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COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND NATION BUILDING

A Study with Emphasis on Southeast Asia

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## PREFACE

This study deals with two inter-related items of major concern to AID--rural based insurgencies and social modernization. The focus of the study is Southeast Asia because the active insurgencies are now taking place there and also because of the author's own interest and experience. Nevertheless, a good deal of the analysis and conclusions have more general applicability.

The report treats each of these items, that is, insurgency and modernization, separately; there is however an internal linkage. The linkage is inevitable because the societal milieu in which the insurgencies and the modernization process occur are the same. Thus, for example, in describing the attitudes of peasants, their value systems and motivations one finds it convenient, almost <sup>inseparable,</sup> necessary, to relate these phenomena to both the problem of nation building and that of countering insurgencies.

The separate treatment is dictated by the major premise embodied in this effort. That premise is, that, contrary to beliefs generally held by many Americans, the strategic requirements in the rural areas in an insurgency situation are dissimilar from requirements in a peace time nation building effort. It is a major conclusion, and a premise of this work that the insurgencies in the underdeveloped countries do not have their origin in the poverty and disaffection of the masses--granting the fact poverty does exist and sufficient grounds could be found for disaffection.

This premise then leads one to examine insurgency situations and more normal nation building efforts separately to determine the course of action required for each. Examination of our program philosophy leaves one with the strong impression that this distinction has not been drawn in the AID programs. To be sure, the nature of the program content differs but the underlying philosophy is the same. There is an apparent belief that if the conditions of life of the masses were improved, or at a minimum if it could be made to appear that there is progress in that direction, then the root causes of insurgencies will have been attacked and the preconditions for defeat of the insurgency set in motion. This is unquestionably an appealing hypothesis for us. Our own history of a constantly enlarging area of opportunity for all citizens resulting in a high degree of political stability along with economic and social growth has effectively prevented the dire predictions of Karl Marx as to the demise of the capitalist system. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate the relevancy of issues of poverty, social backwardness, and lack of class mobility to the short term requirements of insurgencies. They are highly relevant to the problem of nation building and social modernization.

Conditions of life of the peasantry are such in the underdeveloped countries that one could readily assume a climate favorable to the insurgent. But it cannot be shown that there is such a causal relationship. One need only ask the questions "Why now?"; "Why in this particular country?" and finally "Why did certain insurgencies succeed and others fail?" to conclude that other factors are more determinant. If

conditions of poverty, incompetent government, social injustice, lack of class mobility, etc. will take a very long time to change, as they certainly will, then it becomes obvious that the configuration of our efforts in cases of insurgencies will be quite different from those directed towards peacetime nation building.

The counter argument is made that no matter how successfully one may meet the challenge of insurgents in the short run, the permanent cure requires a more basic nation building effort. For without progress in modernizing the economy, the political system, and the social institutions, a new insurgency or mass insurrection will appear. This may be true and it is not the intent of this study to minimize the need for modernization of underdeveloped societies in our own interests. The issue is really one of timing and priorities. The physical resources, human talent, government ingenuity in underdeveloped countries is limited. The insurgency must have first call on those limited resources.

This paper attempts to define, in operational terms, first the requirements for meeting the threat of a rural based Chinese Communist type insurgency and secondly the requirements for modernizing societies and political systems. These are treated as two separate tasks. The nation building effort is our principle raison d'être and our preferred area of work, but we must recognize the special requirements of an insurgency situation and be prepared to postpone the more fundamental nation building effort.

In the section on insurgency, the critical requirement for the insurgent is identified as the need to maintain contact between his base areas and villages. The lifeblood of supplies, men, and information

depends on an effective communications and logistics system that binds the two through communist cells in the villages and the apathy or coercion of the villagers. Consequently, the task of the counterinsurgent is identified as one of cutting that communications-logistic system. The attitude of the peasant is determined by who is in control rather than by who has the most to offer. Consequently progressive governmental policies and programs cannot defeat the insurgent--the interdiction of access to the village will defeat him.

In the section on modernization <sup>that is,</sup> (political development, nation building), this paper identifies the psychology of the villager as the principle impediment to the movement from traditionalism to modernity. His attitudes, value systems, goals and motivations, it is suggested, can be modified most effectively by bringing tradition bound village dwellers into more frequent and more intimate contact with the modern elements of the society through the matrix of a town-village economic complex; by creating a rural market economy based upon increased production of a farm surplus to be traded by the peasant for a higher level of consumer and investment goods.

It is too much to hope that there will be universal acceptance of all the conclusions embodied in this paper. Though it is based on what we consider substantial empirical evidence, we are nevertheless dealing with a subject that is at the frontier of our knowledge. The relative weights of the variety of factors operating simultaneously are difficult to assess and it will take a long time--generations--to prove or disprove the validity of some of the suggestions.

Furthermore, the evidence tends to support conclusions which run counter to some of our more firmly held hypotheses and assumptions--hypotheses and assumptions largely the product of our own scale of values and cultural heritage. This can be expected to elicit a negative reaction to many of the conclusions in the paper. But we must be mindful of our limited successes to date in both the fields of countering insurgencies and in modernizing societies--a search for the causes of this lack of success should render us receptive to new approaches.

This paper is only the transmittable evidence of the benefits derived during the past year's studies at RAC. The partial list of references attached will give some indication of the wide scope of reading done in this period. Much has been gleaned from personal contacts in RAC as well as discussions in the field. One comes away from this type of assignment with the conviction that more of our career personnel should be exposed to cultural and historical factors bearing on our objectives--in order to imbue the field service with a greater appreciation of the importance of these factors.

We are deeply appreciative of AID for making this effort possible and of RAC for its full support. Though RAC has reviewed this paper--as a matter of courtesy--we alone are responsible for the views expressed.

## Meeting the Challenge of Insurgent Movements

It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to develop a US doctrine of counterinsurgency in operational terms that will have promise of successfully combatting the current strategic offensive of the Communists in the nuclear age.

This is by no means an easy task--as will be seen as we examine the insurgency movements of the past 20-25 years. In view of the successes of the Communists in French North Africa, Indo-China, and Cuba, one recognizes the potency of such revolutionary movements and the difficulty confronting western democratic societies in meeting these onslaughts. The difficulties at home facing parliamentary governments in combatting what is represented as class struggles of the "disadvantaged" is a major asset of the insurgents--the disadvantages of open societies in meeting brutality with brutality is a serious limitation on the means available for countermeasures. Furthermore, the weakness of the legitimate government resisting such aggression--in both administrative and political terms--provides the US with a blunt tool to work through and with.

But these are impediments that must be accepted in the calculus. The struggle, in a large sense, is to preserve our form of open society and our form of parliamentary government--to limit or circumscribe such freedoms in our own society in order to try to preserve freedom in other societies would indeed be ironic. To hope for greater administrative skill and political unity in the governments we are assisting is hardly a meaningful strategy--it is tautological. If this were the

case, then there would be no insurgency. We are forced to live in the world we were born into--we cannot reconstruct it in the short run. All of these limitations on our capacity and the advantages that accrue to the enemy as a consequence thereof, must be ground into the equation as "given" before we can come up with a meaningful set of countermeasures.

### Part I - Diagnosis

I. Let us first examine the present US strategy--broadly stated. On the civilian side, the strategic concept involves alienating the peasantry from the revolutionary movement by attempting to meet the "felt needs" of the peasantry--to win the "hearts and minds" of those whose support is essential for either side.

On the military side, it is to kill and capture guerrillas, protect vital installations, destroy base areas, and interdict the introduction from abroad of men and supplies. Added to these is a combined military and civilian effort to encourage defectors from the ranks of the Communists and a propaganda campaign directed at the populace. These are deemed essential elements of a counterinsurgency campaign.

No matter how reasonable a strategy may appear, its effectiveness can only be judged by its success or failure. On the other hand, there are always extenuating circumstances that affect the outcome--other than the strategy. These are the relative capacities of the contestants--a weak, disunited, faction ridden government will have less success than a more cohesive government even if both adopt the same strategy.

# The quality of leadership of the communist insurgency will similarly affect the outcome--regardless of the counterinsurgent's strategy. Consequently, one cannot expect to develop a strategy that will guarantee success. But one can, on the basis of a detailed review of recently concluded insurgencies--successful and unsuccessful--develop some appreciation for the crucial elements in the roles of the insurgent and the counterinsurgent and some insights into the roles of the populace in that struggle. It is from such analysis that we hope to fashion a more precise doctrinal framework for US action and priorities.

At the outset it must be recognized that we are confronted, around the world, with insurgency movements at different stages of development, of different origins and support and within different cultural settings. The responses to these threats must therefore be tailored to the circumstances of the individual case.

The problems of Vietnam are quite different from the problems of Thailand or of Columbia. However, a review of the anatomy of rural based revolutions will be helpful in identifying the main common characteristics and the various stages--and thus facilitate the fashioning of an appropriate response to specific cases.

II. Revolutions from the Renaissance to the Russian revolution have been largely middle class inspired--designed to transfer power to the emerging or existing middle class from the current holders of power--the land owners, the feudal aristocracy and nobility. The "liberty, equality, fraternity" of the French revolution was meant for the middle class, who demanded equal treatment with the aristocracy.

The peasantry were perforce brought into the struggle, but the revolution was not intended for their benefit or to achieve equality for them. These revolutions were designed to establish governments under the control of and responsive to the needs of an articulate, dynamic middle class in the more modern and technologically advanced geographic areas of the world.

Beginning with the Russian revolution and extending through the revolutions of the past two decades, there has emerged a different genre of class struggle. A new order of intellectuals, inspired by the teachings of Marx, and Engels, and other mid-nineteenth century philosophers ~~have become the Communist trained leaders of the new~~ <sup>secularization through violence,</sup> struggle. Coming from a disaffected but articulate and educated sector of society, these leaders are conducting revolutions in the less technologically advanced and less modern geographic areas, directed against land owners, oligarchies, colonial powers, as well as against middle classes. It is a revolution designed to eliminate not only the existing regime, but also the middle man, the entrepreneur, and to substitute for that middle class a set of "managers"--the bureaucracy of a Communist state.

In agrarian societies, the Communists have developed a technique of legitimizing the revolution by exploiting causes of real or fancied popular disaffection, gaining respectability through front organizations, and then creating a structure of control in the villages based on organization, discipline, and terror. This is designed to (a) deny the government access to the people and (b) establish de facto control, for the revolutionary movement, over the people and resources. The

method used for capturing control of the government is guerrilla warfare, <sup>usually in the country-side</sup> as distinguished from a coup d'etat, <sup>usually in the urban centers and</sup> which ordinarily affects a transfer of power within the existing elites.

Governments are vulnerable to guerrilla wars. They are mainly vulnerable because the guerrilla retains the initiative--he chooses the locus of the struggle and the nature of the conflict. The government, on the other hand, is responsible for the whole country. It must keep the economy functioning, must maintain an appearance of normalcy, and is limited as to the repressive measures to be taken towards the populace as a whole. The government can afford to be unconcerned about the loss of a few government officials to assassins, or even to the temporary loss of a government installation, but it cannot be unconcerned at the publicity these acts engender and the doubts created as to its ability to govern. <sup>For governments must have a monopoly on physical power or they cease to be governments.</sup>

Nations are able to maintain identity as nations through a combination of habit, a common social philosophy, loyalty, and, to an extent, coercion. It is generally expected that as long as a social system permits some degree of satisfaction of perceived needs through its institutions and practices, it will tend to remain stable; when perceived needs and desires are repressed, the social system tends to instability and revolution. It is generally accepted that guerrillas cannot grow in strength to the point where they replace the existing regimes except where social and political conditions produce a potential revolutionary situation; that insurgency, with

an ideological base, requires the existence of grievances, class divisions, economic tensions, an oppressive government. This concept of the causes in insurgency, immediately puts governments on the defensive both within and outside the country--the mere existence of an insurgency being virtually a prima facie evidence of guilt. However, it is not certain that economic backwardness, low productivity, low levels of income are decisive factors. Poverty is a condition of life that has existed for a long time. Those factors, however, are not enough; revolution is still far off without the nucleus of a revolutionary organization.

Nevertheless, the first task for the revolutionary is to create a "cause" so that the revolution becomes the means of rectifying a great evil-- a completely moral and just means for meeting the needs of the masses and thus enlisting the people themselves in the struggle. The important element is "cause"; in order to stand on firm moral ground there must be some great purpose; it cannot be an act of opportunists.

Leadership of such movements comes from intellectuals, from an elitist group, not from the peasantry itself. The peasant is not a revolutionary. The intellectual who finds himself outside looking in is the raw material for this role. Leadership comes from unstable social sectors. It usually includes the radical, the frustrated, and the least successful members of the middle class. Most Communist leaders are, in fact, frustrated intellectuals <sup>-- dissident or "non-integrated" products of the elite --</sup> who have become Communists because their ambitions exceed their capabilities. The unique

quality of this leadership is its ability to use existing conditions as a method of describing latent discontent and to attack the existing order, <sup>(which it comprehends so well)</sup> in a manner designed to open avenues of new opportunities for the masses. The creation of discontent, based on age old conditions of poverty and neglect, does not solve problems, but it opens up new possibilities, a new hope for the future. What was formerly accepted as the way things must be suddenly are represented as intolerable. These are, in fact, the attitude and the feelings of the leadership, and it is their role to spread this to the masses.

Planners of insurgency movements possess important assets in the underdeveloped countries. It is beyond the capabilities of any incumbent regime to meet a set of perceived needs as postulated by revolutionaries, not only for lack of resources but also because the social system itself tends to inhibit achievement in a meaningful time frame. Furthermore, the sense of nationhood and the existence of an accepted structure of relationships within these states are for the most part lacking.

Most Asian villagers live at subsistence levels and are less interested in politics than in keeping alive. If there is a guerrilla war, they will individually wind up on the side that holds promise for protecting their meager way of life or holds promise for giving greater security to them, than on the side with the most appealing program of social and political reform. But the appealing program of reform does permit the coalescing of leadership at various levels of the society, the creation of an aura of respectability within the

country and in the international arena, and at a minimum, a noninterference on the part of the masses.

In summary, revolutions are led by those who wish to upset the existing order, the existing arrangement of power, and the existing elite, for their personal gain and to substitute themselves for those now in control. In order to accomplish this, the all pervasive poverty, lack of class mobility, grievances, etc. are exploited to raise to a higher level the rationale for the revolt and thus gather to the fold local followers and international support.

Guerrilla actions have military objectives--to obtain weapons, ammunition and supplies, to inflict casualties, to force the enemy to extend his lines, etc. But psychological and political objectives are paramount. Local military success serves no useful purpose if the morale of the government and its soldiers is not weakened and political pressure exerted on the regime through apprehension and dissatisfaction. Above all the insurgent attempts increasingly and inexorably to impair the government's capacity to govern over and to protect its people.

Roger Hilsman gives the following as his estimate of the casual relationship between lack of support for Government and insurgency:

"In the long run, popular support is essential for stable government and a stable world. And there is no question that economic development, modernization, and reform are key factors in creating popular support and stable governments. But in my judgement it would be mistaken to think that guerrillas cannot thrive where governments are popular and where modernization, economic development, and reform are going forward. And the usual corollary to this thought--the notion that the existence of guerrilla warfare as proof positive that the government is unpopular and therefore not worth supporting--is even more mistaken. As for modernization, although essential for the long haul, it cannot mean much in a

counterguerrilla program. Modernization inevitably uproots established social systems, produces political and economic dislocation and tension, and cannot deliver results quickly enough to relieve these short-term pressures."

III. Guerrilla warfare is not new--some military historians detect this form of conflict in biblical descriptions of tribal wars--the campaign of the Maccabees against the Syrian army. In early recorded history, the harassing tactics of small bands has been named Fabian, <sup>by</sup> ~~after~~ Fabius Maximus, who successfully used these tactics in a campaign against Hannibal.

The term "guerrilla warfare" became part of the military vocabulary after Napoleon. After his victory in Spain in 1807-1808, the Spanish army reorganized itself into small independent units. The diminutive suffix was added to the Spanish word for war--guerre.

Guerrilla units, sometimes grouped around small core cadres of regulars, became prominent, though not dominant, elements in many European and American wars during the nineteenth century. Partisan operations against Napoleon in Russia; Greek partisans against the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century; Mexican guerrilla actions against Scott; General Mosby's partisan operations in the American Civil War; the Boers against the British in South Africa; etc.

In the 20th Century, Arab ~~irregulars~~ irregulars under T.E. Lawrence waged war against the Turks, the Zionists in Palestine against the British; anti-German campaigns in occupied Europe during World War II, as well as guerrilla campaigns against Japanese occupation forces in Asia.

The first significant appearance in military literature of guerrilla warfare is in Clausewitz: "Operations are to be carried out in the interior of the country; the theatre of war should be extensive. There must be a popular base for the struggle; the country should have irregular and difficult terrain features."

Clausewitz however viewed guerrilla warfare as an ancillary to main military forces. Lawrence, on the other hand, viewed guerrilla warfare as a separate and distinct type of warfare and superior, under circumstances, to warfare by regular forces--even if the creation of regular forces were possible. Lawrence's postulate has become the take-off point for the Communist development of guerrilla warfare tactics and strategy--their principle contribution being emphasis on goals to be achieved and the refinement of socio-economic and ideological concepts. They have developed an elaborate theory of insurgency to be used against superior forces to replace existing regimes, and have spelled out the evolution of a campaign from the stage of "strategic defensive" to that of "strategic offensive" culminating in victory for the Communists.

Mao Tse-tung, building on the works of the ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu as well as Clausewitz and Lawrence, has made the most significant contribution to modern guerrilla warfare. He enunciated the principle of the "unity of opposites"--concealed strength in weakness. He contends that though it might appear logical that small guerrilla bands can be destroyed easily because of

their smallness--the fact is their extermination is difficult because of their very size. The advantage of airpower and superior mobility of the adversary is offset by the superior intelligence of the guerrilla; superior firepower is blunted by propaganda; the industrial base with a political base. Space is traded for time--protracted wars provide the time frame necessary for the cellular evolution of the insurgency.

In the 20th Century, guerrilla warfare has become a serious menace to the existing order; it has become virtually a continuous menace. For a long time now, some guerrilla war is always being fought somewhere, and frequently more than one guerrilla war at a time.

Guerrilla warfare has become the tool of communist leaders and has changed from a chiefly military instrument to a conflict conceived in a larger worldwide political setting. The West is confronted today with a serious challenge by the strategists of international communism. But guerrillas are not invincible--they have been defeated.

