

**Workshop on Reconstituting the United States' Relations
with the Islamic World**

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2:00pm to

Transcript

LANGUAGE HOUSE MULTIPURPOSE ROOM
ST. MARY'S HALL
THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND AT COLLEGE PARK



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OPENING PLENARY SESSION

1

2 MR. SOSNOWSKI: I have the easiest and the
3 most difficult task. The easiest is to welcome you.
4 The most difficult one is for me to leave after just a
5 few minutes because we're having at the same time
6 another workshop that we are co-sponsoring, which is
7 dealing -- has been dealing since yesterday with issues
8 of deliberative democracy with a focus in Argentina.

9 And if you're following the news, what we
10 need there is quite a bit of liberation, quite a bit of
11 democracy, and we're trying to mix those two things.

12 But it is my very distinct pleasure to
13 welcome you to this workshop which we are very proud to
14 co-sponsor with IRIS on reconstituting the United
15 States relations with the Islamic World.

16 The idea of this workshop is that Ambassador
17 Tariq Karim who for quite a while started considering
18 what are the various issues that we should be tackling

1 in connection with the Islamic World and long before
2 the Iraq War took place. And as things unfolded, we
3 decided that there was sense of urgency to this issue
4 that we should convene.

5 So it is my pleasure to welcome you to the
6 University of Maryland. I'm sure this is going to be a
7 very rewarding afternoon and I will leave you in the
8 excellent hands of my colleague, Charles Cadwell, who
9 will moderate at this time. Thank you.

10 MR. CADWELL: Thank you very much, Saul.

11 I should say that Saul's become the head of
12 international programs in Maryland. It's many, many
13 days when he has conflicting activities here as this
14 campus takes advantage of its geographic location to
15 become yet more international.

16 It's my pleasure in joining him in welcoming
17 you this afternoon. My job is to set the scene for our
18 first discussion, introduce our speakers, and then to
19 get out of the way, save for my very important role of
20 limiting them to their amount or their predetermined
21 amounts of time so that we leave time for discussion

1 and questions and comments from you 'cause we have, I
2 think in this room, assembled, not just in our panel
3 here and later on in the afternoon, but in the room all
4 together, an impressive array of both scholarship and
5 practice that I hope will serve us well throughout the
6 afternoon.

7 The War in Iraq, the events of September 11th
8 have thrown into stark relief some issues that have
9 been with us for a lot longer than that period would
10 suggest. And all of us know this. But it also spawned
11 an industry in analyzing Arab and Islamic culture,
12 history, prospects for development that results in
13 conferences, workshops, books, a whole range of things
14 that I hope we can today be more than just one more
15 such event. We can distinguish ourselves in a couple
16 ways.

17 The first way I've already alluded to and
18 that is that we have in the room a mix of both
19 practitioners and scholars, expert both in the history
20 and culture and politics, but also alert to how people
21 in the region might and could adapt to new

1 circumstances and/or to outside intervention.

2 At the IRIS Center here in Maryland, we for a
3 long time have had narrow projects in Bangladesh,
4 Indonesia, Egypt, Iraq, on the West Bank, lots of
5 places, but those have been constrained by the fact
6 that they are project activities and limited to certain
7 sorts of tasks. And so while we bring lots of
8 experience and we think our own perspective, in fact,
9 we're very grateful to have with us experts who can
10 help broaden that perspective for us and I hope for
11 you.

12 Our discussion today is targeted. It's the
13 second way I hope that we distinguish ourselves. Both
14 here and in the two break-out sessions, we're asking
15 you to think about fundamental aspects of aid or
16 assistance for reform or progress in the parts of the
17 world that we might describe as Muslim or with
18 significant Islamic populations. What can be done and
19 is there a U.S. contribution to be made, particularly
20 on the current time?

21 Are the reports of even greater estrangement

1 from the U.S. among the populations true? Whether they
2 are or not, are there ways that U.S. interest and
3 support for more stable and prosperous societies can
4 find partners in the region?

5 It's my hope that in the course of our
6 discussion today, we'll get sort of beneath and to the
7 root of questions that in the past people involved in
8 foreign assistance have had the luxury of ignoring or
9 not paying so close attention to and that is what is it
10 that we think actually is effective and why do we think
11 it's effective and why do we think it would be the case
12 in these parts of the world and at this time? Are we
13 teamed with the most appropriate partners? Is it
14 important that programs be U.S. programs?

15 One way in my own mind of thinking about this
16 would be to ask the question, what's the war we're
17 involved in? Is it a war on terrorism or is it a war
18 on underdevelopment or is it a war on autocracy and
19 disenfranchisement? Our choice of war, so to speak, we
20 have to rethink about who are our likely allies in
21 those wars. Are they just found in the state, in the

1 mosques in such civil society as there may be?

2 Our choice reflects a view of how we think
3 progress will occur it seems to me, not only in Iraq, a
4 place that's subject to much newspaper interest these
5 days, but more importantly perhaps the many other
6 places including the non-Arab Islamic World where there
7 are places that may be notionally democratic but still
8 not places where you can always feel confident that the
9 state plays a positive role in economic and human
10 progress.

11 If we have a view of what interactions are
12 most likely to be effective, do we think that they can
13 be determinative? For example, even if we have
14 successful programs on education or exchange or other
15 things that people might suggest, do they get
16 overwhelmed by the symbolism inherent in military and
17 economic support for an unpopulated regime?

18 Can aid or other interactions be developed in
19 ways that enhances credibility as opposed to
20 undermining it? Do we design things behind closed
21 doors or do we interact with the allies we actually

1 need?

2 Now, the questions we've posed in our agenda
3 today and that have, I hope, drawn some of you to the
4 room might suggest an arrogance or an imperial view
5 that there's sort of value to it's important to move
6 from one part of the world to another. And that's
7 certainly not our hope and our intention in organizing
8 today's session, but it's very much, I think, a
9 relevant topic for us to discuss as we talk about these
10 issues and these problems.

11 Our own take at IRIS, our -- and subject to
12 your contributions and those of the panel is
13 necessarily forward-looking and optimistic. And that's
14 our title, "Reconstituting Relations" as opposed to,
15 you know, what with us.

16 And with your help, I hope we can also
17 develop ideas that are not just optimistic but also
18 realistic and that's really, I think, the idea that
19 brought Tariq to do so much work organizing this and
20 that is what's realistic to do, not what's idealistic
21 to do or what's any other istic you might come up with,

1 I suppose.

2 We have three sessions today. We have this
3 first plenary session and then a second session where
4 you will need to choose which topic you want to commit
5 time to. One talking broadly about voices and
6 interests in the Muslim world and the second zeroing in
7 on this stark relief I've talked about that the current
8 circumstances put our interventions into. What's
9 effective? What will work?

10 Following that session, we'll reconvene here
11 and the two chairs of those sessions, Mack Destler and
12 Thomas Johnson, will both report to us so that other
13 panelists will have a chance to speak and hopefully
14 we'll have yet more opportunity for everyone here to
15 comment as well.

16 We have worked hard and despite our somewhat
17 slow start, I want to make sure that we preserve time
18 for discussion and questions, so I'm going to be strict
19 not only with the speakers who will have more than one
20 chance, but also with speakers who will only be
21 appearing once and try to constrain ourselves to our 15

1 minutes.

2 So let me move immediately and introduce the
3 first three speakers from this -- for this first panel.

4 The first speaker will be Dr. Peter Singer who is the
5 Olin Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings
6 Institution and Coordinator of the Brookings Project on
7 U.S. Policy towards the Islamic World.

8 Peter has been -- I think it's safe to say
9 Brookings was perhaps even before -- pick your
10 determinant event -- Brookings has been very early on
11 doing a lot of very good work to both commission papers
12 and scholars and convene lots of good discussion on
13 this topic. And so I'm hoping we can harvest lots of
14 that good experience here today.

15 Dr. Jillian Schwedler is here at the
16 University of Maryland. She's an assistant professor
17 in the Government and Politics Department. She's got
18 many, many publications on issues of civil society,
19 democracy in the Middle East. Her book manuscript, and
20 I guess it's a manuscripts means we can't go out and
21 buy it somewhere yet, but the title intrigues me

1 "Between Movement and Party: Islamist Movements in
2 Stalled Democracies."

