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APPROACHES TO LAND TENURE IN AFRICA

by Ann Seidman

I. Introduction:

Many of the newly independent governments of Africa have sought to alter land tenures and associated institutions with a view to attaining increased agricultural productivity. There appears to be a lack of research relating to the possible impact which such efforts may be expected to have on national development.[1] This article seeks to contribute to the formulation of a conceptual framework for the evaluation of proposed land tenure systems as well as associated institutions and working rules in Africa which will direct attention to their possible consequences for broad development goals.

Traditional agricultural systems of land tenure evolved primarily as the foundation for group security and survival in a harsh natural environment. In the colonial era, large plantations and individualized ownership were imposed in the colonies to achieve a limited kind of specialization in the production of export crops as raw materials and foodstuffs for the growing industrial sectors of the imperial powers.[2] Today, African governments are trying to formulate land tenure policies which will permit the application of science and technology, investment, and accumulation of physical capital to agriculture.[3]

Given that land tenure policies both affect and are affected by national development strategies, it is essential[4] to formulate an explicit statement of the generalized ends of development to contribute to establishment of at least a tentative set of criteria for a meaningful evaluation of

specific policies.* This paper rejects the formulation of development goals as the mere increase in output per capita. It adopts instead the view that development must encompass increased productivity in all sectors of the national economy directed to raising the levels of living of the broadest masses of the inhabitants.suSuch an approach is essential to ensure that demand and supply will expand simultaneously in the framework of a balanced nationally integrated economy.[6] It is the contention here that proposed land tenure policies should be considered in terms of their potential consequences for this pattern of development.

This article first seeks to present a brief overview of traditional land tenure systems and the impact of colonial agricultural policies. Secondly, it will suggest the basic issues which should be considered in formulatingland tenure measures in the context of a national development strategy. The final section will discuss possible alternative approaches to changes in associated institutions.

II. Land tenure systems in Africa:

The newly independent countries of Africa have inherited such a wide range of land tenure systems that it would be impossible to describe

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*After six years of research and teaching in Africa, I am convinced that these goals are necessary to the realization of the expressed desires of the majority of Africans. A means-end continuum is implicit here: it is assumed that the researcher and/or policy maker should be concerned with the consequences of specific land tenure proposals for the attainment of the stated generalized goals. If analysis suggests that specific proposals are inconsistent with the stated generalized ends, then both the means and the ends need to be re-examined to determine which are appropriate for national development. In the last analysis, that re-examination must be made by the Africans themselves; this article aims only to present a conceptual framework which will focus attention on this relationship.[5]

them all.[7] This section merely outlines some of the predominant characteristics of the major categories of the traditional systems and those introduced with the expansion of export crops in the colonial era. The purpose is to set the stage for singling out the variables which need attention in considering how land reform may contribute to increased productivity and higher levels of living for the broad masses of Africans.

Traditional land tenure patterns tended over wide areas to reflect the constraints imposed by near-subsistence agriculture given the particular characteristics of the environment.[8]* What has been widely characterized --perhaps misleadingly--as "communal tenure" has tended to be associated with the development of shifting agriculture.[10] The head of the community (which might vary in size from the extended family to a fairly large tribe) was empowered to give a group member the rights to use a given land area (usufruct rights) for purposes of growing the crops required by his family. The farmer and his family cleared the land, usually by some form of "slash and burn" technique, and farmed it for several years until it began to become exhausted. Then it was allowed to lie fallow for a period of five to ten years or longer; since it was out of use, the usufruct lapsed, and the land returned to the common pool. Meanwhile, the farmer obtained rights to another piece, or pieces, and began the process over again. For

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*A substantial body of anthropologists maintain that the very use of English terminology, shaped as it has been by English experience, distorts the characteristics of traditional land tenures.[9] There is no space to deal with this argument here, but one needs to be sensitive to the linguistic problem.

the most part his tools were simple: a hoe and a cutlass. A man and his family could cultivate about three to five acres a year. They produced almost all their own needs, including their food, their clothing, and their housing. Occasional markets provided for exchange of a few items, notably salt, some vegetables, simple handicrafts like pots, stools, and cloth, and perhaps some small livestock like chickens or goats. The farmer did not have the right to sell the land or alienate it in any way. This reflected the circumstance that there was plenty of land available as well as the political-economic relationships. Land had no cash value.

In widespread areas of the semi-arid continental plains, cattle complexes emerged in which cattle, rather than land itself, were the scarce resource.[11] Cattle became a form of "walking bank" for the community, providing food, clothing, and even materials for house-building. A family's status in the community reflected, to a significant degree, the number of head of cattle it owned. These groups tended to migrate according to season in search of fodder and water for their cattle, covering vast areas of range land. Ordinarily, they undertook little stable cultivation of the land itself. Extensive burning over of the ranges traditionally utilized by specific groups was considered essential to enable the cattle to graze on the best new grass. Some of these groups tended to be more settled than others, but cattle remained a major source of wealth and prestige.

As land areas became crowded, some engaged in shifting cultivation, too, and moved on to new areas, contributing to widespread migration movements

across the continent. In other cases the tribes settled permanently, sometimes participating in creation of larger political economic units, remaining settled even when population pressures reduced land availability. This by shortening the fallow period, lowered the land's productivity.

The emergence of larger political economic units tended to be associated with the expansion of trade. The ancient kingdoms of Mali and Ghana were built on the trade of West African gold, leather handicrafts and other items across the Sahara for salt and other products of the northern African territories and even Europe.[12] The Hausa city states in what is now northern Nigeria, developed trade in a range of items including cotton cloth, simple iron utensils, and other products throughout West Africa.[13] In the mountainous territory of Ethiopia, a semi-feudal empire emerged in which many tribes succumbed to the rule of the Amhara.[14] Large feudal and semi feudal land-holdings were established in Egypt,[15] along the lower Nile, and in Morocco[16] in the framework of kingdoms which emerged in centuries of Arab rule.

The agricultural requirements of the rulers of these larger units were fairly adequately supplied by the relatively limited agricultural techniques. In more crowded areas, irrigation (e.g. along the lower Nile and the upper Niger), fertilizers and other improved techniques were introduced. The ruling groups might use their status to cream off surpluses for somewhat more sumptuous living and/or military adventures, although the surpluses were never very large; they were seldom directed towards long term investment to increase productivity throughout the agricultural sector.

Whether the expansion of trade and the emergence of larger political economic units might have led ultimately, as in Europe, to centralized nations and more rapid industrial and agricultural development will always remain a matter of conjecture. By the early 16th Century, Europeans, armed with guns, and playing African tribes off against each other, opened the slave trade along the west coast to obtain cheap labor to produce raw materials in the New World for their own factories at home. The emerging patterns of economic growth in the region were seriously disrupted.[17] Military states, like those of Ashanti, Yoruba, and Dahomey emerged in the centuries of the slave trade.[18] These typically involved federations of tribes which paid taxes and provided soldiers for the ruling groups. With a few exceptions, their agricultural and land tenure systems, though seriously disrupted by warfare, changed relatively little.

In the 19th Century, the growing requirements of the industrial revolution of Europe led to further expansion in search of raw materials and markets, as well as new profitable areas of investment.[19] In the ensuing "Scramble for Africa" the European powers arbitrarily carved the continent into colonies whose boundaries, cutting across ethnic and pre-existing tribal frontiers, were determined predominantly by their own military might.[20]

Outright foreign rule imposed export enclaves on the traditional economies of the divided colonies.[21] Although these enclaves varied in detail depending on historical circumstances and resources, they were all geared to the production of one or a few cheap raw materials and/or tropical foodstuffs for European urban dwellers. At the same time they constituted

new markets for European manufactured goods, not infrequently processed from materials originally exported from Africa itself. Each colonial government provided an administrative umbrella under which oligopolistic privately-owned colonial firms with their associated financial and shipping interests came to dominate the economies of the separate colonies, reaping considerable profits from the two-way trade.

Although European firms almost invariably acquired outright ownership of mines,* where capital expenditures were relatively high, the pattern of ownership of productive agricultural units introduced in these export enclaves varied depending on a variety of factors. In North, East, South and Central Africa, the European colonizers created large scale, relatively modern settler estates and plantations for production of crops for export.[22] Africans were simply pushdd off much of the best land onto "reserves" and settlers or plantation companies were allocated giant tracts for little or nothing in the way of chab payment.** In some cases outright forced labor was introduced. In others, hut and poll taxes were imposed to force Africans to work to earn cash; since Africans were prevented from selling export crops, the only way they could pay the tax was to work on the estates or in the mines. Hundreds of thousands of young men

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*In some cases they obtained such long-term concessions that, to all intents and purposes, they exercised ownership rights.

