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PRELUDE TO POINT FOUR

American Technical Missions Overseas

1838-1938

The University of Wisconsin Press

MADISON, 1954

Published by the University of Wisconsin Press
811 State Street, Madison, Wisconsin
 Distributed in Canada by Burns and MacEachern, Toronto
Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 54–6741

FOR

PAUL KNAPLUND

WHEN in 1949 President Truman enunciated his plans for the "bold new program" which has come to be known as Point Four, he spoke hopefully of the "aspirations of peace-loving peoples for a better life"; of a "world-wide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom"; of "helping the least fortunate to help themselves." Spelled out in detail, his proposal promised that, given financial assistance and technical advice, backward areas and peoples would be enabled "through their own efforts to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens"; that so assisted, they would realize "the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people."

The authors of *Prelude to Point Four* have undertaken through historical research to test the assumptions that underlie these altruistic hopes: to examine the problems which arose in previous attempts to bring American know-how to alien cultures and foreign governments. Their book is based on American materials and is written from the American point of view. Within these limitations the research has been exhaustive. Information from official reports of the experts themselves has been supplemented by data from unpublished reports and despatches, papers in the National Archives, correspondence files in the Smithsonian Institution, and memoirs and personal reminiscences of many of the participants in the enterprises here described. Significant information has come to light in letters and interviews which the authors obtained personally from a number of the technical experts who took part in the missions.

Their story begins with the work of agriculturalists and of mining and geological technicians in Latin America, Turkey, China, and Japan during the nineteenth century; they tell of the work of financial experts as advisors to Persia and Liberia in the early years of the present century; they review the successes and failures attending American inter-

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

MANY men and women have provided us with clues, special information, and material in the course of our investigation of American technical missions in foreign lands. In a special sense, this volume could not have been written without their help.

We found the participants in missions ready to answer questions and provide information. We wish to thank in this connection Dr. Emmett J. Scott and Mr. George Finch, both of Washington, D.C., for information regarding the mission to Liberia in which they took part. We are also indebted to Dr. Bolivar J. Lloyd, Assistant Surgeon General, Retired, of Washington, D.C., and to Dr. Arthur I. Kendall, of Oracle, Arizona, for information about their work in public health in Latin America. Mr. Sidney Paige, of Alpine, New Jersey, shared his knowledge of technical aspects of minerals and mining in Turkey. Many participants in educational missions, broadly defined, gave us information, and in this connection we wish to thank Dr. Hiram Bingham, of Washington, D.C., Dr. H. G. Lull, of Carmel, California, Dr. Ernest Work, of Indiana, Pennsylvania, Dr. Albert A. Giesecke, of Lima, Peru, Dr. Beryl Parker, of Fisk University, and Mrs. Stanley P. Clark, of Tucson, who filled in many details relating to the agricultural mission of her husband in Turkey. Mr. Henry Bruère prepared a memorandum on his work as financial advisor in Mexico. Data regarding financial missions were also supplied to us by Professor Frank W. Fetter of Northwestern University, Professor C. R. Whittlesey, of the University of Pennsylvania, and Dr. John Parke Young, of Washington, D.C. Judge Otto Schoenrich, of New York City, enlightened us regarding the work of the Advisory Law Commission in Cuba. We also owe thanks

to Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, of New York, for materials and comments on his mission to Persia; to President Harold W. Dodds, of Princeton, in connection with the Nicaragua story; to Mr. Goldthwaite H. Dorr for making available the report of the Hines-Kemmerer-Dorr mission and for helpful explanations in an interview; and above all others, to Dr. Arthur N. Young and Dr. William W. Cumberland. Dr. Young wrote two long, detailed letters from Saudi Arabia, where he was engaged in Point Four work, regarding his missions in Mexico, Honduras, and China. Dr. Cumberland prepared a lengthy and invaluable account of his work in the Caribbean and in Peru.

Members of the United States Foreign Service who helped interpret events that they witnessed or had special knowledge about include Mr. G. Howland Shaw, of Washington, Mr. A. E. Southard, of San Francisco, and Mr. Sumner Welles.

We are also indebted to a few non-Americans for their reactions to the technical contributions of experts from the United States. We thank in this connection Señor Luis Montes de Oca, of the Banco Internacional of Mexico, and Mr. Kasim Gulek, of Ankara. We are also grateful to His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie for a letter evaluating the contributions of Everett A. Colson.

While we have drawn rather heavily, in places, on the data supplied us by those with first-hand knowledge of American technical missions, none of these participants and informants are responsible for our conclusions and interpretations.

Several men and women have supplied us with documentary materials. Mrs. Carroll Paul, of Marquette, Michigan, lent us materials relating to Henry Martyn Paul. We thank Mrs. Herbert Hanson, of Addis Ababa, Professor Donald Kemmerer, of the University of Illinois, Mr. Eliot Wadsworth, of Northeast Harbor, Maine, and Ailsa E. Reid, Registrar of the New Paltz State Teachers College. Mr. George Brill, of Poughkeepsie, New York, also supplied material. We are especially indebted to Miss Mary Campbell Brill, of Newark, and Mr. Gerow Brill, of Freehold, New Jersey, for making available the rich collection of their father, Gerow D. Brill. Mr. Richard Lane gave us material on his father, Rufus Lane.

Various scholars have put us in debt to them. Dr. Blake McKelvey guided us to information about the Rochester background of E. Peshine Smith. Professor Robert Triffin, of Yale University, commented, on the basis of his knowledge of recent developments, on the achievements and limitations of the early financial missions. Dr. Manuel James Sorenson, President of the West Indian Training College, Jamaica, B.W.I., shared

with us his knowledge of American technical activities in Ethiopia. Dr. Richard Brown made helpful suggestions. Joseph Van Hise, Dr. Sidney Brown, and Professor Eugene Boardman read the chapter on technical missions in Japan and made valuable comments. Professor Watt Stewart, of the New York State College for Teachers, Albany, read and made welcome criticisms on the chapters dealing with Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Haiti.

Much of the investigation was carried on at the National Archives, and we are indebted to its staff for many courtesies and helpful suggestions. We also owe a deep debt to the Library of Congress, and especially to its Division of Manuscripts, to the Library of the United States Department of Agriculture, and to the Library of the United States Postoffice Department. The staff of the Smithsonian Institution went to considerable trouble to make available to us its useful files of manuscript correspondence. We cannot mention all the other libraries to which we are indebted, but we are particularly grateful for many courtesies to the Library of the University of California, the Library of the University of Wisconsin, the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, the Baker Library of Dartmouth College, the Northwestern University Library, and the Library Society of Charleston, South Carolina.

Part of this material, organized in relation to areas and topics, was presented in lecture form at Northwestern University under the auspices of the Norman Waite Harris Foundation. The courtesies extended and the generous reception of these lectures puts us in deep debt to the Harris Foundation.

Finally, we thank Arlen Birr and Margaret Wooster Curti for critical reading of the manuscript. And we are very grateful to the Research Committee of the University of Wisconsin for providing research assistance; to the University of Wisconsin Foundation for the help given in connection with the Frederick Jackson Turner Professorship; and, especially, to the University of Wisconsin Press.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

The Setting

In recent years there has been increasing interest in what has come to be known as cultural interchange. What happens when cultures come into contact with each other? Just how are cultural characteristics transferred from one group to another? The study of such questions is by no means new. Scholars in both the social studies and the humanities have dealt with the subject in one way or another. In many cases the interest in the process of cultural interchange has been a peripheral one, subordinate to an interest in general problems of diplomatic relations, literary influences, foreign trade, immigration and the like. But it has more and more become apparent that the most important single task of the twentieth century is to discover some method of enabling a large number of very diverse cultures, most of them nationalistic and ethnocentric, to live together in a world being rapidly integrated by the progress of transportation and communication. In such a context problems of cultural interchange have achieved a new importance.

Cultural interchange has been as multisided as culture itself, and so an amazing number of topics can throw light on the processes involved. Such widely separated subjects as the acculturation of the immigrant, the influence of Japanese art on the nineteenth-century impressionists, the influence of Locke on American thought, the activities of British investors throughout the world, and the spread of nationalism from Europe to other parts of the globe are all relevant to the problem.

Among the many aspects of cultural interchange, none is more deserving of investigation than the world-wide production and exchange of use-

ful information, of knowledge about man and his social and physical environment. Such information is science in the broadest sense of the word. In no area of human culture has there been more rapid change. The vast increase in knowledge and the ability to use it to manipulate nature and society has literally remade the modern world.

The production and distribution of useful knowledge in modern times has had a distinct international flavor. Despite the rise of national states and the emergence of the vernacular languages, the international culture of medieval Europe long retained a surprising degree of vitality. This generalization is particularly true in the case of scientific endeavor. Modern science had its roots in a society which recognized Latin as a universal language and scientists as members of a universal brotherhood. An excellent illustration of the international character of modern science is the fact that British scientist Sir Humphry Davy received a special prize from Napoleon for his researches in electricity, traveled on the Continent, and was honored in France by French scientists—all at a time when Britain and France were pitted against each other in the Napoleonic struggles.[1]

No particular country has had a monopoly on the discovery and utilization of scientific knowledge, but it is true that developments in these directions were largely concentrated in western Europe and its cultural appendages. In a world in which significant differentials existed in the rate of production and in the use of knowledge, there inevitably developed a flourishing trade in ideas and information. A great many agencies took part in transferring these from one part of the world to the other. In the open society of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, much of this useful information was accessible to anyone familiar with European languages. The latest scientific knowledge and the newest technical innovations were, with few exceptions, freely available to those willing and able to cope with the flood of printed material inundating the rapidly expanding libraries of the day. In many cases, travel and personal contact proved to be profitable methods for exchanging information. European and American universities became centers of instruction for foreign students. Europeans and Americans sometimes became teachers in foreign lands. Missionaries carried with them information useful for life in the here and now as well as in the hereafter. Engineers, colonial governors, businessmen, and philanthropic foundations all lent a hand in carrying on this trade in ideas.

The United States occupied an intermediate position in this interchange. By and large, the young republic was built on a culture imported from Europe. American farmers used what had been learned in Europe in cultivating the lands of the New World. American manufacturing was

in large part built on the foundations laid by British inventors. Indeed, the whole of American society was based on the knowledge and assumptions carried to this country by its first citizens.

However, the traffic was by no means entirely one way. Americans quickly improved on the ideas they had brought with them from Europe and added to the world's store of useful knowledge. Such men as Joseph Henry and Benjamin Franklin made fundamental contributions to the theory and practice of electricity and magnetism. Eli Whitney not only revolutionized American agriculture with the cotton gin but also helped lay the foundations for mass-production industry by his work on interchangeable parts. In many cases these developments were not kept for the exclusive use of the United States. European engineers visited this country to see the accomplishments of the self-taught engineers of the Erie Canal. George Washington Whistler, father of the noted American painter, was an engineer who built railroads in Russia in the 1840's. By mid-century, the agricultural machinery of Cyrus Hall McCormick was proving its worth in England, the center of the industrial revolution.

Nor was the export of useful knowledge confined to the natural sciences. Europeans looked with interest at American public-school systems. They sent missions to this country to study the new American ideas about penology. And of course, countless folk in other countries observed carefully the American experiments in political democracy. By the end of the century almost everyone recognized the United States as one of the leading centers for the discovery and transmission of useful knowledge. To some degree, this was an import and reëxport trade, but the United States was increasingly becoming an originator and exporter of knowledge and techniques.

For some time the trade in useful knowledge was heavily concentrated within the western world. However, in the past century and particularly during the past few decades there has been more and more emphasis on the export of technical information from the European world to other parts of the globe. In considerable part this has been the result of economic trends within the western world. For one thing, the industrial revolution brought with it a huge demand for the raw materials and other varied goods produced outside of Europe. But European nations found that in order to maintain an adequate flow of these goods to European markets it was necessary to introduce European business techniques, processing methods, transportation, and the like. In short, the export of European technical knowledge was an essential item in the growth of the world economy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

With this growth there was a vast outflow of European capital. Most of it helped to develop industry and transportation and thus went hand in hand with the flow of useful knowledge to other parts of the world. The British were the leaders in this sort of activity through World War I. But they have gradually been replaced by the Americans after being forced to liquidate a large part of their foreign investments in the course of two long and costly global conflicts.

Political factors were also involved in the export of western techniques and knowledge to other parts of the world. As nationalism developed in European-dominated parts of Asia and Africa, subject peoples began to demand the sort of knowledge and information that would enable them to deal on equal terms with Europeans. As a result, many so-called backward areas have selectively imported European techniques and ideas to develop their own power. Japan furnishes one of the best examples of this process.

Other factors in the western world have also contributed to this development. Groups of humanitarians within Europe and America exerted more and more pressure to improve the treatment of colonial peoples. Improvement, viewed in political and economic terms, has involved a considerable attempt to educate colonial peoples in the techniques of western political and economic systems. Finally, the struggles among the western powers in World War II and the subsequent cold war have been accompanied by powerful ideological conflicts and a competitive struggle to win the loyalty of allies outside the European world. Nazi penetration of Latin America provided one of the more powerful arguments for American aid in the development of technical and economic assistance to that area in the late thirties and early forties. In the postwar period, Soviet Russia and the United States have vied with each other in promising a better economic and political future to the masses of various parts of the world in return for allegiance to their respective causes. In short, from varied motives and from varied sources has come a steadily increasing demand for the export of utilitarian knowledge from the western world to other areas which have shared to only a limited extent in the scientific revolutions of recent centuries.

These aspirations have been most dramatically expressed in the technical assistance programs of the United Nations and the Point Four program of the United States. Numerous methods have been suggested for carrying out these programs of technical assistance in the development of backward areas. Many have worked for a freer flow of information across national boundaries and an increased flow of foreign students to

western educational centers. A good many have pointed out that technical information alone will be barren of results unless there is a concurrent flow of capital to underdeveloped countries. International, national, and private agencies have been proposed for the control and execution of the whole scheme. One of the more interesting proposals, and the one that concerns us most directly, is to send abroad teams of experts sponsored by a national or international governmental organization, these experts to help other peoples help themselves.

Whatever the methods of execution that have been proposed, there remains the question of how effective any or all of these devices may be. To be sure, there seems to be little doubt about the quality of western scientific personnel. And the progress of the social sciences in the past half century has lent some hope that the problems in human relations likely to arise from the transfer of useful knowledge to other parts of the world may not be insoluble.

Still, it seems fair to say that a good many advocates of such aid have operated on certain assumptions which are largely untested. One of the best examples of these assumptions is to be found in the message of President Truman that proposed a Point Four program under American sponsorship. The President maintained that "humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering" of that part of the world still living in poverty, and he went on to argue that poverty and suffering could be greatly reduced if the United States offered technical assistance to these people. In the end, he felt, such a program would promote good relations between all nations and would "stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies—hunger, misery, and despair."[2] In short, the President felt that technical assistance could help defeat poverty in all parts of the world and that it would win allies for the United States in the cold war now and help produce international amity in the future.

History should be of some help in testing assumptions of this kind. The present study surveys some earlier American experience with official missions which were designed to export useful knowledge to other countries. In investigating American experience with government-sponsored technical missions abroad, we have kept in mind a large number of relevant questions. How did the missions originate, for example? It seemed a likely hypothesis that the source of inspiration for such ventures might have had a significant effect on their final outcome. We were also interested in the objectives of the various missions. Who set the objectives and how? Were the objectives adequate for the problems at hand? What sort of social and

psychological assumptions underlay their selection? Finally, were suitable means at hand to execute these objectives?

We were also interested in the personnel of such missions. What effect did the quality of personnel have on the success of the mission? The missions, of course, required men who were competent in their technical specialties. How important also, in these early missions, were such factors as knowledge of a country, ability to speak the language, and adeptness in the field of human relations?

We were particularly interested in the sort of difficulties such missions met and the means used to overcome them. Was there evidence of inadequate technical preparation? Did capital shortages handicap the utilization of expert knowledge? Above all, we wondered if American know-how had proved adequate when applied to new and different problems in areas of the world far different from the United States. There was also the important matter of dealing with the inhabitants. What would happen if the foreign country proved uncoöperative, and in what kind of situation might a foreign country prove uncoöperative? Were technical missions handicapped by cultural differences? Might Americans have assumptions about human nature and human motivation, for example, which were not relevant to the culture in which they were working? Such missions, it was thought, might also pose some problems in administration. We wondered how the ageless administrative dilemma of authority and responsibility was resolved, and what effect it might have had on the success of the missions. After consideration of these questions, we felt, it might be possible to draw up some sort of general balance sheet. Just how successful were such missions? Have their results in the past been such as to justify the hopes expressed for similar activities in the present and the future?

In this study we have concentrated on American technical missions abroad which have been in one way or another government-sponsored. We have used "technical" in a broad sense of the word; as used here it includes virtually all kinds of useful knowledge or scientific information which can aid in the conduct of human affairs. We have included knowledge which is relevant to the solution of social as well as physical problems.

Within this general definition we have approached the problem through the method of the historical case study. The case-study method seemed most appropriate in view of the *ad hoc* nature of most of the missions and the wide variety in their size, personnel, objectives, and areas of operation. We have tried to include as broad a sampling of these missions as possible. The reader will find accounts of American financial missions as well as missions made up of agricultural experts and engineers. We have in-

cluded missions of all sizes. The degree of American governmental sponsorship has ranged all the way from informal diplomatic representations to full military occupation. Much of the material is entirely new. Some of the sections, notably the case studies of Cuba, Haiti, and Santo Domingo, review fairly well known material from the point of view of this study.

The scope of the research has been restricted in several ways. The study stops about 1938, in part because the State Department was reluctant to make available many of the relevant materials after that date, in part because a study of the export of American techniques after 1938 would make a book in itself. There is virtually no attention to private activities which in some ways provide as significant material for testing the assumptions behind technical assistance programs as do governmental missions. Since most capital export has been under private auspices, this is another related subject not treated here. Nor have the authors discussed American experience in such long-term colonial dependencies as the Philippines, the Panama Canal Zone, or Puerto Rico.

Finally, it should be noted that for the most part this book is written from American materials and from the American point of view. The main emphasis has been on the export of useful knowledge through technical missions rather than on the reactions to the missions in the countries involved. Problems of administration, personnel difficulties, accomplishments, and frustrations are seen largely through American eyes. The picture would no doubt be substantially different in some respects if seen through the eyes of the recipients of American aid. This limitation was made necessary by the broad geographical scope of the American missions and by the fact that neither of the authors is an area specialist. With American missions ranging through most of Latin America, Persia, China, and Japan, to mention only the most prominent areas, it was manifestly impossible to dig very deeply into the literature of any one country. The difficulty in acquiring materials in these countries and of using the languages involved made such an approach impossible. There is, however, need for a study based on American materials, written from an American point of view.

We hope that this study will make a beginning toward answering some of the questions suggested. It is in large part an exploratory work, opening up new fields which call for a good deal more research especially in foreign countries. We need detailed regional studies of the impact on other parts of the world of western knowledge of all kinds brought by whatever agency.[8] The whole subject of the export of useful knowledge by private groups needs much more work. There is plenty of room for broad studies of the problems of capital development of the so-called backward areas. We

seem now to be in the twilight of imperialism, and so this might be an excellent time to reëxamine colonial programs and their impact on the peoples involved.[4] Indeed, some of the cases discussed in this book deserve more comprehensive treatment. And we hope that someone will carry on this historical survey by investigating American missions abroad since 1938 while the people involved are still alive and can furnish an investigator with invaluable data which may be lost in the future. But before studying the contemporary scene, we do well to turn back into the early nineteenth century and watch the gradual evolution of the American technical mission abroad as it enters its practice period.

The Practice Period

1838–1908

The first organized efforts of an official character to export American skills and knowledge to foreign lands came only after the Civil War. These efforts possessed the elements of the technical mission of our time, but it was not until late in the first decade of the twentieth century that the technical mission in its full, modern sense emerged. The modern technical mission rested on much practice and on many experiences.

The method of exchanging knowledge and information through the technical mission was a relatively early development. Both European nations and the United States sent such missions abroad for specific purposes. European governments sent to America officials to report on our internal improvements, our prisons and welfare agencies, our libraries and educational institutions.[1] In 1847 the American Commissioner of Patents printed a series of observations of European agriculture made by a former member of the staff during a European visit in 1844–45.[2] A few years later the War Department sent a mission to observe military science as it operated in the Crimean War.[3]

Under government sponsorship other American scientists and engineers in foreign lands accumulated bodies of technical information desired by special groups able to bring pressures to bear on the proper authorities in Washington, or deemed of importance to the national interest. The motive was commercial rather than philanthropic, and there was little or no connection between these enterprises, each of which was *ad hoc* in character. Yet together they provided a body of experience in foreign lands for American scientists and engineers; they familiarized other countries

with American skill; and they accustomed the American people themselves to such overseas enterprises on the part of their fellow-citizens. In some instances, in addition to aiding American commercial interests, they also contributed to the development of natural resources in the areas in which Americans explored topography, made maps, took stock of mineral and agricultural resources, and conducted meteorological and astronomical observations. Thus indirectly these pre–Civil War operations abroad provide part of the setting for our first technical missions to aid other countries by the introduction of American know-how.

A few examples will indicate the scope and significance of these precedents. The Wilkes Exploring Expedition is the best known. New England maritime interests had long agitated for an exploring expedition to the South Seas, and the example of similar expeditions sponsored by foreign powers whetted the rising national pride of the young republic. The expedition, commanded by Lt. Charles Wilkes and accompanied by several competent scientists, set out in 1838 and did not return until four years later. It surveyed some 280 islands of the Pacific and adjacent waters; it initiated astronomical and meteorological observations in the Sandwich Islands, as Hawaii was then called; and it collected rich stores of specimens in all departments of natural history. It contributed materially to man's knowledge of the pack-ice conditions prevailing in the Antarctic region.[4]

The Wilkes expedition was only a point of departure. The principal purpose of the United States Astronomical Expedition to Chile, 1855–56, was to make a new determination of the solar parallax; but its leader, Lt. James Melville Gillis, saw to it that in the course of its astronomical and meteorological observations, the expedition also collected useful information about the topography, the climate, and the agricultural and mineral resources of Chile and the western provinces of Argentina.[5]

Of greater importance in providing basic information to guide the development of natural resources were the two exploring expeditions sent to the La Plata basin in the 1850's. President Fillmore, Secretary of the Navy Kennedy, and Secretary of State Everett, alive to the advantages of Latin American trade and friendship, asked Lt. Thomas Jefferson Page to explore the La Plata basin and to report on its natural resources and potentialities for trade. The first expedition, which took off in 1853 and lasted three years, resulted in a report to the government and in a popular book by Page. The book was translated into Spanish and other languages, and helped to stimulate a migration to the La Plata basin. It pictured a land rich in resources and commended a government eager to welcome newcomers. When Page went to Argentina after the Civil War to start life

anew. General Mitre, former president of the republic, greeted him warmly and told him he had done more for the country than any living man.[6]

In 1851 the Navy sent Lt. William Lewis Herndon and Lt. Lardner Gibbon to explore the Amazon from its source to its mouth, to report on its resources, including the Peruvian and Bolivian silver mines, to determine the type of staple crops best adapted to the climate and terrain, and to discover the character of native populations and future prospects for trade. The United States government had become convinced that the geographical situation and the commercial potentialities of the Amazon indicated the importance of opening it to the free trade of the outside world. The expedition was to test this assumption and to provide data to implement a commercial program. The report that the expedition submitted to the American government was a pioneer document in making available knowledge of the area.[7] Neither Herndon's dream of leading immigrants into the Amazon basin nor the hope that the Brazilian government would open up the great river to commerce materialized as an immediate result of the expedition. In time, however, the Amazon was opened to the world, and Herndon can properly be regarded as a pioneer in the movement that led to that event.

The Mexican War occasioned information-seeking activities in countries south of the Rio Grande. Before the contest was over, two army engineers surveyed the valley of Mexico and prepared maps and reports of importance in later railway projects.[8] The acquisition of California, one of the results of the war, stimulated an interest not only in an ocean-to-ocean railway in Mexico and Central America but in an interoceanic canal as well. Lt. Nathaniel Michler, an army engineer, conducted a survey for a canal projected from the Gulf of Darien to the Pacific Ocean. This survey, undertaken under authorization of Congress, contained data on geography and geology, meteorology, botany, and zoology; it presented elaborate statistical tables and maps, and it remained for some time an authoritative source of knowledge.[9] Still later A. W. Thompson, an American citizen, persuaded the Navy Department to make a survey along the Isthmus of Panama in connection with a concession he had secured to develop steamship lines on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts.[10] These activities heralded more thoroughgoing surveys toward the end of the century, when the movement for an interoceanic canal became well organized.[11]

In less degree than Latin America the Far East beckoned American enterprise and led to explorations in which new technical information familiarized other governments and peoples with American skills and provided data which were useful in later development of natural resources. In

naming Perry McDonough Collins commercial agent in the Amoor River country of Siberia, the Pierce administration lent a helping hand in his explorations, undertaken with an eye to the development of a telegraph line. The activities of Collins, reported in a valuable account of northern Asia,[12] stimulated the Western Union Telegraph Company to initiate a project during the Civil War for the construction of an overland line to Europe by way of Alaska and Siberia. Bold in conception, the project contributed to the knowledge of a region hitherto untraveled. The company's working parties, mounted on reindeer, or negotiating icy brine in skin canoes in temperatures 50 to 60 degrees below zero, reported on the topography and meteorology of rarely visited regions. The company entered into contracts with the Russian and British governments and obtained promises of help from Congress. But it abandoned the project when in 1867 the Atlantic cable was successfully laid. The venture nevertheless was a pioneer example of the combination of private enterprise, government encouragement, and fact-gathering activities in little-known areas. It publicized to the Arctic-minded everywhere American technological skills and readiness to take risks in carrying the instruments of civilization to the ends of the earth.[13]

Here, then, were some of the early, pragmatic approaches to problems related to American official or quasi-official technical missions to other lands. They illustrate the use of the mission technique to add to America's store of scientific and technical knowledge. Their motives varied; in some cases the missions featured a simple search for new scientific knowledge; in other cases they worked for the advancement of economic interests. In any event, they were chiefly concerned with the collection and importation of technical and scientific information; America had not yet reached the point where it could systematically offer aid to nations whose technical resources were inferior to those of Western European peoples.

THE later part of the nineteenth century was a period of transition. There was a continuation of the sort of activity characteristic of the pre–Civil War period. Agents of the republic, either alone or in coöperation with other groups, undertook to add to the stores of information in America by means of explorations in remote corners of the earth or surveys of areas close at hand. However, other nations increasingly began to call on Americans to share their know-how with them to aid them in solving problems which seemed beyond their reach. The later nineteenth century, then, in part represented a continuation of earlier importing activities and in part illustrated the shift toward the later export of American technical knowledge.

Of marginal relevance was the participation of the federal government in privately initiated and managed exploring expeditions in the Arctic area. Concern with such enterprises was international, and in the pre-Civil War decades Americans had shown their interest. In 1865 Charles F. Hall brought out the American edition of his report of incredible hardships and adventures—*Arctic Researches, and Life among the Esquimaux*. This contributed in important ways to knowledge of Greenland and the northern seas. The expansionist fever at the end of the struggle for national unity took note of Greenland and Iceland as well as of Alaska; and the State Department issued in 1868 a report, compiled from library sources by the United States Coast Survey. The report implied that the interest in acquiring Iceland and Greenland from Denmark could be justified in terms of potential economic and strategic considerations.[14] Nothing happened here, but Congress in 1870 did appropriate $50,000 to support Charles Hall's renewed attempt to discover the North Pole. The indefatigable hero died before the expedition returned. Although it failed to accomplish its major objective, it did contribute new knowledge about the northern ice packs and seas. The report was presented to the world as a government publication.[15] Colorful, exciting, and hazardous, these enterprises to some degree committed the government to an interest in extending knowledge of remote areas in the interest of national prestige and, possibly, of future material advantages.

More important was the work of Lt. A. W. Greely. He profited not only from the Hall enterprise but also from the untiring exertions of Capt. A. W. Howgate of the United States Army who had reached the Cumberland Gulf in 1877 and engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to reach Lady Franklin Bay in 1880. Declining to accept the command of a private venture, Greely did accept the command of an expedition in 1881, when Congress assumed responsibility for supporting unity in an elaborate system of international scientific research involving eleven nations and fifty observatories. "For America," Greely rightly said, this "marked a forward movement toward fellowship with other countries" in the interest of increasing knowledge.[16] The specific object of the international agreement was to accumulate data on Arctic ice and weather conditions and on the flora, fauna, and geographical features of the forbidding northern wastes. The United States occupied two stations, one under Lt. P. H. Ray at Point Barrow[17] and one under Lieutenant Greely at Lady Franklin Bay. "Nature's changes," wrote Greely, "engaged our attention, as to its influence on all forms of life."[18] The coming and going of ice on the sea, the thickness, shape, and species of marine life, the study of birds, animals, plants, and

mosses, the movement of tides, winds, and cold, the temperature of air and sea, air pressure, and magnetic bearings, all were duly recorded. While one of Greely's assistants was in northern Greenland, he himself explored Grant Land. "Our discoveries," he wrote, "were extensive and important. Briefly, we found an area of about one thousand square miles free from ice cap. In the center was a lake . . . about fifty miles long and from one to five miles wide . . . ."[19] In this polar paradise with its musk-oxen feeding on grass and willows and its fish-inhabited lakes, remains of huts and implements proved that in ages past Eskimo families had lived there. The United States ultimately waived its rights to these newly discovered lands. But the fresh geographical knowledge resulting from the expedition, together with the American contributions to a cooperative, international program of data-gathering, particularly in the field of magnetic conditions, were substantial results. "The systematic and continuous readings of the magnetic instruments enabled experts to accurately calculate the secular variation of the magnetic declination for the regions of Smith Sound, which were then erroneously charted . . . . The tidal records at Lady Franklin Bay . . . enabled scientists not only to determine the cotidal lines of the Arctic Ocean, but also to make the remarkable discovery that the diurnal inequality of the tidal wave conforms at Lady Franklin Bay to the sidereal day."[20] Authorities later regarded the pendulum swings, the most northerly ever made, as the best within the Arctic circle. In fact, the scientific contributions made by the expedition stood up well in terms of later investigations.

Less dramatic in character, the coast, geodetic, and topographical surveys in other countries executed by American government agencies were in a sense technical missions. The United States, on the basis of treaty rights, dispatched the "Wyoming" during the Civil War to survey certain Chinese ports.[21] In the 1880's the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey took part in an expedition to the west coast of Africa to determine the gravity and the magnetic elements of that area.[22] But more was done in countries closer at hand. Under the auspices of the Hydrographic Office government vessels explored and charted much of the west coast of Mexico and the Gulf of California. The U.S.S. "Narragansett" inaugurated these surveys in 1873; the "Ranger" and the U.S.S. "Thetis" continued them in the 1890's. The Mexican authorities cooperated in these hydrographic surveys, and unusual friendliness marked the relations of the officers of the two governments. In 1877 the superintendent of the Coast Survey invited Alexander Agassiz, an authority in thalassography, to take part in deep-sea dredging in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. The undertaking, which involved a sequence of cruises of the "Blake," enriched knowledge

of deep-sea formations, submarine deposits, flora and fauna, and the meteorology of the Gulf Stream.[24]

The commercial implications of this work were not realized at once, but these were in the picture. In the interest of increasing commerce with the presumably fertile Amazon basin, the government equipped the U.S.S. "Enterprise," commanded by Thomas Selfridge, U.S.N., for an expedition into the vast South American inland waterway, with the purpose of making a running survey in transit and of determining geographical positions with whatever accuracy might be possible.[25] And in 1890 the Venezuelan government granted permission for a United States naval vessel to survey the bar at the mouth of the Orinoco in the interest of commerce.[26]

But it was not always the United States which took the initiative singlehandedly. On occasion the mutual interests of the United States and Latin American governments resulted in something like a coöperative undertaking, although the chief technical work was done by North Americans. Thus the Nicaraguan canal project led to associated investigations that increased knowledge of rainfall, temperature, and topographical features of the proposed route.[27] An even better example is the Intercontinental Railway Commission that resulted from the decisions made at the Pan American conference of 1880. The commission was organized in Washington in December, 1890, with Alexander Cassat as president. The exploring parties, made up largely of United States engineers, tried the ground for an international continental railway through Central and South America. The coöperating governments offered the free use of existing communication facilities and provided the services of native engineers and scientists. The reports included data on the terrain, altitudes, and social and economic conditions. Tables showing grading, costs, and estimated time for construction, as well as profiles, maps, and magnetic declinations, accompanied the reports. In many instances the establishment of precise geodetic positions, triangulations, and transit lines represented the first accurate measurements in these countries. Although Congress did not replenish the funds of the commission, its participants rightly took pride in its accomplishments, which proved to be invaluable to governments and engineers in later undertakings.[28]

American coöperation in polar expeditions and inter-American railroad surveys illustrated the use of American technical and scientific personnel to pursue objectives sought by several nations. At the same time, individual foreign governments were beginning to turn directly to Americans for aid and assistance in solving local or internal problems. In short, there was a shift in the balance of trade in ideas. American exports, economic and

ideological, played an increasingly significant role in the late nineteenth century. Americans began to send abroad their technical knowledge along with the goods this knowledge had produced.

The role of the United States government in these ventures varied considerably. In many cases the government was not involved at all.[29] Government officials frequently saw little justification for encouraging men and missions dedicated to the solution of the internal problems of foreign nations. In other cases, however, officials coöperated in this work, particularly if American interests were involved. Mid-century witnessed a full-fledged proposal for a government-financed technical mission to an underdeveloped land—Liberia, and its disadvantaged people.[30] Of much greater significance was the series of American technical missions to Japan in the 1870's which owed something to the Perry expedition of 1854 and which excited considerable coöperation on the part of the American government.[31] Still, such facts did not indicate that America was gradually developing a consistent policy of coöperation in such schemes. The *ad hoc* nature of most of the missions meant that the attitude of the government and its degree of participation varied with the circumstances surrounding each venture.

Some of the earliest requests for American expert aid came from the various nations of Latin America. For example, in 1868 the Costa Rican government, having little confidence in the reports of private engineers, asked for help from the United States in surveying a route for a wagon road or railway between San José and the Atlantic. The Washington government agreed to detail two of its scientific engineers for the purpose.[32] And in 1883, the Guatemalan government, in undertaking an accurate astronomical survey of the country to test its claims to territory Mexico regarded as hers, asked the United States for the services of technical personnel from its navy. After finding out that Mexico had no serious objections to such an arrangement, the State Department indicated that the matter must be a private one between the Americans and Guatemala. Miles Rock, a civil engineer and assistant astronomer at the Naval Observatory, resigned his position to make an accurate astronomical survey of the country.[33] The task took eleven years. Thanks to his services, Guatemala obtained title to a large part of the Peten district. When Rock died, he left only a modest estate, and the American minister to Guatemala spoke of his life as "a most pathetic one." For, he continued without complete accuracy, "a professor in the United States Navy, he was induced by our government to come down here to serve this Republic. Lured by one prospect or another, he remained here, spending the best years of his life in this country, having

given up a sure chance of advancement at home in our Navy." The elaborate official funeral tendered Rock was, our minister thought, hardly a compensation, though he admitted that he had never seen during his residence at the capital "such an outpouring of people, even at the funeral of a public man." The body lay in state; the highest officers of the government laid floral wreaths on the coffin; the President reviewed the cortège; and the Under Secretary of State delivered the funeral oration. The press sang Rock's praises. This was Guatemala's honor to a North American who had served her well.[34]

A Peruvian mission of this same period did not turn out quite so well, despite action by the American government. Thomas W. Sparrow in 1872 contracted with the Peruvian government to serve for three years as a civil engineer on the Hydrographic Commission of the Amazon. His services, for which he received only a modest pay, were highly satisfactory, and the contract was renewed. But when the agency was dissolved in 1877, Sparrow could not collect his dues. The American legation at Lima took the ground that this case might be regarded as an exception to the general rule that diplomatic interference was inapplicable in controversies over contracts between American citizens and foreign governments. Although the justice of the claim was often admitted, Secretary of State Olney was still asking as late as 1895 whether the government of Peru had taken any action on it.[35]

Brazil, too, requested American assistance in the late nineteenth century. Professor C. F. Hartt, of Cornell, headed an expedition in 1874 which did some of the first systematic geological work in that country. As a result of the reconnaissance work of Hartt and his group, the government set up the Commissão Geologico do Imperio do Brasil. Hartt was director, and one of his students, John Casper Branner, assistant director. In the decades that followed, Branner was to play a major part in deepening knowledge of Brazilian geology and in making possible the exploitation of natural resources. Later the government named Dr. O. A. Derby state geologist for São Paulo. These Americans contributed materially to the geological survey of Brazil, and this in turn helped open the black-diamond districts.[36] The American government itself had nothing to do with these operations; but the enterprise gained in prestige from the facts that Branner had been a member of the Pennsylvania Geological Survey and had been State Geologist of Arkansas, and that others in the Brazilian survey had worked with state surveys in the United States.

China, too, asked and got aid in the development of geological and mining techniques. In 1886 Li Hung-chang, the progressive-minded viceroy, engaged John Adams Church to introduce American mining methods

into his country. Church, an early graduate of the Columbia School of Mines, had continued his studies in Europe and helped edit the *Engineering and Mining Journal* before preparing, as a member of the United States Geological Survey, his masterly monograph on the Comstock lode. Taking American foremen and other helpers, Church spent three years in reopening and modernizing silver mines in a remote and unvisited part of the Celestial Empire, some 150 miles north of the Great Wall. Church built an up-to-date smelter and solved the stubborn problem of basic flux by using crushed magnetite, the only available material. But it was not easy to manage the Chinese labor force. Church also faced other problems. There were ferocious dragons, for example. One of them allegedly inhabited near-by coal mines, and it so terrified the Chinese workers that Church was forced to transport his coal from a distance. But to do this successfully he had to organize a cavalry force to control the bandit-infested country through which he transported his coal. Despite all these and other difficulties, he left the mines a paying property.[37]

The Church project introduced new techniques into China; other American groups made studies fundamental to the discovery and exploitation of China's natural resources. Early in the twentieth century the Carnegie Institution of Washington initiated an expedition which was designed primarily to throw light on man's remote ancestors but which also led to important monographic studies in geology. Dr. Arthur G. Spencer of the United States Geological Survey was charged with preparing plans for the project. When it proved impossible for him to head the expedition, Bailey Willis was chosen in his place. He was accompanied by Eliot Blackwelder, of the University of Chicago, as assistant geologist, and by R. Harvey Sargent, of the United States Geological Survey, as topographer. The party, armed with introductions from Secretary of State John Hay and indebted to the Chinese minister for official aid, made its way to China. During its interview with the viceroy the mission impressed that official with the remarkable contributions the United States Geological Survey had made to the wealth of the nation and with the willingness of such geologists as Van Hise to enrich others while remaining poor. The publications of the mission contributed substantially to knowledge of the physiography, stratigraphy, and paleontology of the areas visited. Such work was, of course, basic to any later development of natural resources.[38]

WHILE American technical missions abroad in the late nineteenth century touched on many branches of knowledge, agriculture received more than its proportionate share of attention. There were good reasons for this. The

United States had long been a rural nation engaged in agricultural pursuits. American inventors had made spectacular and widely known contributions to agriculture with such devices as the reaper. And a vigorous Department of Agriculture and well-supported agricultural colleges were rapidly bringing the United States into the forefront of the scientific revolution in agriculture. It was only natural, then, that agriculture should play a significant role in many of the missions of this period.

At first these agricultural missions were, to be sure, not chiefly concerned with the improvement of agriculture in the countries where they operated. But it was generally assumed that any increase in the knowledge of problems common to the United States and another country would benefit each. Some of the agricultural missions to Latin America were of this type. Thus, in 1882 the Department of Agriculture sent John C. Branner[39] to Brazil, accompanied by Albert Koebele, to collect entomological and other data relating to cotton culture. The mission, which examined the life of injurious insects, made timely discoveries that the Department of Agriculture published.[40]

A mission to Mexico late in the century provides another example of this kind of operation. In connection with a comprehensive survey of the geographical distribution and the economic relations of species in the United States, the Department of Agriculture in 1892 sent Edward W. Nelson as its field agent to Mexico to make a biological survey of that country. Maj. E. A. Goldman accompanied him. The survey was to include a study of the relations between agricultural products and climatic and other conditions. Nelson was a distinguished naturalist who had, as a member of the signal corps at Point Barrow, not only made the specified meteorological observations but had also conducted a biological survey of the area and assembled a rich collection of Alaskan ethnological specimens.[41]

In preparation for the Nelson mission to Mexico, the Secretary of State addressed himself to the Mexican legation in Washington in behalf of the venture and instructed the American minister in Mexico to commend it to the proper authorities. The Minister of Foreign Affairs courteously promoted the objects of Nelson's mission by giving him letters of commendation to the governors of the several states. The survey continued for fourteen years and resulted in an extraordinarily rich collection of Mexican birds, mammals, reptiles, and plants, some of which were previously unknown.[42] Such investigation was basic to the development of many aspects of scientific agriculture in Mexico.

If missions to Brazil and Mexico were designed primarily to import scientific and technical information, the activities of an American agricul-

tural expert in Panama early in the twentieth century stressed the export of American know-how. At the instance of the Secretary of the Fomento, Henry F. Schultz, an agriculturist, explored Chiriquí Province to investigate agricultural possibilities. He met with admirable coöperation in every quarter and reported that the hundreds of thousands of acres of fertile land he surveyed possessed great agricultural potentialities. Schultz recommended the establishment of an experiment station and a program of agricultural education. He also urged small farmers to raise sufficient crops for their own maintenance and large planters to supplement their chief staple with a secondary crop as insurance against the failure of the major enterprise in any given season. Schultz also called attention to the possibility of developing forest resources and to the need of better transportation facilities. The Panama government implemented the last of Schultz's recommendations when it asked the aid of American engineers in surveying a route for a railroad from Panama City to David, the capital of Chiriquí. Such a survey was made in 1910 with the Panama government footing the bills.[43]

But the interest of the Department of Agriculture reached beyond the boundaries of our southern neighbors. Albert Koebele, who had accompanied Branner to Brazil to study cotton culture, later visited Australia to investigate the natural enemies of the fluted scale. The results of the mission were published in 1890 by the Bureau of Entomology.[44]

Europe, too, provided a stage for our technicians. In 1846 the State Department received a request from the progressive-minded Sultan of Turkey to recommend two or three scientific agriculturists to introduce improved cotton culture into his realm. President Polk regarded the request as a flattering mark of confidence, and Secretary of State Buchanan went to great pains to find suitable personnel. The Turks wanted the American government to fix the terms of compensation of the experts, but Buchanan preferred to leave these details to be worked out in Constantinople with the help of the American minister, Dabney S. Carr. Buchanan believed that the two men who were finally chosen, Dr. James Bolton Davis, a successful planter, and Dr. J. Lawrence Smith, likewise a South Carolinian, were unusually well qualified.

Eager to observe the effect of the autumn climate on the cotton plant, Davis went on ahead of Smith. The Turkish government built him a handsome three-story house, southern mansion style. One room was fitted up for the instruction of students of agriculture. Most of the land needed irrigation; but at last a moist stretch was found on which several varieties of cotton—white, silk, and Nankeen—did well: the yield was about 2,000

pounds to the acre. It is, however, hard to say how successful the experiment was. The Porte professed to be satisfied. But Davis' American colleague, Dr. Smith, was of a different opinion; and the American dragoman of the legation reported to friends in Washington that the experiment was a failure. The American minister, Dabney Carr, insisted that this was not the case. Yet Davis' contract was not renewed, and the Legation had to intervene in a controversy over his compensation. Meantime, Dr. Davis had sent to Persia for Angora and Cashmere goats. These were brought back over the desert in baskets on the humps of camels. The later importation into Turkey of these species of goats was doubtless the outcome of the Davis experiment. Incapacitated by illness resulting from the Turkish climate, Dr. Davis at last bade farewell to the sultan. Courtiers were horrified when, on leaving the audience chamber, he turned his face to the door and walked out in the ordinary American way. Aides tried to stop him, but the sultan laughed goodnaturedly and forbade any interference with the democratic exit.[45]

When Dr. Smith arrived in Constantinople he refused to have anything to do with the cotton experiment, which he regarded as badly set up. But the Turkish government persuaded him to investigate its natural resources, and he stayed on. The idea was an excellent one; Dr. Smith was admirably equipped for the assignment. After studying chemistry, physics, and engineering at the University of Virginia, he had acted as assistant engineer of the Charleston and Cincinnati railway, had studied medicine in Charleston and Paris, had worked with Liebig, the great agricultural chemist at Giessen, and had established himself as a leading analytical chemist in South Carolina. Even during his residence in Paris he had contributed learned papers to scientific societies. At home in Charleston he became State assayer, working with the gold that entered commerce from South Carolina and Georgia deposits. He investigated the composition of the fossil bones near Charleston, studied the action of solutions of the neutral phosphates on carbonate of lime, and most important of all, analyzed the composition of near-by marls which proved to be highly useful as fertilizers. His work was known favorably to fellow-scientists through contributions to the *American Journal of Science* and to European journals.

During the four years he stayed in Turkey, Smith made notable contributions both to geology and mineralogy and to mining operations. Little was known about emery, a mineral mined in the Greek island of Naxos, which possessed a monopoly of its export. Smith discovered emery deposits in the Turkish Empire. His memoir on Turkish emery was presented to the French Academy in 1850 and led to the continued exploitation of the

Turkish deposits, to the advantage of the government. Smith also pursued investigations of coal, chromite, and magnesite and made an important report on the thermal waters of Asia Minor. It was he who persuaded the sultan to introduce the Morse telegraph.

Although Smith received generous pay and many honors, he found the conditions under which he worked irksome. To his friend Benjamin Silliman he wrote that he felt like "a caged bird, being prevented from making those examinations of the country that my situation would so well enable me to do. But no!" he went on to say, "they must keep me at Constantinople the most of the time, because they *might want me*, and when I do go it is always with a troop of lazy, ignorant scoundrels, who are sent rather to watch my movements than to afford any assistance. The people are both suspicious and ignorant, and they believe an honest man exists only in the wildest dreams of philosophers . . . . I am becoming more and more disgusted with this country and its people." His disgust knew no bounds when, after difficult preparations had been made to mine coal in a newly discovered deposit, an order came to abandon the project. The sultan's mother and some of the great pashas, owners of other mines, did not like the idea.[46] On returning to the States Smith's activities led to the discovery of emery in Massachusetts and North Carolina. His career at the University of Virginia and at the University of Louisville was a distinguished one: he had a reputation as one of the leading research chemists in the country.

The mission to establish cotton in Turkey was followed, after a long interval, by one designed to popularize corn in Central Europe. The proposal was made in 1878 by Abram S. Hewitt to obtain a Congressional appropriation to exhibit corn at the Paris Exposition. The proposal did not materialize and, as Charles J. Murphy, who was to become the great evangelist of the idea later remarked, corn thus "missed a grand opportunity." Convinced that the popularization of corn would aid both the American farmers in marketing their surplus and the hungry European masses, Murphy began a grand campaign to that end.

A New York brewer, Murphy had fought in the war with Mexico. According to his testimony, he went to California at the end of that episode and embarked for China, where he founded the first American commercial house on the Chinese side of the Yang Kin Pang River, opposite the foreign quarter in Shanghai. His chief stock in trade seems to have been wine. In any case, he later termed himself a New York wine merchant. At the threshold of the Civil War he left his family and business to found the Scott Life Guard, named after his commander-in-chief in the Mexican War.

His military services in the Civil War are obscure; but he was taken prisoner in the first battle of Bull Run and at last escaped to Washington.[47]

From the time that he became interested in corn—he once experimented with it in his brewery operations—Murphy devoted his life to it. His wife, his son, and his daughter aided and abetted him. On his own, and without compensation, he tried to persuade the management of the American Exhibition in London in 1886–87 to promote corn in a big way. Those in charge of the affair, however, turned deaf ears to his argument that in exporting wheat American agriculture faced the stiff competition of Russia; whereas, if the proper effort were made, American farmers might export twenty times as much corn.[48] Undaunted, Murphy spared no pains to publicize American corn at the Paris Exhibition of 1889. He secured the endorsement of the New York Produce Exchange, made tours of the country with his wife to raise money for a vast exhibit of corn and corn products at the French show, interested newspaper editors in the project, and, despite various mishaps, including two railroad accidents, headed for Paris to induce Commissioner General Franklin to take up the cause officially. He was disappointed again.

However, Murphy did do something for corn. The National French Agricultural Society asked him to lecture on its merits, which he did.[49] At his own expense he got substantial space in the gardens of the Exhibition, erected a large building, had Indian corn cooked, sold the food samples at a nominal price, invited charitable institutions to partake of it freely, and won the first award in the category in which his displays fell. Much out of pocket, Murphy and his devoted family went from European city to city, spreading light about corn. His wife wrote cookbooks that revealed the secrets of corn dishes; his son translated them into various languages; his daughter contributed her typing skill to the enterprise.[50] No aspect of corn was unimportant in the Murphys' eyes: its history, its habitat, the various species, and its export figures, no less than the enticing dishes it yielded fascinated the family.

But Murphy knew the handicaps he was under in having no official status. He persuaded the National Farmers' Congress to urge the government through American consulates to promote Indian maize. General Rusk, Secretary of Agriculture in the Harrison administration, finally named him an agent of the department, despite the fact that he was a Democrat. The commission which Rusk gave the corn evangelist said that he deserved the plaudits of his countrymen for his volunteer work at his own expense in behalf of our national grain. Senator A. S. Paddock, of the Committee of Agriculture and Forestry, wrote Murphy that his name was a

household word in the cornbelt and that he had done a great work. "The field which has been opened to our corn by your intelligent and persistent efforts is of greater value than anything that has been accomplished abroad by any agent of the government whatever his rank in recent years."[31] When the Democratic administration came in, Murphy spoke several times with President Cleveland on the topic so close to his heart—the introduction of a cheap food to the needy masses of Europe and the opening of new markets to American corn in consequence. Secretary of Agriculture Morton renewed his commission as an agent of the department.

Thus fortified, Murphy took up his propaganda with mounting enthusiasm. American consular and diplomatic agents gave a hand. At Copenhagen a great public banquet at the Hotel King familiarized the press, agriculturalists, government officials, and professional chefs with the delicacies Mrs. Murphy cooked—corn muffins, corn mush, corn fritters. Partly as a result of this venture, Murphy interested three great Danish commercial firms in the importation of American corn. One of them, Caroe and Company, induced thirteen of the largest breweries to experiment with the use of maize, and Murphy reported that the experiments had been entirely successful. Dr. Jurguensen, a noted physician and nutritionist, recommended in public prints the use of corn. Several large institutions in Copenhagen took up corn as a health food. The Danish edition of the corn recipe book enjoyed an encouraging success. "I think you will agree with me," Murphy wrote to his chief in Washington, "that the Agricultural Department has scored a great success in northern Europe, a ground which has almost hitherto been untrodden . . . ." Murphy turned his attention to Belgium, Holland, and England. He was elated when the London School Board induced the School of Cookery to include corn in its curriculum.

But it was Germany from which Murphy expected the greatest results. In Berlin, Minister Phelps aided in a banquet similar to the one held in Copenhagen. Three Indian corn mills were set up in Hamburg. A Prussian royal commission was named to look into the merits of corn, and Murphy was assured that its report would be favorable. Faced by a shortage of rye, the German military experimented with a mixed rye-corn bread, "Murphy Brot" it was called. An Indianapolis outfit told Murphy that thanks to his efforts their special corn milling machinery was more and more wanted in Europe. The corn missionary was delighted, in view of the surplus of American corn in the early 1890's, to note the increased exports to Germany, which he naturally regarded as the result of his mission. But his enthusiasm was not bounded by Germany, or Europe either for that matter. He was sure the Department of Agriculture would be happy to

know that he had communications from South Africa asking how American maize could be developed and where maize-grinding machinery could be bought.[32]

But the sailing was not altogether smooth. Murphy, alas, gave his confidence to a man purporting to be a correspondent of the New York *Tribune* —one Charles Frank Dewey. His new acquaintance, seemingly an ardent convert to his cause, took Murphy's letters of introduction to Washington and induced Secretary Rusk to appoint him as Murphy's assistant. Returning to Europe, he began to attack Murphy in the German press; worse, he ridiculed the sacred cause of corn! It is not clear what his motives were; Murphy himself thought he was a downright scoundrel. Murphy, sick at heart, sorrowfully wrote that he had never imagined such a rascally scoundrel could exist. It turned out his name was not Dewey at all; he had worked only a month for the *Tribune*, and was then fired for turning in a bogus interview with some high Russian official. That the cause suffered, Murphy had no doubt. But worse was in store.[33] By 1894 the Secretary of Agriculture, J. Sterling Morton, informed him that, because of the slacking off in the corn crop resulting from the disastrous drought, there was little point in continuing the mission. His services were to end on January 1, 1895.[34] Nor was help forthcoming from Senator A. S. Paddock, of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, who had expressed warm appreciation of his work.

Until the first world war the Murphy overture was almost the only enterprise in Europe that had the requisites of a technical mission. The Bureau of Animal Husbandry did, to be sure, send experts abroad to investigate the allegations that American meat products were diseased and to secure the removal of restrictions believed to be unfairly placed on American exports. But this was designed to help American rather than European agricultural economy.[35] The nearest approach to a true technical mission in this field was the invitation on the part of the French government in 1907 to Dr. Harvey Wiley to help in the revision of the national pure food law. Wiley went to France, where he proved to be useful. He was, in due time, made a chevalier of the Legion of Honor.[36] The recognition of an American expert in the field of food processing was a tribute indeed, but it remained an almost solitary official testimony on the part of Europeans to American specialized skill.

Almost. For the story of David Lubin comes in here. Devoted to the ideal of economic justice, this remarkable Californian worked out, in fruit-marketing associations and in other enterprises, concrete and practical approaches to the larger objective he cherished. In 1896 when he was in Eu-

rope, he had concluded that it was impossible to advance the cause of the American farmer without at the same time advancing that of farmers the world over. He outlined in his address before the International Agricultural Congress at Budapest a proposal for an international institute of agriculture, and he devoted the rest of his life to realizing it. Snubbed by the Department of Agriculture of his own government and brushed aside at London and Paris, he at length found a friendly sponsor in Victor Emmanuel of Italy. The International Institute of Agriculture, on the permanent committee of which he represented the United States, collected and made available agricultural statistics and useful information and became a foundation stone in the growing international structure of official agencies for cooperation in particular fields.[57] The Institute can in no sense be regarded as an American agricultural mission; but in its American inception and in its international character it anticipated certain aspects of later missions, of the United Nations program of technical assistance, and of Point Four.

If Murphy's quasi-official mission was wrecked by a new situation in American agriculture, the 1890's also witnessed a fully developed mission the outcome of which was determined by conditions in the country that requested it—China. Li Hung-chang had come to realize the great need for the improvement of agriculture in his country. Missionaries had introduced American fruits into Shantung, and they had done well; peanuts had been successfully cultivated in South China; and one of the most progressive viceroys, Chang Chih-tung of Hunan and Hupeh had imported choice American cotton seed. But according to the *Shanghai Mercury* the Chinese paid no attention to the fruit trees, and insisted on pulling the fruit too early, neglected the peanuts, and did not give the American cotton a fair show.[58] Chang Chih-tung, who was appreciative of the advantages offered by improved methods of the West, now, in 1897, determined to establish a model farm and school, in which the latest and best appliances and methods used in the United States might be made the basis of scientific agriculture in his provinces. He turned for help to the Reverend Sidney C. Partridge, principal of an Episcopalian school in Wuchang, asking to have approaches made to Cornell University.[59] No sooner had Partridge communicated the request to President Schurman of Cornell when Chang Chih-tung was besieged by European agents who deprecated American agriculture and urged him to turn to one of the European countries for technical assistance in this field. Thanks, however, to one of the viceroy's leading secretaries, who had been trained at the Sheffield Scientific School, His Excellency was induced to decide in favor of an American mission.[60]

After consultation with Dean I. P. Roberts, director of the Cornell Experiment Station, President Schurman recommended Gerow Brill. This thirty-three-year-old Dutchess County farmer had been graduated from the College of Agriculture in 1888, had done some graduate work, had increased the fertility of the home farm, drained part of the land, addressed farmers' meetings, and otherwise commended himself to his old teachers in Ithaca. He was, in addition, full of enthusiasm and was a church member in good standing. Brill accepted a contract which paid his expenses to and from China, provided him with living quarters, and promised him $3,000 a year for three years. He was also to have an assistant and to establish an agricultural center for improving Chinese farming and for training agricultural leaders.[61] Brill prepared himself, with the assistance of the Cornell people and the Department of Agriculture in Washington, by visiting cotton and rice plantations in South Carolina and by informing himself about tea culture. He also called on the Chinese minister in Washington, who received him cordially and urged him to go slowly and not to be discouraged if at first the Chinese opposed American methods. On the basis of observations of Chinese farmers on the west coast the director of the University of California Experiment Station gave similar counsel.[62]

Brill and his Cornell advisors believed that his chance of success would be greater if he enjoyed official American as well as official Chinese status; the report of the opposition of Europeans in Wuchang to an American mission strengthened this assumption. No efforts were spared to induce the Department of Agriculture to give Brill an official appointment. In urging this, Brill reminded the Secretary of Agriculture that during his recent visit in Washington, officials in the department had asked him to send information about seeds, plants, and shrubs, and to transmit samples of soil.[63] The representative of Brill's district in Congress also lent a hand, informing the Secretary of Agriculture that his constituent was not only a trustworthy individual and a practical farmer, but a gentleman of culture. More to the point was the possibility that, should the mission succeed, American enterprise might profit through the sale of agricultural machinery in China.[64] Though Secretary Wilson indicated to Dean Roberts of Cornell that Brill would be given a commission, this was not done, apparently, until fairly late in his Chinese career, when he was made an Agricultural Explorer and instructed to report on farming methods in interior China and to send specimens and seeds to Washington.[65]

Brill arrived in Wuchang in the early autumn of 1897. His assistant, John Gilmore, a Cornell friend, came out the following summer, having meantime bought a considerable agricultural library, seeds, nursery stock,

and, at greatly reduced prices, a good supply of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and other materials. Brill himself, on taking up residence in Wuchang, set about his work in an intelligent way, observing conditions, familiarizing himself with Chinese agriculture, and trying to learn the language. This he found hard going—perhaps, wrote the thirty-three-year-old New Yorker to his aunt, he was too old to master the intricacies of Chinese.[66] Throughout his stay the language problem proved a serious handicap, for Brill learned he could not count on the accuracy of translations his interpreters made. And these officials were often ill or indisposed, making communication impossible. It would have been of great help could he have had for his chief assistant a Chinese graduate of an American college; but this he was denied.

The petty officials assigned to Brill proved unsympathetic, dilatory, and inefficient. "We have a new director coming in a few days," he wrote in the autumn of 1899, "and as the change cant [*sic*] be for the worse it may be an improvement. This will be the fourth beside the original man . . . ."[67] As Brill found increasing difficulties in getting the simplest and most necessary supplies and, above all, even a plot of land, he received a tip from foreign residents that perhaps his ways were too simple to impress the Chinese bureaucracy. So he asked an old China hand whether he should "put on more style." The advice was to keep himself more prominently before the higher officials, press his claims more vigorously, and continually ask the viceroy for what he needed and insist on getting it. The Chinese had a way, he was told, of granting what was superfluous and withholding what was necessary on the ground that they alone knew what was best for China and the Chinese. Matters were made worse by the discovery that the viceroy was somewhat fickle in his enthusiasms, having great zest one day for a new project and shifting his zeal to something else within the week. He was, as someone in the foreign colony put it, like a boy with a new toy who quickly tired of it, or like a child who expected a rich harvest before the seeds had sprouted.[68]

In any case, Brill continued to find it uphill business to get even the small piece of land on which to start the farm. Promises were made only to be broken. It was true that the population was dense, that the graves of the dead occupied great portions of the territory, and that thousands of acres were flooded for part of the year. When, at Brill's suggestion, a dyke was built below the city to reclaim and underdrain a large but hitherto useless tract, he was promised he might choose what he wanted of the newly available land. But when he went out with Chinese functionaries to stake out his claim, he was told that the land he wanted belonged to the

people who were squatting on it, and that he must take less desirable land, widely scattered in tiny tracts. Meantime, in the late spring of 1898, he was given the five-acre drill ground of the military school which was staffed by German officers. The land was hard, alluvial clay, poorly drained, and full of stone and broken bricks. Finally, after great delays and discouragements, Brill got the land into some sort of shape. True, he failed in his effort to show the Chinese that it was possible to use two oxen together in the plowing: the beasts were afraid of the American plow, of Brill, and of each other. It was in the end necessary to follow the Chinese custom of leading one ox yoked to the plow around and around. Understandably he and Gilmore longed for a pair of good American horses or even mules.[69]

Although many of the fruit trees imported from America were dead on arrival, Brill set out those that still had life and nurtured them tenderly. The field was sown to corn and small grains—many hitherto unknown in China—to rice, cotton, and vegetables. An unusually severe drought seemed to insure disaster. Water had to be lugged in the primitive Chinese fashion. Noting the constant winds, Brill felt that deep wells and windmills might solve the water problem. He spared no pains in trying to get from America, England, and Holland models for windmills sufficiently simple and cheap to make their construction in China on a wide scale possible.[70] Despite the drought, the wretched soil, the dubious vitality of the seeds that had been so long delayed in transit from the States, the first experiment on the parade grounds was encouraging. The corn eared well, the small grains matured nicely, the American cotton grew almost as successfully as the inferior Chinese variety, the rice demonstrated the importance of superior American seed and methods of cultivation, and the vegetables, hitherto unknown in the area, did surprisingly well.[71]

Then the German officers who had blithely agreed to the use of the parade grounds for the demonstration farm had a change of heart. Brill was told he could no longer use the parade ground. He had no place to which to transplant the shrubs and young trees he had imported and kept alive at such odds. "Am afraid," he wrote to his aunt, "the chance for doing good work here is small on account of [the viceroy's] mismanagement. In fact, they say, why do you care, dont [*sic*] we pay you."[72] Commenting on the contrast between what the Chinese said and what they did, he confessed to his aunt that he would not be sorry if he were well out of the entire business. "I begin to think," he added, "that the Chinese make an official study of making excuses and telling plausible lies."[73]

Troubles multiplied. It was not only that the officials were constantly changing their minds as to what should be done and how it should be done,

not only that the Americans were being constantly put off by promises that in due time they would be given some land. The psychological barriers between them and their employees yielded to no solution. "They expect things to be done by magic. I nearly lost my reputation," Brill wrote home, "by telling a Chinese officer that he should underdrain his land and plant his cotton farther apart in order to grow it from American seed. He wanted me to analyze it and tell him what the matter was."[74] And again: "They expect a fellow to know everything here from the management of silk worms to raising forests. I told the Viceroy it would need about twenty men and a fully equipped University to teach on all subjects. He wanted my assistant to be a fish culturist in addition to his other qualifications .... They think all is necessary is to translate a few books and read them over then buy a few machines and have men turn the cranks. I think much might be done if one could get the confidence of the people; but they are suspicious of the officials and foreigners both." Later still: "Has been a change of plans .... They dont [*sic*] know what they want anyway. Is like working for a child that needs a spanking."[75]

Things went somewhat better in the so-called Hupeh Agricultural College, the first school of the sort in China. But even here there were interminable and insuperable problems. The tool house, constructed the first year, proved to have been built so badly that the American tools were exposed presently to the weather. There was endless delay in remodeling an old building, in getting books and supplies. The school started with ten boys and eight officials to open the gate and look after them. The boys were all from the cities, sons of officials who knew nothing about farming. Only four had enough English to count for much. Brill and Gilmore did the best they could in teaching English to those who knew little or none and in giving basic instruction. They made use of pictures, slides, and the blackboard in trying to teach the elements of botany. It was hard, moreover, to break the Chinese habit of memorizing without apparent understanding. And when the experiment was tried of teaching simple agricultural subjects through an interpreter, it was clear that the interpreter had absolutely no understanding of what he was translating. Nor did the Chinese, from the viceroy down, grasp the problems involved in the instruction of boys in technical branches when they were without adequate English, the basic disciplines, and any practical experience. The viceroy himself seemed to hold that any Chinese boy could learn all a foreigner had to teach in a year or two, regardless of his preparation. Nor was it any better when the experiment was made of trying to teach the boys something about tools and the practical aspects of agriculture. Brill noted that his American friends

would have smiled to see the boys in the fields in their long robes, their umbrellas, and their fans."[76]

But the problem of instruction was not the only difficulty. The Chinese authorities assumed the prerogative of disciplining the pupils, and clashes between these officials and the Americans often resulted. Brill urged the importance of removing the school to the country, partly to be near some actual land, and partly to avoid the temptations of the streets of Wuchang, which the boys loved to frequent of nights. And in the interest of efficiency, the Americans urged the consolidation of all three schools under the viceroy's patronage. To no avail. When at last a new building was made ready and the question presented itself of the selection of fifty new students, there was still no disposition to choose the sons of farmers with some knowledge of Chinese characters, as Brill had so long urged. It was again the sons of city officials who presented themselves. "The height of a Chinaman's ambition," remarked Brill, "is to become an official where he can squeeze money from those under him."[77] Despite the evidence in letters from students to Brill that at least some held him in high esteem and in affection, he rightly felt that the school was hardly a success.