It might appear that guerrilla warfare is a primitive military form compared to conventional wars, but in many respects it is more sophisticated. Its basic element is people--rather than weaponry--and the control and use of organized bands is a more complex undertaking than the use of advanced machinery. The continued success of the guerrillas in Vietnam against France, the Republic of South Vietnam and even the United States with all their mobility and

firepower is empirical proof of the sophisticated nature and efficiency of guerrilla warfare.

Modern guerrillas take full advantage of a whole set of psychological advantages--the abuses and disintegration of 19th century colonial rule; the inefficient and corrupt governments that have emerged in the wake of the collapse of the colonial empires; the dualistic societies controlled by a small minority having the bulk of the wealth; inequitable land tenure systems, usury; disaffected intellectuals, etc. And these psychological advantages are exploited on a world-wide basis--more effectively than ever before because of more effective world-wide communications. The "cause" holds out appeal to liberals and humanitarians everywhere--even within the countries whose very security is menaced by the guerrillas. The cultural tradition of the West, its parliamentary form of government, its compassion for the underdog, all make it especially vulnerable to this propoganda, and causes confusion as to the real issues involved--the camouflaged grab for power which is the real motivation. This camouflage imposes limitations on the response.

The fact that the kind of government that would follow an insurgent victory is less rather than more democratic than the existing autocratic government; the fact that personal liberty would be further curtailed rather than expanded, that a rigid police state would emerge with informers in every village and hamlet; the fact that innocent government workers are being assassinated by the insurgents--all are blurred by the propoganda machine of the insurgents.

Consequently the basic need of an insurgent is an attractive cause; and causes are not hard to come by in the underdeveloped countries. The insurgent has no responsibility for meeting the requirements of law or equity--no responsibility for resolving competing claims among the nationals--he can assume a posture of negative criticism of that which exists and is free to use any propaganda trick. He is not obliged to prove--he is to be judged by what he promises, not by what he does--a powerful weapon indeed. The revolutionary movement chooses a cause that holds promise for attracting a maximum and repelling a minimum--independence, land for the landless, neocolonialism, exploitation, corruption in government. The cause is one that the government cannot well assume--in view of its responsibility to the nation as a whole and its own involvement in running the government.

The government cannot hope to end the revolution by attempting to remedy the grievances exploited by the revolutionaries--even if this were possible without giving up power; insurgents would find new grievances or turn the government action inside out and represent it as a fraud or would sabotage any government attempt to carry out reforms. They are not fighting for a redressing of grievances--they want power.

Given the fact the soil is fertile in virtually all parts of the underdeveloped world for revolutionary "causes" and is likely to remain so for a long time, the relevant question is not how to overcome Communist propaganda but whether strategy and tactics can be

devised to deal with insurgencies and prevent prolonged guerrilla wars. To answer these questions we will first examine at some length the structure and dynamics of an insurgent system and then attempt to formulate views on how to deal with this phenomenon on the basis of our experience with insurgent movements of the past.

IV. A guerrilla movement is initiated by a small number of people having a common objective, the intellectual capacity to plan and organize a revolutionary movement, and a strong commitment to the overthrow of the regime. After some discrete jockeying to feel each other out, this elitest group agrees on what is to be accomplished and, pledge themselves, to act to bring this about.

Decisions are made on how to proceed, the internal structure of the movement, relationships with potential external supporters, relationships of the heads of the political aspects of the movement to the military; relationships of headquarters to lower echelons. Agreement is reached on division of responsibility, coordination, and security measures to protect the movement from penetration. A stop gap or temporary formula is established for a system of civil administration in the event the insurgents gain control over parcels of territory, decisions are made as to prime target areas on the basis of which decisions are made on sites for base areas, and contact is established with outside sources of help.

Then comes the actual preparation of campsites, the acquisition of arms, training in guerrilla tactics, establishment of communications systems--all before action can start.

The initiative is with the guerrilla; the beginnings of the movement are so vague that one hardly recognizes that something new has happened--especially when banditry is endemic.

"Since the insurgent alone can initiate the conflict, strategic initiative is his by definition. Until the insurgent has clearly revealed his intentions by engaging in subversion or open violence he represents nothing but an unprecise potential menace and does not offer a concrete target that would justify a large effort.

Promoting disorder is a legitimate objective for the insurgent. It helps to disrupt the economy, serves to undermine the strength and authority of the counterinsurgent. As the people clamor for protection, the government is forced into restrictive practices--searching people, dispersing its resources, guarding all bridges and vital installations--the counterinsurgent cannot escape his responsibility for maintaining order.

The insurgent would prefer to confine his attacks to government installations and government personnel and not attack the peasantry and others he is wooing. However, when voluntary community support is not spontaneously forthcoming at the outbreak of the struggle or cannot be sustained at the desired level, the guerrilla movement almost inevitably will resort to terrorism to compel such support. The insurgent recognizes that even in this area, the advantage lies with him. The more stable and mature powers of the West with their deep-rooted humanitarian concepts react to this type of bloody and protracted conflict with a troubled conscience and will not meet terror with terror. If the Western nation momentarily sheds its moral scruples--the guerrilla gains a psychological advantage--it tends to weaken the international position of the Western nation and consequently strengthens the bargaining positions of the insurgent movement--which always seeks to have the conflict internationalized.

The insurgent is fluid because he has neither responsibility nor concrete assets--the counterinsurgent is rigid because he has both. Afflicted with a congenital weakness--the wide disparity in manpower and implements of war--the insurgent would be foolish if he mustered whatever forces were available to him and attacked his opponent in a conventional fashion. Logic forces him to fight on a different ground when he has a better chance to balance the physical odds against him. The population represents this new ground and thus the battle for the population is a major characteristic of the revolutionary war. Undergrounds are as important as guerrilla units, if not more so to the success or

The third stage--strategic offensive--begins when the opposing forces of the government and those of the guerrillas have reached balance. Now the insurgents seize the initiative--not as pure guerrillas but as mobile columns up to divisional

recruitment activities. In the second stage of the campaign--period of equilibrium--a stalemate sets in. The government finds it cannot destroy the guerrillas--it can only seem to contain them while preparing new offensives for the future. The guerrillas cannot destroy the army. They continue to harass, expand base areas, improve its internal economy--workshops, arm repair facilities, and step-up its propaganda and

concentrate comparatively heavy forces against a single enemy weak point. opposition is strong the net is drawn in: the guerrillas expanded, contracted, or abandoned on short notice. Where movement--to establish rear base areas, bases which can be action--to strengthen the internal economy of the revolutionary guerrillas disperse to carry on the work of political indoctrination--where little opposition is met, the net is cast. The guerrillas--we retreat; the enemy retreats--we harass; the enemy advances--we retreat; the enemy camps--we harass; the enemy concentrates our forces to deal with the enemy. The enemy the following points: divide our forces to arouse the masses--"Ours are guerrilla tactics; they consist mainly of

late--not rout--interior enemy units, one at a time. Mao writes: and then to concentrate all available guerrilla strength to annihilate possible, by harassing him all along the line, wherever he is weak, The strategy is to force the enemy to spread himself as thin as

The guerrilla strategy remains constant although tactics vary. sending no continuous front for the foe to smash.

circling around, fighting always in the enemy's rear areas and pre- tion is everything. The guerrillas conduct only harassing action,

In the beginning, for the guerrilla, territory is nothing; attri-

*David Collier's "Communist Warfare" (1964)*  
a combination of political and military activities. "The primary target--this is sought by undergrounds through on an active underground. The cooperation of the people is the way and are almost wholly dependent for their support guerrilla units emerge only after undergrounds have prepared failure of a revolutionary movement. Characteristically,

strength capable of confronting and destroying the army in open battles.

As strong points are taken and the army's manpower whittled down--with big units captured or annihilated, and others defecting--the rebels come into possession of heavy weapons--tanks, artillery--which can be used to reduce even larger strong points until at last, a seizing of cities aided by popular uprisings brings the war to a victorious end--through surrender of the army or collapse of the government."

General Giap, although accepting this three stage formulation of the military aspects of insurgency, admits difficulty in identifying the transition from one stage to the other. This stems from the unique situation in Indo China--where there were two distinct theaters of operation in 1950 as there are, in fact, today. The northern theater, Tonkin, was marked by advanced stage operations; while the southern theater, the Mekong Delta, was characterized by early stage type operations. Consequently Giap has expanded Mao's theory of revolutionary stages, refining them in the light of his experiences in Indo China, and makes his contribution to the literature in a more precise delineation of the transition from the second to the third stage.

V. It may be useful to define the stages of insurgency more precisely and elaborate on each of the stages. It should be recognized that the development of a schematic for insurgency lends itself to many permutations--therefore any delineation of "stages" is subject to certain inadequacies--one can therefore expect to see other formulations in the literature on counterinsurgency. Furthermore, a stage or phase will normally be identified by the predominant activity being carried out by the movement--the phases are not mutually exclusive--there is

overlap of the predominant activity into other phases. The evolution can be uneven--some areas of the country in one phase; other areas in a latter or earlier stage.

#### A. Infiltration--Subversion

This phase involves largely the creation of leadership for the insurgent movement and the formation of hard core support among the intellectuals. In the usual case, small bands of Communist agents enter the targeted country to further the world-wide objectives of the Communist movement. These agents join labor unions or peasant societies and recruit local cadres. The propaganda during this period stresses native nationalism and demands for social reform. This propaganda is directed to the native intelligentsia rather than to the masses. The specific targets are the disenchanted or unemployed intellectuals.

Once recruited, the leadership is organized into cells, given training on the spot with outstanding students selected for training at the international seats of Communism. The newly trained Communist leaders--not admitting their affiliation with the Communist movement--begin a two pronged psychological offensive of subversion directed on the one hand, at the peasant or urban slum dwellers and, on the other hand, at the intellectual community at large. This effort is designed to detach from support of the government both the masses, and the intellectuals.

The detachment of the masses gives a quantitative base to the movement; the detachment of the intellectuals provides a qualitative base and thus shores up leadership cadres.

The propaganda techniques against the masses, at this stage, involve both positive and negative themes. The propaganda at an early stage argues for needed changes to bring about the satisfaction of rising expectations (without spelling out specifics); riles against internal conditions--arbitrary, corrupt government; immorality; high taxes; the land tenure system; foreigners, etc. As the movement progresses, a reform program is spelled out more specifically in terms meaningful to both the intellectuals and the masses--an alternative social philosophy--basic reforms in land tenure systems, social justice, government administration for the masses. The alternative social philosophy rarely espouses Communism--it is generally couched in terms of nationalism.

The organizing effort aimed at the masses involves the use of both socially accepted front organizations and covert organizations. The fronts are largely designed to cause trouble in the cities through strikes and demonstrations in order to magnify the level of social discontent, and attract attention within the country and abroad.

#### B. Small Band Operations

During this phase covert groups are militarized. The militarized groups begin to provide guerrilla troops for small band operations against the government and begin to develop logistic and intelligence gathering capabilities.

In rural areas, where the village is essentially isolated from centers of tangible government control (because of terrain, lack of communications, etc.), the newly created insurgent groups begin to

assume de facto control through the creation of local government organizations. At times, de facto control is shared--the government by day and the insurgents by night. In most underdeveloped countries, the government's strength is confined to the national and provincial capitals. Even in key communities where government does maintain garrisons and a police network, insurgents can continue their supply and intelligence activities albeit on a more covert basis.

The insurgent organization contains both full and part-time personnel and both combat and non-combat support personnel. The part-time insurgents do not ordinarily withdraw from village life as do the full-time insurgents. At night the part-time workers man the human supply trains that furnish logistic support to the regular guerrilla forces; they conduct acts of sabotage, and perform support functions for guerrilla raids carried out by the regular forces in the local areas.

The principal objective at this stage continues to be the detachment of the populace from the existing political regime--specialized terror activities are the tactics. These are aimed at key officials or quasi-official personnel, against local and central government officials, and others who represent the established order. Consequently, public administration suffers as officials become more constrained in their activities and travel; recruitment of replacements becomes more difficult affecting both quantity and quality of government services--and all this highlights and reinforces the propaganda theme of weak government.

### C. Limited Government

The objective now becomes the replacement of government control over a carefully integrated geographic area; moving from the earlier objectives of detaching the people from government to a replacement of the government itself by a new authority. This requires the destruction of government infrastructure--bridges communication systems, railroads--so that a large area can be isolated from government action.

This phase is characterized by expanded propoganda activity--providing on a massive scale reformist and nationalistic ideology. The insurgents fill out the regional organization machinery--both civil and military--that was established in embryonic form at an earlier stage. Normally a particularly strong static base serves as the seed for expansion to a regional organization for operations at this stage. The intelligence net is expanded and improved; the supply operations become responsible for procurement of basic war materials and food-stuffs from the general populace; small scale industries are established in secure areas to meet basic needs of insurgents; farm plots are set up in base areas; complex overt-covert supply networks are created. Recruitment is stepped up to provide more full time guerrillas; an extensive military reserve system is established; and first steps are taken in the creation and training of regular army units.

Insurgent forces still will not choose to fight positional battles with government troops--despite their growing strength--even to defend key installations in their own area. However, by this time, one starts

to see tangible effects on government--its forces are being consolidated into a defensive configuration of forts located at strategically important points or have even abandoned the hostile countryside for the security of the larger urban centers.

#### D. Expansion of Control--Civil War

In the classic development of a successful insurgency, the movement now undertakes large-scale military actions--well coordinated guerrilla operations launched from secure base areas--picking up forces along the way from district and village units. These strikes are aimed at acquiring additional supplies and isolating an expanding area from government control. The most noticeable characteristic of this phase is the high level of activity, the increase in the number and scope of military operations concomitant with an expanding capacity to acquire the means of warfare by attacks on government troops and installations. Another characteristic frequently associated with this phase is the establishment of a "government-in-exile" in order to further the aims of international support and further dilute the influence of the incumbent government.

Finally, the insurgents feeling confident of their strength and the government's weakness, take on government troops in orthodox battle formation in a war of position. This has been preceded through all the previous stages, by a demoralization of government troops who find themselves continually bested despite their superior equipment. By this time the country is divided--the government controls only pieces of the territory--the insurgents have created an aura of invincibility--one government crisis after another followed by changes

in government has bled off more and more of the leadership group from government ranks. The populace wants an end to the conflict and return to peace and has little confidence that this can be achieved under the existing government. There are tremendous external pressures on the government for a settlement to this fratricidal conflict and an end to the carnage and killing and maiming of innocent civilians. There has been a continuous withering away of discipline and efficiency in the ranks of the government and it finds it more difficult to carry out plans for combating the insurgents.

Two important points must be kept in mind: first, these phases are not discrete--there is an ebb and flow between stages in different parts of the country depending on the quality of execution of the plan, the international situation, and a host of other local considerations. The second point is that the empirical evidence to date indicates that the insurgent faces grave difficulties in moving into the final phase no matter how successful he has been in earlier phases. Assuming no total collapse of discipline within the government, the superiority in weapons and greater mobility of government troops represents a serious disadvantage for the insurgents in their attempts to capture major urban areas and defend open positions. External aid of a major nature appears to be a prime requirement for the insurgents--including heavy weapons and ammunition for such weapons.

VI. Continuing an analysis of the anatomy of an insurgency movement requires an examination of the structure of the apparatus, its organization, and how it functions. Here again, many variations on a main theme are possible and found in real life, but a general description is possible. The organization and functional relationships become more

complex and sophisticated as the insurgency matures and prospers. The structure is quite different in the early stages from what will ultimately emerge as the insurgent gathers strength.

The communist apparatus functions on three general levels. The first echelon is village or town based, organized into cells, each cell usually having a well defined mission. These cells comprise the primary operative level of the organization--they perform most of the in-country logistics-procurement; provide the mechanism for recruiting, perform much of the basic intelligence work for the upper echelons. These cells are locked functionally into the upper echelons by an organized system of communications--transmission of orders, information, personnel assignments--carried out usually by couriers and mail drops.

The second echelon is the part-time guerrilla. His role is dictated by local circumstances as is his relationship to the other echelons in the apparatus. He is generally a group bound terrorist--not a soldier. He lacks training and equipment, and his offensive role is usually limited to harassment. In addition to his offensive role, he is assigned responsibility for guard duty (caches, courier routes), gathers intelligence, collects taxes, and often augments the first echelon terrorist cells. He may become "filler" for main force elements when needed--thus the second echelon guerrilla is a link between the first echelon cells based wholly in the village or town and the full time warriors of the third echelon based in the jungle or other redoubt.

The third echelon is the main force--the hardcore regulars. These are full-time soldiers, trained and equipped in camps located in base areas. The mission of this echelon is dependent on the stage of

development of the insurgent movement. In earlier stages, he employs what appears on the surface the same range of tactics traditionally associated with guerrillas--small unit tactics. At more advanced stages, he operates as part of a more orthodox military organization, in larger units against larger forces.

At the apex is the Central Committee or Politburo which carries out local operations through regional, district, and local branches, corresponding to tactical areas. The regular armed forces operating from bases deep in isolated areas are attached to regional or district branches--they are the military arm of the higher levels of the Communist organization as opposed to the part time guerrillas who are the military arm of the lower levels of the organization.

Communications between the different levels is ordinarily by courier or a courier system, letter boxes, jungle trails and camp sites. The communications system is complex, with individuals knowing only part of the system in order to avoid compromise of the whole system through capture or defection. Personal contacts between members of different echelons are limited, as is information as to the location of letter boxes and camp sites.

In the early days of the insurgency, the Communist leadership is directly involved and exercises detailed control over tactics, organization of cells, propaganda etc. Therefore as cadres are being built up in the rural areas, there is usually no need for intermediate central organization unit above the village level to control these units. Gradually there begins to emerge a small staff at District level which will become the core for a full military-civil command section for later stages. Similarly there may begin to emerge regional or provincial

headquarters' cadres--which start to fill out and assume operational significance during the latter periods of organized terrorist activity. The organization being illegal, it occupies a parasitical role within the economy and the society--it must have access to the legal and overt part of society. Its selection of base sites is therefore governed by expediency and functional need--with the heavier emphasis on expediency.

The first echelon is quite naturally concealed in the villages and towns--a backyard cache, storeroom, a cover business,--these provide the space and facilities required for its assigned mission. No special areas need to be set apart, no specialized facilities generated.

Beyond the first echelon, special facilities and removal from areas readily accessible to government forces become necessary--this is the base area complex. This complex serves the second echelon in its military role and in its contacts with the third echelon--and serves the third echelon as political headquarters, command headquarters and site for the training and recuperation of regular troops. In this complex, facilities serving third echelon forces are generally more remote from the populated areas than those serving the second echelon--deeper into the jungles or mountain redoubts. Facilities for second echelon workers generally are on the fringe of the jungle closer to population centers and of an extremely temporary nature. These latter facilities are shifted frequently in order to maintain security--third echelon bases are of a more permanent nature and frequently involve warehousing, training, and recuperation facilities.

