

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET

FOR AID USE ONLY

Bat #22

1. SUBJECT
CLASSI-
FICATION

A. PRIMARY

Agriculture

AE30-0000-0000

B. SECONDARY

Development

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Extent of administrative unity within the technical assistance complex

3. AUTHOR(S)

Ellsworth, D.F.

4. DOCUMENT DATE

1968

5. NUMBER OF PAGES

115p.

6. ARC NUMBER

ARC

7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

Purdue Res.

8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (*Sponsoring Organization, Publishers, Availability*)

9. ABSTRACT

10. CONTROL NUMBER

PN-RAB-319

11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT

12. DESCRIPTORS

Contractors
Project management
Technical assistance

13. PROJECT NUMBER

14. CONTRACT NUMBER

CSD-840 Res.

15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT

CSW-890 BARKER
#3

EXTENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITY WITHIN THE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COMPLEX

by

David F. Ellsworth

Lafayette, Indiana

Purdue University

June 30, 1968

One portion of the Final Report of the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project, Contract No. AID/csd-840

Table of Contents

	Page
Research Procedure	1
Administrative Unity Defined	1
Sampling Method	2
Interpretation of the Propositions	2
Interpretation of the Data	3
Criteria in Selecting Propositions for Discussion	4
Propositions Upon Which There Was the Least Degree of Administrative Unity Within TAC	5
Propositions Upon Which There Was the Greatest Degree of Administrative Unity Within TAC	30
Administrative Unity Within TAC and the Various Entities	46
Appendix A	49
Appendix B	111

RESEARCH PROCEDURE

Administrative Unity Defined.

Administrative unity is defined by McDermott in his paper *Administrative Strategies and Procedures* as "concurrence on contract objectives, resources, means, and procedures." Following the development of the TA-IB model, McDermott developed a topical outline of the relationships and problems involved in the operation of technical assistance projects. He then developed more propositions for each topical heading which resulted in the sixty propositions on which this analysis is based. These propositions evolved not only out of his own personal experiences and insights, but out of the insights of many of those involved in the early stages of this research project. Although there is no way of knowing whether the propositions which he decided upon are the most important which could be asked, the finalized list of propositions almost all dealt with such important issues as contract objectives, resource use, means and procedures of contract implementation. The propositions, thus, became a basis for a discussion of administrative unity within the Technical Assistance Complex.

The empirical definition of administrative unity is the extent of concurrence on a given proposition by the entities being considered. That is, administrative unity merely refers to the degree upon which the entities being considered agree upon a given proposition. Unity exists when there is very little disagreement. Disunity refers to a broad level of disagreements with a given proposition, or one entity feeling much stronger about the proposition than another entity.

Administrative unity within TAC for a given proposition is measured by taking the difference of the highest and smallest proportion of respondents from the TAC entities substantiating the proposition. For example, in proposition Number 1, 50% of USAID/M, 77.68% of USAID/W, 42.84% of USU/FT and 84.62% of the USU/C respondents substantiated the proposition (for the determination of administrative unity, the figures were rounded to the nearest 100th).^{1/} Thus the degree of administrative unity within TAC on proposition Number 1 is indicated by subtracting 42.84 from 84.62, giving a difference of 41.78, a considerable degree of disagreement within TAC entities on the proposition.

The measure of administrative unity within the USAID entities (the Washington office and the Mission) and the USU entities (the U.S. University campus and the U.S. university field team), is found by obtaining the difference between the center unit's and the field unit's responses. For example, for USAID on Proposition Number 1, by subtracting 50.0 from 77.68, giving 27.68.

The determination of the extent of administrative unity relative to a given proposition for the field units and center units is determined in the same manner as above. Field units are identified as USAID/M and center units as USU/C and USAID/W.

The results of this effort is presented in Table 1B, Appendix B, titled "Extent of Administrative Unity Within TAC and the Various Entities Over All Propositions."

^{1/} USAID/M refers to U.S. Agency for International Development/Mission; USAID/W to U.S.A.I.D./Washington, D.C.; USU/FT to the U.S. university field team; and USU/C to the main campus of the university in the U.S.

Sampling Method

USAID/M, USAID/W and USU/C personnel were chosen who were directly involved in USAID-USU technical assistance-institution building contracts. At times the USAID/M representative was the Rural Development Officer, while in other cases it was the officer at the Education Desk.

Representatives were selected from the various regional bureaus and subdivisions within those bureaus in USAID/W. In the USU/C, personnel who served as the campus coordinator or supervised the contract operation were asked to complete the contract. Within the USU field team, team members and team leaders completed the proposition list. In addition to the proposition list team leaders were asked to reply to the following questions:

- (a) What difficulties can you delineate between the USU/FT and USAID/M?
- (b) In your experience what have been the consequences of these "difficulties" in terms of individual and/or project performance? Have they been anything more than nuisances? How much?
- (c) What is the nature of these "difficulties"?
- (d) What kinds of measures could you suggest to diminish these difficulties?

Table 1

Number of Proposition Lists Returned from Staff Working Within the Technical Assistance Complex

USAID/W	22
USAID/M	20
USU/C	13
USU/FT	63
USU/TM46
USU/TL17

Later in the project seven new propositions were added to the list. As a result those respondents who received the proposition list in the earlier stages of its formation did not respond to the last seven propositions. This amounts to 3 USAID/W personnel and 19 USU/FT respondents, reducing the sample to 17 USAID/W personnel and 44 USU/FT personnel on propositions 54-60.

Interpretation of the Propositions

It was felt by members of the research staff that the distinction between "experience" and "judgement" was too arbitrary to make valid use of it. The instructions were very clear. The experience scale was to be used only (1) if the respondent had had specific experience relevant to the propositions, and (2) if he could cite a specific case. The judgement scale was to be used if he had had no specific experience relevant to the proposition. If the respondent had neither experience or judgement relevant to the proposition he was to mark NA (No Answer).

The proposition list was originally designed to be administered directly to the respondents, where they could be asked to cite the experience or case they were referring to when they used the experience scale. The thought was to develop case-lets on a number of the propositions.

However, for a number of reasons, it became necessary to mail-out the proposition list to individuals representing the four primary entities; USAID/M, USAID/W, USU/FT, and USU/C.

This made it quite easy for a wide variety of interpretations to be given to the distinction between judgement and experience, even though the directions were rather explicit. For example, should the respondent consider experiences of other people he had heard about as an experience. Or, as another respondent related, "I tried to abide by your instructions and used the judgement scale where I felt that my number of 'experiences' may have been insufficient to give a reasonably valid reaction...."

Given this difficulty it was decided that the distinction between judgement and experience was too arbitrary. It was, therefore, decided to use only the numerical rating given by the respondent.

However, a few interesting questions could still be asked using the distinction between experience and judgement. First, personnel from which entity would use the judgement scale in the highest proportion of the answers? Secondly, who would use the judgement scale most, USU team leaders or USU team members? And lastly, would there be any differences in the proportion of USAID and USU field units using the judgement scale based upon their regional location?

This shows the following generalizations can be made:

- 1) USAID/M personnel used the judgement scale least and the USU/FT used it the most. USAID/W used the judgement scale a higher proportion of times than did USU/C. Either the USU field team members have had fewer experiences relative to the proposition, or they have associated experience with a statement of fact to be rejected or accepted and are expressing the somewhat typical intellectual reluctance to call something a fact based upon a limited number of observations.
- 2) USU team leaders, although of the university climate and thus subject to the above mentioned trait used the judgement scale far less than team members. This implies (1) they have had a broader range of experiences enabling them to reply to the administratively oriented proposition based on their experience, and/or they have a trait of being more decisive than team members.
- 3) Members of field units in Latin America used the judgement scale in a higher proportion of the propositions than did those in NESAs and Africa.

Interpretation of the Data.

The last problem which arose for this author was interpreting the data as to the propositions in the most efficient manner. It was decided for the purposes

of this study the most important fact was whether the proposition was accepted or rejected. Although the data is presented in the tables in a manner following the 1 to 5 scaling which we asked each respondent to rate the proposition, for purposes of exposition a rating of 1-2 was interpreted as a rejection of the proposition and a rating of 4-5 was interpreted as substantiating the proposition. A rating of 3 was interpreted as indicating the respondent was neutral to the proposition, although there were times when one wonders whether the respondent had had neither experience or a judgement on the proposition and instead of indicating so by marking NA, marked a "3".

Using an authors discretion, words are used to describe the extent by which a proposition is substantiated or rejected and the extent of differences of opinion relative to a given proposition between entities, personnel and regions.

When speaking of the degree by which a proposition was substantiated the following definitions are used:

Complete agreement with proposition-----	greater than 95% to 100% of responses give the proposition a 4 or 5 rating;
Substantial agreement-----	greater than 75% to 95% of the responses are in the 4-5 category;
General agreement-----	Greater than 60% to 75% of the responses to the proposition are in the 4-5 categories;
Slight agreement-----	greater than 50% to 60% of the respondents have given a 4 or 5 rating;
Neutral-----	50% of the responses are in the 4-5 category;
Disagreement-----	Less than 50% of the responses are in the 4-5 category.

The same scale is used to describe the degree of rejection of a proposition. For example, a proposition is spoken of being completely rejected if greater than 95% to 100% of the respondents give the proposition a 1-2 rating.

As there is a third possibility, a 3-rating, it may be that rejection nor substantiation will acquire a majority. It will be necessary then to speak of the proposition as being neither rejected nor substantiated.

When speaking of the extent of difference of opinion, an insignificant difference of opinion means that the difference between the proportion accepting (or rejecting) the proposition is from zero to five percent. A slight difference of opinion means that there was a spread of greater than 50% up to 10% between the proportion substantiating (or rejecting). A moderate difference of opinion indicates that a spread of greater than 10 to 15% existed between the entities or groups being compared. A spread of from greater than 15 to 20 percent is spoken of as a significant difference of opinion. A great difference of opinion indicates that a difference of greater than 20 percent existed between the entities or groups being compared.

Criteria in Selecting the Propositions for Discussion

Using the procedure described on page one, those propositions upon which there was the greatest and the least administrative unity were chosen

to be discussed. In addition to those, the author "Relates" other propositions which are relevant to the problem being discussed in the chosen propositions.

Propositions Upon Which There Was The Least
Degree of Administrative Unity

Proposition 17:

"The most common threat to productive, cooperative relations between the field units of AID and USU from USAID/M is its tendency to regard USU field team as operationally subordinate. (There is no question of USAID's authority on general policy matters)"; and

Proposition 18

"The most common threat to productive, collaborative relationships between the field units of AID and USU from the USU is its tendency to consider itself operationally--and at times even politically--virtually independent of USAID/M."

The greatest level of disagreement within the Technical Assistance Complex, or the issue over which there is the greatest lack of administrative unity within TAC, is that presented by Proposition 17. Although the administrative disunity on Proposition 18 is great, it ranks 12th as propositions over which there is administrative disunity. However, because it is closely related to proposition 17 it will be considered in conjunction with 18.

The two propositions represent attempts to analyze the cause of the lack of unity or harmony between the two field units. U.S. University field teams charge that USAID/M is guilty of attempting to make the USU/FT an operational subordinate. They require too much information, too many reports, and do not give equal weight to the ideas and advice rendered from USU/FT members and their own staff. On the other hand, USAID/M counters that the USU/FT appears to desire no responsibility to USAID. After all, the field team is merely the representative of an institution which signed a contract with USAID/W to provide certain services and man-power to accomplish a given task. Due to this interpretation, some USAID personnel have the tendency to regard USU/FT staff as substitutes for direct-hire personnel, and should, therefore, be subject to the same discipline as USAID direct-hire personnel. One of the members of the research staff notes that "In spite of the desire of the USU/FT for independence, I've seen many cases in which the field party and its chief wouldn't exercise all of the prerogatives open to it, i.e., would not take any responsibility."

Writing on the same two propositions J. H. Atkinson notes in his paper U.S. University Field Team and AID-Field Relationships, "the affiliation of respondents was related to their responses." 1/

1/ For another analysis of these propositions refer to Atkinson's paper, pages 7 to 9.

That is, the lowest proportion of substantiation for Proposition 17, which "incriminated" USAID/M, came from USAID/M with the highest level coming from the USU/FT. The lowest proportion of agreement for Proposition 18, which points the "finger of blame" at the USU/FT, came from USU/FT while the highest came from USAID/M (refer to Tables 17A and 18A, Appendix A).

Turning to Proposition 17, USU/C is in substantial agreement, and USU/FT respondents are in general agreement with the proposition, while USAID entities do not agree with it. Probably even more significant is that 68.4 percent of the USAID/M respondents refute the proposition, contrasted to 37 percent of the USAID/W staff, and 13 percent of the USU/FT staff.

None of the USU/Center respondents refuted the proposition. It was on this proposition that there was the greatest level of disagreement between the field units.

The strength of the USU Center's support of the proposition suggests that the USU/C may feel threatened by USAID and strongly feel that should operational subordination be transferred from the U.S. university campus, productive and co-operative relations between USAID and the USU would be threatened.

The team leaders substantiated the proposition more strongly than did the USU team members. Team leaders and USU team members have great differences of opinion with USAID/M personnel on this proposition. (Refer to Table 2) There are no differences which can be attributed to regional location of the field units.

Table 2

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition No. 17

Field Unit Staff Position	1 *	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leaders	13.3	6.7		46.7	33.3	15
Team members	4.5	6.8	.25	29.6	34.1	44
USAID/M	42.1	26.3	5.3	15.8	10.5	19

USAID/M and USAID/W respondents were in general agreement with Proposition 18. Although USU entities did not agree with the proposition, nearly 37 percent in both the field and center unit recognized the threat to USU and USAID/M relations should USU/FT consider itself operationally independent.

Team leaders have a greater tendency than field team members to agree that the feeling of operational--and political--independence threatens productive relationships with USAID. Only 33 percent of the team leaders, contrasted to 48 percent of the team members, rejected the proposition. Seventy-one percent of the USAID/M respondents, as contrasted to 48 percent of the USU team leaders and 32 percent of the team members felt that the USU field team independence presented a threat to productive, collaborative relationships. (Refer to Table 3)

* Respondents were instructed to respond to each proposition on the basis of either experience or judgement. They marked a "1" for a proposition if on the basis of experience or judgement they strongly disagreed with it, a "2" if they disagreed not as strongly, a "3" if undecided or neutral, a "4" if agree not so strongly, and a "5" if strongly agree.

Table 3

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 18.

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team Leader	20.0	13.3	13.3	33.3	15.0	15
Team member	18.2	29.6	20.5	22.7	9.1	44
USAID/M	4.8	4.8	19.0	33.3	38.1	21

In both propositions there were a high proportion of respondents who answered the proposition on a neutral manner, indicating either that they were uncertain as to whether or not subordinancy or independence would effect USAID-USU relations or that they were uncertain as to whether the proposition described their particular situation.

Conclusion. The degree of disagreement between USAID and the USU on these propositions suggests that the issue of subordination versus independence is one of the most important effecting USU-USAID relations and merits considerable attention and effort, on both parts, to resolve.

Proposition 59:

"Dependence on USAID/M for commodity purchases and participant training management leads to delays and other inefficiencies in project administration."

