were made.

The result of the study is reassuring as far as Western Europe in general is concerned. The reconstruction, aided by a 40 billion dollar inflow of public funds—grants and loans—from 1946 to 1955, brought such an increase in production, exports, government revenues, domestic savings, and gold and exchange reserves that the ability to service the debt cannot be doubted.

The result looks less reassuring for countries in Asia and Latin America. These sweeping generalizations, it should be noted, are those of the reviewer; the book carefully points to country-by-country differences and makes needed qualifications concerning the nature of the estimates. With respect to a number of countries in these areas the book concludes that maintaining their present economic goals may endanger the discharge of their debt service obligation.

The author did not raise the question of the possible consequences if transfer difficulties should force these countries to lower their goals of economic expansion. In some cases such lowering may mean merely abandoning overly ambitious plans and promises. In other cases it may mean that the rate of population growth could exceed that of production, a fact which may lead to despair and the discrediting of the current leadership.

If the lowering of goals leads to undesirable economic, social, and political consequences, ways should be explored for promoting economic growth in underdeveloped countries in a manner which takes account of the limited capacity of these countries to transfer rising debt service payments—for example, by a flexible debt service which would be related to the country's debt service capacity. The author did not explore these questions and as a staff member of the International Bank probably could not explore them. Thus, the study is limited to assembling and analyzing statistical estimates in an excellent manner, but other questions need to be discussed before accepting the general conclusion that these countries must face the choice of lowering their economic goals or defaulting on their obligations.

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LESTER V. CHANDLER. *Benjamin Strong, Central Banker*. Pp. x, 495. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1958. $6.00.

Well-written biography has the great virtue of presenting history in human terms. Professor Chandler's biography is well written, and his subject is worth the effort. Altogether he has provided a wholly sympathetic but nonetheless objective treatment of one of the leading creators of our American central banking system. The book shows the reader how the Federal Reserve System came into its own despite the war climate into which it was born; how it first established itself as a useful agency of government through its help in the sale of government bonds; how its objectives were left only vaguely defined by the act creating the System; and how the instruments of monetary policy, especially open market operations, had to be discovered by trial and error during the years 1921–24.

In all of this evolution one man, large in vision, capacity, and personality, stood out above his fellows. Governor Strong brought to his post as head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank many talents together with experience in banking. His experience in the trust field had led him by 1904 to the secretaryship of the newly-formed but important Bankers Trust Company. When drafted to head the Federal Reserve Bank, he had already achieved a

considerable reputation and had broad contacts in the nation's financial capital.

It was, however, in the rebuilding of a world wounded deeply by World War I that Strong and Governor Montagu Norman of the Bank of England learned and passed on to us the lessons of restoring financial and trade relations. They were the best physicians which the sick world had at a time when effective international agencies for dealing with these problems were lacking.

Especially valuable to anyone interested in central banking is the analysis of the great debates incident to the structure of the Federal Reserve System and the determination of the powers vested in the Board of Governors and in the several banks, especially that in New York. The compromise that eventually resulted is unique. It consists of a central banking system rather than a central bank—a system that is partly governmental, partly private. Its design is intended to provide an agency which will guard the public interest and still be sensitive to practical realities.

It is in reporting and analyzing the policy mistakes of the past that Professor Chandler makes his most timely contribution. For example, the avid desire of Strong and Norman to have England return to the gold standard at the previously established rate seems now to have been a mistake of judgment. Strong saw coming the stock market inflation that culminated in 1929. On August 3, 1928, he relayed his fears to Walter Stewart, but was too ill to lead or even participate in a campaign to curb the ill-fated flow of credit into Wall Street through the call-money market. By October 15 of that year he had died. One cannot but wonder what leadership he might have given the system had he lived. Of still greater interest is what he would recommend to solve today's monetary and fiscal problems were he still alive.

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E. GARTLY JACO (Ed.). *Patients, Physicians and Illness: Sourcebook in Behavioral Science and Medicine.* Pp. viii, 600. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. $7.50.

An extraordinary amount of research is going forward these days in "medical economics," "medical care," "public health," "medical sociology," and, as Professor Jaco chooses to name his delineation of interest, "behavioral science and medicine." It would take an uncommon amount of self-assurance to lay out the independent limits of these territories with any dogmatism. The editor of this important compilation says that the behavioral sciences eventually will constitute a basic science for all branches of medicine, and he names these sciences as "sociology, cultural anthropology, and social psychology."

Maybe so, maybe not. Anyway, this book is a sometimes exciting and nearly always interesting accumulation of miscellaneous essays, over a third of them published for the first time. They often rest on surveys, arithmetical procedures, knowledge of psychology, awareness of the realities of earning a living and clinging to happiness, and discriminating use of the research findings of others. But is this grouping of recent studies by sixty-three contributors a definable area with an organized body of knowledge, something that can be studied and taught? The editor thinks so. Despite much reflection, this reviewer remains to be persuaded. Somehow, most of the authors write like plain old sociologists, physicians, statisticians, administrators, journalists, social workers, and anthropologists, and one wonders if calling them or their work by a common label really changes anything.