The requirements for base areas are dictated by the very nature of guerrilla warfare--bases must be inaccessible to government control and yet permit access and egress for guerrilla forces. They must have

access to food, water, recruits, intelligence and must provide an opportunity for escape in the event of attack. Thus, not all unpopulated areas are suitable for base areas nor is it necessarily true that only unpopulated areas are suitable--if other reasons render the populated areas inaccessible to government action. Sanctuaries in neighboring countries as well as areas populated by people traditionally hostile to government control within the country are possible base areas even in populated centers.

A "base complex" ordinarily represents a clutch of rather primitive facilities and a network of unpaved roads, trails and paths connecting them. Food must be raised in the area, or within easy hauling distance of the base area. The growing of food in the jungle itself is limited by the requirement for concealment of the base against aerial reconnaissance--thus limiting the amount of jungle clearing and sunlight for crops in the base area.

#### VII:

Crucial to the question of fashioning an adequate response to the threat posed by Communist led movements of insurgency is an understanding of the peasant's attitudes--his motivations, aspirations, values system. It is unfortunate that this is an area in which the western scholar finds himself in greatest difficulty. This difficulty arises from the fact that the western scholar comes from a culture where a peasant society no longer exists and his own cultural heritage renders incredible or at least incomprehensible the value system of peasant societies. Official western contact with peasant societies is limited largely to those with the ruling elites or important ethnic minority

groups whose motivations and value systems are as different from those of the peasant as are our own.

Given these limitations, it is hazardous to assume anyone can either come up with a complete understanding of the peasant or communicate intelligently to other westerners crucial insights into peasant behavior. Furthermore, peasant society today is in great flux--the traditionalism of millenia is being transformed by communications, wars, independence and growing urbanization. The diversity within peasant societies becomes increasingly important as they tend to become modernized, improvements in communications systems breakdown the isolation of village life, and wars take the younger members of village society away to distant parts of the nation. These changes are having widespread effect within these societies and creating new and disturbing values. Nevertheless, it is possible, on the basis of studies made and empirical evidence observed to reach certain generalized conclusions about peasant societies at least to the extent relevant to a study of insurgency.

The value system of the peasant invariably derives from several different cultural traditions--those of his own ethnic group; those of ancient conqueror groups; and those of the Western world to which he has become exposed in the 19th and 20th centuries. His system of values is also influenced heavily by religious doctrine and its various interpretations. Generally speaking, we are not dealing therefore with a homogeneous, uniculture system--but rather a syncretism of various cultures overlaid with religious beliefs strongly influenced by belief in the supernatural. The entire complex of values is not shared

equally by all segments of the population--some tend to be more influenced by certain elements than others.

The ancient ethnic culture modified by thousands of years of invasions and conquests is generally oriented toward a system of fixed classes with ascribed status and important rank distinctions. Each person is supposed to have a definite place in the social order and a clearly prescribed role to go with it. This tradition still affects all parts of the society to some extent.

A second set of values derives from religion. In Buddhist countries the basic concepts are the unity of all life and the ultimate spiritual perfectability and equality of all mankind. Specific doctrines include acceptance of the secular social order, religious detachment from worldly affairs, the individual's responsibility for his own status in life, and the possibility of altering one's status through a combination of individual merit and reincarnation. The achievement of merit is possible through service and by adhering to various prescriptions for personal conduct. Among the latter, emphasis is on the avoidance of suffering and of causing suffering, on self-discipline and improvement, humility, passivity, temperance, non-accumulation of wealth, harmonious relations with others.

The strongest popular focus of religious traditions is probably in the rural areas among the peasantry, for whom the doctrines serve as a rationale and a salve for his low status in the total rank and class system of the society.

A third set of values derives from the cultural tradition of the Western influence. This tradition places a high value on the

individual's ability to raise his status in life by the direct and practical means of secular education and economic advancement. It stresses active rather than passive aspects of achievement and the accumulation of material wealth as a means of achieving both personal and social ends. This tradition is most influential among civil servants and upper classes who have been directly exposed to Western education and who frequently served in the colonial administration or who lived abroad. Little of it has penetrated to the rural areas.

Today the strong divergence in values and general outlook is between the secular-minded, foreign-educated governing class of the urban centers and the more religious-minded, conservative peasantry. Peasants prefer to have their social relationships clearly defined so that each person involved has a distinct status and a prescribed role to play. There is security in knowing precisely where an individual stands, what is expected of him and others, what he and others can and cannot do. The peasant's greatest anxiety is that he will be unable to perceive the nature of the situation in which he is involved at the moment, and hence not know how to act or what to expect of others. If the peasant is unable to understand the nature of a situation or is placed in a situation of conflict between alternate positions, his tendency is to withdraw completely. One of the ways in which irrevocable family situations are handled, for example, is to retreat to the pagoda as a bonze. If he does not understand political situations, he becomes passive, uncooperative, unreachable.

A principal role of any leader in a peasant society is to explain. He is not seeking personal support in the sense that American political

candidates seek to justify their policies or affirm their personal integrity. He is trying, rather, to reestablish on a new basis the formal lines of authority, ~~and responsibility~~ <sup>Communication,</sup> between the government and the governed so that the people will cooperate. If the leader fails to explain the new situation adequately, he faces the possibility that the peasant will simply withdraw from it completely to avoid doing something improper.

Because governments have not taken the trouble to explain; because colonial powers exercised control in the cities and ruled with the acquiescence of and for the limited benefit of the local elites, government has little or no meaning or relevance to the average peasant. Elections for government officials are more a ritual that one goes through because it is required by "outsiders" than an expression of want, need, or inalienable right. The reasons for this apathy are not hard to understand--one does not have to delve into the mysticism of religious philosophy or obscure cultural heritage. It is explainable simply in terms of the environment in which the peasant lives and what is important for his survival. He is a victim of little or no education in a secular sense; he is at the mercy of the natural elements--not enough water, too much water, pests, epidemics, etc. These are things beyond the demonstrated capacity of government to cope with or ameliorate--it is more propitious to appeal to the spirit world and the pagoda than to the local government official.

In this context it becomes clear that government--for the peasant--governs best when it governs least. Politics is for another breed of people--those in the cities, those with education, and those corrupted and driven by a materialistic philosophy.

The question arises as to how the Communists can build an effective or any kind of apparatus in the villages in the face of peasant apathy to political matters and resistance to blandishments of outsiders. The answer lies, in part, in the disparity in the tasks confronting the government and those facing the insurgents. For the former, it is a task of organizing the entire village into some cohesive political structure wherein all will participate in some degree in the political life of the village--and this in the face of no historical or traditional precedents for such action. For the insurgent, it is a matter of gaining only a few adherents or workers who then become the link to the village as a whole in gathering intelligence, recruits, taxes, food, etc. Those few join the movement for a variety of personal reasons, despite the general condition of political apathy, which usually have no ideological or political basis. Recruits are obtained amongst those looking for adventure, through family ties, from among those who have been either in fact or in fancy wronged by the government or government officials. We are discussing now not the disaffected intelligentsia, but rather the people of little education, little understanding of the abstractions of power, politics, and ideologies--people with little notion of nationhood.

The fact that the insurgents are able to recruit, motivate, and maintain discipline amongst people who are inclined to be apathetic, undisciplined and family oriented--without any demonstrated desire or capacity to organize for political or other limited objectives is an anachronism that can only be explained in terms of small group dynamics prevalent even in a society that has a limited propensity for group activity.

The question of recruiting leaders of the movement is more easily explained. The elites have a different cultural heritage and behavioral response than do the peasantry. They are motivated by opportunities for self expression and power that are denied them under the existing regime. They are literate, articulate, and ambitious. They have been conditioned to operate in groups and to strive for leadership in such groups. They have no deep-seated feelings of inferiority--they welcome climactic political change as an opportunity to achieve power. The peasant joining the movement may be motivated in some cases, by less intense and less grandiose desires in this same direction--but this is far from the answer to the main recruitment job of the insurgent.

Attempts to resolve this anachronism through questioning of defectors and prisoners of war have not been successful. The answers given are patently rationalizations--answers that either are acceptable to the individual in the context of his own value system or deemed by him acceptable to authorities in theirs. These answers generally identify some great wrong done to the individual or his family by the authorities or by the community--bombing raids that destroy his family; land taken from the individual so that he can no longer earn a living; ostracism or discrimination in communal society, etc.

Observations, not only in Vietnam but also in Thailand, appear to provide some more realistic answers. In the first instance, the youth find joining the guerrilla movement an escape from boredom--and in Vietnam especially--an escape from the draft. In Vietnam, to the youngster who sees himself carted off to some far off impersonal army command for training

and assignment, the local communist organization becomes increasingly appealing. If he joins the Viet Cong, he will be close to home; he feels that he is not being committed irrevocably--he is assured he can leave the organization if he wants to. There are people he knows in the organization; and, of equal importance to all these, he feels it is safer to be a Viet Cong than a private in the Vietnamese army. And there is a positive incentive for the youth. They have not yet resigned themselves to accepting the boredom and stagnation of village life and their inferior position in society. It is the "rebellious" youth looking for an escape from life--the life of their parents and other elders they see about them--not unlike the rebellious youth in our own country. The insurgents offer an opportunity the government cannot or at least has not offered--status, opportunity, and identification. There is promise of excitement in the guerrilla camp--comraderie, drills, training, games--all in contrast to the dullness of life in the village. There are promises of advanced training in foreign lands; promises of promotions and positions of authority, especially when the evil government and its henchmen have been replaced; these are extras to the immediate benefits of escape from boredom. The cultural heritage which ordinarily inhibits sharp deviations from the present mode of life, the inhibitions imposed by the responsibility for providing for a family, have not yet made captive the young of the village and they seize the opportunity to break away from the path of drudgery they see in the lives of their parents. It is not surprising then that one finds only old people and young children upon entering a Vietnamese hamlet or among refugee groups--the youth have found an escape route in the insurgent movement.

The second part of the answer as to why peasants join the insurgent movement lies in the communist recruitment techniques. The recruitment campaign is generally not in terms of some grand design to make everyone equal or everyone rich--it is keyed to highly particularized dissatisfactions, grievances, or evidence of multiple standard of justice. The propaganda groundwork is carefully laid and usually directed to small groups--groups small enough to have common grievances and large enough to involve an element of social pressure on the individuals. The communists do not expect or particularly want large numbers of converts at a time; they prefer small numbers to facilitate digestion into the organization. But every new member leads to further recruitment because of the effectiveness of family ties in getting new recruits. An appealing feature for the individual is that he does not "enlist" for a tour or fixed time. He feels convinced he can leave when ever he decides he wants to--he can give it a whirl without committing himself. However, it frequently happens that a commitment takes place, step by step, with the recruit hardly knowing it is taking place, as he stays on in the organization and gets more and more assignments and moves deeper and deeper into the Communist labyrinth.

Thus the peasant is led as though through decompression chambers gradually from the familiar and usual to the more unfamiliar. He is influenced by the behavior of others in his village and sometimes there is coercion--used only when necessary and when the communist apparatus already exercises considerable control over the locale.

It is evident that the communists, as a result of long experience in dealing with peasant societies and through propitious circumstance

afforded by the Second World War that created conditions of enemy occupation and general dislocation of society have developed techniques for breaking down the normal apathy of the peasant towards joining revolutionary movements. This success is attributable to an understanding of the peasants and designing methods that are compatible with his normal behavior; by gradualism--which is more attuned to the peasant time frame--by the use of family and other ties which normally influence peasant behavior and by a judicious and selective exploitation of real or contrived grievances.

The communists on coming to a village, will already have a good line on the particular problems in that village and will, therefore, exploit and blow-up this problem into a "cause". Their propaganda teams, having softened-up the village, will wait for recruits to come forward to help the movement. The villagers for their part will not view those who elect to help in any other light than they have been viewed before--they do not become evil, unpatriotic, or subversive.

Once cells are established, expansion becomes a relatively easy matter. The cells are made up of people from the village known by all, and having interlocking family relationships with other families. Youngsters of draft age are readily convinced that it is less disturbing to their personal lives and more convenient for all concerned, to join the insurgents in the vicinity than to go off to some remote government army camp. The gathering of intelligence is simply a matter of listening to gossip and being aware of what is going on in this village and what the villagers know. The collection of

taxes and supplies is more complicated, because it could impinge on the welfare of the villagers. A variety of methods are employed--the insurgents' agent in the village has been compromised to the point where it is difficult not to comply with orders--therefore, he tries to carry out his assignments even when they are personally distasteful. The villagers who are asked to contribute in all likelihood do so because they are convinced by the agent they have no alternative--a form of terrorism. Ultimately, the insurgents have built a link to the village, partly on the basis of individual discontent (which one finds in any social organization), partly on opportunism and partly on terror.

#### VIII

~~We have tended to interpret~~  
~~the writings of Lenin, Mao Giap, Che Guevara and others have led~~  
~~us to believe that a successful revolution can be accomplished only with~~  
~~the mass support of the discontented, and this view is shared by many~~  
~~Americans.~~ We have come to believe that an insurgency cannot succeed unless mass discontent with the status quo and popular support for the insurgency movement are present. This has led us to the conclusion that we must eradicate the causes of discontent--raise national income, provide health and education facilities for the masses, eliminate corruption, and so on. No one can seriously argue the desirability of these things--but we now see quite clearly that they do not form an adequate response to an insurgent movement.

Although the rebels claim to have the mandate of the people, they base their hope for success on such practical measures as organization, selective terror, subversion, and military victory. By proper application of these measures, they gain enough control to force popular support.

While Mao expounds as doctrine "popular support of the masses" he is in reality aware that the key to successful revolution is in organization. While he extols the uprising of the suffering and deprived masses, his agents are busily spreading discontent, persuading and propagandizing people and organizing them into small groups.

We might explain the rise of Castro in a region of Latin America as a function of economic deprivation, poor government, social inequality, and Anti-American sentiment. But how then do we explain why it was that of the various underdeveloped countries which manifested these same characteristics, only some have experienced a communist insurgency. Or how do we explain the difference in reaction to Castro-ism even among various villages all of which are in the same situation.

We are not able on the basis of past insurgencies to isolate any one socio-cultural factor as being a key one in predicting the vulnerability to communist insurgency. Nor are we able to isolate any one personality trait, motive, or goal as key to an individuals joining the movement or as a general characteristic of the members of the group. At most, we can say that certain factors appear common to all countries in which insurgencies have occurred and therefore must assume that these are facilitating conditions--but since other countries suffer from these same problems without experiencing insurgencies we cannot determine which factors or combinations of factors will cause the movement or cause an individual to join the movement.

The fact that social ills exist does not mean the movement will develop or that a person will join. They do not improve our ability to predict. We cannot say that if these conditions are removed or

changed that the movement will decline or that a given person will then not join the group or defect from the movement.

Members characteristically postulate that they entered the movement to escape from bad conditions. But we are now sure these statements are ex post rationalizations.

One important explanation for these variations in response to social ills is the presence or absence of another factor--opportunity and leadership--the spark that ignites the powder keg. This appears to be a key factor; the precipitant of the action. It is not through chance alone, that most of the important insurgencies in the past 20 years occurred in countries that were occupied by enemy troops and where underground movements were encouraged and armed. It was these organizations, the leadership they developed, and this equipment which provided the spark.

A necessary condition of subversion and insurgency is the recruitment of people into a group of subversives, conspirators, agitators, propagandists, and insurgents. It is, of course, possible to have a sudden burst of riot and rebellion without such recruitment and organization, but the insurgent movements which are most common and of most significance are movements which are organized.

In sum, empirical studies show that conditions of deprivation, injustice, inequality are not sufficient conditions for an insurgent activity or any other type of social movement. They may facilitate the movement but they ~~do not cause it~~ are not the catalytic agent. A movement may develop in the absence of an objective condition of deprivation. Insurgents may be able to convince people they are deprived even when they are not so

by previous objective standards, and it may create the very internal conflict and general stress which later on are judged to be the cause of the movement.

Nation building is a ~~good~~<sup>viable</sup> activity--and the US should continue to devote its attention, resources, and ingenuity to this task in the underdeveloped countries. It is important not only in humanistic terms but in terms of US interest. The drive for modernization is shared by the poor as well as the elites and helping meet these aspirations of the leaders and the masses provides an effective tool for US foreign policy. But contrary to prevalent intuition, it does not appear that this is the principal way to get at the problem of rebellion. Control of insurgency movements cannot be equated with economic development.

A detailed study has been made of twenty-four insurgencies in recent times to determine whether there were any significant common general economic-sociological factors that could be reasonably attributed as casual factors. The results of that study indicate, among others:

1. A country's stage of economic development provides no immunity to insurgency. With the exception of the few mass-consumption societies, insurgency has occurred in countries at all levels of economic development.

2. Only a small percentage of the total population actually participated in the movement--from 7 to 11 percent, with an average of 6 percent were directly or indirectly involved.

3. As an insurgency progresses, the kind of individual it attracts, and the nature of individual motivation for joining change. In the early stages there is a strong ideological flavor to recruitment, and potential leaders are the target. Recruits are thoroughly screened and

tested for leadership potential and dedication; the underground looks specifically for those with ideological sympathies.

During the expansion and militarization phase motivation for joining the movement becomes less and less ideological and more and more personal. It can be deduced that individuals join as a result of a combination of factors--most often reflecting immediate needs and situational constraints--a chance to obtain personal advantage, an escape from an intolerable family situation, a chance at leadership and recognition in some group.

The main thesis is that the notion of "hearts and minds" has been misinterpreted or misunderstood in developing the U.S. Civil programs of counterinsurgency. Starting from our basic posture that economic development and the evolutionary social and political reforms following in the wake of such development are crucial to the orderly modernization of the underdeveloped countries, we appear to have moved to the thesis that grass roots economic and social improvements are decisive ingredients in blunting the force of and defeating insurgencies. Without debating now the validity of the assumption that economic development leads to orderly modernization of social and political institutions, there is no empirical evidence that grass roots economic programs or any other design of economic development program can be decisive in wars of insurgency of the type we face in Asia.

We find that the wars are conceived, planned, and directed by an elite that is bent on capturing power. This elite has had its own reasons, for joining the Communist movement, most often at an early age--as for the "grand old men" of the movement--in the early days of the

international communist movement. For some, it undoubtedly started as a revolt against colonial administration and found kinship with those leading the Russian revolution and the Mao Tse-tung movement against the Kowmintang. For whatever personal reason, it is clear that the leaders of the indigenous "liberation" movements are inspired by the opportunities a successful revolution would offer them. In this respect, the motivations are not greatly different from those associated with a coup d'etat-- the difference in tactics is dictated by the fact the revolutionary has no power base from which to stage a coup.