3 Jillian has participated in some earlier
4 workshops we've done, so I know that her comments will
5 be very useful to our discussion.

6 Our third speaker is Ambassador Husain
7 Haqqani who's now a visiting scholar at the Carnegie
8 Endowment. He's a journalist, diplomat, and a former
9 advisor to Pakistani prime ministers.

10 Anyone who reads the "New York Times," the
11 "Wall Street Journal," the "International Herald
12 Tribune," the "Toronto Globe," other publications will
13 have come across his thoughts and writings on this and
14 so we are very fortunate to have him with us today.

15 We are by my clock about 15 minutes behind
16 our pace. I will propose that we make up some of that
17 time by constraining our coffee break rather than our
18 speakers. But let me ask Peter Singer to go right
19 ahead.

20 DR. SINGER: Thank you. I'm delighted to be
21 here and also that IRIS is looking at this, because I

1 think it's a most important issue. In a sense, the
2 challenges that have resulted from 9/11, not only in
3 terms of the attack itself, but in the very responses
4 to them, I believe, will be at the center of
5 international relations for at least the next couple of
6 decades.

7 While the last year has seen great American
8 military success in Afghanistan and then Iraq, we have
9 to admit it's also seen political and diplomatic
10 failure. This is exemplified by the deepening of
11 tension between the United States and the Islamic
12 World. By "Islamic World," I mean not only the
13 founding core within the Middle East but also former
14 Soviet states and Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast
15 Asia, et cetera.

16 For example, in a survey of Muslim countries,
17 only four percent of Saudi Arabians have a favorable
18 opinion of the United States now. Similar figures hold
19 elsewhere in the Islamic World. Six percent in Morocco
20 and Jordan, 13 percent in Egypt, et cetera.

21 Perhaps the most illustrative aspect of the

1 challenge we face right now is that what we see
2 commonly as the "war on terrorism" is broadly
3 interpreted in the Islamic World as "a War on Islam."
4 This means that Bin Laden himself may be on the run,
5 but his actions are more popular than ever.

6 My basic point is that the original message
7 that we sent out to try and explain and justify our
8 responses to an unprovoked attack on 9/11 have somehow
9 backfired. We are now at a situation where suspicion
10 and hostility plague the relations between the world's
11 dominant state power and the world's one billion Muslim
12 believers. Regardless of who is to blame for this
13 state of affairs, it presents a deep policy for
14 American relations and long-term foreign policy.

15 Now, besides the fact that we should not be
16 actively trying to expand and aid the recruitment of
17 anti-American radical groups, once you become perceived
18 as an arrogant, indifferent, or even hateful power, you
19 undermine the effectiveness of your foreign policy.
20 Good will is an element of national security.

21 And as the crafters of American foreign

1 policy in the wake of World War II discovered, it's
2 perhaps the most profound elements of national
3 security. It builds alliances that endure past
4 temporary disputes. It builds a reservoir of
5 understanding and mutual interest. And most
6 importantly, it means that every policy goal doesn't
7 turn into an active teeth-pulling, uphill battle to
8 persuade ostensibly allied governments to do something
9 that they now see as against their own domestic public
10 opinion.

11 Equally if we're to take an imperial view of
12 American foreign policy, good empires lead by
13 persuasion, not by the power of the sword. Or, if we
14 take a values-based assessment of American foreign
15 policy, I believe few Americans would take pride in
16 being the most hated power, but would rather see us
17 seen as a leader.

18 So today in thinking about grand strategy of
19 the U.S. towards the Islamic World, I think there's
20 five key policy dilemmas that we need to resolve. How
21 we resolve them will shape not only our success in the

1 war on terrorism, but I believe what will be the shape
2 of world politics for decades to come. What I think is
3 most important is in the wake of a fairly successful
4 military campaign in Iraq, these five questions are
5 still out there.

6 The first is the challenge of dealing with
7 failing and often authoritarian regimes that have long
8 been considered our traditional allies in the Islamic
9 World. Specifically what is the policy that we adopt
10 towards not just the remaining axis of evil or its
11 junior partner in Syria, but our allies and
12 authoritarian democracies like Egypt are monarchies
13 that are fairly unbending like Saudi Arabia because the
14 key is that the vast majority of the threat from Al
15 Qaeda comes from these states, not from the axis of
16 evil.

17 Now, our old strategy was based on a central
18 bargain, a cold war bargain. Authoritarian governments
19 were fine as long as they supported us in anti-
20 communism and/or provided easy access to oil. This
21 bargain is now insufficient, I think it's fairly

1 broadly agreed, and it's because not only the times
2 have changed but the nature of the threat has changed.

3 And what I argue has to be an essential
4 element of our national security policy is that it is
5 the general failure of the state within the Islamic
6 World that is the center of our new quandary.
7 Essentially the idea of a healthy state, able to
8 provide good governance to its people, that means
9 providing public services that make their people
10 secure, healthy, educated, and prosperous is almost
11 unknown in the Islamic World right now.

12 Instead the prevailing model is one of a
13 brittle regime beset by cronyism which provides little
14 in the way of public goods. This heightens the
15 legitimacy concern of all these states when you layer
16 on top of it most of them are non-democratic and in
17 many cases came to power several generations ago, in
18 some cases through coos.

19 Now, I won't go into the details of the UNDP
20 human development report, but there's a whole host of
21 statistics there that sort of underline the essential

1 problem.

2 What this raises is that not only do you have
3 the problem of legitimacy, but you have no past
4 positive performance that they can point to. And this
5 raises an essential dilemma in that it calls their
6 record, these regimes' record into question. In a
7 sense, the regime has the inability to continue
8 legitimizing its right to maintain power.

9 Now, this general failing to keep pace with
10 change also reinforces a general sense of anger within
11 much of the Islamic World and right now that anger has
12 become directed at the United States. The key is that
13 many see the United States as the guardian of a status
14 quo, a status quo that is failing. Their resentment is
15 with an existing political order that's supported by
16 the United States that most people on the ground feel
17 that they can't affect.

18 There's an indignity in the day-to-day lives
19 fed by local abuses of power, whether in the economic
20 or political realm, but also by central governments
21 that are supported by the United States. And the

1 Palestinian issue, in a sense, is the one area of
2 allowed expressed adds to this sense of indignity and
3 also directs more anti-Americanism.

4 I argue that the United States needs to
5 develop a new strategy that deals with this. It should
6 be shockingly no different than the strategy that we
7 adopt towards other regions or the globe itself. In a
8 sense, we have to deal with the downside of
9 globalization. How we wrestle with globalization and
10 its discontents, whether we're talking about the spread
11 of AIDS and SARS or the spread of Islamic radicalism,
12 is key here.

13 In particular, U.S. strategy must be remade
14 to hinge on its roots from the last period of American
15 triumphalism, which was in the 1940s, in the post World
16 War II period. Specifically America must be identified
17 with supporting prosperity and opportunity.

18 Now, an important realization is that this is
19 not about changing regime type in and of itself. Then
20 as now it's about building good governance. It's
21 building political liberalization, rule of law, and

1 most importantly economic development. In particular,
2 the need is to support the building of human capital
3 and this would not only face a dire need, but it would
4 also entail popular actions on the ground.

5 Now, specifically in this age of knowledge,
6 which is shaped by globalization, the most important
7 challenge within a majority of Muslim countries is
8 their inability to invest in human development. Now,
9 human development is a concept that goes beyond the
10 rise and fall of national incomes. It's about creating
11 an environment in which people can develop to their
12 full potential and lead protective, creative lives. In
13 a sense, it recognizes that people are the truth wealth
14 of nations.

15 Now, before I move on, I think the key is to
16 talk about democratization here because it's an obvious
17 hot button issue in D.C. right now. And I think
18 there's two important points to draw on that. First,
19 if there's one lesson from all of the experiences of
20 America promoting democratization, it is that elections
21 do not lead to democratization. It's actually the

1 reverse. Elections are the final part of it.