One of the most frequently heard complaints is the amount of time consumed and opportunities lost because AID is so slow in selecting and approving participants and that AID cannot seem to get commodities to the site at the time when they are most urgently needed. Dependence upon USAID/M for these decisions "simply puts one other layer in the process and takes it out of the hands of those who are committed and those who have something to gain by some sort of promptness" reasons those desiring greater flexibility in these two areas.

A substantial proportion of USU/C personnel agreed with the proposition, along with 60 percent of the USU/FT. However, USAID/M personnel generally rejected the proposition. A large proportion (i.e., 35.7%) of the USAID/W staff responded to this important matter in a neutral manner, with 35.7 rejecting and 28.5 percent of them substantiating the proposition. One USAID/Washington staff member commented that "This of course varies from country to country and university to university, however, I would give the USU the edge in rating of ability to administer the commodity and participant training programs relative to their project." As this is the standing policy, the neutrality of USAID/W to the proposition would seem to suggest that USAID/M is determining the policy, and not USAID/W. Although AID's desire to have an operational decentralization may be wise, it is questionable whether or not it should extend to substantive policy issues (refer to Table 59A, Appendix A for a more complete listing of data).

Although the same proportion of USU team leaders and team members supported the proposition, as can be seen in Table 4, a higher proportion of team leaders indicated that they strongly agreed with the proposition.

Table 4

Percentage Distribution of responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 59.

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leaders (USU/TL)	20	13.3	6.7	33.3	26.7	15
Team members	6.7	33.3		26.7	33.3	15
USAID/M	31.6	31.6	5.3	10.5	21.0	19

There was a great difference of opinion between USU team members and team leaders with USAID/M, with 63.2 percent of the USAID/M personnel rejecting the proposition.

USAID/M personnel in Africa and NESAs had a slightly greater proportion of personnel rejecting the proposition than the field staffs in Latin America.

One USU team member commented that it depends on individual USAID personnel and their attitudes. Junior AID staff attempting to call the shots on clearances of participants and their program causes severe problems."

Another commented that "We've always had efficiency displayed in this respect".

"Inefficiencies," replied one USU staff member, "is the cost of bureaucracy." And another, upon agreeing with the proposition, stated that "this does not mean that to include these in the contract would eliminate delays and inefficiencies."

Conclusion. USAID/W indicates that they neither accept or reject the proposition. Within AID/M there is general disagreement and within the USU/FT there is slight agreement with the proposition.

Proposition 19

"Even in the ideal situation there will be some conflict situations between AID and the USU contractor. Project achievement will be enhanced to the extent that unpleasant contacts or negotiations involving conflict between AID and USU are shifted from the field units to the center units (Washington and Campus)."

This proposition was proposed as a tactic to reduce the amount of friction between USAID/M and USU/FT, especially the Ag and Rural Development Officer and the USU team leader. Writes a former team leader, "I think that during my time in the field, I did this. Unless it was necessary for me to handle, we let the center units work it out...this is always a good administrative technique. When one has to make a bad decision, if he can blame someone else, or claim he has not the authority to concede, he is a lot better off."

From the respondents it is quickly seen that both AID field and AID center want nothing to do with this tactic. As one USAID/staff member responded, "Due to the time delays and lack of knowledge of the center units concerning the situation, field problems are better solved in the field."

The USU/FT did not substantiate the proposition, nor did it reject it, although a slightly higher proportion supported this strategy. The USU/C seems very willing to fight its field units battles. Two different reasons are offered: (1) They desire to perform a continuing function, and (2) A feeling that they are more able (because of their greater power) than the field unit to handle USAID.

Seventy percent of the USAID/M respondents rejected this strategy, 79 percent of the USAID/W staff, 45 percent of the USU field teams and only 31 percent of the USU/C respondents. In contrast it was substantiated by only 15 percent of the USAID/M personnel, 10.5 percent of USAID/W respondents, 49.1 percent of the USU/field team members and by 61.5 percent of the USU/C staff members responsible for overseeing the USU-AID contract. (Refer to Table No. 19A, Appendix A)

Team leaders felt slightly more inclined than team members to transfer negotiations involving conflict to the center units. Nine of the seventeen team leaders (or 52.9%) responding to the proposition favored transferring unpleasant contacts or negotiations through this tactic. Forty-eight percent of the team members and a mere 15 percent of the AID/M personnel agreed with this tactic.

Table 5

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 19.

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leaders	29.9	17.7		35.3	17.7	
Team members	19.1	23.8	9.5	28.6	19.1	
USAID/M	55.0	15.0	15.0	5.0	10.0	20

Proposition 20, which simply follows up 19, states "Many negotiations or contacts between AID and contractor involving conflict or unpleasantness can be transferred from field negotiating to center negotiating." This is a much clearer statement of a tactic which would result in greater centralization, and the clearness of the statement seemingly caused greater concern over this tactic among USU team members and team leaders as an increased proportion of them rejected the tactic, 53 percent of the USU technicians and 59 percent of the team leaders rejecting the strategy.

Due to the rather strong opposition of USAID to this tactic, should a team leader attempt to use it, USAID may take this as an indication of a weakness on the team leaders part, i.e., an inability to accept responsibility and resolve problems which he has the responsibility for handling.

A number of USU and AID respondents who commented on this proposition said that use of such a tactic would depend upon the type of conflict or issues involved with one stating that negotiations or problems should be "transferred to the center only as a last resort."

Commented one Senior Overseas Researcher, "This depends very much on the nature of the disagreement. In several instances, it appeared that the team leader might well have worked out acceptable solutions if he, in fact, had authority to speak for his own university in the matter. However, having to refer the issue back home, it was difficult to bring sound judgement to bear on the issue. Similarly, in one USAID Mission referred many questions to Washington simply because the mission did not have the courage to thresh it out with the team involved. To have taken a more forthright approach would very likely have resulted in a solution that both parties would have been willing to live with. To refer matters back to the U.S. detracts from the administrative stature of those involved in the field."

Most of those commenting on the proposition felt that the field was the place to settle most problems. A sample of these comments gives the reasons for their position:

Commented one USU field team member, "The center units should be the leader in administrative problems with the field, the USU/FT receiving direction from the campus "However," he continued, "this is not always true because many of the problems evolve from field operations. The center units are not aware of the situation, adding to the complications."

Stated another field team member, "Shifting responsibilities to Washington may not solve the problem. Authority for decision must be recognized. Background information that is accurate and dependable is essential for effective problem solving. Moving the activity to a central location hazzards completeness of the background information--without which no applicable solution is likely to result.

"Other than things like overhead changes, it is probably better to focus on USAID/M and USU/FT negotiations for program content, staffing needs, spending flexibilities, etc. The role of the campus director should be one of legitimizing field team ideas in Washington," stated another USU/FT staff member.

One AID/M respondent reminded us of the extra time that would be consumed using such a strategy.

Conclusion. USU field team members and both entities of AID are reluctant to transfer problems to the center units for resolution. USU/C, on the other hand, is willing to accept the responsibility for these problems. In fact, in some cases the university insists that the field team allow it to deal with AID, restricting the role of the team leader to one of an administrator and not a problem solver.

Proposition 4:

"Contracting to do a technical assistance job in institution building is a high risk operation. It would save time, opportunity, and, in the long run, USAID money for USAID to insure financially a minimum level of operation so that the contractor and HI (Host Institution) could demonstrate the new concepts central to the project."

Many of the goals and elements of the program that TAC is trying to accomplish in the HI are new in the HC. Extension, research and joining appointments are likely to be new to the HC. When problems arise within the HC, such as when they may be short of funds or an unfriendly minister is appointed, these new activities are the ones that get hurt first. Few projects escape a period of "rough sailing." As a result, these new innovations are scrapped because the HI people do not have, cannot have, real confidence in them. From their viewpoint this is a new idea which will require a lot of time and money, and will not pay off very soon. Thus, a USU team can get something going, but have it starved out before it can really take root. Then TAC will have to start all over again.

This proposition refers to having some insurance--some funds--available that will enable the project to salvage something of an innovation. This should be nothing more than insurance, perhaps just to maintain the project at a minimal level. Too much money could relieve too much pressure on both the project and the HI. USU's need some pressure, too, to get the HI scrambling for funds. Maintaining the right level of pressure is the difficult administrative strategy here.

The respondents from the USU/C and USU/FT gave this proposition substantial support. USAID/M gave it general support, and USAID/W was slightly in favor of the proposition. USU/C felt the strongest concerning the proposition with 90.1 percent of the respondents substantiating the proposition and none rejecting it.

Although USU/FT was substantially in agreement with the proposition, USU team leaders supported it more strongly than did USU team members. Nearly 44 percent of the USU team leaders supported the proposition with none rejecting it. In contrast 4.8 percent of the USU team members rejected it, 14.6 percent reacted neutrally, and 80.5 percent reacted favorably to the proposition. In USAID Mission 26.3 percent rejected the proposition, 10 percent were neutral and 63.3 percent substantiated it.

USU units and USAID units are definitely at odds on this proposition, with the chasm between USAID/W and USU/C being greater than that of the field units.^{1/}

The great difference of opinion between the USU and USAID entities may be, in part, explained by a difference of interpretation of the proposition. This is somewhat reflected by the comments made by USU and USAID personnel on the proposition.

Comments coming from AID staff included the following:

- 1) "My experience strongly substantiates that Institution Building is a high risk venture, and I agree that a minimum level of operation is necessary; however, by whom it should be financed is another issue. My experience does not necessarily substantiate that it saves USAID time and money for USAID to make the guarantee. If the HG will not make the effort, it is probably a poor project from any standpoint."

^{1/} Although AID/M personnel in Latin America tended to reject the proposition that too many demands are made of the HG (proposition # 1), they believe more strongly than do their associates in NESAs and Africa that USAID should insure a minimum level of operation in institution building projects.

- 2) "The HC should insure minimum levels of operation. If they cannot or will not there is little point of AID doing so, as the institution will fall apart when the TAC support is withdrawn. This is probably meant to refer to support for local costs which AID just cannot do because of our balance of payments problems."
- 3) "The major factor in HI development is the financial restraints placed on it by the HG. In no event should AID or other donors develop an institution which is beyond the ability of the HG to finance, otherwise we create a perpetual 'beggar'."
- 4) "Effective demonstration requires involvement and commitment of the HC to try out the new concepts and demonstrate these; jointly insured finance from USAID beyond the very substantial payments already covered would be a sign that the HC lacks interest."
- 5) "I do not see the risk. I can see uncertainty. Would you say that institutional maturity is a slow process which would more than likely develop in our desired hue if one maintained constant personal guidance until maturity is achieved."
- 6) "Good, but what about Congress on funds;" and lastly,
- 7) "Provided that both contractors will live up to the commitment; otherwise such an approach will still have a poor result."

Among the USU comments were:

- 1) "This is very important. Many times for the lack of relatively small expenditures it is impossible to complete a project and consequently the total effort of TAC is lost completely."
- 2) "With a multi-year program agreed upon, we can operate successfully on annual financial increments."
- 3) "to be able to guarantee the duration of the contract is more important."
- 4) "This proposition is appealing as stated, but I am afraid that the U.S. University teams have not exhausted their potential to date for doing just this type of operation within resources available to them. What is needed, in addition to slightly better financial support, is a reorientation away from a purely advisory role."

A couple of USU staff members commented that the problem of continuity within TAC, the HI and the HCC was a more serious problem.

This problem is related to other problems which are encountered in institution building projects. There is the problem of continuity, not only of funds but of manpower, which entered into the comments related above. There is the problem of commitment of the TAC entities, the HI and the HG to the objectives and the optimum level of pressure on the HI and HG and methods of applying pressure on the HI and HG. The issue of flexibility within the project, especially with money, which might be required to meet changes in the situation is implied by the proposition. And there is the problem of gaining acceptance of ideas which are new to the HC personnel.

Only statement 4, made by a USAID staff member, connects these problems. This suggests that either the proposition was not sufficiently explicit in what it was attempting to get at, or that TAC personnel are more worried that the HC meet its commitments than they lose sight of some of these important factors in project achievement.

Conclusion:

Given the financial problem of USAID it may be impractical to expect AID to insure a minimum level of operation for new innovations which are being demonstrated to host nationals. Although the question of HG, HI and USU commitment cannot be overlooked, it is agreed, by some entities more strongly than others, that the project should have sufficient flexibility in the use of funds to insure a minimum level of operation in the demonstration of new concepts. The recognition of the need for flexibility is demonstrated by results from Proposition 35, pages 25 to 27.

Proposition No. 6

"Frequently, the USAID/M does not take advantage of the improved strength developed in HI in other parts of its agricultural programming."

USAID is involved in assisting the HC and the USU in building a Land-Grant Institution, which is a college, a research center and includes an extension arm. It could frequently use the strength of a Land-Grant College in other activities of its total program, but does not. It does not see the institution it is building as part of the total economy, ready to play a part. So Land-Grant personnel are not used for executing programs, or counseling--especially HI personnel. Research contracts may or may not be made to the HI. Frequently, USAID will want to use the USU personnel--almost as its own staff. But this is completely different than using the HI as an institution. The significance is that an institution gets strong by use and atrophies by non-use.

USAID/W was in substantial agreement with the proposition, USU/C in general agreement, and the USU/FT in slight agreement. USAID/M neither accepted or rejected the proposition, although a higher proportion of the USAID/M respondents substantiated than refuted it. Interestingly enough, a higher proportion of the field units reacted neutrally to this proposition than did the center unit respondents, with 22.2% of USAID/M and 23.1% of USU/FT giving the proposition a "3". (Refer to Table 6A, Appendix A). It would seem that the field units should be in a better position to react positively or negatively to the proposition than the center units.

The source of the great disagreement on this proposition came from the substantial difference in the proportion of USAID/W and USAID/M personnel substantiating the proposition, with 89.5% of USAID/W substantiating contrasted to 44.4% of USAID/M. There was a moderate level of disagreement between USU/C and USU/FT, a slight difference of opinion between the field units, and a great difference of opinion between the field units, and a great difference of opinion between the center units. It is notable that the two field teams are more closely in agreement upon the proposition than each field unit is with its respective superior (Refer to Table 1B, Appendix B)

USU team members and USU team leaders felt nearly the same on the proposition, both being in slight agreement with 52.9% of the team leaders and 54.3% of the team members substantiating. This is only slightly different from the 44.4% of the USAID/M respondents who substantiated the proposition.

Table 6

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition No. 6

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team Leaders		23.5	23.5	29.4	23.5	17
Team members	2.9	20.0	22.9	40.0	14.3	35
USAID/M	11.1	22.2	22.2	22.2	22.2	18

USU field teams located in Africa felt the proposition to be more true than did field teams located in Latin America or NESAs. Eleven of the twelve "3" ratings from USU/FT came from Latin America. There were no regional differences of opinion within USAID/M.

One USAID staff member reacted to this proposition by stating "Frequently the HC does not take advantage of the improved strength developed in HI and in other parts of AID's agricultural programming."

A USU team leader commented that he could cite many examples of AID's failure to work with the HI in many parts of its agricultural programming. Another stated, "It (USAID/M) is always bringing in 'experts' from the USA for a week or more for advise and ignoring local TAC personnel. USAID/M and USAID/W do not utilize local HC and TAC talents in its program development."

One Senior Overseas Observer commented that "there are only two or three institutions in my region out of the eleven which have developed enough strength to merit reasonable attention on the part of USAID. In these cases, there is no indication that they have been deliberately shunned and there is some evidence that they are used by USAID." The statement of this SOR is in direct contradiction with that of a team leader from the same region.