The building of a power base--from the peasantry on the one hand and other disaffected intellectuals on the other--leads to a war of insurgency that has some of the attributes of and gives the outside world the impression of a "popular" revolt. This is reinforced by the propaganda of the revolutionary.

But it is interesting to note repeated attempts to blunt the propaganda theme have failed to bring the insurgency to an end. The British gave Malaya its independence--and the insurgency went on ~~as was the case of~~ <sup>kept its promise of independence to</sup> the U.S. in the Philippines, but the war of national liberation continued. Repeated attempts by the Philippine government to grant general amnesties, offers of land reform, opportunities for rebel leaders to take part in the government, all failed to end the rebellion. Even in Laos, the formation of a triumvirate government at Geneva failed to bring peace.

If we examine the "sea the insurgents swim in" we find no evidence that the peasantry are either committed to the insurgents or become "uncommitted" by government programs at the grass roots. The peasantry,

because of its own experience, tradition and preoccupation with personal affairs, has little faith in and expects little from government, its officials or anyone else offering panaceas. The fact they do not dislike local members of the insurgent cell and tend to dislike or distrust government officials has led us to believe they are against government and for the insurgent. But all evidence we have indicates that the peasant attitude depends more on the individual than the organization or program. The local communist agent is someone they know intimately, a member of the community and of local families. He goes about his business without impinging on their lives. On the other hand, the government official is an outsider, always wants the villager to "do something"--and the villager frequently finds little relevance of this demand on his time to his immediate needs. But more important, he traditionally distrusts government officials even when they appear to be bearing gifts. There is even evidence that government sponsored projects, designed to elicit popular support for the government, have instead had the opposite effect.

There have been startling unresolved incongruities between our doctrine and the villagers response to that doctrine--but we have been slow to probe the reasons for these incongruities and slower to change directions despite these unexpected responses. In South Vietnam a hamlet oriented economic and social development counterinsurgency program was started in late 1962 and is still an integral part of both the US and Vietnamese activities in that country. Despite the building of thousands of hamlet classrooms, health stations, provincial hospitals, the distribution of fertilizers and pesticides, pig raising programs, rural electrification and a myriad of other local projects, security

conditions in the countryside are worse now than in 1962 when the programs were started. One might argue that they would have been considerably worse without such programs--but this is a moot question. Long An province is one of the wealthiest provinces in South Vietnam--with irrigation systems and double cropping of rice--at the same time it is one of the most insecure provinces in Vietnam.

One hears the argument that economic programs cannot succeed without security and that military efforts alone cannot succeed without economic programs--therefore, we should go ahead with the economic programs and hope that security will catch up--that the investment in economic programs, albeit showing no real political return now, will yield increasing dividends with security and in fact, give us a head start on full pacification. This argument is appealing and probably provides the real rationale for the continued existence of rural programs in Vietnam. But it appears, on balance, to be a rationalization for the failure to date and a rationale for continuing.

Priorities must be set if the counterinsurgent is to succeed. ||| |

Countries beset by insurgencies must ration their resources because of their underdevelopment and low productivity. They are poor not only in physical but also in human resources. These are countries with low literacy rates, few qualified technicians, and mediocre bureaucracies. There is a real and crucial competition for resources between military buildup; paramilitary and police requirements; intelligence agencies; border and internal resource control, communications, and social and economic development. One can mitigate to an extent the effects of this competition by adding resource from abroad--economic aid on the financial side and technicians on the human resource side. But experience shows

that economic aid cannot offset the inflationary pressures generated by the combination of all these efforts even when economic aid is virtually without limit--as in Vietnam.

As for foreign technicians--they can be helpful but not decisive.  
Such technicians cannot operate without local technicians and add the problem of need for interpreters and ancillary services. Secondly, the foreign technician cannot meet the requirements of a doctrine that postulates the necessity for building a stronger link between the people and their government. This leaves aside the question of the effect on local morale generated by the introduction of large numbers of foreign technicians enjoying higher standards of living, interpersonal frictions arising from such disparities, and the grist it provides for the enemy propaganda mill.

Priorities must be set within the context of an analytical framework that identifies what is crucial to setting down the insurgency and deferring or deemphasizing during the period of the insurgency those activities which bear little promise of affecting the course of the insurgency. In examining the history of the insurgencies in the Philippines and Malaya--the two successful cases of suppression in recent times--one does not find that economic and social development programs were decisive or even important in suppressing the insurgency. This is not to say these things are unimportant in normal circumstances, but nation building and countering insurgencies are two separate things. Our difficulty, it seems, derives from our viewing them as related and requiring an identical response.

In time of conflict, the fundamental requirements are to know what is going on at all levels of the insurgent apparatus, to cut the link between the insurgents' base areas and the population at large, to provide protection for the population so that it can resist demands for the resources and recruits essential to the insurgent movement, and hunt and destroy the guerrillas in their base areas and as they come out to terrorize or accumulate stores, and to do this with as little adverse impact on the population as possible. All the evidence available on past insurgencies and conditions in South Vietnam does not lead to the conclusion that economic and social development in the villages and hamlets is an essential ingredient. In the case of Vietnam, one could go further and argue that increasing the resource base in the rural areas (fertilizer for more rice, pigs, medical supplies, etc.) may well enhance the insurgent's capacity to wage war because he can manage to exact a larger slice of this augmented resource base.

We then come back to the notion of "hearts and minds" and attempt a definition with greater precision in order to give some indication of the direction we must pursue. In our view, the heart and mind of the peasant is with the side that gives him security, exercises control over the area he lives in, and, at the same time, makes it possible for him to pursue his normal way of life with minimum disruption.

It might appear that a government confronted by a dynamic insurgent ideology is bound to meet defeat--that no amount of tactics and technique can compensate for the ideological handicap. But this has not proved to be the case. One can generalize, with respect to the population at large, that the individual's attitude is determined not so much by the popularity and arguments of the insurgents as by his more primitive

concern for safety. The side that offers best protection; the one that appears most likely to win--these are the factors governing population's stand.

IX. In the early stage of an insurgent movement, the essential problems for the counterinsurgent stems from the fact that the demands made by an adequate response will always appear to the nation as out of proportion to the actual danger. The government is tied to his responsibilities to the nation as a whole--and is constrained by the image it projects internally and abroad.

Vigorous response in the early stages when the movement is ill defined and the prognosis of the ultimate threat not generally accepted or credible, becomes interpreted as a means of centralizing power, setting down legitimate opposition, and protecting the ruling oligarchy.

The security of the underground movement is of crucial importance to its functioning in the early stages and the leaders of a revolution are principally concerned with the reliability of those in the movement. They plan carefully the organization of the apparatus. It is therefore important for the government to penetrate the guerrilla movement, seek out its leaders and destroy the organization. The best chance of destroying the movement is to suppress it at the outset.

In the early stages the government can theoretically set its course to:

- (a) try to set down the insurgency by police action directly against the insurgent leaders;
- (b) promise and take action to ameliorate the social and economic conditions that form the core of the insurgent propaganda;
- (c) penetrate the insurgent organization and try to render it ineffective;

and (d) start to build up or reinforce the political machinery at the local level in order to govern more effectively where the masses of the people live and the insurgents must spread their tentacles.

But some of these courses are impractical. Acting forcefully against critics of the government through repressive police measures has psychological disadvantages--both internally and externally. The imposition of censorship, the arbitrary arrest of suspected leaders of a revolutionary movement (when a revolution in the making is still not a generally accepted fact), can give impetus to the cause of the revolutionary. Ameliorating the weaknesses in the society is, in effect, to solve the country's basic problems and these problems are not susceptible to ready solution.

On the other hand, a young insurgent movement is necessarily inexperienced and should be relatively easy to infiltrate with agents who will attempt to derail it, disintegrate it, or at a minimum, gather information. As to building a more effective political machine at the village level, it will be considerably more easily accomplished at the early stages than later on when the insurgent has built a network of cells and extended his control into the villages. Ultimately, such political control must be exercised by the government, if it is to defeat the insurgency, in order to provide the protection of the population needed to isolate the insurgent from the population.

Therefore, in the early stages, it would appear that the most effective action to be taken by government would be in the areas of intelligence (penetration of the movement by government agents) and the build-up of local government at the village level.

consisting principally of an officer class trained in conventional warfare  
The military establishment finds itself ill-prepared for the new conflict. It has been trained and equipped to fight conventional wars--defending the country's borders from an advancing enemy using conventional military tactics.

The strategy of conventional warfare prescribes the conquest of enemy's territory; the destruction of his forces. But here the enemy holds no territory and refuses to fight for territory.

The destruction of insurgent forces requires that they be localized and encircled--but they are either too small to be spotted and encircled or the terrain doesn't lend itself to encirclement, or both. In these circumstances, intelligence is crucial and intelligence must come from the population--but they won't give it unless they feel safe, to feel safe the insurgents first have to be removed--a chicken and egg dilemma.

Insurgent forces are too mobile to be encircled and annihilated easily--the terrain they work in is not readily susceptible to mechanized transport--they know the terrain well and have escape routes all worked out.

The counterinsurgent must apply a new and unique type of warfare that takes into account the nature of the revolutionary war. He must recognize that the support of the population is as necessary to the counterinsurgent as it is to the insurgent. It may be possible to disperse and expel the insurgent forces from a given area by purely military action, but it is impossible to prevent the return of the guerrilla units and the rebuilding of the political cells, unless the population cooperates.

Once the insurgency has moved from the initial organizational stages to active warfare and sabotage, a higher degree of national involvement is required. In this stage, the insurgent has succeeded in building a political organization--he directs either an elite party working through front organizations that reach an important segment of the population, or he leads directly a large revolutionary movement bent on eroding government control.

At this stage, one starts to recognize geographic areas where either (a) the insurgent effectively controls the population and carries out guerrilla warfare; (b) he attempts to expand by organizing the population along with some guerrilla activity; and (c) areas not yet affected but nevertheless threatened.

It is at this point that a popular recognition of an organized revolution begins to emerge--something the leaders of the government were aware of earlier but were constrained from giving it widespread acknowledgement. Within the government itself, the bureaucracy is slow to react--the vested interests of departments and leaders of power factions are still difficult to subordinate to the requirements of the common welfare. Old line ministries look with fear on centralized direction and control over their activities which require reorientation to meet the threat. The government finds itself confronted with the inertia of normal operations, the necessity of reorienting its efforts to key areas and fixed installations, expanding police and para-military forces to protect lives and property and patrol the highways, the need to track the insurgent forces in their redoubts; and the need to extend its area of political involvement to the villages.

Control over the population, therefore, becomes the objective of the counterinsurgent as it is for the insurgent. The insurgent, with his organization at the grass roots, is tactically stronger where it counts-- at the population level. But this is where the fight must be conducted.

Support must be gained through an active minority--the majority is passive; the insurgents work through an active minority of their own. The strategic problem is to find the favorable minority; to organize it in order to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority. The strategy involves not only the destruction in a given area of the insurgents forces and his political organization--but the creation of a favorable political organization in the village that will serve to prevent the re-emergence of an insurgent political base--in short, the destruction of the insurgent's apparatus, the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population.

This strategy presents difficulties--support from the population is conditional. The minority hostile to the insurgent will not and cannot emerge as long as the threat of insurgent reprisal has not been lifted to a reasonable extent. The bulk of the population will not be willing to support the counterinsurgent so long as it is not convinced that the counterinsurgent has the will, the means, and the ability to win. Therefore, effective political action on the population must be accompanied by military and police operations against the guerrilla units and the insurgent political organization.

Political, social, economic reforms, however desirable, wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered where the insurgent still controls the population.

The insurgent is fluid, but the population is not. By concentrating on the population, the counterinsurgent minimizes his relative rigidity and makes full use of his assets. When the counterinsurgent concentrates his efforts not on the insurgent directly but on the population which is the insurgent's real source of strength, the insurgent is cut-off from his access to the open world and must come out from his jungle and mountain hideouts or perish.

While the modern guerrilla depends increasingly upon the international community for military and diplomatic support, he must rely almost exclusively on the local community for all the immediate necessities - - food, clothing, shelter, funds, cover, and intelligence. This "community support" need not be actively friendly--it must be at least passive. The government's strategy must deprive him of the active and passive support of the community--this cannot be done without a government presence in the village.

## Part II--Prescription

In the preceding section we have examined a variety of factors affecting the development of an insurgent movement and attempted to describe the dynamics of the movement itself and the social structure in which it operates. In this section we will first summarize what appears to us as the crucial considerations and then attempt to relate those considerations to a counterinsurgency strategy.

When one compares the political systems of existing regimes with those of insurgent movements, it becomes apparent that the village and the people of the village are the real battleground. Existing governments have their power concentrated in the national capitals, here is where coups are made, where power struggles take place, where the vested interests are concentrated, as well as being the seats of cultural and financial life. From the national capital slender fingers of control are extended to the province capitals--principally through Ministries of Interior--with limited discretionary powers delegated to these appendages of central government.

Other agencies of government participate at this level by attaching personnel to provincial headquarters. The military establishment, police, tax collectors, and judicial systems are the principal ingredients of provincial government, augmented in varying degrees with personnel from civilian agencies, such as agriculture, health, education etc. By the time one gets to the district level, the central government presence is very thin--and at the village level is virtually non-existent. Village life is largely self-administered--with the village headman selected in accordance with traditional custom and exercising

little influence on the people and having little contact with formal government as a representative of the people.

The guerrillas, on the other hand, build their political base from the bottom up. They start from base areas in the jungle or mountain redoubts and concentrate manpower, resources, and leadership there. While government operates from the relative comfort of the capital, the guerrilla operates from the hostile environment of unpopulated and concealed redoubts. But the guerrilla cannot survive for long in this isolation. His need for recruits, resources, money, and intelligence requires that he leave the comparative safety of his bases and set up lines of communication into the village. He hopes to extend this network so that it encompasses towns and cities, and finally the capital city. But when he reaches that stage, he is no longer a guerrilla but a full-fledged revolutionist fighting a conventional war--holding territory and flying a flag over parts of the country.

The link between the covert world of the jungle bases and the overt world of resources and information is a network of cells in the village. These cells are created painstakingly lest the network become infiltrated with government agents and in order to get people with greatest potential for serving the guerrilla's cause. In the end, the success or failure depends on the success or failure of the village organization. Without this window to the open world the guerrilla is blinded and will perish in the hostile jungle.

In opening this window, he is helped by the absence of a government presence in the village--this is a key element in the success of insurgency movement. The insurgent takes advantage of lack of government

presence, latent and potential discontent, as well as the boredom and neglect of village life. We spent considerable time in the previous section in outlining the recruitment techniques in the village and the factors influencing village people to cooperate. Against the boredom, bleak outlook for the future, <sup>and</sup> feeling of abandonment, he offers excitement, comradeship, and future prospects.

The lack of commitment to government on the part of the villager helps facilitate the establishment of cells in the village and permits individuals to cooperate with the movement without alienating themselves from the village. Once this toehold has been established, then the acquiescence of the rest of the villagers becomes a matter of personal survival--informers are liquidated--non-cooperators treated severely and the insurgent apparatus takes over the village.

Agrarian societies in the underdeveloped countries represent fertile soil for such organizing efforts regardless of whether the central government is benevolent or not; whether it is committed to economic development or not; or even whether popularly elected or not. The issue is whether government exercises control, whether it communicates with people, has access to intelligence, is able to provide protection. In the absence of effective government presence, one can join the insurgent movement with very little hazard. Those who do not join will cooperate with whatever force represents power in the community.

The first principle in counterinsurgency is the need to control-- control at the village level and the second principle is that economic and social development, per se, will not blunt the force of the insurgent

movement unless it is tied to the concept of village control. The people will cooperate with whomever exercises power and provides protection. The villages must be purged of all vestiges of the Communist apparatus. But no village even if purged of communist cells can ever fully protect itself against communist attack. The insurgent has the initiative in selecting targets and can concentrate his forces on such targets. Therefore a village defense system requires a back-up of mobile strike forces that can help village defenders and inflict losses on the attacking force.

### I. Vietnam

Vietnam represents the most serious and most efficient insurgent movement since the days of the struggle on the China mainland. Before the arrival of large elements of American armed forces in 1965, South Vietnam stood in danger of losing important population centers which in turn could have engendered a complete collapse of government morale and final military defeat. The American presence has been effective in preventing the Communists from moving to the final and successful stages of guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, the introduction of American forces has not materially affected the guerrilla network in the villages, especially in the delta. The Viet-Cong still controls the rural areas and has access to the resources, manpower and intelligence of the villages.

The bombing in the North, designed to weaken North Vietnam's appetite for the war, arouse international concern, and impair North

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Vietnam's capabilities in supplying troops in South Vietnam has thus far failed to produce a short cut to an acceptable solution. This failure can be attributed to the fact that the North Vietnamese do not see themselves in grave difficulty--the communist network is intact in the South, the bombing damage in the North is tolerable, the staying power of the US and the Vietnamese governments is questionable, and the terms of a settlement acceptable to the US are unacceptable to North Vietnamese. Hanoi and Peking probably calculate that public dissention in the U.S. over the Vietnam war and particularly the bombing of North Vietnam has a greater weakening effect on us than does the bombing of North Vietnam on them.

It would be surprising if there were not, in the inner councils of the Peking government, opposition to China's foreign policies. These policies have isolated China and deprived her of access to assistance in modernizing both the military structure and the civilian economy. This isolation combined with recent setbacks in Indonesia, elsewhere in Asia and Africa, the continued estrangement with the Soviet Union, must ultimately affect China's foreign policy. But moderation of the current drive to expel American power from Asia and to expand China's hegemony over the underdeveloped countries of the continent would be delayed and the force of the voices of moderation overruled if we were to yield in South Vietnam. It appears that it is now too late for us to opt for working with an independent Communist state in Vietnam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, even if that option had in fact existed in 1956. Standing firm in South Vietnam for an independent South Vietnamese government may ultimately be less

costly than a pull-out--the hawks in Peking could only be encouraged from such a withdrawal to more adventures which could lead in the end to a direct confrontation between the US and China.

Vietnam is a mixture of success and failure. The insurgents cannot conquer South Vietnam by moving to stage three of the classic Mao Tse Tung strategy in the face of American and allied forces; on the other hand the Vietnamese have not been able to root out the Communist apparatus from the villages nor have we been able to wipe out the jungle bases. We have not been able to erode North Vietnam's resolve to continue the struggle through bombing and we cannot be sure that expanding the bombing area or numbers of targets will change that condition.