Eager to promote Chinese agriculture in every possible way, Brill proposed the importation of bulls to develop a better strain of dairy cows—the Chinese variety gave less than half as much milk as the American. But the Chinese preferred to import butter than to experiment with improved dairying: the limited amount of land was needed, it was felt, for food crops. Then Brill tried to improve tea culture. After great difficulty he imported some thousands of superior tea plants, only to have them arrive before he had been given any ground in which to set them out. In an able document he urged the viceroy to spare no pains to improve tea culture in view of the increasing competition of Indian tea, which was being produced and processed in accord with modern scientific ideas.[78] And during a holiday Brill went to Japan to study farming methods and to learn what he could of the effects of early American agricultural missions to that country.[79]

Goaded to discouragement at his inability to get even adequate land for a demonstration farm, Brill appealed to Minister Conger, when he visited Wuchang, for help. Conger told him that he had urged the viceroy to give him the land. But the American consul, who was present at the interview, said that the minister had merely emphasized the importance America attached to agriculture by noting the fact that it was represented in the central government by a cabinet officer. Brill took note of the contrast in the way in which European powers supported their nationals engaged in technical assistance programs in China and the aloofness of American

consular and diplomatic officers toward the problems of United States citizens engaged in similar work.[80]

In the autumn of 1899 Brill presented to the viceroy an eloquent document which reviewed the long and sad story of broken promises, delays, and mismanagement. He made it clear why it was impossible to run a demonstration farm sufficiently profitably to pay the costs of maintaining the school—a new demand on the part of the viceroy. He also specified certain essential conditions for any kind of success: a clear plan of procedure, assurance that this plan would not be constantly changed, coöperation from officials, and a permanent site. "I wish to say that I have no fault with anyone in particular," Brill concluded, "but the system under which we are working is entirely wrong, as no one to whom we have access seems to have any authority whatever to decide matters . . . . At present everything appears to end in talk."[81]

The viceroy at first seems to have been favorably impressed by the document. But his intimate advisors persuaded him to bring the mission to an end and to substitute Japanese experts for the Americans. Asked if he would accept a termination of his contract six months before it expired, Brill acquiesced gladly, for he had long been weary of the conditions that made any real achievements impossible.[82] Minister Conger wrote that he was sorry China was to be deprived of his services, which were so much needed. "If the Chinese can ever experience regret," he added, "they will sometime regret your loss."[83] The Reverend Sidney Partridge, who had been responsible for Brill's coming and who had befriended him throughout, expressed great disappointment at the outcome. Assuring him that both foreigners and Chinese alike respected and honored him for his honest efforts to do his duty and to be faithful to his contract against overwhelming odds, Partridge confessed he had hoped, even after it was evident that the task was almost hopeless, that the viceroy in this one instance might be able to carry out his genuine intention of doing something for the good of his country and his people. "But alas! I fear the spirit of selfish greed among his subordinates has proved too much for him."[84]

This, however, was only part of the explanation. There is no doubt that the increasing wave of antiwestern sentiment cooled the enthusiasm of the somewhat opportunistic viceroy for the progressive measures he had sponsored. Moreover, it was true that he was now hard pressed for funds, both by reason of the demands of the empress dowager, who had come to power, and because of the changes in the tax structure which reduced his revenues. But it is also true that even before this the viceroy, under Japanese pressure, had been lukewarm about the American mission. Perhaps this

attitude was to be laid at the door of his shifting enthusiasms. It is hard to say.[85]

Having offered to be of any help he could to his Japanese successors, Brill turned his attention to a new task. The Department of Agriculture, to which he had made interesting reports on agricultural conditions, commissioned him an agricultural explorer and instructed him to proceed up the Yangtze and to study and report on farming conditions and to collect seeds and specimens to send to Washington.[86] Brill reached Chungking. His letters and his diaries describe not only agricultural techniques and flora; they also relate his dramatic experiences. These included assistance to missionaries fleeing from the aroused antiforeign movement and an escape from death thanks to the loyalty of a servant. Brill sent some specimens to the department, but received instructions to bring the mission to an end after reports of the disturbances reached the secretary.[87]

Brill was later to work briefly as an agriculturist in the Philippines. But he spent most of the remaining years of his life in farming in New York and New Jersey. His mission to China—the first of its kind—did not achieve its objectives. Yet, as his associate Gilmore wrote to him in 1924, it was a pioneer effort not unrelated to many later developments, and remembered for at least two decades after it came to an end.[88]

The story of Brill's successor, Edward C. Parker, illuminates other problems which American agricultural missions abroad encountered. After taking his degree at the Minnesota College of Agriculture, Parker worked at the Experiment Station on wheat- and oat-breeding projects, gave instruction in soils and crops, had charge of a cost-of-production study, and served as special agent in the Bureau of Plant Industry and the Bureau of Statistics in the Department of Agriculture. The Manchurian government, through the State Department, requested an agricultural expert and the Department of Agriculture recommended Parker. With an associate, William H. Tomhave, Parker set out in 1908 for Manchuria, where he was to stay for more than three years.

Parker's difficulties can hardly be exaggerated. It was disappointing—but within the sphere of what any agriculturalist might expect—to have the American wheat he planted fail. He sent specimens of soil to Washington to find the reason. But Japanese so-called "experts" unfortunately posed more difficult problems. The Tokyo government not only foisted these "experts" onto Manchuria; it also forced the local Chinese authorities, after they finally got enough nerve to dismiss them, to reinstate the whole crew. And, apart from knowing nothing about agriculture, the Japanese were a constant thorn in Parker's side. The petty Chinese bureaucracy also subjected

the Americans to countless annoyances. It proved impossible to get help in enlarging the scope of the work or in taking the first steps toward realizing plans that had been carefully worked out with higher officials. It was necessary to wait for weeks for piddling allowances from an extremely modest budget; seeds and machines often lay idle as a result. There was, unfortunately, no continuity of policy, and frequent changes in the bureaucracy itself only made things worse. The students in the agricultural school, moreover, had too little English to make instruction possible. Parker's associate left in disgust. Regarding the mission as the chance of a lifetime and hating to admit defeat, Parker urged the American legation to show some interest in the hope that this might counteract the prevailing apathy. To no avail. Parker, like Brill before him, concluded that in comparison with western standards what had been done amounted to very little. But he believed he had at least gained something "in the broader knowledge of world affairs."[89]

Such agricultural missions became increasingly common. For in the first decade of the twentieth century the Bureau of Plant Industry, to take a single agency, responded to several requests for the loan of its technical personnel to the four quarters of the globe. John C. Barnett, experienced in the Bureau's Farmers' Cooperative Demonstration work in the South, helped Siamese agriculture jump ahead, in return for which he himself jumped from the $1,200 the Bureau paid him to the magnificent salary of $6,000. When a scientific agricultural program was set up in its East African colonies, the Portuguese government secured the services of Otis W. Barrett; V. C. Brewer and W. H. Scherffius went to South Africa to aid in tobacco culture; Henry F. Schultz, whom we have seen at work in Panama, was called by Argentina to help introduce tropical plants there. Brazil invited Walter Fischer to become director of the Pará Experiment Station.[90] Leslie C. Coleman presently became Director of Agriculture in Mysore State, India. His numerous reports on agricultural education, green manuring in Mysore, and other topics indicated the scope and nature of his much appreciated activities.[91] All these men suddenly found themselves on a far higher salary level than they had known at home; and all of them not only gained in experience but extended American scientific agricultural methods to lands that had hitherto known little or nothing of this side of American enterprise.

All of these activities represented a substantial achievement. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries America had learned something about exchanging information with other lands by means of technical missions. In part these missions were designed to procure information for the benefit of Americans only or to achieve certain common ends in coöpera-

tion with others. But it was increasingly clear by the turn of the century that other countries were finding it profitable to look to America for expert assistance in solving their varied problems and were finding the technical mission to be a suitable instrument. Agriculture, if the most important, was only one of the many fields of activity of such missions. Experts found use for their talents in widely separated parts of the world: Latin America, Europe, China, India, and even the polar regions. The stories of these technical missions form no clear pattern. Most of them were *ad hoc* attempts to solve a specific problem, and the nature of the mission, its personnel, and its degree of success varied with circumstances. There was little evidence of continuity except as some individuals, such as John C. Branner, Henry F. Schultz, and Albert Koebele, participated in more than one mission.

But the missions thus far discussed do not furnish the only examples. For in the 1870's a series of more or less related missions to Japan added up to truly impressive achievements in the exportation of American techniques—scientific, administrative, and educational. And the practice period was only the beginning.

Missions to Japan

Just six years after Commodore Perry presented the shogun with seeds, plants, agricultural machinery, and technical information,[1] Japanese officials turned to the United States for help in exploring the northern island of Yezo. It is not clear why the shogun's bureaucrats sought the assistance of Americans, for the Dutch had preceded them in introducing many aspects of western civilization, and other European powers quickly followed the example of Perry in presenting the shogun with gadgets and other samples of western ingenuity. In any case, the shogunate, in its effort to strengthen its hold on the outlying possession and to increase its wealth, decided to seek American aid in the development of western methods of mining the largely unknown mineral resources of Yezo.

The shogunate's cautious overture was made with some awkwardness and met with an almost equal amount. It asked the Japanese commercial agent in San Francisco, C. W. Brooks, to engage two geologists and mining engineers. But the request, also passed along by the American legation in Yedo, led to independent action on the part of Americans in Washington. By coincidence, both the group in Washington and the commercial agent in San Francisco hit on the same man for one of the nominations. That was Raphael Pumpelly, who had been trained in mining engineering in Saxony and who turned up in San Francisco in 1861 after a harassing but successful exploratory operation in Arizona.[2] In the end, William P. Blake, the commercial agent's other choice, went along with Pumpelly. Blake was a graduate of the Sheffield Scientific School at New Haven; he had worked as a mineralogist for various chemical outfits in New York and Baltimore;

and in addition he had investigated North Carolina's mineral resources and was the current editor of *The Mining Journal*.[3] The men sailed from San Francisco on November 23, 1861.

After their arrival at Yokohama, nearly two months passed before Blake and Pumpelly had any word from Japanese officials. The Japanese did not know whether engineers should be received as mere mechanics or as high officials. Townsend Harris, our minister, finally set them straight by telling them that he would receive the American engineers in his home exactly as he had received Commodore Perry. A curious interview followed, in which the Japanese officials asked very naïve questions which suggested that in their minds the western scientists possessed "a key to open a royal road through the secrets of nature." The questioners were surprised when the strange Americans said it was impossible to tell from the taste of fish and water whether Japan was rich in minerals.[4]

At last Pumpelly and Blake reached the outlying and sparsely settled island of Yezo. They visited the mines. They observed the methods of washing for gold. They made the first application of powder to mining which the Japanese ever saw. The young men whom they were to teach learned fast enough the art of drilling. But it took patience to teach them to take part in charging, tamping, and lighting the dynamite-filled holes. Here, in effect, was an embryonic school—the first in which Americans taught young Japanese western science and its application to mining. In reconnaissance journeys the Americans studied volcanic deposits of varying kinds, and older stratified rock formations. In the later Tertiary or post-Tertiary formations they found fossils of mollusks much like existing forms. In these and in later terrace-like formations they found evidence for the comparatively recent uplift of the whole island. All this and much more they described in careful reports. The distribution of rocks was sketched in one of the earliest geological maps of Japan.[5] But the Americans could not get leave to inspect the coal mines of the interior, presumably a chief reason for their coming. The truth was that the feudal daimyos eyed the Americans—and all foreigners—with great fear and hostility. In fact, opposition to the liberal policy of the shogun toward western "barbarians" threatened civil war. So Pumpelly and Blake said goodbye to Japan and headed toward China and new adventures.

To the surprise of many westerners in Japan the Meiji restoration of 1868 went much further than the shogunate had tried to do in opening Japan to western influences, especially to western science and knowledge. The new oligarchy, drawn in large part from the lower bureaucratic ranks of the old feudal class, determined to adopt western science and techniques,

in part to consolidate their own power and in part to advance the national welfare without permitting the conquest of Japan by western powers. In other words, the leaders of the Meiji restoration appear to have been a remarkably able and perspicacious group who were better able than most of their Chinese contemporaries to appreciate the importance of carefully selecting certain western techniques and adapting these to indigenous conditions and desires as the most likely means of resisting western aggressive control. It was as if they felt the time was very short in which the techniques which gave the West power could be selectively adapted to Japanese uses. This was the upshot of the hope expressed and the policy outlined toward western knowledge in the Emperor's Charter Oath and in other documents. To further these purposes special embassies went abroad to observe, to pave the way for young Japanese to study in the West, and to invite specialists to Japan, there to train future leaders, to help modernize communications, administration, education, agriculture, and industry, to advise the government—so long as might be necessary—in every sphere.[6]

In the importation of western knowledge and in the associated modernization of Japan, Americans, along with British, French, Germans, Dutch, and Belgians took part. In the decision to include Americans three men in Japan played important roles. One was the Reverend Guido Verbeck. He arrived in Japan in 1859 as a missionary of the Dutch Reformed Church. Under the shogunate he taught English, through the medium of the Bible and the United States Constitution, to a group of young Japanese many of whom became future leaders. The school that he headed in Yedo in 1869 became the nucleus for the later Imperial University of Tokyo. Under the old and the new regimes, ministers of state sought his advice. It was partly the result of his counsel that the government in 1871 decided to send the Iwakura Mission to America and Europe. This mission selected American personnel to come to Japan for specialized technical services. One commissioner, Kuroda Kiyotaka, was so deeply impressed by the competence, spirit, and happiness of American women that he determined to have his country emulate the American example by providing widespread education for girls.[7]

A man very different from Verbeck was Charles De Long, who took charge of the American legation in 1869. Back of him lay a colorful career in the California of the gold-rush era. His lawyer's hand helped him write the constitution of Nevada, whither he had pioneered with his eye on the main chance. In recommending him for the Japanese appointment Senator William Stewart said that no one would be more zealous in promoting

American commercial interests in Japan. Eloquent testimonials from the American business community in Japan later testified that Senator Stewart was a good prophet. In defending himself against a multitude of charges launched by his enemies, De Long informed the Department of State that one of his principal reasons in promoting the retention of American experts by the Japanese government was to open Japan to American exports. In Nippon, De Long pointed out, the government, not private persons, was the chief buyer of foreign goods—railroad materials, telegraph apparatus, lighthouse equipment; and since native officers in the several bureaus were greatly influenced by their overseas advisors in placing orders for foreign equipment, he regarded the American technical experts whose employment he encouraged as "quasi-commercial agents, for these people might assist in building up American trade with Japan and help our country to overcome as nearly as possible the balance of trade which has hitherto been so largely against us."[8] It would be unfair, however, to suggest that De Long was interested in American technical experts only because of the advantages they might bring to commercial enterprise. He believed that the success of our technical experts would promote good relations between the two countries.[9] If anything, De Long was overzealous in promoting the activities of the American experts in Japanese employ.

De Long was followed by John Bingham, Ohio lawyer best known, perhaps, for his testimony that the framers of the fourteenth amendment meant to protect corporations no less than freedmen from state encroachments on their rights. Like De Long, Bingham spared no pains in furthering the cause of American technical experts in Japan. He shared his predecessor's conviction that the agents of European powers in Japan set themselves against the United States not only in their newspapers but in their efforts to have their own nationals named as experts in Japanese employ.[10] Bingham felt that his nation was handicapped by the clause in the diplomatic and consular act of 1856 which forbade officers in the foreign service from recommending to the governments to which they were accredited any person for employment of trust or profit.[11] Bingham urged the department to further the repeal of this provision, so that any diplomatic officer might recommend an American citizen to a foreign government, subject to such regulations as the Secretary of State set up.[12] At the suggestion of the department, this was done.[13] Later interpretations on the part of the State Department smoothed the way for the more efficient nomination of Americans interested in serving foreign governments.

When the new Meiji government undertook the colonization of the northern island of Yezo, or Hokkaido, in the interest of relieving the pres-

sure of population in the older areas, of checking possible Russian expansion, and of demonstrating what the new regime could do in the way of modernizing Japanese life, it turned to the United States for technical aid. Topographical and meteorological conditions in the frontier outpost, which had a bare 50,000 inhabitants and an economy resting almost entirely on fishing, resembled conditions in the northern United States more closely than those of any western country. Moreover, the United States enjoyed an enviable reputation in agricultural technology. American exhibits at the world's fairs had publicized American plows, cultivators, reapers, and harvesters. Foreign visitors, including Japanese, had been impressed by the efficiency and productivity of American agriculture. Nor was the unforgettably favorable impression created in Japan by our first minister, Townsend Harris, without effect. The well-conducted educational work of our missionaries in Japan was also in the picture. For all these reasons the government, late in 1870, sent General Kuroda Kiyotaka to America instructed to choose a chief advisor in agriculture with assistants in engineering, geology, and mineralogy.

When Kuroda sought the counsel of President Grant on personnel, he was referred to Horace Capron, Commissioner of Agriculture. Capron seemed well fitted for the undertaking. It is true that he was well along in years—67 to be exact. But he enjoyed vigorous health. He had directed textile factories in Maryland. He had supervised and built up celebrated farms near Baltimore and in Illinois, reclaimed waste lands, and experimented successfully with livestock breeding. He had contributed articles to the agricultural press, served as president of the National Agricultural Association, and fought as a general in the Civil War. Moreover, Capron was currently administering the agricultural agency of the federal government.[14]

Capron outlined his terms. Kuroda met them. His title was to be Commissioner and Advisor to the Kaitakushi or Colonial Office charged with the development of Hokkaido. He was to have his expenses paid to and from Japan and to be given a house, guards, and servants—and to get $10,000 a year. This was a handsome salary for an American public official and considerably more than that of the prime minister of Japan. Capron was to be responsible only to the Kaitakushi and was to be free to choose his assistants. When possible, however, he was to employ Japanese since the government was eager to have its youth trained in the special knowledge and skills of the West.

The agreement made, Capron and Kuroda visited factories, shipyards, farms, nurseries, militia headquarters, and engineering centers; farm ma-

chinery was bought, also seeds, nursery stock, and livestock, together with a couple of ships to be used in plying back and forth between Nippon and Hokkaido. Finally Capron resigned as Commissioner of Agriculture and received from the White House recommendations and good wishes for his new venture. Predicting a fine performance Grant ended by saying that "such a result cannot prove otherwise than beneficial to the world's interest, leaving out of account that of ourselves, as a single nation."[15] The Department of State gave Capron a letter to the American minister in Tokyo, asking whatever help he might give.[16]

Meantime Capron had been recruiting a skeleton staff. This included Dr. Thomas Antisell, chief of the Bureau of Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture, Dr. Stuart Eldridge, librarian of the department, and Maj. A. G. Warfield of the Baltimore and Ohio, chief engineer. Subsequently Capron hired a nurseryman, a livestock man, and an agricultural mechanic. The General realized that much depended on his associates. "God grant," he wrote in his diary, "that I may find them all that is desired."[17]

Capron bade goodbye at the Washington railway station to his friend, Dr. Joseph Henry of the Smithsonian Institution, and to members of the Department of Agriculture. After a brief sojourn in Wisconsin to arrange for future orders of livestock and nursery stock, he reached California. He set sail for Tokyo on August 1, 1871.

The reception in Tokyo, both on the part of the American legation and Japanese officialdom, was warm and appreciative. The American minister, Charles De Long, reported that he had been active in influencing the government to give the commission the widest range for its labors. There was no doubt that he welcomed the Americans as allies in his campaign for increasing his nation's influence in Japan. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iwakura, spoke to De Long of the mission with "great pride and pleasure as having been sent by the United States Government . . . out of kindness for Japan."[18] Innumerable officials, including the prime minister, called on the Americans, to whom a great banquet was tendered. The emperor received Capron in audience—the first audience ever given to any foreigner not in the diplomatic service. The mission was housed in the elaborate Shiba Temples compound, the finest of its kind in the country.[19]

Capron arranged for a preliminary inspection of Hokkaido—a task he entrusted to Antisell and Warfield. In addition to making mineralogical and topographical surveys, they were carefully to examine the soil, to find its adaptation for drainage by natural or artificial means. They were to

consider its potential productiveness in terms of its native grasses and timbers.[20]

The report that Warfield submitted did not cover all the points Capron outlined.[21] The season was too late for that. But it recounted arduous explorations by horseback, and it made specific recommendations. In addition to noting the general topographical features of the southern part of the island, the report commented on the fertility of the somewhat sandy soil, noted the abundance of good timber, and called attention to the industrial as well as the agricultural potentialities of the island. Antisell's paper spoke adversely of the subfrigid climate of the island. But Capron, struck by Antisell's own description of native grasses and trees, concluded that the weather was much like that of the northern American states. The unfavorable comment of Antisell on the climate became a sore point, one that Capron could neither forgive nor forget, as the frequent references to it in his diary show.[22]

On the basis of the reconnaissance of his aides and such other information as he could gather, Capron submitted his first report early in January, 1872. It stated unequivocally that contrary to a widely held opinion Hokkaido had both a soil and a climate suited to agriculture. Inasmuch as the island possessed several climates, however, Capron recommended a meteorological survey and the establishment of a meteorological service. The same region in America, if thrown open on liberal terms to settlers, would be at once occupied, Capron held. But he pointed out that a people used to the mild climate of Nippon could not quickly adjust themselves to the more rigorous climate of the northern island. "They must become gradually inured to it, and must learn that it is not only possible to live comfortably in a cold climate, but that the invigorating influence of such a climate, together with a partial change of food, will strengthen the system and enable it to resist the influence of the cold." Capron also pointed out that rice, the staple food of the Japanese, was both the costliest and the least nutritious of the food grains and recommended the development of a taste for wheat, vegetables, fruits, and meats. Careful scientific experiment could determine what soils, not only in Hokkaido but in Nippon itself, were suitable for such produce. To that end he urged the establishment of an experimental farm at Sapporo, the new capital of Hokkaido. This farm, making use of fertilizers and agricultural machinery, could test the suitability of the area to the culture of grains, fruits, and livestock.

Whatever course the government might adopt to encourage colonization, Capron pointed to the imperative necessity of a survey of the island "for convenience of location and description." The report appended sum-

maries of American land laws. These might suggest a land policy. But the government must be patient, for the changes in the habits and food of the emigrant from Nippon must be slow. The government might well consider introducing from Europe or America immigrants who, seasoned to harsh climates, could teach the native immigrant the best methods of meeting a new situation. To make up for the shortage of manpower, agricultural machinery might, Capron thought, be profitably employed.[23]

The great distance between America and Hokkaido led Capron to build near Tokyo model farms where imported shrubs, trees, and livestock could be acclimated before being sent on to the northern island. Moreover, he was eager to improve the food habits of the people in the older and more heavily settled parts of the empire. To that end he believed in the usefulness of demonstration farms close to Tokyo on which the public, officials, and the emperor himself might see the American type of foods and watch the cross-breeding of a superior type of livestock. Hence it was that the three experimental and demonstration farms were begun in the neighborhood of Tokyo. Eight hundred workers cleared land got from a feudal daimyo, and in short order three farms resulted. Farm number one was given over to improved grains and vegetables, supervised by Edward Shelton. Farm number two comprised the nursery of fruit trees, berries, and the like. It was directed by Louis Boehme, a German-born agriculturist sent out by the New York nursery for which he had worked. Farm number three was devoted to the raising of animal feeds, with the use of farm machinery, and to livestock breeding. N. W. Holt and George Randolph were, for a time, in charge of the machinery; Tom Taylor was foreman; and Edwin Dun, son of a prosperous Ohio farmer, had the livestock in his keeping.[24]

In the spring of 1872 Capron noted proudly in his journal that all was going well at the farms. "Notwithstanding all the croakings and prognostications of not only the Japanese but foreigners that all would be destroyed by bugs and vermin of every kind, not a plant has been disturbed so far, and the vegetables are progressing with less obstruction than I have ever seen in America." On a later occasion he noted with equal satisfaction: "Here we have the first germs for the production of this new food, not only in vegetables and fruits, but in bread food and in meats, of which they now have nothing."[25] In the autumn of the same year—1872—Minister De Long sent a glowing report of the farms to the Secretary of State. "The stock which he has imported from America is all thriving finely and delights the Japanese very much. A vast area of land that one year ago was covered with forests of bamboo and oak, and the ruins of old buildings, is now converted into grain fields, clover pastures, nurseries, vegetable grounds and

ornamented by landscape gardenings. It being my first visit there since General Capron's arrival, I confess that I was astonished and delighted."[26] The birth of the first calf early in 1873 from the new experiment in breeding was another event in the history of the farms; Capron noted that "it marks the first step toward the improvement of their miserable little black native cattle."[27]

Unfortunately, the going was not always so smooth. In May, 1873, a malignant disease, first appearing among the native stock, spread to the imported herds. When an imported Devonshire and a handsome shorthorn bull were struck by the disease, Capron lamented that "the whole herd must go from present appearance, as they are dying off rapidly." Unaware of the trouble that Capron and his helpers were having, the empress dowager and her ladies sent word of their intention to visit the farms, which they did.[28]

The imperial visits added color to the life at the farms if they did not, as Capron hoped, change the food habits of the people. One day the young emperor wanted to see just how the machines at the farm worked. Edwin Dun, in charge, was told to conduct the demonstration in the costume always worn by westerners at imperial audiences, namely, a full dress suit, a boiled shirt, a white tie, and a top hat. Thus outfitted the young Ohioan seated himself on a machine and reaped a few rounds of barley and wheat, the emperor an interested spectator. The Ohio farmer changed his team to a mowing machine and cut a few swaths of rye grass, after which he successively changed his team to a big wheat drill and a corn planter. The emperor was then driven to the steam thresher, and the power started with Dun on the feeding platform. All the work had been dirty, but the threshing was the worst. "I believe I am the only man living," Dun wrote years afterwards in his reminiscences, "who has undertaken the job in a dress suit." Everything went off surprisingly well, however, and Dun was told that His Majesty was much pleased. Thinking that this was the end of the matter, he made a quick run to his own quarters "about the dirtiest individual ever seen in evening clothes and a high hat." After a bath, he settled down with a beer and a cigar, only to be informed that the emperor was waiting to receive him. So there was nothing to do but to get back into the sweaty outfit, present himself to His Majesty who was in the pavilion, make his three bows, and back himself out.[29]

The farms were continued long after Capron left Japan—indeed, until the end of the Kaitakushi in 1882. It is not easy to estimate their influence. We know that Boehme distributed over 2,000,000 fruit trees in Nippon itself. And we have the testimony of a Japanese student of agriculture that

the farms introduced to many Japanese previously unknown vegetables as well as apples, edible cherries, and other fruits and berries. The instruction given by the American crew in practical and theoretical agriculture to some seventy young Japanese was something.[30] On the other hand, Edwin Dun—who stayed on in Japan, married two Japanese women successively, and became the United States minister in Cleveland's administration—was critical of the experiment. In his view the cost of keeping up the enormous way station was far greater than any value therefrom. It, moreover, took up the greatest part of the time and energy of Capron throughout his five years in Japan.[31]

The instruction in agriculture that Dun and his associates at the farms gave to young Japanese was intended by Kuroda, who believed in both mass education and specialized training, to be the germ of an agricultural school. The Minister of Education did indeed approve the idea of developing such a school in connection with the routine work of the Kaitakushi, and in 1872 a school was formally opened. Before Capron left Japan in 1875, he recommended that it be raised to collegiate rank. This was done, and it was also removed to Sapporo. The Japanese minister in Washington turned to President William S. Clark of the Massachusetts State College of Agriculture, whose trustees granted him a year's leave to launch the new institution. With two assistants he arrived in Sapporo in the summer of 1876. The college opened with fourteen students, a staff consisting of a Japanese director, interpreter, and farm overseer, and, in addition to President Clark, three other well-trained American agriculturists. Later on other Americans joined the staff. In curriculum and outlook the institution resembled the Massachusetts State College at Amherst. The influence of the college on the development of Hokkaido was considerable. It introduced the use of American agricultural machinery, the cultivation of corn, potatoes, timothy, bluegrass, apples, onions, cabbages, beans, and tomatoes. The college also took an important part in the larger development of Hokkaido—contributing substantially to mining and industry as well as to agriculture.[32]

Meantime under Capron's general supervision the several projects in Hokkaido proceeded with ups and downs. Among the heartaches none hurt him more than his relations with his staff. That these were so unsatisfactory resulted in part from his own shortcomings. Dun, who remained on pleasant terms with him, later wrote in his unpublished memoirs that while Capron was a charming companion—and the best cocktail mixer in the world—he was an extremely poor leader and administrator. "Instead of being a help and support to his staff he was constantly a hindrance in

their way. If one of us had a suggestion to make regarding our speciality," Dun continued, "he would blandly refer us to the Japanese in our department. If we ventured to question the advisability of his suggestions he would intimate that it was impertinent to question the wisdom of the acts of our chief." The superior air he adopted toward his associates naturally rubbed them the wrong way. "With such a chief there was no possibility of teamwork," concluded Dun.[33] Capron's relations with Dr. Antisell were especially ill-fated. The physician regarded his chief as a blundering incompetent. Capron considered Antisell a traitor. The intervention of the American legation only partly straightened matters out.[34] Nor were Capron's relations with Warfield very happy. The Major imbibed alcohol too freely, insulted some Japanese officers, shot their dogs, and did all sorts of mischief. Yet the Legation took the ground that no member of the American mission could be dismissed for minor causes without due proceedings. The want of discipline in the American mission, commented a member of the Legation in Tokyo, caused considerable sorrow among the Japanese and excited their wonder.[35]

Despite the outwardly pleasant relations between the Japanese and Capron, the American felt great distress at the way things went in Hokkaido. His misgivings and depression must be viewed within the frame of his own assumptions and conceptions of the Japanese—assumptions and conceptions that took shape early in his sojourn in the land of cherry blossoms and chrysanthemums. "Everything in Japan is to me a mystery," he wrote in his diary shortly after arriving; "how it is that a people naturally so intelligent, ingenious, appreciative, and so capable of imitating everything they see, should remain so long in a state of semibarbarism, is perfectly incomprehensible."[36] After spending his first summer in Hokkaido Capron concluded that the Japanese were "very sanguine and overzealous" and that their "unbounded conceit and confidence in their own ability to comprehend at a glance the full scope and meaning of every plan or suggestion which emanates from their foreign advisors," was "the great fault of their character."[37] For the Japanese people, whom he compared to children with new toys, he had a low regard; for the potentialities of Hokkaido which, he thought, might in the hands of Anglo-Saxons be made "the garden spot of the world," an exaggerated one.

With such predilections Capron quite naturally did not understand the reasons for the vexations he experienced in his dealing with the Japanese. On arriving at Hakodate he was shocked at the mistaken judgment that had led to the expenditure of over $100,000 for the government farm which, after several years, was still unable to produce enough food for the

slender population. He was even more horrified at the mistaken judgment that had led to the dead loss of another $100,000 to erect at Mori docks that could not possibly be reached by ocean-going vessels—so shallow was the sea and so heavy the swell—and warehouses that could only be useless for years to come. Imagine his feelings when on his visit the next summer he found that, contrary to his advice, the piers had been extended several hundred feet, only to reach to seven feet of water. Nor was Capron less distressed at the construction of useless roads, canals, and other projects, many of which were worse than useless.[38]

For the superabundance of officials in every enterprise Capron expressed exasperation and bitterness. When he examined the fishing stations he concluded that these might provide a large revenue to the government if properly managed; as it was, there was an official for every hundred fish caught, and in some cases, one for every ten. At the Kaitakushi farm eighteen officials, housed in extensive quarters, were supervising the workers, when one good American farmer with his two sons and a yoke of oxen would have produced better results on a forty-acre farm. On one occasion Capron used the great Illinois breaking plow to break the prairie soil—the first so broken in the island. But the Japanese required six men for each bull. "The most trouble," Capron reported, "was with the men themselves ... who require the ring in their noses in place of the bull's." However, each day's effort made it possible to drop a man and a bull, until Capron had one man leading the forward bull after the first furrow was cut. But an official quickly appeared to take over, to organize a board of direction, to appoint a master of bulls with unlimited assistants. Even they, however, were put to it to know what to do when the bulls broke loose and demoralized the one trained team.[39] So many examples of costly and useless red tape led Capron to the conclusion that it was impossible, by any remonstrances he could make, to keep the Japanese from rushing into expensive schemes or to combat the costly uselessness of the innumerable officials.

Capron came to realize that his work was hampered by language difficulties. Despite the help of his interpreters, he learned that the shade of meaning in words was hard to convey. Many of the misunderstandings sprang from the problem of communication.

Yet there were triumphs as well as frustrations. Each summer Capron noted the progressive improvement of the farms. He took delight in having further proved that his assistant Dr. Antisell was wrong about the climate when the maize matured well enough to be roasted on the ear on an August 21, when wheat, rye, and other grains headed beautifully, when vegetables of many kinds flourished, when the first pear was plucked, and when the

livestock showed improvement. Capron not only showed the Japanese how to break prairie soil; he also taught farmers how better to plant, cultivate, and harvest. And he took pride in the admirable botanical survey—a survey that included the collecting and classifying of specimens.[40] Despite the ravages of wolves and the shyness of the native stock in breeding with the imported American studs, the merino sheep multiplied and the average yield of unwashed wool beat the American record.[41] A successful California rancher, D. W. A. Jones, carried sheep-raising along American lines still further.[42] In another area Capron's advice was also much to the point. At his suggestion Dun provided Japanese officials with special reports on the Newfoundland fisheries. On the nomination of Dr. Baird of the Smithsonian Institution, Ulysses Treat, of Maine, came to Hokkaido and helped promote the salmon and shrimp canneries that in due time became an important industry.[43]

In developing agriculture and fishing the Capron mission also planned and carried through important engineering projects. After making an initial survey of the island, Maj. A. C. Warfield recommended the development of the commodious, landlocked and ice-free harbor of Mororan, described the course of the route from the harbor to Sapporo, the new capital, indicated the general topographical features, and further called attention to the coal deposits at the head of the Ishikari River. Warfield also commented on the industrial possibilities if water power were developed and roads were built. He further advised that proper steps be taken to lay out the streets of Sapporo with pavements at each side, as in American cities, and that adequate drainage be provided. The Warfield report also indicated where bridges and canals were most needed and where, ultimately, railroads could be most profitably located. Warfield advised that the coal, silver, and sulphur mines be modernized and reopened. Estimated costs for the various projects accompanied the report. On the basis of the data and recommendations in it Capron made essentially the same proposals to the Japanese government.[44]

One of the major engineering accomplishments was the trigonometrical survey of the island. This was carried out by Lt. James Wasson, a West Point graduate, and by Lt. Murray Day, U.S.N., on leave. Despite the inadequacy of available instruments and the untrained Japanese assistants, the group took the field early in May, 1873. After surveying the proposed extension of the road to Sapporo, the party moved with difficulty up the Ishikari River to a large, open valley, which promised to be a favorable spot on which to establish a "base line." In this the party was disappointed. It

did, however, make important contributions to the knowledge of this little known and remote part of the island.

The next attempt was made at Yubetsu on the east coast. On July 18, Lt. Murray Day was enabled, thanks to the arrival from America of proper instruments, to begin the survey of the tributaries of the Ishikari River. The mouth and the channel of the river were also surveyed. The parties used the methods of the United States Coast Survey. As a result of the season's work, 4,725 stations were occupied and 344 miles of river work accomplished. The next year rivers and a considerable part of the coast line were surveyed, the triangulation work was continued, and astronomical observations were made. The attempt to systematize the survey of farm lands was not successful. Unfortunately, Day did not complete the entire survey of the island that he outlined. Kuroda warmly commended him and asked to have the United States Navy thanked for giving him a leave to perform a great service.[45]

The surveys of Wasson and Day were overshadowed by the more extensive and intensive geological surveys made under the direction of Benjamin Smith Lyman, chief geologist and mining engineer to the Kaitakushi or colonial office. Henry S. Smith, assistant geologist and mining engineer, was also associated with the project. Lyman had been trained at Harvard, at the School of Mines in Paris, at the Royal Academy at Freiburg, and, equally important, in the geological surveys of Pennsylvania, Iowa, and other states. He had already made geological surveys in the Punjab in quest of oil. Lyman's contract specified that he was to perform diligently all the labor assigned to him, obeying orders by or through the department or the commissioner, General Capron. He agreed also not to engage in any private business, nor to absent himself without permission except on Sundays and holidays. The pay, in addition to a house and transportation, was $7,000, a princely sum to be paid in those days for professional work in a land which seemed romantically alluring to Lyman and to other Americans. Before beginning his work in Hokkaido, Lyman gave a short course in geology. Then he took his pupils into the field, where he supervised the work with extreme care, indicating in his reports just what the work of each party was, just what his own part was, and giving credit generously. At one time his party numbered fifty men. The devotion of his Japanese students was touching, as the Lyman papers, now deposited in the Forbes Library in Northampton, Massachusetts, testify. In after years these students continued to send Lyman gifts and to seek him out wherever he was. Here we have evidence of the importance of a sympathetic personality in explaining the success of such missions.[46]

The work began with making topographical and geological maps of Hokkaido. In 1873 Lyman made three rough reports on the surveys of various oil lands. But this was only the beginning. The work resulted not only in the discovery of oil fields but of other minerals, especially coal. Extending his surveys to the whole empire, Lyman estimated in 1879 that its coal resources approximated 620,000,000 tons, valued at $100,000,000. But his reports included not only the descriptions and maps, topographical and geological, of most of Japan. They also included descriptions of water-power sites, of potential reclamation projects, and of the customs and folklore of the primitive peoples. When Lyman's contract ended in 1879, he stayed on in Japan for another two years, putting his field notes into shape, completing his maps, finishing the reports. On leaving the country in 1881 he discovered that the Japanese department of engineering had no funds for publishing his survey map of the oil fields of the country. Characteristically Lyman paid for the publication and contributed the map to the department. His reports, in English and Japanese, comprised seven volumes. The subsequent development of the oil industry owed much to his pioneer work, as did that of the coal mines.[47]

Capron also took satisfaction in the record of road-building. In the spring of 1872, when Major Warfield arrived on the island, there was not a rod of wagon road. The early summer of that year witnessed the completion of twenty-five miles of graded road. By midsummer of 1873 the road from Hakodate to Sapporo was ready for carriages. It was, in Capron's eyes, "a grand work, and will do more for the development and settlement of this Island than all that has been done besides. Already its beneficial effects are seen in the new farms and settlements all along the route from Hakodate to Mori .... The same influences are visible on all the new roads of lesser magnitude." By the end of 1873 some 173 miles of thoroughly constructed roads had been finished.[48]

After Capron left for America, one of his fellow-citizens further developed communications in Hokkaido. In 1880 the Japanese govern ent asked Col. Joseph U. Crawford of the Pennsylvania Railroad to build the first railroad in the island. It was to run from the harbor of Otaru to the coal mines—a distance of forty-five miles. Assisted by two Japanese engineers trained at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Crawford showed what energy and teamwork could do. The road was finished in less than half the stipulated time, despite the steep gradient and sharp curves. It was built at a cost of $20,000 a mile, considerably less than the British required for the less difficult roads that they constructed. The project was equipped with rolling stock from the Baldwin Locomotive Works. This, the first

American road built in the Orient, was a credit to its chief engineer.[49] In the years that followed, Crawford's work was supplemented by the roads, bridges, and harbor improvements constructed by the engineering department of the Imperial Agricultural College's American staff.

From the point of view of the objectives of the larger experiment in Hokkaido nothing was more encouraging than the steady progress made in the substitution of machine power for human power. On July 29, 1874, the first wheat was harvested on the Kaitakushi farms by reaper. N. W. Holt of Dayton, Ohio, and his single American assistant, succeeded in building, under Capron's direction, grist mills and sawmills, and installing the American machinery without mishap. Capron was on hand for the first grinding of grain and took delight in noting the amazement of the Japanese onlookers, who had never seen machinery grind food products. He hoped that the grist mill would speed up the much desired transformation of the diet from rice to wheat. The two sawmills at Sapporo, the one operated by water power created by damming the Hokei and developing reservoirs into which flowed the canal bringing the logs, the other driven by steam power, were capable of sawing 12,000 feet of lumber a day. By the end of the season —the mills were put into operation in July—about a million feet of plank were sawed. Power machines also made shingles, window sashes, laths, and other wood products. Capron rightly saw that this was a necessary step in substituting for the Japanese paper type of house, structures built of wood, which were far more suitable to Hokkaido's climate.[50]

When Capron left for America in 1875, he was warmly commended for his work and given the highest decoration yet conferred on a foreigner. Whatever the limitations of his mission to Japan, it seems to have been regarded by the Japanese as on the whole successful.[51]

American technical assistance to Japan of the Meiji restoration was not limited to agriculture, geological exploration and mapping, and engineering. At the same time that experts in these fields were at work technicians in public administration were also invited to Japan. In the spring of 1871 Minister Charles De Long became convinced that the interests of Japan and the prestige of the United States might be advanced by introducing an American element into the foreign personnel in the service of the Japanese government. He was struck especially by the primitive and utterly unsystematic character of the Japanese customs and internal revenue services. So he suggested to the Minister of Finance the employment of competent Americans to organize matters. The Japanese decided to ask the State Department to recommend experts in customs and revenue services. Congres-

sional legislation of 1856—not yet modified—made such action on the part of the American government difficult if not illegal. But De Long urged the importance of the Japanese request. He hoped that a way would be found to meet it, that men of education and experience, mild in manner, patient, devoted, and competent might be recommended. If they were wise, De Long added, they would bargain sharply in advance on all matters touching on pay and conditions of work. The second assistant minister of finance, Ito, Count Hirobumi, had gone to America on a mission, and he conducted the negotiations.[32]

The choice fell on George B. Williams, who was named financial advisor to the government of Japan. Williams had conducted banking business at Lafayette, Indiana, served in the Civil War, and was at the time of his appointment to the Japanese office, deputy commissioner of customs in Washington. During his Japanese service, Williams twice went with native officials on missions to Europe to negotiate loans. Before he resigned in 1876 he had helped modernize the coinage system, the banking laws, and the patent structure—and all of them reflected American patterns.[33]

At about the same time that Williams went to Japan, Hilliard Miller entered the customs service of the government. When he left in 1878 the emperor in a special audience praised him highly for his efficient and faithful service.[34] During these years Matthew Scott worked as a technical expert in the customs service. On his death in 1880 the government set aside a fund for a memorial to this valued public servant. It is clear that the Americans in helping organize financial institutions on a national scale contributed to the victory of centralization over the traditional feudalism.

The same thing was true of an American who helped develop the modern postal service. When Minister De Long went to Washington in 1872 with the special Japanese embassy, he ran into a young postal clerk, Samuel Bryan, whose character and qualifications impressed him greatly. He recommended Bryan to the Embassy in connection with the plans for modernizing Japanese postal services, domestic and foreign. The young clerk, who was but twenty-five, hailed from Cadiz, Ohio. After a war record he had become attached to the Post Office Department.[35] When he arrived in Tokyo, the Japanese officials seemed to think him too young a fellow for taking any position of great responsibility. But he presented a scheme for postal organization which, according to later report, was adopted in February, 1873. Thereupon he was named commissioner to visit Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin to negotiate postal treaties. Although he was less successful in European capitals than in Washington, he laid the groundwork for Japan's admission into the International Postal Union in

1877.[56] Returning to Japan in 1874, Bryan continued his work as superintendent of foreign mails. Postmaster-General Mayesima in his annual report for 1874–75 took pleasure in mentioning the eminent services of Bryan "to whose energy and experience the present prosperous condition of this service is due. It is proper to say," he added, "that very general satisfaction is expressed, both here and in the United States, in regard to the manner in which the service, generally and in detail, has been conducted."[57] The young American, with the aid of a fellow-citizen, L. T. Farr, continued to improve the postal service until 1882, having meantime represented Japan at the congress of the International Postal Union in 1878.

Prison administration as well as postal services profited from the technical aid of an American. Dr. John C. Berry, a medical missionary, called attention in a forceful memorandum to the atrocious conditions in the prisons he visited. Toshimichi Okubo, who later became home minister, was impressed by Berry's revelations and constructive suggestions for improvement. At his instance, the Berry report was translated and sent to all governors. Widely read throughout the country, the report became the basis of the reforms that Berry noted five years later on revisiting some of the same prisons that had earlier horrified him.[58]

American influence also operated in another important sphere of public administration and policy. Minister De Long pointed out to the Japanese government the advantages of having in the Department of Foreign Affairs a western expert in international law and diplomacy. Here De Long differed with his colleagues in the diplomatic corps in Tokyo, for they held it was not to the advantage of western powers to have Japan employ western counsel at the very time that the treaties were about to be revised.[59] But the Japanese took De Long's advice. The State Department, on request from Tokyo, nominated Erastus Peshine Smith, a graduate of Columbia College and of the Harvard Law School, a former newspaper man in several cities, and the author of a *Manual of Political Economy* which had been translated into French and German. At the moment Smith was in the employ of the State Department.[60] Secretary Hamilton Fish had every reason to think he would make a good showing in Tokyo.

Unfortunately Smith and Minister De Long fell out, and Smith lined up with De Long's enemies, Consul Sheperd and Edward L. House, of the New York *Tribune*. It would be entertaining to detail the charges and countercharges: De Long's indignant protest to Secretary Hamilton Fish that the new American expert in the Foreign Office was leaking official American secrets which he gleaned from a friend in the State Department; that he had made his Tokyo quarters the scene of a "perfect orgy" in which

his American friends had been entertained by Japanese prostitutes, that he drank too much and talked too freely, and that he lived in open sin with a native concubine.[61] But when Fish expressed regret to the newly arrived Japanese minister in Washington at the behavior of Peshine Smith, the minister merely said that the American expert "serves us well, and as long as he does that, we don't mind his private life after office hours."[62] According to a careful Japanese scholar, Smith was "instrumental in bringing about the end of a humiliating period in Japan's foreign relations by initiating a positive, self-assertive foreign policy which did not sit well with the British minister, who tried to have the American legal expert dismissed."[63]

The Japanese government retained other American experts in this field. These included Eli T. Sheppard, whom Grant recommended to the Japanese Foreign Office as a special advisor on international law,[64] and Gen. Charles LeGendre. The latter, an amazing personality, resigned his consulship in China to take service with the Japanese. It is possible that study in Japanese sources may confirm the claims of LeGendre to a positive influence in shaping Japanese policy toward expansion in Formosa and Korea and toward the western powers. All that can now be said is that he played a major part in helping organize a dubious quasi-filibustering expedition to extend Japanese influence over Formosa. LeGendre enlisted Lt. James Wasson, who was serving in the Kaitakushi or Colonial Office, to aid in setting up the expedition. After pulling many strings in Washington LeGendre also secured the release from active service in our Asiatic squadron of Lt. Comdr. Douglas Cassel. Wasson and Cassel played parts of some importance in organizing the technical end of the operations of the Formosa expedition. Although LeGendre certainly prodded the Japanese authorities to continue with the expedition when forces within Japan called for a halt and when foreign pressures were exerted to the same end, it is unlikely that his role was as important in the expedition itself and in the subsequent complicated negotiations with China as his own contemporary correspondence indicates.[65] After the expedition LeGendre prepared many memoranda for the Japanese government on a wide range of issues, foreign and domestic, in which he took into account both Japanese traditions and ambitions and, where it seemed relevant, American experience.[66] But insofar as the Japanese followed the same course as that which LeGendre recommended, it seems likely that he was merely telling them what they wanted to hear and what in any case they meant to do.

It would of course be easy to overestimate the influence of the American experts in the field of public administration and policy. We must re-

member that the Americans in Japan were working along with British, French, German, and other nationals. We must also remember that the Japanese skillfully selected and adapted to their own ideas and uses the techniques and knowledge they borrowed. Yet the American impacts on Japanese administration were not negligible. This resulted from the genuine desire of the Meiji authorities to make the Empire more efficient and more modern and from the abilities and tact of at least some of our experts.[67]

When the Meiji restoration decided to adopt western educational methods to modify and in some degree to shape to new ends the cultural heritage, it turned to several western countries. But in the 1870's the influence of the United States transcended that of any other land.[68] This was exerted in part through such outstanding missionaries as Guido Verbeck, whose school at Yedo became the nucleus of the later Imperial University. Verbeck also advised the Japanese to send official missions to study the educational systems of other countries and to recruit personnel. These missions became a second important channel of American educational influence. The one to the United States headed by Fukuzawa Yukichi sent back to Japan schoolbooks, dictionaries, and treatises on law, history, geography, economics, and science. Translated by missionaries, these enjoyed wide use.[69]

In 1872 a Japanese mission to the West asked two of its members to examine the departments of education in several American states and to visit leading institutions of learning. The men chosen for this were Kido Takayoshii, a high cabinet official who was to be Minister of Education from 1874 to 1877, and Tanaka Fujimaro, afterwards Vice-Minister of Education. In addition to these inspections, the mission studied the replies to inquiries addressed to leading educators on the type of education most likely to quicken the modernization of Japan and the elevation of her people. Finally, the educational personnel selected by this mission and by the Japanese legation in Washington to work in Japan, provided another important channel of American influence.

The statement of educational aims in relation to Japanese problems which Professor David Murray of Rutgers College made for the Japanese mission of 1872 especially appealed to its members. The essay reflected familiarity with the Japanese culture and education, for Murray had taken an interest in the Japanese students at Rutgers. He also hit hard at the idea that Japan could profitably borrow intact the educational system of any other country. On the contrary, he insisted, an educational system "must be a natural outgrowth from the wants of the nation." It must not try to subvert all the old established customs. He saw no compelling reason for the Japanese to set up a completely new system in order to realize their objectives. Mur-

ray emphasized certain things as highly desirable if not indispensable to the realization of these objectives: universal education, including that of females; teacher training institutions; special technical schools; and educational museums. This analysis and these recommendations fitted into the feeling entertained in many quarters in Japan that western learning should be received without giving up the main heritage of the Japanese past. Murray's paper also implied doubts about the desirability of a highly centralized, schematized system. This position impressed Tanaka Fujimaro, who had already become greatly impressed by the local autonomy given to the American states in educational matters and by the principle of community support for schools.[70] Thus it was natural for the embassy to invite him to come to Japan as superintendent of educational affairs and as advisor to the Minister of Education. The contract, concluded on March 15, 1873, stipulated that he was freely to offer his advice, that he was to be responsible only to the Minister of Education, and that he was to coöperate with the head of the educational department in such a way as not to disturb "the peace of the Empire."[71]

When Murray reached Japan in the summer of 1873 the Monbusho or Department of Education, presided over by Ōki Takato, was trying to implement the educational code adopted the year before. The code envisioned universal education, supported and directed by the imperial government. In general, it was inspired by the centralized and standardized system of France, for this greatly appealed to Fukuzawa, its chief architect, as best designed to hasten the disappearance of feudal remnants and to prepare the Japanese people for the kind of lives they were to live in the new era. To that end the program emphasized the practical subjects rather than the traditional Confucian ethics that had been regarded as the most appropriate method for developing character. The Department of Education had inherited from the preceding regime the institutions of higher learning the shogunate had begun to develop and the special schools for the military class. But the new department, lacking experience and even basic understanding of what universal education involved, hardly knew how to proceed.[72]

The papers of Murray in the Library of Congress provide ample proof that from the start his modesty, good sense, tact, and organizing ability inspired his superiors with confidence. His relations with the Department of Education remained cordial throughout the six years he was in its service. After the retirement in 1874 of Ōki Takato and the appointment of Kido Takayoshi as minister and of Tanaka Fujimaro as vice-minister, his influence became appreciably greater, for it will be recalled that these men

had been greatly impressed by American education, which they had studied as members of the Embassy of 1872. Murray, who had been troubled at first by having little actual work to do, now wrote happily home that since the reorganization he had been given "much greater responsibilities and much more work. I am glad and sorry," he continued. "It is pleasant to think that my services have secured their confidence and that I can feel that what I do will be appreciated. But I see very well that I will have plenty to do during the rest of my stay."[73]

Murray convinced his superiors that the first necessary step was to establish a normal institution to train teachers for the rising elementary schools. One of these was at once organized on American lines and placed in charge of M. M. Scott, the product of a similar institution in the States. Its first recruits, largely retainers of the feudal chiefs, received instruction in Arabic numbers, arithmetic, simple science, geography, the history of Japan and other nations, and pedagogy. A few of the first graduates went to America or Europe for further training. Others became superintendents or inspectors of the new public schools. In 1874, again at the instigation of Murray, a normal school was started for young women. Opening the teaching profession to that sex was a great innovation.[74]

In addition to taking charge of the teaching program, Murray gave advice on programs of study, school equipment, and a multitude of miscellaneous matters, including the best way of teaching morality, of designing a western type of staircase, and of making a cradle for a foreign baby! Nor was this all. He took a hand in the affairs of the Kaisei-Gakko, the forerunner of the Imperial University of Tokyo, and helped establish the Academy of Literature and Science. His work was not limited to Tokyo, for he visited and inspected schools in various parts of the land.

Murray took pride in the educational museum he founded, for he thought that the actual physical presence of educational displays, properly arranged, would have more influence on Japanese teachers and administrators than mere written descriptions. He was commissioned to represent Japan at the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876, and collected an impressive number of exhibits. These included geographical specimens, industrial products, casts of fruit and vegetables, photographs of bridges, exhibits of school materials, government documents, maps, models of schoolhouses, and laboratory equipment, to cite only a few. All these later became part of the educational museum in Tokyo.[75]

Murray set himself to study the educational code of 1872. He also familiarized himself with actual conditions. In his view the growing opposition in the provinces to the new system suggested that the department

would do well to proceed slowly. The localities did not understand just what the central government was trying to do, and they feared that heavy taxation would be needed. Moreover, since inadequate funds made it impossible to establish secondary schools at once, Murray believed that the private institutions already operating filled a big gap in the government program. The value of their several approaches seemed clear to him. Thus he advised his superiors to modify the rigid, centralized scheme contemplated in the educational code of 1872. Inclined as he was toward the decentralized American type of educational enterprise, Tanaka instructed Murray to study anew the various educational systems of the West during his visit to the Centennial Exhibition and, on his return, to be ready to help revise the existing code.

On getting back from America in 1877 Murray prepared advisory documents reflecting his original idea that no country could profitably borrow an educational system from another. Tactfully paying his respects to the code of 1872 by fully subscribing to its basic commitment to a universal system of education, Murray presented his principal document in a tentative way, "with the hope that something contained therein may be of service during the consideration of the subject and may assist in determining the form which shall be given to this most important law." Already, he continued, unforeseen emergencies had led to many changes in the code. Hence the need of revision.[78]

Murray proposed that the new code merely state the broad and indispensable objectives and then leave the details of administration to the department. He believed that many of the centralized features in the existing code should be retained—control over standards, periodical inspection, teacher qualifications, and plans of study. In still other respects Murray evidenced an eclectic readiness to borrow from the centralized systems of Europe features lacking in his own America—teachers' pensions and government scholarships.

On the other hand, in making certain recommendations, Murray reflected American ideas and procedures. It seemed to him wise to move in the direction of decentralization and flexibility, at least in some matters. He suggested that the local administration be left to the discretion of local officers in the school districts and recommended elasticity in the matter of school support. Calling attention to the contributions that the private schools had made, he advocated the continued encouragement of these institutions. Murray further held that religious instruction should be excluded from public schools for much the same reasons that it was excluded from those in the United States. Of interest too were his remarks about the

educational value of visual aids, including museum exhibits. In discussing the program for the government vocational schools Murray argued that these should not only provide training in operative techniques but also combine technical training with the basic sciences to enable students to gain some understanding of the larger industrial processes. In these recommendations for a greater amount of local responsibility and a functional type of vocational education that combined theory and practice Murray reflected assumptions and procedures associated with his own country. But he was also sensitive not only to the useful features in European educational systems but also to the peculiar needs of the Japanese themselves. These in his view included a considerable amount of responsibility and control on the part of communities to offset the traditional dependence of the Japanese on the government for guidance and assistance in many spheres of living.[77]

In other documents Murray discussed in terms of broad national policy and in a thoroughly statesmanlike way the interrelations of education, crime, industry, commerce, agriculture, and war. When the financial burden of the new educational program weighed heavily and the budget was substantially reduced, Murray presented plausible arguments for the thesis that liberality in education meant a saving in other spheres. To buttress his argument that progress and general education went hand in hand, he pointed to the example of the United States and Germany. Again and again the Rutgers professor reminded the Japanese that they too might develop their natural resources, their industry, and their commerce by training engineers, ironmasters, navigators, and other specialists. But he counseled the government not to expect immediate results from generous expenditures for education. Insisting that the theoretical be combined with the practical, Murray made the point that man does not live by bread alone—that the social sciences and the humanities had their place, too. This was good advice at a time when utilitarianism colored much Japanese educational thought. It would be a misfortune, Murray counseled, if the new education should merely prepare for the occupations and vocations of life: it must prepare for all phases of living. Nor did he hesitate in speaking of the importance of a broadly conceived education to point out that this had often been valuable in deterring rulers from painful excesses in the use of power.[78]

The new educational code that Murray helped draw up contained many of his recommendations. It was proclaimed in October, 1879, just after he left for America. Looking back on the contributions that he made to the new code Murray justly evaluated his services. "By patient and deliberate industry, yielding as the case required to the modifications sug-

gested by foreign experience and by knowledge of historical precedents and the wants of their country, we worked out a system which with such modifications and adjustments as trial has shown to be necessary has already accomplished wonders in this land of untold wonders."[79] It is true that the allocation of greater responsibility for elementary schools to the local governments actually caused a decline of public interest in education: the decentralization aroused fears of increased taxation. Thus in the revision of the education code of 1880 the central government again resumed greater control. Yet even in this, the example of Murray's pragmatic approach was apparent.[80]

Certainly there was abundant evidence at the time the American advisor left Japan that his labors had been highly appreciated. This is true even when allowance is made for Japanese politeness. "It is chiefly due to your efficient labors that during this period great improvements in our educational system have been effected and results so remarkable and satisfactory have been attained," Saigo Tsukumichi, Minister of Education, testified in writing to Murray.[81] The vice-minister, Tanaka Fujimaro, in reviewing Murray's contributions to the development of the University, the normal schools, female education, to the improvement of curricula, educational materials, and visual instruction, spoke of his efficient, obliging, prompt, and courteous attitude.[82] An imperial audience, the conferring of the decoration of the Order of the Rising Sun, a special purse, and a public banquet all indicated a sense of deep appreciation.[83] The *Tokyo Times* reflected the attitude of those outside official circles in declaring that Murray's position and influence had been "surpassed by no foreigner of any nationality."[84] The American legation in reporting the honors conferred on the American educator attributed much of the progress in education to his advice, administrative talent, and unstinted labors.[85] On his part Murray later set down his own feelings about his mission: "My connection with the government was from beginning to end an unalloyed pleasure. Everything was done for my comfort and happiness which the most critical could have suggested. I brought away evidence of every kind of the good will of my employers."[86] Nor were these empty words, as his sustained friendship for Japan was to prove.[87]

In several special fields Americans made substantial contributions to Japanese education at the very time that Murray was at work in the 1870's. John Barton, an assistant paymaster in the United States Navy, organized the pay department in the Japanese navy. When he retired in 1877 he was praised by the Japanese minister in charge for the high quality of his work as a teacher of naval accounts.[88] In 1872 President Seelye of Amherst Col-

lege visited Japan and interested the new department of education in physical training. Asked to recommend someone to introduce "the Amherst system" of physical training he named young Dr. George Adams Leland who, from 1878 to 1881, took charge of this work in the National Department of Education. He not only led classes in the preparatory division of the University but trained about a hundred young men as teachers of physical education for schools on all levels. Author of several works in Japanese on physical education and gymnastics, Leland also made many measurements of children, comparing them with measurements of Americans of the same age. In 1921 Baron Kanda declared that his work had resulted in an increase of two inches average height of the Japanese people. On leaving the department of education Dr. Leland received the fourth order of merit of the Sacred Treasure of Japan.[89]

The Tokyo government also turned to America for education in music. In the late 1870's when so many American educational experts accepted invitations from the Japanese authorities, Luther Whiting Mason, author of *The National System of Music Charts and Books* and supervisor of music in the Boston public schools, went to establish a school of music to train school supervisors. Beginning with the elementary basis of the art, studying the native music, and building on it, Mason introduced the diatonic scale. Thanks to his tact and deference to Japanese musicians, western music in Japan bore his name. When he left the country in 1882 the Imperial University conferred on him its first doctor's degree in music.[90]

It was, however, at the new Imperial University of Tokyo that American scholarship and education shone with special brightness. Fathered in a true sense by the American missionary, Guido Verbeck, the institution included on its early staff William E. Griffis and other missionaries. In 1877, just three months after the University opened, Edward Sylvester Morse arrived in Japan to study brachiopods. A graduate of the Lawrence Scientific School and a student of Agassiz, Morse not only early accepted Darwin's theories but won the praise of the great scientist by his own investigations. In Japan Morse quickly captured the hearts of those whom he met by his major discovery of five-thousand-year-old shells, by his enthusiasm, by his engaging manners, and, above all, by his acceptance of the Japanese as equals and co-workers rather than as objects of curiosity if not quasi-barbarians. The University offered him an opportunity to organize instruction in zoology, which he did. In the thirteen years that he kept his association with the Imperial University, he introduced modern methods of collecting and classifying, dissecting, and preparing sections. He introduced the Darwinian theory which students quickly accepted, to the con-

sternation of the missionaries. He excavated archaeological remains and won the reputation of a leading authority on pottery. He set up at Enoshima the first marine laboratory in the East. Much of Japan's progress in biological and agricultural research, in physics, anthropology, and archaeology, and in medicine, can be properly ascribed to the inspiration and training that Morse gave a notable band of young scientists, to whom he bore much the same relation that Agassiz did to American students.[91]

In addition to Morse, the faculty of the Imperial University at Tokyo included other able Americans. His successor, Charles O. Whitman, trained by Agassiz and by the scientists at Leipzig, gave much to his four students, all of whom became well-known scientists.[92] Thomas C. Mendenhall, a professor at the Ohio State University, accepted in 1878 the chair of physics and during his three years' stay organized a laboratory, a meteorological observatory, and a seismological society. He also introduced modern experimentation in his field. Mendenhall measured the absolute force of gravity at Tokyo and the relative force of gravity between Tokyo and Fujiyama, thus getting the mean density of the earth in what was one of the best calculations of the time. In his later years in America, Mendenhall continued his studies in seismology, gravity, and atmospheric electricity.[93] Whereas British scientists largely founded modern chemistry at Tokyo, Americans had a major hand in developing astronomy. Henry Martyn Paul of the United States Naval Observatory, became the first professor of astronomy and put the new department on a sound footing before leaving for Washington in 1883.[94]

Although American contributions to the Imperial University of Tokyo bulked largest in science, scholars in the social studies and humanities also graced the new institution. In 1873 Dr. Divie Bethune McCartee, a Presbyterian medical missionary of long service in China, accepted an appointment at the Kaisei-Gakko or foreign language school which became the Imperial University. In addition to teaching the natural sciences and helping arrange the Botanical Garden at Koishikawa, Dr. McCartee acted as foreign advisor to the Normal School for Girls. But his chief work was the instruction he gave in Justinian's Institutes, Pomeroy's Municipal Law, and the Law of Nations. Deeply learned in Oriental languages, literature, philosophy, and history as well as in western knowledge, McCartee nicely balanced the approaches of West and East. He continued at Tokyo until 1877, when he went back to China; but the Japanese later saw a good deal of him in his capacity as advisor to the Chinese legation in Tokyo.[95]

Another American who left an enviable reputation was George W. Knox, professor of philosophy and ethics from 1886 to 1893. This Presby-

terian missionary and theologian attracted attention by his lucid and penetrating writings while he was in Tokyo. The list could be extended.[86] After teaching for a time at the government school at Kumamoto, Lafcadio Hearn received the appointment to the chair of English literature, which he held from 1894 to to 1903. From the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston came Ernest Fenollosa in 1878, to teach successively political economy, philosophy, and logic. Fenollosa became an ardent champion of Japanese art and culture, contributing greatly to its appreciation in Japan as well as in America.

