

REF  
HC  
60  
no.10  
Hist  
Coll

*"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves and then we shall save our country."*

ABRAHAM LINCOLN  
Message to Congress, December 1, 1862

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RETURN TO  
TASG  
ROOM 416 M

# "The Time Has Come To Face The Facts"

**A Summary of the Four Reports of  
The President's Committee to Study  
The United States Military Assistance Program**

September 1, 1959

A. I. D.  
HISTORICAL  
COLLECTION

Reference Center  
Room 1036 NS

Published by  
**COMMITTEE TO STRENGTHEN THE FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM  
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.  
Washington 6, D. C.**

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

## What the President Asked His Committee To Do

In his letter of November 24, 1958, appointing the bi-partisan Committee of private citizens to conduct the study, President Eisenhower said in part:

“... I request that your committee undertake a completely independent, objective, and non-partisan analysis of the military assistance aspects of our Mutual Security Program . . . to evaluate the results to date . . . to recommend the most suitable means whereby the free world's defenses may be insured . . .

“What is needed . . . is a forthright evaluation . . .

“I am particularly interested in your committee's critical appraisal . . . of the relative emphasis which should be given to military and economic programs, particularly in the less developed areas . . .

“It would be advantageous if your committee could furnish me with some preliminary conclusions which can be taken into account in presenting the Mutual Security Program to the Congress at its next session . . . However, I desire that your study and final recommendations be the product of a thoroughgoing analysis which I realize might well take longer . . .”

In his Budget Message on January 10, 1959, the President said:

“The accomplishments, future needs, techniques, and interrelationships of military and economic assistance need to be reassessed in the light of continuing change in military technology and strategy and in economic and political conditions, and with consideration of new Communist techniques in waging the cold war. Therefore, I recently appointed a committee of outstanding citizens, with experience in government, the Armed Forces, and business, to appraise the military assistance program and the relative emphasis the United States should place on military and economic aid. Accordingly, in the present budget, provisions for the mutual security program are subject to whatever recommendations I may make in connection with my later transmission to the Congress of this program.”

(All underlining supplied)

355  
C734

Committee to Strengthen the Frontiers of  
Freedom, Washington, D.C.

"The time has come to face the facts"; a  
summary of the four reports of the President's  
Committee to Study the U.S. Military Assistance  
Program. Sept. 1959.

20 p.

OFF-SITE  
EIS-110

1. Economic assistance, American. 2. Military  
assistance, American. 3. Mutual security  
program, 1951- . I. Title. II. Draper report.

ua  
12  
JSS  
1959

## **A Committee Speaks Unanimously . . . .**

After nine months of hard study, the unanimous final conclusion of the President's Committee is:

- That both military and economic assistance programs have provided necessary, vital and successful support to U. S. strategy and foreign policy objectives in an increasingly dangerous world;
- That they must be continued;
- That major steps should be taken as a matter of urgency to strengthen and improve their operation.

**NOTE:** To promote a better public understanding of the Mutual Security Program, the Committee to Strengthen the Frontiers of Freedom feels that there is need for a short summary of the four voluminous reports of the President's Committee to Study the U. S. Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee), which together constitute an exhaustive bi-partisan unanimous report on foreign aid. The present unofficial summary has accordingly been prepared for, and published by, the Committee to Strengthen the Frontiers of Freedom. In making this material available, it emphasizes that the President's Committee, which of course has the responsibility for the reports summarized, has not reviewed or passed upon this summary.

# What the President Said About the Reports

The White House  
Washington

August 20, 1959

Dear Mr. President:

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I transmit herewith for the consideration of the Congress the Final Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, with the several studies which are Annexes thereto.

Together with the Committee's three earlier Reports, of March 17, June 3 and July 13, which I have previously sent to the Congress, this Report and the annexed studies provide us with an extremely valuable analysis of the Mutual Security Program.

Over a period of nine months, this group of eminent citizens has made the completely independent, objective, and non-partisan analysis for which I asked in appointing the Committee. This penetrating examination will, I believe, furnish invaluable guidelines, both to the Congress and the Executive Branch, for these programs which are of such critical importance to the defense and foreign policy of the United States.