This situation is quite different from the closing days of the war in Korea. At that time, there was great pressure in the US for a strike across the Yalu River after the invasion of South Korea has been rolled back. We had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, and the only constraint was US policy and public opinion both of which could have been changed with continued frustration. In such circumstances a return to the status quo ante became acceptable to the Communists. Today, it does not appear that the Communists are prepared to settle for a return to status quo ante in Vietnam--Peking does not feel itself in danger of attack from the US, North Vietnam may have lost its capacity to end the war unilaterally, the Soviet Union finds it difficult or not in its own interest to influence North Vietnam to pull back despite North Vietnam's reliance on the Soviet Union, and the frustration in the US generate serious public quarrels about US policy in Asia.

There is of course the possibility that some break will occur in the Communist position through some fortuitous chain of occurrences-- revolution in China, Mao Tse-tung's demise--effective Soviet pressure on North Vietnam. These could quickly bring an end to the war--just as Tito's defection from Moscow brought an end to the Greek rebellion. But at present there appears no acceptable basis for negotiations with the Communists.

Negotiations ordinarily take place when the rival positions are close enough to work out the details. The communists have not given up hope of control of South Vietnam as a first step to an extended sphere of influence in Asia and a withdrawal of US influence there. As long as we are unwilling to accept this scenario, we cannot agree to North Vietnam's conditions for negotiations. As long as the communist apparatus controls the rural areas of South Vietnam and as long as there is doubt as to whether we are prepared to stay the course, the communists find our conditions for negotiations unacceptable, <sup>particularly</sup> since we are not willing to negotiate away South Vietnam to Ho Chi Minh and the communists are not prepared to accept as a permanent arrangement US power and influence in Southeast Asia. In the power-security dilemma that Vietnam represents for both us and the communists, negotiations are possible when either side is prepared to accept defeat or both sides recognize a stalemate that cannot be broken by any foreseeable set of circumstances. It does not appear that we have reached either.

The political problems in the US surrounding the war in Vietnam are not unique to us or to the Vietnam war--it is the generic problem

of a Western parliamentary democracy in fighting a war of insurgency. The propaganda of the insurgents depict the struggle as a class-war with the insurgents on the side of the depressed masses and the US supporting the corrupt oppressors of the masses. The camouflage of the real issues is performed so expertly that support is built up in the US among a variety of groups. There are those who are led to believe that the war is another case of anti-colonialism or peasant revolt against oppressive land owners and corrupt government. The ideological base of the propaganda is embellished with stories of government atrocities, the government's weakness and ultimate defeat, defections from the Army, and popular support for the insurgent cause.

All these factors, combined with a latent fear that as the war continues the possibility of a general war increases, give rise to doubts as to whether the continuation of the struggle is in our interest. But the fact is, if the present regime with all its weakness, were replaced by a communist regime, the new regime would hold less rather than more promise for expanding the area of personal freedom, modernization of the political and social systems, and the whole gamut of liberalism portrayed in the propaganda.

The history of the Communist states in the 20th century reveals less personal liberty--rather than more, a greater suppression of the individual to the dictates of the regime; less popular participation in making policy, selecting governments, and in the amelioration of economic conditions. One has only to consider whether the people of North Vietnam have more or less freedom than those in South Vietnam,

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whether popular protests and demonstrations against government policy is possible in North or South Vietnam; whether communist bureaucracies have been advantageous to the peasants of China or North Vietnam, to recognize the hypocrisy of communist propaganda.

If the war is to be concluded in South Vietnam, it will take a long time. An examination of successful counterinsurgencies of the recent past--Malaya, Philippines, Algeria, Greece--reveals that the crucial factor was the cutting of the communications-logistics link between the guerrilla bases and the sources of supply. The jungle bases depend for their viability on access to men, material and information from the villages.

Runners, recruited in the villages or impressed into the service of the guerrillas through coercion carry the implements of guerrilla warfare, transmit messages, and serve as the eyes and ears of the guerrilla movement. Without them and the resources they represent, the guerrillas in the jungle are isolated and fall to government counter measures. This was recognized as early as 1961 in Vietnam when the strategic hamlet program was the cornerstone of the counterinsurgency. Its failure was not due to faulty doctrine--but to ineffective execution. Failure to develop detailed plans and failure to communicate with lower echelons of government responsible for execution spelled failure for the plan. Criteria for strategic hamlets became quantitative--number of hamlets with fences around them, numbers of radios installed, etc. The neglect of the qualitative elements--elimination of communist cells from within the fenced area, political organization of the hamlet, defense systems, etc, were the critical defect in the plan.

It appears on the basis of an analysis of previous insurgent movements and the current situation in Vietnam that the war in South Vietnam cannot be won there (if it is to be won in South Vietnam) without a major concentrated move into the hamlets. Whether this can be done by the Vietnamese is an important question. Any number of strategies can be devised for accomplishing this--the crux of the matter is the willingness and ability of the Vietnamese to execute effectively any such plan.

One can conceive of a plan along the following general lines. American and other foreign fighting forces in South Vietnam are assigned the mission of coping with Viet Cong main force units, infiltration routes, and direct action against jungle bases. This would fit best their capabilities of greater fire power and mobility. The ARVN would be assigned the mission of hamlet defense and pacification--a form of para military operations requiring small units stationed in hamlets, patrolling the nearby areas, and ambushing Viet Cong guerrillas operating out of the jungle areas. All hamlets in an area under the political and military control of a single guerrilla base complex would constitute a single pacification area. A senior Vietnamese military officer would be assigned responsibility for the pacification of that area which may cut across province, district, or corps lines. This would become a military district under the control of the military commander. Small units would be stationed in each hamlet in that area, the size of the unit in each hamlet decided on the basis of an evaluation of the requirements. These units would be armed with rapid fire small arms

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and mortar. Searchlights and communications equipment would be installed in order to light up the area at night in the event of attack and to keep up regular contact with military headquarters. In the region there would be established "quick reaction" forces, with helicopters, infra-red sensors, and other equipment considered necessary to come to the relief of an attacked village without becoming vulnerable to guerrilla ambushes.

The hamlet defense units would move into each hamlet in the military area almost simultaneously--the reaction force post would have been set up in advance--and communications started immediately. The hamlet defense units would be led by officers who had been given training in dealing with civilian population. Whatever was acquired in the hamlet would be paid for--quarters would be set up for the unit so as not to dislocate or inconvenience the people. In the first days this could be the schoolhouse or any other public building--if none of these are available--tents would be part of the initial equipment. These outposts could be provisioned from outside if necessary.

The first task of the hamlet defense unit would be interrogation of all family heads--with equal time for each interview in order not to cast suspicion on those that remain longer. The purpose of the interrogations are two-fold: (a) to start a census of the hamlet, identifying each house on a map, the occupants, who is missing from the village, and the issuance of ID cards and (b) to attempt to get information that would lead to a rooting out of the Communist apparatus in the hamlet. Personnel would have to be specially trained for such

interrogation--how to treat the people, what questions to ask, and how to evaluate the reaction of those interrogated. <sup>4</sup>In the beginning, the results of this effort would, in all likelihood, be meager--the hamlet inhabitants are not going to expose themselves until there is substantial evidence that the military force will continue to stay in the hamlet and that it can indeed provide protection for the hamlet. After a period of time--weeks or perhaps months, as the intentions, behavior, and competence of the hamlet defense group becomes clear--there will occur a "break" in the intelligence area--an informer will come forward identifying the communist operators--and then the "purging" of the hamlet will be underway. The interrogation of suspects would take place outside the hamlet, at some specially established detention center, with more expert interrogators in charge of the operation. Decisions as to what should be done with different classes of Communist workers would be made at this center, the ultimate objective being rehabilitation and return to the hamlet, but this would have to be delayed while the purge and reorganization of the hamlet is underway.

While waiting for this break on the intelligence front and as part of the long range tactical approach to the hamlet, the hamlet defense group would move ahead on attempting to establish a normal routine for the hamlet under this form of "military occupation". It is important that the authority of the military group be established at the outset. Orders to the hamlet must be obeyed--curfews, school attendance, reporting of visits by strangers to the village, etc. Violations when clearly established would result in fines--the principle must be established that there are risks involved in non-cooperation. This will

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require considerable judgement on the part of the head of the military unit--new situations will arise continuously taxing his ingenuity. The treatment should be fair, and in accord with established rules, but rules should be rigorously enforced. The success or failure of the operation hinges on this factor. ✓

avoided almost entirely to matters of security --

After the first few weeks--with the census and first round of interrogations completed, regulations announced and clarified, some small civic action projects would be started. To do this, the hamlet inhabitants would be required to name a leader--a person responsible for working with the people to determine the kinds of projects. It would probably be hard to get anyone, in the early stages, to accept this position because of innate distrust and because of the risk that the Viet Cong would mark such a person as a collaborator. In this event, the head of the military group would designate someone in the village--making it clear to all that he has been designated, that he has not volunteered--and that he has been designated because he seems to have the qualifications for this particular task. It should also be made clear that his cooperation is required--that there will be punishment for non-performance and that those who attempt to obstruct his work will be treated similarly.

The projects--school house, dispensary, market place, feeder road, etc-- will be those selected by the people. The resources needed for the projects would be requisitioned from the military, funds would be allocated for hamlet labor and supervision would be delegated to the hamlet. The military establishment would also see to it that a teacher is provided for the

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school, that a medical officer makes regular calls on the hamlet, that hamlet needs are met quickly and effectively. Each night 3-4 men of the military unit would be sent out on patrol in the environs of the hamlet, ambushes would be laid on roads suspected of guerrilla traffic or of being messenger routes to base areas. While this pacification effort proceeds in the hamlet and a continuous population and resource control program is in effect, larger friendly military units would be attacking the jungle bases themselves. With bombing and shelling by day and patrols at night, the guerrilla bases would be under a two pronged attack--from American and other allied forces attacking the bases directly and from Vietnamese troops cutting off access to the hamlets.

There would, of course, be attacks on individual hamlets by guerrillas attempting to wipe out hamlet defense units--and some would succeed. But a general defeat in the whole area through defeat in detail is unlikely--if the whole military area is blanketed by hamlet defense units and if the reaction force responds to such attacks. If a plan of this nature could be made to operate effectively, the guerrilla movement in the military district would begin to crumble quickly. Attrition, lack of intelligence, and the dangers involved in just getting supplies would result in major defections from the bases. Procedures would have to be established to make defection possible and relatively easy--and an enlightened and liberal policy for dealing with defectors. The leaders of the guerrillas are not likely to give up-- the defectors would be villagers who joined for excitement, from coercion, or other non-ideological motivations.

As the security situation improved and the hamlet gave evidence of its ability to defend itself--then local defense auxiliaries would be added to the military contingent. The size of the military contingent would be reduced as auxiliaries replaced military personnel and ultimately local police and local auxiliaries could do the whole job.

The strategy outlined above is not a theoretical or untried system for dealing with insurgents. It was used successfully in Algeria, in the Kybilia region, by colonial troops in a hostile village environment. David Galula, the local French commander of a sub-region, has described this work in detail in a RAND Corporation publication "Pacification in Algeria." This has been selected as a model for the Delta region of South Vietnam because it appears more relevant than the experience in the Philippines or Malaya.

There are two questions involved in the above proposal. First, would the Vietnamese military establishment be willing to accept as its primary mission village pacification?<sup>?</sup> and Secondly, is there enough confidence in the quality of Vietnamese military leadership and discipline within the units to hold out promise for effective implementation of this mission?<sup>?</sup> We cannot, however, afford to ~~accept a Vietnamese take~~ <sup>dismiss this concept solely on the</sup> ~~basis of these unknowns.~~ <sup>basis of these unknowns.</sup> ~~basis.~~ If some form of effective hamlet control is not undertaken, the war probably cannot be won in South Vietnam, no matter how many troops we put in, or how much we are willing to devote to economic development.

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Questions of Vietnamese willingness and ability to execute hamlet pacification programs must be considered in the context of our own involvement in Vietnam and the "advisory" component of our military effort there. The US has considerable leverage in Vietnam in getting the Vietnamese to agree to such a division of roles and missions. It will also be necessary to attach American advisors to all echelons of the pacification effort--in part to advise, in part to monitor, but largely to act as a brake on Vietnamese Army excesses in the hamlets and a spur to its conscience--to stay on the job, to fight when called upon and to protect the populace.

A realistic appraisal of the AID counterinsurgency program in Vietnam to date--starting from 1962--would lead one to the conclusion that it has not been successful in terms of strengthening the government's position in the rural areas, weaning the populace away from the insurgents, gaining their support, etc. The program was started--on a modest scale--as an adjunct to a strategic hamlet program that was to provide security for the people in the hamlets. With the demise of Diem--and even before--the failures of the strategic hamlet program became obvious. This was followed by a rapid succession of strategic plans--the "oil spot" plan, Rural Pacification, Rural Development, Political Action Teams, Rural Development cadres etc.

All during the past five years however it was clear that economic and social development could not materially affect the balance of the power struggle between the Vietnamese government and the insurgents--that security for the people and isolation of the guerrillas was the prime

requisite. The economic and social development programs could be a useful adjunct to a security program and could have long range benefits in terms of political stability and liberal, humanistic political development. But without a successful security program, economic development cannot break the hold of the Communist apparatus over the countryside. Under some circumstances (such as increasing rice production) economic development programs could have a negative effect as the communists gain control over larger stocks of resources in their control over the rural areas and the main arteries of communications.

Any rural development program must therefore be assessed in terms of its efficiency in helping the Vietnamese government regain control over the countryside. The US government's decision to assign responsibility to the US military command for rural development is probably a wise one. Dislodging Communists is a military matter--the economic activities must be consistent with an contribute to this military effort. The key elements of such programs are those that will deny resources to the enemy, will help bridge the transition from peace to war. The people must participate in the planning of projects for their hamlet, they must choose their leaders to deal with the central government on matters important to them, and the government, in turn, must establish effective presence in the rural areas. This whole process must be institutionalized so that it remains after the war and becomes a part of the "normal" functioning of government. If rural development is not institutionalized--but consists only of a series of individual projects depending upon the presence of an American technician--then the opportunity for building a viable Vietnamese political structure for the future will be lost.

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Vietnam is by far the most difficult test we face in meeting Communist insurgency. The organization and leadership of the Viet Cong is good; the proximity to North Vietnam as a source of manpower and military equipment, Cambodia as a safe haven; Laos as an infiltration route--all complicate the defense problem. The factionalism, and war weariness of the South Vietnamese are further assets in the Viet Cong. If this insurgency is defeated, we will have defeated a really professional outfit--the Malayan, Philippine, Greek insurgents were all minor league compared to the Viet Cong. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia we face other problems of insurgency--but nothing to compare with the one in Vietnam.

## II. Thailand

In Thailand, there is a communist insurgency movement in early stages of development. The Chinese Communist government has threatened insurgency in Thailand in return for Thailand's support of US policies in Asia. The main effort is concentrated in Northeast Thailand--an area populated in the main by non-Thai ethnic groups and disadvantaged in terms of resources--poorer soil, lower per capita income, more remote from population centers. The area is also suitable for guerrilla operations because of its rugged terrain and access to communist assistance across the Mekong River. In addition to the problems of the Northeast, the Thais still have the remnants of the Malay insurgents in the predominantly Moslem southern provinces, a long standing tribal dissidence near the Burmese, Laos and Chinese borders in the North and more recently, guerrilla activity in the mid-South--near the

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Burmese border. The US has until very recently concentrated its attention on the Northeast--this appearing to be potentially the most dangerous area because of its linkage to Chinese initiative, proximity to Laos and North Vietnamese resources, leadership and safe havens.

Historically, Thailand has maintained its own independence in an area otherwise characterized by spheres of influence, suzerainty, conquest and colonialism by an astute balancing act between the principle competing powers. This was successful even during the dynamic period of European conquests in Asia--Thailand became a buffer between British interests to the West and French interests to the East.

Today, the threat to Thai independence is China and China's attempts to extend hegemony over Asia as part of a drive to expel American military power and political influence from that continent. This has a strong influence on Thai foreign policy--its support of SEATO; its support of US objectives in South Vietnam. Thailand provides, at considerable risk to itself, military facilities for use by the US against communists in Vietnam, and has furnished troops for South Vietnam. It has elected to cooperate with the US in Asia as a counter poise to Chinese power, looking upon expansion of Chinese influence in Asia as a threat to its own independence.

Thailand probably views this relationship with the US important even if the struggle in South Vietnam goes against us. For if the Communists were to succeed in South Vietnam, the pressure on Thailand would increase even if it had not cooperated with the West as Communist resources are freed for new adventures and Peking policy becomes more expansionist.

Thailand is led by a coalition of political forces--each deriving power from a military or para-military base rather than from popular support of the people. This coalition is therefore necessarily fragile and stands in danger of breaking up if any part of the coalition elects to upset the existing power arrangement. Consequently, all actions taken by the government with respect to domestic policy, missions assigned to military and para-military units, the organization of government agency operations and responsibilities are weighed by the government in light of its impact on the relative power of the protagonists. This factor is probably the chief reason for fragmenting responsibility within the government for counterinsurgency policy and execution and the seemingly inchoate assignment of roles and missions between (a) the several elements of government and (b) central authorities in Bangkok and local authorities in the provinces. Insurgency or rebellion are not new to Thailand--there is a long history of tribal rebellion in the North, and since the end of the "emergency" in Malaya, guerrillas from Malaya have hidden out in the South.

Despite a step-up in the "incident rate" in Northeast Thailand, it appears the guerrilla movement has progressed slowly. The numbers of guerrillas, their capacity to carry out guerrilla operations, the communications and logistics systems, as well as the organizing and recruiting momentum all remain at levels associated with only the early stage of the development of a classical Communist guerrilla movement. This slow progress is either by design or because of the competition, within the Communist camp, for resources and leadership cadre. The

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response of the Thai government has been mixed. On the civilian side, the Thais have mounted an economic and social improvement program by both military and civilian agencies of the government. The objective is to remove the major causes of discontent, to demonstrate progress and government concern for the welfare of the people, and increase the level of government presence in a progressive and benevolent manner. On the security side, local police capabilities are being strengthened as well as those of the Border Police, local military units and intelligence agencies. Coordinating facilities are being established at Civil-Police-Military Coordinating Centers in the "hot" regions and a Joint Security Center has been established at Udorn. Police installations are being decentralized to the county level in order to bring police protection, intelligence gathering, and resource and population control closer to the seats of rural population.