Yet American influence, both in elementary and in higher education, was in large part overshadowed in the 1880's and 1890's by that of European countries, notably Germany. Perhaps one clue lay in the remark of Mori Arinori, for a time chargé of the legation in Washington, and later Minister of Education. Mori frankly said that although the Japanese found American institutions fascinating, it was of great importance to consider the evils resulting from the misuse of freedom since such abuses were the hardest to correct. In any case, the German spirit of authority, discipline, and centralization exerted an increasing spell on the Japanese—though in truth it was becoming less and less necessary to depend on any foreign land in the matter of educational technique. Whatever else may be said, it is clear that in the 1870's the Japanese efforts to borrow in the educational sphere from America proved in considerable measure a successful enterprise. The success, to sum up, can be understood in terms of the conviction that America had something to teach which Japan needed—at least for the time; in the competence, tact, and adaptiveness of the American educators in Japan and the courtesy the Japanese showed toward them; and in the receptivity of the Japanese people to what they understood to be the policy of their governing authorities. Despite surface changes and Japanese acquiescence and politeness, the American impact was not as deep as appeared to many Americans at the time—a point it may be well to keep in mind in connection with the apparent victory of Americanism in Japan under the MacArthur regime.

Liberia and Persia Calling

THE MID-NINETEENTH century, which engendered so much expansionism, based on economic interest, on national pride, and on humanitarian zeal, witnessed the first proposal for a government-financed technical mission to an underdeveloped land. In 1850 the government published as an official document the report of the Reverend Ralph R. Gurley, whom it had sent to Liberia to obtain information. Gurley, an agent of the American Colonization Society, quickly saw that Liberia lacked the financial means to develop its harbors, its agricultural resources, and its educational agencies. "But since this republic, more than any other power, will develop the resources and increase the trade of western Africa," Gurley argued, "the United States, in aiding her endeavors, will open new markets for American productions, and essentially augment American commerce. Yet far higher and nobler motives than those of gain will, I trust, incline our national authorities to encourage and assist the citizens of Liberia, a few adventurous but determined children of Africa, gone out from our midst, that they may recover their long-lost inheritance, show their ability to build up civilized cities and states in regions where they have been unknown, and bring a vast continent, now lying in dim eclipse, within the circle and the influence of enlightened nations." Gurley urged the appropriation annually for ten years of $50,000 to bring stability and progress and the "triumph of liberty and Christianity" to the African shore.[1] Liberia was to wait for over half a century before the United States officially began, and then most hesitantly, to tender the kind of aid Gurley had in mind. But ideas underlying Point Four had been clearly expressed.

Apart from granting a gunboat to Liberia in 1867 to help guard her coast commerce against lawless depredations,[2] the American government paid little heed to the republic on the African shore—even diplomatic recognition was tardily given.[3] The Afro-American elite living on the coast and controlling the government found it hard to put down the petty warfare of the native tribes, especially near the frontiers. In the early years of the twentieth century these difficulties provided Liberia's neighbors, Sierra Leone and French Equatorial Africa, with excuses for occupying her territory. To the north and west the French persistently encroached on Liberia's domain. By show of force Sierra Leone seized land to the west. British troops refused to move until Liberia paid the cost of occupation. But Liberia had no funds. The country was backward economically, educationally, politically. The competition of Brazilian coffee had all but ruined the chief staple, coffee. Forest and mineral resources lay undeveloped. Moreover, a primitive financial structure deepened Liberia's plight. The government accepted British loans, but the controversies arising from these, from the boundary wrangles, and from other things, hampered internal development and added to the unrest.

The Liberian government gradually turned to the British and accepted what was in fact an unwelcome and irksome tutelage. It accepted, in return for further loans, a program of reforms to be administered by British officials. The reforms—covering customs, a frontier police force, and judicial improvements—were indeed much needed. But the British failed completely as mentors.[4] When they peremptorily demanded that the reforms be carried out, the haste with which this was done insured failure. Moreover, the British commander of the frontier force proved to be unusually lacking in tact. He refused to dismiss some seventy British subjects from the frontier force when the Liberian government concluded that these men formed the center of a plot to occupy the country. Early in 1909 the British commandant was dismissed. The American ambassador at London reported that the British were sending a gunboat and troops to Liberia.[5] Fear was widespread that the death knell to Liberian independence had been sounded. The American minister, Ernest Lyon, urged the State Department to have an American war vessel sent to Monrovia to show that the United States had not forgotten the offspring of her colonized freedmen.[6]

In June, 1908, when the Liberian government was convinced that the British mentorship had failed and even threatened the independence of the state, a commission was sent to Washington to urge help in maintaining the independence of the republic and in carrying on a peaceful, orderly, and efficient government.[7] Little was done until after the autumn elections,

when the crisis in Liberia was heightening. Secretary of State Root suggested that Booker T. Washington, with whom he consulted, approach President-elect Taft in order to find out whether he would approve sending a commission to inquire into the facts and to make recommendations. Taft thought well of the idea and suggested that the expenses be paid for by including an item in the diplomatic-consular bill about to go before Congress. Thus it was that in his message of January 19, 1909, President Roosevelt recommended to Congress approval of a commission and indicated the reasons for sending one.[8]

Meantime discussions took place concerning the personnel of such a commission. Root felt it should be headed by Booker T. Washington, and that it should include a man experienced in colonial administration in Puerto Rico or the Philippines and a Southern white member who had shown interest in helping the Negroes. Washington was willing to head the commission. But the Tuskegee trustees felt that his appointment might evoke criticism on the part of Southern whites, who would regard this as evidence of Negro participation in politics, and that Negroes would not take kindly to it inasmuch as there had been some discussion of further colonization of the race in Liberia—a discussion that had proved to be very unpopular among colored people. In the end, Washington named his secretary, Dr. Emmett Scott, as the Negro member of the commission.[9]

Two matters came up to cause delay, however, in appointing the commission. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations refused to recommend an appropriation for such a mission to Liberia. State Department officials asked Booker T. Washington to use his influence with his friends in Congress in behalf of the proposal.[10] Finally, on March 4, 1909, the Deficiency Act provided $20,000 for the expenses of the commission. But this was not the only hitch. The British Foreign Office, after learning about the proposed mission, suggested that the United States, Great Britain, and France make joint representations to Liberia for reform. The State Department decided that it would be more useful all the way around if it acted with Great Britain in making concurrent but independent representations to Liberia. Hence it instructed its minister at Monrovia to urge the Liberian government to maintain the reforms already initiated, to reorganize the treasury thoroughly, and to protect foreign lives and property.[11]

After approaching two other men as possible heads of the commission, the State Department finally settled on Dr. Roland P. Falkner, chief of the documents division of the Library of Congress and an authority on colonial finance, population, and other economic problems. Dr. George

Sale, a Baptist missionary in Cuba, and Dr. Emmett Scott of Tuskegee, were the other members. Attached to the commission were Maj. Percy Ashburn, medical officer, Capt. Sydney Cloman, and Frank A. Flower, an expert on Liberia by virtue of his connection with the American Colonization Society.[12] Dr. George Finch, a young official in the State Department, accepted the secretaryship of the commission. After making hurried preparations, including the acquisition of books on Liberia loaned by the Library of Congress, the commission called on President Taft at the White House before sailing for western Africa. One member of the commission recalled later that in his oral instructions President Taft had said, emphatically, "We wish particularly to know about the relations between France and Liberia, and Great Britain and Liberia, and *to know the exact truth about them.*"[13] The decision to send the commission and its staff on three men-of-war was meant to impress on the Powers the seriousness of American interest in Liberia.[14]

In Liberia the announcement that a commission was en route to the country was hailed with tumultuous joy.[15] Minister Lyon set to work on a comprehensive description of the republic and its problems, to help orient the members of the commission, and otherwise proved very helpful. When the Americans arrived off the coast of Liberia, on May 8, 1909, they were escorted to the capital in the government launch, newly painted red and green, with the paint not yet dry. A huge public reception greeted them. Wreaths and arches had been put up, flags flew, the bands played the Star Spangled Banner. "Lord dey done come!" shouted someone as the procession passed. "Glory, glory hallelujah." "Thank God I live to see this day. Welcome honies [*sic*]," shouted someone else.[16] One old woman, broadly grinning, greeted Dr. Scott, the Negro member, and Dr. Finch with a "Welcome home." Dr. Scott remarked that the woman must have had Dr. Finch in mind.[17] The commission called on the British and French consular officers, were received by the President and Cabinet, and after lavish entertainment began to confer with the Liberian commission specially named to sit with them. But the Americans also conferred with all conditions and sorts—including the opposition leaders. The hospitality continued to be so lavish that it interfered with the job at hand, and the commission was forced to call a halt to it. After three weeks in Monrovia its members divided and visited different parts of the interior. Everywhere they were received with ceremonies, native dances, and sumptuous feasts. It was obvious that the ordinary folk expected miracles of the visitors.[18]

Putting its cards on the table, the Liberian government at the start made it clear what it hoped for from the United States: a guarantee of its

independence and territorial integrity; a customs receivership comparable to that of Santo Domingo; American aid in policing the frontier; assistance in vocational education; and a research center for the promotion of public health and for the development of the republic's resources. The center was to be staffed with American experts.[19]

The commission proceeded to collect information, and, in view of the lack of statistical data, this was no easy task. It also sized up Liberia's leaders and took stock of the accomplishments as well as the shortcomings and needs of the country. When the report was finally made, it paid tribute to the advances Liberia had made in civilization despite great handicaps, rejected the idea that it had failed in self-government, and repudiated the notion it was completely bankrupt. It took the ground that the country owed its existence to the United States, which ought to regard it as a ward, and which ought to extend it material help in this, its hour of crisis.[20]

The report, which the chairman and secretary drafted[21] and which was unanimously accepted by the members, was a long and impressive document in its manuscript form. It refused to recommend that the United States guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of Liberia; but it went far toward accepting the other proposals Liberia's leaders had made. It recommended that the Army lend three officers, preferably Negroes, to help reorganize and direct the frontier militia; that the United States enable Liberia to repay her debts by taking control of her customs and allocating certain portions of the revenue for that purpose; that help be given in reorganizing and improving various governmental services; and that, especially, the research center be established. The commissioners held that this might well be the most important thing the United States could do for Liberia. Leaving to technical experts the issue of building a coaling station, which the Liberian government had proposed, the commission noted that it would benefit not only the United States, but Liberia as well, since the country was without a genuine harbor.

Officials in Washington seemed reluctant to act on this report, however. Secretary of State Knox regarded the report as too long, and suggested that it be condensed before being printed for the Senate. Apparently, he did not think the matter was one of any great importance.[22] Meanwhile, the American minister to Liberia had forcefully indicated that some sort of decision was highly desirable, since the government at Monrovia was in a quandary as to what to do or where to turn.[23] Dr. Finch finally asked Knox what he proposed to do. In reply Knox invited Finch to dinner along with Lodge, Stone, and other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in the course of the evening he asked the young secretary of

the commission to tell the Senators all about Liberia. Their reaction was somewhat disappointing to the advocates of American aid. Lodge and the other members of the committee took the view that nothing should be done that might involve the United States with England, France, or Germany; but they added that if help could be given short of that, the department might go ahead.[24]

In the end the State Department decided to implement at least some of the commission's recommendations. The idea of a treaty with Liberia was rejected, partly because of fear that the Senate might not ratify it, and partly because of possible British objections. But the State Department informed the Legation at Monrovia that President Taft had decided to designate three American officers to help police the frontier and the native tribes and, further, to give financial assistance.[25] The plan was to use private finance from several countries and to guarantee the loan by a joint customs receivership on the part of designated American, British, and French officials. In 1912, American, British, and French bankers made a loan to Liberia; and customs receivers—an American was to be receiver general—were nominated by the respective powers and appointed by the Liberian government.

Almost from the beginning, however, things went badly. For one thing, the customs receivers were responsible only to their own government, and when disagreements arose between them and with the Liberian government, an impasse resulted. Thus the financial problem did not lift. And the disagreements over the financial matters were worsened by personal friction. According to the account of Melvin Hall, a colleague of the American director of customs, T. C. Mitchell, the director got into an unfortunate ruckus with the Liberian Minister of Finance. The minister in an angry moment kicked the dog of the director of customs. "The Minister was very black and Mitchell hailed from Georgia," Hall commented. In return Mitchell kicked the Minister of Finance down the stone steps of the Ministry. Placed under arrest and fined ten thousand dollars, Mitchell hurriedly escaped in the dead of night, thanks to a steamship captain he had befriended.[26]

Such untoward incidents only symbolized a more profound impasse. The president of the republic did coöperate with the United States to improve conditions and to implement advice; but the legislature refused to submit applications for concessions to the financial advisor. In 1920 Liberia agreed to place complete financial control in the hands of thirteen Americans, in return for a government loan of $5,000,000. But Congress refused to sanction the loan. This story, however, and the entrance of Firestone and

the League of Nations into the Liberian picture, belong to the era following World War I.[27]

Meanwhile, the American officers sent in accordance with the arrangement of 1912 proved useful in reorganizing and directing the frontier militia.[28] But even this was of dubious advantage. In the long run it was to prove impossible for the governing elite of the seaboard to control in its own way the restless native tribes. To be sure, a Cru revolt in 1915 was suppressed by the American-directed frontier militia and by a United States gunboat; but this was not the end of the tribal unrest. Although President Taft indicated that an agricultural expert was to be sent to Liberia, this, the most promising part of the program, seems not to have materialized.

The Taft administration not only sponsored an official mission to Liberia. It also gave its blessing to one for Persia. The United States had no ties with that country comparable to those existing with the African republic. But as early as the 1880's the shah's government expressed interest in having American technical aid. Acting on instructions concerning the advancement of our commercial interest abroad, E. Spencer Pratt, minister to Persia, questioned the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs in the autumn of 1886 regarding his government's attitude toward American enterprise. The minister arranged a private interview with the shah. After speaking eloquently of the rich mineral resources and the fertile soil of his kingdom, the shah added that American capital had "but to come and reap its fruits." The rights and interests of Americans would be guaranteed and extraordinary concessions would be granted. Would the American minister himself investigate and report on the resources of the empire? His first-hand knowledge of cotton and cane culture and of railroad and mining engineering qualified him well for the undertaking. Cursory examinations convinced Pratt that there was much truth in the shah's boasts.[29]

A year and more passed. The Persian government then indicated to Pratt that the Europeans had come only to exploit Persia and that possibly something better might be expected from America. Would the government at Washington lend two of its engineers and geologists, with competent assistants, to be remunerated by Persia?[30] Nor did the Persians drop the matter. Later in the year the Minister of Mines and Telegraphs, after indicating to Pratt his government's awareness that it could not alone develop the country's resources, asked the American minister to suggest a plan for the general internal improvement of Persia through the aid of American capitalists and a closer commercial tie-up with the great trans-

atlantic republic. Minister Pratt urged the State Department to consider most seriously the exceptional opportunities that Persia offered the United States "to obtain industrial and commercial ascendancy in this empire."[31]

In subsequently renewing the request for geologists and mining engineers with experience in American government service, the Persian minister in Washington frankly admitted that his government foresaw the course of events should European intervention take place in his country. In his communication with the State Department he added that to permit the Old World powers to exploit the natural resources of Persia was to invite the loss of political independence.

But Secretary of State Bayard pointed out that "vast and extraordinarily lucrative fields of enterprise" lay almost undeveloped at America's own door, and that these offered the advantages of easy communication, systems of constitutional law approaching that of the United States, and familiarity. On the other hand, the avenues to Persia were already controlled by states whose "commercial avidity is no less keen than ours." To overcome such adverse factors, corresponding inducements would be necessary to entice American capitalists into the Persian field. Bayard made it clear that the United States government could not advise American capitalists to invest in Persia.

However, Bayard viewed the Persian approach as evidence of good will, and he did what he could to implement it.[32] Samples of Persian gold were assayed and reported on by the Smithsonian Institution.[33] The State Department approached the Geological Survey in the matter of mining experts. Powell, chief of the Geological Survey, pointed out that competent experts were unwilling to have their names considered unless the plan of organization suggested by the Persians were modified. The suggestion that two coördinate chiefs be named was objectionable, as was that of the independent appointment of assistants by the Persian government. "They foresee that inefficiency would result from such a plan, and they believe there should be but one chief, and that all his assistants should be nominated by him." Would Persia consent to the naming of one chief, empowered to nominate the rest of the mission in terms of the special requirements for the job? Powell suggested that in addition to mining engineers and general geologists, it would be well to have a skilled paleontologist, a chemist, and a meteorologist. Charles A. Ashhurst, a competent mining engineer of Pennsylvania, who enjoyed Westinghouse connections, was ready to consider the undertaking at a salary of $15,000, in addition to expenses, a tidy sum for that day. Bailey Willis, a trusted official of the Geological Survey who later took part in technical missions in China and Patagonia, was an-

other possibility. He had no business connections, and was willing to consider the job at half the price Ashhurst named. In the end nothing came of these negotiations.[34]

But the Persians did not forget this American dream of the 1880's. And the same considerations that governed their thinking then were to play a like part in 1910. The revolution that had deposed the ruling house and resulted in the rise of the Majlis or parliament raised hopes for a national regeneration. But it was obvious that this must rest on checking the rapidly mounting influence of Britain and of Russia in the southern and northern parts of the kingdom, an influence that the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 formalized. It was equally obvious that if the influence of the Powers was to be curbed and Persian independence maintained, the antiquated and chaotic tax structure and treasury must be reformed. Who could better be trusted with such a difficult and delicate task than experts from the United States, a great country which as yet had shown no sign of becoming politically involved in the tangled power politics of the Middle East? Moreover, American loans might make possible railroad, mining, and irrigation developments on which any national regeneration must rest. Minister Charles Russell intimated in his despatches in the spring and summer of 1910 that these things were in the wind.[35]

No word, however, had come directly from the Persian government when Baron Rosen, the Russian ambassador, presented an *aide-mémoire* to the State Department which was a clear straw in the wind. The *aide-mémoire* intimated that the selection of American advisors would interfere with Russian and British interests in Persia's financial affairs, inasmuch as Persia was in debt to both countries. Moreover, the presence of American official advisors might lead to the entrance of American investors and other enterprises. The Imperial Government expressed the hope that the United States would recognize the paramount interests of Russia and Great Britain in Persia.[36]

Within the State Department, the discussions of this *aide-mémoire* revealed a rather schizophrenic attitude. On the one hand, the department was convinced that Persia was not a place where American investments would be of political benefit or national advantage, and that, further, American finance would be highly reluctant to invest without government guarantees. Moreover, the department was in general sympathetic with British and Russian interests in Persia. On the other hand, it was reluctant to make any commitments that might interfere with the open-door policy. It was obviously well to move cautiously, to find out, first of all, whether the Russians also spoke for the British.[37]

Investigation in the British capital revealed, indeed, that the Russian *aide-mémoire* did not represent the whole story. The British admitted that at first they had shared the Russian point of view and that they did not favor a contemplated American railroad leading into India. But they added that they had no objection to the appointment of American financial experts except insofar as an American mission might provide a precedent for a similar one from a leading continental power. The British in fact were worried about a possible German mission and preferred an American one to that. In any case, Washington was informed that the British and Russians had agreed not to press any objections they might have to an American mission.[38]

When the Majlis, with only three dissenting votes, approved the scheme for inviting American experts, some members of the State Department still hesitated. Assistant Secretary Adee held that it was not practicable to lend American officers in view of statutory regulations. Nor, in his view, could the American government assume responsibility for the designation of private citizens for such important employment. But if the American bankers identified with the London house that had made the reported loan should deem it advisable to have one or more American citizens employed by Persia in a financial capacity, Adee thought the department might well communicate the names of such persons recommended by the bankers. Should the Persian government also ask for assistants in nonpolitical, technical capacities, such as irrigation, education, and the like, the State Department might appropriately consider the request. Such a procedure could hardly antagonize the sensitive Muscovites or give any support to the thesis that the United States was intervening as a great power in the domestic affairs of Persia.[39] From Teheran, Minister Russell was quick to point out that this suggestion was regarded in Persian circles as reflecting pro-British deference and as a kind of "rebuff."[40]

In the end, however, the United States decided to coöperate with the Persians at least to the extent of recommending an expert. On December 28, 1910, the Persian chargé in Washington, Mirza Ali-kuli Khan, transmitted to the State Department his government's official request for impartial experts to reorganize the financial structure and administration of Persia. Secretary of State Knox discussed the matter of personnel with Secretary of the Treasury Franklin MacVeagh. The latter suggested that one expert be named with the power of selecting his own assistants. He mentioned as possibilities Dr. Jacob Hollander, professor of finance at the Johns Hopkins University and financial advisor to Santo Domingo from 1905 to 1908; W. F. Willoughby, assistant director of the census and former

treasurer of Puerto Rico; and W. Morgan Shuster, a young man of thirty-five with a background of service in the Cuban customs administration and in the Philippine Commission under Taft. Shuster had already intimated his deep interest in the project in a letter to Taft, and consequently received Taft's recommendation.[41] Knox thereupon suggested Shuster's name to the Persian legation, a nomination which the Majlis quickly confirmed.

If the American government had coöperated to the extent of suggesting an expert for the job, it apparently had no intention of going much further. To avoid future misunderstanding, the State Department made it clear that Shuster and his associates went as private citizens in Persian employ. The American government took no responsibility for their actions. It was, however, interested in the success of the mission, and it expected that the American employees would be assured the rights enjoyed by all private American citizens abroad.[42]

The mission began under fairly favorable circumstances. Besides Shuster, it included four other men—Charles McCaskey, F. S. Cairns, R. W. Hills, and Bruce Dickey—all of them experienced in the administration of public finance.[43] The Americans arrived in Teheran in May, 1911, and met with expressions of enthusiastic expectations. One Persian official told the American minister that the coming of the mission was regarded as second in importance only to the adoption of the Constitution.[44] The mission knew it was up against a hard job, but it believed that with the help of sincere patriots in and out of the Majlis, it could set Persia on her feet financially.

It did not take Shuster and his assistants long to find a superfluous number of divisions and minor sections in the financial system, overlapping authority, and much shifting of responsibility. Moreover, M. Mornard, Belgian administrator of customs who had hoped to get Shuster's assignment, tried from the start to boycott the mission by placing the supervision of a recent loan under a mission he was to head. Shuster thereupon drafted a bill designed to establish a centralized system of undivided responsibility, localized in the office of Treasurer General. The powers of this office included the control of the customs administration, Mornard's special bailiwick. The Majlis passed the bill by an overwhelming majority. A month later it gave the Treasurer General even more sweeping powers, including the control of the purse strings. This clipped most of the remaining prerogatives of Mornard, whose vigorous fight, supported by the Russian legation, came to naught—for the time.[45]

Thus armed with power, the American treasurer general introduced

honesty and efficiency into the collecting of taxes. In Persia taxes still largely were collected in kind. The position of tax collector in the various districts was hereditary, and the tax collectors were virtually irresponsible agents. The government had to collect, store, and transport the produce that made up the tax. Since no register existed, it was impossible to check the sources of internal revenue. A corrupt racket had grown up: the collectors piled up fortunes, and the central government was helpless. With the consent of the Majlis, Shuster organized a treasury gendarmerie to insure the collection of the government's due. He asked an officer of the British Indian Army, Major Stokes, whose knowledge of Persia was extensive, to head the new organization. Since the treasury gendarmerie was to operate in the northern or Russian sphere as well as in the southern or British, the Russian government regarded the nomination of Stokes as a violation of the agreement of 1907. Unwilling to offend its ally, the British government acquiesced and refused to give Stokes leave to take on the new job.[46] Shuster nevertheless proceeded, with American help, to organize the gendarmerie. When he left, it numbered about one thousand and it might well have solved the tax collection problem could it have continued to function.[47]

In the first months of his experience in Persia, Shuster seems to have tried to enforce American standards of efficiency and honesty; but he varied his approach to meet Persian conditions. The mounting opposition of the landed grandees and of the bureaucrats convinced Shuster that a more gradual procedure was indicated. Even so, he aroused much hostility among those who were of no mind to pay taxes. Nor did the ministries and other agencies of government fancy his insistence on rigid economy and his war on graft. Still, he was convinced that he could surmount this opposition, in view of the widespread conviction among Persians that the time for reform was long overdue and that reorganization alone could effect national regeneration and insure national independence.[48]

If Shuster tended to underestimate the strength of Persian opposition to his reforms, he was fully aware of the nature and extent of that of the foreign legations. Here the leader was Russia. The representatives of the czar won a great victory when they succeeded in thwarting Shuster's plan to have Major Stokes organize the treasury gendarmerie. The Russian press denounced Shuster for what they called his lack of tact, for his failure to take into account established interests, and for his reduction of the profits of Russian and British banks. Moreover, the Russians insisted that he was a Jew and attributed to this his alleged hostility toward their country.[49] Sir Edward Grey told Whitelaw Reid, the American ambassador, that he found Shuster less acceptable than he had anticipated. He too spoke of his

lack of tact, his "utter ignorance," and his unwillingness to recognize the actuality of British and Russian spheres of interest. In other words, Sir Edward insisted, he failed to see that Persia was actually a weak state surrounded by powerful neighbors with well-defined and well-recognized interests and prerogatives.[50] Probably the British also shared the Russian fear that if the Shuster mission succeeded in rehabilitating Persian finances, the way might be paved to a true regeneration that would interfere with their own national policies.

Thus thwarted, Shuster decided to bring things into the open—and to a head. He sent a letter to the *London Times* in which he spared neither Russia nor Britain, charging them with directly or indirectly boycotting reform efforts and undermining the new financial system. He went into the Major Stokes affair; and he made much of the fact that the Russians had permitted the former shah to escape and to lead an armed rebellion against the established constitutional government.[51] The *Times* in turn criticized Shuster for tactlessness and for failing to grasp the realities in the Persian picture.[52] Shuster, however, was valiantly defended by H. F. B. Lynch, an old Persia hand who had done much to develop the country's communications. Lynch insisted that Shuster had given many evidences of a sincere desire to work with the British and Russians, that he had tried to promote British economic interests, and that he had administered the finances competently and impartially.[53]

The climax was reached when the Persian Council of Ministers ordered the treasurer general to execute a decree confiscating the estate of a brother of the former shah for his part in the rebellion. Russian Cossacks resisted the treasury gendarmes. On November 29, 1911, the Russian legation presented a forty-eight-hour ultimatum to the Persian government. It demanded that Shuster be dismissed and that all of his assistants be approved by the Russians and the British. The Persian government was forced to bow to the Russian demand, for Russian troops were pouring into the northern part of the country and might easily seize Teheran. But the Persian government capitulated only after the Majlis passed an enthusiastic resolution approving Shuster and expressing confidence in him.[54]

At this late point in time, it would have been impossible for the State Department to take an effective stand in favor of Shuster even had it been minded to do so. The situation had gone much too far. Earlier, conceivably, the department might have encouraged the British Foreign Office to resist the Russian intrigues and attacks on Shuster.[55] But at no time had the American government taken any position other than that the mission was solely an affair between private American citizens and the Persian gov-

ernment. The United States might in theory favor the open door and look forward to American development of natural resources in Middle Eastern countries; but trade with Russia was at the moment important; and, further, the department had no wish to embarrass the Russian government.[56] Basically, of course, there was no intention of jeopardizing the policy of noninterference in the affairs of the Middle East.

Important sections of the American press did, to be sure, lament the fact that countries like Persia, struggling against imperialistic encroachments, could not count on American aid.[57] Pride was also expressed in the courage of the young American who had helped inspire the Majlis to resist foreign aggression and who had made a strong open appeal to the British for justice to Persia. Others praised Shuster's financial reorganization and reforms as an American achievement which, had it been permitted to continue, might well have checked Russian and British expansion, might well have given Persia the boost necessary to modernize and strengthen herself.[58]

In any case, the Shuster mission was enlightening from several points of view. One party in Persia, the Democrats, who before Shuster came had opposed his mission on the score that foreign advice was unnecessary, regretted his departure despite the fact that many among them had sometimes felt that he was proceeding "too fast." The Moderates, who had been chiefly responsible for his coming to Persia, joined with other groups in regarding the collapse of the mission as a great calamity.[59] Minister Russell reported, after the dust had somewhat settled, that for eight months Persia had virtually been an American territory and that the Persians had "acquired a taste for American ways."[60] Too optimistic a view, certainly. But there was a bit of truth in it, as the continued interest of the Persians in a new American mission suggested. It is possible, looking at the mission from another angle, that Shuster attached a disproportionate amount of blame to the Russians and the British and failed to take into due account the responsibility of many Persians for what happened. Arthur C. Millspaugh, who later was to undertake a mission to Persia, believed this. No doubt, many grandees resisted the effort to collect taxes; no doubt many bureaucrats opposed efficiency and honesty in financial administration. No doubt, too, that Persian confusion and cowardice in some quarters invited Russian and British interference and domination.[61] Yet, granted that all these factors operated, the fact remained that without the support of a strong power, either within Persia itself or from without, the Americans' efforts to effect reforms could only fail. Given the situation, Shuster could have gained little even had he shown what the British and Russians termed more tact—which is to say, had he compromised in greater degree. For

what the Persians had asked him to do, and what he might have done under more favorable circumstances, ran counter to vested interests on the part of certain Persians and to the claims and ambitions of two great neighboring nations.

Cuban Experiments

In 1898, the United States stumbled suddenly onto vast new opportunities for the export of American techniques and practices. In that momentous year, Americans annexed Hawaii, and after a short war with Spain found Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands on their hands. The United States was ill-equipped to handle its new colonial empire. There was no experienced colonial service and no well-established policy to guide the new and inexperienced administrators for these overseas possessions.

Cuba provides a good example of the fumbling experimental approach out of which a fairly coherent policy eventually emerged. Within certain broad and vague outlines, American policy toward Cuba was clear enough. The ostensible motive of the war with Spain had been to free the Cubans and give them independence, and this policy had received Congressional sanction in the Teller Resolution which promised the island independence.[1] But the difficult questions of when, how, and under what conditions Cuba was to be set on its course of national independence remained unsettled.

In the end the power to answer such questions went by default to the military governor of the island. No individual or group within the United States had enough interest or influence to gain the initiative. Public opinion, for example, offered no guide. To be sure, there was much talk about the "white man's burden," and most people probably agreed with the New York *Tribune* when it argued that the United States must make certain "that the government of Cuba shall in the future be civilized, humane, and decent, as it has not been."[2] But such arguments were at best platitudinous and offered nothing of value to those Americans who were grappling with the realities of a military occupation.

Congress and the President did little more than offer generalized instructions to the American occupation forces. Congress, as we have seen, promised Cuba independence, and in the Foraker Amendment, it provided that the United States should grant no property, franchises, or concessions during the occupation, thus making certain that American citizens would not abuse American power in Cuba.[3] But beyond this Congress did nothing. President McKinley went so far as to instruct General Brooke, the American commander in Cuba, in the broad principles to be followed in preparing the Cubans for independence. He ordered the American commander there to conduct the occupation "in the interest and for the benefit of the people of Cuba and those possessed of rights and property in that Island." Brooke was instructed to give the Cubans a "wise, just, and equal administration of law," to be sympathetic to "any effort to advance the comfort and prosperity of the destitute classes," and to reform local government, especially in the fields of sanitation and education. Finally, McKinley hoped that Americans could avoid giving offense to any particular faction in Cuba by building a government of moderation and law rather than one of severity and military force.[4] Yet even these instructions were vague, leaving a wide latitude for interpretation.

The execution of this general policy in the end was left to the War Department. Since the United States lacked a colonial bureau in 1898, the conduct of affairs in the various overseas possessions quite naturally fell into the hands of the people on the spot, and in most cases this was the Army. The Bureau of Insular Affairs, an agency of the War Department, gradually took over the supervision of colonial administration.[5] In the case of Cuba, however, this agency was ill-developed and exercised little supervision of the first occupation; policy-making was largely the function of the American military commander.

Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, the American commander in Cuba in 1898, was a competent and honest officer but he lacked imagination. During the year in which he commanded the occupation forces he did little to explore the possibilities of the vague instructions which McKinley had given him. Indeed, many seemed to think that the occupation under Brooke had no policy. In general, Brooke contented himself with providing relief from the horrors of the preceding revolution and war, and tried to turn the government back to the Cubans as rapidly as possible. By the end of 1899, Cubans were operating the government under only loose military supervision.[6] In such a situation there seemed little possibility of any extensive changes in Cuban life and society.

Not all American army officers in Cuba agreed with this general policy

of laissez faire, and at least one, Gen. Leonard Wood, did something about it. Wood had been a surgeon in the regular army and had gained some military experience in the Indian wars before becoming McKinley's personal physician. During the war, he had commanded the famous Rough Riders assisted by his close friend, Theodore Roosevelt. When the latter returned to the United States to make political capital of his war reputation, Wood remained behind to take charge of the American occupation of Santiago. There he pursued the problems of civil administration as vigorously as he had those of military action. He cleaned up the city and cut the death rate, restored the water system, distributed relief, and demobilized the Cuban army, all with a vigor which sometimes verged on highhandedness.[7] Nevertheless, Wood rapidly became the most popular of the American commanders in Cuba and something of a national hero in the United States to boot.

The popular and ambitious Wood soon came into conflict with his superior, General Brooke. Wood resented Brooke's attempts to centralize administration in Havana, and he was openly critical of some of Brooke's policies. Wood felt Brooke gave too much authority to the Cubans and was swayed by political pressures; on the other hand he was doing nothing to reform the judicial system, the schools, or local government, all elements in the military paternalism which Wood felt was essential in preparing Cuba for independence.[8] Nor did Wood hesitate to press his views on higher authorities. President McKinley heard his criticisms, and Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge helped to promote his ideas. With such influential friends behind him, Wood late in 1899 got Brooke's position despite the opposition of many army officers.[9]

As military governor of Cuba, Wood received all the authority he wanted. McKinley gave him about the same instructions he had given Brooke. And McKinley's successor, Wood's old friend Theodore Roosevelt, gave Wood "the largest liberty of action possible, and the heartiest support . . . ." Wood's immediate superior, Elihu Root, offered only general guidance and in most cases gave Wood a free hand and full support in whatever policy Wood devised.[10]

Wood himself saw his task as one of building up a republic "by Anglo-Saxons, in a Latin country where approximately 70 per cent of the people were illiterate," this republic to be "modeled closely upon lines of our great Republic."[11] Wood apparently desired Cuban annexation to the United States, hoping that his policy would be so successful that the Cubans would in the end demand such a move.[12] And Wood had no doubts about his eventual success. "Success in Cuba is so easy," he told a reporter, "that it

would be a crime to fail."[13] To execute his task, Wood devoted himself to a series of reforms designed to develop a sound financial system, a prosperous nation, a healthy and literate people, a good judicial system, and a sound constitutional government. To achieve these ends he had at his command a military government and an extraordinary amount of personal energy.

Of all the branches of government, the financial department needed attention most urgently. It was quite clear that if the aims of the occupation were to be achieved, the money to pay for them would have to come from Cuba. However, when the Americans arrived they found that the Cuban department of finance was virtually nonexistent. With Cuban personnel either completely unavailable or incompetent, Americans quickly took over the key financial positions. The customs service, the principal source of Cuban revenue, came under American control for the duration of the occupation. American army officers reorganized the department of finance and occupied the key financial positions of disbursing officers and auditor before gradually turning the department over to the Cubans.[14]

Finding Americans for these positions was not always easy. Most of them proved to be financial amateurs. Maj. Eugene F. Ladd, for example, chief auditor of the island for a time, admitted that while he had had some experience as an army disbursing officer he knew nothing about auditing techniques and had to improvise as he went along. Lt. Frank McCoy, the officer on Wood's staff in charge of overseeing financial affairs, was without any experience in financial matters.[15] Despite their limitations, these officers did a good job. They were apparently efficient, and no breath of scandal ever touched them.

In reviving the Cuban financial system, the Americans depended on the sources of revenue which the Spanish administration had developed. Of these, by far the most important was the customs. To be sure, some American officers pointed out that the system bore most heavily on those who could least afford it. There were some suggestions that the customs be reduced in favor of an improved and increased land tax, but nothing much came of this.[16] Doubtless the ease of collecting the customs as compared with a land tax played a part in Wood's decision not to press the matter. Nor did Wood seem willing to alienate the wealthier landowners in Cuba who he hoped would provide the country with stable leadership at the end of the occupation. In one tax reform, the Americans seemed moved more by moral than by financial considerations. In 1899 General Brooke abolished the national lottery. This was one of the less permanent American reforms. Sub rosa lotteries appeared even during the occupation, and the

national lottery was officially reëstablished in 1909 to become a perennial center of Cuban political conflict.[17]

Perhaps the chief financial reform was in the realm of administration. Lt. Col. Tasker Bliss built up an efficient customs service. After considerable difficulty, American officers trained Cubans in the accounting methods used by the United States Army, initiated them into the mysteries of checking accounts, and eventually set up a fairly efficient system of administering financial affairs.[18] Everything considered, things went quite well. Over $55,500,000 passed through the hands of the occupation government with only one instance of dishonesty.

Unhappily, the one exception to this otherwise excellent record occurred in that traditional center of American political patronage, the post office, and, involving Americans as it did, became something of a *cause célèbre*. The director general of the Cuban post office was one Estes G. Rathbone, a protégé of Senator Mark Hanna. Wood became somewhat suspicious of matters when Rathbone proved to be a disturbingly independent executive and when one of his subordinates, Charles F. W. Neely, proved to be both postal auditor and disbursing officer. When Wood finally forced an investigation early in 1900, shortages of over $100,000 were revealed.

While Neely was the obvious culprit in the case, Wood was convinced that Rathbone had also been involved. But the prosecution of Rathbone proved rather troublesome. Although Wood finally convicted him, a certain amount of genuine doubt about his guilt brought some stiff criticism in the United States. Furthermore, Senator Hanna used all the influence at his command to support his protégé (who had earlier been accused of questionable practices in connection with Hanna's election to the Senate in 1898) and did much to hamper Wood's army promotion. The evidence seems to indicate, however, that Wood honestly prosecuted the case with his usual vigor, unmindful of the toes on which he trod. Just what effect the whole business had on the Cubans is hard to say. Doubtless Wood's energetic prosecution made a good impression, but Rathbone had his supporters in Cuba as well as in the United States. Some quite naturally found in the case material for criticizing the Americans. The story is told that the wife of a Cuban official whom Wood had deposed announced: "The Spaniards stole everything, and now the Americans are stealing everything. My husband is for independence. Of course the Cubans will steal, but then the money will stay in the country."[19]

In view of the fact that Cuban governmental income depended heavily on the prosperity of the country, it would have seemed logical for the Americans to have emphasized economic aid to the Cubans. In actual

fact, however, this was not the case. The occupation paid less attention to economic affairs than to virtually any other aspect of Cuban life. Take agriculture, for example. Wood did sell some livestock to Cuban farmers on easy terms, but he refused to provide cheap government loans. Wood's attitude on the question of revising the land tax had implications for Cuban agriculture; in effect he refused to break up and put into use large quantities of Cuban land. Furthermore, Wood did nothing about setting up agricultural experiment stations and promoting agricultural extension work despite the urgings of Cubans and some of his own subordinates. To be sure some experts from the United States Department of Agriculture did help the Cubans attack certain crop and animal diseases, but such aid hardly met the larger problem.[20] Wood's most vigorous attempt to aid Cuban agriculture came with his fight to acquire tariff concessions from the United States. He spent over $15,000 of Cuban funds lobbying for lower sugar tariffs, but it was not until a year after the end of the occupation that he was able to overcome the objections of American sugar-beet growers and doctrinaire protectionists.[21] In the end, however, lower tariffs did bring some temporary prosperity to Cuban sugar planters.

Several surveys proved of benefit to the Cuban economy. The most important of these was the general census of 1899 directed by Lt. Col. J. P. Sanger and Victor Olmsted which collected data on population, agricultural products, and educational conditions. Three experts from the United States Geological Survey spent three months in Cuba making a geological reconnaissance which, cursory though it was, as late as 1934 constituted the only survey of the island. Army engineers also compiled a much-needed map of Cuba.[22]

The occupation concentrated most of its economic aid on Cuba's transportation and communication system. Despite the interruption caused by the Rathbone scandal, Americans modernized the Cuban postal system and introduced such innovations as a money-order system, registered mail, and a dead-letter service. The Army Signal Corps reconstructed and operated the government-owned telephone and telegraph system and expanded it to serve nearly every Cuban city of any commercial importance. How efficient this work was it is hard to tell. Cuban President Estrada Palma complained in 1903 that the lines had been received "in very bad condition," some of them almost unserviceable.[23]

Wood was eager also to expand the railroad system. Sir William Van Horne, builder of the Canadian Pacific, was on hand, ready to go ahead with construction. By a bit of legal exegesis on the part of Wood and Root, Van Horne was able to get around the apparently insuperable barrier of

the Foraker Amendment's ban on concessions or franchises and to add a sound and valuable link to Cuba's railroad network.[24] While Wood encouraged railroad building, he also saw to it that Cuba's railroads gave the nation good service. In 1900 his special commissioner of railroads, William H. Carlson, reported that Cuban railroads had become a law unto themselves. On the basis of this and other information, Wood charged that the railroads did "not appreciate their obligations to the public," had charged "exorbitant and arbitrary" rates, and in some cases had even violated their charters. Wood was no man to leave such conditions unchanged. Aided by a host of American experts—railroad lawyer E. R. Olcott, Wood's invaluable headquarters assistant Frank Steinhart, Van Horne, American railroad builder Gen. Grenville Dodge, and Edward A. Moseley and Martin Decker of the Interstate Commerce Commission—Wood pushed through a new railroad law which regulated rates, banned such familiar discriminatory practices as rebates and rate discrimination, and generally brought railroads under government supervision. There was some opposition, of course, but in general the law seems to have been a necessary and progressive step.[25]

An integral part of Wood's economic policy was a program of public works for Cuba to help alleviate the after-effects of the revolution. American engineers took over the disorganized Cuban department and embarked on a program designed to improve Cuba's transportation system. American engineers helped persuade various Havana groups to agree on a plan for a public transportation system. Others improved harbor facilities, especially in Havana. Still others attempted to pave the streets of Cuban cities and extend the meager country road system.[26] Such activities were not without their frustrations, however. American engineers found their highways cut to pieces by the narrow, heavily-loaded Cuban cartwheels, and laws regulating the size of such wheels and the loads they might carry were of only limited effectiveness—as modern state highway departments have learned to their sorrow.[27]

The public works program in Cuba was intimately bound up with a plan for improving Cuban health. The high disease rates during the war, the fear that Cuban epidemics might spread to cities in the southern United States, and the fact that Wood himself was a doctor, all contributed to American interest in public health problems. A cleanup campaign was the first order of business. There was no question that Havana needed it. Americans had to remove over 1,200 cubic yards of rubbish and several tons of fetid matter from the Havana customs house alone, for example, and conditions elsewhere were almost as bad. Quick action corrected this

situation. Sewers, water supplies, plumbing facilities, garbage collection, and street cleaning received much attention. Indeed, sanitation seemed to be almost a fetish with the Americans. Wood's reports are filled with official photographs of local toilet facilities "before and after" the advent of American ideas, pictures of the serried ranks of uniformed Havana street-sweepers lined up before their carts and brooms, and detailed views of newly-improved garbage scows.[28] Yet the work was effective. As early as February, 1900, one observer wrote: "Havana is really a clean city now, and the private houses of the poorer class are clean like the streets . . . . I have concluded that cleanliness is catching."[29] Other cities, notably Santiago, received much the same treatment.

Such improvements brought with them difficulties, too. In Havana, American engineers discovered what United States cities had long known: sewers and street paving involve contractors, and contractors often involve trouble. Army engineers, after importing American specialists to draw up plans for Havana's new system of streets and sewers discovered that an American contractor, Michael J. Dady and Company by name, had already signed a contract for the work in 1895. Although the army rejected Dady's plans as inadequate and his bid as exorbitant, when it came to letting the final contract, Dady had certain rights under Cuban law, and, what was more important, political influence in the United States. Only by some rather highhanded methods was Wood able to buy out Dady's rights at what he regarded as a reasonable figure and get new bids for the work. When the occupation ended, funds had not yet been found to start the work, and the problem dragged on for many years.[30]

Other health measures supplemented the cleanup campaign. The hospital system was improved and extended throughout the island until Wood declared that Cuba was better supplied with hospital facilities than was rural America. American nurses came in and began training Cuban women for the nursing profession; Wood reported that these new trained nurses had helped reduce hospital death rates, the ultimate proof of the usefulness of this reform.[31]

For a while, though, this health campaign seemed to be a failure. It was apparent by the beginning of 1901 that the work had done little to solve the problem of yellow fever. Wood had stopped an epidemic in Santiago in 1899 only after the most drastic measures of removing nonimmunes from the city and virtually immersing the city in corrosive sublimate. In Havana, Maj. W. C. Gorgas, the sanitation officer, had to face the fact that the cleanup was doing little to stop yellow fever, while Wood's drastic Santiago methods were inapplicable in a large city like Havana. Mean-

while, however, a doubting surgeon general had appointed a special commission headed by Walter Reed to investigate the theory of Cuban doctor Carlos Finlay that yellow fever was carried by mosquitoes. After some brilliant investigation and the heroic sacrifices of several human guinea pigs, Reed and his co-workers established the validity of the theory, "the greatest medical discovery since the discovery of vaccination," according to General Wood. Armed with this knowledge, Army engineers under the skeptical Gorgas methodically went about the task of cleaning out the mosquito population of Havana and with it yellow fever.[32]

But yellow fever was not the only menace to Cuban health. The sanitation, ineffective against the fever, did much to improve urban health conditions, lowering the death rate to a third of what it had been. An effort was made to vaccinate the whole Cuban population. A vigorous campaign eradicated glanders, and the fight against tuberculosis was begun. Finally, Americans alleviated the unhappy lot of the island's leper colony.[33]

But the spectacular success of the yellow-fever campaign and the impressive size of the sanitation cleanup should not blind one to the difficulties or limitations of the American health measures. Schools for nurses had to close for lack of interested students, for example. Doctors faced prejudice against vaccination. If much was accomplished, much remained to be done. Havana's high death rate, for example, depended more on such general urban diseases as tuberculosis than it did on the much-feared yellow fever.[34] Nor should it be forgotten that health gains were largely confined to the larger cities; the country districts were quite generally neglected.

Closely allied to the health program were American-organized efforts on behalf of Cuba's unfortunates. Maj. E. St. John Greble and Homer Folks, the latter a member of the New York State Board of Charities, wrote a new law providing for the care of destitute and delinquent children, treatment of the insane, homes for the aged, and public hospitals. Another American, Jerome B. Clark, used American ideas of social work in caring for Cuba's war orphans. Indeed, Americans gave the whole social-work movement a lift by holding the annual meeting of the National Conference of Charities in Havana in 1902 where Cubans heard the latest American ideas on reformatories, hospitals, caring for needy children, and the treatment of the insane.[35]

Of all the governmental activities, education came in for the greatest attention. It was sorely needed. Over 60 per cent of the population was illiterate, and the inadequate prewar Cuban educational system had completely disintegrated during the revolutionary turmoil preceding the American intervention. The situation was particularly serious in light of the fact

that American policy-makers regarded literacy as a prime requisite of any sort of stable democratic government, the chief aim of the occupation.[36]

Action on the education front began late in 1899 with the arrival of one Alexis Everett Frye. Frye, a Harvard graduate with an independent income derived from writing geography texts, arrived in Cuba with a recommendation from Harvard's President Eliot and a compulsion to uplift Filipinos or Cubans. Appointed superintendent of schools in November, 1899, by General Brooke, Frye quickly tossed out a cumbersome school law written by Brooke's Cuban advisors, drafted another in twenty-four hours, and began to establish schools at the rate of sixty or seventy a day. By March, 1900, Frye had set up more than 3,300 schools.[37] In the end, however, his influence waned. General Wood was convinced that Frye's enthusiasm outran his administrative ability and removed him in favor of a young West Pointer, Lt. Matthew E. Hanna. Doubtless Wood's feeling that Frye "was a dangerous man in the Island" whose "influence on the teachers and children was in the direction of the most intense radicalism as [to] the future relations between Cuba and the United States" was a factor in Frye's removal.[38]

The chief accomplishment of the new education head, Lieutenant Hanna, was a new school law. Feeling that Frye's law failed to provide for adequate inspection and that it neglected teacher examinations, Hanna wrote a new law based on that of Ohio, where he had taught for four years. Actually, both laws were rather similar. Both vested extensive powers in local boards of education, at the same time giving national officials broad supervisory powers on such subjects as teacher training, textbooks, and curricula. Both provided for compulsory school attendance. In general Hanna's law provided for these things more systematically and instituted more careful administrative procedures than had Frye's.[39] All in all, they were notable attempts to adapt American institutions to Cuban conditions and particularly to encourage local participation in and responsibility for education.

But school laws, as Americans well recognized, did not guarantee a sound educational system. Good teachers had to be provided, for example. Wood in general refused to import American teachers, contending that Cuba would resent it as an attempt to "Americanize" the island. He did accept an invitation from Harvard whereby 1,200 Cubans received free summer school training at that institution in 1900. All evidence seems to indicate that it was a valuable experience and that it helped Cuba meet its immediate and pressing need for teachers.[40] To help solve the continuing problem of teacher training, Wood initiated summer teacher institutes and

arranged further trips to the United States for summer school. In addition, when he left the island in 1902, Wood left behind a contract whereby the New Paltz Normal School of New York was to train sixty Cuban students a year. This early attempt at international education ended rather quickly, however, when the Cuban government terminated the contract in 1902 shortly after the Americans left the island.[41] Besides providing teachers with better training, American authorities attempted to improve their lot by taking teacher appointments out of politics and putting them on a merit basis. Salaries went up, too, until they compared favorably with those in the United States.[42]

Books and buildings posed additional problems. New textbooks, purchased in wholesale lots, were generally Spanish translations of American texts; there just weren't enough good Spanish or Cuban textbooks. Although the American texts were the best available, they left Cuban children, raised in the tropics, in the curious position of reading stories about ice-skating. Housing for the school system was very scarce. Wood, hoping that the Cuban school system could eventually have its own schools, put engineers to work drawing up plans for different types of buildings to meet varied Cuban needs. Other Americans actually built new schools for the Cubans; they hoped, in so doing, to set an example for future regimes.[43]

While the American authorities concentrated most of their attention on setting up common schools to promote literacy, they did introduce a number of innovations which went somewhat beyond these limited aims, in these cases using American teachers. Wood, for example, in an attempt to promote good citizenship, brought Wilson Gill, of New York City, to Cuba. Gill introduced his idea of "school cities" in which students practiced, through organized governments of their own affairs, the techniques which they would have to use later on in the new Cuban society. Notes printed for the guidance of Cuban teachers clearly indicated that Americans hoped to introduce some of their own political techniques and ideas into Cuban society. Other American teachers brought the kindergarten and manual training into Cuban schools. Although the manual training teachers had to work through translators, the plan was greeted with enthusiasm and spread to several parts of Cuba.[44]

The demoralized University of Havana also received a shot in the arm. Wood backed his capable Cuban Secretary of Education, Enrique Varona, in a campaign to reëxamine the members of the faculty, weeding out incompetents and replacing them through competitive examinations. The old curricula were reformed, and courses in pedagogy, engineering, elec-

tricity, architecture, and agronomy were added to meet the practical needs of the new Cuba.[45]

It is easy enough to outline the general activities of the occupation in dealing with Cuban education, but it is more difficult to assess the results. A few things seem clear. Americans put a great deal of stress on education relative to other aspects of the occupation program. A fourth of the Cuban governmental expenses during the occupation went for education. And these expenditures brought results. School enrollment jumped to 172,000, three times the pre-revolutionary peak.[46] This was only one side of the picture, however. At best only half the children of school age were enrolled. Hanna frankly admitted there weren't enough funds to provide schools for everyone. Even when schools were available, the Americans found they could not enforce the compulsory school law. School boards gave trouble also. Board members proved either incompetent or corrupt, elections were often fraudulent, teaching appointments became political footballs, and boards were often extravagant or dishonest with their funds. Nevertheless, the Americans retained these local bodies in the firm belief that Cubans could learn democratic techniques at the local level only by practicing them. Some critics attacked the whole philosophy behind the occupation policy. They suggested that Wood and Hanna were naïve in their hopes of producing a democratic government through literacy and suggested that Cubans really needed practical education designed to help them adapt themselves to their rural agricultural environment.[47] There is truth in these contentions, but Wood and Hanna, amateurs that they were, could hardly be expected to adopt ideas which were just coming to the fore in educational thought.

More closely related to the fundamental American aim of setting up a stable, democratic government in Cuba were the legal and political changes introduced by the American occupation authorities. In general, Americans left the Spanish legal system largely unchanged. To be sure, Americans wrote laws on such subjects at railroads, education, and the customs, and abolished cockfighting and the lottery in accord with American conceptions of public morality.[48] Still, these changes left untouched the basic legal structure.

Relations between church and state gave the Americans some difficulty. Cuban anticlericals persuaded General Brooke to issue a law changing the marriage ceremony from a sacred to a secular one; under the new law, the religious ceremony had no legal effect. Needless to say, such a development scandalized devout Catholics in both Cuba and America, and they were able to exert enough influence on Wood to produce a compromise whereby

the marriage ceremony remained a civil contract but one which could be performed by priests and ministers as well as by civil officials. Eventually, in 1940, the Cubans returned to the original idea of completely secularizing the ceremony.[49] Americans ran into some difficulty also when they attempted to solve a long-standing problem by arranging the purchase of certain church properties being used by the government.[50] Although some anti-Catholics felt that the price was too high, it seems to have been a fair solution to an always difficult problem.

Americans seemed more interested in judicial administration than in legal substance, however. They helped reconstitute the judicial system, which was incomplete and disorganized after the revolution. Most notably, they introduced American police courts, for a while run by American army officers, which with their oral, summary procedure, were designed to relieve the judicial system of some of its burdens. Judges got higher salaries, and Wood persistently tried to place honest men on the bench. Still, there were numerous indications that many of the judges, particularly on the local level, were incompetent or corrupt. Americans tried to introduce some characteristic Anglo-Saxon legal safeguards into Cuban judicial procedure also, but they seemed to obstruct rather than aid justice. Judges complained that if prisoners were not held incommunicado, they immediately conspired with their friends to produce alibis. Trial by jury wasn't too effective either. Juries simply refused to convict at times, even in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Bowing to the second of these complaints, Wood quietly abolished trial by jury shortly before the end of the occupation.[51]

Law-enforcement and correctional officials also received the benefit of American assistance. Former New York police officials helped organize the Havana municipal police system which was quickly placed under civil service in an attempt to put it beyond the reach of spoils politics. American military commanders trained the Rural Guard, which acted as a police force and provided the nucleus of the new Cuban army. On the correctional side of the picture, the warden of the Havana penitentiary visited American prisons at Leavenworth, Kansas, and Joliet, Illinois, learning the most advanced prison methods of the day, methods which he subsequently introduced into Cuba. Meanwhile, correctional schools for juvenile offenders were set up in charge of Americans who had had more or less experience with such work in the United States.[52]

As we have seen, the occupation utilized the services of a large number of more or less well qualified Americans. Indeed, some of the men trained in Cuba formed the nucleus of a growing colonial service. Several Americans who were trained in the Cuban customs service later utilized

their training in the Philippines. General Wood himself became a major figure in the administration of that American colonial possession. Matthew Hanna eventually joined the State Department where he could use his Cuban experience in dealing with Latin-American affairs.[53] Since the Americans had always recognized that their stay was temporary, they had from the beginning trained Cubans and placed them in charge of the government services. Not that this was always easy. Some jobs required skills which Cubans simply did not possess, and some American administrators claimed that it was difficult to find and train efficient, responsible men. Nevertheless, the job was done, and the Cuban government services were in the end turned over to the new Cuban president without a sudden change in personnel.[54]

Only one step remained before the refurbished Cuban government could be turned back to the island's natives: the establishment of a constitutional government. Planning had started early in the occupation. As early as 1899 and 1900, Brooke and Wood began the work of reorganizing the local governmental units. Equally important was the writing of a new election law under which municipal elections were held. Under the law, written with the advice of two Americans and approved by Wood, Cubans enjoyed wide, if not universal suffrage.[55]

In the summer of 1900, the call went out for the constitutional convention. The constitution-makers, elected in a rather apathetic contest by only 30 per cent of the eligible voters, worked largely on their own. To be sure, Wood had early had ideas of writing the Cuban constitution himself, including provisions which would assure the Cubans of the benefits of continuing American control and assistance, but these ideas were overruled by Secretary of War Root. In only one important subject, relations with the United States, did Cubans receive American instructions. Here the Americans, after considerable haggling and not a little pressure, pushed through the famous Platt Amendment, a document framed by Root and supplemented with some of Wood's ideas, which was to dominate Cuban-American relations for over thirty years.[56]

This single but exceedingly significant intervention into Cuban constitution-making had several motives. The Platt Amendment was designed in part to protect Cuba against her own folly, in part to safeguard American strategic interests, and in part to protect some of the American reforms. On the one hand, Cuba promised neither to impair her sovereignty nor to contract debts beyond her ability to pay, thereby avoiding any possibility of European intervention. On the other hand, the United States received the right to intervene to preserve Cuban independence and to maintain a

government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. Finally, Cuba promised to validate the acts of the occupying authorities and execute plans already made for improving the sanitation of Cuba.[57] It was a well-intentioned act on the part of the United States, but it proved to be a source of endless trouble later on.

With the final ratification of the Platt Amendment and the holding of elections, the Americans turned Cuba over to its new government early in 1902 and left the island amidst the plaudits of the Havana crowds. Wood left behind him a substantial accomplishment. But accomplishment meant controversy, and controversy bred friends and enemies in both the United States and Cuba. Surprisingly, most of Wood's enemies were in the United States. Political friends of the deposed Cuban postmaster, Estes Rathbone, and army friends of Wood's predecessor, General Brooke, were both critical of Wood. There was enough heat to generate a few charges of corruption, but these were of dubious merit. That such charges were so few was a tribute to Wood's general honesty and efficiency. Democrats went so far as to send detectives to Cuba to uproot some scandal, but without success.[58] To balance these accusations and enemies were a host of friends and all kinds of favorable publicity. Wood's career in Cuba made him a public figure of major importance.

The Cuban reaction is more difficult to judge. There was some dissatisfaction without a doubt. Some feared with some justice, that Wood was reluctant to give the island back to its inhabitants. There were some inevitable incidents between the occupying troops and the population. And Rathbone had his friends in Cuba as in the United States. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of evidence on the other side. Cuban officials and the common people were in general coöperative, and Wood himself remained something of a public hero in Cuba long after the end of the occupation.[59]

Whatever the judgment of contemporaries may have been, certain things seem clear. The Americans held to their promise to make Cuba independent, a significant achievement in the heyday of imperialism. The occupation authorities, in attempting to create conditions for a stable constitutional government in Cuba, made important contributions to Cuban life. The defects of the occupation—overemphasis on politics, health, and education and the relative neglect of economic aid—were errors of emphasis. Americans gave freely of their talents, although in some cases their talents were unequal to the task at hand. Finally, the occupation forces did their work with a minimum of irritation to the Cubans; the American reputation remained high after Wood and his associates left the island, indicative of the Cuban receptiveness to American ideas and American

assistance. There can be little doubt that the first American attempt to help the Cubans form a model Latin-American republic was a relatively successful one, the result of coöperation between diverse men with a common goal: Cuban independence.

IN THE four years following the American evacuation of Cuba, it seemed as if the Platt Amendment would never have to be used to justify further American "assistance" to Cuba. Under President Estrada Palma, Cuba enjoyed probably its most placid and successful years of independence. Yet in 1906 the Americans once again found themselves in charge of the Caribbean island, trying to give it a fresh start.

In the end it was the failure of the constitutional government in Cuba which brought American intervention. Trouble began in 1905 when the overanxious political supporters of Estrada Palma won their election by making full use of fraud and violence. The opposition party, the Liberals, in the approved manner retreated from the polls to the country where they prepared for revolution. Estrada Palma quickly concluded that the situation was out of hand, threatened to resign, and asked for American intervention. President Roosevelt, reluctant but convinced that the United States must do something because of the Platt Amendment, sent Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon and Secretary of War William Howard Taft, perhaps the United States' leading colonial expert, to the scene. Unhappily, they found it impossible to arrange a compromise, and when Estrada Palma and his government resigned, the Americans suddenly found themselves in charge of an island without a government.[60]

With an occupation inevitable, peacemakers Taft and Bacon were withdrawn in favor of Judge Charles E. Magoon. Magoon had been a successful Nebraska lawyer who had become an expert on the legal problems rising out of the new American empire. He had also been a member of the Isthmian Canal Commission and later governor of the Canal Zone and minister to Panama. Popular and capable, he seemed to be an excellent choice to head the second American attempt to guide the Cubans toward independence and stability.

Initially, Magoon had intended to patch up the political dispute which had produced the intervention and then get out, but various factors convinced him that the Americans would have to stay longer. Annexationist sentiment among the Americans, American reformist ideas, various difficulties in settling the political disputes, the necessity of taking a census before elections could be held, and Cuban economic woes growing out of

bad weather and the panic of 1907 all induced the Americans to extend their stay and undertake a thorough job of reform.[61]

As in the first American intervention in Cuba, American army officers were much in evidence directing the affairs of the Cuban government and training its personnel. To be sure, during the second occupation the Americans acted as advisors rather than as executive officers, but their influence seemed no less pervasive. Many of the men had worked with Wood in Cuba during the first occupation, while others had gained experience in colonial administration in the Philippines.[62] If experience meant anything, this should have been a spectacularly successful government.