The members of the Committee have given many months of careful study to these problems and have made a collective personal appraisal, based on their own experience in activities closely related to the program and on recent visits to the areas receiving assistance.

I call your special attention to the comments of the Committee concerning the dangerously low level of appropriations authorized for the Military Assistance Program for fiscal 1960. I agree with their analysis, and, as indicated in my letter to you of April 29, this fall I shall review the effect on the program of the final Congressional enactment

for fiscal 1960. Following that review, I will make appropriate recommendations to the Congress.

The basic concepts of the Committee's plan for reorganizing the administration of the Military Assistance Program, embodied in its second Interim Report, were approved by me, and I am gratified that the Congress has already taken legislative measures toward putting some of these recommendations into effect. Work is under way on implementing by executive action other recommendations of this Report.

The present Report, like the Third Report which dealt with economic assistance and its administration, covers fields so extensive as to require correspondingly extended consideration. I have submitted copies of this Report to the Executive Agencies concerned, and shall later communicate with the Congress concerning recommendations requiring legislation which are embodied in both the Third and Final Reports.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon  
President of the Senate  
Washington, D. C.

The Honorable Sam Rayburn  
Speaker of the House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

## What the President's Committee Did

Members of the President's Committee visited most of the principal areas of the world where the Mutual Security Program operates.

The Committee assembled a full-time professional and clerical staff and commissioned a series of special studies by universities, private research organizations and individuals with special competence.

Before reaching conclusions, the Committee conducted three major types of inquiry:

First, as to the general position of the free world in the mid-twentieth century.

Second, as to the current activities, the intentions and the threat of international communism.

Third, as to the operation of the Mutual Security Program and its predecessors.

With these in hand, the Committee considered the need for continuing or discontinuing, increasing or reducing the military, economic and technical assistance programs; also how the over-all effectiveness of the Mutual Security Program might be improved, better to meet the changing techniques of the Communists.

The detailed reasoning and supporting facts which led the Committee to its major conclusions and recommendations are set forth in a series of four reports submitted to President Eisenhower between March 17 and August 17, 1959, and eight professional studies published as Annexes, listed on page 18.

### The Free World in the Mid-Twentieth Century

As basic background for assessing the Mutual Security Program, the President's Committee took account of conditions in the free world today.

There are roughly 1.5 billion people in the free world—of whom one-third live in relatively developed industrialized nations and two-thirds live in areas characterized by low living standards, illiteracy, poor health and general economic weakness.

The Committee found that these conditions in the most populous areas of the non-communist world "constitute both a threat and a challenge to every nation of the free world—to us, to the other developed countries, and especially to the underdeveloped countries themselves . . ."

The Committee found that the revolutionary origin of the USSR has produced "a new energy and dynamism" and a rate of economic growth considerably in excess of the U. S. rate. It said:

"The Soviet accomplishments, added to the reported developments in Red China, have shaken the composure of both the developed and less developed world. This communist dynamism appeals to some people in the less developed countries who seek a higher living standard, and who do not realize that brutal human suppression and a dictatorial political system inevitably attend it."

The Committee concluded that "entirely aside from the threat of communist aggression, the United States and other free nations face the challenge of the revolutionary insistence on progress by the hundreds of millions of people in the less developed areas."

### **The Threat from International Communism**

The Committee then considered the current range and level of the threat posed by the actions and apparent intentions of the communist bloc of nations. It took into account:

- the rapid growth of Soviet capabilities for nuclear warfare.
- the continued investment of a very large proportion of Soviet resources in armed strength and war-potential industries.
- the reality that communist and communist-controlled armed forces on the borders of the Sino-Soviet bloc—including those opposite South Korea, South Vietnam and Taiwan (Formosa)—have not been decreased but are being re-equipped with modern weapons and given intensive training.
- the creation and rapid growth in the past five years of Sino-Soviet military assistance programs to selected countries in South and South East Asia and the Middle East.
- the significant expansion of Sino-Soviet aid and trade agreements which amounted to more than \$600,000,000 in economic credits in 1958 alone, and which sent nearly 3,000 Sino-Soviet bloc non-military technicians abroad during the second half of 1958.
- the continued use of overseas communist parties as instruments of infiltration and subversion.
- the unrelenting use of propaganda and other political warfare techniques.

