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
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Charles Erasmus

LAND TENURE CENTER

University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

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Upper Limits of Peasantry and Agrarian Reform: Bolivia, Venezuela, and Mexico Compared¹

Charles J. Erasmus
University of California at Santa Barbara

The usefulness of "peasant" as a classificatory term is undergoing reappraisal similar to that of "folk" a decade and a half ago. Ironically, one of the first persons to criticize Redfield for including too much under "folk" (Foster 1953) is now being criticized for doing the same with "peasant" (Kennedy 1966). However, Eric Wolf's timely *Peasants* (1966) alleviates many of the difficulties faced by those of us who have worked among subsistence-oriented rural populations within contemporary state societies and have found the word a handy, if somewhat crude, tool for communicating with one another. Wolf's book helpfully provides us with an open-ended model for comparative analysis.

Historically Wolf's (1966: 11, 4) peasants come into being with the development of the state (not the city *per se*) and with a division of labor between cultivators and rulers such that the former deliver part of their product as "rent" to the latter. While this separates peasants from primitives in relatively clearcut fashion, Wolf (1966: 2) does not say much about the line between peasants and farmers except to identify the latter as "agricultural entrepreneurs as we know them in the United States" where a farm is "primarily a business enterprise, combining factors of production purchased in a market to obtain a profit by selling advantageously in a products market. The peasant, however, does not operate an enterprise in the economic sense; he runs a household, not a business concern." While subsistence-oriented rural groups I have observed in such land-reform countries as Mexico, Venezuela, and Bolivia would not qualify as farmers in this sense, neither would they strictly qualify today as "rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm but must be fed for their specific goods and services in turn" (Wolf 1966: 3-4). However, the virtue of Wolf's model lies partly in the openness of his upper limits of peasantry and partly in the technological, economic, social, and ceremonial dimensions he provides for measuring differences and changes among peasant groups from his exploitative baseline.

It is Wolf's (1966: 10) emphasis on the "asymmetrical structural relationship between producers of surplus (peasants) and controllers" which leads


me to view the "closed" end of his model as essentially exploitative. My concern in this paper is with groups which have been freed from the exploitative causal denominator of peasantry but continue to simulate peasantry along other dimensions. I am not directly concerned with the problem of typology, either for peasantry as a whole or its possible subtypes. I accept the closed end of Wolf's largely historical model and welcome the opportunities his scheme provides for analyzing problems at the open end. My purpose is to investigate the persistence of certain peasant attributes by comparing southeastern Bolivia with Venezuela and northwestern Mexico. All three areas have been exposed to agrarian reform programs which have affected rural cultivators in different ways. In southeastern Bolivia land reform has drastically altered previous feudal labor patterns, but little has been done to alter the primitive technology. The emphasis of Venezuela's agrarian reform, however, has been more on altering the technology than on expropriation and redistribution of land. Northwestern Mexico has had two stages of agrarian reform. The earlier stage involved land reform without change in the system of agricultural exploitation, while the second has been focused primarily on revolutionary technological alterations. A comparison of these social experiments helps us to understand which situational factors are most determining for those attributes of underdeveloped rural life we are accustomed to associate with "peasantry."

SOUTHEASTERN BOLIVIA

At the time of my study in the summer of 1963, over ten years had passed since the Bolivian revolution had given all hacienda peons free use of their perquisite plots by abolishing their obligations to the former owners. In Wolf's (1966: 9) terms, the "funds of rent" (all permanent labor, produce, or money charges on the peasant's production) had been eliminated. Yet in the provinces of Chuquisaca and Tarija the great majority of the rural population were still running households, not "business concerns," and the ceremonial "fund" and "ideology" were still very much alive. I shall indicate first, for their historical value, the kinds of obligations (funds of rent) that existed on haciendas in this area prior to 1952 as reconstructed by my investigations. Then I shall examine the effects of their abolition on replacement and ceremonial funds within a relatively static ecotype.

The characteristic "domain" of this area before the land reform was what Wolf (1966: 53) designates as "mercantile." Land was the private property of landowners who exacted tribute from serfs known as *arrenderos* and less commonly as *colonos*. Tables 1 and 2 give some idea of the size and internal distribution of hacienda lands in this part of Bolivia at the time of the land reform. This information was extracted from the legal records of land reform judgments affecting 335 different properties in Chuquisaca, a sample which included nearly all the legal records available in the Sucre and district land-reform offices at the time of my visit. (The rest were in the archives in La Paz.) In the tables I have retained the land reform classification of the properties—large (*latifundio*), medium (*mediana*) and small (*pequeña*)—which also indicates their final disposition. In the case of a *latifundio* all land

MAP I: DEPARTMENTS OF CHUQUISACA AND TARIJA, SOUTHEASTERN BOLIVIA



was expropriated. Each *arrendero* became the owner of the perquisite plot or plots which he had been using at the time of the reform and was now freed of all the former fee and labor obligations to the dispossessed hacendado. The lands which the serfs had cultivated and maintained for the owner (the hacendado's demesne) were all expropriated for the collective management and benefit of the former serfs. In the case of medium properties, dis-

position of the land was the same except for the hacendado's demesne, which he was allowed to keep. In theory none of a small property was expropriated, but in practice *arrenderos* with perquisite holdings on a *pequeña* were allowed to remain on them—free of any further obligations to the owner—until they could be relocated, which they seldom were. The criteria for judging the size category of a property were not constant but varied according to zone categories defined by the agrarian law. Moreover, in cases where the treatment of *arrenderos* was considered to have been extremely feudalistic, a medium or small property could be declared *latifundio*.

TABLE 1
Pre-Reform Property Sizes (Hectares)
in Chuquisaca, Bolivia

	Latifundios	Medianas	Pequeñas
Number of Cases in Sample	45	188	102
Average Size of Haciendas	1356.26	950.02	100.23
Average Amount of Cultivated Land	202.30	112.30	7.22
Average Amount of Pasture Land	1142.61	835.24	92.93
Percentage of Cultivated Land	15	12	7
Percentage of Pasture Land	85	88	93

TABLE 2
Distribution of Lands Within Pre-Reform
Chuquisaca Properties (in Hectares)

	Latifundios	Medianas	Pequeñas
Number of Cases	45	152	102
Percentage of Total Cultivated Lands Worked by Owners	33	20	70
Average Arable Land Per Arrendero	4.0	3.2	1.6
Average Non-Arable Land Per Arrendero	21.8	20.6	14.0
Average Arable Land Per Owner	161.2	27.9	5.1
Average Non-Arable Land Per Owner	204.0	366.3	76.7

Several noteworthy facts are indicated by the tables. First, the amount of cultivated land is small in relation to the amount of pasture in all types of properties, a reflection not of crop-pasture rotation but of the extremely mountainous terrain. Second, the percentage of *latifundio* or *mediana* directly worked by its owner was only a third to a fifth respectively. In other words, these property owners relinquished two-thirds to four-fifths of their cultivable land to serfs in order to secure their labor to work the remainder. Third, the perquisite holdings of *arrenderos* (called *arriendos*) usually included pasture as well as cultivated land so that each *arrendero* could cultivate fresh plots as old ones became exhausted. In practice, most *arrenderos* had to plant all their cultivable land year after year because of the small size of their *arriendos*. Fourth, extensive pasture lands were frequently held by the hacendado, which his *arrenderos* could also use by paying an annual fee.

The fees and work obligations (Wolf's "funds of rent") of *arrenderos* were reconstructed for thirty different locales in Chuquisaca and Tarija (see Table 3). Although former *latifundios* were visited more often than *medianas* and *pequeñas*, size of property did not seem to make much difference in work obligations. Obviously property size rather than differences in labor "exploitation" was the determining criterion of expropriation in most cases. As Table 3 indicates, obligations of *arrenderos* included payments in money and kind as well as labor.

TABLE 3
Fee and Labor Obligations on Pre-1952 Haciendas in Southeastern Bolivia

Place	Arrendero's Payments			Arrendero's Labor Obligations							Total Number of Days Worked Per Annum for the Hacienda		Agrarian Reform Designation of Hacienda				
	Money Rent	% of Crops	% of Livestock	Field Labor	Domestic Labor—Men	Domestic Labor—Women	Animal Care	Transport	Spinning	Weaving	Muqueo	Firewood	Men	Women	Latifundio	Mediana	Pequeña
Chuquichuqui	X	X		X	X		X	X			X		180		X		
Media Luna				X	X		X						168		X		
El Chaco				X	X								162		X		
Tejahuasi	X			X	X		X				X		188				X
La Florida			X	X	X		X	X					113				X
La Brisa	X			X	X		X				X		180	24			X
Cabeza Baja	X			X	X		X	X			X		109	24			X

TABLE 3 Continued
Arrendero's Labor Obligations

Place	Arrendero's Payments			Arrendero's Labor Obligations								Total Number of Days Worked Per Annum for the Hacienda		Agrarian Reform Designation of Hacienda		
	Money Rent	% of Crops	% of Livestock	Field Labor	Domestic Labor—Men	Domestic Labor—Women	Animal Care	Transport	Spinning	Weaving	Muqueo	Firewood	Men	Women	Latifundio	Mediana
Nucchu	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	125	28	X		
Cororo	X	X	X	X	X		X			X	X	193	7	X		
Vila Vila		X	X	X	X		X			X	X	98	84	X		
San Blas	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	85	14	X		
Molleni	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	121	62	X		
Azurduy	X	X	X	X			X					175				X
Cantón Fernández	X			X								104				X
Huerta Cucho	X	X	X				X					175				X
San Julián	X	X	X				X			X	X	5				X
La Ciénaga	X	X					X			X	X	42	5	X		
Monteagudo	X		X									6				X
Compañía				X	X							350				X
Camargo		X	X							X		186				X
Nazaret		X	X	X						X		156				X
Cocha Loma	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	70	38	X		
Caraparí	X	X	X				X			X		90				X
Ingahuasi	X	X	X				X			X		180				X
Patanca		X	X					X	X	X		30				X
Santa Ana	X		X							X		51				X
Bella Vista	X	X	X	X	X		X			X	X	214	24	X		
San Andrés	X	X	X	X						X		199	17	X		
Nogalito	X	X	X				X			X		30				X
Entre Ríos	X	X	X				X			X		38				X

Informants had difficulty in recalling rental sums because of inflation since 1952, but figures between 35 and 50 bolivianos were mentioned most frequently. Given the 1950 wage rate, such fees equaled 50 to 100 days of wages. In some cases the rental fee was canceled by the *arrendero's* labor on the hacienda, but frequently labor obligations were demanded in addition to rent. Sometimes rent was paid in livestock or grain but in fixed amounts; percentage payments were a separate and sometimes added obligation known as *catastro*.