Conclusion.

All entities, except USAID/M, are in agreement with the proposition. However, there is only a slight difference of opinion between USU/FT and USAID/M. A big proportion of both field units reacted neutrally to the proposition.

Proposition 1

TAC (the Technical Assistance Complex) frequently tends to make demands on the HG (Host Government) that it cannot meet because of so many other demands for resources made by expanding national programs, other AID programs, and technical assistance from other entities.

TAC bargaining with HGs and HIs has been described by many individuals as, at best, unskillful, and at worst, sloppy and hurried. Deadlines are short. Terms of the bargain are not carefully thought out, and bargainers are often not trained for their task. TAC will bargain for terms which it should be aware the HI cannot keep. The HI is aware that TAC is using this frame of reference, and thus doesn't worry too much about the bargain. This leads to disrespect for the bargain and often for each other.

Pressures on Host Governments currently are greater than TAC realizes. There are many competing programs which demand HG attention, such as building new schools and roads. Other projects backed by USAID or some other donor compete for the very scarce HG resources. One of the most common errors made by Host Governments is overextending or overcommitting themselves.

It is argued by some people that TAC expects more from the HC than it can guarantee. That is, TAC expects the HG and HI to make long range commitments. However, USAID and the USU does not, and cannot under existing domestic relationships, guarantee that it can fulfill its commitment to the HI. For example, staffing difficulties in the USU and AID's problems with Congress represent a continual threat to their ability to comply with a long-range and overly-specific commitment.

USAID/W and USU/C personnel who responded to the proposition were found to be in substantial agreement with it. Fifty percent of the USAID/M respondents agreed that TAC frequently tends to make demands on the HG which it cannot meet, while 31.8 percent disagreed. The USU/FT did not substantiate or reject the proposition, with 42.8 percent agreeing, 48.2 percent disagreeing, and 9 percent reacting neutrally to the proposition. (Refer to Table 1A, Appendix A for complete summary of data).

However, when team leaders are separated from the rest of the field teams it is found that 64.7 percent of the team leaders felt that TAC tends to make demands which the HG cannot meet. Team members felt that this was not so, with 55 percent rejecting the proposition and only 35 percent agreeing with it. Of those members of the field units, team leaders gave the strongest substantiation to the proposition, followed by USAID/M staff, and the team members clearly rejecting it (Refer to Table 7)

Table 7

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 1

Field Unit Staff Member	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team Leaders	5.9	23.5	5.9	35.3	29.4	17
Team Members	20.0	35.0	10.0	32.5	2.5	40
USAID/M	18.2	13.6	18.2	22.7	27.3	22

USAID/M in Latin America rejected the proposition indicating that they felt that too much is not being demanded of the HG, while the mission personnel stationed in Africa and NESAs felt that too much is being demanded. These regional differences did not exist within the USU/FT.

A few individuals commented on this proposition.

One university staff member, who has had considerable contract experience, responded that "Every agency providing technical assistance must make demands on the HG...The problem is not so much one of making demands which HG cannot meet but rather it is one of making demands which HG is not prepared to give sufficiently high priority."

His statement parallels that of a USAID staff member who said, "Insecurity of future financing is a myth propagated by HG."

Another USAID staff member pointed out the great difficulty of "knowing in advance the full dimension of demands." Secretarial help seems to be one of the demands which the HG and HI have the greatest difficulty in filling.

A USU team leader commented that "The contract put real financial pressure on the government..., particularly the needs for capital development."

Another team leader stated that the "experience on this project strongly substantiates this proposition." Problems experienced were an inability to support the USU field team with office equipment, translation services, office space, and a lack of sufficient finances to hire qualified staff members and development of the physical plant.

Conclusions.

USAID/M and USU/FT in Latin America tend to feel that more can be demanded from the HG. For Africa and NESAs the proposition that too much is frequently demanded of the HG by TAC seems to be substantiated.

There is a great difference of opinion between the field units and the center units on this proposition, with center units leaning a great deal more toward the feeling that too much is demanded. A relatively high proportion (18.2%) of USAID/M reacted neutrally to this important question.

Bargaining should be preceded with a study of country needs and ability to support a given project. The study should be based upon realistic assumptions. No more should be demanded of the HG than they are expected to provide.

Proposition 52

"One of the most effective techniques a USU team member can use to gain acceptance and establish adequate rapport is to identify himself with the Host Institution."

The disagreement associated with this proposition is a rather basic issue: Is the frame of mind associated with identifying with the HI just as important to one's performance as is the frame of mind of objectivity.

In identifying closely with the Host Institution, the USU technician talks about how his efforts help the HI, not merely himself. He demonstrates a willingness to sacrifice and fight for the welfare of the HI. In so doing he is setting an example for host nationals who, frequently, do not identify themselves closely with the HI. By becoming immersed not only in the HI but life in the HC avenues are opened to acceptance. Furthermore, identifying with the HI protects the USU technician when he errs, as one will surely do if he does anything. Writes one former team leader "I would almost argue that individual success is highly correlated to the degree with which he identifies with the HI."

On the other hand, to become so involved in the HI may cause a loss of perspective and objectivity. It becomes extremely difficult to "step back" and analyze a matter purely on its own merits or demerits. Impulsiveness associated with strong identification with the HI's cause or programs can create mistakes which might otherwise be avoided. Besides that, to identify too closely with the HI might put the USU/FT at cross purposes of USAID/M or some of its objectives and on some issues.

In putting this proposition to the personnel in USAID/W, USAID/M, USU/FT and USU/C, it was surprising to find that a highest proportion of rejection came from USU/C personnel. Fifty percent of them rejected the proposition in contrast to 23.8% of USAID/M, 5.3% of USAID/W and 3.2% of the USU/FT.

USAID/W and USU/FT were in substantial agreement with the proposition and USAID/M in general agreement.

Ninety-four percent of the USU team leaders felt that identifying with the HI is an effective technique for gaining acceptance, with 86.7% of the USU field members and 66.7% of the USAID/M respondents also in accord with the proposition. Obviously, this is a technique commonly employed by team leaders. (Refer to Table 8)

Table 8

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition No. 52

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader			5.9	35.3	58.8	21
Team member	4.4		8.9	40.0	46.7	41
USAID/M		23.8	9.5	28.6	38.1	21

Among the comments which AID personnel noted concerning this proposition was agreement, but a reminder that it may result in conflict with USAID on policy matters. Another noted that "this is true, but it can be overdone." Another stated that "USU/FT should feel as though they are actually working with the staff members of the HI, and not just a superior advisor."

One USU/TL felt that it was true and research on the matter had proven it so. Another added the curious comment, "Not if it (the HI) is a loser. Otherwise this is a valid statement," which is to say that one should use this strategy for institutional development only if the institution is developed. The writer of the comment was probably thinking that HC personnel could be shamed into doing a better job. His strategy should be more positive than indicated by the comment.

Conclusion.

The wide variation in the proportion of agreement on this proposition suggests that this tactic ought to be discussed by the TAC entities. The most serious threat to cooperative relations is the great difference of opinion between the team leader (and his team members) with USAID/M and USU/C as to the effectiveness of this technique in gaining acceptance and establishing rapport.'

Proposition 47

"The role of the team leader has been conceived too narrowly by both the U.S. University and AID."

The proposition was based upon the complaints from team members that their team leader did not give leadership to the program, and his reply that the administrative chores were too great. USAID/M requires a great deal of information and reports on the project almost all of which must be prepared by the team leader. In fact, a number of team leaders commented that they felt their role was to act as an umbrella for the USU technicians, protecting them from outside disturbances so that they can do their technical job without interruption. Some say that the narrowly defined role has been conceived by USAID and the USU, others say that narrowly defined roles occur because the team leader defines his role narrowly. This proposition was to determine the feelings of staff members in the various entities.

There is slight to general agreement with the proposition on the part of USU entities, but USAID entities do not support the proposition. Nor do a majority of the USAID/M and USAID/W personnel reject it. Fifty percent of the USAID/W respondents and 25 percent of the USAID/M reacted to the proposition in a neutral manner indicating they were uncertain as to whether the role of the USU team leader was adequately or inadequately defined. (Refer to Table 47A, Appendix A)

Nearly 65 percent of the USU team leaders who responded to the proposition felt that their role was defined too narrowly, while 56.4% of the team members agreed that the role was not adequately defined. However, only 35 percent of the USAID/M respondents agreed with the majority of the USU field team, while 40 percent disagreed. Over 35 percent of the USU team leaders disagreed with the proposition.

There was greater uncertainty on the part of the USAID Mission personnel stationed in the NESAs-Africa regions as to whether or not the team leader role was defined too narrowly. A higher proportion of the USAID/M staff stationed in Latin America tended to substantiate the proposition with 44.4% from the Latin American Region substantiating the proposition contrasted to 27.3% from the NESAs and African regions.

A higher proportion of the USU staff stationed in the NESAs region substantiated the proposition than is true for the USU staff in Latin America. One of the sources of conflict between AID field and USU field in the NESAs region has been the extent to which the team leader should be allowed to negotiate directly with the HG. 1/

Conclusion

There is a great deal of disagreement between USU and USAID, both field and center units, as to whether the role of the team leader has been conceived too narrowly. This is less true for Latin America than it is for the NESAs and African field units.

It appears that USAID and USU should undertake a re-evaluation as to whether or not the team leader role is defined too narrowly, especially for the NESAs region. The high proportions of USAID/W and USAID/M personnel responding to the proposition in a neutral manner indicates that they should give greater thought to the matter.

Proposition 15 2/

"Project performance is impaired with an increase in contact between USAID/M and USU/F Party if these contacts concern simply routine project administration and operation, and if the relationship tends to or seems to put the USU team in a position definitely subordinate to USAID/Mission".

Proposition 14. 3/

"Project performance is improved with an increase in contact between USAID/M and USU Field Party if these contacts are truly collaborative in nature and if they concern program development and execution."

Proposition 15 is one of those in which there is the greatest administrative disunity, with the disagreement between the field units being very great. Proposition 14, on the other hand, is one of those where there is the greatest administrative unity, with the agreement between the field units being considerable. However, because they are so closely related they should be discussed together.

1/ For an extensive investigation into the team leader function refer to William Miller's paper titled Team Leader prepared for the CIC-AID Rural Development Research Project.

2/ Refer to J.H. Atkinson's discussion in U.S. University Field Team and AID-Field Relationships.

3/ Ibid.

The propositions say that if USAID and USU talk about important things relations will improve, but if they worry about administrative detail they will get on each others' nerves.

USU/C was in general agreement with Proposition 15, USU/FT in substantial agreement, and USAID/W in slight agreement with it. USAID/M, however, did not accept the proposition that an increase of contacts dealing with routine administrative matters impairs project performance. Forty-seven percent of the USAID/M respondents rejected the proposition while only 42.1 percent agreed with it. This is in contrast to the proposition being rejected by only 11.7 percent of the USU/FT and accepted by 78.3 percent.

USU people seem to want collaborative, peer relationships over a broad range of matters, resent burequcratic impositions, and are desireous of minimizing contacts over matters which they consider trivia. However, USAID/M personnel, who must be concerned with sending progress reports to Washington and other forms of "trivia" feel that USU people must also be concerned. "If the USU people want a peer relationship they should not resent having to deal with the same types of reports which we have to provide for the mission and Washington," commented one AID/M staff member.

USAID/W, which is at least partially responsible for the fact that USAID/M must be concerned with administrative and operational "trivia", responded somewhat favorably to the proposition (52.9% substantiating and 35.3% rejecting).

When only the opinions of field team members are considered the clear lines of distinction between USAID and USU opinion becomes even more distinguishable, with 87.5 percent of the team leaders and 75 percent of team members agreeing with the proposition, in contrast to 42 percent of the USAID/M respondents.

Table 9

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 15

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leaders	6.2	6.3		31.3	56.2	16
Team members	2.3	9.1	13.6	34.1	40.9	44
USAID/M	15.8	31.6	10.6	26.3	15.7	19

Proposition 14 states that project performance is improved if the contacts between USU/FT and USAID/M are collaborative and deal with substantive issues, not administrative problems. USU/C is in substantial agreement, while USU/FT, USAID/M and USAID/W are in almost complete agreement with the proposition.

USU team members reflected the greatest reluctance to have increased contact with USAID, but this was minimal.

Table 10
Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 14.

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leaders				35.3	64.7	17
Team members		2.3	2.3	45.4	50.0	44
USAID/M		4.5		18.2	77.3	22

Conclusion

USAID, especially USAID/M, recognizes that project performance is improved when the collaborative contacts aimed at program development and execution are increased. However, they do not believe that increased contacts dealing with routine project administration impairs project performance. This represents, on USAID/M's part, an inability to recognize something obvious to every academic-- people associated with universities generally have a disdain for administrative detail and, in some cases, detailed planning. Instead, they are most at home with general concepts and broad outlines, preferring to leave detail to someone else.

USU people, on the other hand, want collaborative relationships dealing with program development and execution, but do not recognize the importance of an administrative mechanism for establishing an organizational memory, so necessary when the turnover is as great as it is within TAC.

The USU and USAID need to work together in developing an efficient organizational memory with USAID recognizing the importance of collaborative relationships dealing with substantive issues and the USU/FT recognizing the importance of organizational memories and accepting the full responsibility of a collaborative, peer relationship.

Proposition 23

"There is a tendency for U.S. University contract projects to concentrate on internal technical factors and to neglect (1) problems of administration and (2) problems of building relations and working arrangements with other agencies of government and the general public."

Reports written by Rigney 1/ and McDermott 2/ emphasize the importance of involvement on the part of the USU technician, especially the team leader, in institutional transformation and in building a bridge between the HI, the HCC, and the people. McDermott hypothesized that these aspects of institution building were too often neglected by the USU/FT.

1/ J.A. Rigney, Optimum Role For U.S. Overseas Advisors

2/ J.K. McDermott and J.A. Rigney, Role of Technical Personnel in the Technical Assistance-Institution Building Process, and J.K. McDermott, Administrative Procedures and Strategies of the Technical Assistance Complex in Institution Building Contracts

The two center entities, USAID/W and USU/C were in substantial agreement that U.S. university contract projects tend to concentrate on internal technical factors and to neglect (1) problems of administration and (2) problems of building relations and working arrangements with the HCC and the general public. USAID/M was in slight agreement with the proposition; however 33.3% rejected it, with nearly 7 percent reacting neutrally to it.

Nearly the same proportion of USU team leaders and USAID/M staff accepted the proposition, 59 percent and 57 percent respectively. Less than half of the USU/team members substantiated the proposition, with 44% of the USU/team members substantiating the proposition and 49% rejecting it. (Refer to Table 11, below)

Table 11

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 23.

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leaders	35.3		5.9	35.3	23.5	17
Team members	13.9	34.9	7.0	27.9	16.3	43
USAID/M staff	14.3	19.0	9.5	14.3	42.9	21

USU staff in Latin America felt they did not dedicate enough effort to the tasks of improving administration and relations, whereas those stationed in NESAs felt that they did. This is reflected by 66.7 percent of the USU/FT stationed in NESAs who rejected the proposition in contrast to 38.5% in Latin America who disagreed with the proposition. There were no regional differences of opinion reflected by USAID/M respondents.

One AID/M staff member, commenting on the proposition, offered the opinion that such a result "could be due to the short-term nature of the contracts."