**The land was not always owned outright. In East Africa, the settlers held land under long-term lease which in theory at least was subject to being taken over by the Colonial Administration in the event that it was not developed in accordance with specific criteria.

migrated hundreds of miles from their homes annually in search of work--in some cases in the 'thirties for less than a dollar a month,[23] in the 1950s for less than 50 cents a day.[24]

In West Africa and Uganda, the British encouraged the African peasants themselves to produce export crops for sale to the colonial trading firms.[25*] Private British trading firms financed up-country buying stations. The African farmers, sometimes doing the work themselves, sometimes hiring (or using sharecrop) labor, planted and harvested the crops for sale to the big firms. The governments used taxpayer money to build the essential roads, railroads and ports to transport the crops out of the country. As the growth of export crops spread in these areas, traditional land tenure systems were gradually transformed. Land itself, once cleared and especially when planted with valuable tree crops, began to acquire a cash value. More successful individual farmers, now able to hire migratory labor to do the work, sought to buy more land from their less prosperous neighbors in order to increase their profits. "Indeed," Allott declares, "one of the criticisms of customary land law . . . has been of its over-successful adaptation to the business of making money rather than keeping alive."[26**]

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*It is perhaps significant that in West Africa, the Africans mounted military opposition against the colonizers until just before World War I, suggesting that had the British granted large landholdings to Europeans there they might have faced further military expenditures which would have rendered the colonies uneconomic. In Uganda, where the Bugandan King represented a potentially powerful political military opponent, the British gave the Bugandan notables themselves large land areas on which cotton and later coffee were introduced through their tenants.

**Allott argues that proposals to revise existing land laws should be based on the "good features of existing customary land laws, while eliminating those which are definitely inimical to the increase of yields and the protection of natural resources." He suggests that the lack of specialist knowledge and the Western bias of such reformers as the East Africa Royal Commission is such as perhaps to preclude an adequate consideration of these possibilities.

The chiefs eventually discovered they could obtain large amounts of cash for sale of rights in land to "strangers," those not members of the clan.[27] Farmers, seeking loans, pledged their crops, sometimes even the rights to harvest crops from their lands. Despite "communal" ownership traditions, conditions increasingly approaching individual ownership and sale of land began to emerge. Colonial courts, in dealing with the endless litigation which came before them concerning land rights, tended to give decisions reinforcing the rights of individual ownership although maintaining the fiction of inalienability.[28] Banks, mostly foreign-owned, but also Government-sponsored lending agencies, provided credit only to larger farmers (almost entirely non-African) whose rights to their land provided security. In Kenya, in the midst of the guerrilla warfare waged by Africans seeking to regain their lands, the Colonial Administration devised the Swynnerton Plan to consolidate each farmer's separated pieces of land into one unit, registering the title to formalize his ownership. One aim, among others, was the creation of a politically stable yeoman class of farmers which would support Government efforts to defeat the guerrilla fighters.[29]

By the time of independence, decades of colonial rule had bequeathed on the new African states dual economies bound by hundreds of invisible ties to the former colonial power. The relatively modern export enclaves, dominated by foreign trading and mining firms and in some cases plantations and estates, were geared to production of cheap raw materials and the import of manufactured goods. Land tenure practices in the export enclaves tended to parallel those of the colonial power with individual rights in the land sanctified by a whole set of working rules andinstitutions.

The newly independent African nations inherited a set of working rules from the colonial era which functioned to support the expansion of the export enclave as a source of raw materials and to provide markets for the metropolitan countries. The legal structure[30] was designed to import, at least to the export enclaves of Africa, a similar admixture of public and private institutions as prevailed in Europe: The Government provided the infrastructure and administration; private firms and individuals owned the farms and mines, the trading companies, the banks, shipping companies, and insurance firms. These rules served to reinforce the expansion of individualized land tenures in cash cropping areas, even where African farmers themselves carried on production. Production and trade were carried on through enforcement of contracts between private buyers and sellers, enforceable at law. The giant foreign trading firms advanced funds to up-country buyers and through them to individual farmers on export crops which they would acquire when harvested. Farm workers worked for settlers under congracts enforceable in courts of law, pledging to work for a given period for a fixed wage (enforceable by criminal procedures under colonial rule). As cash crop farming extended to African farms, farm laborers made similar contractual arrangements (verbal or written) with private African farmers. Thus the legal system provided the essential sanctions to ensure that private farm owners could hire labor.

Outside the export enclaves, traditional agricultural practices and associated tenures tended to remain relatively unchanged. In some areas, as population expanded, population pressures began to mount. This reduced the fallow time required for shifting agriculture to succeed,[31] and tended

to lead in some cases to fragmentation of land as fathers divided their parcels among their sons (or whoever traditionally inherited). Land shortages were aggravated in Eastern, Central and Southern territories where Africans had been forced into restricted reserves. Increasing numbers of young men began to leave their homes in the rural areas to seek employment in the urban areas, mines, or the larger farms of the export enclave. Low productivity in the rural areas and lack of adequate marketing channels hindered the production even of the foodstuffs needed to sustain the growing urban populations; increasingly the export enclaves came to rely on imported foodstuffs, particularly for the higher income group.[32]

Two features of these export enclaves if left unchanged could be expected to have serious consequences for national economic development. First, they were extremely dependent on the conditions of the overseas markets in the metropolitan areas for the limited exports. Agricultural prices, in particular, tended to fluctuate severely as supplies outpaced slowly growing overseas demand. From the mid-twenties until the Great Depression of the 1930s, and again from the mid-1950s throughout the 1960s, African agricultural export prices as a whole tended to decline relative to the price of manufactured goods imported into Africa.[33] Significant amounts of investible surpluses were shipped out of Africa by the colonial firms which dominated this trade.[34] It had become increasingly evident by the late 1960s that one feature of national development policy would have to be the reduction of dependence on the sale of agricultural exports to a handful of big trading firms which dominated their overseas markets.

Second, the cash incomes in the export enclaves tended to be sharply skewed.[35] This reflected the fact that those who managed the trading, mining and associated firms, as well as European settlers, and some of the larger African farmers, were obtaining incomes many times those of the laborers who carried on the actual production. Salaries and incomes of company and government personnel tended to be comparable to or higher (as inducements) than those of similar personnel in Europe. European settlers earned incomes running into thousands of dollars. A handful of the more prosperous African farmers in West Africa, Uganda and elsewhere--those who acquired large acreages of land, hired many workers, and perhaps entered into trade, money lending, and/or speculative real estate--obtained sufficient funds to build luxurious town houses, own private automobiles, and send their children to college overseas. The migrant laborer, on the other hand, might earn a third of the crop he produced in the cocoa belts of Ghana or Western Nigeria, or forty shillings (about $7.00) a month in Uganda's or Tanzania's coffee or cotton shambas. Monetary incomes in the traditional areas outside the export enclave remained as low as $15 to $20 per capita annually. Aside from possible political tensions generated by such a sharp distinction between the "haves" and "have nots", the very low incomes of the masses of laborers and traditional peasants constituted a sharp limitation on the potential internal market for a broader range of consumer goods which might be produced if industrial development plans succeeded.[36]

By the time that the nearly 40 new African countries had attained political independence, their economies had acquired dualistic features

characterized in particular by the external dependence of the relatively more modern export enclave. The falling world prices of the major agricultural exports of the African countries, accompanied by rising imports as they sought to implement development plans, contributed to serious balance of payments deficits, and in several cases to outright stagnation. Their governments confronted the challenge of restructuring their economies to ensure that future resource allocation would contribute to increased internal specialization and exchange as a foundation for increased productivity and higher levels of living for the broad masses of the population. Since the entire set of working rules and institutions in the inherited export enclave functions to perpetuate the existing distorted pattern of resource allocation, these governments need to examine every aspect of the legal framework and specific institutions to ensure that the entire complex contributes positively to the restructuring program. Land tenure policies, along with all other institutions and working rules, need to be re-examined in light of their possible contribution to or hindrance of the attainment of this goal.

III. Private vs. cooperative land ownership--two ideal types

Parsons has argued[37] that "The role of the government in the modernizing reformation of a tenure system is crucial." He asserts,[38]

> As the productive capacity of agriculture is increased and development supported, by the integration of science, technology and capital into the farm economy, with the correlative conversion of agriculture into a market oriented economy, so have the customary tenure systems to be modernized by bringing the powers of the state to bear upon the system of tenure relations.

Various efforts have been made to formulate a set of criteria for evaluating the consequences of measures that government might undertake in reformulating land tenures. FAO experts have delineated four principles which should govern the introduction of technical improvements and land use patterns in the framework of planned agricultural development:[39] First, specific new techniques or crop varieties designed to increase productivity must be considered in relation to the soil and water conditions of specific areas. Second, patterns of land use should encompass the best possible allocation of various types of soil and water resources to meet both present and future needs. Third, technical improvements should, where possible, be applied in combination with other farming or land use practices and other possible improvements. Fourth, full regard to the physical, social and institutional conditions of the particular area should be considered when technical innovations are being considered.

