



CROSS-SECTORAL ASSESSMENT FOR AT-RISK YOUTH IN KENYA REVISED REPORT

Submitted by Education Development Center, Inc.

Subject: Solicitation: **SOL-623-09-000002-**
Cross Sectoral Assessment of At –Risk Youth in Kenya


Reference: **AID LWA # GDG-A-03-0001 0-00 EQUIP3 - Earning, Learning and
Skill Development Opportunities for Out of School Children and Youth II**

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REVISED November 2009

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMFI	Association of Micro-Finance Institutions
AMPATH	Academic Model for Providing Access to Health Care
CBO	Community Based Organization
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
DBSC	District Business Solution Center
DFID	Department for International Development
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DYO	District Youth Officer
EDC	Education Development Center
EQUIP	Educational Quality Improvement Program
FSD	Financial Services Deepening Project
FBO	Faith Based Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GOK	Government of Kenya
GROOTS	Grassroots Organizations Operating Together in Sisterhood
HIV/AIDs	Human Immune –Deficiency
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IRDC	Internal Refugees Displacement Center
KADET	Kenya Agency for the Development of Enterprise and Technology
KIPPRA	Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis
KKV	Kazi Kwa Vijana
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KT	Kituo Thibiti
KYPD	Kibera Youth for Peace & Development
LOE	Level of Effort
MFA	Micro Finance Associations
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOHEST	Ministry Of Higher Education Science and Technology
MOYAS	Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports
MYSA	Mathare Youth Sports Organization
NACC	National Aids Control Council
NCKK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NFE	Non-Formal Education
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NQF	National Qualifications Framework
NYC	National Youth Council
NYS	National Youth Service
PEPFARUS	President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PEV	Post-election Violence
SACCOs	Savings and Credit Cooperatives Organisations

SID	Society for International Development
SME	Small and Micro Enterprises
SMS	Short Message Service
STD	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
STI	Sexually Transmitted Infections
TEARS	Theatre for Enhancement & Acceleration of Researched Solutions
TIVET	Technical Industrial, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children Education Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VCT	Voluntary Counseling and Testing
VM	Vigana Mashanini
WPAY	World Programmme of Action for Youth
YAIMA	Youth as Implementing Agents Approach
YECs	Youth Empowerment Centres
YEDF	Youth Enterprises Development Fund
YIKE	Youth Initiatives Kenya
YSO	Youth Serving Organizations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose of the Assessment

This At-Risk Youth Assessment for USAID/Kenya supports a new generation of youth development programming, based on a cross-sectoral understanding of youth needs, risks, and opportunities. It seeks to answer the question, *What are the specific sources of vulnerability, marginalization, and disaffection among Kenyan youth, particularly in areas affected by the 2007–2008 post-election violence, and how can they be countered?* The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) asked that the assessment focus on the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western, and Central provinces, and the major slum areas of Nairobi, and recommend priorities for the short term (2012) and medium term (2015).

Context: Economic and Political Trends

For three decades, from Independence to the early 1990s, Kenya enjoyed a worldwide reputation for political and economic stability in a region beset with political conflict and stalled economies. With its magnificent seacoast, mountains, and game parks, it was the favored African destination for international tourists. That began to change in the 1990s with high levels of urban crime, reports of large-scale corruption by leading politicians, and the increasing use of force in political affairs. There were reports of gangs used for intimidation in local and national elections, as well as the use of state-sponsored militias. The relatively peaceful elections of 2002 seemed to put such charges to rest. In reality, it was an uneasy peace, with discontent at continued corruption in high office and the failures of the judicial system to bring those in power to account, while government decision-making on land allocations, public service employment practices, and allocation of public goods were seen to be biased and governed by political pressures rather than justice, equity, and national development. These matters came to a head in the 2007 election, which the vast majority of Kenyans believed to be fraudulent, setting off the most devastating political crisis since Kenya's Independence.

Youth were at the center of the 2007/2008 post-election violence (PEV), both as direct perpetrators and as victims. Although analysis of the PEV has identified politicians as the force and organizers behind the large-scale terror, killing, arson, rape, and destruction, youth were the agents. The fact that almost 2 million youth (15–30 years) are out-of-school, and the great majority of these have no regular work or income, makes them particularly vulnerable to recruitment, for pay, into political campaigns and criminal gangs. This report examines this highly exploited and vulnerable group, and seeks to develop, with their voices and recommendations, options for youth programming to transform what continues to be a highly destabilizing condition.

Kenya has a large, growing, and increasingly urban youth population. Youth aged 15–30 represent 32 percent of the population, and the current 11 million young people in this age group are expected to increase to 16 million by 2012. This high population growth is accompanied by rapid urbanization. The 50 towns and cities in Kenya with a population over 10,000 in 2006 have experienced a population growth of approximately 25 percent over the past decade, and a very high proportion of that growth has been youth migrating from the rural areas in search of better livelihoods.

These youth face a complex reality: On one hand, they have a relatively high level of basic education, with a literacy rate at over 90 percent, and more than half of those who are out of school have completed some or all of secondary schooling. However, 75 percent of the out-of-school youth do not have regular, full-time employment. As many as 40,000 of these youth are entering this labor force each year with tertiary education, and facing an employment market that has only created 150,000 new jobs in the past six years (Waki Commission, p.34). This is reflected in increasing levels of youth who are on the street and highly vulnerable to recruitment to petty crime, gangs, and prostitution (MOYAS Strategic Youth Plan 2008–2012).

Youth frustrations and failed expectations, and the lack of opportunity for regular employment, fueled but did not drive the widespread chaos that spread throughout Nairobi and the Central, Rift Valley, and Western regions in the post-election violence 18 months ago. It is true that almost 80 percent of those who were direct perpetrators and victims were youth, but they were the ammunition and the targets—not the gun or the trigger. In Kenya, the political culture has increasingly used youth as a central tool for gaining and holding power. Enlisting and paying youth is a relatively cheap and effective way to mobilize for political rallies, to gather votes through persuasion or threat, and to intimidate the opposition. Politicians also mobilize youth and communities by highlighting historical grievances, particularly the allocation and control of land, and ethnic demonization. This is not an isolated phenomenon, but rather systematic and widespread, that is well documented and understood, by youth, the general public, and politicians alike.

Our Findings

Our dominant finding gleaned from listening to youth, interviewing stakeholders, and studying the many government, agency and academic analyses of youth in Kenya, is captured by this youth voice:

We are not the problem in Kenya, we are a part of the solution. But we remain vulnerable unless there is change in accountability for systemic political, social, and economic exploitation.

Youth are vulnerable for multiple and complex reasons, with historical roots in the colonial and post-colonial Kenyan experience. On one hand, there is an education system that is designed to be highly individualistic and competitive, in which “paper” examinations determine one’s life opportunities, and the majority “fail” before attaining qualifications that are needed for formal sector employment. On the other hand, the education system raises expectations, leading

school leavers to disdain agricultural work, without providing the knowledge, skills, and disposition to seek livelihoods through enterprise and self-employment. Yet youth who are not from a wealthy, connected family have little opportunity for wage employment in the formal sector.

The evolution of political life in Kenya has increasingly led to the enlistment of youth to support politicians' partisan and ethno-centric agendas. Politicians have fueled inter-ethnic hostility, citing historical injustices and grievances. Rampant corruption in land allocations, the bias in national resource allocations, and the distortions in public service appointments (including ethnic bias in hiring for the security forces) are viewed through ethnic lenses, so that it is perceived to be the tribe that gains or losses politically. The widespread abuse of government authority and lack of accountability has resulted in a pervasive corruption of public affairs, notably in the police force.

Our findings indicate that the great majority of youth have lost trust in the integrity of Kenya's political and social institutions and leaders, resulting in alienation and, without other means of support, a high level of involvement in petty crime (drugs and prostitution), and, for some, militias and gangs. Many youth lack a stable community with leadership from adults that guides their own social, economic, cultural, and spiritual development. Youth are looking for such leadership, and say that if they cannot get it from elected politicians and community leadership, they will create it themselves.

A Holistic Perspective

Youth have told us, and we share this perspective, that programs that address critical issues, such as the opportunity for education and training; providing livelihoods and income; improved health; and civic and political participation will NOT, in themselves, have a significant impact on youth vulnerability to exploitation. Why? Youth point out that livelihoods income without security and protection from corruption; education and training without follow-on application; health interventions without a change in the social environment; and participation in peace-building and policy councils without integrity from public leadership will not change the mistrust, alienation, and exploitation that is now so widespread.

The Assessment examines youth conditions and opportunities through the lenses of (i) Democracy, Governance and Conflict; (ii) Livelihoods, Enterprise and Employment; (iii) Health and Well-being; and (iv) Capacity Development: Education and Training. Within each perspective we examine the key issues and options for ways forward. Significant findings include:

- Although there are thousands of registered youth organizations (over 50,000 have received loans through the government's Youth Enterprise Development Fund), they do not necessarily reach the most vulnerable, their impact is highly variable, and many are short-lived and dependent on a single source of financing or support.

- Youth feel acutely disempowered by existing governance councils and procedures, where they often have only a token representation, and where policies are not implemented as stated due to a high level of corruption.
- There is a lack of appropriate information about policies, programs, and opportunities, and a good deal of misinformation.
- Kenya's informal enterprise sector, *jua kali*, has grown to engage some 70 percent of the labor force, albeit often in part-time, underpaid, and short-term enterprise. Given the very low growth of employment in the formal sector, the growth of micro-enterprise provides the best opportunity for youth livelihood.
- The growth and spread of micro-financing in Kenya is remarkable, providing a strong base for financing start-up, small-scale, youth-organized enterprise.
- Youth who become engaged in viable micro-enterprise move through what we term a "Three Stage Youth Enterprise Development Process," starting with assessments and often voluntary service projects, then moving onto informal money-earning activities, and ending with micro-finance and viable enterprise. It is a process that typically takes up to three years.
- There are hundreds, if not thousands, of youth-led informal enterprises and organizations that are successful (and even more that are not sustained).
- Youth consider that their health problems have been too narrowly defined as sexually transmitted disease and HIV/AIDS. They view health from a broad perspective, which includes personal health; community and environmental conditions; and psycho-social well-being, including values of integrity, caring, unity in diversity, spiritual purpose, and lives of service, as well as recreation and sports. Youth activities and organizations, they feel, should engage in activities that promote these values.
- There is a high level of sexual abuse of girls and young women, with more than 20 percent becoming mothers before the age of 16 years, and a much higher percentage who suffer through abortions.
- There are a great many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) who began working on these issues, particularly those funded to combat HIV/AIDS, that have evolved into multi-functional, youth-serving organizations, addressing livelihoods, public advocacy, and capacity building.
- Youth feel that most existing health services are not "youth friendly," and they would like to be able to access information and treatment from "one-stop, friendly" health services that are both confidential and trustworthy.
- There are 155,000 youth enrolled in formal technical, entrepreneurial, and vocational training institutions, yet many do not obtain the competencies needed to be successful in micro-enterprise, nor do they easily find employment in the formal sector. There are a great many more youth who are involved in non-formal education experiences, often

linked to the development of micro-enterprise. Yet there is little inter-organizational sharing and no quality control on Non-Formal Education (NFE).

- Out-of-school youth want and need ways of achieving competencies that are practical and recognized as legitimate. This is a matter of high priority for Kenya's development, and for the growth of opportunity for youth. The Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology has proposed to Parliament the development of a National Qualifications Framework (NQF) to address this critical need.

A Way Forward

Youth insist that they must assume responsibility and begin to play a leadership role in addressing the issues that confront them and the nation. They assert,

We are not the problem in Kenya, we are a part of the solution. But we remain vulnerable unless there is change in accountability for systemic political, social and economic exploitation.

We found a good deal of evidence that this is beginning to happen. There is a widespread movement within towns, cities, and in rural areas of youth-led organizations that are service oriented, developing enterprises, contributing to youth well-being, and engaging in policy advocacy and oversight. These groups seek to develop their own capacity, gain local support, provide security for members, and develop information and networking on training and livelihood opportunities. The clarity in the minds of many at-risk youth of the threats and challenges facing them and their way forward in addressing these is in itself a positive sign.

Many of these groups had their genesis in the past two decades, growing out the widespread NGO, CBO, religious groups, and donor agency efforts to address the HIV/AIDs pandemic, the plight of unemployed urban and rural youth, and more recently the extensive PEV work in peace-building and conflict resolution. We estimate that there are thousands of registered youth organizations throughout the country which have the potential to become viable and effective.

Proposed USAID Options for a Youth Programming Strategy

The options that we propose draw on and synthesize the proposals made for each of the sectors. The fundamental focus among the programming options is on the support and expansion of local youth organizations in those areas most critically affected by PEV in the Nyanza, Western, Rift Valley, and Central provinces and the poorest areas of Nairobi. This focus draws upon what at-risk youth have said is their central recommendation for improving conditions:

We recommend the development of structures that create a bottom up system of youth development to ensure all young people can participate.

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF ASSESSMENT

USAID/Kenya opened its description of the purpose for the Assessment of At-Risk Youth in Kenya with a succinct description of the current political and development crisis the country faces:

“The unprecedented violence following the 2007 presidential elections brought new attention to the large number of disaffected youth in various regions of Kenya. While limited livelihood opportunities are often cited as a serious risk factor and major driver of youth delinquency and violence, past experience shows that the issue of youth development is highly complex and multifaceted. Accordingly, a new generation of youth development programming in Kenya must take place within a cross-sectoral understanding of youth needs, risks, and opportunities linked to the ultimate outcomes of reduced vulnerability, marginalization, and disaffection among at-risk Kenyan youth. These outcomes can potentially contribute to objectives under the economic growth, education, democracy and governance, and health areas of USAID programming in Kenya. To better inform and direct programming for youth in Kenya, USAID is undertaking the ... cross-sectoral youth assessment.”

USAID/Kenya requested Educational Development Center, Inc., (EDC) with its EQUIP3 program, to undertake a Youth Assessment, presenting a detailed set of questions related to youth challenges and opportunities in the areas of livelihoods, democracy and governance, education for livelihoods, democracy and governance, and health. The purpose of the assessment was to examine (i) the structure and characteristics of youth cohorts; (ii) the needs, risks and opportunities demonstrated by youth; and (iii.) a review of existing service providers and other institutions in relevant sectors that may address the stated needs of target youth. The primary question for the assessment was ***What are the specific sources of vulnerability, marginalization, and disaffection among Kenyan youth, particularly in areas affected by the 2007–2008 post- election violence, and how can they be countered?***

The Assessment was designed to analyze issues connected with:

- Unemployment and lack of opportunity for gaining a livelihood
- Inequalities in resource distribution and marginalization
- Rapid urbanization and the breakdown of social values
- Alienation and disillusionment—lack of trust in institutions and leadership
- Ethnically based patronage politics and incitement, formation of gangs
- Inadequate system of education and training
- Spread of drug abuse, HIV/AIDS, and teenage pregnancies

On the basis of this analysis, and the exploration of strategic options, the Assessment was expected to recommend youth program strategy options to USAID that address:

- Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western, Central Provinces, and Nairobi Slums
- At risk youth between 16 and 24 years
- Priorities for short-term needs (by 2012) and medium-term, two-to-five-year developments
- Information disaggregated by age, gender, ethnicity, rural/urban, income levels, as appropriate

II. ASSESSMENT DESIGN

II.1 THE ASSESSMENT TEAM

The Youth Assessment Team was composed of 20 members: a Core Team of international and national professionals, and 12 youth leaders and activists who served as facilitators in organizing and conducting youth focus groups in each of the four provinces and in three areas of Nairobi (Kibera, Dandora, and Haruma). The neighborhoods in Nairobi were chosen based on their socioeconomic characteristics, as well as the familiarity of the Youth Facilitators with the youth in these communities.

The Core Team included the following:

- Joseph Kimani (peace-building and youth policy) and Lainie Reisman (youth conflict resolution), focusing on democracy, governance, conflict, security, civic participation, and advocacy
- Jacqueline Glin (workforce/livelihood) and Chris Murray (youth enterprise development), focusing on livelihoods, enterprise, and employment
- Dr. Eunice Kamaara (social analyst and youth well-being) and Dr. Harrison Maithya (youth health programs), focusing on health and well-being
- Dr. Sophia Macharia (the education system) and Dr. Ash Hartwell (team leader and specialist on non-formal education), focusing on education and training

The Youth Facilitators, all of whom are youth organizers within their regional areas and university graduates, worked with the Core Team in the write-ups of the youth focus group reports, the analysis of data, and the development of proposals on youth development. The youth facilitators were Paul Otiende (Kibera, Nairobi); Phoebe Naliaka (Nakuru); Felix Cheruiyot (Molo/Kericho); Beatrice Okal (Kisumu); John Kiarie (Eldoret); Elizabeth Wangu (Nyeri/Murana); Michael Yakhama (Kakamega); Vincent Atowa (Kisumu); Janet Achieng (Kakamega); Edna N. Kivuva (Dandora, Nairobi); Hassan Abkikadhir (Haruma, Nairobi); and Juma Hemedi (Thika). Their input was critical for our findings and strategic approach. This reflects the principle that youth should be engaged in any assessment and development relating to their opportunities and welfare.



Assessment Team

II.2 Principles

The Assessment activity was guided by the following principles:

1. Developing a partnership with USAID/Kenya: USAID/Kenya and the U.S. Embassy were intimately involved in the project, particularly during the fieldwork phase which served to strengthen the team's knowledge and understanding while also ensuring consistency over time. All aiming together towards "a new generation of youth development programming in Kenya."
2. Building on proven models: While assessing constraints and key problems and issues facing youth, we focused on identifying, describing, and understanding what strategies and models have been successful in Kenya to enhance youth well-being and livelihoods.
3. Listening to the voices of youth: Experience indicates that the experiences of youth are best presented by the youth, since it is youth transformation that is at the heart of the social change needed. The imperative to listen to youth's voices and youth's views about what they need, within the context of overall political, social, cultural, and economic dynamics, is critical for shaping a strategy. By working with and learning from the Youth Facilitators and emphasizing fieldwork directly with youth, the team prioritized youth input.
4. Understanding the role of the Kenyan government, at all levels: Recognizing that government goodwill and cooperation are necessary for successful programming, and particularly for a policy environment conducive to youth transformation, the team evaluated opportunities for coordination with government actions at all levels (national, regional, local).
5. Using a holistic / cross-sectoral perspective: Youth have physical, intellectual, social, cultural, and spiritual needs, aspirations and identities. They seek social environments which respect them as capable, creative human beings. Much of the failure of youth programs has been their design as sector service delivery systems: disease prevention, education and training, enterprise development, civic service, and policy advocacy. There is a strong need to integrate these services within a framework that provides youth a social identity, a secure "home," which nurtures their talents, creativity and potentials.