The Committee concluded that there has been no moderation of the communist goal of eventual world domination, no convincing cessation

of acts of aggression, and therefore no lessening of the total communist threat to the survival of the free world.

Instead, the Committee found that Soviet-Chinese capability to apply military, political and economic pressures is expanding. This increasing threat, the Committee said, "is an indivisible military-economic-political menace."

The Committee found:

"... we have been forced reluctantly to conclude that this is another example of a dictatorship which means what it has said about its destructive intentions."

### **Our Assistance Programs: The Broader Aspects**

In the light of conditions in the free world and the expanding threat of aggressive communism, the Committee looked beyond the immediate objectives of military and economic assistance programs.

It reviewed the evidence of U. S. leadership in seeking to rebuild the fabric of international order in the post-war world through the United Nations . . . through programs of recovery for the industrialized countries of Europe, and for Japan . . . by assisting at the birth of new nations arising out of colonial empires . . . through economic and technical assistance to help them achieve economic growth, political stability and national dignity . . . and by other positive policies and actions which have contributed constructively to progress and prosperity in the free world.

The Committee also noted the growth of hemispheric partnerships between Canada, the U. S. and Latin America; the increasing influence and effectiveness of international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; and the movement toward integration of Western Europe, which it described as a development comparable in significance to the rise of Soviet power and the developments in Communist China.

Nevertheless, the Committee found that "our horizon is too often the narrow confines of the cold war." Faced with the need to protect ourselves and others against the threat of communist imperialism, we have responded largely by defensive measures.

"We are not satisfied," the Committee reported, "with the thought that programs of such size and character should be presented only in the framework of what is essentially a defensive approach . . . if all we have to look forward to is a continuing arms race with the Soviet Union, the prospect would be dismal indeed."

In its final report the Committee said:

"The critical question, the one that will determine the ultimate victor, is whether we and the other free world nations . . . will be able to unify our world and direct its energies toward a common goal, or whether the world is to be organized by the communist bloc."

". . . if the peoples and the leaders of the free world lack a dynamism of their own and are satisfied with things as they are, there would be little doubt as to who would win in the long run."

"Our objective", the Committee said, "must be an increasingly close association of free nations grounded in a concept of justice for individuals and nations which all willingly accept . . . We believe that any nation which has freedom of choice will elect to build its future within the framework of such a system."

"We must always make it clear—even to the communist states—that all nations will be welcome in the community who prove by their actions that they are willing to live by its principles."

In conclusion, the Committee reported:

"Together, the free world has the greatest accumulation of talent, imagination, skills and energy which the world can muster. We should combine these with the genius, strength and resources of all our peoples, not for the purpose of impeding the development of the communist or any other countries, but to set an example of both freedom and development."

"The only alternative we can see to the interdependent allied free world, strengthened by our aid where needed, would be the Fortress America concept—taking our first stand in the last ditch."

### **Role of the Mutual Security Program**

The Committee devoted major attention to a detailed analysis of the past and potential role of the Mutual Security Program in supporting U. S. foreign policy goals under existing world conditions.

#### **Military Assistance**

The Committee considered the role of military assistance and set forth the aims which the military assistance program should accomplish:

- desirable build-up of forces in strategic positions where the maintenance of U. S. forces is neither practicable nor desirable.
- the more equitable sharing of the human and material burdens of free world defense.
- increased unity and cohesiveness of purpose in the free world.

- the development of closer ties between the United States and its allies.
- increased confidence within allied countries.
- maintenance of allied forces at less cost than equivalent U. S. forces.

### **The Record**

The Committee concluded that U. S. military assistance programs over the past decade:

- provided the critical element in the growth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as "an essential security bulwark of the free world."
- accomplished "the strengthening of the nations around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc."
- contributed "in large part" to the survival of Taiwan.
- made possible the "continued maintenance of the needed military strength in Korea"—to avert a new Korean war.
- brought about the defeat of communist-backed insurrections in Greece and the Philippines.
- played "an indispensable part in Iran's continued survival."
- made it possible for Vietnam "to establish and maintain a free nation."
- contributed significantly to the indispensable internal stability of many recipient countries.
- influenced a shift in current communist tactics from direct military aggression to subversion, propaganda, and economic offensives.
- contributed in large measure to the level of technical and administrative skills in other countries by training programs, including the training of many thousands of allied armed forces personnel in this country and abroad.