The editor has made a clever and useful selection from the rapidly expanding literature that discusses morbidity, mortality, medical education and practice, attitudes of patients, and the meaning of sickness and health to society. Physicians and specialists ought to read most of it. Certainly it would be a pity if the original essays included here without prior publication in scholarly journals failed to have their day in court.

This unsophisticated reader took pleasure in the narratives on the fate of idealism in medical school, the problems of the fa-

cially deformed, the Christian Scientist as a "problem patient," and the osteopathic student as jealous rival of the medical student. Nose counting reaches a new low in several essays—how many times do nurses wear their caps in a Veterans Administration hospital—yet important results surprisingly flow from some of the least promising of these. The racy magazine *Medical Economics* gets some items printed here, although the original studies by scholarly researchers might better have been included in two cases. Robert Albright's advice to physicians on "Economics of Doctor-Patient Relations" strikes this layman as a sound companion of similar warnings issued repeatedly by units of organized medicine but taken somewhat lightly by a fair number of doctors down the street. Henry D. Lederer says, "The experience of illness is a complex psychological situation," and he urges that the convalescent be accorded "graded 'successes'" on the road back.

Harold Wolff suggests that "disease is indeed related to our attitudes, our individual and group actions, our goals, and the conflicts they engender." What this does to the economic determinist arguments of the essays which open this book is not clear. Bernhard J. Stern could write in 1951 that cardio-vascular diseases are to a large extent community products, judging, "It will require the resources of all community agencies to conquer them" (p. 30). In the light of medical accomplishment by individual practitioners in this century, aided mightily by health education activities and government public health work, one doubts so sweeping a statement.

VAUGHN D. BORNET

Glen Ellyn, Illinois

THEODORE CAPLOW and REECE J. MCGEE. *The Academic Marketplace*. Pp. x, 262. New York: Basic Books, 1958. $4.95.

This interesting and well-written report by two sociologists continues the analysis of the occupational life of the university professor begun in Logan Wilson's *The Academic Man* some fifteen years ago and continued by Lloyd Woodburne in his study, *Faculty Personnel Policies in Higher Education*.

This report is based on data obtained from a sample of the faculties at ten major public and private universities in this country. The focus of the research is the occurrence of vacancies and the addition of new personnel in academic departments during a two-year period. A large amount of data obtained through interview and questionnaire are correlated with various aspects of personnel turnover. The type of university and of academic position are related to the direction of mobility and to rates of turnover. These relationships are grouped into topical chapters describing the occurrence of vacancies, procedures in recruitment, the distribution of power over personnel changes in universities, and the relative value of teaching and research in academic mobility. A final chapter of the book presents recommendations for changes in university procedures aimed at reducing conflicts in the role of the university teacher.

This volume will appeal to at least three audiences. First, the lay audience or the nonacademic man. A few in this group may view this volume as an exposé of the university professor; most will find proof of what they suspected—that professors, not unlike themselves, also pursue wealth, power, and prestige, but after their own fashion. A second audience will be the professional sociologist who will read this as a research study of an occupation, or of a major social institution. For this audience, however, and notwithstanding the fact that the author is one of the leading sociologists studying occupations, this report generates little or no theory in the sociology of work or in comparative institutional analysis. The definitive social science analysis of the university remains to be made. A third audience will be the university teacher himself. He will find some facts which are familiar to him. Other findings will confirm hypotheses he has had for years about the workings of departments and universities. A third group of results will come as novelties. Among the findings: one's prestige and potential mobility are determined by the time one is in his thirties; the lower the position, probably the more staff time spent in choosing a candidate; a university might, out of good

faith, meet one outside offer a professor receives but will not feel it has to match all such offers. This latter audience, because of both professional and personal concern with the results, will find this book of much interest.

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C. W. W. GREENIDGE. *Slavery.* Pp. 235. The Macmillan Company, 1958. $4.75.

Mr. C. W. W. Greenidge, Director of the Anti-Slavery Society, has written a short but useful book on slavery today. This is divided into two parts—The Facts and The Fight, the latter including a final chapter on "What Remains to be Done." Under The Facts he describes slavery as it exists today in Arabia and has chapters on debt bondage, particularly in India; serfdom or peonage, with illustrations from a number of Latin American states; the sale of women in marriage; and the sham adoption of children. There is a valuable chapter on the attitude of Islam which states with cogency the view that the Quran by no means sanctions slavery as a permanent institution. The most controversial chapter in this part of the book refers to African marriage customs. Mr. Greenidge describes the bride price system as analogous to slavery, making little distinction between different forms of the practice and writing as though it were uniform among different tribes. Broadly speaking, a high *Lobola*, stable marriage, and a clearly defined authority of the father go together, though it would be crude to regard one of these factors as a cause of the others, and this, like every other social institution, is today affected by the Industrial Revolution through which Africa is passing. To regard *Lobola* as a form of slavery and to attempt to abolish it at one stroke is surely superficial.