II.3 Process

The Assessment began with planning sessions to consult on the most effective process of carrying out the task. Initially, this was done through teleconferencing, thanks to information technology. Hence, by the time the team met physically for the first time, a number of tasks had already been accomplished with the following outputs: (i) lists of Youth Serving Organizations (YSOs) in targeted Provinces, (ii) lists of contact persons for the various YSOs, (iii) lists of identified key informants for each targeted province, (iv) contacts of key informants, (v) lists of relevant government national policy documents and initiatives, and (vi) relevant literature for review.

A two-day meeting was held in Nairobi for all the Core Team members to strategize on the way forward in terms of methodology, including means of responding to questions posed in USAID's RFA. In the meeting, it was agreed that the Assessment team would do the following:

1. Use a structured qualitative approach for interviews and focus groups.
2. Draw on documentation for quantitative data.
3. Focus on Appreciative Inquiry—that is, finding what is working and building from there.
4. Use experience in one stage to improve later stages so that learning informs the process.
5. Work with a methodology that shifts from analysis of challenges and issues to ways forward during the assessment. It was largely recognized by the Assessment Team, and confirmed by USAID, that while there has been significant study and analysis of the challenges and issues facing youth conducted by government and nongovernment agencies alike, little has actually been prepared regarding strategies for moving forward. As such, a strategic decision was taken to emphasize creative thinking around what steps could be taken to address the challenges, rather than the challenges themselves.
6. Examine and consult with key contacts and groups that were prioritized during the meeting.

Documentary Research: Over 80 papers and documents were identified as relevant and were therefore examined. These included government policies, legislation, strategies, plans, government agency strategies, programs and plans, institutional and individual research and analyses papers, as well as NGO/Youth Group program descriptions and evaluations. A list of all materials is included in the Annexes.

Field Research: To ensure effective completion of the Assessment within the stipulated time, the Assessment was divided into two field teams, and every field team composed of sectoral specialists. National Team members set up meetings with key informants as well as the focus groups within the provinces and Nairobi locations with the help of Youth Facilitators.

Oral interviews: Approximately 60 meetings were held in which key informants were interviewed on various aspects of youth services and youth needs. The meetings were with government officials from relevant ministries: the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MOYAS), the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology (MOHEST); the Ministry of Education (MOE); and others at the national, provincial, and district levels. In addition to government officials, the majority of the interviews were conducted with nongovernmental actors, including international development agencies with youth programs; international, national and regional NGOs; micro-financing institutions; and youth organizations at national and local levels. Field reports on all the meetings were prepared and analyzed to provide data that could be used in the Assessment.

Focus Group Discussions: Youth focus group methodologies were piloted during the first week in Nairobi, followed by a thorough review, analysis, and adaptation as needed. Following that pilot phase, a total of 12 focus groups were conducted in each of the target provinces, including Nairobi. Each focus group discussion had about 10 youth identified by the Youth Facilitators as most at risk because they were unemployed, out-of-school, and/or from at-risk communities. Participants in the focus group discussion were selected purposely to maintain representation in terms of gender, ethnicity, and age. A protocol for conducting the focus groups was developed, drawing on EQUIP3 experience and team members' expertise, and the Youth Facilitators were trained, in a one-day period, to use that protocol (See Annex 4).

Data Analysis: The entire team was involved in data analysis at end of the fieldwork, a process which included two half-day workshops that facilitated group analysis and project preparation. At the end of

the team's collective work in the field, each two-person sectoral group prepared and presented a report, within a clearly articulated holistic perspective, for further analysis and consultation.

Preparation of the Final Draft Report: During the last week in Kenya, the team leader, with a number of team members, presented assessment findings and recommendations to the following: USAID for critique and questions; the U.S. ambassador and staff; the director of Youth Affairs at the Ministry of Youth and Sports; and the permanent secretary, directors and senior officials at the Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology (which is responsible for all public, private, and non-formal technical, entrepreneurial, and vocational training). Based on the constructive feedback and questions arising from these meetings, a preliminary draft report was prepared. The final report benefited from a detailed review, with issues and questions raised by USAID/Kenya.

III. CONTEXT: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC TRENDS & YOUTH POLICY

For three decades, from Independence to the early 1990s, Kenya enjoyed a worldwide reputation for political and economic stability in a region beset with political conflict and stalled economies. With its seacoast, mountains, and magnificent game parks, it was the favored African destination for international tourists. That began to change in the 1990s with high levels of urban crime, reports of large scale corruption by leading politicians, and the increasing use of force in political affairs. There were reports of gangs used for intimidation in local and national elections and the use of state-sponsored militias.¹ The relatively peaceful elections of 2002 seemed to put such charges to rest. In reality, it was an uneasy peace, with discontent over the continued corruption in high office and the failures of the police and justice system to bring those in power to account, while government decision-making on land allocations, public service employment practices, and allocation of public goods was seen to be biased and governed by political pressures rather than justice, equity, and national development. These matters came to a head in the 2007 election, which the vast majority of Kenyans believed to be fraudulent, setting off the most devastating political crisis since Kenya's independence.


Youth were at the center of the 2007/2008 post-election violence (PEV), both as direct perpetrators and as victims. Although analysis of the PEV, particularly in the comprehensive Waki Commission Report and such studies as the Kenya Youth Agenda and Media Focus on Africa, have clearly identified politicians as the force and organizers behind the large-scale terror, killing, arson, rape, and destruction, youth were the agents. The fact that almost 2 million youth (15–30 years) are out-of-school, and the great majority of these have no regular work or income, makes them particularly vulnerable to recruitment, for pay, into political campaigns and criminal gangs. The following assessment report examines this highly exploited and vulnerable group, and seeks to develop, with their voices and recommendations, youth programming options to transform what continues to be a highly destabilizing condition.

III.1 Youth At-Risk

Kenya has a large, growing, and increasingly urban youth population. Youth aged 15–30 represent 32 percent of the population, and the current 11 million young people in this age group are expected to increase to 16 million by 2012 (KNBS, 2009). This high-population growth is accompanied by rapid urbanization. The 50 towns and cities in Kenya with a population over 10,000 in 2006 have experienced a population growth of approximately 25 percent over the

¹ See Anderson (2005) and the Waki Commission (2008) for analysis of these political developments.

past decade, and a very high proportion of that growth was youth migrating from the rural areas in search of better livelihoods².



Urban Life

These youth face a complex reality: On one hand, they have a relatively high level of basic education, with a literacy rate at over 90 percent, and more than half of those who are out of school have completed some or all of secondary schooling. However, 75 percent of the out-of-school youth do not have regular, full-time employment, a condition that is not improving for the 500,000 who leave school each year to join what is euphemistically termed the “labor force” (MOYAS Department of Youth Strategic Plan 2008 – 2012). And as many as

40,000 of these youth are entering this labor force each year with tertiary education, and facing an employment market that has created only 150,000 new jobs in the past six years. This is reflected in increasing levels of youth, often highly educated and skilled, who are on the street and highly vulnerable for recruitment to petty crime, gangs, and prostitution (MOYAS Strategic Youth Plan 2008–2012)

Youth frustrations and failed expectations, and their lack of opportunity for regular employment, fueled but did not drive the widespread chaos that spread throughout the Nairobi, Central, Rift Valley, and Western regions in the post-election violence of 18 months ago. It is true that almost 80 percent of those who were direct perpetrators and victims were youth, but they were the ammunition and the targets—not the gun or the trigger. In Kenya, the political culture has increasingly used youth as a central tool for gaining and holding power.³ Enlisting and paying youth is a relatively cheap and effective way to mobilize for political rallies, gather votes through persuasion or threat, and intimidate opposition. Politicians also mobilize youth and communities by highlighting historical grievances, particularly the allocation and control of land, and ethnic demonization. This is not an isolated phenomenon, but rather a

² Analysis based on data from the Kenya Statistical Bureau, <http://www.prb.org/Countries/Kenya.aspx>

³ See *The Youth Agenda: Who is Guilty?* (2009)

systematic and widespread one, which is well documented and understood by youth, the general public, and politicians. (See Anderson, 2005, Waki, 2008, Roessler, 2005)

The Waki Report describes the vulnerability of youth to gangs and political recruitment:

...unemployed youth have been mobilized into gangs along ethnic lines. Their power, to the point of having become shadow governments in many areas, stems from two sources. First as the main aim of Government in the 1990s was to mobilize political support to gain and maintain political power, a good deal of revenue was spent on patronage rather than on maintaining infrastructure and providing social services. This meant that the country started to crumble, visually evident in the decay of roads and the proliferation of uncollected garbage, even in the capital city of Nairobi, which once had been called the “city in the sun”. This crumbling as well as a decline in social services and security also paved the way for violent gangs which provided them. This gave unemployed youth work, albeit within gangs, and made the latter extremely powerful. Over time these gangs operated as Mafioso shakedown gangs, with violence and impunity, as they continue to do. Increasingly, citizens began to ask who was in charge of Kenya, gangs or the Government.

The gangs are devoid of ideology and operate on a willing buyer willing seller basis. Given the hierarchical nature of gangs and the upwardly mobile hopes of their members to become as well off as their leaders, youth can be mobilized for a variety of reasons, not just to meet their daily needs. This, in itself is a very dangerous situation, helping to explain why since the 1990s violent gangs have proliferated all over Kenya (Waki, p 34)

In a Post-Election Violence Survey conducted by Media Focus on Africa (March 2009), it is clear that this is well understood by youth and the general public. An analysis of survey results by province shows that politicians are seen as the main instigators of violence in Rift Valley (95 percent), Western (92 percent), Central (91.8 percent), Coast (91.2 percent), North Eastern (89.3 percent), Nairobi (88.5 percent), Nyanza (83.5 percent) and Eastern (55 percent), (Media Focus on Africa, March 2009).

Kenya’s urban youth are caught up in the increasing globalization of information and media, characterized by a high level of violence, individualism, and lack of any clear set of social values. The current life situation for the great majority of youth is characterized by serious threats to life due to risks of health, insecurity, political movements, and the lack of a stable livelihood. Youth operating within an environment of rapid change are angered and confused by the conservatism and failure of leadership from parents, elders, politicians and an education system that is intensively competitive and does not provide livelihood knowledge and skills. Youth are a majority group in the population, yet they are seldom consulted; they are considered as problematic and difficult—immoral, violent, irresponsible, and unhealthy. In traditional African culture, wisdom and leadership were emphasized—wisdom for the elders and leadership opportunity for young people. In the current situation, young people are not given the opportunity to lead, and old people are not demonstrating wisdom (from the group report on health and well-being).

This is the bad news—but the youth themselves articulate a different story. During three months of 2009, UNICEF, commissioned by the MOYAS, carried out an in-depth set of focus group discussions in all the provinces of the country with groups of representative youth, ages 15–30 (organizing groups by age and gender), with each group meeting for six days. Sixteen youth from each province, for a total of 128 representatives, met over a full week in Nairobi and examined the issues and challenges facing youth in each region and exploring the steps forward.

Also, during this USAID-commissioned At-Risk Youth Assessment, we conducted 12 youth focus groups in four provinces and Nairobi, examining areas of governance, livelihoods, health and well-being, and capacity development (education and training). We found that the MOYAS/UNICEF Youth Voices participatory assessment and our own more limited set of focus groups revealed similar issues and recommendations. What we heard is well articulated in the preface to the Youth Voices report:⁴

Box 2. YOUTH VOICES--SURVEY OF 2009--Preamble

We the young people of Kenya would like to state that, contrary to the thinking of many:

- We are not the problem in Kenya. We are the solution, if you give us the chance.
- Some of us are certainly problematic but that is more a product of what has been done to us rather than what we wanted to do.

Therefore:

- We have decided that we must be the drivers of our own destiny. No one will direct us in a negative way, but we will accept wise guidance and counsel that leads to positive development.
- We will not wait for tomorrow to be leaders. We will do it today for we know how much we can contribute.

We recognize with gratitude all the efforts made by our parents and families, our communities, different organizations and the Government of Kenya at all levels to ensure that we fulfill our dreams for ourselves and our communities within a developed Kenya. But a lot still needs to be done so that youth in Kenya are no longer an ‘emergency case’, no longer a ‘source of threat’ as many perceive us to be.

We say that all the good efforts will come to nothing unless they are welded together in a coordinated and comprehensive whole. What people need for their development is a **system**. The education and health sectors did not depend on the uncoordinated efforts of people with good intentions, but rather built comprehensive systems to ensure that everyone attains

⁴ We have made extensive use of the full MOYAS/UNICEF Youth Assessment in this report, which is still in draft form. For ease of reference we refer to it here as (Youth Voices, 2009).

Box 2. YOUTH VOICES--SURVEY OF 2009--Preamble

their rights to education and health. Similarly, the youth sector is in urgent need of a comprehensive system with its own structures and modalities for young people to be able to realize their full potential.

III.2 Profile of Economy and Employment: Key Facts

Notwithstanding sporadic periods of strong economic growth, Kenya remains a low-income country with a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranking of 193 out of 228 countries worldwide. The Kenyan economy is based mainly on service provision (trade and finance) and agricultural production centered on tea, coffee, and horticultural products. Kenya is characterized by extreme inequality and over 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. While economic indicators did show encouraging signs in the beginning of this decade, particularly high GDP growth from 2002 to 2007 (7 percent), GDP growth plummeted to 2.2 percent in 2008, likely related to the post-election violence as well as the global economic downturn, although data for the first quarter of 2009 show signs of a rebound. Notwithstanding its positioning as an economic hub in East Africa, the economic challenges facing the country remain significant, notably since investor confidence, and the economy as a whole, is beleaguered by damaging levels of government corruption and graft.

Employment in Kenya, not surprisingly, has been relatively stagnant, with few formal sector jobs created, and a majority of those employed based in the agricultural sector (75 percent of overall labor force), with notably low wages and a minimal contribution to overall GDP. Of the total estimated populace of 34 million, approximately 67.6 percent (22.9 million) are considered part of the active labor force, but a mere 9.5 million are employed. Of this 9.5 million, 20 percent are employed by the private sector, while 80 percent are employed within the informal (*jua kali*) sector. The percentage of individuals employed in the formal versus non-formal sector is almost the exact opposite of the sectors' collective contribution to GDP, as the informal sector with 80 percent of the employed workers contributes only about 25 percent to overall GDP, (World Bank, 2009). It is important, however, to recognize the tremendous potential for growth and improved efficiency of the informal sector and its ability to diversify and innovate that could be a catalyst for future growth. Examples include the widespread growth in successful micro-finance institutions, as well as introduction of innovative cellular phone technology and cellular-based savings and investment services (MPESA).

Economy

GNI p/c	\$680 (WBank, 2009)	
GDP growth rate	3.9% (for 1st Quarter 2009, KNBS, 2009 1st quarter report) ⁵	
% GDP by Sector	1997	2007 (WBank, 2009)
Agriculture	31.6	22.7
Industry	18.2	19.0
Manufacturing	11.6	11.8*
Services	50.2	58.2

*A high proportion of Kenya's manufacturing is in processing agricultural production.

Population Estimate	34 mil (2006 estimate, KNBS)
Urban population %	30% (est.) ⁶ with 4.1% annual growth rate (KNBS)
Poverty rate %	27% with 19% in extreme poverty (WBank estimate, 2009)
Labor Force (15+)	22.9 mill (estimated from 67.6% in 2005/06, Heinz, 2008)
Employment	9.5 mill, 39.1% of labor force (KNBS)
Formal Sector Wages	1.9 mill 20% of those working
Informal Sector	7.6 mill 80% of those working

On the labor demand side, data from the annual Economic Surveys show that formal sector employment growth has been sluggish. It rose by less than 3.0 percent annually between 2002 and 2007. Public sector employment declined by 7.4 percent from 1998 to 2002 due to public sector reforms but recorded marginal growth of 0.3 percent between 2002 and 2004. On the other hand, informal sector employment increased by 10 percent between 1998 and 2002 and 6.4 percent between 2002 and 2005. This was attributed to shrinking growth in both formal public and private sector employment. (KIPPRA, 2009).

% in Formal/Informal Work	Male	Female
Formal Employment	17.4%	8.0% (Heinz)

⁵ The growth in real GDP in the first quarter is primarily a culmination of rebound of activities in wholesale and retail trade, transport and communications, construction, and hotels and restaurants sectors, which expanded by 4.6, 4.3, 30.7 and 59.0, respectively (see Table 2). In addition, agriculture and forestry recorded a smaller contraction of 0.9 percent in the first quarter of 2009 compared to a substantial decline of 6.1 percent in the same quarter of 2008 (as a consequence of the post-election violence and destruction of infrastructure), and therefore its impact on the overall growth was less detrimental (from KNBS, 2009, <http://www.cbs.go.ke/>)

⁶ The 30 percent urban population is an estimate for 2009 made for the Media Focus for Africa survey [reference]

Informal/Agriculture	27.4	20.3
Informal/Other	53.6	67.5
Access to Cell Phone/Media	13 mill subscribers (Mobile Banking, 2009)	
Using M-PESA Mobile Banking	6.8 mill (by April, 2009), growth of 300,000 p/mo	
Access to Financial Services	54.4% (22.2% informal) (FinACcess, 2009)	

Statistics and trends in the Kenya economy suggest that the opportunities for youth are not as grim as other reports suggest. While it is true that there is a 70 percent or higher unemployment rate in the formal economy, there is a large and growing informal economy. The informal economy, even apart from farm labor, involves as many as 6 million youth (Heinz, 2008), albeit with relatively low wages and much part-time activity. Years ago, economists believed that the informal sectors in Africa would fade away as formal industry grew (King, 1996). Instead, what has happened is that the informal sector, characterized by enterprises of often less than 10 persons and often with a short life span, has grown more rapidly than the formal sector, and is now the major avenue for livelihoods (Heinz, 2008).