To this the Committee adds that "perhaps the most important accomplishment of our aid, however, is the less dramatic but more effective prevention of aggression through deterrence."

### **Administration**

The Committee found that some allegations of mistakes in carrying out the military assistance program have been warranted and that there are "serious deficiencies in planning and execution." It recommended both major and detailed steps to improve administration in the future, including reductions of certain programs.

Major difficulties, the Committee concluded, stem from failure to authorize and develop a "long-range program" to meet a "long-term challenge" and from failure to decentralize authority to the field.

### **On Balance**

From its studies, including field surveys in which operational military units were reviewed in training exercises, the Committee concluded that the military assistance program "has provided the mortar giving cohesion, strength and credibility to our collective security arrangements. It is the foundation on which our forward strategy is built and has been one of the principal instruments abroad supporting our foreign policy objectives over this decade of clash with communism."

### **Future Funds**

The Committee's analyses showed that probable reductions in Fiscal Year 1960 funds for military assistance programs, unless corrected, would result in a decline of some forty percent in the delivery of U. S. military equipment to allies two years hence.

It concluded that such a reduction "involves a serious security danger for the United States and for the free world" and will lead to a "major deterioration of military strength in forward areas, and a clearly apparent withdrawal of effective support from many of our allies. This may well require basic changes in our present military strategy and our alliance system."

The Committee urgently recommended corrective action. It stated that, to maintain a foundation "strong enough to support all our activities for world peace . . . the annual cost of the military portion, below which we should not go, is about \$2 billion." The Committee pointed out that for this year, "the Congress has authorized only \$1.4 billion for military assistance, and it appears that less than this amount will actually be appropriated." Accordingly, the Committee recommended, "that all possible steps be taken to close the dangerous gap between funds available and essential requirements," and that, "requests be made to Congress for military assistance appropriations for Fiscal Years 1960 and 1961 to bring the level of appropriations for each of those Fiscal Years to approximately \$2 billion."

### **Economic Assistance**

The Committee reviewed the various programs of U.S. economic assistance beginning with Marshall Plan aid to Europe, including develop-

ment lending, economic support of military allies, special assistance, surplus agricultural commodities aid, and technical aid.

It found that economic aid programs:

- made possible the recovery and rising prosperity of Western Europe, laid the economic base for "the revival of European self-defense," and helped reverse "the rising trend toward communism."
- revived "the failing Turkish economy in the face of Soviet threats."
- helped "save Greece from Soviet inspired insurrections."
- helped Iran survive "heavy pressure from outside by the Soviet Union and from inside by powerful communist subversive groups."
- successfully supported the independence of Vietnam against odds estimated by responsible United States officials as strongly adverse.
- made possible "substantial economic progress" on Taiwan.
- rehabilitated the "war-torn economy" of Korea.
- helped other nations in their efforts to improve their standards of living.

The Committee reviewed other forms of external aid available to the less developed world from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Export-Import Bank, the UN and its specialized agencies, and from other industrialized nations.

It studied the contribution to economic growth which can be made by private capital, and proposed specific steps greatly to increase this.

It invited attention to the grave long-range economic problem created by the "population explosion" in the less developed world.

These matters were all considered in the light of the unremitting Sino-Soviet economic offensive. This the Committee described as a "powerful and dangerous political weapon." It concluded, however, that while the United States must be aware of the political overtones of communist aid-trade programs, "our policies should not be based simply on countering Soviet moves."

"Our best counteraction is a clear cut policy of our own directed toward positive objectives. The long-range answer to the economic offensive of the communist bloc is a strong and growing economy throughout the free world. Our aid program is an important element in the achievement of this end."

The Committee further concluded that the United States and the developed nations of the free world cannot continue to enjoy their present rate of economic growth and prosperity in isolation.