Mr. Greenidge's account of the fight against the slave trade and slavery is necessarily short but within these limits is admirable. The final chapter outlines with wisdom the action which needs to be taken. In Arabia, chattel slavery is still a recognized part of the social order; Mr. Greenidge makes the sensible suggestion that other Islamic countries should give the Arab states a lead in this matter. He believes that the trade from Africa is more flourishing today than thirty years ago when the Royal Navy still patrolled for slave-carrying vessels and the Treaty of Brussels was still enforced. He suggests that the United States and the United Kingdom should together convene the signatories to the Treaty of Brussels and revive its provisions. Mr. Greenidge also sees value in the setting up of a permanent anti-slavery committee of the United Nations. Here he is probably right, though surely it would be better to leave the question of marriage to a committee concerned with human rights; one may believe that the limit of age for marriage should be raised and the levirate made a matter of consent without talking about slavery. With this one exception regarding marriage, this is a wise and useful little book.

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GEORGE Z. F. BEREDAY and LUIGI VOLPICELLI (Eds.). *Public Education in America: A New Interpretation of Purpose and Practice.* Pp. x, 212. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $4.00.

This symposium was written by a number of well-known American educators under the editorship of a professor in the University of Rome and of an American of Polish birth. It was originally designed to enable foreign students to understand American education—the assumptions upon which it has been built, and the social forces that have sustained and developed it. As the writing of the volume progressed, it was discovered that, with some additional effort, it could be adapted to the needs of both American and foreign readers. By the combination of American authorship and foreign editorship, it was hoped to present an adequate analysis and appraisal of the basic current issues in American education. On the whole this purpose has been successfully achieved although some readers will not accept as adequate all of the analyses or proposed solutions of issues.

The first three chapters are devoted to general aspects of American education—its basic features, the significant concepts and philosophical theories that have influenced its development, the purposes and issues that are likely to be faced in the future.

Each of the fourteen chapters that follow the first three deals with some particular problem or aspect of American education: the private school, the college and its problems, the educational implications of social class, racial integration in the schools, current attacks on the curriculum in the public schools, local pressures on the school superintendent, manpower problems, federal control of education, school and community relations, audio-visual instruction, the teaching of international relations, and change and continuity in American education.

This volume is characterized by its balanced emphasis on historical development, current issues, and future prospects. It will serve three very useful purposes. The specialist will find little that is new in it, but he will find it a clearly organized source of information on practically all issues in American education. The volume will make its greatest appeal to laymen and beginning students in professional education. They will find it a stimulating account of the purposes, achievements, and future prospects of American education. And finally, the book will serve admirably its original purpose of explaining American education to foreign audiences.

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SIDNEY GOLDSTEIN. *Patterns of Mobility, 1910–1950: The Norristown Study.* Pp. xxii, 254. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958. $7.50.

As a member of the seminar on technological change and social adjustment led by Dorothy Thomas and Thomas Cochran at the University of Pennsylvania, Mr. Goldstein undertook to analyze the horizontal and vertical mobility of the population of Norristown, Pennsylvania in the forty years between 1910 and 1950. The primary sources of demographic data—decennial censuses of population, and birth and death records—while yielding measures of the net changes resulting from inward and outward migration and occupational shifts, do not reveal the great volume of compensatory inward and outward migration and changes in individuals' occupational status. The fact that more than three out of five present inhabitants of the city were born elsewhere, and that migration has accounted for four-fifths of the net growth of the city's population since 1910, give no indication of the total amount of circulation. A house-to-house survey of the city conducted by members of the seminar provided migration and occupational histories of the present residents, but obviously excluded previous residents who had died or moved away.

Mr. Goldstein turned therefore to the city directories which had been compiled and published biennially under commercial auspices throughout the past century. Drawing a 10 per cent sample of males listed in the directory in decennial years, he sought to trace each individual through the preceding and succeeding biennial issues. Public school records and registries of births and deaths were also consulted. From the resulting data on individuals, Mr. Goldstein has estimated, for males over eighteen years of age, their moves into and out of Norristown, changes of place of residence within the city, and shifts from one broad occupational category to another in each of the four decades. Females and boys under eighteen are excluded because the city directories do not give adequate information about them. The accuracy of the results is impressively demonstrated by comparing estimates of the occupational composition of the population in a given year, projected by these procedures from the composition a decade earlier, with the United States Census figures for the year.

Mr. Goldstein points out some of the consequences of mobility for the social organization of the community, noting for example that despite the great amount of mobility there has remained a substantial stable core of persons who change neither their places of residence nor their occupations. It remains for him or other sociologists to explore more deeply the implica-

tions of his findings. He has placed demographers and sociologists very much in his debt for his painstaking development and validation of a method for measuring migration and occupational mobility. As Professor Thomas observes in her Foreword to the book, it is to be hoped that his methods will be applied in studies of numerous other American communities.