A USU/Campus administrator and former team member asserted that "Contract field personnel have always been aware and worked toward the alleviation of these two problems."

A USU/team member offered a third failure of the U.S. university operation that being establishing "effective communications with policy makers served by counterpart agencies."

A number of respondents pointed out that this was in reaction to the proposition, then refuted the alternative that the U.S. University team was doing little to improve administration, but accepted the statement that they were doing little to improve relations with the HCC and the people."

Conclusion

There is a distinctive difference of opinion between the central and field

units within TAC. If insufficient efforts are being made, as USAID/W and USU/C believe is true, what are the center units doing to get the field units to perform this vital function? If the field units are doing an adequate job in this function, why is it that center units are not aware of this? There is a need to resolve this issue for there is a great deal of administrative disunity on it.

Proposition 54

"At times objectives of the USU team remain inflexible and do not adjust either to changed situations in HC or to a new information that changes or should change USU's evaluation of the HC."

One should not expect to have a very good intelligence report on the environment at the beginning of the project, and he should expect it to keep changing. Certain initially planned functions or programs that seem essential early may be for less so as the project progresses and new information becomes available, or the situation changes. Inflexibility in programming is not bad per se. It is certain objectives and criteria that are set so early that U.S. standards prevail and they simply are not realistic in the HC setting. Writes a former member of the Purdue research team, "We have considerable evidence that USU's tend to be downright inflexible in insistence on U.S. standards or criteria set too early in the project history."

USAID/W was in substantial agreement with the proposition, while USAID/M was in general agreement. Slightly more than fifty-nine percent of the USU/FT substantiated the proposition. USU/C was, however, not in agreement with the proposition, with 44.4 percent substantiating, 33.3 percent reacting neutrally, and 22.2 percent rejecting. (Refer to Table 54A, Appendix A)

As can be seen in Table 12, a slightly higher proportion of USAID/M respondents substantiated the proposition than did USU team leaders or team members. However, a slightly higher proportion of team leaders and Mission personnel rejected the proposition than is true of team members.

Table 12

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 54.

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leaders		26.7	13.3	46.7	13.3	15
Team members		18.2	22.7	31.8	27.3	22
USAID/M	10.5	15.8	5.3	42.1	26.3	19

A considerably higher proportion of USU staff stationed in Latin America thought there was greater inflexibility in their area than did those stationed in NESAs and Africa. Of the USU/FT stationed in Latin America 86.7 percent of the respondents supported the proposition in contrast to 43.8 percent from NESAs

and 33.3 percent from Africa. However, a large proportion of the respondents in the NESAs and African regions reacted neutrally to the proposition.

One former overseas observer saw the danger of inflexibility of standards as being particularly true as the institution matured. Another USU respondent recognized that there was often "too long a time lag in making needed adjustment." He added, "On the other hand, there have been instances of over-adjustment--shifting to new HI's or new project objectives before original attempts have had a chance to work out to the extent possible."

One AID official thought it to be a rather common failing of the USU team to remain inflexible and not to adjust either to the changed situations in the HC or to new information that should change the USU's evaluation of the HC.

Conclusion

With USAID/W, USAID/M and USU/field team agreeing to the proposition it would seem that they recognize the problem. However, they must move forward in solving it. This requires that they know what is going on within the HC, the HCC, and the HI--which, in turn, requires a considerable degree of rapport with relevant individuals within the HCC as well as with HI staff members.

Proposition 32

"Program Agreements that provide resources and support with Host Institution in and of themselves cannot be regarded as adequate accomplishments in the task of building good relations between the HI and Host Government."

The fact that every project has had a high level of government-to-government agreement causes much confusion in the minds of some people. A program agreement can be signed for many reasons. The U.S. Government may only want to be present in a country. The HC may want something else from the U.S. Government, and decides to go along with this idea for a Land Grant-type university in order to gain some other objective. For example, it may want the commodities and participant training, but doesn't pay any attention to the Institution Building components. Few host government signers even know what a land grant-type institution is. In effect, the program agreement does little more than give the U.S. access to the HI. Yet many observers take the program agreement at face value.

Due to the relatively smaller response on this proposition at all levels except by the USU/C, it appears that there are a number of individuals who have considered the proposition as a criterion at some prior time or did not understand the proposition well enough to answer it.

USAID/W respondents agreed most strongly with the proposition, being completely in agreement with it. USAID/M and USU/C were in substantial agreement with it, with 88.2 percent and 83.4 percent respectively substantiating the proposition. The USU/FT with 66 percent substantiating, 16 percent rejecting and 18 percent reacting neutrally to the proposition, was in general agreement with the proposition.

Within the field units USU team members gave the proposition the weakest support with 58.8 percent substantiating, 17.7 percent rejecting and 23.5 percent answering the proposition in a neutral manner. U.S. team members, thus, seem to have the greatest tendency to read more into the project agreement than is actually there. This is probably also a reflection of their concern that the HG and HI meet its commitments, and their belief that too much is not demanded of the HC. (Refer to Proposition 1, pages 14 to 16) Between USU team leaders and USAID/M personnel, there was only a slight difference of opinion, with 88.2 percent of the USAID/M personnel substantiating the proposition in contrast to 81.2 percent of the USU team leaders (Refer to Table 13)

Table 13

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 32

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader		12.5	6.3	31.2	50.0	16
Team member	3.0	14.7	23.5	35.3	23.5	34
USAID/M		5.9	5.9	17.6	70.6	17

There are no differences of opinion which can be attributed to the regional location of field unit personnel.

The shallowness of the institution building concept in the minds of the USU team members is best exemplified by a comment one technician made on this proposition. He wrote, "One doesn't always have to have complete government support to have a successful project. In our case we are interested in improving courses, curriculum, and faculty, not government relations." In order for that institution to provide a useful function within the society, someone must either be interested in improving and/or building relations between the HI and the HG, or those relations must already be existent.

Conclusion

The data suggest that there is at least general agreement with the proposition. USU team members are most likely to interpret program agreements as being some indication of accomplishment in establishing good relations between the HG and HI.

Proposition 35

"Operational flexibility in terms of contract provisions and resources will improve project performance by allowing the project to exploit opportunity and to meet adversity."

As was stated in the latter part of the discussion of Proposition 4, it brings up the issue of flexibility. Actually Proposition 4 could be considered to be a sub-topic in the broad topic of operational flexibility.

One of the most common, and in this author's point-of-view justifiable criticisms of USAID is that they have little flexibility in the use of their resources and they restrict, through the contract, the flexibility which the USU/FT may have in the use of their resources. Operational rigidities have hampered some USU/FT only temporarily--their leadership, however, was sufficiently dynamic and innovative that they were able to overcome the minor rigidities. For example, reimbursement for travel within the HC on TAC business was extremely slow. The team leader requested and received the support of the USU/campus in setting up a fund for reimbursement. When the payment finally came through USAID, the staff member then paid back his advance from the contingency fund. As one individual who has had considerable experience with both USAID and USU's reports, "U.S. University field teams are not now using flexibility which is available to them, and, therefore to give them more without doing something else to stiffen their spine against fear of the auditors would not greatly increase project performance!" He concluded, "My guess is that it would help in about half the cases."

USU/Center and field units gave their complete support to the proposition, indicating they believe that greater operational flexibility will enhance project performances by allowing exploitation of opportunities and meeting of adversity. USAID/M was in substantial agreement, with 90.5 percent of their respondents substantiating the proposition and none rejecting it. However USAID/W was in only general agreement, with 68.4 percent substantiating the proposition and 21.1 percent rejecting it. Thus, USAID/W has been the most conservative supporter of two propositions (4 and 35) aimed at providing greater flexibility in project flexibility, and over which they have the direct power to influence the policy.

The USU team leaders gave the proposition its strongest support, with team members and USAID/Mission personnel giving it weaker, although substantial, support. (Refer to Table 14)

Table 14

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 35

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader				26.7	73.3	15
Team member				38.6	61.4	44
USAID/M			9.5	38.1	52.4	21

There were no differences in opinion concerning the proposition which can be attributed to the region in which the field unit respondent was located.

It is interesting to note that it was between the center units and within USAID that the great disagreement comes on this proposition. The field units had only a slight difference of opinion on the proposition. A respondent from

a USU field team, commenting on this proposition, agreed with this conclusion in stating, "The problem is more with USAID/W than with USAID/M in getting needed flexibilities."

Other comments, coming from USAID personnel, stated:

"I have found that USU contract teams are much slower than AID to exploit opportunities or to meet adversity."

Another commented that he believes that "flexibility will have to come through AID/USU agreement on contract changes." A USAID/W staff member felt that the contract should require "detailed work plans be developed and serve as the governing implementation documents."

Conclusion

USAID/M and USU field and center units felt that greater operational flexibility in terms of contract provisions and resources would enhance project achievement. USAID/W is somewhat resistant to the desire for greater flexibility. The issue of flexibility is one of the key issues over which there is administrative disunity in the TAC and within USAID entities. This does not, however, deny the failures of USU field teams in taking advantage of opportunities which were within their power and scope of action.

The problem of operational flexibility is, thus, one which requires USAID/W alter its policies to the maximum extent possible, and requires dynamic and imaginative leadership of USU field teams in order that they exploit every opportunity and meet adverse situations.

Proposition 21

"Typically, relations between the Host Institution and the Host Government are in terms of individuals. Rarely has the Host Institution, as an organization, developed a strong base of public support," and

Proposition 22 1/

"Project performance is impaired by inadequate relationships of the Host Institution with other organizations or institutions in the Host Country. This implies that the project needs to divert some specific attention to the development of public support and relationships with government and public agencies."

Proposition 21 is definitely related to the institutionalization process as presented by McDermott in the paper Administrative Procedures and Strategies. If the HI is really institutionalized it is considered inherently good by the society. Therefore, it has a broad base of support and relations between two individuals are relatively unimportant. Given a broad base of support, poor relations between a national leader and a member of the HI staff would not

1/ Although there was not sufficiently great agreement or disagreement with Proposition 22 to merit its presentation out of those two considerations, it is closely related to Proposition 21. Its results, therefore, have importance.

necessarily adversely effect HI appropriations. However, without that support the HI may be subjected to arbitrary limitations of many different types.

Although all entities recognized that the HI rarely has a "strong base of public support" the entities of the USU saw this as a greater problem in Institution Building projects than did USAID/W and USAID/M personnel. There was a significant difference between how USU/FT and USAID/M felt about this problem, as 17.6 percent more of the USU/FT supported the proposition, and 19 percent fewer rejected it. (Refer to Table 21A, Appendix A). A relatively high proportion (one-third) of the USAID/W respondents reacted neutrally to the proposition.

The difference of opinion between the field units was magnified when team leaders and mission personnel attitudes are contrasted. Eighty percent of the team leaders and 57.9 percent of the USAID/M personnel supported the proposition. Only 6.67 percent of the team leaders contrasted to 31.6 percent of the USAID/M respondents rejected the proposition. The team leaders feel slightly stronger about the proposition than do team members with 73.7 percent of the team members agreeing with the proposition and 15.8 percent rejecting it.

Table 15

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 21

Field Unit Staff Member	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leaders	6.7		13.3	40.0	40.0	15
Team members		15.8	10.5	44.7	29.0	38
USAID/M	15.8	15.8	10.5	31.6	26.3	19

Mission personnel located in the NESAs and African regions felt that a broad base of public support was more of a problem than did USAID/M staff located in Latin America. The same is true of USU field units.

One USU team leader remarked, concerning the proposition, "From my point of view this takes time. We are very close in having achieved public support, but of course not on a strong, broad basis. This in itself is a part of the educational process and can and should be done simultaneously as the institution is developed in the host country. One way that this can be achieved is through agricultural research and extension work."

Proposition 22 follows from 21 as a way to cure the problem of 21. It states that, "Project performance is impaired by inadequate relationships of the Host Institution with other organizations or institutions in the Host Country. This implies that the project needs to divert some specific attention to the development of public support and relationships with government and public agencies." This proposition was rejected by 11.1 percent of the USAID/M respondents and 6.8 percent of the USU/FT respondents. One of the four USU/FT respondents who rejected the proposition was a team leader. However, all entities were in substantial to complete agreement that the project needs to divert some attention to developing public support and relationships with government and public agencies.

USAID/W, which gave weaker support to proposition 21 than did the other entities, gave strong support to this proposition. The way in which proposition 21 is stated is such that an individual having little or no overseas contract project experience may react neutrally to the proposition, whereas little or no experience is required to answer Proposition 22.

One USU team member saw the task as important, but having high political sensitivity. He warned, "Too many cooks can confuse the issues. Carefully developed policies need to be followed after a full understanding has been developed on the role and responsibilities of individuals representing the USU team and the Mission."

Another warned of the danger of "over-reliance on an existing tie."

One AID official agreed with the need for USU field team participation in this area, but stated that it is "difficult to get HI and/or HC approval for U.S. contracts which would allow participation in this area."

A team member stated that the administration of his HI "either fails to see the need or simply refuses to consider the importance of cooperating with other HC agencies." Another, in a different project, pointed out that the "USU sometimes is in a unique position to foster better lines of communication among institutions through contacts with ex-participants in various organizations."

A USAID/M staff member suggested that "before a University is committed to a contract USAID should have a thorough understanding of the local agency situation and involve them in the contract."

Conclusion

"Within TAC there is a significant difference in opinion on the strength of public support for host institutions. However, from the results of Proposition 22, it can be seen that there is substantial agreement that adequate relationships are important and that the project needs to devote some attention to developing public support and relationships with government and public agencies. Still, USAID/M was the most reluctant entity to grant either that this was important or that this was a proper role for the USU/FT. As this threatens to be an issue between the field units, USAID/M should note that their Center unit gives this proposition almost complete support.

**Proposition Upon Which There Was
the Greatest Degree of Administration
Unity Within TAC**

Proposition 8

"TAC bargaining personnel need to know almost as well as HC people the bargain the Host Country can accept and fulfill. If it doesn't, it runs the risk of forcing bargains the HCC (Host Country Complex) cannot live with which could cause loss of respect and trust."

It was upon this proposition that the greatest degree of administrative unity was demonstrated.

It is always a good bargaining technique to know exactly what the opposite party can afford to give and what its objective is in bargaining. In a sense, the Technical Assistance Complex (TAC) and the Host Country Complex (HCC) are on the opposite side of the table. In another sense, they are partners in trying to accomplish something--and they have to work together. So the bargaining situation is a case in which both parties should be aware of and respect the limits--financial, administrative capacity and others--of the other party. The goal then becomes one of reaching a level of commitment sufficient for the task but not so great that the other partner may become overextended.

Bargaining is a part of the technical assistance process. It is probably true that most bargainers, both for TAC and the HCC, know much too little about the HC situation, in the first case, and the situation within the TAC, in the second case.

As one overseas observer commented, "It should not and usually is not a question of TAC imposing something on HC or HI; rather, it should be and frequently is a question of their working out jointly an aspect of institution building that takes proper cognizance of HC's capability."

A substantial proportion of respondents from all entities agreed with proposition number 8; 95.5 percent of USAID/M, 94.8 percent of USAID/W, 93.4 percent of USU/FT, and 92.3 percent of USU/C.

One hundred percent of the USU team leaders substantiated the proposition in contrast to 90.9 percent of the team members. The only team member to reject the proposition was stationed in Latin America.