After studying the demonstrated capacity of the less developed areas to absorb capital and technical assistance, surveying estimates of future requirements, considering the capacity of the United States to provide overseas economic assistance, and reviewing the result of previous economic and technical assistance programs, the Committee concluded:

"We cannot assure equal opportunity for all peoples, but we can, along with other prosperous nations, help find a way for all peoples to see opportunities ahead. For us not to do so would be contrary to our national tradition. Only if we continue to do our part in this general international effort can we fully realize the ideals and purposes which should inspire us as a nation if we are to play our proper role in the world."

The Committee stressed the primary responsibility of the less-developed areas for their own progress and expressed the view that other industrially-developed nations—which already have increased their overseas aid programs—can and should do more.

The Committee recommended:

- increases in the rate of development lending under the Mutual Security Program, "starting in Fiscal Year 1961 at a rate of at least \$1 billion a year."
- continued emphasis on Technical Assistance and further increases in the effectiveness of this essential program.
- a decrease in grant aid.
- greater reliance upon international agencies.
- increased use of private contractors.
- greater and more flexible use of agricultural surpluses.
- a series of detailed actions designed to improve continued economic assistance programs—which the Committee said are "justified on grounds both of enlightened self-interest and of our moral responsibility to ourselves to do what we can to help other peoples realize their legitimate aspirations."

To carry out cooperative programs for economic growth in the less-developed areas the Committee called for a mutual effort by the United States and other capital exporting nations with the less-developed world—with aid being extended under conditions which are specific but "not unreasonable."

## **Administration**

In a detailed analysis of the operation of economic aid programs, the Committee declared that "there is no more difficult administrative undertaking in the United States Government than . . . the management of the various economic assistance programs . . ."

The Committee found that the lack of centralized responsibility for administering various aid programs and the inability to plan effectively and recruit personnel because of year-to-year authorizations of the programs have seriously handicapped effective administration.

The Committee strongly recommended the creation of a single economic and technical assistance agency and legislative authorization for development lending, technical aid, and surplus disposal programs for a multiple-year period.

It favored setting up this agency outside the State Department, with provision for strong and clear foreign policy direction by the Secretary of State but with clear operating responsibility and authority in the agency.

### **The Committee Concluded**

*"That the Mutual Security Program has played a significant role in deterring a third world war, in keeping many nations free, in supporting our strategic system of alliances and overseas bases and in providing hope for economic progress among the people of the less developed countries."*

### **"Relative Emphasis" on Military and Economic Aid**

Pointing out that both military and economic assistance increase the total resources available to the recipient country, the Committee reported that it was impressed by the "wide variety of ways in which these two forms of aid complement each other."

Military assistance often is a "useful instrument for more than purely military purposes. Social and economic benefits can, under some circumstances, be derived from assistance intended to support military forces."

At the same time, "economic assistance, by strengthening the local economy, permits it to bear a heavier military burden and increases the incentive to the country's people to sustain a military effort."

Committee studies listed many civilian-type supplies—such as medicines and textiles—furnished to armed forces under military aid programs, and provided examples of military-type supplies which served direct economic purposes.

The Committee further pointed out that while the United States is the only country providing significant supplies of military equipment to other free world nations, the less-developed areas receive external economic assistance from other nations, from international agencies, and from private investment in addition to U. S. mutual security assistance.

Considering all forms of U. S. military and economic contributions, the Committee's studies show that during Fiscal Year 1959 only about 40 percent of total U. S. aid was furnished under military assistance programs and about 60 percent under economic programs and contributions by international agencies. These figures do not reflect private investment.

The Committee concluded that it "does not believe any continuing formula can be found that would satisfactorily determine the relative emphasis to be placed upon our economic or military assistance program whether overall or in respect to any particular country."

Under these circumstances, the Committee found that economic and military assistance "should be considered on their respective merits, and not as competitors. Money should be appropriated for each to the extent that it is considered in the United States' interest in achieving free world security."

### Criticisms

The Committee analyzed criticisms of operation of the Mutual Security Program and found, while mistakes have been made and criticisms have been of "varying degrees of validity and credibility," that "most projects in the program have been well planned and successfully executed" and "the successes have far outweighed the failures."