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## *PHILOSOPHY*

JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET. *Man and Crisis*. Translated by Mildred Adams. Pp. 217. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1958. $4.50.

*Man and Crisis* is a worthy companion of the author's well-known *The Revolt of the Masses*. Both works are marked by the brilliancy, originality, and depth of the author's interpretation of the crisis of our age and of the basic historical processes. Both volumes belong to the significant books of our time in the field of psychosocial sciences. The particular importance of *Man and Crisis* lies in the fact that it gives a more systematic development of Ortega y Gasset's conception of "the science of history" and of his "reading" of historical facts than is given in any of his other works.

The book opens with a criticism of the traditional conception of the science of history as a mere chronological recital of so-called historical facts and events. The author correctly challenges L. von Ranke's famous contention that through a mere chronological description of these facts the "science of history can find out *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*—'how things actually happened'." José Ortega y Gasset rightly indicates that science is not a mere collection of raw facts and data but "correct interpretation of facts" for the purposes of adequate comprehension of reality.

"By themselves, facts [like hieroglyphics] do not give us reality; on the contrary, they hide it, which is to say that they present us with the problem of reality. If there were no facts, there would be no problem, no enigma, there would be nothing hidden which is necessary to de-hide, to dis-cover. . . . Facts cover up reality; while we are in the midst of their innumerable swarmings we are in chaos and confusion. In order to discover reality we must for a moment lay aside the facts that surge around us, and remain alone with our minds." Then, like all great scientists do, we must build a postulational hypothesis or "an imaginary reality, a pure invention of our own." After thinking through all the facts of this imaginary reality—that is, after deduction of all the consequences of our postulational hypothesis—we must compare them "with the facts which surround us. If they mate happily with one another, this means that we deciphered the hieroglyph, that we have discovered the reality which the facts covered and kept secret. That labor is what science is."

In accordance with this understanding of the science of history, the author gives to us his theory of the historical crises, particularly his analysis of "what, how and why" of the crisis of our age, and of the long-time fluctuations of the basic types of culture and the ways of historical life. In a very inadequate form, the gist of his ideas can be glimmered from the following quotations.

"There are many reasons for surmising that European man is lifting his tent from off that modern soil where he has camped these three hundred years and is beginning a new exodus toward another historic ambit, another manner of existence. This would mean that the ground of the modern age which begins beneath the feet of Galileo is coming to an end beneath our own. Our feet have already moved away from it. . . . [For this reason] it becomes very important for us first, to understand precisely just what is the system of life which we are abandoning; second, to know what it means to live in the midst of an historic crisis; third, to inquire how an historic crisis comes to an end and how we enter into a new age."

The volume unfolds the author's answers to these problems. These answers place his theories among the most significant

"social philosophies" of our time. Among other things, the author's theories are very similar to the reviewer's interpretations of the crisis of our age and of the dynamics of historical processes.

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ROGER BROWN. *Words and Things*. Pp. xvi, 398. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. $6.75.

Descriptive linguistics began about fifty years ago with the work of the French scholar Ferdinand de Saussure. In this country, two pioneers in the field were Edward Sapir and Leonard Bloomfield, whose researches laid the groundwork for modern American linguistics. Despite this brief history, descriptive linguistics has considerably influenced the social sciences, particularly cultural anthropology and social psychology. According to Professor Brown, modern linguistics has provided the social scientist with a wholly new view of language and this in turn has made possible a new and potentially fruitful approach to a psychology of language.

In his introduction and first three chapters, Brown supplies a metalanguage and applies this to the analysis of speech, writing, and meaning. Linguistic forms—words, phrases, and so forth—and their referents, or meanings, are viewed not as unique events, but as categories with definable criterial attributes. Communication by language then becomes "the coordinate recurrence of categories, one a linguistic form, the other not" (p. 9).

With this analytic tool, Brown examines six problems which have long troubled scholars concerned with language: the nature of meaning, the language of animals, the relation between language and thought, the character of primitive language, the possibility of phonetic symbolism, and the techniques of persuasion through language. While Brown does not neglect the work of previous scholars, he quite properly emphasizes current studies in the psychology of language. Recent studies, he says, have provided "a lot of new evidence" on these questions, "evidence derived from psychology, descriptive linguistics, and anthropology. The questions are alive and moving toward solution in the behavioral sciences" (p. 16).

Brown's conclusions are not easily summarized in a brief review; his own summary requires nearly six pages. A few points may be noted, however. First, there is evidence of primary phonetic symbolism, particularly in onomatopoeic words referring to sounds. Second, animals do not share in human language; their responses to categories are different in kind from those evidenced in speech. Third, first language learning is an important guide to a child's "cognitive socialization." Fourth, reference categories may not be equally "codable" in different languages, which means in effect that peoples of different cultures or sub-cultures may differently classify their kin, personality types, or even "the basic classes of sensation, such as colors, tastes, and smells" (p. 375). Fifth, since grammatical categories, such as parts of speech, tend to have semantic implications, it is possible that "languages having different semantic distinctions among their parts of speech teach a different metaphysics" (p. 375). Sixth, language is expressive—"speech is treated as an expression whenever we use it to categorize a speaker" (pp. 375–76). This fact "is the great cognitive check on the power of propaganda and advertising" (p. 376). Seventh, children and pre-literates, apparently able to operate with very general categories, have relatively few general terms, since such terms "are less useful for the purposes of children and primitive societies than are terms on a more concrete level" (p. 376).