In many ways, the second intervention followed the pattern of the first. Finances, as usual, presented some of the more knotty problems to be faced. Magoon and his subordinates put through customs reforms, improved disbursing and auditing techniques, recommended banking and currency laws, closed up some of the leaks in the Cuban fiscal system by uncovering a number of sizable thefts and embezzlements, and supervised the disbursement of state aid to municipalities. In addition, Magoon consummated the arrangements for the purchase of church property begun earlier by Wood, in some cases at a substantial saving for the Cuban government over the original agreement. Although Magoon, like Wood, considered a new property tax, he also deemed it inadvisable to introduce such a radical change during the relatively short stay of the Americans.[63]

In the end, these financial problems brought Magoon a good deal of grief. Groundless but effective rumors began to circulate that Magoon had been bribed by the church. The disputed state of the Cuban treasury at the beginning of the intervention, the $80,000,000 of expenditures by the occupation authorities, the authorization to issue improvement bonds, and the existence of a $6,500,000 deficit when the Americans left—all gave rise to Cuban charges that the Magoon regime had been extravagant and corrupt.[64] Although no evidence of any real corruption has ever been produced and although some historians have argued that the Cubans received good value for their money, these charges have nonetheless lingered on to contribute heavily to Magoon's unhappy reputation in Cuba.

In the sphere of economic assistance, Magoon followed roughly in the footsteps of his predecessor. In agriculture, for example, the ravages of the revolution had been followed by drought and storm. In general Magoon relied on better weather, peace and order, and improved transportation facilities to aid the farmer. Agriculturists did get some credit, cattlemen got an increase in the Cuban tariff, and the agricultural experiment station

founded by the Cubans in 1904 and heavily staffed with Americans and American-trained Cubans received continued support. But there was no attempt to explore the possibilities of technical assistance or agricultural education, no attack on the basic problems of Cuban agriculture: seasonal unemployment, low wages and prices, absentee ownership, and the high cost of living.[65]

The most substantial aid to the Cuban economy was a public works program. For this, Magoon had a double motive. He felt both that Cuba badly needed improved transportation and that public works would help Cuban agricultural workers live through their seasonal unemployment.[66] Ironically enough, one of the subordinates of William Howard Taft adopted a policy in Cuba in 1906 which some of Taft's Republican successors regarded with horror in the United States as late as the 1930's.

The major element in the public works program was an ambitious road-building campaign. Magoon spent over $13,000,000 to build about 570 kilometers and repair another 200 kilometers of a projected 2300-kilometer road net. He regarded it, with some justice, as his greatest achievement. In general the roads were well designed and constructed, and they produced some startling reductions in freight costs and travel times. This is not to say that the program was universally applauded. There were again unsubstantiated charges of poor quality, favoritism, and corruption. Nor were the effects as permanent as Magoon may have hoped. The two-wheeled cart which had plagued Wood continued to wreak havoc on Magoon's roads, particularly when subsequent regimes failed to maintain them adequately. But Magoon could hardly be blamed for this.[67]

The public works program had other aspects too. There were extensive river and harbor improvements. The post office, the telegraph system, and public buildings were rehabilitated. And the influence of American engineers in Cuba extended beyond these strictly physical accomplishments; Cubans adopted new engineering techniques learned from the Americans.[68]

Among Magoon's many problems in connection with public works, none was more vexing than the question of utility franchises. Unprotected by the ban on granting franchises which Wood had enjoyed, Magoon found himself entangled in the treacherous web of pressures and political maneuvers that surrounded franchise-giving in the early twentieth century. He was involved in a dispute over a telephone franchise which was not settled until after the end of the occupation. More important, his administration teetered on the edge of a major scandal when it approved a franchise for the Havana Electric Railway, a company controlled by Frank Steinhart, an intimate advisor of the occupation forces. Actually, no graft seems to

have been involved and Steinhart had apparently done a good job of rebuilding a badly run company, but it was difficult to convince suspicious Cuban critics that this was the case.[69]

The problems of health and sanitation were not as crucial as during the first occupation, but there was plenty to be done. In the interval between the two occupations, sanitation had been left to local governmental units which were either unwilling or unable to provide the funds. As a result, there were new outbreaks of yellow fever. The occupation authorities took vigorous measures to correct this situation. Army medical officers nationalized the health service, and by the end of the occupation had eradicated yellow fever from Cuba. With yellow fever under control, health officials turned to attack tuberculosis with special dispensaries, a sanitarium, and an intensive publicity campaign. At the end of the occupation, however, tuberculosis still remained a grave problem.[70]

Magoon also had trouble trying to persuade the Cubans to complete work in sanitation which they had begun under Wood's direction. Despite American promptings and the existence of the Platt Amendment, nothing was done between 1902 and 1906 to carry out the contract for the paving and sewering of Havana. Magoon looked into the matter again and then negotiated a supplementary contract by which the Cuban national government was to bear two-thirds of the cost of the job. Work was begun finally in the fall of 1908, but the last work was completed and the last claims of the American construction company were settled only in 1920 after considerable pressure from the State Department.[71]

American assistance in the general field of health extended to Cuba's hospitals, prisons, and charitable institutions. The Department of Charities, set up by Wood to care for such matters, was in bad shape when the Americans returned; hospitals and correctional institutions had declined under its care. Under American leadership, however, prisons were inspected and repaired, hospitals got new equipment and advice on administration, and the insane asylum was cleaned up. How lasting these reforms would be seemed questionable. Occupation authorities feared that some places would need American personnel for some time to make them a success, personnel which would be unavailable after the exit of the occupation forces.[72]

Although the Wood reforms in education had stood up fairly well under the Estrada Palma regime,[73] there were still many complex problems for Magoon and his associates to solve. The school system had been thrown into confusion by the revolution which preceded the American intervention. By no means were all Cuban children getting any education, and of those that attended school, few went beyond the first two grades.

Moreover, the local school boards which had troubled Wood continued to be centers of political activity and corruption. The Cuban head of the department of education frankly felt that the whole idea of local responsibility had been a mistake. Politics in the hiring and firing of teachers, the handling of colored teachers, and school discipline also aroused a great deal of criticism.

The occupation authorities met these problems with little imagination; the American educational advisor lacked the energy of Frye or Hanna. Schools received a generous allocation of funds. The ravages of the revolution were repaired, and in general the system returned to its prerevolutionary efficiency. Finally there were some improvements in secondary education.[74] Still, the Magoon regime did little to solve the more basic problems inherited from the earlier intervention.

The limited nature of the American activities in some areas was balanced by some very considerable accomplishments in the realm of legal reform. Taft and Bacon, the American peace commissioners in 1906, had felt that the Cuban government would require some real reform before it could hope to be stable, and had therefore urged the enactment of several basic laws, including a new municipal law, a new electoral law, a reorganized judiciary, and a civil-service law. Magoon, a lawyer by profession, sympathized with these recommendations, and appointed the Advisory Law Commission to execute them. The commission, in effect an informal legislative group, included three Americans and nine Cubans. The Americans were Col. Enoch H. Crowder, a lawyer who had been legal advisor to the military governor of the Philippines; Maj. Blanton Winship, later judge advocate general and governor of Puerto Rico; and Otto Schoenrich, a lawyer with considerable Latin-American experience. The nine Cubans included men of varied political groups; perhaps the most important figures were Francisco Carrera Jústiz, a noted lawyer, and Alfredo Zayas, a leading Liberal politician and later Cuban president.

The commission, led by the Americans and by Jústiz, worked very hard. Subcommittees wrote the first drafts of the new laws. After revision by the commission as a whole, the drafts went to various Cuban leaders for comments and criticism. The final results were then promulgated by Magoon. For the most part the group worked well together. To be sure, there were some sharp differences of opinion, particularly over political matters, but there were never any Cuban-American splits, and members of the commission remained good personal friends.

One aspect of the commission's work was intimately bound up with the necessity of holding new elections. A subcommittee headed by Crowder

wrote the first draft of a new electoral law, an elaborate one based on the Australian ballot but incorporating in addition proportional representation. Crowder included many provisions based on American election experience to prevent fraud and assure honest elections. There was some conflict over the suffrage qualifications, but in the end Cubans got the universal manhood suffrage they had themselves adopted in the Constitution of 1902. Another prerequisite for new elections was provided when Victor Olmsted, who had helped in the census of 1899, guided a new national enumeration which provided the essential list of qualified voters. In actual operation, the new law proved to be rather complex, but close American tutelage and supervision produced honest and orderly elections in 1908, the results of which were accepted by both sides. This part of the commission's work was clearly successful. It remained to be seen, however, whether the complex barriers against fraud would be effective under Cuban administration.

The Advisory Law Commission also tried to build a more efficient executive branch of the government. Political patronage and disputes over jobs had helped bring on the revolution of 1906 and had remained to plague Magoon afterwards. To help control this problem in the future, the commission wrote a civil-service law. The law, drafted by Major Winship, was modeled after the United States civil-service law as modified by Philippine experience and benefited from criticism by American civil-service experts. In addition, the commission drafted a law of executive power to harmonize executive practice with the Cuban constitution. The law, drafted in part by Judge Frank Feuille of Texas, one of Schoenrich's Puerto Rican associates who became attached to Crowder's staff in Cuba, incorporated some forms and practices found in American political codes.

The commission turned its attention to the judiciary also. The new judicial law tried to rationalize the existing system and made the judiciary to some extent independent of the other branches of government. It was not an entirely satisfactory law, and not all of the members of the commission supported it. Schoenrich, the author of the law, felt that reform of the legal system was dependent on the reform of the legal procedure; since such revision was out of the question at the moment, the commission presented the judiciary law as the best obtainable under the circumstances. In the light of the fact that Cuban legal procedure has never been substantially revised, the commission's "half a loaf is better than none" policy proved to be quite sound.

The commission's work on government organization extended to the local level also. Led by Jústiz, the commission wrote a new law giving the municipalities a greater degree of autonomy. While the commission in

general tried to follow Spanish precedents, it was a curious commentary on the influence of the Anglo-Saxon idea of the importance of independent local government that the commission should stress autonomy for Cuban municipalities at a time when Cubans were criticizing the independence and responsibility which the Hanna school law had placed in the hands of the Cuban school boards.

Elections, civil service, the judiciary, and the municipalities absorbed most of the energy of the Advisory Law Commission, but not all of it. The commission wrote a law systematizing Cuban military law and reorganizing the army, already being trained by American officers. It pushed through a game law. And it worked on laws dealing with telephones, juvenile courts, notaries, mortgages, irrigation, and property registration which it turned over to the incoming Cuban government for action.[75]

In general, the commission deserved nothing but praise. Its work proved to be permanent and generally able. Most of the laws have survived down to the present although amended to meet changing conditions. In some cases where the laws did not work well, the blame was to be laid on the administration rather than on the laws themselves. There was some criticism, of course. A few claimed that the commission had usurped legislative powers, but this was a minor cavil. Otto Schoenrich testified in later years that "the laws formulated by the Advisory Commission have given such excellent results that the work of the Commission has become something of a legend in Cuba." Schoenrich himself was favorably received on subsequent visits to Cuba and in December, 1951, received the Order of Lanuza from the Cuban government and an honorary degree from the University of Havana for his work on the commission.[76]

The American occupation forces left the island in January, 1909, after national elections had been held the previous November. Magoon was gone, but far from forgotten; for behind him he left a reputation in addition to the concrete physical accomplishments of his regime. And in the conduct of human affairs, what people think about their past is ofttimes as significant as what has actually happened.

Magoon, like his predecessor Wood, met with some criticism during his administration. As we have seen, some Cubans criticized the terms of his purchase of church property, his granting of telephone and traction franchises, the Havana paving and sewering contract, and his general management of financial affairs. Others were dissatisfied with the educational system he had inherited from Wood and Hanna or found fault with his distribution of patronage. Doubtless the whole nation resented the presence of American troops on Cuban soil, a feeling heightened by the inevitable

bad manners or criminal activities of a few of the American soldiers. Nonetheless, Magoon seems to have left the island with a fairly good reputation. Havana made him an adopted son, and newspaper comment was in general quite favorable.[77]

Subsequent criticism grew in volume and brutality until it became almost libelous. Almost as soon as Magoon left the island, newspapers began to hint darkly at "evil influences" in the provisional government.[78] Soon one Cuban author was calling Magoon "a magnificent example of Yankee honor: gross in type, rude of manners, of a profound ambition, avid of constant rapines. He falls like a buzzard on the treasury of Cuba and devours it. He falls like a hurricane of administrative immorality upon everything and infects it all; he is a Jew who fondles gold like a sweetheart."[79] Such charges have become standard fare in Cuban textbooks which picture Magoon as wasteful, prodigal with his pardons, and incompetent if not downright dishonest.[80] To be sure, there were a few Cubans who gave sincere praise to the American administrators. One Cuban praised Col. J. R. Kean, the head of American health work under Magoon, as "the grand organizer of Cuban sanitary methods, and the good and modest man, who consecrated with all his soul, his greatest talents to the improvement of sanitary conditions in Cuba."[81] And we have already noted the praise and honors which devolved upon the American members of the Advisory Law Commission. Still, on the whole, the reputation of the Magoon regime has been anything but bright.

While the evidence is not always conclusive, Magoon seems to have deserved little of this wholesale condemnation. Most of the charges against Magoon attack his conduct of financial affairs, his administration of the patronage, and his use of the pardoning power. While the actual state of Cuban finances remains somewhat in doubt, it is probably fair to say that Magoon was somewhat overenthusiastic in his use of funds, but there is no evidence to buttress charges that he or any other Americans were corrupt. In the handling of patronage, Magoon may have listened too closely to the advice of Cuban party leaders, but there is no evidence of any serious corruption. As for pardons, Magoon actually issued fewer than had Wood or Estrada Palma in comparable periods of time; in any event, a considerable number of pardons were to be expected in Cuba where a pardon represented an act of justice rather than an act of grace.[82]

It is extremely difficult to account for this situation. It is hard to see how Magoon offended many more people than did the highhanded Wood. Apparently the undercurrent of resentment against occupation by a foreign power was much greater in the second than in the first intervention. Wood

had come as a liberator from the Spanish yoke; Magoon arrived as an arbiter of Cuban political squabbles. The origins of the intervention apparently had much to do with Cuban receptivity to American ideas. In any event, the adventures of Magoon in Cuba serve as a constant reminder of the fragility of a reputation.

In retrospect, one wonders if the physical accomplishments of the second intervention were worth the animosities it generated. To such a question one can give, at best, an equivocal answer on the basis of available information, scanty and difficult to interpret. It does seem safe to say, however, that while American activities had an important impact on Cuban life, they by no means fulfilled the high expectations of the more optimistic.

Take sanitation and education for example. General Crowder complained in 1924 that the sanitary service was shot through with graft and corruption; conditions were bad enough, he thought, to warrant American action under the Platt Amendment. Still, there was other evidence to indicate that American reforms were retained and studiously followed.[83] In the long run, the Cuban health situation never descended to the depths it had once known; yellow fever, at least, was a thing of the past. The situation was much the same in education. Local school boards worked badly; the compulsory education law became a dead letter; and the school system never was able to afford its own buildings. All the evidence points to a steady decline in the educational system until the demoralization of Cuban education in the tumultuous days of the early thirties. Still, the schools founded by the Americans did help promote literacy, and for good or for ill, the Cuban system conformed more closely to the educational system of the United States than did that of any other Latin-American country.[84]

As for other American activities it is more difficult to say. We have already noted the persistence of some of the reforms of the Advisory Law Commission; still its electoral law did little to bring stable government and honest elections to Cuba. The Cuban road system built by Magoon suffered from poor maintenance and remained uncompleted for years. One wonders how long lesser reforms such as prison methods lasted. Indeed, the general frustration of American reforms led one of the more pessimistic writers on Cuba to exclaim that reform could become part and parcel of Cuban life and practice only with an American intervention lasting the lifetime of a full generation.[85]

If it was true that essential reforms in Cuba would require an American occupation lasting for decades, the American State Department demon-

strated no eagerness to go to such lengths. The American intervention in 1906 had been a reluctant one, and there was little disposition for further such adventures. In the way, however, stood the Platt Amendment. It virtually obliged the United States to intervene in order to maintain a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. Nor were the Cubans unaware of this fact. The revolution of 1906 which had brought the American intervention of that year had been inspired in part by men who hoped for American intervention on behalf of their political interests. Similar hopes apparently played a part in the Negro revolt of 1912. The Liberal party, claiming fraud after its defeat in the election of 1916, also looked for American intervention in the subsequent revolution.[86]

The State Department saw the dangers in such a situation. Consequently, the United States pursued a policy of preventive action designed to forestall any situation which might make American intervention inevitable. The State Department protested the granting of concessions it felt were harmful to Cuban interests, and applied pressure against an amnesty bill which would have shielded Cuban grafters. American armed forces landed in Cuba in 1912 and 1917 to protect American lives and property threatened by the revolution.[87]

World War I brought new opportunities for the exercise of American influence and "assistance." The United States was in a position to dictate terms for the Cuban sugar crop through the control of shipping. Once Cuba joined the Allies, American officials played an important role in Cuban life. The American military attaché was referred to in the press as the military advisor of Cuba. Other officers helped manufacture uniforms for Cuban troops or supervised the censorship and shipping control systems. A few Cuban officers were trained in United States camps while some marines were landed in Cuba, allegedly for training purposes but actually to give greater confidence to Cuban sugar planters, still smarting from the effects of the last revolution.[88]

Informal intervention in Cuba reached a peak in the years immediately following World War I, when Cuba again faced a serious political crisis. In 1919, even before elections had been held, the Liberals voted in convention to invoke American intervention when the conditions seemed to warrant it. The Americans, fully aware that such a situation might well lead to another and permanent occupation, put pressure on Cuban President Menocal to request American assistance in writing a new electoral law. Menocal acceded to the pressure, and Gen. Enoch Crowder, author of

Cuba's 1908 electoral law, proceeded quietly to Cuba to begin his career as informal reformer.[89]

Crowder's initial job was to revise the Cuban election law. It was clear enough that his 1908 effort had been completely negated by corrupt administration. Cubans had proved immensely ingenious at producing fraudulent results while complying with the letter of the law. Registration was obviously fraudulent, and election boards didn't even bother to fold the ballots when they stuffed the boxes. Crowder worked hard with the Cubans to produce something better. Because of his coöperative attitude he had no trouble getting his program through. The new law entrusted the judiciary with much of the responsibility for protecting the honesty of the elections. Regulation of political parties, a corrupt practices law patterned on American examples, a new census, and new and ingenious methods of detecting fraud brought hope that the new law, even if it did not produce honest elections, would at least expose to public view the dishonest practices.[90]

The new election law, however, did not settle things. With Crowder back in the United States, the Cuban government amended the law in certain ways favorable to the government parties. Meanwhile, the opposition Liberals continued to ask for direct American supervision of the elections and threatened to withdraw from them and revolt were such supervision not forthcoming. The United States refused to intervene, however. In the end, the elections proved to be fully as dishonest as some had feared, and because of delays in deciding election disputes, the outcome of the balloting was still unknown two months after the election. With Cuba seemingly near political and economic collapse, Crowder returned, this time without a Cuban invitation and to the distress of Cuban President Menocal. He quickly prodded the courts into action, arranged for new partial elections in disputed areas, and pushed them through to completion. While the Liberals held out for full American supervision of new elections and withdrew from the new partial elections, they did not revolt when Crowder supported the election of the new president, Alfredo Zayas.[91] Crowder's work, if it had not assured completely honest elections, had at least avoided a new revolution and an American intervention.

Meanwhile, however, Cuba was having to grapple with a serious economic crisis. The sudden decontrol of sugar prices after World War I sent sugar prices skyrocketing. Cuban banks, mistaking the fabulously inflated sugar prices for real prosperity, invested heavily in sugar mortgages. And as the price of sugar fell, so did Cuban banks. On October 10, 1920, the Cuban government found it necessary to declare a bank moratorium.[92]

There were plenty of Americans on hand to advise the Cubans at this point. Much of the State Department's advice was negative; it looked askance at a good many expedients advocated by the Cubans. Meanwhile, a Cuban delegation trekked to Washington where it employed one Albert Rathbone (not to be confused with Estes G. Rathbone), a former assistant secretary of the Navy. He spent a week in Cuba conferring with bankers and government officials and advocated a loan of $100,000,000 with which the government could bail out the sound banks. For this advice he demanded $50,000 and was eventually paid $15,000.[93] In the end, the Cubans rejected his advice, gradually reopened the banks, and watched them go under. Only the foreign banks, backed by non-Cuban resources, were able to survive. As a result of this collapse, foreign interests came to dominate the Cuban banking scene and gained heavy interests in Cuban sugar lands through foreclosures. While the plan to gradually reopen the Cuban banks had originated with Cubans, it had also received the blessing of General Crowder; and Oscar Wells, an American banker recommended to the Cuban president by the Federal Reserve Board, acted as a member of the commission appointed to administer bankrupt organizations.[94]

Crowder's advice and activities did not end with the electoral laws or bank moratoria. As 1921 advanced, Crowder began a campaign to reform various parts of the Cuban government. His original instructions had ordered him to try to improve the congested dock conditions in Havana (caused when bankrupt Cubans refused to accept goods they had earlier ordered) and to urge Menocal to initiate immediate reforms in the departments of Sanitation and Public Works.[95] His real work began, however, when the secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes, pointed out to Crowder that the Cubans, under the terms of the Platt Amendment, were obliged to "maintain an honest and efficient government in return for the obligations assumed by the United States." Hughes suggested that a good cabinet was essential to good government, and he instructed Crowder to look into the cabinet appointments of incoming Cuban President Zayas.[96]

From these beginnings, Crowder expanded his activities until he eventually scrutinized virtually every aspect of the Cuban government in attempting to make certain that the Cubans were living up to their obligation to "maintain an honest and efficient government." Crowder not only got a list of cabinet appointees before their names were made public, but also managed to get some of them changed. Furthermore, in April, 1921, he persuaded Zayas to promise to undertake a wide range of reforms in Cuban government: a reduced budget, stricter control of budgetary allotments, suppression of sinecures, lottery reforms, a sanitary survey of the island,

and regular financial reports to be made available to the American government. In return, Zayas apparently hoped to get tariff concessions in the United States.[97]

Promises were one thing, action another, as Crowder well knew. But he had an effective lever with which to move Zayas and the other Cuban officials in the direction he wanted—an American loan. Using the necessity for a loan to exact needed reforms from reluctant Cuban politicians had been explicitly suggested as early as 1912 by the American minister to Cuba, A. M. Beaupré,[98] but nothing had been done about it. Furthermore, the Cubans did not seem to desire a loan in 1921. Nevertheless, after Crowder brought in an American accountant to help straighten out the tangled Cuban finances, it became apparent that some sort of loan would be essential. It was revealed that in addition to its funded debt of $85,000,000, Cuba had a floating debt of about $46,000,000. With declining revenues and this large floating debt, Cuba was drifting perilously close to bankruptcy. This was the lever that Crowder needed. As loan negotiations proceeded, it became clear that there would be no loan without State Department approval, and there would be no State Department approval without some reforms to assure the department that Cuba would eventually be capable of repaying the loan.[99]

In succeeding months, Crowder and a host of invading American experts investigated the Cuban government and developed a more specific program of reform designed to put Cuba on a sound financial basis. Crowder, for example, kept a close eye on the budget, constantly arguing that it would have to be reduced if Cuban revenues were to become adequate to repay another loan. At the same time, he attempted to increase Cuban revenues. An American tariff expert did some work in Cuba in August, 1921. Crowder demanded reforms in the lottery also. John S. Hord, a peripatetic financial expert, headed a commission which in 1922 came up with a proposal for a sales tax. Crowder attacked corruption wherever he could find it. Maj. Albert Lyman, the American military attaché, investigated public works contracts and exposed more than a little dirty linen to the public view. Crowder, frustrated by his inability to get definite evidence of corruption in the face of what he called a conspiracy to hide the facts, demanded a temporary suspension of the civil-service law. Crowder pushed for an improved accounting system also, and imported another American banking expert, W. P. G. Harding, a former governor of the Federal Reserve Board, to audit Cuban government accounts and recommend banking legislation. After five weeks, Harding recommended a central bank of emission modeled after the Federal Reserve System and partially

controlled by the United States; like many other American proposals, this one was never acted upon.[100]

To get approval of these reforms, Crowder alternately cajoled and threatened the Cuban government. In October, 1921, a temporary $5,000,000 loan helped persuade Zayas to put his reform promises in writing, but six months later, Crowder, exasperated at Zayas' dilatory tactics, wrote Hughes that the time was approaching for "an ultimatum." While the State Department objected to the idea of an ultimatum with the implied threat of intervention, it did permit Crowder to present a series of very explicit demands. The pressures were effective. In June, 1922, Crowder forced Zayas to appoint a reform cabinet and subsequently to push the reform program through the Cuban Congress. At long last, with the reforms enacted into law, Crowder approved the loan.[101]

Crowder's success, however, was largely illusory. Cuban public opinion, fairly friendly to Crowder so long as his activities remained secret, turned to strong hostility once the full measure of his influence and pressure was revealed. A resolution of protest against this new interpretation of the Platt Amendment was passed by the Cuban Senate in 1922 and probably represented the feeling of the country at large. More important, once the loan was approved, the reforms which Crowder had so strenuously fought for went out the window.[102]

Indeed, the whole American experience in the Cuban crisis of 1919 to 1922 had been rather cheerless. To be sure, Crowder had managed to piece together a political settlement, thereby avoiding chaos and a possible American intervention. On paper he had pushed through important reforms in his campaign to save the Cuban government from bankruptcy. Still, the American-supported elections had probably given the Cuban presidency to the wrong man (through no fault of the Americans, however). American experts had charged high fees for advice which was not followed. Worst of all, Crowder had learned that reform is hopeless without authority for the reformer and without a sincere desire for reform on the part of the people involved. The permanent effect of his reforms was negligible save to arouse some Cubans to the dangers, real or imagined, of American influence in Cuban affairs. As a result of this experience, the State Department reconsidered its aggressive policy in Cuba. When Crowder returned to Cuba after a vacation in the United States, he came as full ambassador, but Cuban-American relations subsided to less vigorous levels.

The last direct attempts on the part of the American government to assist in the management of internal Cuban affairs came in the period from 1930 to 1933. Harry Guggenheim, the American ambassador in C a from

1929 to 1933, used an economist on his staff to investigate the state of Cuban finances before the State Department would approve a new Cuban loan in 1930. Furthermore, Guggenheim, although under specific instructions from Secretary of State Stimson to avoid all interference or appearance of interference in Cuban affairs, did all he could to advise President Machado, suggesting measures which might liberalize the government and bring a compromise with the steadily mounting opposition.[103] Without power behind him, however, Guggenheim was unable to exercise much influence.

The next American envoy, Sumner Welles, was no more successful. He tried to mediate between the various political factions in Cuba, and offered the aid of American experts in revising once again the Cuban electoral law and in reorganizing the Havana University, closed by Machado as a hotbed of opposition sentiment. But before these plans could materialize, Machado was overthrown by a revolt. In the subsequent revolutionary activities, advice gave way to the jockeyings of power politics by which the United States was eventually able to get a Cuban president to its taste.[104] The main result of Welles's well-intentioned efforts was to leave a widespread impression that disturbed conditions in Cuba were an outgrowth of American "advice" and the attempts of the State Department to make and unmake Cuban governments. Discouraged with this outcome, the United States in 1934 abandoned the Platt Amendment, the document which had furnished the rationalization and legal basis for the requested and unrequested aid to Cuba since 1902.[105]

With the Platt Amendment gone, official American advice and assistance virtually ended until World War II brought new occasions for such activities. However, the Cuban government continued to call on private American citizens for expert knowledge. Several Americans worked for the government in the 1920's, and others appeared in the 1930's. The Americans gave advice and assistance in widely varied fields of knowledge. In 1927, Dr. W. L. Schurz, a former United States commercial attaché at Rio de Janeiro, joined the Cuban government as an economic advisor. Professor Marvin S. Pittman made a critical survey of the Cuban educational system in 1932.[106] In 1935, the Rockefeller Foundation helped support a Cuban campaign against malaria.[107] And in the same year, Dr. Harold W. Dodds, president of Princeton University, came to Cuba to settle a political dispute which made possible the first real elections in Cuba since 1924.[108] Perhaps the most comprehensive work of Americans came in 1934 when Cuban President Carlos Mendieta invited the Foreign Policy Association to make an independent survey of Cuban problems. The result was the Commission on Cuban Affairs, a group of distinguished Ameri-

can experts in Cuban and Latin-American affairs led by Raymond L. Buell. The group wrote a lengthy report which included various recommendations for solving Cuban problems, in several cases pointing to American experience with similar problems.[109]

Probably the most illuminating American missions to Cuba in these years were two economic missions, the first undertaken in 1931–32 by Professors E. R. A. Seligman and Carl Shoup of Columbia University, and the second carried out in 1938 by Shoup and Roswell Magill. The first study was confined to an analysis of the Cuban tax system from the point of view of fiscal efficiency. Seligman and Shoup urged the government to abolish the lottery, abolish or reduce the sales tax (introduced earlier by another American expert), decrease the tariff on everyday necessities, strengthen the administration of the tax service, take over the collection of the Cuban real estate tax, and introduce a presumptive income tax based on rentals. While the two experts felt constrained to study the Cuban fiscal system purely from the point of view of fiscal efficiency, they were well aware of broader questions of social policy, urging for example, that greater reliance be placed on real estate and income taxes than on the tariff. The Magill-Shoup analysis made much the same recommendations: better budgetary procedures, more efficient tax administration, and a shift in the tax burden from customs to property and income taxes.[110] It was perhaps symbolic of the success of American efforts to improve Cuban finances that American experts in 1931 and 1938 should be advocating much the same sort of measures advocated by earlier American experts under Wood, Magoon, and Crowder.

It appears, then, that while American advice and assistance to the Cuban government were widespread and influential, they fell far short of completely renovating the Cuban government and nation. When Americans such as Wood possessed both authority and Cuban coöperation the results were quite impressive, at least for a time. On the other hand, if Americans tried to press their ideas on unwilling Cubans or sought authority through economic pressures or interpretations of the Platt Amendment, the chief results were hostility and frustration. Nor should it be forgotten that American experts were not all of the same capability or integrity. Some gave mistaken advice, some missed important opportunities. And there were a few Americans who apparently cared less about Cuban affairs than their own advancement. In short, the American record showed general honesty and a reasonable degree of intelligence, but the results gave little comfort to those who now hope to change the face of the globe through American know-how. But before generalizing too widely on the basis of

American experience in Cuba, we must turn to study some other examples of American advice to foreign governments.

The Dominican Republic and Haiti

"Marines and Latrines"

The American experiments in Cuba were by no means isolated phenomena. The United States had always been interested in the Caribbean, and in the twentieth century various political and economic factors combined to bring extensive American intervention into the affairs of Santo Domingo and Haiti, two strategically located Caribbean republics. The American experience there sheds still further light on the problems which arise when Americans attempt to aid the governments of other nations.

The United States government had taken an interest in Santo Domingo on several occasions in the nineteenth century. In 1851, for example, the United States, with France and Great Britain, agreed to protect the Dominican Republic against its neighbor, Haiti. Two decades later there were vigorous and nearly successful efforts to annex Santo Domingo to the United States. American experts were in the island in the 1890's, helping the government with monetary problems. J. Laurence Laughlin, the noted economist, went there in 1894 to work out a scheme of currency reform.[1]

More substantial American influence came in the first decade of the twentieth century when the Dominican Republic suffered from a series of political and economic crises that seriously threatened its stability. With the overthrow of the dictator, Ulises Heureaux, in 1899, the Dominican government entered a period of political instability which approximated a state of constant revolution and verged on anarchy.[2] More important, the country's financial ills grew until they threatened national independence. Santo Domingo had suffered from chronic financial improvidence and a succession of dubious loans, and with foreign loans came foreign financial in-

fluence. One of the more important groups of foreign investors was the Santo Domingo Improvement Company, formed in 1892 to take over the interests of foreign investors who had been trying to finance the Dominican government. Through the years, this American concern gradually expanded its influence until it virtually controlled the Dominican customs as a guarantee of the service on the various loans it held. Deprived of these powers in 1902, the company appealed for American intervention, thus beginning a long series of American attempts to reform the Dominican government in the interest of foreign bondholders. Diplomatic pressure eventually forced the Dominican government to arbitrate. The arbitration agreement provided that the American State Department appoint a financial advisor to the Dominican government, the advisor to have the right to take over Dominican customs houses in the event the government was unable to maintain its payments. Unfortunately, the financial advisor turned out to be one John T. Abbott, an official of the much hated Improvement Company, hardly a man to inspire Dominican coöperation.[3]

Various motives and factors eventually shifted the job of collecting Dominican customs from the shoulders of an American corporation and transferred it to the hands of the American government. The Dominicans were clearly unhappy with Abbott and the Improvement Company. In addition Dominican President Morales recognized that his rise to the presidency had been aided by American power, and he apparently hoped that further intervention would help maintain him in power. Morales was also under pressure from foreign creditors, and American intervention seemed the least of several evils. On the American side, various American economic interests were asking the State Department for protection. More important, the State Department feared that if the United States did not intervene to stabilize the situation, some foreign nation would do so, thereby endangering American control of the Caribbean. A few, notably President Roosevelt, expressed an altruistic desire to help the Dominicans solve their problems. It was widely hoped that a customs receivership would solve Dominican political problems, for it was commonly assumed that control of the customs houses was a prime objective of revolutionary activity.[4] A customs receivership thus seemed a simple way to improve political as well as economic conditions.

The first moves toward an American customs receivership came from the Dominicans. President Morales suggested late in 1903 that the United States accept fiscal control and certain naval bases in return for tariff concessions. Early in the following year the United States seemed close to intervention, but nothing came of it. Finally, late in December, 1904, when

the State Department feared that European intervention was near, the American minister in Santo Domingo opened negotiations with the Dominicans for an American customs receivership. Essentially, the agreement provided for American collection of the Dominican customs, 55 per cent of the collections to go to Dominican creditors. Another clause made possible other American assistance. Judging from negotiations, the Americans had patterned the agreement on the financial arrangements which brought the British into Egypt.[5]

Final arrangements took some time. Although the American Senate refused to ratify the original agreement, its essential provisions were carried out in a *modus vivendi*. Meanwhile, an American financial expert, Professor Jacob H. Hollander of Johns Hopkins, worked closely with the Dominican Minister of Finance to scale down the Dominican debt from about $40,000,000 to about $17,000,000 and to negotiate a loan of $20,000,000 to refund this debt. Hollander was well paid for his expert assistance; indeed, some disgruntled bondholders felt that he had been bribed by the Dominican government to scale the debt down in the interest of the latter.[6] Meanwhile, negotiations on a new convention were successfully completed. The new agreement provided for American administration of the customs service, but stipulated that a fixed sum ($1,200,000) rather than a fixed percentage of customs receipts should be devoted annually to the service of the debt. This agreement met the approval of the United States Senate, and in 1907 the Americans began their control of the customs service that was to continue until 1940.[7]

In general the customs receivership seems to have done a good job. Collections rose in the early years of the new regime. American administrators did much to plug holes in the customs service by stopping smuggling over the Haitian frontier and purchasing revenue cutters to better cover sea operations. American experts, as usual, revised the tariff in the interests of greater clarity and fairness. The receivership was efficient too; expenses remained well within the limits prescribed by the convention, and collections were generally cheaper than equivalent collections in the Philippines or most United States ports.[8]

Not everything went smoothly, however. There were personnel troubles, for one thing. Doubtless the Dominicans were rather annoyed that George R. Colton, the American customs receiver under the *modus vivendi* who had come from work in the Philippines, was being paid $500 a month, twice the salary of the Dominican minister of finance. Furthermore, while all of the American receivers were competent enough, Walker Vick who came in 1913 was there clearly because he was a "deserving Democrat."

American and Dominican authorities clashed over the appointment of subordinate customs personnel, and the general efficiency of the receivership was impaired by the high turnover among employees.[9]

Neither the Dominicans nor the Americans seemed completely satisfied with the arrangement. Many Dominicans had been bitterly opposed to the agreement to begin with, although some felt that the Americans were better than European overlords would have been. On the other hand some Americans had resented the way in which President Roosevelt had put through the agreement. A few felt that the United States would have to go further than a customs receivership if the Dominican people were to be truly reformed.[10]

Perhaps the most important element of dissatisfaction with the arrangement, however, came with the knowledge that a customs receivership would not guarantee Dominican political stability. Up through 1912 things went well,[11] but the assassination of President Cáceres in 1911 quickly dissipated hopes for political stability. The government was incapable of suppressing the new revolts that broke out in 1912, although its attempts to do so played havoc with the budget. Once again, the United States intervened, trying to reform and stabilize the government through diplomatic advice and pressure. After forcing out one government, American officials saw a second resign when it became clear it would be unable to push through certain reforms demanded as the price of American support.[12] The situation was not helped any by the character of the new American minister who arrived in 1914. James Mark Sullivan had little to recommend him save his reputation as a staunch Democrat. Lacking knowledge of the local situation and understanding of the aims of the American policy, he succeeded merely in alienating the Dominicans who came into contact with him.[13]

The political and economic crisis steadily worsened. While the revolution of 1913 was ended after American-observed elections, a new one broke out again in 1914. Dominican finances remained in a critical state, and in 1914 the Americans temporarily forced the Dominican government to accept an American controller as the price for some possible American financial assistance. The United States was finally able to halt the 1914 revolution only through the personal intervention of President Wilson who ordered American supervision of new Dominican elections followed by an American guarantee of the new government. But a new government proved no better. There were minor revolts whose suppression continued to divert funds. President Jiménes went back on his promise to appoint an American financial advisor. And the few American experts in the Dominican government, although increasing in number, seemed to be able to do

little or nothing. As fast as the customs receivership paid off the old debt, the Dominican government piled up a new one.[14]

In trying to solve the increasingly difficult situation the American minister presented even stronger demands for reforms. By late in 1915 these included an American financial advisor, American reorganization of the constabulary, and closer control over the public works. President Jiménes found it politically impossible to grant such demands, however, and when a new revolt broke out early in 1916, Jiménes resigned despite American aid. In the chaotic situation that then prevailed, it was only a short step to full intervention. The Americans refused to pay over customs funds to a provisional president who would not guarantee the politically impossible American demands, and the Dominicans were unable to elect a president who would or could meet American requirements. After several months of waiting and negotiations, the Americans in exasperation declared martial law on November 29, 1916.[15] This military occupation seemed, as President Wilson put it, "the least of the evils in sight in this very perplexing situation."[16]

The chief result of this declaration of martial law was to place the complete control of the Dominican government in the hands of American naval and marine officers. When the members of the Dominican provisional government refused to coöperate with Adm. H. S. Knapp, the commander of the occupation forces. Knapp appointed naval and marine officers to the vacated cabinet posts. As in the first occupation of Cuba, the direction of the occupation fell to the military commander on the spot. This was only natural in view of the confusion resulting from overlapping jurisdictions in Washington. Three Washington agencies had some degree of authority in Santo Domingo. The Bureau of Insular Affairs in the War Department supervised the customs receivership; the State Department had conducted the negotiations leading to the occupation and theoretically retained general supervision; and the Navy Department had direct charge of the occupation by virtue of the fact that a naval officer commanded the occupation forces. The result was either jurisdictional disputes or general neglect. The latter was the usual case, for all three Washington bureaus were so immersed in the problems of World War I that they devoted little or no attention to the relatively unimportant affairs of the Dominican Republic.[17]

This influx of American marine and naval officers was not an unmixed blessing. The commanders of the occupation forces occasionally left something to be desired. If Admiral Knapp possessed a judicious temperament and tried to avoid offending Dominican susceptibilities, his successor, Adm. Thomas Snowden, was somewhat indecisive, rarely consulted the Domini-

cans, and aroused their enmity by his opinion that the occupation should be a long one. If some subordinate American officers worked long and hard to improve government administration as Admiral Knapp predicted they would, others were highhanded in their dealings with the natives. Few if any of the officers knew Spanish, the native language. Some of the American employees in the island apparently took a rather dim view of the merits of the Dominican people, which did little to please the Dominicans. And as often happened in such situations, when American officers gained some experience in their Dominican job, they were promptly transferred to some other part of the world.[18]

Everything considered, it is surprising that the Americans accomplished as much as they did. American officers and experts did try to straighten out the tangled Dominican financial affairs which had done much to produce the occupation. Financial experts of one kind or another invaded Santo Domingo to collect Dominican taxes, supervise government expenditures, and in general reorganize the Dominican financial system. Accounting and auditing methods were made more effective, and the country was provided with up-to-date financial legislation. Finally, there was the inevitable claims commission which scaled down the floating debt and funded it with another bond issue.[19]

The tax system came in for a good deal of scrutiny. The tariff, revised in 1909 by American experts, was again rewritten with the aid of an American expert who had gained experience working on the Philippine tariff. The new revision clarified the existing tariff, lowered the rates somewhat, shifted from *ad valorem* to specific rates, abolished export duties, and put certain items such as agricultural machinery on the free list.[20] More important was an attempt to make Santo Domingo less dependent on the tariff by increasing the yield of internal taxes. The main element in this was a property tax. Unhappily, an effective property tax required a system of land registration and a certain degree of coöperation on the part of the taxed people. The military government was unable to solve either of these problems; the required land surveys were often more costly than the land was worth, and there was a strongly entrenched public sentiment against direct taxation. Although the property tax broke down of its own weight by 1924, internal revenue collections increased considerably under the American occupation and came to occupy an increasingly important place in the Dominican financial picture.[21]

In the end, however, the fate of American financial reforms was determined more by the economic consequences of World War I than by the actions of American officials. The war brought a temporary decline in

customs revenues; the shipping shortage hampered Dominican exports and forced the occupation government to control the food supply. More important, however, was the economic boom and bust following the war. Customs collections were the highest in history in 1920, but by the end of the year the depression set in. Merchants had overstocked and faced rapidly falling prices. Customs receipts in 1921 fell to less than half those of 1920; the resulting government retrenchment meant that public works had to be curtailed, further deepening the depression. Adm. S. S. Robison's misplaced attempt to help out the tobacco growers in this crisis by guaranteeing purchase of their product cost the Dominican government about $686,000. In the end, the American officials who had been so highly critical of the growth of the Dominican debt before the occupation were forced to float new loans in 1921 and 1922 to complete the public works projects and keep the government solvent.[22] It was an ironic end to the occupation's financial policy.

American concentration on financial problems did not result in the neglect of other economic questions. In agriculture, for example, an American named by the United States Department of Agriculture headed the Dominican agriculture department even before the beginning of full-scale American intervention. Under the occupation, agricultural experimental work was expanded. The government also tried to see to it that available agricultural information was used. Traveling demonstrators were employed to teach new agricultural methods to illiterate natives. The literate could read the free monthly agricultural magazine with its circulation of three thousand. Plans were made to give students advanced training at a new agricultural college. In addition, agricultural experts tried to lessen Dominican dependence on its main export, coffee, by encouraging natives to produce tobacco, cacao, or corn. Finally, diminishing Dominican forests received their first scientific treatment during the American occupation.

How effective all this was is somewhat doubtful, however. The agricultural experiment stations with their limited resources accomplished rather little, and the largest one had to be moved after its first location proved unsuitable. Furthermore, most of the agricultural demonstrators proved unfitted for their task.[23] Still, the occupation officials gave every indication of recognizing the importance of agriculture for the island's welfare and of trying to promote it.

American supervision of the public works program in Santo Domingo had begun as early as 1908 and continued after the occupation. Under the occupation, a full-scale public works program was developed, but its execution was badly handicapped, first by the war and then by a lack of funds.[24]

In all, the military government completed about 240 miles of first and second class roads and worked on about 155 additional miles of trails. Most of them were apparently well built. Indeed, of all the work of the occupation forces, this was perhaps the most favorably received. Dominicans appreciated the roads they got and clamored for more.[25] Other public works included renovation of the government-owned railroad, improvement of the postal service, and a more efficient and an expanded telephone and telegraph system, all under American direction. In addition there were the usual harbor improvements, although some complained that Dominican harbors near the end of the occupation were in the worst condition they had ever been in. Other work of an economic interest included a geological survey, a meteorological service, and an inadequate census.[26]

If American authorities put a great deal of emphasis on their economic program, they did relatively little for public health, in marked contrast with American activities in Cuba. Occupation forces developed a rather pretentious program and pushed through a new sanitary law, but little of the program was ever executed and the sanitary law rapidly became a dead letter. Although the lack of funds and the rapid turnover in medical personnel provided some explanation, the failure to do more for Dominican health seems rather strange considering American work along these lines in Cuba, Haiti, and the Philippines.[27]

The educational program was somewhat more effective, but it still left a good deal to be desired. In this one field, the Americans coöperated closely with the Dominicans, for a Dominican committee proposed the new laws which became the basis of the new educational system. Col. Rufus Lane, the marine-corps officer in charge of education, was apparently one of the most vigorous and popular of the occupation officials. Under his leadership, the occupation instituted a rash of reforms: higher salaries, more rural schools, better school buildings, and a revised curriculum. Still, there were schools for only half the school-age children in the island. The program stressed an attack on illiteracy but neglected higher education. And there was no guarantee of permanence for the reforms. Indeed, in the economic crisis of 1921, the Americans themselves made drastic cuts in school funds, thereby destroying much of their own work.[28]

In the maintenance of public order and justice, the occupation achieved considerable success, although with some ultimate consequences that might be regarded as unfortunate. It will be recalled that one of the main American demands in 1915 had been for American control and training of the Dominican constabulary. Under the occupation, American marine officers trained the constabulary, transforming it into an efficient police body.

Curiously enough, however, occupation authorities never seemed to feel that it was efficient enough to permit the withdrawal of the marines. Indeed, the alleged deficiencies in the training of the constabulary became a significant issue in the negotiations leading to the withdrawal of the American forces; American negotiators for a while insisted that an American military mission remain to complete the job but were forced to give up the idea in the face of determined Dominican opposition. There was a certain amount of sense in the American demand, for initially Americans had not trained Dominican officers, and as a result the constabulary was still dependent upon American leadership. Yet in the end American training proved its worth; marine tutelage provided the Dominican Republic a few years later with its military dictator, General Trujillo, and his efficient instrument of power, the new Dominican army.[29]

In the legal sphere, the Americans did rather little. A few minor changes were made in the laws of the land. Under a new marriage regulation, Dominicans could choose between a civil and a religious ceremony; illegitimate children received some protection under another law promulgated during the occupation. There was some talk of making a general revision of the Dominican code, but nothing came of this. Occupation authorities were much interested in the administration of justice and tried to eliminate politics from the Dominican courts. Failing this, they had to fall back on provost courts in many situations. Unhappily, there were charges that the provost courts with their unfamiliar language, legal methods, and judges failed to dispense much justice, and their existence provided some telling arguments for those who favored ending the American occupation.[30]

Exactly what the Dominican people thought of all this is very difficult to say. American officials felt that 90 per cent of the Dominicans favored the occupation and only the politicians opposed it. Charles E. Chapman, a prominent Latin-American historian from the University of California, reported that on a visit to the Dominican Republic shortly after the end of the occupation the supposedly hated Americans were surprisingly popular among the "nonpolitical elements of the population." On the other hand Santo Domingo's leading newspaper felt that only 1 per cent of the nation's people favored the occupation. An American commercial traveler in the island in 1921 reported that he did not meet a single native who did not want the Americans to leave. And another American investigator, generally friendly to the occupation, noted quite a few Dominican criticisms.[31]

It is clear, however, that the occupation authorities left themselves open to criticism by their suppression of civil rights. There was censorship from

the start. Justified partly as a wartime measure, it was continued after the end of World War I as a method of suppressing criticism of the occupation forces. Marine justice in and out of the provost courts did not help the reputation of the Americans in Santo Domingo. Provost courts, initiated to handle offenses against the military government, broadened their scope until they covered almost every offense. Outside the provost courts, the marines were engaged in wiping out "bandit" activity in the eastern half of the Dominican Republic, an activity which led to some pretty well substantiated examples of atrocities and rumors of countless more. The bandit uprisings themselves, persisting as they did throughout the occupation, may have been an indication of smoldering Dominican resentment, although there is no evidence to indicate that the bandits had any political aims.[32]

These rumblings from Santo Domingo were accompanied by some critical comments about the occupation by American observers. Respected men with experience in Latin-American affairs such as Otto Schoenrich, Carl Kelsey, and W. E. Pulliam, the first American receiver of Dominican customs, joined with such liberal publications as the *Nation* in criticizing the occupation. A Senate investigation in 1922 of the American occupations of both Haiti and Santo Domingo gathered a good deal of information and aroused considerable public interest, particularly with its emphasis on the alleged marine atrocities and the suppression of civil liberties. The State Department took a new interest when it became apparent that these revelations were having a very bad effect on United States attempts to win Latin-American friendship.[33]

The first move to end the occupation came from the Dominicans themselves. Dr. Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, whose election as provisional president in 1916 had been frustrated by the United States, led a campaign from outside Santo Domingo to free the island from American control. He went to Paris and tried to agitate at the Peace Conference in 1919, urging the end of provost courts, greater Dominican participation in the government, and gradual elections and evacuation of the Americans. As a result an advisory council of Dominicans was appointed to give Dominicans a voice in the government. The council resigned in disgust, however, when, in reply to a council recommendation that the censorship be suspended, Admiral Snowden promulgated a new and more rigorous regulation. Indeed, in the middle of 1920, the Admiral was still speaking in terms of an occupation of ten years more.[34]

Late in 1920, however, the State Department began the negotiations which were to bring the withdrawal of the occupation nearly four years

later. The initial plan of withdrawal envisioned a gradual lifting of control, but it died with the outgoing Wilson administration.[35] Admiral Snowden, who had not coöperated very well with the first plan of withdrawal, was then replaced by Adm. S. S. Robison. Negotiations were resumed, only to drag on for some time. The Dominicans were critical of the American demand for the approval of new loans and were reluctant to permit American post-occupation training of the constabulary. They were suspicious also of a proposed clause which would have ratified the acts of the occupation forces. Even after the United States withdrew its demand for control of the constabulary, opposition continued. Finally on July 3, 1922, an agreement was reached which provided for an end to provost courts, extension of the receivership to cover all long-term loans, ratification of the acts of the occupation, and gradual new elections leading to eventual ending of the occupation. Even after the agreement was signed, however, it took nearly two years to complete the elections and the negotiation of the new convention. Political disputes, the agitation of the extreme nationalists who asked immediate and unconditional withdrawal, and the difficulties in setting up election machinery slowed the ending of the occupation. The long and adroit negotiations of Sumner Welles, the American in charge of ending the occupation, finally ironed out the last difficulties in 1924.[36] Thus ended the American occupation of the Dominican Republic.

In the years following, the Dominican Republic in general broke away from American influence and discarded the reforms of the occupation. To be sure, the receivership was extended to cover the new loans of 1922 and 1924, but a new convention in 1924 made its terms somewhat less onerous. The Dominicans further robbed the receivership of some of its effectiveness by levying what were actually customs duties in the guise of internal revenue measures. Meanwhile, it became clear that various government agencies established by the Americans had become corrupt or inefficient; by 1929 the government was once again shot through with graft according to the reports of on-the-scene authorities.[37]

Indeed, the disintegration of American reforms became so rapid that the government once again faced the danger of financial disorganization, even during the relatively prosperous days of the late 1920's, and once again sought American assistance. Dominican President Horacio Vasquez with the coöperation of his close friend Sumner Welles, persuaded Charles G. Dawes, just finishing his term as Vice-President of the United States, to organize a mission to Santo Domingo. Welles apparently wanted the group to undertake a comprehensive survey of the existing situation and recommend policy as well as administrative changes, but Dawes chose to limit

his work to investigating the financial administration and installing a budget system. Dawes himself picked the staff of the mission. Most of the other members were businessmen; many had been associated with Dawes during World War I or at the time he had installed the new budget system in the United States. At least one, James G. Harbord, had had experience in an American colonial dependency, the Philippines.[38]

The commission worked very hard for about three weeks in Santo Domingo, making an intensive investigation of conditions in the Dominican government. Its two-hundred-page report analyzed the current financial situation; recommended drafts of a new budget law, a law of finances, and a law controlling public works outlays; offered suggestions for reorganizing government departments; and suggested specific economies in the operation of the government. Many of these changes were modeled directly on American experience and practice, not a very surprising thing in view of the fact that the group drafted the main outlines of its final report on the boat going down to Santo Domingo![39]

The immediate results of the mission seem to have been very good. In considerable part, this may have been because Dawes was well aware of the necessity for good personal relations and did his best to win over Dominican leaders to his point of view.[40] At any rate, the recommended laws were quickly enacted by the Dominican legislative branch. American experts remained behind to see that the recommendations were put into practice and to teach the Dominicans how to use the new budgets and accounting procedures.[41] In the long run, however, the work of the commission amounted to little. A later American financial expert reported that while the Dawes recommendations represented the most modern methods in vogue in the United States, these were not always adapted to Dominican needs and consequently certain features were never enforced. Later administrations dropped a good many of Dawes's ideas.[42]

The financial difficulties which had moved the Dominican government to request the Dawes Commission became more complicated and infinitely more difficult to resolve with the onset of the depression in the early 1930's. Dominican revenues which had topped $15,000,000 in 1929 dropped to less than half this amount in 1931. What was worse, debt payments increased in 1930, just when revenues began to decline. This crisis was augmented in the fall of 1930 by a hurricane which destroyed a good part of the capital city.[43]

The net results of these events was twofold: a change in Dominican administration and the influx of new American advisors. President Horacio Vasquez was replaced by a military dictator, Gen. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo.

Trujillo had been trained by American marines during the occupation and had risen through the ranks to head the new Dominican army. From here he had taken over the presidency. Although Trujillo was fiercely nationalistic, he did remember his old marine teachers and was apparently advised by them from time to time.[44] Despite his general aversion to foreign advisors, Trujillo was forced to invite American financial experts in to salvage the Dominican Republic's financial solvency in the crisis of the early thirties. Thus Eliot Wadsworth, a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was sent to Santo Domingo in the fall of 1930 to survey the hurricane damage and the financial situation; he reported that there was no need for further loans but that the receivership must be continued. William E. Dunn, who had earlier worked in Haiti, was a more important figure. As a special financial advisor in the Dominican Republic from 1931 to 1933, Dunn handled funds designated for debt service, reorganized the Internal Revenue Service, acted temporarily as budget director, and made numerous general financial recommendations. Various other Americans assisted Dunn in his work in one way or another.[45]

Two expedients were adopted to help the Dominican government weather its financial difficulties. As customs receipts reached their low point, the Dominican government defaulted temporarily on its sinking-fund payments although maintaining payment of the interest. A new agreement in 1934 eased the long-range terms of the debt service; 1942 bonds were extended until 1962 and 1940 bonds to 1970 with the amortization payments adjusted accordingly.[46] Needless to say, both of these steps were taken in coöperation with and with the approval of the American State Department. With these changes, the Trujillo government was able to increase its governmental revenues considerably, rebuild Santo Domingo City (renamed Ciudad Trujillo), and carry out an extensive program of public works. The American customs receivership continued its work there until 1940; by the thirties it had become such an established institution that it began a retirement program. The fiscal efficiency of the Trujillo regime was such, however, that the receivership ended in 1940 by mutual agreement. The last bond was paid off in 1947.[47]

Thus ended a thirty-five-year experiment in financial rehabilitation and government reform. It had accomplished its main objectives: the protection of American economic and strategic interests. From almost any other point of view, however, it was a failure. The occupation was singularly unrewarding in terms of long-range and permanent accomplishments. Indeed, cynics assert that its chief accomplishment was the marine training of a Latin-American dictator whose reputation is, at best, dubious. The

chief legacy of most of this activity was a persistent Dominican belief in the reality of "Yankee imperialism."

In Haiti, the Dominican Republic's next-door neighbor, the United States faced a situation in 1915 roughly analagous to the one it was facing in the Dominican Republic about the same time. Haiti's political and financial stability was, if possible, even more insecure than that of its neighbor. Such problems were made more difficult by virtue of the fact that Haiti had half as much land to support twice as many people as had the Dominican Republic. And Haiti had to solve its problems with a population that was, technologically speaking, among the most backward in the western world.

Through the years, economic penetration had given the United States an interest in Haiti. Like Santo Domingo, Haiti found itself heavily burdened with foreign debts, generally contracted to fund still earlier debts. In addition American and other foreign interests had gained a foothold in the country through economic concessions. Disputes between the National Bank of Haiti and the Haitian government were of continuing concern to the American State Department, for American stockholders had gained an interest in the company in 1910. Furthermore, although American investments in the island were relatively small, many Americans, including Secretary of State Bryan, seemed to feel that if political stability were established, foreign investment funds would flow in.[48]

Haitian political instability also gave American diplomats cause to pause and consider. From 1886 to 1915, Haiti had seen twelve presidents come and go. Not one of them served a full term in office; four were killed and six others were driven from office. Such political instability was not only harmful to American economic interests and to the interests of the Haitian people themselves; it also kept before the eyes of the American State Department the dread specter of foreign intervention and the resultant threat to the American strategic position in the Caribbean. American diplomats were constantly concerned lest naval bases in Haiti fall into the hands of other leading powers.[49]

American intervention came in 1915 after a great deal of revolutionary turmoil and extended negotiations. In 1914, as Haiti edged closer and closer to bankruptcy with each succeeding government, Bryan sought a customs receivership like that in the Dominican Republic. The Haitians, however, seemed reluctant. In the following year, various American envoys proposed some form of American tutelage as a means of bringing a degree of stability to the debt- and revolution-ridden country.[50] Then on July 28, 1915, Haitian revolutionary activities reached new extremes of violence. A

Haitian mob dragged President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam from his sanctuary in the French legation and hacked him to death in the streets in frenzied retaliation for the murder of seventy political prisoners by one of Sam's lieutenants. Frightened at the invasion of the hitherto sacred precincts of a foreign legation and fearing widespread looting, Adm. W. B. Caperton landed troops at the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, to restore order.[51] The occupation had begun.

The Americans, once landed, pursued a vigorous policy. Marines stood guard in the Haitian legislature as it elected President Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave. If the presence of the marines had freed the government from the influence of the *cacos*, or professional revolutionaries, it also made the new government dependent upon American aid for its continued existence. Meanwhile, marines pushed inland to pacify the island while other American officers took over the collection of the all-important customs and began to supervise the government. These new relations were regularized less than two months after the American landing with the treaty of September 16, 1915, pushed through under American pressure. The treaty provided that the United States would "aid the Haitian government in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural, mineral and commercial resources and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid basis." An American customs receiver and a financial advisor were given extensive powers over Haitian financial matters. American engineers were to supervise Haitian sanitation and public works, and marines were to train and officer the Haitian constabulary.[52] On this rather slim base was erected an occupation which endured for nineteen years.

The occupation for the first five years or so was pretty largely a military occupation, dominated by the activities of the marine corps. Direction from Washington was of negligible importance. To be sure, the State Department had offered some general guidance at the time the treaty of 1915 was being negotiated. Thereafter Washington officials seemed preoccupied with other problems. The rapid turnover of personnel in the Latin-American desk of the State Department made any continuous policy from that direction almost impossible. The other treaty officials were appointed only after some delay, and once they arrived, their coöperation left something to be desired. In any event they were not effective policy-makers.[53] As in the case of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, direction of the occupation fell by default to the military.

It must be said that of all the Americans involved in the occupation during these early years, the marine officers seemed to have the clearest ideas of what the occupation was about. Gen. Eli Cole, for a while marine com-

mandant in the island, felt that the United States "had a moral duty to clean that place up and establish decency down there, because it did not exist . . . . The Aegean [*sic*] stables were Paradise compared to it." Gen. Smedley Butler, commander of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, later asserted that the Americans in Haiti had been imbued with the idea that they were trustees of a large estate, that they were to "make out of Haiti a first-class black man's country . . . . What we wanted was clean little towns, with tidy thatch-roofed dwellings."[54] That the marines were not particularly well equipped to produce such results is irrelevant; they saw their duty and did it since no one else seemed interested.

One of the major accomplishments of the occupation in its early stages was the extension of its power considerably beyond the limits envisioned in the treaty of 1915. The occupation forces supported the Dartiguenave government, which had been elected under the protection of American marines. When the legislature quarreled with the president and the occupation authorities, Dartiguenave dissolved it indefinitely, again with marine protection. A new constitution giving foreigners the right to own land and equal protection under the laws, ratifying the acts of the occupation, and authorizing the suspension of the legislature was submitted and passed in a plebiscite, with marines conducting a frankly pro-constitutional campaign throughout the country. In conflicts over the interpretation of the treaty of 1915, the United States in general got its own way; occupation officials took over the telephone and telegraph system, got the power to nominate subordinate customs employees, and got about as much control over Haitian finances as they could use. Most important, after a considerable struggle, the Americans won the right to veto proposed Haitian legislation. In some of these disputes, the Americans won their point by simply refusing to turn over customs funds to the government. The power of the purse was indeed a potent weapon.[55]

Other accomplishments in the early years were largely the result of marine initiative. Under the treaty of 1915, marines took over the training and direction of the Haitian constabulary. Officered by marines, the Gendarmerie slowly became a fairly efficient police force, despite such handicaps as disease and difficulty in finding competent Haitian officers. General Cole had high praise for the men who undertook this work.[56] The main function of this organization was to maintain order, of course, and this it did with a fair degree of efficiency, although the country was not finally pacified until 1920. Still, the officers of the Gendarmerie undertook other responsibilities as well. Early in the occupation, white officers of the Gendarmerie became advisors to the local Haitian communes. They ap-

parently concentrated most of their attention on producing some degree of order in communal finances, and were relatively successful in increasing tax collections and stopping some of the graft. Yet the reforms were not universally successful, and American authorities complained that the officers lacked real authority.[57]

Marines were active in improving other aspects of Haitian life in the early years of the occupation. They initiated a few sanitary measures, cleaning up at least some of the larger towns, and tried to improve the medical and hospital treatment in rural as well as in urban districts. Haitian prisons were rehabilitated in a successful attempt to lower the distressingly high death rates.[58] Moved by a potential food shortage because of wartime restrictions on shipping and aided by three Department of Agriculture experts in the summer of 1917, marines tried to increase Haitian food production by establishing small experimental farms. The Haitian government seemed uninterested, however, and little came of these efforts.[59] The marines were also responsible for the little educational aid the Haitians received between 1915 and 1922. Lacking funds, the American officers necessarily confined their efforts to small-scale coöperation with Haitian authorities. The occupation did bring in a Louisiana school superintendent as Haitian Superintendent of Public Instruction, but his proposed reforms met with such opposition that he was forced to resign. The Gendarmerie did help construct a few new school houses, but these were about the limit of productive American educational efforts.[60]

Almost from the beginning, the supervision of public works fell into marine hands. The most important activity here was road construction. Built largely for military reasons, the roads also had an economic function. Unhappily, however, they were constructed only at the price of considerable Haitian dissatisfaction. In building the roads, the marines resurrected the old *corvée*, still on the Haitian statute books but long unenforced. According to this law, every citizen had to give a specified amount of service to road work or pay an equivalent sum of money. Unhappily, the law was abused. Apparently marines sometimes forced peasants to work longer than the specified time or to labor outside their own district. There is good evidence to indicate that marine supervision of this labor was not always too gentle; some natives were virtually shanghaied and worked in what amounted to chain gangs. Although the *corvée* was abolished by higher authorities in 1918, resentment mounted so high that it contributed to a new *caco* outbreak in 1918 involving over five thousand Haitians, a revolt not quelled until the summer of 1920. Unfortunately, suppression of these revolts involved a resort to martial law and provost courts with their at-

tendant abuses. After marines suppressed the revolts which had furnished the justification for employing provost courts, American officials still found use for such courts in suppressing what they considered to be excessive or irresponsible criticism of the occupation or of the Haitian government.[61]

What limited the American accomplishments as much as anything during these early years was a lack of funds induced by the failure of American financial experts to devise any satisfactory solution of Haitian financial problems. Haitians were critical of the first two financial advisors. They pointed out that the second of these, John S. McIlhenny, spent most of his time in the United States living on a sizable expense account without producing any tangible results; if McIlhenny argued that he had important business in the United States, the Haitians could argue that his presence there meant that he neglected important business in Haiti. To be sure, the financial advisor did win a large degree of control over Haitian finances, as we have already noted, but his efforts to use this power to hold down Haitian expenditures were not always successful. World War I and its aftermath made it difficult if not entirely impossible to float the loan essential for refunding the Haitian debt. Furthermore, these years brought economic difficulties to Haiti; on two different occasions, government revenues fell so low that it was necessary to stop payment on the already existing debt. One thing American financial advisors were able to do: they gave Haiti a stable currency by pegging the Haitian gourde to the American dollar in 1919.[62]

In the final analysis, this was not an impressive record for a nation which had occupied a foreign country in order to set its affairs in order,[63] and there was a great deal of criticism both in Haiti and in the United States. It was clear that few Haitians bore much love for the occupation forces. The *corvée* had alienated the peasants, while general American interference in Haitian affairs quite naturally brought opposition from the Haitian governing class. Haitians argued that American officials had been incompetent, had failed to untangle Haitian finances, and had in general behaved in a highhanded and arbitrary fashion, overstepping the bounds of their authority and threatening Haitian sovereignty. Some American officials believed that Haitian resentment was based on the fact that the Americans had stopped the lucrative business of looting the governmental treasury, but there was no denying the resentment, whatever its cause. Haitian officials like their Dominican neighbors appealed to the Paris Peace Conference, thereby causing the American delegation some embarrassment. Haitians were quick to suggest that new revolts in 1919 had political significance and to address detailed criticisms to the State Department. There

was criticism in the United States too. The occupation was an issue in the presidential campaign of 1920, particularly after reports of marine atrocities leaked out, and in 1922 a Senate investigating committee revealed the undistinguished record of the occupation.[64]

Similar criticism of the Dominican occupation at this time led to a withdrawal of American forces. In Haiti, however, it brought reforms in the administration of the occupation and a period of considerable Haitian progress under American tutelage. Several factors made this new turn of events possible. For one thing, the control of occupation policy was concentrated in the State Department and in an American high commissioner in Haiti, Gen. John H. Russell. This change made certain that there would be no more confusion and working at cross-purposes among American officials. The State Department also offered some fairly explicit guidance for the occupation; it instructed Russell to stabilize Haitian finances, gradually withdraw the marines, and put more emphasis on education and economics.[65]

A second factor aiding in this transformation of the occupation was the election of Louis Borno as President of Haiti in 1922. His election came after the United States had refused the overt election support requested by Dartiguenave. Subsequently, Borno coöperated very closely with high American officials. Lesser Haitian officials ceased to obstruct American efforts, even if they proved largely uninterested in American reforms. There was a price for this, of course. The United States had to support Borno's government and Borno's reluctance to call the long-postponed legislative elections.[66] The new policy was further aided by the peaceful state of the country. Martial law fell into disuse by 1923, although some censorship remained. Borno's government was at least mildly repressive. But one of his most notable restrictions, his refusal to permit the ardent anti-imperialist, Senator William King, to visit the country, was apparently motivated more by a desire to show King that Haiti was no mere puppet of the Americans than by fear of what King might see.[67]

In the end, however, it was successful financial reform that provided the all-important funds to implement the expanded American program. The financial advisors during the 1920's were all experienced men. W. W. Cumberland (1924–27) had just returned from a financial mission to Peru; A. C. Millspaugh (1927–29) had had experience on a mission to Persia; and S. de la Rue (beginning 1929) had worked in Liberia. A good start on handling the debt problem was made in 1922 by floating a long-term loan of $16,000,000 in the United States. In Haiti, an international claims commission scaled down claims from about $40,000,000 to a little over $3,500,000.