If we were to draw up a balance sheet on conditions in Thailand we would find on the credit side a long history of stable, independent government, strong commitment on the part of the elites to keep Thailand independent, and a popular monarch. This history of managing its own affairs for some 700 years in a region rife with intrigue and conquest, as well as dissident minority tribal groups, has resulted in a government intelligence system capable of protecting the country. Another important plus on the balance sheet is an open admission of an insurgent movement on Thai soil and public acceptance of the need to meet the threat. The government's control over the communications media has thus far prevented Communist propaganda from identifying

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the movement country-wide as a progressive movement to liberate the peasantry from the clutches of a ruling oligarchy. To these advantages can be added US support which helps break bottlenecks, injects resources, and commits itself to Thailand's security.

On the debit side of the balance sheet is the internal competition for power, the lack of a coordinated and cooperative effort on the part of all elements in the government, the traditional dislike on the part of rural people for local government officials and police, the lack of an integrated strategy for meeting the threat of insurgency, large clusters of hostile minority groups in Thailand, difficult terrain, and the guerrilla's easy access to Communist held territory in Laos. To this must be added a hypothesis on the part of some observers that a Communist guerrilla movement in Northeast Thailand represents a political asset to the Thai government in that it insures US involvement in Thailand and provides the essential counterpoise to China.

This latter point is a possible debit because it could contribute to complacency on the part of the Thais--limiting their reaction to measures necessary to contain the movement so that it does not get large enough to endanger the regime but never eliminating it lest the US lose interest in Thailand. According to this hypothesis, the Thais will take measures, with US support, to demonstrate concern for the peasantry and build-up para-military capabilities, but somehow fail to exploit all the resources available to deal a crippling blow to the fledging insurgent movement. This hypothesis may be too complicated for the Thais to have developed as a calculated plan and failures to deal

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effectively with the insurgents may be due to government inefficiencies and rivalries rather than design but it cannot be dismissed as completely irrelevant.

Whether through bureaucratic inefficiency or through design-- the Thai inability to choke off the insurgency despite its stable government, public support, relatively efficient intelligence system and US help--represents an ominous warning for the US. Guerrilla movements in Asia have not been easy to set down even when the guerrilla movement itself--by objective criteria--was not very efficient or well organized. But guerrilla movements in China and Vietnam were and are efficient. The Communists are perfecting their techniques, learning by mistakes, picking their shots in light of past experience, and developing more and more experienced leadership cadre. For the Thais to miss an opportunity to eliminate the insurgency at an early stage in its development could turn out to be a very costly matter.

This brings us to the question of what should be done and whether what we are now doing is proper and effective. On the security front, the Thai Government has an 09/10 plan (current calendar years) designed to wipe out Communist bases in the Northeast. On the economic-political-social front, it continues its concentration on the efforts of the MDU and ARD programs to bring economic benefits to the depressed Northeast, decentralize government decision-making to the province level, and provide an improved police protection system.

Thus far, it would be hazardous to predict the outcome of these efforts--the Communists are changing their tactics to meet government

initiatives, and the government will perforce change its tactics to meet new situations. Furthermore, we apparently do not know everything the government is doing to meet this problem, especially in the matter of intelligence and penetration of the Communist apparatus.

If we accept, however, the thesis that the most efficient and long-lasting response is to build a government presence into the villages themselves--as a means of preventing the creation of Communist cells, or of eliminating them where they already exist--then the present effort appears inadequate. Whatever real value a road building program may have in the future economic development and modernization of the Northeast--it does not materially inhibit the growth of the Communist insurgency. The 09/10 plan is, thus far, not succeeding. Despite casualties inflicted on the Communists, they continue their harassment of villages--using twilight and night raids as a means of countering increased daylight mobility of government forces in the area. As one could predict on the basis of earlier experience, base camp sites are moved quickly in response to direct government attacks on the bases. There is no comprehensive government presence in the villages. Without the latter, it is not likely that the 09/10 plan will have lasting effects.

It is recognized that the build-up of police-military capabilities is still going on and that one cannot judge the ultimate efficiency of that force on the basis of current capabilities. However, it can be predicted that the provision of equipment and training of personnel will not suffice to break up the communist apparatus. The need remains for a strategic plan.

It is not possible to get solid information on Thai government intelligence activities and penetration of the Communist movement. It is possible, even likely, that they have penetrated the organization and are working effectively from within. This may account, in part, for the insurgent's slow progress to date.

There appears to be no consensus among US officials on what must be done. Those oriented to "nation building" activities contend that the long term solution is economic development--thus providing a rationale for road building, agricultural improvements, health and education programs and so on. Those oriented to political development seem convinced that the long term solution lies in the direction of greater democracy and the emergence of a "third force"--a politically articulate, non-communist opposition group vying for power with the established military oligarchy. Experts in the study of Chinese Communist style insurgencies recognize the need for an expanded government presence in the villages but find it difficult to find the leverage and means for doing this.

An outstanding weakness in our position in Thailand is the lack of a strategy for dealing with the insurgency. Though virtually our entire economic aid program is postulated on the need to provide resources for counterinsurgency, the individual elements of our program have not been fitted into a general mosaic. It is difficult to see either the inter-relationship of the various economic projects to each other or their intended contribution to countering insurgency. There are a variety of road projects in the Northeast, there have been

proposals for major arterial highways, there are projects to assist the police, some to assist the border police, volunteer village defense systems. Other agencies of the US government are also involved in projects affecting security and the military assistance program provides equipment for the military establishment.

But the counterinsurgency roles and mission of the various Thai military, para-military, and police units have not been developed in a logical pattern based on a central concept and an analysis of capabilities. The build-up of the role of combat police to seek out and destroy the insurgents in the jungles and mountains appears redundant with Army responsibility. Each unit seeks greater mobility (helicopters) and firepower in order to destroy the Communists-but instead of a coherent division of responsibility we seem to be supporting domestic political rivalries. Much the same can be said for the intelligence system. The role of economic development projects in countering the threat of the insurgents is not clear--they are based on a general assumption that economic activities in the rural areas will inevitably help in overcoming the guerrillas without a more detailed analysis of how this is to come about.

A first requirement then in Thailand is the development of a strategic plan to deal with the problem of Communist insurgency.

Conditions in Thailand are obviously different from those in Vietnam or Laos and therefore the requirements are different. Questions of economic development and nation building must be related

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to their contribution to the defeat of the insurgency.

Once we have reached general agreement on objectives and strategy the second step should be the institutionalization of the counterinsurgency program in the THAI government. The analytic framework leading to the US position would be discussed with Thai government leaders, the concepts and programs agreed to, and a joint US-Thai group established to (a) implement the program (b) evaluate, on a continuing basis, progress made against this program (c) suggestions for modification of programs in light of such evaluation. The resource requirements would be worked out jointly and the US financial assistance, as well as military assistance, would be made consistent with the basic concept and programs.

One has the feeling now that programs started before are running on inertia and precedent without any real assessment of their validity or efficacy in countering insurgency. Failures of execution seem to be of greater concern to us than evaluation of the worthwhileness of the programs themselves. If the program cannot be shown to contribute significantly to the solution of a problem, it would appear a waste of time and money to try to make it more efficient--the achievement of program goals in terms of kilometers of roads built or health stations erected becomes an irrelevancy if the goal is the suppression of insurgency--any evaluation of the program must be in these terms.

The cornerstone of the strategy must be the extension of government presence into the villages--to fill the political vacuum exploited by the Communist insurgents. The kinds of things this government presence

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will perform will range from straight out population-resource control and police protection to organizing villagers to carry out economic and social development programs. Economic and social development programs should be a response to village initiative--should be the means for involving villagers with government officials in programs in which they have interest and should represent to the villager the quid-pro-quo for the temporary inconveniences of government control over their movements.

This two pronged approach at the village--control and security on the one hand and modernization of methods of production and social services--could become the forerunner of a post insurgency relationship between government and population--with the control aspects fading out and the modernization effort gaining momentum. The opportunities that such a relationship offers for dialogue between government and population could lead to a modernization of the political system of the country--a mechanism for rendering government more responsive to the needs of the people in the villages. A larger share of government revenues would flow to rural areas in response to local pressures, a general increase in rural income from development projects, and a stronger tie between the rural population and the Bangkok ministries.

In addition to a move towards government presence in the villages, a concept must be developed for the use of military, para-military, and police units. The experience in the Philippines and in Malaya would indicate a rationalization of these roles to be a prime factor in defeating the insurgents. The build-up of combat police units

to attack guerrilla units in the jungle and mountain redoubts should be reexamined. It appears a more logical assignment for the Army in terms of manpower, training, and materiel. If the police are to be expanded, it would be more logical to expand their role in village security rather than combat missions in the jungles.

The expansion of government presence into every village in a threatened area is a costly matter. The numbers of villages is large, the number of people to be added to the government payroll will be large. In addition there will be expanded overhead costs as well as village oriented project expenses. But this is a requirement for countering the guerrilla movement and the funds must come from savings in lower priority budget items, increased government revenue and economic aid.

### III. Philippines

In the course of the second world war, there developed in Luzon an armed underground with US support that provided resistance to the Japanese occupation. After the war the communist leadership of the underground attempted to seize power and establish a communist government. The Huks although not very efficient, proved capable of causing considerable trouble and even for a while appeared capable of taking over Luzon. This was due to the weakness of the Philippine government following the Japanese occupation. More than a dozen years have passed since the Huk rebellion was considered officially ended--but remnants of the guerrilla movement remain in the hills of Luzon, and continue to represent a potential threat to the government.



More than 20 years have elapsed since the Japanese defeat and the granting of independence to the Philippines. Despite the traumatic experience of the Huk rebellion and the promises for economic and social improvement made by the government, conditions in the rural areas of Luzon and for the poor in general have not shown marked improvement. The government and its legal institutions still operate not as impartial arbitrators on behalf of all its citizens, but rather as protectors of the elites. The government is run by and for the wealthy families that emerged from the Spanish period with large land holdings and great wealth. No president of the Philippines has been reelected--a reflection of the negative voting on the part of the masses--but the replacements have generally not been much of an improvement. Improvements in the system of justice and modernization of the economy are hamstrung by the parliamentary system--still controlled by the wealthy whether in or out of power. Power is balanced so evenly between the President and the Senate (elected at large) that the President is a captive of what has become a capricious and irresponsible Senate.

Corruption in government is so pervasive that programs bog down in charges and counter charges, investigations, and delays. There is little respect for law and the level of crime has gotten beyond the control of the police. The courts are corrupt so that even cases of effective police work go for naught. The land tenure system today is hardly any better than it was 20 years ago. Population has been rising but productivity on the farms has been falling. Smuggling of imports into the country and cash out of the country keeps at a low level both

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government revenues and private investment in productive enterprises.

Despite the outward symbols of democratic government, the people have not been able to elect leaders willing or capable of leadership and house cleaning. The two party system works imperfectly--individual members shift parties in mid-term--with continuous jockeying for personal power. Despite all these factors, the reemergence of a communist insurgency is not considered likely. The remnants of the Huks appear to prefer a life of crime and the profits they reap therefrom to an ideological struggle to capture the government. The Central Communist Party is dormant and has virtually no contact with the Huks in the hills. The Philippines probably do not rate a high priority at this time in the view of Peking or Moscow-- *although the situation could change.*

On balance, the situation in the Philippines does not appear to be leading to a resumption of insurgency. Foremost, is the fact that there appears no organized communist attempt to seize power; the Huks are content with their illegal enterprises that generally go unhindered-- a modus vivendi between local government officials and bandits. Secondly there has been developed a new rice seed that has already demonstrated dramatic increases in farm productivity in Luzon. The government is making progress in a land reform program which should also increase farmers income. Improved seed, fertilizer, and financing are being made available to tenant farmers on a broader scale. These programs along with the new rice seed hold real promise for improving conditions for the rural population.

It appears, therefore, that the emphasis should be on economic development and nation building activities as requisites for the modernization and political development of the Philippines. *The Philippines needs institutions to cope with change along with its economic progress.* Counterinsurgency programs would be of low priority at this time. [REDACTED]



#### IV. Laos

Laos is a special case. In itself, it represents an unlikely spot for big power interest and competition. Laos is a remote kingdom with no outlet to the sea, virtually no natural resources, an illiterate and backward population and no capacity or inclination to trouble its neighbors. The government is ineffective in governing the country, and the bulk of the population lives in inaccessible areas. There are more Lao People outside Laos than in Laos; and most of the people of Laos are not Lao. Its people are generally docile, pleasant and still largely unaffected by the affairs of the outside world.

But the dissolution of the French and British Empires in Asia and Laos's proximity to Vietnam, China, Burma, and Thailand have thrust her into the vortex of Asian strife. The small group of Laos elite, confined mainly to royal families, are constantly vying for power and seeking foreign support. Neutralist, Rightist, and Leftist are relative terms in Laos which are hardly descriptive of political ideology--more descriptive of the sources of external support.

The war in Laos is unique. It is neither a guerrilla war along Vietnamese lines, nor along the lines of guerrilla underground movements in Europe, nor a conventional war. It is guerrilla in the sense that the bulk of the fighting is in remote areas and by unconventional forces. The Pathet Laos recruits its fighters from the peasantry and tribes and the government also uses mountain tribesmen to augment regular forces. It is conventional in the sense that defined areas are recognized by both sides as Pathet Laos country, government controlled territory, and no-man's land.

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The eastern portion of Laos is important to North Vietnam as a link to the guerrillas in South Vietnam. The western portion is important to Thailand because of its proximity to Thai territory and the security of the Mekong River. Consequently a modus vivendi provides that the government will not attack Pathet Laos positions threatening the Ho Chi Minh trail and that the Communists will not push to the Mekong River. In view of the docile nature of all Laos-- their reluctance to fight, and the general agreement of the great powers not to attempt to push the war to a clean-cut decision, this arrangement is likely to hold up awaiting an outcome to the war in Vietnam. If the tempo of conflict in Laos should be stepped up, it would be on North Vietnamese initiative.

Programs of rural development--financed by the US--designed to elicit peasant support for the government have not, and are not likely, to represent an important factor in this contest. It is difficult to see how any economic program will, in the context of the situation already outlined, materially affect the future of military operations. The continued support of refugees is probably justified on military grounds and an economic stabilization program on political grounds.

But it is clear that economic modernization will come slowly and with great difficulty in Laos. Modernization of an economy just as modernization of the military, political, or social apparatus requires first of all modernization of people. The prime target in Laos is the people--and thus emerges the need for concentration on education facilities and teachers. Rural development cannot take place if pockets

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of population are separated from each other for lack of roads--in-  
creasing production is impossible without enlarging markets. Farmers  
will not produce a surplus, even when technology for doing so is available  
unless there is an obvious outlet for such surpluses. Without surpluses,  
farmers represent no market for increased production of other consumer  
goods. This circular process can be broken only gradually by opening  
up the country to permit travel between population pockets and the  
development of a marketing system in the rural areas. Thus a priority  
activity in Laos remains road construction, road improvement and road  
maintenance.

Nation building in Laos is a long term undertaking. The human  
and financial resource limitations are great--greater than anywhere  
else in Southern Asia. Too large a range of activities, too fast a  
pace will only exacerbate conditions which lead on the one hand to  
larger aid requirement to maintain the internal price structure--  
worsening an already untenable import level, and on the other hand to  
political instability.

We should reexamine our activities in terms of the critical  
requirements for long term economic growth. We should cut back our  
involvement in projects to concentrate on those critical requirements.  
If it is agreed that education and roads are the prime requisites of  
long term modernization, then ultimately we should confine our assistance  
to these two areas and pace the programs in accord with Laos capabilities  
without materially increasing the problem of domestic price instability.

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New ideas for new undertakings--whether emanating from the Laos or from the US establishment--should be discouraged on grounds of absorbtive capacity and rational priorities.

There are no proposals contained herein for counterinsurgency programs--other than perhaps the continuation of a refugee program. This is due to a conclusion that no effective counterinsurgency program can be devised for Laos--neither the Pathet Lao nor the Royal Laos government's armed forces have shown any real capability of waging war. The present accommodation between these two factions and between the great powers appears to be the only mechanism for keeping, in a general way, the status quo. As new roads are built, the RLG is able to inch its military outposts forward--but this progress has practical limitations. When the roads get close to important Pathet Laos positions--the road construction will be stopped.

The countries covered specifically in this section are those in the Far East where active insurgencies are underway or threatened. The principles developed in this study are: (1) rural development programs per se will not defeat insurgencies; (2) government presence and control over the villages and hamlets are prerequisites to defeating insurgents; (3) the peasantry is in the main on the side of whoever offers protection and maintains control. These principles may have more widespread applicability than just the Far East even though this study concentrated on countries in the periphery of China.

The succeeding section of this report deals with the general question of nation building, modernizing societies and political development.

### III. Nation Building and Political Development

Previous sections have dealt mainly with situations of insurgency and, more specifically, with the Chinese Communist type insurgency in the Far East. It is natural that our present preoccupation with Southeast Asia leads to a more generalized consideration of the problems faced by all underdeveloped countries in their attempts to transform traditional peasant societies to modern political and social systems.

The Marshall Plan for Europe originated in a period when Communist led underground movements in Europe appeared ready to seize control of Western Europe as the German occupation came to an end. It was our conclusion that a rapid reconstruction of Europe and the restoration of tolerable living standards were a prime requirement in stemming the advance of Communism in Europe.

In this instance, the threat to parliamentary governments was not political immaturity, peasant uprisings, class struggles--conditions associated with crises in underdeveloped countries. The threat was basically an organized minority group that played an important role during the war and now was attempting to seize power in the confusion following the war and the German occupation. Ultimately a long tradition of human freedom and representative government proved decisive in Europe; US assistance in the reconstruction of economies and the restoration of pre-war standards of living were marginal, albeit an important margin.

As our emphasis shifted from Western Europe to the underdeveloped countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, we were confronted with a new dimension to the problem of political stability. It is not simply a matter of creating conditions which will permit a previously

developed system of government and social structure to survive; it is rather to help governments develop for the first time modern societies and institutions. This is an important distinction and requires, on our part, the development of a strategy to deal with the fundamental problems of the underdeveloped countries. AID has been charged, under the ~~National Security~~ <sup>Foreign Assistance</sup> Act and by executive delegations of authority, with responsibility for developing strategies for the political development of the underdeveloped countries--but the term "political development" is only shorthand for a variety of concepts.

### Part I. Diagnosis

I. It might therefore be useful at the outset to consider the term "Political Development" and attempt a clarification of our objectives. In the underdeveloped countries we are now witnessing general political instability, including in some cases insurgency and in others a series of military coups. We are witnessing these phenomena despite substantial assistance given in developing and modernizing their economies and technologies. This leads to the conclusion that US aid programs must have not only an economic development component but also a political development dimension that will deal with problems of political instability. Programs of economic development alone will not meet US objectives.