Some of these points are obviously subject to debate. In general, however, Brown's discussions and conclusions are well balanced and reveal an admirable command of the pertinent literature in linguistics, anthropology, and psychology. *Words and Things* is an original and provocative treatment of language which should help to bridge the gulf that has long existed

between the several behavioral sciences concerned in part with language.

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DOUGLAS F. DOWD (Ed.). *Thorstein Veblen: A Critical Reappraisal.* Lectures and Essays Commemorating the Hundredth Anniversary of Veblen's Birth. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958. $5.00.

The hundredth anniversary of the birth of Thorstein Veblen, America's greatest social thinker, occurred in 1957. The occasion has not been widely commemorated in a nation herded into hothouse conformity by cold-war pressures. This volume of seventeen essays is a notable exception. Moreover, it is one of the best secondary works on Veblen ever published. Although the book contains a wide variety of viewpoints, its general tone is sympathetic to Veblen. Yet it is no sense uncritical. Indeed, it happily recalls the generous and searching spirit of the earlier commentaries on Veblen by Homan, Mitchell, and Hobson.

Like all symposia, this one is somewhat uneven in quality. Among the better essays, we should surely mention Dorfman's "The Source and Impact of Veblen's Thought." However we may disagree with some of his interpretations, probably no one has a broader basis for evaluating Veblen than Dorfman, the author of a classic biography of Veblen.

C. E. Ayres presents a stimulating discussion of Veblen's theory of instincts, although we can hardly agree that this was Veblen's most important contribution. M. A. Copeland succinctly describes Veblen's ideas—and some of his own—on the scope and method of economic science. We believe that he errs, however, when he more or less dismisses Veblen's last essays. These papers, written mostly in the early 1920's, still offer more insight into American domestic and foreign policies, especially cold-war politics, than almost any other analysis of the last generation.

The relation of Veblen to Marx is a much debated issue. F. G. Hill's paper on this subject probably underestimates Veblen's debt to Marx, but it is nonetheless an able comparison of those two giants. More justice is done to this matter in P. M. Sweezy's essay. Sweezy sees Veblen's analysis of American capitalism as basically Marxian with some original Veblenian additions.

There is an informative summary by Leslie Fishman of the ideas of Veblen's student, Robert Hoxie, on American labor. Philip Morrison pushes Veblen's famous thesis on the engineers a step or two further. Carter Goodrich critically examines the extent to which Veblenian insights can be applied to Latin America, New Zealand, and Australia. Douglas Dowd does the same for the Soviet Union. Although superior to most contemporary American analyses of the USSR, Dowd's effort seems to be a watered-down version of Isaac Deutscher's brilliant interpretation of Russian social development.

In summary, this volume shows the continuing vitality of Veblen's ideas, not only for his own time, but also for ours.

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CARL L. BECKER. *Detachment and the Writing of History: Essays and Letters of Carl L. Becker.* Edited by Phil L. Snyder. Pp. xvi, 240. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958 $3.50.

Carl Becker's deserved reputation as a historian far outran his printed output. Hence it is important that everything of value which he wrote—essentially all that he published—should be made permanently available between covers. In this, the latest and obviously the last collection of Becker articles, essays, reviews, and literary fragments, Professor Snyder, an admirer but not a student of Becker's, has placed us in his debt by assembling a number of the most valuable scholarly and literary remains of one of the more fertile, illuminating, and witty minds among American historians. It is well edited, and the only defect of the volume is the lack of an index.

Each article and essay in the volume, as

well as some of the reviews, is so suggestive that it would warrent comment extending beyond the space assigned to this review, which must necessarily be highly selective. The most permanently valuable material is the article on "Detachment and the Writing of History," published in 1910 and largely forgotten even by Becker enthusiasts, and the paper on "What Are Historical Facts?" delivered before the American Historical Association in December, 1925, which most conventional American historians have understandably avoided. In retrospect it even seemed to upset Becker himself.

In the article on detachment, Becker pretty well disposes of a fundamental dogma of traditional historical "science," that is the idea that a historian can rather completely divorce himself from all emotional concern with the significance of the events about which he is assembling the historical record. Even if he could, the result would be likely to be of little utility in illuminating the historical past. Becker essentially agrees with his teacher, James Harvey Robinson, that "objective history," if actually achieved, is all too likely to be "history without an object."