Meanwhile, Cumberland worked with considerable success to bring order to other aspects of the Haitian debt.[68]

American financial experts also did much to reorganize the Haitian revenue services. Customs collections had been under American control since the beginning of the occupation, and Americans there had done what they could to make the organization more efficient. Unfortunately, the tariff was long out of date; it did not cover a good many items commonly used in trade, it required a long series of complex computations to arrive at the correct duties, and it levied low rates on luxury items and high ones on commonly used necessities. Led by E. A. Colson, who had gained customs experience in China and the Philippines, Americans modernized and clarified the laws, adjusting the rates to provide higher taxes on luxuries and lower ones on necessities. Indeed, the revision was so effective that it was adopted in principle by several other countries. Internal revenues provided a more difficult problem. The confusion of land titles was such that it was impractical to impose any sort of property tax, a fact to which American experience in Cuba and Santo Domingo bore witness. A sales tax, applied on the recommendation of John S. Hord, Cumberland's predecessor as financial advisor, a man who had also worked in Cuba about the same time, had to be withdrawn, such was its unpopularity. However, the bureau of internal revenue was reorganized and placed under the direction of William E. Dunn (later to work in Santo Domingo). New taxes on such items as alcohol and tobacco helped raise funds and lessened the undesirable Haitian dependence on export and import taxes. Finally, the general conduct of financial affairs was made more efficient by the introduction of modern accounting techniques which provided the information so essential to the conduct of economic affairs.[69]

The net result of these reforms and of the prosperity of the 1920's was a steady rise in Haitian revenues and a surplus to be applied to purposes other than debt payment.[70] The question of how this surplus was to be used, however, remained to be decided. It was generally agreed that any permanent improvement in Haiti's position depended on an increase in production, but to stimulate production virtually everything needed to be done. In the end, funds were distributed according to a general plan outlined by Cumberland and agreed to by the other treaty officials. Most of the newly available funds went to enterprises under American control; in 1923–24, American-controlled services spent two-thirds of the budget, while in 1928–29 these same groups spent five-sixths of the total.[71]

The largest amount of funds went to public works projects. From eleven to twenty-six Americans directed a force of Haitians which reached

a peak of 9,815 men in 1929. There could be little criticism of the competence of American personnel; such men as Adm. Ben Morrell, founder of the Seabees in World War II and later president of Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, and Adm. Howard L. Vickery, later a member of the United States Maritime Commission, worked in Haiti. By 1927 public works were taking nearly $2,500,000, about a third of the total Haitian budget. Having to depend on current revenue rather than bond issues, public works were, in the end, hampered by lack of funds, despite the priority they received.

The accomplishments were impressive. Haitians under American direction built numerous public buildings, such as the Palais de Finance in Port-au-Prince, and numerous hospitals. The agency was responsible for a good many municipal services. It rehabilitated and extended numerous water systems and drilled wells in some of the smaller communities. American engineers paid little attention to sewers as compared with American activity in Cuba, largely because Haitian cities possessed relatively few modern plumbing devices. Rehabilitation and extension of the telegraph and telephone services, particularly the latter, was regarded as one of the top accomplishments of the public works agency. As in Cuba and the Dominican Republic, American engineers laid great stress on roads. By 1930 they had opened nearly 1,725 kilometers of roads to automobile traffic, about a thousand of which received regular maintenance. Finally, American engineers assisted Haitian commerce with lighthouses, wharf construction, and dredging. It was an impressive record, even if some Haitians complained that the rural areas had been neglected and that a great many of the projects were too ambitious for permanent maintenance by Haiti.[72]

Agriculture received the next largest amount of attention. Since a geological survey had revealed that Haiti lacked promising mineral resources and since immediate industrialization was out of the question, this emphasis was quite logical. In its treatment of agriculture, the occupation had a double aim: to boost Haitian production and to diversify it, relieving Haiti of some of her dependence on coffee. One method of achieving these aims was to introduce foreign capital and techniques. While the constitution of 1918 permitted land ownership for foreigners, there was a prejudice against such a situation in Haiti; land ownership in any event was very uncertain because of the confused land titles. Occupation engineers did some preliminary work on a proposed irrigation project in the Artibonite Valley with the idea of turning it over to a private foreign group for completion, but nothing came of this. In any event, occupation officials were

reluctant to grant concessions wholesale, and turned to other methods of improving Haitian agricultural production.[73]

Another possibility was to encourage improved agricultural practices among the small farmers. To do this, the Americans set up in 1923 the Service Technique, the agency which subsequently directed agricultural work. The agency was headed by Dr. George F. Freeman, a southerner who had just returned from a mission to Indo-China, and by Carl Colvin, previously State Supervisor of Vocational Education in Illinois. The agency undertook a wide range of experimental work. As early as 1922 an American expert in tropical agriculture surveyed the island. There was extensive experimental work on new crops such as cotton, rubber, logwood, citrus fruits, and pineapples. One of the most successful of these ventures was the introduction of sisal cultivation. Agricultural experts worked to improve the older crops also; they tried to increase the Haitian financial return from the coffee crop by introducing coffee grading. There was a marketing service, too, as well as veterinary work, seed distribution, and even some thought about the need for rural credit.[74]

Even more important than the experimental work, however, was the educational activity of the Service Technique. Unfortunately, it was also one of the major sources of controversy with the Haitians. Curiously enough, considering the American program in such places as the Philippines and Cuba, there was nothing in the Haitian treaty of 1915 about education. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, Americans made some attempts to assist the Haitians in the early part of the occupation. Several factors led to a change in policy, however. The Haitians seemed not to want American aid. Moreover, the Americans regarded the Haitian educational system as backward and corrupt. The exclusive emphasis on the classical curricula and training for politics or the professions seemed ill-adapted to a Haiti which required technical and economic knowledge. Furthermore, Haitian schools were badly if not corruptly administered. In any event, they fell far short of providing an education for all in Haiti. In general, the occupation authorities stabilized expenditures for Haitian education while steadily increasing funds for the American-operated system of agricultural and vocational education in the Service Technique. By 1928–29, the Service Technique with roughly 11,500 students got about two-thirds of the education budget; the Haitian system with a capacity of close to 100,000 students received the remaining third. At best, less than 15 per cent of the total budget went for educational purposes.[75]

The educational program of the Service Technique included several sets of institutions. The École Centrale at Damien was a normal school de-

signed to train agricultural instructors. A system of vocational schools served the interests of urban areas, while rural farm schools attempted to take care of the nonurban youth. Finally, agricultural extension work tried to transmit new agricultural ideas to adults and the illiterate. Occupation authorities even operated a radio station broadcasting to radio receivers in the town squares.[76]

In this particular program, the Americans ran into an exceptional amount of opposition and criticism. The Haitian elite correctly felt that the Americans were attacking their ideas about education and resented the American failure to provide funds for the expansion of the Haitian system. They argued that the whole program was being operated on too large and costly a scale. Some asserted that the so-called American experts knew nothing about tropical agriculture and could not transmit what they did know because they did not speak French or Creole. For their part, the Americans had difficulty in recruiting students who had the necessary educational background and who were willing to undertake the manual labor which though necessary was generally scorned by the elite. All in all, it was a dispute which boded ill for the occupation.[77]

The occupation found other obstacles to raising Haitian production. For one thing many Haitians seemed uninterested. The basic incentives to acquisition of wealth which were taken for granted in western society seemed to be missing in Haiti. The natives were easily satisfied with a little and refused to work for more.[78] Moreover, those who chose to accumulate wealth had difficulty in holding it in the face of an unfair, if not corrupt, judicial system. This was particularly true when foreigners were involved. Increasing production was one area in which the Americans were unable to make much headway.[79]

If agricultural education seemed to be the service least appreciated by the Haitians, the public health work was the best liked. The health problem in Haiti was very grave. American marine officers remarked that Haitian soldiers, because of poor health, would sometimes fall asleep in broad daylight while standing guard. Malaria, hookworm, and yaws were omnipresent, sapping the strength of the population. Initially, the Americans had put a higher priority on economic measures, but revenues increased sufficiently by 1926 to justify an attack on the health problem. Attack it they did with vigor and imagination if with only limited resources. Naval officers and Haitian doctors were here aided by the Rockefeller Foundation. In the peak years of 1927 and 1929, health officials had less than a million dollars to spend, but they spent it well.

Public health measures included new facilities, treatments, and train-

ing. Hospitals and urban sanitation were improved and expanded relatively early in the occupation, but the lack of financial resources confined such measures to the cities at first. As funds became available, the fight against disease was extended to the rural parts of Haiti. Rural health clinics were set up in all parts of the island where natives were treated *en masse*. The virtually nonexistent Haitian medical school was closed by the simple expedient of depriving it of funds, and a new one was set up under American auspices with the Rockefeller Foundation assisting in the expense of equipping it. American nurses initiated their art among Haitian women. A Haitian medical society was set up to encourage research and the dissemination of new knowledge among medical personnel.[80]

All this was deeply appreciated by the Haitians. Initially, the ignorant peasants feared the attention of the doctors, but by the end of the occupation there was no question but that public health had won the respect of the Haitians. Only one thought marred the satisfaction with which American officials viewed the results of the health campaign. The health improvement would only increase the Haitian population, wiping out what few economic gains the Americans had been able to achieve. The shadow of Malthus hung heavily over Haiti.[81]

As to the general Haitian reaction to the occupation program in its progressive phase from about 1922 to 1929, it is difficult to make any statements with any degree of certainty. American marines and other officials had apparently been indoctrinated concerning the maintenance of good relations with the Haitians. Some of this may have done some good. General Russell contended that Haitian peasants at least were appreciative of American efforts, and a survey after the end of the occupation indicated that they were more friendly toward Americans than toward any other foreign group.[82] On the other hand, the Americans had allied themselves with the Catholic church in an attempt to wipe out voodoo in Haiti, and this, combined with an ancient fear that the whites would once again enslave the Negroes, doubtless limited the enthusiasm which the peasants felt toward the Americans.[83]

It was quite clear that the Haitian elite never did acquiesce in the reforms of the American occupation, even though members of the Borno government coöperated with the treaty officials. American penetration of the government services and of education represented a challenge to the elite's control of these social agencies and, in the case of education, a challenge to elite ideals. Moreover, it was widely believed that the Americans were attempting to develop a middle class in Haiti which would offer a serious challenge to the elite. Worst of all, it was widely charged that American

officials brought with them the racial mores of the state of Mississippi. While General Russell apparently attempted to rid the occupation forces of persons holding objectionable racial ideas, there is equally good evidence to indicate that at least in the early days of the occupation some Americans held ideas about the nature of black folk that boded ill for their relations with the Haitians. In any event, the natives believed that the Americans were racially prejudiced, and in the end this belief determined their attitude toward the occupation.[84]

Meanwhile, American criticism continued. A group of academicians headed by Emily Balch, professor of economics at Wellesley, visited Haiti in the middle twenties and returned with a somewhat skeptical attitude toward the virtues of occupying Caribbean republics, particularly with marines. Such journals as the *Nation* and the *New Republic* continued to agitate against the alleged evils of military occupation.[85] Indeed, doubt about the wisdom of an apparently indefinite occupation had begun to penetrate the Republican administration in Washington by the fall of 1929. In September of that year, President Hoover and Secretary of State Stimson agreed to send a special mission to Haiti to look into affairs and help determine future policy.[86]

The American determination to change policy was buttressed by events in Haiti in the fall of 1929. On October 31 of that year, students at the École Centrale, the normal school operated by the Service Technique, went on strike, apparently in protest against certain scholarship changes. While the American authorities tried hard to conciliate the students, general anti-American sentiment, opposition to the new alcohol taxes, and resentment over lower coffee prices broadened the strike into nation-wide protest against the occupation. Russell found it necessary once again to enforce the long-neglected martial law, and once again marines fired on a Haitian mob to prevent the looting of a Haitian city.[87]

The strike was also involved with the political situation. Haitians were apparently afraid that President Borno would again refuse to call legislative elections and would again be reëlected by the hand-picked Council of State. Although Borno announced that he would not be a candidate, the Forbes Commission selected by Hoover to investigate Haitian affairs found a tense political situation when it arrived in February, 1930. The commission, headed by W. Cameron Forbes, a veteran of colonial administration in the Philippines, plunged into the work of producing a political settlement. They finally devised a plan whereby Borno would select a provisional president from a list of candidates drawn up by the numerous opposition groups; the provisional president would then call general elec-

tions. American pressure eventually forced Borno to meet these requirements; a newly selected Council of State elected the provisional president, Eugene Roy, according to plan, and Roy in turn called elections for the fall of 1930 which brought in the new government under the presidency of Stenio Vincent.[88]

Meanwhile the United States had decided to get out of the island. The Forbes Commission report, while it praised the work of the Americans in Haiti, also criticized the occupation for its failure to plan for an eventual American withdrawal and for its inability to win the approval of the Haitian elite. Dissatisfaction with the way the occupation was going was augmented by the report of the Moton Commission, a group appointed concurrently with the Forbes Commission to look into the conduct of American educational enterprises in the occupied country. Headed by the distinguished principal of Tuskegee Institute, Dr. Robert R. Moton, the commission listened patiently to the strictures of Haitian critics on the Service Technique. While the commission agreed that vocational and industrial education was necessary and while it criticized Haitian officials for their lack of concern over the welfare of the masses, it also concluded that the occupation had gone too far in restricting the Haitian educational system and had certainly erected a new educational structure which was beyond the financial capacity of the Haitians to maintain.[89] As a result of these reports, the State Department eventually decided to follow the recommendations of the Forbes Commission. The department instructed Minister Dana Munro, who replaced Russell, to withdraw the marines gradually, Haitianize the treaty services, and withdraw from the island by 1936, the date of expiration of the treaty of 1915, if not before.[90]

As in the case of the Dominican Republic, however, withdrawal took time and some difficult negotiations. While Americans had begun Haitianization of the treaty services in the 1920's, progress had been slow, and Americans were reluctant to turn over the top positions to Haitians whom they regarded as unprepared. On their part, the Haitians were eager to get the Americans out as rapidly as possible and with no strings attached. After a good deal of tortuous negotiations, an agreement was eventually signed in August, 1933, providing for the withdrawal of the marines by October 1, 1934, and for restricting the powers of the fiscal advisor. The other treaty services had already been Haitianized. Eventually, marines left the island in August, 1934, ahead of schedule. Although the occupation had ended, a fiscal representative remained behind in control of the customs service, supervising the payment of the Haitian foreign debt.[91]

What were the long-range results of the American intervention? The

Moton Commission, despite its criticism of many aspects of the occupation, predicted that "there will remain in the island after the withdrawal of the American forces a body of material accomplishment and a system of organization that will, if properly utilized, minister effectively to the welfare and progress of the Republic long after the circumstances of their introduction are forgotten."[92] While it is extremely difficult to document, it seems as if these hopes were doomed to disappointment.

It is very questionable, for example, whether the strong American emphasis on economic progress left much of an impress on Haiti. Although General Russell reported clear signs of higher living standards by 1928—more substantial buildings and increased imports of such items as chemical products, iron beds, shoes and soaps—it is doubtful whether the changes were significant.[93] The much maligned Service Technique, however, remained a useful Haitian agency after the Americans left. On the other hand, there was good evidence to indicate that many of the public works gradually broke down. Roads, for example, were poorly maintained and rapidly deteriorated.[94] While Haitians seem to have taken some of the American ideas about sanitation to heart, the vigorous and well-planned public health campaign apparently made no permanent impress on the Haitian problems of yaws, intestinal parasites, and malaria. And of course, the American educational program with its emphasis on agricultural and vocational education did little or nothing to solve the problem of illiteracy. Government administration seemed little more honest or efficient in 1950 than it had in 1915.[95] Indeed, American experts working in Haiti during the 1940's and United Nations technical assistance teams at a somewhat later date faced much the same problems the Americans had faced after 1915.[96]

One reform seemed to be permanent. Marine pacification and disarming of the country combined with a strong and efficient police force trained originally by the Americans had stopped revolutions.[97] Unfortunately this seems like a rather meager accomplishment in the light of the hard feelings the Americans left behind. We have already noted the opposition which the occupation engendered. Apparently the hard feelings remained after the Americans left. The elite continued to prefer French to Americans while the peasants celebrated the Festival of the Second Independence with *Te Deums* and patriotic discourses. The Americans had not succeeded in producing any fundamental change in the social structure as some had charged they were attempting to do.[98] As one observer remarked, the chief American legacy in Haiti had been "marines and latrines."

CHAPTER SEVEN

Missions Multiply

The Era of World War I, 1912–1929

THE EARLY years of the period between the outbreak of the first world war in Europe and the Great Depression witnessed continued activities in the field of technical aid much like those that had already taken place. This was especially true in Latin America, where Pan-Americanism on the one hand and closer economic control of the Caribbean republics by the United States on the other hand, increased the technical assistance given in one form or another to our southern neighbors. At the same time the war, in itself and in its effects, proved a notable stimulus in the further evolution of American technical missions to other lands.

Technical aid to Latin-American countries in part followed the by now well-established pattern in which foreign governments retained American scientists and technicians. Thus, late in 1916 the government of Panama sent a commission to Washington to seek the coöperation of the United States in highway, railway, radio, and agricultural developments. Although promises were made by the United States to aid agricultural development by giving pertinent information and by setting up radio stations, little was actually done. But Americans not directly connected with the government at Washington conducted an economic survey of the tiny republic and introduced certain American methods into the system of administration.[1] And, after a fracas in which one American sailor was killed by the Panama police and others brutally beaten, the government accepted a loan of a United States army officer to instruct the police.[2]

Of much greater significance in the evolution of the technical missions were the topographic, geologic, and economic surveys conducted in Pata-

gonia. American scientific interest in the tip of the South American continent began at the end of the nineteenth century. Professor J. B. Hatcher of Princeton carried through a remarkable expedition to investigate vertebrate and invertebrate fossils, partial knowledge of which had raised far-reaching geological and historical problems. Friends of Princeton financed the expedition, and J. Pierpont Morgan helped with the publication of the thirteen impressive volumes making up its report. Among the officials of the United States to give indispensable help were Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson and Dr. C. Hart Merriam, a member of his department, Assistant Secretary of State David J. Hill, and W. J. McGee, of the Bureau of Ethnology. Argentine officials likewise extended generous and invaluable aid. The work proceeded in the face of the most discouraging obstacles, but it was a brilliant success in the end. In addition to assembling rich collections of mammals, plants, birds, amphibians, and mollusks, the expedition contributed to the first rational account of Patagonian geology and made important additions to geographical knowledge. This proved of great use in later surveys of the Argentine and Chilean boundaries. The expedition also yielded new ethnological data. Further, it called attention to and gave concrete information about economic potentialities—stock raising, fishing, lumbering, and, given irrigation, agriculture. The problem of transportation was recognized for the grave one it was; but the expedition did not regard it as insoluble.[3]

A few years later the Minister of Public Works, Dr. Ramos-Mexía, in the process of promoting a national policy of railroad construction, encountered difficulties in Patagonia which stemmed both from inadequate knowledge and from the failure to reach necessary supplies of water by driving deep wells. Ramos-Mexía looked with concern on the occupation of what he believed to be a potentially fertile area of the public domain by a few great stock raisers; he visioned a colonization of rank and file Argentinians in the remote southern province. At the Scientific Congress in Buenos Aires in the centennial year of the republic (1910) he met an American geologist who had come to the country to help Aleš Hrdlička investigate the antiquity of man in this part of the world. The geologist was Dr. Bailey Willis; he had served under Raphael Pumpelly in the United States Geological Survey and was currently chief geologist. Dr. Ramos-Mexía challenged Willis to solve the water problem in Patagonia and to locate a railroad route—for surely he could do in the semi-desert area of Argentina what he had helped to do in his own country.

Willis was intrigued by the challenge. But he had no sooner given an affirmative answer, than the first of a long series of obstacles confronted

him. For the contract presented to him, while seemingly liberal in terms, contained, he learned through an Argentine friend, a clause making him personally responsible for the cost of the surveys. This was written into the contract by bureaucrats in the Ministry who were jealous of "outside" participation and who had no sympathy for the minister's development scheme. When this was straightened out, Willis went back to the States to recruit a staff. He brought down three able members of the Geological Survey, an economic geographer, topographers, and other assistants. To these were added a motley crew of Argentinians and foreigners resident in the country. Much of Willis' time was taken up in straightening out misunderstandings and tensions that developed between members of the outfit. But this was nothing in comparison with the sustained boycott of the bureaucracy, which did all in its power to hamstring the expedition.[4]

Despite these obstacles, the expedition succeeded in solving the water problem of the San Antonio district of Patagonia and in locating a route for the railroad. It discovered some petroleum and indicated the possibility of hydroelectric power as a future basis for industry. The magnificent scenery, the report suggested, might be preserved in national parks to attract a profitable tourist trade. But the most important part of the report was the appraisal of land utilization—the possibilities not only for stock raising but for mineral, forest, and agricultural development. All in all, the expedition was remarkably successful in carrying out its technical assignment.

In some other respects, however, the mission was not quite so fortunate. The bureaucracy withheld payments due Willis, and he was able to publish English and Spanish editions of his report in the United States only with great difficulty.[5] When Dr. Ramos-Mexía was replaced by a new Minister of Public Works, the report was suppressed, and a thousand copies lay buried in the archives of the Ministry until 1930. The Comisión de Estúdios Hidrológicos, under which the work in Patagonia was carried on, was a casualty of World War I as well as of the bureaucracy and an English-owned railroad that opposed the development of Patagonia. Willis lived, however, to see some of the recommendations he had made implemented by a new group of Argentine officials.[6]

Argentina was not the only Latin-American country in which our scientists inquired into the potentialities of natural resources. But the next two important missions, coming after the first world war, marked a new type of operation. The war had made both American business and the federal government acutely aware of the importance of certain basic raw

materials not available in the country itself. Also, the postwar competition with other countries brought home the implications of a monopoly of essential raw materials when that monopoly was in other hands. These considerations, in addition to the aggressive foreign-trade policy of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce in the postwar period, account for the surveys undertaken by the American government in Chile and in Brazil in the early 1920's.

In 1923 the Commerce Department arranged with the Chilean government to have a nitrogen survey of Chile made by H. A. Curtis of Yale and J. Foster Bain, chief of the Bureau of Mines. The survey studied the extent to which the increasing requirements of the United States could be supplied by corresponding increases of fixed nitrogen in coke and coal gas industries, and investigated the Chilean nitrate industry to find what changes might be made in machinery to lower the price.[7]

It was likewise the government, in close association with the relevant industries, that took the initiative and carried through a more important survey of the Amazon River basin. In 1923 Congress passed an act enabling the Department of Commerce in association with the relevant governments to investigate the possibilities of developing rubber plantations in both the Philippines and Latin America. The act made available $357,000 to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, $42,300 to the Bureau of Standards, and $100,000 to the Department of Agriculture for studying the possibilities of rubber production in areas not subject to monopoly control. The Amazon project was directed by Commercial Attaché W. L. Schurz; but the distinguished scientist, C. F. Marbut, actually conducted the inquiry.

The survey revealed the erroneousness of the idea that the Amazon basin is a vast, flat, low-lying plain subject to annual inundation. On the basis of comprehensive analyses of soil, climate, land tenure, tax structure, labor supply, and transportation, the survey showed that the production of rubber was entirely feasible. Leaders in the industry took the position, however, that for the time being little investment was likely to flow into the Amazon region. But they welcomed the evidence that, if and when the demand became pressing, the area was suitable for large-scale production.[8] The point cannot be overemphasized that in this, as in the nitrogen survey, the technical missions were official American ventures designed to serve the needs of the American economy, with incidental benefits to the underdeveloped area. This, clearly, carried further the evolution of the overseas technical mission.

If American national interest governed the postwar surveys of natural resources in Chile and Brazil, this played only a subordinate role in the impulse given by Americans to the conservation of forest resources in China. The Chinese, to be sure, first learned about the value of forest management from the Germans, who introduced it at Kiaochow after they took it over at the time of the Boxer Rebellion. But the German approach rested entirely on government authority and made no appeal to the people themselves. It was this necessity that impressed Maj. George P. Ahern, director of the Philippine Bureau of Forestry, when he visited China in 1910 and was struck by the barren aspects of heavily populated sections of the country.

Convinced that the United States could in the long run benefit from the modernization of China only insofar as it contributed to that end, Ahern enlisted the help of the American legation and of prominent Chinese officials in a campaign for popular education in forestry conservation.[9] Arrangements were made to have the tuition fees remitted for Chinese students at the Philippine Forest School at Los Baños; six young men studied there between 1912 and 1914.[10] Ngan Han, head of the Department of Forestry at Peking, accepted an invitation to spend three months in the Philippines observing American methods, which he introduced into China on his return.[11] Thanks to Ahern, a forestry school was also established at Nanking with the help of Joseph Bailie, professor of agriculture at the University. Bailie enlisted the support of wealthy Chinese in reclaiming a thousand-acre tract and in planting trees on 10,000 acres of the untillable Purple Mountain.[12] "If the Forestry school will ever amount to *anything*," Ngan Han wrote to Ahern some years later, "you will have the *honor* to be the first *man* who started the *ball rolling*."[13] Ahern was glad to know that the Chinese foresters trained in the Philippines had made good records.[14] Some years later he took steps to have young foresters included in the contingent of Chinese students studying in America under the indemnity fund.[15] Ahern's activity in stimulating the Chinese to be more deeply concerned about forestry was carried on by his successor in the Philippines, Forsythe Sherfesee, who became an advisor to the Chinese government.

Of much more potential significance was the scheme for developing flood control in the Huai Valley. Much of this area had long been subjected to floods and chronic famines. The American Red Cross provided relief, but it was like pouring water down a sink. It occurred to Mabel Boardman, chairman of the executive committee, that American engineers might work out plans to control the Huai's waters in order to mini-

mize flood hazard and reduce suffering. To carry through such a plan required making arrangements with the Chinese government, getting an act through Congress to enable the army to lend an engineer to make the initial survey, and arranging for financing the project. Secretary of State Knox proved sympathetic, and he instructed the American legation in Peking to sound out the government. "The Department trusts China will adopt the suggestion as a measure of economy and humanity."[16] This it did. The Legation reported that the Chinese authorities felt the sooner the plan was executed the better, and expressed its readiness to organize a corps of necessary assistants.

The Red Cross retained Charles Davis Jameson, a civil engineer who had worked many years in China. Jameson left for the Far East in June, 1911, to study and report on the general problem of river conservation. The Chinese government paid the field expenses of the survey parties. The report, which was published in the spring of 1913, analyzed the topography and took into account the incidence of rainfall. It recommended that a well-defined channel be cut through the Loma lake bed and be continued to the sea, with the development of headworks. The importance of keeping the channels clear of vegetation and of maintaining well-defined water outlets to the sea was emphasized; ditching would be needed to permit the sea water level to be lowered. Jameson recommended a well-organized engineering department, after noting the deficiencies of available Chinese surveys. The technical deficiencies of the Chinese engineers, and the lack of a definite, responsible head, had resulted in spending much time and money on unimportant works. Moreover, the work thus far had been discussed merely in terms of local considerations; the central government alone could finance and direct the necessary operations, which Jameson estimated would cost $30,000,000. The intense jealousy of their local rights on the part of the provinces was recognized as an important obstacle. The report stressed the moral implications of the successful realization of such a project: the starvation and degradation of millions of people who were fast becoming beggars and robbers, might be eliminated.[17]

On the basis of the preliminary Jameson report, the Chinese government informed the State Department of its readiness to invite American capital and to give an option for one year to the Americans to raise a loan and make a contract for construction. Paul Reinsch, Minister to China, emphasized the soundness of the project as a business investment.[18] Thereupon the Red Cross secured the consent of the J. G. White Engineering Corporation, a New York firm, to undertake the work and to negotiate with bankers for the necessary loan. The Red Cross further agreed to use

its good offices to secure a competent engineer acceptable to the Chinese government to supervise the conservation work. In accordance with the preference of the Chinese authorities, the Red Cross pushed through Congress a bill providing for the loan of an experienced officer in the engineering corps to make a supplementary survey at the expense of the Chinese government.[19] The necessary authorization in hand, the Red Cross named a board of engineers to verify the Jameson report and estimate. This consisted of Col. William L. Sibert, chairman, Daniel W. Mead, professor of hydraulic engineering at the University of Wisconsin, and Arthur P. Davis, director of the United States Reclamation Service.[20]

By the autumn of 1914 the engineering mission had begun its work in China. At the first conference the Chinese ministers of agriculture and commerce displayed some distrust and even prejudice, but their attitude quickly changed. The central government provided an interpreter and instructed all local magistrates to extend every aid and courtesy. The innumerable banquets and entertainments consumed precious time, but the commission, consisting of fifteen American engineers, made substantial headway.[21] Four parties were organized, and various possible approaches to the problem were explored in terms of engineering feasibility, costs, and probable results. The report warned that the engineering works recommended would not entirely prevent the flooding of the lands benefited, but held that the magnitude and duration of the floods caused by heavy rains could be taken care of in large and free outlets, so that the waters would run off quickly before killing growing crops.

In addition to the direct benefits in the form of the reclamation and irrigation of lands, the project was expected to improve the navigation of the Grand Canal. The estimated cost of $30,000,000 could be met by loans, to be repaid by the taxes on the reclaimed and benefited lands and by the charges for the use of the locks on the Grand Canal. The board finally recommended that complete responsibility and authority should be given the Chief Engineer, subject to review by a board of engineers to be named by the banking houses that financed the work.[22] Reinsch reported to the State Department on October 28, 1914, that the report was "so favorable that all doubts with regard to the undertaking, both as to its economic soundness and as to the lasting benefits to be secured, have been dispelled."[23] It was, in the eyes of the American minister, a remarkable combination of philanthropy and sound business.

But on the return of the engineering mission the Red Cross got nowhere in its efforts to negotiate loans from "financiers of high standing." Nor was the effort to enlist the support of the Rockefeller Foundation any

more succersful. Both the Red Cross authorities and Secretary of State Bryan attributed the indifference of the financiers to war conditions. The Chinese authorities continued to urge action. "It is hoped," Minister Reinsch wrote to the State Department on December 17, 1915, "that this great work of progress with which the American name is linked may now actually be undertaken while the influences in the government are favorable and ready to make the most liberal arrangements."[24] Although the American International Corporation, alone among American outfits, showed some interest in the project, it decided that in view of the revolutionary situation in the Far East it was unwise to negotiate with the Chinese government for a large loan. Reinsch insisted that the apprehensions of American bankers were unwarranted and "ought not control unless American enterprise is to forego present opportunities through abnormal modesty and timidity." The political situation, he went on, was not yet such that American bankers "need ask permission of their competitors before engaging even in new business with China. In fact, these competitors still harbor the idea that Americans really desire to do business here."[25]

The Chinese government did sign a contract for the improvement of the Grand Canal as part of the Huai River Conservancy, subject to the approval of the American International Corporation. But Willard Straight, the corporation's chief Far Eastern authority, took the position that it was impossible to finance the scheme inasmuch as Tokyo protested and as China refused to accept a Japanese counterproposal for joint American-Japanese coöperation.[26] It seems clear in retrospect that the project could hardly have been pushed to completion in view of the friction between the Chinese and Japanese; and after the war, the Chinese lacked a sufficiently stable government to undertake large internal improvements. But the engineers associated with the report believed that if and when the project was ever undertaken, it would be carried on along the lines laid down by the Americans making the surveys.[27]

During the negotiations for a loan for the Huai River Conservancy, another American technical expert played a minor but interesting role in China. Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, a distinguished political scientist of the Johns Hopkins University, accepted a post as constitutional advisor to the government. In 1914 Goodnow prepared a draft of a permanent constitution which held that a presidential form of government was better adapted to China than a cabinet form. According to the American legation, Goodnow's draft of a constitution received "a good deal of favorable attention."[28] Somewhat later the Chinese government asked Goodnow to prepare a memorandum on the respective merits of a republic and a monarchy. As

the American chargé of the Legation, J. V. A. MacMurray wrote, Goodnow prepared in good faith, but with inadequate wariness, a memorandum which was exploited by President Yüan Shih-k'ai, who wanted to transform the republic into a monarchy. Goodnow now held that theoretically and in the abstract, monarchy was best suited for the Chinese genius, traditions, and present political development. He did, to be sure, disclaim any judgment as to whether the existing situation made such a change expedient or feasible. The *Peking Daily News* publicized the Goodnow memorandum, and this evoked a well-planned monarchical propaganda in which the American expert was quoted as categorically favoring a monarchy. Even when he repudiated the views attributed to him, the propaganda continued.[29]

In the postwar years the Huai River Conservancy scheme was not promoted as such, but the United States did play a part both in the discussions for the economic improvement of China and in fact-finding inquiries intended to relate to that objective. In 1920 Sun Yat-sen's *The International Development of China* advocated the use of the vast productive resources released in the West at the end of World War I for the development of Chinese harbors, railroads, canals, public utilities, power development, heavy industries, mines, agriculture, and reforestation. It was his idea that unless China could cease being the prey of western militaristic and capitalistic powers it was bound to occasion a new and terrible world war; and the alternative he proposed to western competitive exploitation was an international organization of the capital-supplying governments, which was to send to China not only capital but war-work organizers, administrators, and various other experts who would formulate plans and standardize materials to prevent waste and facilitate modern production. The Chinese were to be full partners in the enterprise, which assumed a socialistic frame. When the plan was released, Dr. Paul Reinsch, American minister, at once had an expert survey the site of the port development Sun had laid out as a point of departure. The report confirmed the feasibility of this particular proposal.[30] But the beautiful scheme of Sun Yat-sen died soon after it was proposed.

Less grandiose and more immediately realistic was the China Foundation. This was established in 1924 when the American government remitted the second portion of the Boxer indemnity. It was administered by distinguished intellectuals named by both the American and Chinese governments. The Board of the Foundation defined education and culture, which it was to promote, as "the development of scientific knowledge and

. . . the application of such knowledge to the conditions in China, through the promotion of technical training, of scientific research, experimentation and demonstration and training in science teaching, and . . . the advancement of cultural enterprises of a permanent character, such as libraries and the like."[31]

Among the many enterprises that the China Foundation promoted was a soil survey, which was entrusted to the National Geological Survey of China. Despite the troublous 1930's when the work was pushed forward, the survey extended to almost every province and resulted in a soil map of China together with numerous reports and bulletins.[32] James Thorp, senior soil scientist in the United States Department of Agriculture, became the chief soil technologist in the National Geological Survey of China in 1933, and gave unsparingly of his abilities through the following years.[33] The report concluded that China's soils possessed about the same range of fertility as those of other nations of comparable size, and that China was thus capable of indefinite support of a large population. But the survey indicated that irrigation and other reclamation projects could not be expected appreciably to increase productivity. Thus Thorp frankly pleaded for the dissemination of birth-control information as the only method of keeping the population within the bounds of soil productivity.[34]

The Chinese intellectual world was greatly touched when it was announced that Dr. Curtis Fletcher Marbut, the "grand old man" in the soils survey area, and a great inspirational force in the China Soils Survey, was en route to China to inspect and assist in the work under way. Marbut's death before reaching the scene of operations deprived the survey of his talents, but it left a profound impression on those acquainted with his work.[35] The enterprise did, however, have the benefit of the vast knowledge and prestige of Dr. Amadeus W. Grabau, professor of paleontology at Columbia, who in 1920 accepted the post of chief paleontologist of the Chinese Geological Survey. In 1926 his Chinese colleagues presented him with a medal named after him in recognition of his original contributions to geological research in China.[36] His magnum opus, *The Rhythm of the Ages*, was published in Peking in 1940, five years before his death in China, where he remained throughout the Japanese occupation. Thus, if the magnificent Huai River Conservancy scheme associated with the American Red Cross did not materialize, American technicians on a smaller scale remained in the field and sustained American reputation by making significant contributions to knowledge and by pointing the way to its fruitful applications.

Although World War I occasioned the collapse of the Huai River Conservancy, it gave impetus to a great expansion of American technical services overseas, both during the actual period of combat and in the armistice months thereafter. These were both unofficial and official in nature.

The activities of the American Red Cross which were initiated at the outset of the war in Europe, represented unofficial American missions. During the first fifteen months of the war more than 250 nurses served in European countries under the direction of the Red Cross; and in addition American educational institutions, particularly Harvard, despatched medical and relief missions. The Red Cross heroes and heroines, for they were such, worked under indescribably adverse conditions, especially in Russia and the Balkans. If the physical aid rendered was slight in relation to the need, it was nevertheless an act of mercy in itself not inconsiderable. Moreover, in the postwar decade standards set by the Red Cross in European hospitals helped, intangibly to be sure, to disseminate American nursing standards.[37]

The Red Cross program was not the only example of unofficial American technical services in the common cause. In 1916 the Employers Industrial Commission went abroad to investigate labor conditions in the interest of promoting a better working basis between the allied and associated powers. The Engineering Commission arrived in 1918 with a similar objective. These unofficial missions helped demonstrate American willingness and ability to contribute technical know-how in the interest of victory.

But the problems associated with promoting coöperation for victory involved official as well as unofficial efforts. The first of the official missions to arrive in wartime Europe was that of the War Industries Board, headed by L. L. Summers. The twelve distinguished men who composed the mission were instructed to clear up misunderstandings with Great Britain that had arisen in connection with prices for food supplies, and the objectives were in part realized.[38] In 1918 the federal government sent an agricultural mission to find out the conditions of European agriculture as these related to the problems and potentialities of the United States under war conditions. The firsthand study of conditions in England, France, and Italy resulted in a useful compilation of relevant factual material, although the mission did not suggest the need of technical aid for Europe.[39]

The French in particular benefited from the investigations of American agriculturists overseas. The Department of Agriculture, for example, sent a mission to Algiers to help solve technical agricultural problems. On the basis of a four-week study the mission concluded that the grain-produc-

ing area could be considerably extended and the yields increased by the use of machinery for threshing and handling grain. Due consideration was given to the difficult problems of transportation between Algiers and France. The agriculturists expressed gratitude for the help and courtesy received from officials in both France and Algiers.[40]

The principal official mission designed to help win the war was that which went to Russia after the revolution of March, 1917. In the words of Secretary of Labor Wilson, the purpose of the mission was to "present the ideals of the common people of America and a knowledge of the advantages that come to the masses through the evolutionary processes of a democratic form of government, together with the economic and political attitude of American wage workers toward the problems confronting the world in the present crisis."[41] At one point it was hoped that the mission could help the Russian people help themselves in establishing advantageous trade relations with other nations, in rebuilding their damaged transport system, and in promoting food production by the adoption of scientific agricultural techniques.[42] The commission was headed by Elihu Root and included, in addition to military and naval personnel, Cyrus McCormick of the International Harvester Company, James H. Duncan, vice-president of the American Federation of Labor, Charles R. Crane, friend of Russia and a Chicago manufacturer, John R. Mott of the Y.M.C.A., Charles E. Russell, prominent socialist, and others. Members of the mission made many inspirational and hortatory speeches. Duncan and Russell helped bolster up Russian labor in the production of war materials. In the opinion of Root, all the members helped Russians understand the problems of effective self-government.[43] A railroad commission also reached Siberia, but its well-laid plans for reconstructing transport fell to pieces when the Bolsheviks seized power.[44] If this mission failed to prevent that and to keep Russia in the war, it was, like the other missions set up to aid the war effort, evidence of a growing tendency to use official technical missions in international crises.

The problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction led in the first instance to unofficial and quasi-official missions. A few examples will illustrate this approach. George B. Ford, for instance, went to France in the spring of 1916 as head of the Reconstruction Bureau of the American Red Cross. This well-known architect and city planner, who had been an American delegate to the International Housing Conference in Vienna in 1910, was given an official appointment in 1919 as consultant to the French government on the replanning of the devastated cities of Arras, Soissons, and Rheims. Ford arranged for the first international town-planning conference,

which met in Paris in 1919. The data he collected during his field trips in the devastated regions proved useful in many ways in the reconstruction that France so gallantly undertook.[45] Another example of unofficial initiative was the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland. This derived its authority from a committee of distinguished citizens brought together by the editors of the *Nation*. Its purpose was to ascertain the truth about conditions in Ireland and to improve the relations between the United States and Britain which the Irish problem menaced. The commission also tried to contribute to both the Irish and the English people some basis for mutual understanding. It would be too much to claim that it succeeded in promoting an early peace in Ireland by strengthening that section of British opinion that abhorred a military subjection of Ireland; but it was a gesture of good intentions.[46]

After the armistice, the French Ministry of Agriculture accepted an offer of the American Committee for Devastated France to aid in the conservation of food products by introducing American techniques. Leaves of absence were granted to three French-speaking Louisiana home-demonstrators to conduct a ten-week campaign in France instructing housewives in American methods of fruit and vegetable canning.[47]

The most far-reaching of the official technical services designed to forward rehabilitation grew out of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, established early in the war. The American Relief Administration, which operated from February, 1919, until the summer of that year, represented pioneering in large scale international relief. It was directed with efficiency and humanity by Herbert Hoover and supported by special Congressional appropriations as well as by allocations from the Food Administration. The experience proved the great importance of centralized and responsible control made possible when the allied governments appointed Herbert Hoover to direct and coördinate the vast and complicated problems associated with relief.[48] An eye witness of relief work in the Baltic countries testified that the Americans made nothing out of their opportunity except good will, for there was "no attempt to use our power to drum up future favors." Instead, every effort was made to combine altruism with hard common sense.[49] During the period after the armistice Hoover as director of general relief helped feed the hungry, not only in western Europe, but also in Russia, aided in the rehabilitation of railroad traffic, and stimulated an increase in the production of coal while facilitating its more efficient distribution.[50]

Associated with the technical missions designed to promote rehabilitation were those which went overseas during or shortly after the war to

make investigations bearing on the problem of peace-making. Thus in 1918, the Inquiry set up to gather technical knowledge to be used in peace negotiations selected C. F. Marbut, the noted soil technician, to prepare a report on the agricultural potentialities of Africa. Samples of soil hurriedly collected were analyzed, and on the basis of these studies Marbut prepared *The Vegetation and Soils of Africa*, which for some time remained the best assembled source for an understanding of its subject.[81]

In a few cases the official missions involved large questions of policy. Thus in October, 1918, the mission of the War Industries Board was joined by its vice-chairman, Alexander Legge, with the assignment of making a survey of the industrial status and requirements of the devastated territory. Legge had visited Europe first in 1908 as sales manager of the International Harvester Company and was well qualified for his task. With the help of competent assistants he collected concrete economic data relevant to the adjustment of reparation claims. Legge was discouraged by the impression President Wilson gave on arriving in Paris that economic matters were to be subordinate in the treaty-making, and returned to America. But the data he collected proved useful in making economic sections of the peace settlement.[82]

One of the burning issues of the peace conference was what to do with the Turkish Empire. American missions gathered information and offered advice on this question, advice which was only partially accepted. One mission was headed by President Henry King of Oberlin College and by Charles Crane of the Interallied Commission on Mandates. The Crane-King report, based on painstaking investigations, was pigeonholed at the Paris Peace Conference, and its efforts went for naught.

Better known was the mission to Armenia, dispatched in 1919 to look into the considerations relevant to a decision as to whether the United States should undertake a mandate of that troubled land. Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord headed the mission, which included military engineers, economists, and relief administrators. Although General Harbord alone was responsible for the report, he asked each of the fifteen experts to submit his views on the task in question. When the individual reports were sifted, it appeared that seven favored a mandate and the same number opposed.

The experts in education, communications, and public health sensed the great need for American aid in these fields. The final report did not explicitly recommend technical aid, but it did include among the arguments suggested in favor of assuming the mandate the statement that the Near East "presents the greatest humanitarian opportunity of the age—a duty for which the United States is better fitted than any other—as witness

Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and our altruistic policy of developing peoples rather than material resources alone." The final report further added, no doubt reflecting the point of view of this group of experts, that without visiting the Near East it was impossible for an American "to realize even faintly the respect, faith, and affection with which our country is regarded throughout that region."

On the other hand, the experts in government, finance, and military defense emphasized the great difficulties which a mandate would involve. A review of the history of governments in the Near East suggested that to expect honest and stable government would be unwise; a survey of the economy indicated that the amorphous area would not be a viable entity from the point of view of self-support; and a study of defense pointed to the immense problem of securing an area wedged between the Soviet Union and the British sphere. The military opinion, which the report incorporated, held that in case a mandate were undertaken, the entire Turkish Empire should, so far as defense was concerned, be included, inasmuch as Armenia could not be separated from the larger area in any way practicable from a military point of view.

The report itself, following the divided sense of the experts, cautiously made no effort either to recommend or to discountenance a mandate. It rather estimated the time likely to be required to restore order and the cost in money and men of setting up a stable regime. These included complete control by the mandatory of financial and diplomatic arrangements, with a guarantee by the powers that the control be absolute. The report, accompanied by twelve volumes of the findings of the experts, was submitted by President Wilson to the Senate on April 3, 1920. The Senate's decision to steer clear of Armenia was no doubt a wise one. The mission nevertheless represented an official exploratory operation and suggested that the United States stood cautiously on the threshold of a new era in its relations with the rest of the world.[53]

THE American demonstration of armed strength during World War I greatly enhanced the prestige of the United States as a military power. It is true that even before the war a few foreign governments recognized in America a nation from which military and naval lessons might be advantageously learned.

Turkey, for example. The Senate rejected a clause in the first treaty with the Porte which provided for having naval vessels built in America.[54] But on arriving in Constantinople in 1831 as our first diplomatic representative, Com. David Porter found that the sultan, Mahmoud, was as

keen as ever about American naval achievements. He was especially delighted with the "John Adams," the fine sloop that had brought the commodore to Turkey. Porter on invitation accompanied the sultan to the dock yards, explaining the defects in Turkish ships. The pasha in charge of naval affairs consulted Porter, and many interviews with the sultan followed. Porter at last found a way to enable Turkey to have American naval vessels.[55] The plan involved bringing to Turkey Henry Eckford, one of America's greatest shipbuilders.

Eckford, Scottish born and reared, had become fully identified with American shipbuilding. During the War of 1812 he had built ships on the Great Lakes for the American Navy; and for a time he was employed as constructor in charge of the Brooklyn Navy Yard. President Jackson asked him to submit a plan for improving the Navy and though he did so, nothing came of it. The president, however, on being informed that Eckford planned to go to Europe to introduce American methods of shipbuilding, gave him a letter testifying to his important achievements.[56]

When Eckford arrived in Constantinople in the late summer of 1831 in his beautiful corvette, the "United States," he was placed in charge of Turkish naval construction—with high pay and perquisites. He sold the "United States" to the Turkish government and proceeded, with the help of the dozen-odd skilled American workmen he had brought, to construct a battleship. The sultan was delighted with Eckford. "America," he remarked to Commodore Porter, "must be a great nation, that can allow such men as Henry Eckford to leave her dominions."[57] But Eckford fell ill and died before his work was completed. The New York City press in leading editorials paid him high tribute and declared that the country had lost one of its great geniuses.[58] Eckford's foreman, a Mr. Rhodes, was persuaded to stay on. Under his direction and with the advice of Commodore Porter, the Turkish navy was considerably strengthened for its contest with the pasha of Egypt. In 1839 jealous Turkish officials ousted the American foreman. Nevertheless, this mission to Turkey proved to be a highly successful one.

Years later, in 1874, Sarmiento, the Argentine president who admired the United States, asked to have the graduates of the military school at Buenos Aires admitted to West Point, the expenses to be borne by his government. Although no action seems to have been taken, cadets from foreign countries increasingly sought such a privilege. It was generally granted on the recommendation of the State Department by a joint resolution of Congress. By 1910 five young Latin Americans were enrolled at the United States Military Academy, and two Chinese cadets sought permission to

enter the following year. Similar privileges were granted for Annapolis. This practice continued after the first world war.[59]

From this it was a natural step for other countries to request the services of American military personnel for instruction in their own training institutions. As early as 1880 the government of Colombia expressed satisfaction at the contributions of Lt. Henry R. Lemly, who organized a military school at Bogotá and, with the rank of colonel in the Colombian army, assumed the superintendency of the military academy.[60] In 1912 Capt. John W. Gulick was, by joint resolution of Congress, designated to act as an instructor of coast artillery in Chile's military school.[61] Two years later Congress authorized the President to grant a leave of absence to two commissioned officers of the line to act as instructors at the newly established Brazilian Naval War College. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, in strongly recommending this action, regarded the Brazilian request as "a flattering proposal." Such action, he continued, would not only provide the officers with valuable experience but would also tend "to develop the friendly relations between the Government of the United States and that of Brazil."[62]

The technical impact of the Navy of the United States on Argentina in the prewar years raised economic and administrative issues that were not fully appreciated at the time. During the Taft administration the State Department vigorously supported the policy of having naval vessels of friendly Latin-American states built in the United States, chiefly in the interest of aiding those industries on which the government would have to depend in case of war. Moreover, such contracts testified to the ability of the United States to compete economically and technically in this important category with the great industrial and naval powers of the world. In 1909 the Argentine government contracted with Bethlehem Steel for two battleships of 28,000 tons to be constructed at a cost of $23,000,000. The contracting company requested the Bureau of Ordnance to furnish designs for underwater discharge tubes for torpedoes and for the arrangement of fire controls. The designs requested were confidential, but the Bureau recommended that they be given to Bethlehem Steel provided assurances were forthcoming that the plans would be treated confidentially. The acting chief of the Bureau suggested that there would be more likelihood of increased foreign orders if it were understood that the Navy would aid with consultation and advice on plans.

Bethlehem Steel accepted these terms, and Secretary George von Lengerke Meyer ordered the Navy to coöperate as much as possible both with the construction firm and with the Argentine Naval Commission in

the United States. The Navy furnished specifications for a wide range of equipment, including turbine engines, torpedo boats, watertight joints, electrical apparatus, armor plate, steel and gun forgings, and other requisites. The Secretary of the Navy defended this whole policy on the basis of over-all benefits to the United States, which, he argued, would thus acquire information on the construction of the battleships which it might otherwise not have. He further maintained that the policy strengthened our shipbuilding and ordnance-making facilities which might be of great value in wartime.[63]

The prestige of the United States as a naval power and the closer rapport with Latin America that the war brought, at least for the moment, partly explain the passage of a Congressional act in 1920 enabling the President to detail navy officers to assist the governments of the South American republics.[64] On December 9, 1922, the first United States naval mission of its kind sailed for Brazil. It consisted of sixteen officers and nineteen petty officers, all specialists in strategy, engineering, gunnery, and the operation of submarines, destroyers, and mines. The mission, which was to be in Brazil for four years, aroused the suspicion of Argentina, to whom it savored of an alliance that jeopardized Pan-American solidarity. The State Department, citing the act of 1920, informed Buenos Aires that the mission was in no way political, that it would be withdrawn in case Brazil became involved in war, and that its officers in no circumstances would take part in any war in which Brazil might be engaged.[65] Peru also requested a naval mission which, according to our legation in Lima, "undoubtedly added to the prestige of our country."[66]

After considerable discussion, Congress in 1926 passed a more comprehensive act enabling the President, on the application of the foreign governments concerned, to detail officers and enlisted men of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to help the governments of the republics of North America, Central America, South America, and Cuba, Haiti, and Santo Domingo, in military and naval matters. Such men might receive pay from foreign governments while their own pay was to be continued by the United States. The renewed interest of European powers in the military and naval affairs of Latin America provided one of the chief arguments in support of this legislation.[67] Senator Wadsworth, for example, argued that we would lose the opportunity of having our officers imbue our southern neighbors with "the nonmilitaristic spirit" of the American army and navy if we permitted Europe to monopolize the naval and military missions that Latin America required.[68] Most Latin-American countries, still suspicious of the United States, preferred to forego this offer of assistance in favor of

European military missions. There were some exceptions, of course. Brazil renewed her request for a comprehensive naval mission, which she received.[69] In some cases, Latin-American nations received military aid in other connections. The United States Army conducted an aerial survey for Costa Rica in 1930.[70] And Haiti and Nicaragua[71] received military assistance in training their constabularies in connection with broader programs of American technical aid.

After the inauguration of the Good Neighbor policy, increasing requests for naval and military missions were made. Such aid might, to be sure, enhance the power of already overambitious military men. But if it were refused, the influence of European governments was bound to become more pronounced. After it became clear that Fascism constituted a menace to the security of the United States, technical and military assistance was increasingly given to Latin America. In time every republic except Uruguay received military, naval, or air advisors. In the case of Argentina and Chile, where the military organization had been modeled on that of Germany, this involved drastic change. In addition, as the crisis deepened, the United States opened military training posts at home to Latin Americans.[72]

American Financial Missions between the Wars

In the years following the first world war there was a growing tendency to send military and naval missions to less developed countries. But the technical missions that rested on America's enormous economic growth and prestige attracted more attention.

Even before the era of the first world war a few Americans took service in the customs administrations of Oriental powers. We have noted American contributions to Japan. But China also figured in the picture. After graduating from Harvard, Henry F. Merrill entered the Chinese customs service in 1874. In the late 1880's he was in Korea, organizing the customs service for her government. On returning to China, he acted successively as commissioner of customs at Tientsin, Shanghai, and Canton until his retirement in 1916.[1] Other Americans also contributed, in an official relation to foreign governments, to the improvement of customs and other administrative agencies.

We have seen the relation of America's aloofness from power politics and of her available pool of colonial experts to the early financial missions, notably to Persia and Liberia in the years before the war. We have also seen that in the Caribbean area strategic and economic considerations occasioned the financial missions of the postwar years which helped make this part of the hemisphere a virtual bailiwick of the United States. It is impossible to understand the financial missions of the 1920's without keeping all this clearly in mind.

The story begins with Mexico. Shortly after the turn of the century the Díaz regime, in association with China, the other leading silver-standard

country, asked the coöperation of the United States in seeking remedies for the unstable exchange relations between gold- and silver-standard nations. Under authorization of Congress, Secretary of State John Hay appointed a commission which, with a similar Mexican commission, investigated the European aspects of the monetary problem. The bulky report contained data useful to Mexico in working out its plan for monetary reform.[2]

The coöperation thus initiated was further developed in 1917. The revolution had accentuated the chronic financial problems of Mexico. Industries lay idle and the transportation system was crippled. Relations between Mexico and the United States went from bad to worse. In an effort to work out a *modus vivendi* the two governments named commissions to confer. The Mexican commission was headed by Luis Cabrera, the United States commission by Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane. When the Mexican commission arrived in the United States, American mining interests sought a conference with it to discuss the recently promulgated export tax on minerals, which the Americans regarded as highly prejudicial, as well as the disturbed conditions in Mexico which militated against the operation of foreign enterprises. William Loeb, vice-president of the American Smelting and Refining Company, invited Henry Bruère, an employee of the American Metal Company and a specialist in municipal administration, to the conference. Bruère, who had been director of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research and Chamberlain of the City of New York, had successfully discharged broad responsibilities for studying and improving administrative organization and procedure. At the initial conference with the Mexican commissioners, and at later conferences, Bruère asked whether the Mexican government was sufficiently independent of the generals to establish administrative efficiency in any degree, particularly in regard to control over revenues and expenditures. Apparently pleased at the interest that Bruère expressed in the possibility of improving Mexican administrative procedures, the commissioners proposed that Bruère come to Mexico to make a survey of conditions in the government. Secretary Lane and President Wilson approved the suggestion, and the American Metal Company granted Bruère leave of absence with pay, on the clear understanding that he would not use his connection with the Mexican government to further the special interests of the company's subsidiaries in Mexico.

The mission included, in addition to Bruère, Thomas R. Lill, who had been a staff member of the Bureau of Municipal Research and had served for some years as auditor in the Philippines, and Francis Oakey,

who had also been on the staff of the bureau as a public accountant and had served on President Taft's Commission on Governmental Reorganization. The Mexicans provided quarters and clerical and research assistants, and except for Bruère's own salary, took care of the expenses involved. Excellent progress was made in the accounting, budgetary, and auditing fields. Bruère was invited to become a member of the board of the National Railways, and he proposed that the railroads follow the example of the Chicago and Rock Island in promoting better agricultural methods among the farmers and adopt other procedures of operation suggested by his firsthand acquaintance with American roads.

These plans necessitated a sound fiscal and banking system as well as a stable currency. At the suggestion of Mr. Lill, Bruère invited Professor Edwin Kemmerer of Princeton, who had developed the Philippine currency system. Kemmerer accepted the invitation and brought with him one of his pupils, Dr. Arthur N. Young, a Californian who had been a research associate at the University of California after taking his degree in economics at Princeton. Bruère also invited Professor H. A. Chandler of Columbia University to join the mission. After five months, Bruère himself returned to the United States where, in the midst of pressing jobs for the American Metal Company and for the United States Department of Labor, he directed the work in Mexico as best he could.

Although Bruère's absence interfered with carrying out fully the plans he had made for the economic rehabilitation and administrative reorganization of Mexico, much was accomplished as a result of both his initial work and that of other members of the mission. When Kemmerer, Young, and their associates reached Mexico, conditions were so disturbed that it was impossible to venture safely even a few miles beyond the capital. At night the American experts dared move about in the streets only in the protection of the group and of firearms. Despite this situation and the troubled relations between Mexico and the United States, the Mexican authorities continued to give cordial coöperation to the Americans. Young completed the work on tax policy and then, on request, studied the tangled financial problems of the federal district. The government adopted a substantial part of his recommendations, in particular those aimed to correct the regressive features of the revenue system. In 1947 when Dr. Young revisited Mexico he found these reforms had proved to be permanent.[3]

The experiences of Dr. Young in Mexico were put to good use a few years later in Honduras. Early in 1920 the government of that country asked the State Department to recommend a financial advisor. The choice fell to Young. When he reached Honduras in August, 1920, a revolution had

just taken place which put Lopez Gutierrez in power. The budget problem was critical. Although revenue receipts were high, spending exceeded income, a situation which had resulted from the distribution of graft through the Ministry of War and through a heritage of irregular and exaggerated claims for government indemnities. On the advice of Dr. Young the government adopted a system of reports of revenue and payment under main heads. These reports were telegraphed in summary form during the first five days of each month to the Minister of Finance and confirmed in detail within the next twenty days. The system worked well.

Young next attacked the problem of controlling funds, for there was no real budget. The president was persuaded to call a special three-day session of the Cabinet to go over the budget, office by office, place by place. Young then prepared instructions as to just what was to be paid each month. Payments to the War Ministry were reduced from nearly $500,000 monthly to $190,000. This reduction made it possible to pay other officeholders, such as schoolteachers, whose salaries were greatly in arrears. Other achievements included the adoption of an improved budget, the establishment of special commissions for approving claims before payment was made, the enactment of a law substituting salaries for fees in the consulates abroad, the preparation of a plan for the settlement of a huge defaulted debt, and the working out of a plan for currency reform.[4]

Young's reforms met with only partial success. The plan for reduction of expenditures worked well for a time, but various internal pressures forced "military" outlay to higher levels month by month despite his efforts to maintain the economic level to which the president had agreed. The proposals for debt settlement and currency reform, while not adopted at the time, formed the basis of later and successful measures. When Young returned to Honduras in 1947, he found various parts of his program, notably the currency reform and his system of reports, still in successful operation. Nevertheless, it became clear to Young at the time that the government was unwilling to execute his whole program. When he discovered that the government was flagrantly disregarding the laws on the payment of claims and on the budget, Young called for a showdown. Although the State Department upheld him, he eventually resigned.[5] Despite this rather unhappy ending, it was clear that the mission had accomplished a great deal.

Americans helped to improve the administration of public finances in Guatemala and Panama as well as in Honduras.[6] But Nicaragua was the scene of the most far-reaching impact of financial experts from the United States. In 1909, in the revolution that broke out against the tyrannical dictator José Santos Zelaya, a leader of the Liberal party, American lives were

lost and American property interests were jeopardized by Zelaya's forces. In the ensuing confusion, which made a farce of republican institutions, the diplomatic and naval influence of the United States was the crucial factor in the triumph of the Conservatives—a party differing from the Liberals less in ideological than in geographical and traditional respects. The new regime, however, was little better. It was torn by internal factions, threatened by the bitter opposition of fallen Liberals, and crippled by an empty treasury and clamorous creditors. In short, there was general chaos.