Catastro percentages varied from 10 per cent at Chuquichuqui, Huerta Cucho, and Curaparí to 50 per cent at Molleni and La Ciénaga. They were highest when the *patrón* did not cultivate any of the hacienda land himself and relied on the *catastro* for his income. But in such cases the labor obligations were minimal. The livestock *diezmo*, the most widespread payment made by *arrenderos*, was generally 10 per cent of annual increments, but at Molleni 20 per cent. Bella Vista, San Andrés and Nogalito charged an annual head tax in addition to the *diezmo*.

Work obligations included field labor and domestic services. The first was performed on the *patrón's* land according to some fixed or rotational schedule. In some cases *arrenderos* worked for the *patrón* three days a week except during planting and harvesting, when they worked for him full time—much like the English manorial system (Sutton 1951: 137-138). Other haciendas prescribed a certain number of work days per year ranging from 150 at Tejahuasi to 30 at Patanca and Nogalito. Sometimes haciendas used the *yanapacu* system, by which each *arrendero* was given a certain quantity of seed in an amount which determined the area necessary to plant, cultivate, and harvest. *Yanapacu* took about 80 to 90 days a year according to estimates at La Florida, Cabeza Baja, Ñucchu, Cororo, and Molleni. Another arrangement was the *quincena*, by which *arrenderos* were divided into two groups working alternate fortnights. Caring for livestock of the *patrón* was sometimes an obligatory work service apart from field labor. At San Blas and Molleni each *arrendero* was required to raise and fatten one hacienda pig a year, which he replaced if it died.

One prominent domestic service was *semanería* or *pongueaje*, which included duties ranging from messenger service (*runacacha*) to construction and maintenance work on hacienda buildings. *Mitanaje*, the domestic service of the wife or grown daughters of an *arrendero*, consisted mainly of cooking and cleaning. In both cases work periods of one week were rotated among the hacienda labor force so that they affected the same household about twice a year or less.

Cacha was the common obligation—averaging five to six days a year—of transporting the *patrón's* agricultural products to the nearest market or road, almost always on burros and mules of the *arrendero*. Another common service, averaging about six days a year, was the cutting and transporting of firewood for the hacienda. Other special domestic services included: (1) gathering and manufacturing construction materials for the hacienda (posts, roof beams, and adobes); (2) *muqueo*, the making of chicha (corn beer) by women; and (3) spinning and weaving by women.

In addition to *arrenderos* some haciendas had *yerbajeros*, individuals with only pasture rights for which they paid in money or kind and sometimes with labor. The same man might be an *arrendero* on one hacienda and a *yerbajero* on a neighboring one. Usually the *yerbajero* paid the annual *diezmo*, 10 per cent of his livestock increment. Patanca, in the inclement environment of the high Andes along the Tarija-Potosí border, was a livestock hacienda (sheep and goats) exclusively for *yerbajeros* who worked 30 days a year on the owner's agricultural haciendas located at lower altitudes in nearby valleys.

In the grape-producing valleys of North and South Cinti a distinction was made between *peones efectivos* (paid peons) and *arrenderos*. Owners of vineyards in the Cinti canyon loaned tiny plots of *huerta* (irrigated canyon bottom) to their paid laborers for growing food staples. These did domestic service without remuneration on Sundays, but were paid for all farm work during the week, a payment usually applied against their debt at the hacienda store. Since these paid peons were insufficient to meet peak labor loads on the vineyards (a hectare of vineyard required about 1,200 man days of work per annum), most of the larger winegrowers (above ten hectares) owned an *estancia*. An *estancia* was an hacienda located at higher altitudes above the Cinti canyon on which all cultivable land was divided into *arriendos* to maintain a work force of *arrenderos* used by the *patrón* much like a Patanca *yerbajero*. Instead of working for him on the *estancia*, they worked for 90 days as needed on his vineyards in the Cinti. Haciendas growing sugar cane along the Pilcomayo River also kept *estancias* such as Cocha Loma in the high valleys to secure their labor force.

The information summarized in Table 3 shows that a great deal of this peasantry's surplus went into the "funds of rent," and we are using "surplus" in the same elementary sense as Wolf (1966: 4) to refer to production "above and beyond the minimum required to sustain life." Since our figures for *catastro* and money payments are not precise enough for conversion into their equivalents in man days of labor, we cannot express all the rents in man days. Even so, the total number of work days provided by the average *arrendero* family at each of the haciendas listed is impressive by itself. Two-thirds (for men) fall between 100 and 200 days per year, with half of them over 150. However, the highest figure, 350, was for obligatory wage labor (*peones efectivos*) and actually illustrates the extent to which the rent fund decreased toward the southern and eastern portions of the region, where land was more plentiful and labor in greater demand. The vineyards of the Cinti continually had a labor shortage, and in the tropical lowlands east of Montegudo all farm labor was paid even before 1952. In the areas of labor scarcity the hacienda-store type of debt-slavery system was used if labor could be coerced. But since most of these areas were far from population centers and military surveillance, there was less coercion of labor than in the highlands, where the population was more dense and labor more abundant.

The revolution of 1952 and the land reform which followed effected a drastic change in the daily life of the majority of Bolivian peasants. It totally eliminated the old funds of rent which claimed in many cases nearly

half of the peasants' productive effort. And this was precisely the major objective of the reform—to eliminate "feudal" exploitation of labor throughout rural Bolivia. Yet because so little else was changed by the revolution in southeastern Bolivia, we have an excellent "control" case for observing the consequences of the removal of the funds of rent alone.

In Wolf's (1966: 4-7) scheme, the peasants' "surplus" is that which he produces above and beyond the caloric minimum for survival. This "surplus" is absorbed by the "replacement" and "ceremonial" funds as well as the funds of rent. The first is "the amount needed to replace" the peasant's "minimum equipment for both production and consumption" and includes provision for next year's seed, feed for livestock, and the repair and replacement of tools, housing, household furnishings, and clothes. The ceremonial fund includes expenditures for the social relations "surrounded" by ceremonial activity and "symbolic constructions" which help to keep order in the society and "to render life predictable and liveable." According to this scheme a decrease, through curtailment or reallocation, of ceremonial funds or an increase in the replacement funds and caloric consumption may indicate a significant change away from the classic or exploitative peasant situation. Let us now consider evidence for change or lack of change along these dimensions in southeastern Bolivia following the dramatic removal of the funds of rent.

Evidence for changes in the caloric consumption of this peasantry is indirect and inconsistent. So far as peoples' attitudes were concerned, some peasant households felt they were eating better since the reform; a few felt they were worse off because there was no longer a *patrón* to help them when in need; but most felt there had been little if any change in their diet. Significant was the fact that most peasants preferred to emphasize the elimination of labor obligations to their former *patrón* as the major benefit of the reform rather than any change in consumption.

One indication of a change in rural eating habits was the fact that the number of permanent butcher shops in a few small towns near Sucre had tripled since the revolution. Some members of the rural population in this zone were undoubtedly consuming more meat, but these were cultivators growing crops for the readily accessible Sucre market. In more remote parts of southeastern Bolivia there was no certain indication of a similar change. Detailed food consumption estimates were obtained in the Cinti Valley and at Bella Vista in Tarija. Estimates rather than exact measurements are certainly not conclusive, and the two families were not average. The head of the Tarija household worked seasonally in Argentina to supplement his income, and the head of the Cinti household was a peasant syndicate leader. While both families were very conscious of the costs and quantities of food consumed and far more able than most to make budgetary calculations, they also seemed a bit above average in their standard of living. Their food consumption, more than 80 per cent of which was corn, wheat, and potatoes, was equivalent to about 2,200 calories per day per person for both families. The minimal standard of living in rural Bolivia is illustrated rather than proven by this crude statistic.

Data on the replacement fund were obtained at eight places. Peasant families at Cabeza Baja, Nucchu, Cororo, Molleni, Azurduy, San Julián, Compañía, and Bella Vista were asked to estimate the frequency with which they replaced their blankets and each of their various articles of clothing and the cost to them of purchasing these various items or the raw materials. So close were the estimates from the eight places that the calculated annual replacement costs for all such items for a man and his wife ranged between 750,000 and 950,000 *bolivianos* and for a child 250,000 to 350,000 *bolivianos* (12,000 *bolivianos* = \$1.00 U. S. in 1963). Half of these same families were also asked to estimate the life span and cost of their various tools and household utensils and the annual consumption of various foods and household supplies not produced on their own land (sugar, coffee, lard, meat, kerosine, etc.). Annual costs of these two categories of goods for a family of four totaled about 500,000 and 800,000 *bolivianos* respectively.