Becker proceeds from this disconcerting conclusion to an examination of the real nature of historical facts, and his observations on this subject constitute the most important single contribution to so-called historical science since Leopold von Ranke, a century and a quarter ago, asserted that historians must gather and narrate the facts about the past as they actually happened—*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*. Indeed, it is the only fundamental advance in this field since Von Ranke's day. In only a few pages of cogent and witty example and analysis, Becker amply demonstrated that no historian, however learned, well equipped, and painstaking, can ever reconstruct the past as it actually happened. He thus torpedoed for all time what had been the veritable cornerstone of traditional historical science.

This paper deserves to rank in the history of historiography with Werner Heisenberg's law of indeterminacy in the history of physics, and is as upsetting to basic historical premises as Heisenberg's law is to the traditional cause-and-effect dogmas of classical physics. It is far more devastating than all the many and turgid volumes devoted to so-called "historicism" with which Charles Austin Beard wrestled not too successfully in order to arrive at much the same conclusions which Becker reached with such brevity and lucidity. The implications of Becker's paper seemed to frighten even him, for he resisted pressure to publish it and rather sought to laugh it off. It remained all but forgotten until Professor Snyder finally had it published in the *Western Political Quarterly* in September, 1955. In the light of the above comments, it is hardly necessary to observe that this paper alone is adequate justification for the publication of the whole volume.

The third item to be stressed is the lecture on "The Art of Writing," for in addition to his keen insight and ready wit, the outstanding feature of Becker's historical writings was the great care he took in preparing all that he published and the felicity of expression in the resulting products. Their quality far exceeded and transcended their quantity.

Becker's comments on education, drawn from his professorial experience, are a welcome and inspiring relief from the "stuffed shirt" variety of academic pontifications. His discussions of the origins of liberalism and democracy, as illustrated by the writings of Jefferson and De Tocqueville, have an intellectual affinity with his famous little book on *The Declartion of Independence*. His brilliant and penetrating article on "The Dilemma of the Liberals" has even more relevance today than it had when written in 1932.

Becker lost much of his "detachment," at least temporarily, in the propaganda of World War II, but his record for "objectivity" was much superior, on the whole, to that of most of his colleagues during the half-century in which he lived and wrote.

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CHRISTIAN BAY. *The Structure of Freedom*. Pp. xii, 419. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. $7.50.

Research into political and social behavior, in recent years, has flourished like the

Biblical green bay tree. Roughly, two main schools have emerged. One consists of the vote-counters and opinion-samplers perhaps best represented by Angus Campbell and his disciples of the Survey Research Center at Ann Arbor, Michigan. The other comprises researchers who ground their conclusions on the data contributed by anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists; and to some extent, also, on the speculations of political theorists. This second school has a major institutional embodiment in the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University.

The author of the book under review, who now teaches at the University of California at Berkeley, was a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in 1954–55. His book bears all the hallmarks of extensive erudition and penetrating analysis characteristic of the school. But the author is also a political philosopher. Despite the title he gives to his book, his main purpose is to expound the value of freedom, rather than to describe its structure. Though he proffers little that is new, he defends the best that has ever been said on the subject with a virtuosity rarely equaled. He champions the viewpoints of humanism; of cultural and social pluralism; of democracy, in the Jeffersonian sense; of individualism, in the Thoreauist sense that the sovereignty of conscience confers the right to disobey a bad law; and of liberalism, in the Kantian sense that the individual must always be treated as an end and not as a means.

*The Structure of Freedom* is so admirable in content and purpose that this reviewer is loath to disparage it. Nevertheless, it has its deficiencies. The style is difficult in places, and the organization is amateurish. The author has neglected to remove the scaffolding after he finished the house. Some weaknesses in analysis also appear. In summarizing the data from psychology, Dr. Bay should have taken a closer and more critical look at the causes of politically oriented neuroses and the remedies for them. He seems also to lapse into dubious reasoning with respect to freedom of expression. He asserts that even "possible" results of great harm to society justify restrictions on freedom of speech, and that "incitements" to unlawful acts may, in certain circumstances, be punished. Apparently he forgets the admonition of Justice Holmes that "every idea is an incitement."

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BARRINGTON MOORE, JR. *Political Power and Social Theory: Six Studies.* Pp. xi, 215. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $4.50.

The key chapter in this collection of essays deals with "Strategy in the Social Sciences." In it Moore criticizes contemporary sociological theory and compares it unfavorably with the preoccupations of theorists in the nineteenth century. In Moore's opinion these theorists, such as Durkheim and Weber, made significant contributions to the understanding of society by dealing with issues in historical perspective. They were influential also because they boldly engaged in social criticism, as did Marx and Mosca. Modern social theorists are at pains to be ahistorical and stress abstract principles and formal analysis. Consequently, sociology today "has less to say about society than it did fifty years ago" (p. 123), is imbued with a static bias, and tends to deal with trivial matters.