To escape from this impossible situation, the Nicaraguan government accepted an American protectorate. The United States government encouraged its acceptance partly by reason of strategic considerations and partly because of the desire to protect American investments. These ends could seemingly be achieved only by rehabilitating the disordered finances of the country and by salvaging its chaotic republican institutions. Whatever the reasons, American marines occupied Managua from 1912 to 1925; they were then withdrawn only to return the following year and to stay until 1932.[7] Meanwhile, various Americans embarked on a vigorous campaign to establish some degree of order in the political and financial life of the country.

The financial situation received the most concentrated attention. On the recommendation of the State Department an American financial expert in 1911 made a preliminary study of the financial situation in Nicaragua.[8] This study led to the negotiation of a loan from American bankers, the proceeds of which were to be used in stabilizing the currency, consolidating the debt, and building a railroad. A collector-general, named by the American bankers and approved by the State Department but appointed by the Nicaraguan government, was to have charge of the customs until the debt was paid.

The appointment went to Col. Clifford D. Ham, a thoroughly competent and honest administrator who had been trained in the Philippine service. He represented American and European creditors and was responsible to the Nicaraguan Minister of Finance and to the State Department. Colonel Ham served from 1911 to 1928, when he was succeeded by the deputy collector, Irving Augustus Lindberg.[9] During his long term of office, Colonel Ham made a record for efficiency and tact. He built up a staff remarkably free from corruption. In addition to administering the customs honestly and well, he supervised and improved lighthouses, wharves, and warehouses, codified and published the tariffs, and carried through other reforms. This record was achieved despite petty annoyances on the part of Nicaraguan officials, the bitter attacks of President Chamboro

while he was in office, and savage denunciations by a section of the public press. At one point it was necessary for the State Department to intervene in behalf of the collector-general.[10] But such criticisms were usually dictated by political motives. By and large, thanks in part to the tact of Colonel Ham and his assistants, the agency won the esteem of all classes of Nicaraguans.

In addition to reforming and efficiently administering the customs, which collected duties and paid proceeds to creditors of the government, the American protectorate may be credited with other important fiscal achievements. The reform of the monetary system also promoted fiscal rehabilitation. Here the American bankers, employing New York and London currency experts, played a major role. The establishment of an exchange fund and of a national bank further contributed to the stabilization of Nicaraguan finances, while three claims commissions adjusted the country's tangled debts, which had accumulated to an alarming degree.

These operations, like the customs receivership, evoked criticisms. But the criticisms apparently resulted from the fact that the reforms militated against the privileged, hampered ambitious politicians, and annoyed those who disliked new methods and ways. For the most part the criticisms seem—if we accept a careful North American's study of the business—to have had irresponsible sources or to have issued from leaders of the Liberal opposition. But when that party came into office it continued the reforms it had criticized—an indication of the general disposition of Nicaraguans to admit, even if reluctantly, the advantages from the financial system that American experts developed.[11]

Americans went one step further in their attempt to put Nicaragua on a sound financial basis. In 1927 the State Department, at the suggestion of the Nicaraguan government and with the approval of both parties in the country, sent Dr. William W. Cumberland, former financial advisor of Haiti and Peru, to carry out an economic survey of the republic. Cumberland, discovering the inadequacy of statistical information, properly concluded that a compilation of minimum data was the first step. He tried to put the data in a form which would enable the government of Nicaragua to carry forward the collection of reliable information; but this effort was doomed to fail. After getting in shape such data as he could and becoming reasonably familiar with the country, Cumberland prepared a report of the economic conditions of Nicaragua.

The report included systematic discussion of the land and the people, wealth and income, public security, health, instruction, agriculture, forestry, mining, commerce, transportation, and the financial system. Cumberland

held that Nicaragua had considerable undeveloped or inadequately developed resources and that these might become assets if security of life and property could be counted on, if budgetary structures were improved, if agricultural extension services and vocational education were initiated, and, especially, if public highways were built and maintained, for these seemed more feasible than an extension of railways. On the whole, Cumberland found that the financial system was good, though he made it clear that the overdependence on coffee was a weak point in the economy.

The report was issued in the midst of a political campaign in which neither party concerned itself with any plan that looked forward to a balanced and expanding economy. The report was ignored. But it made several points that were in themselves important.

In the first place, Cumberland warned that if the United States was to take an active interest in the financial and general administration of Nicaragua, "the utmost care should be exercised in selecting American personnel for these purposes. At best," he urged, "the task will not be easy, and incompetent or unsympathetic American officers could well create more serious problems than those which they would be supposed to solve."[12] As in his work in other countries, Cumberland further advised that efforts be made to train the local personnel in technical competence and in the moral principles necessary to the constructive administration of financial policies. In the second place, Cumberland refrained from expressing an opinion as to whether the United States should assume further responsibilities: he merely presented what he regarded as a practicable program in case, at the policy level, it was decided to extend American responsibilities. In conversations at Washington Dr. Cumberland questioned whether an extension of responsibilities was in the best interest of the United States, for it seemed to him that either much more should be done, or much less. In time it was decided to do much less.

But that time was not yet. Meanwhile the financial reforms and economic advice presented in the Cumberland report represented merely one aspect of American activity in Nicaragua. The necessity for stabilizing Nicaragua's political affairs also loomed large among Nicaragua's problems. Consequently, in 1922, the State Department had Dr. Harold W. Dodds draft a new electoral law for Nicaragua. The State Department then made it clear that the new law must be accepted without essential change, and this was done. Unfortunately, most electoral laws, no matter how well drawn, are no better than their enforcement. Consequently Americans next found themselves supervising Nicaraguan elections in 1928 and 1932.[13]

If the government was to achieve any degree of stability, either financial or political, it had to be able to protect itself. To achieve this end, American advisors helped train a Nicaraguan constabulary. Initially this attempt to organize a constabulary under American tutelage failed because the Americans were limited to instructional functions. Subsequently a fresh approach to the problem produced a more effective organization.[14]

The effect of all this is difficult to assess. It is clear that the financial arrangements did not solve all of Nicaragua's problems, at least at first. The record after the initial important agreement of 1911 was one of continued indebtedness, new loans, political overturns, farcical elections, and successive dickerings with the United States over canal rights. In short, the country was no more stable than it had been previous to the American protectorate. The situation became so critical that in 1927 President Coolidge sent Col. Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War, on a special mission to find the facts and clear up the situation. Facing a drastic situation, Stimson took drastic action.[15] The subsequent American-supervised elections in 1928 and 1932 and the American-trained constabulary produced some degree of stabilization and at least superficial observance of republican procedures, sufficient at any rate to warrant the withdrawal of American marines in 1932.

THE list of principal economic advisors that headed missions to other countries in the era of World War I includes such distinguished figures as A. R. Zimmerman[16] and Jeremiah Smith,[17] who worked in Austria and Hungary. Four men, however, may be taken as representative of the advisory financial mission to other countries—Arthur Millspaugh, William W. Cumberland, Arthur N. Young, and Edwin Kemmerer.

The failure of the Shuster mission[18] left Persia in a plight which steadily deteriorated. By October, 1914, the American minister was reporting that the government was bankrupt and needed either a public or private American loan of $30,000,000, which it hoped to get by pawning the crown jewels.[19] Persia, of course, realized that a foreign financial advisor was a prerequisite to any help from the outside; and the government expressed its hope to the American legation that an American, someone like Shuster, might come to Teheran, on the ground that any representative of the United States was unlikely to be subject to foreign influence. Perhaps this time Russia and Britain might guarantee to keep hands off such a mission.

The Division of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department was wary, since the Shuster episode had hardly been a happy one.[20] During the course of the war the Persian legation in Washington approached

Shuster, urging him to sound out the attitude of the State Department.[21] Until the collapse of the Anglo-Persian agreement in 1921, however, the attitude of the State Department did not change. Meantime certain American promoters had begun to consider the possibility of obtaining oil concessions from the Persian government.[22] It appeared that although Standard Oil was considering some sort of agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company it had little intention itself of entering into the Persian field, at least for the time.[23] While convinced that American interests required the assertion of equal opportunity in the Near East and the foreign investment of American capital, the State Department continued to be cautious and to let things ride. There was some feeling in the department that Persia was lacking in good faith in proposing the employment of an American advisor—his powers might be limited to preparing memorials of advice to a weak and corrupt Minister of Finance and serve thus merely to be a means of enlisting American loans.[24] Despite the caution of the department, the Persian minister in Washington, Hussain Alai, continued to exert pressure, indicating clearly the critical situation of his government, which, he confessed, could hardly expect to stave off banditry and chaos in its existing bankrupt condition. In calling attention to the passage of almost a year's time in which he had been kept waiting, the Persian minister later stated that Under Secretary of State Fletcher had told him that as soon as the new American minister reached Teheran and made a preliminary survey, an American financial advisor would be designated. Since it was clear that his appointment was bound up with the question of a loan, Fletcher had added that Persia might well afford to wait for an advisor whose recommendations would carry great weight.[25]

One factor in the waiting policy of the department was its uncertainty about the British attitude—Russia was no longer able to play a role of importance in Persia. There was great reluctance to do anything that might occasion British disapproval. The Persian minister informed the department that once the proposed Anglo-Persian agreement fell through, the British had no objection to an American financial advisor; in fact, that the Persians had virtually been advised to approach Washington to that end.[26] Finally, in late June, 1922, the Secretary of State notified the American legation in Teheran that the British had indicated they would welcome and coöperate with an American mission in Persia.[27]

After months of delay, negotiation, and discussion, Secretary of State Hughes decided to name an American whom the Persian government might appoint as financial advisor. The choice was hard to make: many able men had no desire to undertake a mission to Persia, and no one iden-

tified with New York financial circles could properly be suggested in view of the certainty that the question of loans would come up. Hughes finally sent the name of Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh to the Persian legation. Millspaugh, a highly competent scholar in his field, was an economic expert in the department. Hughes made it clear that Millspaugh would go to Persia as a private citizen, that the American government would take no responsibility for his actions, and that he himself, not the department, was to name his assistants.[28] The Persian government was disappointed that the department took an even more limited view of its relation to the proposed mission than it had done in the Shuster case. It was anxious to have the department name all the members of the mission—which, in the mind of the department, implied a responsibility it had no intention of accepting.[29]

Millspaugh began his mission under seemingly favorable circumstances. For one thing, his contract apparently gave him adequate power to cope with any problems he might meet. True, the Persian legation had on more than one occasion during the discussions made it clear that its government did not want to invest the new advisor with the powers that Shuster had enjoyed, that it especially wanted to make him responsible to the Minister of Finance. In the end, however, Millspaugh received the title of Administrator General of Finances with complete charge of the entire financial administration; he was to prepare the budget, and no payment was to be made without his written approval.

In the beginning, Millspaugh also enjoyed the apparent support of several powerful groups in Persia. In Teheran no bones were made of the fact that Millspaugh was expected to attract foreign capital; the Persian press glowed with enthusiasm over the mission, which included ten experienced administrators and technical experts. The Majlis or Parliament almost unanimously approved of Millspaugh's appointment. In addition, there was a group of intelligent deputies in the Majlis who were fully aware of the corruption in the Persian public service and of the need for reform, economic development, and the safeguarding of the country's independence in the process of westernization. This group could be counted on to support the mission. At the start, Millspaugh also enjoyed some backing from Reza Khan, the rising strong man of Persia. The son of Mazanderan peasants, he had marched into Teheran in 1921, set up a new prime minister, and made himself Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. He was later to establish a dictatorship and a new dynasty. Finally, the British and Russians, who had done so much to wreck the Shuster mission, apparently offered no problems. The former had promised to support the mission, while the latter had their hands full elsewhere.[30]

But it was from the start clear that the job was to involve endless uphill work. The *Morning Post* of London, in speaking of British approval of the venture, warned that the chief obstacle would be the Persians themselves, for the governing clique, the *Post* insisted, did not want reforms or honest administration in the treasury. Millspaugh would find, it went on, that he was merely to be used as the stalking horse for a loan.[31]

Later events lent support to this prophecy. In discussing the opposition to Millspaugh's reforms, the American minister to Persia, Joseph Saul Kornfeld, later wrote that it was not so much Millspaugh's services as a financial reformer that the Persian government wanted as it was to use him as a means of getting foreign loans. Thus even when reform measures were conceded in the interest of attracting foreign capital, the Persians nullified the legislation when the American financial administrator tried to enforce it.[32] A representative of a New York firm, Ulen and Company, reported after a stay of six months in Persia that since Millspaugh had been invited chiefly to help get a loan, he would probably fall unless it was forthcoming.[33] By the summer of 1925 Millspaugh himself indicated that the position of the American financial advisors would become difficult unless Persia secured a loan in New York.[34] Years later, in commenting on his mission, Millspaugh bore out the initial analysis of the London *Morning Post* in writing that the Persian professional politicians for the most part had little understanding of "the pain and unpopularity involved in the process of reform, little of the real statesmanship of action, and little desire that the rebuilding of their country should interfere with vested interests, the feelings of influential persons, or the game of personal and factional politics."[35]

This, then, was the general situation that the mission faced on arriving in Persia. To complicate matters further, the large taxpayers were greatly in arrears, the employees of the Treasury were demoralized, the Minister of Finance was a weak and unscrupulous official, and the financial situation was critical.[36]

After a brief honeymoon, hopes began to fall, and things went from bad to worse. In the early summer of 1924, Dr. Millspaugh, alleging the violation of his contract, called for a showdown. The government, he claimed, had expended funds without his approval; it had made decisions on financial matters without consulting him; it had failed to give him an opportunity to attend meetings of the Council of Ministers when financial issues were under discussion; it had ignored his recommendations regarding personnel over which, he insisted, he was entitled to exercise absolute authority. He demanded permission to work without interference, espe-

cially to be free from pressure to give special advantages to the favored few. If the government would not meet his demands, he asked for a settlement of his contract and the contracts of his staff. To give point to his threat, he let it be known that he had taken steps to secure passage home.[37] The situation was the more delicate because some Persians had murdered American Vice-Consul Imbrie.

The situation had, to be sure, another side. Reza Khan, the War minister, bitterly resented Millspaugh's contention that in order to rescue Persia from her desperate financial plight it would be necessary to reduce his budget one million tomans each year until it had reached the sum of six million tomans. Excessive though the expenditures of the War Ministry were, the efficient force Reza Khan had built had backed up the reforms the financial advisors had instituted. Other prominent Persian officials frankly admitted that their countrymen were generally opposed to the plans of the advisors to reorganize the financial system and impose new taxes to balance the budget, that they wanted experts to "advise" Persia as to the proper steps to be taken.

On his part, the president of the Majlis made it clear to the American minister that ever since that institution arose it had prepared its own budget lest an arbitrary government in control of the budget dismiss that body. But the Minister of Finance, on behalf of Millspaugh, had protested to the Majlis against its budgetary control, which the head of the American mission regarded as a violation of his contract, by which he was to be consulted on all matters of government expenditures. The president of the Majlis took the ground that Parliament must maintain its independence. Since Millspaugh had not answered definitely questions put to him by the budget committee it had, in Millspaugh's absence during the past week, been acting independently of his counsel. Millspaugh, on the contrary, insisted that he was under no one's direction.[38]

The State Department, surprised at Millspaugh's indication that his return might be expected on a given date and concerned over the murder of Vice-Consul Imbrie, authorized the American legation to make representations to the effect that Millspaugh's withdrawal by reason of the violation of his contract would be regarded by both the American government and the public as unfortuna[39] Fearing that the departure of the mission might antagonize the American government which had taken the murder of the vice-consul seriously and, more important, that it might still further injure Persia's financial standing abroad, the government made concessions to Millspaugh. It was agreed that not merely the budget of the War minister—which represented half the nation's income—was to be

reduced, as Millspaugh had demanded, but that the budgets of all the ministries were to be scaled down; that the War minister, Reza Khan, was to use the army to collect taxes on all occasions, and not to withhold it, as he had sometimes done to make the mission bow to his will; and that Millspaugh's controversies with the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs were to be resolved largely in his favor. On his part Millspaugh withdrew his demand that new contracts be negotiated which would clarify and enlarge his powers. The American legation felt, however, that he had come out on top.[40]

Yet the path of the mission continued to be rough. Finally, in 1927, the year after Reza Khan declared himself shah, matters came to a head. On authorization of the State Department, Minister Hoffman Philip interviewed the shah in an effort to straighten things out. Reza Khan admitted that the mission had accomplished much of value and that it was still needed; but he maintained that Millspaugh failed to respect the dignity of the Persian government, that he violated his contract—a law of the land—in doing things without the concurrence of the Ministry of Finance; and that if he remained when his contract presently expired, he would have to change his attitude in his dealings with the government. After months of negotiation Millspaugh refused to accept the changes in his new contr. and left Persia. Reza Khan was said to have remarked privately that there could be only one shah in Persia.[41]

The factors working against the mission included what had been described by Imbrie, shortly before he was murdered, as parliamentary intrigue, though this term implied something of an oversimplification. It was true, however, that some members of the Majlis opposed the mission because it made raiding the treasury more difficult. Others worked for its overthrow to discredit Reza Khan, who had become prime minister as well as Minister of War. These groups blocked many reforms that Millspaugh proposed. They also secured the discharge of one of his valuable assistants. At the time of the crisis in the early summer of 1924 members of the Ministry, speaking in the Majlis, tried to meet criticism by making Millspaugh bear the brunt of it. The Majlis also rejected Millspaugh's proposal relating to oil concessions. His draft of a loan bill was turned down, partly because he favored getting a loan independently of an oil concession.[42]

In addition to the troubles the mission encountered with the Majlis, it alienated many bureaucrats in its effort to enforce the civil-service law. Incompetents were discharged to achieve economy and efficiency. When, for example, one of the staff, Captain Melvin Hall, dismissed at Meshed 80 out of 150 employees as useless, an anti-American party sprang up.[43]

These disgruntled men carried on a bitter attack on the mission in the press and through supporters in the Majlis.

It is hard to evaluate the effects of the foreign intrigues in Teheran. The Belgian customs collector's unfriendliness and readiness to contribute to the difficulties of the mission were less important than the attitude of the Russians and the British.[44] It is true that Millspaugh reported that the Russians, apart from sniping in the Moscow press now and again, presented few difficulties. But Millspaugh's refusal to acquiesce in the high-handed manner in which the Kremlin dealt with Persia in the Caspian fisheries matter no doubt lay back of the Moscow wireless condemnation of the American mission.[45]

At first, Millspaugh was convinced that the friendliness of the British legation in Teheran was genuine. Minister Kornfeld believed that Millspaugh's close affiliations with the British were detrimental to the mission; that their apparent backing of Millspaugh's proposals was a handicap; and that having been unable to prevent the appointment of the mission, the British were trying to defeat it by lavishing affection on it.[46] Consul-General Gotlieb and Chargé Murray shared the views of the American minister regarding the underlying hostility of the British to the mission and to the prospective entrance of American enterprise into Persia. They, likewise, felt that Millspaugh's close relations with the British were unfortunate.[47] This was also the view of other Americans in Persia.[48] In support of this thesis the American foreign service in Teheran reported to Washington that Millspaugh had insisted that the North Persian oil concession be accorded to Standard, whose British affiliations were well known; that the chief of the mission had shown determined opposition to Sinclair, which was at least American; that he had failed to investigate the accounts of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company; that he had tried to dissuade the government from raising a loan of $5,000,000 in the United States, which the British opposed; that his attitude toward the Persian railways reflected his deference to the British; and that his close personal contacts were with the British colony.[49]

On his part, Millspaugh at first felt that the growing number of Persians alienated by the mission's reforms was the basic cause of the accusations in the press that it was pro-British. For this was a sure way of reducing his influence and wrecking the mission.[50] In time, Millspaugh came to share the conviction of the American foreign service in Persia regarding the underlying hostility of the British to the success of his mission.[51] During the crisis of the summer of 1924 Millspaugh concluded there was a connection between the attacks on the mission and the British protests against

every American project in Persia. Thus Millspaugh expressed to the Department of State the wish that it would give the Persian government a list of American firms able to assist in developing Persia and some assurance regarding American loans in order to prevent foreigners in Persia from saying that the United States would not now make investments in the country, but that they would if the American mission were sent home.[52] Millspaugh's changing attitude was also reflected in his decision not to advise the Persian government's acceptance of an ostensibly favorable British offer to settle outstanding debts with a loan secured by Persian customs and oil revenues. Millspaugh believed that the purpose of the British was to make an American loan impossible by tying up Persian securities, in other words, to effect a closer British-Persian *rapprochement*.[53]

What appeared to the American legation to be a pro-British attitude during the first phase of the Millspaugh mission partly explained the antagonism between Minister Kornfeld and Dr. Millspaugh. The minister's criticisms of the mission for failing to enforce the civil-service law and for having nothing to show in the way of reforms certainly added to Millspaugh's difficulties. Moreover, this criticism failed to weigh all the pertinent facts, and it ignored the consideration that results are often not apparent for a long time.[54] When the State Department, which was critical of Kornfeld on several accounts, asked him for fuller reports and instructed him to give all legitimate support to the mission, the American minister defended himself by saying he had done just that except in cases where the mission threatened to jeopardize American interests by favoring the British. He had been unable, he continued, to support Millspaugh's demand that the Majlis reject an oil proposal solely because Millspaugh's recommendations had not been incorporated. He had rather urged the passage of the oil bills since their defeat might well have meant the exclusion of American interests. He was actually deeply concerned to have the mission succeed, he went on to say, not only because American prestige was involved but because the only salvation for millions of starving Persians lay in the economic regeneration which the mission might promote.[55]

Millspaugh later indicated that Minister Kornfeld had become much more helpful. During the final crisis of 1927 his successor, with the approval of Washington, tried to quash Reza Khan's proposal to limit Millspaugh's powers. The Legation was further empowered to indicate to the Persian government that the State Department viewed Millspaugh's activities "with interest and satisfaction."[56] Thus despite its cautious stipulation in 1922 that it had no responsibility for the mission, the State Department step by step indicated its interest in and readiness to help Millspaugh. For

American prestige was at stake, and, as Secretary of State Hughes made clear, the success of the mission would contribute to the stabilization of the Middle East.

Many, Americans and Persians both, believed that the difficulties Millspaugh met could be set down to his own personality. Leading members of the Persian government felt that the chief of the American mission did not understand how to deal with Persians, that he failed to realize that with them everything rested on a personal basis of friendship. Reza Khan at the time of the attack on Millspaugh in the Majlis in 1924 said that had the administrator-general been sufficiently close to him, members of Parliament would not have dared attack him. Other Persian functionaries found Millspaugh too self-opinionated, too indifferent to valuable advice that he was sometimes given, too arbitrary in his dealings with them. Still others pointed out that in a country like Persia reform must proceed slowly and that immense patience was necessary.[57] Vice-Consul Imbrie, before he was killed, had felt that the extreme reserve of Millspaugh made him generally unable to establish rapport with the Persians.[58]

All these factors explain the virulent attacks in the Persian press on Millspaugh and his associates. They were accused of being ignorant of Persians and of Persia; of being mercenary and of not having the true interests of the country at heart; of having failed to obtain foreign loans; of having made no really basic reforms; and even of having aggravated the seriousness of the financial situation.[59]

Such criticisms, whether inspired by disgruntled former civil servants or by foreign interests in Persia, fell far from the mark. The mission achieved a notable success despite all the obstacles—resistance from the grandees, from local army commanders, from the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, from the Ministry of Finance, and from Reza Khan himself. Millspaugh summarized the work years later: ". . . at the end of our period of service, the main preparatory job had been done: Persia's house, so far as concerned finances, was in order." New tax laws together with improvements in the administration of the tax structure, which included centralization of revenues, expenditures, and accounting, increased the resources of the government. Medieval road tolls were abolished. A more efficient and humane administration of villages and forests belonging to the government was set up. The government with the assistance of the mission, which by 1925 numbered a staff of sixteen, balanced the budget, started the payment of claims, and laid the groundwork for financing new constructive undertakings.[60]

The mission did not confine itself to the reordering of finances. An

American agricultural expert was brought into the Ministry of Agriculture. Dr. Edward Ryan, rich in experience in war relief, took charge of the municipality of Teheran. Despite the tremendous obstacles thrown in his way, he demonstrated, before his death, that improvements in municipal administration could be made. The mission also prepared studies for the rehabilitation of the rug industry, the development of irrigation, and the revision of the tariff. The improved state of finances made possible a serious consideration of needed expansion of educational services. In 1925, at the suggestion of Millspaugh, the government invited an American engineer, W. B. Poland, to undertake a survey for a railroad. This was done with the help of eleven fellow-engineers, attached to the Ministry of Public Works. On the advice of the mission the Majlis enacted a surtax on sugar and tea to produce funds for financing the Trans-Persian railway.[61] It is hard to say what might have been done in addition to all this, or how lasting the accomplishments might have been, had not Reza Khan in 1927 dismissed the mission and established through terror a dictatorship that undid some of the experts' work and stifled further reform. In any case, by 1929 the treasury was again in a state of confusion.[62]

In the same year the shah, in an interview with Arthur Upham Pope, an authority on Iranian culture, expressed regret at the unfortunate impression made in the United States by the withdrawal of Millspaugh and hope that the incident would soon be forgotten. He asked Pope to use his influence, especially through the Persian Society of America to blot out the effects of that incident. According to the Turkish ambassador, the shah considered inviting another American mission, headed by Millspaugh or someone else, to stabilize Persia's finances and to help attract foreign capital.[63]

It is possible only to speculate on what attitude the American government would have taken had the shah pursued this idea. On one hand the State Department early in 1933 facilitated the request of the Turkish government for American economic advisors to coöperate with the Ministry of National Economics in restoring Turkish prosperity.[64] In supporting the move by which Everett A. Colson became financial advisor to the Ethiopian government in 1931, the State Department likewise indicated a coöperative attitude toward American technical services to a Middle Eastern country. Colson was well equipped for his work, having had experience in Haiti under Dr. Cumberland, in the Far East, and in Turkey. During the years 1931 to 1935 he did a remarkable job in reorganizing the Ethiopian state bank and in planning currency reform, which was suspended because of the Italian war. The British, French, and Italian legations tried unsuccessfully to defeat Colson's work. Colson also served as an advisor in foreign

affairs. Despite serious illness, he placed himself at the disposal of Haile Selassie when Ethiopia pleaded her cause before the League of Nations. The Emperor, in a letter especially dictated to his private secretary, concludes his appreciative eulogy with the remark that "though Mr. Colson's grave is in the United States, his loyal services remain engraved in the heart of His Imperial Majesty and the people of Ethiopia."[65]

On the other hand, with the recent experience in Persia in mind, Secretary of State Kellogg made it clear that the United States did not want to become involved in the political implications that seemed to inhere in the Tsana Dam project in Ethiopia. The British claimed prior right to build the dam and in general opposed the entry of American interests into Ethiopia, as did France and Italy. The State Department instructed the Minister Resident in Addis Ababa, A. E. Southard, merely to further the Tsana project by communicating through the department any pertinent information that might be useful to the J. G. White Engineering Corporation of New York, which had expressed interest in the matter. After the American legation procured the preliminary agreement between the Ethiopian government and the J. G. White people, the latter carried out two surveys. It is likely that the final contract for actual construction of the dam, based on these surveys, might have been negotiated and the work begun had not the Italians waged their war on Ethiopia.[66]

American technical and advisory aid proved to be of far greater importance in China than in many smaller countries. In 1928 the government of that country invited Professor Edwin Kemmerer of Princeton and six senior experts, together with several assistant experts, known collectively as the Commission of Financial Advisors. In taking this step the Chinese government was influenced in part by a desire to quicken modernization and reform, and partly by the hope that the mission would pave the way for foreign loans. The work of the commission proper ended late in 1929. The report consisted of ten separate volumes, covering such subjects as railway finance, tariffs, public credit rehabilitation, monetary reform, the creation of a central reserve bank, and suggested legislation for placing customs duties on imports on a gold basis.[67] Several of the senior experts stayed on for a longer or shorter term of years.

Of those that remained and made contributions of outstanding importance, Dr. Arthur N. Young ranks foremost. We may appropriately recall here his contributions to the financial rehabilitation of Mexico and Honduras. For seventeen years China was the chief focus of Dr. Young's interest, though during that time he returned to the United States, alone

or with high Chinese officials, to negotiate loans. During the course of his long service to China, Dr. Young gradually enlarged his functions beyond the sphere of public credit. He took on special responsibilities in relation to currency, budget, aviation, and flood and famine relief. It is possible here to indicate only the general character of his outstanding contributions.

Young's activities included the formation of plans for the consolidation of defaulted debts. The plan he recommended in 1929 for paying the arrears of salt-secured loans, which had gone into default, was carried out. In 1936–37 his plans for the settlement of defaulted debts, foreign and domestic, were adopted with only slight changes. The planning in the case of foreign debts was especially complicated because of the difficulty of obtaining precise information about the large number of loans held by creditors of different nationalities in several countries, for which loans different grades of security had been pledged. The plan as adopted was carried out until a year and a half after the Japanese launched their attack of 1937 on China. The debt structure was further simplified and made more susceptible to economic administration by Young's plan for consolidating internal loans. This operation saved the government about $25,000,000 yearly in debt charges through the reduction of the rate of amortization of debt.

No less important were Young's contributions to much needed monetary reform. These in part rested on the recommendations of the Commission of Financial Advisors—recommendations with which both Dr. John Parke Young and Dr. Arthur N. Young were concerned.[68] The recommendation was made in May, 1929, to collect import duties on a gold basis in view of the fact that the foreign debt was payable in gold currencies. The danger of collecting import duties on a silver basis lay in the fact that silver was depreciating and that continued depreciation was anticipated. Beginning in 1930, the collection of duties in Customs Gold Units was inaugurated: the C.G.U., which was worth forty cents in United States money, was the unit in which the customs receipts were to be assessed. This change was, in view of the steady decline in the value of silver, worth millions of dollars to China. The debt service was fully maintained on customs loans all during the depression. In the words of Dr. Arthur N. Young, "Though the change to a gold basis for customs was made without increase of the ad valorem relation to the cost of imports, the effect of receiving large revenue on a gold basis was to add greatly to China's total receipts during a difficult period and thus to add to the strength of the Government—because the gold received would buy an increasing amount of Chinese silver dollars."[69]

But this was not the only needed improvement in monetary matters.

At the initiative of Finance Minister T. V. Soong the tael, a unit of weight, and the miscellaneous dollars of varying silver content were abolished in favor of a standard silver dollar. This reform necessitated the rehabilitation of the Shanghai Mint, which was accomplished by Robert J. Grant, formerly Director of the Mint, in the United States Treasury, whom Dr. Young brought to China. Further, the decision, forced by the American silver-buying policy and taken on the advice of Dr. Young, to quit the silver standard in 1934 by adopting a sliding-scale export duty on silver checked the deterioration of the financial situation and, to quote Dr. Young, "practically committed China to a managed currency system adopted a year later." The currency stabilization and managed currency system not only strengthened Nationalist China but contributed greatly to her ability to fight the Japanese.

The improvement in the debt structure and the monetary system paved the way for Dr. Young's successful negotiation of loans in the United States. Along with Dr. John Earl Baker he worked out a plan in 1931 by which the United States was to sell fifteen million bushels of wheat and flour on several years' credit, for use by more than a million workers engaged in rebuilding thousands of miles of dykes broken in a disastrous flood and in rehabilitating homes and other buildings. The loan, together with another contracted to buy surplus American cotton and wheat which could not be absorbed in the ordinary markets available to the America of the depression years, was fully repaid. Here was another proof that, thanks in part to the American advisor, the Nationalist government could rise to positive action when a great calamity took place. It also indicated that an American economic advisor abroad could prove of benefit to the United States.

Although Dr. Young's efforts to induce the government to moderate its expenditures to the level of current income failed, he spared no efforts in the attempt. The pressure of the war lords and of regional circumstances was too great. Once the war with Japan had started and particularly when it reached full-scale operations, the American financial expert urged the government to suspend expenditures for economic reconstruction not essential to the war effort and to concentrate on the struggle to survive. Again to no avail. Yet Young did succeed in strengthening the Nationalist government's war effort by a series of important measures, all of which belong, however, to a later story.[70]

ANOTHER expert to play roles of special importance in the financial missions of the first world war era was William Wilson Cumberland. He had taken his doctorate at Princeton, served as an expert with the War Trade Board

and the Reparation and Financial Commission, gone to Armenia with the Harbord mission as financial advisor, and held the post of economic advisor in the State Department. In the autumn of 1921 the Peruvian government, eager to negotiate an American bankers' loan, approached the Guaranty Trust Company. No doubt it was led at the same time to ask the State Department to recommend an administrator of customs on the assumption that this would strengthen its chances of getting the loan. The department named Dr. Cumberland, who assumed the office of administrator of customs late in October, 1921.[71]

The conditions under which Cumberland worked were anything but encouraging. Virtually no one in the government and no section of the public was genuinely interested in having the financial house put into any real order. It presently became clear that Cumberland had been invited to Peru as window dressing—as a means of enabling the government to obtain American loans regardless of whether these could be profitably used for Peruvian improvement or repaid. President Leguía, while personally honest, lacked business acumen. He was, for example, convinced that foreign loans would translate Peruvian potential wealth into an actuality and that it was necessary neither to have adequate machinery for making efficient use of the loans nor to be concerned over Peru's ability to repay: that, Leguía maintained, was for the American bankers to worry about. It was commonly taken for granted in Peru that Cumberland would himself take his share of graft and lend his assistance to the plans for negotiating loans. In addition, the administration of the customs was inefficient if not dishonest. The budget was unbalanced—expenditures were approximately twice as great as receipts. The treasury was empty. Officials and schoolteachers went unpaid. Moreover, the Peruvian pound had declined in value from $4.87 to about $3.30. Since there was little confidence in Peruvian currency, foreign currency was in demand and great efforts were made to import it. Business and agriculture suffered general depression. On top of all this, the Leguía regime, while a reasonably benevolent dictatorship, was subject to internal attacks and revolts.

In view of the magnitude of these problems, Dr. Cumberland's success was, in the words of the American chargé, "quite remarkable." The changes made in the customs house increased the efficiency of its administration.[72] In the face of considerable opposition the Peruvian Congress passed the budget that Cumberland, in his capacity as financial advisor, recommended. Despite protests from interested ministers, this reduced expenditures by 30 per cent. The budget of 1922 was thus balanced. Convinced that cheap money and inflationary trends did not promise to open the way to an

expanding economy, Cumberland refused to devalue the Peruvian pound but set about restoring parity. By 1924 he had largely succeeded in so doing, for the pound was then valued at $4.73 instead of the $3.30 it was worth in 1921. The balanced budget and the restoration of the currency increased confidence in Peruvian currency and lessened demand for foreign exchange. In turn this stimulated economic recovery, in both agriculture and trade, reversed the rise in the cost of living, and added to purchasing power through increased employment.

Again, despite considerable opposition in Congress, Cumberland succeeded, with the help of others, in establishing the Banco de Reserva, modeled on the Federal Reserve System of the United States.[73] He was on the board of directors. On one occasion President Leguía telephoned to him about three o'clock in the morning to explain that the bank had been unable to balance its accounts and to ask him to become governor at once. Cumberland assumed full responsibility for the assets and liabilities of the bank and quickly straightened out the tangle which had confused the accounts. He was not able to persuade President Leguía of the wisdom of transferring for safe keeping the gold reserves of the bank to London and New York. Nor did he succeed in opposing the demands of the silver-mining interests for overissuing silver money. But he did manage to introduce much efficiency and to wipe out dubious practices in the management of the bank.

Cumberland's success owed much to the support President Leguía gave him on many occasions. But it also rested in considerable part on his determination to look for the good rather than for the bad in the Peruvian officials and to operate on the assumption that all of them wanted to do the right thing.[74] Indeed, his tact and competency won the support of the business community and the warm commendation of the American embassy.

But all was by no means smooth going. Some Peruvian authorities were understandably jealous when a foreigner was named to a position of power, and many politicians who had used the government offices to hand out favors resented the reforms Cumberland had inaugurated as director of customs. Moreover, Cumberland, despite his justifiable satisfaction with the initial record, informed Assistant Secretary of State Dearing in the spring of 1922 that it looked as if the Peruvian financial structure was "falling down around our ears." The dismissal of Fuchs, Minister of Hacienda, an honest and economical administrator, indicated the dominance of elements "which desire fast and loose finances." It began to look as if Peru's president might not be able to control the zeal of his followers, many of

whom cast hungry eyes on the treasury.[75] In a candid and confidential statement submitted to President Leguía in the autumn of 1922 the American advisor took the position that financial disaster lay ahead if the government clung to its extravagant and wasteful policy. Cumberland offered as a possible way out, perhaps the only way out, the floating of a large loan. This might consolidate most of the existing funded debt of Peru, pay off current obligations, and provide the means for public works. The loan, Cumberland continued, might be secured by the customs and internal revenues. And he added the constructive suggestion that the whole arrangement might include control features which would help enforce economy and put the country on a sounder financial basis. President Leguía authorized Cumberland to draw up a plan apt to prove acceptable to foreign bankers.[76]

Back of this recommendation lay, however, a troubled and complicated story. At about the time that Cumberland came to Peru as director of customs and financial advisor, Nicholas Kelley, representing New York banking interests, arrived by invitation of the Peruvian government. Kelley had been Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in charge of loans to foreign governments. Things got off to a bad start. Kelley quickly discovered that he had overestimated the adequacy of developed resources as a guarantee for a loan. On their part, the Peruvians found Kelley rather on the brusque side, and some among them resented the fact that the Lima government had apparently agreed to pay the expenses of his mission to the sum of $50,000. Kelley's stipulation that reforms be launched before a loan was even considered alienated President Leguía.[77] Although the Embassy believed that the representatives of the Guaranty Trust had pursued dilatory tactics, the New York bankers explained that the delay was due to lack of concerted action.[78] More serious was the growing fear in the Peruvian Congress that a loan with the conditions attached would tie the hands of the government by a foreign control impinging on Peru's sovereignty.[79]

The matter of a loan from American bankers thus bogged down. Later, however, American bankers proposed a loan to Peru which seemed to Cumberland unwise in view of the fact that the government had no adequate machinery for its profitable use and that it would be best for Peru to develop local capital rather than to borrow from foreign bankers. As Cumberland saw the picture, the loan could not be properly serviced and, should this be the case, Peru's asset of impeccable credit would be forfeited. Despite Cumberland's advice to President Leguía, the loan was made, with results very much like those the advisor anticipated. Wild spending followed on the loans, and Peru received slight benefit. Ill-fated

bondholders were left with a bitter taste in their mouths. When it was clear that the loan was to go through, Cumberland asked Secretary of State Hughes for a transfer. In the end Cumberland wondered whether his success in restoring the Peruvian pound to parity and in balancing the budget had been altogether fortunate for the country: for these achievements had opened the way to the foreign loans which ended in disaster. The truth was, the Peruvians had little business acumen or financial statesmanship in the American sense. Nor was there any solid foundation for a sound economy based on saving and careful investment: both history and political conditions discouraged such a course. Without a clear understanding of the economics of production and the role of capital, there could be no solid foundation on which to build.[80]

Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer, who taught William Cumberland at Princeton, was made head of a mission which presented the Peruvian government in 1931 with a comprehensive plan for a central reserve bank, for new monetary legislation, an organic budget law, modifications of the tax structure, and the reorganization of the Department of Comptroller-General.[81] Professor Kemmerer also taught Dr. Arthur N. Young at Princeton and had headed the financial mission to China which initiated the latter's work in that country. In a genuine sense, Kemmerer was the pioneer in developing the pattern of the American financial mission to other countries. He began, as so many others in this field began, in the Philippine service. As financial advisor to the United States Philippine Commission in the early years of the twentieth century Kemmerer was especially responsible for the establishment of the gold standard in the Islands. From 1904 to 1906 he headed the division of currency in the insular government. His professorship at Princeton did not end his work in the field, as we have seen in connection with his mission to Mexico. In 1916 Kemmerer's firsthand studies of financial and especially currency problems in the Philippines, in India, in the Straits Settlements, in Puerto Rico and Mexico were systematized in his important book, *Modern Currency Reforms*. It is impossible to deal in detail with his successive missions which, by 1926, embraced countries in five continents. A few examples of the nature and scope of his work must suffice.

In 1924 Kemmerer spent three months in Colombia.[82] Here, as a result of the mission, the Bank of the Republic, a new central bank of issue and rediscount, was established; a new banking law was passed to make government supervision possible; currency reform was effected by new legislation; the internal revenue system was revised; a new national budget

law was enacted; and the accounting system was improved.[83] The mission to Chile in 1925 followed much the same pattern.[84] In 1926 the results of the commission of financial experts which the government of Poland invited were published in Warsaw. Kemmerer had first made a preliminary survey. The later and more comprehensive mission, which included specialists in banking, commerce, industry, public finance, and customs, prepared reports that covered the whole range of public finance—the tobacco monopoly, public debt policy, stabilization of the zloty, banking, and accounting in the customs service, to name only some. The mission prepared the way for floating an American loan in 1927—a loan that involved the presence in Poland of American financial experts, presumably to safeguard the investment by seeing to it that the recommendations of the mission were not shelved. Other missions which Kemmerer headed followed—to Germany, South Africa, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Turkey.[85]

The mission to Turkey deserves special comment, both because Kemmerer was associated with it only in its later stages and because in its scope it was broader than most such missions. In its postwar effort to modernize the country, the Turkish government looked to the United States for assistance. This it did for many reasons. It believed that the American republic, having no political axes to grind, might be most safely brought into the picture on a large scale. Nor should the influence of two members of our foreign service be overlooked—that of Gardiner Howland Shaw, counselor of the American embassy and consul-general, and Julian G. Gillespie, commercial attaché. Thus, even before the mission was called, American experts were helping the Turkish government on many fronts. These included Robert Vorfeld, customs, Sidney Paige, geology and mining, Charles Bell, communications, Wallace Clark, scientific management, Dr. Beryl Parker, education, and Stanley P. Clark, agriculture.[86]

The contributions of all these and of other American experts were important, and it may be misleading to select Stanley Clark for special mention. An unusually gifted agricultural expert, associated with the University of Arizona, Clark, at the invitation of the Turkish government, began an assignment designed to improve the quality of cotton and the methods of production. For ten years he carried on crop experiments at Adana in the Cilician plain in connection with a school of agriculture. According to a firsthand observer, Clark was "the most outstanding example of what a technical assistant can accomplish if he has the practical training and instincts, is willing to get into the life of the country, get his hands dirty and has the instinct for friendship and understanding of the people with whom he is working."[87] Clark's contribution greatly increased the quality and

quantity of Turkish cotton and the work he began was carried on by an able Turkish assistant whom he had trained.[88]

Such, then, was the setting for the decision of the Turkish government in the summer of 1932 to accelerate the program of modernization by inviting a mission of American experts to make a comprehensive economic survey. The Minister of Economy, Djela Bey, was especially convinced of the desirability of such a move. It was his idea that on the basis of a thorough economic survey a mission might draw up a plan for future development. Supervision of the execution of the plan was to be placed in the hands of a permanent American economic advisor.

On request the State Department suggested as an appropriate head of the mission Walker D. Hines, former director of railways during the war. He accepted, choosing as his advisors and associates Goldthwaite H. Dorr, a member of his New York law firm, who was to shoulder the major responsibility in view of Hines's subsequent illness and death; Maj. Brehon B. Somervell of the Army Engineer Corps, released for the mission; and O. F. Gardner, a practical agriculturist whom Dorr had first met in Colorado in 1912 and who had spent some time in Beirut. Somervell and Gardner went to Turkey in May, 1933, and Hines made a preliminary visit the next month. When Hines died in January, 1934, his New York legal associates, Goldthwaite H. Dorr and H. Alexander Smith, asked Professor Kemmerer to put the entire report in order and to prepare the sections on banking and currency. With the help of two Princeton authorities, Walter L. Wright and C. R. Whittlesey, Kemmerer edited the reports which came in from the staff in Turkey and asked the field force to elaborate or clarify statements. In the summer of 1934 Kemmerer, Wright, and Whittlesey went to Turkey, where they finished the sections relating to money and banking. Turkish officials proved to be extremely helpful.[89]

Although there were separate reports on railways, resources, education, and banking and currency, the major report, a document of 1,800 pages, was of special interest.[90] This was largely prepared by Somervell, although Dorr and the other associates had a large hand in it. The document approached the problem of modernizing Turkey in terms of three basic factors —the heritage of the old regime, the spirit of the new republic, and the circumstances resulting from world economic conditions. This report expressed much appreciation of Turkish aims and accomplishments; each section was headed by an apt quotation from a leading Turkish authority. Such a tactful and appreciative approach was excellent psychology, of course. But the report did not hesitate to criticize Turkish customs and habits. It specifically pointed out what was wrong in the old economic

policies, particularly in the antiquated agricultural system and in the bureaucracy; and it did not refrain from raising questions about Turkish proposals for rapid industrialization.

Briefly, the American experts felt that Turkey's basic need was greater efficiency in production. This could best be obtained by encouraging the improvement of transportation and communication, the opening of minds to the new order, the promotion of internal security and the improvement of health, and the application in the shop and on the farm of better techniques and practical knowledge. A stable financial system and an examination of the tax structure were of obvious importance. So too was the development of local initiative and enterprise, the training of skilled personnel, and the organization of the nation's efforts to advance modernization and increase living standards.

As means to these ends the report recommended an emphasis on vocational education, a systematic campaign to improve health and to safeguard the well-being of agricultural and industrial workers, and a sustained effort to carry forward innumerable small improvements in every area of production and on every level of life. Where existing data were inadequate, as in the case of water resources, the effort must be made to find out the facts.

In putting its prime emphasis on the modernization of agriculture and transportation the report may have surprised those who anticipated specific proposals for a vast industrialization.[91] The economic experts in the mission knew that in the early 1930's it was impossible for Turkey to borrow capital from abroad on a huge scale—the world-wide depression excluded that. It was clear that the country must pull itself up by the bootstraps. Common sense therefore suggested that future industrialization could best be promoted on the basis of savings which an improved agricultural economy might make possible. It was better to build on the industries Turkey had than to embark on gigantic plans for new enterprises—especially heavy industries. Again and again the report maintained that until the Turkish workers knew something about machinery it would be foolish to buy great quantities of machines. The better thing was to make every possible little improvement; the accumulated effect of these would be little short of revolutionary.

Although recommendations for improving marketing conditions were necessary and realistic, it is possible that the tenor of the report, in emphasizing the imperative improvement of production, underestimated the problems of distribution and consumption.[92] In any case, the economic survey and the recommendations were informed, pragmatic, and sensible. These

characteristics, together with the emphasis on local and private enterprises and initiative and the warnings against grandiose planning and a topheavy bureaucracy, gave the report an unmistakably American flavor.

It is hard to say just what was the actual effect of the report. For just as the work was finished, a dramatic event focused the attention of Turkish officials on quite a different matter. The Italians announced that the future of Italy was in Africa and the Near East. It was inevitable that Turkey respond to this pronouncement by stepping up her military budget. Thus the funds that Premier Inonu might have put into implementing the recommendations of the report with regard to agricultural extension went into preparation for war. But the report was translated into Turkish, printed, and distributed among the members of the National Assembly. When Goldthwaite Dorr visited Turkey in 1949 and 1950 he met various members of the government, especially engineers, who remarked that the report had been their Bible. Inonu, who was retiring from the presidency, praised it in warm terms. So did the new president Celal Bayar.[93] A goodly number of Turkish students have also testified that the report is still known and that the engineering sections have proved of lasting value and even of current influence.[94] More than this it is hard to say. General Somervell put the question of influence tersely in concluding, "As to how much good the report did, only Allah knows."[95]

We may now make some generalizations regarding the financial and economic missions between the two world wars. In commenting in his presidential address to the American Economic Association in 1926 on the missions to the ten countries with which he had been associated, Kemmerer noted a decline in the traditional preference of Latin-American governments for European advisors and an increasing tendency on the part of countries in other continents to turn to the United States. This he attributed to the well-founded belief, especially in Europe, Asia, and Africa, that the United States was less likely than other countries to exploit the services of its nationals in order to extend its political power. The remarkably high standard of living and other indications of American economic progress had also contributed to the growing tendency to choose financial advisors from the United States. The desire to attract capital from this country, the chief source of exportable capital, also played an important part.[96]

Most of the missions were asked to attack a whole series of interrelated financial problems. These generally included the establishment of the gold standard, reforms in the existing central bank or the creation of such a bank, the enactment of an organic budget law, revision of existing banking,

customs, and tax laws, and the improvement of accounting systems. In eight of the ten countries Kemmerer had worked in by 1926, foreign loans were involved. Four countries required reform in the administration of government railways, two in government monopolies.[97]

The missions fell into two broad categories. On the one hand, some merely diagnosed the ailment and prescribed remedies, leaving to others the execution of the reforms. Most of the missions headed by Kemmerer were of this type. On the other hand, some not only analyzed the problem but remained to act as physicians. Such were the Millspaugh mission to Persia, the Cumberland mission to Peru, the Jeremiah Smith mission to Hungary, and the Hord mission to Ecuador.[98]

That the type of experts in the financial missions and economic survey staffs was all-important goes without saying. Kemmerer pointed out the necessity of choosing at least two well-trained experts in each field to be covered, in order that one might critically review the reports of his fellow-specialist. The most successful missions coöperated with professional and business men as well as with government officials and paid attention to public relations. The help of native statisticians, draughtsmen, interpreters, and translators was, of course, indispensable. Instead of submitting separate reports, Kemmerer learned that it was more effective to submit specific memoranda on specific subjects. Although it was not at all uncommon to meet opposition to proposed tax reforms, Kemmerer found that by and large a mission's report more often became a patriotic rallying cry than a football of politics. Experience proved the necessity of having the recommendations, which governments for the most part adopted and tried to follow, carried out by top officials invested with power commensurate with responsibility. Nor could missions ignore the problem of educating the public in regard to certain common economic fallacies, such as the balance-of-trade fallacy and the confusion between money and capital.[99]

Perhaps the chief limitation in the Kemmerer approach, at least according to some of his associates, was the tendency to be concerned almost exclusively with a major currency reform involving introduction of the gold standard and a new currency system. Professor Kemmerer was less receptive to a step-by-step approach than to the over-all one. Nor did he want to become involved in the current problems that some of his colleagues believed desirable insofar as these might offer opportunities for constructive changes and basic reforms.[100] A recent authority on Latin-American banking and monetary problems concluded that the Kemmerer central banks constituted only a "minor advance beyond the exchange-office system." During the 1920's the prosperity of export markets and the inflow

of foreign capital resulted in an inflationary expansion which the Kemmerer banks were unable to offset in any appreciable degree. Although the banks tried to maintain the stability of the currency by enforcing strong deflationary pressures in the years that immediately followed 1929, the effort involved the sacrifice of most of their reserves. By the early 1940's little was left of the Kemmerer legislation.[101]

But whatever the limitations of the Kemmerer and of other economic missions, they accomplished valuable and in some cases "permanent" improvements. And they heralded the day when American financial and other economic experts were to play an even larger role on the world stage.

Public Health and Education

The growing realization that public health must be regarded as an international problem has meant that its story in the twentieth century must be told largely as a chapter in international history. The work of the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, of the health agencies of the League of Nations and of the United Nations, and the invaluable contributions of the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, a nongovernment agency, figure as important chapters in that history. Indeed, what may be described as official American health missions to countries other than those we occupied or controlled as colonial dependencies, are of considerably less moment than the truly wonderful record of the International Health Board.[1] Still, in any discussion of American technical missions to other lands, the official aid given in the field of health has importance. The success of the Army Medical Corps and of the United States Health and Marine-Hospital Service[2] in fighting yellow fever after the Spanish-American War and in the Canal Zone of Panama and our other dependencies, gave a prestige to these agencies that Latin America could hardly ignore.[3]

The invasion of Texas by yellow fever shortly after the turn of the century created a problem that could properly and intelligently be met only in coöperation with Mexico. In 1902 under the auspices of the United States Health and Marine-Hospital Service, working parties went to Vera Cruz to investigate diseases common to the two countries. The mission enjoyed the hearty coöperation of E. Liceaga of the Superior Board of Health of Mexico and of local physicians and officials. Its members made careful studies of the habits of mosquitoes of the region and kept careful rec-

ords of the imbedded and sectioned as well as of the freshly dissected contaminated mosquitoes.[4] The work was regarded in competent circles as "highly satisfactory."[5] The Rockefeller Foundation's Board of International Health later carried on a program of yellow fever control both in Vera Cruz and at Tampico. But the Public Health Service of the United States did not give up its interest in Mexico, as the admirable work of Sanitary Engineer J. A. Le Prince in Tampico testified in the years following the first world war. The reduction of the stegomyia index greatly reduced the menace of yellow fever not only on the east coast of Mexico but in the Gulf ports of the United States itself.[6] In later years public health officers were also assigned to our consulate in Mexico City.

But American interest in promoting public health was not confined to our immediate neighbors to the south. The proximity of the Panama Canal to the ports of northern South America gave the United States a special interest in the health conditions of Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. In 1906 President Eloy Alfaro of Ecuador invited special technical assistance from the United States in the crusade against yellow fever. When local opposition to the proposed mission developed, the matter was dropped.[7]

Two years later, President Alfaro again took the initiative in turning to the United States for help. On the recommendation of the American legation, Dr. Bolivar J. Lloyd of the United States Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service, was invited to come to Ecuador to work with the Superior Board of Health of Guayaquil. Dr. Lloyd served as president and director of the Special Sanitary Commission at Guayaquil during 1908 and 1909, and continued for another year as National Director of Health and as physician to the president. Dr. Lloyd made many personal sacrifices in the interest of his mission and, according to the American legation, conducted himself with commendable discretion. But the local medical profession was jealous, especially when he cured President Alfaro of a disease that had been pronounced incurable. Moreover, it developed that Ecuadorians had little fear of yellow fever, to which they presumed themselves immune—the plague was what worried them. When financial support was almost cut off, Dr. Lloyd left. His farewell report emphasized the immense importance of providing the city with ample pure water as the basic step toward eliminating malaria, yellow fever, and the plague. Had his program been carried out, the later chapters of the story would have been far different and happier.[8]

In 1912 domestic politics led to the third effort to improve the sanitation of Guayaquil. Col. William Gorgas of the United States Army Medical Corps, already famous for his work in freeing Cuba and the Canal Zone

of yellow fever, headed a mission of public health officers. It drew up an extensive and on the whole an encouraging report, estimating that Guayaquil might be freed from its worst diseases at a cost of $9,000,000. Although a contract was made with the J. G. White Company of London and New York, the war prevented any immediate improvement in the situation.

A fourth attempt to attack the public health problems of Guayaquil was more successful. General Gorgas had become chairman of the Yellow Fever Board of the International Health Board after his 1912 inquiry. Convinced that yellow fever could be erased from the face of the earth, he now enjoyed access to funds to help him make the dream come true. Attacking yellow fever in Ecuador was a job requiring more than money, however. Latin Americans were sensitive about what appeared to be medical backwardness and tended to resent the presence of a North American medical mission. Gorgas, persuaded to head a mission of inquiry, needed all of his tact and prestige to open the way to later work. Even so, anti-North American feeling ran high—a mob in Ecuador burned Gorgas in effigy.[9]

Investigating the situation was one thing; doing anything about it was more difficult. Gorgas turned this job over to Dr. Arthur I. Kendall of Northwestern University near the end of World War I. He requested Kendall to go to Guayaquil to see if he could get permission to work with local authorities in an effort to exterminate yellow fever. Since it was not altogether clear to Dr. Kendall how this was to be done, he decided to set up a commission for the study of yellow fever and then await developments. The commission included Dr. Hideyo Noguchi, bacteriologist; Dr. Charles Elliott of the Northwestern University Medical School; Dr. H. E. Redenbaugh, a Northwestern chemist; and Dr. Mario G. Lebredo of Cuba, an interpreter.

For a time, however, the commission met only indifference and opposition. There were several reasons for this. National pride resented the fact that Ecuadorian ships that touched at the Canal Zone were quarantined. The commission further found itself entangled in economic questions. There was a belief in Ecuadorian circles that the yellow fever mission was merely a cover on the part of the United States in an effort to get concessions. The erroneous supposition that the interest on the Guayaquil and Quito railroad was to be paid to the United States Government aroused further antagonism toward the commission.

In the end, however, Dr. Kendall and his commission gained access to Ecuador. Largely through a series of fortuitous circumstances, Dr. Kendall was invited to Quito as a guest of the government. There formal luncheons and the discussion of Guayaquil bonds all conspired to give Dr. Kendall

the ear of the president. In Dr. Kendall's words, the strange events that took place could hardly have been as well planned in advance, had there been any such planning at all.

The upshot of the matter was that the mission gained entrance to Ecuador and attacked the public health problems there with signal success. The coöperation of the local authorities was enlisted. By efficient work on the bacteriological, chemical, and clinical aspects of the problem, the commission largely succeeded in eliminating yellow fever, smallpox, and the plague, thus earning the gratitude of the people and government of Ecuador.[10] Persistence in the face of considerable opposition and numerous difficulties over a period of years finally paid off.

One of the more enlightening experiences in the field of public health missions was the effort to improve sanitation in Peru. As early as 1912 the Peruvian government, aware of the unhappy sanitation conditions and of the prevalence of yellow fever, bubonic plague, and other scourges, asked the United States government to name a public health service officer and a sanitary engineer to take charge of sanitation in Iquitos. After being assured that such officers would be given enough power to operate effectively, the State Department recommended Acting Assistant Surgeon George M. Converse, Samuel E. Bayless, an engineer, and a Mr. Keegan of the health department of Richmond, Virginia.[11] Perhaps the fall of President Leguía explains why little was accomplished by the mission.

In 1921 the Peruvian government, again under the leadership of President Leguía, and interested, as we have seen, in negotiating an American loan and reforming its financial administration under American direction,[12] asked for and obtained technical help in the public health field. Col. W. D. Wrightson, who had accompanied Gorgas on his South American reconnaissance of 1916 and replaced him as Director of Public Health in the United States upon his death in 1920, went to Peru as consulting sanitary engineer. His contract stipulated a generous salary; and in the later part of 1921, he assumed in addition the office of Director of Public Health, an appointment that carried no stipend.

When Dr. Curletti became head of the Ministry of Fomento, which controlled the office of public health, Colonel Wrightson's difficulties began. From the start the Minister of Fomento disregarded Wrightson's efforts to reorganize and improve the public health service; many of those who had been appointed in the interest of efficiency he dismissed and replaced them by his own political friends. As the American ambassador to Peru put it, Curletti blocked Wrightson's endeavors in "every conceivable way." But although Curletti was admittedly a hard man to work with and open to

dishonest as well as to political influences, the ambassador added that on his part Wrightson "displayed little tact in dealing with his chief, and, moreover, has not proved himself either very diligent or efficient in the discharge of his duties as director. Considerable criticism of his services," the ambassador continued, "has been made in the press and elsewhere and it was a foregone conclusion several months ago that he would be forced to resign."[13] He was. Wrightson for a time retained his appointment as consulting sanitary engineer, but his mission accomplished little.

A brighter page began in 1920 with the coming of Dr. Henry Hanson of the Rockefeller Foundation. For three years Hanson fought yellow fever intelligently and efficiently. In his report to the Peruvian government, Hanson pointed out that the situation required coöperation and individual effort. Instead of being a pest-ridden backward country, Peru might be made a model for South America. Save for the bubonic plague, conditions were no worse than elsewhere; and he listed, among the projects to be pushed forward, adequate water and sewage disposal for each town, proper collection and disposal of garbage, street paving, survey and adjustment of irrigation systems to avert malaria breeding swamps, and rigid enforcement of ratproofing. Both President Leguía and the officials of Peru gave Dr. Hanson good support. But when the government named him to take over Wrightson's position, it was clear that more was needed than good will, efficiency, and an ability to work well with others. Discouraged by the lack of funds to carry on his work, Dr. Hanson resigned within a few months.[14] It was one thing to work under the well-supported Rockefeller Foundation; it was another to try to carry on a government post with utterly insufficient funds.

Although Wrightson and Hanson left, another American appeared to carry on what they had begun. Dr. John D. Long had been an officer in the United States Public Health Service, had reorganized the Philippine Health Service, and had, on loan by the United States Government, served as advisor on public health to the Minister of Hygiene in Chile in 1925 and 1926. In 1928 Dr. Long accepted an appointment as traveling representative of the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau. In this capacity he became technical advisor to Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and other South American countries.[15] Now, acting under a Peruvian presidential decree, he undertook a campaign against the bubonic plague. In 1931 he published his final report, which reviewed the program he had helped organize and put into effect. This included field-training a staff that later traveled through the sectors into which the country was divided, trapping rats, examining them, and sending fleas to the Lima laboratory for identification and computation

of prevalence indices. The program also included a rat-poisoning extermination campaign, which was conducted in so economical a manner that after it had been concluded there was actually a small balance left in the budget. As a result of the work, all the seaports were freed of bubonic plague. Dr. Long recommended the continuation of the activities of the program for at least two years after the last case of bubonic plague had been reported. Throughout the work he enjoyed the greatest assistance from the Peruvian government.[16]

In the admirable work of the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation in San Salvador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and other countries both the State Department and the United States Public Health Service contributed effective help.[17] The inter-American and public-private character of much of the research and field work in public health was also well exemplified in the establishment in the 1920's of Gorgas Memorial Laboratory in the City of Panama. Friends of Gorgas established the Gorgas Memorial Institute of Tropical and Preventive Medicine on a site donated by the Republic of Panama in the City of Panama. The plan was to have the various American governments contribute to the support of the Institute and to be represented on its governing board in proportion to contributions. The Institute had an impressive roster of officers and an extensive program in public health education when Congress was persuaded to appropriate $50,000 annually for the support of the Institute.[18] The work which it did justified the faith its founders had in it.

While American health missions, under public and private auspices, were thus pioneering in Latin America, other parts of the world were becoming the scene of operations on the part of the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation. Sometimes personnel of the Public Health Service was involved. In general the American foreign service offered a helping hand. This was the case, for example, in Albania, whose government had asked the League of Nations in 1924 to help fight malaria. Surg. Gen. Arthur Stimson of the United States Public Health Service suggested lending Le Prince, a veteran in this field. Nothing came of the suggestion, apparently, but a few years later the Rockefeller Foundation agreed, with the friendly assistance of the American legation in Tirana, to enter the Albanian field.[19] In 1924 Surgeon W. W. King of the United States Public Health Service participated in a consultative capacity in the work of the Sanitary Commission for Turkey.[20]

We turn again to Liberia, however, for an example of something like a full-fledged public health mission. In 1929 the American minister to Liberia, as well as other American and European residents of Monrovia,

succumbed to yellow fever. Several governments, including that of the United States, made representations to Liberia. The Firestone Company, which had begun to develop the rubber sources of the country, pointed out that $150,000 of the $200,000 lent for public improvements was available and suggested that some of it be used by the Liberian government to improve public health by cleaning up epidemic diseases. Expenses might be met by the specified funds available to the Liberian government. The Rockefeller Foundation offered its cooperation.[21] The upshot was that the Liberian government designated Dr. Howard F. Smith of the United States Public Health Service to be chief medical advisor to the Republic of Liberia. The contract stipulated that Dr. Smith was to make a health survey, to institute corrective sanitary measures not contrary to the basic statutory laws of the land, and to be directly responsible to the president. A sum of $18,000 was appropriated for the work, and Smith was promised ample police assistance in carrying out his mission.

On arriving in Monrovia in January, 1930, Dr. Smith undertook a survey of houses and mosquito breeding spots. Trucks removed from the city refuse that in the rainy season was likely to serve as breeding places. A public health nurse was employed to check suspicious cases. The government was persuaded to issue a decree requiring all cases of 100+° temperature to be reported in order to check for possible yellow fever. All this activity was followed by a May death rate 75 per cent below that of the preceding year.