These estimates, based as they are on informants' memories rather than detailed records, probably come closer to what a family feels it needs rather than to what it actually consumes. Informants' estimates of their rate of clothing replacement often seemed quite inconsistent with the condition of their wearing apparel during the interviews. All clothing was patched or tattered. I have therefore used only the minimal estimates, which total about 2,500,000 *bolivianos* or \$200 U. S., a liberal figure for the replacement expenses of a family of four.

Table 4 shows the amount of land a family would have to devote to a cash crop to earn the above \$200. The figures are based on high and low production estimates of four prominent highland crops and the highs and lows in their price fluctuations. The left hand column figures are the lowest production estimates multiplied by the lowest prices; right hand column figures are the highest production estimates multiplied by the highest prices. When we compare these figures with those for the average size of cultivated holdings of peasants in Table 2, we can see that the margin for the replacement of durable goods depends considerably on weather and prices.

Twenty families at Huaca Huasi (in the potato growing highlands), which claimed to subsist from their farm plots and very seldom hired out as day laborers, averaged 4.2 members and 4.5 hectares per household or approximately 2.5 acres per person. At Chuquichuqui (in an irrigated sub-

TABLE 4
Number of Hectares Needed to Earn a Gross Profit of \$200 U. S.
Calculated for Five Important Crops in Southeastern Bolivia

Crop	Poor Conditions	Excellent Conditions
Corn	20	5
Wheat	15	1 $\frac{1}{4}$
Potatoes	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{2}{3}$
Peanuts	2	$\frac{1}{2}$

tropical valley growing three crops of vegetables per year for the Sucre market) seven households averaging 3 members per household were living from only a half to three quarters of an acre per family. The productivity of different kinds of land in southeastern Bolivia is so variable that the average size of *arriendo* plots for different hacienda sizes in Table 2 probably lies within the range of minimal subsistence in most cases. Smaller properties with smaller peasant plots are usually located in the more intensively cultivated subtropical valleys, and the larger haciendas with larger peasant plots are usually at the higher altitudes where potatoes, corn and wheat are grown.

Our figures are not sufficiently precise to indicate how an average family manages to allocate its production among its food and replacement needs for an average year. But they are exact enough to show that in relation to the rest of the world the peasants of southeastern Bolivia in 1963 were still very close to minimal subsistence levels despite the removal of the funds of rent. This is certainly understandable when we consider that the amount of cultivated land redistributed to the peasants was relatively small. In my sample of 335 Chuquisaca properties, only 14 to 17 per cent at most of the cultivated land changed hands. Most of this was that third (see above) which constituted the *latifundio* owner's demesne. And while these lands were supposed to be operated as collectives by the former *arrenderos*, at all former *latifundios* I visited the collectives had been voluntarily disbanded and the land divided (often into very tiny plots) among the *ex-arrenderos'* landless offspring. In most cases peasants simply went on working their old *arriendo* with no change other than emancipation from previous fee and labor obligations.

Nothing was done by the reform to equalize the size of the *arriendos*, which varied in my sample between such extremes as 0.1 and 648 hectares (including pasture). The amount of cultivated lands within *arriendos* fell predominantly between 1.0 and 15.8 hectares. Peasants with less land than they needed to subsist often sharecropped (*aparcería*) parcels of land belonging to peasants with larger holdings. Another help was pasture land for, as Table 3 shows, families in the sample averaged between 14 and 22 hectares of pasture each. The few head of livestock they normally kept (cattle, sheep, goats, hogs, and chickens) provided a ready source of cash in time of need.

Not only were landholdings not substantially increased nor inequalities diminished among the peasants themselves, but almost no further capitalization of agricultural techniques had taken place since the reform. In Wolf's (1966: 19) terms, the ecotype had remained "paleotechnic." Since expropriation, most landowners who could afford to were afraid to invest further in their farms. Many of the more capitalized pre-reform properties had been expropriated as *latifundios*; machinery had been sold or left to deteriorate and improved dairy herds butchered and eaten.

Given the fact that living standards were not substantially altered by the reform, it is not surprising that the traditional ceremonial life persisted in many highland communities. Table 5 lists the locations where data were collected on fiesta sponsorship in southeastern Bolivia. In all cases fiestas were being held for patron saints once a year, with the economic burden of

the fiesta falling upon a sponsor called *alferez* or *alférez*, sometimes *el obligado* or *el nuevo*. The fiesta was usually held at the hacienda, and in many cases (for example Tejahuasi, Ñucchu, Cororo, Porvenir, Santa Ana) the hacienda had a *capilla* or chapel where the patron saint was kept during the year. In other cases the saint was "owned" by an individual or kept in the church of a nearby town.

The expenses incurred by the sponsor were various and included food, drink, entertainment, and the priest's fee for mass. For expensive fiestas cattle were butchered and for less expensive ones sheep or goats. In addition, potatoes, wheat, and corn were consumed and great quantities of *chicha*. Sometimes cane alcohol was purchased, and usually there were sky rockets. For the evening dance the sponsor often had to hire musicians when there were none locally to donate their services free.

Fiesta expenses were itemized by informants who had recently served as sponsors at all the places listed in Table 5. Much of the expenditure comes from goods which the sponsor had on hand or could borrow from friends and relatives. This was particularly true in the case of the most costly ingredients of the fiesta—the meat and *chicha*. To buy the items he could not produce or manufacture himself, he might have to sell livestock, sometimes even his plow oxen.

TABLE 5
Cost of Fiesta Sponsorship in Bolivian and Mexican Communities
Southeastern Bolivia Northwestern Mexico

Place	Dollars	Bolivianos	Place	Dollars	Pesos
Cororo	270	3,253,000	Etchojoa	246	2960
Chuquichuqui	250	3,000,000	Pueblo Viejo	203	2439
Tejahuasi	248	2,985,000	Júperi	174	2039
Azurduy	215	2,580,000	San Pedro	137	1643
Nazaret	176	2,115,000	Tesia	125	1498
Ocurí	172	2,065,000	Etchoropo	116	1390
Ingahuasi	166	2,000,000	Batacosa	116	1386
Vila Vila	159	1,914,000	Sebampo	112	1342
Ñucchu	159	1,905,000	Masiaca	86	1038
Molleni	126	1,516,000	El Recodo	83	990
Monteagudo	83	1,000,000	Bacavachi	72	860
San Julián	77	934,000	Tepahui	67	806
San Blas	64	766,000	San Ignacio	66	795
Cabeza Baja	60	723,000	Macoyahui	24	289
Porvenir	26	310,000	Camoá	13	150
Compañía	8	100,000			

According to members of the former landed class, Bolivian peasants are not naturally inclined to produce for market unless properly managed by people like themselves. Once liberated from fee and labor obligations, the Bolivian peasantry began producing only to fill its own stomach and to support its fiestas, more lavish and drunken than before. There are half-truths in this distorted picture. For example, it is true that at first peasants concentrated on feeding themselves, causing the cities to suffer acute food shortages with a painful inflation in food prices. As a result many of the occupationally skilled—engineers, agronomists, nurses, doctors, etc.—left Bolivia for employment in Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and other Latin American countries. And in some communities, particularly highland Quechua-speaking communities, there did seem to be some evidence for the allegation that the time and expense devoted to ceremonial activity had increased. But this is not the whole story.

In the first place, the urban market situation had definitely ameliorated by the time of my visit. Vendors in the Sucre market, for example, who had observed the full cycle of changes since pre-reform times claimed that as much food if not more was now available. While in pre-reform times food came to market in larger units, brought by hacendados, it was now being brought in small quantities but by so many small producers that the supply was greater than ever before. Moreover, the peasants could not afford to hold their crops off the market for prices to go up, as the hacendados had been accustomed to do, with the consequent periodic shortages and price fluctuations. Now there was always food in season and prices fluctuated less.

Second, much of the rural labor exploitation by the hacendados was inefficient and dedicated to their conspicuous consumption of labor as a leisure class. Within ten years after the reforms great hacienda houses stood in various stages of ruin and disrepair throughout southeastern Bolivia, giving the countryside an air of decadence and neglect. But these lavish structures, built and maintained by peonage, were the monuments of feudalism. What the casual observer was not so likely to note were the many very small but cumulatively significant changes taking place in peasant housing. Some of the peasants' shacks now had tile roofs instead of the customary thatch; a few had windows, and some owners proudly called attention to their new concrete floors. Labor and materials that once went into the hacienda buildings were now going into the houses of the *ex-arrenderos*. Before the reform, the peasants explained, they were never sure of staying on the hacienda; the *patrón* could send them away. It would have been foolish to invest in a house they might have to leave, but now land and improvements belonged to them.

Such consumption changes varied, however, among communities. In the Río Chico Valley, for example, half of the 43 families in Tejahuasi had constructed new houses with tile roofs since 1952, whereas very few families had done so in surrounding communities exposed to the same conditions and opportunities. At other places, such as Ingahuasi, bicycles had become something of a consumption fad. Ingahuasi, however, is located on a large, flat *altiplano* with a scattered residence pattern where a bicycle is just as useful

as a horse and much cheaper to maintain. One or two radios were encountered in most communities but seldom in greater quantities. Sewing machines were prevalent in some places, as at Ñucchu where 60 per cent of the families had them, yet many other communities had none at all. Close to Sucre some peasants used bicycles to get to seasonal jobs in town. Those living within or close to the larger population centers, where they could secure at least occasional employment, were more likely than most peasants to have radios, bicycles, and metal beds. But the number and proportion of such families was low.