In Kenya, the growth and development of small-scale, often informal, enterprise is strong and growing. This is reflected by the very rapid growth of a wide variety of micro-financing institutions over the past 20 years, accelerating rapidly in the past 2 years with the introduction of mobile phone banking. Today, there are 13 million cell phone subscribers in Kenya, with the youth population being the dominant users. Our estimate is that something like three-fourths of all youth, including the poor, have cell phone accounts. Of these, there has been a phenomenal growth in cell-phone banking (M-PESA is the main provider) over the past two years, currently adding more than 300,000 subscribers a month and reaching almost 7 million by September 2009 (Mobile Banking, 2009). This growth is, unquestionably, spurred by the low cost of transactions and the fact that over 80 percent of youth are literate.



Bike repair youth enterprise

Although the informal economy is diverse and growing, it is also true that its overall efficiency is low, and while it engages more than 70 percent of the active labor force, it only contributes about 20 percent to GDP (World Bank, 2009). Thus, although as a short-term strategy, the expansion of opportunity for productive enterprise in the informal sector is a good short term strategy for youth, in the long-term, the growth and transformation of informal enterprise into formal business is an essential process for Kenya's full development.

III.3 Youth Policy and Programs

Kenya has long recognized the importance of youth policies and programs within its national development agenda, particularly following the key Kericho Conference on Education, Employment and Rural Development in 1966, with the publication of the 'After School – What?' Report by NKKC. Nonetheless, living conditions, livelihoods and employment prospects for youth, as well as youth involvement in political threats and violence, have continued to worsen.

This situation has led the government to establish a National Youth Policy, to create a Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MOYAS), establish a Youth Enterprise Development Fund, and more recently to initiate a crash youth employment program (Kazi Kwa Vijana). Currently under discussion in Parliament is a draft bill creating a National Youth Council, and the formulation of a Marshall Plan for Youth Employment. In this section we will describe the National Policy, MOYAS, the Kazi Kwa Vijana Program and the proposed Youth Employment Marshall Plan. In section IV.3.B, on Youth Livelihoods, Enterprise, and Employment, we will examine in some detail the experience of the Youth Enterprise Development Fund. This section also provides an overview of major donors' youth initiatives.

Kenya National Youth Policy

The KNYP of 2007 states the following vision, “The National Youth Policy visualizes a society where youth have an equal opportunity as other citizens to realize their fullest potential, productively participating in economic, social, political, cultural and religious life without fear or favour”. The policy claims to be driven by the principles of respect of cultural belief systems and ethical values, equity and accessibility, gender inclusiveness, good governance, and mainstreaming youth issues. The KNYP defines youth as those between 15 and 30 years. The overall policy goal is “to promote youth participation in democratic processes as well as in community and civic affairs, and ensuring that youth programmes involve them and are youth centred.” The policy objectives are:

- i. To sensitize national policy makers on the need to identify and mainstream youth issues in national development
- ii. To emphasize, support and partner with positive and effective initiatives and programs set up by associations, no[n]-profit groups that help the youth to fulfill their expectations and meet their needs
- iii. To create proper conditions for the youth to empower themselves and exploit their potential
- iv. To identify ways of empowering the youth.
- v. To promote a culture of volunteerism among the youth
- vi. To explore and suggest ways of engaging the youth in the process of economic development
- vii. To identify constraints that hinder the Kenyan youth from realizing their potential
- viii. To propose ways of mentoring the youth to be just and morally upright citizens
- ix. To promote honest hard work and productivity among the youth.

The policy defines obligations of youth, adults and parents, the State (lead implementer of the policy and guarantor of youth rights), and the private sector. The policy elaborates eight priority strategic areas which include; employment creation, health, education and training, sports and recreation, the environment, art and culture, youth and the media, and youth

empowerment and participation in national life. As one means to implement the policy, Government has prepared a National Youth Council bill which is now under discussion in Parliament. It's mandate is to co-ordinate youth organizations, and develop an integrated national youth development plan in collaboration with the Ministry for Youth Affairs and Sports. It is to act as an advisory, research and policy institution on youth affairs in Kenya.

III.3.A Government Programs

The National Youth Policy provides an excellent framework for youth program development. It is crucial to recognize that Kenya's challenge is not the articulation of policy or even the establishment of institutions such as MOYAS, KKV and the National Youth Council. The central challenge is the effective implementation of policies. How can youth, and the society, hold government and agencies at national, provincial, constituency and local levels accountable for acting on the National Youth Policy?

Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports

The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MOYAS) was established in December 2005 to represent and address the concerns of youth in Kenya. The Kenya National Youth Policy (KNYP) provides the broad framework that guides the work of MOYAS. This work is planned and carried out through The Department of Youth Development and the Department of Youth Training.

MOYAS: Kenya Department of Youth Development

In 2007, MOYAS recruited staff and created offices throughout the country to implement the NYP. However, according to the Kenya Department of Youth Development Strategic Plan 2008-2012, the newly created department did not have an organizational structure or programs in place to guide the implementation process and initiative was seriously under resourced. The DYP Strategic Plan provides a framework for its activities which includes the following departmental mandates and strategies.

Box 3: MOYAS Strategic Plan Mandates & Strategies

MANDATES

- To promote Youth-owned Small and Micro Enterprises (SME).
- To coordinate and increase support for youth-led initiatives.
- To facilitate opportunities for youth to participate in all processes of national development.
- To promote self-reliance among the youth.
- To promote an entrepreneurial culture among the youth.
- To empower the youth to participate in economic, political and social affairs of the nation.
- To facilitate effective youth participation in all decision making at all levels.
- To promote networking and collaboration among the youth organizations.
- To carry out Youth Development Research and disseminate information.
- To initiate and implement Youth activities, programs and projects.
- To promote peace and security among the youth
- To register and maintain a data on youth Groups

STRATEGIES & ACCOMPLISHMENTS

- Entrepreneurship training (Rehabilitation of about 250 youth polytechnics)
- Establishment of the Kenya National Youth Policy and establishment of the National Youth Council (Bill drafted, in Parliament)
- Construction, refurbishment and equipment of Youth Empowerment Centres and partnership with resources centers. (Plan is to have one Centre in every constituency. Currently there are 43 under development)
- Youth Employment Marshall Plan. (Drafted – target of 500,000 new jobs)
- Increase the participation of youth in all economic, social and political decision making processes.
- Improve access to all disadvantaged youth in Business opportunities, health, educational services and justice. (YEDF reading over 8,000 organizations and 57,000 individuals)
- Minimize vulnerabilities through sensitization of retrogressive practices such as Female genital mutilation and early marriage and sexual exploitation that may result in HIV/AIDs infections. (150 Youth workshops and training)
- Intensify collaboration with stakeholders for youth rehabilitation programme for drug addiction victims and criminals. (Trained 300 youth leaders on Drug and Substance abuse)
- Upscale youth volunteerism /community services as a social responsibility.
- To enhance youth involvement in national development and cohesion through leisure, recreation and youth cultural exchange programmes.(National Youth Congress focus, youth leadership clinics)
- Develop policies and programmes that will increase youth awareness and participation on environmental issues. Trees for jobs creation (15,000 youth have planted 900,000 trees – through KKV and MOYAS)
- Develop youth-led programs geared towards promoting peaceful co-existence amongst different communities.

Kazi Kwa Vijana

The Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV) program is a short-term response to the PEV and to an extended drought. Cultivation has been disrupted, so food assistance has been expanded to over 5 million people. KKV is intended to (i) provide relief to people at risk through gainful employment—up to 300,000 youth, and (ii) contribute to increased food production through better utilization of water resources (and the repair of considerable damage to water systems in the PEV). KKV is administered through the Office of the Prime Minister, with funds allocated to line ministries to administer. At the constituency level, these funds are used to hire youth at the rate of 250/= KShs per day, typically for a period of three months.⁷ On the whole, youth's evaluation of KKV has been both supportive and critical. Many youth appreciated the opportunity to obtain an income, albeit doing menial work for limited periods of time. However, many were also strongly negative because (i) there is no capacity building or training involved, and the work is largely manual; (ii) the work is very short term, and the pay is low, so what is earned is often squandered; and (iii) youth believe that there is political motivation and favoritism in the selection process.

The Youth Employment Marshall Plan

The Youth Employment Marshall Plan aspires to create 500,000 new jobs. Once enacted, Kenya plans to put a new emphasis on its Labor-intensive Public works projects which is a short-term employment-generating mechanism for Kenya's unemployed youth especially those eager to do any income-generating work activity. Labor-intensive public works projects provide for hands-on experience for un-skilled and semi-skilled youth and impart technical skills where necessary to better prepare youth for insertion into Kenya's labor market. Examples of Kenya's public works projects (most of which are on-going) include: The Rural Access Roads Program; Roads 2000 Program; Kenya Slum Upgrading Program (KENSUP); Trees for Jobs program (implemented by MOYA); the laying of the Fibre Optic Cable. The majority of these projects are directly funded by the GOK and often times co-financed by other donors and/or NGOs.

The UNDP Report: *Assessment of Public Works Projects in Kenya*, which conducted an evaluation of Kenya's public works programs (UNDP/Kenya, 2009), notes that public works programs play a key role in contributing to the government's poverty reduction strategy on a relatively short-term basis (4- 6 months), provided that these projects include a provision for on-the-job training for youth and include an affirmative action to "promote equal opportunity employment for all youth in employment intensive projects."

Policies in Practice

The following information was gathered during interviews with provincial and district youth officers in MOYAS officers discussed. We were particularly interested in the staffing of the MOYAS provincial and district offices, the priority programs and activities, and the challenges

⁷ See the Kazi Kwa Vijana Programme Manual (April 2009) Republic of Kenya.

they faced. What is evident is that the MOYAS district offices are seriously understaffed (the majority of districts do not have MOYAS offices in these provinces) and underfunded and are, therefore, not able to effectively implement their programs with the resources they have. This was also reflected by the Youth Focus Groups which claim that they have little or no information about the National Youth Policy, the National Youth Council, or access to the YEDF and other services of MOYAS. Youth also expressed skepticism about the planned Youth Empowerment Centers in that these are to be based at a district or constituency level, rather than at a more accessible local level.

Table 1 : Ministry of Youth Programs and Challenges

LOCATION	PROGRAMS	CHALLENGES
Central Province Youth Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current livelihood projects include fish farming, rabbit rearing, dairy goat product marketing, farming, and bee-keeping. • Providing loans from YEDF. • Encouraging the formation of youth SACCOS. • Establishment of young entrepreneurs clubs in a number of primary and secondary schools. • Conducting career fairs targeting a number of districts. • HIV/AIDS training for the youth • Youth Polytechnics rehabilitation and staffing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The # of females seeking loans from YEDF is considerably less than the # of males. • Youth do not know the selection process or guidelines for YEDF and are frustrated by this. • Low repayment of YEDF loans. • Majority of youth are unaware of the youth policy. • No election process for youth representatives for government committees, i.e. YEDF. Therefore, the youth are selected by the DYO. • Government bureaucracy slows down its responses to the needs of the youth. • There needs to be a mapping of Youth organizations with a focus on their geographical and programmatic areas of operation to encourage mutual learning, avoid duplication of efforts and wasting scarce resources.
Nyanza Provincial Youth Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building Youth empowerment centers. • Building/maintaining a good relationship with BDS centers. And partners with UNDP who trained youth in start-up business. • Supporting review and management of YEDF loans • Partnership with CDF and creating a network of youth groups for capacity building and empowerment through programs such as civic education, youth rights awareness, governance and youth representation through youth council 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOYAS lacks staffing and resources to reach rural areas • Very few repayment in loans due to lack of training in financial management. • Youth groups have disbanded after receiving YEDF loans
Western	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organize small forums on climate change, health, drugs, & crime. • Assist with screening and oversight on YEDF loans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understaffed, under resourced • Low repayment of YEDF loans • No monitoring plan of programs • Youth are very frustrated because they do

Provincial Youth Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to KKV programs. • Building Youth Empowerment centers. 	<p>not know how proposals are selected for loan awards</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth do not know how to manage the money once granted the loan (YEDF) and therefore have low-repayment • Kazi kwa vijana has involved the Ministries of Forestry, Water, Roads and the Municipality. The agreed stipend was 250 KHS/day but some youth were paid less.
Rift Valley Provincial Youth Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tree for Job Project: Growing tree nurseries and selling the trees in Nakuru North—this is a Youth Action for Rural Development (YARD) project. MOYA contracted the youth group to plant and take care of nurseries and initially paid them KSH 200 per day at 3 days a week. The group has planted 25,000 trees and now the youth are paid KSH 8 for every tree they take care of. • In the process of acquiring land and building youth empowerment centers. • Mobilizing communities to offer services to OVCs. • MOYA, in partnership with UNDP, have trained youth on microenterprise and 30 youth business advisors. • Facilitating Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV). • Created a data base and have registered 5000 youth groups. • Currently encouraging youth groups to form SACCOs. DY0 wants to start with TEARS and GENESIS youth groups because they have integrity, strength, talent and resources. • Providing youth with loans through the YEDF. • Organizes annual youth day. • Supported Peace Caravan from Eldoret • Organized Magnetic Theatre in conjunction with youth groups such as TEARS (based in Nakuru) to tackle HIV/AIDS, drug abuse and other vices. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Few or inadequate/non-existent youth centers at the district, divisional and local levels • Understaffing – most districts do not have Youth Officers & inadequate funds to reach youth at the local level...we are only reaching urban youth in centers. • Poor repayment of YEDF loans. • Some NGOs do not serve in the interest of the youth. • Interference by politicians in youth affairs. <p>KKV</p> <p>Within Nakuru the following major KKV projects are completed or underway:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local Government: hired up to 1,500 youth for cleanup/repair of public spaces • Ministry of Water & Irrigation: 300 youth built a dam • Department of Public Works: hired up to 100 youth in each of 10 wards for a one month period, so that another 100 come in for the 2nd month, and a 3rd group of 100 for the third month, thus a total of 3,000 youth for short periods of employment at 200 KSH/day.

III.3.B Donors & CBO Programs

As highlighted throughout the report, the definition of youth and youth-centered activities is complex and very often programs that are couched in a distinct terminology (ie. reproductive health, slum upgrading, violence prevention, women’s’ livelihoods) at their core are youth-centered activities. The following is an overview of some of the major donor programs in Kenya

Table 1 Major Donor Programs in Kenya

Institution	Program Description
World Bank	The World Bank has just improved a substantive youth program in Kenya totaling \$50million over 4 years. US\$40 million will be used to support and strengthen the GOK Kazi Kwa Vijana program and US\$10million will be used to focus on training and internships for youth (in coordination with ILO, UNDP, IYF) as well as institutional support for the Ministry of Youth emphasizing policy and monitoring and evaluation. In addition to its youth program, the World Bank has robust programs focusing on orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) as well as slum upgrading, both of which work directly with youth.
UNHabitat	The UNHabitat Safer Cities programs works with youth at risk primarily in the Nairobi area (Kibera) and UNHabitat also has a strong slum upgrading program in five urban areas. UNHabitat has also just issued an Opportunities fund for urban youth-led development (global)
Italian Cooperation	Kenya-Italy Debt for Development Programme (KIDDP). The project seeks to assist Kenya in achieving sustainable economic growth, increase employment creation and poverty alleviation, through a bottom-up community-demand driven approach.
UNDP	The Kenya National Youth Development Training - a) Peace building and conflict transformation program for youth – where youth are taking to cultural exchange camps and provided with an opportunity to meet and interact with their peers in other regions/ethnic groups. This helps to increase their knowledge and understanding and ultimately tolerance of youth of different ethnicities; b) Entrepreneurship and Development Training Program; and c) a program which supports the development of the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. Also relevant is UNDP’s Livelihood Solutions Program which establishes local business centers.
ILO & Youth Employment Network	ILO in partnership with UNDP and the World Bank is initiating a \$23 million regional youth program for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania starting in January 2010. Entitled <i>Youth Entrepreneurship Facility</i> its objective is to “enable youth to turn their energy and ideas into business opportunities thereby increasing their incomes and creating employment.” The program seeks to work as a catalyst through partnerships with government (MOYAS, KIE, YEDF) donors (DANIDA and World Bank), and NGOs (Enablis EA, YMCA, Kenya

	Community Development Foundation and the Private Sector Foundation). The program will draw on ILO strengths in entrepreneurship development and training, and use competitive grant schemes, micro-financing, and public advocacy through media. It aims to create 11,500 new youth businesses and 23,000 new jobs by 2014.
DFiD	DFiD has no explicit youth programming but manages several programs that target youth including its Market for the Poor (M4P) – to support new market development program in Kenya and expand the economic opportunities of disadvantaged target groups and their capacity to respond to those opportunities. DFiD also has programming around conflict prevention and has recently set up a gangs/militia task force along with UNDP.
UNICEF	UNICEF manages a substantial portfolio of programs but most target children rather than youth. UNICEF has recently appointed a Youth Programme Officer and is now preparing program activities for youth. UNICEF collaborated with MOYAS in undertaking a nationwide dialogue through youth focus groups in every Province (4 groups of 20 youth over a one week period), culminating in a national workshop to identify priority youth issues and recommendations. (the draft MOYAS/UNICEF ‘Youth Voices’ report)

In addition to the above major donor activities, there are a wide range of international NGOs working on youth and/or young women’s issues including, but not limited to, Care International, PACT, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Population Council, Oxfam, Terra Nuova, Nairobi, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Fredrich Ebert Foundation (FES), DSW Kenya, Kenya Women Finance Trust, African Centre for Women, Information and Communications Technology (ACWICT) , and Informal Sector Business Institute (ISBI).

III.4 Conclusion

It is clear from this overview of Kenya’s situation and youth policies that however effective a program for assuring improved livelihoods may be over the next two years, this in itself will not eliminate youth’s vulnerability and exploitation by political, destabilizing actors. There is general consensus, articulated by the Waki Commission, that to avoid violent social conflict in 2012, political action is necessary to accomplish the following:

1. Bring organizers of criminal action and violence during PEV 2007/08 to account;
2. Prohibit exploitation of youth for ethnic, political aggression
3. Re-orient security and police forces to support a rule of law and justice
4. Develop public watchdog functions to assure these steps are taken by political parties and politicians, and that there is forward movement on the promises of youth policy and programs.