Even this achievement was carried through against great odds. The local physicians resented the decree requiring temperatures to be reported; it seemed to reflect on their ability to diagnose yellow fever. The courts refused to execute the sanitary regulations. And the president insisted that the sanitary inspectors Dr. Smith trained be responsible to himself, not to the Chief Medical Advisor. Despite the appropriation of $18,000 the work came to a standstill on May 31, 1931, for lack of funds. All this was the more discouraging because only $3,730 of the $18,000 had been spent. At this point a case of yellow fever occurred. As soon as the diagnosis was made the family changed doctors and the death certificate read "strangulated hernia." Dr. Smith had found it hard to examine death certificates, and he did so on this occasion only with difficulty. Now, with the aid of the Financial Advisor, an American, Dr. Smith managed to get $11,000 released and to receive from the president the promise of broad enforcement powers. But it was the old story all over again. The necessary executive orders were not forthcoming. And there was little point in spending the $11,000 advance.

The report that Dr. Smith submitted on leaving Liberia pointed to the existence of inadequate marine quarantine, an unsafe water supply, the lack of vital statistics, and, among the spots sampled, an incidence of 96 per cent of breeding places. Public health facilities in Liberia, Dr. Smith indicated, were utterly inadequate. There could be no doubt, despite local conventions, that yellow fever had existed for some time in Monrovia, and that the marked lowering of the death rate in a brief campaign of ten weeks indicated what might be done with proper cooperation from the Liberian authorities. The president of the republic did not even trouble to acknowledge the report despite its urgent pleas for a continuation of the reforms that had been begun.

A year later the United States, together with eight other governments including that of Liberia, set up an international committee to examine various social and administrative conditions in the African republic. The committee asked a League of Nations health officer to survey and report on the sanitary situation. The plan of the international committee, which the State Department approved, included the support by Liberia of two full-time medical officers to "carry out all the ordinarily accepted duties of a medical officer of health in a tropical country."[22] The situation improved, but it was not until the second world war, when American interest in Liberia became very important by reason of strategic considerations, that any real improvement took place.

At the same time that the world was becoming aware of American preeminence in sanitation and public health and was turning to it for advice, it was also becoming familiar with the special emphasis that American education placed on practical approaches and on training for the actualities of vocational and social living. The American school exhibits at the international expositions, the reports of British and other official educational missions that visited the United States to observe its education, and the teaching activities of missionaries in many parts of the globe spread the word that in the States a new type of education went far toward explaining American industrial achievements and the high American standard of living. Yet it would be easy to overemphasize our reputation in the field of education, for everywhere that traditional and classical emphases prevailed there was a suspicion in academic circles of the American stress on the practical and the vocational.

In the later years of the Díaz regime in Mexico new currents stirred that help explain the invitation to James Mark Baldwin, a distinguished psychologist at the Johns Hopkins University, to serve the federal govern-

ment as educational advisor in contemplated reforms and especially in the organization of the new national university. Armed with credentials from the United States Commissioner of Education, Baldwin went to Mexico, where he received courteous treatment as a guest of the nation. Diaz, perhaps with a twinkle in the eye, told Baldwin that he was glad to have a North American who had come not to exploit Mexico's natural resources but to improve her education. Minister of Education Justo Sierra assembled select groups of educators and scholars to hear Baldwin expound his educational philosophy and to discuss with him his ideas for educational improvement. Baldwin also helped Sierra's lieutenant, Ezequiel Chávez, a liberal if not a utopian disciple of Comte as well as a poet and distinguished scholar, draw up educational plans. These included compulsory primary education, the establishment of secondary schools in the cities, and the organization of the Escuela de Altos Estudios. They were plans, Baldwin felt, which would have done credit to any democratic community in the world.

Baldwin lived to see at least some of his plans executed. Initially, he had to warn his idealistic collaborator of the dangers of moving too fast, but in actuality little was done to realize the larger aspects of their educational scheme. Still, the School of Higher Studies became an actuality, and in 1908, Baldwin resigned his Hopkins professorship in order to give more time to it. His fourth and last visit, in 1912, was in fulfillment of a contract to lecture at the University. But anti-American feeling now ran so high that Baldwin never succeeded in getting into close touch with the Mexican authorities that followed Madero, though he remained nominally a professor in the national university. We may doubt whether Baldwin's ideas or influence bulked very large in the educational revolution that Mexico was to see; but we may be sure that the act of the government in calling him as an advisor marked a new day in the cultural relations of Mexico and the United States.[29]

One of the most important developments in American educational missions after World War I was a changing attitude on the part of the educators themselves. Such men began to realize that American educational institutions or techniques could not always be successfully transferred *in toto* to a new environment. The social and economic problems of lands that differed considerably from the United States might require a special educational approach, they discovered.

This changing attitude toward the transfer of American educational ideas to foreign lands was best emphasized by a remarkable postwar survey undertaken by the Near East Relief and other agencies. Headed by

the distinguished Columbia University authority on comparative education, Dr. Paul Monroe, the mission, after a careful study of conditions in Armenia, Greece, Syria, and other countries, advised that the relief programs be supplemented by education in agriculture, industry, and hygiene. Monroe recommended that schools, whether of the missionary type or not, seek more closely to develop an integral relationship between educational programs and community needs. The emphasis in the report on family life, health, self-support, and economic rehabilitation and on the relations of formal education to these problems typified an approach that differed considerably from the indigenous ones and even from those sponsored by western philanthropies.[24]

The years immediately following World War I did not, to be sure, witness any full-fledged educational missions with an official status at the extending and the receiving ends. Foreign governments, however, called on American educators for advice with sufficient frequency to indicate the growing prestige of American education and the increasing tendency of governments in the less westernized or less industrialized areas of the world to rely on the counsel of American educators. The new governments of China and Turkey invited John Dewey to give counsel on educational reform, which he did.[25] In 1926 Liberia, as part of its response to the critical pressure of leading powers and to the situation created by the entrance of Firestone, invited Dr. James Sibley, an American Negro, as an educational advisor. Unfortunately Dr. Sibley fell a victim to the yellow fever which Liberians looked on with such casual eyes.[26]

In the 1930's another African nation called on an American scholar for educational assistance. Ethiopian students attending Muskingum College in Ohio were so impressed with Professor Ernest Work that they prevailed upon Emperor Haile Selassie to invite Work to Ethiopia as educational advisor to the government. Dr. Work was convinced of the basic desire of the Ethiopians for an educational system, and the Ethiopians, especially the Emperor, did what they could to coöperate with him. In the end, however, Work failed to accomplish his objective. The Ethiopian coöperation was willing but ineffective. More important, according to Work, was the fact that foreign legations in Ethiopia, particularly the French and Italian, were extremely jealous of anyone working directly with the Ethiopians rather than through them, and actively sought to defeat his mission. In any event, whatever Work might have accomplished was destined to disappear when the beleaguered Ethiopians received the thrusts of Mussolini's armored troops.[27]

Still more impressive was the invitation extended by the new govern-

ment of Iraq to an American educational mission in 1932. In view of the close relations between Iraq and Britain, the decision to turn to America for educational advice was especially significant. Headed by Paul Monroe and including such able and experienced educators as William C. Bagley of Columbia and Edgar Knight of North Carolina, the mission reached Baghdad early in February, 1932. It received the fullest coöperation of the government. The mission visited all sorts of schools, consulted with agricultural experts and medical men, and surveyed the history, traditions, and conditions that would, of necessity, affect any effort to implement any recommendations.

The report, wisely, made no pretense of giving counsels of perfection. But it did point out that the prevailing centralized administrative scheme should be gradually relaxed in favor of local initiative and participation in educational activities if Iraq wanted education to have substance and reality. To that end it indicated the role that might be played by parent-teachers associations, adult education, a new type of agricultural village school, moving schools for the remoter tribes, and vocational education. Only if the people could see that education might affect for the better the conditions of life under which they lived and only if they could be interested in themselves doing something about it, could it become functional to the needs of the country. The report also emphasized the importance of improving teacher training, of simplifying the requirements for very young children, of extracurricular activities, of health education and sports, as well as technical courses, library facilities, and homemaking programs. Iraq was further advised to substitute guidance for the prevailing inspectorial system.[28] It appears that the Ministry of Education did make some effort to carry out some part of the recommendations, especially those involving tribal education and village schools.[29] But probably little was actually realized, whether because of the deadening hand of tradition, or the impositions of poverty, or still other conditions.

In many ways the most important and enlightening educational mission with an official status was that which the government of Peru invited in the early 1920's at the very time that it was turning to the United States for technical aid in finances and in public health. Several considerations explain why an educational mission was called to Peru. For other Latin-American countries were confronted by many of the same discouraging conditions—the handicaps of geography and inadequate communications, mixed races and a great gulf between the Creoles and the Indians, political instability, poverty, a not too enlightened bureaucracy, and, in the eyes of some, an unsympathetic Roman Catholic hierarchy. No doubt the interest

of Peru in American financial and public health services played a part; but even more important was President Leguía himself.

Even before the post-World War period when Leguía had been in power prior to his fall, the government of Peru turned to the United States for help in reorganizing education. In 1919 Dr. Manuel V. Villaran, Leguía's Minister of Education, invited four departmental instructors of primary education, a number of special teachers for the national *colegios* and for normal schools, and a director-general of education, all from the United States. The director-general chosen was Dr. Harry Erwin Bard, a graduate of Wabash College and a doctor of philosophy from Columbia University who had been a division superintendent in the Philippines.[30] The American legation gave such support as it could to Bard's efforts to have an American became director of the Guadalupe College—this to help replace French by American military influence.[31] Bard inaugurated some administrative reforms and recommended the appointment of a special commission to study the educational situation and to frame a new code.

Before the work got very far, an unsympathetic Minister of Education replaced Villaran, and Bard went back to the United States. But Dr. Albert A. Giesecke, who held the Cornell doctorate and who had undertaken to introduce commercial courses into the secondary schools, remained, to marry into a prominent Peruvian family, to become the rector of the University of Cuzco, the titular mayor of that city, and a leading figure in the educational circles of Peru. Giesecke recognized the need of further improvements in administrative machinery and of a more flexible and functional curriculum.[32] He stayed on to become increasingly identified with Peru and to enjoy a respected place in Peruvian life.

When Leguía returned to power he took up the educational reforms he had begun a decade before. His first step was to recall Bard, who had meantime published in Spanish and English an interesting book on the cultural relations between the United States and other American republics. In 1919 Bard drafted the educational law that had been in part prepared by the special commission created during his earlier stay. The new law, which the president signed on June 20, 1919, gave the director-general, that is Bard, almost complete power over the educational system, save for the universities. Bard left almost at once for the States to recruit a staff of competent, trained American educators. Some twenty arrived in the spring of 1921; and in the fall, the director-general left again to recruit another twenty-five or thirty.

The men who came had held places of importance, either in the States or in the insular possessions. Many of them held higher degrees as well.

Among the better known members of the mission were Dr. Lester M. Wilson, director of examinations and studies; Forrest R. Spaulding, a trained librarian and formerly chief librarian of the Des Moines Public Library, director of libraries and school museums; H. G. Lull, author of books on the manual-training movement and on moral instruction through social intelligence; Glenn W. Caulkins, and William W. Andrew. Frank L. Crone, who had served six years in the Philippines as director of schoolhouse construction, occupied a similar post in the mission to Peru. William E. Dunn, director of the higher school of commerce, was well equipped for such a position. There were others, too. The thing looked big and promising. As William Gonzales of the American legation at Lima wrote: "It is a bold step to 'Americanize' the educational system of Peru, but considering the strong hold the Catholic Church has in this country and the influence accredited to the Ambassador from the Pope, it has met with remarkably little opposition."[33]

But Gonzales spoke too soon. Before the year was over, Frederick A. Sterling, chargé d'affaires, was reporting trouble. The work of the mission had been criticized in the Senate on the ground that salaries were excessive and that nothing had been accomplished. Attacks appeared in the press as well. Some of the unfavorable impressions voiced in Congress and in the newspapers were shared by the military attaché of the American embassy, who reported that a third of the mission, parading high sounding titles, sat about doing little or nothing. It was clear that Dr. Bard had put too much stock in the promises the government had made. The higher school of commerce which Dr. William Dunn had been brought to head actually existed, for instance, only on paper, and Dunn resigned to become commercial attaché to the Embassy. Lack of funds provided another source of trouble. But the military attaché also laid much blame on Bard himself, who, he thought, was jealous of his authority, failed to work well with his subordinates, and let petty details floor him.[34] By the spring of 1922 Bard's lack of tact and experience so alienated several members of the mission that they resigned. He himself quit in June of the same year, to be succeeded by Dr. Lester M. Wilson, who had served as *ad interim* director during Bard's absence in the United States on a fruitless mission to negotiate a loan of $1,000,000 for educational purposes.[35]

Wilson proved to be forceful and well liked. But it was clear that if it so pleased the government, Wilson and his associates were held responsible for acts not originating with them but with the government itself. Added to these difficulties was the question of funds for carrying out satisfactory programs. Members of the mission became disillusioned when even their

personal salaries were paid at irregular intervals—sometimes being six months in arrears. Wilson agreed with President Leguía that at the termination of contracts on August 1, 1922, the salaries were to be paid in full, and members of the mission were to be given four months' salaries in advance and passage home. Wilson agreed to stay, however.[36] But illness required him to go to Panama for surgical treatment and he was succeeded by Dr. Frank Crone, who took over in August, 1922.

Efficient, forceful, and well liked, Crone seemed to be on the point of accomplishing some improvements despite limited funds, irregular payments of salaries, and restricted authority.[37] The chief thorn, however, was the Ministry of Education. Its head, Dr. Ego Aguirre, made things as hard as possible for Crone. The regional director of the district, Dr. Caulkins, was abruptly informed by the Minister that his contract was canceled. Caulkins left forthwith for home. Crone felt himself unable to carry on his work without using methods to which he could not stoop. Difficulties arose over the patronage and over the habit some in authority had of obliging teachers to pay heavy discounts in order to cash their salary drafts. When matters came to a head between the Minister of Education and Director-General Crone, the latter offered his resignation to the President. Leguía, however, persuaded him not to take this step, but rather to make a tour of inspection during which a cabinet crisis would be engineered which would result in the naming of a new Minister of Education in place of Dr. Ego Aguirre. Crone took the advice; but it led to more trouble. For the question of his probity was raised by his enemies. Crone answered the charges in detail to the entire satisfaction of the Embassy.[38] But he was nevertheless dismissed and despite the efforts to reappoint him,[39] he was replaced by Dr. Albert Giesecke.[40] It will be recalled that Giesecke had lived in Peru for many years and by virtue of his close identification was regarded in many eyes as a Peruvian.

Before this final unhappy outcome, which was accompanied by the retirement of all members of the mission save one, the question of its relations with the Embassy had been canvassed. Chargé Sterling informally defended members of the mission on more than one occasion and believed that missions of a peaceful character in Latin America were of as much importance as military missions, or of more. In his opinion the support of the Embassy might be stronger if the Department of State were willing to give some formal recognition to the mission. On the other hand he believed that Crone had a mistaken conception of what it was proper for the Embassy to do and how far it was to go. That, Sterling felt, might well be left to the discretion of the Embassy.[41]

On his part Crone spared no efforts to obtain official recognition for the mission. He pointed out to Director Rowe of the Pan American Union that whereas other governments gave much support to comparable missions in Latin-American countries, our own did almost nothing; and that this was the more serious in view of the fact that certainly the Germans, and probably the French, in Peru did all they could to injure the American educational mission. As for Peruvian opposition, much of it could be set down to the outraged feelings of those who had been dismissed for incompetency or deprived of graft.[42] And Director Rowe of the Pan American Union did indicate to the State Department that it would be helpful if occasion were taken to express the interest of the American government and people in the work of the educational mission.[43] Though the issues raised were of obvious importance, they were left somewhat indeterminate.

Yet even if the mission had enjoyed an official status in the eyes of the United States government no less than in those of the Peruvian, the outcome could hardly have been essentially different. Its harassed career made plain the many difficulties facing adventures of this sort: the lack of adequate funds to implement educational improvements, the ill effects of dissension within a mission, the importance of good administration and leadership on the part of its chief, and, above all, the differences of educational aims and methods between a group of American experts invited to reform an educational system at the behest of a president and those of local politicians who had been used to regarding education in terms of politics and power.

CHAPTER TEN

The Meaning of the Missions

For over a century, Americans have been going abroad to help foreign governments solve their problems. Most of these missions have been in the twentieth century. A relatively large share of the nineteenth-century missions were of minor importance or were designed to gain information for the United States rather than to help others. Only the missions to Japan approach some of the twentieth-century ventures in scope and complexity.

Most of the American missions abroad went to Latin America or to the Far East. There were good reasons for this emphasis. Europe and its dependencies could call on men fully the equal of American talent and therefore had little need of technical missions from the United States. At the same time, Americans were unlikely to venture into parts of the world which had little contact with America or in which American interests were of little importance. Much of the reluctance of the United States government to grant Persian requests for American missions grew out of a feeling that this country had too few interests in the Middle East to warrant such activity. By contrast, technical missions quite naturally followed American economic and diplomatic interests into such places as the Caribbean or China. It was no accident, either, that American missions became most prominent after the turn of the twentieth century. It was only then that the United States became a world power with such prestige that requests for American missions were frequent.

Perhaps the most important period in the life of any mission was its origin. Its very beginnings often set its scope and had much to do with its final success or failure. We may well review at this point the motives that

led both foreigners and Americans to carry out technical missions. Such a review will help explain why particular missions succeeded or failed.

Several factors operated in persuading the United States government to initiate missions. Scientific curiosity was one. The Wilkes voyage of exploration and the various surveys of Latin-American waters were examples of missions motivated by a desire for new scientific knowledge. The desire to increase American trade or otherwise advance prosperity in the United States lay behind a few technical missions. Charles J. Murphy's corn promotional efforts in Europe were clearly designed to better the position of the American farmer, while the rubber surveys in Brazil in the 1920's aimed to lessen American dependence on the international rubber monopoly. In Japan in the 1870's Minister Charles De Long saw that American advisors in influential positions might well stimulate our commerce with Japan, although other factors were probably more important in bringing American experts to that part of the Orient. In some cases, the United States sent experts abroad to solve particular political problems. A number of American missions to Europe worked at winning World War I, while the Harbord mission to Armenia gathered information bearing on America's postwar responsibilities in that area.

In some cases American motives were not very clear-cut. The attempts to build model Caribbean republics in Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua grew out of a compound of economic interests, humanitarian sentiment, and strategic considerations. In most of these cases, the motives were so mixed that American aims were never clearly defined beyond a vague desire to maintain a series of reasonably stable republics, free from non-American domination. In all four cases, the United States found itself committed ever deeper to an occupation which it had never clearly envisioned and which might have been difficult to defend beforehand. Whatever the motives may have been, the point is that the Caribbean peoples involved looked on such aid with growing skepticism. Technical assistance in their minds was simple imperialism; this in turn led to a nationalist reaction that seriously handicapped American efforts in those countries.

The motives and aims of foreign countries asking for American assistance were equally varied. In some cases, the United States had built a special reputation which attracted foreign interest. A good many of the public health missions to Latin America apparently grew out of the signal success of American medical authorities in wiping out yellow fever in Cuba and Panama. Many of the military missions after World War I reflected new respect for American military might displayed during the war. American agricultural attainments seem to have attracted attention from the be-

ginning. When the Turks wanted to introduce cotton culture into their realm in 1846, it was only natural for them to call on a Southern cotton planter like James Davis. In a few cases, Americans on the spot helped persuade the foreign government to select American advisors in preference to experts from some other country. Charles De Long in the 1870's did much to make possible the various American missions to Japan, while more than a quarter-century later Sumner Welles was instrumental in organizing the Dawes Commission to Santo Domingo.

We have already suggested that the location of American interests abroad had a good deal to do with the parts of the world in which American missions operated. But the United States was invited to send several missions specifically because Americans had no strong national interests in the areas involved. Americans seemed like relatively disinterested parties to Persian officials who were harassed by the British-Russian rivalry in their country. Liberians and Ethiopians looked to the United States to save them from the encroachments of African colonial powers.

The desire of these foreign countries for American capital was an equally important motive. It was clear that Cuba heeded the advice of General Crowder only so long as he had the power to grant or withhold a much-needed loan. Persia invited the Millspaugh mission and Peru acquired the services of W. W. Cumberland at least in part to gain the confidence of American bankers. Some of Arthur N. Young's success in China also seems to have been related to his ability to get American loans.

The origins of these missions in a good many cases had much to do with their eventual success or failure. Missions motivated by scientific curiosity, requiring no real sacrifice, and threatening no vested interests, obviously had an excellent chance of success. On the other hand, missions designed primarily to serve the interests of the United States were often viewed with suspicion by foreigners. The American ventures in the Caribbean looked like imperialism to many of those countries, and most American efforts met rather serious resistance there. Even though missions initiated by the United States were designed to benefit other peoples, it was hard to convince the parties involved of that fact. In short, missions begun by the United States sometimes had one strike against them simply because they had been begun by the United States.

Missions initiated by foreign governments seemed to have had somewhat better chances at the start. The very fact that the foreign governments wanted them indicated that they might be in some degree receptive to American ideas and advice. This was not always the case, however. Foreign receptivity to American ideas sometimes faded rapidly once the funda-

mental aim of the government, a foreign loan, had been achieved. In any event, the origins of the missions, while often important, were not always the decisive factors. A mission begun under the most auspicious circumstances sometimes failed for other reasons.

The American missions before the 1930's varied greatly in scope. Often the parties involved came to some sort of agreement beforehand. In the cases of the Capron and Millspaugh missions, this agreement was formalized in a contract. In nearly all of these missions, however, the scope was modified in one way or another, either by common agreement or through the push and pull of conflict on the scene of operations. The scope of the Caribbean adventures was largely an *ad hoc* development. In Cuba, for example, the desire to liberate the Cubans led to the war with Spain. This in turn led to the first American occupation. But once the occupation had attempted to remake the country, it also attempted to protect its reforms through the Platt Amendment, and this in turn led to a second occupation and other subsequent attempts to influence Cuban life.

American missions covered a wide range of subject matter. Some gathered scientific information of all kinds. Others offered geological assistance or mining advice. Agricultural experts, army officers, and engineers exported their respective talents. Other Americans reorganized government administration, introduced sound fiscal policies, drew up educational plans, and improved public health facilities. In most of the more important missions, the fundamental aim was to improve the economy of the country in one way or another. This might be done by increasing productivity in already-existing areas of economic activity, diversifying the economic life of the country, or improving the fundamental public services on which the economy depended: government stability and solvency, transportation, and a healthy and educated labor supply. This range of activities is probably fairly representative of the whole of American technical exports. However, engineering is not fully treated here, largely because most of this was in private hands and thus beyond the limits of this particular study.

The objectives of American missions were indeed varied. Some limited themselves to information-gathering or surveys. Others were restricted to giving advice which might be accepted or rejected. The more important ones planned and executed projects of relatively limited scope. Most of the financial, public health, and military missions were of this kind. A few attempted to attack a large group of problems in a given area. The various American missions to Japan tended in this direction, while the American interventions in Cuba, Haiti, and Santo Domingo clearly attempted to remake the entire country.

There seems to have been no close correlation between the scope of these missions and their success. One writer[1] has suggested that comprehensive programs are more likely to succeed than piecemeal ones. The former produce lasting effects, whereas the relatively minor accomplishments of the latter make no real impression on the total situation. There is considerable truth in this contention, but much depends on the particular situation. Some of the lesser missions were quite successful, and it is no reflection on them to say that larger objectives might have produced more extensive results.

A comprehensive program, American experience indicates, also raises some serious risks. For one thing, the broader the program, the more obstacles in its path and the greater the organized opposition to it. Furthermore, the comprehensive program raises certain planning difficulties. American experience with large-scale missions in Japan and in the Caribbean indicate that such major ventures were in considerable part unplanned. Moreover, there are certain inherent dangers in planning which become more serious as the scope of the plan increases. Errors or false assumptions on the part of the planners can have serious consequences. Even the best of American experts abroad made mistakes or found their work limited by their own controlling assumptions. Kemmerer, for example, showed an excessive faith in the importance of monetary reform. When Wood attempted to rebuild Cuba, his program was limited by his assumption that the new Cuba ought to be modeled on Anglo-Saxon principles. This assumption along with his reluctance to disturb the economic *status quo* led him to place undue emphasis on correct legal forms and literacy and to neglect fundamental Cuban economic and social problems.

Both kinds of missions have their place. The limited-objective type with a pragmatic approach can sometimes be of considerable use and certainly involves less risk of failure with all that this might mean for relations between the two countries involved. On the other hand, the comprehensive program is probably the only type that offers any hope of really solving the fundamental problems underlying the world's ills.

A successful mission needed more than a sound beginning and good planning. It needed first-rate personnel. The staff members on most American missions abroad have been technically competent. Most of them were selected with care and with high qualifications in mind. There were some exceptions, of course. American occupations of the Caribbean were led by military officers not particularly qualified for the task. But most of them did a surprisingly good job. An occasional undesirable such as Estes Rathbone, the Cuban postal official fired for dishonesty, crept in, particularly

when American political pressures played a part in the selection. Col. W. D. Wrightson, the health expert in Peru, apparently proved to be dilatory and inefficient. But such men were the exception.

Experts on these missions were generally well paid. Indeed, some people complained that they were paid too well. John C. Barnett, an agricultural expert, jumped from a salary of $1,200 to $6,000 when he went to Siam. In Japan, Capron's salary of $10,000 a year was greater than the prime minister's. One of Capron's associates, Benjamin Smith Lyman, got $7,000, a princely salary for those days. In Santo Domingo the American customs receiver was getting $500 a month, twice the salary of the Dominican minister of finance. In a few cases, such salaries seemed truly excessive for the services rendered.

Not all experts were paid by the foreign government receiving assistance, however. During the occupations in the Caribbean, the United States continued to pay the American officers there, although a few received supplemental income. Henry Bruère was paid by the American Metals Company while he investigated administrative procedures in Mexico in 1917. And the Dawes Commission paid its own expenses when it came to the aid of Santo Domingo. Furthermore, some of the experts had difficulty in collecting their pay. Finally, most of them could have had lucrative positions in the United States had they so desired. They frequently gave up these advantages in return for the relative hardship, insecurity, and conflict that were inevitably involved in such missions. Most of them doubtless deserved the salary they received and their salary scales were probably not out of line with the scales in positions of similar responsibility in the United States.

Although most of the American experts were technically competent, many had difficulties of one kind or another in human relations. Better preparation in the native languages would have helped here. Brill and Parker in China and Capron in Japan found themselves seriously hampered by their inability to speak the languages and the difficulty of finding translators able to handle the technical information with which the mission dealt. The fact that American agricultural instructors in Haiti could speak neither Haitian language, French or Creole, was one of the chief criticisms of these men. The language barrier, even if it was not of major importance, helped thicken the wall of isolation that often surrounded American experts, hampering their efforts to get information and lessening the amount of coöperation between the Americans and the natives.

The attitude of the experts toward the people with whom they had to work was a far more serious problem. People like Capron or some of the military officials in Haiti and Santo Domingo were openly contemptuous

of the native-born. In the case of Haiti there were a good many charges that American officials had brought the race problem with them from the United States. Race friction was not unknown in Liberia. The assumption that American Southerners, having lived with the Negro, were most competent to deal with him in foreign countries was a highly dubious one. Open contempt for one's associates, whatever the reason, does little to cement friendly, coöperative relations with them.

A few missions clearly suffered from the inability of their members to coöperate with other people, even when there was no question of racial or national prejudice involved. Most of the missions, however, enjoyed relatively harmonious internal relations. To be sure the Capron group in Japan, the Willis Survey in Patagonia, and Wrightson's and Bard's ill-fated missions to Peru suffered from internal dissension, but these were the exceptions rather than the rule.

Difficulties in coöperating with foreigners were more common. Of course, some conflicts were inevitable in a situation where two groups might not see eye to eye on a number of matters, and it is difficult to tell which of these problems were associated with conflicts of policy and which with personality difficulties. It is clear that the success of such men as Benjamin Lyman and David Murray in Japan was due in considerable part to the cordial relations they established. Others paid a good deal of attention to cultivating good relations but sometimes with indifferent success. Magoon's reputation in Cuba suffered badly in comparison with Wood's despite the fact that he had attempted to coöperate with the Cubans rather than command them. In a few cases—in Peru and in Persia—the mission clearly suffered because of the personality of its members.

Through the years, the United States was able to build up a sizable reservoir of men experienced in giving expert assistance to foreign governments. There was, to be sure, no organized colonial service, but the personnel for one was at hand. Financial experts such as W. W. Cumberland and W. Morgan Shuster; soldiers such as Leonard Wood and Frank McCoy; doctors and health men like John D. Long and Victor Heiser; educators like Harry Bard, Frank L. Crone, and Paul Monroe; scientists like C. F. Marbut, Bailey Willis, and John C. Branner—all worked abroad in two or more foreign countries or American colonial possessions. A good many got their start in Cuba or the Philippines, areas which seem to have been particularly important as training centers for such experts.

Experience, of course, did not necessarily guarantee success, but it helped. General Wood was less successful in the Philippines than he had been in Cuba, and Crowder's experience with the Advisory Law Com-

mission during the second American intervention in Cuba apparently did little to help him persuade the Cubans to reform their ways in the 1920's. The experience accumulated in the first occupation of Cuba did not guarantee a successful second occupation. Shuster's experience in Cuba and the Philippines apparently was not of much help to him in Persia. On the other hand, lack of experience severely handicapped the Americans in Santo Domingo. As soon as an officer gained some familiarity with local problems, he was transferred to some other post outside Santo Domingo.

One wonders in retrospect whether, given equal technical competence, native experts could have done a better job. Nearly all of the missions operated on the assumption that sooner or later native workers would have to take over the work performed initially by American experts. Training programs of one kind or another were an integral part of nearly all of the important missions. But Americans found that such training programs were often of only limited success. It was not merely a matter of transferring scientific principles and factual data from teacher to student; it was more largely a problem of developing attitudes: a desire to learn, an interest in science, a sense of honesty and public service. Had native workers had all these personal qualities in addition to technical competence, they might have done a good job, for the personal and cultural clashes that sometimes handicapped the American missions would not have occurred.

Experts, American or native, faced a long series of obstacles before they could successfully translate plans into realities. Missions at one time or another were plagued by scanty information, a shortage of funds, administrative difficulties of various kinds, the opposition of both foreign and local groups, and unfavorable cultural patterns.

The information and skills brought by Americans generally proved reasonably adequate. There was no question about most of the knowledge and techniques from the natural sciences. Yellow fever could be fought by eradicating the mosquito population, be it in the United States, Cuba, or Liberia. American engineering techniques and agricultural practices seemed applicable in nearly all parts of the world. There were occasional exceptions, of course. Some Haitians complained that American agricultural experts knew too little about the problems of a tropical country, and in Japan Capron found that while he could grow North American foods, this fact was relatively useless when the Japanese showed no taste for such foods. But experiences such as these seemed to be the exception.

The usefulness of American knowledge in the realm of the social sciences and social policy seemed somewhat more dubious. Wood's attempts to introduce the locally controlled school board, Anglo-Saxon legal tech-

niques such as trial by jury, and American electoral laws were not too happy. Perhaps not all American experts would have agreed that it was sound policy to try to introduce such institutions. Some of these failures, however, might be matched by successes. American military methods seemed well adapted to Latin-American needs. Educational reforms, if not completely successful everywhere, nevertheless represented important advances in Japan and Cuba. If American financial advice often failed to solve foreign economic problems, the fault generally lay in the execution rather than in the advice itself. Where American advice was followed as in the early days in Cuba, in Young's mission to China, or in other similar cases, the results were clearly good. Few foreign countries, at any rate, were obviously misled in the field of social policy.

Adequate capital resources were also necessary for a successful mission, assuming that the American advice and personnel were competent. A shortage of funds does not seem to have been a major difficulty in most of the missions discussed here. There were some outstanding exceptions, of course. The education and public works programs in Cuba were limited by the funds available and by the inability and reluctance of American officials to borrow extensively. The Huai Valley project in China had to be abandoned when it was impossible to get private capital for it. Dr. Henry Hanson's efforts to improve Peruvian health and American attempts to aid education in the same country both suffered from a shortage of funds.

But other missions had enough funds at least to prevent them from complaining about shortages. In at least one case, Crowder's struggle to reform the Cuban government in the 1920's, the shortage of funds was a virtue; Crowder used the possibility of a loan to get his way. In several cases, notably in the Caribbean occupations, Americans tried to show the natives the benefits of running the country without extensive foreign borrowing. Indeed, W. W. Cumberland felt on the basis of his experience as financial advisor to Peru that plentiful capital was a positive evil; too many governments did not have the ability to use loans profitably. Our conclusions on this point are, however, far from definitive. Most of the missions discussed here had only very modest capital requirements. Problems of acquiring funds may have been much more serious in the case of large-scale public improvements. Most such activities, however, were privately negotiated and were thus outside the scope of this study.

Probably no problem was as serious as that of proper administration. If the plans of American experts were to be brought to fruition, it was essential that they have authority commensurate with their responsibilities. The importance of this point was clearly recognized. American officials

complained in 1888 that Persian plans for bringing in American experts granted them inadequate authority. Both E. W. Kemmerer and W. W. Cumberland in reflecting on their long careers as financial advisors pointed out that little could be done unless experts were given sufficient powers. Some missions clearly suffered from too much responsibility and too little actual authority. This was certainly the case in the Millspaugh mission to Persia, Capron's efforts in Japan, Brill's work in China, and American efforts to improve Liberian health standards. Persistent complaints about the interference of the bureaucracy or other special groups bore witness to the universal existence of the difficulty. In some few cases where the missions received an unusual amount of coöperation from the government involved, the lack of well-defined authority was not quite so serious, but these were exceptional cases.

American experts acquired what authority they had in various ways. In some cases, this was fixed at the beginning by a contract. Capron and Murray in Japan and Millspaugh in Persia had such understandings. A treaty clearly defined the authority of the Dominican customs receivership. In most cases, including some of those involving initial contracts, the question of authority was open to constant revision. It generally required a good deal of constant negotiation and persistent political and economic pressure to bring stubborn opponents around. Experts often called on the American government to exert pressure to help them gain their ends. The amount and effectiveness of such pressure varied. Gerow Brill got virtually no diplomatic backing on his mission to China. In many cases, the American government refused to go further than to facilitate the negotiations for hiring American talent. On the other hand, in some key areas, notably the Caribbean, the United States went to the limit, exerting military as well as diplomatic and economic pressure. General Wood was probably one of the very few Americans abroad who had as much authority as he wanted or needed. In all of these cases the Americans involved generally had to try to weigh on the one hand the benefits to be derived from more adequate authority and on the other hand the friction and disagreements that almost inevitably accompanied the political and diplomatic jockeying necessary to get it.

The opposition of powerful groups opposed to the aims of the mission sometimes counterbalanced what authority the American experts had been able to accumulate. Some of the missions, of course, did so little to change the *status quo* that they had no occasion to arouse significant opposition, but these were certainly the less important American efforts.

A number of missions were either hampered or actually came to grief

because of the pressures of foreign powers. In China Brill found the Germans there uncooperative while his successor, Parker, had a good deal of trouble with Japanese. The financial reforms of Colson and the educational activities of Work in Ethiopia met opposition from foreign powers. In Persia, the Americans had been invited because they were not connected with either Britain or Russia, the two powers struggling for control of the country. Yet the Shuster mission came to grief specifically because of Russian pressures. Although the Millspaugh mission had been informally approved by the British and although the Russians were occupied elsewhere at the time, foreign intrigue and opposition apparently contributed to the downfall of this second attempt to aid Persia.

Finally, it should be noted that World War I played a significant role in some of the missions. It occasioned the abandonment of the Huai Valley project in China. The economic results of the war and the fact that American policy-makers were occupied by wartime problems both contributed to the difficulties of the American occupation authorities in Haiti and Santo Domingo.

The opposition of powerful local interests posed even more serious problems for some of the missions than did international rivalries and intervention. Almost any mission that attempted to make any significant changes was bound to offend some powerful groups. The most common complaint was that the work of the missions was hampered by the bureaucracies of the foreign governments involved. It was a rare group of Americans indeed, that did not complain of red tape. Brill in China found it impossible to get farmers' sons for his agricultural classes—the sons of officials usurped all the positions. In Japan Capron complained of the infinite number of supervisers required for the most minor tasks. In Turkey, Dr. J. Lawrence Smith found his attempt to develop a coal mine frustrated by the opposition of the Sultan's mother. This occurred only a few years after an American shipbuilder had been ousted because of the jealousy of Turkish officials. In Persia Millspaugh faced opposition from the bureaucracy. Such complaints could be multiplied many times.

Other political groups besides the bureaucracy proved troublesome. In Japan Raphael Pumpelly incurred the opposition of the powerful feudal lords, the daimyos, who felt that his work was strengthening the central government. Shuster found himself opposed by the grandees in Persia. Magoon was placed uncomfortably in the center of a patronage dispute in Cuba. Opportunistic political leaders often found it convenient to arouse nationalistic passions in their followers and make political capital at the expense of the foreign experts. This was a particular effective device in

the Caribbean where politicians had some grounds for raising the charge of imperialism against the Americans. Occupation authorities in Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua complained bitterly of frequent attacks which they felt were almost entirely politically motivated. Some of the criticism may have been justified and some of the occupation officials were unduly sensitive to criticism. But there can be little doubt that politicians who personally had a great deal to gain by an American evacuation played on nationalistic fervor and hatred of imperialism with great effectiveness in their campaigns to end American intervention.

Americans at other times came into conflict with well-established social and economic groups. American missions always had to face the question of who should be benefited by their activities. Shuster's tax reforms in Persia brought a quick reaction from the landed grandees of the realm. In Haiti, American officials faced the problem of how to deal with both the elite and the masses. The system of agricultural education in Haiti was set up at the expense of the classical educational system of the elite, a situation which provoked a storm of criticism from the latter. In Cuba Wood chose to coöperate with the upper classes rather than to institute any fundamental economic changes in the country. The power and pretensions of the Liberian elite posed a problem to Americans who worked in that country. A striking example of opposition from an entrenched interest is that of the Liberian physicians. They bluntly refused to coöperate in the yellow fever campaign because they felt it was a reflection on their professional competence.

American experts very often were hampered by well-entrenched social customs and ways of doing things. Some of these both irritated and amused the Americans. John Adams Church had to cope with mythical but ferocious dragons in developing Chinese coal mines. Brill had to try to instruct young Chinese officials in the arts of agriculture while they wore traditional long robes and carried the omnipresent fan. Capron's assistants had to wear formal clothes while demonstrating American farm machinery to Japanese royalty.

Other native ways were far harder to deal with. Americans found that Haitian culture provided no real place for the economic drives and motives so common in western European culture. How could there be any fundamental improvement in Haitian economic life if there was no real desire on the part of the people for self-improvement? Nearly everywhere Americans remarked a noticeable absence of such cherished ideals as honesty and public service. American electoral reforms met little success in a Cuba accustomed to settling political disputes by insurrection. Anglo-Saxon juris-

prudence found rough going in a country in which the law was regarded as an oppressor, in which collusion and perjury were common practices, and in which juries judged a man wholly apart from the evidence in the case.

The crux of the matter was that Americans based a good many of their plans on middle-class assumptions and sought to achieve middle-class standards and ends. Yet in most of these countries the middle class and its ideals were either weak or nonexistent. American officials in the Caribbean persistently referred to business groups and "better elements" in the country which were willing to coöperate with the occupation forces. But for the most part, these groups were small and notably uninterested in politics and political reform.

Many of these obstacles could be and were overcome. Technical skills could be improved. Sources of capital could be found. Administrative difficulties could be ironed out. And opposition groups could be overpowered or placated. But in the end there was little that could be done about the fundamental culture patterns of the country involved. The missions had to work within these patterns as best they could. Leaders of future technical missions may well ponder the problem.

It is extremely difficult to draw up any sort of balance sheet for the success or failure of American missions abroad before 1938. In some cases information on the final results of the missions is simply nonexistent. In others a final judgment must await closer studies in the countries concerned. In most cases the available evidence is confused or at least sufficiently contradictory to make impossible any kind of clear-cut judgment. There were few missions that were clearly successful, few that were total failures.

Certain generalizations about outcomes have emerged from the study, however. The purely scientific ventures were in large part successful. The process of gathering information rarely interferes with a vested interest and consequently almost never arouses any significant social obstacles to its success. Most of the advisory missions were, at least in some sense of the word, successful. They frequently gathered valuable information and made generally commendable recommendations. But their reports were, like so many other such documents, filed away in some musty corner and too often neglected. Perhaps David Murray's educational mission to Japan among the smaller ventures and Wood's first occupation of Cuba among the major efforts came about as close to success as any. There was no more abject failure to carry out a mission than Crowder's ill-fated efforts in Cuba in the 1920's. Most of the missions, however, showed a mixture of accomplishments and failures.

Who actually received the benefits from this technical assistance? A

good many of the missions clearly aided large parts of the population. The public health programs benefited rich and poor alike. Nearly everyone gained something from improved public order and increased government efficiency. Most of the missions, however, improved the position of relatively small groups. An American-trained constabulary in Santo Domingo and Liberia made easier the path of a dictator in the former and strengthened an elite in the latter. Educational reforms aided many people, but they generally favored urban over rural folk. In some places agricultural assistance seemed to strengthen the large landowner or plantation operator. In other places, such as Haiti, Americans made a valiant attempt to reach the masses of the people. Perhaps the vigorous opposition of the elite provided some indication of the success of this attempt. The nature of a good many of the missions, limited as they were to such relatively narrow topics as governmental reorganization or financial administration, made it inevitable that their benefits would be limited to small groups.

This study throws relatively little light on another extremely important question, namely, the long-term results of these activities. In some cases, the defeat of a mission and the disappearance of its accomplishments came concurrently. Crowder's reforms in the 1920's in Cuba disappeared beneath his very eyes. In other cases, the time span was longer. Most of Kemmerer's reforms faded away in the years following his missions. On the other hand, Arthur Young's reforms in Mexico and Honduras stood the test of time. In the case of the Caribbean nations, the long-term trend was mixed. Many of the American accomplishments such as improved education and public works decayed but did not completely disappear. Such accomplishments, even if neglected, sometimes formed the foundations for renewed efforts at a later date. The fruits of some of these missions, permanent as they may have been, yet seemed small in comparison with the problems that remained. James Thorp warned in his analysis of China's soil in 1933 that irrigation and reclamation projects offered little hope for China considering its high birth rate. The shadow of Malthus hung over Haiti also, where Americans were engaging in a comprehensive attack on the country's problems. Officials wondered whether they could keep up with the population rise.

How did these missions affect the American reputation? This is even more difficult to answer than preceding questions. It is open to debate whether American accomplishments in Cuba were worth the damage to the American reputation. There seems less doubt that the Americans in Haiti and Santo Domingo generated enough dislike to counterbalance the good effects of American reforms there. This is not to say that the net

effect of these missions has been to cloud the American reputation. The opposite may be the case. This study does not provide enough evidence for any final judgment. What is clear is that technical aid abroad is no simple or sure method of improving international relations. Such missions almost inevitably generate opposition, and opposition breeds discontent and conflict. In any case it is necessary carefully to balance the possible advantages of a mission against its potential disadvantages.

Policy-makers of the present might well ponder the meaning of these missions. They teach no final truths and provide no clear-cut blueprints for future enterprises. But they do call attention to the importance for good results of certain factors. Technical missions cannot alone remake the world even if Americans are willing to pour more effort into the task than they have shown any willingness to do in the past. But technical aid can help to achieve some limited but useful ends.

Missions should, clearly, be planned not only with care but with imagination, and in both the planning and the execution men and women should participate who really know something about the country being helped. Technical skill is not enough—there is needed also appreciation of the ideals and the accomplishments of the other land. Firmness and confidence are necessary in dealing with the inhabitants, but courtesy and tact are just as important.

Before experts are sent abroad it would be highly desirable that they be made aware of various difficulties they are bound to face. They should of course have money and authority to execute their plan. Above all, such missions ought to help those who really want help and are willing to coöperate. Finally, planners should carefully weigh the potential accomplishments, material and otherwise, of the mission against the potential damage to the American reputation.

Let it not be said that "history teaches nothing save that history teaches nothing." Careful planning and a coöperative spirit can work, using our great technical resources, to create happiness as well as material well-being abroad. But if American experience in the past is neglected or overlooked and the mistakes of previous missions are repeated, Point Four may turn out to be merely one more grand scheme that failed. In an atmosphere of freedom and good will, however, Americans can, through Point Four and its successive programs, be of very great help in bringing some of the blessings of liberty and well-being to needy peoples of the world.

A NOTE ON MATERIALS

Our footnotes indicate quite fully the wide range of materials on which this study rests. This note, therefore, is intended merely to bring together in a convenient summary the main categories of these materials and to characterize them in a general way. Anyone working in the field of international cultural relations—a relatively new field in which little basic research has thus far been done—will recognize the inevitability of our dependence on the types of materials brought together here.

This study is based in considerable part on official reports of the missions. These fall into two large groups. The first consists of the reports of American experts to the foreign governments which invited and financed them. In some instances these reports are detailed and voluminous. Such, for example, is the case with the *Reports and Official Letters to the Kaitakushi, by Horace Capron, Commissioner and Advisor, and his Assistants* (Tokei, 1875). Others are more technical. Bailey Willis' *Northern Patagonia. Character and Resources. Comisión de Estúdios Hidrológicos 1911–1914* (For the Ministry of Public Works, 1914) and *River, Lake and Land Conservancy in Portions of the Provinces of Anhui and Kiangsu North of the Yangtsze River* (Shanghai, 1913) are only two examples. Some of the reports of American technical experts to foreign governments, especially those in the field of finance, summarize very crisply what conditions the mission found and what was accomplished in the way of new legislation and administrative action. In a few instances, the reports of American missions to foreign governments were published only in the language of the country. But it is generally possible to locate the original English language report from which the translation was made; this was true, for example, of the report of the Hines-Kemmerer-Dorr mission to Turkey in the early 1930's.

The official reports in the second instance consist of those published in the United States. Many, such as the mid-nineteenth-century Gurley report on Liberia, the report of the Harbord mission to Armenia, and reports on military and naval missions and exchanges, are to be found in the Congressional series. Even more important are official reports published by various United States government agencies such as the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, the United States Health and Marine Hospital

Service and its successor, the Public Health Service, the Bureau of Entomology of the Department of Agriculture, the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, the United States Hydrographic Office, and the War and Navy Departments. The volumes of *Foreign Relations* published by the State Department are particularly useful; these volumes, if they do not always tell the complete story of a mission, provide invaluable leads for further investigation. The documentary material on the technical assistance programs in countries occupied by American military and naval forces is voluminous. The reports of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, Charles E. Magoon, the American High Commissioner in Haiti, the Dominican Customs Receivership, and various special commissions are very useful. Other United States Government documents such as the *Congressional Globe* and the *Congressional Record*, the *United States Statutes at Large*, the State Department's *Press Releases*, and hearings of Congressional committees offer further information, particularly on the inner history of the missions and the attitude of the American government.

These official reports, whether published in the United States or abroad, are sometimes inconclusive or misleading unless supplemented by other material. For example, the unpublished report of the Liberian Commission, in the State Department Record Group in the National Archives, is much more full than the published account. The unpublished despatches and reports from American foreign-service officers in nearly every case furnish valuable insights into the activities of American experts. Such despatches often include both the firsthand knowledge of the American representative concerned and translations of material from the foreign press offering foreign reaction to the American mission. This study also draws heavily on material in the National Archives deposited by the United States Geological Survey, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Plant Industry, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Surgeon General, and the Department of Labor. Special attention should be called to the rich and illuminating correspondence files in the Smithsonian Institution, the officers of which often helped recruit personnel and followed the activities of the experts with great interest.

A good many of the experts wrote memoirs or personal reminiscences of one kind or another. Many of these accounts were published. The list is a large one although the usefulness of the material varies. Of special value are Maj. Gen. A. W. Greely, *Reminiscences of Adventure and Service* (Scribner, 1927); John Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan* (Dutton, 1920); James Mark Baldwin, *Between Two Wars, 1861–1921* (Stratford Co., 2 vols., 1926); E. W. Kemmerer, "Advisory Work for Governments," *American Economic Review*, 17:1 ff. (Mar. 1927); Bailey Willis, *A Bit of Auto-*

biography. A Yanqui in Patagonia (Stanford University Press, 1947); Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Haiti under American Control* (World Peace Foundation, 1931), and *Americans in Persia* (The Brookings Institution, 1946); W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (Century, 1912); Melvin A. Hall, *Journey to the End of an Era* (Scribner, 1947); Arthur N. Young, *China's Financial Progress* (Foreign Policy Association, 1938); Frank J. Goodnow, *China: An Analysis* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1926); and Paul S. Reinsch, *An American Diplomat in China* (Doubleday, 1922). The list could easily be tripled.

Of inestimable importance are the manuscript collections of the principals in the missions overseas. The Gerow Brill Collection in the possession of Miss Mary Campbell Brill of Newark, New Jersey, is especially rich in incoming and outgoing correspondence, official and unofficial. The Horace Capron Memoirs, in two manuscript volumes in the United States Department of Agriculture Library, are basic but must be used cautiously. The manuscript reminiscences of Edwin Dun, in the same library, also throw considerable light on the Capron mission. The Benjamin Smith Lyman Collection in the Forbes Library in Northampton, Massachusetts, is made up of many volumes of outgoing correspondence, letters received, and miscellaneous personal papers useful in tracing Lyman's activities as a geologist in Japan. The David Murray Collection in the Library of Congress is necessary for any real understanding of one of the most successful technical missions, in this case in the field of education in Japan. The Charles LeGendre Collection in the Library of Congress is voluminous, but needs to be used with great caution in dealing with LeGendre's Japanese adventures. The Hamilton Fish Collection in the Library of Congress contains a large number of letters that give color and lend excitement to the study of the American missions in Japan in the 1870's. The Dawes Collection at Northwestern University throws much light on the Dawes mission to Santo Domingo.

We have supplemented the information provided by published memoirs and the manuscript collections of participants with letters from and interviews with a number of technical experts. We have acknowledged elsewhere in this volume our indebtedness to a considerable number of such men. The letters which they generously wrote for us are valuable documents.

Other primary materials used in this study include the newspaper and periodical press. We have made no systematic study of newspapers, but we found relevant material in the *London Times*, the *New York Times*, the New York *Tribune*, the *Washington Post*, the *New York Evening Post*, the *New York Commercial Advertiser*, and the *National Intelligencer*. Among the periodicals, the *American Journal of Science*, *Science*, *Journal of Race*

Developments, *The Independent*, *World's Work*, *Scientific American*, *Bulletin of the Pan American Union*, *Current History*, *Nation*, *New Republic*, *Outlook*, *Review of Reviews*, and *Asia* provided contemporary articles or comment of value.

It is not feasible to try to mention all the secondary works that appear in our footnotes. They vary greatly in their usefulness for this study. While few were written from the particular point of view of this study, many of them provide information of importance or offer useful leads for further investigation.

The current interest in Point Four has produced a growing literature dealing with the problems of economic development and cultural interchange in various parts of the world. Willard Espy's *Bold New Program* (Harper, 1950) is representative of the semi-popular approach. Books like H. B. Allen, *Rural Reconstruction in Action* (Cornell University Press, 1953), Robert T. Mack, Jr., *Raising the World's Standard of Living* (Citadel Press, 1953), S. H. Frankel, *Essays in Economic Impact on Underdeveloped Societies* (Harvard University Press, 1953), Walter R. Sharp, *International Technical Assistance* (Public Administration Service, 1952), and Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries* (Harper, 1954) are representative of growing scholarly interest. Jonathan Bingham, *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy* (John Day, 1953) sets a high standard for future memoirs from participants in Point Four work. While books such as these rarely dealt directly with this study, they often provided ideas or suggested problems for further investigation.

Among the more useful secondary works are various biographies and biographical sketches. Hermann Hagedorn's *Leonard Wood: A Biography* (Harper, 2 vols., 1931) and Philip C. Jessup's *Elihu Root* (Dodd, Mead, 2 vols., 1938) provided valuable insights into the American occupation of Cuba. Other biographies worthy of mention are John M. Gibson, *Physician to the World. The Life of General William C. Gorgas* (Duke University Press, 1950); H. H. Krusekopf (ed.), *Life and Work of C. F. Marbut* (Soil Science Association of America, n.d.); Edward B. Clark, *William L. Sibert, the Army Engineer* (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1930); William E. Griffis, *Verbeck of Japan* (Revell, 1900); and Forrest Crissey, *Alexander Legge, 1866–1933* (Chicago: Privately printed, 1936). The *Biographical Memoirs* and the *Memoirs of the National Academy of Science* and the *Dictionary of American Biography* furnish brief but illuminating sketches of many of the participants in the missions.

Among the more general secondary works, we found a number particularly useful for Latin America. Among these were Roscoe R. Hill,

Fiscal Intervention in Nicaragua (New York, 1933); Melvin M. Knight, *Americans in Santo Domingo* (Vanguard, 1928); Sumner Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard* (Payson and Clarke, 2 vols., 1928); Charles E. Chapman, *A History of the Cuban Republic* (Macmillan, 1927); Russell H. Fitzgibbon, *Cuba and the United States, 1900–1935* (Menasha, Wis.: George Banta, 1935); Leland Hamilton Jenks, *Our Cuban Colony* (Vanguard, 1928); David A. Lockmiller, *Magoon in Cuba* (University of North Carolina Press, 1938); Raymond L. Buell, "The American Occupation of Haiti," *Foreign Policy Association Information Service*, 5:327 ff. (Nov. 27—Dec. 12, 1929); and Lois F. Parks and Gustave A. Nuermberger, "The Sanitation of Guayaquil," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 23:204 ff. (May, 1943).

For the Far East, Inazo Nitobé, *The Intercourse between the United States and Japan* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1891); George B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan* (Knopf, 1950); Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry* (McGraw-Hill, 1949); and John A. Harrison, "The Capron Mission and the Colonization of Hokkaido, 1868–1875," *Agricultural History*, 25: 135–42 (July, 1951), were particularly useful. John A. Harrison, *Japan's Northern Frontier* (University of Florida Press, 1953) appeared as this volume was about to go to press. Raymond Leslie Buell, *Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847–1947* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947) competently surveys that area of American interest, while Sister Rosaleen Gilroy, C.S.J., "The Shuster Mission to Persia, 1911–1912" (Doctoral Dissertation, Fordham University, 1947), furnishes information on the Middle East ventures of American experts.

NOTES

THE FOLLOWING list includes only those abbreviations and abbreviated titles that may not be self-evident. For fuller description of manuscript collections the reader is referred to the "Note on Materials" in the preceding pages.

Blakeslee. George H. Blakeslee, ed. *Mexico and the Caribbean.* Stechert, 1920.

Brooke, *Report. Civil Report of Major-General John R. Brooke, U.S. Army, Military Governor, Island of Cuba.* G.P.O., 1900.

Dominican Customs Receivership. Annual Report of the Dominican Customs Receivership, published by the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, for successive fiscal periods.

F.P.A. Foreign Policy Association.

Foreign Relations. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States . . . 1861——. G.P.O., 1861——.

G.P.O. Government Printing Office.

Inquiry. Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo. Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, U. S. Senate. G.P.O., 1922.

J.A.H. Journal of American History.

J.N.H. Journal of Negro History.

Magoon, *Report.* Charles E. Magoon. *Republic of Cuba; Report of Provisional Administration. . . .* Havana: Rambla and Bouza, 1908–9. Citations designate the periods covered: Oct. 13, 1906 to Dec. 1, 1907; and Dec. 1, 1907 to Dec. 1, 1908.

Moton Commission Report. Report of the United States Commission on Education in Haiti. Dept. of State, Latin American Ser. No. 5. G.P.O., 1931.

N.A. National Archives.

Report of High Commissioner. Annual Report of the American High Commissioner at Port au Prince, Haiti . . . . G.P.O., 1923–30. Each citation designates the year covered by the report, not the year of publication.

Reports and Official Letters. Reports and Official Letters to the Kaitakushi, by Horace Capron, Commissioner and Advisor, and his Assistants. Tokei, 1875.

Wood, *Report. Civil Report of Major General Leonard Wood, Military Governor of Cuba . . . .* [Havana, ?1901–2], 12 vols. (for the period Dec. 20, 1899—Dec. 31, 1900); [Havana, ?1903], 15 vols. (for the year 1901); [Balti-

more, 1903], 6 vols. (for the period Jan. 1—May 20, 1902). Citations designate the periods covered.

CHAPTER ONE

1 Robert Hunt, in *D.N.B.*, *s.v.* "Davy, Sir Humphry."

2 95 Cong. Rec. 477–78 (Jan. 20, 1949).

3 For example, see Harry Franklin Jackson, "The Technological Development of Central America, 1823–1913" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1948).

4 A good start has been made in this direction by Charles William Forman, "Science for Empire: Britain's Development of the Empire through Scientific Research, 1895–1940" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1941).

CHAPTER TWO

1 These included the mission of Beaumont and Tocqueville in the early 1830's to study American prisons; that of Thomas Wyse, M.P., in 1838, to study American educational agencies, that of P. A. Siljestrŏm of Sweden, with a similar purpose.

2 H. Exec. Doc. No. 54, 30 Cong., 1 sess. (Washington, 1848), pp. 239 ff.

3 Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 60, 36 Cong., 1 sess. (Washington, 1860). The letters of Alfred Mordecai, one of the members of the mission, are in the library of Congress. George B. McClellan was also a member of the mission.

4 *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition* (Washington, 1844. 5 vols.). Volumes containing the scientific reports appeared from time to time, the last one being issued in 1874. For modern evaluations of Wilkes' contributions to knowledge, see Frank E. Ross, "The Antarctic Explorations of Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, U.S.N.," *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, South Australian Branch*, 35:130–41 (1935), and D. M. Henderson, *Hidden Coasts* (Sloane, 1953).

5 *The U.S. Naval Astronomical Expedition . . . 1849–52*, H. Exec. Doc. No. 121, 33 Cong., 1 sess. (Washington, 1855–56. 4 vols.).

6 Thomas Jefferson Page, *La Plata, the Argentine Confederation, and Paraguay* (Harper, 1859); "Autobiographic Sketch of Thomas Jefferson Page," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 49:1661–91 (Oct., 1923).

7 *Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon*, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 36, 32 Cong., 2 sess. (Washington, 1853–54. 2 vols.). H. Miscel. Doc. No. 22, 33 Cong., 1 sess. (Washington, 1854). See also Donald Dozer, "Pathfinder of the Amazon," *Va. Quar. Rev.*, 23:554–67 (Autumn, 1947).

8 Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 11, 31 Cong., 1 sess. (Washington, 1850). After the Civil War Albert K. Owen envisioned a railroad from Norfolk, Virginia, to Mexico, terminating on the west coast. He appealed to Congress for a sur-

vey from Austin to Topolobampo. Congress finally called on Army engineers to report on the potentialities of the proposed road, but made no appropriations. In the end the scheme failed.—J. Fred Rippy, *Latin America and the Industrial Age* (Putnam, 1944), pp. 154–60. For a later chapter of the story see Frank A. Knapp, Jr., "Precursors of American Investment in Mexican Railroads," *Pacific Hist. Rev.*, 21:43–64 (Feb., 1952).

9 Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 9, 36 Cong., 2 sess. (Washington, 1861).

10 J. Fred Rippy, *The Capitalists and Colombia* (Vanguard, 1931), pp. 44–45.

11 *Reports of Explorations and Surveys for the Location of a Ship-Canal . . . 1872–'73*, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 57, 43 Cong., 1 sess. (G.P.O., 1874).

12 Perry McDonough Collins, *A Voyage Down the Amoor: with a Land Journey through Siberia* (D. Appleton, 1860).

13 George Kennan, *Tent Life in Siberia, and Adventures Among the Koraks* (Putnam, 1870), Preface, pp. 2–3.

14 Benjamin Mills Peirce, comp., *A Report on the Resources of Iceland and Greenland* (G.P.O., 1868).

15 *Narrative of the Second Arctic Expedition made by Charles F. Hall . . .*, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 27, 45 Cong., 3 sess. (G.P.O.,1879); C. H. Davis, ed., *Narrative of the North Polar Expedition . . .* (G.P.O., 1876).

16 Maj. Gen. A. W. Greely, *Reminiscences of Adventure and Service* (Scribner, 1927), pp. 120 ff.

17 *Report of the International Polar Expedition to Point Barrow, Alaska . . .*, H. Exec. Doc. No. 44, 48 Cong., 2 sess. (G.P.O., 1885); *Ninth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology . . .*, H. Miscel. Doc. No. 11, 52 Cong., 2 sess. (G.P.O., 1892), pp. 3–441.

18 Greely, *Reminiscences*, p. 121.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 127; see also Adolphus W. Greely, *International Polar Expedition. Report on the Proceedings of the United States Expedition to Lady Franklin Bay, Grinnell Land* (G.P.O., 1888. 2 vols.).

20 A. W. Greely, *The Polar Regions in the Twentieth Century* (Little-Brown, 1928), pp. 214–15.

21 *Foreign Relations, 1890*, pp. 193–94.

22 *Report of the Superintendent of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey . . . June, 1890*, H. Exec. Doc. No. 80, 51 Cong., 2 sess. (G.P.O., 1891), Appendix No. 12.

23 U.S. Hydrographic Office, *West Coast of Mexico and Gulf of California. Original Surveys of U.S.S. Narragansett 1873–1875, U.S.S. Ranger, 1890–1892, and U.S.S. Thetis 1894–1897* (Hydrographic Office, Jan., 1909); *Foreign Relations, 1874*, pp. 746, 754; *ibid., 1880*, p. 713.

24 Alexander Agassiz, *Three Cruises of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Steamer 'Blake' . . .* (Houghton Mifflin, 1888. 2 vols.).

25 *Foreign Relations, 1878*, pp. 70–71.

26 *Ibid., 1899*, pp. 795–96.

27 Arthur Powell Davis, "Hydrography of Nicaragua," in U.S. Geol. Surv., *20th Annual Report, 1898–1899* (G.P.O.,1899–1900. 7 pts.). Pt. 4, pp. 563–660.

28 Intercontinental Railway Commission, *Reports* (Washington, 1895–98. 3 vols. in 4).

29 A few examples of such assistance are cited in this work, but private American citizens and their expert assistance to foreign governments are a story in themselves.

30 See Chapter 4.

31 See Chapter 3.

32 *Foreign Relations, 1868,* 2:330–31; *ibid., 1871,* pp. 249–50.

33 Frelinghuysen to Hall, Feb. 15, Apr. 4, June 18, June 23, July 31, 1883; John Davis to Hall, Aug. 20, 1883 (Central America, 18, Instrs., Dept. of State, N.A.).

34 W. Godfrey Hunter to John Hay, Feb. 1, 1901 (Central America, Guatemala, and Honduras, Despatches 486–600, Dept. of State, N.A.).

35 Sen. Doc. No. 125, 54 Cong., 1 sess.

36 R. A. F. Penrose, Jr., "Biographical Memoir of John Casper Branner, 1850–1922," *Memoirs of the Nat. Acad. Sci.,* Vol. 21, Third Memoir (1926); R. A. F. Penrose, Jr., "Memorial to John Casper Branner," *Bul. Geol. Soc. Amer.,* 36:15–44 (1925); *Pan American Geologist,* 37:257–66 (May 1922).

37 *Engineering and Mining Journal,* 103:427–28 (Mar. 10, 1917); *New York Tribune,* Feb. 14, 1917.

38 Bailey Willis, *Friendly China. Two Thousand Miles Afoot Among the Chinese* (Stanford University Press, 1949), pp. xiii-iv, 50 ff.; *Research in China.* Part I: *Descriptive Topography and Geology* (Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1907–13. 3 vols.).

39 As we have seen, Branner was also a member of the group that made important studies of geology in Brazil. See above p. 19.