2 All the problems that we face right now in
3 the Islamic World are essentially failings of
4 authoritarian governance. So liberalization entails
5 not just the promotion of elections, but its underlying
6 institutions, an open media, non-governmental
7 organizations, representation in parliament that act as
8 forums for citizens' debate, and most importantly the
9 emergence of a robust, civil society, not just in terms
10 of more civil society organizations, but one that is
11 active and effective.

12 Secondly, there's a great diversity in
13 political pluralism across the Islamic World. We need
14 to recognize that there's not a one-size-fits-all
15 answer here. You have full autocracies like Syria.
16 You have semi-autocracies like Kuwait and you have
17 states that are actually seeking to make change like
18 Qatar and Bahrain.

19 One recognition may be that we need to
20 embrace those states that are acting towards change and
21 use them as levers towards states that aren't. For

1 example, Saudi Arabia may be too difficult, depressed
2 to reform effectively. But we can certainly surround
3 it with positive examples of success that then
4 activists within Saudi Arabia can point to.

5 I think it's very important point that Qatar
6 right now has not only greater freedom and has become a
7 spot for Saudis to vacation in, but it also has a
8 greater per capita GDP at the same time that the Saudi
9 per capital GDP is going down. So it's becoming a
10 model of success that we can point to.

11 Also, the rich diversity within the Islamic
12 World can also provide, in a sense, an example of how
13 different Muslim countries have wrestled with
14 globalization. And, therefore, it's in the American
15 national interest to promote more intra-Islam
16 discussions so that these examples of success stories
17 can carry over.

18 Now, the second aspect of our foreign policy
19 is --

20 MR. CADWELL: You have about four minutes.

21 DR. SINGER: Okay. I'm going to -- then you

1 know what? I'll skip -- I'll focus on the second one
2 which is on civil society.

3 Essential reality is that we can't stand
4 aside from the debate within the Islamic World right
5 now. Standing aside would be a decisive action in and
6 of itself. I would argue that we need to mind the
7 lessons from past periods of where were success
8 stories, specifically during the Cold War.

9 We need to be reaching out to dissidents and
10 civil society groups. A particular aspect may be in
11 Egypt where we have identifiable actors who are facing
12 repression from the government. We can establish means
13 with them and, in a sense, a provide a cover to their
14 activities.

15 The other part is that we need to have a
16 larger public diplomacy agenda. The U.S. must do more
17 to ensure that our deals carry across in our public
18 diplomacy. It's not just about shiny pamphlets and TV
19 commercials. It's about getting people out there to
20 understand how American democratization works, how our
21 political system works, to respond to conspiracy

1 theories, as well as making contacts.

2 And I would argue that the present Visa
3 program right now is a critical problem for our public
4 diplomacy agenda. Basically we've made it well nay
5 impossible to bring future ambassadors of tomorrow to
6 the United States to establish these close ties. It's
7 something I think the AID community needs to weigh in
8 on this immigration debate.

9 The third one, which I don't think we need to
10 go into much more depth is, we need to face up to the
11 fact that the Arab-Israeli problem is a challenge to us
12 and we need action on this front. It basically
13 undercuts all our activities elsewhere. And it's just
14 simply -- it's simply there.

15 The fourth is dealing with Muslim minorities.
16 They're an often ignored group within our AID policy
17 and our outreach policy. An important realization is
18 that over one-third of the world's Muslims live as
19 minority groups and this is important not just in our
20 AID activities, but in our public diplomacy, but also
21 how we approach homeland security.

1 Because of the new changes within
2 globalization, these minorities are now hooked into the
3 Ummah in a broader way than ever happened before. So
4 the tension and anger in one place translates over. A
5 recognition is that much of our problems are not just
6 in places like Saudi Arabia, but also within places
7 like Chechnya (phonetic), like Brussels, London, and
8 Paris, as well as the United States.

9 Finally, I think we need to think in terms of
10 grand strategy towards the war on terrorism and our
11 broader relations with the Islamic World. Basically I
12 think it is an important recognition by thinkers like
13 Elliott Cohen and Jim Woolsey, that this is a long-term
14 war of ideas. And with that, we need to learn the
15 lessons that there is a diversity in this battle of
16 ideas.

17 I'll give you a quick example. Al Maida has
18 three radical Islamic groups. We cannot afford to
19 approach them in the same way that we approach the "red
20 minister" in the cold war. Just as Vietnam --
21 Vietnamese nationalism, Chinese communism, Russian



1 communism were different, we need to approach these
2 three different groups in different ways.

3 And I would argue that one strategy that the
4 U.S. can adopt is, in a sense, we are powerful enough
5 to allow them to choose the weapon of our engagement,
6 whether it's innocence, aiming for their destruction,
7 aiming for deterrence, or aiming for dialogue, which I
8 think needs to happen with some of these more radical
9 Islamic groups that have not yet reached out towards
10 violent means.

11 Hizb-ut-Tahir is a group that's gaining in
12 great popularity in Central Asia. It's one that I
13 think we need to engage with before it turns to
14 violence to make sure that we try and prevent it from
15 turning to violence.

16 In a sense, what we need is for the United
17 States to articulate a positive vision of its long-term
18 goals. This means a constructive engagement program
19 and so that by having this out there, not only do we
20 have a way to shape our strategy but also a way to
21 answer competing visions that describe us in

1 imperialist terms or other terms.

2 I think basically it requires the
3 identification of an ideal end game. What is the end
4 state that we are aiming for in our relations? And
5 from that, work backwards.

6 One idea is that we need to develop, in a
7 sense, a national security directive or what's an NSPD
8 right now that articulates what is the ideal end state
9 in our relations. Once we identify these final goals,
10 we can work backwards and establish a more systematic
11 way towards approaching them, charting out mileposts
12 for determining progress that's made, for example,
13 levels of anti-Americanism, levels of engagement with
14 civil society groups, effective AID aid engagement
15 activities, basically taking a more methodological
16 approach towards our grand strategy.

17 And I think a key victory, and what I would
18 argue is the ideal end state, is when the United States
19 is seen on being as part of a positive change within
20 the region, i.e., when we're seen as affording people
21 the opportunities to reach their own potential, whether



1 it's in terms of governing, that's representative
2 rather than repressive, or in terms of economic
3 activity.

4 Basically I'll end here. I apologize for
5 having to sort of breeze through, but it's tough to
6 characterize broad American grand strategy in 15
7 minutes or less.

8 But basically the underlying lesson of
9 September 11th is that we can no longer defer our hard
10 choices. The tragedy of these attacks has given a
11 mandate to change business as usual in American grand
12 strategy.

13 If we can work on constructing a positive and
14 enduring relationship between the U.S. and Islamic
15 World, that will be a great victory for American
16 foreign policy in the long term. But how we solve
17 these dilemmas that we've laid out may well determine
18 not only whether we prevent terrorism in the future but
19 what will be the ultimate legacy of this war on
20 terrorism.

21 And I would end by noting this. It's the

1 legacy that is the most important fact. World War I
2 was a great military victory. History judges it as a
3 failure because its legacy was not positive. World War
4 II was judged as a victory because of its legacy. We
5 have to think in those kind of terms.

6 What are the long-term institutions that we
7 leave here? What is the long-term vision for
8 engagement that we have? So that hopefully this will
9 be seen in terms of a victory in the long term, a
10 legacy akin to World War II. Thank you.

11 (Applause.)

12 MR. CADWELL: Thank you very, very much.

13 I'm going to move directly through each of
14 our three speakers and leave our discussion for the
15 end.

16 Jillian Schwedler.

17 DR. SCHWEDLER: Thank you. I'm going to try
18 to add some things to what Pete's fabulously
19 comprehensive talk set out for us in the beginning.
20 And I particularly wanted to talk more about how --
21 practical issues, how we can improve relations with the

1 U.S. and the Muslim World vis-à-vis the AID Agency as a
2 sort of corollary to the larger foreign policy and AID
3 issues that Pete started out with.

4 I want to base my observations on my
5 experience living in Jordan and Yemen for years and
6 having both friends that worked in AID programs and
7 interacting with people from those countries and them
8 expressing to me some of their frustrations. And so I
9 wanted to communicate some of those things to you
10 today.