There are tremendous difficulties in dealing with this problem, not the least of which is the need for a clearer understanding of what we mean by political development. In the realm of social institutions and economics, we have <sup>imperfect</sup> ~~some~~ objective criteria for determining relative development--per capita income; literacy rates; productivity; death rates; etc. In the area of politics we are confronted with either a tautology--the political structure is stable, therefore developed; or

a subjective judgement--the level of personal freedom and mass participation in the business of government is to a major degree lower than in the West, therefore the country is underdeveloped. There are no objective criteria for measuring political development <sup>in the real world,</sup> as one measures economic development. It would be fruitless to <sup>through a logical analysis</sup> seek answers to the theoretical question: if the US is politically developed, is the USSR also politically developed? For if the answer were affirmative, then we would have to answer the question as to whether a political system developed along the lines of a totalitarian regime would be considered progress by us. We therefore conclude that whether theoretically developed or not, a totalitarian system is not in our interest and not among our objectives. Our objective is to develop regimes and political systems that are based on humanism, personal freedom, democratic institutions, and democratic processes; regimes that are prepared to accept it as morally justifiable that its actions be subjected to review by its people and morally correct that any citizen may succeed to power within the framework of an orderly and prescribed system for succession to power.

¶ As nations proceed in modernizing their economies, the traditional power structure, the traditional inter-personal relationships within families, tribes, and communities, and the traditional value systems become less and less relevant or satisfactory. As a larger segment of the traditional society enters the modern sector--the existing acceptable arrangements come under strain as the economy and institutions develop faster than new social and political arrangements. Viewed in this light

political development involves dealing with the whole process of modernizing societies--not just economic development--adds a dimension to our aid program for which there was no need in the Marshal Plan.

Today we are dealing, in the main, with transitional societies--societies in which the bulk of the population lives in a traditional milieu, where a relatively small part of the society has been exposed to modern methods, and where this small group is in the vanguard in leading the rest of the society out of its traditional pattern. Traditional societies are characterized by the existence of primary, small, traditional, integrated communities. People live their whole lives in small closed kinship groups of family and tribe and these groups provide security for the individual as well as a satisfying outlet for his own aspirations. It provides a connected system of relationships where the role of the individual <sup>idol</sup> is largely predetermined by birth.

The world of the ruling elites is sharply divided from the world of the villager. The power of the ruler is deemed absolute--checked only by his inability to enforce his rule through the country and into the many disconnected villages. The authority of rulers traditionally rests on religious and mystic grounds and is related to personality--status--rather than performance or policies. Political processes are governed by a hierarchal pattern of superior and subordinate and changes in the hierarchal pattern are limited to the elites--most usually accompanied by violence and conquest. Consequently a high premium is placed on loyalty which naturally leads to patronage and nepotism. Rewards, higher positions, official recognition are predicated on loyal service to superiors and this provides a clearly understood, objective standard for all.

In this dual society the court and its officialdom lies at one end of the spectrum--the village at the other. Village headmen, largely hereditary, are only marginally involved in politics. Agriculture being the basis for life, villages tend to be self-contained units and people remain tied to the village of their birth. New problems in the villages are few--and when they arise, they are overcome by tradition--solutions tend to be the solutions found satisfactory in the past. Because of this reliance on traditional approaches, old age is a virtue; it represents a storehouse of experience--a village memory bank--of problems met and solved in the past.

The chasm between the elites and the masses is great and the contacts infrequent, sporadic, or non-existent. The village solves its own problems--the headman carries out the onerous tasks imposed by government--tax collection, recruitment of soldiers, etc. On those occasions when a government official does appear in the village, the village expects trouble. Virtually from childhood, therefore, the villager considers the government official dangerous and ruthless-- a symptom of a government system of rewards based on loyalty to the regime rather than compassion for the people. At the same time, the king is venerated--because of the mystique that has become part of the culture of the society, the subconscious reaction of individuals raised in this culture, and the remoteness of the imperial court.

II. The age of imperialism has had profound long range effects on traditional societies. The effects varied, by area, in scope and intensity and has been different under different colonial regimes. The most apparent change was the creation of nations; lines drawn on a map were used to

describe a geographic region as a unitary state--a condition more relevant to the modern areas of the globe and useful for demarcating the boundaries of the imperial rule. A variety of tribal kingdoms as well as ethnic and cultural groups--previously having only loose connections or no connections--became part of an integral state.

In some cases colonial powers elected to govern through an existing hierarchal arrangement and existing elites; carefully circumscribing the real power of these elites but outwardly changing little in the relations between the elites and the peasantry. In other cases the existing order had to be replaced by another regime, or local government taken over completely by the foreign power. These latter colonial powers found the task of governing easier if traditional forms of social order continue to give a society coherence--thus they tended to place a premium on unsettling as little as possible. But some deep-seated changes were necessary--and these changes started the transition process from traditional to modern societies. It became necessary for the protection of investments and the personal safety of foreigners to introduce elements of western laws, institutions and administration. But these were simply overlays on traditional patterns and affected almost exclusively the areas and enterprises of prime interest to the colonial power.

Colonialism brought with it investments in agriculture, natural resources, economic infrastructure, commerce, etc. It furnished a ready foreign market for increased production of farm products, it introduced plantation crops, the exploration and development of metals, minerals, oil, timber and the modernization of shipping ports, energy sources etc. The foreign owned enterprises became modern enclaves

in a traditional society--managed by foreigners but employing local people. It was these employees who were exposed to and required to live by the rules of the enterprise. They experienced a new set of <sup>Western</sup> values and relationships--sharply different from those in the traditional society. This provided an avenue of release from the traditional inherited hierarchal status for some--a chance to change status through education or technological skill. It made possible and necessary the growth of cities--especially port cities--to handle the higher level of commerce. This urbanization tended to break down the kinship relations of the traditional societies for those who become part of the urban complex. Peasants who remained in the villages found a new and enlarged market for surplus production--a market managed by the more modern or non-traditional segment of society--and these contacts tended to break down the insularity of the traditional village.

Though the age of imperialism had a profound effect on traditional society, for the overwhelming majority that remained in the village the changes came imperceptibly and life went on much as it had. Though in a constant state of change, life appeared to each succeeding generation as it had been in ancestral days. <sup>-- a system of established values and "givens."</sup> The modernization process affected in a major way the life of only a small fraction of the population--innovations in trade and production largely benefited the foreigners. The local elites were frozen in position since real power was in other hands and these others wanted to disturb the status quo as little as possible.

During this period, Western power in both military and economic terms provided a sufficient deterrent to inhibit or set down any political

or social upheavals. Though social tensions were inevitably engendered through the introduction of an external power and new institutions as well as the modernization of some parts of the economy, the conflicts were held in check by Western power.

The European assumption of control brought to an end the indigeneous contest for power--there being only one real power, the colonial power. The previously ruling classes either became the local agents of administration or were replaced by an administration willing to accept that limited role. This local administration became the foundation upon which the West based its indirect rule--but the administration could not assure the loyalty of the masses of the people. The personal attachment of traditional societies to their king was not transferrable to the new rulers. So long as Western power could intervene directly to maintain order, the erosion of the social system was not readily apparent. When Western powers began the roll back of empires the underlying tensions engendered during the colonial period became apparent.

**IV** The results of this climactic political change in the underdeveloped countries--the sudden removal of a power structure that ruled for some hundred years--are now the problems of the regimes that have inherited power in the post colonial period. The issues and the context within which the issues to be resolved are not issues that we can readily understand nor for which we have on hand satisfactory solutions.

The political changes in our society from the dawn of the industrial revolution until today have come in small increments over a very long period of time. These political changes have produced

political systems in harmony with modern technology and modern economic systems. The rulers of newly independent countries, however, have inherited peasant societies and traditional political forms while they attempt to bring their countries into the vortex of 20th century life. The modernization of economies and societies is seen by the new rulers as the most promising path to long range survival for their regime and their nation, and this compounds the tensions already created by the political changes.

Outside the zone of Western civilization, nations are not numerous. ==  
The peoples of the new states are not yet nations as we know them in the West--they are for the most part heterogeneous populations. Living within a ring imposed during the era of Western imperialism. One of the first items on the agenda of new rulers is to create a nation out of these heterogeneous peoples while coping with the social and institutional problems of modernization. This task is complicated by internal power struggles as well as Communist exploitation of the tensions as neo colonialism.

This combination of legitimate and natural contests in a formative period along with communist attempts to seize control during periods of confusion represents a dilemma for the U.S. The communist camouflage of its real intent cloaks its moves in patriotic and nationalist colors and introduces another confusing element into an already unstable and muddled situation. Our own security as well as our objective to further the development of liberal, humanistic regimes renders our interest and participation in these struggles inevitable.

During the nineteenth century, world history seemed to be at the mercy of economic forces, but the twentieth century has witnessed a

determined effort to control history by ideology. A new type of intellectual warrior has emerged--banding history to his own view of the world and claiming to possess the qualifications for leading men to secular salvation. His propoganda attempts to define the political and social evolution in terms of class struggle--the regime against the people--while taking up arms even against those regimes that seek modernization.

Previous sections dealt with Communist wars of national liberation and concluded, in general terms, that the appropriate response is control over and protection of the people--attempting to defeat insurgents by attacking "root causes" would not succeed. On the other hand, the nation building effort, in the absence of subversion, requires concentration on "root-causes" of tension within the society. This represents the dilemma for U.S. policy--are the reformers acting on behalf of the people in a legitimate attempt to modernize the nation or are they acting on behalf of a communist movement to take over the reins of government. *(as a summary)*

The required response is different in the two classes of instability. The nature of our economic assistance in a nation building effort will be quite different from the nature of our assistance in meeting the threat of insurgency. The type of assistance useful in easing the transitional problems of modernizing a society, may be irrelevant or even harmful in dealing with externally inspired conspiracies. Our task therefore is to determine whether the role we are performing is nation building or counter insurgency. The implications for programs and actions are significantly different and it appears that to date we

have not clearly drawn that distinction.

V. In leading up to a broad strategy for modernizing societies, it would be useful to start with a general description of the characteristics of a transitional society as opposed to those of a modern society. Recognizing that virtually all societies are of a mixed nature with some features of a traditional society in modern societies, and modern elements in transitional societies--it is possible to identify and catalogue societies as either modern or transitional by the predominating characteristics. The capital cities of under-developed countries, and especially the foreign quarters of those cities, frequently give the impression of modernity. On the other hand, the primitiveness of the countryside with its lack of roads, water, electricity, schools, medical facilities leave an impression of backwardness. But all of these are simply physical characteristics and represent symptoms. The stage of development is more realistically approached from the psychological makeup of the people--their attitudes, values, and motivation. If the gap between a traditional society and a modern society could be narrowed or closed solely by technology and the creation of productive facilities the problem of modernizing societies would be relatively easy. Our aid programs to date appear to have rested on an assumption that social and political development would come automatically in the wake of economic development--the creation of modern production facilities and the development of modern means of communication. We have assumed that the establishment of facilities for technological training would change traditional patterns of behavior and that democratic institutions and political systems would

follow the creation of schools and training of teachers. But the process is not automatic. John Stuart Mills observed, "No great improvements in the lot of mankind are possible until a great change takes place in the fundamental constitution of their modes of thought."

People in transitional societies can be distinguished from those in modern societies by their degree of motivation, their goals, and their capacity to work together with people outside their immediate kinship group for objective purposes. The ability to work with others, in turn, is related to motivation and goals, and is a critical element in reaching modern political, economic and social forms. The degree of motivation--a psychological factor influenced early in life and controlling the individual's actions throughout his life--is derived from the attitude of parents, kinsmen, and the immediate social grouping. In traditional society the individual has difficulty in seeing himself in some other status or hierarchal arrangement. This sets limits on his goals and is a personal factor that works against class mobility. This attitude is transmitted from generation to generation and becomes a subconscious and important limiting factor on the level of motivation. As the child matures, the goals that he sets for himself are influenced by the social group in which he has been reared. Attitudes towards commerce, leaving the region of his ancestors, new crop production methods, family planning, and so on are the attitudes of his kinfolk--unadulterated by any outside influence. The value system of the community even exercises a constraint on the possibilities inherent in an educational system for breaking down barriers to modernization. The individual grows up in an environment

that dampens his motivation and limits his horizon for exercising even this limited level of psychic drive. The religion of the peasant--combined with extra-religious superstitions--reinforces this stultification of the drive for escape from tradition and traditional subjugation to superiors.

One of the results of this dwarfing of psychological drive is the individual's incapacity to combine his efforts with those of others for limited and objective ends. Modern society requires individuals to get along with others within the constraints of institutional policy and objectives without regard to personal empathy or good will towards each other. Conflicts that arise must be settled in objective and substantive terms not in terms of personalities. Inability to cope with conflict on other than terms of personality wrecks the institution and could wreck the nation. This is a key requirement for modern societies--the formation and survival of large enterprises, the rational development of national policy, the orderly transfer of power on the basis of policy and performance--and this rests in turn on the psychic makeup of the people.

One can postulate that the military successes of Israel over its Arab neighbors is due to the vastly different ability the Western oriented Israelis have in working together toward some limited and objective end. The Israeli Western tradition and psychology permitted rapid mobilization, development of a military plan, transmission of orders through all echelons of the military establishment, and the rapid carrying out of orders. The institution functioned as a modern institution. On the Arab side, concepts, strategy and tactics were more

than likely poorly transmitted--unevenly understood--and hardly implemented. In short the institution was too large for the tradition-oriented, village-bound fellahins. Modern equipment and modern technology--radar, jet fighters, communications systems--were superimposed on a traditional people and they were no match for the modern equipment operated by a modern population in Israel.

This may also explain why it is so difficult for governments to subdue guerrillas in traditional societies. For traditional people it is a more suitable form of conflict than conventional warfare because it conforms to the associative behavioral patterns of men in traditional societies. Individual and small group sabotage operations; the family and village oriented cellular structure of political operations; the limited number of contacts in the whole chain of communications and logistics; the assignment of recruits to bases near home--all conform to the behavior patterns of the people. Large unit discipline requirements, complex chain of command and, decision making process of conventional armed forces; the unfamiliar surroundings of training bases for raw recruits and unfamiliar areas of operations of government forces induce tensions in the soldiers which to many become intolerable. Thus the relative efficiency of the guerrillas as compared to government forces. Some attribute the guerrilla's commitment to "cause" as the reason for superior performance. It is more likely that ideology is not nearly so significant as the fact guerrilla operations are consistent with his culture and the government's method of operations are not.

VI. The leaders of transitional societies today are, in the main, the products of the colonial period. <sup>usually</sup> They are either those that cooperated

with colonial powers as administrators, or those that fought against colonial status. As a general rule the former have received a higher level of formal Western education and are more modern in their outlook-- but they also suffer from feelings of guilt and disorientation. The guilt arises from their previous cooperation with the colonial power and the disorientation from the new order of things following the end of the colonial period.

Government consists of two main branches--politicians who exercise power, compete for power, make appointments to the apparatus of government, and decide on policy; and bureaucrats who administer policy, adjudicate disputes between nationals, defend the nation, collect taxes etc. During the colonial period decision making was in the hands of foreigners; the educated <sup>elite who</sup> ~~was~~ elected to cooperate had to content themselves with functions of administration. There were to be sure, provocateurs and anti-imperial power workers within and outside the country. But they were effectively isolated from the main-stream of society, operating within groups of like minded revolutionists or with world-wide revolutionary movements abroad.

With independence, the revolutionaries became the natural leaders of the new nations--the sacrifices and risks they incurred for so long a time inevitably imparted charisma--an attribute needed for leadership in the confused days that followed. These leaders for the most part inherited bureaucracies and military establishments out of step with the leadership. The backgrounds, temperament, and priorities of the two were significantly different.

At the outset, new leaders were confronted with "organization" problems--the relative status within the new elite; rewards for

individual assistance in achieving independence, fending-off of competitors for power in a period when rules for succession and legitimacy of the regime had not yet been established. The ruling group, was therefore, forced to concentrate on matters involving the regime's own security as well as inter-personal and inter-factional disputes.

Ⓐ All this tended to neglect the bureaucracy and leave it in the dark as to new policies and programs. This was a changed situation for the bureaucracy--the colonial power depended on <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>technically qualified and</sup> bureaucracy to <sup>a political</sup> carry out orders and implement policy and was explicit as to what was expected of the local administrators. Consequently, we note in the post-independence period, the inherent gulf between administrators and political leaders becomes even greater. Because the new rulers were better suited to leading revolutions than administering independent countries, the dialogue between administrators and rulers was difficult and soon became infrequent. Amongst politicians, solutions to problems were cast in terms of personalities and factions while the administrators viewed problems as requiring solutions in substance.

Lacking articulated objective policies and programs, witnessing constant rivalry between competing centers of power, and without opportunity for meaningful dialogue with the new leaders, the bureaucracy became insecure and confused. The picture of apathetic bureaucrats demonstrating little initiative in solving problems or feeble capacity to work with other agencies of government, is attributable in large part to this set of circumstances. The rewards for bureaucrats, in such an unclear and unstable situation, lie in keeping ties with all possible power groups, in subduing any rational inclination to suggest solutions.

In modern societies individuals can clash on substantive matters without calling into play personal animosity or arousing suspicions about motivation. Transitional societies lack the long history of impersonal institutions having their own drive and momentum to shield the individual from the full force of the controversy. In transitional societies, therefore, objective disputes become subjective and personal, and participation in disputes represents risks for the bureaucrat. In this situation one finds all problems, no matter how trivial they may seem to the outsider, referred to political leaders. In the end the ostensible makers of policy are instead making unimportant administrative decisions frequently based on a modicum of factual data. The result is a highly centralized bureaucracy with the whole decision making process plagued by irritation and a less than adequate understanding of the nature of the problem on which decisions are being made. The politician understandably begins to feel that lower level administrators are incompetent and cannot be trusted to perform even moderate tasks; at the same time, lower echelon administrators get a feeling of incompetence and procrastination at the highest levels in government. Relations between the two levels become stiff and formal--rather than easy and compatible. The gulf between the administration and the policy makers grows and the machinery of government limps along at a slow pace.

There are striking exceptions to this generalization--one can find individuals who eschew the security of anonymity, who take initiative in formulating plans, suggesting new policies, becoming advocates for reform. These individuals invariably have their own long range plans for moving from bureaucrat to political leader. Initiative then becomes

identified with another challenge to the regime--a move to acquire a power base for eventual succession to power. Such ambition frequently requires collaboration with competing factions already having a power base and the bureaucrat with initiative soon becomes absorbed in power politics.