Youth can, and very much want to, contribute to these actions, but cannot, on their own, bring these processes about.

IV. FINDINGS

IV.1 Who are the At-Risk Youth in Kenya?

The concept and definition of youth in Kenya is not entirely straightforward. The Kenya National Youth Policy defines youth as those individuals between 15 and 30 years. The USAID/Kenya Mission has asked the Assessment Team to look at youth between 16 and 24 years, and to examine youth cohorts by age, gender, ethnicity, rural vs. urban residency, household income, marital status, schooling status, and geographic location. In the policy documents and secondary literature on youth in Kenya, it is evident that slightly varying age spans are used. The government National Youth Policy defines youth as those between 15 and 30 years old. The detailed youth focus group survey conducted by UNICEF for MOYAS in 2009 included the 10–14 year group, with the argument that these “youth” would soon be leaving school and become part of the out-of-school population. Much of the economic, employment, and livelihoods analysis focus on the 18 years and older population, since 18 is the age at which one receives a national ID, and thereby becomes eligible for micro-financing services. Thus, youth must be between 18 – 35 years to qualify for loans through the Youth Enterprise Development Fund. In the analysis of the youth involved in the political advocacy, as well as the 2007/08 post-election violence, a number of surveys also focused on those in the 18-35 year group. Also, based on fieldwork conducted directly with youth and adults, the Assessment Team understood that many Kenyans define youth as those who do not have children and a family to care for, even if they are in their 30s.

USAID/Kenya specifies “at-risk” youth as the focus for this assessment. “At-risk” could be understood as those youth who were either perpetrators or victims in the PEV and thereby potential agents for the 2012 elections. But more broadly and accurately, “at-risk youth” implies those whose aspirations and realities are in conflict; namely, those who (i) have had to drop out of school and training; (ii) are not able to earn a decent livelihood and cannot depend on parents or relatives for support; (iii) have been victims of abuse and/or violence; (iv) have to make a living by, in their words, “doing bad,” such as using and dealing drugs or engaging in protection and extortion rackets and prostitution; and (v) have been recruited into gangs, militias and criminal networks.

During this analysis, as we carried out focus group discussions with youth and looked at youth organizations, and when we interviewed those who provide youth services, including government, it was evident there are no clear markers between these categories. For example, youth leaders are often university graduates or drop-outs who started work in their 20s, and

remain with their organization into their 30s, and today still consider themselves “youths.” A particular youth could be engaged in a service organization as a volunteer, while also working as a part-time employee in a *jua kali*⁸ enterprise, and have been recruited into a *political* militia during the election period while also an active member of a church youth group. We understood that many Kenyans define youth as those who do not have children and a family to care for, even if they are in their 30s. These examples are meant to illustrate the complex and constantly changing set of circumstances that make it particularly challenging to define categories of youth.

For the purpose of this assessment, we have not attempted to draw hard and fast lines delineating these meanings and categories. We focused on youth ages 16–24 (as requested by USAID), within the geographic areas where there has been historically, and in 2007/2008, the greatest degree of civil conflict: namely, within the slums of Nairobi and in the Central, Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza provinces. We focused for the most part on those youth who were out-of-school (while recognizing the merit in addressing in-school issues related to livelihoods, well-being, capacity development, and governance), and for those youth who were not in regular, formal sector employment. And we concentrated on the poor, seeking out those organizations, groups, and youth who, within each particular location, were considered by informants to have the fewest opportunities for education, training, and livelihoods. Annex 6 provides a detailed set of projections we have made, based on population estimates from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, on the current at-risk youth populations in towns, municipalities, and provinces for Central, Rift Valley, Western, Nyanza, and Nairobi. Our overall estimate for 2009 is 650,000 out-of-school and out-of-work youth from ages 15 to 30 in these areas, with more than half of them concentrated in Nairobi.

Before examining the findings in detail, it is useful to have an overview of youth opportunities for education and livelihoods. The data are drawn from the population projections of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and the 2003 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (the detailed 2009 survey data has not yet been released). The DHS data, based on a representative population sample, provide information as percentages for male and female youth ages 15–19 and 20–24.

Youth Education and Employment: An Overview

Youth population (15–30yrs)	10.8 mill (calculated for 2006 from KNSB)
	32% of population (from National Youth Policy)
	60% of active labor force

The DHS data reflects our findings in youth focus groups and interviews. A quite high proportion of younger youth, estimated at 62% of all 15-19 year olds, are still in school. Secondly, the majority of those out-of-school in the older youth age group have a relatively high level of basic education, with over 60% both males and females over 20 years having completed primary schooling. This is reflected in literacy rates, which are 82% in urban areas, and 65% for rural areas, for all those between 15 and 24 years.

⁸ *Jua kali* means “hot sun” in Swahili and is used to describe those engaged in informal enterprise. When the term was first used by President Moi it referred to metal workers in Nairobi who were laboring outside under the hot sun (King, 1996).

Table 2 Youth Out of School by Age and Sex

	10-14	15-19	20-24
MALE	11%	38%	85%
FEMALE	15%	52%	94%

Table 3 Education Attainment of Out-of-School Youth by Age Group and Gender

		10-14	15-19	20-24
MALE	No Education	80%	22%	8%
	Inc Primary	17%	37%	27%
	Complete Primary	2%	25%	28%
	Secondary		15%	31%
	Higher			5%
FEMALE	No Education	82%	22%	12%
	Inc Primary	15%	35%	26%
	Complete Primary	3%	28%	30%
	Secondary		15%	28%
	Higher			5%

An important finding in this data is that for that small proportion of youth in the 10-14 year age group who are not in school (11% for males and 15% for females), the great majority have never entered school. Further analysis suggests that this is characteristic of remote areas of Kenya, and not of the regions that are the focus for this youth assessment. This is also reflected by noting the distribution of youth out of school in urban and rural locations, and the relatively low proportion of those living in urban areas who have not completed primary school.

Table 4 Youth Living in Urban Areas Who Have Not Completed Primary School

	YOUTH NOT ATTENDING SCHOOL		OUT-OF SCHOOL YOUTH Never in School or Dropout Primary	
	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL
MALE	34%	66%	29%	48%
FEMALE	39%	61%	29%	54%
TOTAL	37%	64%	29%	52%

The relatively high level of basic education for the youth of Kenya is reflected in high levels of literacy (assessed in the DHS survey by the respondent's ability to read a full sentence in the language they spoke without mistakes).


Table 5 Literacy for Out-of-School Youth

Age Group	Male	Female
15–19	89.4	86.0
20–24	91.1	86.1

Youth Employment and Work

There is a significant difference between youth of different ages, and also a gender gap, in the proportion of youth who report that they are working (this includes working in the informal sector on a part time basis, often for little or no cash payment).

Chart 1: School Youth Working



NOTE: Work includes agriculture work for family, casual and part-time work, and informal (jua kali) enterprise.

An analysis of the role that education attainment and gender play in the type of work that youth are engaged in is shown in the following table. Agriculture work continues to be the single most important type of work for youth, even for those with secondary education.

Table 6 Youth Work by Type of Work and Education Level

MALE	No Ed	Primary	Secondary	TOTAL
Prof/Tech	0	1%	11%	3%
Sales/Service	18%	17%	30%	21%
Household	10%	8%	3%	7%
Manual	10%	30%	25%	28%
Agricultural	63%	44%	31%	42%
FEMALE	No Ed	Primary	Second.+	TOTAL
Prof/Tech	0	0	11%	3%
Sales/Service	31%	22%	39%	27%
Household	10%	24%	15%	21%
Manual	5%	7%	14%	9%
Agricultural	53%	45%	21%	39%

Of those youth who report that they are working, 38% say that this is part-time or seasonal work, and 37% report that they receive either no pay, or non-cash, payment 'in-kind', e.g. lodging, food, gifts, etc. Also of interest is that those who report working in agriculture, 76% are working on family land. Thus, there are relatively few youth who work as employees in agriculture enterprise.⁹

*NOTE: There are a number of different estimates of youth unemployment, from the government's National Youth Policy and Strategy, the National Bureau of Statistics, and the World Bank, among others. The problem has to do with the definition of employment (age range for youth, work in formal, non-formal enterprise or farm, work as an employee or not for wage (e.g. a family member working on a farm or family-owned enterprise), full-time, part time, in-school and out-of school, actively seeking employment or not). The National Kenya Bureau of Statistics estimates the percentage of 15-24 year old youth who are unemployed at 24% or 2.6 million. The estimate from the 2003 DHS estimates a somewhat higher proportion of youth who are not working (some of these may not be 'seeking' work, a criteria for unemployment), particularly for 15-24 year old females, of whom approximately half say they are not working.

⁹⁹ All of the data and information above is derived from an analysis, utilizing SPSS, of the Kenya 2003 DHS database.

Prevailing Differences between Male and Female Youth

According to the 2006 Kenya National Youth Policy, “the lower level of education for girls, coupled with social cultural practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced early marriages, put the female youth at a disadvantage” which has in turn led to low participation and representation in decision-making. The KNYP goes further to state that traditional gender roles overburden the female youth, limiting opportunities for progression and self-development.

Boys are traditionally given increased opportunities (schooling, instruction, etc.) while girls bear increased family and household duties. Roughly half of young women aged 15-19 report having had sex, resulting in unplanned pregnancies as well as risks of STIs, including HIV/AIDS. During the female-only focus group discussions, the issue of young women having to sell their bodies for survival was a recurrent theme. Most of the girls in these FGDs admitted that only by having sex with young men could they obtain the goods they needed (ranging from mobile phone credit to food for their children). They also added that sex was usually unprotected. Furthermore, having to care for their own children, or younger siblings, severely limited their potential to improve their own lives.

While young women clearly face increased challenges over their male counterparts, a promising signal is the potential of young women to absorb teaching and training opportunities, make sound decisions for themselves and their families, and undertake productive livelihood activities. One of the strongest indications of this potential is the success of the Women’s Enterprise Fund (WEF), which boasts of loan default rate of less than 5%, which is a significant improvement over the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF), which has struggled, particularly in its group lending C-YES program.

Youth Gangs

One of the key dimensions of the analysis of at-risk youth are those involved in gangs. Youth gangs have grown in numbers and influence since Kenya’s Independence. They are predominantly male, and for the most part are ethnically defined with the exception of some groups in large urban slum areas. In urban areas gangs engage in criminal activities of extortion and protection rackets, drug distribution, and prostitution. They also are encouraged and enlisted by political leaders as local militias and enforcers, and, during the pre and post-election violence some of the gangs were organized as attack forces. In the rural areas youth gangs have been organized and financed by local political leaders to lead attacks on members of ethnic groups whom they perceive to be occupying land that their tribal leaders claim as their homeland. While it is common for young men from many ethnic groups in Kenya to undergo initiation rituals and induction into legitimate peer groups armed with a variety of weapons including machetes, spears, bows and arrows and clubs (but rarely firearms), the politicization of these groups markedly increased just prior, during and following the 2007 election.

Although we did not explicitly interview gangs (in some of the more prominent gangs members are pledged to secrecy, and few youth would openly admit to membership), we found that

many youth whom we did meet had either been involved in gangs or had been directly impacted by them.

Youth acknowledge that the gangs in the urban areas are ever present, and there is widespread exploitation of small businesses and enterprises for protection money. The pull of gangs in urban areas is very strong for male youth who are out-of-school, without work, and desperate to find a way to make some money and establish a social support network. In rural areas elders, tribal leaders and politicians appeal, through ethnic youth age groups, to perceived and actual historical injustices, calling on youth to defend the homeland. Youth who are frustrated by lack of opportunity, including access to land that they can utilize, are easily enlisted, particularly when there is payment involved. There is overwhelming evidence from the Waki Commission and other studies¹⁰ that the greater part of the initial violence perpetrated by youth groups during the PEV was organized and financed (including the transportation of armed youth for training and attacks across provincial lines) by elders, tribal leaders and politicians.

Below is a brief overview of available information on a few of the more prominent of the armed groups active in Kenya drawing on an edited analysis from the UN Kenyan Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.¹¹ This summary is based on local media reports, interviews with slum residents, political observers, academics, village elders and religious leaders.

Mungiki

A secretive, outlawed and quasi-religious group dating back to the mid 1980s, whose exclusively Kikuyu male membership is drawn mainly from Central Province. Mungiki (“multitude” in Kikuyu) traces its ideological links with the anti-colonial Mau-Mau movement. Mungiki was increasingly used, and paid, to support political causes and individuals, and has not received what was promised. This has turned them, particularly over the past few years, to organized crime and violence. While rooted in the Central Province, Mungiki now has a strong presence in the slums of Nairobi, where it controls and charges for access to basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation. It is alleged to have close links to senior Kikuyu politicians.

Before the 2007/2008 crisis, tenants moving in or out of certain Nairobi slums had to pay for protection at rates that increase depending on the security situation. The group also operates protection rackets, including in the public transport sector, confiscating the property of small businesses that refuse to pay a daily “fee”. Mungiki also holds “trials” for people who violate

¹⁰ See in particular the excellent analyses by Ruteere (2008), and *Who is Guilty?* from the Youth Agenda(2008).

¹¹ <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=76896>

its strict rules of dress or behavior, detaining, maiming and even killing those it finds guilty.

Security forces have conducted a number of crackdowns on Mungiki, arresting and killing many of its members. And although it is outlawed, it continues to flourish, with some observers asserting that it has grown in importance following the PEV. Its handlers and supporters, who are said to include some senior members of the Kikuyu elite, want to make it an effective counterweight to the Kalenjin warriors [see below], and there are reports it is accumulating weapons, including guns. The group continues to be implicated in attacks on opposition groups, particularly targeting Luo and Kalenjin from Kikuyu dominated areas of Central and Rift Valley Provinces.

Kalenjin Warriors

Well-organized community defense training forms an integral part of the graduated progress from childhood to adulthood in the seven ethnic groups collectively known as Kalenjin. A specific name is used for each stage of this progress. Young men in these ethnic groups, where tradition demands a strict respect of hierarchy and obedience to elders, also undergo circumcision as a rite of passage. As a result, young Kalenjin men develop a certain esprit de corps with their age mates, a trait that facilitates mobilization.

Within the overall designation of Kalenjin Warriors there are factions. One of these calls itself the People's Liberation Army and the other one calling itself the Group of 41 (the number 41 refers to the non-Kikuyu ethnic groups in Kenya). Both of these groups are reported to be well organized and commanded by people with a military background. Further these groups are reported to be organized and financed by elders within their settlements. Such groups were particularly active in Uasin Gishu district, which includes the town of Eldoret, where they have been accused of fomenting much of the post-election violence.

Sabaot Land Defence Force

The Sabaot Land Defence Force has been blamed for most of the violence that has rocked the western district of Mt Elgon in the past two years. It was formed after claims of injustice over land allocation in a settlement scheme in the district. The Mt Elgon conflict involves two main clans of the dominant Sabaot community - the majority Soy clan and the minority Ndorobo clan - and revolves around disputed government allocation of land to squatters in a settlement scheme known as Chebyuk. The district has an estimated population of 150,000; government officials estimate 45,000 people have been displaced and 132 killed since 2006.

The SLDF is now the most powerful and best-armed militia group operating in the west. Its hit-and-run attacks from the Mt Elgon forest are a major challenge for the authorities, who appear incapable of quelling the rebellion. The group is officially headed by a man called Wycliffe Matakwei Kirui Komon, but there is speculation the real leader is a newly elected ODM parliamentarian from the region, though he has denied any links. The SLDF is one of the few non-state groups in Kenya that possesses firearms. Unconfirmed reports suggest the group's arsenal includes automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

Chinkororo

Chinkororo, outlawed in the 1990s, is the Kisii equivalent of Kalenjin warriors, and represents the armed wing of the Abagusii community, which is found in several districts in the western ethnic Luo-dominated Nyanza Province. Traditionally, Chinkororo was a community defense force, guarding territory against cattle rustlers and other perceived "enemies". The Chinkororo also undertook retaliatory attacks whenever there were raids in Kisii areas. Since the PEV, elements of the Chinkororo have engaged in clashes with Kalenjin youths from the neighbouring Sotik district in the Rift Valley Province.

Taliban

After Mungiki, the best-known urban armed group in urban slums is the Taliban, mainly Luo and active in Mathare, Huruma, Baba Dogo, Kariobangi North and Kariobangi South quarters of Nairobi's Eastlands district. Members communicate and identify themselves via a system of secret hand signals. Like Mungiki, the group runs extortion rackets, notably on public transport operators. Taliban has no membership oath or cells throughout the country, but it does have squads in various slum locations. Its leader was jailed in 2002, after skirmishes with Mungiki over control of these illegal activities, especially levies on matatus [minibus taxis].

Jeshi la Mzee aka Kamjesh

A slum-based gang specializing in extortion and protection rackets, targeting operators of public minibuses. This is one of the youth gangs that draws its membership from multiple ethnic groups including Kikuyu, Luo, Maasai, Kisii and the Luhya.

Baghdad Boys

Vigilantes active in Kibera, Kenya's largest slum, whose members are drawn mostly from the Luo community.

Kosovo

Another vigilante group based in Kibera, including members from the Luo and Luhya communities, using slingshots and knives

This brief profile of some of the more prominent gangs in Kenya does not do justice to the complexity of their origins, organization or influence. Those who have studied Kenya's gangs have noted a variety of characterizations, each of which bear some validity and yet are contested: i) gangs as post-colonial radical political resistance groups; ii) armed militias in support of political actors and tribal leaders; iii) criminal mafia-type gangs; iv) youth support groups organized for protection. Even the largest and most notorious of the gangs, Mungiki, has at earlier times acted as a development group, establishing urban enterprises, and enforcing norms of dress and behavior. One of the youth groups in Kibera is the Urban Agriculture Group, which (with initial support from UN Habitat) grows vegetables in urban areas for sale in the market. Many of its members admit to participation in vigilante gang activity, but

now claim that they are making money for doing good. They have painted murals celebrating peacemaking on the walls behind their gardens at the entrance to Kibera.



Urban Agriculture Youth Group garden



Urban Agriculture Youth Group's wall mural, Kibera
(See note¹²)

Street Youth: More than 60,000 children, youth live on Nairobi's streets, according to charity groups. What follows is a portrait of how that happens, in this case to a young woman, and what it means.