11 First off, it has to be said, to repeat
12 something Pete said, but it's important, one of the
13 main obstacles to U.S. AID programs is the history of
14 U.S. intervention in the region. We're not only
15 talking about military intervention, the Gulf War, the
16 current War on Iraq, but also politically. For
17 example, the Arab-Israeli conflict is an important one.

18 But even more importantly support for a non-
19 democratic regimes, turning a blind eye to human rights
20 abuse is in particular instances. This is something
21 that's not just something that's happened in the past.

1 It's something during the Gulf War, regimes that have
2 been able to repress dissent, repress protest
3 expressing opposition to foreign policies. Those
4 regimes have been rewarded with foreign aid for keeping
5 things quiet.

6 This is the type of obstacle that foreign AID
7 agencies are going to encounter when on one hand, the
8 government, our government in this case, but not only
9 the United States, will support regimes that are not
10 democratic, support and even reward regimes for
11 repression. Meanwhile AID agencies are really trying
12 to do serious work on the ground.

13 So that's obviously a tension that exists
14 there. And there's also, of course, intervention
15 economically, not only with regards to the oil
16 question, but particularly in promotion of particular
17 kinds of economic restructuring programs. Again, these
18 are seen as, you know, foreign tools to push for an
19 interest, western global capitalist interest, et
20 cetera.

21 So those are out there, the tensions that are

1 out there, and they make this, together with this long
2 history of intervention, make AID intervention quite
3 problematic. And it's an obstacle.

4 I don't think it's something that can be
5 overcome, but it's something we need to be aware of,
6 but the suspicion on intentions of AID agencies is
7 going to be out there because they're not going to be
8 separated from these other interventions.

9 I want to stress this isn't only with regard
10 to foreign intervention. One of my experiences has
11 been that -- and this varies across the countries --
12 but in many, many cases, citizens distinguish between
13 governments and people and it's something you don't
14 always do in the United States.

15 They'll say, you know, we don't have a
16 problem with America. We like the freedoms. We have a
17 problem with your government-wise, your government
18 pushing these policies. And it's a lesson I think we
19 sometimes forget.

20 And I think part of the reason they make that
21 distinction is because they're suspicious of their own

1 governments. Most people live under very repressive
2 regimes. Their brother has been picked up and
3 tortured. You only get things through patronage, et
4 cetera.

5 So they're inherently suspicious of any kind
6 of government-initiated programs of any type and even
7 AID programs to build schools, to bring clean water are
8 seen with sort of what's going on here? What's the
9 real program? And so it doesn't -- again, it's not to
10 say that it's hopeless, but we need to be consistently
11 aware of these and present consistent messages.

12 I think improving relations can only happen
13 -- the foreign policy part is extremely important and
14 the most important thing. But it can only happen when
15 we consistently demonstrate our good intentions, not
16 just assert our good intentions, but actually
17 demonstrate our good intentions. Follow-up on these
18 programs.

19 And I think if the AID agencies are able to
20 do this somewhat consistently and express their
21 opinions or their intentions openly from the beginning,

1 that would be helpful. But, again, they're going to
2 have these obstacles.

3 You know, the friends I know that were
4 working with UNDP and some USAID contracts were
5 constantly frustrated by things the U.S. government was
6 doing. They're, like, we're struggling to convince
7 people that we really have good intentions.

8 And when things go wrong -- there was a
9 horrible, horrible tragedy when I was in Yemen. Yemen
10 still has a polio problem and they were vaccinating
11 babies against polio. And it was in a village where
12 there's no electricity, so there was one place that had
13 a refrigerator and it was a store. And they stored all
14 the medicines there. And by a horrible mistake, they
15 vaccinated a number of infants with insulin and the
16 babies all died.

17 And it set the AID projects back just decades
18 because you need only one story like this to shoot
19 across the regions. Suddenly everyone is suspicious.
20 They're trying to kill our babies. And the AID's
21 people were obviously devastated by it as were the

1 people, but these types of things, given the concerns,
2 suspicions of U.S. policy, one story like this, it just
3 sets things back so far.

4 And so obviously that's not a new story that
5 I'm telling to AID agencies. I know this is what
6 you're encountering all the time. But it's something
7 that, you know, needs to be kind of addressed up front
8 as opposed to kind of being an obstacle that sort of
9 lingers.

10 Given that, though, I think the situation is
11 not at all hopeless and I think there's several areas
12 where steps can be taken to improve relations between
13 the United States and the Muslim World.

14 In addition to some of the broad AID
15 programs, I think education exchange is incredibly
16 important. There have been threats to a lot of these
17 AID's programs, other types of exchange programs.
18 Scholars can't be brought to the United States because
19 they can't get Visas.

20 We need to push for these programs to be
21 supported. They're incredibly important. I've done

1 research where people have said, God, is this what
2 Americans are like? This is incredible. This is so
3 hopeful and I think those kinds of interactions are
4 incredibly important. So -- but they need to be
5 interactions that take place at all levels.

6 So I thought I'd talk briefly about three
7 issues, three sort of tests or ideas or issues that we
8 should keep in mind.

9 The first is demonstrating respect for local
10 values. Now, this may already be the case. From the
11 friends I knew working in AID agency programs did
12 respect local values. They certainly did. But it
13 needs to be expressed consistently, asserted
14 consistently, and particularly asking, constantly
15 asking the people from communities, community leaders,
16 you know, what are the issues here? What are things we
17 need to be concerned about? Is this seen as pushing
18 secularism? Is this seen as something that's against
19 your values?

20 And the question of secularism is incredibly
21 important. Very many people seem to feel that the AID

1 programs, we're pushing a separation of church and
2 state, that they didn't feel was appropriate for the
3 society. And one of the ways this happened is that a
4 lot of AID money goes to NGOs.

5 And so you'll have this or that person often
6 who speaks English who will say to the Dutch
7 government, you want a woman's NGO? I'll be woman's
8 NGO if you give me a half a million dollars a year. It
9 doesn't mean they're not doing good work. They're
10 doing very good work in many cases. But those projects
11 are seen quite suspiciously by communities in general.

12 Again, the fact that the liaisons are very
13 often with the English speakers, the people that are on
14 the conference circuit, the familiar faces is something
15 that's seen as very suspicious by broader society.

16 So I would urge liaising with a variety of
17 local leaders, whether they're -- I'm jumping to
18 something I was going to say later, but I'll say it now
19 -- whoever the local leaders are, mosque leaders,
20 tribal leaders, you know, take account these various
21 different forms of socialization.

1 That doesn't mean you need to grant AID's
2 building contracts to tribal agencies, but engaging
3 these and trying to bring them in on it and find out
4 what their concerns are. I think doing that
5 consistently can help. It can open the lines of
6 communication. And I think putting the question of
7 foreign aid up front in the beginning of these
8 dialogues can be helpful, that it's not something we're
9 hiding.

10 It's something we're aware is a
11 contradiction, but we're an AID agency and our concern
12 is clean water. That's where we want to get. Yes, we
13 know these other things are out there. But try to
14 start a dialogue. Put these issues on the table
15 instead of, you know, shrugging at them and being
16 frustrated and just leaving them behind.

17 An example is education. Education is
18 incredibly important. In terms of values, it something
19 that I know we value very highly and like to promote.
20 We see all kinds of benefits to education. And in
21 Muslim societies, education is a priority. You can't

1 be a good Muslim unless you can read the Koran.

2 So literacy is incredibly important. A lot
3 of Islamic groups, in fact, in the early part of the
4 20th Century were at the forefront of promoting women's
5 literacy because women need to be able to read.

6 So I think there's areas where we can promote
7 things that aren't seen as flying in the face of local
8 values like education, but it needs to be done in
9 dialogue rather than just showing up and saying we're
10 going to build X schools and they're going to be
11 secular schools and here's the curriculum, which, of
12 course, isn't what happens, but there's things not far
13 from that that I've seen happen in influencing
14 textbooks, et cetera.

15 Before I run out of time -- how much time do
16 I have?

17 MR. CADWELL: Five.

18 DR. SCHWEDLER: Okay. So I'll do my last two
19 kind of quickly.

20 Contributions to key development needs. We
21 need to ask what are the key development needs. What

1 do societies see as priorities for needs?

2 To give you another story of a well-
3 intentioned project gone wrong, clean water in Yemen --
4 and this happened in the '70s and only in one village.