Others have emphasized that, from the point of view of productive efficiency, land tenure systems must be concerned with:[40]

1. Economic size and layout of the farm: Tenure systems may influence the size and layout of farms in a manner affecting the use of machinery and labor relative to their availability in the economy.

2. Incentives and opportunities: The land tenure system adopted should be designed to influence the incentives and opportunities of the farm operators so as to induce the most efficient productive methods, given constraints of labor availability and capital shortage.

3. Capital investment: If productivity is to increase over time, the land tenure system must provide conditions needed to encourage farmers

to invest a significant share of surpluses produced; it has been added that modernization requires, above all, a stable investment in land.[41] It requires a production unit of a single enclosed area large enough to accomodate the use of modern cultivating and reaping machinery. It requires an annual reinvestment of a substantial surplus in the land.

The preceeding section of this article suggests that governmental efforts to formulate land tenure policies should contribute to attainment of a balanced internally integrated economy capable of increased productivity and higher levels of living for the broadest masses of the population. If this hypothesis is valid, it would seem important to add this to the elements outlined by others: To what extent are land tenure policies proposed likely to contribute to attainment of these goals?

It appears to be widely agreed that, over time the land tenure policies formulated deed to create conditions in which entrepreneurs, cultivators and investors will be willing and increasingly able to take advantage of the potential increases in productivity through the greater use of scientific methods, and, over time, improved technology.[42] The issue of whether large scale productive units will eventually be required to attain these goals has been extensively debated, but there is evidence that land units considerably larger than the typical individuals African farms will be required.* In Africa today, lack of skills and capital

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*It has been argued, particularly in the Latin American contest,[43] that available evidence suggests that large scale farms may be less productive than smaller ones. There is evidence[44] that the largest farms in Latin America consist of very large holdings on which large areas may be left fallow, and whose owners--usually latifundistas--accumulate adequate surpluses from low labor costs. Smaller, more commercialized farms, still considerably larger than (cont.)

constitue major constraints on rapid introduction of scientific farming and modern technology; hence, initially at least, land tenure policies certainly do not need to be directed primarily to large farming units which may take advantage of the economies of scale that will ultimately be required for the introduction of modern technology. But land tenure policies should be formulated so that, as these constraints are gradually eliminated, they will facilitate creation of larger-scale units in which all the potential advantages of economies of scale may be realized. The manner in which this perspective is to be realized is likely to influence the choice of land tenure policies in terms of their implications for overall national development.

Despite the current relatively low level of productivity, and the existence of a considerable degree of underemployment in traditional agriculture, repeated experiences in East and West Africa have led to the conclusion that to attempt to increase agricultural productivity by simply introducing large-scale productive units with capital-intensive methods such as tractors and combines is unlikely initially to contribute to creation

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* (cont.) the typical African peasant farm--between 40 and 100 hectares--are, it is ture, more productive, but they are in fact essentially more capitalistic and profit-motivated than the latifundistas. There is similar evidence that large Kenyan settler farms were not as productive as the middle-sized African peasants who took over in the low-density schemes on the highlands,[45] but, again, these farms tend to be larger than the typical African farm, and the owners were carefully selected with a view to their educational qualifications and other factors which might be expected to contribute to their output. This kind of examination tends to support the contention here made that as managerial skills spread, and requirements of efficiency are imposed by increased labor costs, larger units are likely to be required to take advantage of economies of scale.

of the conditions necessary for balanced national development. In the short run, and with only a few exceptions, such projects consume large amounts of scarce capital resources with relatively little return and in some respects significant negative consequences for national development. This is true for several reasons relating to economic factors:[46] First, lack of research concerning the appropriate techniques to use in tropical soils has led to expenditure of huge sums of money on the wrong kinds of equipment. Second, lack of appropriate skills on the part of the typical peasant leads to inappropriate use and frequent breakdowns of equipment. Third, difficulties of obtaining spare parts for machines once broken has resulted in large amounts of capital being tied up in idle equipment while new parts are imported; the initial importation of a wide variety of makes of equipment has aggravated this problem by requiring many different types of spare parts which are expensive to keep on hand. Fourth, the utilization of scarce capital in agriculture does not contribute to employment of the growing numbers of underemployed rural workers. Instead, as tractors substitute for labor, numbers of younger peasants crowd into urban slums seeking employment, while the shortage of capital for implementation of a planned industrial strategy hinders the construction of factories in which they may be employed.* Fifth, the initial high capital and wage costs per unit of this pattern of agricultural production renders

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*Eicher et al. have pointed out that foreign aid tied to sale of specific agricultural machinery has been a significant factor contributing to unemployment in Africa.[47]

it incapable of competing in the domestic market with crops produced by peasant families who use their own (unpaid) labor and provide for their own subsistence; and limits the competitiveness of its output on the world market unless heavy government subsidies are introduced.[48] Finally, the vast majority of peasants must, because of capital scarcity, remain outside the resulting limited modern sector; their incomes will remain inadequate to provide the internal market needed to permit expansion of an industrial sector producing a broad range of farm inputs and consumer goods.

In addition to these economic factors, there are important sociological features which have tended to be neglected.[49] Among the most important of these have been the failure of planners and managers to consider the needs and desires of the settlers adequately. Markets have not been organized, on the assumption that settlers could set them up without assistance. Scheme budgets have been drawn up without consideration of local needs. Repayment schemes have been heavy. Settlers have been expected to handle new crops and new grades of livestock without previous experience and inadequate training. Attitudes of settlers towards new crops and techniques have tended to be ignored. Managers have been drawn from different cultures, often from abroad, and have not infrequently been unable to inspire settlers with confidence or mobilize them for more effective productive activity. This last shortcoming may be aggravated by the provision of expensive housing and facilities for the management with the result that they are further set apart from the peasants as some kind of an elite.

The Gezira scheme in the Sudan has been held to be an outstanding exception to the record of failures of large scale projects in Africa.[50]

Based on initial plans dating back to 1907 to pump Nile waters for irrigated cotton, a British Company gradually expanded the project until it was finally taken over in 1950 by the Sudan Gezira Board, an autonomous public authority. The scheme now involves over 2 million acres and is operated on a partnership basis: The government provides the water and land; the board administers the scheme and does the research, allocates the tenancies, supervises and finances the tenants, mechanically cultivates the land, provides seed and fertilizer, undertakes pest control, transport, gins and markets the cotton; the tenants provide the labor. The proceeds are divided 44:40:10 between the tenants, government and the board. Of the remaining six percent, two percent goes to the local government, two percent is spent on social development by the national government, and two percent goes into a Reserve Fund held by the board against possible crop failures. The land is under cotton only a quarter to a third of the time, depending on the area; other crops grown belong entirely to the tenants. In recent years, tenants have numbered about 75,000. Their average per family annual share has been around $500. In addition, the board employs 10,000 workers, and the tenants themselves hire about 250,000 workers.

The following have been identified as critical variables which might contribute to success of large scale projects like that of Gezira:

1) Productivity can be markedly increased, as for example, through irrigation, greatly improved farming prices, or introduction of a saleable crop;

2) A high value crop should be grown, providing means of obtaining returns on investment (tea, cotton, rubber);

3) Economic crops should be capable of control through sale, processing or both (e.g. cotton at gin, tea at processing factory) to avoid illegal marketing or consumption and proper division of returns among participants;

4) Specialist technical and/or managerial skills should be required;

5) Capital investment should be required which the farmers themselves cannot provide;

6) Control of farming practices should protect the soil, assure adequate production of cash crops, improve quality of the product, and prevent unnecessary damage by plant pests.

Examination of state farms in Ghana indicates that, particularly in the case of tree crops and perhaps for the introduction of new crops, large scale plantations may be justified.* Those state farms producing crops in competition with domestic peasant farmers, on the other hand, were unable to surmount the problems indicated above.

Both economic and sociological factors appear to suggest that, initially for most crops, more labor-intensive agricultural techniques should be introduced. This would contribute to a more gradual expansion of specialization and exchange and increased productivity depending on: the pace with which more and more peasants gain new skills and the ability to manage larger units; the expansion of the internal market ampthesframework of an appropriate industrial strategy;[51] and the accumulation of capital needed to permit acquisition of more modern machinery and equipment throughout the agricultural sector.

Two broad categories of approaches to land tenure seem to be emerging as the modernization of African Agriculture advances. One is the extension

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*After the coup in 1966 the Government sold the state-owned rubber plantations to a private U.S. firm which suggests that they were viable, and continued to operate the Russian and Israeli-initiated rice projects which apparently became viable once redundant labor supplies were laid off.

of individualized private ownership of land in which the ownership rights in land acquired by individuals are mortgageable and saleable.[52] The other category of approaches to land tenure centers on some form of cooperation among groups of producers to expand output, perhaps building on traditional communal tenures.[53] In some areas, particularly North Africa, expropriated settler farms have been turned over to various forms of producer cooperatives.[54]*

These two categories are dealt with here in the sense of ideal types. In reality, in Africa, there tends to be a continuum between them. The purpose of setting up the ideal types or models here is to single out the key variables which may have significant consequences for development in the long run and which should therefore, it is here argued, be taken into consideration by planners in formulating approaches to land tenures even in the short run.