Table 16

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 8

Field Unit Staff Member	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader				23.5	76.5	17
Team member		2.3	6.8	40.9	50.0	44
USAID/M			4.5	27.3	68.2	22

It is interesting to note that although there was almost complete agreement between the entities that TAC bargaining personnel need to know what kind of a bargain the HC can accept and fulfill, there is little agreement that TAC tends to make demands on the HG which are beyond the financial capacity of the HG. Only 50 percent of the USAID/M respondents and 42.8 percent of the USU/FT respondents felt that "TAC frequently tends to make demands on the HG that it cannot meet..." (Refer to discussion Proposition 1). However, the results of one of the propositions not discussed in this paper (Proposition 55) indicated that nearly 90 percent of the USAID/M, USU/FT, and USU/C respondents agree that "At times USU's and TAC's objectives for HI are beyond the administrative capacity of the HI, and the HG capacity can support HI, especially in the short and medium term." A number of USU team members commented that personnel demand also exceeded HI ability to provide.

Conclusion

It is important to know the bargain the HC can accept and fulfill. Although it may be feasible to demand a greater financial commitment on the part of the HG to the HI, in determining the short and medium run objectives an important consideration must be the administrative and personnel capacity of the HI.

Proposition 31

"Efforts at giving program leadership in HI and improving relations with Host Government will not be successful unless supported by adequate technical performance of the HI. Adequate technical performance could exist without project activity, but in general it will require project activity to develop this performance."

Proposition 31 is closely related to Proposition 30 which states that "Work at the technical level has definite and rather serious limits on its potential achievement unless it is supported and protected by specific achievements in improving HI administration and in improving relations between HI and Host Government." And Proposition 30 is very closely related to two propositions discussed previously, Propositions 21 and 22. These propositions represent an effort to substantiate important elements of the McDermott-Rigney "Conceptualization of the Technical Assistance-Institution Building Process." 1/

There are probably two lines of thought on strategy for accomplishing some objective. One is that you have to get to the "king-makers" and get certain decisions made. The other is that if you work with the technicians over the long run you will get more done. This proposition (#31) would hold that perhaps either one would work over the long run, but since you need to change behavior of both the worker and the decision maker, it is possible to design a strategy to get both and in a relatively short time. Adequate technical performance by the HI will not only raise the status of the HI in the eyes of the decision makers within the HG, but as the technical performance of the HI becomes common knowledge within the HC, a momentum will be established which places still greater demands upon the HI to produce and demands upon the HG to make it possible for the HI to produce.

All units within the TAC were in substantial agreement with the proposition, with 94.1 percent of USAID/W, 91.5 percent of USU/FT, and 90.9 percent of both USAID/M and USU/C substantiating the proposition. (Refer to Table 31A, Appendix A for further delineation of the data).

As can be seen in Table No. 17, a slightly higher proportion of team leaders substantiated the proposition than either team members or USAID/M staff,

Table 17

Percentage Distribution of Field Unit Personnel Responses to Proposition Number 31

Field Unit Staff Member	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader			5.9	52.9	41.2	17
Team member			9.5	47.6	42.9	42
USAID/M			9.1	59.5	36.4	22

1/ J.K. McDermott and J.A. Rigney, Role of Technical Personnel in the TA-IB Process.

However, as one USU team member commented, "One of the chief limitations of project accomplishment at all levels is a lack of available or qualified HC technicians, leaving well-developed laboratories inoperative, research and teaching positions unfilled."

Conclusion

Clearly USU and USAID personnel agree that work at the technical level has limits to its achievement, unless it is supported and protected by specific achievements in improving HI administration and relations between HI and HG (Refer to Proposition 30). They also agree that in order to improve relations with the HG adequate technical performance, likely requiring project activity, will be necessary.

Of course, technical performance accomplished through project activity will have limited impact until sufficient numbers of qualified staff are available. This factor should be considered in determining the project objectives, especially in the short and medium runs, and in determining the strategy in the allocation of USU and USAID inputs. If achieving an immediate impact and bettering HI-HG relations is important it may be desirable to concentrate heavily on the strongest department within the HI, using USU personnel, temporarily, in HI administrative positions.

Proposition 27

"Project performance is impaired when for any reason the USU team members and the Host Institution team members are not able to establish a kind of relationship that both groups regard as collaborative or cooperative."

In designing the proposition list, Professor McDermott regarded a collaborative or cooperative relationship between the USU team members and the Host Institution staff members as extremely important. Writes McDermott:

"This gets into the problem of inferiority complex that most HI personnel feel when the more highly trained USU team arrives. It's very difficult to build up HI confidence, so that they really collaborate with the USU team. If it doesn't develop this confidence the HI staff will consider itself apprentice to a master or it will resent the "master." Neither is a productive relationship. We have emphasized this in the TA-IB model."

"On the other hand, it's not easy for the USU team to develop a respect for its HI collaborators who are usually less well-trained and because of the system operate so much more inefficiently."

"This becomes highly important in the role played by the USU team..."

"This also raises another interesting point about the so-called "top" man from the U.S. The top man is so motivated to be top that sometimes he has a difficult time sharing the limelight with his HI colleague. This is discussed in the TA-IB model."

There is absolute to almost complete agreement to this proposition on the part of all four entities. The only rejection of the proposition came from one of the sixty-two USU team members, who happened to be stationed in Latin America. (Refer to Table 27, Appendix A, for a complete enumeration of the responses to the proposition)

A slightly higher proportion of USAID/M personnel felt that, on the basis of their experience or judgement, they could strongly substantiate the proposition (i.e., give it a "5" rating). (Refer to Table 18)

Table 18

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 27

Field Unit Staff Member	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader (USU/TL)				29.4	70.6	17
Team member (USU/TM)	2.2		2.2	24.4	71.2	42
USAID/M				18.2	81.8	22

It has been pointed out by Rigney and McDermott in a number of different

papers, ^{1/} and by many of the observations made by the research projects overseas observers, how difficult it is to establish a truly collaborative or counterpart relationship between HI and USU personnel. The role the USU team member defines for himself can be all important in establishing this relationship, although this generalization varies with the stage of maturity of the institution. As one USAID/M staff member noted, "One TAC man never made a move until he was actually approached for advise. Eventually he was not approached." Another noted, "Equality becomes essential in establishing a collaborative relationship." As McDermott states, a feeling of equality may be hard to establish, where there are vast differences in levels of training. However, a feeling of superiority cannot be tolerated if the individual is to contribute substantially to the institution building process, and when a team is dominated by individuals set on demonstrating their superiority, the chances of project success are greatly impaired. However, if objectives are limited, such as the performance of a very specific task such an attitude may be tolerable. Also, one USU team member stated "there are instances when it is appropriate for the USU to 'charge ahead' with demonstrations of its own, rather than trying to bring a whole agency along initially in acceptance of the idea." Another added "...even when teams may not collaborate, there is still contact with students, etc., which may make partial success possible."

The Collaborative Relationship and Acceptance of the USU Technician

(A discussion of Propositions 50, 52, and 53)

As the cooperative relationship comes after acceptance, the acceptance of the USU technician becomes important. Acceptance is at two levels: (1) technical acceptance and (2) personal acceptance. Rigney advances the concept of "early visibility" as a means of gaining early technical acceptance.

Personal acceptance or the establishment of rapport is hypothesized to be enhanced by:

- (a) identifying with the host institution; and
- (b) knowing the language of the host country.

Furthermore, the USU team member's family becomes important in a good many cultures in facilitating the establishment of rapport with HC staff members.

The USU/FT and USAID entities are in agreement with the first tactic, although USAID/M supports it less strongly than does the USU/FT or USAID/W. (Refer to the discussion of Proposition 52, pages 16 to 18.) The field units in USU and USAID are in general agreement with the proposition that it is important to know the language. However, the data considered on regional basis states, unequivocally, that it is important to individual effectiveness to know the language if one is stationed in Latin America. (Refer to Table 50A, Appendix A) All entities are in substantial agreement that the USU team member's family has a significant role to play in project achievement. (Refer to Table 53A, Appendix A)

The comments from the USU and USAID respondents concerning the importance

^{1/} J.K. McDermott, "Administrative Procedures and Strategies, J.K. McDermott and J.A. Rigney, Role of Technical Personnel in the Technical Assistance-Institution Building Process and J.A. Rigney, Optimum Role for U.S. Overseas Advisors.

of learning the language reflected what the TAC personnel feel are exceptions to the rule that it is important to know the Host Country's language. Commented one USU team member, "The importance of learning the language depends entirely on the country or the role of the USU team member." Others commented that it depends on whether or not the counterpart can speak English. It was also stated that "A short-term member may be very effective without command of the HC language." One USU team member commented that "knowing the language is particularly important in a Spanish speaking country." Another commented that if the technician does not know the language he will be ineffective and frustrated, particularly if he is going to teach or do 'field' research. One AID official commented that "This proposition will not be answered objectively by those (the majority) who do not learn the language."

The following are comments related to role of the family in project achievement:

AID respondent, "that role is to provide a tranquil home life for the USU team member. Direct contributions by the family to project implementation is not required;"

USU respondent, "The family plays a vital role in that it cannot be a negative influence. But a neutral performance does not hinder project achievement;"

AID respondent, "The USU team member's family has a significant role to play in developing the right image for project and individual achievement;"

USU respondent, "the families attitudes and behavior can affect both the team member's performance and relations with HC people;"

USU respondent, "The family is important from a morale and public relations standpoint;"

Another USU respondent commented that the family was "the most overlooked criteria in selection;"

USU respondent, "At least to some extent. Certainly social rapport plays a part in acceptance and, ultimately in achievement;"

USU respondent, "Unhappy families make the technicians role difficult. Family social and other contacts can produce positive effects through improved public relations and assisting the technician to understand the problems of the region;"

USU respondent, "In some situations, the wife and children provide the proper atmosphere to gain social 'confidence' first, so that Colombian counterparts will take the North American staff into their professional competence. However, good working relationships can be, and have been, established between North Americans and Colombian counterparts without the involvement of the family;"

One USAID staff member complained of the proposition list that "These questions have not sufficiently considered language training, orientation for foreign work and living, and the important role of the wife in adjustment to overseas life."

Conclusion

It is conclusively accepted that collaborative relationships are required between HI and USU personnel. Furthermore, it is accepted that the family and language skills play a large part in personal acceptance, so important in establishing collaborative relationships. The tactic of identifying with the HI is one which has substantial support in USAID/W and the USU/FT, and the general support of USAID/M.

Proposition 45

"Knowing what is going on in the HCC requires a high level of rapport between team members and especially the team leader with relevant host country persons, and a high frequency of contacts."

Not only is rapport necessary in order to have cooperation between USU and HI staff members, as was stated under the discussion of Proposition 27, but rapport is also necessary if the TAC is going to know what is happening within the HCC. It is important to know what is going on in the HCC before and during the bargaining process in order that TAC will have some idea as to the burden the HG can actually afford to bear. It is important to know what is going on during the operation of the contracts so that the team is aware of HI and other HCC entity reactions to the efforts of the USU and so that the USU will be aware of its degree of acceptance within the HCC, especially the HI.

There is complete to highly substantial agreement with the proposition. Only 1 of 19 USAID/W and 1 of 61 USU/FT respondents rejected the proposition. (Refer to Table 45A, Appendix A for data break-down by entity). The only rejection at the field unit level came from a USU team member stationed in Latin America, with one hundred percent of the USU team leaders and USAID/M respondents supporting the proposition. A higher proportion of USAID/M personnel, 77.3 percent, said that their judgement or experience strongly supports the proposition. (Refer to Table 19)

Table 19

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 45.

Field Unit Staff Member	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader				35.3	64.7	17
Team member		2.3	2.3	34.1	61.3	44
USAID/M				22.7	77.3	22

There were differences in responses to the proposition which could be attributed to differences in the regional location of the field units.

Among the comments made by USU/FT concerning this proposition were the following:

- 1) "HI key personnel may provide a good idea of what is going on within the HCC if proper rapport between the team (particularly the chief of party) and the HI personnel exists;"
- 2) "Knowing what is going on within the HCC also requires excellent communications at all levels of the TAC;"
- 3) "Team members can sometimes get the 'inside story' better than the team leader;"
- 4) In specifying a high number of contacts, beware that there are not too many formal meetings.

Conclusion

A high level of rapport with relevant HC people and a high frequency of contacts between HC and USU/FT personnel was verified as an effective tactic in gaining knowledge of what is going on within the HCC. However, an issue which has arisen out of the experience of a number of projects in a wide variety of countries is whether the contact between TAC and the HCC should be made by USU or USAID personnel. In at least one country this issue served as a point of conflict which was so distracting that project performance was no doubt reduced.

Proposition 41

"Institution building projects can only progress when conditions within the HCC are adequate. Thus a good overall strategy would include:

- a) Conditioning of key Host Country persons,
- b) Recognition of "right" conditions in HCC,
- c) Maintenance by TAC of ability to act, and
- d) Decisive action when the time comes."

This proposition represents an effort to list in a very few words the criteria for a good project strategy. This was developed by an attempt to generalize from things that worked in at least one contract. It is related to some of the other propositions concerning the recognition of opportunity. To what extent one can create opportunity by the conditioning of HC personnel is difficult to say, but probably it offers, in some cases, a possibility. Key people within the HCC can be cultivated just as can the colleagues in the HI, an approach spelled out in the McDermott-Rigney Technical Assistance-Institution Building Model. As one AID respondent wrote, "These things don't just happen but are developed by competent people who know their job."

The respondents to the proposition felt that although all conditions may not be able to be met at any one time, progress could go forward. Writes one AID respondent, "The first sentence of the proposition is certainly true, but the 4 conditions are almost impossible to get at the same time." Another writes, "Institution building can progress under inadequate conditions, but more slowly. Decisive action possibilities may relate to the percentage of AID's total involve-

ment in the program." One USU team member wrote, "Of course, all necessary conditions seldom are present. However, you can go ahead with certain components with others 'jelling'." Another wrote, "In general, for the best results this is probably true. Conditions can be developed however, and indications are that while the process may be more painful, a little premature pressure can produce substantial results". One team leader commented that "The assessment of these points needs to be made repeatedly through a project."

As can be foreseen by the nature of the comments of field unit personnel, stated above, there is substantial agreement with the proposition. In fact, the overall strategy suggested by the proposition was rejected by only three respondents, one each from USAID/M, USU/FT and USU/C. Within USAID/M, 95.2 percent agreed with the strategy; within USAID/W, 89.5 percent; within USU/FT, 94.8 percent; and USU/C, 92.3 percent.

The field unit personnel in USAID and USU who rejected the proposition were both from NESAs. One hundred percent of the team leaders were in agreement with the strategy.

Table 20

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 41

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader				52.9	47.1	17
Team member		2.6		53.8	43.6	39
USAID/M		4.7		28.6	66.7	21

Those rejecting the strategy did not say why, nor did they offer an alternative.

Conclusion

A strategy based upon moving ahead was acceptable to nearly all respondents when conditions within the HCC were appropriate, and based upon the steps of (a) conditioning key HC persons, (b) recognition of the "right" conditions within the HCC, (c) maintenance by TAC of ability to act, and (d) decisive action when the time comes.

Proposition 30

"Work at the technical level has definite and rather serious limits on its potential achievement unless it is supported and protected by specific achievements in improving HI administration and in improving relations between HI and Host Government."