Nairobi, Kenya (CNN) – from 6 November, 2009 on site:

<http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/11/06/kenya.street.survivors/index.html>

On a wet dawn in Nairobi, Kenya, Joan stands on a grubby patch of concrete she calls home. As shopkeepers tear open their iron shutters to start their day, she gingerly touches her bruised face with her fingertips. Even for a hardened street teenager like Joan it's been a rough night.

"Living in the streets, especially if you are a girl, is very risky," says Joan, age 19. "You can be raped any day, any time, by anyone who wants to do it."

Joan became the target of one of those predators just one night earlier when she says an older street kid tried to rape her. In a monotone voice she describes how he mercilessly beat her with his fists and heavy boots when she resisted. Joan spent the rainy night in pain lying on her flattened cardboard box.

This is Joan's reality. It is a reality she shares with thousands of others. More than 60,000 children and youth live on Nairobi's streets, according to various charity groups. Tens of thousands are at risk of ending up there. Unlike

¹² The Urban Agriculture Youth group formed (supported by UN Habitat), after the PEV with former gang members, to grow, protect and market crops in Kibera

some other cities in Africa, Nairobi's street people aren't always visible. They are banished to the gray industrial parts of the city, often harassed by police, business owners and ordinary citizens.



Gallery: Living in the streets

The way Joan's homelife became the street life is, in many ways, the story of how a generation of African youth end up without homes. At 15, Joan worked as a maid in a town a few hours from Nairobi. But she says the owner abused her and got her pregnant. In a fit of jealousy, Joan says the owner's wife threw her out of the house and she ran away to the capital out of shame and desperation.

Finding herself among people wracked by poverty but bound by common struggles, Joan learned to beg with her baby from cars stuck in traffic and struggled to keep warm on rainy nights. She and her newborn survived together for more than a year on the streets but she eventually sent him to live with her mother. Somehow, she says, she has managed to hide her street life from her family.

"I don't belong here. It is shameful everybody knowing that you are on the street," says Joan.

Street kids form their own tight-knit groups. Joan is part of a small community who do what they can to help each other survive by sharing food, clothes and money. "We see that the rest of the community hates us," says Joan. "We ask ourselves if the community is not taking care of us, we should remain as our own family."

That often means sheltering each other from the violent streets. Just a day before she was attacked, Joan took a boy who had been injured in a fight to the hospital. Now it is her turn. A friend lends her a faded green shawl to cover her swollen face and a Joan limps off to find a Matatu bus, Kenya's ubiquitous people carrier, to ferry her for treatment.

A tear trickling down her eye is the only betrayal of her pain. The clean wards and tender words are a brief respite for Joan. The doctor says there is no major damage and gives her some painkillers in a brown paper bag. All Joan can do is head back to her patch on the street.

Despite her daily struggles to survive, Joan refuses to return to begging and instead turns to dealing. To make enough money to help her son, she sells highly addictive glue to young street kids. Sitting on a broken piece of concrete below the edge of the Globe Roundabout, Joan sells liquid glue from a water bottle to ragged children at 10 Kenyan shillings a hit. They stumble over barefoot to Joan and she tops their bottles up with an inch of the toxic substance. The street kids sniff the glue into oblivion. After a while, a small group of boys gather around Joan with the vacant look of wasted futures.

"You know that you are doing an illegal business," she says. "You feel that you are spoiling someone's life. But the circumstances we are in are forcing you to do it." The harsh urban realities of Africa give Joan no other choice, she says. She dreams of being an actress or a musician and says she wants to go back to high school. But survival is her

goal while she's living on the streets.

"I feel bad and I feel maybe hated and I feel that life doesn't belong to me, but according to me and according to my lifestyle and according to my determination, I have never allowed myself to be a victim of my situation."

IV.2 A Holistic, Cross-Sectoral Approach: Rebuilding Social Capital

Our dominant finding, gleaned from listening to youth, interviewing stakeholders, and studying the many government, agency and academic analyses of youth in Kenya, is captured by this youth voice:

We are not the problem in Kenya, we are a part of the solution. But we remain vulnerable unless there is change in accountability for systemic political, social, and economic exploitation. (from Youth Voices, 2009)

A. Education System: Youth are vulnerable for multiple and complex reasons, with historical roots in the colonial and post-colonial Kenyan experience.¹³ On one hand, there is an education system that is designed to be highly individualistic and competitive, in which “paper” examinations determine one’s life opportunities, and the majority “fail” before attaining the qualifications they need for formal sector employment. On the other hand, the education system raises expectations, leading school leavers to disdain agricultural work, without providing the knowledge, skills, and disposition to seek livelihood through enterprise and self-employment.

B. Inequality: Youth who are not from wealthy, connected families, and do not have higher education credentials, have little opportunity for steady, wage employment in the formal sector. The analysis of the types of employment (including informal and self-employment) by “wealth” group indicates the gap. The table below shows that 18 percent of the wealthiest males are employed in technical and professional jobs, whereas only less than 1 percent of the poorest males are employed in these fields. Similarly, 69 percent of the poorest males are working in agriculture, while less than 10 percent of the wealthiest males are working in the fields.

¹³ For an analysis of Kenya’s post-colonial situation, see Leys(1975), Mamdani(1996), and Crawford(1986, 1995)

Table 7 Occupations by Wealth Group: Percent Employed (formal and informal sectors)

WEALTH GROUP	Technical & Professional		Sales & Service		Unskilled		Agriculture	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Poorest 20%	.8 %	.8	9.9	20.6	15.3	4.3	69.0	72.3
Highest 20%	18%	14	30.7	37.3	26.8	10.6	8.6	9.5

(from SID: Pulling Apart: Facts and Figures on Inequality in Kenya, 2004, p.10)

It is notable that this gap is high in the provinces that historically have been the areas of greatest social conflict. The following table indicates that in Kenya the poorest 20 percent of the population only earn 2.5 percent of all income, while the richest 20 percent earn almost 60 percent of all income, and that gap is even greater in Nairobi. (SID, p.14)

Table 8 Percent Income Distribution by Income Group and Province

REGION	Top 20%	Bottom 20%
Nairobi	63.5%	3.9%
Central	55.5	3.4
Rift Valley	60.0	2.5
Western	59.0	2.3
Nyanza	60.7	2.1
KENYA	59.1%	2.5%

C. Political manipulation and mistrust: The evolution of political life in Kenya has increasingly led to the enlistment of youth to support politicians' partisan and ethno-centric agendas. Youth are paid to gather crowds for political events, to strong arm others to support a particular politician, and to intimidate the opposition, including the threat and application of violence. Politicians have fueled inter-ethnic hostility, citing historical injustices and grievances. Widespread corruption in land allocations, the bias in national resource allocations, and the distortions in public service appointments (including ethnic bias in hiring for the security forces) are viewed through ethnic lenses, so that it is perceived to be the tribe that gains or losses politically (Anderson, [2005], Roessler, 2004, Southall, 2005, Waki Commission 2008, USAID 2009). Clearly, given the wide gaps in opportunity for livelihood and income between the wealthy and the poor, there is much anger and grievance upon which to

build. Politics has been reduced, in the public view, to the use of political position to gain increased power and wealth, through inciting, coercing, and buying the support of one's own ethnic group, while denigrating and attacking other ethnic groups. In the words of the survey of post-election conflict by Media Focus on Africa Foundation,

“...thus have emerged common refrains such as *“it is our turn to eat,”* to mean that when a leader from a particular tribe ascends to power, his tribesmen have to enjoy the goodies that come with it. Historical injustices in relation to land or even political marginalization and exclusion in national resource allocations are therefore primarily viewed from ethnic lenses, and it is the tribe that gains or loses, fights or negotiates politically.” (Media Focus on Africa, p.16)

There are high stakes on gaining political office, which, given the levels of corruption in public affairs, is the surest path to power and wealth in Kenya.¹⁴ Seventy-six percent of the voting-age population believed that the 2007 election was unfair, with the greatest numbers in Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western, and Nairobi (Media, p.21).

An analysis of the nature of the PEV reveals that political leaders and elders organized and exploited youth vulnerability. The analysis of the well-researched Youth Agenda report *Who is to Blame* (Youth Agenda, 2009) reveals that 72 percent of all PEV was pre-planned, and 74 percent of that was organized or guided and financed by politicians and elders.

Youth have little trust in government, the police, the courts or elected leaders. When youth were asked to rate the performance of government actors in resolving conflicts within their areas, the majority condemned the police, the courts, and particularly elected leaders.

Table 9 Performance of Actors in resolving

State Actors	Done Poorly or Very Poorly
Government Officials	40.7 %
Police	63.8
Courts	54.0
Elected Leaders	74.3

(from Sources of Conflict. Media focus for Africa, 2009)

D. Lack of positive role models: Most youth we interacted with asserted that they do not have positive role models, particularly in the political arena of the country—they stated that most politicians only use

¹⁴ According to Transparency International's worldwide assessment of corruption in public office, Kenya ranks 150 out of 179 countries. www.heritage.org/index/country/Kenya. Corruption in public office is pervasive. Youth see the police as the most corrupt of government officials (Youth Agenda Survey, 2009).

and discard them during election campaigns and do not have their interests at heart. They thus have a negative attitude towards the political class whom they find uninspiring and uncommitted to the welfare of Kenya’s young men and women.

E. Pessimism: The 2009 survey by the Media Focus on Africa found that youth (18–35 years) are pessimistic about the future and see socioeconomic conditions worsening. Almost 80 percent of older youth (26–35 years) think government corruption is likely to get worse!

Table 10 Political and Socioeconomic Conditions in the Future-Percent Youth Believing Conditions will be Worse/Better

CONDITION	AGE GROUP	WORSE	BETTER
Job Opportunities	18–25	65%	13%
	26–35	66	13
Standard of Living	18–25	56	17
	26–35	60	16
Conflict between Groups	18–25	37	25
	26–35	40	27
Tribalism	18–25	48	20
	26–35	57	19
Corruption of public officials and leaders	18–25	67	11
	26–35	78	7

The various government, NGO, and donor agency policies and programs, in the view of the majority of youth, have not substantially altered these conditions. In the focus group discussions, we heard a common theme from youth in relation to the work of NGOs and donor projects and agencies: They are often “brief-case” NGOs, who seem to care more about publicity and public relations so as to raise funds than about the needs and voices of the youth they purportedly serve. The term “hit and run” training is often used to describe short-term training workshops, where youth spend a week or more, but there is little or no follow-up. These events raise expectations but then disappoint, leaving youth embittered and angry.

F. Lack of family and community support and positive spaces: Youth feel at odds with those institutions that under stable social conditions would be the foundation for well-being: one’s parents, community elders, and religious leaders. What we heard, confirmed by the Youth Voices Assessment, was that the great majority of at-risk youth see their parents and community elders as encouraging “negative” ethnicity, and adding to, rather than mitigating, traditional animosities and inter-communal distrust. And the churches, in the judgment of about one-quarter of the youth,¹⁵ are more concerned about the size and visibility of their congregations and the income this affords, than about the spiritual principles leading to

¹⁵ Based on the findings from the Media Focus on Africa Foundation survey (p. 24, 2009) and our focus group findings.

increased trust and an ethic of unity and diversity. On the other hand, quite a number of church-based youth groups are also dynamic and effective, particularly insofar as they are stable and emphasize values of trustworthiness, leadership with integrity, caring for others, and community service.

One other social agent that the youth have come to distrust is the media. They widely perceive that the media has demonized youth, presenting the perspective that it is the youth who are to blame for the post-election violence.

G. Conclusions: Our findings indicate that youth have increasingly lost trust in Kenya's political and social institutions and leaders, resulting in alienation and, without other means of support, a high level of involvement in petty crime (drugs and prostitution) and, for some, militias and gangs. Many youth lack a stable community with leadership from adults that guides their own social, economic, cultural, and spiritual development. Youth are looking for such leadership, and say if they cannot get it from elected politicians and community leadership, they will create it themselves!

Youth have told us, and we share this belief, that programs that address critical issues, such as the opportunity for education and training, the provision of livelihoods and income, improved health, and civic and political participation will NOT, in themselves, have a significant impact on youth vulnerability to exploitation. Why? Youth point out that livelihoods income without security and protection from corruption, education and training without follow-on application, health interventions without a change in the social environment, and participation in peace-building and politics without support from community leadership will not change the mistrust, alienation, and exploitation that are now so widespread.


These key elements need to work together within the framework of youth-serving organizations (e.g., community-based organizations CBOs, churches, and mosques), where youth themselves play a critical leadership role, building within the organizations a culture of service, wealth creation (rather than dependency), and trust.

H. A Holistic Approach: We have seen many examples of another side to what may appear a dismal picture, one that we believe indicates responsible and committed youth leadership in addressing this deterioration of social trust. There is a widespread movement in towns, cities, and rural areas of youth-led organizations that are service oriented, developing enterprises and contributing to the well-being of youth. These groups seek to develop their own capacity, garner local support, provide security for members, and develop information and networking on training and livelihood opportunities. The clarity in the minds of many at-risk youth of the threats and challenges facing them and their way forward in addressing these is in itself a positive sign.

Many of these groups had their genesis in the past two decades, growing out of the efforts of agencies, churches, and NGOs to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the plight of unemployed urban and rural youth. There are today literally thousands of registered youth organizations throughout the country, many of which have emerged as viable and effective organizations.

The approach of building from existing youth organizations must be understood to be a holistic one. It is an approach which simultaneously addresses youth identity, meaning, and purpose, as well as the rebuilding of social trust by enhancing opportunities for meaningful livelihoods; increasing organization and participation in democratic processes; improving health and well-being; and increasing knowledge, skills, and capacity through education and training. The need and urgency of a holistic approach, the most important of our findings, is represented in the following diagram. The foundations of social capital and trust, the engagement in positive social and political action with community support, and the dissemination of information on opportunities are each key elements contributing to youth organizational capacity.

OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS *A HOLISTIC FRAMEWORK*



IV.3 Overview of Sector Perspectives: Key Issues and Options for Ways Forward

The Assessment Team’s approach worked with youth groups¹⁶, stakeholders, and the review of documents to establish the priority issues contributing to youth vulnerability, specific to each of the geographic areas: Nyanza, Western, Rift Valley, and Central Provinces, and three of the poorest settlements within Nairobi. This work tended to confirm the body of research and

¹⁶ When we use the term ‘youth group’ or ‘youth organization’ in the report we are referring to groups that are constituted by and for youth, and have youth leadership. In some cases, as we have noted in the Kenyan concept and definition of youth, this includes those who are in their late 20s and early 30s. These groups are to be distinguished from CBOs and NGOs which serve youth (and often other populations), which may have some youth representation, but are organized and managed by other adults.

analysis that has previously been carried out in Kenya, particularly by the Kenyan government in its National Youth Policy and the Ministry of Youth Affairs Strategic Plan 2008–2012. Our principle focus has been on an appreciative inquiry into what works; namely those policies, conditions, programs, and projects that have proven effective at addressing Kenyan youth vulnerabilities and helping youth to realize their potentials. We examined public sector, NGO, private sector, and youth-led initiatives, and found that there is a rich body of experience upon which to draw.¹⁷ Using this information, we then probed youth groups, stakeholders (including USAID), donor agencies, and government ministries to examine the potential these positive interventions would have to inform a USAID/Kenya youth program, bearing in mind the time frame leading to the next elections in 2012. In this section, we report our findings that link to key sectors: democracy and governance; livelihoods, health and well-being, and education and training. In each section, we highlight the priority issues and present those programs and interventions that appear to demonstrate the greatest potential for enhancing youth development. A menu of recommended options for youth programming is provided within each sector section.

IV.3.A. Conflict, Democracy, and Governance

Introduction

Kenya is a complex country, which while having suffered from a diversity of challenges over time, has nonetheless demonstrated the tenacity to maintain democratic principles and a functioning, albeit flawed, system of governance. The forces that shape violence and conflict in Kenya, including the 2008 PEV, are complex and inter-related. While the racial and ethnic tensions have been highlighted by Kenyans and non-Kenyans alike, youth clearly and resolutely articulate that these prejudices are imposed upon them by parents and politicians. Perhaps the single most important driver of conflict has been the frustration and anger felt by the youth at the lack of opportunities, blended with political manipulation.

Often overlooked by the narrow media emphasis on political violence, youth identify street crime, particularly muggings and robberies, as a major problem within their communities. This is clearly linked to drug and alcohol abuse and is also a manifestation of extremely limited income generating opportunities. The police and other security structures were viewed overall with mistrust; although in some instances, the police (particularly the Administration Police) were viewed as helping victims of crimes. However, this was often based on a personal not an institutional commitment.

With extremely high levels of distrust in the government and, with any elected officials, the concepts of accountability and roles of civil society in oversight are largely overlooked. The

¹⁷ This Assessment did not carry out a comprehensive survey of existing youth-serving organizations, agencies, programs and activities by region and location. This is an important step, and could be carried out through what we have proposed as the ‘Youth-led Community Assessments.’

collective sense of youth is that they are powerless in holding politicians accountable and that any attempts to monitor government action could be futile at best, and likely to result in retaliation by power structures. In the area of civic and political participation, youth are largely excluded from the political processes and exhibit a deep sense of distrust and despondency regarding civil and political participation; they do not feel that they can currently change the system from within.

Key Issues and Promising Practices

Most young people have no structure they can call their own and in many cases do not feel comfortable with the structures set up for them, or on their behalf.
(Youth Voices, 2009)

Youth Organizations

There are thousands of registered youth organizations in Kenya. By March 2009, as many as 8,480 registered youth groups had received funds through the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) Constituency Youth Enterprise Scheme.¹⁸ There is a widespread perception that a large proportion of these funds have been either misused or misappropriated¹⁹. The Mars Group has noted that large allocations of funds have not been accounted for. By June 2009, MOYAS had not responded to significant audit queries from November 2008.²⁰ Youth in the areas that we visited generally believe that the allocations of funds are decided on political grounds, and they have little confidence that the program has integrity. This may not be entirely fair. In our interviews with Provincial and District MOYAS officers, they acknowledged multiple problems, including political interference, unrepresentative youth participation on the boards, and very low loan paybacks (as low as 15 percent in Nakuru District and 30 percent in Central Province). The MOYAS is taking steps, including a reorganization of the YEDF as a youth group “Merry Go Round” loan, allocated to individuals rather than groups, as part of an effort to improve the performance of this fund. Nonetheless, the YEDF continues to generate controversy and mistrust as illustrated by recent news.²¹

¹⁸ Youth Enterprise Development Fund: Fund Status Report as of 31 March, 2009. YEDF Board.