Third, along with these various indications of a growing market orientation and new consumption goals there were conflicting and changing views with regard to the traditional ceremonial practices. At Media Luna and El Chaco in the Río Chico Valley, fiestas were no longer being given as often as they had been ten years ago, and several informants claimed that no one attained any special status by giving a fiesta. Such claims were made even at Tejahuasi and Chuquichuqui, where fiesta expenses were high. Near Sucre (in Río Chico and at Cabeza Baja) and at Azurduiz, La Ciénaga, and Huaca Huasi the greatest antagonism to fiestas was encountered. At the last three places people had once been obligated by the local priest to serve as *alferez*, and at La Ciénaga and Huaca Huasi the peasant syndicate leader no longer permitted his members to sponsor church fiestas and had successfully influenced local attitudes. Throughout most of the area there is a belief in supernatural sanction, divine punishment for people who refuse to sponsor fiestas, but at La Ciénaga the syndicate leader laughed scornfully when I mentioned this. "Hemos hecho la prueba ya y no cayó nada" (we have tested [the belief] and nothing [bad has] happened). This was the only syndicate leader I encountered who had undertaken to oppose the age-old fiesta system. The fact that La Ciénaga had been a church-owned hacienda greatly despised by the local peasantry may have made his task easier.

Informants at more inaccessible haciendas claimed that any man who had made the personal sacrifices necessary to serve his community as *alferez* deserved respect. At Ñucchu it was said that in all arguments the men who had given the most fiestas were paid the most attention. An individual might even be quieted with the admonition to give fiestas before contradicting those who had. At Ingahuasi those who had failed to sponsor fiestas were disparagingly referred to as *evangelistas* (Protestants) and at Nazaret as men who no longer believed in the saints. An *alferez* is respected because to serve successfully "he must be a man of character and maturity capable not only of supporting his family but of helping his community as well."

Near the city of Tarija at Bella Vista, San Andrés, Santa Ana, and the town of Entre Ríos, fiestas for the patron saint were being supported by the community. At San Andrés, Santa Ana, and Entre Ríos the *alferez* had become simply a fiesta director appointed by a committee of community leaders, and everyone contributed to the fiesta's support. At Bella Vista a committee in charge of the patron saint merely charged a fee of each family in the community, and no other directorship was appointed. Some families had begun to make a *negocio* (business) out of the fiesta for *La Concepción*

by paying for mass and then inviting everyone to a private fiesta at their house where they sold *chicha*. At Campo de Vacas near the border of Argentina, families of land-clearing colonists had begun their own community fiesta two years before. All families made an equal contribution to pay for the fireworks and *aguardiente* (rum).

These observations on fiesta consumption in southeastern Bolivia indicate three general tendencies. First, the traditional consumption goals were still strong in many places. Peasants were not buying bicycles and radios and other durable goods, although they were still spending large sums on fiestas. Nor were fiestas for patron saints the only ones being held in the communities visited. Although this was usually the most important community fiesta during the year, every chapel and church contained several images which had annual sponsors and expenses. And in addition to these church fiestas there were wakes, memorial services, and weddings. The first two usually cost between 100,000 and 300,000 *bolivianos* and the last from 500,000 to 1,000,000.

Second, these ceremonial consumption patterns tended to be most persistent in the Quechua-speaking zones, particularly in areas farthest from major population centers. In Spanish-speaking Tarija they had been modified toward smaller household fiestas, and the larger community affairs had been commercialized. There fiestas were losing whatever "redistributive" quality they may once have had.

Third, even in the Quechua-speaking regions there were individuals in every community who were not only uninterested in sponsoring fiestas but were antagonistic toward them. Even at a place as much off the beaten track as Ingahuasi, "evangelist" and "Protestant" had become terms of opprobrium directed at those who did not sponsor fiestas. What is noteworthy here is not the presence of conservatism but the presence of circumstances threatening local traditions. Similarly at Nazaret some families who had never given fiestas and refused to do so were no longer invited to social affairs. Everywhere there were people who complained about the expense of fiestas and refused to sponsor them when asked. Consequently the respect position of the fiesta sponsor was no longer a subject of agreement. Status-seeking through fiesta sponsorship was still strong but by no means universal.

Southeastern Bolivia was certainly an area ripe for sweeping change. Seeds of change were evident everywhere—in the marketing activities of the peasants, in their growing interest in new consumption goals, and in their increasing disaffection with older ceremonial patterns of consumption. Yet compared to most of Latin America, this was undoubtedly one of the most static areas I had ever seen. The reasons were obvious enough. Southeastern Bolivia is still one of the most inaccessible areas in the world. Transportation is an ever-present and extremely expensive problem. Sucre and Tarija are connected with the capital mainly by dirt roads that are negotiable only during the dry season. Not only is it difficult and expensive to transport produce to market, but local markets are quickly saturated. More than 80 per cent of the population is rural, and when a good year brings bountiful harvests the other 20 per cent cannot consume the peasants' "surplus." Dur-

ing 1963, southeastern Bolivia had enjoyed bumper crops, yet everywhere I went harvests were spoiling; prices were too low to pay transportation costs to market. At a time when the peasantry might have used a greater spendable income to increase their consumption of durable goods and with its future expectations and market orientations, they were richer only in foodstuffs. Nearly everywhere grain was being used to fatten pigs, and corn was being converted into *chicha*, the native beer. Most of the traditional ingredients for the economic support of the ceremonial system were being augmented by these circumstances, and fiestas were more prevalent and more lavish than they had been the previous year.

The case of southeastern Bolivia helps us to see what happens when one of the major variables in Wolf's model of classic peasantry is radically changed while the others are held constant. The ecotype (including technology and availability of markets), ceremonial fund, and replacement fund remained relatively static after the funds of rent were eliminated. This example shows that many of the characteristics of peasantry can persist in spite of the elimination of classic exploitation and suggests that the independent variable is what Wolf (1966: 19) calls the ecotype. Wolf was justified in giving detailed attention to the classification of technological ecotypes and market systems, for even exploitation through the funds of rent is largely dependent on these.² The feudalistic labor arrangements that existed before 1952 were in part an adaptation to a "paleotechnic ecotype" further characterized by geographic isolation and limited markets. To work only a third to a fifth of their cultivable lands while loaning out the rest in perquisite plots was a rational procedure for landowners maximizing their standard of living under conditions where this could be done only through conspicuous consumption of labor.

The limitations of this ecotype become clearer when we examine some of the results of the peasant federation movement in southeastern Bolivia after 1952 using Wolf's (1966: 81-89) social dimensions for distinguishing among kinds of "peasant coalitions." Wolf differentiates between single-interest ("single-stranded") and multiple-interest ("many-stranded") coalitions. The first is characteristic of more highly "individualized" situations, particularly the development of voluntary associations ("polyadic" and "horizontal") with increasing industrialization and commercialization of urban and adjacent rural areas. The multiple-interest type of coalition in its usual Latin American form is represented by the many strong "dyadic" ties of friendship, mutual aid, kinship, and fictive kinship, etc. that exist among equals in small communities as well as dyadic coalitions structured "vertically" in "patron-client" relationships.

Around Cochabamba, which lies on the principal transportation artery of Bolivia between La Paz and Santa Cruz, considerable commercialization of agriculture has taken place, and both the urban and rural populations have been proletarianized by growing opportunities for employment as semi-skilled laborers. It is to this area that Patch (1960) traces the origins of the 1952 peasant revolution. But wherever the peasant uprisings began in Bolivia, the peasants of Chuquisaca and Tarija were beneficiaries rather

than instigators of the revolt. While the Cochabamba area had already experienced the changes which facilitate single-interest coalitions or voluntary associations, the southeastern section both before and after the reform remained characterized by the multiple-interest coalitions typical of much of rural Latin America.

Peasant syndicates are a form of voluntary association where they grow up spontaneously as in the Cochabamba valley. At such times they are dominated by one interest—the expropriation and redistribution of land. In fact each local syndicate in Bolivia was formed for the purpose of bringing expropriation proceedings against a landlord. They have outlived this original purpose, however, for even after receiving title to their lands the *ex-arrenderos* have continued to be members of their syndicate and the national peasant confederation to which it ultimately belongs. The political focus has remained, while interest has shifted toward pressuring for other forms of government assistance. However, in Chuquisaca and Tarija, where frightened peasants often had to be cajoled by outside leadership into forming syndicates for bringing legal action against their *patrón*, the syndicates have tended to adapt to the previous multiple-interest mode of coalition.