This proposition was discussed in conjunction with Proposition 31, pages 32 and 33.

Proposition 14

"Project performance is improved with an increase in contact between USAID Mission and USU Field Party if these contacts are truly collaborative in nature and if they concern program development and execution."

This proposition was discussed in conjunction with Proposition 15. Although Proposition 15 was one of those on which there was great disagreement, Proposition 14 was so closely related it was decided to be desirable to discuss the two together. For a discussion of Proposition 14 turn to pages 19 to 21.

It is also related to Proposition 16, which states "Project achievement is enhanced to the extent that the contractor field team is informed on total USAID agricultural program and is even further enhanced if the field team participates in program development when it has a special competence for this task." This proposition was offered as a suggested tactic which was felt would encourage a more collaborative relationship between the USU/FT and USAID/M. As McDermott states, "This is little more than a logical way to maintain group solidarity in any situation. For example, USAID is frequently faced with international political situations that are clearly outside the knowledge and experience of the USU, and in reacting to these situations, AID's reaction may appear irrational to the USU. This fosters distrust, disrespect, and perhaps even dislike. A simple explanation of this situation would tend to remove these feelings."

Furthermore, such cooperation would represent an effort of USAID to use all of its resources. There is, still, another element. The Land-Grant College in its native habitat has always put itself to the service of its own government. This pattern should be carried overseas, especially among the Americans. This would also serve as an example to the HI to put its services to the use of its government.

This approach is, however, not without problems. The tactic of identifying with the HI as a method of gaining rapport with the HI staff was discussed earlier (pages 16 to 18). It is possible that working closely with USAID could arouse the suspicion of HCC staff, including HI staff members, making acceptance a more difficult task to achieve. Another danger, the occurrence of which a number of reports substantiate, is that the USU/FT merely becomes the leg-men for USAID/M, performing functions normally performed by direct hire staff.

One hundred percent of the USAID/M respondents, 89.5 percent of the USAID/W respondents, 93.5 percent of the USU/FT respondents, and 91.7 percent of the USU/C staff members who responded to Proposition 16 agreed with it. It was rejected by only 10.5 percent of the USAID/W and 1.6 percent of the USU/FT respondents. USU team members stationed in Latin America were slightly more reluctant to accept it than were those stationed in NESAs and Africa.

Conclusion

It is agreed that project performance would be improved to the extent that relationships between USAID/M and USU/FT are collaborative and relate to program development. Furthermore, it is agreed that project performance would be enhanced

if the USU/FT was aware of, and participated in the development of the total USAID agricultural program. Meetings between USAID/M and USU/FT staff, set aside for these purposes, would certainly seem to be appropriate and recommended. Furthermore, transcripts of the discussions at these meetings would add to the organizational memory and possibly reduce the amount of paper-work required of both USAID/M and USU/FT personnel.

Proposition 42

"Imagination--the ability to see opportunities and alternatives in any situation--is just as important in project administration as is recognition of and concern about problems."

This is one of a number of propositions which pertains to opportunities. This proposition deals specifically with a leadership quality rather than tactics which can be used in order to insure that opportunities are reaped.

There is 100 percent agreement with the proposition on the part of the USAID entities, with 95.1 percent of the USU/FT respondents and 92.3 percent of the USU/C respondents supporting the proposition.

Team members support it slightly more than do team leaders, with one of seventeen team leaders rejecting the proposition in contrast to one of forty-four team members.

Conclusion

Imagination is a quality which team members, and particularly team leaders, should have in order to see opportunities and alternatives in any given situation.

Proposition 26

"Having the 'right' individual persons in key positions in both the Technical Assistance Complex and the Host Country Complex with the 'right' relationships among them is frequently the most important determinant of project performance."

There was substantial to complete support of this proposition on the part of the four entities with only a slight difference in the proportion from each entity substantiating the proposition. The proposition was agreed to by 100 percent of the USAID/M respondents, 94.5 percent of the USAID/W respondents, 95.8 percent of the USU/FT respondents, and 91.7 percent of the USU/C respondents. The only individual to reject the proposition was a USU team member stationed in Latin America.

As can be seen in Table 21, there is little variation in the proportion substantiating the proposition based upon their staff position within the field units.

Table 21

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 26

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader				24.5	76.5	17
Team member		2.2	2.2	26.7	68.9	45
USAID/M				27.3	72.7	12

One AID respondent, writing on the proposition concluded, "Therefore, selection of the person and training for the specific job, especially language training, is a major key for success."

The rapid turnover at the top and middle-management levels within some Host Institutions was noted by a number of respondents. Wrote one respondent, "I have worked with two different managements in the same HI. One management felt that our help was of no value. The other appreciated our help and, as such, we have been very effective being able to advise the HI..."

One USU field team member noted that "Some phases of our project are operating much more effectively because of 'right' relationships, especially where local people have had stateside exposure." And another stated, "The principal (i.e., top administrator) of the HI was the key person with the 'right' relationship to the HG on this contract."

A former team leader presented the research team with the following case:

"I noticed that in my HI, and since have heard many people say that a certain person in the key spot was responsible for their progress. We had in the HI, for example, a secretary of Agriculture who enjoyed the confidence of the governor. He was in a sense a non-politico. He certainly was dedicated, intelligent, hard working, open-minded and approachable. Without him things would have been different. There was another 'break' or several of them in the HI experience. At one time, due to troubles between the U.S. government and the Host Government, USAID was doing much of its programming through states rather than through the federal government. This was a real break for the project which was able to react quickly and forcefully enough to exploit it. This gave the HI and the USU team both a chance to be useful and to develop meaningful contacts. This coincided with the mentality in the project of 'usefulness'. It also coincided with a foundation's interest in doing something for the University which resulted in a large grant. Here are at least three identifiable factors, completely outside the control of the project that were highly important in project achievement.

"The only credit the project can take was that it kept in close enough touch with what was going on, that it was able to recognize these opportunities and help somewhat in putting them together so that they all contributed to the accomplishments of the project."

The above caselet has several implications, some of which are reflected in other propositions. First, sometime you have to bide your time waiting for the right opportunity to come. Moving when things aren't right ends up in frustration. Secondly, when things do get right, project leadership has to be able to recognize it. It has to see possibilities and opportunities. Perhaps it is better to think positively than negatively in such situations. One must keep looking for opportunities and alternatives rather than worrying about problems. Thirdly, a project must be able to move decisively and forcefully when the time comes and not get bogged down in trivia. Sometimes inaction is not due to the red tape involved, but due to indecisiveness on the part of decision-makers within TAC, especially the team leader.

Conclusion

Although it is recognized by USU and USAID staff that it is very important to develop a broad base of support for the Host Institution within the Host Country Complex, it is also seen to be important to cultivate friendships with people in relevant positions in the HCC and the TAC. The more urgent the matter requiring a reaction on the part of one of the units, the more important it becomes to know someone within the structure.

Proposition 57

"At times USU team does not adjust to reactions of HCC to some of its operations, either because it doesn't know them, or for some reason ignores them."

Several different individuals noted from their overseas observations an often appearing sanctimonious attitude on the part of the USU personnel, although they may understand the Land Grant model in the US context, and be skilled in establishing the types of relationships required in the U.S. However, the transfer of that knowledge and skill may be most difficult. That is, there is seemingly a resistance to fitting in and adjusting to the new environment of the HC. Although someone wanting to bring about change cannot adjust completely to the situation, actions and strategies, if not ideas of what "ought to be", can be adjusted.

All units were in substantial agreement to the proposition with very little disagreement between them. The only two rejections of the proposition came from USU team leaders, one stationed in NESAs, the other in Africa.

As can be seen in Table 22, of the field unit personnel USAID/M agreed with the proposition more strongly than either team members or team leaders. Team leaders gave the weakest level of support to the proposition. Those team leaders who rejected the proposition stated that it was not true in their case. However, one overseas observer commented the proposition was true, and that "The most frequent violation stems from a feeling that HC does not really know what is best for them, and therefore, should not be trying to tell the advisors what do to." One USU team member commented that sometimes, "the USU team ignores some of the HCC's operations. They (the USU team) have an obsession to pursue a given line of analysis regardless of the needs of the HC or the opportunities which arise."

USAID staffers had two interesting statements. One stated "AID is usually the one that takes too long to react." The other stated, "There should be a minimum of adverse reaction to USU team operations if they are governed by the agreed-to short-term work plans. "Thus one staffer recognizes the need for greater flexibility and decisiveness on the part of USAID, while his counterpart says the way to improve relations is to have less flexibility on the part of the USU team operations, an approach which seemingly ignores the question of adjusting to HCC reactions.

Conclusion

All entities and most field personnel agree that the USU often does not adjust to reactions of the HCC to some of the USU team's operations. The question arises, then, if everyone is aware of this problem, what justification can be given for continuing to allow the practice?

Proposition 5

"Both AID and U S. Universities have in the past tended to underestimate the task of institution building."

All entities were in substantial agreement with this proposition with 92.3 percent of the USU/C personnel substantiating, 89.5 percent of the USAID/W respondents agreeing, 86.4 percent of the USAID/M staff agreeing, and 83.3 percent of the USU/FT respondents agreeing.

A higher proportion of team leaders agreed with the proposition than did other field unit personnel, although the difference between the proportion of USU team leaders and USAID/M staff substantiating is only slight. However, a higher proportion of USAID/M respondents rejected the proposition (13.6%), than did USU team members (11.6%) and team leaders (5.9%).

Table 22

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 57

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader		14.3	14.3	50.0	21.4	14
Team member			14.3	71.4	14.3	21
USAID/M			11.1	44.4	44.4	18

Table 23

Percentage distribution of Responses of Field Unit Personnel to Proposition Number 5

Field Unit Staff Position	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
Team leader	5.9			23.5	70.6	17
Team member	7.0	4.6	9.3	34.9	44.2	43
USAID/M	4.5	9.1		18.2	68.2	22

A slightly higher proportion of both AID and USU field units stationed in NESAs and Africa agreed with proposition than did those stationed in Latin America, indicating that both field units feel that the problem of institution building is underestimated even more in these regions than in Latin America.

It is interesting to note that in a couple of cases, AID staff thought that this was more true of U.S. universities than themselves. As one former USU team leader who is presently with AID commented, "Building a Land Grant college in six years is not possible, but you hear deans and high USU administrators asking, "When can we get out? We're not going to stay forever, are we?" USU's criticize AID for a two-year mental complex. We so far have very little evidence to indicate that a USU with a contract has operated significantly differently than AID, or thought much differently."

A number of USU staff members disagreed with their former colleague. The commented that the "USAID planning horizon is too short," that it was "especially true of AID officials, who lack an understanding of needs for development and the methods of operation of a U.S. or foreign university," and so forth.

Some USAID and USU personnel, in agreeing with the proposition stated that the USU team, AID and the Host Country had "underestimated the problem of capital development and lack of trained and experienced personnel in agriculture." Another urged that we "forget about 1-5 year plans and think in terms of 15-20 years."

Conclusion

The substantial agreement on this proposition causes one to again ask, "Why do we continue to make this mistake if we all recognize that it is a mistake?" For one reason, both universities and USAID are not in the habit of, indeed, cannot make such long range commitments under the present set of relationships of the university with its domestic constituency and USAID with Congress. Secondly, in this proposition, as in others where there has been agreement, there has also been a tremendous amount of "passing-the-buck" with one entity saying that mistakes are made by them, but not by us.

Attempts will have to be made to find another set of arrangements which can alter the present set of relationships of the university to the domestic community and USAID to Congress. Also, each administrator in every entity must be completely honest in his evaluation of his entities efforts in institution building, answering the question "Are our long-range objectives compatible with the type of commitment required for institution building projects?"

**ADMINISTRATIVE UNITY WITHIN TAC
AND THE VARIOUS ENTITIES OVER ALL 60 PROPOSITIONS**

Up to this point propositions have been discussed on which there was the most and the least administrative unity. At this point two hypotheses will be offered which will deal with the degree of administrative unity over all propositions within the entities of USAID and the USU, between the field units and the center units.

It is hypothesized that:

- 1) Greater administrative unity over all propositions is demonstrated by the U.S. Universities entities than by the USAID entities; and
- 2) Greater administrative unity over all propositions is demonstrated by the field units than by the center units.

Using the procedure described on page one the extent of administrative unity for each proposition was determined between the entities within USAID, USU, the field units, and the center units. This data is published in Table 1B, Appendix B. These differences of opinion on each proposition within each of the entities and units were then summed over all propositions and averaged providing the data in Table 23. This indicates that within the TAC complex there was, on the average, a difference of 21.47 percentage points in the proportion of responses responding most and least favorably to the propositions, an indication of a considerable lack of administrative unity within the TAC. That is, the lower the value in Table 23, the greater the degree of administrative unity within the entity being discussed. The greatest amount of administrative unity is exhibited within the USU entities, i.e., between USU/C and USU/FT. The lowest level of administrative unity exhibited within TAC, was that between the center units, USAID/W and USU/C.

Table 23

Average Degree of Difference in Percentage of Respondents Substantiating Propositions 1-60.

Within the TAC	21.47
Within USAID entities	10.864
Within the USU entities	9.772
Between the field units	11.095
Between the center units	13.808

The administrative unity within the USU entities being greater than that exhibited by the USAID entities allows the first hypothesis to be verified.

Also, as the administrative unity between the field units is greater than that between the center units, the second hypothesis can be accepted. This result corresponds to the reports from a number of USU field team personnel that the problems were not so much between USU/FT and USAID/M, as between USU/C and USAID/W.

SUMMARY

The comments and data from the propositions suggest that the major areas of administrative disunity within the Technical Assistance Complex are: (1) the type of relationship between the USU units and USAID units which would be most effective in the technical assistance project; (2) the conceptualization of the various TAC entities as to the various elements which are necessary in institution building projects, such as what best indicates Host Country commitment and the role which the USU field team should play in building better relations between the Host Institution and the Host Country Complex; and (3) the extent of operational flexibility required at the field level in order to best accomplish the Technical Assistance-Institution Building task.

The proposition upon which there was the greatest level of administrative disunity stated that "The most common threat to productive, cooperative relations between the field units of AID and USU from USAID/M is its tendency to regard USU field team as operationally subordinate." There was also great disunity over another proposition which stated that it was the tendency on the part of the USU field team to feel independent of AID/M that represented the greatest threat. Of course, AID staff thought that the fault was that of the USU's over-independence, and the USU field team thought that AID was to blame for trying to subordinate it. A great deal of administrative disunity was also demonstrated on other propositions dealing with the relationships between USAID/M and the USU/FT. USU staff feel that project performance is impaired if there is an increase in contact with USAID/M when these contacts are to discuss matters of routine project administration and operation. USAID/M disagrees. However, both USAID and the USU entities agree that increased contacts between USAID/M and USU/FT will improve project performance when these contacts are collaborative in nature and concern program development and execution. Furthermore, they agree that it is important for the USU field team to be informed on the total USAID agricultural program and possibly even participate in its development if their competencies lend to such participation. Exploitation of these areas of agreement would do much to better relations between USAID/M and the USU/FT, promoting a better understanding of each other.