We have witnessed in the 20 odd years since the end of the second world war striking failures on the part of many leaders of independence movements in governing independent nations. The development of orderly systems for acceding to power is a rare phenomena in the new nations and this has resulted in violence. This failure has led to the emergence of military dictatorships on a wide scale--and the validation of these coups ultimately by "popular" elections. The political leaders of the revolution are being succeeded by bureaucrats with a power base--the military. India is one brilliant exception--the legacy of Gandhi, a relatively large and skilled civil service, Nehru, ~~and~~ the Congress Party, and the enlightened British policy following the rebellions of 1870--have resulted in the Indian model of democracy with its tolerance for dissent and orderly process of succession to power. One cannot predict with confidence the future of India--but to date it continues an island of elected parliamentary government in a sea of governments by coups.

Political parties of a Western type appear to be meaningless in transitional societies. The contenders for power are many--and their ambitions are motivated by personal rather than policy considerations. Shortly after formation of an opposition party it tends to splinter into as many groups as there are contenders for leadership of the opposition. No one is ready to subordinate personal ambition to policy

goals and therefore issues rarely emerge as a unifying force. They can agree on "throwing the rascals out," the only theme on which an earlier generation of political leaders were able to agree. The legitimacy of government has not yet been established, the ground rules for political activity and succession to power have not been accepted; and the methods for organizing and running a political party are even less established. The reluctance, or rather unwillingness, of elected officials to relinquish power--using whatever leverage and strategems their position of power affords to maintain themselves in power--is a deterrent to the legitimizing of government and the development of generally accepted channels for political change. Political parties, in challenging indigenous kinship groups and therefore no means as such, have no means for rewarding loyalty or punishing disloyalty--these means are in the grasp of those in power rather than in the party organizations--consequently the party can establish no discipline nor develop coherent policies.

VII .If we look at a political system in terms of its prime function, we find that it is a set of interactions or relationships through which things valued in the society are allocated or rationed by authorities. It is a means for resolving differences within the society--a system for processing demands and deciding on responses to those demands. It is the means by which the resources and energies of the society are mobilized in the pursuit of national goals.

Conflicts over demands are the principle business of politics. The establishment of priorities, the weighing of risks involved in satisfying certain demands at the expense of others, the manipulation of politically potent power groups--these constitute the art of politics.

A demand can be defined as an expression of opinion that the authorities decide on an allocation of resources for a particular purpose--whether it be security, development, standards of living--or between classes of society. Expectations are not the same as demands--expectations must be converted to demands before the authorities can deal with them positively or negatively. In transitional societies, the masses have difficulty in getting their expectations processed into demands--the demands on which governments operate in such societies are more frequently those of other elite groups.

The reasons for government's failure to satisfy demands are varied. In many cases, the resources are not equal to the total requirements--obviously an important consideration in developing countries. Here security requirements, urban unrest, vested interests of important conservative groups, concentration on modern industrial, communications and cultural symbols are all in conflict with requirements for rural development. In some cases, when resources are not a factor--as for equal justice under the law; greater freedom of speech; honest elections--the regime may remain unresponsive to demands because of the risks seen to the regime itself.

It is when the felt needs or expectations are translated into demands by the articulate and modern segment of the society and when those demands become too great for the political system to handle that the political system itself is in danger of collapse. The volume of demands is not the sole--or frequently the most important--criterion; the kinds of demands and their political content has an important relationship to the system's capacity to process.

A key element in any social or political system is the mechanism for converting wants or expectations into politically recognizable demands. Members of the system do the converting of wants into demands-- and they also weed out wants from the political apparatus as either not warranting treatment as demands, as capable of solution in other than political terms, or inconsistent with the accepted norms of the existing political system.

However free the society there are always limits on the kinds of demands a member of the society may raise--these limits vary as between countries and they vary within a country depending on changing conditions. A country at war will place greater restrictions on political activity, freedom of press, freedom of criticism of government, criticism of conduct of foreign relations than it would tolerate in time of peace. Internal class strife and economic crises will similarly engender restrictions on the kinds of demands that are acceptable--the socially disruptive potential of certain demands renders them outside the arena of legitimate political activity and becomes subversion.

In traditional societies the peasantry are excluded from political power. They readily accept the legitimacy of their rulers and have assigned broad areas of life as the exclusive domain of the rulers; other areas are subject to management by the family, the village elders or the gods. This exclusion from the political process is not viewed as discrimination or evil. It is just another "given" in their pattern of existence. They do not consider themselves eligible to participate in an area reserved for the ruling elites.

Societies in transitions are experiencing a breakdown of this general acceptance. The end of the colonial period--which fostered the

traditional outlook on government and power--and the encouragement given peasantry to participate in national liberation movements by revolutionary leaders--have resulted in a change in the traditional regulators that kept the system running despite a multitude of wants and needs that never became processed into demands. The peasantry has been told by those who would upset the existing regime that the legitimate concern of government and the government's capacity to change things is far greater than that accepted by a stable traditional society.

During the last days of the colonial period the appeals to democratic processes and ideologies was useful in helping mobilize internal support and eliciting foreign support against imperialism in general and the imperial power in particular. But in espousing democratic ideologies, the dominant groups in the post-independence period now find themselves committed to a complex kind of political system in many cases highly irrelevant to the structure of the society, the current problems, and little understanding of what is needed to make such a system work.

In primitive societies, the channels between government and people are largely unorganized. <sup>because the community interest is small,</sup> The volume of demands is small. <sup>therefore,</sup> The areas of government and private life are sharply defined and face-to-face relationships as opposed to organized channels of communication are the heart of the system. In modern societies the government has a much broader scope for impact on the private lives of the people; the technological complexities of our entire existence have resulted in an ever increasing impact of government action on the welfare of people. This has necessitated the development of highly specialized channels to

handle the ever-increasing volume of demands. But these changes took place over a period of centuries and took place slowly--this permitted experimentation and invention in political science and in creating the gate keepers for sorting out, reshaping, interpreting demands so that they were in a form amenable to political action.

Transitional societies find themselves striving for modernization and committed to democracy without the attributes and mechanisms to render this possible. Mass media do not reach the masses, political parties do not function, administrative mechanisms to serve as gate keepers or channels for the flow of demands are lacking, poorly operative, or strongly controlled.

Part II - Preservation

The road to modernization is long and difficult. There are no shortcuts or single all-purpose solutions to the problems of bringing rural traditional people into the vortex of a modern world. Charismatic leadership is not enough--though helpful in creating an ideological unifying force for a nation. The sacrifices required, the unsatisfied aspirations aroused beset such leadership with incalculable problems. Nasser, Syngman Rhee, Sukarno, Sihanouk are examples of charismatic leaders <sup>who</sup> have on the one hand aroused popular emotions but on the other hand, have failed to rationalize and institutionalize their charisma and thus to solve the society's problems. Solutions have to be tailor-made for each society and for each set of unique circumstances--only broad strategy lines can be drawn at best.

One reaches the conclusion that the modernization strategy in transitional societies where most of the people live in a traditional typology with only a small segment modernized, involves enlarging the modern segments. This poses certain short term problems--the urban

centers are the seat of modern life and are already overpopulated; the educated are the potential leaders of the modernization process but unemployed intellectuals are now a principle source of political instability. The solution is long term and there are inherent dangers of violent eruptions intermittently as tensions increase. But inaction is even more dangerous for the long run--modern communications and the 20th century articulation of class struggles lend themselves to attempts at violent solutions by opportunists and demagogues.

In examining transitional societies for possible points of leverage, it appears that the greatest promise lies in the business sector. This represents a class that thinks in modern terms--rational calculations rather than mystic explanations. Decisions on investments and relative profitability require detachment from traditional thought patterns and total reliance on habits of the past. It requires a greater degree of working with others for limited, objective, substantive ends and requires an assessment of and appreciation for individual ability.

Therefore, economic programs designed not only to create modern facilities but also to modernize societies would concentrate on (a) inducements to the private business sector to expand its activities in the rural areas; (b) build-up rural towns as centers of modern life in the rural areas; (c) incentives to farmers to increase production and productivity; and (d) improved marketing and communications facilities. The principle economic requirement is the creation of a surplus in the rural areas that will translate itself into increased rural consumption. This will be the market for the production of other

parts of the economy and will provide a higher level of farm products for the rest of the country or for export. This would transform rural areas into a market economy and broaden the horizon of the tradition bound, subsistence level village dwellers. The marketing mechanism would, quite naturally, be in the hands of those who have access to other parts of the country--the modern segment of society--who will increase their contacts with villagers and result in an interchange of ideas and a demonstration of modern methods. Nearby towns would become rural centers for marketing, processing, and even manufacturing products for the growing rural market. Rural youngsters would tend to move to towns as employment opportunities develop and gradually modernize their outlook as they are removed from tradition oriented village life. Schools in the towns would be able to attract teachers from other cities and towns--people with a more modern outlook than present village teachers and this will have a further modernizing impact on the next generation of town dwellers.

Townspeople, having close kinship links to those remaining in the village, would exchange visits with those remaining in the village and this would have a modernizing effect on the village itself. The combination of new people coming into the village to buy and sell; the visits exchanged with kinsfolk in the towns; and the influence of urban born and educated teachers on the children of the town would all bring a new set of influences and thought patterns to bear on the traditional rural village. It would provide an outlet for surplus village population and the towns would become a training ground for modern skills needed in industry and commerce.

The involvement of the private sector is essential. The government will have to lay aside its innate distrust of businessmen as profiteers and exploiters of the people. This will be harder to do if business is largely in the hands of foreign ethnic groups. The long term solution to the problem of transferring entrepreneurship to the dominant local ethnic group is through the process of getting a larger segment of the population acculturated to a business community and the more general acceptance on the part of the people of a business community's values system.

The kind of expanding rural economy visualized would require an increasing number of skilled technicians in agricultural production, packaging, marketing, and small and medium scale industry. Training facilities for such skills would be established in the towns--preferably by the private sector with government help--to meet the demand and help keep emerging job opportunities open for local people. Admission into universities would be limited to <sup>university level (university level)</sup> the needs of the country for such skills as administrators, teachers, doctors, nurses, and other highly skilled technicians.

The strategy sketched above--the emergence of a town-farm complex with increasingly higher levels of production and consumption led and inspired by the existing mercantile class and assisted by government programs of infrastructure and credit could become the 20th century model of releasing the under-developed states from their feudal type social and economic structure just as the mercantilist class led Western Europe out of feudalism. A combination of private entrepreneurial skill and motivation, government policy and programs, and U.S. capital assistance would appear feasible and practical. What is

required is the development of detailed programs, country by country, with this long range strategy in mind. This would involve discussions with the political leaders in the country leading to a broad agreement on goals and methods for achieving those goals and then discussions with influential members of the business community within the country.

With adequate financial and other inducements and insurance against losses in the formative stages, the business community can be expected to be forthcoming in its own interest--an expanding local market holds promise for expanding opportunities for profit. Capital now stored in land, buildings, overseas bank accounts, and conspicuous consumption at home could be put to greater use and greater profit in rural investments. Just as the capitalists of the imperial powers sought investment opportunities abroad in the underdeveloped countries for their surplus capital in the 19th century, the "capitalists" of the 20th century in the underdeveloped countries would be encouraged to seek investment opportunities in their own rural areas. Just as investment in foreign land brought modern ideas and institutions to traditional societies, rural investment by urban entrepreneurs can bring modern ideas and institutions to the peasantry.

¶ The question of land reform invariably arises in consideration of rural development programs. We should approach this question pragmatically. The land owner performs social and economic functions in the production and marketing cycle--and more often than not there is no ready replacement at hand for his services. It could be more advantageous in many cases to think in terms of liberalizing the contractual relationships between land owners and tenant, rather than expropriating the land as a means to provide incentives for greater farm production--a larger

share of the value of production for the farmer without removing entirely the potential modernizing influence and the current services of the land owner. The land owner could become a part of the town oriented marketing-production matrix of the rural areas combining his resources and influence on the farmer with the marketing skills of the urban based merchant. Without increasing real farm income, a land redistribution scheme tends to be temporary--the farm family soon finding itself in debt to the point that the real land owners are the creditors.

III. We turn now to consider a social and political problem plaguing almost all transitional societies--the unemployed "intellectuals." Colonial powers had need for and used local administrators as the means for maintaining control over the countryside and carrying out their policies and programs in the country. This class provided continuity as foreign governors were rotated, provided a cultural and linguistic bridge between the governors and the governed. Education was the ladder by which one could hope to move from one class to a higher one--and by which one retained the prerogatives of one's family. But the opportunities for higher level education were limited--limited by cost and by opportunity. It is not surprising therefore that education ranks high in the priority scale in transitional societies--nor is it surprising therefore that the education system is heavily weighted towards training future bureaucrats.

Consequently, and especially since the removal of the imperial power layer, more people have been trained as generalists and administrators

than the government is prepared to employ. The coffee houses have become the rendezvous of disenchanted intellectuals who had been led to believe that gratification of their life goals would be met through education. They now find bitter disappointment in their inability to serve gainfully in a role they had every expectation of achieving and find it impossible to return to the role of farmer. This human resource is wasted and becomes a latent force for disruptive political activity. The discontent spreads beyond their own immediate circle--it infests the students and youth of the country and becomes a rallying point and cadre for demagogues and revolutionaries.

The opportunity for education in those fields already in a surplus condition should be limited--promising talent should be channeled into technological fields required for the modernization process. Government assisted technical schools, decentralized throughout the country, can be made attractive alternatives to a liberal arts university training especially when employment opportunities are weighed. The promise of employment for those successfully completing work at such institutions--with no such ready guarantees for graduates of liberal arts curricula, would prove an incentive to youngsters completing their primary education. Admittance to the liberal arts schools would be limited to accord with estimates of employment opportunities for graduates. Ultimately, this system would become self-regulating as youngsters learn to assess where the better opportunities lie--but at present, the history of the recent colonial period have distorting influences on individual choice.

As for the present stock of unemployed intellectuals, some method must be found for restoring their sense of usefulness and identity. They are truly alienated--neither part of the traditional society nor accepted by the modern sector. Absorption into an expanded government presence in the rural areas and into private business as it expands its activities into rural communities could absorb large numbers. Others might be sent abroad for limited tours to other underdeveloped countries in a world-wide exchange program that could be universally helpful. A world-wide peace corps for people from underdeveloped countries would expose the disaffected intellectuals to a more enlightened view of the problems of modernization, seen from the perspective of another country. It would dramatize the absence of easy solutions and breed more understanding of his country's own problems. In turn, they could bring back new insights and ideas on how other countries deal with the same set of problems which could be useful and relevant at home. The pay scale and other emoluments for such a peace corps should be modest--living conditions abroad should not prove a disincentive to return nor discontent with living conditions after return. Plans should include absorption of the returnees into government service or the private sector--with emphasis on work in the rural areas.

IV. What is envisioned is a major expansion of activity in the rural areas by both the government and the private sector--and the need for a greater allocation of the nation's resources in the rural areas. This kind of expansion will bring expanded opportunities for employment for rural people, closer contact between the modern and traditional sectors of society. The objective is threefold--(a) to bring to the

rural people the influence and behavior patterns of a more modern segment of the population; (b) provide useful employment opportunities for surplus farm population as well as the currently disaffected educated and (c) to strengthen the relationship between government and rural people in order to build a sense of nationhood and change people's attitude toward government.

This last mentioned factor--the building of a bridge between the rural peasantry and the ruling regime--is an important consideration in political development. The ruling elite in transitional societies is generally preoccupied with its own survival against the threats of other elitist groups. It is more concerned with the internecine struggle--the manipulation of personal alliances and the neutralization of potential usurpers of power--than in the mundane business of governing the country. In a social environment where the masses had little or no influence on policy or the selection of rulers and in the immediate wake of a difficult and divisive struggle for independence from western powers, it is to be expected that the concentration of effort will be on external affairs in order to enhance the international prestige of the rulers and on preventing a coup internally that could transfer power to others.

As a consequence, the rural peasantry remains without an opportunity to adequately represent its needs to government. Its traditional form of life and internal organization remains largely unchanged by national independence. To change this pattern will require the creation and institutionalization of a new set of political gate-keepers that will channel village problems and needs to those elements of government

that can do something about them. These could be matters of economics-- market prices and terms of trade between village and city; matters of social justice--the legal system as applied to rural areas and the masses; taxation; developments projects;--roads, water, power, and security.

The articulation of these needs must be accepted as normal and proper within the political philosophy of the country--rather than as subversive and disruptive--the gate-keepers must be able to translate the inchoate mass of needs into terms understandable to the regime so that the regime can act. Whether the gate-keepers are elected or appointed, whether they are provincial officials or central government officials is not important at this stage; what is important is that they exist. Outward symbols of Western democracy--polling booths-- do not ensure democratic government ~~and institutions~~ <sup>do not establish</sup>. To attempt to reproduce our political system may lead to dissolution of the society in a welter of meaningless political cliques or to a corrupt form of concealed authoritarian rule. Institutions and forms are designed by people but not out of whole cloth--they are limited by the raw material of established social institutions. The creation of a meaningful dialogue between the masses and the ruling elite is the crucial issue--the particular form that this takes in different countries is far less important.

Political leadership and power ~~will~~ <sup>now reside and</sup> reside, in the near future, almost exclusively in those who led the movement for independence ~~and~~ <sup>or</sup> in the educated elite of the bureaucracy--more frequently the military arm of the bureaucracy. Recent history has traced an evolution of

Political power passing from those who led revolutionary movements during the colonial period into the hands of military leaders. This transfer of power is frequently confirmed by "popular" elections--but whether there are elections or not--the results are invariably the same because of the ground rules for the election and the way the elections are conducted. Syngman Rhee in Korea--the leading patriot and fighter for independence during the Japanese occupation--was replaced through a military coup. Sukarno has been replaced by Suharto. Vietnam is ruled by a military junta; Pakistan and Burma are under military leadership.

<sup>has had long</sup> Latin American experience with military dictatorship and <sup>the</sup> coups <sup>is what</sup> has been the traditional method for transferring power. Africa is led in part by leaders of independence movements <sup>is well known as is the shifting scene in Africa.</sup> The development of

stable responsible political parties and the orderly transfer of power is in the future. It will come, as it has in the West, only after the society has become modern--thinks in terms of issues, policies and programs--and has created the institutions necessary to articulate the demands of the people. These institutions will spawn a new group of leaders who will represent a real challenge to the ruling elites.

For the present we should concentrate on the immediate task of raising the sights of and modernizing the attitudes of the rural peasants through education, town-farm marketing complexes, increased farm productivity and income, and the institutions for channeling rural demands to government.