Within the department of Chuquisaca in 1963 the National Confederation of Farm Laborers (*Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos*) maintained a Peasant Headquarters (*Central de Campesinos*) in almost all the provinces. The Headquarters for each province was in charge of a “secretary general,” under whom were the various secretaries-general in charge of the *subcentrales* of each *cantón*. Under these in turn were the individual syndicates administered by the secretaries-general, commonly known as *sindicatos*. *Arrenderos* belonging to a given hacienda formed a “natural” community which became the logical unit for the formation of individual syndicates. Members of these communities traditionally worked together, exchanged labor, frequently were related or were *compadres*, annually co-operated in paying homage to the patron saint in the hacienda chapel, and usually lived together in a hamlet near the major hacienda buildings. The populations of these hacienda communities were quite stable. In a sample of 34 “married” couples at hacienda Ñucchu, for example, both spouses in 22 of the unions were from Ñucchu. In the remaining 12 cases one spouse was from Ñucchu and the other from one of the haciendas lying within a mere five-kilometer radius. Most *latifundio* and large *mediana* haciendas had sufficient *arrenderos* to form a syndicate, which was supposed to have a minimum of 40 members. In the case of smaller properties, syndicates were formed by grouping together the *ex-arrenderos* of adjoining haciendas.

This overlapping of traditional hacienda communities and the new syndicate memberships helped to preserve the traditional community in the face of change by giving it an official position in the new peasant political structure. *Arrenderos* were now referred to as *ex-arrenderos*, and their syndicates took the same name as their haciendas. *Ex-arrenderos* on *mediana* haciendas continued to work for their old *patrón*, although now of their own free will and on their own terms. The *patrón* communicated with

them through their elected syndicate leader, and in case of disagreements a Peasant Federation work inspector acted as judge and intermediary. On expropriated *latifundios* the syndicate leadership had in many cases taken over the role of the former *patrón* in organizing collective work parties to repair irrigation canals and other pressing maintenance chores. In other cases, through the urging of local District School Directors (*Directores de Núcleos Escolares Campesinos*), collective work parties of syndicate members had constructed rural school buildings or remade parts of expropriated hacienda mansions into classrooms.

In a few places syndicates had even constructed their own community chapels where none had existed before. But on many haciendas—both *latifundios* and *medianas*—chapels attached to the hacienda house were being maintained by the syndicates. In such cases the chapel contained the patron saint of the hacienda, and each year the *ex-arrenderos*, now syndicate members, participated in the religious celebration in its honor. On the *mediana* properties, the *patrón* or *patrona* still assisted in the arrangements for the fiesta. Usually the *ex-arrenderos* had continued to address their former master as *patrón* and still treated him with the same formal respect and courtesy, even to removing their hats in his presence.

A common complaint among landowners and ex-landowners, however, was that the reform had created a *lucha de clases* (class struggle). Before the reform, as one hacendado's wife expressed it, the *peón* had *cariño al trabajo y al patrón* (love for work and *patrón*). But everything had changed. "Under the old paternal system we could all sleep peacefully. Now the laborers sabotage their work for us, and there is not the same fondness between *peón* and *patrón*." Of course, what the landowners viewed as the creation of a "class struggle" was merely the breakdown of the rigid class system which had preserved their favored position as a landed oligarchy.

Obviously, the syndicate organization in its adaptation to the natural community of rural southeastern Bolivia had not seriously challenged the horizontal multiple-interest coalitions which are so much a part of traditional community life. And through the ceremonial fund and its accompanying ideology they had even in some cases helped preserve the vertical *patrón-peón* coalitions they were supposed to eliminate. Nevertheless the influence of the syndicate organization has been overwhelmingly in the direction of destroying and replacing the multiple-interest coalitions between former *patrón* and *arrenderos*. But in the replacement process the product often simulated the previous structure.

In the early days of the reform some syndicate leaders took advantage of their position to overcharge members for dues and to misappropriate syndicate funds. Some required their fellow syndicate members to work their lands much like a *patrón*. Even as late as 1963 the syndicate head at Hacienda Molleni in Azurduy was being accused by the other members of misappropriating funds collected for administrative expenses, of fining members who failed to attend meetings in order to make them work off the fine by performing free agricultural labor on his own farm plot, and of dividing among his relatives and friends that part of the former owner's

expropriated demesne designated for the new school. The case was still being adjudicated in the Sucre office of the Chuquisaca Peasant Federation when I left. Although the Molleni peasants had endured these injustices for several years, their action in bringing the case to the attention of Federation officials is indicative of the growing political sophistication which the syndicate movement has helped to foster. But that the slowness of this growth is also attributable to the syndicate organization is indicated by the reluctance of the Chuquisaca Federation's executive secretary to dispose of this syndicate leader despite the evidence against him and despite the overwhelming discontent of the membership. The reason for the secretary's reluctance was the fact that this syndicate leader was the most effective political boss in his region and had been extremely diligent and effective in organizing peasant voters at election time.

Prior to 1952 the vertical *patrón-peón* coalition had been the peasants' only channel of interaction with the national power structure, at that time in the hands of the landowners. After 1952, the Bolivian peasant syndicate organization became the new channel, and in this area during the regime of President Paz Estenssoro it was a vehicle of the one-party (*Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*) system for organizing peasant political support. Instead of becoming real voluntary associations, these syndicates became a prescribed form of political organization through which the party in power could manipulate the rural population and, when possible, dispense political favors. And because the government had been unable as yet substantially to alter the ecotype, the basic technology, or the marketing problems of the area, the new vertical coalitions established by the syndicate organization had tended in many respects to recapitulate the old. Even the egalitarian facade, which included elimination of the word *indio* from the vocabulary of all land-reform and peasant federation officials and the use of the word *compañero* (comrade) in all face-to-face confrontations with peasants, could not disguise their paternalistic and often patronizing manner. In Mexico, and especially Venezuela, peasant syndicates have been vehicles for active single-interest coalitions but usually where a paleotechnic ecotype has changed to neotechnic.

VENEZUELA AND MEXICO

Revision of the exploitative conditions of classic peasantry took place in Mexico with the revolution of 1910 and in Venezuela with the upheaval following the death of dictator Gómez in 1935. In northwestern Mexico where land was in greater supply than labor, landowners had employed a debt slavery system to control the labor available. Hacienda stores called *tiendas de raya* gave peasants credit for food, cloth, and even the goods they consumed for their ceremonial fund. But once in debt peasants were seldom able to regain their freedom. In fact, many landowners did not allow their peons to plant subsistence plots until all debts were repaid, a rule which made it virtually impossible for them to become independent of the *tienda de raya*. If peons endeavored to escape they were pursued by

the *sobresalientes*, the hacienda policemen, and after capture were subjected to a variety of indignities and corporal punishments.

Prior to 1935 the hacienda system of Venezuela, particularly in the lowlands, closely resembled that of pre-1910 northwestern Mexico. Haciendas had their own stores and their own policemen known as *comisarios de campo*. Workers, as in Mexico and Bolivia, were sought out by a hacienda foreman or *caporal* if they did not appear for morning chores. In all three countries municipal jails were often used to incarcerate runaway peons, and municipal authorities participated in the control of workers. The head or president of the local *municipio* was invariably an important member of the hacendado class.

Unlike Bolivia, in both Mexico and Venezuela coercive forms of farm labor exploitation were terminated long before land reform programs went into full-scale operation. Although Mexico's 1910 revolution ended the *tienda de raya*, it was not until 1935 under President Lázaro Cárdenas that the program of land reform *ejidos* was intensively developed. Similarly in Venezuela the most extreme forms of exploitation ended with the Gómez dictatorship in 1935, although the modern agrarian reform did not begin until the fall of Pérez Jiménez some 25 years later. In both countries informants described an intermediate period of intensive sharecropping, when landowners were unable fully to coerce the labor supply and yet were often unable to pay wages. Even in Bolivia, where revolution and reform were simultaneous, many a *mediana* owner in 1963 was so short of cash that he was providing the seed, draft animals, fertilizer, and tools for former *arrenderos* to work his remaining land for half the harvest. The fund of rent is obviously a relative matter, as is the degree to which peasant labor can be said to be exploited.

Abolishing funds of rent changes the exploitative equation between groups of men but not between men and their physical environment. The standard of living of a privileged elite is lowered with the reduction of their conspicuous consumption of labor. But this does not automatically raise the level of living and market orientation of the underprivileged masses. Redistribution around a mean does not raise the mean; moreover, what can be taken from a small elite in an underdeveloped land may not go very far among the disadvantaged. And in time new funds of rent may appear though less intensive and coercive than before.

Providing landless peasants with small farm plots in addition to removing the funds of rent is again redistribution around a mean. Without new technological inputs to alter the ecotype, no radical changes in living standards can be expected. This fact, already illustrated by the case of southeastern Bolivia, applies to northwestern Mexico between the period of *ejido* expansion in the 1930s and the irrigation and highway developments initiated in the early fifties. Although the creation of a great many new land-reform *ejidos* in the thirties brought social changes no less significant than those following the Bolivian revolution, these changes were minor compared to those precipitated by the drastic increases in commerce and agricultural productivity which the roads and irrigation projects made

possible. Prior to this commercial revolution the rural population, of which a high percentage was Indian, practiced predominantly subsistence oriented cultivation with a minimal replacement fund and a high level of participation in traditional ceremonial activities. Today most of the mestizo population and many of the Indians are cash-cropping and buying from an expanding range of new consumer goods. I shall be concerned with the relative conservatism of the Indian population in the face of technological change after a brief discussion of Venezuela. Because detailed treatment of the changes in northwestern Mexico are available elsewhere (Erasmus 1961, 1967b), I shall limit my discussion of this area to the minimum essential for the comparisons at hand.