Perhaps the most significant arguement in favor of an individualized tenure system is that it relies on the individual farmer's own initiative: He risks his own labor (initially, later he may hire others) and capital (if he has any; in any event, he may create capital in the form of clearddland, and in some cases, the planting of palm, rubber or cocoa trees).[55] There is no need for heavy governmental expenditure or imported management skills; the farmer does his best with what he has, taking advantageoof

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*In addition, governments supporting both categories of approach have invested in state owned agricultural projects for experimental, research and sometimes pole of growth effects. As indicated above, lack of managerial and technological skills at all levels in the early stages have tended to limit the initial spread effects of these projects, even in countries committed to an expanding public sector.

government assistance if it is forthcoming and he deems it worth his while.

In the early stages of efforts to draw farmers into an increasingly monetized system of increased specialization and exchange with gradual increases in productivity, this approach appears to have something to recommend it. Government assistance in the form of extension advice, establishment of marketing institutions (perhaps through cooperative marketing which has become widely spread especially for sale of export crops in most African countries) and provision of credit may be provided relatively easily with only slight modifications of existing institutions to aid African (as opposed to foreign settler) farmers.

In the longer run, this approach may have less desirable consequences for the national development pattern attainable. As markets expand and capital and skills accumulate, creating conditions necessary to take advantage of economies of scale, more "progressive" farmers are likely to expand their acreage, perhaps at the expense of their less fortunate neighbors, and hire laborers to work it.

President Nyerere of Tanzania maintains that the emerging pattern of individualization of tenure typified in export crop production has led to abandonment of the old traditions of living and working together and sharing the proceeds. On the one hand, the resulting increase in productivity has, it is true, increased the national output, but they have been accompanied by increases in the relative wealth of the man who owns, manages and initiates the larger farm. On the other hand,

> . . . the moment such a man extends his farm to the point where it is necessary for him to employ labourers in order to plant or harvest the full acreage, then the traditional system of ujamaa has been killed. For he is not sharing with other people according to the work they do, but simply paying them in accordance with a laid out minimum wage . . . the result is that the spirit of equality between all the people working on the farm has gone--for the employees are the servants of the man who employs them. Thus we have the beginnings of a class system in the rural area.[56]

The author of the Swynnerton Plan in Kenya asserted bluntly:[57]

> Able, energetic, or rich Africans will be able to acquire more land, and bad or poor farmers less, creating a landed and landless class. This is a normal step in the evolution of a country.

The creation of a balanced, internally integrated economy depends critically on the expansion of an internal national market as productivity increases; otherwise, inevitably, the only market available for expanded output, both agricultural and other, will be limited to the uncertain export market and the high income elite in the associated export enclave. If the incomes of the broad masses of peasants are restricted in the manner indicated by the Swynnerton planners to low wages or thinly spread shares of export crops, then perpetuation of an externally dependent dual economy appears to be probable.

Sir Michael Blundell, the British settler-turned-Kenyan who accepted Kenyan independence when the costs of colonial control appeared too high and who helped to implement the Swynnerton Plan, has suggested that in the long run the political consequences of this first approach are likely to be:[58]

> . . . as African political thought becomes more experienced in the actual practice of government, there will be a regrouping on economic lines if democracy continues in Kenya; one party will be socialist and revolutionary in concept, looking to the landless and lower paid workers for support, while the other will increasingly be a progressive evolutionary alliance of property owners and "haves" as distinct from the "have nots."

The other approach to land tenures which has emerged in Africa has been centered on the possibility of building some form of producer cooperation, perhaps on the foundation of existing traditional tenures.* Fundamentally, the notion seems to be that traditional tenures did provide for a degree of community effort as well as a joint ownership of the land. If agricultural development policies could contribute to expansion of productivity by building on this presumably pre-existing cooperation, it is argued that it will be possible over time to move towards larger units of production which could take advantage of economies of scale without the emergence of a pattern of "haves" and "have nots" which is both economically undesirable and politically potentially explosive.

President Nyerere, for example, holds,[59]

> To make our socialism and our democracy a reality we should . . . adapt to modern needs the traditional structure of African society. We must, in other words, aim at creating a nation in which ujamaa farms and communities dominate the rural economy and set the social pattern for the country as a whole

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*These have frequently been associated with the concept of "African socialism," although that term has remained so vague and undefined as to contribute little as an analytical device for evaluating the consequences of proposed policies.

Various attempts have been made to achieve a degree of producer cooperation, ranging from block farms, on which individual peasants share in the use of mechanical equipment on blocks of land (frequently owning their own small plots in addition) to outright collective ownership of the land and productive facilities. Experience suggests a considerable degree of caution in attempting to implement this approach in the short run. Block farms and similar schemes have encountered problems of management and misuse of equipment not unlike the large scale projects cited above (see pp.).[60]

Experience to date in Tanzania ujamaa villages--attempting a higher degree of cooperation and common land ownership based on presumed cooperative traditions--has not been notably successful; in fact the widespread endorsement of the President's approach has led to numerous attempts to build ujamaa projects, but to date only a fairly limited number are reported to have been able to implement the ujamaa principles suggested by the President.[61]

There appear to be several difficulties which will need to be overcome if cooperation among peasants is to succeed: First there appears to be a need for more research showing the extent to which existing traditional practices may actually foster effective group activity in modernizing agriculture.[62] Secondly shortages of adequately skilled leadership,*

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*The kind of leadership required to promote this type of cooperative endeavor is not merely managerial, but must involve ideological commitment and the ability to mobilize willing community participation.

managerial and technical manpower may lead to serious difficulties; there are instances in which mismanagement of group production has discouraged farmers; left to their own devices, they might simply utilizing family labor with improved techniques and expanded market opportunities, have attained increases in production.[63] Thirdly, working rules must be carefully devised to ensure that individuals have adequate incentives to participate effectively in the group activities; these involve careful consideration as to appropriate schemes for payment in accord with work done, as well as sanctions for those who fail to do their tasks.[64] Fourth, there is a severe scarcity of capital for acquiring the modern machinery and equipment which might provide an incentive for more effective immediate resolution of these problems. In one sense, this has an advantage in that it tends to reduce the necessity for building group production units immediately.

Supporters of the cooperative approach argue that, in the longer run, it will contribute more effectively than individualized tenures to a nationally integrated, balanced pattern of internal specialization and exchange leading to higher levels of living as well as increased productivity throughout all sectors of the economy. As groups of peasants learn to work together to plan the division of labor among themselves on increasingly large land units and invest the resulting surpluses to increase productivity still further, all participants will benefit directly in terms of increased incomes. On the one hand this should lead to the continued expansion of the internal market required to ensure an adequate demand for the output of new industrial projects. On the other, it should provide incentives for all members of the group--not only the owner as in the case of individualized

tenures--to exercise their ingenuity to the utmost to increase productivity.

Given these short and long run considerations, governments adopting the cooperative approach to land tenure should evaluate alternative initial policies in light of their longer term impact. Perhaps in early stages individual peasant families should be encouraged to expand their output, selling their surpluses on expanding internal markets. On the one hand, this should probably not be accomplished by enshrining previously non-existent individualized ownership of pieces of land by legal devices which is likely to conflict with attainment of cooperative production at later stages when initial shortages of leadership personnel and capital have been overcome. Sufficient security of tenure would be required, however, to encourage families to invest in improvements. On the other hand, a limit might be set to the size of land unit an individual family might own or to the number of laborers he might hire, so that attainment of economies of scale beyond that size might require resort to cooperation with neighbors. As the pool of trained leadership grows with expanding educational opportunities,* and the amount of investible surpluses increases, the areas of cooperation required to take advantage of economies of scale could be expanded. This would require careful attention to formulation of new sets of working

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*Obviously the educational system would need to be overhauled to ensure that it contributed to skilled committed leadership who will work to reshape agricultural institutions, rather than generating an elite which seeks to remove itself as rapidly as possible to the supposed delights of urban life.[65]

rules which probably would need to be changed gradually as the underlying constraints on group activities were modified.

In some cases, short cuts may be possible within the framework of this approach. For example, large settler farms or estates, with large accumulations of land and capital, may be taken over to be run as producer cooperatives. There is, however, a danger that such producer cooperatives may continue to advance (perhaps with extensive government assistance), raising the output and incomes of those lucky enough to be participating "owners,"[66] while the rest of the economy stagnates. This appears particularly probably where the "owners" hire landless laborers for low wages on a seasonal or permanent basis. Such an approach hardly appears likely to foster the creation of the broad internal market required to attain national development as here defined.

