


# USING THE FRAGILE STATES FRAMEWORK

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# STEP 1: SCREEN STATES WITH THE FRAGILE STATES MATRIX



The PESS-EL Framework can be used to screen for Fragile States. Fill in the PESS-EL cells in Yellow if any of the conditions in Table 5 are met; in Red if any of the conditions in Table 6 are met, and Green otherwise. Countries are FRAGILE if they have 2 or more red cells or 4 or more total Yellow and Red cells. States with at least 4 red cells can be considered “Failed.”

**EXAMPLE:** A dictatorship that oppresses opponents and slants economic rewards to its cronies, provides weak social services (but equally weak to all), and weak security protection except to its direct supporters, even targeting opposition groups for violence (e.g. Nicaragua under Somoza in the late 1970s, Philippines under Marcos in mid-1980s)

	Effectiveness	Legitimacy
Political	XXXXXX	XXXXXX
Economic	XXXXXX	XXXXXX
Social	XXXXXX	XXXXXX
Security	XXXXXX	XXXXXX

# DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO



	Effectiveness	Legitimacy
<b>Political</b>	<p>National statistics not currently being collected</p> <p>Two attempted coup d'états in 2004</p> <p>10-15% territory loss</p>	<p>10 parties excluded from major power sharing agreement</p> <p>Reports of civil unrest (protests and strikes)</p>
<b>Economic</b>	<p>Classified low-income economy by World Bank</p> <p>GDP/Capita is \$85 - less than 50% of previous high.</p>	<p>One group illegally exporting resources from country</p>
<b>Social</b>	<p>Primary school enrollment at 40%</p> <p>Government unable to respond to natural disasters</p> <p>Health system unable to provide care to majority of population</p>	<p>Tutsi groups report restricted access to social services</p>
<b>Security</b>	<p>Power sharing agreement among competing rebel groups</p> <p>High turn over of cabinet level positions</p> <p>10-15% territory loss</p>	<p>Private militias formed in certain provinces.</p> <p>Militias in alignment with other ethnic groups and neighboring states.</p>

# HAITI



	Effectiveness	Legitimacy
<b>Political</b>	<b>Weak central government with nominal control over parts of country; stability dependent on UN forces.</b>	<b>Appointed transitional government. Political protests and strikes are common and at times violent.</b>
<b>Economic</b>	<b>GDP/Capita is \$350 - this is 30% less than previous high; Unemployment greater than 20% for past 3 years; Limited tax collection or ministry control.</b>	<b>History of elite dominance and state patronage, though no one faction currently in control of state revenues.</b>
<b>Social</b>	<b>Primary school enrollment rates at 65% and falling. Government able to provide public health coverage to less than 25% of population.</b>	<b>Government nearly entirely dependent on foreign assistance. Some Aristide supporters excluded from provision of public services.</b>
<b>Security</b>	<b>Regime recently overturned and replaced by transitional government.  More than 1000 people killed in political violence over past three years.</b>	<b>Transitional government not seen as systematically subjecting selected groups to violence.</b>

# STEP 2: USE THE SCENARIOS TO IDENTIFY THE GAME



## Failing/Failed

## Failed/Recovering

Communal Group Conflicts	External Intervention
State Predation	Negotiated Settlement
Regional or Guerrilla Rebellion	Clear Winner
Democratic Collapse	Rebels Contained
Succession/Reform Crisis	Ongoing Failure

# STEP 3: USE THE SCENARIOS AND FS MATRIX TO CREATE ANALYTIC NARRATIVES FOR EACH CELL



- FOR STATE EFFECTIVENESS

What actors and actions are reducing state effectiveness? What incentives can be offered to whom to improve effectiveness?

- FOR STATE LEGITIMACY

What actors and actions are reducing state legitimacy? What incentives can be offered to whom to improve legitimacy?

# STEP 4: DESIGN TREATMENTS FOR EACH CELL, USING USAID COMPETENCIES



- For example, DG to improve state legitimacy
- ITA to improve state and economic effectiveness
- Aid to health and education to improve social effectiveness and legitimacy
- Conflict resolution in ongoing failure

# STEP 5: BUILDING CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (1)



- After treatments have been devised for all cells, the overall program of assistance should be assessed in order to make sure that its provisions will work toward building ‘constitutional order’ – a set of institutions that provides incentives for key actors to maintain good outcomes in all cells.
- The goal of treatments is not only to rectify problems in each cell, but create institutions that foster cooperation among different actors and groups across the range of PESS issues.

# STEP 5: BUILDING CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2)



- Treatment plans should be assessed to make sure they address the following issues:

Is any group in a position where they would likely succeed in taking control of the state, rather than cooperate with other groups?

Is any group so fearful/mistrustful that they would rather withdraw or act pre-emptively than cooperate with other groups?

Is any group so outraged by past actions that they would rather seek revenge than cooperate with other groups?

WHERE NEEDED, special institutions should be addressed to these problems

# STEP 6: MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT



- Repeat step 1 (Screening with FG Matrix) to assess whether state is still Fragile or has ‘graduated’ out of Fragility.
- Use results of repeat of step 1 to maintain holistic approach, cross-fertilize work across cells
- Use results of repeat of step 1 to identify which cells need further/continued/new interventions