Benefiting from the previous experience and mistakes of Mexico and Bolivia and having the advantage of an enormous national income from oil exports, Venezuela has chosen to emphasize capitalization of her rural sector rather than simple redistribution of land or wealth. If one counts the nominal change in ownership of the perquisite plots of the Bolivian serfs as well as the small percentage of land which actually changed hands, 84 per cent of the cultivated land in the Bolivian sample could be considered "redistributed." In the choice irrigated districts of coastal Sonora, 35 to 40 per cent of the land is under the jurisdiction of *ejidos* originally formed through the expropriation and redistribution of privately owned property. But in Venezuela only 4 to 5 per cent of the cultivated land had been redistributed to members of the land reform settlements or *asentamientos* by 1964. Venezuelan officials were deliberately trying to keep land redistribution secondary to a broad program of rural development including the colonization of new lands, road building, construction of irrigation systems, mechanization, electrification, and supervised credit. Even Mexico in the past four years has been endeavoring to divert public attention away from land redistribution toward broader aspects of agrarian reform including many long completed rural development projects not previously advertised as "agrarian reform."

Venezuela today offers an interesting spectrum of rural ecotypes and rural life. The densely populated highland areas in the west still preserve a few nearly classic examples of peasantry. For example, on one hacienda of several thousand hectares near the city of Trujillo most of the land is too steep to qualify for purchase and redistribution by the Agrarian Institute. Yet all the cultivable land is still farmed by peasant sharecroppers who provide their own seed, draft animals, and "paleotechnic" wooden plows while the owner lives comfortably in Caracas. A few sharecroppers known as *caporales* supervise the others and collect the owner's half of all harvests; for this they are excused from rent payments. One is reminded of descriptions of post-1910 haciendas in northwestern Mexico.

Palenque, a potato growing hacienda in the highlands of southern Lara, was purchased by the Agrarian Institute and the land divided among the former labor force. Members of this *asentamiento* live on their parcels (*parcelas*) but form an established community. They have their own chapel near what was once the hacienda house and sponsor an annual fiesta for

their patron saint. One is reminded of expropriated *latifundios* in southeastern Bolivia.

La Misión in the state of Portuguesa is a community of self-made independent small farmers, many of whom have over 100 hectares of land. All of the men in the community of middle age or older were once *conuqueros*, slash-and-burn subsistence farmers who barely had enough to eat. Now, since the opening of this area to outside markets through roads and the consequent growth in population of nearby cities, these families own small modern homes equipped with inside plumbing, refrigerators, and television sets, and most own pick-up trucks and tractors. Here one is reminded of prosperous small farmers in the irrigation districts of southern Sonora.

Although these former *conuqueros* of La Misión are more prosperous than most of the rural population of Venezuela, they are indicative of current consumption trends in the Venezuelan lowlands. Radios are common everywhere, and bicycles are numerous in settlements near paved highways leading to cities or large towns. Near urban areas rural families possess many consumer goods. At one agrarian reform settlement near Maracay all families had radios, over half had refrigerators and sewing machines, a third had television sets, a fifth had gas stoves and a sixth had washing machines. The greater affluence of most Venezuelan rural families compared with those of Bolivia and even Mexico is very apparent. They have acquired a strong taste for consumer goods and are well on the way to becoming an internal market for Venezuelan manufactures.

The peasant syndicates of lowland Venezuela are usually much closer to true voluntary associations than their counterparts in southeastern Bolivia and northwestern Mexico. Although here, too, the principal incentive to join a peasant syndicate is to obtain land, the broad nature of Venezuela's agrarian reform makes it possible for syndicates to work for other local improvements, such as government support for roads, housing, farm credit and the purchase of farm machinery. Because Venezuela's peasant federation has two highly competitive subdivisions, each linked to one of the two major political parties (Democratic Action and Christian Democrats), the party in power must pay more attention to syndicate demands than in Bolivia and Mexico, where for the most part the peasant syndicates have been captives of a one-party system. In the latter two countries the peasant syndicates are more often the government channel for controlling the peasants than *vice versa*. In Venezuela, too, the government brings pressures to control the rural population by refusing to help constituents of syndicate leaders who are too troublesome. But in Venezuela syndicates are much more active and because of political division can exercise a greater threat to the party in power. Capable syndicate leaders under these circumstances are able to obtain considerable government support for rural aid programs desired by their constituents. Where land is the only objective of peasant organizations, syndicate members tend to lose interest after redistribution. Landless peasants are the natural antagonists of landowners, but once they become landowners themselves they have no collective bargaining antagonist

as do the members of trade unions. In Bolivia the syndicate leaders try to maintain hatred and distrust between peasants and owners of *mediana* properties especially when members are working or sharecropping for the latter. In Venezuela the federal government serves as the potential antagonist as syndicates make more and more demands in exchange for political support.

Single-interest ties are more characteristic of the progressive rural areas of lowland Venezuela than of the static highland areas. This is due in large part to the great amount of spatial mobility among the lowland population. At land reform settlements in Portuguesa and Barinas for example, I found members from Táchira, Mérida, Trujillo, Lara, Yaracuy, Cojedes, Carabobo, Anzoátegui, Apure and Bolívar. The proportion of settlement families from out of state was always greater than the proportion of native born. Much of this population movement is caused by the road construction programs and the opening of new lands for colonization by the federal government. But it is in just such states as Portuguesa and Barinas that nuclear families from many parts of Venezuela are drawn together by new opportunities, and single-interest coalitions of many kinds are developing. It is not surprising that the growth of farmer associations, dairy associations, and credit unions are most characteristic of these progressive commercially oriented areas.

Nor is it surprising that the "ceremonial fund" has become relatively unimportant in Venezuela. Local fiestas for patron saints resemble those of Tarija in southeastern Bolivia rather than those of Chuquisaca or the conservative Indian communities of southern Sonora. No one individual or small group of individuals accepts all the economic hardships of sponsoring the fiesta in search of social approbation. Instead, the town and village fiestas for patron saints are usually sponsored by an elected or appointed committee of three to five members called such names as *Comité Pro-Fiesta*, *Comité Pro-Capilla*, *Junta Pro-Fiesta Patronal*, and *Junta Directiva de las Fiestas Patronales*. In a few places, such as Rubio in Táchira, the *comité* is appointed by the municipal council, but usually it is elected by a meeting of local family heads. In any event this local committee collects contributions from the entire community in order to meet the expenses of the fiesta. Often it is the local merchants who contribute most generously to this enterprise, for they are well aware that a fiesta draws many people from neighboring farms and towns in a festive spending mood.

The Venezuelan method of sponsoring local fiestas is identical to what one finds in those parts of Mexico and Bolivia where the older more primitive consumption patterns have broken down. Local merchants and other members of the community begin to assume more and more of the financial burden until the affair becomes a community, rather than an individual, project. Whether or not this has been the history of Venezuelan village fiestas I cannot say, but the Venezuelan fiesta pattern coexists with the same sort of social and economic patterns that one finds in other countries where the fiesta organization is no longer of the conspicuous community service type. Such patterns include increasing spatial and social mobility and in-

creasing attention to cash crops and the consumption of manufactured goods. And these patterns in turn are associated with alterations in the ecotype involving improvements in technology and transportation. They are not associated with land redistribution *per se*.

Northwest Mexico provides an excellent case in point that land reform can actually help to preserve certain attributes of peasantry in the face of drastic alterations in the ecotype. Despite the introduction of highways, irrigation systems, and public power networks with the strong urbanizing and commercializing influence they have had on this region, those communities of southern Sonora which have retained their peasant characteristics the longest are invariably beneficiaries of land reform.

One reason for this effect of land redistribution is related to Wolf's (1966: 50-57) distinctions among the types of land domain which have affected peasantry. He distinguishes three "traditional" forms—the patrimonial, prebendal, and mercantile—and one twentieth-century form he calls the "administrative domain." The last he reserves mainly for farm collectives such as the Russian *kolkhoz* and the collective form of Mexican *ejido* in which the state manages the enterprise. However, all individual-type land-reform communities, whether they be Mexican *ejidos*, Venezuelan *asentamientos*, or Bolivian ex-haciendas, involve "decommoditization" of land. Although the peasant beneficiaries are made nominal owners of the plots distributed to them, they cannot treat such land as a commodity by selling or renting it at their own discretion. Land-reform programs, based as they are on their antagonism to *latifundismo* (large holdings) incorporate rules to prevent redistributed land from reconsolidating.

In many places land-reform beneficiaries try to circumvent such laws by legal and extra-legal means. One method, legal under certain circumstances in all three countries, is the selling of *mejoras* or *bienes* (improvements). Theoretically the land beneficiary is not selling his land, only the expense and labor he invested in its improvement. But in practice the improvements become a negotiable substitute for the land itself. The only places I saw land transferred on this basis in northwest Mexico were indigenous communities (*comunidades indigenas*). In Bolivia I found it practiced only in the lowlands around Monteagudo and Bermejo on recently colonized plots close to town. The practice is most common and widespread in Venezuela, although some Agrarian Institute personnel are opposed to it. The most common reason for selling is when beneficiaries get so far in debt to the Agrarian and Livestock Bank that they are unable to obtain further credit. This may lead to reconsolidation if a more prosperous neighbor buys additional plots in his wife's maiden name and the name of his children, and Institute personnel are either unaware of the family connection or prefer to ignore it. A man who attempts to increase his holdings in this way is in great danger from his fellow beneficiaries, who out of jealousy complain to the Institute.