40 John C. Branner, *Cotton Culture in the Empire of Brazil,* Dept. of Agric., Miscel., Spec. Rpt. No. 8 (G.P.O., 1885).

41 *Cruise of the Revenue-Steamer Corwin in Alaska and the N.W. Arctic Ocean in 1881,* H. Exec. Doc. No. 105, 47 Cong., 2 sess. (G.P.O., 1883), pp. 55 ff.; Edward W. Nelson, *Report upon Natural History Collections Made in Alaska . . .,* Sen. Miscel. Doc. No. 156, 49 Cong., 1 sess. (G.P.O.,1887).

42 Corr. of the Office of the Secy. of Agric., 1893–97 (Boxes 2 and 3, Rec. Gp. 16, Natural Resources, N.A.); Will C. Barnes, "Edward William Nelson, Naturalist, Explorer, Writer, and Arizona Cattleman," *Ariz. Hist. Rev.,* 6:43–49 (Oct., 1935). L. O. Howard also reported on the Mexican cotton-boll weevil in 1896 in U.S. Dept. of Agric., Div. of Entomology, "The Mexican Cotton-Boll Weevil," Cir. No. 14, ser. 2 (1896). This report was translated into Spanish and German.

43 Henry F. Schultz, *Report of Horticulturist Schultz to the Secretary of Fo-*

mento (Panama: Linotipo Diario de Panama, 1909); William D. McCain, *The United States and the Republic of Panama* (Duke University Press, 1937), p. 163.

44 Albert Koebele, *Report of a Trip to Australia . . . to Investigate the Natural Enemies of the Fluted Scale*, U.S. Dept. of Agric., Div. of Entomology, Bul. No. 21 (G.P.O., 1890).

45 This account is based in part on a sketch of Dr. James Bolton Davis in *History of the State Agricultural Society of South Carolina from 1839 to 1845* (Columbia, S. C.: R. L. Bryan Co., 1916), pp. 223 ff. and on the diplomatic correspondence between the Department of State and the American legation in Constantinople deposited in the National Archives, especially John P. Brown, Dragoman of the Legation, to Secy. of State Buchanan, Jan. 5, 1846; Carr to Buchanan, Oct. 24, Dec. 14, 1848; Buchanan to Carr, May 14, Aug. 18, Aug. 28, 1846; Oct. 15, 1847 (Despatches, Turkey, Vol. 10, Gen. Records of the Dept. of State, Rec. Gp. 59, N.A.). It is worth noting that Carr was involved in the problems arising from the mission to a greater extent than he had anticipated. Davis settled for his salary of $1,000 a month for the time he was in Turkey and his further claims were compromised; he accepted an additional $24,000.

46 Benjamin Silliman, "Memoir of John Lawrence Smith," National Academy of Sciences, *Biographical Memoirs*, 2:217–48 (1886); *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 19:535–37 (1883); *American Journal of Science*, 26:414–16 (Nov., 1883); George Pitt to Secy. of State Buchanan, July 13, 1846, encl. in Buchanan to Carr, Aug. 18, 1846 (Despatches from Dept. of State, Rec. Gp. 84, N.A.).

47 Charles J. Murphy, *Reminiscences of the War of the Rebellion, and of the Mexican War* (New York: F. J. Ficker, 1882).

48 Burnet Landreth to Charles Murphy, Philadelphia, Apr. 21, 1892, encl., Murphy to J. Sterling Morton, Copenhagen, Mar. 6, 1893 (Corr. of Office of Secy. of Agric., 1893–97, Box 2, Rec. Gp. 16, N.A.).

49 Charles Murphy, *A Lecture Delivered by Charles J. Murphy . . . before the National Agricultural Society of France* (Edinburgh: R. Grant & Son, 1890).

50 Murphy to Morton, Mar. 2, 1893 (Box 2, Corr. of Office of Secy. of Agric., 1893–97, Rec. Gp. 16, N.A.).

51 Senator A. S. Paddock to Charles Murphy, Washington, July 2, 1892; Paddock to Murphy, Beatrice, Nebraska, Nov. 30, 1892 (*ibid.*).

52 Murphy to Delano, Esq., Brussels, Apr. 13, 1894 (Box 4, *ibid.*).

53 Murphy to Morton, Copenhagen, Mar. 2, 1893 (Box 2, *ibid.*).

54 Morton to Murphy, Sept. 1, 1894 (Pers. File of Charles J. Murphy, Dept. of Agric., N.A.).

55 H. Exec. Doc. No. 243, 53 Cong., 2 sess. (G.P.O., 1894), pp. 33 ff.

56 Harvey W. Wiley, *An Autobiography* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1930), pp. 318–20.

57 Olivia Rossetti Agresti, *David Lubin: A Study in Practical Idealism* (Little-Brown, 1922).
58 *Shanghai Mercury*, Oct. 8, 1897 (Brill Collection).
59 The Reverend Sidney C. Partridge to President Schurman, Wuchang, Mar. 15, 1897 (*ibid.*).
60 Brill to Partridge, Ithaca, Apr. 19, 1897; Partridge to Brill, July 8, 1897; Partridge to Schurman, June 14, 1897 (*ibid.*).
61 Agreement between Professor G. D. Brill and the Provincial Government of the Peh, no date (*ibid.*).
62 Milton Whitney, Div. of Soils, Dept. of Agric., Washington, D.C., to President W. A. Clark, Columbia, S.C., July 28, 1897; Roberts to Brill, Ithaca, July 20, Aug. 5, 1897 (*ibid.*).
63 Brill to Secy. of Agric. James Wilson, Aug. 27, 1897 (Corr. of Secy. of Agric., Rec. Gp. 16, N.A.); *Poughkeepsie Semi-Weekly Eagle*, July 27, 1897.
64 J. H. Ketcham to Secy. of Agric. James Wilson, Aug. 13, 1899 (Corr. of Office of Secy. of Agric., 1893–97, Rec. Gp. 16, N.A.).
65 Dean I. P. Roberts, Ithaca, to Brill, Feb. 3, 1898 (Brill Collection).
66 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Wuchang, Mar. 3, Mar. 22, 1898 (*ibid.*).
67 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Wuchang, Oct. 17, 1899 (*ibid.*).
68 John Ferguson to Brill, Nanyang College, Shanghai, May 7, 1898; E. T. Williams to Brill, Kianguan Arsenal, Shanghai, Nov. 15, 1898; J. G. Schurman to Brill, Ithaca, May 21, 1899 (*ibid.*).
69 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Wuchang, July 9, Nov. 20, 1899; Sept. 19, 1898 (*ibid.*).
70 George J. Corey to Brill, Amsterdam, Dec. 17, 1898; Brill to Professor W. C. Stubbs, Aug. 20, 1898; Brill to Professor E. H. Barbour, Aug. 30, 1898 (*ibid.*).
71 Brill to His Excellency, Chang Chih-tung, Viceroy of Hu Peh, and Hu Nan, Oct. 8, 1899 (*ibid.*).
72 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Apr. 16, Mar. 31, 1898 (*ibid.*).
73 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Wuchang, July 17, 1898 (*ibid.*).
74 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Wuchang, Mar. 3, 1898 (*ibid.*).
75 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Jan. 2, 1898 (*ibid.*).
76 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, May 2, 1899 (*ibid.*).
77 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, June 6, 1898 (*ibid.*).
78 Brill to His Excellency, the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, Wuchang, Nov. 16, 1898 (*ibid.*).
79 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Tokyo, Aug. 3, 1899 (*ibid.*).
80 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Wuchang, Oct. 6, Nov. 5, 1899 (*ibid.*).
81 Brill to the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, Oct. 8, 1899 (*ibid.*).
82 Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Dec. 15, 1899 (*ibid.*).
83 E. H. Conger to Brill, Peking, Jan. 18, 1900 (*ibid.*).
84 Partridge to Brill, Wuchang, Dec. 2, 1899 (*ibid.*).

85 *Ibid.*; Brill to Mrs. Stacia Dodge, Nov. 28, 1899; Feb. 11, 1900 (*ibid.*).
86 Secy. of Agric. James Wilson to Brill, July 3, 1900 (*ibid.*).
87 Ernest A. Bessey, Office of Plant Industry, Dept. of Agric., to Brill, May 25, 1901 (*ibid.*).
88 John Gilmore to Brill, Berkeley, Calif., Feb. 28, 1924 (*ibid.*).
89 The discussion of the Parker mission is based on the Correspondence of the Bureau of Plant Industry *re* work of Edward C. Parker in Manchuria, 1908–12 (Rec. Gp. 54, N.A.).
90 Correspondence of the Bureau of Plant Industry *re* Men Furnished or Recommended to Foreign Governments, 1912 (*ibid.*).
91 *Report of an Agricultural Tour in Europe, America, and Japan during 1912–1913* (Bangalore: Printed at the Government Press, 1914).

CHAPTER THREE

1 Allan B. Cole, ed., *A Scientist with Perry in Japan* (University of North Carolina Press, 1947). Introduction.
2 Bailey Willis, "Biographical Memoir of Raphael Pumpelly, 1837–1923," Nat. Acad. of Sci., *Biographical Memoirs*, 16:23–62 (1931).
3 Rossiter W. Raymond, "Biographical Notice of William Phipps Blake," *Trans. Am. Inst. Mining Engineers*, 41:851–64 (1910).
4 Raphael Pumpelly, *Across America and Asia* (Leypoldt & Holt, 1870), p. 100.
5 William P. Blake, "Notes on the Geology of the Island of Yesso, Japan," *Trans. Conn. Acad. Arts and Sci.*, 2 (Pt. 2): 299–300 (1873).
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7 William E. Griffis, *Verbeck of Japan* (Revell, 1900); Charles Lanman, ed., *The Japanese in America* (New York: University Publishing Co., 1872), p. 45.
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68 The subject has been investigated by Robert S. Schwantes in a dissertation presented at Harvard University in 1950. We have not seen this study.

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CHAPTER FOUR

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4 *Affairs in Liberia*, Sen. Doc. No. 457, 61 Cong., 2 sess. (G.P.O., 1910), *passim*.

5 J. C. O'Laughlin, Asst. Secy. of State, to Robert C. Ogden, Feb. 16, 1909 (794 Numerical File 1906–10, N.A.).

6 Lyon to Dept. of State, Feb. 17, 1909 (*ibid.*).

7 Philander C. Knox to W. Morgan Shuster and others, Apr. 13, 1909 (795 Numerical File 1906–10, N.A.).

8 *Affairs in Liberia*, pp. 8 ff.; Booker T. Washington to Elihu Root, Dec. 14, 1908 (794 Numerical File 1906–10, N.A.).

9 Washington to Root, Dec. 14, 1908; Root to Washington, Dec. 16, 1908; Seth Low to Root, Dec. 28, 1908; Root to Low, Jan. 19, 1909 (*ibid.*). See also Emmett Scott, "Is Liberia Worth Saving?" *Journal of Race Development*, 1:277–301 (Jan., 1911).

10 O'Laughlin to Washington, Feb. 11, 1909 (794 Numerical File 1906–10, N.A.).

11 Robert Bacon to Whitelaw Reid, Feb. 16, 1909; Dept. of State to Ernest Lyon, Feb. 18, 1909 (*ibid.*).

12 Flower proved to be a problem. In Liberia he consorted openly with the most violent critics of the government, failed to attend public receptions for the commission, and contradicted statements of his colleagues. On his return he wrote letters to the department disparging the commission and offering to convey special information he had personally collected in Liberia. The offer was refused. Flower insisted that it was a mistake to send a colored man as Minister to Liberia.

13 Frank A. Flower to Secy. of State Knox, Laurel, Md., Aug. 12, 1909 (799 Numerical File 1906–10, N.A.).

14 Interview with Dr. George Finch, Apr. 16, 1951.

15 Lyon to Knox, Monrovia, Apr. 2, 1909 (797 Numerical File 1906–10, N.A.).

16 Roland P. Falkner to Sec. Knox, May 15, 1908; Lyon to Knox, June 9, 1909 (795 Numerical File 1906–10, N.A.).

17 Interview with Dr. George Finch, Apr. 16, 1951.

18 Lyon to Knox, Monrovia, June 9, 1909 (795 Numerical File 1906–10, N.A.).

19 *Affairs in Liberia*, p. 30.

20 Falkner to Knox, Washington, July 21, 1909 (795 Numerical File 1906–10, N.A.).

21 The following discussion is based on the Report of the Liberian Commission dated Oct. 9, 1909 (797 Numerical File 1906–10, N.A.). See also *Affairs in Liberia*.

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25 Knox to Lyon, June 11, 1910, *Foreign Relations, 1910*, pp. 709–10.

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29 E. Spencer Pratt to Secy. of State Bayard, Nov. 29, 1886 (Persia Despatches 2, N.A.).
30 Pratt to Bayard, Feb. 6, 1888 (Persia Despatches 3, N.A.).
31 Pratt to Bayard, Dec. 19, 1887 (*ibid.*).
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35 Russell to Secy. of State, Teheran, Sept. 29, 1910 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).
36 Memorandum, no signature, to Mr. Knox, Sept. 13, 1910 (*ibid.*).
37 Huntington Wilson to U. S. Embassy, London, Sept. 21, 1910, (*ibid.*).
38 Whitelaw Reid to Secy. of State, London, Sept. 22, 1910 (*ibid.*).
39 Comment of Adee on telegram from Russell to Secy. of State, Oct. 27, 1910; Adee to Russell, Oct. 28, 1910; Nov. 10, 1910 (*ibid.*).
40 Russell to Secy. of State, Nov. 10, 1910 (*ibid.*).
41 Shuster to Taft, Dec. 28, 1910, encl. in letter from President Taft to Secy. of State Knox, Dec. 28, 1910; Franklin MacVeagh to Knox, Jan. 17, 1911 (*ibid.*).
42 Knox to Mirza Ali-kuli Khan, Jan. 19, 1911 (*ibid.*); Curtis Guild to Secy. of State, St. Petersburgh, Dec. 17, 1912 (State Dept. Rec. File 1910–29, Rec. Gp. 59, N.A.); Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (Century, 1912), pp. 3–4.
43 In addition to Shuster's own account, *The Strangling of Persia*, the mission has been described in a competent doctoral dissertation written by Sister Rosaleen Gilroy, C.S.J., "The Shuster Mission to Persia, 1911–1912" (Fordham University, 1947).
44 Russell to the Secy. of State, Mar. 29, 1911 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).
45 Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia*, pp. 6 ff., 282 ff., 301 ff.; Gilroy, "The Shuster Mission," pp. 98 ff.
46 On July 26, 1911, the *New York Times* reported that Shuster was engaging in military activity. This report he asked to have publicly denied as sensational and groundless.—Shuster, telegram, to Dept. of State; Whitelaw Reid to President Taft, London, Nov. 29, 1911 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).

47 Shuster to Secy. of State, Aug. 26, 1911 (*ibid.*); Shuster asked to have the War Department send small-arms firing regulations, infantry and cavalry regulations, guard manual, Butts' Drill Manual, and other aids. The department refused to do this on the ground that the United States government must scrupulously abstain from even seeming to interfere in Persian domestic issues: Huntington Wilson to Russell, Aug. 26, 1911 (*ibid.*).

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CHAPTER FIVE

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CHAPTER SIX

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27 *Foreign Relations, 1917*, p. 716; *ibid., 1918*, pp. 361, 367; *ibid., 1920*, 2: 160; Snowden, *Santo Domingo*, pp. 37–42; *Inquiry*, p. 943; Trujillo, *Evolution of Democracy in Santo Domingo*, p. 37.

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29 *Foreign Relations, 1917*, pp. 716–17, 720; *ibid., 1918*, pp. 362, 367–68; *ibid., 1919*, 2:100, 120; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 2:849, 881, 907–9; see also footnote 36.

30 *Bul. Pan Am. Union*, 51:97–98 (July, 1920); Snowden, *Santo Domingo*, pp. 26–27, 29–30; for contrasting views of the provost courts, see Thorpe, "American Achievements in Santo Domingo," and Schoenrich, "Intervention in Santo Domingo and Haiti," in Blakeslee, pp. 212, 244–45; also see footnote 32.

31 Knight, *Americans in Santo Domingo*, pp. 119–20; *Inquiry*, pp. 1330–31; Chapman, "The United States and the Dominican Republic," *Hisp. Am. Hist. Rev.*, 7:88–89; letter of Philip Douglass, Apr. 13, 1921, in *Nation*, 112:663.

32 *Foreign Relations, 1916*, p. 249; *ibid., 1919*, 2:99–100, 118–19, 126–28, 132–34, 143; *ibid., 1920*, 2:160–73; Knight, *Americans in Santo Domingo*, pp. 78–79, 108–10, 112–17; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 2:803–10; letter of Tulio M. Cestero, Apr. 2, 1920, in *Nation*, 117:78–79 (July 17, 1920); Blakeslee, pp. 213, 224, 245.

33 Schoenrich, "Intervention in Santo Domingo and Haiti," in Blakeslee, *passim;* Carl Kelsey's *American Intervention in Haiti* was printed separately and was also reprinted in the Senate *Inquiry;* William E. Pulliam, "The Troubles of a Benevolent Despot," *Outlook*, 126:758–60 (Dec. 29, 1920); *Foreign Relations, 1920*, 2:136–38.

34 *Ibid., 1919*, 2:98–99, 106 ff., 128–35, 139–44; *ibid., 1920*, 2:110–11, 115–20; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 2:824–27; *Nation*, 111:79–83 (July 17, 1920) contains some relevant documents.

35 *Foreign Relations, 1920*, 2:136–38, 145–51, 155–57; *ibid., 1921*, 1:828–34, 837.

36 *Foreign Relations, 1921*, 1:834–53; *ibid., 1922*, 2:10–78; *ibid., 1923*, 1:892–917; *ibid., 1924*, 1:618–43; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, 2:840, 845–50, 859–66, 872–75, 880–95, 906–7; Knight, *Americans in Santo Domingo*, pp. 120–25.

37 *Foreign Relations, 1924*, 1:662–66, gives the new convention; for the loans of the period under this convention, see *Dominican Customs Receivership, 1925*, p. 6; *ibid., 1926*, pp. 6–9; *ibid., 1928*, p. 3; for tariff changes, see Knight, *Americans in Santo Domingo*, pp. 127–28; on the rise of graft and corrup-

tion, see *Foreign Relations, 1930*, 2:716; Memo. No. 1, Sumner Welles to C. G. Dawes, Feb. 21, 1929 (in "Dominican Commission, 1929," Dawes Collection).

38 Welles to Dawes, Feb. 20, 1929: Dawes to Welles, Feb. 22, 1929; Welles to Vasquez, Feb. 28, 1929; Dawes to Welles, Feb. 26, 1929; Dawes to Owen D. Young, Mar. 7, 1929 (in "Dominican Commission, 1929," Dawes Collection); *Report of Dominican Economic Commission*, p. vii; Welles to Birr, June 27, 1952.

39 *Report of Dominican Economic Commission, passim;* At Sea, S. S. Coamo, Mar. 31, 1929 ("Santo Domingo Notes," Dawes Collection). These are notes kept by Dawes on his mission.

40 New York City, Mar. 27, Santo Domingo, Apr. 3, Apr. 4, Apr. 6, 1929 (in "Santo Domingo Notes," Dawes Collection).

41 J. Clawson Roop to Dawes, Santo Domingo, May 7, 1929 (in "Dominican Commission, 1929," Dawes Collection); Henry P. Seidemann, "Report on Reorganization of Financial and Business Administration of the Dominican Republic" (MS report dated Feb. 24, 1930, in Dawes Collection), pp. 3–5, 33–35; Taylor G. Addison, *Reorganization of the Financial Administration of the Dominican Republic* (Brookings Institution, 1931), pp. vii–viii *et passim*.

42 W. E. Dunn, *Dominican Republic: Report of the Special Emergency Agent for the Period October 23, 1931 to December 31, 1932* ([Santo Domingo, D.R., 1933]), pp. 38–39; Welles to Birr, June 27, 1952.

43 Dunn, *Report of Special Emergency Agent*, pp. 9–10; *Foreign Relations, 1930*, 2:727 ff.

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45 *Foreign Relations, 1930*, 2:736; Wadsworth to Birr, July 7, 1952; Dunn, *Report of Special Emergency Agent*, pp. 9–22.

46 *Ibid.*, pp. 25–28; *Dominican Customs Receivership, 1931*, pp. 4–5, 9–11; *ibid., 1934*, pp. 6–9.

47 *Ibid., 1937*, p. 10; *ibid., 1939*, p. 9; Trujillo, *Evolution of Democracy*, pp. 47–49; *U.S. Statutes at Large*, 55:1104–11 (Sept. 24, 1940).

48 Raymond Leslie Buell, "The American Occupation of Haiti," *F.P.A. Info. Serv.*, 5:331–37, 341 (Nov. 27—Dec. 12, 1929); *Foreign Relations, 1914*, pp. 345–46, 351–54, 370–71; *ibid., 1915*, pp. 496–515.

49 Buell, "American Occupation of Haiti," *F.P.A. Info. Serv.*, 5:342–44; *Foreign Relations, 1914*, pp. 339–40; *ibid., 1916*, pp. 311–14.

50 *Ibid., 1914*, pp. 339–40, 345 ff.; *ibid., 1915*, pp. 461–68; Buell, "American Occupation of Haiti," *F.P.A. Info. Serv.* 5:339.

51 *Foreign Relations, 1915*, pp. 468–76; *ibid., 1916*, pp. 313–20.

52 *Ibid., 1915*, pp. 477–96, 515–38, 431–60; *ibid., 1916*, pp. 328–32, 359–60; *ibid., 1917*, pp. 802–8.

53 *Ibid., 1915*, pp. 434–36; *ibid., 1916*, pp. 344, 352–57, 360–61, 366–68; *U.S. Statutes at Large*, 39:223–24 (June 12, 1916); *Inquiry*, pp. 115–16, 399–400, 403–7, 711–13, 723–24; Buell, "American Occupation of Haiti," *F.P.A. Info. Serv.*, 5:349; Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Haiti under American Control, 1915–1930* (World Peace Foundation, 1931), pp. 63–70.

54 *Inquiry*, pp. 692, 516, 518.

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56 *Inquiry*, pp. 447–48, 513–17, 687.

57 *Ibid.*, pp. 570, 1751; *Report of High Commissioner, 1923*, pp. 31–32; *ibid., 1929*, p. 18.

58 *Inquiry*, pp. 520–22, 629–30, 1350–51; Millspaugh, *Haiti under American Control*, p. 112.

59 *Inquiry*, pp. 535, 688, 711; D. F. Houston to Secy. of State, Nov. 20, 1917; Alvey A. Adee to Secy. Houston, May 11, 1917; Houston to Secy. of State, June 28, 1917; memos of July 30, 1917, and Oct. 31, 1917 (in Corr. Bureau of Plant Industry, National Resources, Rec. Gp. 54, N.A.).

60 *Inquiry*, pp. 86–87, 450, 541, 572, 685–89; for a critical view of the marine attitude toward education, see *ibid.*, pp. 207–8.

61 *Ibid.*, pp. 82–84, 166 ff., 445, 448–49, 785, 1748; *Foreign Relations, 1922*, 2:555–59; Samuel Guy Inman, "The Present Situation in the Caribbean," in Blakeslee, pp. 255–56; Schoenrich, "Intervention in Santo Domingo and Haiti," *ibid.*, pp. 220–21.

62 *Foreign Relations, 1919*, 2:317–28, 340–70; *ibid., 1920*, 2:816–27, 837–53; *ibid., 1921*, 2:205–32; *Inquiry*, pp. 1303–4, 1396–97, 1404, 1411, 1442; see above, note 55.

63 For two brief summaries which point up the limited accomplishments of the occupation through 1921 see *Foreign Relations, 1921*, 2:203–5; Schoenrich, "Intervention in Santo Domingo and Haiti," in Blakeslee, pp. 217–19.

64 *Inquiry*, pp. 114, 762, 779–83, 793 ff., 1313, 1752, *et passim; Foreign Relations, 1919*, pp. 311–40; *ibid., 1921*, 2:191–95, 204; Buell, "American Occupation of Haiti," *F.P.A. Info. Serv.*, 5:351–52.

65 Hughes to Russell, Feb. 11, 1922, *Foreign Relations, 1922*, 2:461–66, outlines Russell's duties and policies.

66 *Ibid., 1921*, 2:199–203; *ibid., 1922*, 2:468–71; *ibid., 1925*, 2:294–308; *ibid., 1927*, 3:48–80; *ibid., 1929*, 3:211–15; W. W. Cumberland to Curti, Jan. 18, 1952; this last is a long and detailed set of memoirs dealing with

Cumberland's experiences in Peru, Nicaragua, and particularly Haiti; we are much indebted to it for informative insights into the problems of financial advisors in foreign countries.

67 *Ibid.*; *Report of High Commissioner, 1923*, p. 7; *ibid.*, *1925*, pp. 3–4; Buell, "American Occupation of Haiti," *F.P.A. Info. Serv.*, 5:385; *Foreign Relations, 1927*, 3:81–83.

68 On Cumberland and Millspaugh, see Ch. 8; Millspaugh, *Haiti under American Control*, p. 123 n.; *Foreign Relations, 1921*, 2:214–24; *1922*, 2:472–515, 535–53; *ibid.*, *1923*, 2:397–411; *Report of High Commissioner, 1926*, pp. 7–8; Cumberland to Curti, Jan. 18, 1952.

69 *Ibid.*; Inquiry, p. 1303; *Report of High Commissioner, 1922*, pp. 22–23; *ibid.*, *1923*, pp. 3–4; *ibid.*, *1924*, pp. 8–9; *ibid.*, *1925*, p. 2; *ibid.*, *1928*, p. 17; *ibid.*, *1929*, pp. 19–22.

70 For a convenient summary of the figures see *ibid.*, *1928*, p. 20.

71 Cumberland to Curti, Jan. 18, 1952; *Moton Commission Report*, pp. 44–45.

72 G. A. Duncan, *The Public Works of Haiti* (Port-au-Prince: Printing Office of Service Technique, 1931), pp. 1–44; *Report of High Commissioner, 1922*, pp. 7–10; *ibid.*, *1923*, pp. 19–23; *ibid.*, *1926*, pp. 32–35; *ibid.*, *1927*, pp. 14–16; *ibid.*, *1928*, pp. 21–24; *ibid.*, *1929*, pp. 25–27; Buell, "American Occupation of Haiti," *F.P.A. Info. Serv.*, 5:359.

73 Millspaugh, *Haiti under American Control*, p. 144; *Report of High Commissioner, 1923*, p. 10; *ibid.*, *1924*, p. 3; *ibid.*, *1925*, pp. 1–2; *ibid.*, *1927*, p. 3; *ibid.*, *1929*, pp. 4–5, 37; Buell "American Occupation of Haiti," *F.P.A. Info. Serv.*, 5:375–77.

74 *Report of High Commissioner, 1922*, p. 25; *ibid.*, *1923*, pp. 4–5, 8–9; *ibid.*, *1924*, pp. 11, 31–32, 34–35; *ibid.*, *1925*, pp. 44–50; *ibid.*, *1928*, pp. 8–9, 77–78; *ibid.*, *1929*, pp. 39–40; Emily Balch (ed.), *Occupied Haiti* (New York: Writers Publishing Company, 1927), pp. 82–84.

75 *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 103–5; *Foreign Relations, 1921*, 2:188–90, 197–98; *Moton Commission Report*, pp. 7–12, 45–47, 56; *Report of High Commissioner, 1923*, p. 5; *ibid.*, *1929*, pp. 73–74; Rayford Logan, "Education in Haiti," *J.N.H.*, 15:441–45, 452–55 (Oct., 1930); Buell, "American Occupation of Haiti," *F.P.A. Info. Serv.*, 5:360 ff.; Cumberland to Curti, Jan. 18, 1952.

76 *Moton Commission Report*, pp. 31–32; *Report of High Commissioner, 1925*, pp. 7, 40–44; *ibid.*, *1926*, p. 40.

77 *Moton Commission Report*, pp. 57–61; Logan "Education in Haiti," *J.N.H.*, 15:447–48; Ludwell Lee Montague, *Haiti and the United States, 1714–1938* (Duke University Press, 1940), pp. 256–58.

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79 *Ibid.*; *Report of High Commissioner, 1923*, pp. 5–6; *ibid.*, *1924*, p. 5; *ibid.*, *1925*, p. 3; *ibid.*, *1927*, p. 4; *ibid.*, *1928*, p. 6; *Foreign Relations, 1930*, 3:234.

80 *Report of High Commissioner, 1922*, pp. 12–15; *ibid.*, *1923*, pp. 8–9; *ibid.*, *1924*, pp. 4, 21–23; *ibid.*, *1926*, pp. 2, 16–18; *ibid.*, *1927*, pp. 17–18; *ibid.*,

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81 *Ibid.*, p. 1283; *Report of High Commissioner, 1925*, p. 7; *ibid., 1927*, pp. 46–47; *Moton Commission Report*, p. 25; Balch, *Occupied Haiti*, pp. 90–91.

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84 Montague, *Haiti and the United States*, pp. 261–62; Dantès Bellegarde, *La République d'Haiti et les États-Unis devant la Justice Internationale* (Paris, 1924), pp. 14–16; *Foreign Relations, 1930*, 3:235; James G. Leyburn, *The Haitian People* (Yale University Press, 1941), p. 107; *Inquiry*, pp. 781, 794, 1743; Balch, *Occupied Haiti*, pp. 114–16; Simpson, "Haiti's Social Structure," *Am. Soc. Rev.*, 6:644–45.

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86 *Foreign Relations, 1929*, 3:204–5.

87 *Ibid., 1929*, 3:175–204; *Report of High Commissioner, 1929*, pp. 6–13.

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90 Stimson to Munro, Oct. 18, 1930, *Foreign Relations, 1930*, 3:255–61.

91 *Report of High Commissioner, 1922*, p. 7; *ibid., 1927*, pp. 26–27, 49; *Moton Commission Report*, pp. 27–28; *Foreign Relations, 1930*, 3:261–80; *ibid., 1931*, 2:403–546; *ibid., 1932*, 5:623–96; *ibid., 1933*, 5:691–778; *ibid., 1934*, 5:293–308.

92 *Moton Commission Report*, p. 72.

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95 Willard R. Espy, *Bold New Program* (Harper, 1950), p. 102; Oswald Gar-

rison Villard, "Haiti, 1937," *Nation*, 144:267 (Mar. 6, 1937); Edmund Wilson, "Christophe and Estimé," *Reporter* (May 9, 1950), p. 25.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

1 William McCain, *The United States and the Republic of Panama* (Duke University Press, 1937), pp. 196–97, 106–7.

2 *Foreign Relations*, 1909, p. xvi.

3 J. Pierpont Morgan Publication Fund. *Reports of the Princeton University Expeditions to Patagonia 1896–1899. J. B. Hatcher in Charge.* Ed. by William B. Scott, Blair Professor of Geology and Palaeontology, Princeton University (Princeton, 1901–3); William B. Scott, *Some Memories of a Paleontologist* (Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 224, 237 ff., Ch. 23. Mention may also be made of the archaeological expeditions of Professor Hiram Bingham of Yale to Peru in 1911, 1912, and 1914–15. Like the Princeton expedition to Patagonia, these were privately supported. They resulted in important additions to knowledge of ancient Inca life, and stimulated the development of interest in archaeology on the part of Peruvians. See *The Journal of an Expedition across Venezuela and Colombia 1906–1907* (New Haven, 1909); *Inca Land: Explorations in the Highlands of Peru* (Houghton Mifflin, 1922), and *Machu Picchu, a Citadel of the Incas* (Yale University Press, 1930).

4 Bailey Willis, *A Bit of Autobiography. A Yanqui in Patagonia* (Stanford University Press, 1947), pp. 35 ff.

5 Bailey Willis, *Northern Patagonia. Character and Resources. Comisión de Estúdios Hidrológicos 1911–1914* (For the Ministry of Public Works, 1914); Wellington D. Jones, *Pioneer Settlement: Present Status and Future Possibilities of Agricultural Land Utilization in Patagonia*, Am. Geo. Soc., Spec. Publ. No. 14 (New York, 1932).

6 Willis, *A Bit of Autobiography*, pp. 142 ff., 150.

7 *Eleventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce, 1923*, p. 115. In 1928, when a strong agitation in Colombia arose to declare the petroleum industry to be a public utility, a committee of experts was appointed to consider the question. The committee included Foster Bain, former director of the Department of Mines and Petroleum of the United States, and J. W. Steel, of the United States Geological Survey; J. Fred Rippy, *Capitalists and Colombia* (Vanguard, 1931), pp. 148–50.

8 John C. Treadwell, C. Reed Hill, and H. H. Bennett, *Possibilities for Para*

Rubber Production in Northern Tropical America, For. and Dom. Comm. Bureau, Trade Promotion Ser. No. 40 (G.P.O., 1926); *Eleventh Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce, 1923*, pp. 114–15; C. F. Marbut and C. B. Manifold, U.S. Dept. of Agric., "The Soils of the Amazon Basin in Relation to Agricultural Possibilities," *Geogr. Rev.*, 16:414–42 (1926); H. H. Krusekopf (ed.), *Life and Work of C. F. Marbut* (Soil Sci. Assn. Am., n.d.), pp. 55–58. In addition to the Amazon rubber survey, the American government assigned David M. Figart to conduct field investigations in the Middle East. The study was allegedly motivated because of monopoly conditions in the industry, which raised prices on essential raw materials for the American industry. Figart's report discussed the economic factors surrounding the industry, emphasizing the cost of production and the extent to which the future potential output from the present planted area seemed adequate to meet future demands. See David M. Figart, *The Plantation Rubber Industry in the Middle East*, Foreign and Domestic Commerce Bureau, Trade Promotion Series No. 2 (G.P.O., 1925).

9 Thomas H. Simpson, "Restoring China's Forests," *Rev. of Revs.*, 53:337–340 (Mar., 1916).

10 Ahern to Secy. of the Int., Manila, Nov. 23, 1912 (Corr. of Forest Serv., Capt. G. P. Ahern, Philippines 1900–5, Rec. Gp. 95, N.A.).

11 Ngan Han, Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, to Major Ahern, Peking, Dec. 9, 1914 (*ibid.*).

12 Simpson, "Restoring China's Forests," *Rev. of Revs.*, 53:337–40.

13 Ngan Han to Ahern, Aug. 4, 1915 (Corr. of Forest Serv., Capt. G. P. Ahern, Philippines 1900–5, Rec. Gp. 95, N.A.).

14 Joseph Bailie to Major Ahern, Feb. 1, 1919 (*ibid.*).

15 J. B. Williams, Vice-President of the University of Nanking, to Ahern, Sept. 11, 1919 (*ibid.*).

16 Knox to Calhoun, May 16, 1911, in *Foreign Relations, 1914*, p. 95.

17 *River, Lake and Land Conservancy in Portions of the Provinces of Anhui and Kiangsu North of the Yangtze River; Preliminary Report of Charles Davis Jameson, Member of the American Society of Engineers, American Red Cross Engineer* (Shanghai, 1913). For Jameson's views on China, see his article "The Future of China," *The Outlook*, 98:577–83 (July 15, 1911).

18 *Foreign Relations, 1914*, pp. 97–98.

19 Edward B. Clark, *William L. Sibert, the Army Engineer* (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1930), pp. 139 ff.

20 *Foreign Relations, 1914*, pp. 106–9.

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 110–11.

22 American National Red Cross, *Report of the Board of Engineers on the Huai River Conservancy Project in the Provinces of Kiangsu and Anhui, China* (Washington, 1914).

23 *Ibid.*; see also Paul S. Reinsch, *An American Diplomat in China* (Double-

day, 1922), pp. 74–75, 80–81, 98–99; Reinsch to the Secy. of State, Oct. 28, 1914, *Foreign Relations, 1914*, p. 111.

24 Reinsch to the Secy. of State, Dec. 17, 1915, *ibid., 1915*, pp. 215.

25 Reinsch to the Secy. of State, Dec. 30, 1915, *ibid., 1915*, pp. 215–16.

26 *Ibid., 1916*, pp. 103–28; *ibid., 1917*, pp. 207 ff.

27 Clark, *William L. Sibert*, p. 154.

28 *Foreign Relations, 1914*, p. 43.

29 *Ibid., 1915*, pp. 46 ff. See also Frank J. Goodnow, *China: an Analysis* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1926), pp. 240–41, and Reinsch, *An American Diplomat in China*, pp. 47, 173. Another American expert working officially at this time was Dr. Henry C. Adams, of the University of Michigan. Adams was a distinguished authority on railroad economics, and was trying to elaborate a system of unified accounting for the railways of China. As other foreign experts had, Adams encountered much political corruption which militated against his task. "At every turn," he told Reinsch, "we seem to get into a blind alley leading up to a place where some spider of corruption sits, the whole tribe manipulated by a powerful head spider."—Reinsch, *An American Diplomat in China*, p. 30.

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32 *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

33 James Thorp, *Geography of the Soils of China* (London, n.d.), pp. xi–xii.

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 510–11. In 1935–36, the Rockefeller Foundation made a substantial contribution to the work of the soils survey.

35 H. H. Krusekopf (ed.), *Life and Work of Curtis Fletcher Marbut*, p. 269.

36 V. K. Ting, "Modern Science in China," *Asia*, 36:130–34 (Feb., 1936); *Science*, 63:632 (June 25, 1926), 85:551–53 (June 11, 1937), 103:690 (June 7, 1946).

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38 Forrest Crissey, *Alexander Legge, 1866–1933* (Chicago: Privately printed, 1936), p. 152.

39 Dept. of Agric., *Report of Agricultural Commission to Europe* (Washington, D.C., Jan. 17, 1919).

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43. *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia,* 1:107–58, esp. pp. 144–45.
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49. Arthur Ruhl, *New Masters of the Baltic* (Dutton, 1921), pp. 49 ff.
50. *Foreign Relations, 1920,* 1:235.
51. Homer Leroy Shantz, "A Memoir of Curtis Fletcher Marbut," *Annals Assn. Am. Geogr.,* 26:113–23 (1936). As we have seen, Marbut was later involved in the China soil survey and in the analysis of the rubber potentialities of the Amazon. In 1930 he made a soil survey study of the Soviet Union.
52. Crissey, *Alexander Legge,* pp. 152–53.
53. Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, "Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia," Sen. Doc. No. 266, 66 Cong., 2 sess. (G.P.O., 1920), pp. 26, 28 *et passim;* W. W. Cumberland to Merle Curti, Jan. 18, 1952.
54. Hunter Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (Washington, 1933), 3:541–98, esp. pp. 570 ff.
55. Admiral David D. Porter, *Memoir of Commodore David Porter of the United States Navy* (Albany, 1875), pp. 399 ff., 413 ff.
56. James Fenimore Cooper, *History of the Navy of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1839. 2 vols.), 2:449; John H. Morrison, *History of the New York Shipyards* (New York: William F. Sametz, 1909), pp. 36 ff.; Phyllis DeKay Wheelock, "Henry Eckford (1775–1832), an American Shipbuilder," *The American Neptune,* 7:177–95 (July, 1947).
57. *New York Evening Post,* Feb. 7, 1833.
58. *Ibid.; Morning Courier and Enquirer of New York,* Feb. 7, 1833; *New York Commercial Advertiser,* Feb. 7, 1833; the *National Intelligencer,* Dec. 25, 1832.
59. H. Exec. Doc. No. 224, 43 Cong., 1 sess. (1874); *U. S. Statutes at Large,* 34:1423 (Mar. 2, 1907); 36:1456 (Feb. 24, 1911); 39:10 (Feb. 15, 1916); Sen. Doc. No. 321, 59 Cong., 2 sess. (1907); Sen. Rpt. No. 943, 61 Cong., 3 sess. (1911); H. Rpt. No. 254, 70 Cong., 1 sess. (1928).
60. *Foreign Relations, 1881,* pp. 344, 357.
61. *Ibid., 1912,* pp. 44–45.
62. 51 *Cong. Rec.* 16255 (Oct. 7, 1914); *U.S. Statutes at Large,* 38:780 (Oct. 13, 1914).

63 Sen. Doc. No. 2, 62 Cong., 1 sess. (1911).
64 *U.S. Statutes at Large*, 41:1056 (June 5, 1920).
65 *Foreign Relations, 1922*, 1:651–56; "American Naval Mission to Brazil," *Outlook*, 132:687 (Dec., 1922).
66 Frederick A. Sterling to Secy. of State, Lima, Feb. 21, 1923 (State Dept. Dec. File, 1910–20, N.A.).
67 H. Rpt. No. 1018, 69 Cong. 1 sess. (1926); *U. S. Statutes at Large*, 44:565 (May 19, 1926).
68 65 *Cong. Rec.* 6762 (Apr. 21, 1924).
69 U.S. Dept. of State, *Press Releases*, 6:597 (June 25, 1932); *U.S. Statutes at Large*, 49:3543–51 (May 10, 1934).
70 U.S. Dept. of State, *Press Releases*, 3:183 (Sept. 13, 1930).
71 See Chapters 6 and 8.
72 Laurence Duggan, *The Americas* (Holt, 1949), pp. 178–79.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1 *Foreign Relations, 1885*, pp. 349, 353, 358–59; Stanley F. Wright, *Hart and the Chinese Customs* (William Mullan, 1950), p. 506.
2 Edwin W. Kemmerer, *Modern Currency Reforms* (Macmillan, 1916), pp. 495 ff. The American Commission included Professor Jeremiah Jenks of Cornell, Hugh H. Hanna, and Charles A. Conant.
3 This account is based on a memorandum by Henry Bruère, prepared for the authors and dated Feb. 29, 1952; on a letter from Dr. Arthur N. Young to Merle Curti, dated Jidda, Saudi Arabia, Sept. 9, 1951, and his report on *Finances of the Federal District of Mexico* (Mexico City, 1918); and on Edwin Kemmerer, "Discussion of Mexico's Currency," *Am. Econ. Rev.*, Suppl., 8:261–62 (Mar., 1918), and *Inflation and Revolution. Mexico's Experience of 1916–1918* (Princeton University Press, 1940). Mexico's experiences with depreciated currency led to the experiment of operating with a metallic system until 1925, when the Bank of Mexico was established with note-issuing privileges.
4 Dr. Arthur N. Young to Merle Curti, Jidda, Saudi Arabia, Sept. 9, 1951.
5 *Ibid.*
6 McCain, *The United States and the Republic of Panama*, pp. 106–7. A. F. Lindberg served as financial advisor in Guatemala in 1924, where he helped reorganize the revenue and fiscal system.
7 For details see *A Brief History of the Relations between the United States and Nicaragua 1909–1928* (G.P.C., 1928) and Isaac J. Cox, *Nicaragua and the United States 1909–1927* (World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. 10, No. 7, 1927).
8 Ernest H. Wands, who was in Nicaragua in the late winter and early spring of 1911, *Foreign Relations, 1911*, p. 656.

9 Irving Lindberg has devoted virtually his entire life to Nicaraguan finances. During the 1930's he was abroad on numerous financial missions for the Nicaraguan government, and in recent years has been connected with the Nicaraguan mission to the United Nations. His brother, Abram Frank Lindberg, a certified public accountant, began his career as a financial expert in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. He was in Nicaragua in various capacities from 1911 to 1920 and subsequently served as financial advisor in Guatemala and Bolivia.

10 *Foreign Relations, 1917*, p. 1121.

11 This is based largely upon Roscoe R. Hill (formerly a member of the Nicaraguan High Commission). *Fiscal Intervention in Nicaragua* (New York, 1933), pp. 103–5, *passim*.

12 William W. Cumberland, *Nicaragua. An Economic and Financial Survey* (G.P.O., 1928), p. iv. Dr. Cumberland was a man of considerable experience. In addition to having served as an economic expert on the Harbord mission and having been financial advisor in Haiti and Peru, Dr. Cumberland had held the position of economic advisor in the State Department. We are indebted to him for details regarding his work in Nicaragua.—Dr. Cumberland to Merle Curti, Jan. 18, 1952.

13 *Foreign Relations, 1923*, 2:605–6, 612; *ibid., 1927*, 3:355–56; Harold Dodds to Merle Curti, Sept. 6, 1951.

14 For details, see "The United States Marines in Nicaragua," Sen. Doc. No. 288, 71 Cong., 3 sess. (1931); U.S. Dept. of State, *Press Releases*, 4:103–6 (Feb. 21, 1931).

15 Henry L. Stimson, *American Policy in Nicaragua* (Scribner, 1927).

16 A. R. Zimmerman, *Financial Reconstruction of Austria* (n.p., 1923).

17 Mr. Smith, *az Amerikā ba utazó fōfiztos, Az Est utján fejezi ki hálájāt a vendégszeretō magyar népnik*, with accompanying photostats and typed translation in Harvard University Library. See also *Harvard Graduates Magazine*, 36:1–12 (Sept., 1927).

18 See Chapter 4.

19 John Caldwell to Secy. of State, Teheran, Oct. 7, 1914, (State Dept. Record File, 1910–29, Rec. Gp. 59, N.A.).

20 Caldwell to Secy. of State, telegram, Teheran, May 2, 1917, with memo, Putney, Near East Division, State Dept., to William Phillips, May 10, 1917 (*ibid.*).

21 Shuster to Phillips, Jan. 2, 1918 (*ibid.*).

22 Lester H. Woolsey (law partner of Robert Lansing) to Robbins, Nov. 26, 1921 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.). See also Sen. Doc. No. 97, 68 Cong., 1 sess. (G.P.O., 1924), pp. 87 ff.

23 A.C.M. [Arthur C. Millspaugh] to Mr. Harrison, Apr. 11, 1922 (State Dept. Record File 1910–29, N.A.).

24 "T.A." to Cumberland, Oct. 3, 1921, Memo (State Dept. Dec. File, 1910–29, N.A.).

25 Dulles, Memo, May 5, 1912 (*ibid.*); Hussain Alai to Secy. of State, Persian legation, Washington, May 14, 1922 (*ibid.*).

26 *Ibid.*

27 Secy. of State Hughes to the American minister in Teheran, Joseph Saul Kornfeld, June 30, 1922 (*ibid.*) On April 20, 1922, the British Ambassador communicated a confidential memorandum dated London, March 1, 1922, which indicated British willingness to have an American financial mission go to Persia.

28 Hughes to Hussain Alai, June 22, 1922 (*ibid.*).

29 A. W. Dulles, memo to the Secy., to Mr. Phillips, and to Mr. Harrison, June 26, 1922; Hussain Alai to Dulles, Aug. 22, 1922 (*ibid.*).

30 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, Teheran, Aug. 29, 1922 (*ibid.*); Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia* (The Brookings Institution, 1946), pp. 21–22.

31 London *Morning Post*, July 8, 1922.

32 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, July 5, 1923 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).

33 Memo by Allen Dulles, Div. of Near Eastern Affairs, of a conversation with Mr. Bennett of Ulen and Company, June 24, 1924 (*ibid.*).

34 Memo, Div. of Near Eastern Affairs, of conversation with Dr. Millspaugh, Aug. 10 and 13, dated Aug. 14, 1925 (*ibid.*).

35 Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 22.

36 Millspaugh to Hughes, Jan. 10, 1923 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).

37 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, July 28, 1924 (*ibid.*).

38 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, June 17, 1924 (*ibid.*).

39 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, July 28, 1924; Acting Secy. of State Grew to Minister Kornfeld, July 30, 1924 (*ibid.*).

40 *Foreign Relations, 1927*, 3:533–40.

41 *Ibid., 1927*, 3:541 ff.; Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 26 n.

42 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, July 8, 1925 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).

43 Extract from private letter from a friend in Meshed, Memo, Aug. 24, 1923, Div. of Near Eastern Affairs (*ibid.*); Hall, *Journey to the End of an Era*, pp. 181 ff.

44 Vice-Consul Robert W. Imbrie to Dept. of State, Teheran, June 18, 1924 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).

45 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, June 6, 1924 (*ibid.*).

46 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, July 8, 1923 (*ibid.*).

47 Consul Bernard Gotlieb to Dept. of State, Teheran, Feb. 5, 1924; Chargé W. Smith Murray to Dept. of State, Nov. 5, 1924, Documentary file note, 123 I M/381 (*ibid.*).

48 Memo by Allen Dulles of a conversation with Mr. Bennett of Ulen and Company, June 24, 1924 (*ibid.*).

49 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, July 8, 1923: Consul Bernard Gotlieb to Dept. of State, Dec. 2, 1923, Feb. 5, 1924 (*ibid.*).

50 Millspaugh to Hughes, June 8, 1925 (*ibid.*).

51 Document File Note, relating to Despatch No. 725, dated Nov. 5, 1924, Murray to the Secy. of State, Teheran (the notation is "See 123 IM/381") (*ibid.*).

52 Millspaugh to Allen W. Dulles, Teheran, Dec. 12, 1923; Kornfeld to Secy. of State, June 11, 1924 (*ibid.*). Dulles marked his veto on the document containing this suggestion.

53 W. Smith Murray to Dept. of State, Teheran, Feb. 17, 1925 (*ibid.*).

54 Millspaugh to Kornfeld, June 10, 1923 (*ibid.*).

55 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, July 22, 1923; Hughes to Kornfeld, July 16, 1923 (*ibid.*).

56 Millspaugh to Allen Dulles, Dec. 12, 1923 (*ibid.*); *Foreign Relations, 1927*, 3:546, 553.

57 Kornfeld to Secy. of State, June 11, 1924 (State Dept. Dec. File, 1910–29, N.A.).

58 Vice-Consul Robert W. Imbrie to Dept. of State, June 18, 1924 (*ibid.*).

59 Encl., Kornfeld to Secy. of State, despatches 891.51 A/107, 891.51 A/891, 891.51 A/122, 891.51 A/129 (*ibid.*).

60 Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, pp. 23–24.

61 *Ibid.*; *Foreign Relations, 1927*, 3:526; Kornfeld to Secy. of State, Jan. 28, 1924 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).

62 Report of the American Consul Augustin W. Ferrin to Dept. of State, July 27, 1929 (*ibid.*).

63 David Williamson, Chargé d'Affaires, Teheran, Dec. 23, 1929, to Secy. of State (*ibid.*).

64 See below, pp. 183–86.

65 His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie to Merle Curti, Mar. 27, 1952; U.S. Dept. of State, *Press Releases*, 8:322 (May 6, 1933). Gen. Eric Virgin, in his book *The Abyssinia I Knew* (London, 1936), p. 80, spoke of the "truly American capacity" for work which Colson had as well as his "great intelligence."

66 *Foreign Relations, 1927*, 2:599. We are also indebted to Mr. A. E. Southard for information about the Tsana Dam project and to Dr. Manuel J. Sorenson whose doctoral dissertation at the University of Nebraska (1950) deals with the problem.

67 In addition to Kemmerer and Arthur N. Young, the commission included F. B. Lynch, a banking expert; Dr. O. C. Lockhart, a taxation specialist; William Watson, accountant; F. A. Cleveland, a budget authority; B. B. Wallace, a tariff expert; and Dr. John Parke Young, assistant to Professor

Kemmerer on currency. Professor Kemmerer's son, Professor Donald Kemmerer of the University of Illinois, has kindly made available to us the reports of the commission.

68 Dr. John Parke Young, Chevy Chase, Md., to Merle Curti, July 18, 1951, and Dr. Arthur N. Young to Merle Curti, Jidda, Saudi Arabia, Sept. 10, 1951.

69 Arthur N. Young to Merle Curti, Sept. 10, 1951.

70 See Arthur N. Young, *China's Financial Progress* (F.P.A., 1938) and "On the Chinese Financial Front," *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, 18:350–56 (Jan., 1940). The foregoing account rests largely on a long, detailed, and very informative letter from Dr. Young to Merle Curti, dated Jidda, Saudi Arabia, Sept. 10, 1951.

71 Burnett Walker, Vice-President of the Guaranty Co. of New York, to Secy. of State, June 1, 1922 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).

72 F. A. Sterling to Secy. of State, Lima, Jan. 7, 1922 (*ibid.*).

73 Sterling to Secy. of State, Lima, Feb. 25, 1922; Mar. 14, 1922 (*ibid.*).

74 W. W. Cumberland to Fred M. Dearing, Lima, Mar. 21, 1922 (*ibid.*).

75. *Ibid.*

76 Sterling to Secy. of State, Oct. 24, 1922 (*ibid.*).

77 Sterling to Secy. of State, Feb. 3, 1922, Mar. 14, 1922 (*ibid.*).

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79 Sterling to Secy. of State, Nov. 7, 1922 (*ibid.*).

80 Cumberland to Curti, Jan. 18, 1952.

81 Lizardo Alzamoro Silva, *Sobre el plan Kemmerer* (Lima, 1931). The reports, dated March and April, 1931, bore the imprint of the Commission of Financial Advisors on Finances of the National Government of Peru.

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83 "Notable Achievement of a Notable Commission," *Bul. Pan. Am. Union*, 58:164–66 (Feb., 1924). See also E. Taylor Parks, *Colombia and the United States, 1765–1934* (Duke University Press, 1935), and José de la Vega, *El buen vecino* (Bogatá, 1944).

84 Republic of Chile, Commission of Financial Advisors, *Project of Law for the Taxation of Tobacco* (Santiago, Aug. 31, 1926); *Draft of Project of Law for the Taxation of Real Property* (Santiago, Aug., 1925); *Decree-Law No. 718 of Nov. 13, 1925, which approved the Organic Budget Bill Presented to the Government of Chile by the Commission on Oct. 3, 1925* (Santiago, 1925); *Decree-Law No. 559 of September 26, 1925.*

85 *Republic of Poland, Reports submitted by the Commission of the American Financial Experts headed by Dr. E. W. Kemmerer* (Warsaw, 1926). See also H. H. Fisher, *America and the New Poland* (Macmillan, 1928),

pp. 335 ff., and Pearl Franklin Clark, *Challenge of the American Know-How* (Harper, 1948). pp. 42 ff.

86 U.S. Dept. of State, *Press Releases*, 8:320 ff. (May 6, 1933).

87 Goldthwaite H. Dorr to Merle Curti, New York, Oct. 23, 1951.

88 Mrs. Stanley P. Clark, in a letter dated Tucson, Nov. 19, 1951, has supplied helpful information. For the story of two mid-nineteenth-century private ventures designed to improve agriculture in Syria by introducing American techniques see Harold Davis, "The Jaffa Colonists from Down East," *Am. Quar.*, 3:344–56 (Winter, 1951).

89 C. R. Whittlesey to Merle Curti, Philadelphia, Aug. 31, 1951, and Brehon Somervell to Merle Curti, New York, Oct. 9, 1951.

90 "A General Economic Survey of Turkey 1933–1934. General Comment. Conclusions and Recommendations," Vol. 1, and additional volumes in the possession of Goldthwaite H. Dorr.

91 *New York Times*, July 15, 1934.

92 Interview with Goldthwaite H. Dorr, Dec. 27, 1951.

93 Goldthwaite H. Dorr to Merle Curti, Oct. 23, 1951.

94 C. R. Whittlesey to Merle Curti, Aug. 31, 1951.

95 Brehon Somervell to Merle Curti, Pittsburgh, Oct. 9, 1951.

96 E. W. Kemmerer, "Economic Advisory Work for Governments," *Am. Econ. Rev.*, 17:2–4 (Mar., 1927).

97 *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

98 John S. Hord had been financial advisor to Haiti before accepting a similar appointment to Ecuador in 1923. *Foreign Relations, 1923*, 1:925; *ibid., 1924*, 1:693–94, 699.

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CHAPTER NINE

1 Raymond B. Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation* (Harper, 1952).

2 For the development of the public health service in the Federal government see Harry H. Moore, *Public Health in the United States* (Harper, 1923), and Harry S. Mustard, *Government in Public Health* (The Commonwealth Fund, 1945), Ch. 2.

3 The credit for this work belongs to the teamwork of many participants; but the important role of Gen. William C. Gorgas is described by John M. Gibson, *Physician to the World. The Life of General William C. Gorgas* (Duke University Press, 1950).

4 *Annual Report of the Surgeon-General of the Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1904* (G.P.O., 1904), pp. 291–96; John Hay to the Secy. of Treas., Aug. 28, 1902; W. I. Rosenau to the Surg. Gen., Oct. 16, 1903 (File 146, Box 28, Rec. Gp. 90, N.A.).

5 Dr. George B. Bayer to Surg. Gen., Vera Cruz, July 3, 1903 (*ibid.*).

6 Lombard to the Asst. Surg. Gen., R. H. Creel, New Orleans, Apr. 12, 1921 (Pub. Health Serv., Gen. File, 1897–1923, 1876 [1920–21], 177 *ibid.*). D. J. Moran, General Manager of the Texas Oil Company, writing from Tampico, testified that Le Prince had attacked the problem diplomatically as well as scientifically and had succeeded in overcoming the old antagonism toward the methods used. D. J. Moran to Surg. Gen., Pub. Health Serv., Tampico, Apr. 2, 1921 (*ibid.*) For Le Prince's work in Panama see his *Mosquito Control in Panama* (Putnam, 1916).

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8 *Ibid.*; Dr. B. J. Lloyd to Surg. Gen., Guayaquil, Sept. 1, 1908; William C. Fox to Secy. of State, Quito, Sept. 11, 1909 (Pub. Health, File 1057, Box 95, Rec. Gp. 90, N.A.). Dr. Lloyd received various decorations from the government of Ecuador.

9 Parks and Nuermberger, "Sanitation of Guayaquil," *Hisp. Am. Hist. Rev.*, 23:210 ff.; Manuel Ugarte, *The Destiny of a Continent* (Knopf, 1925), p. 179.

10 Parks and Nuermberger, "Sanitation of Guayaquil," *Hisp. Am. Hist. Rev.*, 23:216 ff.; Acting Asst. Surg. Carlos V. Coello to Surg. Gen., Guayaquil, Oct. 2, 1918 (Pub. Health, File 1057, Box 95, Rec. Gp. 90, N.A.); *Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1922* (G.P.O., 1922), pp. 174–75; Arthur I. Kendall, *Civilization and the Microbe* (Houghton Mifflin, 1923); Arthur I. Kendall to Merle Curti, Aug. 14, 1951.

11 *Foreign Relations, 1912*, pp. 1280–86.

12 See Chapter 8. For Leguía's program and achievements, see Guillermo Forero Franco, *Entre Dos Dictaduras* (Bogatá, 1934–35), pp. 127 ff. and Miles Poindexter, *Peruvian Pharaohs* (Christopher Publishing House, 1938).

13 Sterling to Secy. of State, Lima, Mar. 28, 1922 (State Dept. Dec. File, 1910–29, N.A.).

14 *Ibid.*; Sterling to the Secy. of State, July 13, 1922 (*ibid.*).

15 Sterling to Secy. of State, Lima, Aug. 10, 1922 (*ibid.*); Secy. of State to Treas. Dept., Dec. 26, 1930, with encls.; Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secy. of State, Lima, Jan. 11, 1930 (U.S. Pub. Health Serv. [1924–35], Box 37, Rec. Gp. 90, N.A.).

16 John D. Long, "Cooperative Campaign for the Eradication of Plague in Peru," *Pub. Health Rpts.*, 46:2161–68 (Sept. 11, 1931).

17 F. J. Russell, International Health Division, Rockefeller Foundation, to Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, Sci. Res. Div., U.S. Pub. Health Serv., June 29, 1932; Russell to Thompson, June 16, 1932 (File 1950, Box 206 [1924–35], Rec. Gp. 90, N.A.).

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19 Dept. of State to Secy. of Treas., Aug. 14, 1929, encl. copy of despatch dated Tirana, Jan. 16, 1929, Charles C. Hart to Secy. of State; L. D. Fricks, U. S. Pub. Health Serv., to Asst. Surg. Gen. A. M. Stimson, Feb. 14, 1924 (U.S. Pub. Health Serv., Afghanistan through Argentina [Albania], Box 1, Rec. Gp. 90, N.A.).

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24 Paul Monroe *et al, Reconstruction in the Near East* (New York, 1924).

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26 Charles Morrow Wilson, *Liberia* (Wm. Sloane Associates, 1947), p. 210; *Foreign Relations, 1929,* 3:316–17.

27 Ernest Work, *Ethiopia, A Pawn in European Diplomacy* (New Concord, Ohio: Published by the author, 1935), p. 5; Dr. Work to Merle Curti, Sept. 3, 1951.

28 Government of Iraq, *Report of the Educational Inquiry Commission; Survey Directed and Report Edited by Paul Monroe* (Baghdad, 1932).

29 Edgar W. Knight to Merle Curti, Mar. 20, 1951.

30 Albert A. Giesecke, "Public Instruction in Peru," Am. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci. *Annals,* 37:663–82 (May, 1911); Harry Erwin Bard, *Cuestiones sobre las universidades y la instrucción universitaria que presenta la comisión especial ancargada de elaborar un projecto de ley de instrucción, formuladas por H. E. Bard* (Lima, 1912). For Leguía's cultural program and interests see Victor Andrés Belaunde, *La Realidad Nacional* (Paris, 1931), p. 136 ff.

31 Charles Lyon Chandler to Mr. Pierpont, Sept. 6, 1912 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).

32 Giesecke, "Public Instruction in Peru." *Annals*, 37:673; interview with Hiram Bingham, Apr. 4, 1951.

33 William Gonzales to Secy. of State, Lima, Apr. 6, 1921 (State Dept. Dec. File 1910–29, N.A.).

34 F. A. Sterling to Secy. of State, Nov. 14, 1921, with enclosed report of military attaché to the War Dept. (*ibid.*).

35 F. A. Sterling to Secy. of State, Mar. 24, 1922 (*ibid.*).

36 F. A. Sterling to Secy. of State, Aug. 1, 1922 (*ibid.*).

37 Miles Poindexter to Secy. of State, Aug. 27, 1923 (*ibid.*).

38 Pabst to Secy. of State, Oct. 27, 1923; Poindexter to Secy. of State, Feb. 10, 1924 (*ibid.*).

39 Poindexter to Secy. of State, Mar. 10, 1924 (*ibid.*).

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41 Sterling to "Dear Bill" [William White], Lima, Feb. 19, 1923 (*ibid.*).

42 Crone to Rowe, Oct. 7, 1923, enclosed in undated memorandum from Rowe to Under Secy. of State, 823.42/12 (*ibid.*).

43 Undated memorandum, Rowe to Under Secy. of State, 823.42/12 (*ibid.*).

CHAPTER TEN

1 H. B. Allen, *Rural Reconstruction in Action* (Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 123.

INDEX

(continued from front flap)

vention in the Caribbean in the years following the Spanish-American War; and their story concludes with accounts of the rapidly multiplying American missions abroad during and following the first world war, when American experts were called upon for advice in developing natural resources, in supervising projects for flood control, in revising monetary systems, and in making educational surveys.

Most of the missions took place after the turn of the century, and most of them went to Latin America and the Far East. Scientific curiosity, desire for commercial advantage, and the complex reasons of diplomacy motivated American-initiated enterprises. A special American reputation in technical fields, belief in American disinterestedness, and the desire for American capital helped persuade foreign countries to seek American aid. The scope of these missions varied all the way from simple surveys to complex attempts to remake whole societies. Despite the *ad hoc* nature of most of them, the United States succeeded in building up a reservoir of experts with experience in foreign missions. These men had to cope with all kinds of obstacles: language difficulties, uncoöperative natives, inexperienced personnel, inadequate information, a shortage of funds, too much responsibility and too little authority, the opposition of powerful groups, and well-entrenched social customs. Nevertheless, the generally high quality of the experts helped make certain that many of the missions proved useful and that few were total failures.

The gradual eclipse of Point Four does not minimize the importance of the conclusions inevitable in this study. Present-day policy makers may well ponder them. Successful missions require careful and imaginative planning, experts skilled in human relations as well as technical specialties, adequate authority, and above all, the enthusiastic coöperation of those the missions intend to help. Wisely administered, a foreign-assistance program can become a force for good in the future of many nations; poorly managed, it can do irreparable harm to American prestige throughout the rest of the world.