In sum, it appears that land tenure policies are in the short run likely to be conditioned by constraints imposed by inherited conditions relating to land, manpower skills, and capital. The long run approaches are likely to differ significantly depending on the pattern of national development desired. A long run approach such as that recommended in Kenya by the Swynnerton Plan appears likely to contribute to perpetuation of the inherited dual economy with its built-in external dependence. Alternative efforts to build on traditions of cooperation require careful research relating to the scope and potential of those traditions; the avoidance of initial policies fostering individual land ownership while seeking to encourage increased investment and output; widespread appropriate education of leadership-manager cadre capable of helping to build producer cooperatives

over time; and formulation of new sets of working rules which will in the long run foster increased cooperative productive activity to take advantage of the technological possibilities of scale as existing constraints of manpower and capital are overcome.

IV. Reshaping associated institutions:

Government policies relating to land tenure should be conceived as extending beyond the issue of land ownership to include associated institutions which may correctly be characterized as part of the land tenure system.[67] Examination of the African circumstance suggests that this broader system both affects and is affected by the national plan--particularly as it shapes industrial strategy--as well as a range of working rules relating to marketing, farmer education, credit and taxation.

Agricultural development in Africa may best contribute to restructuring the economy if it is carried on within the framework of an overall national plan. Every African country has, upon attaining independence, formulated a plan,[68] so that the issue clearly is not whether to plan. Rather the crucial questions are: What are the key elements to incorporate in a national plan; and what institutional changes are required to implement the plan once it is formulated?

One essential point emerges from the preceeding discussion of alternative approaches to land tenure: Agricultural and industrial development must be planned simultaneously so that they mutually support and reinforce each other.[69] On the one hand, if the goal is gradually to improve technology on the farms as manpower skills and capital accumulate, it will be necessary, simultaneously, to plan industrial production of appropriate

farm implements, fertilizers and insecticides. Ox-drawn ploughs may replace the hoe; and simple labor-intensive factories may be set up to produce these domestically. Fertilizer use may be expanded, perhaps initially encouraging farmers to use natural manures; eventually, depending on the availability of natural resources, more capital-intensive fertilizer industries may be established. Appropriate insecticides and new seed varieties may contribute to rapid increases in output. Resulting increased farmer incomes will create an expanding internal market for the growing industrial sector. Eventually, simple standard tractors may be imported.* Perhaps a range of simple standardized parts may be produced locally, contributing to the accumulation of labor skills as well as capital equipment so that as the market expands still further the entire tractor may be made in the country or the region. Likewise, simple standardized trucks may initially be imported and later built domestically for rugged up-country transport as the internal road network expands, broadeningg internal market possibilities still further.

On the one hand, agricultural output should be directed, not only to the production of exports to earn foreign exchange for essential capital goods imports, but also to the production of foodstuffs and raw materials for the growing industrial sector. Industrial projects will need to be built to process agricultural products to meet the needs of the expanding

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*This assumes that scarce investment capital and foreign exchange will not be wasted on the import and/or production of expensive luxury items like private autos.

internal markets for consumer goods as well as increase foreign exchange earnings by processing raw materials before sale overseas. Rural small-scale labor-intensive industries may expand to mill maize, rice and wheat or to process vegetables and fruits for sale in urban markets,* thus supplementing local seasonal agricultural employment and incomes. Other rural industries may produce furniture and simple construction materials, contributing to gradual but real increases in levels of living. This kind of approach to agricultural development assumes a gradual broadening of the internal market in the framework of a planned industrial strategy and the gradual accumulation of capital, skills and working rules needed for a more gradual but continuous transformation of the agricultural sector.

Within this general perspective, specific industrial projects may be built to create poles of growth to set off chains of development throughout entire less developed rural areas.[70] Properly designed to take into account existing constraints as well as to ensure linkages with smaller manufacturing and agricultural activities, such projects may stimulate rapid economic, social and political growth on many levels.[71] In particular, as agricultural productivity increases as a result of the introduction of improved seed varieties and techniques, pole of growth projects may absorb the growing numbers of farm laborers released from the farms. Thus they can help to reduce the present misery and congestion--not to

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*Perhaps using re-usable glass bottles rather than tin.

mention the growing political and social tensions--which are increasing as the unemployed crowd into growing urban slums in capital cities in export enclaves throughout Africa.[72]

Implementation of plans for balanced agricultural and industrial expansion will undoubtedly require significant institutional changes. The inherited set of institutions, created in the colonial era, seem likely to foster investment decisions which will perpetuate the present resource allocation pattern.[73] Many, including those of Tanzania, the United Arab Republic, Guinea, and Uganda, have concluded that attainment of their plan goals for restructuring the economy requires direct government participation in and control of critical industries and direct investment in new pole of growth projects in the framework of a national industrial strategy.

Within the framework of a plan for an increasingly balanced and integrated national economy, careful attention needs to be directed to ensuring that marketing, farmer education institutions, credit and tax policies perform the required supporting roles for the land tenure system adopted. In the first place, accumulating evidence suggests that no agricultural development policy will be successful unless adequate attention is given to building appropriate marketing institutions.[74] To those who argue that African peasants do not respond to economic incentives, the obvious answer is to point to the rapid expansion of export crops in all parts of Africa once the farmer has been assured of a market and an adequate price.[75] This experience also tends to prove that a prime prerequisite for African development is to ensure that the old marketing institutions are reshaped and new ones created to provide an assured market at reasonable prices for thefarmers' output; and an adequate supply of

reasonably priced manufactured farm inputs and consumer goods to the farmers in return.[76] Improved road and transport systems, of course, are required as the foundation on which any expansion of a national marketing system must rest; but examination of the existing set of marketing institutions in Africa suggest that this, by itself, is unlikely to be sufficient.

In the colonial era, foreign trading firms established the necessary marketing institutions to ensure that African farmers could sell their produce,on the world market for cash.[77] At the same time, they have constituted major institutional features perpetuating the external dependency characteristic of the inherited dual economies of Africa. They seem unlikely to pursue policies of broadening sources of supply and overseas markets, or selling increasingly processed agricultural exports, because of their existing linkages with overseas manufacturers. Some African governments seeking to restructure their economies have sought to replace these trading firms by institutions more likely to pursue policies consonant with national development goals.

A range of institutional innovations have been introduced in various independent African countries, including marketing cooperatives for export crops and various types of parastatals for overseas purchases and sales.[78] From the outset, these instututions seem to have been plagued by shortages of skilled, dedicated manpower. There seems to have been a pervasive tendency for some firmers, usually the larger, more powerful ones, to manipulate marketing cooperatives for their own advantage, occasionally contributing to disrepute for marketing cooperatives in general.

Marketing boards have, for the most part, functioned much as before independence, although greater numbers of African farmer representatives have been involved. State trading firms have tended to be confined in scope, in some cases directed only to attempting to encourage the emergence of private African traders, although in a few cases they have taken over a major share of imports. Only a few efforts have been made to alter these institutions with the serious intention of reducing the external dependency.[79] The experience with all such institutional innovations needs to be evaluated to see which policies do, in reality, contribute to shifting the economy from dependence on agricultural raw material exports to an internally balanced economy in which participation in foreign trade contributes to essential economic restructuring.

Marketing institutions for expansion of internal trade also need to be carefully assessed. Evidence suggests that a small portion of the more powerful private traders in Africa have sought where possible to corner the market in order to lower prices to farmers, while raising them in urban areas.* On the one hand, this has tended to constitute a disincentive to farmers to enter cash crop production; in a few cases, surpluses produced in one year may be left uncollected, rotting, so the next year the farmers logically refuse to do the extra work needed to produce the surplus. On the other hand, rising urban food prices and even shortages of foodstuffs have led to increased importation of foodstuffs and contributed to the inflationary pressures which to one degree or another characterize most African cities.

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*In some cases, these traders are aliens, as in East Africa where British policy was explicitly directed to establishing Asians and excluding Africans from trade; in West Africa, however, Africans themselves have played this role.[80]

Several African countries have sought to introduce additional marketing cooperatives (sometimes compulsory) and sometimes state marketing boards to facilitate increased sale of internally consumed crops.[82] These institutions have encountered difficulties. Shortages of high level manpower and inadequately considered price and marketing policies have tended to cause problems. Private traders have found that, by virtue of their greater flexibility in local markets, they can outmaneuver cooperatives in their dealings with individual farmers, encouraging widespread "black market" practices which undermine cooperative endeavors. Development of managerial and bookkeeping skills are a prime requisite for overcoming these problems. In addition, careful analysis is needed to lay the foundation for formulation of the kinds of institutions and working rules which might overcome these difficulties and contribute more successfully to balanced internal expansion of the essential two-way trade between the growing agricultural and industrial sectors.