Moore attributes these weaknesses to the neglect by Parsons, Lazarsfeld, and others of the special character of social science material. He holds, for example, that there are strong reasons "for suspecting that we have so few universal propositions in the social sciences because such propositions frequently do not give us the kind of knowledge we really seek" (p. 129). Therefore, a strategy that aims at the establishment of abstract, quasi-mathematical formulae about human society is out of place. Instead Moore advocates the resumption of studies oriented around the concept of social evolution. Such studies would deal with what is historically unique. However, they would seek for the general in unique situations in order to find principles of change and contribute to the assessment

of the range of possible alternatives of effective human actions.

Most of the essays in the book can be taken as demonstrations of the new strategy. For example, the process of generalizing from the historically unique is illustrated by two essays, one dealing with "The Process of Acquiring Power," the other with "Totalitarian Elements in Preindustrial Societies." Both of these essays make a genuine contribution to the understanding of important social issues and of historical factors that have influenced them. The treatment of the problem of social change is illustrated in two other essays, one relating to conformity in industrial society, the other to the family. Both are speculative. However, although in the first essay Moore uses valid sociological data for his prognosis of a continued need for conformity, his essay on the family lacks factual and theoretical support. Moore holds that the family is "obsolete" and "barbaric" and "a repressive survival under conditions of advanced technology" (pp. 163–64). He envisages decentralized arrangements for rearing children by a device of which the "Skinner box" is a prototype. Clearly, Moore's new strategy, like any other, is not a safeguard against personal bias in interpretation.

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FELIKS GROSS. *The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions.* Pp. xxvii, 398. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. No price.

This book, as the author makes clear in his Introduction, is a study of how revolutions are made rather than of why they are made. Professor Gross makes a primary distinction between revolution from above, such as the great French and Russian revolutions, and revolutions from below, such as the old-fashioned "Latin-American" revolutions. But his sociologist's training and conscience oblige him to qualify this apparent dualism by setting up subtypes such as the "combined seizure," which contains elements of both the revolution from above and that from below, and the palace revolution, a transfer of power within a super-elite, rather than an acquisition of power by genuine outsiders. In the rest of the book he qualifies and fills out these first definitions very fully.

In the body of the book, Professor Gross is concerned mainly with the history of the development of Russian revolutionary strategy and tactics from 1825 to 1917, in which he works out broadly and yet in some detail the various strands of the Russian political movements which were aimed at change by acquisition of power. He follows this set of case histories by a series of others, focused first on the Communist strategy and tactics in their effort to expand from their Russian base—among these be includes the difficulties of "inside revolts" behind the Iron Curtain—and then on the "struggle against seized power," a section concerned chiefly with the events since 1945. Professor Gross, trained at Cracow, is particularly good on the experience of contemporary Polish political émigrés.

Professor Gross has clearly grown up in the climate of opinion of social democracy; his sympathies are well left of center. But he is a conscientious and well-trained scholar, and has, as one would expect from a man who has gone through so much, no naive expectation that we shall all become as lambs once a few predatory human animals have been done away with. He has read widely in sociology and in history. The subject he has approached in this book is an enormous one, and Professor Gross himself would be the first to admit that he has no more than sampled some of its difficulties, but it is a good suggestive sampling. A final chapter on "Democracy and Violent Change" sets in brief compass one of the master problems of our age.

CRANE BRINTON
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KENNETH W. MORGAN (Ed.). *Islam: The Straight Path: Islam Interpreted by Muslims.* Pp. x, 453. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958. $6.00.

This book is the third in a series edited by Professor Morgan and supported by grants from the Edward W. Hazen Foundation. As are the former two volumes on Hinduism and Buddhism, it is an effort to present a non-Western religion to a West-

ern audience through the writings of followers of that religion. The book contains eleven chapters dealing with Muslim beliefs and practices, the history of the Muslim community, sects and divisions of the community, and the peculiarities of Muslim culture of various areas. Each chapter was written by a distinguished Muslim scholar whom Professor Morgan chose for the task after consulting with other prominent Muslims in different parts of the world. It was hoped that the method of allowing Muslims to speak for themselves would give the book an authenticity and a flavor that second-hand descriptions of religions often lack. Islam, in particular, has seldom been presented to Western readers in a manner that reveals either its religious depths or its warm appeal to the millions who find their spiritual guidance in it. Compilation of this volume was an invitation and a challenge to its Muslim contributors to present their faith in a compelling and sympathetic way.

Unfortunately the book fails badly to achieve the understanding and appreciation for Islamic piety that were its aims. It fails even to make its presentation interesting. The fault lies partly with the very broad plan of the volume, but must be charged largely against the account of most of its contributors. Not only do they fall short of answering the questions uppermost in the minds of their intended readers, but their writing generally lacks depth of approach and the fire of conviction. Only in some of its historical sections is this weakness overcome.