The most common means of reconsolidation in Mexico and Venezuela is through renting and sharecropping. Renting procedures are those normal anywhere, but the sharecropping practices might better be labeled "share-

cropping in reverse." Since the land-reform beneficiary in these cases is without financial resources, the tenant provides the seed, machinery, water, and fertilizer costs and even pays the beneficiary for his labor. At harvest time the crop is equally divided after the tenant first deducts the above costs. More than half the plots in some Sonoran *ejidos* were being rented or sharecropped in 1959. In most cases a single tenant sharecrops a large group of contiguous *ejido* plots to economize his operations. In Carabobo, Venezuela, in 1964 a fifth of the 150 members of the land-reform settlement La Linda were sharecropping their parcels in one huge block with a Canary Island immigrant who owned his own farm machinery. In Mexico these operations were officially ignored, but in Venezuela they were openly condoned by Agrarian Institute officials. Since such arrangements do not give any one land-reform beneficiary a permanent advantage over his fellows, and since many find it a necessary source of assistance, there is seldom any community opposition.

Despite these tendencies toward reconsolidation through ownership of "improvements" or through management by renters and sharecroppers, "decommoditization" of land is one of the most effective consequences of land reform, and for most beneficiaries results in a ceiling on the expansion of their enterprise and expectations. In all three countries the amount of land held by each beneficiary is little more than enough to provide a minimal existence in a given ecotype. For most beneficiaries their land is a source of security rather than opportunity.

A second reason why beneficiaries of land redistribution tend to retain peasant characteristics is because they are vulnerable to new forms of exploitation. Lacking capital, knowledge, and technological skills, they are readily taken advantage of by the employees of welfare agencies established to help them, and even by their own local leaders. In 1959, members of Sonoran *ejidos* often compared the Ejido Bank to the old *tienda de raya*; it loaned them money, they claimed, only to get them in debt so they could be exploited for the profit of the Bank officials. Although Mexico has come a long way in curtailing the *mordida* (graft) in government during recent years, officials readily admit that even in the fifties there was considerable truth in many of these accusations. The elected *ejido* leadership often worked in collusion with government officials to their own benefit. We have already seen how some syndicate leaders in southeastern Bolivia adopted *patrón* characteristics; in Sonora they often illegally rented the land of *ejidatarios* or rented machinery to *ejidos* through the Ejido Bank, with which they worked closely to the mutual benefit of both themselves and the Bank officials.

Ethnic or cultural differences between a rural group and the larger society, a third major reason for the retention of peasant characteristics, may combine with the previous two to produce varying degrees of social isolation. We have seen how geographic isolation was an important attribute of a static ecotype in the case of southeastern Bolivia. Even the western highlands of Venezuela presented a more static ecotype than the rest of the country. But northwestern Mexico illustrates how a rural population

component identifiable as culturally distinct—in this case “Indian”—can be socially isolated in the midst of rapidly changing conditions. A “decommoditized” land base assuring a minimal level of existence, combined with bureaucratic exploitation and inefficiencies absorbing surpluses above that minimum, helps to perpetuate the low status position of the “Indian” population. Given a disadvantaged situation of this sort, in which social mobility is too limited to provide a demonstration effect for most, many continue to find satisfaction in contributing to the ceremonial fund. And this form of consumption continues to mark them as a kind of peasantry.

In other respects these people do not always conform to the classic patterns of peasantry. Many Mayo Indians now produce only cash crops, such as sesame seed and cotton, and work as day laborers to buy their food during the growing season. At harvest time most of their cash crop goes to pay their debt at the local store where they buy their food staples. Living at a subsistence level in the new cash economy, many have learned to estimate the costs of ceremonial sponsorship and have learned to compare their costs unfavorably with those of new consumption goods competing for their attention. Yet despite these changes, which lead inexorably to the commercialization of fiestas as fewer people volunteer to undertake the economic hardships involved in traditional forms of ceremonial sponsorship, ceremonial funds continue to be supported, albeit by a steadily diminishing proportion of conservative adherents.

Living north of the Yaqui River in a giant *ejido* known as an “indigenous community,” the Yaqui Indians by 1958 were only beginning to enjoy any direct benefit from the damming of their river for irrigation purposes. Nearly all the water had been diverted south of the river into the Yaqui River Irrigation District populated predominantly by Yoris (“whites” or Mexicans), the hated enemy of the Yaqui. Unable to continue their traditional agriculture based on flood irrigation, most had been reduced to earning their living by cutting and selling firewood and by working seasonally as field hands for Yoris. Irrigation had been started within the Yaqui reserve, but the new farm collectives were still so tightly under the administration of the Ejido Bank that the Yaquis so “benefited” were more angry than pleased. Beals (1945: 211) found the Yaquis “nationalistic” in the early thirties, and in the late fifties the label was still appropriate. They had a strong sense of tribal identity, undoubtedly strengthened and preserved by tribal ownership of their reserve and the greater social isolation this afforded. Ceremonial service and consumption were still the principal interests of Yaquis and the principal activities identifying them as Yaquis. Although they were no longer subsistence cultivators, the ceremonial fund was still the predominant Yaqui interest and expenditure above bare subsistence needs.

Along the Mayo River a few miles south of the Yaqui River, the Mayo Indian population lives dispersed among many small *ejidos* and communities in which Indians and Yoris are intermingled. Forced to plant cash crops in order to obtain the credit necessary to farm under the new irrigation conditions, most Mayos, like the Yaquis, have been buying their food staples

for some time. Although many Mayos were still maintaining the ceremonial fund in 1959, all villages were divided between those still supporting the fiesta system and those who were not. While Yaquis could escape the demands of ceremonial service only by leaving the Yaqui reserve, Mayos could escape simply by changing their factional allegiance within the same community. While about 90 per cent of the Yaqui households at Vicam were affiliated through one or more of their members with ceremonial societies and associations in 1958, 18 per cent was a high figure for a Mayo village. Moreover, among the Mayos, fiesta sponsorship was no longer a means by which more affluent individuals sought social esteem through redistribution. Out of a sample of 100 Mayo Indian *fiesteros* interviewed in 1958, half were field laborers with no lands at all, and of the other half—made up of small landowners and *ejidatarios*—only seven had farming operations large enough that they did not have to hire out as field hands part of each year to support their families. The Mayo fiestas were undoubtedly being supported by the poorest families in the rural population, while those with more means were spending for a wide variety of durable goods made available by the general development and prosperity of the area and the more easily obtainable consumer credit. Among the Yaquis, however, pressures to support the fiesta system were strongest for those with cattle or some other obvious source of income greater than that of the minimal subsistence level typical of most families. Men in charge of the newly established, irrigated farm collectives were prime targets. Yaquis were quite emphatic in their attitude that those with the greatest resources should be willing to help most.

Table 5 lists the fiesta costs of *fiesteros* (fiesta sponsors) at various communities in the Mayo area. As in Bolivia, these costs were itemized by informants from memory with the aid of a list of all the usual fiesta expenses. Since fiestas in this area are sponsored by as many as twelve persons, the Mexican figures represent only a fraction of the total fiesta costs. Even so, the dollar cost for the individual sponsor is not very different from those of a Bolivian fiesta sponsor who bears most of the financial weight alone. Since the daily wage rate in northwest Mexico was twelve pesos, about the same as the exchange rate of pesos per dollar, the dollar column for northwest Mexico also represents the number of labor days it would take a field hand to earn the amount of money spent by that particular sponsor, a range varying from .7 to 4 per cent of a year's wages. In Bolivia, however, where the daily wage for field hands was only about 33¢ (U. S.), the highest figures represent the equivalent of more than two years' wages for a man working every day of the year. This difference was due in part to the Bolivian inflation, which had resulted in an unrealistically low wage scale. Wages were low because landowners had no money with which to pay them—also the reason why sharecropping was so common. Moreover, the cost of the fiestas in both countries was calculated on the basis of current market prices for the goods consumed. In Bolivia the goods were largely those available to a sponsor in his own community, often when there was no outside market for them anyway. In Mexico, however, it was not un-

usual for all the members of a *fiestero's* family to work seasonally to help him accumulate the cash to buy his fiesta supplies in the market place.

Thus, even though the wage-day equivalents of fiesta sponsorship were less for northwestern Mexico than for southeastern Bolivia, the average Sonoran *fiestero* and his family actually performed far more wage work to meet fiesta expenses than did their Bolivian counterparts. Moreover, he had far more consumer alternatives at hand than the Bolivian *alferez*. It is not surprising, then, that the sponsorship of fiestas was even more often a subject of debate and a cause of factional differences within Sonoran communities than in those I visited in Bolivia. Many fiestas had been dropped for lack of willing sponsors, and in other cases costs were being reduced to the minimum essential for feeding the ceremonial performers. The "social" or redistributive expenses were in some instances deliberately being eliminated by mutual agreement among the *fiesteros*.

Although some Yaquis would privately admit that the burdens of fiesta sponsorship were "very heavy" and the reason their "tribe does not progress," I never heard one make such an admission in the presence of other Yaquis. "Yaquis will never lose their religion" was a common public assertion. Yet even the Yaquis over the past ten years had been forced to discontinue some of their fiestas and to curtail the costs of others.

The Mayos still clinging to their ceremonial fund in the face of drastic changes in the ecotype were doing so because of a sense of relative deprivation. Those who did not feel capable of achievement on the Mexican status ladder of economic enterprise and rising standards of consumption could still seek status among the conservators of ceremonial service and consumption. Those with greater confidence in their ability to win rewards in the Mexican status system, or who had come to view costs of ceremonial participation as outweighing its rewards, were gradually abandoning the traditional ceremonial fund. The fact that other Mayos in each community had already done so reduced the costs of challenging tradition, for they did not have to face total isolation or disapprobation within their ethnic group.