Careful attention should be directed, secondly, to farm extension programs. These have, in the past, been geared to encouraging individual farmers to adopt more scientific methods and improved techniques in export production. If the goal is to perpetuate the continued expansion of individualized tenures, then perhaps the only requirement is to improve these efforts. Experience in Africa, as elsewhere, indicates that this approach tends to lead to the provision of greater amounts of assistance to the larger farmers, thus fostering the emergence of a skewed distribution pattern.[83]

If, on the other hand, the goal is to gradually build towards cooperative farming practices as skills and capital are accumulated, farm extension programs need a thorough overhauling to ensure that they provide essential leadership and skills to foster this approach.[84] In particular, the extension workers would themselves need to adopt a new set of attitudes directed towards seeking opportunities for and encouraging group activities at every conceivable point in the production as well as the marketing process.*

Third, the existing financial institutions and their credit policies need to be re-examined to ensure that they do, in fact, contribute to the desired land tenure policies devised. Experience suggests that private commercial banks (in Africa these are mostly foreign-owned) are unlikely to inoovate in the direction of stimulating small African farmer production, far less in encouraging producer cooperation.[86] Loans made have mostly been for the actual crops, using the crops themselves for security, rather than for longer term development investments. What is required is to ensure that credit institutions direct more credit to small peasant farmers for the type of capital investment needed to increase productivity. If individual African farmers are to be encouraged to expand production, banks have to be persuaded to provide them with the essential long term credit for development. If the long range perspective is for individualized land

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*The national entire system of education, as well as the system of recruiting and educating extension workers, needs revision to overcome the bias introduced prior to independence which tended to denigrate in agricultural pursuits.[85]

ownership, then insistance on individual titles as security for loans, as is frequently the situation in African countries today, appears justifiable.[87]

If, on the other hand, the goal is to work gradually towards increased cooperation in production, then it would seem worthwhile to seek forms of security, other than individual titles to land, in order to leave open the possibility of pursuing this option. Attention needs to be directed to creating incentives for farmers as a group to invest in the long term improvements required to enhance productive capacity.*

Efforts have been made to extend loans through marketing cooperatives, partly to create collective responsibility and ease of repayments. Repayments are frequently collected through the cooperative as the crops have been sold. This has sometimes had the effect of discouraging continued participation in cooperative marketing arrangements. Where the entire cooperative has been held responsible for repayment of individual debts, membership participation has been discouraged.[88] Where banks have provided credit to larger private farmers to hire labor, this has acted as a disincentive to farmers' continued or increased participation in any form of producer cooperation.[89]

In Tanzania, for example, after the Government had nationalized the banking and financial institutions, it adopted policies directing credit towards ujamaa development.[90]

For this approach to succeed, however, it appears probable that the leadership and working rules of ujamaa projects need to be adequate to ensure effective operation to ensure repayment, among other things; otherwise,

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*It may, perhaps, be necessary to ensure that individual farmers feel that, if they want to leave the project, their past individual efforts will not remain unrewarded.

It may turn out that the government will have to use tax powers (or create money with attendant inflationary potential) to subsidize ujamaa projects. All this suggests that if it is desirable to support some form of group tenure for production purposes then a considerable amount of research and evaluation needs to be directed to creating appropriate supporting credit institutions and policies.

Fourth, the government seeking to restructure the economy will need to work out appropriate tax policies.[91] These will be influenced by the governmental philosophy regarding the best way of implementing the national plan. If private entrepreneurs are to make critical investment decisions in agriculture, careful consideration of taxes on income, exports, imports, sales and possibly land is required to ensure that they do not discourage and if possible encourage individual farmers to make appropriate decisions. On the other hand, if it is concluded that in the long run group productive enterprises in agriculture are more likely to contribute to national economic reconstruction, tax policies may be shaped to facilitate developments in these directions. Since such a perspective is likely to be implemented only over time, it may be essential, in the shorter term, to avoid discouraging individual farmers from increasing productivity and selling their surpluses on the market, as long as they do not hinder advancement along the lines of producer cooperation. Only recently have tax policies begun to receive the scrutiny they deserve as critical development instruments in the African context. Extensive research is required to see that they play their part

within the overall financial plan designed to ensure adequate funds to implement the national development strategy.

IV. Summary and conclusions:

This article has attempted to outline a conceptual framework for evaluation of alternative land tenure systems and associated institutions and working rules in Africa. It has presented a brief overview of the land tenure systems inherited by the newly independent states of Africa within the framework of the externally dependent dual economies shaped in the colonial era. These consisted of individualized tenure systems in the relatively modern export-enclave supported by the institutions and working rules established under the umbrella of the colonial administration; and a wide variety of traditional systems which tended to persist outside of the sector devoted to export crop production.

In the context of this inherited pattern, the two broad categories of land tenure systems emerging in independent Africa have been tentatively evaluated with a view to suggesting their potential consequences for efforts to attain an internally balanced, integrated economy capable of providing for increased productivity and higher levels of living for all sectors of the population. On the one hand, individualized tenures, initiated in the colonial era in the export enclave, provide conditions in which the individual small peasant farmer exercises initiative at his own risk to expand production. If this approach is pursued, attention needs to be directed, on the one hand, to avoiding fragmentation through inheritance rules; and, on the other, to ensuring a sufficiently permanent interest in the land to encourage

the peasants to make long-term investments to increase productivity. In the long run, there appears to be a considerable probability that continued expansion by individual peasants seeking to take advantage of economies of scale may lead to acquisition of land by a few wealthy farmers from their less fortunate neighbors, who will then seek to hire the resulting landless laborers at the lowest possible wage. Unless guarded against, this tendency may eventually lead to the emergence of a landed and landless class. In addition to the probable political and social tensions arising from such a division, the accompanying skewed income distribution is likely to limit the market for expanded internal production, and hence to hamper creation of a nationally integrated, balanced national economy.

The alternative of attempting to build producer cooperatives to take advantage of economies of scale while avoiding the emergence of "haves" and "have nots" also appears likely to encounter difficulties in the early stages of post-independence development. Shortages of capital initially render the rapid acquisition of modern machinery and equipment impossible except in a few limited cases, so that initially at least the expansion of the size of units of production is not a primary requisite for expanded output. The lack of ideologically committed and technically qualified leaders who can help to shape the new institutions and working rules required to weld the masses of traditional peasants into modern producer cooperatives appears to be an equally if not more serious problem. This suggests that countries seeking to pursue this alternative approach to land tenures should seek to encourage attainment of the essential preconditions of producer cooperatives--in particular training cadres of leaders and developing attitudes and activities

fostering cooperation wherever possible--while avoiding any rigidification of individualized tenures which might hamper their creation at later stages when emerging economies of scale require larger production units. Introduction of small-scale industrial projects as part of an expanding regional specialization and change may arise from and contribute to expanding areas of producer cooperation. As productivity expands, and capital and manpower skills accumulate, the gradual emergence of producer cooperation may then ensure the more equitable distribution of resulting increased incomes, laying the essential foundation for internally balanced and integrated national economies.

The government will need to evaluate the entire complex of associated institutions to ensure that they contribute to the implementation of whatever approach to land tenures it adopts. In the first place, both agriculture and industry need to be planned to expand simultaneously to ensure creation of an internally balanced economy, reducing dependence on the inherited export enclave. Research is required to lay the basis for formulating the appropriate institutional changes needed to attain this goal; such research should include careful evaluation of the consequences of measures already undertaken.

Secondly, the associated institutions and working rules providing for marketing, farmer education, credit and taxation need to be reviewed to ensure that they are supportive of the land tenure system adopted within the framework of the national plan perspectives. Given that the inherited set of institutions and working rules in the export enclave tends to foster individualized tenures, the main requirement for continued extension of this

approach would appear to be to improve their functioning, and, in particular, to ensure that small African peasants, not a few foreign settlers or wealthy Africans associated with the export enclave, benefit. If, however, a government adopts an approach designed to build producer cooperation over time, it seems evident that it will be necessary to re-evaluate and alter these basic institutional structures and working rules to implement this approach. Again, careful research is required to ensure that measures introduced will work; and adequate feedback is essential so that, once new institutions and working rules are adopted, they may be altered if their initial operation proves unsuccessful.

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1. Cf. C.K. Eicher, Research on Agricultural Development in Five English-Speaking Countries in West Africa, (New York: Agricultural Development Council, Inc., 1970) for survey of kinds of research which has been done relating to agriculture in that area. While he contends (p. 33) that too much research has been directed to "irrelevant" issues of land tenure and marketing, while neglecting such critical issues as unemployment and lack of effective demand, it is argued below that it is precisely the failure to relate land tenure studies to overall national development which has led to the neglect of these issues.

2. Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1965) p. 614.

3. K. Parsons, Land Reform in Nigeria, Agency for International Development Spring Review, Washington, D.C., June 1970 (SR/LR/C-16) p. 3.