¹⁹ It is important to distinguish between the C-YES scheme and the YEDF channeled-through financial institutions which constitute a much larger, and more successful, mechanism for YEDF funding (see p. 45)

²⁰ See the report *Crony Capitalism Exposed at the Kenya Youth Enterprise Development Fund* (Mars Group, June 27, 2009).

²¹ In late October 2009 the Minister of Youth Affairs reinstated the CEO of the YEDF, Umuro Wario, who had been dismissed by the Board over alleged mismanagement. The YEDF Board states in a public notice that the Minister is exceeding her powers in reinstating Wario when a procedure is in place to appoint his replacement. However, others – including youth advocacy groups - say that Wario is actually the corruption fighter, trying to blow the whistle on a 300 mill KShs loan to a Canadian NGO. By this account, the Minister is politically reinstating an honest and capable leader and using her political status to override a corrupt Board. Whatever the case, this reflects contested political views about the integrity of YEDF.

However, what we have found remarkable is that, in fact, there are a very large number of neighborhood youth groups, youth centers that serve these groups, and youth group and center networks throughout the areas of the country we visited. While it may be that many of the beneficiaries of the YEDF were not capable to collectively manage the funds, or whose purposes and leadership lacked integrity, we think that there are a significant number of youth organizations that, with support for communications, networking, training and incentives, can make a major contribution. In the following sections of the report, we will present a number of illustrative examples of youth oriented and/or youth-led organizations at local, district, regional, and national levels that exemplify good practice. Organizations described under this sector—governance, democracy, and conflict—are characterized by their focus on a deliberately holistic approach, building organizational capacity, addressing issues of conflict resolution, advocating for youth representation on public decision-making bodies, and advocating for youth friendly policies and programs.

Table 11 YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING EMPOWERMENT and CAPACITY

ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION
*Shairi Yako Community Youth Support Center	Nyeri	Founded in 1996, this is a small, local youth-led organization committed to community development through youth mentoring, outreach, sports, and community services. They have built a small center through self-help and work with street youth to provide a day “home.”
Uzima Foundation	Nairobi, Nyanza, Nyeri	The Foundation strengthens existing youth groups and supports formation of new ones through which young people can articulate problems, plan how to solve them, and carry out actions.
One Stop Youth Information Resource Center	Nairobi (City Council)	Founded in 2003, with the support of UN Habitat, the center seeks to empower youth to have ownership of the development process and be agents of transformation in the city. It does this through employment training, counseling, recreation, and cultural activities. In fact, once the City Council took over, the youth role has been increasingly marginalized, and the Center has lost much of its appeal.
*PCEA Eastleigh Community Center	Eastlands (Mathare and Eastleigh), Nairobi	Started in 1959 (church based), the center focuses on community empowerment with a holistic approach to education, community health and environment, advocacy, skills training and enterprise development, organizational capacity building, and research/assessments. It works with 32 groups.
*Kibera Youth for Peace and Development	Kibera	KYPD is a new youth network (4 months), developing collaborative efforts among institutions, organizations, and individuals involved in peace work in Kibera—promoting resource and information sharing between groups and carrying out assessments of needs, opportunities, and capacities.
*Youth Alive	National	Founded in 1998, Youth Alive seeks to empower young people to take active responsibility for their lives and to

		shape their destiny by working in areas of health, justice and human rights, democracy and governance, environment, and livelihoods.
Africa Youth Trust	National, Regional	Founded in 2005, the trust works to harness the productive energies of youth towards peace, equity, and prosperity within and across communities in Africa.
*GROOTS	National	An effective advocacy group for women on issues of human rights: justice, enterprise, property rights, and labor laws. It aims “to facilitate grassroots women and their communities to effectively participate in development processes.”

These organizations are nonprofit and nongovernmental and are either led by youth or have a large representation of youth on their boards and senior staff. They represent the range from local organizations (such as Shaira Yako), to centers serving other groups (PCEA and Uzima), to networks such as KYPD, to national organizations and networks (such as Youth Alive, The Kenya Youth Foundation, and the Africa Youth Trust).

Although these, and hundreds of other youth organizations with laudable mission statements, are to be found in virtually every town and city, they do not reach all youth, nor do those they reach necessarily get much benefit from the association. Further, a rather large number of youth-serving organizations with lofty objectives appear to have short lives. Many registered organizations are, according to MOYAS officials at the District level and to our youth focus group informants, “paper” organizations: they form to access benefits or to obtain loans through the YEDF. Quite a number of groups have learned the right kind of rhetoric and strategy (including getting board members with connections) to obtain recognition, support, and financing. These organizations are formed, raise support and financing, and then fade from sight as they are not able to deliver effective services. Many organizations also bypass youth who are the least educated, poorest segment of the population, and particularly those in rural areas. And there are also youth who, while they are listed as members of a registered youth group, often through their churches or local NGOs, are inactive—in many cases, because after one or two activities, the group itself becomes inactive.²²

The widespread organization of youth gangs in the town and urban slums, and the absence of effective police or of a system of legal redress for criminal attack, means that youth enterprise development needs a system of security, and one that does not require high costs to pay for

²² Our period of two weeks in the field was too brief to get a good estimate of the number of “inactive” youth organizations. According to the MOYAS district offices, and to Youth Centers, that we interviewed, more than half of the registered youth organizations in lower Rift Valley akuru are now inactive.

^{3b} See Internal Refugees Displacement Center website www.internal-displacement.org. Also, USAID’s *Land Tenure and Property Rights Assessment* (2009) provides an in-depth analysis of the historical and policy issues related to land allocations, ownership, and use.

protection. Individuals who are fortunate to do well in private enterprise become easy prey for extortion from organized gangs. This is one of the reasons that youth organizations, particularly those that are connected through a youth center or network, provide an effective strategy for the development of enterprise. This is not to imply that youth organizations promoting enterprise will become a militant, armed group in competition with existing gangs. Rather, by widely sharing information, alerting members to threats, getting the cooperation with legitimate security forces, youth organizations can provide some protection to members' emerging income-generating enterprises.

There are other important reasons for the development of youth organizations at the local, neighborhood, or village level. This is a means by which youth empowerment and voice can be realized. Youth who are individually victimized by the injustice of police or official corruption have no possibility of seeking redress. Groups, and particularly those that are connected through networks of information sharing, can make the public aware of such abuses, and if they present a unified voice of protest, can exert pressure, especially through the media, on government officials, police, and politicians.

Youth Relationships with Elders

One of the most complex issues facing Kenyans is the changing nature of the relationship between youth and elders and the inherent conflicts that have arisen as a result of such changes. The current relationship is largely characterized by tension as youth no longer adhere strictly to traditional norms. Modernization has watered down the relationship and many Kenyan youth are in fact unaware of their traditional structures but are conversant with, and faithful to, modern trends.

By way of example, the issues around land tenure and asset management help illustrate the tensions. Traditionally young men only obtain land once their fathers pass away, creating a condition in which young people yearn for self-determination, and often want to promote innovation and change, but are unable to do so due to absolute parental control over land and other productive assets. This has in turn led to frustration on the part of youth and in many cases urban migration as young people look for opportunities outside of their communities. Another example of the tensions is in regards to circumcision practices, in which young people are forced to undergo traditional ritual procedures that they often do not want and in some cases know can be harmful. While there are programs in place to help educate parents and elders, the process is both time consuming and requires significant face-to-face interventions. In its simplest form, the relationship between youth and elders is often one in which the elders want to maintain absolute authority and control while the young people yearn for their own opportunities. When the youth express different opinions, they are often labelled as troublemakers and are ostracized from their communities, which in turn leads to increased crime and violence.

However, a few exceptions exist most notably in the Kalenjin area of the Rift Valley Province and amongst the Maasai where the elders still maintain considerable influence on the community. Here, the youth undergo traditional rituals and are bound by their age-group ties

throughout their existence—an illustration of this bonding has been noted for the Kalenjin Warriors group and the Maasai Morans which are comprised of bands of youth organized according to shared age-groups.

Youth Roles in Public Policy and Decision-Making

From our interactions with the youth, it is clear that the youth as a distinct constituency is not involved in the making or oversight of public policy. A clear demonstration of this exclusion is the fact that the majority of youth engaged in our assessment were either totally unaware of the existence of the National Youth Policy, and those who had heard of it were not informed of its content. This is a particularly damning fact considering that it is the National Youth Policy that articulates the needs and concerns of the youth and the strategies to improve their lives. This exclusion from public policy-making is evident from the local level to the national stage. Several key youth leaders expressed frustration regarding the “theft” of the Youth Councils, which were originally conceived as bottom-up representative processes but have been reconfigured to be top-down in terms of identifying youth representatives. This is consistent with the Kenyan government history of dominant and centralized political structures resisting changes that might decentralize control and authority to groups outside of the intimate leadership core. That the Kenyan government might explicitly or implicitly oppose a program that would support bottom-up youth leadership is a real risk that must be mitigated moving forward.

The lack of youth representation on local, regional, and national councils; the lack of youth agency in protest at the widespread misuse of public office; and the failure of government to hold leaders responsible for violating public trust are a core force behind youth alienation, despondency, and anger. Youth also are angered by their marginalization, even by the groups that purportedly serve their interests. Our focus groups, and the MOYAS/UNICEF Youth Voices Assessment, repeatedly stressed that they do not appreciate agencies and NGOs that define youth problems and develop solutions without the representation and leadership of youth themselves.

Most young people interviewed in the focus group discussions stated that they are also excluded from decision-making in the family structure (in which decision-making is dominated by adults) and continuing into community settings from the grassroots to the national level. The challenges within the family structure were particularly marked in the non-urban areas around adult control of resources (e.g., land, equipment, etc.)

Youth almost unanimously stated that those youth who are placed in decision-making bodies are mainly selected based on their personal relationship with the appointing authority and thus cannot be said to be legitimate representatives of the youth. An illustration of this reality is the selection of youth to the Constituency YEDF (vetting) Committee. A number of District Youth Officers we interviewed admitted that they appoint youth to sit in these committees based on their personal knowledge and relationships. However, many did state that they would prefer it if the youth themselves elected their own representatives to these committees and lamented

the lack of a mechanism that would facilitate this. Even in the event that there are youth representatives, the youth are always in the minority and are easily overruled by other committee members in decision-making.

Box 4 YOUTH VOICE: Nothing for us without us

We can run faster than you can. We can fulfill so many roles in our societies. We are more attuned to the innovations of a rapidly changing world. Just as our traditional societies depended on the young people to defend their societies and bring about development under the guidance of the elders, so we too can address so many of the issues in our community. By serving our communities we gain experience and we ensure that the poor, the marginalized, the more vulnerable all can be reached with quality education and health, can be protected against harassment and abuse. And we become leaders in our own right. (Voices of Youth, 2009)

Youth also identified a lack of information as a main barrier to participation and growth and a primary impediment to youth empowerment. The overwhelming majority of youth interviewed in the focus group discussions lamented that they were unable to access important information that would assist them in uplifting themselves. By way of example, while many had heard of the *Kazi Kwa Vijana* (KKV) program and the Constituency Loans Programme (C-Yes), none of the youth involved had any specific literature or guidance on how to access these programs. Many expressed frustration at having to pay transport fees to go the urban areas to visit the various district, provincial, and local government offices to only return to their homes without any clarity on the process.

However, there are important exceptions to this grim picture. In Kisumu, Councilor Tom Mboya speaks of 11 youth councilors in the City Council, out of a total of 30. This came out of a concrete decision taken within the Nyanza Youth Coalition to encourage young people get involved in the Council, and which has resulted in increased attention to youth affairs. The youth councilors tend to be better educated than older councilors, resulting in a higher standard of governance and procedures. In this case, representative youth leaders are making a significant impact at the ward level. The case demonstrates what can happen with the support of local political leadership.



Youth Center in Siaya District

IV.3.B. Livelihoods, Enterprise, and Employment

Introduction: Growth of Micro-Enterprise and Micro-Financing

In the early 1960s, just after Independence, Kenyans and development agencies believed that economic development meant the growth of the formal sector, and that employment meant steady, wage-paying work for an established industry or firm. The informal sector hardly existed, and was considered a peripheral phenomenon that would fade away as development proceeded. Thirty years later, in 1994, USAID commissioned a study by K-Rep which estimated that there were about 900,000 informal enterprises in Kenya, engaging some 2 million workers.

²⁵ The EQUIP3 youth leadership program in the West Bank is an excellent example of this approach.

During the 1980s, President Moi provided shelters to metalworkers in a Nairobi slum area and introduced the term *jua kali* (hot sun) to refer to this informal, small scale industrial enterprise. This presidential attention preceded a set of national policies and legislation that encouraged small-scale “informal” sector development.²⁶

Today informal *i* enterprise makes up almost 70 percent of all employment, with an estimated 7 million workers, although the informal sector only contributes about 25 percent to GDP (World Bank, 2009). A key indicator of the dynamism in the informal economy is the remarkable growth and diversity of micro-financing systems.

The Financial Sector Deepening program (FSD) was established in 2006 to support the development of financial markets in Kenya and to stimulate wealth creation and reduce poverty. FSD organized a (second) detailed survey on micro-financing in Kenya in 2009 (FinAccess available at <http://www.fsdkenya.org/finaccess/>). This study documented an enormous growth in bank deposits from 2002 to 2008, from 400/= KShs bill. to 900/= KShs bill., almost 250 percent. It further tracked a rapid decline in non-performing loans from over 35 percent in 2002 to 6 percent in 2008. The growth in access to financial services from 2006 to 2009 has taken place largely in the informal and non-traditional formal sectors. The non-traditional formal sector includes the spectacular growth in M-PESA use. In 2009, M-PESA,²⁷ after less than two years of operations, has grown to 6.8 million customers by April 2009, served by 7,600 agents (USAID, “Mobile Banking” 2009).

Our focus group sessions and interviews suggest that a very high proportion of cell phone users (13 million in 2009) and M-PESA customers are those between 18 and 35 years.²⁸

This dynamic growth points to informal and non-traditional formal enterprise development as a viable strategy for expanding youth livelihoods. This does not imply that Kenya’s youth should be consigned to informal, economic activity as the only solution to the unemployment crisis. Nor does it imply that opportunities for youth in the formal sector should be ignored. Rather, the informal sector is a strategic point of entry. The more successful informal enterprises, those which have strong leadership and sound (often innovative) technical approaches to production or services, can make the transition from informal to formal organization, employing more staff and accessing credit from commercial banks. There are numerous institutional, legal and financial barriers to this transition, yet there is evidence that an increasing number of organizations (including farmers and fisherfolk) are able to make with the help of regional or national organizations, established, often with donor support, for this purpose.

²⁶ See Kenneth King (1996), *Jua kali: Change and Development in an Informal Economy: 1970-1995*. Nairobi: East African Education Publishers for a definitive history and analysis of the growth of Kenya’s informal economy.

²⁷ M-PESA is a mobile banking service using cell phones through Safaricom and Vodaphone. ZAP is a similar service provided by ZAIN.

²⁸ To register for M-PESA, one needs a national ID card and number. One can only apply for that from age 18 years.

The vast majority of out-of-school youth are not prepared to initiate micro-enterprise. Their schooling has prepared them to think of employment, and not to think creatively about how to start a business. Most don't have the disposition or capacity needed to link their own interests, skills, and resources with actual customers and markets. And it is apparent that there is a huge information gap for youth on where to go, what to do, and how to do it in starting and sustaining a business. Thus, any program that is to help youth engage in micro-enterprise will provide stages of capacity building, starting where youth are and moving to the point where they can individually or collectively organize an enterprise.

Key Issues and Promising Practices

Kenya's paradox is that while its political development is mired in corruption, injustice, and a failure to hold to account those who are known to have misused their public office, its economy, particularly the informal sector, is doing very well. Even with the global downturn and the PEV destruction, Kenya has rebounded from negative GDP growth rates in 2008 to 3.9 percent economic growth in the first quarter of 2009. (KNBS, 2009)

In terms of a longer-term, macro-economic perspective, the findings in the excellent analysis by USAID's *Business Climate Legal and Institutional Reform Project* (BizCLIR) on a strategy for Kenya's economic development are important considerations for the nurturing of youth enterprise:

A key fact sets the stage for considering Kenya's journey into middle-income status. In this East African nation of 39 million people—with a labor force of only 17 million—approximately 75 percent of the working population derives its living from the agriculture sector... There is a second and related key fact: of the country's GDP—\$16.1 billion in 2007—around 28 percent comes from agriculture... In Kenya, as in much of Africa, little processing of locally produced goods takes place within its borders, although the government is striving to improve this situation.

The past two centuries of global economic growth demonstrate that greater prosperity in a country translates to fewer people engaged in agriculture and less GDP derived from agriculture. This experience is likely to be realized in Kenya. Rises in agricultural productivity will increase incomes and improve health, permitting more Kenyans to turn to skilled labor, entrepreneurship, and other avenues for progress. But even as fewer Kenyans work directly in agriculture, the sector can serve as a stronger and more efficient driver of growth. To the extent that there are ongoing reforms for "doing business" in the agriculture sector, the country will experience greater productivity, entrepreneurial activity, and international trade.

USAID, *Kenya's Agenda for Action: Commercial and Institutional Reform Diagnostic for Kenya's Business Environment*. BIZCLIR (2009).

The remarkable growth in Kenya's micro-enterprise and micro-finance is good news for the informal sector, and for youth. However, there are still more than 2.5 million youth who are under- or unemployed. Youth place the need for work and employment as their first priority.

The link between livelihoods and vulnerability was emphasized in all our focus group discussions and in interviews with key informants, both from government and nongovernment organizations. It is clear that the key to reducing youth vulnerability is through expanding opportunities to earn legitimate, decent livelihoods. In areas that have criminal youth gangs, young persons were unanimous in asserting that most of those joining these gangs are there to gain money and would leave if they had viable, legitimate alternatives. Peace in Kenya will, to a significant degree, depend on enhancing youth enterprise and sustainable livelihoods.