In the Technical Assistance-Institution Building projects it is necessary to also be concerned about establishing relationships between the Host Institution, the Host Government, related Host Country agencies and the public being served by the Host Institution. Although all of the entities of TAC agree upon the importance of this, a smaller proportion of USAID/M staff saw having such relationships with the HI and HG being on a person to person basis as a threat. The other entities believe in the importance of the relationships being more between institutions rather than individuals. Also, USAID/M was the most reluctant of the TAC entities to grant the performance of the function of building relationships between the Host Institution and the Host Country Complex to the USU field team. The relevance of this task to the Institution Building process must be made known to all TAC personnel, and especially those working in the field.

Besides the importance of building better relations between the HI and the HCC, the various entities of the TAC complex need to better understand what is involved in building a Land Grant-type institution. This is just as true for the USU/FT members who come from Land Grant institutions as it is for USAID staff. Although there is wide agreement that the institution building task is underestimated, there is considerable evidence that USAID and the USU (especially the USU/C staff) continue to make the same mistakes. It is also agreed that there is at times too much preoccupation with establishing the institutional form as it is in the United States, rather than seeing to it that the function is performed. Yet this mistake continues to be made. In short, although the McDermott-Rigney TA-IB Model may not be the last word as a model for the development of a Land Grant Institution in the developing areas, it is a start. Staff working in Technical Assistance-Institution Building Projects should be made aware of its content and the implications of its content to the performance of their task.

On at least two propositions USAID/W indicated a greater reluctance to build greater operational flexibility into the contract at the field level. They gave the weakest support and the strongest rejection to a proposition proposing the assurance of sufficient financial support to demonstrate new concepts central to the project (Proposition 4). They were the only entity from which respondents rejected the proposition proposing greater operational flexibility in terms of contract provisions and resource use (Proposition 35). The issue of flexibility is one of the key issues over which there is administrative disunity in the Technical Assistance Complex and within the USAID entities. This does not, however, deny the failure of USU field teams, and especially certain team leaders, in using aggressive leadership and taking advantage of opportunities which were within their power and scope of action. The problem of operational flexibility is, thus, one which requires a great deal of further consideration.

If there is a single word which best describes most of the ills found to exist in Technical Assistance-Institution Building projects and sources of administrative disunity, it is rigidity--rigid definitions of roles; rigid interpretations of who is to provide what; and when it is to be provided; and many more. The most essential need in Technical Assistance-Institution Building projects in developing areas is greater flexibility.

APPENDIX A

Table 1A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 1: TAC (The Technical Assistance Complex) frequently tends to make demands on Host Government that it cannot meet because of so many other demands for resources made by expanding national programs, other AID programs, and technical assistance from other entities.

TAC Entity	1*	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	18.2 ^{1/}	13.6	18.2	22.7	27.3	22
USAID/Washington	5.3	15.8	5.3	36.8	36.8	19
USU/Field Team	16.1	32.1	8.9	33.9	8.9	56
USU/Center		15.4		53.8	30.8	13

* Respondents were instructed to respond to each proposition on the basis of either experience or judgment. They marked a "1" for a proposition if on the basis of experience or judgement they strongly disagreed with it, a "2" if they disagreed not as strongly, a "3" if undecided or neutral, a "4" if agree not so strongly, and a "5" if strongly agree.

^{1/} All percentages are rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent.

Table 2A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 2: The problem of "agreement on objectives" among USAID, HC (Host Country, and USU (U.S. University) is one of the most sensitive. It is possible to have an agreement so specific that the project has no flexibility. On the other hand it is possible to have so little agreement that the parties to the agreement are at cross purposes with each other.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	14.3	19.0		28.6	38.1	21
USAID/Washington	5.0		5.0	50.0	40.0	20
USU/Field Team	1.8	3.5	7.0	49.1	38.6	57
USU/Center		7.7	15.4	46.1	30.8	13

Table 3A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 3: Project accomplishments are improved if there exists an overall country development plan that pertains to the project's objective (such as a country plan for higher education) which USAID accepts as a policy guide whether or not U.S. personnel were instrumental in the development of the plan.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		14.3	4.8	47.6	33.3	21
USAID/Washington			10.0	35.0	55.0	20
USU/Field Team	1.7	8.3	6.7	55.0	28.3	60
USU/Center			7.7	68.2	23.1	13

Table 4A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 4: Contracting to do a technical assistance job in institution building is a high risk operation. It would save time, opportunity, and, in the long run, USAID money for USAID to insure financially a minimum level of operation so that the contractor and HI (Host Institution) could demonstrate the new concepts central to the project.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	5.3	21.0	10.5	15.8	47.4	19
USAID/Washington	16.7	16.7	11.1	38.9	16.7	18
USU/Field Team	1.8	1.8	12.3	33.3	50.9	57
USU/Center			9.1	36.4	54.5	11

Table 5A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 5: Both AID and U.S. Universities have in the past tended to underestimate the task of institution building.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	4.5	9.1		18.2	68.2	22
USAID/Washington		5.3	5.3	26.3	63.2	19
USU/Field Team	6.7	3.3	6.7	31.7	51.7	60
USU/Center		7.7		38.5	53.9	13

Table 6A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 6: Frequently, the USAID does not take advantage of the improved strength developed in HI in other parts of its agricultural programming.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	11.1	22.2	22.2	22.2	22.2	18
USAID/Washington		5.3	5.3	26.3	63.2	19
USU/Field Team	1.9	21.4	23.1	36.5	17.3	52
USU/Center		16.7	16.7	41.7	25.0	12

Table 7A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 7: USAID and the USU cannot drive a hard bargain on certain aspects of institution building projects (such as Extension or other new programs being introduced). TAC personnel have seen the value of these programs, while to HCC personnel they are new and untried concepts.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	23.8	14.3		23.8	38.1	21
USAID/Washington	5.9	23.5	17.6	41.2	11.8	17
USU/Field Team	8.5	11.9	8.5	49.1	22.0	59
USU/Center		16.7	16.7	50	16.7	12

Table 8A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 8: TAC bargaining personnel need to know almost as well as HC people the bargain the Host Country can accept and fulfill. If it doesn't, it runs the risk of forcing bargains the HCC (Host Country Complex) cannot live with which could cause loss of respect and trust.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission			4.5	27.3	68.2	22
USAID/Washington			5.3	36.8	57.9	19
USU/Field Team		1.6	4.9	36.1	57.4	61
USU/Center			7.7	30.8	61.5	13

Table 9A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 9: Participation in a pre-contract survey by the contractor facilitates project accomplishments, and if first team leader also participates, the project accomplishments will be further facilitated.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission				36.4	63.6	22
USAID/Washington			15.8	26.3	57.9	19
USU/Field Team		1.6	4.9	45.9	47.5	61
USU/Center				23.1	76.9	13

Table 10A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 10: It is not feasible to expect the contract as a document to specify adequately the roles of all the persons and entities involved in a contracted project. In other words the contract document cannot provide a basis for each person to understand the TAC organization and his place in it. Such an understanding needs to be built on other bases, such as experience and tradition or frequent relevant contact among personnel of various entities.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	9.5	4.8	9.5	19.0	57.1	22
USAID/Washington	5.3		10.5	26.3	57.9	19
USU/Field Team	6.9	8.6	3.4	25.9	55.2	58
USU/Center			7.7	53.8	38.5	13

Table 11A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 11: Both AID and Universities have often concerned themselves with relatively unimportant operational matters to the extent that larger, more significant problems and opportunities have been neglected.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	5.0	20.0	10.0	35.0	30.0	20
USAID/Washington		5.3		47.4	47.4	19
USU/Field Team	4.9	13.1	18.0	27.9	36.1	61
USU/Center		7.7		46.2	46.2	13

Table 12A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 12: Project performance is impaired by the lack of understanding of or agreement on the kinds of relationships that exist between the USAID mission and the USU Field Party.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		22.7	18.2	22.7	36.4	22
USAID/Washington		15.0	5.0	45.0	35.0	20
USU/Field Team	1.6	9.7	6.5	53.2	28.0	62
USU/Center			15.4	38.5	46.1	13

Table 13A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 13: Project performance will be facilitated by the existence of peer relationships or collaborative relationships between the field units of AID and the USU even though client-contractor relationships must exist in general between the two entities.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	5.3	5.3	15.8	10.5	63.1	22
USAID/Washington			5.3	36.8	57.9	19
USU/Field Team	1.7	3.3	1.7	41.7	51.7	60
USU/Center			15.4	7.8	76.9	13

Table 14A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 14: Project performance is improved with an increase in contact between USAID Mission and USU Field Party if these contacts are truly collaborative in nature and if they concern program development and execution.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		4.5		18.2	77.3	22
USAID/Washington				15.0	85.0	20
USU/Field Team		1.6	1.6	42.6	54.1	61
USU/Center		7.7		23.1	69.2	13

Table 15A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 15: Project performance is impaired with an increase in contact between USAID/Mission and USU/Field Party if these contacts concern simply routine project administration and operation and if the relationship tends to or seems to put the USU team in a position definitely subordinate to USAID/Mission.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	15.8	31.6	10.5	26.3	15.8	19
USAID/Washington	11.8	23.5	11.8	35.3	17.6	17
USU/Field Team	3.3	8.3	10.0	33.3	45.0	60
USU/Center		9.1	18.2	9.1	63.6	11

Table 16A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 16: Project achievement is enhanced to the extent that the contractor field team is informed on total USAID agricultural program and is even further enhanced if field team participates in program development when it has a special competence for this task.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission				31.6	68.4	22
USAID/Washington	5.3	5.3		21.0	68.4	19
USU/Field Team		1.6	4.8	33.9	59.7	62
USU/Center			8.3	33.3	58.3	12

Table 17A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 17: Most common threat to productive, cooperative relations between the field units of AID and USU from the USAID/Mission is its tendency to regard USU field team as operationally subordinate. (There is no question of USAID's authority on general policy matters.)

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	42.1	26.3	5.3	15.8	10.5	19
USAID/Washington	10.5	26.3	21.1	21.0	21.1	19
USU/Field Team	6.8	6.8	18.6	33.9	33.9	59
USU/Center			23.1	23.1	53.8	13

Table 18A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 18: Most common threat to productive, collaborative relationships between the field units of AID and USU from the USU is its tendency to consider itself operationally--and at times even politically--virtually independent of USAID/Mission.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	4.8	4.8	19.0	33.3	38.1	21
USAID/Washington		10.0	20.0	45.0	25.0	20
USU/Field Team	18.6	25.4	18.6	25.4	11.9	59
USU/Center	27.3	18.2	18.2	27.3	9.1	11

Table 19A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 19: Even in the ideal situation there will be some conflict situations between AID and the USU contractor. Project achievement will be enhanced to the extent that unpleasant contacts or negotiations involving conflict between AID and USU are shifted from the field units to the center units (Washington and Campus).

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	55.0	15.0	15.0	5.0	10.0	20
USAID/Washington	42.1	36.8	10.5	5.3	5.3	19
USU/Field Team	22.0	22.0	6.8	30.5	18.6	59
USU/Center	7.7	23.1	7.7	30.8	30.8	13

Table 20A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 20: Many negotiations or contracts between AID and contractor involving conflict or unpleasantness can be transferred from field negotiating to center negotiating.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	30.0	25.0	15.0	25.0	5.0	20
USAID/Washington	26.3	36.8	10.5	5.3	21.1	19
USU/Field Team	12.1	43.1	15.5	19.0	10.3	58
USU/Center		23.1	23.1	23.1	30.8	13

Table 21A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 21: Typically, relations between the Host Institution and the Host Government are in terms of individuals. Rarely has the Host Institution as an organization developed a strong broad base of public support.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	15.8	15.8	10.5	31.6	26.3	19
USAID/Washington		13.3	33.3	33.3	20.0	15
USU/Field Team	1.9	11.3	11.3	43.4	32.1	53
USU/Center			15.4	38.5	46.1	13

Table 22A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 22: Project performance is impaired by inadequate relationships of the Host Institution with other organizations or institutions in the Host Country. This implies that project needs to divert some specific attention to the development of public support and relationships with government and public agencies.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	5.6	5.6	11.1	44.4	33.3	18
USAID/Washington			5.0	60.0	35.0	20
USU/Field Team		6.7	8.5	44.1	40.6	59
USU/Center			15.4	42.1	38.5	13

Table 23A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 23: There is a tendency for U.S. University contract projects to concentrate on internal technical factors and to neglect (1) problems of administration and (2) problems of building relations and working arrangements with other agencies of government and the general public.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	14.3	19.0	9.5	14.3	42.9	21
USAID/Washington		15.8		63.2	21.0	19
USU/Field Team	20.0	25.0	6.7	30.0	18.3	60
USU/Center		16.7		58.3	25.0	12

Table 24A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC ENTITIES to Proposition Number 24: In institution building projects, provisions for increasing Host Institution appropriations need to be specific objectives of the USU team's program and activities.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	21.0	5.3	5.3	31.6	36.8	19
USAID/Washington	10.5	10.5	21.1	15.8	42.1	19
USU/Field Team	5.3	14.0	8.8	29.8	42.1	57
USU/Center	16.7	8.3	16.7	33.3	25.0	12

Table 25A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 25: Some factors affecting project achievement, especially in the short run, are completely outside the control of USU team and other entities of TAC.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	4.5	4.6	4.5	22.7	63.7	22
USAID/Washington		5.0		25.0	70.0	20
USU/Field Team	3.4	3.4	1.7	28.8	62.7	59
USU/Center				7.7	92.3	13

Table 26A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 26: Having the "right" individual persons in key positions in both the Technical Assistance Complex and the Host Country Complex with the "right" relationships among them is frequently the most important determinant of project performance.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission				27.3	72.7	22
USAID/Washington			5.5	16.7	77.8	18
USU/Field Team		1.6	1.6	25.8	71.0	62
USU/Center			8.3	16.7	75.0	12

Table 27A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 27: Project performance is impaired when for any reason the USU team members and the Host Institution team members are not able to establish a kind of relationship that both groups regard as collaboration or cooperative.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission				18.2	81.8	22
USAID/Washington				31.6	68.4	19
USU/Field Team	1.6		1.6	25.8	71.0	62
USU/Center				30.8	69.2	13

Table 28A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 28: USU team personnel who are confined or who confine themselves to purely advisory activities will encounter serious difficulties because of the lack of opportunity to demonstrate technical competence which is important in winning technical acceptance.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	9.5	14.3	9.5	19.0	47.6	21
USAID/Washington	5.3	15.8	5.3	42.1	31.6	19
USU/Field Team	6.6	9.8	8.2	24.6	50.8	61
USU/Center		7.7	15.4	23.1	53.8	13

Table 29A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 29: U.S. University personnel in administrative positions of the Host Institution constitute essentially a holding action (until HI had developed its own administrative personnel), and performance of the HI under USU administration is not a reliable criterion of progress in institution building.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	5.0	10.0		35.0	50.0	20
USAID/Washington	11.8	11.8		41.2	35.3	17
USU/Field Team	3.7	14.8	14.8	37.0	29.6	54
USU/Center		16.7		50.0	33.3	12

Table 30A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 30: Work at the technical level has definite and rather serious limits on its potential achievements unless it is supported and protected by specific achievements in improving HI administration and in improving relations between HI and Host Government.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission				31.8	68.2	22
USAID/Washington				61.1	38.9	18
USU/Field Team			6.8	45.7	47.5	59
USU/Center		7.7		30.8	61.5	13

Table 31A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 31: Efforts at giving program leadership in HI and improving relations with Host Government will not be successful unless supported by adequate technical performance of HI. Adequate technical performance could exist without project activity, but in general it will require project activity to develop this performance.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission			9.1	54.5	36.4	22
USAID/Washington		5.9		64.7	29.4	17
USU/Field Team			8.5	49.1	42.4	59
USU/Center			9.1	63.6	27.3	11

Table 32A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 32: Program agreements that provide resources and support with Host Institution in and of themselves cannot be regarded as adequate accomplishments in the task of building good relations between the HI and Host Government.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		5.9	5.9	17.6	70.6	17
USAID/Washington				37.5	62.5	16
USU/Field Team	2.0	14.0	18.0	34.0	32.0	50
USU/Center		8.3	8.3	33.4	50.0	12

Table 33A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 33: The lack of a specific strategy for setbacks in project progress results in (1) losses of earlier gains and (2) delays in project progress that could be avoided. Ups and downs of many kinds are the common in technical assistance situations, not the unusual.