4. Cf. W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, A Case Study of Economic Development in a Dualistic Society, (California: Stanford University Press, 1961) p. 6.

5. See R.B. Seidman, "The Jural Postulates of African Law", (paper presented to African Studies Association Conference, Boston, Oct., 1970) for problems of determining goals of development in Africa.

6. Cf. P. Dorner, "Research Issues in Agricultural Developmental Policy," Land Tenure Center, (submitted for Journal publication); T.F. Carroll "Appraising the Adequacy of Land Tenure Systems for Agricultural Production", p. 584.

7. For an extensive bibliography on land tenures and possible reforms, see Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rural Institutions Division, Bibliography on Land Tenure in Africa, Rome, 1970. (ESR/MISC:70/23, May 1970).

8. A.M. Karmarck, Economics of African Development, New York: Praeger, 1967. Ch. V.

9. P. Bohannan, " 'Land' 'Tenure,' and 'Land-Tenure,' in Biebuyek," ed., African Agrarian Systems, 1963, pp. 101-111; V. Ayoub, "Review: The Judicial Process in Two African Tribes" in M. Janowitz, ed., Community Political Systems, Free Press of Glencoe, N.Y. 1961, pp. 237-250; M. Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965, pp. 182, 185.

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12. B. Davidson, The Lost Cities of Africa.

13. Ibid.

14. Cf. R. Pankhurst, State and Land in Ethiopian History, Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Monographs in Ethiopian Land Tenure No. 3.

15. For summary of characteristics of land holding system in Egypt prior to the 1952 reforms, see K.B. Platt, Land Reform in the United Arab Republic, Agency for International Development Spring Review, June, 1970 (SR/14/C-17), pp. 3-4.

16. Cf. W. Zartman, "Farming and Land Ownership in Morocco," Land Economics Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 187-198.

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18. eg. K. Arhin, "Status Differentiation in Ashanti in the Nineteenth Century: A Preliminary Study," Research Review (Institute of African Studies, Legon) vol. 4, No. 3, 1968, pp. 34-52.

19. Lord Lugard, in The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1965) p. 614 explicitly formulated these as reasons for the expansion of the British Empire into Africa.

20. On the consequences of this for independent African countries, see R. Green and A. Seidman, Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan Africanism, Harmondsworth: African Penguin, 1968, esp. Part I.

21. For model of export enclave within inherited dual economies of Africa see A. Seidman, "A Model of the Dual Economies of East Africa," in East Africa Journal, April, 1970 and May, 1970. (Based on forthcoming book, Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa, East Africa Publishing House, 1971, and Ghana's Development Experience, 1951-1965, East Africa Publishing House, forthcoming.)

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32. The value of food, drink and tobacco imports into Kenya, for example, tripled from 1956-1966. (Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey, 1967.) Nairobi: Ministry of Planning and Development, 1967, p. 24. In Ghana, as cocoa output has spread, mounting imports of foodstuffs have continued to be a major burden on the balance of payments, (Cf. Republic of Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, March 1968, Table 18, p. 16) and the inadequacies of foodstuff marketing has been the subject of repeated debates (eg. "Ghana's Agriculture: 2: Sorting Out the Legacy," West Africa 6/13/68). The problems of marketing institutions are summarized in Seidman, Ghana's Development Experience, 1951-65, esp. section three of Chapter IV.

33. See the International Monetary Fund, Annual Reports, for terms of trade data. For effect on some specific economies since independence, see Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies, Chapter VIII, Section II, and Ghana's Development Experience, 1951-1965, Chapter XI, Section II, and "Post-script: Stagnation." Cf. Contra, Eicher, Research on Agricultural Development in Five English-speaking Countries in East Africa, p. 12, fn. Eicher's argument that African countries succeeded in expanding the value of total exports 42 per cent from 1955-63 appears misleading, given that the rapidly expanding volume of real exports considerably exceeded this but was offset by falling prices of agricultural output; and at least a significant share of the expanded overseas sales took place at the expense of Latin America and Asia--whose total exports increased only 22 and 10 percent according to his own evidence--suggesting that it could be expected to be once-only expansion.

34. Cf. R. Green and A. Seidman, Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan Africanism, Harmondsworth: African Penguin, 1968, esp. Part II, Chapter 2, "Summary: The role of foreign private firms," pp. 126-132. For comparable data for Latin America, see R. Prebisch, Change and Development, Latin America's Great Task, Report submitted to the Inter-American Bank, Washington, 1970, p. 65.

35. For summary of distribution theories and examples from Africa, see A. Seidman, An Economics Textbook for Africa, London: Methuen, 1969, esp. Ch. 7; see also G. Hunter, The New societies of Tropical Africa, A Selective Study, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 135; and UN, Economic Survey of Africa Since 1950, Table I-LIV, Annual Personal Income, African and non-African, in Selected Countries, p. 94.

36. The implications of the small markets in most African countries are surveyed in Green and Seidman, Unity or Poverty? esp. pp. 58-65; The necessity for greater research concerning the effect of skewed income distribution is suggested by P. Dorner, "Research Issues in Agricultural Development Policy," Land Tenure Center, March 1970, (submitted for journal publication), pp. 20-22.

37. Parsons, Land Reform in Nigeria, pp. 3-4.

38. Ibid., p. 9.

39. Food and Agricultural Organization, United Nations, Africa Survey: Report on Possibility of African Rural Development in Relation to Social and Economic Growth, Rome, 1962, p. 18.

40. Cf. T.F. Carroll, "Appraising Adequacy of Land Tenure Systems," pp. 585-587.

41. Cf. W. Allan, The African Husbandman, Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1964, p. 470; and, for discussion of implications for land tenures, see Seidman, "Law and Economic Development. . ."

42. Parsons, Land Reform in Nigeria, p. 9.

43. P. Dorner and D. Kanel, The Economic Case for Land Reform: Employment, Income Distribution, and Productivity, prepared for AID Spring Review, June, 1970.

44. D. Stanfield, "Economic Strata and Dependency as Determinants of Innovativeness and Productivity in Rural Brazil," Rural Sociological Society Meetings, August 1970.

45. Farm Economics Survey Unit, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Survey of 1965-66 Crop year, reported in Republic of Kenya, Development Plan, 1966-1970, p. 152.

46. For some post independence experiences, see M. Miracle and A. Seidman, State Farms in Ghana, Land Tenure Center, 1968; R. Apthorpe, (ed.) Land Settlement and Rural Development in Eastern Africa, Kampala: Nkanga Editions, Transition Books; D. Forbes Watt, Mechanized Group Farming in Uganda, Land Reform No. 1, FAO, 1968; and M. Hall, "A Review of Agricultural Mechanization in Uganda," Makerere: 1969, mimeo; and C. Eicher, T. Zalla, J. Kocher, and F. Winch, Employment Generation in African Agriculture, Institute of International Agriculture, College of Agriculture and Material resources, Research Report No. 9, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, July, 1970, passim.

47. Eicher et al, Employment Generation in African Agriculture, p. 14.

48. eg. Both Tanzania and Kenya still subsidized exports of surplus maize, in the late 1960's, although they hoped to eliminate these subsidies in the 1970's. (See Republic of Kenya, Development Plan, 1970-74, and United Republic of Tanzania, Development Plan, 1969-1974, Vol. 1).

49. Cf. Apthorpe (ed.), Land Settlement and Rural Development in Eastern Africa, esp. articles by Apthorpe, and J. Morris; see also J.O. Akinwolemiwa, "The Fram Settlement Scheme in Western Nigeria, and Assessment of the Problems involved and Evaluation of the Results Achieved to Date," World Land Conference, Rome (RU:WIR-C/66/ 2), May, 1966.

50. UN, FAO, "Land Reform in the Republic of the Sudan," Country Paper Rome: RU C/66/36, May 1966; and W.A. Hance, African Economic Development, New York: Praeger, 1967, Ch. 2.

51. For discussion of the ingredients of an industrial strategy and the consequences of alternative policies, see Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa, esp. Ch. 6, and Ghana's Development Experience, esp. Ch. X and Part III.

52. This approach, as indicated above, was introduced in the colonial era, and since independence has been consciously fostered in particular in Kenya; cf. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Giku Areas, passim., and Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies, Ch. 7.

53. FAO Africa Survey: Report on Possibilities of African Rural Development in Relation to Social and Economic Growth, Rome, 1962.

54. J.L. Simons, "Land Reform in Tunisia," Agency for International Development, Spring Review, June, 1970; and P. Foster, "Land Reform in Algeria," Agency for International Development, Spring Review June, 1970.

55. For an effort to estimate the creation of capital through the planting of tree crops, see R. Szereszewski, Structural Changes in the Economy of Ghana, 1891-1911, London: Watson & Viney, 1965, p. 137

56. J. Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 7.

57. Swynnerton Plan.

58. M. Blundell, So Rough a Wind, The Kenya Memoirs of Sir Michael Blundell, London: Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p. 287.