There are a very large number of agencies, government ministries, CBOs, NGOs, and private sector organizations engaged in support to youth enterprise and employment generation. These exist at local, district, provincial, regional, and national levels. They address issues of enhancing productivity in existing enterprises. In rural areas, these include value chains of production and sale for livestock, dairy products, horticulture, cut flowers, honey production, and fishing. In urban areas, are enterprises that support transportation—including bicycles, motorcycles, cars and buses (repairs, services, operations); construction; metal work; furniture and woodwork; crafts; fashion; entertainment (music, drama, performances); food services; clothing; and petty trade. What is beyond doubt is that there are an increasing number of opportunities for the entrepreneur who can assess market demand, develop a business strategy to meet that demand, acquire working capital, and organize production (or services).

In Kenya one of the constraints to the growth of formal sector employment has been the number of new labor laws and regulations that, while intended to enhance the wages and benefits of employees, have dampened demand for hiring of new workers. These new laws, enacted hurriedly with strong labor union support just prior to the 2007 elections, include regulations on minimum wage, working conditions, and benefits. Many of these new regulations are now being contested in courts by the private sector.²⁹ It is estimated that no more than 20% of youth leaving school at primary, secondary and tertiary levels will be able to find employment in Kenya's formal economic sector.

The strategy of providing youth employment through enterprise development is, for Kenya's immediate future, the most promising path for enhancing youth livelihoods. The promotion of youth entrepreneurship is one of the few feasible options to stimulate the demand side of the labor market and create income generating opportunities. While youth enterprise is a growing phenomenon, with many lessons learned, there are also significant constraints. In the youth focus groups, the barriers to starting and sustaining micro-enterprise were discussed and important differences were noted between urban and rural areas:

²⁹ See USAID/BizCLIR (2009) pp. 41-44.

Barriers to Enterprise Development in Urban Locations:

- Large numbers of new migrants into urban areas, who, when they do not find legitimate work, turn to drug dealing, *chang'aa* brewing, prostitution, and petty crime, which leads them into organized gangs.
- Police and local authorities distrust and harass youth; the registration of a youth organization usually requires extra payments to officials.
- Gangs, police and local authorities present a constant threat for young women, who are regularly propositioned, abused, assaulted and even raped without accountability to the perpetrators.
- For rural and urban enterprises, there are multiple start-up fees, and then levies and taxes. Often these payments have to be made with an extra bribe to officials and/or police.
- Youth have great difficulty starting enterprises on their own; they need to become a part of an organization that can acquire support and resources, and provide protection and small loans to members.³⁰
- Training and mentoring is essential for organizational development, management, and successful entrepreneurial activity. It is difficult to find appropriate and timely training.
- Access to credit and loans is beyond the reach of most youth groups: They don't have the capacity to prepare business plans; youth claim that even the YEDF is only accessed with the proper connections or bribes.
- Youth organizations often are in competition for the attention and support of agencies and NGOs, rather than working together in ways that could lead to mutual advantage.

In Rural Settings

- Youth face the challenge of being unable to own land.
- Even if they do have land, youth lack capital, especially given the high cost of farming inputs and fertilizers.
- As in urban setting, starting a new enterprise, including trading goods in the market, requires multiple and complex levies and fees, usually accompanied by a bribe.
- Environmental destruction of landscapes, changes of streams and river courses, flooding, and droughts affect development of sustainable agricultural production.

³⁰ The poor experience of the YEDF C-YES loans to youth organizations signals the risk of schemes that provide loans to new organizations which have not established credibility or assets. However, youth organizations that provide support in the form of training and enterprise development, can also, as demonstrated by the 'merry-go-round' scheme provide social capital to individuals in the form of group guarantees for loan repayments, thereby making other members in the group eligible for credit and/or loans.

- The poor road network³¹ result in lack of access to markets of farm produce. This was one of the main reasons why young people put such an emphasis on improvement of the road system in the country.
- There is an agricultural monopoly for some commodities, including maize, millet, and sweet potatoes in Luo Nyanza and Kisii areas. This has resulted in lowered marketing costs in some cases, permitting increased prices for farmers in some cases but not in others.
- Uncontrolled imports of some commodities have depressed incentives to farmers to farm maize, sugar, and rice. Overall, liberalization has led to greater price variability in the absence of buyers-of-last resort for crops.

A significant barrier to any aspiring entrepreneur in both rural and urban areas is the complex system of taxation and levies, and the widespread corruption by public sector officials who demand these fees. While this phenomenon is seldom given much careful analysis in the literature on poverty reduction and economic development, youth speak of these apparently arbitrary and corrupt demands as a major barrier to starting or maintaining an enterprise. One in depth analysis³² of livelihoods in western Kenyan villages and towns identified the following:

Table 12 Examples of Formal and Informal Taxes and Levies

Category	Amount KShs	Description
BUSINESS LICENCES/TAXES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Jua Kali</i> set up fee • Kiosk or shop tax • Clothes trading • Land transactions 	2,100 100-800/week 100 per bale 1,200 1,000	License fee for start-ups (to Town/City Council) To Town/City Council – varies by location Application fee Survey fee License fee for land transaction
CROPS & LIVESTOCK TAXES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maize or millet/sack • Vegetables/sack • License to trade livestock (cattle) • Market levy/goat • Sales tax per cow Goat Hen 	60-90 20,000 30 10 – 100 10-35 20	Paid to town or city council on entry to market Paid to livestock officer on entry to market Paid to livestock officer
Fishing Taxes & Licenses	1000	

³¹ The issue of roads was highlighted by participants from all the provinces.

³² Freeman et.al (2004) analysis of 10 villages (35 households per village) in Suba (Nyanza) and Bomet (Rift Valley) districts.

Category	Amount KShs	Description
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fishing boat license Private mark for boat Fisheries marketing license Market tax per day Confiscation fee Health certificates 	300 350 20-40 2,800 400	Paid to Fisheries Department Marketing license with health certificate Daily charge for small scale selling To release boats confiscated for being unsafe Paid to health officials – (seen as bribes)
'Informal' Levies/Dues <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public holiday contributions to chiefs Entertainment of Dos or DCs Obtaining ID forms and vetting 	30-50 per person 250 p/household 300+	Paid to chiefs and government officials Wide variety of amounts, also paid in kind (e.g. chickens, goats). Lack of compliance can lead to confiscation of property, refusal to permit trading or business.

Another significant barrier to the development of youth enterprise is the lack of relevant information that reaches youth in an understandable form. Business know-how and entrepreneurial skills have not been well developed. This knowledge is not nurtured in the formal education system. Youth focus groups noted that guidance on where to go, what to do, and how to do it with regard to starting and sustaining a business is, for the most part, lacking or misleading. Programs such as the Youth Enterprise Development Fund and the Women's Enterprise Development Fund have come into existence over the past three years and were designed to provide much needed business support services. However, few youth, especially in rural areas, know about these programs.

Access to micro-financing and loans is in fact beyond the reach of the great majority of youth. Although the YEDF, through thirty-five financial institutions, has been able to reach out to more than 57,000 youth enterprises since 2007, this is a small proportion of the hundreds of thousands of 18 – 35 year old youth who potentially could benefit from micro-financing of start-up enterprises. It is important to note that at the start-up stage, individuals and youth organizations are, with few exceptions, not eligible for loans, micro-credit, or grants from any financial institution. Many of the youth who are not living with family or relatives often live from hand-to-mouth, eking out a living through very informal processes, trading each day to make enough to eat. The question for youth in this situation is not how to develop a business plan, but rather how to make this work a little more efficiently, so as to earn a bit more...

Youth Enterprise Development Fund: The Youth Enterprise Development Fund, established in 2007, is now managed by a Board that is legally independent from the Ministry of Youth

Affairs.³³ According to the YEDF Board report on 31 March 2009, YEDF has disbursed 1.9 bill KShs (with another 500 mill in the pipeline for 2009) through two channels. Youth from 18 to 35 years are eligible, either as individuals or through youth organizations.

The first channel, using financial intermediaries, has disbursed 1.53 bill through (35) financial institutions – including EQUITY, K-Rep, Kenya Commercial Bank, Kenya Women’s Financial Trust and numerous SACCOs. 57,075 youth enterprises received these loans. According to the YEDF Board, 98% of the loans disbursed through financial institutions have been repaid.

A positive sign of the effectiveness of this channel is that in Dec 2008 the YEDF negotiated 2.4 Bill KShs as additional leveraged funds for youth loans from the institutions through this scheme.

The second channel, through constituencies, is called the Constituency Youth Enterprise Scheme (C-YES) and allocates 2mill KShs per constituency. These loans are made to registered youth groups which present proposals to a local Constituency C-YES Committee, with MOYAS field staff serving as the secretariat. Initially, the C-YES scheme was to provide a means of reaching youth in areas not served by financial institutions. By 31 March 370 mill KShs had been disbursed to 8,480 youth organizations. In the Provinces and constituencies the repayment rate on the C-YES loans was as low as 10% (Rift Valley) to 15%(Central). It is apparent to the government that loans to youth organizations, through the Constituency Scheme, have not been effective. The analysis suggests that there is no incentive, or penalty, for repayment.

Youth groups that we interviewed believed that the allocation of C-YES loans was corrupted by political influence, and there was little expectation that loans should be repaid. The YEDF and the MOYA are planning to eliminate C-YES by the end of 2009, and are exploring and piloting other approaches, including the ‘merry-go-round’ micro-credit approach, by which an individual receives a loan with the support for three or four others within a group. If and when that loan is repaid, the co-signers to the loan are themselves eligible for the next loan. However, YEDF and MOYAS suffer from having little capacity to mentor or train youth organizations, a key feature of an effective youth enterprise development program. A forthcoming World Bank project which is to provide institutional support to MOYAS and YEDF intends to address this situation.

³³ Although note that in the recent dispute between the YEDF Board and the Minister for Youth Affairs and Sports over the appointment of the YEDF CEO, the Minister seems to have the power to overrule the Board.

Youth Enterprise Opportunities

We have noted that a significant number of youth are organizing to start small-scale businesses within their localities with their own ideas. Youth focus groups discussed the existing enterprise and employment opportunities for each of the regions. This exploration with the focus groups was not a survey of market enterprise opportunity and employment, nor did it reflect an analysis of potential growth areas.³⁴

Table 13 **YOUTH AND ENTERPRISE & EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES**
Youth Economic Activities by Area³⁵

URBAN SITES	The activities below are found in all urban locations that we visited
Nairobi	Jua Kali activities e.g the second hand clothes business, tailoring, barber shops, food kiosks, vending water and shoe repair and making, such as <i>akala</i> , washing/bathing (shower), Jua kali artisans, video shows, fruit/juice parlors, 2 nd hand clothes and shoes sales.
Kibera	
Huruma	
Dandora Eastlands	
Rift Valley	Boda boda (bicycle)transport, repairs and carwash(Wasio)
Nakuru	
Molo	
Kericho	
Western	Females are engaged in hair dressing, beauty salons, weaving, tailoring, laundry services (picking up laundry door to door), making recycled sanitary pads. Weaving, sewing, tailoring, embroidery and beadwork curios, necklaces, for sale in jua kali shops and to tourists
Eldoret	
Nyanza	The arts industry, including the music industry cultural festivals, arts and theatre performance, organizing events. Also (in Nakuru, Haruma) fashion design modeling, and graphic arts.
Kakamega	
Central	ICT support services in internet cafes, web design (this is a fast growing enterprise)
Kisumu	
Thika	
Nyeri	Sports activities like athletics and soccer have enabled youth to nurture their talents, gain exposure and a source of income
	Chang'aa brewing (very widespread in urban areas) and support services (fetching water, wood, tending pots, sales, etc.
	Criminal activities : security/protection services and vigilante groups, prostitution, drug sales, sales of pornographic materials, 'sugar' daddies

³⁴ The team has not found any rigorous surveys or analyses of economic development and employment trends and opportunities by region. This would be a very useful analysis and needs to be undertaken.

³⁵ This information comes from youth focus groups and interviews in each region, and also draws on the economic opportunity/activity mapping in the MOYAS/UNICEF 'Youth Voices' draft Report.

RURAL SITES	Youth economic activities in peri-urban and rural areas is conditioned by the location. The activities below reflect this diversity.
Farmland	<p>Agri-business including farming of miraa (Central), fruit and vegetables (Nyanza, Western, Rift Valley highlands and Central).</p> <p>Small scale horticulture, cash crops – transport to market and market sales including vegetables, flowers, mushrooms (Central), eggs, other produce. Note that even in Nairobi there is ‘urban’ agriculture and market sales.</p>
Pasture lands	<p>Bee keeping and honey sales (initially strong in Central – and Eastern - Province, now nationally distributed)</p> <p>Cattle, goats, sheep herding, dairy production and sales, wool and leather work (Rift Valley, Central, Nyanza, Western)</p>
Forest Areas	<p>Planting trees (trees for jobs program) and tree nurseries</p> <p>Tourism services (e.g. in parks such as Mt. Kenya, Lakes Naivasha, Nakuru, Victoria), making and selling curios, assistants for tour guides</p>
Lakes	<p>Fishing – fish processing, sales (especially in Nyanza and shores of Lake Victoria), and work connected to fishing ‘industry’- net making, boat making and repair. Also aquaculture/fishing in Central Province</p>

In this overview, youth noted the potentials that exists but also stressed that these opportunities need to be explored locally. There is clearly a need to involve youth in careful analysis of opportunities and constraints to enterprise development and employment within specific locations, and to determine means of developing these potential opportunities .

Three areas of opportunity from this listing stand out: the agri-business sector, ICT services and jua kali enterprises.

- 1. Agricultural/agri-business sector:** Agriculture/agribusiness (agro-processing, packaging, storage and transportation) is a key but declining growth sector in Kenya’s economy. Youth have the opportunity to engage in agric-related jobs that will not only serve to increase the food-security of Kenyans but also allow for relatively stable employment in this sector. In the USAID BizCLIR *Diagnostic for Kenya’s Business Environment Commercial Legal and Institutional Reform 2009* report, it states that: *“Rises in agricultural productivity will increase incomes and improve health, permitting more Kenyans to turn to skilled labor, entrepreneurship, and other avenues for progress. But even as fewer Kenyans work directly in agriculture, the sector can serve as a stronger and more efficient driver of growth. To the extent that there are ongoing reforms for “doing business” in the agriculture sector, the country will experience greater*

productivity, entrepreneurial activity, and international trade.” This information was also substantiated during key informant interviews held in all 5 focal provinces of the assessment. The challenge will be to get youth to **appreciate farming as a viable livelihood** and see and understanding the value-chain needs and opportunities to “fill the gaps.”

2. **ICT sector:** The ICT sector is another emerging market for youth in Kenya. The Youth Employment Marshall Plan underscores this and states that with the on-going development of the Information Communication Technology sector, employment opportunities “will open up for youth.” An example of prospective employment in this sector is the laying of the fiber optic cable in Kenya, a project that has, to date created thousands of jobs for youth. Whilst this is an emerging market, it should be noted that “Kenya needs to have depth of relevant skills, a good work ethos, managerial capabilities, entrepreneurial drive, intellectual property protection and establishment of linkages between companies in the first world and those in Kenya.” (Kenya Youth Employment Marshall Plan, 2009). GOK realizes that ICT has great potential for job creation for its youth in setting up ICT-enabled business services such as customer, back-office and professional services to offshore, near-shore and in-shore companies that are keen on concentrating on their core competencies and cutting operational costs. In order to take advantage of this emerging trend, the Kenyan authorities state that it shall put some initiatives in place. These include among other things: 1) Adjusting Kenya education and training programs to enable our youth to cash in on new employment opportunities; taking advantage of existing and new marketing networks and promoting local and international partnerships; and recruiting highly qualified staff, motivating and retaining them as part of the process of building a critical mass for emerging business opportunities. 2) Collaborating with Kenyan universities and the private sector to establish ICT business incubators to support existing and start-up businesses; set operating standards in accordance with international principles to ensure quality assurance; and provide for decisive response based on market intelligence and research.³⁶

3. **Jua Kali Sector:** Kenya’s small-scale, informal manufacturing and retail sector also known as the “jua kali” sector is quite large and is probably the most promising for Kenya’s youth. Many youth seem to have taken advantage of the Jua Kali – albeit a short term solution for employment – as a means of day-to-day survival. This informal business sector holds a large potential for youth because it allows for youth to establish micro businesses without going through an expensive, lengthy, and often corrupt

³⁶ Quotations and general information taken from an article entitled: Overview of ICT in Kenya accessed on the internet: www.SoftKenya.com

process of business registration. It facilitates innovative micro-enterprises to be launched and to grow. There are some sub-sectors in the informal sector that, if well organized, can be a source of employment such as the fast growing entertainment industry. An excellent example of this is TEARS youth-led organization in the Nakuru area (see p. 69)

Another emerging sector which has potential for youth is in the conservation and rehabilitation of Kenya's environment. Some of this potential is reflected in the ongoing 'Jobs for Trees' program, and in the details of the Marshall Plan for Youth Employment. With the challenges of power shortages and electricity rationing, now a reflection of the current drought, Kenya will be forced to find new and creative ways to reverse the effects of deforestation and engage in solar panel development and use.

Micro-Financing Institutions

Although access to micro-financing is considered by youth to be a significant constraint, in fact, there are a large number of organizations in addition to government that are providing mentoring, training, and financial services to support the development of youth enterprise. USAID has been a leader in this field, assisting in the creation and development K-Rep, one of the major players in the field of financing micro-enterprises. It is arguable that Kenya is the leading country in sub-Saharan Africa on the development of micro-financing services. Within the past decade, two umbrella organizations have developed to coordinate and strengthen financial services to the poor.

The Financial Services Deepening (FSD) Program (supported by DfID, the World Bank, SIDA, and other agencies) was established in 2005 to stimulate wealth creation and reduce poverty, expanding access to financial services among lower income households and smaller enterprises. It has carried out two wide-ranging surveys on the status of micro-financing, analyzing constraints, and best practices. The Association of Micro-Financing Institutions of Kenya (AMFI) (which USAID has assisted, even during difficult times) now has a membership of more than 35 national organizations and banks that are leading the development of micro-financing in Kenya. These include K-Rep, Equity Bank, Kenya Women's Finance Trust, KADET, and the Aga Khan Agency for Micro Finance. Both organizations are rich sources of information on a wide range of micro-financing experiences, approaches, and best practices (see www.fsdkenya.org and www.amfikenya.com).