The Committee dealt with valid criticisms of the program through a frank recognition of them and a series of specific recommendations to correct them through measures for improved organization and administration.

The Committee concluded that "in our fascination with our own mistakes, and the constant use of foreign aid as a whipping boy, we may be gradually choking this vital feature of our national security to death."

It said: "In our democracy this program must in the long run depend on the understanding and support of the American people."

Pointing out that the public information effort dealing with the program has "deteriorated" while "staffs charged with informing our public have been cut, eliminated or transferred, and press conferences have

dwindled," the Committee said that "the press has justifiably complained of the lack of information."

## The Need Today

Having concluded that both military and economic assistance programs are necessary and important parts of a U. S. foreign policy designed to strengthen and further integrate a free world community, the Committee prepared an extensive series of major and detailed recommendations.

All of them stem from the basic conclusion that "*The time has come to face the facts of both the long-term nature of the struggle and what we must do to assure survival and ultimate victory.*"

## Major Recommendations

Among the major recommendations made by the Committee were:

- that the military assistance program be made a part of the regular budget of the Department of Defense and given continuing authorization.
- that increased funds be appropriated for the military assistance program to forestall the decline in the flow of military aid within the next two years and to permit the modernization of allied forces.
- that the various economic assistance programs be consolidated under a new agency, preferably outside the State Department.
- that development lending, technical assistance, and the use of surplus agricultural commodities for development purposes be given long-term status to improve planning, administration, and personnel recruitment.
- that increasing emphasis be placed on loans for economic development purposes and that grant aid be reduced.
- that increased emphasis be placed on channeling economic aid funds through international agencies.
- that foreign policy direction of both the military and economic assistance programs by the Department of State be strengthened and improved, and that clear responsibility for operations be given to the Department of Defense as to military aid and to the proposed new agency as to economic aid.
- that greater responsibility for planning, programming and executing both military and economic assistance be decentralized to the field.

- that there be continuous evaluation of both military and economic assistance programs.

### Other Significant Proposals

The Committee made detailed recommendations for:

- improvements in the military assistance program by closer consultation with allies in country program planning; by better integration of allied military forces and equipment with U. S. and other free world defense forces; by increased emphasis on joint research and development projects; by making appropriated funds available more quickly; by encouraging the use of military forces in less-developed countries for achieving economic objectives; by improving the training of military assistance program personnel serving overseas; and by legislative changes to take better advantage of the availability of retired military service officers for duties with the Mutual Security Program.
- improvements in the economic assistance programs by substituting development loans and agricultural commodities for grant aid wherever feasible and desirable; by more flexible use of agricultural commodities to support economic development; by greater emphasis on the establishment of country-wide or regional training centers under the technical cooperation program; by assisting less developed countries, upon their request, concerning their population explosion problem, and by various personnel system improvements including the institution of a permanent career service.
- encouragement of greater initiative on the part of countries receiving U. S. aid in planning and carrying out their own development programs.
- greater cooperation among the industrially advanced nations in joint programs of assistance to developing areas, including *ad hoc* international programs to meet the needs of particular countries or regions.
- greater reliance on international agencies for economic assistance, including specific support for the proposed International Development Association, the Inter-American Bank, increased financing for the UN Special Fund, and a larger UN Technical Assistance Program.
- encouragement, through tax law changes, broadened guarantees and in other ways of a greater role for private overseas investment.
- expanded use of business firms, foundations, universities, and other organizations to carry out development and technical assistance projects under contract.
- encouragement of efforts by the less-developed nations to stimulate their own export earnings.

## **Public Support**

Finally, to bring about a public understanding of the role of the Mutual Security Program in support of U. S. strategic and foreign policy, the Committee recommended "a major, sustained effort to make available to the public all the facts about the program," and to this end:

"(1) That Presidential instructions be issued to the appropriate agencies to institute vigorous measures to inform the American public adequately concerning the Mutual Security Program; and (2) that unjustified attacks upon the program be answered publicly, promptly and forcefully, stressing the program's positive accomplishments in the replies."