59. J. Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 15.

60. eg. M. Hall, "A Review of Agricultural Mechanization in Uganda," Makerere 1969, mimeo; M. Miracle and A. Seidman, "Cooperatives and Quasi-Cooperatives in Ghana, 1951-1965," Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1968; and L. Cliffe and G. Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania," Rural Development Research Committee, Paper No. 3, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1968.

61. eg. R.W. Kates, J. McKay, L. Berry, Twelve New Settlements in Tanzania A Comparative Study of Success, University Social Sciences Conference, Makerere, Dec. 30, 1968 - Jan. 3, 1969; Cliffe and Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania".

62. Such research is being undertaken at the University of Dar es Salaam, cf. L. Cliffe and G. Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania;" D. Feldman, An Assessment of Alternative Policy Strategies in the Agricultural Development of Tanzania and their Application to Tobacco Farming in Iringa," ERB Paper 68.1, UCDSM, 1968; D. Feldman, "The Economics of Ideology, Some Problems of Achieving Rural Socialism in Tanzania," Economic Research Bureau, UCDSM, Seminar Paper, Nov. 1, 1968; R.W. Kates, J. McKay, L. Berry, Twelve New Settlements in Tanzania: A Comparative Study of Success, University Social Sciences Council Conference, Makerere, Dec. 30, 1968 - Jan. 3, 969. There is need for more, as emphasized in United Republic of Tanzania, The Economic Survey and Annual Plan, 1970-71, p. 25. Other research includes W.J. Argyle, "The concept of African Collectivism," Mawazo (Makerere) Vol. 1, No. 4, Dec. 1968, pp. 37-43.

63. The problem of the inadequacy of managerial skills as well as the inappropriate attitudes of many managers is discussed in Cliffe and Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania." See also Tanzania, The Economic Survey and Annual Plan, 1970-71, p. 25.

64. The differences in working rules among ujamaa settlements existing in Tanzania, for example, was illustrated by a report of a student to the author's class in the University College, Dar es Salaam, who said that, in one village of former sisal workers, a worker absent without adequate excuse was fined not only for the day lost, but also for an additional day's pay; in a village of more traditional farmers, the sanction was far less onerous.

65. For an interesting analysis of the problems of developing an appropriate extension education program, see B. Harris, "Survey of Agricultural Training Institutes: Implications for Producing Ujamaa Vijijini Extension Workers," Rural Development Paper No. 2, Sixth Annual Symposium of East African Academy, University College, Dar es Salaam, Sept., 1968.

66. Cf. Simons, "Land Reform in Tunisia," and Foster, "Land Reform in Algeria," Agency for International Development, Spring Review, 1970.

67. Parsons, "Land Reform in Nigeria," p. 39.

68. See Green and Seidman, Unity or Poverty? p. 222.

69. Cf. Eicher, Research on Agricultural Development in Five English-Speaking Countries in West Africa, p. 12. For consideration of some of the issues involved in developing balanced plans, see Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies, esp. Chapter 5; these have been further analysed in Seidman, "Industrialization and Rural Development", Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1970, mimeo.

70. Cf. A.O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, (Yale, New Haven, 1958) Ch. 6; and F. Perroux, "Note sur la notion de 'pole de croissance'", Economie Appliquée, Jan-June, 1955, pp. 307-320.

71 For the results of a thorough interdisciplinary study involving economists, sociologists, geologists, soil scientists, etc., of the introduction of large industrial plants in rural underdeveloped areas of Poland, see: Conference: "Optimal Model for Development of Traditional Agricultural Areas," Department of Research on Industrialized Regions, Polish Academy of Science, 1969, hereinafter cited as Polish Studies.

72. The seriousness of this problem has been repeatedly underlined (e.g. R.J. H. Church, "Urban Problems and Economic Development in West Afria", Journal of Modern African Studies, No. 5, pp. 511-520, Dec., 1967; and W.A. Lewis, "Unemployment in Developing Countries", World Today, Jan., 1967, No. 23, pp. 13-22) and was singled out as a priority item for research by Eicher, Research on Agricultural Development in Five English-Speaking Countries in West Africa, pp. 40-41.

73. For evidence, see Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa, Part I; and Seidman, Ghana's Development Experience, 1951-65, passim.

74. Cf. A. Mosher, paper delivered to Workshop in Economic Development, University of Wisconsin, April 11, 1967.

75. For discussion of responsiveness of export crop farmers to price changes see E. Clayton, Economic Planning and Developing Agriculture, Headley Bros., 1963; and W. O. Jones, "Economic Man in Africa," Food Research Institute Studies (Stanford, California: Food Research Institute, 1960,

76. The importance of reshaping marketing institutions and the alternative approaches available are considered in Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies, esp. Ch. 8.

77. For a detailed examination of the role of these trading companies in West Africa, see P.T. Bauer, West African Trade, A Study of Competition, Oligopoly and Monopoly in a Changing Economy, London: Rutledge and Kegan Ltd., 1963, revised.

78. See Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies, Ch. 8, for alternatives and an initial assessment of their consequences for national development in East Africa; see also African Urban Notes, Special Issue on Markets and Marketing in Africa, Marvin Miracle, ed., 1970.

79. For review of aims and initial problems of organizing the State Trading Corporation with a view to attaining these goals, see A.L. Bennett, Assistant General Manager, State Trading Corporation, "Self-Reliance and Foreign Trade," a panel, Economic Society of Tanzania, 11 Sept., 1968.

80. Cf. Seidman, Ghana's Development Experience, 1951-65, esp. p. 281 ff.; also Comparative Development Strategies, esp. Chs. 3 and 8.

81. For comparative price trends in African countries, see current United Nations Statistical Yearbook.

82. For consideration of problems of internal marketing boards, see J. Helleiner, Agricultural Marketing in Tanzania, Policies and Problems, ERB paper, 68.14, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1968; and for analysis of cooperatives, see United Republic of Tanzania, Report of Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Cooperative Movement and Marketing Boards, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1966. See also DeGraft Johnson, Report on Cooperatives, 1966, summarized in M. Miracle and A. Seidman, Cooperatives and Quasi-Cooperatives in Ghana, 1951-66, Madison: University of Wisconsin, Land Tenure Center, 1969.

83. Cf. B. Harris, Survey of Agricultural Training Institutes. Discussions of Rural Sociological Conference in Washington, Sept. 28 - Aug. 1, confirm that this has been experienced in the South in the U.S. although an additional factor has been discrimination against Blacks; and for Latin America, see M. Brown, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1970.

84. Harris, Survey of Agricultural Training Institutes.

85. Interview with Mr. Kahumbe, Senior Tutor, Institute of Adult Education, Madison: Land Tenure Center, Spring, 1970.

86. eg., J. Loxley, "Financial Intermediaries and Their Role in East Africa," University of East Africa Social Science Conference, December, 1966; for efforts to change the limited role of commercial banks in East Africa, see Republic of Ghana, Economic Survey, 1962, esp. pp. 100-101, 1963, pp. 54-63, and 1964, pp. 52-60.

87. This has been a major argument in Kenya for consolidation and registration of title of farmers in the former African reserves; cf. I.K. Kutuku, Senior Economist/Statistician, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, "Land Consolidation and Registration--Kenya's Experience," IDEP/MISR Quarter Continent Conference on Experience with Planning Agrarian Change in East Africa, Jan., 1969.

88. See M.P. Collinson, "Agricultural Credit in Tanzania," in Helleiner, ed., Agricultural Planning in East Africa, for discussion of problems allocating credit to small farmers.

89. Feldman, "The Economics of Ideology--Some Problems of Achieving Rural Socialism in Tanzania."

90. For overall analysis of Tanzania's approach to finance, see Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies, Ch. 9. See also Tanzania, The Economic Survey and Annual Plan, 1970-71, esp. pp. 11-13, 73.

91. Among materials useful for consideration of the tax issue are: D.P. Ghai, Taxation for Development, A Case Study of Uganda, East African Studies No. 23, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1966; J.F. Due, "Reform of East African Taxation," The East African Economic Review Vol. 2, No. 2, Dec., 1964; D.P. Ghai, "Tax Structure for Rapid Economic Growth in East Africa," in Problems of Economic Development in East Africa, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1965; R.G. Penner, "Local Government Revenues in Tanzania," Agricultural Economics, Department of Economics, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1968-69. For details of Tanzania's efforts to reduce tax burden on rural area, see United Republic of Tanzania, Speech by the Honourable Minister of Finance Introducing the Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure 1969-70 to the National Assembly on 19th June, 1969, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1969, pp. 22-24. For comments on necessity of examining taxes on agriculture, see Eicher, Research on Agricultural Development in Five English-Speaking Countries in West Africa, esp. p. 40.