While there is an infrastructure of micro-financing institutions in place and growing, and a significant number of youth micro-loans through the YEDF mechanism, its overall reach is actually small relative to the total out-of-school and underemployed youth population. The FinAccess report for 2009 estimates that 12.3% of those in the 18 – 25 year age group are recipients of loans through banks, and another 19.9% access loans through micro-financing institutions (including those working with YEDF) and savings and credit associations (SACCO). This proportion is far lower, as would be expected, in rural areas. The report does note that

the proportion of youth accessing micro-financing has doubled since 2006, a strong indicator of the positive impact of the YEDF program channeled through MFIs.

Two of the more prominent emerging Micro-Finance Institutions, K-Rep and EQUITY Bank, were evaluated to determine the business services that they provide to youth. Both of these Banks, through support of YEDF and donor agencies, have developed information and training programs.

Equity Bank has a proactive approach to youth development, enabling youth entrepreneurs to access funding for their businesses. They have put in place a structured program through which they are prepared to consider loans for as little as Kshs1,000 for anyone who is generating regular income. Equity has developed an active education and outreach program to youth in which they claim that they do not look at size of business, but at what the business does.

Equity has lending programs for both individuals and groups. Equity supports each scheme with trained bank officers on the ground who examine the cash flow cycle of the group and individual, and set the repayment terms based on this.

K-Rep Development Agency (KDA) is a microfinance development organization which aims “to increase employment and income opportunities through the development and promotion of appropriate microfinance systems and products for low income people.”

Two key program activities of K-REP are:

- The micro leasing project – to enable low-income smallholder farmers acquire productive assets as a way of improving smallholder farm productivity and incomes.
- Youth saving and credit Project – a project that accesses credit to adolescent girls and boys living in slum areas of Nairobi to start micro-enterprises. (KIPRA, 2009).

The need for greater awareness creation about these micro-enterprise programs is essential for youth to be able to take advantage of these resources and use it to create employment/enterprise opportunities for themselves.

Youth Enterprise Organizations

There are also hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of organizations involved in support to youth enterprise, and a great many exemplary examples of youth enterprise. The following table provides a brief description of a sample of those we visited, interviewed, or learned of.

IV.3.C. Health and Well-Being

Introduction and Key Issues

A recurring message from youth on health and well-being was that health services were not easily accessible or friendly, and that youth health issues were too narrowly focused on sexual problems, including sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and HIV/AIDs. The vision of health and well-being that has developed from our assessment is that youth want, and believe in, a broad definition and approach to health, including environmental conditions, such as sanitation, clean water, and surroundings. It relates to healthy bodies and includes sports and recreation. It refers to social relationships that reflect security from threat, abuse, and violence in the community, and freedom from a drug and alcohol culture (especially in towns and cities). Youth want to live in a community that supports caring for one another, including intimacy and loving relationships, and provides mentors and leaders who have integrity, spiritual values, and lives of service. Finally, health refers to access for the treatment of illness and disease. Youth believe that good health is integrally connected to livelihoods, civic engagement, and education.

Youth face a number of obstacles in accessing health services, particularly location of services, the fees associated with services, and the lack of services that are youth friendly. Youth services and programs are largely sectoral rather than holistic. Youth find it difficult to go to clinics for sexual health services because they fear they will be stigmatized. Youth health is associated largely with sexually transmitted infections (STIs), and STIs imply sexual promiscuity and immorality. Thus, young people prefer to buy medicine over the counter rather than from these unfriendly settings (Kiboss, 2009). Yet, a lack of resources makes it difficult for them to access health services. As one participant in our youth focus groups put it, “We can’t feel healthy without some money in the pocket.”

Girls in particular note that their lives are blighted by the experience of sexual pressure, exploitation, and abuse. Abortion and teenage pregnancy are everyday occurrences, and girls speak of doctors who do abortions to make extra money on the side. Youth groups gave several case studies of girls who died having abortions and analyzed how teenage pregnancy starts a vicious downward spiral that leads to dropping out from school, running away from their communities, and often ending up in sex work as the only alternative left open. This, in turn, leaves girls very vulnerable to STIs and particularly HIV (Youth Voices, 2009). Even with the high rate of abortion, 23 percent of young women report having their first child before the age of 16 (DHS, 2003).

These issues are addressed through hundreds of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), agencies, and youth groups. The support and financing that Kenya has had in combating HIV/AIDS over the past 10 years has resulted in an enormous number of grassroots, regional, and national organizations devoted to raising awareness and taking action to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS and to mitigate its effects. Annex 5 includes a matrix listing of 80 of the better-known organizations providing services to youth in areas of reproductive health and HIV/AIDS.

Many of these groups have, over time, transformed into organizations providing a range of services, including public advocacy for policy reform, micro-enterprise, and community service and development. Four groups are profiled below which have been effective in organizing youth and providing health services. One of these groups, the Mathare Youth Sports Organization, has been highly successful working with youth in urban slums, including former gang members. This model, which is similar to the well-known Harlem RBI organization (<http://www.harlemrbi.org>), develops leadership and community service along with team sports, and has grown to be the largest youth sports league on the continent. Building on the outreach capacity of these groups providing health services to expand service provision to young people is a key part of any truly holistic approach to youth development.

Table 16 ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING YOUTH HEALTH AND WELL-BEING


ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION
KERICHO YOUTH CENTER	Kericho	A local youth-led center with services, including reproductive health counseling, treatment for STD and VCT for HIV (friendly, confidential), a cyber café, barber shop and hair salon, as micro-enterprises and training, with a center to hang out, with a pool table and information services.
AMPATH Academic Model for Providing Access to Health Care	North Rift, Western and Nyanza	An excellent case of an HIV/AIDs program that has organically grown to provide multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral system-based services, including economic enterprises, family preservation services, nutritional support, and psychosocial support. It is supported by Indiana University School of Medicine, Moi University School of Medicine, USAID, PEPFAR, and government through the Ministry of Health and MOYAS. AMPATH has a youth program with a significant percentage of youth clients incorporated into activities such as the management of the AMPATH farm and in the Imani workshop. A good number of them are also employed in the 19 AMPATH sites located throughout the Western Kenya region, working as trainers, caregivers, social workers, data managers, clerks, research assistants, and office assistants, among others. See:(http://www.iukenya.org/)
MATHARE YOUTH SPORTS ORGANIZATION	Mathare, (Nairobi) and now Africa wide	MYSA began in 1987 in Mathare and now is the largest youth sports league on the continent. While football (soccer) is central to MYSA’s work, MYSA has established an extensive program to empower youth living in slums and similarly inhospitable areas. MYSA effectively recruits young people, develops values like teamwork and community engagement, and provides opportunities for leaders to emerge and be recognized. All the while, being owned, led, and spread through these young leaders themselves. Community service programs are as essential as athletic competitions in everything from the way points are tallied to the decisions made by MYSA’s youth executive council. To succeed in the program, a young person must be active both on the field and off. In this way, MYSA has been successful in pairing the development of youth athletic

ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION
		programs with improvements in community infrastructure.
TUUNGANE	Nyanza	<p>Tuungane Youth Center is part of Tuungane Youth Projects, being implemented by Impact Research. The project is funded by PEPFAR and targets youth under 29 years old. Tuungane means “Lets’ Join Hands.” The project at the Youth Center initiates the following activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Trains the youth on life skills – life planning, peer counseling, education, and theater ➤ Offers health care including VCT (as well as home-based care and a mobile clinic), STD treatment, family planning, and circumcision procedures (out patient) ➤ Counsels and treats for alcohol and drug abuse ➤ Provides educative material and magazine development and distribution ➤ Provides recreational activities, including a TV room, board games, pool table, and theater <p>Because of the recreational and social activities that take place at Tuungane, young women feel comfortable going there, and then move to health counseling without parents or community members seeing them do this.</p> <p>Tuungane has a central youth center as well as cluster centers in Obunga, Bandani, Nyakach, and Chemelil, working with a total of 251 youth groups.</p> <p>The cluster centers located in communities, and using either church space, social halls, or leased property, offer similar facilities to the central facility, with the exception of daily health and VCT care. This is provided by a mobile clinic on a weekly basis.</p>
UZIMA FOUNDATION	Nairobi, Nyanza, Western in 1st 10 years, now national	<p>UZIMA Foundation was established in 1995 to provide a youth organization that promoted a holistic approach to healthy life styles, livelihood through enterprise development, and youth capacity to contribute to community development and well-being. It does this by establishing and developing youth groups at local, district, and provincial levels. By December 2005, UZIMA had 100 youth groups with approximately 20,000 members in Nairobi, Nyanza and Western Provinces.</p>

IV.3.D. Capacity Development: Education and Training

Introduction and Key Issues

Although Kenya's education system was intended to impart appropriate knowledge and skills to enhance self-employment, it continues with a rigid examination system that drives the curriculum and pedagogy. Such critical entrepreneurial capacities of problem-solving, group planning and action, managing organizational finances, and innovative and creative strategies for dealing with real-life




Tuungane Youth Center near Kisumu

⁴⁴ Youth centers can also work with local clinics or, in towns, hospitals, to improve the quality of their interaction with youth. One means of doing this is to train and hire youth health assistants who can serve both in-clinic and through outreach to youth groups. This approach has been undertaken at a number of hospitals (Nakuru Hospital Youth Wing is an example).

problems are not acknowledged or developed by the system. However, Kenya has succeeded in providing access to basic education, and with that a reasonable level of literacy, to the great majority of youth. As indicated below transition rates from primary to secondary school have continually increased this decade.

Figure 1 PRIMARY TO SECONDARY SCHOOL TRANSITION PROFILE IN KENYA (MOHEST)



However, the expectations that basic schooling engenders are frustrated by the lack of opportunity for further education and training and the lack of employment opportunities in the modern sector. Due to the high costs at the secondary school level, there are high dropout rates. Most youth leave school and technical institutes without necessary skills for generating enterprise and self-employment.

It should be noted that by 2008 the great majority of youth (70%) make the transition from primary to secondary school. For those who have left school, 37% males and 35% females dropped out of primary school, and, for both males and females, approximately 40% left school after completing primary (DHS 2003). The Principal causes of drop out are poverty, youth unable to afford to continue secondary or post-secondary school. Female drop out is also due to poverty (where poor families choose to educate boys in preference to girls), plus a heavy home work-load, early pregnancy (25%), harassment and abuse.

The country's training institutions also lack essential facilities, teaching staff, and technology to prepare students for the challenging market demands. Recently, sub-standard private training institutions have emerged in all urban areas to take advantage of high demand and shortage of training opportunities for youth seeking relevant technical, administrative, and management skills. In most cases, there is no linkage between the training institutions and either the formal

or informal (*jua kali*) sector. The youth trained in these institutions are not absorbed into the job market. Besides this, society's attitude towards *jua kali* informal micro-enterprise discourages many youth from venturing into it, as they do not want to be regarded as failures in life. (From National Youth Council Strategic Plan, 2006)

Formal TIVET Efforts

In 2008, the Ministry of Science and Technology produced a strategic plan that provides an excellent analysis of existing education and training provision related to industry and enterprises. The report reviewed the many past attempts to reform and realign the education system to support Kenya's economic development.

TABLE 17 KEY TECHNICAL, INDUSTRIAL, VOCATIONAL AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP TRAINING (TIVET) RECOMMENDATIONS, 1964 TO DATE IN KENYA
(Ministry of Science and Technology. Strategic Plan, 2008)

COMMISSION REPORT/ YEAR	KEY RECOMMENDATIONS AND EFFECTS	THRUSTS
Ominde Commission – 1964	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disintegration of education system • Fostering national unity • Creation of technical secondary schools • Establishment of first Christian Industrial Training Centre from 1965 by NCKK and stakeholders • Creation of Village Polytechnics from 1969, upgrading of Kenya and Mombasa Polytechnics and creation KTTC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social Integration • Establishment of skills development institutions
Ndegwa Commission – 1970	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expansion of education • Upgrading of trade schools to national technical secondary schools • Establishment of Harambee Institutes of Science and Technology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of adequate skills for employment and economic growth • Expansion of training opportunities to meet labor skills demand for growing economy
Mackay Commission – 1981	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expansion access to skills training • Establishment of Moi University in addition to UoN • Creation of the CHE to coordinate higher education, introduction of vocationalization technical subjects at all levels of education • Upgrading of technical secondary schools to Technical Training Institutes in 1986 • Upgrading of Eldoret Polytechnic • Upgrading of Kisumu Polytechnic and a National polytechnic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of adequate human capital for middle level and senior Management cadres • Empowering the TIVET graduates for self-reliance • Employment creation • Poverty alleviation • Social integration • Economic recovery and growth
Kamunge Commission – 1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost sharing • Introduction of entrepreneurship education alongside technical skills acquisition. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rationalizing • Financing of skills development provision • TIVET skills for competitive employment and job creation.
Koehn Commission – 1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Removal of vocational technical subjects from primary and secondary curriculum • Strengthening of TIVET institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rationalizing TIVET

While the formal primary and secondary education sector is still preparing a new sector plan, the new TIVET strategy lays out what it sees as the key challenges to be addressed to improve the preparation of youth for employment and enterprise in Kenya’s economy. These are as follows.

Box 6: CHALLENGES FOR TIVET EDUCATION PROGRAMS

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate access and equity • Low capacity for delivery • Low quality and relevance of skills • Fragmented delivery and inefficient use of resources • Lack of unifying policies and legal frameworks | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ineffective application of ICTs • Weak collaboration and linkages • Lack of effective research and development • Inadequate funding • HIV/Aids and other social issues |
|--|--|

The Strategy paper notes that government TIVET institutions are largely unable to cope with the current demand for skills training and are out of tune with modern technology. This gives rise to a thriving market for unregistered private colleges, most of which offer sub-standard training with unknown programs and qualifications. This coupled with the fact that some teaching personnel do not possess the right skills has led to a mismatch of the skills being imparted with the requirements of the industry.

The historical record of attempted reforms does not provide much confidence that the a new TIVET strategy will be successful in reforming and expanding government technical training institutions. There has been no shortage of policy initiatives to address the challenges identified in the 2008 Strategy. Yet these various policies and reforms have not, after 40 years, had much impact on the relevance and quality of formal technical and vocational education and training.

However, the Strategy breaks quite new ground, by focusing not so much on just training through formal institutions, but rather on the skills and competencies that are actually needed in the marketplace:


There is a radical transformation in education worldwide at all levels where education is now being measured in terms of standards, learning outcomes and competencies. Most jobs profiled either in job descriptions or in classified job advertisements, set out in great detail the specific competencies required for the job delineating all its three components, namely, knowledge, skill and attitude or in other words, the cognitive, psychomotor and the affective domains of learning.

It is this reality to which TIVET institutions in this country are directed to embrace the philosophy and practice of competency-based education, training and certification. This approach ensures that every certificate issued is a guarantee of the holder’s competence to perform at whatever given level of the occupation anywhere in the world. Qualification must equal competence and specific learning outcomes...The existing exam subject, syllabus-driven system is no longer tenable. The TIVET community advocates and is able to contribute significantly toward the creation of a more holistic learning outcomes-based

curricula based on standards derived from the workplace. This approach widens access to learning and provides a comprehensive profile of the graduate, not just the subjects he or she earned. (TIVET Strategy, 2008, p. 5)

Currently the only way that one can get a recognized certificate of knowledge and skills is through the formal education system. In formal technical and vocational institutions, there are currently approximately 155,000 students enrolled, of which 30 percent (or 46,500) are in private institutions. The most popular of these are the “colleges” offering training in computer usage, secretarial, and business skills that proliferate in town and urban settings. These institutions typically promise more than they deliver, and most graduates find that their newly acquired skills don’t lead to employment in the formal sector.

Figure 2 Enrollment in Formal TIVET Institutions, 2007 (MOHEST)



Non-Formal TIVET Programs

Our assessment discovered that there is a great deal of education and training taking place through thousands of youth organizations and NGOs, often directly linking practical skills with developing micro-enterprise. There is also an abundance of short-term training in areas of health and HIV/AIDS, peace and conflict resolution, organizational development, civic service, and livelihoods. The example of Youth Initiatives Kenya is interesting here. YIKE surveys active, registered youth groups in the Haruma and greater Nairobi slum areas, and each year selects 10 “applicants” to assist in developing micro-enterprise. They have now, after five years, worked

with 38 organizations. They provide a three-year training, mentorship, and support program, leading to a groups' arriving at "partner" status (10 have now done this). By which time, the groups are financially independent and credit worthy (having managed multiple loans—the final one being up to 250,000/=). This year, the enterprises being developed by the youth groups include the following:

- Tailoring, interior design and fabrics, jeans, and upholstery
- Traditional drums – marketed in hotels and overseas
- A cyber cafe
- Video youth hall for sports and music
- Event management (parties, weddings, public events)
- Pig raising

None of the training provided through these non-formal channels is recognized. Some of it, by youth accounts, is of the hit-and-run type, meaning a short course that raises expectations, but with no follow-up, leaving trainees disillusioned. However, it is evident that from some NFE training, youth gain highly relevant knowledge and skills that link directly to their actual work, as in the case of YIKE. Another source of NFE training comes from the micro-financing institutions, such as K-Rep and EQUITY Bank, which assists applicants to develop sound business plans and track their micro-finance supported income and expenditures and their loan repayments.

While there are 155,000 youth enrolled in formal technical and vocational institutions, there are far more engaged in on-the-job, non-formal and informal training, many of whom are gaining practical knowledge and skills that are more relevant than what are gained in formal institutions. Yet this non-formal training is fragmented, and like the private TIVET institutions, there is no quality control or certification process that assures that relevant competencies are acquired.

During our focus group discussions a large percentage of youth complained that most of the jobs provided through public works and KKV did not develop skills, provide training, nor, when skills were actually developed, did youth receive any certification that they had attained these skills. Since most of these employment opportunities were relatively short term (KKV being only three months), youth did not gain any long-term benefits or livelihood security from these opportunities.

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