## A Summary: Some Highlights From The Reports

"Soviet-Chinese capability to apply military, political and economic pressures is expanding."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Entirely aside from the threat of communist aggression, the United States and other free nations face the challenge of the revolutionary insistence on progress by the hundreds of millions of people in the less-developed areas."

\* \* \* \* \*

"The critical question, the one that will determine the ultimate victor, is whether we and the other free world nations . . . will be able to unify our world and direct its energies toward a common goal, or whether the world is to be organized by the communist bloc."

\* \* \* \* \*

"The only alternative we can see to the interdependent allied free world, strengthened by our aid where needed, would be the Fortress America concept—taking our first stand in the last ditch."

\* \* \* \* \*

"The Mutual Security Program has played a significant role in deterring a third world war, in keeping many nations free, in supporting our strategic system of alliances and overseas bases and in providing hope for economic progress among the people of the less-developed countries."

\* \* \* \* \*

"In our fascination with our own mistakes, and the constant use of foreign aid as a whipping boy, we may be gradually choking this vital feature of our national security to death."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Our horizon is too often the narrow confines of the cold war."

\* \* \* \* \*

"We are not satisfied with the thought that programs of such size and character should be presented only in the framework of what is essentially a defensive approach."

\* \* \* \* \*

"The time has come to face the facts of both the long term nature of the struggle and what we must do to assure survival and ultimate victory."

## Studies Annexed to the Reports

- Annex A: The Purpose of United States Military and Economic Assistance, by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research (Affiliated with the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University).
- Annex B: Questions of Priority in Mutual Security Allocation, by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.
- Annex C: A Study of United States Military Assistance Programs in the Underdeveloped Areas, by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.
- Annex D: Contributions of Military Resources to Economic and Social Progress, by the Committee staff.
- Annex E: Training and Education Under the Assistance Program, by the Committee staff.
- Annex F: Program for Pooling Military Scientific Research and Development Capabilities with our Allies, by Dr. A. G. Hill and a panel of scientists.
- Annex G: A Study of Certain Aspects of Foreign Aid, by Mr. John H. Ohly.
- Annex H: Selected Statistics, by the Committee staff.

## Members of the President's Committee

### WILLIAM H. DRAPER, JR., *Chairman*

Chairman of the Board, Mexican Light & Power Company  
Former United States Special Representative in Europe  
Former Under Secretary of the Army

### DILLON ANDERSON

Lawyer and author  
Former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

### JOSEPH M. DODGE

Chairman of the Board, National Bank of Detroit  
Former Director of the Bureau of the Budget

### ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

President, American National Red Cross  
Former Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe

### MARX LEVA

Lawyer  
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense

### JOHN J. McCLOY

Chairman of the Board, Chase Manhattan Bank  
Chairman of the Board, Ford Foundation  
Former U. S. High Commissioner to Germany  
Former President of the World Bank  
Assistant Secretary of War during World War II

### GEORGE MCGHEE

Independent oil producer; owner of McGhee Production Company  
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and  
African Affairs  
Former United States Ambassador to Turkey

### JOSEPH T. McNARNEY

Former Commander U. S. Forces, Europe

### ARTHUR W. RADFORD

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

### JAMES E. WEBB

Businessman, Chairman of Educational Services, Inc., Massachusetts  
Institute of Technology  
Former Under Secretary of State  
Former Director of the Bureau of the Budget

The Committee was assisted by counsel and a staff directed by:

**Committee Counsel:**

**TRACY S. VOORHEES**

Former Under Secretary of the Army

Former Defense Advisor to U. S. Mission to NATO

Former Chairman, President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief

**Committee Study Coordinators:**

**GEORGE A. LINCOLN**

Professor and Head of Department of Social Sciences, U. S. Military Academy

Former Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense and to Secretary of the Army

Military Advisor to Secretary of State, Paris Peace Conference, 1946

**C. TYLER WOOD**

Head of Evaluation Operations, International Cooperation Administration

Former Ambassador, Deputy Special U. S. Representative in Europe for Marshall Plan

Former United Nations Command Economic Coordinator, Korea

**Secretary:**

**JOSEPH E. SLATER**, later succeeded by—

**E. W. KIGER**, Major, USAF