For the individual Yaqui, however, the situation was more complex. Social isolation from Mexican society was enhanced by the geographic segregation of their communal reserve. Most saw only two alternatives in 1958—conformance to Yaqui norms with all the inconvenience of ceremonial service or exile into a forbidding Mexican world in which they felt ill equipped to cope. Many Yaquis clearly wanted to share in the new abundance of consumer goods they saw all about them, but for the great majority the rewards of Mexican society still seemed much more elusive than the immediate rewards of social approbation within their own group.

In his excellent study of the cargo system of a Chiapas community, Cancian (1965) has shown that population growth in the face of a limited number of cargos is threatening the Zinacantan prestige system by reducing the opportunities for achievement. The situation has been ameliorated by the use of "waiting lists," for a man can get some status from the announcement of his intention to serve while simultaneously incurring a definite and continued commitment to the existing system. But while Cancian

predicts the eventual disappearance of the cargo system in Zinacantan on the basis of population growth, he sums up the situation in his concluding chapter in weighing "the economic factor"—the fact that economic opportunities in Zinacantan have expanded even faster than the population, resulting in a "growing surplus of cash." Men frustrated in their desire to achieve within the limited cargo system may seek alternative prestige symbols from the Ladino world. "Perhaps more than anything else, the manner in which these new surpluses find an outlet will determine the direction that life in Zinacantan will take" (Cancian 1965: 192). Had Cancian not limited himself to the "functional" analysis of one community, he might have been able to ascertain with greater confidence the relative importance of his "population" and "economic" factors.

All the way from northwestern Mexico to southern Bolivia ceremonial funds have disappeared in the recent past or are currently on the wane. To predict the demise of ceremonial funds at this point involves more "post-diction" than prediction. Today the conditions which favor their persistence are more interesting than those which favor their disappearance. In Venezuela the capitalization of the rural sector through road building, colonization projects, and mechanization has not provided a haven for primitive consumption patterns. In southeastern Bolivia a social revolution has made the population more receptive to change, but the paleotechnic ecotype continues, and so alternatives to ceremonial consumption have not materialized. In northwestern Mexico a highly capitalized neotechnic ecotype has replaced the former paleotechnic ecotype, and the ceremonial fund is definitely being threatened by alternative consumption goals. The strength with which it still persisted among Mayo and Yaqui Indians in 1958 was in direct proportion to their social isolation, an isolation stemming from low social status, ethnic distinctiveness, and to some extent territorial segregation.

Such conditions are often accompanied by what I have found convenient to call the *encogido* syndrome (Erasmus 1967). The term *encogido* was sometimes used by Sonorans to distinguish shy, withdrawn rural individuals from the *entrones*, those who endeavor to push themselves up the social ladder. Though not formal, widely used terms, they crept into conversations frequently. Upon explaining these Sonoran terms to rural informants in Bolivia and Venezuela, I invariably got an immediate, interested response. While the words were new to them, the meaning was not. They could always classify families to fit the two types. At *asentamiento* Palenque in Venezuela, a group of peasants likened themselves to Sonoran *encogidos* with the statement "Somos muy patronizados." They were explaining why they were no longer active in the peasant syndicate and did not agitate for local improvements. They had been under the *patrón-peón* system for so long that they were still "*patrón-ized*" (subjugated in spirit or low on the pecking order). Daniel Lerner's (1958: 21-27) vivid contrast between the shy, giggling, "constricted" shepherd and the pushy, ambitious Balgat grocer epitomizes the same *encogido-entrón* distinction for the Middle East.

The *encogido* syndrome is simulated to some extent in the lack of self-confidence and feelings of powerlessness endemic among low-status groups

in industrial urban society. With such characteristics it is common to find invidious sanction, the tendency for a group to suppress *entrón* behavior among its members. When a Mexican-American high-school girl from Guadalupe, California, was rewarded for her scholastic achievements with part-time work in her high-school office, she was beaten by her peers on the way home from school.³ Under such circumstances the pressures to conform to group standards of "success" are very strong. Where ritual traditions provide an acceptable avenue for success among low-status ethnic groups, it is understandable why such traditions seem persistent.

Foster (1965) was misled by the widespread existence of invidious sanction among rural populations in underdeveloped areas to view this behavior as the expression of a cognitive orientation of "limited good." According to Foster (1965: 296-297), a peasant lives in a "closed system" in which "it follows that an individual or a family can improve a position only at the expense of others," a situation much like a zero-sum game. In the classic, exploitative model of peasantry, where the ecotype is static, landowners and serfs are indeed very much like antagonists in a zero-sum game, since there are few inputs into the system and rewards are in very limited supply. Any increase in the well-being of the peasant must be at the expense of the leisure class that conspicuously consumes his labor, and the leisure class clearly recognizes this fact as it zealously guards its prerogatives. Among the peasants themselves in this classic situation there was probably not as much need to apply invidious sanctions since the ruling class saw to it that there was very little social mobility.

But in the kinds of situations described in this paper, where the ecotype is being radically altered by new technological inputs, the expanding world of the erstwhile peasant is more like that of a positive-sum game. He is beginning to perceive the world as one of unlimited goods in which he is relatively deprived. In my experience, the kinds of rural peoples Foster calls "peasants" do not view the success of other peasants as a source of their relative deprivation. The "rate-buster" model applies to peasantry much better than the model of "limited good." The rate-buster incurs enmity by establishing new standards of performance which become an index for measuring the inadequacy of his fellow workers. The worker-management rivalry underlying the rate-buster model does not apply to the peasant situation, but the intra-group antagonisms are much the same. The peasant *entrón* is not disliked by his fellows because they believe his relative affluence has deprived them; they dislike him because his success demonstrates that their inability to enjoy a greater share of the unlimited goods of the new positive-sum game is a product of their own inadequacy. Eventually, as mobility increases, successful individuals provide a demonstration effect rather than a frustration effect, and invidious emulation replaces invidious sanction. But as long as social discrimination and ethnic identity help maintain barriers of social isolation, the mobility rate may not be rapid enough to effect a change in outlook. In these situations groups provided with a system of mobility tied to a ceremonial fund will encourage their members to maintain it.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I have compared three widely separated rural populations which I have had the opportunity to observe at first hand. My purpose was to apply Wolf's exploitative model of peasantry in an open-ended manner such that his attributes became my dimensions for measuring change at the upper limits of peasantry. However, I have not been concerned with delineating the boundaries of peasantry or of peasant types. My intention was to partially explain certain characteristics of underdeveloped rural populations by concerning myself primarily with cross-cultural situational factors. The economic "satisficing" model underlying my argument has been left largely implicit for fuller development elsewhere. The present exercise has produced the following generalizations, all of which need further confirmation.

1. Change or lack of change in a paleotechnic ecotype (including technology, transportation, and availability of markets) is the most determining condition for the perpetuation or disappearance of the characteristics of peasantry. In fact, the social exploitation which determines the funds of rent will itself be a product of an ecotype in which maximization of living standards by the elite is limited to the conspicuous consumption of labor. Even the elite in this view is a product of a primitive technology, geographic isolation, and lack of markets. Only when drastic alterations are made in the ecotype through technological and transportation improvements, are the characteristics of peasantry most likely to disappear.
2. Removing economic exploitation (funds of rent) without radically changing the ecotype will result in new forms of exploitation and little change in the level and quality of living.
3. Where removal of the funds of rent is attempted through the redistribution of land in small, "decommoditized" plots, a subsistence level of "security" will help rural peoples retain such peasant characteristics as ceremonial service, multiple-interest coalitions, and the primitive technology of a minimal replacement fund. This situation will even reduce the "depeasantizing" effects of drastic changes in the ecotype.
4. When ethnic differences and low status are so associated in a rural population of peasant origins that they contribute to its social isolation and relatively low degree of social mobility, the ceremonial fund will persist within a diminishing group of conservative *encogidos* as the major form of status seeking which it finds rewarding even though drastic changes in the ecotype are making alternative patterns of consumption feasible.
5. When the characteristic conditions of peasantry are breaking down in the face of a changing ecotype, peasants are likely to view their position as one of relative deprivation in a world of unlimited goods. They will not view the achievements of peers as a source of that deprivation; they will view the achievements of peers as a measure of their own inadequacy, and where social mobility is relatively limited they may act together in bringing sanctions against the mobile individual as a means of protecting their own self-image.

NOTES

1. This paper is based on the following field work by the author: Bolivia—June to September, 1963; Venezuela—September, 1963 to February, 1964; Mexico—August, 1957, to March, 1959. The Bolivian study was made at the invitation of Dwight B. Heath, the Venezuelan at the invitation of Richard P. Schaedel, and the Mexican at the invitation of Julian H. Steward. The studies were financed by the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin (Bolivia), the United States Agency for International Development in Caracas (Venezuela), and the Ford Foundation (Mexico).
2. Eric Wolf (1966: 19-37) distinguishes several kinds of paleotechnic and neotechnic ecotypes, but for my purposes these two general categories are sufficient. Plow agriculture in the highlands of Bolivia and Venezuela, swidden farming in the lowlands of both countries, and the former flood "irrigated" cultivation of the Mayo and Yaqui deltas are all lumped together as paleotechnic. My concern here is not with the dependent variables of specific forms of primitive cultivation but with those variables affected everywhere when paleotechnic ecotypes are replaced by more advanced technologies, improved transportation, and expanding markets.
3. From field notes of Mr. Timothy Hillebrand, graduate student in anthropology, University of California at Santa Barbara.

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