5 The women had to walk long distances every day
6 carrying containers on their head to get water to the
7 village. And so the AID agencies came in and
8 said, well, this is horrible. Let's give them water in
9 every household, clean water in every household, and
10 that will free up their time, which, in fact, it did.

11 But what then happened was that trip to the
12 water source on a regular basis was important for
13 socialization. It got the women out of the household,
14 talking to each other. And now suddenly the women were
15 in all the households and they weren't given reason to
16 go out and communicate and deal with each and talk
17 about politics.

18 And it seemed like a good project and, you
19 know, it was effective for health reasons, but it was
20 disastrous on the community level and the role of the
21 women in that society.

1 That's something if you talk to the
2 community, you can find out what actually is happening
3 in those situations. And, in fact, to the benefit of
4 the agencies that were doing it, they stopped that.
5 They started making locales of clean water but that you
6 still had to walk to.

7 So, you know, they were responsive. But I
8 think if communications happened earlier on, you could
9 find that out, those types of questions.

10 So I think we need to be flexible on what the
11 priorities are. Obviously health care, clean water,
12 education, these are all priorities. There's common
13 values on that. But how we go about implementing them
14 is something we need to really look on a case-by-case
15 basis.

16 And, again, a lot of this should be generated
17 with dialogue with different communities and different
18 community leaders. And, again, that doesn't mean
19 formally engaging them, bringing their tribal leader on
20 as a decision-making figure. It means talking to
21 everybody. You know, what kinds of community forums

1 are there? How do people get together to debate
2 things? And try to engage in those forums as much as
3 you're welcome to do.

4 And the last effective communication both
5 directions, I think one of the biggest failings since
6 9/11 on the U.S.'s side is effectively conveying our
7 issues. One, for example, was directly afterwards, we
8 did not effectively convey our evidence for Al Qaeda
9 being responsible. We did not effectively convey our
10 reasons for going into Afghanistan.

11 And so now there's all these wild stories
12 that still circulate, not as much as did immediately
13 after, but still circulate. And instead, we were kind
14 of arrogant, like, well, we know we don't have to show
15 anybody the evidence and we're just going to do it.
16 That kind of arrogance leads people to say, well,
17 what's really going on here?

18 So I think if we can make the case and try to
19 engage people honestly, obviously we'll still have
20 security issues and reasons to hold certain information
21 back. But I think if you treat people with more

1 respect and make your case, take the time to make the
2 case, I think that will go far.

3 You're not going to win everyone over
4 obviously. But as a lot of people, I was very
5 distressed when I went back last summer to Yemen to a
6 lot of people who are English speakers, who are
7 educated in the west, who have these wild stories of
8 what actually happened on 9/11.

9 And I was very distressed by that because I
10 didn't expect it from their community, that community.

11 And they essentially conveyed that they just didn't
12 ever see the evidence. And I think those are the types
13 of things that we can do.

14 And, finally, I think we need to be, you
15 know, consistent. We need to be up front about what
16 our intentions are, what are goals are, try to
17 continually keep dialogues open with these different
18 community leaders, how are the projects going? You
19 know, is this meeting your needs? What's working, what
20 isn't working? And I think that can lead to an
21 improvement of relations.

1 job of addressing certain issues. I'm going to try and
2 talk from the perspective of the Islamic World. Why it
3 is a world? What is it?

4 And I'll begin by saying that when we talk
5 about the Islamic World, we are talking about over one
6 billion people living in seven countries with a Muslim
7 majority and many countries, many countries with large
8 Muslim minorities, like India, China, Russia, France,
9 and the United States, which has five million Muslims,
10 at least.

11 So we are talking about a community which is
12 characterized by a preeminence of religion and
13 discourse in an age in which the society that we belong
14 to, the United States and the rest of the Western
15 World, does not consider religion as the preeminent
16 shaper of discourse. And I think that is what sets the
17 U.S. apart from the Islamic World.

18 So if we are going to try and understand how
19 to reconstitute U.S. relations with the Islamic World,
20 we have to first understand what is the principal
21 difference. And this in my view is the principal

1 difference.

2 Second, why is the U.S. relationship with the
3 Islamic World the way it is? To understand that, and
4 when you're trying to do something like that in ten,
5 fifteen minutes, you have to resort to miniaturization
6 which I have learned and everybody else has learned
7 from the Japanese. I'm going to try and give an
8 example and that is how do people look at the issue of
9 history.

10 I've been in the United States only one year.

11 I've lived most of my life in Pakistan, growing up as
12 a Muslim, having gone to a religious seminary, as well
13 as having had a western education, which is unusual in
14 our part of the world. Usually you either go to a
15 seminary, grow a beard, teach religion, or you end up
16 in the western stream in which case, you end up having
17 a good job and making a good living.

18 And I've done all of that in my 45 years of
19 life from political prisoner to ambassador to
20 everything. So I have a good picture of what goes on
21 there. But I've understood certain things about the

1 U.S. after being here for a year.

2 And one of the first things that struck me
3 was somebody was describing somebody who they thought
4 was a has-been, an unimportant person. And they said
5 he's history. And the first thing that came to my mind
6 was that in the Islamic World if you say he's history,
7 that would mean he's somebody to be revered. He's
8 somebody that you should learn something from.

9 And that is another important thing. Here's
10 a country which has become the world's most preeminent
11 power technologically, militarily, and economically.
12 There's about 250 years of history. I mean, you know,
13 I visited historic cities in the United States which
14 are, you know, this is a historic site, 200 years.

15 Well, the Smithsonian, you know, you have
16 something about the Native Americans which goes a
17 little beyond that. And then there's the dinosaurs.
18 But as far as the human beings are concerned, it's 250
19 years. In our part of the world, you live in houses
20 which have been around for 250 years. And, you know,
21 you -- so there's a totally different approach to life

1 that is to be addressed.

2 Now, where did things go wrong? Well,
3 there's the whole pieces about, you know, these
4 Muslims, they didn't want to learn about modern life
5 and didn't accept it and et cetera, et cetera, and they
6 all got upset and they lived in time warp. And now
7 they just have to wake up and understand that the times
8 have changed.

9 That's that pieces which has been pondered
10 very strongly by a lot of people since 9/11, including
11 some very eminent historians of the Muslim World. And
12 they said that's all that went wrong. There's these
13 one billion people just couldn't understand what was
14 happening and haven't understood it for the last 200
15 years. They didn't get it and we'll make them get it.

16 Well, ain't going to happen.

17 What is most likely is that one -- the both
18 sides have to make an effort to try and understand each
19 other's concerns. And the last hundred years of
20 history or hundred fifty years of history have to be
21 particularly understood.

1 Almost all the Muslim majority territories
2 today or countries were, as they are constituted today,
3 were colonial creations in one form or another. What
4 is in Indonesia today, the world's largest Muslim
5 country, several islands, never ruled by one until the
6 Dutch came and made it into one entity and then made it
7 into a country.

8 But as far as the Muslims themselves are
9 concerned, they were either Acehnese (phonetic) or
10 Sumatrans or Japanese. They had a different historic
11 fountain and entities. What is Pakistan? Only 54
12 years of history. Nothing before that. Bangladesh,
13 even shorter because it became independent from
14 Pakistan in 1971, although unified by language, by
15 culture, by tradition, but -- so there are all these --
16 and they have a historic resentment of the colonizers
17 because the colonizers divided tribes, divided
18 communities, divided -- ended up messing the way of
19 life, et cetera.

20 And that is part of the history. And then we
21 have to recognize and remember that in this one period,

1 there are at least three issues that I think are what I
2 call three dilemmas and Peter's dilemmas were of a
3 different nature. Mine are -- there may be some
4 overlap, but I'm going to concentrate on what I think
5 have been the dilemmas of especially the United States
6 interacting with the Muslim World.

7 The first has been what I call the security
8 and stability versus values and democratic change. Do
9 you base your relationship on your security needs,
10 security, whether it's security for continued supply of
11 oil, whether it's security in terms of being able to go
12 through the Suisse Canal, whether it's security in
13 terms of being able to provide security to Israel, that
14 you share values with, whatever. It's security. It's,
15 you know, a major security concern.