Although this book is far from a good introduction to Islam, it is instructive as an example of modern Muslim thought about Islam. Its pages illustrate the major trends of Muslim modernism and its principal shortcomings. For example, the selective and uncritical use of historical evidence to build a case for the virtues of Islam is abundantly evident. Despite the editor's disavowal of apologetics as a purpose for the volume, in both tone and content, much of it is an apology in the tradition of *Amīr Alī*. Also, as other modernist writings, it does not reveal an effort to grapple with the religious problems thrown up by the modern age. What is worse, the contributors often do not seem aware of the existence or nature of those problems. Even the outsider cannot resist the judgment that they have dealt superficially with their great religious heritage and is left to wonder why Muslims experience such difficulty in expressing the meaning of their faith.

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C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE. *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia: Five Essays*. Pp. xii, 248. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958. Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York. $5.00.

HARRY J. BENDA. *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942–1945*. Pp. xiv, 320. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958. Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York. No price.

Many of us in recent years have become interested in Indonesia but many doubtless like this reviewer cannot read either Dutch or Indonesian. We have been faced, as a result, by a stringent paucity of material on the area. This fact in itself testifies to our long neglect of this part of the world—a neglect that must make a scholar pause and blush before the political innuendoes of such a situation. It is nowadays no longer necessary to argue for the political significance of this large, turbulent, and obviously problematic nation. Students of Islam, however, by and large have still to come to any vivid recognition of the major significance of the Indonesian sector of the contemporary Muslim world. Statistics elude those who debate whether it or Pakistan is the largest Muslim national community today. In any case one may note that over 60 per cent of the world's Muslims live east of Karachi, and one must consider that the Indian ocean as well as the Mediterranean may be the locus of Islamic history in the future.

If the role of Indonesia in modern Islam is yet to be assessed, conversely that of Islam in modern Indonesia is also in need of accurate appreciation. The 1957–58 troubles made it evident that that role is important, even for political developments. But it was evident also that for outside

observers a good deal more understanding of the subtle situation was required.

One cannot but be grateful, therefore, that these two books are offered for our enlightenment, and doubly grateful that they are written in English by men for whom this is not the mother tongue. What a courtesy to us! They are not merely timely contributions, but very solid ones which will last. The Benda monograph is a careful documentation and analysis of a short but crucial period in political-social history—the Japanese occupation—preceded by a long and useful historical introduction. The van Nieuwenhuijze essays are highly illuminating and provocative interpretations that dig deep into the subtlest issues involved and challenge one's thinking to a new flexibility that may prove adequate to these new situations.

The van Nieuwenhuijze volume is to be strongly recommended not only to students of Indonesian affairs but to all students of modern Islamic developments anywhere. The insights and interpretations put forward by the author to make understandable what has been happening in Java are, this reviewer found, not merely intriguing in themselves as pieces of sociological-religious theory, and not merely informative for South East Asian history, but strikingly helpful in clarifying Islamic processes in other countries such as Pakistan and Egypt, with which he is more familiar. Presumably this is some test of their validity.

The volume consists of five substantial essays. The first discusses the "background to Islam in Indonesia: . . . the 'closed' community" and the second, contemporary Islamic "tendencies and possibilities." Both are highly theoretical. They rest on the postulate, not always palatable, but strongly corroborated by our own studies, and on whose importance we would vigorously insist, that Western man must with careful delicacy modify his own thinking and strain his intellect to encompass new and alien presuppositions if he would at all adequately understand a religion or civilization other than his own, as well as the behavior of its members. Anthropologists have long urged something comparable to this for little communities, but there it is relatively easy; great traditions demand a self-sea[illegible] that is not easy at all. In their cas[illegible] [illegible]erver has not only to construct ne[illegible] [illegible]pts but to revise old ones. These chapters are difficult, but will greatly repay any reader who is willing to make the exacting intellectual effort needed to avoid distorting what he observes by analyzing it in terms of his own familiar concepts. There is a brilliant treatment of "freedom" and its meaning for an Indonesian Muslim, and similarly for the state, for what Westerners are wont to regard as "acculturation," for the expectation of religious "crisis," and so forth. The next two chapters are more factual, being descriptive presentations of Japanese policy towards Islam in Java during the military occupation, and of the Dāru-l-Islām movement in West Java from 1945 until 1949. The final essay interlaces factual description with the theoretical analysis, in an interpretation of, as it were, the Muslimness of Indonesian secularism.

The Benda work is an expanded doctoral thesis. It accordingly presents a mass of painstakingly gathered and scrutinized material on the period covered, which it weaves into a connected story of the Japanese formulation of a policy towards Islam after the occupation (1942), the consolidation of this in 1943, and the rise of the Masjumi the following year, followed by the accelerating new developments that intertwined towards the end of Japanese rule and emerged into the 1945 independence. This is a much more detailed and elaborate enlargement of the third van Nieuwenhuijze essay. However, the title of the book must not distract one from the fact that all this constitutes only one-half of the text. The last one hundred pages of the book are what used to be called footnotes, the middle hundred portray the developments in question, but the first hundred—"Part One: The Colonial Legacy"—constitute a summary not otherwise available in English of the history of Islam in Indonesia from the fifteenth century.

It is a joy to review such unusually valuable works.

WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH
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