TAC Entities	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		4.8		52.4	42.8	21
USAID/Washington		5.3	15.8	57.9	21.0	19
USU/Field Team		5.5	16.7	42.6	35.2	54
USU/Center			8.3	50.0	41.7	12

Table 34A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 34: Just as TAC allows itself to lose some ground already gained by an inadequate "strategy of Adversity", it also loses some opportunities because for some reason it is not able to exploit opportunities presented to it, some unexpected.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission			10.0	40.0	50.0	20
USAID/Washington		5.5	5.5	66.7	22.2	18
USU/Field Team		3.6	16.4	47.3	32.7	55
USU/Center			8.3	50.0	41.7	12

Table 35A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 35: Operational flexibility in terms of contract provisions and resources will improve project performance by allowing project to exploit opportunity and to meet adversity.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission			9.5	38.1	52.4	21
USAID/Washington	5.3	15.8	10.5	42.1	26.3	19
USU/Field Team				35.6	64.4	59
USU/Center				30.8	69.2	13

Table 36A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 36: At times it becomes essential that USU and perhaps other TAC personnel participate in reorganization plans and in drafting or even negotiating new legislation for the Host Institution.

TAC Entities	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	13.6	4.5	9.1	36.4	36.4	22
USAID/Washington	5.0		10.0	45.0	40.0	20
USU/Field Team	6.9	3.4	12.1	29.3	48.3	58
USU/Center			8.3	33.3	58.3	12

Table 37A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to proposition Number 37: It is relevant in contract project field administration to know how well the HI accepts USU team members and other TAC personnel.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission			4.5	13.6	81.8	22
USAID/Washington				25.0	75.0	20
USU/Field Team	1.7	1.7	15.2	33.9	47.5	59
USU/Center			16.7	25.0	58.3	12

Table 38A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 38: One strategic error in project administration is for USU personnel to underestimate their acceptance by HI and thus not exploit opportunities for program and administrative leadership.

TAC Entities	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		16.7	33.3	27.8	22.2	18
USAID/Washington	5.6	27.8	27.8	33.3	5.6	18
USU/Field Team	7.3	21.8	16.4	41.8	12.7	55
USU/Center		9.1	27.3	45.4	18.2	11

Table 39A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 39: Our strategic error in project administration is for USU personnel to overestimate level of acceptance by HI and thus attempt achievements at levels impossible (or improbable) because of lack of proper groundwork at more basic levels. Not only are efforts frustrated but time and opportunity is lost at more basic level.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		5.0	20.0	35.0	40.0	20
USAID/Washington		5.9	5.9	58.8	29.4	17
USU/Field Team	1.8	14.5	9.1	43.6	30.9	55
USU/Center			18.2	45.4	36.4	11

Table 40A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 40: The team leader role (or function) is not adequately defined by the entities of TAC (USU, AID/W, or USAID), thus providing the team leader with inadequate expectations as to his role and forcing too much responsibility on him to define his job and function.

TAC Entities	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	9.1	45.4		22.7	22.7	22
USAID/Washington	12.5	18.8	6.2	56.3	6.2	16
USU/Field Team	2.1	21.3	19.1	21.3	40.4	47
USU/Center		16.7	8.3	58.3	16.7	12

Table 41A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 41: Institution building projects can only progress when conditions within the HCC are adequate. Thus a good overall TAC strategy would include: (a) Conditioning of key Host Country persons, (b) Recognition of "right" conditions in HCC, (c) Maintenance by TAC of ability to act and (d) Decisive action when time comes.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		4.8		28.5	66.7	21
USAID/Washington			10.5	47.4	42.1	19
USU/Field Team		1.7		51.7	43.1	56
USU/Center		7.7		38.5	53.8	13

Table 42A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 42: Imagination--the ability to see opportunities and alternatives in any situation--is just as important in project administration as is recognition of and concern about problems.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission				13.6	86.4	22
USAID/Washington				47.4	52.6	19
USU/Field Team		3.3	1.6	34.4	60.7	61
USU/Center	7.7			30.8	61.5	13

Table 43A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 43: At times preoccupation with the form or type of United States organizations and a lack of understanding of the function of these organizations leads to lost opportunities in project administration as well as to objectives and activities with small chance of success in a different culture.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	5.0		10.0	30.0	55.0	20
USAID/Washington		5.6	5.6	33.3	55.6	18
USU/Field Team	1.8	10.9	18.2	43.6	25.4	55
USU/Center			23.0	38.5	38.5	13

Table 44A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 44: For adequate achievement in institution building projects, TAC administrators need to know what is going on within the Host Country Complex that is relevant to the project.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission				18.2	81.8	22
USAID/Washington				25.0	75.0	20
USU/Field Team			1.6	27.9	70.5	61
USU/Center			15.4	38.5	46.1	13

Table 45A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 45: Knowing what is going on in HCC requires a high level of rapport between team members and especially the team leader and relevant host country persons and a high frequency of contacts.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission				22.7	77.3	22
USAID/Washington		5.3		21.0	73.7	19
USU/Field Team		1.6	1.6	34.4	62.3	61
USU/Center				30.8	69.2	13

Table 46A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 46: For adequate project progress, some proportion of personnel, probably half, need to stay four years to provide the necessary continuity which is basically quite difficult in two-year assignments.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	4.5		4.5	27.3	63.6	22
USAID/Washington			5.0	40.0	55.0	20
USU/Field Team	1.6	4.9	6.5	31.2	55.7	61
USU/Center		16.7		16.7	66.6	12

Table 47A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 47: Role of team leader has been conceived too narrowly by both the U.S. University and AID.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	25.0	15.0	25.0	15.0	20.0	20
USAID/Washington	5.6	11.1	50.0	5.5	27.8	18
USU/Field Team	10.7	12.5	17.9	17.9	41.0	56
USU/Center	7.7	15.4	15.4	30.8	30.8	13

Table 48A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 48: The role of team leader is the most important single role in TAC, as far as administration of the contract project is concerned.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	4.5	4.5	18.2	27.3	45.4	22
USAID/Washington	11.1		5.6	44.4	38.9	18
USU/Field Team	3.4	6.8	13.6	28.8	47.5	59
USU/Center	7.7		15.4	7.7	69.2	13

Table 49A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 49: Field teams function independently of the home campus to such an extent that at times the field team behavior does not conform to the "image" of the home campus and individuals are not subject to the same discipline they would be on campus. This sometimes impairs project accomplishment.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	38.9	16.7	11.1	11.1	22.2	18
USAID/Washington	5.9	5.9	41.2	23.5	23.5	17
USU/Field Team	20.3	37.3	18.6	10.2	13.6	59
USU/Center	15.4	30.8	7.7	23.1	23.1	13

Table 50A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 50: Very seldom is a USU team member effective if he is not in command of the Host Country language (which could be English).

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	4.5	22.7	9.1	31.8	31.8	22
USAID/Washington	5.9	24.5	17.6	35.3	17.7	17
USU/Field Team	8.1	19.4	4.8	19.3	48.4	62
USU/Center	15.4	30.8	7.7	30.8	15.4	13

Table 51A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 51: Seldom can ineffectiveness of a USU team member be explained simply by technical inadequacies.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		4.5	13.6	27.3	54.5	22
USAID/Washington		21.1	10.5	26.3	42.1	19
USU/Field Team	5.1	5.1	5.1	42.4	42.4	59
USU/Center		7.7	15.4	7.7	69.2	13

Table 52A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 52: One of the most effective techniques a USU team member can use to gain acceptance and establish adequate rapport is to identify himself with the Host Institution.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		23.8	9.5	28.6	38.1	21
USAID/Washington		5.3	10.5	31.6	52.6	19
USU/Field Team	3.2		8.1	38.7	50.0	62
USU/Center	41.7	8.3		33.3	16.7	12

Table 53

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 53: The USU team member's family has a significant role to play in project achievement.

	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission		9.52	14.28	38.09	38.09	21
USAID/Washington		5.55	5.55	38.88	50.00	18
USU/Team		6.66	3.33	33.32	56.66	60
USU/Center		7.69	7.69	38.45	46.15	13

Table 54A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 54: At times objectives of the USU team remain inflexible and do not adjust either to changed situations in HC or to a new information that changes or should change USU's evaluation of HC;

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	10.5	15.8	5.3	42.1	26.3	19
USAID/Washington		6.7	13.3	53.3	26.7	15
USU/Field Team		21.6	18.9	37.8	21.6	37
USU/Center		22.2	33.3	33.3	11.1	9

Table 55A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 55: At times USU's and TAC's objectives for HI are beyond the administrative capacity of HI and the HG capacity to support HI, especially in the short and medium term.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission			9.5	38.1	52.4	21
USAID/Washington			26.7	60.0	13.3	15
USU/Field Team	2.3	2.3	4.5	54.5	36.4	44
USU/Center			10.0	70.0	20.0	10

Table 56A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 56: There simply does not exist an adequate TAC Strategy for phase out.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	6.2	18.8	12.5	43.7	18.8	16
USAID/Washington		7.7	15.4	53.8	23.1	13
USU/Field Team		3.6	14.3	46.4	35.7	28
USU/Center			30.0	20.0	50.0	10

Table 57A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 57: At times USU team does not adjust to reactions of HCC to some of its operations, either because it does not know them, or for some reason ignores them.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission			11.1	44.5	44.4	18
USAID/Washington			14.3	64.3	21.4	14
USU/Field Team		5.7	14.3	62.9	17.1	35
USU/Center			18.2	82.8		11

Table 58A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 58: Dependence on HG for logistic support of USU team almost always results in frustration and does not contribute to institution building.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	4.8	28.6	9.5	33.3	23.8	21
USAID/Washington	6.7	6.7	26.7	40.0	20.0	15
USU/Field Team	5.6	8.3	16.7	22.2	47.2	36
USU/Center		9.1	18.2	27.3	45.4	11

Table 59A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 59: Dependence on HG for logistic support of USU team almost always results in frustration and does not contribute to institution building.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	31.6	31.6	5.3	10.5	21.1	19
USAID/Washington	7.1	28.6	35.7	21.4	7.1	14
USU/Field Team	13.3	23.3	3.3	30.0	30.0	30
USU/Center	9.1	9.1		36.4	45.4	11

Table 60A

Percentage Distribution of Responses of Various TAC Entities to Proposition Number 60: USU teams would be more effective and more efficient if made up of a high proportion, perhaps half, of individuals committed to a career of overseas operation and experienced in contract projects. It would be particularly useful to have "professional" team leaders.

TAC Entity	1	2	3	4	5	No. of Cases
USAID/Mission	9.5	4.8	14.3	23.8	47.6	21
USAID/Washington		6.3	6.3	56.2	31.3	16
USU/Field Team	10.3	10.3	12.8	33.3	33.3	39
USU/Center	20.0	10.0	10.0	30.0	30.0	10

APPENDIX B

Table 1B

Extent of Administrative Unity Within TAC and the
Various Entities of TAC Over All 60 Propositions.

Propo- sition No.	TAC	USAID	USU	Field Unit	Center Unit
1	41.78	27.68	41.78	7.16	6.92
2	23.33	23.33	10.8	21.04	13.09
3	10.36	9.07	7.96	2.4	1.29
4	45.3	7.60	6.71	21.00	45.3
5	8.97	3.13	8.97	3.01	2.83
6	45.04	45.04	12.83	9.39	22.82
7	18.24	8.96	4.51	9.28	13.76
8	3.14	0.72	1.13	2.01	2.42
9	15.79	15.79	6.56	6.56	15.79
10	16.13	8.03	11.28	4.85	8.10
11	29.74	29.74	28.37	1.07	2.44
12	24.91	20.91	2.76	22.15	4.00
13	21.04	21.04	8.71	19.65	10.12
14	7.69	4.55	4.41	1.27	7.69
15	36.22	10.83	5.60	36.22	19.99
16	10.53	10.53	1.86	6.47	2.20
17	50.61	15.80	9.11	41.50	34.81
18	35.07	1.43	0.9	34.17	33.64
19	51.00	5.52	12.38	34.14	51.00
20	27.54	3.69	24.55	0.70	27.54
21	31.28	4.55	9.13	17.60	31.28
22	16.23	16.23	0.04	5.88	10.39
23	35.88	27.08	35.00	8.80	0.88
24	14.05	10.53	13.60	3.52	0.45
25	13.64	8.64	8.48	5.16	5.00
26	8.33	5.55	4.10	4.23	2.78
27	3.23	0	3.23	3.23	0
28	10.26	7.02	1.51	3.24	8.75
29	17.33	8.53	16.16	17.33	6.86
30	7.69	0	0.91	6.88	7.69
31	3.21	3.21	0.61	0.61	3.21
32	34.	11.76	17.33	22.24	16.67
33	17.48	16.3	13.92	17.48	12.74
34	11.67	1.11	11.67	10.0	2.78
35	31.58	22.06	0	9.52	31.58
36	18.94	12.28	14.1	18.94	6.66
37	18.64	4.55	1.97	14.09	16.67
38	24.75	11.11	9.00	4.56	24.75
39	13.71	13.23	7.29	0.48	6.42
40	29.54	17.04	13.32	16.22	12.50

Propo- sition No.	TAC	USAID	USU	Field Unit	Center Unit
41	5.77	5.77	2.51	0.43	2.83
42	7.71	0	2.79	4.92	7.71
43	19.81	3.89	7.84	15.92	11.97
44	15.39	0	13.75	1.64	15.39
45	5.27	5.27	3.28	3.28	5.27
46	11.67	4.09	3.56	4.02	11.67
47	38.22	11.68	2.61	23.93	38.22
48	10.62	10.62	0.65	3.56	6.41
49	23.35	13.73	22.45	9.62	0.90
50	21.59	10.68	21.59	4.12	6.79
51	14.33	13.40	5.82	0.93	8.51
52	38.71	17.54	38.71	22.04	34.21
53	13.80	12.64	5.39	13.8	4.28
54	35.56	11.59	15.02	8.92	20.54
55	17.58	17.14	0.91	0.44	16.67
56	19.64	14.42	12.14	19.64	6.92
57	8.94	3.17	2.88	8.94	2.89
58	15.59	2.87	3.28	12.31	12.72
59	53.28	3.03	21.82	28.43	53.28
60	27.50	16.08	6.66	4.76	27.50
ΣX_i	1288.2	651.83	586.29	665.7	828.49
\bar{X}	21.470	10.864	9.772	11.095	13.808