16 And then to ensure that security, do you
17 create stable little islands, you know? Everybody
18 remembers Jimmy Carter's great line about the Shah of
19 Iran, an island of stability in a sea of turmoil. And,
20 of course, we know what happened to the island of
21 stability. But that is the historic pattern of

1 creating islands of stability for the purpose of
2 security policy.

3 On the other hand is the whole question of
4 values and change and democracy and, you know, should
5 that even feature in U.S. policy? So that's the first
6 dilemma that everybody has to face and we will all have
7 to face it. And those of you from USAID have to face
8 it on a day-to-day basis, you know, what is going to --
9 which one is going to win out? Which is the priority?

10 I think that whatever we do is related to the
11 values, change, relationship, building the long-term
12 relationship. And then there may be security
13 considerations that will wash out all the good work
14 that is done.

15 Second, I think, is the dilemma of who should
16 the U.S. link up with? Should it link up with liberals
17 and quote, unquote, moderates within Muslim societies,
18 who do not have any support, any constituency within
19 their own societies, you know? Nice guys, speak
20 English.

21 And I remember that in 1971, soon after the

1 Iranian Revolution, a journalist came to interview me.

2 I was a student leader in Pakistan and the students
3 were, of course, burning the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad
4 and burning this and that. And I was kind of, you
5 know, an island of stability and all of that.

6 So this guy comes to interview me and he
7 says, you know, one of the things that -- I said, well,
8 why couldn't you get the Iranian Revolution and he said
9 all my life -- and he had been a journalist for 38
10 years, award-winning British, and he said we never
11 really thought that people who did not wear executive
12 suits and did not speak English really made a
13 difference in any of these countries.

14 And that is a dilemma even today. Do you
15 deal with all these turban-wearing people, you know,
16 who are, like, down below in society, important, have
17 support, have constituency, but did not share your
18 lifestyle? You can't sit over a drink with them in the
19 evening and discuss business.

20 So which ones do you support? Which ones do
21 you -- forget about support. Which ones do you relate

1 to? Who is going to be your intermediary with those
2 societies?

3 And that is -- the reason why I'm saying all
4 of this is because I've been told to talk about can
5 more liberalized Islamic societies lead by example. We
6 are only going to get to liberalizing Islamic societies
7 if we understand where Islamic societies are today.
8 And then I'd be able to say whether they can lead by
9 example or not.

10 The third is -- the third dilemma is should
11 we accept the values and belief systems of others and
12 work with them, hoping that over a long period of time,
13 they will adopt some of ours, maybe we'll adopt some of
14 theirs, and that's how life is all -- that's what life
15 is all about. But that is not really what some people
16 think ought to happen.

17 Some people think we should go and just
18 change these people's belief systems and change their
19 values. And during the colonial period, efforts were
20 made to do that. For example, what is today India and
21 Pakistan didn't have any Christians before the British

1 really came there because they opened up as a country
2 for missionaries. And the missionaries changed
3 people's religions, et cetera.

4 So if there is a resentment or a fear that
5 somebody would first come, beware of people bearing
6 gifts. They bring -- you know, these AID works, they
7 bring us water and they bring us the food and all that.

8 But they lots of time take away something they get
9 from us which is our soul. And so that's the dilemma
10 and that has to be borne in mind, you know. How do you
11 work around with values that you cannot really relate
12 to?

13 I mean, you know, here's a guy, nice guy,
14 everything, you know, really cares about his people,
15 but he has two wives. I mean, you know, and that's not
16 -- that's just not right. And so that kind of creates
17 a problem at every step in terms of the timing. So
18 that, I think, is the dilemma.

19 Now, what is the issue that we -- that is
20 forcing the United States? I mean, I was at one
21 meeting yesterday. Some of you saw me there. I'm at

1 another. Why is everybody talking about it?

2 And I think what is happening is that there
3 has been a tremendous reaction and action and
4 everything going on in the Islamic World over the last
5 few decades which erupted and hit the United States, so
6 to speak, for want of a better phrase, in the face on
7 9/11.

8 And so the United States, which had sort of
9 allowed everything to happen on its own, felt, hey, we
10 have to do something about it. And so we are all
11 talking about it.

12 So what is the issue? The issue, I think, is
13 that Muslim societies, which are characterized by the
14 preeminence of religion in their discourse, also now
15 have a very strong body of people who believe in
16 pursuing that religious discourse through coercion and
17 violence. And a lot of that coercion and violence is
18 either against U.S. interests or against U.S. citizens
19 or the U.S. itself.

20 So to counter that, it is important to try
21 and arrest the growth of this tendency and, B, to

1 foster a more tolerant approach to this religious
2 discourse, trying to create, so to speak, a Muslim-like
3 approach. You know, I don't agree with you, but I
4 accept your right to do that. And that is perhaps what
5 I think is what I see as the objective of creating
6 liberalized Islamic society.

7 My definition of a "liberalized Islamic
8 society" is a society where the balance of power is not
9 held by those who use coercion as the mean means
10 irrespective of whether they still want to hold onto
11 their religious belief in a certain way, but rather who
12 believe in a more tolerant approach and are willing not
13 to necessarily -- well, not necessarily -- not to use
14 coercion at all in discourse.

15 And I think that is the minimalistic agenda
16 that we can work with. I'm going to use two more
17 minutes and then I'm going to be done. And I think
18 that to do that, we have to first identify a spectrum
19 within the world of Islam. Islam, the world of Islam
20 is not monolithic. One billion people. Throwing one
21 billion people with anybody's system, they'll never be



1 the same anyway, let alone people living in a stretch
2 of the world that stretches from Morocco on the one end
3 to Indonesia.

4 I mean, I don't know how many people in this
5 room really know that the Arab Middle East constitutes
6 only one-fifth of the world's Muslim population. Only
7 one-fifth. And yet, day after day I get invited at
8 campuses, et cetera, to speak and I keep on saying I'm
9 not from the Middle East. I'm from a Muslim country.
10 I'm a political Islam specialist or whatever. But the
11 person introducing me will still say he's a Middle East
12 expert because the presumption that -- and Indonesia,
13 by the way, is 10,000 miles away from Iraq, you know,
14 and yet it's part of the Muslim World without being
15 part of the Middle East.

16 So the important thing is that there is a
17 spectrum at all levels. But even within political
18 Islam, there's a spectrum. And just as after the
19 second World War when an effort was being made to
20 contain Marxism, communism, the U.S. made a distinction
21 in the political spectrum and understood that there are



1 social democrats who are also of Marxist religion and
2 then there are Eurocommunists, et cetera, et cetera,
3 going all the way to gorillas in Peru and the Soviet
4 Union in between somewhere and the anarchists and the
5 Japanese.

6 So one of the most important things that
7 needs to be done is creating an understanding of the
8 whole political spectrum even of political Islam or
9 militant Islam. Not all political Islam is anarchist
10 and necessarily like Osama Bin Laden, et cetera.
11 Therefore, it's not a threat. Before the social
12 democrats of the Muslim World end up being cast in the
13 same mold as the red brigades, I think it's time to
14 take stock and try and understand that.

15 As far as leading by example is concerned,
16 yes. Liberalized Muslim societies will be able to lead
17 by example provided the liberalized societies or the
18 liberalized Muslims are not lumped together with the
19 extremists, meaning that Islamic terrorist does not
20 become the -- there's a terrorist Muslim which is
21 different from being -- from describing someone as an



1 Islamic terrorist because what the latter means is that
2 anyone who is a terrorist or anyone connected with
3 Islam can be described or seen as a terrorist.

4 And there are key pockets within the United
5 States and internationally that have vested political
6 interest in trying to make this into a war on Islam
7 rather than a war on terrorism. And that needs to be
8 avoided.

9 In the course of discussion, we come to
10 models. Turkey has the justice and development party
11 that has come to power only recently. It's a party
12 with Islamic roots. I would say that this is to me the
13 equivalent of European labor party or social democratic
14 party on the Marxist spectrum. Inspired by the same
15 ideas, but different methods.

16 And I think that such organizations the U.S.
17 can do business with. I strongly feel that the areas
18 where the U.S. -- the work in promotion of tolerance,
19 creating a secularistic Islamic dialogue because within
20 Muslim society, it's much easier for Muslims that are
21 secularist or Islamist to come and talk to you all than

1 it is to talk to each other because the secularists
2 feel totally under attack by the Islamists and vice
3 versa and they don't necessarily communicate.

4 So maybe fostering some kind of dialogue
5 where people with a little more religious bent and
6 people with a lesser religious bent can actually
7 coexist or learn to coexist because you will not be
8 able to de-Islamize Islamic societies. I mean, that is
9 a myth if anybody thinks that somehow you can take
10 Islam out of Islamic societies.

11 Fostering of free media and discourse and
12 then I think last but not least recognizing that U.S.
13 policy can be wrong and can really cause rage. I mean,
14 when people turn around and say, okay, give us any
15 number of reasons why there is something that we need
16 to do, but the one thing we aren't going to do anything
17 about is our own policy.

18 We're not going to turn around and look at
19 how we have caused people to be angry with us. We want
20 to know why they hate us, but none of that is going to
21 include any introspection at this end about what we may



1 have done deliberately, inadvertently, or by way of
2 policy to cause that hate.

3 I think that that needs to be looked as well.

4 Thank you all.

5 (Applause.)

6 MR. CADWELL: Lengthening list of dilemmas,
7 some suggestions. Let's use the rest of our time in
8 this first session to round out this framework before
9 we move into the two smaller sessions to work on some
10 specifics.

11 Comments or questions from the audience?
12 We're in complete agreement?

13 Yes, in the very back. If you could tell us
14 who you are and your affiliation.

15 MALE VOICE: (Unintelligible.) I'm curious
16 to get Dr. Singer's and Dr. Schwedler's reaction to the
17 recent announcement proposal by President Bush
18 regarding the U.S. Middle East free trade area and do
19 you think that this will help in pushing forward a more
20 reformed agenda within the Middle East?

21 DR. SINGER: I think it was actually a

1 positive move. It put us in a proactive stance. It
2 also articulated an end goal in mind that we can work
3 towards, not only within U.S. government, which is very
4 important to have something at the presidential level
5 that people at lower levels can point to help push
6 projects through, but also it identified an end state
7 that our diplomats can point to and what is the
8 progress that we're making towards that.

9 Now, that said, we can't view this as the end
10 all be all. It's not going to -- it is not going to
11 change the perspective of most people on the street.
12 They're going to see it for what it is. It's a way to
13 shift attention from other issues which aren't so
14 popular. And we have to realize that this has to be
15 part of a broader strategy.

16 But I think it was a positive move and I
17 certainly hope that we move towards using it as a lever
18 to work on human development issues, particularly maybe
19 using it towards building -- how would I put it -- a
20 lot more public-private partnerships and also rule of
21 law. Those are two key issues that you can work under

1 a free trade zone.

2 DR. SCHWEDLER: Yeah. I don't have much to
3 add. I basically agree with everything. The only
4 thing I would add is that there are portions of the
5 communities that are going to view any of these issues,
6 free trade zones, with suspicion. You know, this will
7 be foreign capital coming in, taking jobs from us.
8 Whether that's true or not, that's going to be part of
9 the obstacle.

10 And that -- again, I would urge that that
11 needs to be addressed immediately and to highlight
12 instances where that's not the case, to highlight the
13 local merchant who is now doing better, you know,
14 really to try to take efforts to promote that, to show
15 that the money is actually going back into global
16 hands, which we hope is actually what's happening.

17 There will be groups that will oppose it
18 across the board, but I think that's an issue where you
19 can actually foster more support. I don't see it
20 having any connection with the political reform
21 unfortunately.

1 MR. CADWELL: One of the things we're working
2 on at IRIS is that very issue, is how do you -- under
3 what conditions does trade liberalization get
4 democratized, if you will? How do you distribute the
5 benefits more equally through unequal societies?

6 Sir.

7 MR. RUFFIN: I'm Dick Ruffin (phonetic) with
8 Initiatives of Change, a private group doing work in
9 reconciliation.

10 Resolving these dilemmas that were spelled
11 out very well, I wonder whether there could be benefit
12 from trying to establish common values. It seems to me
13 language gets in the way. You go to some of the
14 predominantly Muslim countries, you find, yes, they
15 care about their families. They care about human
16 relationships. They're not for violence.

17 They want basic integrity and genuineness and
18 relationships, a lot of things which we also fully
19 endorse and yet because the origin of values is
20 perceived here to be more secular, perceived there to
21 be more -- we get in arguments.

1 But, in fact, amongst real people, I don't
2 find the values all that different. Political values,
3 yes, but human values very close to the same. And
4 whether we might really embark on an effort to publicly
5 identify the commonality of values, do you think that
6 would help?

7 AMBASSADOR HAQQANI: I think it certainly
8 would help. I think that very little work has been
9 done. I've spoken about this earlier. You find a lot
10 more written about political issues such as Israeli and
11 Palestinian question, et cetera, available in the
12 languages of the Muslim World, Indonesia, Malaysia,
13 Turkish. There's very little by way of literature
14 about family values and family life in the United
15 States, et cetera.

16 And we must remember -- I don't know if
17 anybody has read the statistics recently -- only 20
18 percent of Americans ever travel abroad. And with
19 State Department warnings about people not traveling to
20 the Muslim World, there's very little. So the chance
21 of the average Muslim in a little village in Djibouti



1 ever knowing what an American is like and what his
2 family is like is very unlikely.

3 So the only view of America they get is from
4 Hollywood movies which a lot of Americans don't agree
5 reflect American values. And they have no idea about
6 us. So building common values, maybe that is one of
7 the areas where, for example, United States and
8 international assistance can be -- can be devoted to,
9 to try and find the areas of commonality instead of,
10 look, there will be people in the Muslim World who will
11 always say, yeah, we know you're more powerful. You're
12 technologically more advanced. But we have a glorious
13 history. And there will be people who will turn around
14 and say who cares about your history.

15 But I think that as long as there is
16 acknowledgement and respect, that, you know, some
17 people at one time in history will follow. If there
18 had been Nobel Prizes in the year 1003, all of them
19 would have been won by Muslims, you know. If you go
20 back into history, that was a state of scientific
21 advancement there. So they've fallen behind a little



1 bit. That doesn't mean you're going to look down on
2 them.

3 And so you can find the commonality of
4 values, of -- especially of more basic human values. A
5 merchant in the Muslim World is as interested in making
6 a profit as a trader here. And, yeah, sure. There are
7 no Enrons in the Muslim World that we know of. But if
8 we had really, you know, good oversight, et cetera, we
9 might uncover some. So there's a lot more in common
10 and that common ground, I think, needs to be
11 identified.

12 MR. CADWELL: Yes.

13 MS. BUTLER: This is a follow-up to that.

14 I --

15 MR. CADWELL: Please identify yourself for
16 the --

17 MS. BUTLER: I'm Tish Butler with USAID.

18 And I guess my sense is that I -- we talk
19 about common values in the foreign assistance arena
20 over there, building it over there with foreign aid,
21 but I'm struck by how absolutely essential the -- it is

1 to build that here in America.

2 When you think of how our policies are -- the
3 high-level policy now is moving and how it is -- how
4 the -- the public support for both engagement in Iraq
5 and for post-Iraq support for the administration for
6 President Bush, it is phenomenally high. And it has to
7 be built on a relatively reductionist view of what --

8 AMBASSADOR HAQQANI: Sure.

9 MS. BUTLER: -- what we face over there. And
10 so I guess what I would say is I suspect that the
11 bigger need is to build that, set the understanding of
12 common values here at home even more than overseas.

13 MR. CADWELL: The official imperialist
14 ambitions at home.

15 Sir, in the back and then here in the front.

16 MR. KALL: John Kohl.

17 It was mentioned as far as our supporting
18 authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. As
19 I understand, foreign aid of two billion dollars to
20 Egypt which obviously props it up. And if my history
21 is correct, then went in with Jimmy Carter, Camp David

1 stop fighting between Egypt and Israel as part of the
2 deal.

3 If we were to cut that out, there would be a
4 betrayal to Egypt and it might have some other adverse
5 effects over there. I think there's a tough situation
6 there and I think it's glibly that we can say, oh, we
7 should stop propping up authoritarian regimes.

8 Now, does somebody have a good solution on
9 that? I'd be happy to hear it.

10 DR. SCHWEDLER: I think there's a middle
11 ground between cutting off foreign aid. And that can
12 be trying to not be so hypocritical about human rights.

13 So, for example, in Egypt, Sadam Ihrobrahim
14 (phonetic) was an activist, a democratizer who was in
15 jail and it took months before we could mobilize in the
16 states any kind of criticism to the U.S. government.
17 You don't have to cut aid to Egypt, but say this is not
18 really appropriate.

19 A female parliamentarian in Jordan was put in
20 prison after she was actually out of office last summer
21 and she's 70 years old and she was in prison for over

1 two months. She was sentenced for 18 years because she
2 criticized the prime minister for raising the insurance
3 rates on cars under a state security law, a temporary
4 law, an emergency security law. And all the car
5 insurance companies are owned by his family.

6 So all she did was raise questions whether
7 this was actually a question of state security. She
8 ends up in prison and not a word comes from a single
9 U.S. official. And that's something that resonates
10 here. I mean, Jordan at the time was, like, why is no
11 one commenting on this. I think you can comment on
12 that far short of cutting aid and abandoning allies.
13 And I think that would help.

14 AMBASSADOR HAQQANI: And I'll just add to
15 that, you know, as somebody who has himself been a
16 victim of security service in the United States, et
17 cetera, and beaten up and everything, I can relate to
18 it a little bit better.

19 Let me just say, where you put that money is
20 crucial. I mean, if those two billion dollars were
21 intended for Egypt in terms of economic projects, et

1 cetera, there would be less criticism. The U.S. ends
2 up bumping a lot of this money because when these are
3 spoken about, they're spoken about as two billion
4 dollars in economic and military assistance.

5 So it's not just the money that is going
6 through USAID. Sometimes the money is also going into
7 -- in Pakistan right now and after 9/11, the U.S.
8 government is helping the Pakistan security services
9 modernize.

10 Well, if it's a dictatorship and you have a
11 modernized security service, yes, they'll also catch a
12 few Al Qaeda people, but, hey, come on, commentators
13 and dissidents like me better watch out for how they're
14 going to be stripped naked and beaten up on the butt
15 next time around by those very people with money that
16 you're putting in.

17 So that needs to be looked at and maybe there
18 is a middle ground that you say we'll give economic
19 assistance to Egypt, but we're not going to bolster
20 Hosni Mubarak security services or Hosni Mubarak better
21 tell us what date he's going to step down because, you



1 know, he's had -- he's had a 25-year transitional
2 regime in Egypt, you know.

3 DR. SINGER: I would add two essential
4 things. The first is we need to remember who is the
5 superpower in the relationship and we need to remember
6 that we have the ability to set the agenda. And in
7 some cases, you know, it's -- you'll hear -- we go in
8 asking for certain things and in certain ways they're
9 asked back to us where that money goes. Okay. We need
10 your -- within this military world, but we can say no
11 at some point. We have that ability.

12 The second is that we can do very small
13 things that are very important. One of the critical
14 tactics during the -- trying to provide protection to
15 dissidents in the Helsinki process and also in Latin
16 America and also during the 1990s in the Balkans was
17 any time senior U.S. policy makers went to these
18 regions, they made a point not only to meet with the
19 prime minister or the president, they also made a point
20 to leave on that schedule a meeting with a dissident, a
21 meeting with a civil society leader, a visit to a



1 school, a visit to a hospital.

2 We don't do very much of that within
3 primarily the Arab World. We've somehow granted an
4 exceptionalism to this region. And I don't think we
5 need to grant that exceptionalism and that can carry on
6 whether you're talking at the senior government level
7 or also at the ambassadorial level or even the AID
8 worker level is that these meetings provide a
9 recognition and also a sense of protection that puts us
10 on the positive end of change.

11 MR. CADWELL: There's a question here in the
12 front and then I want to take one more after that and
13 move into our next sessions.

14 MR. Ahmad: I'm Imad Ahmad from the
15 University of Maryland and the Freedom Institute. It
16 was not a question. It was a comment.

17 If you want to establish or reconstitute
18 relationships, one of the most important things in
19 relationships is communication. It means you have to
20 be able to listen to the other side and in listening to
21 this panel, I realize you have to be able to listen to

1 what you yourself are saying.

2 I did agree with almost everything that was
3 said here, but certain expressions, having shared
4 values, for example, with Israel. You know, you say
5 that to a Muslim audience and they're going to say,
6 well, what exactly are these shared values you're
7 talking about? Are you talking about apartheid or you
8 talking about illegal occupation?

9 And you hand over the ammunition to the
10 enemies of the relations between the United States and
11 the Muslim World to say, oh, well, they're probably
12 referring to the expropriation of the lands of the
13 native peoples.

14 I don't want to brag about that as an
15 American and I'd rather say that the values that we
16 share are those values that would cause us to criticize
17 the September 11th bombings are what cause you to
18 criticize the murder of not only Palestinians but say
19 of racial quarry.

20 MR. CADWELL: Thank you very much for that
21 comment.

1 One last comment or question. Thomas.

2 MR. JOHNSON: Thomas Johnson, USAID.

3 I just wanted to commend Dr. Singer for the
4 very outset of your talk basically pointing out that
5 the problem in many of these Muslim-Islamic countries
6 is, in fact, state failure. We're just starting to
7 realize that ourselves and yet I caution all of us the
8 optic of that obviously is problematic. No country
9 likes to be labeled sort of in that type of category,
10 but, in fact, the governments that they're afflicted
11 with having and it's a problem.

12 DR. SINGER: I think it's an important -- I
13 appreciate your comment and I think what's important is
14 to figure out the way we hook onto those efforts. And
15 the UNDP Arab Human Development Report has given the
16 U.S. government an intriguing way to approach this in
17 that it's not us identifying what are problems, but we
18 can now say here is a problem that you have identified
19 as being an issue.

20 What can we do to help you on these areas,
21 whether we're talking about -- you know, and there's a

1 whole raft of it, whether it's illiteracy to
2 information technology access. But you can say you've
3 identified it, how can you set the dialogue, how do we
4 go about jointly approaching it?

5 And I think that's a far more effective way
6 than going in and saying, okay, we find all these
7 faults with your -- with your state of governance.
8 It's a new way of approaching it.

9 The one comment I wanted to make to the
10 previous one. I think it applies to this values
11 debate. An interesting thing in the polling shows that
12 it's not values. It's not American values that have
13 caused opposition to the U.S. Actually, the polling
14 shows that American values are indeed quite popular.
15 It's the perception that our policies don't represent
16 those values.

17 And on some issues, you know what? We may
18 not be able to do anything about it, on Israel, for
19 example. But at least on the other areas of AID
20 opportunity, we can try and shape them within a values
21 discussion saying how what we are doing on the ground

1 is a representation of what we see our values are,
2 whether it's increasing opportunity in the economic
3 area to providing representation and voice in the
4 political area. Basically providing a way to shape how
5 we play out our aid.

6 DR. SCHWEDLER: Something really quick just
7 on his last point and you might know the numbers more
8 than I do. But consistently in polls when asked in the
9 Arab World, not just the Muslim World, in the Arab
10 World, what government do you admire the most, Israel
11 and the United States are at the top of the list. And
12 they distinguish this. The functioning of the system
13 is something they admire. They might have problems
14 with specific policies, but they're consistently held
15 as models.

16 MR. CADWELL: Lots of hmps in the room on
17 that one.

18 Let me thank all three of our panelists very,
19 very much for getting us off to a really good start
20 here. And we're going to take a short break. There's
21 some refreshments and some fresh air I hope as well.

1 But to catch up our time, I'd like to start our next
2 sessions at quarter to our.

3 Session A is in this room. Session B is in
4 the room called the Cafe Room, just up these three or
5 four stairs to the left, and that room is one we are
6 apparently not allowed to bring food or drink into. So
7 you need to consume that here. The rest rooms for
8 those who need them are along the hallway. Thank you
9 again.

10 (Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the above-
11 entitled conference was concluded.)

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